-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

BRADLEY D. ATKINSON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

June 9, 2015 

v No. 324487 

Ingham Circuit Court 

Family Division 

AMBER L. KNAPP a/k/a AMBER L. 

ATKINSON, 

LC No. 08-001244-DM 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and DONOFRIO and BECKERING, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals by right the trial court’s dismissal of her motion to modify parenting 

time. Defendant sought to modify parenting time such that her daughter would attend school in 

the Grand Rapids area rather than continuing at her current school in Lansing. For the reasons 

provided herein, we affirm. 

 The parties were married in 2001 and had one child together. They divorced in 

November 2008 and both continued to reside in Lansing. At the time of divorce, plaintiff had 

parenting time from 6:00 p.m. Thursday through 6:00 p.m. Monday, and defendant had parenting 

time from 6:00 p.m. Monday through 6:00 p.m. Thursday. Defendant also had parenting time 

one weekend per month. Apparently the parties had by agreement modified their parenting-time 

schedules somewhat, which resulted in plaintiff having parenting time from 3:00 p.m. Friday 

through 3:00 p.m. Tuesday. 

 When the child was old enough, she was enrolled in preschool in Lansing. Both parties 

eventually remarried, and in June 2011 defendant and her husband moved to a community near 

Grand Rapids. In September 2012, the child began attending elementary school in Lansing. 

 Defendant moved for a change in parenting time in September 2012, arguing that there 

had been a “change in circumstances,” predicated on both parties remarrying, defendant moving 

to Grand Rapids with her new husband, the child developing ties in Grand Rapids, and defendant 

continuing to provide all transportation to parenting-time exchanges. Defendant argued it was in 

her daughter’s best interests to enroll in kindergarten in Grand Rapids and to remain with her 

during the week during the school year. The motion was referred for conciliation, and it was 

recommended that the child remain enrolled in Lansing schools because she had an established 
-2- 

environment there in which she was thriving. Both parties objected, and a referee hearing was 

held. The referee found that defendant presented sufficient evidence to establish the requisite 

change of circumstances but also found that an established custodial environment existed with 

both parties and that the proposed change would alter that custodial environment. The referee 

determined that defendant failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that granting 

defendant’s motion would be in the child’s best interests. 

 Following objections, the trial court initially declined to hold a de novo review, but did so 

following remand from this Court. See Atkinson v Knapp, unpublished opinion per curiam of the 

Court of Appeals, issued December 17, 2013 (Docket No. 316510). On remand, the court found 

that defendant had not met her burden to show a proper cause or a change in circumstances to 

reopen the issue of custody. Alternatively, the court found that defendant failed to show by clear 

and convincing evidence that a change would be in the child’s best interests. Defendant now 

appeals. 

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

 “Orders concerning parenting time must be affirmed on appeal unless the 

trial court’s findings were against the great weight of the evidence, the court 

committed a palpable abuse of discretion, or the court made a clear legal error on 

a major issue.” Pickering v Pickering, 268 Mich App 1, 5; 706 NW2d 835 

(2005). Under the great weight of the evidence standard, this Court should not 

substitute its judgment on questions of fact unless the facts clearly preponderate in 

the opposite direction. Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 473; 730 

NW2d 262 (2007). In child custody cases, “[a]n abuse of discretion exists when 

the trial court’s decision is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that 

it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion 

or bias.” Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). Clear 

legal error occurs “when the trial court errs in its choice, interpretation, or 

application of the existing law.” Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 323; 729 

NW2d 533 (2006). [Shade v Wright, 291 Mich App 17, 20-21; 805 NW2d 1 

(2010).] 

II. PROPER CAUSE OR CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES 

 Defendant first argues that the trial court employed the incorrect standard in determining 

whether she showed the necessary proper cause or change in circumstances to modify parenting 

time. 

 A trial court’s determination of child custody and parenting time serve different purposes. 

Id. at 28. Child custody determinations are primarily concerned with “the stability of the child’s 

environment,” while “the focus of parenting time is to foster a strong relationship between the 

child and the child’s parents.” Id. at 28-29. In either case, a trial court may modify or amend 

“its previous judgments or orders” but only for “proper cause shown or because of change of 

circumstances.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). 
-3- 

 This Court has explained that depending on whether the requested change to parenting 

time affects a child’s established custodial environment,1

 differing standards are used to 

determine whether there was a sufficient proper cause or change in circumstances. Shade, 291 

Mich App at 25-27. 

 “If a change in parenting time results in a change in the established custodial 

environment, then the Vodvarka framework is appropriate.” Id. at 27. In Vodvarka, this Court 

determined that “to establish “proper cause” necessary to revisit a custody order, a movant must 

prove . . . the existence of an appropriate ground for legal action to be taken by the trial court. 

The appropriate ground(s) should be relevant to at least one of the twelve statutory best interest 

factors, and must be of such magnitude to have a significant effect on the child’s well-being.” 

Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512. 

 But if the change in parenting time would not affect the child’s established custodial 

environment, then a less stringent standard is used. Shade, 291 Mich App at 28. 

The Court in Shade declined to precisely define what proper cause or change of 

circumstances would be sufficient to warrant a change in parenting time, but 

nevertheless determined that the types of normal life-changes experienced by the 

child in its case were sufficient to warrant modification of the parenting time, 

even though those changes would be insufficient to establish grounds for a change 

in custody under the definitions applied in Vodvarka. [Kaeb v Kaeb, ___ Mich 

App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 319574, issued March 12, 2015), slip op, p 

6, citing Shade, 291 Mich App at 31.] 

 Thus, the first task for a court is to determine whether any established custodial 

environment exists and whether the proposed change in parenting time would affect that 

environment. See Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich 81, 92; 782 NW2d 480 (2010). Here, the trial 

court found that the child had an established custodial environment with both parents, and 

defendant does not challenge this finding on appeal. But, by also requiring defendant to show by 

clear and convincing evidence that a modification is in the child’s best interests, the trial court 

also implicitly found that defendant’s proposed change in parenting time would alter the 

established custodial environment, see Part III, infra. This finding is not against the great weight 

of evidence. Defendant claims that the trial court’s failure to clearly articulate that the requested 

change would alter the custodial environment requires a remand. We do not agree because this 

Court may rely on “a finding [that] can easily and clearly be drawn from the trial court’s written 

opinion.” Powery v Wells, 278 Mich App 526, 530; 752 NW2d 47 (2008). 

 

1

 “The custodial environment of a child is established if over an appreciable time the child 

naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of 

life, and parental comfort. The age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of 

the custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship shall also be considered.” MCL 

722.27(1)(c). 
-4- 

 Where the parties have nearly equal parenting time, a change in parenting time that will 

no longer continue this arrangement may change the child’s established custodial environment. 

Id. For example, when a change in parenting time changes the status quo by relegating a party 

“to the role of a ‘weekend’ parent,” a change in the custodial environment may result. Id. at 528. 

 Under the parenting-time schedule adopted at the time of divorce, plaintiff maintained 

near equal parenting time with defendant, including parenting time on some school days and 

nights. If the court granted defendant’s motion, plaintiff would no longer have weekday 

parenting time and would see his daughter only on weekends or during school breaks. As the 

referee concluded, plaintiff would become a “weekend” parent. It is not that having parenting 

time only on the weekends is inherently inferior. But when the custodial environment is 

characterized by parental involvement during a child’s weekdays, a time that revolves around the 

child’s schooling and all that entails, eliminating a parent’s involvement in those circumstances 

constitutes an important change in the environment. The court’s finding on this matter is not 

against the great weight of evidence, nor does it constitute an error of law. 

 Therefore, given that defendant’s request to change parenting time would alter the child’s 

established custodial environment, defendant had to establish a proper cause or change in 

circumstances as described in Vodvarka. Again, defendant argued that there had been a change 

of circumstances because both parties remarried, defendant moved, the child had developed ties 

in west Michigan, and defendant provided transportation to parenting-time exchanges. These are 

insufficient to establish a change of circumstances under Vodvarka. First, a remarriage and 

move are normal life changes following a divorce. The subsequent transportation changes and 

developing new ties are also normal changes in the life of a child. Indeed, it should be 

anticipated that a child would develop new ties in a changed setting. Second, defendant has not 

shown that the changes will have “a significant effect on the child’s well-being.” Vodvarka, 259 

Mich App at 513 (emphasis in original). Defendant’s argument is one of convenience. Although 

an hour commute to school certainly is not ideal, defendant has not shown, or even argued, that a 

lengthy commute would have a significant effect on the child. 

 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that defendant 

failed to establish a proper cause or change in circumstances, in accordance with Vodvarka, to 

alter the parenting-time arrangement. 

III. BEST-INTEREST FACTORS 

 As the trial court did below, we alternatively address the best-interest factors. 

 Defendant first argues that the trial court incorrectly employed the elevated clear-andconvincing burden of proof for the best interests instead of a preponderance of the evidence 

standard. This was not error. If a proposed modification to parenting time changes the 

established custodial environment, the moving party must show by clear and convincing 

evidence that it is in the child’s best interests. Pierron, 486 Mich at 92; Shade, 291 Mich App at 

23. As already discussed, defendant’s proposed change to the parenting time would have 

affected the child’s established custodial environment. Thus, assuming arguendo that defendant 

did show a proper cause or change in circumstances, she needed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the change was in the child’s best interests. 
-5- 

 MCL 722.23 provides as follows: 

 As used in this act, “best interests of the child” means the sum total of the 

following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court: 

 (a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the 

parties involved and the child. 

 (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child 

love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the 

child in his or her religion or creed, if any. 

 (c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the 

child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and 

permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material 

needs. 

 (d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory 

environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity. 

 (e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial 

home or homes. 

 (f) The moral fitness of the parties involved. 

 (g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved. 

 (h) The home, school, and community record of the child. 

 (i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child 

to be of sufficient age to express preference. 

 (j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and 

encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and 

the other parent or the child and the parents. 

 (k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed 

against or witnessed by the child. 

 (l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular 

child custody dispute. 

 The court considered the best-interest factors. The court found that factors (i), (k), and (l) 

were not relevant. The court explained that it was not considering factors (k) or (l) because there 

were no allegations of domestic violence. Regarding factor (i), the court “determined that this 

seven-year[-]old child’s age and maturity to provide a reasonable preference was not relevant to 

these proceedings”. 
-6- 

 The court found that seven of the factors—(a) (love and emotional ties), (b) (religion), 

and (c) (food, clothing, and medical care), (e) (family unit permanence), (f) (moral fitness), and 

(g) (parent mental and physical health), and (j) (willingness to facilitate a relationship with the 

other parent)—weighed equally between the parties. 

 The court found that factor (d) (time in a stable environment) weighed in favor of 

plaintiff because the current parenting time had been used for over three years and it was “in the 

best interest of this child to maintain continuity.” Similarly, the court found that factor (h) (home 

and school record of the child) also weighed in favor of plaintiff because the court found that the 

child primarily has resided in Lansing, was excelling in a Lansing school, and has friends and is 

engaged in the Lansing community. 

 As for the court’s handling of the statutory best-interest factors, defendant does not argue 

that the factors the court considered were incorrectly determined. Nor does she argue that other 

factors should have been weighed in her favor. Her sole argument with respect to these factors is 

that the court erred in not considering the child’s preference, factor (i), when analyzing the bestinterest factors. In making this argument, she does not assert that the child had a preference in 

favor of defendant, or, more importantly, that it would have tipped the balance in her favor. 

 Where a child has sufficient age to express a preference, the trial judge must consider her 

preference. Kubicki v Sharpe, 306 Mich App 525, 545; 858 NW2d 57 (2014), citing Bowers v 

Bowers, 190 Mich App 51, 55; 475 NW2d 394 (1991). The referee spoke with the child and 

considered the preference she expressed. In contrast, the trial court stated that factor (i) was “not 

relevant” given that she was seven years old. When the proposed change would modify the 

established custodial environment, “the trial court must consider all the best-interest factors 

because a case in which the proposed change would modify the custodial environment is 

essentially a change-of-custody case.” Pierron, 486 Mich at 92-93. “Children of six . . . years of 

age are old enough to have their preferences given some weight in a custody dispute, especially 

where there was a prior custody arrangement.” Bowers, 190 Mich App at 55-56 (emphasis 

added). Given the court’s conclusion that the requested change would operate to change the 

custodial environment, it should have considered the child’s preference. 

 However, reversal is not warranted where the child’s preference, if she had one, “would 

not have changed the trial court’s ruling” on the motion. Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App 

149, 182-183; 729 NW2d 256 (2006). Again, defendant has not argued that if the court had 

considered the child’s preference, the best-interests determination would have changed. In any 

event, it is clear that even if the child did express a preference for altering the parenting-time 

plan in accordance with defendant’s request, this sole factor in defendant’s favor in no way 

would be enough now to show that the change is, overall, in the child’s best interests. Notably, 

defendant did not challenge the court’s findings with respect to the other factors, in which seven 

were deemed equal between the parties, two were in plaintiff’s favor, and zero were in 

defendant’s favor. Even assuming this factor (i) to be in defendant’s favor, it is dubious that 

defendant could show that the change in parenting time was in the child’s best interests. While it 

is merely highly doubtful that this one factor in defendant’s favor would tip the overall balance 

of all the best-interests factors in defendant’s favor with a preponderance of the evidence 

standard, it is a forgone conclusion that it would not tip the balance in favor of defendant using 

the appropriate clear and convincing standard. 
-7- 

 In sum, if the trial court was going to evaluate the best-interest factors, it should have 

interviewed the child for factor (i). But this deficiency is of no consequence because it is clear 

that the court would not have reached a different conclusion had the court made such an inquiry. 

Id. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan 

/s/ Pat M. Donofrio 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering