WASHINGTON 

METROPOLITAN 

AREA TRANSIT 

AUTHORITY

Improved Planning of 

Future Rehabilitation 

Projects Could 

Prevent Limitations

Identified with 

SafeTrack

Report to Congressional Requesters

March 2017

GAO-17-348

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-348, a report to 

congressional requesters

March 2017

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA 

TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Improved Planning of Future Rehabilitation Projects 

Could Prevent Limitations Identified with SafeTrack

What GAO Found

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s (WMATA) planning of 

SafeTrack did not fully align with leading project management practices. While 

WMATA generally followed leading practices to coordinate with stakeholders, it 

did not comprehensively collect and use data on the condition of its assets, 

analyze project alternatives, and develop a project management plan before 

starting work. WMATA did not follow these practices because it believed it 

needed to start work immediately to address critical safety issues. 

• Although WMATA inspected its track assets when planning SafeTrack, those 

inspections were not comprehensive and did not collect detailed data on the 

condition of all track infrastructure, such as all “interlockings,” where trains 

cross from one track to another. As a result, WMATA’s decision makers may 

not have used sufficient information to develop project objectives and to 

properly prioritize SafeTrack work.

• Though WMATA developed three alternatives for SafeTrack, it did not 

determine the costs and impacts of each alternative, or assess them to 

determine which approach may have resulted in greater efficiencies, lower 

costs, or less disruption for riders and local jurisdictions.

• Before WMATA began SafeTrack, it lacked a comprehensive project 

management plan, which is a key tool to ensure a project is completed ontime, within-budget, and according to quality standards.

WMATA does not have a policy that requires, and includes relevant procedures 

for how to carry out, these planning activities for large-scale rehabilitation 

projects. Without such a policy and procedures, WMATA lacks a framework to 

plan future rehabilitation projects so that they achieve their objectives.

WMATA’s implementation of SafeTrack generally aligned with leading project 

management practices. Specifically, WMATA officials collected information on

the work performed and the condition of assets repaired during SafeTrack.

WMATA officials also collect lessons learned during and after each surge, and 

use those lessons during subsequent maintenance and planning efforts. 

Additionally, WMATA developed a new organization-wide quality control and 

assurance framework and is implementing it for the first time through SafeTrack. 

The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has used safety inspections and other 

tools to oversee SafeTrack and direct WMATA to undertake safety-critical work. 

FTA has relied on two different authorities to oversee SafeTrack: (1) FTA’s public 

transportation safety oversight authority, and (2) its project management 

oversight authority. Prior to the start of SafeTrack and during the project, FTA 

conducted safety inspections and directed WMATA to make repairs to reduce 

the risk of smoke and fires on the rail system. After SafeTrack work began and 

estimated project costs exceeded $100 million, FTA determined SafeTrack to be 

a major capital project, triggering the statutory requirement that WMATA prepare 

a project management plan. WMATA did not submit its project management plan 

until 4 months into SafeTrack. FTA found the plan lacked sufficient detail, and 

WMATA told GAO it is working to improve the plan.

View GAO-17-348. For more information, 

contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or 

goldsteinm@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

Recent inquiries into WMATA’s 

Metrorail system have revealed a 

range of serious safety issues. In 

response to some of these issues, as 

well as a backlog of track 

maintenance, WMATA announced in 

May 2016 that it was undertaking 

SafeTrack, a large-scale rehabilitation 

project. The SafeTrack project is 

overseen by FTA.

GAO was asked to review a range of 

safety and oversight issues regarding 

WMATA. This report examines the 

extent to which WMATA’s (1) planning 

and (2) implementation of SafeTrack 

was consistent with leading project 

management practices as well as (3) 

the steps taken by FTA to oversee 

SafeTrack. 

GAO reviewed documentation on 

WMATA’s planning and project 

implementation, and FTA’s oversight of 

SafeTrack. GAO also interviewed 

officials from WMATA, FTA, and local 

jurisdictions, and compared WMATA’s 

planning and implementation of 

SafeTrack to leading project 

management practices developed by 

professional organizations.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that WMATA 

develop a policy that requires and 

includes procedures for it to, prior to 

starting future large-scale rehabilitation 

projects: (1) use asset data to develop 

project objectives; (2) analyze

alternatives; and (3) develop a project 

management plan for those projects 

that may not be designated as major 

capital projects. WMATA agreed with 

GAO’s findings and said that it is 

working to address the 

recommendations.
Page i GAO-17-348 WMATA

Letter 1

Background 4

WMATA Did Not Fully Follow Leading Practices When Planning 

SafeTrack Because It Wanted to Address Safety Issues 

Immediately, but Future Projects Could Benefit from Additional 

Planning 12

WMATA Is Using Several Leading Practices to Implement 

SafeTrack and Improve the Quality of Completed Work 21

FTA Has Used Inspections and Other Tools to Direct WMATA to 

Make Safety Repairs and Oversee SafeTrack 29

Conclusions 33

Recommendations 34

Agency Comments 34

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Transportation 37

Appendix II Comments from the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 38

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 41

Tables

Table 1: Selected Planned and Actual Work Completed under 

SafeTrack, through December 2016 24

Table 2: Discrepancies Identified by WMATA Quality Officials 

through Surge 8, as of September 16, 2016 28

Figures

Figure 1: Select Safety Incidents since 2015 on Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Metrorail System, 

and Key Responses 5

Figure 2: Map of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s 

Metrorail System and SafeTrack Surge Events 7

Figure 3: Segment of Metrorail Track 23

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-348 WMATA

Abbreviations

COSO Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway

Commission

CTA Chicago Transit Authority

DOT Department of Transportation

FAST Act Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act

FTA Federal Transit Administration

FWSO FTA-WMATA Safety Oversight

MAP-21 Act Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act 

MBTA Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

NYCT New York City Transit

OIG Office of Inspector General

PATH Port Authority Trans-Hudson

PMBOK Project Management Body of Knowledge

PMI Project Management Institute

PRIIA Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act

QICO Quality Assurance, Internal Compliance, and Oversight

QMS Quality Management System

TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program

TQIP Track Quality Improvement Program

WMATA Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

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Page 1 GAO-17-348 WMATA

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

March 14, 2017

Congressional Requesters

In May 2016, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 

(WMATA) announced it was undertaking SafeTrack, a large-scale 

rehabilitation project for its rail infrastructure.1 Recent inquiries into 

WMATA’s rail system—the nation’s second-busiest—by the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and others have revealed a range of 

serious safety issues in WMATA’s Metrorail system. In response to some 

of these issues, as well as its backlog of track work, WMATA intends, 

through SafeTrack, to complete three years of track infrastructure 

rehabilitation in approximately one year. According to WMATA, SafeTrack 

is a unique effort, designed to address urgent safety issues with railroad 

track assets. SafeTrack will be funded by federal grants, as well as 

contributions from the three local jurisdictions that are signatories to the 

interstate compact governing WMATA—the District of Columbia, 

Maryland, and Virginia.2 WMATA’s planning and implementation of 

SafeTrack is overseen by the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) 

Federal Transit Administration (FTA).

You asked us to review various safety and oversight issues at WMATA, 

including how SafeTrack was planned and implemented. We examined:

1. The extent to which WMATA’s planning of the SafeTrack project was 

consistent with leading project management practices; 

2. The extent to which WMATA’s implementation of SafeTrack was 

consistent with these practices; and,

3. The steps that were taken by FTA to oversee SafeTrack.

To address our first two research questions on SafeTrack’s planning and 

implementation, we examined documentation on how WMATA planned 

 1

Throughout this report, we refer to “large-scale rehabilitation projects” as projects that 

involve extended disruption to normal revenue service for the maintenance or replacement 

of transit infrastructure.

2

Interstate compacts are legal agreements between two or more states that are designed 

to resolve problems or concerns that transcend state lines. Such compacts enable states 

to act jointly and collectively to devise solutions for matters that are beyond the authority 

of an individual state but which are not within the immediate purview of the federal 

government.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-348 WMATA

SafeTrack, including the alternative plans it developed, as well as how it 

carried out work for SafeTrack. We also examined FTA’s project 

construction guidelines and its quality management guidelines for their 

applicability to SafeTrack work. We also examined WMATA 

documentation on the quality control and quality assurance frameworks in 

place for SafeTrack as well as the results of WMATA’s own SafeTrack 

quality reviews. We also obtained and summarized data from WMATA on 

work tasks planned for and completed during SafeTrack. Based on 

interviews with WMATA officials, we determined that these data were 

sufficiently reliable for our purpose of summarizing work planned and 

completed to date under SafeTrack. Further, we examined the results of 

FTA’s inspections of WMATA track infrastructure. We also reviewed 

recent investigations and studies regarding WMATA, including those from 

the American Public Transportation Association, DOT’s Office of 

Inspector General (OIG), NTSB, and WMATA’s OIG.

To further address our first two research objectives, we interviewed 

officials from WMATA and other organizations. Specifically, we 

interviewed WMATA officials about actions they took to plan and 

implement SafeTrack. We also interviewed officials from the DOT’s OIG, 

FTA, NTSB, and WMATA’s OIG about their work with WMATA and 

perspectives on SafeTrack. Additionally, we interviewed officials from 

local jurisdictions (the District of Columbia; Montgomery County, 

Maryland; and Fairfax County, Virginia) about the coordination and 

communication between them and WMATA officials concerning 

SafeTrack. We also interviewed officials from the Chicago Transit 

Authority (CTA), Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), 

New York City Transit (NYCT, part of the Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority), and Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH, part of the Port 

Authority of New York and New Jersey) about their experiences planning 

and implementing large-scale rehabilitation projects. We selected these 

transit agencies based on their similarity to WMATA in terms of total 

ridership, heavy rail track and passenger miles, as well as whether they 

have carried out or are currently undertaking large-scale rehabilitation 

projects akin to SafeTrack. In selecting these transit agencies we also 

considered geographic diversity and the views of the American Public 

Transportation Association officials on WMATA’s “peers.” Though we 

believe these transit agencies provided relevant and diverse perspectives 

on carrying out transit rehabilitation projects, the information gathered 

from these entities is not generalizable to all transit agencies. We did not 

evaluate or compare the number or type of safety incidents at these other 

transit systems to those at WMATA.
Page 3 GAO-17-348 WMATA

For the first two research questions, we compared WMATA’s planning 

and implementation of SafeTrack to leading project management 

practices identified by the Project Management Institute (PMI) in its A 

Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® 

Guide),

3 and by the Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) in its 

Report 157, which focuses on rehabilitation of transit assets.4 We 

compared WMATA’s SafeTrack project to those leading practices 

identified by PMI and TCRP that we determined were most relevant to the 

planning and implementation of large-scale rehabilitation projects, such 

as SafeTrack. We consider these documents to be relevant summaries of 

leading project management practices for transit agencies and 

appropriate to large-scale rehabilitation projects, such as SafeTrack.

Further, WMATA indicated to us that the PMI PMBOK® Guide and the 

TCRP report are appropriate references for the future state of good repair 

work. We also evaluated WMATA’s efforts based on internal control 

frameworks published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 

the Treadway Commission (COSO), which WMATA uses as criteria for its 

internal control evaluations.5

To address our third research objective on FTA’s oversight of SafeTrack, 

we examined FTA and WMATA documents and interviewed various 

officials. We examined: (1) FTA documents related to its oversight of 

major capital projects and SafeTrack specifically, (2) relevant federal 

statues and FTA regulations governing transit agencies and projects, and 

(3) WMATA documents related to FTA’s oversight of SafeTrack.

Additionally, we interviewed FTA and WMATA officials about FTA’s 

oversight of WMATA and SafeTrack.

 3

Project Management Institute, Inc., A Guide to the Project Management Body of 

Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), Fifth Edition, 2013. PMBOK is a trademark of Project 

Management Institute, Inc. PMI is a not-for-profit association that provides global 

standards for, among other things, project and program management. These standards 

are utilized worldwide and provide guidance on how to manage various aspects of 

projects, programs, and portfolios.

4

TCRP, State of Good Repair: Prioritizing the Rehabilitation and Replacement of Existing 

Capital Assets and Evaluating the Implications for Transit, Report 157 (Washington, D.C.: 

2012). The FTA sponsored this report.

5

Internal control involves the plans, methods, policies, and procedures that an entity uses 

to fulfill its mission, strategic plan, goals, and objectives. COSO guidance has been 

adopted as the generally accepted framework for internal control and is recognized as the 

standard against which organizations can measure the effectiveness of their systems of 

internal control. See COSO, Internal Control – Integrated Framework (New York: 

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2013).
Page 4 GAO-17-348 WMATA

We conducted this performance audit from August 2016 to March 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

WMATA’s Metrorail system has experienced a variety of serious safety 

incidents in recent years (see fig. 1 below). On June 22, 2009, one 

Metrorail train struck the rear of a second train stopped near the Fort 

Totten station on the Red Line, resulting in nine deaths and over 50 

injuries. The NTSB report on the incident found that WMATA failed to 

institutionalize, and employ system-wide, an enhanced track-circuit 

verification test procedure that was developed following near-collisions in 

2005. NTSB also found evidence of an ineffective safety culture within 

WMATA.6 More recently, WMATA has experienced smoke and fire 

incidents involving the electrical cables and other components supporting 

its third-rail system. On January 12, 2015, a Metrorail train stopped after 

encountering heavy smoke in the tunnel between the L’Enfant Plaza 

station and the Potomac River Bridge on the Yellow Line caused by 

electrical arcing7 resulting from a short circuit on the third rail8 power 

system, causing one passenger’s death and numerous injuries. In a 

report on this incident, the NTSB again found a lack of a safety culture 

 6

NTSB, Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail Trains 

Near Fort Totten Station, NTSB/RAR-10/02. According to NTSB, organizations with 

effective safety cultures are generally described as having a commitment to safety that 

permeates the entire organization; that is, senior management demonstrates a 

commitment to safety and a concern for hazards that are shared by employees at all 

levels within the organization.

7

According to an FTA report, electrical arcing occurs when high voltage current leaks from 

a power cable and flows along track component surfaces contaminated with carbon dust, 

rust particles, dirt, and grime, to find a path to the ground. Electrical arcing can burn 

cables and track components, cause flashovers and explosions, damage railcar 

components, and ignite fires to debris located in track beds. The smoke from these 

events, especially in the tunnel environment, may also expose passengers, employees,

and emergency responders to potentially toxic fumes. DOT, Final Report: Traction Power 

Electrification System Investigation Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 

(Washington, DC, Dec. 9, 2016).

8

The third rail is a high voltage rail bar along the track that carries electrical energy to run 

the trains on that track.

Background
Page 5 GAO-17-348 WMATA

within WMATA.9 NTSB specifically noted deficiencies in WMATA’s 

response to smoke reports, tunnel ventilation, railcar ventilation, 

emergency response, as well as the oversight and management of 

WMATA. In November 2015, WMATA’s new General Manager began his 

tenure and initiated a variety of efforts to address WMATA’s Metrorail 

safety issues. On March 14, 2016, an electrical fire occurred near the 

McPherson Square station involving the same kind of power cable that 

caused the L’Enfant Plaza smoke incident. Following this fire, WMATA 

closed the entire Metrorail system for a day for emergency inspections of 

the system’s third-rail power cables.

Figure 1: Select Safety Incidents since 2015 on Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Metrorail System, and Key 

Responses

 9

NTSB, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority L’Enfant Plaza Station Electrical 

Arcing and Smoke Accident, NTSB/RAR-16/01.
Page 6 GAO-17-348 WMATA

On May 19, 2016, WMATA announced SafeTrack, “a massive, 

comprehensive, holistic effort to address safety recommendations and 

rehabilitate the Metrorail system on an accelerated basis by expanding all 

available maintenance windows.” The primary focus of SafeTrack is 

rehabilitating Metrorail’s track infrastructure by replacing over 45,000 

crossties, which are the wooden beams that lay across the railroad bed 

on above ground sections of the track, and 35,000 fasteners, which 

secure rails directly to concrete on underground or aerial sections of the 

track where wooden crossties are not used. SafeTrack is being carried 

out through a series of “surges” that involve intensive work on specific 

areas of track that are either shut down to normal traffic or have only one 

of the two tracks open, a type of operation known as “single tracking” (see 

fig. 2 below). SafeTrack also involves the reduction of operating hours to 

allow additional work to be carried out overnight and on weekends in nonsurge areas. Although the primary focus of SafeTrack is track assets, 

WMATA is also using the extended outages to address other safety 

concerns, such as concerns regarding power cables and other electrical 

components raised by NTSB and FTA. According to WMATA’s initial 

announcement, the project was designed to bring Metrorail’s track 

infrastructure to a “state of good repair,” which WMATA defines as the 

condition at which individual railroad assets can be sustained at ongoing, 

annual replacement rates under normal maintenance cycles.10

 10For example, WMATA’s definition for a state of good repair for track crossties is when 

no more than 15,000 ties need to be replaced in a given year, which is the amount

WMATA can generally replace in normal maintenance cycles each year. FTA published 

its definition of state of good repair in its Transit Asset Management final rule in July 2016, 

which became effective October 1, 2016. FTA defines “state of good repair” as “the 

condition in which a capital asset is able to operate at a full level of performance.” 49 

C.F.R. § 625.5. FTA’s definition of state of good repair applies to WMATA’s capital assets

now and in the future, though FTA officials told us the SafeTrack project is not impacted 

by the rule since it was already established as a project prior to the rule’s publication.
Page 7 GAO-17-348 WMATA

Figure 2: Map of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Metrorail System and SafeTrack Surge Events
Page 8 GAO-17-348 WMATA

WMATA estimates that SafeTrack will cost approximately $120 million.11

According to WMATA and FTA officials, these costs will be covered by 

about $48 million in federal funding, which includes two FTA formula 

grants12 as well as funding authorized by the Passenger Rail Investment 

and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA).

13 The PRIIA funding is also 

matched by over $30 million in local funds from the three jurisdictions that 

help fund WMATA. Beyond the almost $80 million in federal and local 

matching funds, SafeTrack will require an additional $40 million in fiscal 

year 2017 funding; according to WMATA, the sources of this funding are 

yet to be finalized. Although SafeTrack was not specifically included in 

WMATA’s approved fiscal year 2016 or 2017 budgets, WMATA amended 

and its board approved its fiscal year 2017 budget, in November 2016, to 

include additional funding for the project. WMATA’s track rehabilitation 

projects and other capital investments are made through a 6-year Capital 

Improvement Program, with the current version covering fiscal years 2017 

through 2022.

Other transit agencies with aging infrastructure like WMATA have also 

undertaken, or plan to carry out, large-scale rehabilitation projects that 

involve extended disruptions to normal revenue service. For example, in 

2013 CTA shut down the southern half of one of its lines for 5 months to 

completely rebuild the railroad and renovate rail stations on the branch.

Additionally, NYCT is planning to shut down the Canarsie subway tunnel 

connecting Manhattan and Brooklyn to facilitate extensive repairs from 

damage caused by Hurricane Sandy in 2012. Similarly, the Port Authority 

of New York and New Jersey is rehabilitating tunnels used by its PATH 

service between New Jersey and Manhattan and installing positive train 

control technology, which can reduce the risk of accidental collision 

between trains on the same track.

In recent years, FTA has been provided with an expanded role in 

overseeing public transportation safety within WMATA and in other transit 

agencies. The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP21) expanded FTA’s safety oversight role over public transportation 

systems and established the public transportation safety program, 

 11This $120 million estimate does not include non-track work completed during SafeTrack, 

such as repairs to WMATA’s third-rail, electrification system.

12The two FTA formula grant programs are the Urbanized Area Formula Grants, 49 U.S.C. 

§ 5307, and the State of Good Repair Grants, 49 U.S.C. § 5337.

13Pub. L. No. 1110-432, Div. B., 112 Stat. 4907 (2008).
Page 9 GAO-17-348 WMATA

providing FTA with new authority to inspect and audit a public 

transportation system.14 This new authority also required FTA to 

promulgate regulations requiring states to establish state safety oversight 

programs and agencies for states’ public transportation systems.15

Additionally, MAP-21 provided FTA with more safety oversight authority 

and more options for enforcement when transit agencies were found to be 

out of compliance with federal safety laws.16 For example, in response to 

concerns regarding WMATA’s safety performance over the last decade, 

FTA conducted a Safety Management Inspection of the WMATA rail and 

bus systems.17 The Safety Management Inspection evaluated WMATA’s 

operations and maintenance programs, safety management capabilities, 

and organizational structures. FTA found that, in recent years, WMATA 

has implemented new management initiatives and programs to address 

safety concerns, but organizational deficiencies and operational concerns 

continue to limit WMATA’s effectiveness in recognizing and resolving 

safety issues. For example, FTA found that WMATA work crews do not 

have sufficient access to the rail right-of-way to perform critical inspection, 

testing, and maintenance activities. FTA also found serious safety lapses 

in the rail operations control center. More broadly, FTA also reported that 

in key areas, WMATA’s organization is not effectively balancing safetycritical operations and maintenance activities with the demand for 

passenger service.

In response to WMATA safety incidents, FTA assumed temporary and 

direct safety oversight of WMATA in October 2015. Specifically, as part of 

its investigation of the January 2015 smoke and fire incident near the 

L’Enfant station, NTSB found that the Tri-State Oversight Committee’s18

safety oversight of WMATA was deficient and recommended that DOT 

seek an amendment to federal law so that the Federal Railroad 

Administration within DOT could exercise regulatory oversight over the 

 14Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 20021, 126 Stat. 405, 709 (2012) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5329).

1549 U.S.C. § 5329(e)(3)-(4).

1649 U.S.C. § 5329(f)-(g).

17FTA, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Safety Management Inspection, 

June 17, 2015.

18The Tri-State Oversight Committee was created in 1997 by state-level agencies in the 

District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia to oversee rail safety and security at WMATA. 

Later, the Tri-State Oversight Committee became the state safety oversight agency 

required by the public transportation safety program. 49 U.S.C. § 5329(e)(4). 
Page 10 GAO-17-348 WMATA

WMATA rail system.19 DOT agreed that the Tri-State Oversight 

Committee was deficient and ineffective, but disagreed with NTSB that 

the most urgent and effective solution was to transfer safety oversight of 

WMATA’s rail transit system to the Federal Railroad Administration.20

Instead, in October 2015, DOT directed FTA to take direct and temporary 

control of safety oversight at WMATA from the Tri-State Oversight 

Committee.21 To perform direct safety oversight of WMATA, FTA 

established the FTA WMATA Safety Oversight (FWSO) office, which is 

currently comprised of FTA personnel, inspectors on detail from FRA, and 

contractor support staff, according to FTA officials. In February 2016, FTA 

found the Tri-State Oversight Committee was incapable of enforcing its 

safety findings and thus, using new authority provided by the Fixing 

Americas Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, FTA determined that it 

would continue with its direct safety oversight of WMATA.22

FTA’s FWSO and region three office, which includes the Washington 

metropolitan area, have jointly managed oversight of SafeTrack. When 

WMATA announced SafeTrack in May 2016, the FWSO was in place and 

performed initial safety oversight of the project. However, FTA’s various 

regional offices exercise project management oversight over “major 

capital projects,” which include, among other things, projects that involve 

 19NTSB, Safety Recommendation, R-15-31 and -32 (Urgent) (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 

2015).

20DOT, Correspondence to NTSB Regarding Urgent Safety Recommendation R-15-31 

and 32 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 9, 2015). We have work planned to examine FRA and 

FTA safety oversight programs.

21MAP-21 provided FTA with the authority to “oversee the implementation of each State 

safety oversight program” and “make reports and issue directives with respect to the 

safety of the public transportation system of a recipient.” Pub. L. No.112-141, § 20021, 

126 Stat. 405, 714-15 (2012). FTA officials told us it was this authority that permitted FTA 

to take direct and temporary control of safety oversight of WMATA from the Tri-State 

Oversight committee. According to FTA officials, the Tri-State Oversight Committee 

remains the state safety oversight agency of record for purposes of compliance with FTA’s 

State Safety Oversight regulation, and FTA directed WMATA to address the Committee’s 

open safety findings.

22Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 3013, 129 Stat. 1312, 1476 (2015). The FAST Act amended the 

public transportation safety program to allow the Secretary of Transportation to administer 

the state safety oversight program for a transit agency if the Secretary determines that the 

state safety oversight program is not being carried out in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 

5329, has become inadequate to ensure enforcement of federal safety regulation, or is 

incapable of providing adequate safety oversight consistent with the prevention of 

substantial risk of death or personal injury. 49 U.S.C. § 5329(e)(8). The Secretary of 

Transportation has delegated this authority to the FTA Administrator.
Page 11 GAO-17-348 WMATA

the rehabilitation or modernization of an existing fixed guideway with a 

total project cost in excess of $100 million.23 Using this project 

management oversight authority for major capital projects, FTA can 

monitor the project’s progress to determine whether a project is on time, 

within budget, in conformance with design criteria, constructed to 

approved plans and specifications, and is efficiently and effectively 

implemented.24 According to FTA officials, FTA designated SafeTrack as 

a major capital project based upon WMATA’s decision to group together 

funding from multiple FTA formula grants, as well as funding authorized 

by PRIIA, and to manage those activities as a discrete project estimated 

to cost more than $100 million. FTA’s region three office provides project 

management oversight of SafeTrack.

FTA has other efforts to improve the safety and performance of public 

transportation systems. For example, in July 2016, FTA issued its final 

rule establishing a National Transit Asset Management System in 

accordance with section 20019 of MAP–21.25 Transit agencies are 

required to have an initial transit asset management plan completed by 

October 2, 2018.26 Transit agencies’ plans must include an inventory of 

the number and type of capital assets and a condition assessment of

those inventoried assets for which a provider has direct capital 

responsibility, among other elements.27 In August 2016, FTA also issued 

a Public Transportation Safety Program final rule establishing rules to 

support its administration of the public transportation safety program.28

The rule provides the framework for FTA to monitor and enforce transit 

safety.

 2349 C.F.R. § 633.5. “Fixed guideway” is defined as “any public transportation facility 

which utilizes and occupies a separate right-of-way or rails. This includes, but is not 

limited to, rapid rail, light rail, commuter rail, automated guideway transit, people movers, 

and exclusive facilities for buses and other high occupancy vehicles.”

2449 C.F.R. § 633.5.

25A transit asset management system is ‘‘a strategic and systematic process of operating, 

maintaining, and improving public transportation capital assets effectively throughout the 

life cycle of such assets.’’ 49 U.S.C. § 5326(a)(3).

2649 C.F.R. § 625.31(a).

2749 C.F.R. § 625.25(b)(1)-(2).

2881 Fed. Reg. 53,046 (Aug. 11, 2016).
Page 12 GAO-17-348 WMATA

WMATA’s planning of SafeTrack did not fully align with leading project 

management practices, including some that are focused on projects for 

rehabilitating transit assets. Specifically, while WMATA’s efforts to 

coordinate with local stakeholders after SafeTrack began have generally 

been in line with such practices, WMATA did not (1) comprehensively 

collect and assess data on its assets, (2) analyze alternatives, or (3) 

develop a project management plan before starting work. WMATA did not 

follow these practices because it believed it needed to start work 

immediately to address critical safety issues. However, by not following 

these leading practices, WMATA lacks assurance that the accelerated 

approach taken with SafeTrack is the most effective way to identify and 

address safety issues. WMATA also lacks a policy that requires, and 

relevant procedures specifying how, it follow these leading planning 

practices for large-scale rehabilitation projects. Without such a policy and 

procedures in place, WMATA lacks a framework to comprehensively plan 

future large-scale rehabilitation projects to meet their objectives.

Leading management practices for transit rehabilitation projects state that 

transit agencies should collect and use data on assets when planning 

projects. Public transit agencies have a wide variety of assets to maintain, 

including track and third rail infrastructure. The TCRP report on prioritizing 

the rehabilitation of capital assets states that transit agencies should 

collect detailed information on assets, including data on the age and 

condition of infrastructure.29 The TCRP report also states that agencies 

should use data to assess the conditions of assets. This assessment 

should then form the basis of prioritizing rehabilitation work. Indeed, 

according to TCRP, “the process of evaluating and prioritizing 

rehabilitation and replacement work starts with collecting data on existing 

transit capital assets.”30

Though WMATA collected data on its track assets through inspections 

when planning SafeTrack, those inspections were not comprehensive 

because they focused on specific items like rail crossties and did not 

cover all track-related infrastructure. Specifically, in 2015, WMATA 

conducted inspections of its Metrorail track to collect data on the condition 

of its track infrastructure and identify the work necessary to bring the track 

to a state of good repair. The inspections were carried out by a contractor 

 29TCRP, 2012. 

30TCRP, 2012, page 35.

WMATA Did Not Fully 

Follow Leading 

Practices When 

Planning SafeTrack 

Because It Wanted to 

Address Safety 

Issues Immediately, 

but Future Projects 

Could Benefit from 

Additional Planning

WMATA’s Collection and 

Use of Data in Planning 

SafeTrack Did Not Align 

with Leading Practices, 

Though New Asset 

Inventory Is Being 

Developed
Page 13 GAO-17-348 WMATA

for WMATA’s Track and Structures department as part of WMATA’s 

Track Quality Improvement Program (TQIP).31 According to WMATA 

officials we spoke with, these inspections were necessary under TQIP 

because they could not rely solely on track condition data in WMATA’s 

existing asset database. Indeed, WMATA’s OIG recently found that 

WMATA’s asset database does not have adequate controls and oversight 

in place to properly manage assets, among other concerns.32 WMATA 

used the data collected in its 2015 inspections as the primary source for 

identification of the most degraded areas of track, which would be subject 

to SafeTrack surges. However, the data collected during the inspections 

focused on the rail crossties and did not cover all infrastructure in the 

Metrorail track area. For example, according to WMATA officials, the 

inspections did not include an examination of all interlockings33 or of all 

track power systems, including the electrical cables that power the third 

rail system. According to WMATA officials we spoke with, these systems 

were not included in the inspections because the Track and Structures 

department leading the TQIP effort is not responsible for the maintenance 

of other systems. Electrical cables, for example, are managed by 

WMATA’s Power Engineering department. Data on the condition of 

assets in non-track systems has generally been collected by the 

responsible department, but according to WMATA officials, these data 

were not used to identify areas for SafeTrack work.

Officials with other transit agencies we spoke with said that accurate and 

comprehensive data on assets are crucial to identifying and prioritizing 

rehabilitation efforts. For example, NYCT officials told us that they rely on 

data from their transit asset management database to identify track 

sections with the greatest number of defects, or areas in need of repair, to 

prioritize sections of tracks for rehabilitation activities. MBTA officials we 

spoke with said that their agency has developed a state-of-good-repair 

database that includes an inventory of the age of assets that managers 

can use to prioritize rehabilitation and replacement projects. Officials from 

 31As the schedule for undertaking the track’s state of good repair work was developed, 

WMATA “branded” the portion of the TQIP associated with the accelerated rehabilitation 

of track assets as SafeTrack.

32WMATA OIG, Review of WMATA’s MAXIMO Asset Management System, December 

22, 2015.

33“Interlockings” are the parts of the railroad where tracks can cross each other or change 

to direct trains along different routes. The interlocking itself is an arrangement of track 

signals and signal appliances that permit train movements over controlled routes only if 

safe conditions exist.
Page 14 GAO-17-348 WMATA

CTA said they use a new asset management system, which has detailed 

information on the condition of CTA’s assets, to better identify and 

prioritize capital projects.

WMATA’s planning of SafeTrack relied on limited data regarding the 

condition of Metrorail assets, in part because the agency lacks internal 

requirements governing the collection and use of asset information in 

planning projects. More specifically, WMATA does not have a policy or 

procedures requiring it to collect and use asset data, and coordinate with 

other departments on the collection of such data when planning largescale rehabilitation projects. To ensure that such proper management 

practices are consistently carried out, the COSO internal control 

framework used by WMATA states that management should set policies 

establishing what is expected and relevant procedures specifying the 

necessary actions to carry out the policy.34 As we reported recently, asset 

management can help transit agencies optimize limited funding so that 

they receive the “biggest bang for their buck” when rehabilitating and 

replacing assets.35 By not gathering and using detailed data on all 

aspects of the track infrastructure when planning SafeTrack, WMATA 

decision-makers may not have had sufficient information to develop 

project objectives and properly prioritize SafeTrack work. Indeed, serious 

safety incidents have continued to occur on the Metrorail system during 

SafeTrack on assets that were not being addressed in the project. On 

July 29, 2016, a train derailed near the East Falls Church station.36 This 

derailment occurred on an interlocking, a part of track not scheduled at 

that time for rehabilitation under SafeTrack. As a result of this incident, 

WMATA modified the scope of future SafeTrack surges to include the 

rehabilitation of interlockings.37 Additionally, FTA has directed WMATA to 

complete safety critical work both prior to starting and during SafeTrack, 

 34COSO, 2013.

35GAO, Transit Asset Management: Additional Research on Capital Investment Effects 

Could Help Transit Agencies Optimize Funding, GAO-13-571 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 

2013).

36NTSB reported that the probable cause of this accident was the sustained use of 

deteriorating wooden crossties, and that the condition of these crossties was due to 

WMATA’s ineffective inspection and maintenance practices and inadequate safety 

oversight. See NTSB, Railroad Accident Brief Derailment of WMATA Metrorail Train in 

Interlocking Falls Church, Virginia, NTSB/RAB-16/06.

37WMATA officials told us that following this derailment they instituted the requirement that 

the interlockings governing train movement to facilitate SafeTrack work be pre-inspected 

to support the planned service pattern before the next surge commenced.
Page 15 GAO-17-348 WMATA

resulting in changes to the scope and schedule of SafeTrack, as 

discussed later in this report.

Though WMATA did not utilize comprehensive asset information in 

planning SafeTrack, it is developing a new inventory, as required by 

FTA’s 2016 Transit Asset Management final rule.38 More specifically, 

WMATA is currently conducting a Transit Asset Inventory and Condition 

Assessment, and is working with FTA to develop its new transit asset 

inventory. According to WMATA, this effort will help ensure that it has a 

complete, consistent, accurate, and centralized repository of relevant 

asset-related data. A reliable repository of asset data can then facilitate 

data-driven maintenance and capital investment decision making.

WMATA has completed the first of two phases for this assessment. In the 

first phase, WMATA sought to conduct an initial asset inventory and 

condition assessment. In the second phase, WMATA plans to further 

develop how it will manage its assets and collect additional data, among 

other things.

Leading management practices for transit rehabilitation projects state that 

transit agencies should have a policy in place for evaluating project 

alternatives. The TCRP report on prioritizing the rehabilitation of capital 

assets states that agencies should generate alternative plans for 

achieving a state of good repair and quantify the costs and impacts of 

those alternatives.39 As noted above, the COSO internal controls 

framework used by WMATA also states that management should 

establish policies and procedures to help ensure that proper practices are 

carried out.

Though WMATA considered different plans for improving the state of 

repair of its track infrastructure, it did not quantify the costs and impacts of 

each alternative. WMATA currently lacks a policy requiring alternatives 

analysis for large-scale rehabilitation projects. After collecting data from 

track inspections in 2015, WMATA developed three alternatives for 

improving the state of repair of its track infrastructure. These alternatives 

included 8, 10, and 22-month work schedules. According to WMATA 

officials, these alternatives included different levels of service disruptions, 

including extensive single-tracking and track section closures, but 

 3881 Fed. Reg. 48,890 (July 26, 2016) (codified at 49 C.F.R. §§ 625, 630).

39TCRP, 2012.

WMATA’s Analysis of 

Alternatives for Improving

the State of Repair of the 

Track Did Not Align with 

Leading Practices
Page 16 GAO-17-348 WMATA

generally included the same work tasks. According to WMATA officials, 

they ultimately settled on the initially announced 10-month plan, dubbed 

SafeTrack, because it best balanced rider disruption with addressing the 

urgent safety needs of the system. Additionally, they said that WMATA’s 

ability to make effective and efficient use of time on the track was also a 

primary consideration. However, WMATA did not fully assess the 

alternatives to improving the state of its track infrastructure. In particular, 

WMATA did not quantify the effects of the various alternatives on 

extending the life of the track assets, on reducing maintenance costs, and 

on Metrorail ridership. WMATA also did not quantify the costs or establish 

a detailed budget for its alternatives and still has not determined the final 

funding sources for its selected alternative. Although WMATA estimates 

that the SafeTrack project will cost approximately $120 million to 

complete, it has identified funding sources for about $80 million of these 

costs and has yet to determine how it will fund the remaining $40 million.

Other transit agencies we spoke with described detailed considerations of 

alternatives to carrying out large-scale rehabilitation projects. For 

example, CTA officials we spoke with said they developed and assessed 

different plans to rehabilitate its Red Line South track, including estimates 

of the costs and impacts of each alternative. Further, officials at PATH 

told us that they selected a particular approach to upgrading a tunnel they 

use for trains that travel from New Jersey to Manhattan, New York, 

because it balanced rider disruption and work efficiency. The PATH 

officials told us that they conducted approximately one year of planning in 

advance of this project and developed seven different scenarios before 

finally settling on the current approach.

WMATA did not fully assess alternatives to rehabilitate its track assets 

because it believed it needed to start work immediately to address critical 

safety issues. At the time SafeTrack was planned, according to officials 

we spoke with, WMATA leadership was making critical decisions on how 

to address systemic deferred maintenance. Indeed, according to 

WMATA’s Chief Safety Officer, in a call on May 10, 2016, a senior official 

within FTA’S FWSO office notified WMATA that FTA was considering 

taking action to “shut down” the entire Metrorail system due to safety 

concerns.40 According to WMATA officials, SafeTrack was conceived as 

WMATA’s unique and necessary response to the state of its track 

 40FTA opted not to close the Metrorail system. As discussed below, FTA provided a letter 

to WMATA on May 11, 2016, directing WMATA to repair power cables, insulators, and the 

electrified third-rail system on certain portions of the system, before beginning SafeTrack.
Page 17 GAO-17-348 WMATA

infrastructure. Further, WMATA officials noted that the agency is 

committed to devoting the resources necessary to bring the track to a 

state of good repair, and to developing preventative maintenance 

programs that would prevent similar safety-critical situations in the future.

Nevertheless, by not having a policy and procedures in place requiring 

analysis of alternatives for future large-scale rehabilitation projects, 

WMATA lacks a framework to comprehensively plan such projects to 

meet their objectives. WMATA plans to spend over $56 million a year on 

track rehabilitation projects alone starting in fiscal year 2018. If WMATA 

were to make decisions about the scope and prioritization of these 

projects without full information about the various alternatives, it may not 

select an approach that best balances costs and impacts.

Leading project management practices emphasize the importance of 

developing project management plans. The PMI PMBOK® Guide states 

that a comprehensive project management plan should be developed 

before a project begins so that it is clear how the project will be executed, 

monitored, and controlled.41 More specifically, the plan should include the 

critical information for managing a project’s scope, schedule, and cost, 

according to established baselines and in consideration of project risks, 

quality standards, and other items. As discussed below, federal law also 

requires that recipients of federal financial assistance for major capital 

projects prepare a project management plan.42

According to WMATA officials, WMATA did not develop a comprehensive 

project management plan before beginning SafeTrack because they 

believed a project management plan was not appropriate for such a 

project. WMATA considers SafeTrack to consist of accelerated but 

normal maintenance activities. According to WMATA officials, a project 

management plan is best suited for new construction projects. WMATA 

therefore chose to manage SafeTrack using tools that they considered 

more appropriately suited for managing coordinated maintenance tasks.

For example, WMATA uses detailed “march charts”43 to plan and 

 41PMI, 2013. The PMI PMBOK® Guide notes that the content of such plans can vary 

depending upon the application area and complexity of the project.

4249 U.S.C. § 5327(a). 

43“March charts” are a method of graphically presenting a time schedule. These charts 

typically display work crews as a series of lines moving along a right-of-way, such as a 

railroad track.

SafeTrack Work Began 

Before Key Elements of a 

Project Management Plan 

Were in Place, 

Inconsistent with Leading 

Practices
Page 18 GAO-17-348 WMATA

coordinate its various maintenance tasks within surge work areas.

However, according to WMATA officials, they did not develop a plan that 

clearly defined the budget, execution, monitoring, and control of the 

project before beginning SafeTrack. According to FTA officials we spoke 

with, FTA has discretion regarding when it determines a project is major 

and when a project management plan must be submitted.44 As discussed 

later in this report, WMATA developed a project management plan during 

the initial months of SafeTrack implementation, though FTA has not yet 

approved WMATA’s plan.

Other transit agencies we spoke with said that they generally developed 

extensive plans for their large-scale rehabilitation projects. For example, 

CTA officials we spoke with said that they conducted extensive planning, 

and developed a project management plan, for their Red Line South 

reconstruction project, even though they did not use federal funds and 

therefore were not required by FTA to develop such a plan. Additionally, 

in planning for the shutdown and rehabilitation of the Canarsie tunnel, 

NYCT is developing a detailed plan that reflects its risk assessments and 

analysis of lessons learned from previous work, according to the officials 

we spoke with.

Though WMATA developed SafeTrack as a unique response to the state 

of its track infrastructure, future large-scale rehabilitation projects 

undertaken by the agency would benefit from the development of a 

comprehensive project management plan prior to the start of the project.

As discussed above, WMATA officials told us that they implemented 

SafeTrack to respond to a critical safety situation and that they could not 

postpone this track work to develop a project management plan.

SafeTrack, though, involves an unprecedented amount of track work 

performed over an extended period, significantly disrupts ridership, and is 

estimated to cost well over $100 million. WMATA currently lacks a policy 

and procedures requiring the development of a project management plan 

for large-scale rehabilitation projects like SafeTrack, according to WMATA 

officials, regardless of whether the work is to be completed in response to 

an emergency situation or within WMATA’s normal state of good repair 

efforts. The COSO internal controls framework used by WMATA states 

that management should have policies establishing what is expected of 

management and employees, to help mitigate risks to achieving goals.

Although WMATA told us that it has a manual on project implementation 

that is focused on the implementation and close-out phases of a project, it 

 4449 C.F.R. § 633.21.
Page 19 GAO-17-348 WMATA

does not yet cover the planning phase. Further, although a project 

management plan is required for public-transportation-related major 

capital projects receiving federal financial assistance, WMATA may 

undertake future large-scale rehabilitation projects that do not meet the 

major capital project definition or that do not use federal funds at all. Such 

projects could still benefit from having a project management plan in 

place before beginning the project—consistent with leading practices—to 

manage the project’s scope, schedule, costs, and other factors. Without a 

policy and procedures that require the development of a plan for future 

large-scale rehabilitation projects, WMATA lacks a key tool to ensure its 

projects are completed on-time, on-budget, and according to quality 

standards.

Leading management practices and other transit agencies we spoke with 

state that identifying and coordinating with external stakeholders is part of 

proper project planning. The PMI PMBOK® Guide states that agencies 

should identify stakeholders for their projects, communicate and work with 

stakeholders to meet their needs, address issues as they occur, and 

foster stakeholder engagement in project activities.45 FTA project 

guidelines also note that communication with the public can be crucial for 

receiving the necessary buy-in to move a project forward.46 Other transit 

agencies we spoke with said that they generally began stakeholder 

engagement weeks, if not months, prior to the beginning of projects. For 

example, the PATH officials we spoke with said that they began 

communicating with government officials and the public about the 

proposed tunnel weekend shutdowns 2 months before the project started.

Similarly, according to NYCT officials, they presented various schedule 

alternatives for rehabilitating the Canarsie tunnel to the local communities 

directly affected by the tunnel’s closing to explain NYCT’s rationale for 

completing the work, as well as to discuss the benefits and challenges of 

different plans.

According to WMATA officials, urgent safety concerns necessitated an 

accelerated planning process, which precluded advanced notice of 

SafeTrack to local jurisdictions, other regional transit agencies, and the 

public. Officials from one local county we spoke with said that they had 

about a month between when they first heard about SafeTrack and when 

 45PMI, 2013.

46FTA, Project and Construction Management Guidelines, March 2016.

WMATA Provided Little 

Notice of SafeTrack to 

Local Stakeholders but 

Communication and 

Coordination during 

Surges Generally Align 

with Leading Practices
Page 20 GAO-17-348 WMATA

the first surge began in June 2016. According to local officials we spoke 

with, little advanced notice of SafeTrack caused some miscommunication 

between local jurisdictions as well as difficulty identifying funding for 

mitigation efforts. Specifically, one local county official told us that the 

county had to quickly develop a plan to bring 25 recently retired buses 

back into service to provide options to Metrorail riders affected by 

SafeTrack surges. The county estimated that it incurred approximately $1 

million in bus driver labor and other costs as a result of SafeTrack. The 

county official told us that it expects to be compensated by the state for 

these expenses.

Nonetheless, as the SafeTrack project has progressed, WMATA’s efforts 

to coordinate with local stakeholders have generally been in line with 

leading practices. WMATA officials identified stakeholders for the 

SafeTrack project, including local transit agencies and elected officials.

WMATA utilized a variety of methods to communicate and coordinate with 

local transit agencies and jurisdictions during SafeTrack. For instance, 

one local official we spoke with said that WMATA’s Joint Coordinating 

Committee—which brings local officials together to plan for major events 

affecting regional transportation—is an effective mechanism for sharing 

information, such as local plans for the use of shuttle buses in areas 

affected by surges. Local officials also said that communication and 

coordination between WMATA and jurisdictions has been effective, 

especially after the first few months of SafeTrack. For example, one local 

official told us that WMATA has provided the jurisdiction with prompt 

information about the upcoming surges through weekly planning meetings 

at WMATA headquarters, as well as through informal coordination with 

WMATA staff on specific surges.

WMATA has also effectively communicated with the public, according to 

the local officials we spoke with. WMATA officials told us that they have 

used a variety of measures to communicate SafeTrack plans to the public 

including press releases issued to local news media outlets; postings on 

social media, such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter; and a SafeTrack 

web page that includes details about the overall project and each surge.

Officials from one jurisdiction said that WMATA has provided good 

information on its website and that having additional WMATA staff at 

SafeTrack-affected stations and bus areas has also been useful. As a 

result of such efforts, one local official told us that Metrorail riders have 

demonstrated a high level of awareness about SafeTrack.
Page 21 GAO-17-348 WMATA

WMATA’s implementation of SafeTrack generally aligns with leading 

project management practices. Specifically, during the course of each 

SafeTrack surge, WMATA officials collect and document information 

about the work performed and the condition of assets. WMATA officials 

also develop lessons learned during and after each surge period, and use 

those lessons during subsequent maintenance and planning efforts. Last, 

WMATA developed a new organization-wide quality control and 

assurance framework that it is implementing for the first time through 

SafeTrack.

Leading project management practices emphasize the importance of 

collecting and monitoring work performance data and information. The 

PMI PMBOK® Guide states that throughout the lifecycle of a project, 

organizations will generate a significant amount of work performance 

data47 and work performance information48 that is collected, analyzed, 

documented, and shared with stakeholders. This data and information is 

typically created and documented after a project begins, and is a key 

element in controlling a project’s scope, schedule, cost, and risk.

Organizations can collect work performance data and information to 

identify trends and process improvements. Work performance data are 

also a key factor in an organization’s overall quality management for 

projects, as they provide a foundation for implementing quality control and 

quality assurance practices, as well as stakeholder engagement, since 

they inform discussions on project performance.49 The TCRP report on 

prioritizing the rehabilitation of capital assets also states that transit 

agencies should define data collection and inspection protocols, and 

 47The PMBOK defines “work performance data” as raw observations and measurements 

identified during activities performed to carry out project work. Examples include reported 

percentage of work physically completed, quality and technical performance measures, 

start and finish dates of scheduled activities, number of change requests, number of 

defects, actual costs, and actual durations.

48The PMBOK defines “work performance information” as the performance data collected 

from various controlling processes, analyzed in context, and integrated based on 

relationships across areas. Examples of performance information are status of 

deliverables, implementation status for change requests, and forecasted estimates to 

complete.

49PMI, 2013.

WMATA Is Using 

Several Leading 

Practices to 

Implement SafeTrack 

and Improve the 

Quality of Completed 

Work

WMATA Has Consistently 

Collected and Monitored 

Work Performance Data 

and Information
Page 22 GAO-17-348 WMATA

ensure the data are detailed and current enough to support decisions on 

asset rehabilitation or replacement.50

Based on procedures WMATA has established, officials have collected 

and documented information about the work performed and the condition 

of WMATA’s assets in SafeTrack surge areas, consistent with leading 

project management practices. Prior to each surge, WMATA officials from 

relevant departments have conducted inspections on the conditions of 

both the track infrastructure and other non-track assets. WMATA officials 

have used this pre-surge inspection data to develop the overall scope of 

work for each surge, as well as to identify each component planned for 

maintenance or replacement. According to WMATA officials, although 

prior to SafeTrack inspections focused solely on track assets such as the 

condition of crossties, pre-surge inspections have since included 

assessments on the condition of both track and non-track assets, such as 

power cables. However, the number of assets planned for maintenance 

or replacement in each surge varies depending on the conditions of the 

assets in question. WMATA officials told us that during each surge, they 

regularly discuss progress with departments that are responsible for 

ensuring completion of scheduled work, as well as monitoring teams’

work quality and site safety. At the end of each surge, WMATA officials 

have compiled totals for all work completed, after verification and 

completion of the various departments’ quality control processes.

WMATA has then compared the completed work against the pre-surge 

work plan. WMATA has used the completed work data to develop its 

surge progress reports, which it issues to stakeholders and makes 

available to the public at the end of each surge. However, although 

WMATA is collecting information on the condition of assets repaired 

through SafeTrack, WMATA does not have a policy or procedures 

requiring it to use asset data when planning future large-scale 

rehabilitation projects, as previously discussed.

WMATA has also used work performance data and information to identify 

the amount of rehabilitation work that can be performed during a given 

maintenance window. For example, WMATA is not replacing all crossties 

within a given SafeTrack segment; rather, its goal is to ensure that 75 

percent of the ties in a surge area are in good condition so that it will not 

need to replace all of them at the same time in the future.51 WMATA 

 50TCRP, 2012. 

51WMATA officials told us typical crosstie renewal practices replace one out of every four 

crossties. 
Page 23 GAO-17-348 WMATA

officials stated they believe that this approach will allow them to move to a 

more sustainable crosstie replacement model, eliminate maintenance 

backlog, and achieve a state of good repair for those assets. WMATA has 

also incorporated other types of data, such as logistical constraints for 

available work crews and equipment, to inform its assessment of how 

work will be accomplished during each surge. See figure 3 for select track 

assets that have undergone repair or replacement during SafeTrack.

Figure 3: Segment of Metrorail Track

The work performance data collected by WMATA demonstrate that 

WMATA has renewed or replaced a substantial amount of track 

infrastructure, as well as other non-track assets, during the course of 

SafeTrack. According to WMATA officials, SafeTrack work crews have 

been able to complete work more efficiently than is possible during 

normal, shorter, maintenance windows. For example, WMATA reported 

that by limiting service for 13 days on the Red Line from Shady Grove to 

Twinbrook, it was able to replace over 3,500 crossties; this work would 

have taken more than 2 years to complete if performed only after the end 

of the rail system’s service each day. As shown in table 1, through the 
Page 24 GAO-17-348 WMATA

first 10 surges, WMATA has replaced more than 26,000 crossties, with its 

goal being to replace over 45,000 crossties when the project is 

complete.52 Through surge 10, WMATA has also replaced more than 

4,300 insulators, which support the third rail. WMATA plans to replace 

more than 11,800 insulators through SafeTrack, and has replaced over 

700 power cables as well.

Table 1: Selected Planned and Actual Work Completed under SafeTrack, through December 2016

Work Type Asset Description Planned in SafeTrack Actual to date

Crosstie replacement Crossties are the wooden 

beams that lay across a railroad 

bed to secure the rails.

45,496 crossties 26,515 crossties

Fastener replacement In sections of track where 

crossties are not used, 

fasteners affix rails to the grout 

pad and concrete structure of 

the tunnel floor or aerial 

structure.

35,320 fasteners 12,328 fasteners

Insulator replacement Insulators (either ceramic, 

composite fiberglass, or 

porcelain) physically support the 

third rail.

11,850 insulators 4,335 insulators

Grout pad renewal Grout pads are segmented 

blocks of cement that transfer 

the load from the fastener to the 

concrete tunnel floor in 

underground sections where 

wooden crossties are not used. 

10,000 linear feet 9,501 linear feet

Power cable repair/replacement Power cables carry electrical 

current from the power source 

to the tracks, and then from the 

tracks back to the power source 

to complete the electrical circuit.

a 773 cables

Third rail coverboard

maintenance

The third rail is protected by an 

insulated coverboard to prevent 

inadvertent contact with the rail 

and to minimize snow and ice 

accumulation on it.

a 18,802 linear feet coverboard

 52WMATA estimates that approximately 107,539 crossties exist within SafeTrack’s surge 

work areas. As previously described, WMATA is not replacing every crosstie within a 

work area, instead working to ensure that at least 75 percent of ties are in “good” condition 

based on the results of pre-surge inspections.
Page 25 GAO-17-348 WMATA

Work Type Asset Description Planned in SafeTrack Actual to date

Tamping and surfacing Tamping and surfacing involves 

restoring the track to its proper 

alignment by using 

computerized equipment to 

manipulate the rock material 

between the tracks.

a 157,506 linear feet

Source: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority data. | GAO-17-348

a

Indicates assets where WMATA did not develop a planned number to be repaired or replaced.

SafeTrack’s focus is on the repair and replacement of track assets, whereas these assets are nontrack infrastructure to be rehabilitated where possible during surges.

The collection of lessons learned is a key project management step that 

helps inform an organization’s planning and evaluation of its projects, 

programs, and portfolios, as well as supports process improvements. The 

PMI PMBOK® Guide states that organizations should identify and collect 

lessons learned during the course of executing a project to complement 

their overall knowledge base, particularly with respect to project selection, 

performance, and risk management.53 FTA Quality Management Systems 

Guidelines also state that corrective actions for nonconforming work 

common to most projects should be recorded as lessons learned and 

disseminated throughout an organization.

In accordance with leading project management practices, WMATA 

officials have developed lessons learned during and after each surge 

period, and have used those lessons during subsequent maintenance 

and planning efforts. For example, WMATA officials said that over the 

course of the initial SafeTrack surges, they evaluated their work 

procedures and refined their approach to replacing rail crossties. In 

particular, they acquired new machines to remove ties and install rail 

spikes, and implemented better scheduling of the machines and work 

crews to facilitate more efficient crosstie replacement. As another 

example, during the course of the initial SafeTrack surges, WMATA 

officials learned to define clear work limits prior to each surge to improve 

work efficiency. More specifically, during the initial planning of SafeTrack, 

officials did not clearly define surge work areas by specific chain 

markers54 and instead labeled the ends of the surge areas by Metrorail 

station. Furthermore, WMATA officials recognized the need to make 

 53PMI, 2013. 54“Chain markers” are survey markers placed along the rail tracks that identify the 

distance (in multiples of 100 feet) to the middle of the Metro Center station’s center 

platform.

WMATA Has Collected 

and Implemented Lessons 

Learned throughout 

SafeTrack
Page 26 GAO-17-348 WMATA

detailed scope and work plan documents available before the start of 

each surge in order to prevent confusion regarding expectations, work 

inefficiencies, and unachieved objectives.

WMATA has also used project meetings to capture and disseminate 

lessons learned among its work teams. Before every surge period, 

WMATA stakeholders have met to discuss the intended scope of work for 

the surge, prioritize work tasks, and agree upon a work plan. WMATA 

officials have then incorporated this information into a 90-day “look 

ahead” schedule that is used to plan material purchases and verify track 

rights for work crews. According to WMATA officials, once a surge has 

ended, WMATA holds “closeout” meetings with its internal stakeholders 

(including quality assurance officials) to discuss the work performed and 

lessons learned, which are then included in an official closeout report.

The use of closeout meetings after a project work period ends is also 

consistent with leading project management practices.

Leading project management practices emphasize the importance of the 

management, assurance, and control-of-quality issues. The PMI 

PMBOK® Guide states that organizations should establish policies and 

procedures that govern quality management for their projects and 

deliverables. Quality management refers to key processes that comprise 

a quality framework, including identifying quality requirements and 

standards, performing quality audits, and monitoring and recording results 

of executing quality activities in order to assess performance and 

recommend necessary changes.55 PMI notes that having a quality 

management framework in place can ensure that project requirements 

are met and process improvement initiatives are supported.

WMATA has developed an agency-wide quality control and assurance 

framework that is in line with best practices. According to WMATA 

officials, the agency is implementing a new quality assurance framework 

for the first time during SafeTrack. In March 2016, WMATA officials 

established a new, independent quality team called Quality Assurance, 

Internal Compliance, and Oversight (QICO) that reports directly to the 

WMATA General Manager.

56 In addition to serving as an independent 

 55PMI, 2013.

56WMATA officials told us that prior to the establishment of QICO, WMATA’s infrastructure 

groups were responsible for quality assurance operations and no agency-wide quality 

policy existed.

WMATA Is Establishing 

and Implementing Policies 

to Improve the Quality of 

Work Performed through 

SafeTrack
Page 27 GAO-17-348 WMATA

reviewer of the SafeTrack project, the QICO team is responsible for 

developing and implementing a new quality framework for the entire 

organization. According to WMATA officials, this framework has three 

levels of review for work performed by maintenance groups. Maintenance 

groups are to provide the first level of review, with managers assessing 

the quality of the work completed by crews, such as installation and 

maintenance of assets, and documenting their findings on quality control 

checklists. Second, QICO is responsible for assessing the overall quality 

of completed work by reviewing a sample of work tasks competed during 

the surge, and providing feedback for work teams on quality and safety 

concerns. This feedback includes preparing surge closeout reports that 

document any quality, safety, or other concerns and reporting them to 

WMATA leadership and the relevant work teams involved. The work 

teams must then address and close out any quality deficiencies through

ongoing maintenance activities. Last, the WMATA OIG and Board of 

Directors are responsible for monitoring internal performance at the 

agency and approving manager-level decisions regarding quality control 

and assurance. In addition to this review structure, the QICO team is also 

developing an enterprise-wide Quality Management System, in 

accordance with the FTA’s Quality Management Systems Guidelines, that 

is intended to clearly define WMATA’s organizational objectives with 

respect to quality assurance. The QICO team has also developed training 

programs for maintenance supervisors as well as certification 

requirements for quality assurance staff.

In implementing procedures, WMATA’s QICO team has identified a 

number of work-related issues (referred to as “discrepancies”) during its 

quality control and quality assurance inspections of SafeTrack work, 

discrepancies that WMATA is working to address. Specifically, according 

to SafeTrack surge’s closeout reports through the first eight surges, QICO 

inspectors identified a total of 413 discrepancies for WMATA teams to 

address. Officials are to document these discrepancies in “punch lists” of 

work tasks that WMATA workers must complete during the course of 

upcoming routine maintenance. FTA officials told us that the QICO 

closeout reports are useful in order to see work completed during each 

surge as well as to inform post-surge inspections. Through surge 8, 

WMATA has closed 231 of the 413 discrepancies identified by QICO, 

including 93 percent of the safety concerns, 57 percent of the quality 

concerns, and 53 percent of site condition concerns (see table 2).
Page 28 GAO-17-348 WMATA

Table 2: Discrepancies Identified by WMATA Quality Officials through Surge 8, as of 

September 16, 2016

Discrepancy 

type 

Total Closed Open Closed

Site conditiona 320 168 146 53%

Quality concernb 65 37 18 57%

Safety concernc 28 26 2 93%

Total 413 231 166 56%

Source: GAO analysis of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority data. | GAO-17-348

a

Pre-existing discrepant asset component, system, or site condition issue

b

Quality of work issue

c

Roadway worker protection or other safety issue
Page 29 GAO-17-348 WMATA

Prior to WMATA’s announcement of SafeTrack in May 2016, FTA 

conducted many inspections of WMATA’s track infrastructure and internal 

inspection program. These have informed its oversight of the project. As 

previously discussed, FTA established the FWSO office in October 2015 

to provide temporary and direct safety oversight of WMATA in the 

absence of an effective state oversight authority, according to FTA. When 

WMATA first notified FTA of its plans to implement the SafeTrack project 

on May 6, 2016, the FWSO had been conducting inspections on the 

integrity of WMATA’s track since March 2016. The FWSO was in the 

process of developing a directive requiring WMATA to take corrective 

actions to address concerns with its track construction, maintenance, and 

inspection resources, among other issues.57 According to FTA, FWSO 

inspectors conducted 76 inspections of WMATA’s Metrorail system from 

October 2015 through May 2016. For example, in March and April of 

2016, FTA inspected over 60 miles of track on all six Metrorail lines, with 

additional follow-up inspections between late April and June. FTA found 

that WMATA’s track inspection program did not fully account for 

differences in track types, locations, and train traffic volume when 

WMATA prioritized its inspections. In addition, FTA found that WMATA 

maintenance departments did not jointly review inspection results to 

develop coordinated mitigations and assign limited resources to highest 

priority issues.58

 57FTA reported the results of its track integrity investigation in a final report and Safety 

Directive to WMATA in August 2016. See DOT, Final Report: Track Integrity 

Investigation, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; and Safety Directive No. 

16-4, Notice No. 1, Required Actions to Address Findings from Federal Transit 

Administration Investigations Conducted at the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority, (Washington, DC, August 8, 2016).

58DOT, Final Report (Aug. 8, 2016).

FTA Has Used 

Inspections and Other 

Tools to Direct 

WMATA to Make 

Safety Repairs and 

Oversee SafeTrack

FTA Has Conducted 

Inspections and Directed 

WMATA to Make Safety 

Critical Repairs before and 

during SafeTrack
Page 30 GAO-17-348 WMATA

Since the start of SafeTrack work in June 2016, FTA has conducted 

additional inspections and observations of SafeTrack work for each 

surge. According to FTA inspection data from June 2016 through 

September 2016, FTA inspectors conducted a total of 102 individual 

inspections of WMATA rail assets, including 49 inspections that covered 

SafeTrack-related work. For example, FTA officials told us that from the 

first SafeTrack surge, FTA officials accompanied WMATA staff on presurge inspections to identify repair items and observe work tasks during 

each surge to assess the quality of the repairs. FTA officials said they 

also conferred with WMATA staff after each surge to identify work not 

completed, which WMATA compiles into a prioritized “punch list” of critical 

repairs to be completed during the course of upcoming routine 

maintenance. FTA officials told us they have been monitoring WMATA’s 

completion of punch list items and were working with WMATA to ensure 

progress in completing these tasks.

As a result of its inspections, FTA directed WMATA to complete safety 

critical work both prior to starting and during SafeTrack, specifically:

• In response to WMATA’s initial SafeTrack plan provided to FTA on 

May 6, 2016, FTA sent a letter on May 11, 2016, directing WMATA to 

make urgent repairs to reduce the risk of smoke and fire events and 

the occurrence of arcing insulators on certain sections of the rail 

system. FTA’s letter directed WMATA to repair power cables, 

insulators, and the electrified third-rail system on certain portions of 

the Red, Blue, Orange, and Silver lines, before beginning SafeTrack.

• In response to WMATA’s proposed schedule changes after the July 

29, 2016 derailment of a Silver Line train near the East Falls Church 

station, FTA sent WMATA another letter on September 1, 2016, 

encouraging WMATA to also include additional safety-related work in 

SafeTrack, including: (1) prioritizing additional repairs to arcing 

insulators on the Red Line; (2) completing unfinished track work from 

the third surge on the Blue and Yellow lines; and (3) addressing poor 

tie and fastener conditions on certain sections of the Orange and Blue 

lines, including a section of the Orange Line that was not originally 

part of WMATA’s SafeTrack surge plan.

WMATA took several actions to address FTA’s concerns. First, WMATA 

adjusted the order of early surges in its initial SafeTrack plan and has 

replaced insulators, repaired power cables and third-rail components, and 

assigned a dedicated work crew to improve drainage on the sections of 

the Red Line between Medical Center and Van Ness stations, as cited in 

FTA’s May 11 and September 1 letters. Second, WMATA officials told us 
Page 31 GAO-17-348 WMATA

that Metrorail completed unfinished work from the third surge on the Blue 

and Yellow lines during an additional single-tracking event. Finally, in 

January 2017, WMATA scheduled an additional surge from May to June 

2017 to address FTA’s concerns regarding poor track condition on a 

certain section of the Orange Line.

FTA reported that WMATA’s actions taken in response to FTA’s concerns 

have helped reduce safety incidents. According to an FTA report, 

WMATA has reduced the prevalence of electrical arcing incidents on the 

Red Line between Medical Center and Van Ness station as a result of 

WMATA’s additional maintenance activity in that section of track.59

Specifically, FTA reported that between March 1, 2016, and June 14, 

2016, WMATA had experienced 18 electrical arcing incidents between 

Medical Center and Van Ness, including 4 major events at the end of 

April and early May. Since taking additional maintenance actions, 

WMATA experienced 8 arcing events over the 4 month period from midJune 2016 through mid-October 2016, and FTA has characterized these 

events as relatively minor.

In addition to FWSO inspections of WMATA infrastructure and safety 

procedures, FTA has also exercised its project management oversight 

authority over SafeTrack since July 2016. FTA’s project management 

oversight includes monitoring a major capital project’s progress to 

determine whether a project is on time, within budget, and in 

conformance with design criteria, and whether it is constructed to 

approved plans and specifications, and is efficiently and effectively 

implemented.60 As noted previously, major capital projects include, 

among other things, projects involving the rehabilitation or modernization 

of an existing fixed guideway with a total project cost in excess of $100 

million.61 FTA found that SafeTrack met the $100-million criteria for a 

major capital project when it approved an additional $20 million in safetyrelated federal funding for the project in mid-June 2016, during the first 

surge. As a result, FTA announced that it would exercise its project 

management oversight authority over SafeTrack in a July 1, 2016, letter 

to WMATA.

 59DOT, Final Report: Traction Power Electrification System Investigation Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, (Washington, DC, Dec. 9, 2016).

6049 C.F.R. § 633.5. 

6149 C.F.R. § 633.5.

FTA Has Required 

WMATA to Prepare and 

Refine Its SafeTrack 

Project Management Plan
Page 32 GAO-17-348 WMATA

After FTA designated SafeTrack as a major capital project based on 

criteria established in law, WMATA became subject to the statutory 

requirement to complete a project management plan. Federal law 

requires that recipients of federal financial assistance for a major capital 

project related to public transportation prepare a project management 

plan approved by the Secretary of Transportation, and carry out the 

project in accordance with the project management plan.62 FTA 

guidelines state that a project management plan provides a functional, 

financial, and procedural road map for the project sponsor to effectively 

and efficiently manage a project on-time, within-budget, and at the 

highest quality and safety.63 According to federal regulations, as a general 

rule, a major capital project’s project management plan must be 

submitted during the grant review process and is part of FTA’s grant 

application review.64 These regulations also state that if FTA determines 

that a project is major under its discretionary authority after the grant has 

been approved, FTA will inform the recipient of its determination as soon 

as possible.65 In the case of SafeTrack, due to WMATA’s desire to begin 

SafeTrack work immediately, and FTA’s determination of SafeTrack as a 

major capital project after work had already commenced, WMATA did not 

submit its project management plan to FTA until 4 months into the project.

On July 1, 2016, FTA requested that WMATA submit its project 

management plan to FTA by July 29, 2016. WMATA requested and was 

granted an extension, and submitted its project management plan to FTA 

on September 30, 2016.

As of January 2017, FTA has yet to approve WMATA’s project 

management plan because key elements lacked sufficient detail. FTA 

officials told us that WMATA’s plan did not provide adequate information 

on the SafeTrack budget and costs of the work being conducted, as well 

as information to identify and manage project risks, or assess the 

 6249 U.S.C. § 5327(a).

63A project management plan must include, among other elements, a budget covering 

major cost elements, a construction schedule, and quality control and assurance 

functions. 49 U.S.C. § 5327(a); 49 C.F.R. § 633.25. See also FTA, Project Management 

and Construction Guidelines (Washington, D.C., March 2016). The guidelines also state 

that a project management plan should include other project planning and management 

tools, including defined project objectives and an overall risk-informed and performancebased management approach. 

6449 C.F.R. § 633.21.

6549 C.F.R. § 633.21.
Page 33 GAO-17-348 WMATA

performance of the project against defined metrics. FTA provided 

WMATA with detailed comments on WMATA’s plan covering these and 

other issues. As previously noted, WMATA officials told us that they do 

not consider the project management plan to be the most appropriate tool 

to manage SafeTrack tasks, which are primarily maintenance activities.

However, WMATA officials also told us that they were working closely 

with FTA to improve the quality and level of detail in the plan.

WMATA’s recent record of significant safety incidents demonstrates that 

its Metrorail system faces serious safety and infrastructure challenges.

Through SafeTrack, WMATA has accomplished a substantial amount of 

repair work to bring its track infrastructure closer to a state of good repair.

WMATA is also learning some important lessons in implementing 

SafeTrack that could better equip it to identify and address issues in 

future large-scale rehabilitation projects. Perhaps more importantly, 

SafeTrack indicates that WMATA is now committed to preventative 

maintenance, including the repairing of track assets before they break 

and cause more cost and safety impacts on Metrorail riders. Though 

SafeTrack consists largely of routine maintenance work, the intensity, 

length, cost, and disruption of the effort distinguishes it from normal 

maintenance work. As a result of the urgent need for work on the track 

infrastructure and the unique nature of SafeTrack, WMATA’s planning of 

SafeTrack did not fully align with leading practices, and WMATA likely 

experienced some early challenges as a result. These challenges 

highlight the importance of comprehensive planning and project 

management for large-scale rehabilitation projects to minimize the 

impacts on riders and ensure work is completed efficiently and according 

to quality standards. Indeed, SafeTrack is not a comprehensive approach 

to addressing WMATA’s safety needs and additional efforts will be 

needed to bring the entire Metrorail system to a state of good repair.

Without a policy requiring planning processes that are more consistent 

with leading project management practices, which call for thorough 

analysis, planning, and informed decision-making, WMATA’s ability to 

effectively address future infrastructure challenges may be limited. This 

situation is particularly true for future large-scale rehabilitation projects 

that may not be designated as major capital projects and subject to FTA’s 

project management oversight authority, but which could still benefit from 

having a project management plan in place before beginning the project, 

consistent with leading practices. Furthermore, documenting these 

planning requirements, and the relevant procedures for carrying them out, 

would help ensure that they are carried out consistently, in order that staff 

and management can be held accountable for them.

Conclusions
Page 34 GAO-17-348 WMATA

To ensure future large-scale rehabilitation projects are in line with leading 

project management practices, WMATA should develop a policy that 

requires and includes relevant procedures specifying that the following 

three actions be taken prior to starting large-scale projects:

• use detailed data on the conditions of assets to develop project 

objectives and scope;

• evaluate and compare alternative ways of accomplishing the project 

objectives, including estimates for the alternatives’ costs and impacts; 

and

• develop a comprehensive project management plan for the selected 

alternative—to include key elements such as detailed plans for 

managing the project’s scope, schedule, and cost—for those projects 

that may not be designated major capital projects.

We provided a draft copy of this report to DOT, NTSB, and WMATA for 

review and comment.

In written comments, reproduced in appendix I, DOT said that, since 

exercising oversight authority, FTA has guided and examined WMATA’s 

work toward improving its safety culture, infrastructure, and operations. 

DOT also said that FTA will continue to provide safety oversight of 

WMATA and help it build upon improvements made in the last year. 

In comments provided in an e-mail, NTSB noted that it shares our 

concern that WMATA’s interlockings, and other track work, were not fully 

considered in planning SafeTrack. NTSB also said that FTA’s public 

transportation safety oversight approach lacks the necessary standards, 

expertise, and resources. This report focused on FTA’s oversight of the 

SafeTrack project specifically, so we did not evaluate FTA’s overall public 

transportation safety model. We do, however, have planned work to 

examine FRA and FTA safety oversight programs.

In written comments, reproduced in appendix II, WMATA agreed with our 

findings and conclusions, and said that it is working to address the 

recommendations. WMATA also said that the draft report did not reflect 

the urgent safety state of the Metrorail system prior to beginning 

SafeTrack, which precluded comprehensive project planning. We 

acknowledge throughout the report that, at the time SafeTrack was being 

developed, WMATA faced significant safety issues and leadership was 

making critical decisions on how to address systemic deferred 

Recommendations

Agency Comments
Page 35 GAO-17-348 WMATA

maintenance. Nevertheless, by not fully carrying out leading project 

management practices, WMATA lacked assurance that SafeTrack was 

the most efficient and least disruptive approach to accomplishing the 

track repair objectives. Having a policy and procedures in place requiring 

these project management practices for future large-scale rehabilitation 

projects will ensure that WMATA plans such projects so they best meet 

their objectives.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of 

Transportation, Chairman of NTSB, General Manager of WMATA, 

WMATA Board of Directors, and the appropriate congressional 

committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Individuals that made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix I.

Mark Goldstein

Director

Physical Infrastructure Issues
Page 36 GAO-17-348 WMATA

List of Requesters

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz

Chairman

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings

Ranking Member

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Mark Meadows

Chairman

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Government Operations

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Tammy Duckworth

United States Senate
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Transportation

Page 37 GAO-17-348 WMATA

Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Transportation
Appendix II: Comments from the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Page 38 GAO-17-348 WMATA

Appendix II: Comments from the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Appendix II: Comments from the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Page 39 GAO-17-348 WMATA
Appendix II: Comments from the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Page 40 GAO-17-348 WMATA
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 41 GAO-17-348 WMATA

Mark Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Matt Barranca (Assistant 

Director), Kyle Browning (Analyst in Charge), Jason Blake, Lacey 

Coppage, Hannah Laufe, Sara Ann Moessbauer, Malika Rice, and 

Michelle Weathers made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(101073)
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