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TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS


 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 

State of California
 

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP
 

Attorney General
 

OPINION :


 : No. 87-704


 of :
 

: January 14, 1988
 

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP : 


Attorney General :


 :


 RODNEY O. LILYQUIST : 


Deputy Attorney General : 


THE HONORABLE DWIGHT L. HERR, COUNTY COUNSEL, COUNTY OF
 

SANTA CRUZ, has requested an opinion on the following question:
 

Does the lawyer-client privilege or work-product rule,
 

when relied upon by a public officer, automatically terminate with
 

the settlement or adjudication of the underlying claim?
 

CONCLUSION
 

The lawyer-client privilege and work-product rule, when
 

relied upon by a public officer, do not automatically terminate
 

with the settlement or adjudication of the underlying claim.
 

ANALYSIS
 

In 70 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 28 (1987), we recently concluded
 

that the lawyer-client privilege (see Evid. Code, §§ 953-954) and
 

the work-product rule (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2018) could be relied
 

upon in a grand jury proceeding to prevent disclosure of requested
 

information and that a public officer was entitled to claim the
 

protection of the privilege and rule regardless of the "official
 

information" privilege of Evidence Code section 1040. Left
 

unanswered in the opinion was whether the lawyer-client privilege
 

or work-product rule automatically terminated for the public
 

officer when the underlying claim was settled or adjudicated. (Id.
 

at p. 38, fn. 9.) We now address that question.
 

If the person claiming the privilege or relying upon the
 

rule were not a public officer, our task would be a simple one.
 

The Legislature has set forth in the Evidence Code the
 

characteristics of the lawyer-client privilege, including its
 

extension beyond any adjudication or settlement of a claim. (See
 
 

 

Evid. Code, §§ 953-954; Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Deering's Ann.
 

Evid. Code, § 954, p. 120.) As for the work-product rule, it also
 

extends beyond any adjudication or settlement of the underlying
 

claim. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2018; National Steel Products Co.
 

v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 476, 486; Fellows v.
 

Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 55, 62-63; Popelka, Allard,
 

McCowan & Jones v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 496, 501­

502.)1
 

What is different about public officers, however, is that
 

they are subject to the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code,
 

§§ 6250-6257; "Act")2 which was enacted "for the explicit purpose
 

of 'increasing freedom of information' by giving the public 'access
 

to information in possession of public agencies' [citation]."
 

(C.B.S., Inc. v. Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 651.)
 

While the general policy of the Act is to require the
 

disclosure of government information, it contains exceptions
 

allowing the withholding of government records in limited
 

circumstances. With respect to judicial proceedings, section 6260
 

states:
 

"The provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed
 

in any manner to affect the status of judicial records as
 

it existed immediately prior to the effective date of
 

this section, nor to affect the rights of litigants,
 

including parties to administrative proceedings, under
 

the laws of discovery of this state, nor to limit or
 

impair any rights of discovery in a criminal case."
 

1

In our prior opinion, we described the two categories of the
 

work-product rule; one is a conditional privilege and the other is
 

an absolute privilege. (70 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 28, 32 (1987).) In
 

Fellows v. Superior Court, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d 55, 62-63, the
 

court concluded that continuance of the rule "for subsequent
 

litigation applies both to work product which falls within the
 

conditional portion of the privilege and to work product which
 

falls within the absolute portion of the privilege." (See National
 

Steel Products Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d 476,
 

486-492; Rumac, Inc. v. Bottomley (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 810, 816,
 

fn. 8; Propelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones v. Superior Court, supra,
 

107 Cal.App.3d 496, 501-502; 1 De Meo, Cal. Deposition and
 

Discovery Practice (1987) § 28.06 [3]; 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d
 

ed. 1986) § 1145; Privileges for the Trial and Business Lawyer
 

(Cont.Ed.Bar 1983) § 2.19; Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook
 

(1982) § 41.2.)
 

2

All references hereafter to the Government Code are by
 

section number only.
 

2. 87-704
 
 

In addition to section 6260 (see Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976)
 

17 Cal.3d 107, 124), subdivision (k) of section 6254 specifically
 

exempts from disclosure:
 

"Records the disclosure of which is exempted or
 

prohibited pursuant to provisions of federal or state
 

law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the
 

Evidence Code relating to privilege."
 

In light of these exclusions, it would seem undeniable
 

that the lawyer-client privilege and work-product rule could be
 

relied upon by a public officer to their full extent without
 

concern for the disclosure requirements of the Act. Well-


established principles of statutory construction support such a
 

conclusion. "[E]very statute should be construed with reference to
 

the whole system of law of which it is a part, so that all may be
 

harmonized and have effect." ( Moore v. Panish (1982) 32 Cal.3d
 

535, 541.) "Wherever possible, potentially conflicting provisions
 

should be reconciled . . . ." (Wells v. Marina City Properties,
 

Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 788.) To the extent, then, that a
 

public officer were otherwise able to rely upon the privilege or
 

rule, including extension beyond adjudication or settlement of any
 

underlying claim, the Act appears to allow the assertion of such
 

right.
 

A different exemption provision of the Act, however,
 

somewhat complicates our resolution and forms the basis for the
 

question. Subdivision (b) of section 6254 allows the withholding
 

of government records under the following circumstances:
 

"Records pertaining to pending litigation to which
 

the public agency is a party, or to claims made pursuant
 

to Division 3.6 (commencing with Section 810), until the
 

pending litigation or claim has been finally adjudicated
 

or otherwise settled."3
 

This statutory exemption is temporary; it terminates when "the
 

pending litigation or claim has been finally adjudicated or
 

otherwise settled."
 

In State of California ex rel. Division of Industrial
 

Safety v. Superior Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 778, 783, the Court
 

of Appeal stated with respect to this disclosure exemption:
 

"Subdivision (b) exempts from disclosure records
 

pertaining to pending litigation to which a public agency
 

is a party. This essentially provides public agencies
 

with the protection of the attorney-client privilege,
 

3

The California Tort Claims Act (§§ 810-996.6) governs claims
 

and actions filed against public entities and public employees.
 

3. 87-704
 
including work product, for a limited period while there
 

is ongoing litigation."
 

If subdivision (b) of section 6254 provides public agencies with
 

the protection of the attorney-client privilege and work-product
 

rule, what is the purpose of subdivision (k)?
 

We believe that the Industrial Safety case must be
 

limited to its own unique set of facts. No lawyer-client privilege
 

or work-product rule was being asserted by the public agency;
 

indeed, the court specifically found that the challenged order
 

"does not require the disclosure of any documents or records coming
 

within the attorney-client privilege." (Id. at p. 783.) By use of
 

the word "essentially," the court cannot be said to have equated
 

lawyer-client communications, work-product files, and litigation
 

records. The terms are not coextensive. Just as lawyer-client
 

communications and work-product files are not identical (see 70
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 28, 29-35 (1987)), a record may pertain to
 

pending litigation without being a confidential communication
 

between lawyer and client or produced at the initiative of the
 

attorney in preparation for trial. More importantly, the court
 

gave no indication that the Act purports to cover judicial
 

discovery rules, evidentiary matters, or privileges governed by
 

other statutory schemes.
 

Even assuming that a record came within subdivision (b)
 

of section 6254 and was no longer exempt from disclosure under its
 

provisions, other exemptions contained in the Act must necessarily
 

be considered. No single exemption from public disclosure under
 

the Act controls any other; each requires examination as to its
 

applicability. (See Vallejo v. California Highway Patrol (1979) 89
 

Cal.App.3d 781, 784-787; Berkeley Police Assn. v. City of Berkeley
 

(1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 931, 941; Cook v. Craig (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d
 

773, 782-784; Black Panther Party v. Kehoe (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d
 

645, 652-656.) We are directed to interpret statutes so as to
 

"produce internal harmony, avoid redundancy and accord significance
 

to every word and phrase" (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment
 

Ins. Appeals Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 101, 114); "a statute should not
 

be given a construction that results in rendering one of its
 

provisions nugatory." (People v. Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554, 560.)
 

As one commentator has appropriately observed with respect to the
 

specific provisions of subdivision (b) of section 6254:
 

"The exemption remains applicable until final
 

settlement of the claim, at which time the exemption
 

ceases to apply, and the information must be made
 

available, unless another exemption becomes applicable."
 

(Comment, A Look at the California Public Records Act and
 

its Exemptions (1984) 4 Golden Gate L.Rev. 203, 216,
 

emphasis added.)
 

4. 87-704
 
Accordingly, after pending litigation has been adjudicated or
 

settled, the provisions of subdivision (k) of section 6254 would
 

remain applicable if the material came within the lawyer-client
 

privilege or work-product rule.
 

The lawyer-client privilege is provided in order to
 

promote full disclosure in the relationship between lawyer and
 

client. (See Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 599;
 

City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d
 

227, 235; American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1974) 38
 

Cal.App.3d 579, 593.) For lawyers and specified others, the work-


product rule is to "(1) provide an incentive for thorough
 

preparation of their case for trial, (2) promote the investigation
 

of not only the strengths but also the weaknesses of their case,
 

and (3) prevent one party from taking unfair advantage of another
 

party's industry and efforts." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018, subd.
 

(a); see People v. Collie (1981) Cal.3d 43 Cal.3d 43, 60, fn. 13;
 

National Steel Products Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 164
 

Cal.App.3d 476, 486; Rumac, Inc. v. Bottomley, supra, 143
 

Cal.App.3d 810, 815; Popelka, Allard, McGowan & Jones v. Superior
 

Court, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d 496, 501.) The purposes of the rule
 

and privilege and the full application of each are as important to
 

government lawyers as to those in private practice. (See Holm v.
 

Superior Court (1984) 42 Cal.2d 500, 506-509; City and County of
 

S.F. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d 227, 234-237; City of Long
 

Beach v. Superior Court (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 65, 71-72; People v.
 

Boehm (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 13, 21; Sacramento Newspaper Guild v.
 

Sacramento County Bd. of Suprs. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 41, 53-54;
 

Jessup v. Superior Court (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 102, 107-110.)
 

In answer to the question presented, therefore, we
 

conclude that the lawyer-client privilege and work-product rule,
 

when claimed by a public officer, do not automatically terminate
 

upon settlement or adjudication of the underlying claim.
 

* * * * *
 

5. 87-704