22-6167 

Guzman Mejia v. Garland

BIA

Conroy, IJ

A206 013 780

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 

Square, in the City of New York, on the 15th day of July, two thousand twentyfour. 

PRESENT: 

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

STEVEN J. MENASHI,

EUNICE C. LEE,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________

ARLINGTON NAHUN GUZMAN MEJIA, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 22-6167

NAC

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Zoey Jones, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Services, 

Brooklyn, NY.
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FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General; Anthony P. Nicastro, 

Assistant Director; Jenny C. Lee, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. 

Petitioner Arlington Nahun Guzman Mejia, a native and citizen of

Honduras, seeks review of a March 10, 2022, decision of the BIA affirming an April 

16, 2021, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for 

deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Arlington 

Nahun Guzman Mejia, No. A 206 013 780 (B.I.A. Mar. 10, 2022), aff’g No. A 206 013 

780 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Apr. 16, 2021). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts and procedural history. 

We review the IJ’s decision as supplemented and modified by the BIA. See 

Yan Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2011); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We review factual findings for 

substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. See Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 

191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless 
3 

any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

I. Deferral of removal under the CAT

A CAT applicant has the burden to show that he is “more likely than not to 

be tortured” in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a). 

“Analysis of a CAT claim boils down to a two-step inquiry.” Garcia-Aranda v. 

Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 758 (2d Cir. 2022). An applicant must show that (1) he “will 

more likely than not be subject to ‘any act by which severe pain or suffering, 

whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes 

as . . . intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person,’” and (2) “his . . . likely 

future harm will be ‘inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or 

acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting 

in an official capacity.’” Id. at 759 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)). Acquiescence 

of a public official requires that the official, “prior to the activity constituting 

torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal 

responsibility to intervene to prevent it.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). The applicant 

bears the burden of proving that he is eligible for CAT deferral. Id. § 1208.16(c)(2). 

Guzman Mejia essentially argues that he will be tortured by drug and arms 
4 

traffickers, including his sister’s ex-partner and father of her children. 

Accordingly, he had to establish that it was “more likely than not that local police 

acting under color of law will themselves participate in those likely . . . actions or 

acquiesce in those likely . . . actions.” Garcia-Aranda, 53 F.4th at 761. 

The agency did not err in concluding Guzman Mejia failed to establish that 

Honduran authorities would acquiesce to his torture, and that finding is 

dispositive of his CAT claim. See Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 

2004) (stating that torture requires that “government officials know of or remain 

willfully blind to an act and thereafter breach their legal responsibility to prevent 

it”). Guzman Mejia’s own arrest in Honduras illustrates that police at leastrespond 

to complaints and try to enforce the law. He testified that he was arrested and 

detained in 2004 under a false accusation when an ex-partner filed a complaint 

“out of jealousy”; he was released after a week when the police found no grounds 

to charge him. Cert. Admin. R. 107. In addition, his family previously relied on the 

police to arrest and issue an order of protection against his nephew, whom 

Guzman Mejia alleged was a trafficker who threatened the family. And he did not 

alert the police to other dangers. He did not report his 2005 assault by alleged arms 

traffickers because he believed that his attackers “were going to be even more mad 
5 

because . . . the police themselves were going to notify them” of the complaint. 

However, the police informing the subject of a complaint does not establish that 

police would acquiesce to further attacks (or torture); rather, it indicates that police 

follow the law, which “requires police to inform persons of the grounds for their 

arrest.” Id. at 623 (2019 State Dep’t Rep.). 

Finally, as the agency found, the country conditions evidence reflects both 

corruption and government efforts to combat it. The State Department reported 

widespread government corruption, extrajudicial killings, life-threatening prison 

conditions, and violent crimes committed by gangs and drug traffickers, but also 

that the government is addressing corruption by “arresting and charging members 

of congress, judges, prosecutors, sitting and former senior officials, mayors and 

other local authorities, and police officers.” As evidence of widespread corruption, 

Guzman Mejia cites the U.S. indictment of former Honduran president Juan 

Orlando Hernandez and “a slew of other” officials for taking bribes from drug 

traffickers, but such actions show the country is fighting corruption because 

Honduras authorized the extradition of Hernandez. In sum, given the lack of 

particularized evidence that the police were complicit or ignored complaints 

against Guzman Mejia or his family, the evidence that the police helped his family 
6 

when approached about the nephew, and country conditions evidence of both 

corruption and anti-corruption efforts, the record does not compel a conclusion 

that officials would acquiesce or remain “willfully blind” to Guzman Mejia’s 

torture and “thereafter breach their legal responsibility to prevent it.” Khouzam, 

361 F.3d at 171; see also Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 593 (2d Cir. 2021) 

(holding that when “the agency’s conclusion finds support in record evidence, [a 

petitioner] cannot secure CAT relief by pointing to conflicting evidence that might 

support—but not compel—a different conclusion”). 

II. Due Process

To prevail on a due process claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that he 

was deprived of a “full and fair opportunity” to present his case, Burger v. Gonzales, 

498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007), and resulting prejudice, Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 

531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008).

Guzman Mejia, through counsel, stipulated that he would testify 

consistently with his personal statements, which the IJ noted were detailed, and 

he agreed to answer questions posed by counsel prior to cross examination. The IJ 

gave full weight to his statements as well as to his sister’s written statement 

outlining her abuse by her former partner and her fear for her brother’s return. 
7 

Although the IJ and counsel inititally agreed that Guzman Mejia would limit his 

testimony to half an hour to fill in gaps from his statements, he testified for over 

an hour on direct, followed by cross examination and redirect. Guzman Mejia 

assured the IJ he had understood and heard everything during his testimony, 

despite difficulties with the audio quality. On this record, he has not shown that 

he was deprived of “a full and fair opportunity” to present his case. Burger, 498 

F.3d at 134. 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court