U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Follow-Up Review of the 

Drug Enforcement Administration’s 

Efforts to Control the Diversion of 

Controlled Pharmaceuticals 

July 2006 

I-2006-004 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
U.S. Department of Justice i 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

EXECUTIVE DIGEST 

INTRODUCTION 

The U.S. Department of Justice’s (Department) Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) is the primary agency for enforcing the provisions of 

the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 that pertain to the diversion of 

controlled pharmaceuticals, such as narcotics, stimulants, and depressants, 

and regulated chemicals, such as ephedrine. The DEA’s diversion control 

program seeks to prevent, detect, and investigate the redirection of 

controlled pharmaceuticals from legitimate channels, while ensuring an 

adequate, uninterrupted supply to meet legitimate needs. Controlled 

pharmaceuticals can be diverted from legitimate channels through theft or 

fraud during the manufacturing and distribution process, and can be 

diverted by anyone involved in the process, including medical staff, 

pharmacy staff, and individuals involved in selling or using 

pharmaceuticals. Diversion schemes include physicians selling 

prescriptions, individuals obtaining and using controlled pharmaceuticals 

without a documented medical need, and drug traffickers illegally selling 

pharmaceuticals on the Internet without requiring prescriptions. 

Diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals has dramatically increased in 

recent years, and research on drug usage reflects the growth of the problem. 

According to a 2005 report from the National Center on Addiction and 

Substance Abuse (CASA), the number of people who admitted abusing 

controlled prescription drugs increased by 94 percent over a 10-year period, 

from 7.8 million in 1992 to 15.1 million in 2003.1 This rate of increase was 

seven times faster than the increase in the U.S. population for that same 

period. Further, the 2004 National Survey on Drug Use and Health reported 

that 2.4 million people used prescription pain relievers non-medically for the 

first time within 12 months of the survey – the largest number of new users 

for any type of illicitly used drug.2

The increase in the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals has 

coincided with the emergence of the Internet as a significant source for 

 1 Under the Counter: The Diversion and Abuse of Controlled Prescription Drugs in the 

U.S., National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse of Columbia University, July 

2005. The report uses the term “abuse” to refer to non-medical use of a drug. 

2 The National Survey on Drug Use and Health defines “non-medical use” as the 

use of prescription-type drugs not prescribed for the respondent by a physician or the use 

of a drug only for the experience and feeling it causes. 
U.S. Department of Justice ii 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

 

diverted pharmaceuticals. Hundreds of Internet pharmacies have been 

established through which large amounts of pharmaceuticals can be easily 

purchased with a credit card and without a prescription. According to one 

estimate cited in the 2005 CASA report, the number of Internet pharmacies 

in operation had reached as many as 1,400 at one time. In addition, an 

April 2005 study by comScore Networks reported that 17.4 million people 

visited online pharmacies in the fourth quarter of 2004, an increase of 

14 percent from the previous quarter.3 Sixty-three percent of these Internet 

pharmacies did not require a prescription to obtain controlled substances. 

Furthermore, the head of the DEA’s Miami field division underscored the 

problem of pharmaceutical sales over the Internet in congressional 

testimony in 2004, stating, “And perhaps of the greatest concern, the 

Internet has become a virtual wild west bazaar for ‘spam’ emails and 

website advertisements that sell controlled substances with little or no 

oversight.”4 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this follow-up 

review to assess the DEA’s actions to control pharmaceutical diversion since 

our previous review in October 2002.5 As in our previous review, this 

review does not examine the DEA diversion control program’s regulatory 

activities, or its efforts to prevent the diversion of regulated chemicals. In 

2002, we found that despite the widespread problem of controlled 

pharmaceutical diversion and abuse, the DEA had been slow to commit 

sufficient resources to address the problem. According to interviews with 

DEA personnel cited in our 2002 report, DEA special agents spent only 

3 percent of their total work hours on diversion investigations. In addition, 

we found that because DEA diversion investigators lacked law enforcement 

authority, the lack of special agent assistance negatively affected the quality 

and timeliness of diversion investigations.6 In addition, we found that the 

DEA had not resolved the question of the law enforcement authority for 

3 ComScore is a global market research provider and consultant for Internet usage, 

audience measurement, and e-commerce tracking data. 

4 Testimony of Thomas Raffanello, Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Miami Division, 

DEA, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, February 9, 2004. 

5 See the OIG report entitled Review of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s 

Control of the Diversion of Controlled Pharmaceuticals, I-2002-010, October 2002, 

www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/DEA/e0210/index.htm. 

6 In the 2002 review, the estimate of 3 percent of special agents’ time devoted to 

diversion investigations was based on information obtained from interviews with DEA 

officials. In our 2005 review, we used DEA work hour data to determine how much time 

special agents spent on diversion investigations. 
U.S. Department of Justice iii 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

diversion investigators, provided minimal intelligence support to diversion 

investigators and did not provide specialized training for special agents in 

diversion investigations. 

We made four recommendations in our 2002 review, and the DEA 

concurred with them. We recommended that the DEA: 

• increase investigative resources devoted to the controlled 

pharmaceutical diversion program; 

• ensure adequate training for DEA special agents in diversion 

investigation procedures; 

• clarify the roles, responsibilities, and law enforcement authorities of 

diversion investigators; and 

• fully implement the Online Investigations Project (the DEA’s Internet 

investigative tool) and the diversion intelligence group to provide 

effective intelligence support to the Office of Diversion; also, the DEA 

should continue to explore additional intelligence capabilities to 

support the diversion investigator.

In our current review, we examined (1) the actions taken by the DEA 

to control the diversion of pharmaceuticals since our 2002 review, (2) the 

current amount of law enforcement and intelligence assistance the DEA 

provided for its diversion investigations, and (3) the DEA’s response to the 

growing problem of Internet diversion. To investigate these issues, we 

interviewed the DEA Administrator and Deputy Administrator, and other 

personnel at DEA headquarters and in 13 DEA field offices, analyzed data 

from 7 DEA databases, and reviewed a variety of DEA documents. We also 

surveyed the group supervisors of the DEA’s 68 domestic diversion groups 

regarding the organization of their groups, the law enforcement and 

intelligence support they received, the types of investigations they initiated, 

and their training. 

RESULTS IN BRIEF 

Since our 2002 review, we found that the DEA has taken important 

steps to improve its ability to control the diversion of controlled 

pharmaceuticals, especially pharmaceutical diversion using the Internet. 

However, several shortcomings in the DEA’s diversion control efforts that we 

identified and reported on in 2002 still exist. 

On the positive side, the DEA has added diversion control as a 

strategic goal in its strategic plan for fiscal years (FY) 2003 – 2008, 

reorganized its Operations Division to include law enforcement operations 

for diversion control, and provided additional intelligence resources to 
U.S. Department of Justice iv 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

 

diversion investigators. Further, it increased the number of criminal 

diversion investigations initiated from 770 in FY 2002 to 950 in FY 2005 

and the number of authorized domestic diversion investigators by 75 

positions from 512 in FY 2004 to 587 in FY 2005. In addition, in FY 2005 

the DEA established the first performance measures for its diversion control 

program.7

Moreover, since 2002 the DEA has taken a series of actions to control 

the increasing use of the Internet to divert pharmaceuticals. From FY 2002 

to FY 2005, the DEA increased the percentage of time that diversion 

investigators spent investigating Internet diversion cases from 3 percent to 

11 percent. The DEA also developed an operational strategy for Internet 

investigations that has been used successfully on several large 

pharmaceutical diversion investigations. 

Despite these positive actions, we identified several continuing 

concerns. We found that although the need for special agent assistance 

in diversion investigations had increased significantly since our previous 

review, the time spent by special agents assisting diversion investigations 

still constitutes a small share of their total investigative effort.8 In 

addition, we found that the DEA still had not resolved the complicated 

issue of providing law enforcement authority for its diversion 

investigators, although it is actively pursuing the matter. Further, we 

found that few DEA special agents have received diversion control 

training beyond the 2-hour module provided during basic agent training. 

In addition, the support provided by intelligence analysts to diversion 

groups in the field has continued to be limited, and intelligence analysts 

still received minimal diversion control training. 

With respect to the DEA’s Internet efforts, we examined several of the 

intelligence, technological, and investigative tools that are part of the DEA's 

operational strategy, including the Online Investigations Project (OIP), 

telephone and online hotlines, undercover equipment, and training in 

conducting Internet diversion investigations. We found that the OIP, under 

development since 2001, has become a valuable investigative tool even 

though it cannot automatically identify web sites with the highest volume of 

suspect pharmaceutical sales as originally intended. In addition, since 

2002 the DEA has established telephone and online hotlines for reporting 

7 The 75 positions include diversion personnel in domestic field divisions, as well as 

in headquarters and field support. 

8 Diversion investigators lack law enforcement authority and therefore must depend 

on DEA special agents or other law enforcement officers to perform tasks such as making 

arrests and serving search warrants. 
U.S. Department of Justice v 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

 

suspicious Internet pharmacies. However, these hotlines have yielded few 

leads that resulted in diversion investigations. Further, while the DEA has 

started to provide undercover equipment to its diversion groups, as of May 

2006 most diversion groups still did not have this equipment. And while 

over half of the 482 diversion investigators have received training in Internet 

investigations, most have not received the types of specialized training that 

diversion investigators said would prove useful for conducting Internet 

investigations. 

We now discuss in more detail the DEA improvements in its 

pharmaceutical diversion control efforts as well as continuing areas of 

concern. 

Improvements in the DEA’s Diversion Control Program 

The DEA has taken important steps to help prevent the diversion of 

controlled pharmaceuticals since our last review. For example, the DEA 

made diversion control a strategic goal in its strategic plan for FY 2003 – 

2008. In addition, DEA leaders have expressed the importance of the 

agency’s diversion control efforts. For example, the DEA Administrator 

emphasized the importance of diversion control in a January 2004 cable to 

all field divisions, stating that “stopping the abuse and diversion of 

pharmaceutical controlled substances must be a DEA and Department of 

Justice priority.” The DEA also reorganized its headquarters Operations 

Division in the fall of 2004 so that all criminal enforcement activities, 

including those for diversion control, were centralized in one unit, which 

according to one DEA official gave more visibility and importance to criminal 

diversion investigations.9 

In 2002, we recommended that the DEA increase the investigative 

resources devoted to controlling pharmaceutical diversion. In response, the 

DEA added 75 diversion investigator positions in FY 2004, raising the 

number of authorized diversion investigator positions in the DEA’s domestic 

field divisions by 15 percent. Further, in FY 2006 the DEA received 

41 additional intelligence positions and 23 special agent positions that it 

intends to dedicate to diversion control. 

The DEA also provided diversion investigators with additional 

intelligence resources, including a new searchable analytical database and a 

9 Previously, responsibility for oversight of enforcement operations was divided 

between two DEA headquarters offices, with domestic and foreign enforcement for illicit 

drugs overseen by the Office of Enforcement Operations and diversion control enforcement 

by the Office of Diversion Control. 
U.S. Department of Justice vi 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

 

new unit at DEA headquarters dedicated to supporting investigations that 

involve Internet-based communications. Further, the DEA has made the 

Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS) database, 

which tracks Schedule II controlled substances from point of manufacture 

to retail locations, more timely and accessible to diversion investigators.10 

Between FY 2002 and FY 2005 the DEA increased the number of 

criminal diversion investigations it initiated from 770 to 950, an increase of 

approximately 23 percent. The DEA’s formal diversion control performance 

measures, established in FY 2005, showed that the number of drug 

diversion organizations disrupted increased from 454 to 474 and the 

number of diversion drug organizations dismantled increased from 474 to 

594.11

Diversion of Controlled Pharmaceuticals Using the Internet 

Since 2002, diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals using the Internet 

has increased dramatically, and the DEA has increased the percentage of 

diversion investigators’ time applied to Internet diversion investigations from 

3 percent in FY 2002 to 11 percent in FY 2005. In 2004, the DEA developed 

an operational strategy for Internet-based diversion investigations that 

according to the DEA’s Deputy Administrator has been used successfully in 

several large DEA-led operations.12 Although no DEA personnel specifically 

10 All controlled substances, which include illicit drugs as well as those prescribed 

for medical purposes, are assigned to one of five categories or schedules based upon the 

substance’s medicinal value, harmfulness, and potential for abuse or addiction. Schedule I 

is reserved for the most dangerous drugs that have no recognized medical use, while 

Schedule V is used for the least dangerous drugs. Controlled pharmaceuticals are found in 

Schedules II through V. 

11 The DEA formally measures the performance of its diversion control program by 

the number of diversion drug organizations disrupted (total number of civil fines imposed, 

administrative hearings conducted, letters of admonition issued, and registrations 

suspended or restricted) and by the number of diversion drug organizations dismantled 

(total number of registrations revoked, denied, or surrendered for cause). 

12 The DEA’s Internet strategy contains five elements: (1) targeting and analysis, 

which identifies and investigates suspicious Internet pharmacy activity; (2) technology, 

which develops and implements new resources to collect information about suspicious 

Internet pharmacy activity; (3) legislation, which attempts to change laws either to make 

operating illegal online pharmacies more difficult or to make prosecuting operators of illegal 

online pharmacies easier; (4) demand reduction, which establishes hotlines the public can 

use to report suspicious online pharmacies, public service announcements, and Internet 

sites to educate the public about controlled pharmaceutical abuse; and (5) training and 

education, which develop training courses for DEA personnel, task force officers, and 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 
U.S. Department of Justice vii 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

 

mentioned the Internet strategy to us during our field work, DEA 

headquarters managers informed us that they had presented the strategy to 

field managers during 2005 through a PowerPoint presentation. DEA 

management stated that while field personnel might not have been aware of 

the term “Internet strategy,” many had used the intelligence tools and 

technology that are a part of it. 

We also examined the key intelligence, technological, and investigative 

tools that are a part of the DEA’s Internet strategy. Our review found that 

the Online Investigations Project (OIP), while considered by the DEA to be 

implemented and a viable investigative tool, does not operate as originally 

intended because it cannot automatically identify web sites with the highest 

volume of suspect pharmaceutical sales.13 While the OIP is not able to 

proactively identify the Internet pharmacies receiving the most orders so 

that investigations can be prioritized, the DEA reported that analysts are 

using it to efficiently synthesize large amounts of information about web 

sites that are already under investigation. 

According to DEA managers, the OIP scans information that is 

publicly available on the Internet to find connections between web sites 

under investigation and pertinent information such as addresses, phone 

numbers, e-mail addresses, and other web sites. DEA analysts then 

transfer the OIP’s search results to charts that display these connections 

and provide the charts to field investigators to assist in their investigations. 

Further, in our current review we found that most diversion 

investigators did not have undercover credit cards that would allow them to 

establish undercover identities that could not be traced to the DEA, a tool 

often necessary for conducting Internet investigations. DEA managers 

stated that they were aware of this problem and had conducted a pilot 

undercover credit card program for diversion investigations in three field 

divisions during the fall of 2005. DEA managers said that this pilot 

program was successful and that by June 2006 each DEA field division will 

have three to five undercover credit cards to be used exclusively for 

purchasing pharmaceuticals over the Internet.14 

DEA managers also informed us that the DEA has begun establishing 

a virtual private network that will link its undercover computers in each 

13 The OIP is a computer program that searches the Internet, using key words or 

phrases to identify web sites possibly involved in the diversion of controlled substances. 

14 As of June 8, 2006, 6 of the DEA’s 21 domestic field divisions had at least one 

undercover credit card for diversion investigations and 12 field divisions were still in the 

process of obtaining their first card.
U.S. Department of Justice viii 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

DEA field division to DEA headquarters. They stated that the virtual private 

network has already been implemented in the Atlanta, Phoenix, Los Angeles, 

and Miami field divisions. 

Finally, over half of the 482 diversion investigators on board in 

FY 2005 and assigned to domestic divisions had attended the DEA’s 3-day 

Internet Telecommunications Exploitation training. However, only 7 percent 

had attended the DEA training on financial investigations and conspiracy 

and complex investigations.15 Diversion investigators told us that training 

in these areas was crucial for Internet diversion investigations because 

Internet operations often are dispersed geographically and because the 

anonymity of the Internet allows businesses to easily hide their identity and 

financial transactions. DEA managers stated that training resources are 

limited and that providing Internet Telecommunications Exploitation 

training to diversion investigators is a DEA priority over other training 

courses. 

Continuing Concerns in the DEA’s Diversion Control Program 

Despite the positive steps that the DEA has taken to help prevent the 

diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals since 2002, we identified several 

continuing concerns about the DEA’s diversion control program. These 

concerns are related to inadequate special agent support for diversion 

investigations, slow resolution on the issue of providing law enforcement 

authority to diversion investigators, additional need for intelligence analyst 

support, and the need for additional training for special agents and 

intelligence analysts in pharmaceutical diversion investigations. 

Special Agent Support

We found that even though DEA special agent assistance to diversion 

investigations has increased since 2002, it has remained a small part of 

special agents’ investigative efforts. To assess the amount of special agent 

support for diversion investigations since 2002, we considered five sources 

of evidence: analysis of work hour data related to special agent time spent 

on diversion investigations; analysis of work hour data related to special 

agent time spent on pharmaceutical investigations;16 interviews of DEA 

 

Cont’d. 

15 As of April 2006, 34 percent of special agents and 61 percent of intelligence 

analysts had attended the Internet Telecommunications Exploitation training. 

16 In this review, we refer to diversion investigations as those initiated by diversion 

investigators that can involve controlled pharmaceuticals or regulated chemicals, and that 

can be criminal or regulatory in nature; and pharmaceutical investigations as those that 
U.S. Department of Justice ix 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

 

personnel; DEA Pharmaceutical Threat Assessments;17 and OIG survey 

responses of diversion group supervisors. 

Both work hour data analyses indicated that while the time that 

special agents spent on diversion control increased after our 2002 review, it 

still represented a small amount of special agents’ investigative time. 

Between FY 2002 and FY 2005, the DEA increased the number of work 

years that special agents spent on diversion investigations from 14.8 to 

27.4 work years, an increase of 85 percent. Even with this increase, the 

actual percentage of special agent time spent on diversion investigations 

increased from 0.6 percent to 1.0 percent of their total investigative time 

between FY 2002 and FY 2005. That is, DEA special agents collectively 

spent 1 percent of their total investigative efforts on diversion investigations 

in FY 2005. 

We also found that between FY 2003 and FY 2005 special agents 

increased the number of work years spent on pharmaceutical investigations 

from 26.8 to 57.4 work years, an increase of 114 percent. However, this still 

accounted for only 1.2 percent of the special agents’ total investigative time 

in FY 2003 and 2.2 percent in FY 2005. That is, DEA special agents 

collectively spent approximately 2 percent of their total investigative efforts 

on pharmaceutical investigations in FY 2005. 

Although the investigative time that special agents spent on diversion 

investigations constitutes a small part of their total investigative efforts, we 

found instances of the DEA providing significant special agent support to 

some diversion investigations. For example, in FY 2005 four large diversion 

operations accounted for 22 percent of all special agent work hours on 

criminal diversion pharmaceutical investigations. 

The DEA has recognized the importance of providing special agent 

support to diversion investigators for several years. On August 3, 2001, the 

DEA’s Chief of Operations directed field divisions to assign two special 

agents to each diversion group in every division office. The DEA’s plans 

were delayed when, after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, many 

federal law enforcement agents, including DEA agents, were assigned to 

assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation on various counterterrorism task 

can be initiated by diversion investigators or special agents, must involve controlled 

pharmaceuticals only, and are criminal in nature. 

17 In a January 2004 cable, the DEA Administrator directed the Special Agent in 

Charge of each field division to develop a Pharmaceutical Threat Assessment for the 

division’s region containing information such as statistics about drug prices and use, and 

obstacles to case investigation and prosecution. 
U.S. Department of Justice x 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

forces. However, almost 5 years after the Chief of Operations directive, we 

found that only 6 of the DEA’s 27 diversion groups located in field offices 

had at least 1 special agent position authorized to assist with diversion 

investigations.18 

Some DEA diversion personnel told the OIG that the lack of 

assistance from special agents to perform law enforcement functions, such 

as serving warrants and conducting surveillance, caused diversion 

investigations to be delayed. Other diversion investigators said that they did 

not pursue some investigative leads requiring law enforcement support 

because they assumed that they would not receive special agent assistance. 

Three-quarters of the 62 diversion group supervisors who responded to our 

survey stated that they had to rely on law enforcement support for their 

diversion investigations from state, local, or other federal law enforcement 

personnel rather than from DEA special agents. 

During our review, we also found instances in which diversion 

personnel were very satisfied with their working relationships with DEA 

special agents. This was the case primarily in field divisions that assigned 

special agents and diversion investigators to the same group or where the 

field division had been involved in a major diversion control operation. 

Diversion Control Training for Special Agents

Our current review also found that during the past 3 years DEA 

special agents have received minimal diversion control training. In 2004, 

the DEA created a week-long Special Agent Diversion School. According to 

the DEA, as of April 2006 a total of 98 special agents had attended the 

school.19 DEA officials stated that they intend eventually to send all special 

agents who assist with diversion investigations to this school; however, 

according to DEA officials, no additional sessions of this training will be 

conducted in FY 2006. Currently, the only diversion training that all DEA 

special agents receive is a 2-hour session included in basic agent training 

that consists of a video produced in 1996 and a general overview of the 

DEA’s diversion control program.20 

 18 One of the 27 diversion groups did not respond to our survey.

19 In addition, DEA officials informed us that 11 special agents have attended a 

seminar on the development and prosecution of diversion/Internet investigations and that 

34 percent (1,699) of all DEA special agents have attended the DEA’s three-day Internet 

Telecommunications Exploitation Program, which includes a module on Internet pharmacy 

investigations. 

20 DEA officials told us that they are currently updating this video. 
U.S. Department of Justice xi 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Enforcement Authority for Diversion Investigators

In 2002, we found that the DEA had failed to resolve the question of 

whether diversion investigators should receive law enforcement authority, 

and we recommended that the DEA clarify diversion investigator’s roles, 

responsibilities, and law enforcement authority. We found that since our 

2002 review the DEA has taken actions to reclassify the diversion 

investigator position to one with law enforcement authority, but that 

conversion has not yet been accomplished. 

In January 2003, the DEA submitted an initial proposal to the 

Department to reclassify its diversion investigators from a non-law 

enforcement job series to a criminal investigative job series with law 

enforcement authority. DEA officials informed us that throughout 2004 and 

2005 they pursued this effort by meeting regularly with Department officials 

who had to review and approve the proposal. In September 2005, the DEA 

submitted a final proposal to reclassify diversion investigators to a new 

position that would give them law enforcement authority and allow them to 

conduct criminal investigations. However, as of June 1, 2006, the 

Department, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Office of 

Management and Budget have yet to approve the request. 

In addition to obtaining approval, reclassifying DEA diversion 

investigators to law enforcement officers will also require an increase in the 

Diversion Control Fee Account.21 Even if the DEA’s conversion proposal is 

approved and funded, DEA officials estimate that it will take an additional 

18 months to recruit, hire, and train new personnel and 9 months to 

reclassify, train, and assign eligible current diversion investigators. 

Therefore, despite the DEA’s efforts, diversion investigators are not likely to 

receive law enforcement authority anytime soon. We believe that until the 

DEA receives approval and fully implements this initiative, it needs to 

ensure that its diversion investigators receive sufficient special agent 

support.

 

Intelligence Analyst Assistance

Since our 2002 review, the DEA has increased the amount of 

intelligence resources (such as searchable analytical databases) available to 

diversion investigators. However, we found that the assistance that 

 21 The Diversion Control Fee Account (DCFA) is administered by the DEA to recover 

the full costs of operating the various aspects of the DEA’s diversion control program. The 

DCFA is funded by registration fees paid by all manufacturers, distributors, dispensers, 

importers, and exporters of controlled substances and List I chemicals. 
U.S. Department of Justice xii 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

intelligence analysts provide field investigators for diversion investigations 

has remained limited. 

In 2002, we recommended that the DEA provide effective intelligence 

support to the diversion control program. We learned in both our previous 

and current reviews that assistance from intelligence analysts is particularly 

important in diversion control cases because of the increasingly complex 

nature of diversion investigations, especially diversion using the Internet. 

The DEA concurred with our recommendation, and over the past several 

years the amount of time intelligence analysts spent assisting diversion 

investigations increased by 143 percent, from 2.5 work years in FY 2002 to 

6.0 work years in FY 2005. The amount of time that intelligence analysts 

spent assisting criminal pharmaceutical investigations increased from 

3.4 work years in FY 2003 to 11.4 work years in FY 2005. Yet, despite this 

increase, overall intelligence analysts spent 1.7 percent of their total 

criminal investigative time on diversion investigations in FY 2003 and 

5.3 percent in FY 2005. 

Similar to special agent time spent on diversion cases, we found that 

the DEA provided significant intelligence support for several major diversion 

investigations. For example, in FY 2005 four large diversion operations 

accounted for 44 percent of all intelligence analyst work hours on criminal 

pharmaceutical investigations. 

 None of the 62 diversion groups that responded to our survey said 

they had a field intelligence analyst assigned to them, even though we found 

instances in which intelligence analysts were assigned to special agent 

enforcement groups investigating illicit drugs. As a result, diversion 

investigators told us they had to develop their own intelligence by gathering 

information from databases and other sources. Further, 55 percent of the 

survey respondents reported that the lack of intelligence support sometimes 

or often delayed investigations. 

We spoke to DEA managers about diversion investigators’ perceived 

lack of intelligence support. They explained that previously, intelligence 

analysts were often assigned to, and provided support to, specific 

enforcement groups, which gave the enforcement groups direct access to 

intelligence support, whereas diversion groups, on the other hand, had 

indirect access. However, recently DEA field divisions have begun to provide 

intelligence support based on the priority of the investigation, regardless of 

whether the investigation involves illegal drugs or controlled 

pharmaceuticals. 

Finally, we found that intelligence analysts received minimal training 

focusing on the diversion of pharmaceuticals. Currently, the only training 

that intelligence analysts receive in diversion control is a 2-hour module 
U.S. Department of Justice xiii 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

included in their basic training, which represents only 0.5 percent of the 

training hours for intelligence analysts. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Since our last review, the DEA has taken important steps to improve 

its ability to control the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals, including 

efforts to control diversion using the Internet. However, several 

shortcomings in the DEA’s diversion control program that we identified and 

reported in 2002 still exist today. On the positive side, the DEA has added 

diversion control as a strategic goal in its FY 2003 – 2008 strategic plan, 

reorganized its Operations Division to include law enforcement operations 

for diversion control, provided additional intelligence resources to 

investigators, and increased its authorized domestic diversion investigator 

positions by 15 percent from FY 2002 to FY 2005. The DEA also increased 

the number of criminal diversion investigations initiated by 23 percent since 

issuance of our 2002 report and established the first performance measures 

for the diversion control program in FY 2005. Finally, the DEA has 

increased the percentage of time diversion investigators spend investigating 

diversion using the Internet and developed an operational strategy for 

Internet investigations. 

Overall, we found that the DEA had increased the amount of special 

agents’ time devoted to diversion control since our last review. Nonetheless, 

this still represents a very small percentage of special agent time, and the 

need for special agent assistance in diversion cases has increased. In 

addition, while 34 percent (1,699) of all DEA special agents have attended 

Internet training applicable to Internet diversion investigations, only 98 of 

5,013 special agents have attended the DEA’s week-long course specifically 

addressing diversion. We also found that the DEA has not ensured that 

diversion investigators have the necessary tools and training to conduct 

successful investigations involving diversion using the Internet. Finally, 

with the growing threat of diversion using the Internet and the overall 

growth of pharmaceutical diversion in general, the need for intelligence 

analyst support for diversion control has increased. However, similar to 

what we found in our previous review, intelligence analyst assistance 

remains limited in the field and training for intelligence analysts is minimal. 

We are making six recommendations to help the DEA improve its 

ability to address the growing problem of diversion of controlled 

pharmaceuticals. 
U.S. Department of Justice xiv 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

We recommend that the DEA: 

1. Provide diversion investigators with adequate special agent support 

until the conversion of the DEA diversion investigator position to 

one with law enforcement authority is fully implemented. 

2. Ensure that DEA special agents who frequently assist with 

diversion investigations attend the week-long diversion training 

school. 

3. Provide training to intelligence analysts on topics that would 

effectively support diversion investigations. 

4. Update the diversion control training video used in the special 

agent and intelligence analyst training academies to include 

current issues such as diversion using the Internet. 

5. Ensure that diversion investigators receive training in skills 

necessary for conducting Internet investigations, such as financial 

investigations. 

6. Fully implement the program to provide undercover credit cards to 

diversion investigators. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE DIGEST .............................................................................i

BACKGROUND .....................................................................................1

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY............................................12

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW.................................................................16

Improvements in the DEA’s Pharmaceutical Diversion Control 

 Program.......................................................................................... 16

 

 Diversion of Controlled Pharmaceuticals Using the Internet............. 20

 Continuing Concerns in the DEA’s Diversion Control Program......... 27

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................................40

APPENDIX I: GROUP SUPERVISOR QUESTIONNAIRE..........................42

APPENDIX II: SCOPE OF THE OIG REVIEW REGARDING CONTROLLED 

SUBSTANCES AND COMMODITIES.....................................................53

APPENDIX III: DEA’S RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT .......................56

APPENDIX IV: OIG’S ANALYSIS OF DEA’S RESPONSE .......................66
BACKGROUND 

Introduction 

On October 27, 1970, the Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug 

Abuse Prevention and Control Act (P.L. 91-513, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.). 

According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Title II of this Act, 

the Controlled Substances Act, is a “consolidation of numerous laws 

regulating the manufacture and distribution of narcotics, stimulants, 

depressants, hallucinogens, anabolic steroids, and chemicals used in the 

illicit production of controlled substances” and is “the legal foundation of 

the government’s fight against drugs and other substances.”22 The Act also 

regulates all legal and illegal substances that are recognized as having 

potential for abuse or addiction. 

The DEA is charged with enforcing the Controlled Substances Act, 

including the regulation of controlled pharmaceuticals and regulated 

chemicals. Specifically, the DEA’s diversion control program oversees and 

regulates the legal manufacture and distribution of controlled 

pharmaceuticals, which include narcotics such as codeine and methadone, 

stimulants such as amphetamine, and depressants such as diazepam; and 

regulated chemicals, which include pseudo ephedrine and ephedrine. 

The Controlled Substances Act requires registration with the DEA by 

all businesses that import, export, manufacture, or distribute controlled 

substances; all health care practitioners entitled to dispense, administer, or 

prescribe controlled pharmaceuticals; and all pharmacies entitled to fill 

prescriptions. Registrants must comply with a series of regulatory 

requirements relating to security, record keeping and accountability, and 

adherence to published standards. The DEA can deny, suspend, or revoke 

a registration for several reasons, including professional license sanctions 

(by state authorities), prior federal or state convictions, or a registrant’s 

incompatibility with the public interest. 

Controlled Pharmaceutical Diversion 

Controlled pharmaceuticals are used legitimately by a large share of 

the American public and are found in legitimate places such as doctors’ 

offices and pharmacies. However, they can be diverted intentionally or 

unintentionally by doctors, pharmacists, dentists, nurses, veterinarians, 

and individual users. Diversion cases may involve physicians who sell 

prescriptions to drug dealers or abusers, pharmacists who falsify records to 

 22 DEA overview on the Controlled Substances Act, www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/csa.htm. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

1 
obtain and then sell pharmaceuticals, employees who steal from physician 

or pharmacy inventories, individuals who forge prescriptions, individuals 

who commit armed robbery of pharmacies and drug distributors, “doctor 

shoppers” who routinely visit multiple doctors complaining of the same 

ailment to obtain multiple prescriptions for controlled substances, and 

individuals who establish Internet pharmacies that sell controlled 

pharmaceuticals without requiring prescriptions. 

 The abuse of controlled pharmaceuticals can be as dangerous as the 

abuse of illicit drugs. Both can result in addiction, overdoses, and deaths. 

Moreover, the emergence of illicit Internet pharmacies has increased the 

availability of controlled pharmaceuticals by facilitating an easy purchase 

with a credit card and without a prescription. 

Scope of Diversion 

In recent years, the amount of controlled pharmaceuticals diverted 

from legal channels has increased significantly. Statistics from the National 

Drug Intelligence Center show that between calendar years 2000 and 2003, 

thefts of pharmaceuticals increased by 15.7 percent.23 According to a 

July 2005 report from the National Center on Addiction and Substance 

Abuse of Columbia University (CASA), the number of people who admitted 

abusing controlled prescription drugs increased by 94 percent, from 

7.8 million in 1992 to 15.1 million in 2003.24 This rate of increase was 

seven times faster than the increase in the U.S. population for that same 

period. Additionally, the 2004 National Survey on Drug Use and Health 

reported that 2.4 million people used prescription pain relievers nonmedically for the first time within the past 12 months.25 This number was 

the largest number of new users for any type of illicitly used drug during 

that same time period. 

The abuse of controlled pharmaceuticals rivals the abuse of illicit 

drugs. For example, the CASA report stated that more people reported 

abusing prescription drugs (15.1 million) in 2003 than abusing illicit drugs, 

 23 National Drug Threat Assessment 2005, National Drug Intelligence Center, 

February 2005. 

24 Under the Counter: The Diversion and Abuse of Controlled Prescription Drugs in the 

U.S., National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse of Columbia University, July 

2005. The report uses the term “abuse” to refer to non-medical use of a drug. 

25 The National Survey on Drug Use and Health defines non-medical use as the use 

of prescription-type drugs not prescribed for the respondent by a physician or the use of a 

drug only for the experience and feeling it causes. The CASA report uses the term abuse to 

refer to non-medical use of a drug. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

2 
such as cocaine, hallucinogens, inhalants, and heroin (12.3 million). From 

2002 to 2003, the number of people in the U.S. population who reported 

using heroin at least once in their lifetime remained constant, while the 

number who reported using Oxycodone non-medically increased by 

1.9 million users. A 2005 DEA report on prescription drug diversion stated 

that “twenty-two million Americans suffer from substance dependence or 

abuse, with the non-medical use of prescription drugs ranking second only 

to marijuana as the most prevalent category of drug abuse.”26 

In 2005, Congress emphasized its concern regarding the diversion of 

controlled pharmaceuticals. The House Report on the Justice Department’s 

fiscal year (FY) 2005 appropriations stated that while more than 6 million 

Americans abused prescription drugs, the “DEA has demonstrated a lack of 

effort to address this problem.” The report also stated that the DEA was 

expected to work “to ensure a coordinated government-wide approach to 

address prescription drug diversion . . . [and that the] Department of Justice 

is directed to submit quarterly reports describing its efforts to address 

prescription drug diversion.”27 The House Report on the Justice 

Department's FY 2006 appropriations repeated the concerns from the 

previous year. The final appropriation for FY 2006 included an additional 

$8.8 million and 41 positions for the DEA to improve intelligence support 

and $4.7 million and 23 positions for additional agents to assist diversion 

control.28 

One specific area in which diversion recently has increased 

dramatically is through the use of the Internet. According to one estimate 

cited in the CASA report, the number of Internet pharmacies in operation at 

any one time has reached as high as 1,400.29 Additionally, a study by 

comScore Networks reported that 17.4 million people visited an online 

pharmacy in the fourth quarter of 2004, an increase of 14 percent from the 

previous quarter.30 Sixty-three percent of these sites did not require a 

prescription to obtain controlled substances. 

 26 DEA, Prescription Drug Diversion, June 2005. 

 

27 H.R. Rep. No. 108-576 (July 1, 2004). 

28 H.R. Rep. No. 109-118 (June 10, 2005). 

29 Each of these pharmacies may have been represented by multiple web sites. 

30 ComScore is a global market research provider and consultant for Internet usage, 

audience measurement, and e-commerce tracking data. The study is at 

www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=571. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

3 
Three recent high-profile DEA-led Internet investigations indicate the 

scope of the problem of pharmaceutical diversion using the Internet. In 

April 2005, Operation Cyber Chase targeted an organization suspected of 

illegally distributed approximately 2.5 million dosage units of controlled 

pharmaceuticals per month over the Internet. Operation Cyber Chase was 

an international operation involving two DEA field divisions and one DEA 

foreign office, and resulted in the arrest of 26 people in four countries. It 

also resulted in the seizure of 10 million dosage units of controlled 

pharmaceuticals, 231 pounds of an animal tranquilizer (ketamine), and 

$8.5 million. 

In September 2005, Operation CybeRx dismantled an organization 

that was averaging more than $50,000 a day in profits from an illegal 

Internet-based enterprise. The Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Dallas 

Field Division dedicated the entire staff of the Fort Worth field office to 

Operation CybeRx for 71⁄2 months. The operation resulted in 19 arrests, 

suspension orders against 20 pharmacies and physicians, and the seizure of 

$16.8 million in cash and property. 

In December 2005, Operation Gear Grinder targeted eight major 

steroid manufacturing companies whose combined illicit Internet sales of 

steroids smuggled from Mexico totaled $56 million a year. These companies 

were the source of 82 percent of all steroids seized in the Unites States and 

analyzed by DEA laboratories. Operation Gear Grinder took place over 21 

months and resulted in 9 arrests. 

Impact of Diversion

The DEA Administrator noted the consequences of non-medical 

pharmaceutical use in a 2004 cable to DEA employees, stating that “the 

diversion and abuse of legal controlled substances poses a significant threat 

to the health and safety of Americans.” In 2005 congressional testimony, 

the DEA’s Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion 

Control, also stated that: 

 

The non-medical use of prescription drugs has become an 

increasingly widespread and serious problem in the United 

States. A new generation of high dose, extended release, opioid 

pain medications have taken the existing threat to a new level. 

The abuse and diversion statistics are alarming. . . . These 

powerful drugs provide strong incentives for diversion through 

new means, such as “rogue” Internet pharmacies, as well as 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

4 
older methods, like prescriptions for profit. Recent drug use 

surveys have highlighted the gravity of this problem.31 

The DEA’s Diversion Control Program

The DEA’s diversion control program has two main functions: 

• Regulatory – Oversight of all registrants that provide controlled 

pharmaceutical products to the public to ensure that they are 

complying with the requirements of the Controlled Substances Act. 

• Enforcement – Responsibility for identifying, investigating, and 

penalizing (administratively, civilly, or criminally) those persons 

responsible for diversion, whether through willfully negligent or 

criminal acts. 

The DEA’s diversion control activities are directed and supported from 

DEA headquarters but are conducted primarily through the DEA’s field 

divisions and offices. The DEA headquarters Office of Diversion Control 

coordinates regulatory activities, the Pharmaceutical Investigations Section 

in the Office of Enforcement Operations manages the enforcement 

functions, and the Special Operations Division provides assistance with 

Internet investigations (Chart 1). 

 31 Statement of Joseph Rannazzisi, Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, DEA, before the House Committee on Government Reform, 

Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs, Status of the Efforts of the FDA and DEA in regulating 

Schedule II Prescription Painkillers, Specifically OxyContin® and Other Opioid Analgesics, 

September 13, 2005. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

5 
Chart 1: Subset of the Overall DEA Organization Chart 

DEA 

Administrator

Human 

Resources 

Division 

Operations 

Division 

Intelligence 

Division 

Financial 

Management 

Division 

Executive 

Policy & 

Strategic 

Planning Staff 

Office of 

Diversion 

Control 

Office of 

Enforcement 

Operations 

Special 

Operations 

Division 

Office of 

Special 

Intelligence 

El Paso 

Intelligence 

Center 

Office of 

Resource 

Management 

Operational 

Support 

Division 

Inspection 

Division 

Source: The DEA 

Diversion Control Program Structure in DEA Headquarters

Office of Diversion Control. The Office of Diversion Control is located 

within the DEA’s Operations Division. Until the fall of 2004, the Office of 

Diversion Control was the primary headquarters element responsible for 

both the regulatory and enforcement functions of diversion control. In the 

fall of 2004, the DEA relocated the enforcement functions of diversion 

control to the Office of Enforcement Operations and certain Internet 

investigative assistance to the Special Operations Division. Currently, the 

Office of Diversion Control provides policy direction, program guidance, and 

support to DEA diversion control staff in the field. It also coordinates all 

regulatory activities, such as working with registrants, potential registrants, 

and members of the community to help prevent the diversion of controlled 

pharmaceuticals. 

In addition, the Office of Diversion Control manages two systems that 

allow the public to report suspicious Internet pharmacies. The first is the 

Unlawful Medical Internet Reporting Effort (UMPIRE) accessed from the 

DEA’s web site, and the second is the 1-877-RxAbuse telephone hotline. A 

report received through the web site or hotline is forwarded to the DEA field 

division located in the area where the complaint originated. 

The E-Commerce Section of the Office of Diversion Control maintains 

two databases that are used at headquarters and in the field and serve as 

analytical tools for diversion investigators. The Automation of Reports and 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

6 
sold 

d 

Office of Enforcement Operations

Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS) database contains information from 

the pharmaceutical industry such as the path of Schedule II controlled 

substances from point of manufacture to retail locations where they are 

to consumers.32 The E-Commerce Section provides quarterly and yearly 

ARCOS reports to the field showing the most-ordered Schedule II controlle

pharmaceuticals and regulated chemicals in certain geographic areas. The 

second database is an analytical search tool developed by the DEA and 

private industry. Implementation of this database began in 2004, and 

currently all DEA field divisions have access. 

. The Office of Enforcement 

Opera

 cable 

is 

ns 

ield 

pecial Operations Division

tions’ Pharmaceutical Investigations Section (OEP) in DEA 

headquarters oversees diversion investigations. As described in a

from DEA headquarters to DEA staff worldwide in the fall of 2004, “OEP 

responsible for all domestic and international, criminal and/or complaint 

investigations of pharmaceutical controlled substances. . . . OEP will 

provide operational support to domestic field divisions’ . . . investigatio

and other domestic projects having a pharmaceutical nexus.” Diversion 

investigators in the unit who serve as staff coordinators monitor several f

divisions and serve as the divisions’ contact for funding requests, receive 

and monitor reports of investigations from the field, and coordinate multijurisdictional investigations. 

S . The Special Operations Division, 

through its Pharmaceutical and Chemical Internet Coordination unit 

net 

rs. 

he Special Operations Division also responds to requests from the 

field fo

stated 

 

established in the fall of 2004, supports the field by coordinating Inter

investigations, providing administrative support, and providing a liaison 

between the field and certain intelligence resources located at headquarte

The Special Operations Division ensures that all investigators who are 

considering investigating a particular web site are aware of other DEA 

investigative activities associated with the site. 

T

r intelligence information pertaining to specific web sites as part of 

the DEA’s Online Investigations Project (OIP).33 In July 2003, in a 

memorandum to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the DEA 

32 All controlled substances, which include illicit drugs as well as those prescribed 

for medical purposes, are assigned to one of five categories or schedules based upon the 

substance's medicinal value, harmfulness, and potential for abuse or addiction. Schedule I 

is reserved for the most dangerous drugs that have no recognized medical use, while 

Schedule V is used for the least dangerous drugs. Controlled pharmaceuticals are found in 

Schedules II through V. 

33 The OIP is a computer program that searches the Internet, using key words or 

phrases to identify web sites possibly involved in the diversion of controlled substances.

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

7 
 sites 

 the 

 Diversion Control Program Structure in the Field

that the OIP was intended to be a “state of the art data mining and 

warehousing system capable of rapidly detecting public domain web

offering the illicit sale of controlled substances” that would “identify 

pharmacies and other businesses conducting illegal transactions via

web.” 

he DEA domestic field structure consists of 21 field division offices, 

each h

Diversion investigators, special agents, and intelligence analysts are 

the th

Diversion investigators

T

eaded by a SAC, and 234 sub-offices located throughout the United 

States. Sixty-three of these offices and sub-offices have a diversion control 

group of investigators led by a supervisor. As of June 2005, 482 of 535 

diversion investigators were assigned to DEA domestic field divisions; the

remaining positions were in headquarters and in foreign field offices. 

ree types of employees in DEA field offices that have primary roles in 

diversion investigations. The role of each is described below. 

. Diversion investigators conduct regulatory 

tasks,

iversion investigators’ regulatory tasks include conducting onsite 

pre-registration investigations of all applicants proposing to manufacture, 

ers, and 

 addition, diversion investigators perform tasks to prevent and deter 

the di

d 

ng 

 drug 

 control 

 

 educate the public, coordinate with the pharmaceutical industry, 

work with state and local officials engaged in diversion control, and 

investigate pharmaceutical diversion. 

D

distribute, import, or export controlled substances, or to operate a narcotic

treatment program as required by the Controlled Substances Act. The Act 

also requires that the DEA conduct cyclic investigations of all 

pharmaceutical manufacturers, distributors, importers, export

narcotic treatment programs.34 

In

version of pharmaceuticals. They engage in demand reduction 

activities, such as giving presentations to community organizations an

institutions about the dangers of non-medical pharmaceutical use, traini

industry in how to comply with pertinent regulations of the Controlled 

Substance Act, assisting businesses seeking to register with the DEA, 

reviewing pharmaceutical labels, reviewing pharmaceutical companies’

promotion and risk management plans, and establishing quotas for 

controlled substances. Diversion investigators also provide diversion

training to state and local officials and collaborate with states on their 

34 Currently, these cyclic investigations take place every 5 years. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

8 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs.35 The DEA Diversion Investigators 

Manual directs diversion investigators to spend 45 percent of their time on 

these and other regulatory activities. 

Diversion investigators also investigate and take action against 

diverters of controlled pharmaceuticals. Diversion investigators initiate 

investigations through the detection of violations or irregularities uncovered 

during pre-registration or cyclic investigations, from complaints received 

from members of the public or registrants, or from leads received through 

intelligence sources. Targets of diversion investigations can be doctors, 

pharmacists, drug organizations, or individuals. The DEA Diversion 

Investigators Manual directs diversion investigators to spend 55 percent of 

their time on enforcement activities. 

Diversion investigators are not criminal investigators and cannot 

perform law enforcement functions such as serving warrants, conducting 

surveillance, managing confidential informants, and working undercover. 

Diversion investigators rely on special agents or other law enforcement 

personnel when tasks requiring law enforcement authority are necessary. 

 

Special agents. Special agents either are assigned permanently to 

assist diversion groups or are assigned temporarily to assist diversion 

groups on specific investigations or tasks when requested. Special agents 

assist diversion investigators by performing investigative tasks that require 

law enforcement authority such as surveillance, registering and working 

with confidential informants, serving search warrants, and making arrests. 

Tactical Diversion Squads. In 1996, the DEA created Tactical 

Diversion Squads. The squads are composed of diversion investigators, 

special agents, and state and local law enforcement personnel who work on 

retail-level diversion cases, such as investigations of prescription forgers 

and doctor shoppers. Tactical Diversion Squads currently are located in the 

following five DEA field divisions: Denver, St. Louis, Houston, New Orleans, 

and Boston. 

Intelligence analysts. Intelligence analysts also assist diversion 

investigations. The primary functions of intelligence analysts are to collect, 

collate, research, and analyze all available information on a particular 

operation, investigation, organization, drug-related issue, program, or 

 35 Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs are systems in which controlled 

pharmaceutical prescription data are submitted to a centralized database administered by 

an authorized state agency. These programs are designed to help prevent and detect the 

diversion and abuse of controlled pharmaceutical substances, particularly at the retail level 

where no other automated information collection system exists. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

9 
project. They assist diversion investigators by analyzing data collected 

through wiretaps or prescription records, preparing background profiles on 

investigative targets, and performing database checks. Intelligence analysts 

provide three primary types of support: 36

 

• Investigative – Assistance for ongoing cases, including telephone toll 

analysis, financial analysis, and debriefings of confidential 

informants; 

• Tactical – Information such as identification of “traffickers, 

conveyances, methods of operation, and the movement of drugs” that 

allows immediate enforcement action to take place, such as arrests 

and seizures; and 

• Strategic – Complex predictive and descriptive research and analysis 

regarding drug trafficking trends and issues. 

Previous OIG Report on Pharmaceutical Diversion 

 

 The 2002 OIG review of the DEA’s pharmaceutical diversion control 

program concluded that the DEA’s enforcement efforts had not adequately 

addressed the problem of controlled pharmaceutical diversion.37 

Specifically, we found that despite the widespread problem of controlled 

pharmaceutical diversion and abuse, the DEA had been slow to commit 

sufficient resources to address the problem. According to the DEA, special 

agents spent only 3 percent of their total work hours on diversion 

investigations, and the lack of special agent assistance negatively affected 

the quality and timeliness of diversion investigations (since diversion 

investigators lack law enforcement authority).38 In addition, the DEA had 

failed to resolve the question of the law enforcement authority for diversion 

investigators, provided minimal intelligence support to diversion 

investigators, and did not provide specialized training for special agents in 

diversion investigations. 

In the 2002 review, we made four recommendations, and the DEA 

concurred with all four. First, we recommended that the DEA increase 

investigative resources devoted to the controlled pharmaceutical diversion 

 36 Intelligence Program Policy Order 00-200, Responsibilities of Intelligence Analysts, 

November 1999. 

37 See the OIG report entitled Review of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s 

Control of the Diversion of Controlled Pharmaceuticals, I-2002-010, October 2002, 

www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/DEA/e0210/index.htm. 

38 This 3 percent figure was based on information from interviews with DEA 

officials. In the current review, we used DEA work hour data to determine how much time 

special agents spent on diversion investigations. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

10
program. Subsequently, the DEA obtained approval in its FY 2004 budget 

for 75 additional diversion investigator positions.39 Second, we 

recommended that the DEA ensure adequate training for special agents in 

diversion investigation procedures. In response, the DEA implemented a 

week-long course on diversion investigation operations for special agents 

who assist with diversion investigations. 

The third recommendation was for the DEA to clarify the roles, 

responsibilities, and law enforcement authorities of diversion investigators. 

On September 6, 2005, the DEA approved the reclassification of diversion 

investigator positions to positions with law enforcement authority and is 

now awaiting approval by the Department, the Office of Personnel 

Management, and the Office of Management and Budget for the 

reclassification. Finally, we recommended that the DEA fully implement the 

Online Investigations Project and the diversion intelligence group to provide 

effective intelligence support to the Office of Diversion, and that the DEA 

continue to explore additional intelligence capabilities to support the 

diversion investigators. The DEA has stated that the Online Investigations 

Project is now fully implemented and that “although the OIP does not 

perform in the manner originally intended (a push button system without 

any user interaction), it has developed into a viable investigative tool that is 

assisting field personnel in Internet investigations.”40 The DEA also 

received 40 additional field and headquarters intelligence analyst positions 

and one intelligence support position located in the Special Operations 

Division in its FY 2006 appropriation. 

 39 The remaining positions are DEA special agent positions. 

40 The DEA’s December 20, 2005, response to the OIG’s 2002 review. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

11
PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 

Purpose 

The OIG conducted this review as a follow-up to our October 2002 

review, which assessed the DEA’s actions to control pharmaceutical 

diversion. This current review examined the changes to the DEA’s efforts to 

manage the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals in response to the 

recommendations made in the previous report. Specifically, this review 

assessed: 

• the DEA’s actions in pharmaceutical diversion control since our 2002 

review, 

• the amount of law enforcement and intelligence assistance the DEA 

provided for diversion investigations, and 

• the DEA’s response to the growing problem of Internet diversion. 

Scope 

 

Our review examined the DEA’s enforcement efforts to control 

pharmaceutical diversion since our October 2002 report through FY 2005. 

We limited our data analyses to the DEA’s domestic field divisions and 

offices, except in our analysis of diversion using the Internet where we 

considered all diversion work hours because Internet diversion crosses 

national boundaries. We did not assess the diversion control program’s 

regulatory function and did not examine its enforcement efforts against the 

diversion of regulated chemicals.41

Methodology 

To examine the DEA’s pharmaceutical diversion control program, we 

reviewed federal laws, DEA policies and procedures, documentation related 

to the DEA’s pharmaceutical diversion control efforts. To obtain information 

on pharmaceutical abuse trends, we analyzed drug use studies from the 

National Survey on Drug Abuse and Heath, Monitoring the Future, the Drug 

Abuse Warning Network, a July 2005 report by the National Center on 

Addiction and Substance Abuse of Columbia University, and other sources. 

 41 The DEA’s regulated chemical control responsibilities originated with passage of 

the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act (CDTA) in 1988. The CDTA and subsequent 

amendments in 1993 have placed 34 chemicals “under control,” including ephedrine, 

pseudo ephedrine, and red phosphorous. The CDTA also [“regulates”] equipment used in 

the production of controlled substances, such as machines that form tablets. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

12
Field work. We interviewed DEA headquarters staff, including the 

DEA Administrator and Deputy Administrator; the Chief of Operations; the 

Chief of Intelligence; the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion 

Control; the Special Agent in Charge of training; the Special Agent in Charge 

of the Special Operations Division; personnel within the Office of Diversion 

Control, the Special Operations Division, and the Pharmaceutical 

Investigations Section within the Operations Division; personnel within the 

Office of Special Intelligence and the El Paso Intelligence Center within the 

Intelligence Division; personnel within the Office of Resource Management 

within the Financial Management Division; and personnel within the 

Human Resources Division and on the Executive Policy and Strategic 

Planning Staff. 

We also conducted site visits to eight DEA field offices: Washington, 

D.C.; Baltimore, Maryland; New York City and Long Island, New York; 

Miami and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida; and Denver and Colorado Springs, 

Colorado. We selected the Miami Field Division because it was 

recommended by the DEA during the entrance conference for this review 

and by numerous interviewees as being very active in Internet diversion 

investigations, the New York Field Division because it had recently split 

diversion regulatory and enforcement functions into two separate groups 

where the diversion enforcement group was composed of special agents and 

diversion investigators, and the Denver Field Division because it had a 

Tactical Diversion Squad and was recommended to us in an interview as 

actively working with the Special Operations Division. 

During this review we interviewed special agents in charge, associate 

and assistant special agents in charge, special agents, diversion program 

managers, diversion group supervisors, diversion investigators, group 

assistants, intelligence group supervisors, intelligence analysts, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, and state and local law enforcement officers who 

collaborated with the DEA in diversion investigations. 

We also attended presentations on the history of the structure and 

threat of diversion, DEA’s online pharmacy trafficking strategy, intelligence 

support for Internet investigations, intelligence technology supporting 

Internet pharmacy investigations, Internet public awareness, Internet 

training, Operation CybeRx, Operation Cyber Chase, Operation Baywatch, 

Operation Cookie Dough, and Operation Gear Grinder. 

Survey. To obtain a broad perspective on the DEA diversion control 

program, we conducted an e-mail survey of the 63 diversion groups and 

5 Tactical Diversion Squads within DEA field offices, as defined in the DEA’s 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

13
table of organization.42 Out of these 68 surveys sent, we received 62 

responses for a response rate of 91 percent. The survey topics included law 

enforcement and intelligence assistance for diversion investigations, the 

DEA’s efforts to address the emerging threat of Internet diversion, and 

diversion training for special agents and intelligence analysts. The 

questionnaire is included in Appendix I. 

Data. To assess the DEA’s efforts and effectiveness at controlling 

pharmaceutical diversion, we obtained and analyzed data from seven 

sources: the Controlled Substances Act System, the Quarterly Report 

Database, the Case Status Subsystem database, personnel data, the 

1-877-RxAbuse hotline, the Unlawful Medical Internet Reporting Effort, and 

the Work Hours Reporting System. In addition, we reviewed information 

about specific training the DEA offered to its employees as well as a variety 

of other documents. 

Work Hour Data. In this report, we include two analyses of special 

agent and intelligence analyst work hour data to measure different aspects 

of the DEA’s diversion control efforts. To differentiate between the two types 

of work hour data included in this review, we refer to diversion

investigations as those initiated by diversion investigators that can involve 

controlled pharmaceuticals or regulated chemicals and that can be criminal 

or regulatory in nature; and pharmaceutical investigations as those that can 

be initiated by diversion investigators or special agents, must involve 

controlled pharmaceuticals only, and are criminal in nature. Table 1 below 

describes the difference between diversion investigations and 

pharmaceutical investigations. 

 42 We did not send surveys to DEA offices defined on the DEA’s table of 

organization as having “diversion staff” rather than a “diversion group” or “Tactical 

Diversion Squad.” 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

14
Table 1: Types of Work Hour Analysis Included in Review 

Type of 

Investigation 

Initiator of 

investigation

Substances 

involved in 

investigation 

Nature of 

investigation 

Source of 

data 

Diversion Diversion 

investigators 

Diverted 

controlled 

pharmaceuticals 

or regulated 

chemicals 

Criminal or 

non-criminal 

“2000 series” 

data* 

Pharmaceutical Diversion 

investigators 

or special 

agents 

Diverted 

controlled 

pharmaceuticals

Criminal G-DEP 

data** 

* Every DEA investigation has a unique case number consisting of eight digits that specify 

the (1) field division where it was initiated, (2) the fiscal year when it was initiated, and (3) 

who initiated it. Cases initiated by diversion investigators are denoted as “2000 series” 

cases. 

** The G-DEP code is a five-character code the DEA assigns to all criminal investigations 

indicating (1) the type of investigative target, (2) whether other agencies are involved in the 

investigation, (3) the principal controlled substance or commodity involved in the 

investigation, and (4) the geographic scope of the criminal activity under investigation. 

Source: OIG Analysis 

While most investigations into the diversion of controlled 

pharmaceuticals are initiated by diversion investigators, special agents may 

initiate pharmaceutical investigations if they work in field offices where 

there are no diversion investigators, if they obtain pharmaceutical diversion 

information from a confidential informant, or if they discover a 

pharmaceutical diversion link to an existing illicit drug investigation. (See 

Appendix II for the complete explanation of the methodology we used for our 

work hour analyses, and for a comparison of “2000 series” and G-DEP 

data.) 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

15
RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

Improvements in the DEA’s Pharmaceutical Diversion 

Control Program 

Since our 2002 review, the DEA has taken important steps 

to improve its ability to control the diversion of controlled 

pharmaceuticals. The DEA added diversion control as a 

strategic goal in its strategic plan for FY 2003 – 2008, 

reorganized its Operations Division to include law 

enforcement for diversion control, provided additional 

intelligence resources to diversion investigators, and 

increased the number of domestic diversion investigators 

by 15 percent. Further, the DEA increased the number of 

criminal diversion investigations initiated by 23 percent 

since issuance of our 2002 report, and established 

performance measures for the diversion control program for 

the first time in FY 2005. 

The DEA made diversion control one of its strategic goals. 

In 2003, the DEA made reducing the diversion of controlled 

pharmaceuticals one of the agency’s four strategic goals in its strategic plan 

for FY 2003 – 2008. Strategic Goal Four is to “reduce the diversion of licit 

drugs” to “prevent, detect, and eliminate the diversion of [controlled 

pharmaceuticals] into the illicit drug market.” Additionally, the DEA 

Administrator reinforced the importance of diversion control in a January 

2004 cable sent to all field divisions, stating that “stopping the abuse and 

diversion of pharmaceutical controlled substances must be a DEA and 

Department of Justice priority.” 

The DEA increased resources for diversion control. 

In FY 2004, the DEA increased the investigative resources devoted to 

the diversion control program by adding 75 diversion investigator positions. 

This addition increased the number of authorized diversion investigator 

positions in the DEA’s domestic field divisions by 15 percent in FY 2005. 

The 75 positions were allocated among the DEA headquarters and field 

divisions. In the FY 2006 budget, the DEA received 40 additional 

intelligence analyst positions, one intelligence support position located in 

the Special Operations Division, and 23 special agent positions that will be 

dedicated to diversion control. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

16
The DEA reorganized its Operations Division. 

In the fall of 2004, the DEA reorganized its Operations Division so 

that all criminal enforcement activities, including those for diversion control, 

were centralized into one unit.43 By doing so, law enforcement operations 

for diversion control were consolidated with those for illicit drugs. 

According to one DEA manager, this integration of law enforcement 

operations put more emphasis on criminal diversion investigations and 

allowed the DEA to devote additional enforcement resources to addressing 

the diversion of controlled substances. One DEA official in the Office of 

Diversion Control said that the reorganization “energized and revitalized 

diversion investigations.” 

The DEA provided additional intelligence resources. 

Since our 2002 report, the DEA has provided additional intelligence 

resources to assist investigators with pharmaceutical diversion 

investigations, including Internet investigations. For example, the DEA 

made the ARCOS database more timely and accessible to diversion 

investigators. Sixty-three percent of the diversion group supervisors who 

responded to our survey reported that they found ARCOS very useful, and 

53 percent reported that they used it in all or most of their investigations. 

In 2004, the DEA also provided investigators with a new search tool in 

the form of an analytical database used to develop investigations. Sixty 

percent of our survey respondents reported that they found the new 

analytical database very useful, and 61 percent reported that they used it in 

all or most of their investigations. The DEA’s Director of E-Commerce told 

us that without the new analytical database, compiling prescription 

transaction histories would be manual and tedious and that histories now 

can be compiled much more quickly. The DEA plans to create pre-defined 

criteria to produce automatic reports and investigative leads from the new 

database that can be pursued by field investigators. 

In June 2002, the DEA established a new intelligence unit at DEA 

headquarters to support investigations that involve Internet-based 

communications. According to DEA managers, most of this unit’s time is 

spent supporting Internet pharmacy investigations. This unit helps 

investigators analyze data obtained through pen registers and other 

 43 Previously, enforcement operations were divided, with domestic and foreign 

enforcement for illicit drugs managed by the Office of Enforcement Operations and 

diversion control enforcement managed by the Office of Diversion Control. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

17
electronic documents and transactions; and coordinates analytical support 

with Special Operations Division personnel.44 

The DEA undertook more criminal diversion investigations and 

established formal performance measures. 

One indication that the DEA is responding to the growing problem of 

diversion is the increase in the number of criminal diversion investigations 

it has initiated since 2002. In FY 2005, the DEA initiated 950 

investigations, which is 23 percent more criminal diversion investigations 

than the 770 initiated in FY 2002. This increase in criminal diversion 

investigations coincided with a decrease in non-criminal diversion 

investigations. In FY 2002, the DEA initiated 1,440 non-criminal diversion 

investigations; in FY 2005, it initiated 1,353 of these investigations.45 In FY 

2005, criminal diversion investigations represented approximately 6 percent 

of the DEA’s overall criminal investigations for illicit and licit drugs. 

Furthermore, in the FY 2005 budget submission the DEA established 

its first formal performance measures to quantify the accomplishments of its 

diversion control program: 

1. The number of diversion drug organizations disrupted, measured 

by the total number of civil fines imposed, administrative hearings 

conducted, number of letters of admonition issued, and the 

number of registrations suspended or restricted;46 and 

2. The number of diversion drug organizations dismantled, measured 

by the total number of registrations revoked, denied, or 

surrendered for cause. 

The DEA’s performance measures showed that from FY 2002 to FY 2005 the 

number of diversion drug organizations disrupted increased from 454 to 

474 and the number of diversion drug organizations dismantled increased 

from 474 to 594 (see Table 2). 

 44 A pen register is an electronic device that records all numbers dialed from a

particular telephone line. Pen registers can also be used to track Internet communications. 

45 Non-criminal investigations include regulatory investigations (pre-registration and 

cyclic investigations of registrants, which decreased from 793 to 632 between FY 2002 and 

FY 2005) and other investigations involving administrative or civil violations (which increased 

from 647 to 721 between FY 2002 and FY 2005). 

46 Organization includes Controlled Substance Act registrants, applicants, and 

organizations. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

18
Table 2: Number of Diversion Drug Organizations 

Disrupted or Dismantled

FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 

Disruptions 454 435 461 474 

Dismantlements 474 521 582 594 

Source: The DEA’s Case Status Subsystem database 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

19
Diversion of Controlled Pharmaceuticals Using the Internet 

Since 2002, diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals using 

the Internet has increased dramatically, and the DEA has 

increased the percentage of diversion investigators’ time 

applied to Internet investigations from 3 percent to 11 

percent. The DEA has also developed an operational 

Internet strategy for performing Internet investigations. 

We examined several of the intelligence, technological, and 

investigative tools that are part of the DEA’s Internet 

strategy: the Online Investigations Project (OIP), hotlines 

for reporting suspicious Internet activity, undercover 

equipment, and training for diversion investigators on 

conducting Internet investigations. We found that while 

the DEA considers its Online Investigations Project to be 

fully implemented and a valuable tool, it does not 

automatically identify web sites with the highest volume of 

suspect pharmaceutical sales as originally intended. In 

addition, we found that most diversion groups still did not 

have undercover equipment necessary to conduct Internet 

investigations. Further, while 54 percent of diversion 

investigators had received training in Internet 

investigations, most had not received specialized training 

that would prove useful for conducting successful Internet 

investigations. 

As diversion using the Internet has become a greater concern, the 

DEA has increased the number of pharmaceutical-related Internet 

investigations from 10 in FY 2002 to 74 in FY 2005, and increased the 

percentage of diversion investigators’ time applied to Internet diversion 

during the same period from 3 percent to 11 percent. In addition, the DEA 

developed an operational Internet strategy that guides investigators in 

conducting investigations of online trafficking of controlled pharmaceuticals. 

As part of our review, we examined several of the intelligence, technological, 

and investigative tools that are part of this strategy 

The DEA developed an operational Internet strategy. 

We found that since our previous review, the DEA developed in 2004 

an operational Internet strategy. During our original field work, no DEA 

personnel mentioned this strategy. However, after the exit conference DEA 

management provided us with a copy of a PowerPoint presentation entitled 

“On-line Pharmacy Trafficking Strategy.” DEA managers told us they 

disseminated the strategy to field division special agents in charge, diversion 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

20
program managers, and diversion group supervisors at conferences during 

2005. 

Three Recent High-Profile 

DEA-Led Internet Investigations 

• Operation Cyber Chase. In April 2005, Operation 

Cyber Chase targeted an organization that illegally 

distributed approximately 2.5 million dosage units of 

controlled pharmaceuticals per month over the Internet. 

Operation Cyber Chase was an international operation 

involving two DEA field divisions and one foreign office, 

and resulted in the arrest of 26 people in four countries 

and the seizure of 10 million dosage units of 

pharmaceutical controlled substances, 231 pounds of an 

animal tranquilizer (Ketamine), and $8.5 million. 

• Operation CYBERx. In September 2005, Operation 

CYBERx dismantled an organization that was averaging 

more than $50,000 a day in profits from their illegal 

Internet-based enterprise. The operation resulted in 19 

arrests, immediate suspension orders against 20 

pharmacies and physicians, and the seizure of $16.8 

million in cash and property. 

• Operation Gear Grinder. In December 2005, Operation 

Gear Grinder targeted eight major steroids 

manufacturing companies whose combined illicit 

Internet sales of steroids smuggled from Mexico totaled 

$56 million a year and resulted in 9 arrests. These 

companies were the source of 82 percent of all steroids 

seized in the Unites States and analyzed by DEA 

laboratories.

In interviews we 

conducted after our exit 

conference, one of the 

three diversion program 

managers and all four 

field division special 

agents in charge said 

they were aware of the 

DEA’s Internet strategy 

and described specific 

ways in which they had 

applied elements of it to 

their investigations. 

The two other diversion 

program managers 

mentioned elements of 

the strategy, but were 

not aware of the 

strategy itself. DEA 

headquarters managers 

said that field 

personnel may not have 

been aware of the 

strategy, even though 

many of these 

personnel had used 

tools such as the OIP 

that are a part of the 

strategy. Further, they explained that the strategy is not finalized but 

rather is considered a “work in progress” so that it can be frequently revised 

to reflect changes in diversion using the Internet. According to these DEA 

managers, the strategy was used in several recent Internet operations that 

disrupted major Internet pharmaceutical traffickers. 

The DEA’s Internet strategy contains five elements: 

• Targeting and Analysis – Identify trends and investigate suspicious 

Internet pharmacy activity; 

• Technology – Develop and implement new resources to collect 

information about suspicious Internet pharmacy activity; 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

21
• Legislation – Attempt to change laws either to make operating illegal 

online pharmacies more difficult or to make prosecuting operators of 

illegal online pharmacies easier; 

• Demand Reduction – Establish hotlines the public can use to report 

suspicious online pharmacies, issue public service announcements, 

and create Internet sites to educate the public about controlled 

pharmaceutical abuse; and 

• Training and Education – Establish training courses for DEA 

personnel; other federal, state, and local law enforcement officers; and 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

In her April 6, 2006, testimony to the United States House of 

Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Science, 

the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, 

the DEA Administrator said that “The strategy calls for DEA to coordinate 

its Internet investigations with federal, state, and local agencies, and 

provide training for investigators, prosecutors, the pharmaceutical industry, 

and DEA registrants.” 

The DEA has implemented intelligence, technological, and 

investigative tools for Internet diversion investigations. 

We examined several of the DEA’s intelligence, technological, and 

investigative tools that are part of its Internet strategy: the Online 

Investigations Project, hotlines for reporting suspicious Internet activity, 

undercover equipment, and training for diversion investigators on 

conducting Internet investigations. Below is a discussion of what we found. 

The Online Investigations Project (OIP). In our 2002 review, we 

recommended, and the DEA concurred, that the DEA fully implement the 

OIP, which it had begun to develop in 2001. Originally, the DEA told us 

that the OIP would allow diversion investigators to “focus their efforts on 

potential diverters rather than spending valuable time surfing the Web for 

leads.”47 The DEA planned the OIP to function proactively by searching the 

Internet using criteria commonly found in web sites that illegally distribute 

controlled substances to identify those web sites that had the highest 

volume of controlled pharmaceutical orders and that were accessed the 

greatest number of times so that the DEA could identify and prioritize them 

for investigation. 

 47 The DEA’s July 1, 2003, response to the OIG’s 2002 review. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

22
In December 2005, the DEA notified the OIG that it considered the 

OIP to be operational, but stated that the OIP has limited practical 

application as a proactive targeting tool and can only access for retrieval 

that which is publicly available on the Internet. Therefore, the OIP is 

ineffective identifying sites with the highest volume of controlled 

pharmaceutical orders and those sites most frequently accessed. In 

January 2006, DEA managers reported that the OIP was functioning as “a 

viable investigative tool that is assisting field personnel in Internet 

investigations.”48 While the OIP is not able to proactively identify the 

Internet pharmacies receiving the most orders so that investigations can be 

prioritized, DEA officials told us that analysts are using it to efficiently 

synthesize large amounts of information about web sites that are already 

under investigation. According to DEA managers, the OIP scans 

information that is publicly available on the Internet to find connections 

between web sites under investigation and pertinent information such as 

addresses, phone numbers, e-mail addresses, and other web sites. DEA 

analysts then transfer the OIP’s search results to charts that display these 

connections and provide the charts to field investigators to assist in their 

investigations. 

According to the DEA, the OIP is capable of efficiently scanning large 

amounts of data. For example, between July 2005 and May 2006, the DEA 

stated that it used the OIP to scan 4 million web pages from 42,694 sites in 

7,300 hours. The DEA estimated that this task would have taken 60,000 

analytical staff hours without the OIP.49 

Hotlines. In June 2004, the DEA established the Unlawful Medical 

Internet Reporting Effort (UMPIRE), which is linked to the DEA’s web site 

and allows the public to report suspicious Internet pharmacies. In January 

2005, the DEA created the 1-877-RxAbuse telephone hotline for the public 

to anonymously report the illegal sale and abuse of prescription drugs. 

Reports received through the web site and telephone hotline are forwarded 

to the DEA field divisions where the complaints originated, and then either 

addressed by the DEA or disseminated to local law enforcement agencies. 

Of survey respondents who had received leads from the telephone 

hotline, 20 percent had initiated investigations based on those leads. No 

respondents who had received leads through the web-based system had 

 48 The DEA’s February 8, 2006, informal comments on this review. 

49 This is a rough estimate based on the number of hours it would likely take an 

analyst to perform an analysis minus the number of hours it would take the OIP to produce 

the same analysis. This time savings was then multiplied by the number of analyses that 

the OIP has produced since July 2005. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

23
initiated investigations based on those leads. The DEA personnel we 

interviewed stated that the leads typically involved lower-level diversion, 

such as “doctor shoppers,” rather than the higher-level diversion 

conspiracies that diversion group members said they preferred to 

investigate. 

Undercover equipment. Our review also found that most diversion 

investigators did not have undercover equipment – such as undercover 

credit cards and computers – needed for certain types of Internet 

investigations. Based on survey responses, 84 percent of the diversion 

groups had undercover computers that allowed investigators to conduct 

business on the Internet without being traced to the DEA. However, survey 

respondents and interviewees reported that it was not very useful to have an 

undercover computer without an undercover credit card that they could use 

to establish Internet service provider accounts, obtain Post Office boxes, and 

place orders for pharmaceuticals. Of the survey respondents who suggested 

that additional resources were needed for conducting Internet 

investigations, 51 percent mentioned the need for an undercover credit card. 

Moreover, in some of the 2004 Pharmaceutical Threat Assessments, DEA 

personnel stated that problems with establishing undercover identities were 

impeding diversion investigations: 

• “There are possible [Internet] leads but the diversion group is not yet 

able to explore them properly due to the need for investigators to 

obtain undercover identities.” 

• “[The Internet] has shown that to conduct a proper investigation of an 

Internet company the process of obtaining undercover documents 

must be streamlined . . . .” 

• “There are numerous potential Internet cases . . . that cannot be 

pursued due to the lack of undercover driver’s licenses and 

undercover credit cards.” 

DEA headquarters’ managers stated that they were aware that the 

scarcity of undercover credit cards was a hindrance in the field. In 

response, during the fall of 2005 the DEA administered a pilot undercover 

credit card program in three field divisions. The DEA also provided 

documentation that on March 10, 2006, it had begun implementing a 

program to issue undercover credit cards to three to five diversion 

investigators or special agents selected by the Diversion Program Manager 

in each field division. These credit cards were intended exclusively for 

purchasing pharmaceuticals over the Internet. The DEA managers expected 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

24
all diversion investigators to have access to undercover credit cards and to 

receive training in their appropriate use by June 2006.50 

In addition, DEA managers informed us that the DEA had begun 

establishing a virtual private network to link the undercover computers in 

each DEA field division to DEA headquarters so that investigative 

information and analysis can be passed between headquarters and the field 

securely. DEA managers stated that thus far the virtual private network 

had been implemented in the Atlanta, Phoenix, Los Angeles, and Miami field 

divisions. 

Internet diversion training for diversion investigators. The DEA 

has established several training courses pertinent to investigations of 

diversion using the Internet. We found that over half of the 482 diversion 

investigators had attended the DEA’s Internet Telecommunications 

Exploitation Program training. However, few diversion investigators have 

attended additional specialized courses that would be useful for conducting 

Internet investigations, as shown in Table 3. 

Table 3: Training for Diversion Investigators in 

Internet Investigations 

Training course 

Number of diversion 

investigators who 

attended, 

FY 2002 – FY 2005 

Percentage of FY 

2005 on-board 

diversion 

investigators 

Internet Telecommunications 

Exploitation Program 263 54.6 

Diversion Internet* 89 18.5 

Asset Forfeiture Training 50 10.4 

Conspiracy and Complex 

Investigations Training 33 6.8 

Financial Investigations Seminar 

and Techniques 32 6.6 

FinCEN Training** 7 1.5 

* This training was discontinued after FY 2004. 

** Training in accessing the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network database. 

Source: The DEA’s Office of Training 

In addition, we found that 5 percent of diversion investigators had attended 

the Internet Pharmacy and Controlled Substance Pharmaceutical Diversion 

Prosecution Seminar sponsored by the National Advocacy Center.51 

 50 As of June 8, 2006, 6 of the DEA’s 21 domestic field divisions had at least one 

undercover credit card for diversion investigations and 12 field divisions were still in the 

process of obtaining their first card. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

25
According to survey respondents and interviewees, knowledge and 

training in financial analysis and conspiracy investigations are particularly 

important for conducting Internet investigations because Internet operations 

are often geographically dispersed. The pharmacy, drug supplier, web site 

server, web site programmer, and physicians involved could be in different 

states or even in different countries. In addition, the anonymity of the 

Internet, in which businesses can easily hide their identity and financial 

transactions, makes diversion investigations more complicated. 

In interviews with the OIG, diversion investigators stated that their lack of 

training impeded their ability to conduct these difficult and technically 

challenging investigations. 

One diversion program manager that we interviewed stated that 

additional and ongoing training in Internet investigations was needed for 

diversion investigators. In survey responses, diversion investigators echoed 

this statement: 

• “More in-depth Internet classes should be conducted. The 3-day 

classes are not adequate.” 

• “Hands-on long-term training on the use of the Internet to make 

undercover buys [is needed].” 

• “Diversion Investigators need ongoing technical training related to the 

Internet. . . . As the internet becomes more sophisticated, the 

frequency and level of training needs to be increased.” 

We asked DEA officials about the low numbers of diversion 

investigators who attended Internet-related training courses other than the 

Internet Telecommunications Exploitation Program training. They stated 

that the DEA’s training resources are limited and that providing Internet 

Telecommunications Exploitation training to diversion investigators is a 

DEA priority. 

 51 The National Advocacy Center is a joint venture of the National District Attorneys 

Association and the Department that provides prosecution-related training. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

26
Continuing Concerns in the DEA’s Diversion Control Program 

Despite the positive steps the DEA has taken to improve its 

ability to control the diversion of controlled 

pharmaceuticals, we identified several continuing concerns 

about the DEA’s diversion control program. We found that 

although the need for special agent assistance in diversion 

investigations had increased since our 2002 review, the 

work hours spent by special agents on diversion control 

still constituted a small share of their total investigative 

time. In addition, few special agents had received specific 

diversion control training beyond the 2-hour module 

provided during basic agent training. Moreover, diversion 

investigators still lack law enforcement authority, despite 

the DEA’s efforts to reclassify their positions. Further, the 

support provided by intelligence analysts to diversion 

groups in the field continued to be limited, and intelligence 

analysts received minimal training in diversion control. 

Special agent assistance for pharmaceutical diversion control 

investigations still represents a small share of their total investigative 

time even though the need for their support has increased. 

Similar to our 2002 review, we found that special agent assistance for 

pharmaceutical and diversion investigations was still a small share of their 

total investigative time. The assistance of special agents is crucial because 

diversion investigators do not have the law enforcement authority to 

conduct surveillance, work with confidential informants, serve search 

warrants, or make arrests. 

To examine the issue of special agent support for diversion control, we 

considered five sources: analysis of work hour data based on special agent 

assistance to diversion investigations (“2000 series” data); analysis of work 

hour data based on special agent investigative time spent on 

pharmaceutical investigations (G-DEP data); interviews of DEA personnel; 

DEA Pharmaceutical Threat Assessments; and survey responses of diversion 

group supervisors. 

Work hour data analyses. Both work hour data analyses indicated 

that while the time special agents spent on diversion control increased since 

our 2002 review, it still represented a small amount of special agents’ total 

investigative time. Between FY 2002 and FY 2005, the amount of time 

special agents spent on diversion investigations, measured by the hours 

they charged to investigations initiated by diversion investigators, increased 

from 14.8 work years to 27.4 work years. Even with this 85 percent 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

27
increase, the actual percentage of special agent time spent on diversion 

investigations increased from only 0.6 percent to 1.0 percent of their total 

investigative time between FY 2002 and FY 2005 (Table 4). 

Table 4: Special Agent Work Years Spent 

Assisting Diversion Investigations 

Number of Special Agent Work Years FY 2002 FY 2005 

Spent on diversion investigations 14.8 27.4 

Spent on diversion and illicit drug 

investigations 2,376.8 2,722.6 

Percentage spent on diversion investigations 0.6 1.0 

Note: The investigative work years do not include time spent on other types of activities such as 

administrative duties or training. 

Source: The DEA’s Work Hour Reporting database reporting 2000 series data

Using data from the DEA’s G-DEP system as a measure of time spent 

on pharmaceutical investigations, we found that between FY 2003 and FY 

2005 special agents increased the time they spent on pharmaceutical 

investigations from 26.8 work years to 57.4 work years, an increase of 114 

percent. However, this still accounted for only 1.2 percent of special agent 

investigative time in FY 2003 and 2.2 percent in FY 2005 (see Table 5). 

Table 5: Special Agent Work Years Spent 

on Pharmaceutical Investigations 

Number of Special Agent Work Years FY 2003 FY 2005 

Spent on pharmaceutical investigations 26.8 57.4 

Total spent on pharmaceutical and illicit drug 

investigations 2,376.8 2,722.6 

Percentage spent on pharmaceutical 

investigations 1.2 2.2 

Note: The investigative work years do not include time spent on other types of activities such as 

administrative duties or training. 

Source: The DEA’s Work Hour Reporting database based on G-DEP data 

Diversion investigators’ need for special agent support. While 

special agents can initiate pharmaceutical investigations, most 

pharmaceutical investigations are still initiated by diversion investigators 

who do not have law enforcement authority. Therefore, special agent 

assistance in these cases is crucial. The DEA has recognized the 

importance of adequate special agent support for several years. For 

example, on August 3, 2001, the DEA’s Chief of Operations issued a 

directive stating: “To ensure that the diversion investigators have consistent 

access to special agent personnel, each diversion group in every division 

office will have two (2) special agents assigned full time to support their 

activities.” The DEA’s plans were delayed when, after the September 11, 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

28
2001, terrorist attacks, many federal law enforcement agents, including 

DEA agents, were assigned to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 

counter-terrorism task forces. However, almost 5 years later, we found that 

of the DEA’s 27 diversion groups located in field offices, only 1 reported 

having 2 full-time special agent positions authorized to assist with diversion 

investigations, 5 reported having 1 agent, and 20 reported having no agents 

assigned.52

The DEA reiterated the need for special agent assistance in a 

September 6, 2005, memorandum to the Department, which stated that:

Because the [diversion] workforce lacks the enforcement status 

required to engage in all requisite investigative activities, DIs 

must obtain the support of DEA Special Agents or state /local 

police officers to perform the enforcement functions needed to 

develop evidence of criminal violations identified during 

compliance investigations. Such a requirement often results in 

delays and/or errors in the investigation due to the 

unavailability (or limited availability) of law enforcement 

personnel and/or the latter’s insufficient knowledge of the 

registrant community’s processes and practices.53 

During our field work, one SAC explained that the criminal aspects of 

a diversion investigation may not be fully developed because of the lack of 

special agent assistance. Diversion investigators we spoke with reinforced 

this point. They stated that developing criminal diversion investigations 

often requires undercover surveillance or use of a confidential informant 

and that they might not pursue the criminal aspects of the investigation 

because they could not rely on receiving special agent assistance. 

In addition, 58 percent of survey respondents stated that the lack of 

available law enforcement support from special agents sometimes or often 

caused delays in diversion investigations. Diversion group supervisors and 

investigators also explained that they had to work around the schedules of 

the special agents, causing the diversion investigation to be delayed. 

Seventy-six percent of the respondents to our survey stated that they 

most often relied on state, local, or other federal agencies, rather than DEA 

special agents, to provide law enforcement assistance in their 

pharmaceutical diversion cases. Several interviewees and survey 

 52 One of the 27 diversion groups did not respond to our survey. 

53 Memorandum from the DEA Administrator to the Assistant Attorney General for 

Administration, “Request for Establishment of a New Series,” September 6, 2006. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

29
respondents also said that while they appreciated the assistance they 

received from DEA special agents, such assistance often did not fully 

support their investigations. For example, survey respondents stated: 

• “When we request assistance [from DEA special agents] for short term 

projects we receive excellent support, such as for the execution of a 

search warrant. Long term investigations, such as undercover buys, 

are more difficult since there are extensive demands on the [DEA] 

enforcement group that provide us with support. We have found it 

more useful to get assistance for long term investigations from our 

state counterparts. These state counterparts are tasked with doing 

the same type of complaint or criminal investigations as diversion 

investigators but have full arrest powers.” 

• “I normally receive assistance from state/local agencies or other 

federal agencies. . . . When we are ready to make arrests I then get 

special agents from the DEA involved. With the requirements for 

various assignments it is difficult for a DEA special agent to spend 

time with diversion investigators.” 

• “Agents are responsible for their own priorities. They assist on such 

things as search warrants, arrest warrants when needed, and some 

undercover buys. However, they are not available for long term needs 

such as surveillance.” 

According to diversion investigators we interviewed, when the 

diversion groups received assistance from DEA special agents it was 

typically for specific law enforcement tasks such as executing arrest 

warrants or making undercover buys, rather than as ongoing partners in 

the diversion investigation. Fifty-three percent of the survey respondents 

said that they were “somewhat satisfied” and seven percent were “not at all 

satisfied” with law enforcement assistance from DEA special agents.

Situations in which diversion personnel were satisfied with 

special agent support. In contrast, we found instances where diversion 

personnel were satisfied with their working relationships with special agents 

and enthusiastic about the accomplishments of these partnerships. This 

was primarily the case in DEA field divisions where special agents and 

diversion investigators were assigned to the same group or where the field 

division had been involved in a major diversion operation. Diversion 

investigators assigned to these groups described the working relationship 

with the special agents as “tremendous,” “excellent,” “a breath of fresh air,” 

“outstanding,” and “instrumental.” The diversion investigators assigned to 

the groups also said they gained criminal investigative knowledge from the 

special agents. Table 6 describes the groups of diversion investigators and 

special agents. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

30
Table 6: Partnerships between Special Agents and Diversion Investigators

Location Description of Partnership 

Baltimore, Detroit, El Paso, Miami, 

Phoenix, San Antonio, San Diego 

One or two special agents assigned to a 

diversion group 

Boston, Houston, New Orleans, St. Louis* Tactical Diversion Squads that include 

special agents, diversion investigators, and 

law enforcement officers from other agencies 

New York City Tactical Diversion Group of special agents 

and diversion investigators 

Seattle Two diversion investigators assigned to an 

enforcement group 

* At the time of our field work, the Denver Tactical Diversion Squad did not have a special agent 

assigned. 

Source: OIG Diversion Group Supervisor Survey and interviews with DEA personnel 

During our review, the DEA provided four examples of complex 

diversion operations to which SACs dedicated significant personnel over a 

long period of time.54 For example, the SAC of the Dallas Field Division 

informed us that he dedicated the entire staff of the Fort Worth field office to 

an investigation of an Internet pharmacy that took over seven months to 

complete. In fact, we found that these four large operations accounted for 

22 percent of time that special agents spent on pharmaceutical 

investigations in FY 2005. (See Chart 2). 

Chart 2: Share of Special Agent Criminal Investigative Hours 

by Type of Investigation, FY 2005 

 Four Operations 

Ilicit Drug 

Pharmaceutical 

Diversion 

Chemical & 

Clandestine 

Diversion 

Other Pharmaceutical Diversion

All Criminal Investigations All Pharmaceutical Investigations

Source: The DEA’s Work Hour Reporting database

 54 The four DEA operations are Operations Cyber Chase, CYBERx, Gear Grinder, 

and Cookie Dough. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

31
Few special agents have received training in diversion control. 

Similar to what we found in our 2002 review, few special agents have 

received specific diversion control training, although the growing number of 

criminal diversion investigations has since increased the need for special 

agent involvement in diversion cases.55 Diversion investigators that we 

interviewed during our current review stated that the inexperience and 

unfamiliarity of DEA special agents sometimes impeded or delayed 

investigations. This problem was also highlighted in the DEA’s 

Pharmaceutical Threat Assessments. Among the comments in the 

assessments were:

• “DEA enforcement groups . . . either do not know or do not 

understand what is required to successfully prosecute the types of 

cases that the diversion investigators investigate on a daily basis.” 

• “Agents don’t often comprehend or want to comprehend how the 

diversion investigations are done because they don’t reflect the types 

of cases that they normally do.” 

In our 2002 review, we recommended that the DEA train special 

agents in diversion investigation procedures. The DEA concurred with this 

recommendation and noted that each special agent received a 2-hour 

module on diversion control during basic agent training. Yet, this module, 

which represented only 0.2 percent of the basic training hours for special 

agents, included a 30-minute video produced in 1996 that did not cover 

current diversion control issues, including using the Internet to divert 

pharmaceuticals. DEA officials informed us that they currently are 

updating the video. 

In responding to our 2002 recommendation, the DEA also stated that 

it planned to initiate additional training for special agents assigned to 

diversion investigations. The first week-long Special Agent Diversion School 

took place in FY 2004. However, as of April 2006, the DEA had convened 

five classes and reported that 98 of its 5,013 special agents had attended 

the training. DEA officials stated that the DEA eventually intends to send 

all special agents who assist with diversion investigations to this school, but 

due to limited training funds and training facility space, no additional 

classes were planned for FY 2006. 

 55 As discussed previously, between FY 2002 and FY 2005, the DEA increased the 

number of criminal diversion investigations it initiated from 770 to 950, an increase of 

approximately 23 percent. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

32
Separately, the DEA has provided training on Internet investigations 

for special agents conducting investigations involving diversion using the 

Internet. As of April 2006, 34 percent (1,699) of special agents had attended 

the DEA’s 3-day Internet Telecommunications Exploitation Program, which 

includes a 1-day module that highlighted Operation Cyber Chase. Also, 

during 2004 and 2005, 11 special agents attended the Internet Pharmacy 

and Controlled Substance Pharmaceutical Diversion Prosecution Seminar, a 

seminar sponsored by the National Advocacy Center.

Diversion investigators still lack law enforcement authority. 

We recommended in our 2002 review that the DEA clarify diversion 

investigator’s roles, responsibilities, and law enforcement authority. The 

DEA concurred with this recommendation and in response has taken steps 

to reclassify the diversion investigator position to one with law enforcement 

authority. Table 7 summarizes the DEA’s reports to the OIG about its 

efforts since September 2002. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

33
Table 7: Timeline of the DEA’s Actions to Reclassify the Diversion 

Investigator Position to One with Law Enforcement Authority 

Since 2002 OIG Review

Date Action 

9/26/02 The DEA concurs with OIG recommendation to make a decision regarding 

the roles, responsibilities, and law enforcement authorities of diversion 

investigators and reports that DEA management is reviewing a decision 

paper to be discussed at a 10/16/02 SAC advisory meeting. 

1/15/03 The DEA forwards a decision paper seeking to reclassify the diversion 

investigator position to one with law enforcement authority to the Deputy 

Attorney General, whose approval would initiate a 10-year conversion 

process. Various Department components must also review the paper. 

7/25/03 The Department requests additional information and clarification from the 

DEA. 

10/29/03 The DEA provides the Department with the additional information 

requested. 

4/8/04 The DEA reports that it is waiting for a decision from the Department. 

9/27/04 The DEA reports that the Department requested additional information 

concerning demographics of the current diversion investigator workforce 

and that it is conducting a survey of diversion investigators to collect the 

necessary information. 

7/29/05 The DEA reports that it plans to request a new law enforcement job series 

for diversion investigators. 

9/6/05 The DEA provides the Department with a proposal to reclassify the 

diversion investigator position to one with law enforcement authority 

through a new law enforcement job series different from the special agent 

series. 

12/20/05 The DEA reports that it is optimistic that the Department will support the 

request to reclassify the diversion investigator position to one with law 

enforcement authority through a new job series, but that a final decision 

has not been reached. 

Source: DEA responses to the OIG’s 2002 review 

The DEA’s current proposal, submitted to the Department’s Justice 

Management Division in September 2005, is to create a new job series for 

diversion investigators who would focus on criminal diversion 

investigations. The new diversion investigator position would be a “hybrid 

position” with full law enforcement investigative authority while also 

requiring the full knowledge and skills of the diversion investigator. The 

position would have both regulatory duties and investigative responsibilities. 

All diversion investigators hired once the plan was implemented would be 

hired under this new job series. Current diversion investigators would be 

reclassified to the new position if they meet certain requirements, including 

standards concerning age and physical capabilities. A recent DEA survey 

found that 88 of the 340 current diversion investigators (26 percent) who 

responded met the eligibility requirements. According to the DEA, the “roles 

and responsibilities of current diversion investigators who do not reclassify 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

34
[to the new law enforcement position] will be minimally affected” because 

they will devote their time to regulatory work.56

As of May 2006, the DEA’s proposal was awaiting approval from the 

Department, after which it must be approved by the Office of Personnel 

Management and the Office of Management and Budget. If approved, the 

DEA will need to take a series of steps to implement it. First, the conversion 

will require an increase in the registration fees used to fund the Diversion 

Control Fee Account.57 Second, the DEA will need to reclassify, train, and 

assign current eligible diversion investigators, a process the DEA estimates 

will take 9 months. Third, given that only about one fourth of the current 

diversion investigators may be eligible for conversion, the DEA will need to 

recruit, hire, and train a substantial number of people for the new position, 

a process the DEA estimates will take 18 months. 

 Therefore, despite the DEA’s efforts, diversion investigators are not 

likely to receive law enforcement authority anytime soon. We believe that 

until the DEA receives approval and fully implements this initiative, it needs 

to ensure that its diversion investigators receive sufficient special agent 

support.

 

Intelligence analyst assistance in the field is limited. 

Similar to what we found in our previous review, intelligence analyst 

assistance in the field was limited. Work hour data analyses based on 

“2000 series” cases and G-DEP identifiers indicated that the time that 

intelligence analysts spent on diversion control had increased since our 

2002 review. However, it still represented a small proportion of intelligence 

analysts’ total investigative time. 

In our 2002 review, we recommended that the DEA provide effective 

intelligence support to the Office of Diversion Control, and that the DEA 

continue to explore additional intelligence capabilities to support the 

diversion investigators. The DEA concurred with the recommendation. 

Since our 2002 report, the number of work years that intelligence 

analysts spend on diversion investigations, measured by the hours they 

charged to investigations diversion investigators initiated, has increased 143 

 56 The DEA’s December 20, 2005, response to the OIG’s 2002 review.

57 The Diversion Control Fee Account is administered by the DEA to recover the full 

costs of operating the various aspects of its diversion control program. The account is 

funded by registration fees paid by manufacturers, distributors, dispensers, importers and 

exporters of controlled substances and List I chemicals as required by the Controlled 

Substances Act.

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

35
percent, from 2.5 work years in FY 2002 to 6.0 work years in FY 2005. 

Nevertheless, the 6.0 work years still represent less than 3 percent of all 

intelligence analyst investigative work years (Table 8). 

Table 8: Intelligence Analyst Work Years Spent 

Assisting Diversion Investigations 

Number of intelligence analyst work years FY 2002 FY 2005 

Spent on diversion investigations 2.5 6.0 

Spent on diversion and illicit drug 

investigations 181.0 214.6 

Percentage spent on diversion investigations 1.4 2.8 

Note: The total work years for intelligence analysts do not include time spent on other 

types of activities such as administrative duties or training. 

Source: The DEA’s Work Hour Reporting Database based on 2000 series data 

Using data from the DEA’s G-DEP system as a measure of all time 

spent on pharmaceutical cases, we found that between FY 2003 and FY 

2005 intelligence analysts increased the number of work years spent on 

pharmaceutical investigations from 3.4 work years to 11.4 work years, an 

increase of 235 percent. This accounted for 1.7 percent of intelligence 

analyst investigative time in FY 2003 and 5.3 percent in FY 2005 (see 

Table 9). 

Table 9: Intelligence Analyst Work Years Spent 

Assisting Pharmaceutical Investigations 

Number of intelligence analyst work years FY 2003 FY 2005 

Spent on pharmaceutical investigations 3.4 11.4 

Spent on pharmaceutical and illicit drug 

investigations 181.0 214.6 

Percentage spent on pharmaceutical 

investigations 1.7 5.3 

Note: The total work years for intelligence analysts do not include time spent on other types of 

activities such as administrative duties or training. 

Source: The DEA’s Work Hour Reporting database based on G-DEP data 

Three-quarters of the respondents to our survey stated that the need 

for intelligence support had increased since 2002. According to 

interviewees, the diversion control program’s increased need for intelligence 

assistance was largely because of the growth of diversion using the Internet. 

Forty-five percent of the respondents said they were “somewhat satisfied” 

with intelligence support and 27 percent said they were “not at all satisfied” 

with intelligence support. Approximately one-third said that intelligence 

analysts in the field never provided sufficient support. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

36
According to our survey results, 71 percent of group supervisors 

received intelligence support regarding specific cases; however, only 

32 percent received intelligence regarding general trends in diversion and 

23 percent received intelligence regarding specific targets to consider for 

investigation. Receiving intelligence on trends in pharmaceutical diversion 

and specific potential investigative targets would allow diversion 

investigators to focus their efforts on the most significant threats. 

Eleven survey respondents as well as interviewees in each field 

division that we visited stated that the most effective way to provide 

intelligence support was to assign an intelligence analyst to their diversion 

groups, as they commonly have been assigned to enforcement groups 

working on illicit drug investigations. Assignment to a specific diversion 

group would allow intelligence analysts to remain up-to-date and 

knowledgeable about current investigations and would create a more 

effective, long-term working partnership between investigator and analyst. 

Otherwise, diversion investigators who request assistance have to familiarize 

the intelligence analyst with the entire investigation. 

Fifty-five percent of survey respondents said that the lack of 

permanent support from field intelligence analysts “sometimes” or “often” 

delayed investigations. Of the 62 diversion group supervisors who 

responded to our survey, none had an intelligence analyst permanently 

assigned to their group. Instead, 81 percent stated that they had to request 

intelligence analyst assistance on a case-specific basis, 3 percent said they 

received intelligence support through a diversion task force (such as a 

Tactical Diversion Squad), and 16 percent said they received no intelligence 

support at all from the field. Because they did not have an intelligence 

analyst assigned to their group, diversion investigators relied on ad hoc, 

request-specific intelligence support. If diversion investigators had a 

particular need for intelligence during the course of an investigation, they 

requested assistance for only that specific task, such as a database check or 

analysis of prescription records or financial transactions. 

Respondents’ comments to our survey highlight the limited field 

intelligence analyst assistance and diversion investigators’ perception that 

their investigations are a lower priority compared to illicit drug 

investigations: 

• “We have requested assistance and have received some very limited 

help. Diversion investigations are not as important as special agent 

investigations. When something better comes along, our support 

leaves.” 

• “In the eleven years I have served as a Diversion Group Supervisor, 

we have received minimal assistance on only ONE case and that was 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

37
over four years ago. We receive absolutely no assistance from 

intelligence analysts . . . . It has been made perfectly clear to my 

investigators that the analyst in our office is here to assist the special 

agents and that leaves no time for our cases.” 

• “When I ask for support from Intel for case assistance, I have to make 

the request through the assistant SAC. If they are working on Agent 

cases, the Agents get priority. Since Agents almost always have cases 

that Intel is assisting them on, Diversion often doesn’t get assistance. 

We are low man on the totem pole.” 

Intelligence analysts that we interviewed who stated that diversion 

investigators did not know what intelligence assistance they could obtain 

reflected diversion investigators’ limited experience with receiving field 

intelligence support. These intelligence analysts stated that sometimes 

diversion personnel asked for intelligence products at the wrong point of an 

investigation or asked intelligence analysts to perform data entry or prepare 

visual aids for meetings, indications that diversion investigators were 

unfamiliar with the role of intelligence analysts in investigations. 

When we spoke to DEA managers about the perceived lack of field 

intelligence support to diversion investigations, they explained that 

historically, intelligence analysts were often assigned to, and provided 

support to, specific enforcement groups. This gave the enforcement groups 

direct access to intelligence support, while diversion groups had indirect 

access. However, recently DEA field divisions have begun to provide 

intelligence support based on the priority of the investigation, regardless of 

whether the investigation involves illegal drugs or controlled 

pharmaceuticals. 

As with special agent support for pharmaceutical diversion 

investigations, we found evidence that the DEA provided significant 

intelligence support for certain major diversion investigations. In FY 2005, 

four large diversion operations accounted for 44 percent of all intelligence 

analyst work hours on criminal pharmaceutical investigations (Operations 

CybeRx, Cyber Chase, Gear Grinder, and Cookie Dough). (See Chart 3.) 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

38
Chart 3: Share of Intelligence Analysts Criminal Investigative Hours by 

Type of Investigation, FY 2005 

Ilicit Drug

Four Operations

Chemical & 

Clandestine 

Diversion

Pharmaceutical 

Diversion

Other Pharmaceutical Diversion

All Criminal Investigations All Pharmaceutical Investigations

Source: The DEA’s Work Hour Reporting database 

Intelligence analysts receive minimal diversion training. 

We found that intelligence analysts received only minimal training in 

diversion control, such as training on the laws pertaining to diversion, 

methods of diversion, and commonly diverted substances. Similar to what 

we found with special agent training in diversion control, the only training 

that intelligence analysts receive in diversion is a 2-hour module included in 

their basic training that represents only 0.5 percent of the training hours for 

intelligence analysts. 

The need for training in diversion control for intelligence analysts is 

particularly important because, as previously mentioned, intelligence 

analysts have historically not been assigned to specific diversion groups. 

For example, a special agent in charge told us that intelligence analysts 

must become familiar with diversion control through appropriate training. 

In addition, an intelligence group supervisor whom we interviewed stated 

that intelligence analysts sometimes considered diversion control 

investigations to be a “foreign entity” compared with illicit drug 

investigations. Another diversion group supervisor said that intelligence 

analysts may be accustomed to analyzing thousands of telephone calls in an 

illicit drug investigation, but are not as accustomed to analyzing millions of 

prescriptions from an Internet pharmacy for a diversion control 

investigation. This group supervisor stated that some diversion cases are 

more difficult for intelligence analysts than illicit drug investigations. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

39
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Since our 2002 review, the DEA has taken steps to improve its ability 

to control the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals, especially 

pharmaceutical diversion using the Internet. However, there are still some 

areas in need of further improvement in the DEA’s diversion control efforts 

that we identified and reported in 2002. 

Since 2002, the DEA has added diversion control as a strategic goal in 

its strategic plan for FY 2003 – 2008, reorganized its Operations Division to 

include law enforcement operations for diversion control, provided 

additional intelligence resources to investigators, and increased its 

authorized domestic diversion investigator positions by 15 percent from 

FY 2002 to FY 2005. Further, the DEA increased the number of criminal 

diversion investigations initiated by 23 percent since issuance of our 2002 

report and established the first performance measures for the diversion 

control program in FY 2005. 

 Since our previous review, diversion using the Internet has become a 

growing threat. The DEA has increased the percentage of diversion 

investigator time applied to Internet diversion investigations and developed 

an operational Internet strategy for guiding investigators in conducting 

Internet investigations. However, it has not ensured that diversion 

investigators have the necessary tools, such as undercover credit cards, and 

training to conduct successful investigations of diversion using the Internet. 

We also found that the DEA had increased the amount of time that 

special agents devoted to diversion control since our last review. 

Nonetheless, this still represents a very small percentage of DEA special 

agents’ overall efforts at a time when the need for special agent assistance in 

diversion cases has increased. In addition, while 34 percent of special 

agents have attended a 3-day training course that is applicable to Internetrelated investigations, only 98 special agents have attended the DEA’s weeklong course specifically concerning diversion. Also, we found that the 

complicated issue of providing law enforcement authority for DEA diversion 

investigators has not been resolved, although the DEA has been actively 

pursuing the matter. 

Finally, with the growing threat of diversion using the Internet and 

the overall growth of diversion in general, the need for intelligence analysts 

has increased. While we found that the DEA has implemented certain new 

intelligence resources pertinent to diversion investigations, similar to what 

we found in our previous review, intelligence analyst assistance remains 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

40
limited in the field. Further, training for intelligence analysts on diversion 

issues is minimal. 

To make more progress in reducing the illegal diversion of controlled 

pharmaceuticals, the DEA must address these conditions by ensuring that 

criminal diversion investigations receive adequate assistance from special 

agents and intelligence analysts who have been trained in the intricacies of 

this type of investigation. Further, because diversion using the Internet is a 

growing threat, the DEA must also ensure that investigators have the 

necessary tools and training to conduct successful Internet investigations. 

 

We are therefore making six recommendations to help the DEA 

improve its ability to address the growing problem of diversion of controlled 

pharmaceuticals. 

We recommend that the DEA: 

1. Provide diversion investigators with adequate special agent support 

until the conversion of the DEA diversion investigator position to 

one with law enforcement authority is fully implemented. 

2. Ensure that DEA special agents who frequently assist with 

diversion investigations attend the week-long diversion training 

school. 

3. Provide training to intelligence analysts on topics that effectively 

support diversion investigations. 

4. Update the diversion control training video used in basic special 

agent and intelligence analyst training to include current diversion 

issues such as diversion using the Internet. 

5. Ensure that diversion investigators receive training in skills 

necessary for conducting Internet investigations, such as financial 

investigations. 

6. Fully implementation of the program to provide undercover credit 

cards to diversion investigators. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

41
APPENDIX I: GROUP SUPERVISOR QUESTIONNAIRE 

Department of Justice

Office of the Inspector General

Evaluation & Inspections Division

DEA Diversion Control Program Questionnaire 

INTRODUCTION 

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General is conducting a review of the 

Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) diversion control program. Specifically, we are 

examining the DEA’s enforcement efforts regarding controlled pharmaceutical diversion. 

We completed our last review in this area in October 2002. 

As part of the review, we are conducting this survey of diversion investigator, special agent, 

or other Group Supervisors involved in diversion control to obtain information regarding 

DEA’s diversion control operations. Your input is very important to us. For tracking 

purposes, it is important that you include your name on the survey, but your identity will 

remain confidential and will not be used in any survey results. All responses will be 

reported in the aggregate only. 

DIRECTIONS: This survey should be completed by every Group Supervisor directly 

responsible for coordinating and supervising either: 

• a DEA diversion group, 

• a DEA enforcement group that focuses on diversion, or 

• a Tactical Diversion Squad or other task force devoted to diversion control. 

Unless otherwise noted, please answer the survey questions as they relate to current 

operations for your group only. 

We prefer that you answer this questionnaire electronically. To do so, please click your 

cursor in the indicated shaded area and type your response. After you have completed the 

questionnaire, please save the document and e-mail it as an attachment to the following 

address: xxx@usdoj.gov. If necessary, you may print out the questionnaire, fill it out 

manually, and fax it to (xxx) xxx-xxx. 

We estimate that it will take you less than one hour to complete this questionnaire. Please 

return the completed questionnaire by September 9, 2005. 

Thank you for your assistance. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

42
NOTE: For this survey, “diversion investigations” refers only to criminal/civil/complaint 

investigations, not scheduled or cyclic investigations. 

A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Name 

Position (e.g., diversion investigator, special 

agent) 

DEA Field Division (e.g., Phoenix Field 

Division) 

DEA Office (e.g., Tucson, AZ, District Office) 

Phone Number 

 Address 

B. ORGANIZATION OF YOUR GROUP

1. How many of each of the following authorized positions is assigned to your group 

(including yourself)? (Enter a number in each row. If your group has no positions for a 

particular position, enter “0”.) 

 Diversion investigators 

 Special agents 

 Intelligence analysts 

 Task force officers 

 Other (Describe:) 

2. How many, if any, vacant positions do you currently have for each of the 

following in your group? 

(Enter a number in each row. If your group has no vacancies for a particular position, 

enter “0”.)

 Diversion investigators 

 Special agents 

 Intelligence analysts 

 Task force officers 

 Other (Describe:) 

3. Approximately what percentage of time does your group spend on the following? 

(Enter a percentage in each row. The column total should equal 100%.)

 Complaint/criminal/civil 

investigations 

 Cyclic/scheduled investigations 

 Pre-registrant investigations 

 All other activities 

100% TOTAL

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

43
C. LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT FOR DIVERSION INVESTIGATIONS

4. Which of the following best describes the involvement of DEA special agents in 

your group’s diversion investigations? (Check one box.)

One or more special agents is permanently assigned to work with my group. 

I request the assignment of special agents who are part of a DEA enforcement group to 

assist with diversion investigations on a case-specific basis. 

I request the assignment of special agents who are part of a task force devoted to 

diversion investigations (i.e., Tactical Diversion Squad or Diversion Response Team) to 

assist my group on a case-specific basis. This task force is led by DEA or another law 

enforcement group. 

DEA special agents are not involved in my group’s diversion investigations. 

(Please explain why:) 

5. Which of the following best describes the availability of law enforcement support 

that you receive from DEA special agents? (Check one box.)

The availability of DEA special agent support allows diversion investigations to 

continue without delay. 

The availability of DEA special agent support sometimes causes delays in 

diversion investigations. 

The availability of DEA special agent support often delays diversion 

investigations. 

6. Which of the following best describes the amount of law enforcement support that 

your group receives from DEA special agents? (Check one box.)

DEA special agents always provide a sufficient amount of law enforcement 

support for diversion investigations. 

DEA special agents usually provide a sufficient amount of law enforcement 

support for diversion investigations. 

DEA special agents never provide a sufficient amount of law enforcement 

support for diversion investigations. 

(Please explain why:) 

7. How satisfied are you with the law enforcement support that your group receives 

from DEA special agents? (Check one box.)

Very satisfied 

Somewhat satisfied 

Not at all satisfied 

7a. If you answered “Not at all satisfied” to Q7, explain why: 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

44
8. Which of the following best describes the involvement of local/state/other federal 

law enforcement personnel that assist in your group’s diversion investigations?

(Check one box.)

Other law enforcement personnel are part of a task force (led by DEA or other 

law enforcement group) devoted to diversion investigations. 

Other law enforcement personnel are part of a task force (led by DEA or other 

law enforcement group) not dedicated to diversion investigations, but the 

personnel assist with my group’s diversion investigations when necessary. 

Other law enforcement personnel are not part of any task force but we work 

with them informally on a case-specific basis. 

We have no local/state/other federal law enforcement involvement in our 

diversion investigations. 

9. What type of law enforcement personnel do you work with most often to support 

your group’s diversion investigations? (Check one box.) 

DEA special agents 

Other federal law enforcement personnel 

State/local law enforcement personnel 

Other (Describe:) 

10. In 2005, approximately how many of the controlled pharmaceutical diversion 

investigations conducted by your group required some type of law enforcement 

support? (Check one box.)

All investigations 

Most investigations 

Some investigations 

No investigations 

11. Since 2002, would you say that the need for law enforcement support in diversion 

investigations for your group has increased, stayed the same, or decreased? 

(Check one box.)

Increased 

Stayed the same 

Decreased 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

45


The availability of DEA intelligence support allows diversion investigations to 

continue without delay. 

The availability of DEA intelligence support sometimes causes delays in 

diversion investigations. 

The availability of DEA intelligence support often delays diversion 

investigations. 

21. Which of the following best describes the amount of intelligence support that your 

group receives from DEA intelligence analysts in the field? (Check one box.)

DEA intelligence analysts always provide a sufficient amount of intelligence 

support for diversion investigations. 

DEA intelligence analysts usually provide a sufficient amount of intelligence 

support for diversion investigations. 

DEA intelligence analysts never provide a sufficient amount of intelligence 

support for diversion investigations. 

(Please explain why:) 

22. Which of the following statements represent the types of DEA intelligence that 

your group receives from DEA headquarters or from the field? (Check all that 

apply.)

My group receives intelligence for specific investigations when we request it. 

My group receives intelligence regarding specific diversion targets to consider 

for investigation. 

My group receives strategic intelligence regarding general trends in diversion. 

My group receives another type of intelligence. (Describe:) 

23. For what types of diversion investigations would you be most likely to request 

intelligence support? (Check all that apply.)

For priority target investigations (CPOT, RPOT) 

For OCDETF investigations 

For HIDTA investigations 

For investigations involving complex financial transactions 

For investigations involving toll analysis 

For investigations involving the Internet 

Other (Describe:) 

24. How satisfied are you with the intelligence support that your group has received 

from the intelligence group in your office? (Check one box.)

Very satisfied 

Somewhat satisfied 

Not at all satisfied 

24a. If you answered “Not at all satisfied” to Q24, explain why: 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

48
25. In 2005, approximately how many of the controlled pharmaceutical investigations 

conducted by your group required some type of intelligence support? (Check one 

box.)

All investigations 

Most investigations 

Some investigations 

No investigations 

26. Since 2002, would you say that the need for intelligence support in diversion 

investigations for your group has increased, stayed the same, or decreased? 

(Check one box.)

Increased 

Stayed the same 

Decreased 

27. Describe any additional intelligence resources (e.g., access to investigative leads, 

intelligence analysts, or databases) necessary for your group to conduct diversion 

investigations: (Describe:) 

E. DIVERSION INVESTIGATIONS

The following section asks about your interaction with the Special Operations Division 

(SOD) in headquarters and your familiarity with its Webcrawler program/Online 

Investigations Project. The Webcrawler program/Online Investigations Project allows SOD 

to provide data, such as IP address and registration information, regarding specific 

websites or email addresses. 

28. In 2005, how many of the following diversion investigations has your group 

initiated? 

(Enter a number in each row.)

 Investigations of controlled pharmaceutical diversion involving the Internet 

(i.e., suspicious Internet pharmacies or email addresses) 

 Investigations of controlled pharmaceutical diversion not involving the 

Internet. 

29. Since 2002, would you say that the number of the following diversion 

investigations that your group has conducted has increased, stayed the same, or 

decreased? (Check one box in each row.)

Increased

Stayed 

the 

same 

Decreased 

Have not 

conducted 

any 

Investigations of controlled 

pharmaceutical diversion 

involving the Internet (i.e., 

suspicious Internet pharmacies or 

email addresses) 

Investigations of controlled 

pharmaceutical diversion not

involving the Internet. 

30. Do you contact the Special Operations Division prior to initiating an Internet 

investigation? 

(Check one box.)

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

49
Yes 

No 

Unsure 

Have not initiated any Internet 

investigations 

31. Has the Special Operations Division ever provided your group with information 

gathered through the Webcrawler? (Check one box.)

Yes 

No 

Unsure 

Have not initiated any Internet 

investigations 

31a. If you answered “Yes” to Q31, how satisfied were you with the Webcrawler 

information that was provided? (Check one box.)

Very satisfied 

Somewhat satisfied 

Not at all satisfied 

32. Which of the following types of undercover equipment does your group have for 

conducting Internet investigations? (Check all that apply.)

Computer 

Credit card 

Internet Service Provider account (such as AOL) 

Internet connection (i.e., DSL, cable modem, or dial-up 

connection) 

Post Office box 

 

33. Which of the following types of undercover equipment has your group used for 

conducting Internet investigations? (Check all that apply.)

Computer 

Credit card 

Internet Service Provider account (such as AOL) 

Internet connection (i.e., DSL, cable modem, or dial-up 

connection) 

Post Office box 

33b. If you have not used any of the undercover equipment in Q33, please 

explain why: 

(Describe:) 

34. Describe any additional resources that are necessary for your group to conduct 

the following investigations. (Describe in each row.) 

Investigations of controlled 

pharmaceutical diversion involving the 

Internet (i.e., suspicious Internet 

 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

50
pharmacies or email addresses) 

Investigations of controlled 

pharmaceutical diversion not involving 

the Internet. 

 

35. In 2005, how many cases involving controlled pharmaceutical diversion from your 

group have been presented and accepted by the U.S. Attorneys’ Office? (Enter a 

number in each row.)

 Number of cases presented to the U.S. Attorneys’ Office 

 Number of cases accepted by the U.S. Attorneys’ Office 

F. TRAINING

36. Other than the Basic Diversion Investigator Training Course received by all 

diversion investigators, which of the following additional training courses have 

been taken by diversion investigators in your group? (Check all that apply) 

Asset forfeiture training 

Financial investigation seminar 

Conspiracy and complex investigation training 

GATEWAY training 

Internet telecommunications exploitation school (offered by SOD) 

Other (Describe:) 

37. How adequate is the training that the diversion investigators in your group have 

received?

(Check one box.)

Very adequate 

Mostly adequate 

Not adequate 

37a. If you answered “Not adequate” to Q37, what additional training would be 

useful for diversion investigators in your group? (Describe:) 

38. Have the diversion investigators in your group received any specific training 

regarding how to prepare cases for the U.S. Attorneys’ Office? (Check one box.)

Yes 

No 

Unsure 

38a. If you answered “No” to Q38, please describe any additional resources 

that the diversion investigators in your group have access to for 

assistance in preparing cases for the U.S. Attorneys’ Office? (Describe:)

 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

51
G. CONCLUSION

39. In your opinion, how true are each of the following statements? (Check one box in 

each row.)

Very 

true 

Somewhat 

true 

Not true 

at all 

Don’t 

know 

The problem of diversion has grown in my 

DEA office’s geographic area since 2002. 

The availability of controlled 

pharmaceuticals available over the Internet 

has increased substantially since 2002. 

In general, the nature of the problem has 

changed from lower-level diversion (i.e., 

doctor shoppers) to higher-level diversion 

(i.e., organized drug rings selling large 

quantities of controlled pharmaceuticals) 

since 2002. 

The DEA’s efforts to control the diversion of 

pharmaceuticals have improved since 2002. 

 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

52
APPENDIX II: SCOPE OF THE OIG REVIEW REGARDING 

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AND COMMODITIES 

To reach the best estimate of time devoted by the DEA to 

pharmaceutical cases, we present two special agent and intelligence analyst 

work hour analyses based on two different data sets. The first analysis is 

based on “2000 series data” and is a measure of the time that that special 

agents and intelligence analysts spent assisting diversion investigations. 

The second analysis is based on G-DEP data and is a measure of all time 

spent on pharmaceutical investigations by special agents and intelligence 

analysts. 

Diversion investigations. Every DEA investigation has a unique case 

number consisting of eight digits that specify the (1) field division where it 

was initiated, (2) the fiscal year when it was initiated, and (3) who initiated 

it. Cases initiated by diversion investigators are denoted as “2000 series” 

cases. 

Pharmaceutical investigations. The G-DEP code is a five-character 

code the DEA assigns to all criminal investigations indicating (1) the type of 

investigative target, (2) whether other agencies are involved in the 

investigation, (3) the principal controlled substance or commodity involved 

in the investigation, and (4) the geographic scope of the criminal activity 

under investigation. There are 51 principal controlled substances captured 

by the G-DEP code. According to the DEA, 29 of a possible 51 substances 

related to the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals; however, we 

concluded that only 15 were within the scope of this review. 

The 15 substances classified with a G-DEP identifier and included in our 

review are: 

• Methylphenidate 

• Fentanyl (and its generics) 

• Ketamine (and its analogues) 

• Opioid Treatment Pharmaceuticals 

• Hydromorphone (Dilaudid) 

• Schedule II Pharmaceutical Narcotic 

• Schedule II Pharmaceutical Non-Narcotic 

• Schedule III Narcotic 

• Benzodiazepine 

• All Other Pharmaceutical Controlled Substances 

• Oxycodone 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

53
• Hydrocodone 

• Palladone 

• Steroid (pharmaceutical) 

• Pharmaceutical Cocaine 

The remaining 14 of the 29 substances not included in our review (for 

reasons stated) are: 

• Methaqualone – This is a schedule I drug not being legally 

manufactured or imported. 

• GHB/GBL/BD (and other GHB analogues) – This is an active 

ingredient for one Schedule II pharmaceutical, but not a 

pharmaceutical. 

• Unspecified Analogues – This is an ingredient in controlled 

pharmaceuticals, but not a pharmaceutical controlled substance. 

• Amphetamine/Stimulant Related Chemical – This is a listed chemical, 

and thus, outside of our scope. 

• Pseudo ephedrine – This is a listed chemical, and thus, outside of our 

scope. 

• Ephedrine – This is a listed chemical, and thus, outside of our scope. 

• Hallucinogen-Related Chemical – This is a listed chemical, and thus, 

outside of our scope. 

• Iodine/Red Phosphorus – This is a listed chemical, and thus, outside 

of our scope. 

• Depressant-Related Chemical – This refers to chemicals, and is thus, 

outside of our scope. 

• Chemical Equipment (non-drug-specific) – Chemical equipment is not 

a controlled substance. 

• Depressant (clandestine) – Clandestinely produced substances are not 

diverted drugs. 

• Other Stimulant (clandestine) – Clandestinely produced substances 

are not diverted drugs. 

• Steroid (clandestine) – Clandestinely produced substances are not 

diverted drugs. 

• No Specific Drug – This code is used for controlled pharmaceuticals as 

well as illicit drugs. 

Comparison of “2000” series and G-DEP Work Hour Data. The DEA 

informed us that there is no perfect way to capture the entire universe of all 

pharmaceutical investigations. However, both of the methods we present – 

using “2000 series” case data and using G-DEP code data for the 15 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

54
principal controlled substances within the scope of our review – have 

advantages and disadvantages, as described in Table 1. 

Table 1. Comparison of “2000 Series” and G-DEP Work Hour Data

“2000 Series” Data G-DEP Data 

Basis for data Based on an investigation’s 

case number. The “2000 

Series” data represents 

investigations initiated by 

diversion investigators. 

Based on the G-DEP substance 

identifier of investigation. We 

concluded that there were 15 

principal controlled substances 

captured by the G-DEP code that 

were within the scope of our 

review. 

Time period of data Data is available for the entire 

review period, FY 2002 – 

FY 2003. 

Data is only available for 

FY 2003 – FY 2005.* 

Substances 

included in 

analysis 

All cases initiated by diversion 

investigators are captured, 

regardless of the controlled 

substance involved. 

The identifier allows for analysis 

of specific substances. Diversion

cases on substances not selected 

are not captured. 

Disadvantages of 

data set 

Pharmaceutical investigations 

initiated by special agents are 

not captured. 

Chemical diversion 

investigations outside the 

scope of our review are 

captured. 

Deciding which of the 51 

substance identifiers to include is 

subjective. 

Time spent on non-criminal 

diversion investigations is not 

captured because only criminal 

cases are assigned G-DEP codes. 

The identifier for the substance 

only indicates the lead drug and 

is sometimes changed during the 

investigation. 

* Because the DEA restructured the list of principal controlled substances or 

commodities in 2002, FY 2002 data based on the G-DEP code is not comparable to more 

recent data, and our analysis of G-DEP data covers only FY 2003 through FY 2005. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

55
APPENDIX III: DEA’S RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

56
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

57
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

58
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

59
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

60
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

61
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

62
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

63
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

64
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

65
APPENDIX IV: OIG’S ANALYSIS OF DEA’S RESPONSE 

On June 9, 2006, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) sent a copy 

of the draft report to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) with a 

request for written comments. The DEA responded to us in a memorandum 

dated June 28, 2006. 

DEA Response 

 

In its response, the DEA disagreed with several of the OIG’s 

conclusions concerning the amount of assistance special agents and 

intelligence analysts provide to DEA diversion investigations. Specifically, 

the DEA expressed concern with the OIG’s exclusion of certain G-DEP 

substance identifiers from the analysis of pharmaceutical diversion 

investigation work hours.58 According to the DEA, this exclusion led to OIG 

conclusions that were “not fully representative of the pharmaceutical drug 

threat and DEA’s activities.” Also, the DEA disagreed with the OIG 

conclusion that intelligence analyst assistance to diversion investigations 

has remained limited. According to the DEA, intelligence analysts’ work 

hours spent on diversion investigations increased 58 percent from 2003 to 

2005. The DEA also stated that 67 percent of the 60 respondents to an OIG 

survey reported that intelligence analysts “always or usually provided” a 

sufficient amount of intelligence support for diversion investigations. The 

DEA also stated that the OIG overlooked “ongoing budget shortfalls” that 

limit the manpower support the DEA is able to provide for the diversion 

control program. 

Although the DEA disagreed with several of the report’s conclusions, 

it concurred with five of the six OIG recommendations. However, the DEA 

did not state concurrence or nonconcurrence with the recommendation to 

“Provide diversion investigators with adequate special agent support until 

the conversion of the DEA diversion investigator position to one with law 

enforcement authority is fully implemented,” because, in the DEA’s opinion, 

the recommendation was “unnecessary.” Nonetheless, the DEA presented 

an action plan for addressing that recommendation as well as for the five 

with which it concurred. The DEA also offered several minor technical 

corrections to the report that we incorporated in the final version of the 

report, as appropriate. 

 58 G-DEP is the DEA’s case identification system that indicates, among other 

things, the primary substance involved in an investigation. There are 51 G-DEP substance 

identifiers. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

66
OIG Analysis of the DEA Response 

While we believe that the actions undertaken and planned by the DEA 

to improve its ability to address the growing problem of the diversion of 

controlled pharmaceuticals are responsive to our recommendations, we 

address the DEA’s specific comments on our conclusions below. 

The OIG’s exclusion of 14 G-DEP identifiers from the analysis of 

pharmaceutical diversion work hours 

The DEA stated that the OIG’s work hour data analysis based on the 

G-DEP substance identifiers “is overly restrictive and excludes key data.” 

Specifically, the DEA stated that excluding the work hours charged to 

investigations denoted by 14 additional G-DEP substance identifiers 

“renders conclusions that are not fully representative of the pharmaceutical 

drug threat and DEA’s activities.” According to the DEA, “for consistency, 

this review should reflect work hours expended under all relevant G-DEP 

identifiers just as in the 2002 review.” The substances denoted by the 14 

additional G-DEP identifiers are methaqualone, GHB/GBL/BD, unspecified 

analogues, amphetamine/stimulant related chemical, pseudoephedrine, 

ephedrine, hallucinogen related chemical, iodine/red phosphorous, 

depressant related chemical, chemical equipment (non-drug specific), 

depressant (clandestine), other stimulant (clandestine), steroid (clandestine), 

and “No Specific Drug.” 

OIG Analysis. The DEA’s assessment of our G-DEP work hour 

analysis is incorrect. In its calculations, the DEA inappropriately included 

work hours for investigations that did not involve pharmaceuticals. In 

addition, the DEA incorrectly characterized the work hour analysis 

contained in our 2002 report. In Appendix II of this report, we list the 29 

G-DEP substance identifiers that the DEA stated were related to the 

diversion of pharmaceuticals and our rationale for excluding 14 of these 

identifiers that we deemed not to be within the scope of this review. The 14 

excluded G-DEP substance identifiers fall into the following five categories. 

First, we excluded 7 of the 14 G-DEP substance identifiers because 

they are chemicals, not controlled pharmaceuticals. As noted in the scope 

statement of this report (page 12), “Our review examined the DEA’s 

enforcement efforts to control pharmaceutical diversion since our October 

2002 report through FY 2005. . . . We did not assess the diversion control 

program’s regulatory function and did not examine its enforcement efforts 

against the diversion of regulated chemicals.” In addition, because this 

review is a follow-up review to one conducted in 2002, the scope of this 

review was guided by the scope of the previous review, which also excluded 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

67
chemicals and was entitled Review of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s 

Control of the Diversion of Controlled Pharmaceuticals (I-2002-010). 

Second, we excluded 3 of the remaining 7 G-DEP substance 

identifiers because they are clandestinely produced substances and 

therefore cannot be “diverted” in the way we define that term in this report 

since they were never in the legal distribution chain. 

Third, we excluded 2 of the remaining 4 G-DEP substance identifiers 

because they are ingredients used to make pharmaceuticals and not 

controlled pharmaceuticals themselves. Ingredients do not represent 

“diverted pharmaceuticals” because they must be combined with other 

ingredients in order to become controlled pharmaceuticals. 

Fourth, we excluded 1 of the remaining 2 G-DEP substance identifiers 

because it refers to a Schedule I drug. Schedule I drugs have no legal 

medical use and therefore are rarely diverted pharmaceuticals.59 Therefore, 

the vast majority of work hours spent on this Schedule 1 drug reflects illicit 

production. 

Finally, we excluded hours charged to investigations in which the 

G-DEP identifier was listed as “No Specific Drug” because we found that 

most of the hours in this category did not relate to pharmaceuticals. 

Although we explored the possibility with the DEA of extracting the “No 

Specific Drug” investigations that pertained specifically to controlled 

pharmaceuticals and including data about those cases in our analysis, the 

DEA informed us that this would not be possible without an extensive 

manual case file review. Further, when DEA personnel conducted a manual 

review of a small subjective sample of “No Specific Drug” investigations, they 

found that most of the investigations reviewed did not pertain to controlled 

pharmaceuticals. 

The decision about whether to include hours in the “No Specific Drug” 

category was critical to reaching the most accurate analysis possible 

because, of the 29 G-DEP substance identifiers that the DEA said were 

related to the diversion of pharmaceuticals, the “No Specific Drug” category 

contained the most hours. In fact, this category accounted for 30 percent of 

the combined work hours for the 29 G-DEP substance identifiers and 72 

percent of the work hours for the 14 G-DEP substance identifiers that we 

excluded from this review. 

 59 Small amounts of Schedule 1 drugs may be legitimately produced by 

manufacturers for research purposes. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

68
To further test the reasonableness of our decision to exclude “No 

Specific Drug” investigations, we checked the number of work hours 

diversion investigators charged to this category. We posited that if many 

“No Specific Drug” investigations were related to diversion, then diversion 

investigators would have charged a substantial number of hours to this 

category. We therefore examined the percentage of time that diversion 

investigators charged to the “No Specific Drug” category out of the total time 

they charged to the 29 G-DEP substance identifiers that the DEA said were 

related to the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals. We found that 

diversion investigators charged only 0.26 percent of their work hours to the 

“No Specific Drug” category, while special agents charged 49 percent, task 

force officers 43 percent, and intelligence analysts 37 percent. 

We also examined whether diversion investigator work hours made up 

a significant share of total hours spent on “No Specific Drug” investigations. 

We found that in FY 2005, a total of 289,197.5 hours were charged to “No 

Specific Drug” investigations. Of those hours, only 922 (0.32 percent) were 

diversion investigator hours, while 203,898 (70.5 percent) were special 

agent hours, 66,791.5 (23.1 percent) were task force officer hours, and 

17,586 (6.1 percent) were intelligence analyst hours. These analyses 

confirmed that diversion investigators had limited involvement in 

investigations denoted by the “No Specific Drug” G-DEP substance 

identifier. Therefore, we concluded from our analysis that including the 

hours spent on “No Specific Drug” investigations, as the DEA suggested, 

would improperly inflate the amount of time that the DEA spent 

investigating the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals. 

In its response, the DEA also stated that “this review should reflect 

work hours expended under all relevant G-DEP identifiers, just as in the 

2002 review.” In fact, the OIG’s 2002 review did not examine work hours by 

G-DEP identifier because the DEA told the OIG at the time that it was not 

possible to provide data on the number of work hours that special agents 

spent on diversion investigations. Therefore, we used DEA officials’ estimate 

that special agents spent 1 to 3 percent of their time on diversion 

investigations. In the 2002 report, we also gave the DEA the maximum 

credit for special agent assistance by using the highest estimate and 

calculated the total number of work years spent by special agents on 

controlled pharmaceutical cases by computing 3 percent of all special agent 

time spent on criminal investigations. That methodology was required 

because the DEA could not specifically isolate the work hours spent by 

special agents on investigations involving controlled pharmaceuticals. 

Since 2002, the DEA has improved its work hour reporting system 

and can now better differentiate and report the work hours spent by special 

agents investigating controlled pharmaceuticals, using more specific G-DEP 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

69
substance identifiers. This improvement allowed the OIG to produce a more 

accurate analysis of the percentage of special agent time spent on 

pharmaceutical investigations. Given the fact that the DEA has refined its 

work hour reporting system so that it can identify work hours for specific 

substances by job series, we used this information in calculating the work 

hour data. 

In sum, we concluded that using all of the 29 G-DEP substance 

identifiers, as suggested by the DEA, would not accurately assess special 

agent time spent on pharmaceutical investigations. Thus, we made no 

changes to the work hour analysis in the report. 

The OIG’s exclusion of task force officer work hours from the analysis 

of pharmaceutical diversion work hours 

The DEA response noted that the OIG’s analysis excluded the work 

hours of state and local officers working on pharmaceutical investigations 

as a part of DEA task forces. The DEA stated: 

Since the 1970s, these task force officers have been an 

extension of the DEA agent workforce, and are federally 

deputized with equal responsibilities and authorities as DEA 

agents. Most important their activities and investigations are 

directed by DEA priorities. Therefore, DEA maintains that the 

investigative work hours that these task force officers spend on 

criminal diversion investigations should be combined with those 

of DEA special agents. 

OIG Analysis. The OIG recognizes the importance of task force 

officers to the success of the DEA’s mission. During interviews and in 

responses to our survey, diversion personnel often noted the excellent 

partnerships they had with officers from state, local, and federal agencies. 

Although task force officers often play an important role in the DEA’s 

diversion control investigations, the fact that local jurisdictions responded 

to the increasing diversion of pharmaceuticals by increasing their support of 

DEA task forces is not a satisfactory substitute for the DEA providing 

adequate support through its own special agents. The OIG’s review focused 

on DEA resources allocated to control the diversion of pharmaceuticals. 

In addition, because this was a follow-up review, we focused on the 

current status of the issues we identified in our 2002 review. In that review, 

the work hour data analysis focused exclusively on DEA special agents and 

the assistance of task force officers was mentioned only in the context of 

diversion investigators relying on state, local, and federal agents because of 

the lack of DEA special agent assistance. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

70
The OIG’s statement that intelligence analyst assistance to diversion 

investigations has remained limited 

The DEA response stated that while the OIG report states that 

intelligence analyst support has remained limited, its own analysis “shows 

that intelligence analyst work hours on diversion investigations increased 

58 percent from 25,603 hours in 2003 to 40,517 hours in 2005.” The DEA 

also presented its own analysis of the OIG’s diversion group supervisor 

survey. Finally, the DEA noted that it is “continuing to expand its 

intelligence support to diversion investigations and is in the process of 

allocating 41 new intelligence analysts to support the Diversion Control 

Program.”60

OIG Analysis. The DEA made two arguments to support its 

contention that our conclusion concerning limited intelligence analyst 

support to diversion investigations was not accurate. First, the DEA’s 

statement that intelligence analyst work hours on diversion investigations 

increased 58 percent is based on the work hours expended on all 29 G-DEP 

substance identifiers that the DEA stated are related to pharmaceutical 

investigations, including the “No Specific Drug” category. As we discussed 

previously, it is inaccurate to include these substances, particularly the “No 

Specific Drug” category. The “No Specific Drug” category contains 37 

percent of all the intelligence analyst work hours that the DEA stated were 

related to pharmaceutical investigations. Once these hours are excluded, 

the increase in work hours is shown to be much more modest, as we 

describe in the report on page 36. 

Further, that modest increase appears to be mostly attributable to a 

few specific operations rather than an across-the-board increase. We found 

that in FY 2005, 44 percent of intelligence analyst time was charged to four 

specific operations (page 38). While this indicates that some 

pharmaceutical investigations are receiving significant amounts of 

intelligence support, it does not establish that intelligence analyst 

assistance is generally and consistently available to diversion investigators. 

Moreover, our data analysis, interviews, and survey responses showed that 

overall intelligence analyst support in the field is limited. 

Second, the DEA presented its own analysis of the results of our 

diversion group supervisor survey that obscures important information, and 

we do not agree with the DEA’s characterization of the survey data. For 

example, the DEA stated that 67 percent of the respondents reported that 

 60 In its FY 2006 appropriations (H.R. Rep. No. 109-118, June 10, 2005), the DEA 

was appropriated funds for 41 positions to improve intelligence analysis supporting 

diversion investigations. The DEA was allocated 40 of these positions for intelligence 

analysts and 1 as a support position. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

71
intelligence analysts always or usually provide a sufficient amount of 

intelligence support for diversion investigations. However, the survey 

results showed that more than double the number of respondents reported 

that DEA intelligence analysts never provide sufficient support than said 

DEA intelligence analysts always provide sufficient support. In fact, onethird of respondents stated that they never receive sufficient intelligence 

support. The actual survey question and results are shown below. 

Number of 

respondents 

Percentage 

of 

respondents 

Which of the following best describes the amount 

of intelligence support that your group receives 

from DEA intelligence analysts in the field?

9 14.5 

DEA intelligence analysts always provide a sufficient 

amount of intelligence support for diversion 

investigations. 

32 51.6 

DEA intelligence analysts usually provide a sufficient 

amount of intelligence support for diversion 

investigations. 

20 32.3 

DEA intelligence analysts never provide a sufficient 

amount of intelligence support for diversion 

investigations. 

Similarly, the DEA stated that 72 percent of survey respondents were 

very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the intelligence support received, 

as shown in the table below. The survey results showed that 27 percent of 

respondents were not at all satisfied with the intelligence that their group 

received from intelligence analysts. Further, in our opinion, having an 

additional 45 percent of diversion group supervisors report that they are 

only somewhat satisfied leaves considerable room for the DEA to improve 

intelligence analyst support to diversion investigations. The survey question 

and its results are shown below. 

 

Number of 

respondents 

Percentage 

of 

respondents 

How satisfied are you with the intelligence 

support that your group has received from the 

intelligence group in your office? 

17 27.4 Very satisfied 

28 45.2 Somewhat satisfied 

17 27.4 Not at all satisfied 

Moreover, although omitted from the DEA’s response to our report, 

17.7 percent of respondents to our survey reported that the availability of 

intelligence support often causes delays in investigations, and 37.1 percent 

reported that the availability of intelligence support sometimes causes 

delays in investigations. This further reinforces our conclusion that the 

DEA’s limited support of pharmaceutical investigations is negatively 

affecting these investigations. The survey question and its results are 

shown below. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

72
Number of 

respondents 

Percentage 

of 

respondents 

Which of the following best describes the 

availability of intelligence support that your 

group receives from DEA intelligence analysts in 

the field? 

23 37.1 The availability of DEA intelligence support allows 

diversion investigations to continue without delay. 

23 37.1 The availability of DEA intelligence support sometimes

causes delays in diversion investigations. 

11 17.7 The availability of DEA intelligence support often delays 

diversion investigations. 

The DEA also stated that “75 percent of respondents reported 

receiving intelligence for specific investigations when requested.” This 

misrepresents the data in our survey. The question that the DEA refers to 

was intended to capture the type of intelligence support provided, not the 

frequency. The question asks what type of intelligence assistance the 

respondent received – not whether they received assistance when they 

needed it. The responses to this question indicate that it is far more 

common for diversion investigators to receive intelligence support when they 

specifically request it than for them to receive proactive intelligence support 

on specific potential targets of investigation or trends in diversion. We 

found that only 22.6 percent of respondents received intelligence on specific 

investigative targets, and 32.3 percent received intelligence on trends in 

diversion, as shown in the table below. The survey question and its results 

are shown below. 

Number of 

respondents 

Percentage 

of 

respondents 

Which of the following statements represent the 

types of DEA intelligence that your group 

receives from DEA headquarters or from the 

field? 

44 71 My group receives intelligence for specific investigations 

when we request it. 

14 22.6 My group receives intelligence regarding specific diversion 

targets to consider for investigation. 

20 32.3 My group receives strategic intelligence regarding general 

trends in diversion. 

Moreover, while the DEA and the OIG interpreted the survey results 

differently, we also used other evidence from site visit interviews, DEA 

threat assessments, and work hour data to conclude that intelligence 

analyst assistance remains limited, as it was at the time of our 2002 review. 

Finally, the DEA stated that it is continuing to expand its intelligence 

support to diversion investigators and is in the process of allocating 40 new 

intelligence analysts to support the diversion control program. While we 

agree that such a measure will be helpful, the OIG could not assess the full 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

73
impact of these positions on intelligence support because, as of the end of 

our field work, the DEA had not yet begun to fill the positions. 

The OIG overlooked DEA budget shortfalls that limit support for the 

diversion control program 

The DEA’s response also stated that the OIG overlooked “ongoing 

budget shortfalls” that limit the manpower support the DEA is able to 

provide for the diversion control program. The OIG recognizes that the DEA, 

like other Department components, is faced with budget constraints that 

require prioritization of limited resources. In conducting our evaluations, 

the OIG attempts to assess whether the agency’s response is in proportion 

to the scope of the problem and identifies areas where the response could be 

improved. 

 

Yet, we believe the dramatic growth in pharmaceutical diversion 

requires the DEA to consider rebalancing its priorities. As we state in our 

report on page 2, the abuse of controlled pharmaceuticals can be as 

dangerous as the abuse of illicit drugs. Both can result in addiction, 

overdoses, and deaths. Two recent reports show the continuing increase in 

the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals. According to a report released 

by the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia 

University (CASA) in June 2006, “The extensive availability of controlled 

prescription drugs online poses a silent menace to our nation’s health and a 

challenge for law enforcement.” The CASA report also documents the 

increase in web sites selling controlled pharmaceuticals without requiring 

prescriptions between 2004 and 2005 and again between 2005 and 2006. 

In addition, a May 2006 study by the Partnership for a Drug Free America 

reported that nearly one in five (19 percent or 4.5 million) teens has used 

prescription pain relievers or stimulants non-medically and that the 

widespread availability and easy access of these substances has driven their 

popularity among teens. Additionally, the CASA report states, “Today more 

adults and teens report abusing these drugs [controlled pharmaceuticals] 

than the number abusing all illicit drugs combined except marijuana.” 

The DEA’s efforts are critical to controlling the diversion of 

pharmaceuticals, and undertaking criminal investigations of diverters is 

critical to the effectiveness of these efforts. The recommendations in our 

report are intended to help the DEA improve its ability to address the 

growing problem of controlled pharmaceutical diversion, given the limited 

resources available to it. 

The following section addresses the DEA’s responses to the specific 

recommendations in the report. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

74
RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 1: Provide diversion investigators with adequate 

special agent support until the conversion of the DEA diversion investigator 

position to one with law enforcement authority is fully implemented. 

Summary of DEA Response. The DEA did not state concurrence or 

nonconcurrence with this recommendation. The DEA asserted that “this 

recommendation is unnecessary and its objective – ‘to provide adequate 

special agent support’ is ambiguous.” Further, the DEA stated that it has 

“provided ‘adequate’ special agent support to diversion investigations.” The 

DEA also wrote, “Another concern is the OIG reports’ [sic] misrepresentation 

of the August 2001 directive by DEA’s Chief of Operations. DEA’s Chief of 

Operations issued this memorandum instructing Special Agents in Charge 

to place two special agents in each diversion group in each Division office.” 

According to the DEA, this instruction “was overtaken by a 2003 decision to 

instead convert diversion investigators to a series with law enforcement 

authority.” 

Although the DEA neither concurred nor nonconcurred with this 

recommendation, the DEA reported that it is planning to allocate 23 

additional special agents to support diversion groups and the diversion 

control program. In addition, the DEA response said that within 30 days 

after the issuance of this report, the DEA Administrator will issue a 

memorandum and worldwide teletype restating that diversion and 

trafficking of controlled pharmaceuticals, including Internet trafficking, 

remain a top DEA priority and that Special Agents in Charge are to enhance 

special agent assistance to criminal diversion investigations. 

OIG Analysis. Recommendation 1 is resolved – open. The actions 

planned by the DEA are responsive to the recommendation. Please provide 

a copy of the teletype, a description of how the 23 additional special agents 

will be deployed to support diversion groups, and a description of how 

Special Agents in Charge have enhanced assistance to criminal diversion 

investigations in each field division by October 31, 2006. 

However, although we accept the DEA’s planned actions to address 

this recommendation, we disagree with several of the statements included in 

the DEA’s response. We address each of these statements below. 

The DEA stated that it has “provided adequate special agent support 

to diversion investigations.” However, as this report shows, we believe the 

DEA should do more to ensure that diversion investigators have adequate 

special agent support. Diversion investigators still do not have law 

enforcement authority and continue to rely on special agent support to 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

75
conduct critical tasks in criminal diversion investigations. In 2002, DEA 

personnel estimated that special agents spent at most 3 percent of their 

time assisting with diversion investigations. Although diversion of 

pharmaceuticals has increased dramatically since that time, in our current 

review the percentage of special agent time dedicated to pharmaceutical 

diversion investigations was at most 2.2 percent. Further, we were told 

during field interviews that diversion investigators’ lack of law enforcement 

authority, coupled with inconsistent levels of special agent support, 

impeded diversion investigators’ criminal pharmaceutical investigations. 

Moreover, our review of the DEA’s 2004 Pharmaceutical Threat Assessments 

and our survey results supported the field interviews. And although the 

DEA has proposed converting the diversion investigator position to one with 

law enforcement authority, this proposed conversion has not yet occurred. 

We also disagree with the DEA’s statement that the OIG 

misrepresented an August 2001 directive by DEA’s Chief of Operations. In 

the memorandum in question, the DEA’s Chief of Operations instructed 

Special Agents in Charge to place two special agents in each diversion group 

in each Division office to better support diversion investigations. According 

to the DEA, this instruction was overtaken by a 2003 decision to instead 

convert diversion investigators to a job series with law enforcement 

authority. However, the DEA presented no documentation showing that the 

directive had been overtaken or rescinded. In fact, the DEA reaffirmed the 

2001 Chief of Operations’ directive by using it as evidence in a DEA 2003 

memorandum to the Department requesting conversion of the diversion 

investigator position.61 In addition, this explanation that the memorandum 

was overtaken by the 2003 decision to convert diversion investigators 

contradicts the DEA’s previous written statements to us, in February 2006, 

in which it said that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, had 

prevented the DEA from implementing the 2001 Chief of Operations’ 

directive. 

In conclusion, although the DEA states that it believes this 

recommendation to be “unnecessary,” several sources of evidence (such as 

site visit interviews, analysis of survey responses, review of the DEA 2004 

Pharmaceutical Threat Assessments, and special agent work hour data) 

showed that for many diversion investigators, inadequate special agent 

support, coupled with their own lack of law enforcement authority, remains 

a serious concern. In our report (beginning on page 16), we note many 

positive steps that the DEA has taken to improve its pharmaceutical 

 61 The 2003 memorandum briefly outlined the history of the diversion investigator 

position and stated that the 2001 directive reaffirmed previously described constraints on 

the diversion investigator position in order to clarify the duties and responsibilities to the 

diversion investigator workforce. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

76
diversion control program. However, contrary to the DEA’s claim that this 

recommendation is unnecessary, it is needed to ensure that the DEA 

consistently, sufficiently, and timely supports diversion investigations. 

Recommendation 2: Ensure that DEA special agents who frequently 

assist with diversion investigations attend the week-long diversion training 

school. 

Summary of DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and will continue to identify and offer training to all special 

agents and task force officers who are assigned to Tactical Diversion Squads 

or who assist with diversion investigations. The DEA stated that, dependent 

upon funding, special agents and task force officers will be identified and 

will attend the 1-week diversion course during FY 2007. 

OIG Analysis. Recommendation 2 is resolved – open. The actions 

planned by the DEA are responsive to the recommendation. 

Please provide your target number and timeline for the special agents 

and task force officers who are assigned to Tactical Diversion Squads or who 

assist with diversion investigations to attend the 1-week course. Please 

explain how special agents and task force officers will be identified and 

prioritized for this training, and submit the number of special agents by 

field office that are expected to attend the course during FY 2007. In 

addition, please indicate whether any of the agents currently assigned full 

time to diversion groups, Tactical Diversion Squads, or other diversion task 

forces are not expected to attend the 1-week course during FY 2007. Please 

provide an alternative plan to address this recommendation by October 31, 

2006, if the DEA anticipates funding or other constraints will prevent 

special agents and task force officers assigned to Tactical Diversion Squads 

or assisting with diversion investigations from attending the 1-week course 

during FY 2007. 

Recommendation 3: Provide training to intelligence analysts on 

topics that would effectively support diversion investigations. 

Summary of DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and said it will conduct an assessment to determine the 

precise analytic needs of diversion investigators and investigations, which 

will then be used as a baseline to design a course and curriculum for 

intelligence analyst training. 

OIG Analysis. Recommendation 3 is resolved – open. The actions 

planned by the DEA are responsive to the recommendation. However, the 

DEA noted that development of the curriculum and commencement of the 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

77
training are dependent on funding. If the curriculum is developed and the 

training commences, please provide us with a report on the findings of the 

assessment, a copy of the new curriculum, and the schedule of intelligence 

analyst diversion courses planned for FY 2007 by October 31, 2006. If 

funding or other constraints prevent the DEA from developing the 

curriculum and conducting courses in FY 2007, please provide an 

alternative plan to address this recommendation by October 31, 2006. 

Recommendation 4: Update the diversion control training video 

used in the special agent and intelligence analyst training academies to 

include current issues such as diversion using the Internet. 

Summary of DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and said it is currently in the process of developing a new 

training video specifically for pharmaceutical diversion, which it expects to 

complete by September 30, 2006. 

OIG Analysis. Recommendation 4 is resolved – open. The action 

planned by the DEA is responsive to the recommendation. Please provide a 

copy of the new video by October 31, 2006. 

Recommendation 5: Ensure that diversion investigators receive 

training in skills necessary for conducting Internet investigations, such as 

financial investigations. 

Summary of DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and said it will conduct a needs assessment to determine 

the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for diversion investigators to 

effectively conduct Internet investigations by November 2006; increase the 

number of diversion investigators who attend the DEA Special Operations 

Division’s Internet Telecommunications Exploitation Training (ITEP) school 

in FY 2007; increase the number of diversion investigators who attend the 

DEA’s financial investigations, asset forfeiture, complex conspiracy, and 

FinCEN/Gateway courses; and modify existing courses or develop new ones 

to meet the needs of diversion investigators. 

OIG Analysis. Recommendation 5 is resolved – open. The actions 

planned by the DEA are responsive to our recommendation. However, the 

DEA noted that increasing the number of diversion investigators attending 

the ITEP course is dependent on funding. Please provide us with the status 

of the needs assessment, an FY 2007 schedule showing the planned 

number of sessions of each course listed in your response as relevant to 

Internet diversion investigations, and the number of diversion investigators 

expected to attend each course during FY 2007 by October 31, 2006. If 

funding or other constraints prevent the DEA from taking these actions, 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

78
please provide an alternative plan to address this recommendation by 

October 31, 2006. 

Recommendation 6: Fully implement the program to provide 

undercover credit cards to diversion investigators. 

Summary of DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and said it has approved the program, tested it, and issued 

guidelines. The DEA reported that 7 of its 21 field divisions have received 

the undercover credit cards and that the remaining divisions are in various 

stages of processing and having banks issue the undercover cards. The 

DEA anticipates that the program will be completely implemented by 

December 2006. 

OIG Analysis. Recommendation 6 is resolved – open. The actions 

planned by the DEA are responsive to the recommendation. Please provide 

a status report on the implementation by October 31, 2006. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

79