UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

______________________________ 

 ) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) Criminal Action No. 09-182 (RWR) 

MARLANA QUIGLEY, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

______________________________) 

 

MEMORANDUM ORDER

 Defendant Marlana Quigley pled guilty to production of 

child pornography by a parent and distribution of child 

pornography, and was sentenced to serve 15 years in prison and 

to pay $800,000 in restitution to the child victim. Quigley 

moves pro se to defer payment of her restitution until she is 

released from prison claiming that her grandmother can no longer 

provide Quigley financial help and Quigley has no prison income 

since she has been released from her prison job.1 Id. The 

government opposes, arguing that she seeks her remedy in the 

wrong forum, and that she in any event has shown no meritorious 

 1 Quigley also states that “[t]here was no payment plan set 

by the court.” Mot. at 1. To the extent that Quigley is 

arguing that the sentencing court erred by failing to set a 

restitution payment schedule, the D.C. Circuit found no plain 

error in a sentencing court deferring to the Bureau of Prisons 

to schedule restitution payments. See United States v. Hunter, 

786 F.3d 1006, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also, United States v. 

Baldwin, 563 F.3d 490, 491-92 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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change in economic circumstances since the Bureau of Prisons 

(“BOP”) has now reemployed her. Because the timing and amount 

of prisoner payments towards a restitution judgment is an 

executive and not a judicial decision, Quigley’s motion will be 

denied. 

 “This [C]ourt does not have the authority to grant 

[Quigley’s] request to defer or change [her] monthly restitution 

payments. [T]he amount an inmate must pay under [the Inmate 

Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”)] is a matter entrusted 

to the Executive Branch, and courts are not authorized to 

override the BOP’s discretion about such matters, any more than 

a judge could dictate particulars about a prisoner’s meal 

schedule or recreation.” United States v. Hunter, Criminal 

Action No. 11-39-1 (RWR), 2013 WL 4083311, at *2 (D.D.C. 

Aug. 13, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d on 

other grounds, 786 F.3d 1006, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing 

United States v. Rush, 853 F. Supp. 2d 159, 162 (D.D.C. 2012), 

and United States v. Baldwin, 563 F.3d 490, 492 (stating that 

the IFRP operates “under the exclusive control and authority of 

the Executive Branch”)). 

“[A] defendant may seek judicial review of [her] IFRP 

restitution payment amount after exhausting [her] administrative 

remedies.” Hunter, 2013 WL 4083311, at *2 (citing Rush, 853 F. 

Supp. 2d at 162 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 542.10(a))). Quigley “has 
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not shown that she has exhausted BOP administrative remedies to 

challenge her IFRP restitution payment amount before seeking 

judicial relief.” United States v. Small, 13 F. Supp. 3d 24, 28 

(D.D.C. 2014) (citation omitted). “Further, even if she had 

exhausted all administrative remedies, ‘the proper method for 

challenging how BOP is administering the IFRP in her case may 

not be a motion to the sentencing court, but rather a petition 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district where [the defendant] is 

serving her sentence.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citing 

United States v. Ayers-Zander, Criminal Action No. 11-280 (RWR), 

2013 WL 2468300, at *1 (D.D.C. June 7, 2013); Rush, 853 F. Supp. 

2d at 162; United States v. Locke, Criminal Action No. 09-259 

(JDB), 2012 WL 1154084, at *3 n.5 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2012); United 

States v. Diggs, 578 F.3d 318, 319 n.1. (5th Cir. 2009)). 

It is unlikely that Quigley has even met her burden of 

proving that her economic circumstances have “changed enough to 

warrant such a modification.” Hinton v. United States, Civil 

Action No. 99-211 (RMU), 2003 WL 21854935, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 

2003) (citing United States v. Hill, 1999 WL 801543, at *1 (6th 

Cir. Sept. 28, 1999)). The in-prison account statement that 

Quigley filed “may establish that [s]he has very few assets in 

[her] prison-run account, but it does not address the existence 

of any assets [s]he may have in other accounts or locations.” 

Id. And any indigence resulting from the fact of her 
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incarceration does not alone establish grounds for such a 

modification. Id. at *5 (citing United States v. Wolfe, 10 Fed. 

Appx. 249, 250 (6th Cir. 2001)). Since Quigley has not shown 

that she is entitled to have this Court defer her restitution 

payments until she is released from prison, it is hereby 

ORDERED that the defendant’s motion [37] to defer her 

restitution obligation be, and hereby is, DENIED. 

SIGNED this 19th day of January, 2016. 

 _________/s/_______________ 

 RICHARD W. ROBERTS 

 Chief Judge