Filed 9/13/24 C.M. v. M.R. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

C.M.,

 Appellant,

v.

M.R.,

 Respondent.

 G062538

 (Super. Ct. Nos. 20P000074 & 

 22FL001038)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, 

Israel Claustro, Judge. Affirmed in part, and dismissed in part.

C.M., in pro. per., for Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent.
2

Appellant C.M. and respondent M.R. have been involved in two 

cases in the trial court. On this appeal, C.M. challenges two orders, one from 

each case. In one case, M.R. filed a petition to change the last name of their 

child, which the trial court granted over C.M.’s opposition. In the other case, 

the trial court made, inter alia, interim custody orders. C.M.’s arguments on 

appeal are unavailing and raise issues that are not appealable. As explained 

below, we affirm in part and dismiss in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

C.M. and M.R. are the parties in two cases with distinct case 

numbers in the trial court. From what we can discern from the limited record 

on appeal, the litigation between C.M. and M.R. began in 2020 in case 

number 20P000074 (20P000074). In 2021, that case came before a different 

panel of this court on an appeal by C.M. related to certain requests for 

temporary restraining orders.1(C.M. v. M.R. (Dec. 2021, G059269) [nonpub. 

opn.].) From the registrar of actions, there appear to have been many

documents filed in 20P000074 since then that were not provided as part of 

the current appeal’s record.

In November 2022, M.R. filed a petition to change the name of 

their child. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1275 et seq.) This petition was filed under

case number 22FL001038 (22FL001038). The child had the same last name 

as C.M., and M.R. requested to change the child’s last name so that it was a 

hyphenated combination of C.M’s last name and M.R.’s last name (i.e., the 

1

In that appeal, the panel of this court affirmed the denial of 

C.M.’s request for a temporary restraining order and dismissed as moot the 

appeal from a temporary restraining order M.R. had requested. (C.M. v. M.R.

(Dec. 2021, G059269) [nonpub. opn.].)
3

child’s last name would be C.M.’s last name, followed by a hyphen, followed 

by M.R.’s last name). C.M. filed an opposition to the request with exhibits. 

On March 10, 2023, the trial court held a hearing and noted there 

were three matters to address. For 20P000074, the trial court noted there 

was M.R.’s renewal motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 and 

M.R.’s request for order regarding child custody and visitation, child support, 

and attorney fees (no briefing regarding these issues is in the record on 

appeal). The other matter was the request to change the child’s last name 

under 22FL001038. 

Among other issues discussed at the hearing, C.M. raised Family 

Code sections 2030, 2031, 2032, and 76402(all undesignated statutory 

references are to this code) and he argued those sections allowed him to 

request the court hold a hearing and appoint him an attorney. Regarding the 

request for order as to child custody and visitation, child support, and 

attorney fees by M.R., the trial court stated it was going to continue the 

matter at C.M.’s request to allow him to attempt to find an attorney. The trial 

court issued interim custody orders and stated, “[u]nder 3044, you are not 

allowed to have joint legal or joint physical custody, so I am going to award 

temporary sole legal, sole physical custody to [M.R.] pursuant to 3044 of the 

Family Code.”3 Regarding the request to change the child’s last name, the 

trial court denied C.M.’s request for a continuance, heard argument from 

2 At times during the hearing, C.M. also referred to section 7460. 

We presume he meant section 7640 as he also referenced section 7640 during

the hearing and there is no section 7460.

3 From the record it appears the trial court made these interim 

custody orders in respect to 20P000074.
4

C.M., and proceeded to address the merits, finding it was in the best interests 

of the child to grant the petition. 

Following the hearing, the court issued two minute orders dated 

March 10, 2023. The March 10, 2023 minute order for 22FL001038 indicated, 

inter alia, the trial court granted the request for change of name, and a 

decree changing name was signed, filed as of that date, and incorporated by 

reference.4

In the second March 10, 2023 minute order for 20P000074, the 

trial court made several findings. Of significance here, the trial court made 

“temporary custody orders pending the next hearing date[.]” M.R. was to 

have sole legal and sole physical custody of the child, with monitored

visitation for C.M. The minute order required “[c]ounsel for [M.R.] to prepare 

the formal order.” 

In 20P000074, the Findings and Order After Hearing (FOAH) 

was subsequently filed and signed by the trial court on August 25, 2023.

5

Notably here, the FOAH indicated the trial court found C.M. to be “subject to 

the presumption against custody imposed by . . . section 3044” and granted 

M.R.’s “request for temporary custody orders[.]” The FOAH also noted C.M.’s 

“motion for attorney’s fees is denied pending the hearing on April 27, 2023.”

(Capitalization omitted.) C.M. was ordered to timely file and serve an income 

4 On our own motion, we augment the record on appeal with the 

decree changing name, which was filed in 22FL001038. (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).) 

5 On our own motion, we augment the record on appeal with the 

FOAH, which was filed in 20P000074. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.155(a)(1)(A).)
5

and expense declaration and invited to file a notice regarding his request for 

attorney fees with supporting points and authorities.

C.M. filed a notice of appeal, which listed the case number as 

20P000074. His notice of appeal also indicated he was appealing from the

judgment or order dated March 10, 2023. 

DISCUSSION

“A judgment or order of the trial court is presumed to be correct, 

and all intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters 

as to which the record is silent. [Citation.] It is the appellant’s burden to 

affirmatively demonstrate error.” (In re Marriage of Gray (2002) 103 

Cal.App.4th 974, 977–978.)6 As the appellant, C.M. “has the burden of 

providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate 

record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [appellant].” 

(Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.) 

“We are not bound to develop [appellant’s] arguments for [him]. [Citation.] 

The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this 

court to treat the contentions as waived.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke

(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.)

These appellate procedural “rules apply both to parties 

represented by counsel and self-represented parties. [Citation.] ‘A party 

proceeding in propria persona “is to be treated like any other party and is 

6 M.R. did not file a respondent’s brief in this appeal. “However, 

we do not treat the failure to file a respondent’s brief as a ‘default’ (i.e., an 

admission of error) but independently examine the record and reverse only if 

prejudicial error is found.” (Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 

1203.)
6

entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and 

attorneys.”’” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620.)

C.M., a self-represented litigant, presents several arguments in 

his opening brief without citing any legal authority in support or citations to 

the appellate record. He raises some arguments for the first time on appeal in 

his opening brief. C.M. argues the trial court erred for multiple reasons. We 

consider his arguments where possible. We state below when we must find

any arguments forfeited.

I.

C.M.’S NOTICE OF APPEAL

As an initial matter, we address C.M.’s notice of appeal, which

lists the trial court case number as 20P000074 and the judgment or order 

being appealed from as dated March 10, 2023. But the trial court had two 

separate cases before it on March 10, 2023, 20P000074 and 22FL001038. In

each case, the trial court issued a separate minute order on March 10, 2023, 

one in 20P000074 and one in 22FL001038. Thus, there is an issue regarding 

whether C.M. is appealing from only the March 10, 2023 order in 20P000074 

or also the March 10, 2023 order in 22FL001038. 

“‘[I]t is and has been the law of this state that notices of appeal 

are to be liberally construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it is 

reasonably clear what appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the 

respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced.’” (D’Avola v. 

Anderson (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 358, 361.) Given the specific circumstances

here, we liberally construe the notice of appeal to be from both the order in 

20P000074 and the order in 22FL001038. (See id. at p. 362 [“that the wrong 

superior court case number was affixed to the notice of appeal does not 

change the result”].) Since the trial court heard certain issues regarding both
7

case numbers at the same hearing and issued two separate minute orders 

dated March 10, 2023, it is reasonably clear C.M. was attempting to appeal 

from the order in each of those cases. Also, M.R., who did not file a 

respondent’s brief, has not argued she was misled as to whether this appeal 

also involved the order in 22FL001038 or was prejudiced by such.

C.M.’s notice of appeal identified the order in 20P000074 dated 

March 10, 2023. The only order in 20P000074 dated March 10, 2023 is the 

trial court’s minute order which “is not itself appealable.” (Estate of Sapp

(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 101.) However, this minute order does indicate

M.R.’s counsel was to prepare the FOAH as to 20P000074, which was 

subsequently filed and signed by the trial court on August 25, 2023.7So we 

will construe the appeal in 20P000074 to be taken from the FOAH. (See 

Schneer v. Llaurado (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1283.)

II.

THE FOAH IN 20P000074

In his statement of appealability, C.M. asserts “[t]his appeal is 

from the judgment of the Orange County Superior Court and is authorized by 

the Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1).” However, C.M. 

does not provide arguments or authority on how the FOAH in 20P000074 

could come within the definition of a judgment for the issues he raises as to 

20P000074 on appeal. 

In respect to the appeal in 20P000074, C.M. contends the trial 

court restricted his ability to obtain joint or sole custody and made a finding 

7 Although the FOAH and its “Attachment to Findings and Order 

after Hearing” identify only 20P000074, page two of the attachment includes 

the trial court’s order granting M.R.’s request to change the child’s name. 

(Some boldface and capitalization omitted.)
8

under section 30448 without holding a hearing under section 217.9 But the 

trial court’s orders “award[ing] temporary sole legal, sole physical custody to 

[M.R.] pursuant to 3044 of the Family Code” were, as indicated in the FOAH, 

“temporary custody orders,” which are not appealable. (See Banning v. 

Newdow (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 438, 456 [“custody orders are interim and 

not appealable, and we therefore need not consider father’s arguments”].)10

Additionally, to the extent C.M.’s arguments regarding section 

7605 and prejudice, which are discussed post, are intended to apply to

20P000074, C.M. offers no basis for how those arguments would be 

8

Section 3044, subdivision (a) provides, in part, “Upon a finding 

by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated domestic 

violence within the previous five years against the other party seeking 

custody of the child, or against the child or the child’s siblings, or against a 

person in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 3011 

with whom the party has a relationship, there is a rebuttable presumption 

that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person 

who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of 

the child, pursuant to Sections 3011 and 3020.”

9

Section 217, subdivision (a) provides, “At a hearing on any order 

to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a 

stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision 

(b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and

within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the 

parties.”

10 C.M. failed to provide an adequate record on appeal in any 

event regarding his section 3044 argument. Moreover, to the extent C.M. is 

attempting to argue the section 3044 issue was a due process violation, this 

argument is not developed in his briefing, so we must find it to be forfeited. 

(See Martine v. Heavenly Valley Limited Partnership (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 

715, 728–729 (Martine).)
9

appealable as part of this order.11 In any event, as discussed post, those 

arguments are unavailing. We conclude the FOAH is not an appealable order 

by C.M. and dismiss C.M.’s appeal regarding this order as to 20P000074.

III.

THE ORDER IN 22FL001038

The trial court granted the request to change the child’s last 

name to a hyphenated combination of C.M.’s and M.R.’s last names, 

determining it was in the best interests of the child. (See Code Civ. Proc.

§ 1278.5 [stating, where both parents, if living, do not consent to the name 

change, “the court may deny the petition in whole or in part if it finds that 

any portion of the proposed name change is not in the best interest of the 

child”].) The order granting the requested change of name, which 

incorporated the decree, is effectively a final judgment in 22FL001038 and 

appealable. 

The trial court’s conclusion is reviewed under the substantial 

evidence standard of review. (See In re Marriage of Douglass (1988) 205 

11 There are cases recognizing “‘[t]he denial of a request for 

attorney fees pendente lite is appealable because it possesses all the elements 

of a final judgment on the issue of whether a spouse may be able to obtain 

such fees.’” (In re Marriage of Nakamoto & Hsu (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 457, 

468.) Here, however, the trial court’s denial of the request for attorney fees 

was not final as the FOAH showed that this request was only denied pending 

the next hearing.
10

Cal.App.3d 1046, 1055.)12 Under this standard, “‘all conflicts must be resolved 

in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences 

indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. . . . When two or more inferences 

can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without 

power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.’” (Ibid.)

Here, there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s

finding it was in the best interest of the child to have a hyphenated 

combination of C.M.’s last name and M.R.’s last name. (See In re Marriage of 

Schiffman (1980) 28 Cal.3d 640, 647–648 [discussing factors the court may 

consider in determining whether a contested name change of a minor is in the 

minor’s best interest].) The trial court noted the requested name change 

would incorporate both parents’ last names and the change would not “eras[e] 

[C.M.]’s name from [the child’s] name.” The court also explained the child, 

who was then four years old, was at an early enough stage where the child 

could adopt both parents’ last names. The court considered the timing to be 

good for such a change as it is “before [the child] goes on with [the child’s] 

elementary schooling, junior high school, and high school schooling.”

On appeal, C.M. argues “critical issues were not addressed such 

as the fact the minor child has 3 siblings who share” C.M.’s last name. C.M. 

does not elaborate on what those other “critical issues” were besides his 

argument about siblings, but even assuming this argument weighs against 

12 C.M. does not meaningfully address the standard of review. 

There is an argument that abuse of discretion applies here. (See In re Ritchie

(1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1070, 1072 [“the statute does vest the trial court with 

discretion in granting or denying an application for a name change”].) 

However, we need not resolve whether abuse of discretion applies here

because we would reach the same result under an abuse of discretion 

standard.
11

the name change, it does not require reversal under the substantial evidence 

standard of review. C.M. also argues the child had not requested a name 

change. This argument is also unavailing, and C.M. provides no basis for why 

a name change could only be granted upon the request of a four-year-old 

child. 

Additionally, C.M. argues the trial court denied his request for a 

mandatory hearing under section 7605, which relates to an award of attorney 

fees under certain circumstances and discusses certain procedural issues.

13

According to C.M., a hearing under section 7605 should have occurred before 

any judgment or findings to preserve his right to equal representation. 

However, C.M. forfeited his argument regarding section 7605 by failing to 

raise it before the trial court at the March 10, 2023 hearing. (See Coastline 

JX Holdings LLC v. Bennett (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 985, 1012.)

At the March 10, 2023 hearing, C.M. requested a hearing under 

sections 2030, 2031, 2032, and 7640. C.M. argued sections 7640 and 7641 

trigger consideration of section 2030. These are different statutes than 

13 Section 7605, subdivision (a) provides, in part, “In any 

proceeding to establish physical or legal custody of a child or a visitation 

order under this part, and in any proceeding subsequent to entry of a related 

judgment, the court shall ensure that each party has access to legal 

representation to preserve each party’s rights by ordering, if necessary based 

on the income and needs assessments, one party, except a government entity, 

to pay to the other party, or to the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is 

reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or 

defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.”
12

section 7605,14 and on appeal, C.M. does not assert the trial court erred 

because the statutes he actually argued before the trial court apply and 

require reversal.

15

At oral argument for this appeal, C.M. also contended the trial 

court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing under section 217 regarding the 

petition to change the child’s last name. However, even assuming section 217 

applies to this petition, C.M. forfeited his argument by failing to raise it in 

the trial court. (In re Marriage of Cohen (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 574, 684 [“the 

right to live testimony under Family Code section 217 may be forfeited”].) 

C.M. had opportunities to argue the merits of the petition to change the 

child’s last name in the trial court: he filed an opposition with exhibits and 

argued at the hearing. But the record does not reflect C.M. made a request in 

the trial court to present live testimony pursuant to section 217 as to whether 

14 While section 2030 and section 7605 are similar, section 2030 

applies to “a proceeding for dissolution for marriage, nullity of marriage, or 

legal separation of the parties, and in any proceeding subsequent to entry of a 

related judgment.” (See also Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 

633, 641 (Kevin Q.) [“[s]ection 2030 is expressly applicable only to marital 

proceedings”].) “[S]ection 7640 grants a court the discretion to award fees.” 

(Kevin Q., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 642.) Section 7640 also notes “[t]he 

court may apply the standards set forth in [s]ections 2032 and 7605[,]” but it 

does not require the court to apply everything in section 7605. (Italics added.)

It is unclear from C.M.’s briefing as to which case these 

arguments relate. Nonetheless, we address them as to the appeal in 

22FL001038.

15 To the extent C.M. is attempting to argue he was denied due 

process, this argument is undeveloped and forfeited. (See Martine, supra, 27 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 728–729.)
13

the child’s last name should be changed.

16 At most, C.M. requested a 

continuance and a hearing to appoint him an attorney purportedly pursuant 

to sections 2030, 2031, 2032, and 7640, but those issues are different than a 

request to present live testimony pursuant to section 217 for the petition to 

change the child’s last name.

Finally, C.M. asserts “prejudicial judicial comments, and actions, 

resulted in a prejudicial environment in the courtroom.” (Capitalization 

omitted.) We conclude this argument is unavailing. C.M. references various 

portions of the hearing transcript and argues his credibility was attacked, he 

was “coerced and put under duress[,]” and the trial court insulted his 

parenting. C.M. cites People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41 (Clark), abrogated 

on other grounds as stated in People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 462,

for the purported proposition that he must show the judge “‘officiously and 

unnecessarily usurp[ed] the duties of the prosecutor . . . and in so doing 

create[d] the impression that he [was] allying himself with the 

prosecution . . . .’” (Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 143.) C.M. also cites People v. 

Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075 (Fudge). Fudge noted “[a] trial court commits 

misconduct if it ‘persists in making discourteous and disparaging remarks to 

a defendant’s counsel . . . and utters frequent comment from which the jury 

may plainly perceive that the testimony of the witnesses is not believed by 

the judge, and in other ways discredits the cause of the defense . . . .’” (Id. at 

p. 1107.) But Clark and Fudge were criminal cases with a jury and 

prosecution which were not present here and C.M. offers no explanation as to

why those cases apply in this instance. To the extent C.M. is attempting to 

16 The record also does not reflect that C.M. filed and served a 

witness list of any nonparties prior to the hearing under section 217, 

subdivision (c). 
14

make some other argument about bias or due process, C.M.’s argument is 

undeveloped and forfeited. (See Martine, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at pp. 728–

729.)

In any event, the record on appeal does not support an argument 

the trial court was biased. The trial court’s responses and comments at the 

hearing do not evidence bias. 

DISPOSITION

The appeal from the order in 20P000074 is dismissed, and the 

appeal from the order in 22FL001038 is affirmed. Because respondent did not 

appear, no appellate costs are awarded.

MOTOIKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.