NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 10-4132

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CHERYL ANDERSON,

 Appellant

v.

RADIO ONE, INC.

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-09-00194)

District Judge: Hon. Mitchell S. Goldberg 

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 12, 2011

Before: SLOVITER, SCIRICA, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 13, 2011)

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OPINION

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2

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 

Radio One, Inc. on Cheryl Anderson’s claims that Radio One terminated her employment 

in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 

et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. We 

will affirm.1

With respect to the ADEA claim, Radio One did not dispute that Anderson 

established a prima facie case of age discrimination for purposes of the summary 

judgment motion and the District Court presumed that she had met this burden. See 

Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (setting 

forth elements of a prima facie claim). The burden thus shifted to Radio One to produce 

evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. Once 

Radio One produced such evidence, the burden shifted back to Anderson to provide 

sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder to either reject the employer’s nondiscriminatory 

explanation, or conclude that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not 

Because we write primarily for the parties, we need not discuss the facts or 

procedural history of this case. 

 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review of the District 

Court’s grant of summary judgment, and apply the same standard applicable in the 

District Court found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 

527 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 2008).
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a motivating cause of her discharge (pretext). Id. (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 

763 (3d Cir. 1994)).

Radio One claims that it terminated Anderson because she failed to satisfy the 

demands of the Program Assistant position, including meeting deadlines and accurately 

completing assignments. We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Anderson 

did not then produce sufficient evidence of a pretext for age discrimination.2

We have considered all of Anderson’s arguments, but we find no basis for 

reversal. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in favor of 

Radio One.

 Indeed, 

Anderson has never meaningfully disputed the substance of Radio One’s repeated 

concerns with her job performance. Because Anderson failed to meet her burden to show 

pretext, summary judgment is appropriate on her ADEA claim.

Summary judgment is likewise appropriate on Anderson’s ADA claim. We agree 

with the District Court that Anderson “is not actually disabled” within the meaning of 42 

U.S.C. § 12102(2), and “she was not ‘regarded as’ disabled” within the meaning of 42 

U.S.C. § 12102(3) by her employer. Anderson v. Radio One, Inc., No. 09-194, 2010 WL 

3719088, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2010). Even if Anderson could establish that Radio 

One regarded her as disabled, as the District Court concluded, she did not meet her 

burden to demonstrate pretext for disability discrimination. 

 2 Notably, prior to termination, Radio One offered Anderson a position as a 

receptionist, but she rejected the offer.