United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-60705

Summary Calendar

Edwin Eduardo Ibarra-Sanchez, 

Petitioner, 

versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General, 

Respondent. 

Petitions for Review of Orders of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A046 302 870

Before Smith, Southwick, and Douglas, Circuit Judges. 

Per Curiam:*

Edwin Eduardo Ibarra-Sanchez, a native and citizen of Mexico and 

former lawful permanent resident of the United States, petitions this court 

for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying 

his applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention 

Against Torture (CAT). Ibarra-Sanchez also petitions for review of the 

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 13, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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BIA’s denial of his motions for reconsideration and remand. Because IbarraSanchez is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe his filings. See Monsonyem 

v. Garland, 36 F.4th 639, 645 (5th Cir. 2022).

In seeking review of the denial of withholding of removal and CAT 

relief, Ibarra-Sanchez relies primarily on new evidence that was not properly 

before the BIA. See Enriquez-Gutierrez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 400, 409 (5th Cir. 

2010). We consider that evidence only in relation to his claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel and his requests for a remand and reconsideration.

Factual findings are reviewed for “substantial evidence.” Wang v. Holder, 

569 F.3d 531, 536–37 (5th Cir. 2009). The substantial evidence standard is 

deferential, meaning that “administrative findings of fact are conclusive 

unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 

contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that IbarraSanchez failed to show that “it is more likely than not” that his life or 

freedom as a Jehovah’s Witness would be threatened by persecution if he 

were returned to Mexico. See Lopez-Perez v. Garland, 35 F.4th 953, 957 (5th 

Cir. 2022) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, IbarraSanchez’s contention that, for purposes of withholding of removal, his 

proposed group of non-Spanish speakers with substance addiction qualifies 

as a particular social group is unsupported by the record properly before the 

agency. The argument thus does not compel a conclusion contrary to the 

agency’s determination that he failed to show either a particular social group 

or the required nexus to his feared persecution. See Zhang v. Gonzales, 432 

F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2005).

We now consider CAT relief. Contrary to Ibarra-Sanchez’s assertion, 

the BIA did not impose a requirement of past persecution because of a 

particular social group, but properly applied the correct standard for CAT 

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relief. See id. at 344–45 (reciting required showing for CAT relief). 

Moreover, the absence of an adverse credibility finding, and IbarraSanchez’s bare contention that the BIA therefore should grant CAT relief,

fail to compel the conclusion that he faced a likelihood of torture by or with 

government acquiescence if returned to Mexico. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1252(b)(4)(B). 

Ibarra-Sanchez also contends that he had ineffective assistance of 

counsel. The BIA determined that the new evidence Ibarra-Sanchez 

submitted to the BIA but which had not be introduced earlier by counsel did 

not show counsel’s alleged errors regarding the evidence “were prejudicial 

to his case.” See Mai v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 2006). The 

articles and reports, often only partially reproduced, and Ibarra-Sanchez’s

family’s affidavits, do not indicate that he faced a “clear probability” of 

future persecution on account of a protected ground or likely torture by or

with the acquiescence of Mexican officials. See Zhang, 432 F.3d at 344–45. 

Thus, the proposed evidence fails to compel the conclusion that, but for 

counsel’s claimed deficient performance in not submitting this evidence in 

the immigration court, the result of his removal proceedings would probably 

have been different. See Diaz v. Sessions, 894 F.3d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 2018); 

Wang, 569 F.3d at 536–37.

Ibarra-Sanchez also seeks review of the BIA’s denial of 

reconsideration. The BIA addressed his ineffective assistance claim in its 

decision on appeal. Further, Ibarra-Sanchez’s bare assertions of prejudice 

from counsel’s errors show no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s conclusion

that he failed to identify any legal error or establish that the BIA overlooked 

some aspect of the case when it rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim in its initial decision. See Chambers v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 445, 448 (5th 

Cir. 2008); Singh v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 2006).

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As to remand, Ibarra-Sanchez contends that his proposed new 

evidence, including two news articles submitted for the first time with his 

motion, substantiates his claims and compels the conclusion that Jehovah’s 

Witnesses and non-Spanish speaking deportees with substance addiction are 

subject to persecution and murder in Mexico. However, Ibarra-Sanchez has

shown no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s conclusion that remand was not 

warranted because the proposed new evidence was not “likely [to] change 

the result in the case.” See Suate-Orellana v. Barr, 979 F.3d 1056, 1062 (5th 

Cir. 2020). 

The petitions for review are DENIED.

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