The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for th e 1 Western District of Missouri. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-3714

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri Richard Eugene Thomas, * * {UNPUBLISHED} Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: May 20, 1997 Filed: September 2, 1997

___________ Before McMILLIAN, BOWMAN and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Richard Eugene Thomas pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after havin g previously been convicted three times of burglary in Arkansas, in violatio n of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e)(1). The United St ates District Court for the Western District of 1 Missouri imposed a sentence of 188 months imprisonment, four years of supervise d release, and a $50 special assessment. Thomas appeals. His counsel filed a brief-2-

pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and was granted leave t o withdraw. Thomas filed a pro se supplemental brief. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm. Under section 924(e), a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm faces a minimum term of fifteen years imprisonment if he has three prio r co nvictions for violent felonies. “Burglary” is included in the definition of “violen t felony.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Arkansas burglary statute in effect at the time of Thomas & s convictions provided “[a] person commits burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in an occupiabl e structure of another person with the purpose of com mitting therein any offense punishable by imprisonment.” Ark. Stat. Ann

. § 41-2 002 (repl. 1977), recodified at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-201 (Michie 1993)

. “Occupiable structure” was defined as a vehicle, build ing, or other structure where any per son lives or carries on a business. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2001(1) (repl. 1977) , recodified at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-101 (1), (2) (1993).
Even though the Arkansas statute & s definition of occupiable structure--with its inclusio n of vehicles--is broader than the “generic” definition provided in Taylor v

. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990), Thomas & s Arkansas convictions meet th e Taylor definition because the underlying criminal informations identify the structures burglarized as a

n insurance company office and two residences. See United States v. Co rnelius , 931 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding conviction constituted generi c burglary on basis of charging document). The informations also indicate that th e burg laries occurred on different days. See United States v. McDile , 914 F.2d 1059 , 1061 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (for § 924(e) purposes, prior offenses must hav e occurred at different times), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1100 (1991).
There is no merit to Thomas & s argumen t that, to commit a violent felony, he had to use or carry a firearm, knife, or destructive device. Section 924(e)(2)(B) define s violent felony in part as either a certai n type of “crime punishable by imprisonment for-3-

a term exce eding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use o r carry ing of a firearm, knife, or destructive device.” (Emphasis added.) The plai n language of the phrase “involv ing the use or carrying of a firearm” modifies only “any act of juvenile delinquency.”
Thoma s & s contention that the burglary of a commercial building may not be a predicate offense is also witho ut merit. Neither the generic burglary definition nor the Arkansas burglary statute distinguishes between a residence and a commercial building; th e relevant element is the unlawful entry of a structure or building. See Ark. Stat

. Ann. §§ 41-2001, -2002; Taylor , 495 U.S. at 599.
Thomas & s argument that the court was witho ut jurisdiction over him because the original arrest warrant was intended for another Richard Thomas is likewise without merit. Thomas w aived any challenge to personal jurisdiction when he pleaded guilty. See United States v. Juvenile Male , 939 F.2d 321, 324 (6th Cir. 1991). Finally , Tho mas & s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are more appropriately resolved in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings. See United States v. Logan , 49 F.3d 352, 361 (8th Cir. 1995). Having car efully reviewed the record, we find no other nonfrivolous issue fo r appeal. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). Accordingly, we affirm. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.