COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

October 11, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP286 Cir. Ct. No. 2021ME7

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF C. J.:

TREMPEALEAU COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

C. J.,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Trempealeau County: 

RIAN RADTKE, Judge. Reversed. 

¶1 STARK, P.J.1 Carter2appeals an order extending his involuntary 

commitment under WIS. STAT. § 51.20. Carter argues that the circuit court failed 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2019-20). All 

references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2022AP286

2

to find that he was dangerous under any of the specific dangerousness standards 

set forth in § 51.20(1)(a)2. as required by Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 

41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. Carter further argues that the Trempealeau 

County Department of Social Services failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that he met the required elements for recommitment. We agree that the 

court violated D.J.W.’s mandate by failing to find that Carter was dangerous under 

any of the statutory standards. We therefore reverse the recommitment order. 

BACKGROUND 

¶2 In March 2021, Carter was detained by law enforcement after

officers performed a welfare check on Carter and his girlfriend. Carter’s girlfriend 

informed officers that Carter had threatened to kill himself and her, was purposely 

driving recklessly, and had threatened to drive to Washington, D.C., to kill 

President Biden and Vice President Harris. After he was brought to a hospital,

Carter demonstrated further signs of psychosis. The Department shortly after filed 

a WIS. STAT. ch. 51 involuntary commitment petition. The circuit court held a

hearing on the Department’s petition, and ordered Carter involuntarily committed 

for six months. 

¶3 Prior to the expiration of the initial commitment, the Department 

petitioned to extend Carter’s commitment for an additional twelve months. In 

support of the petition, the Department filed a report from a psychiatrist, 

Dr. J. Scott Persing. In preparation of the report, Persing reviewed Carter’s 

records and interviewed Carter. In the report, Persing describes Carter’s past

 

2

 For ease of reading, we refer to the appellant in this confidential appeal using a 

pseudonym, rather than his initials. 
No. 2022AP286

3

behavior that led to his original commitment and he explains that, at the time of 

Carter’s initial hospital admission, Carter was in a “psychotic” state and 

“displayed disorganized thinking.” Persing notes that, since his discharge from 

the hospital and transfer to a group home, Carter had “not required assistance with 

urgent appointments, crisis services, or [had a] repeat psychiatric hospitalization.” 

Persing further notes that Carter was administering his own medication voluntarily 

under supervision. 

¶4 During Persing’s interview with Carter, Carter stated that he “has no 

issues with schizophrenia symptoms, specifically, delusions or hallucinations” and 

has “no interest in harming himself [or] anyone else.” Additionally, Persing 

reports that Carter “denies any suicidal or homicidal thoughts.” However, Persing 

then notes that “[r]ecords from informal communication ... indicate that [Carter] 

continues to have ongoing psychotic symptoms.” These records describe Carter’s 

symptoms as “talking about the radio telling him good and bad things about his 

girlfriend” and as Carter having “delusions about doing illicit work for the 

government.” 

¶5 Persing’s report was received into evidence during the subsequent 

recommitment hearing. During the hearing, Persing testified that Carter is 

currently diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He stated that “[t]o the best of 

my knowledge, [Carter’s] been fully compliant” with the treatment program. 

Persing also testified that Carter “has not caused significant problems at his 

current placement in the group home” which is evidence of improvement from 

before Carter was committed. During the interview, Carter told Persing that he 

was taking his medication. Nevertheless, Persing stated he did not believe that 

Carter “exhibits insight into the advantages and disadvantages and his need for 

medication.” Persing testified that despite Carter’s self-reporting that he had no 
No. 2022AP286

4

current issues “with schizophrenia symptoms, specifically delusions or 

hallucinations,” Carter was still “experiencing symptoms.” Persing also testified

that Carter does not feel “there’s any need for treatment, that it was a situational 

episode.”3 

¶6 Persing opined that Carter would be a proper subject for 

commitment if treatment were withdrawn. Persing explained that “at this point 

[Carter is] not fully in remission in my opinion with regard to control of his 

symptoms” and that the symptoms would return if treatment were withdrawn. 

Persing further stated that the “fact that [Carter’s] not had his symptoms treated to 

baseline, that he is having these auditory hallucinations, as well, ... makes me 

quite concerned that he could act out some of what’s in his head about that.” On 

cross-examination, Persing acknowledged that he had not personally observed any 

symptoms of delusion or psychosis while working with Carter, but the symptoms 

were “reported to me by an unbiased source regarding these occurring and being 

forwarded out of concern that the patient would not volunteer the information 

himself.” Persing did not further elaborate as to the identity of this source. 

¶7 Carter also testified at the recommitment hearing. He stated that he 

understood he is diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, but that his “symptoms 

have alleviated.” Describing his past symptoms, Carter stated he was “not only 

 

3

 The Department’s briefing fails, at various points, to cite to the record and cites solely 

to the appendix or lacks any citation at all. On appeal, a party must include appropriate factual 

references to the record in its briefing. WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(d)-(e). The appendix is not 

the record. See United Rentals, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2007 WI App 131, ¶1 n.2, 302 Wis. 2d

245, 733 N.W.2d 322. This court has no obligation to scour the record to review arguments 

unaccompanied by adequate record citation. Roy v. St. Lukes Med. Ctr., 2007 WI App 218, ¶10 

n.1, 305 Wis. 2d 658, 741 N.W.2d 256. We admonish counsel that future violations of the Rules 

of Appellate Procedure may result in sanctions. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2).
No. 2022AP286

5

hearing voices but ... was completely delusional at that time.” Carter stated that

the last time he experienced similar symptoms was six months ago. When asked 

about the specific events leading to his commitment, Carter described them as 

“uncalled[]for” and “not right.” Carter explained that he was hesitant to speak 

with Persing about the events leading to his commitment and his past symptoms 

because he was afraid that what he told Persing would be presented as something 

Carter was currently feeling and would be used against him. If he were to be 

released, Carter stated he has “stable living” and he is “hoping to get [his] career 

back” and go back to being a father to his children. 

¶8 Carter testified about his medication, stating that he currently takes 

prescribed risperidone twice a day. Carter explained that throughout his 

commitment he voluntarily administered the medication to himself, and that he 

would request the medication from staff in the morning and at night. He testified 

that he started his current medication “about five months ago,” that “[t]he 

medication entirely alleviates those symptoms that [he] was previously having,”

and that if “it wasn’t for [his] past [he] would have no idea how much this 

medication is actually helping.” Carter reported “no negative side effects from 

this medication” but stated that “the prior medication, Haldol, ... did have side 

effects.” Carter testified that he plans “on continuing to take this medication even 

after commitment ends,” and he would “continue going to the pharmacy to pick up 

this medication because this medication is working.” Carter stated that “The best 

way I can explain it is I don’t feel it.” He acknowledged that he was one-hundred 

percent certain he had a problem and that the problem is offset by medication. 

¶9 Based upon Persing’s report and testimony, the circuit court found 

that Carter suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, which is a treatable mental 

illness. The court noted there had been no new crisis during the prior commitment 
No. 2022AP286

6

and that Persing testified that Carter had shown improvement. Nevertheless, the 

court found that there was a substantial likelihood that Carter would be a proper 

subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn. Specifically relying on 

Persing’s “collateral information” that Carter continued to have delusional beliefs 

and auditory hallucinations, the court expressed concern that if treatment were

withdrawn, Carter could act out the original auditory hallucinations that led him to 

be initially committed, making him a danger to himself or others. The court also 

found Carter competent to refuse medication. The court recommitted Carter for 

one year and he now appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

¶10 Carter argues that this court must reverse the recommitment order 

based on the circuit court’s failure to identify the specific subdivision paragraph of

WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. under which the court found him to be dangerous. He 

further asserts that the Department failed to present clear and convincing evidence 

that he was currently dangerous. In a recommitment hearing, the petitioner has the 

burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence all required facts. WIS. STAT.

§ 51.20(13)(e); Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶19, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 

895 N.W.2d 783. Whether the Department has met its burden of proof to extend 

Carter’s commitment presents a mixed question of law and fact. See J.W.J., 375 

Wis. 2d 542, ¶15. The circuit court’s findings of fact will be upheld unless they 

are clearly erroneous, but whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard is a 

question of law that we review de novo. See id.

¶11 Civil commitments constitute “a significant deprivation of liberty 

that requires due process protection.” Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, 

¶16, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. To prevail in a recommitment hearing, 
No. 2022AP286

7

the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the subject 

is: “(1) mentally ill; (2) a proper subject for treatment; and (3) dangerous to 

themselves or others.” Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, ¶¶17, 18, 402 

Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733. Here, Carter only argues that the Department failed 

to meet its burden to show that he is dangerous to himself or others. 

¶12 In an initial commitment hearing, dangerousness can be established 

any one of five separate ways. WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. Each of the five 

dangerousness standards requires the Department to identify evidence of recent 

acts or omissions demonstrating that the individual is a danger to himself, herself 

or to others. J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶17.

¶13 In a recommitment hearing, the petitioner is not required to identify 

recent acts or omissions to demonstrate dangerousness. Instead, the 

dangerousness requirement can be satisfied in part by “showing that there is a 

substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual’s treatment record, that the 

individual would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were 

withdrawn.” WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am). This paragraph recognizes “that an 

individual receiving treatment may not have exhibited any recent overt acts or 

omissions demonstrating dangerousness because the treatment ameliorated such 

behavior, but if treatment were withdrawn, there may be a substantial likelihood 

such behavior would recur.” J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶19. 

¶14 Despite the above principles, every recommitment hearing requires 

proof of current dangerousness. D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶34. Circuit courts in 

recommitment hearings are therefore required to make specific factual findings 

that a subject is currently dangerous by referencing a subdivision paragraph of 
No. 2022AP286

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WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based. D.J.W., 391 

Wis. 2d 231, ¶40. 

¶15 Here, Carter argues the circuit court violated D.J.W.’s mandate by 

failing to identify the specific subdivision paragraph of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.

under which the court found him to be currently dangerous. In response, the 

Department asserts, without citation to the record, that the court made a finding 

that Carter was dangerous to himself and others under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. and b., in 

conjunction with § 51.20(1)(am). According to the Department, based upon 

Carter’s past treatment records, the court found that Carter is not stable enough for 

treatment to be withdrawn due to his lack of insight, continued auditory 

hallucinations, and delusional thinking. The Department reiterates that, according 

to Persing, Carter still poses a danger to himself and others, and the court therefore

“made the required findings regarding the specific statutory dangerousness 

because dangerousness to self or others can only be found 

under ... § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. and b.” 

¶16 An individual is dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. if the 

person “[e]vidences a substantial probability of physical harm to himself or herself 

as manifested by evidence of recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious 

bodily harm.” Section 51.20(1)(a)2.b., in turn, permits a finding of dangerousness 

if an individual 

[e]vidences a substantial probability of physical harm to 

other individuals as manifested by evidence of recent 

homicidal or other violent behavior, or by evidence that 

others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and 

serious physical harm to them, as evidenced by a recent 

overt act, attempt or threat to do serious physical harm.

Sec. 51.20(1)(a)2.b.
No. 2022AP286

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¶17 Contrary to the Department’s assertion, the circuit court did not 

identify a specific statutory dangerousness standard in ordering Carter’s 

recommitment. Instead, the court merely found that based upon Persing’s report 

and testimony, “there [were] continued ... auditory hallucinations” and it had 

“concerns that [Carter] could act on those.” The court further stated that based on 

“the treatment record in the past[,] that meant threats of harm to self and harm to 

others.” 

¶18 As Carter correctly argues, “[t]he closest the court came to 

identifying a statutory dangerousness standard was when it remarked that 

[Carter’s] treatment records from the past involved ‘threats of harm to self and 

harm to others.’” Carter notes that this comment contains one element from each 

of the dangerousness standards in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. and b. However, 

the court failed to find further facts supporting a conclusion that either 

dangerousness standard was met. Although the court stated that it relied on 

Persing’s report and testimony, that evidence does not permit us to infer under 

which subdivision paragraph the court found Carter to be currently dangerous. 

¶19 The circuit court summarily cited Persing’s report and his testimony 

based upon unknown and vague source information to find that Carter continues to 

experience delusions and that if treatment were withdrawn, Carter would likely 

become a proper subject for commitment. The court explained the likelihood that 

Carter would become a proper subject for commitment was based on the 

possibility Carter could act on his delusions, and threaten to harm himself or 

others as he did in the past. 

¶20 Nevertheless, the Department is required to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that “the individual ‘is dangerous.’” D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 
No. 2022AP286

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231, ¶34 (citation omitted). Both Persing and the circuit court merely expressed 

that Carter could be dangerous. “It is not enough that the individual was at one 

point dangerous” id., and neither the Department nor the court specified how 

Carter is currently dangerous. 

¶21 We therefore conclude that in ordering Carter’s recommitment, the 

circuit court failed to make specific factual findings referencing a subdivision 

paragraph of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2., as required by D.J.W. Because the 

recommitment order has expired, the court lacks competency to conduct any 

proceedings on remand, and outright reversal of the recommitment order is the 

appropriate remedy. See M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶4. Accordingly, we reverse the 

recommitment order. Because we reverse based on the court’s failure to comply 

with D.J.W., we need not address Carter’s additional argument regarding the 

sufficiency of the evidence. See Turner v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 256, ¶1 n.1, 268 

Wis. 2d 628. 673 N.W.2d 716 (appellate court may decline to address all issues 

raised by the parties if one is dispositive).

By the Court.—Order reversed. 

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.