U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Review of the Drug 

Enforcement 

Administration’s 

Disciplinary System 

Report Number 

I-2004-002

January 2004 
U.S. Department of Justice i

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

EXECUTIVE DIGEST 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this review to 

assess the effectiveness of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA’s) 

system for investigating allegations of employee misconduct and disciplining 

employees who are found to have committed misconduct in a reasonable 

and timely manner. Specifically, we reviewed whether allegations of 

misconduct were properly reported to and investigated by DEA’s Office of 

Professional Responsibility (OPR); disciplinary penalties were fair and 

reasonable; the overall process was conducted in a timely manner; and the 

system was fairly administered. 

The DEA established its current disciplinary system in December 

1984, in response to a Title VII class action lawsuit filed by AfricanAmerican special agents. In that lawsuit, the United States District Court 

(Court) for the District of Columbia found that the DEA’s disciplinary 

practices (among other personnel practices) were discriminatory, and 

ordered the DEA to implement a non-discriminatory disciplinary system. 

The resulting three-tiered, centralized system consists of the OPR, which 

investigates allegations of employee misconduct; the Board of Professional 

Conduct (Board), which determines whether misconduct occurred and 

proposes disciplinary action; and the Deciding Officials, who make the final 

disciplinary decision. 

RESULTS IN BRIEF 

We found that the DEA’s system for investigating employee 

misconduct generally functioned well. The investigations of alleged 

misconduct in general appear to be thorough and well documented, and 

provide a sound basis for making disciplinary decisions. We also concluded 

that the DEA usually imposed reasonable and relatively consistent 

discipline for confirmed misconduct. 

However, we found problems in various cases that revealed 

weaknesses in DEA’s disciplinary system. Weaknesses included inadequate 

guidance and the possible failure of the Deciding Officials to properly 

consider the Board’s mitigation before applying additional mitigating factors 

which resulted in penalties that appear to be too lenient; the improper 

consideration of personal experience and opinion, and external factors by 

Board members and a Deciding Official when making disciplinary decisions; 

a failure to adequately document disciplinary decisions by the Board and 

Deciding Officials; the failure of DEA management to monitor the timeliness 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

of the disciplinary process; and a lack of management oversight over the 

Deciding Officials. 

Weak Guidance and Mitigation by Both the Board and the 

Deciding Officials Leads to Lenient Penalties. During our review, we 

found that the penalties imposed by the DEA for confirmed misconduct 

sometimes appeared overly lenient. In 9 of the 70 cases that we reviewed, 

involving 13 subjects, we concluded that the facts established by the OPR 

investigation or comments made by Board members in the supporting 

documentation justified a stronger penalty than was imposed by the 

Deciding Official. 

We identified several factors that appeared to encourage the lenient 

penalties. The DEA’s Schedule of Disciplinary Offenses and Penalties 

(Schedule) was last updated in 1992 and does not communicate DEA 

management’s priorities. The defined offenses are generic and not DEAspecific, and the penalties – usually ranging from a Letter of Reprimand to 

Removal for each offense – are too broad to serve as effective guidance for 

the Board and Deciding Officials. Another factor that contributed to lenient 

penalties is that Deciding Official may mitigate the penalty without properly 

taking into consideration that mitigating factors that the Board already 

applied. This can result in penalties that may be reduced below the level 

that is appropriate for the offense. 

Board Members and a Deciding Official Sometimes Improperly 

Consider Personal Experiences or Opinions, or External Factors When 

Making Disciplinary Decisions. In several cases we reviewed, we found 

comments that indicated Board members sometimes used personal 

experiences or opinions to influence their determinations. Also, prior to 

making a decision, one Deciding Official would sometimes contact 

employees’ supervisors or others to obtain information about the employees. 

This was not consistent with DEA regulations that direct Deciding Officials 

to consider only the OPR investigative case file, the Board’s proposal, and 

any written or oral statement by the employee. 

The Board and Deciding Officials Do Not Adequately Document 

All Disciplinary Decisions. We could not determine the full extent to 

which imposed penalties may be too lenient and external factors were 

improperly considered because the documentation in many of the files was 

insufficient. In some cases, the Board members did not document the 

rationale for their disciplinary proposals. In other cases where individual 

Board members disagreed, the Board Chairman did not document his 

rationale for the final proposal. Also, in some cases the advice provided to 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

the Board or the Deciding Officials by the Office of Chief Counsel was not 

documented. We also found that the Deciding Officials did not sufficiently 

document their reasoning when they deviated from the Board’s proposed 

charges and penalties. Further, adverse action files frequently lacked 

documentation of the written or oral statements made by the employees in 

response to disciplinary proposals. In several cases, the Deciding Officials 

mitigated penalties based on these statements, but without documentation 

we were unable to determine whether the mitigations were appropriate. 

DEA Management Failed to Monitor and Ensure the Timeliness of 

the Disciplinary Process. We found that during fiscal year (FY) 2001 and 

FY 2002, the DEA experienced excessive delays in processing disciplinary 

cases. During this period the delays occurred primarily at the Board, with 

backlogs of 60 to 110 cases from September 1999 through January 2002, 

resulting in processing delays of 90 to 120 days. These delays occurred 

because of staffing shortages at the Board and a requirement that the Board 

Chairman review every case file and sign all proposal letters for disciplinary 

action. We also found another source of delay – the requirement that the 

Board review field reports pertaining to routine official government vehicle 

(OGV) accidents and losses of government property. 

According to the Board Chairman, during 2002 the DEA addressed 

the backlog by adding staff to the Board and permitting the Board 

Chairman to delegate review authority to another Board member for those 

cases where the proposed penalty was less than a 15-day suspension. 

Nonetheless, the backlog persisted for more than 29 months before the DEA 

took corrective action. 

Moreover, we were unable to determine the current status of the 

DEA’s disciplinary caseload because the DEA has no overall mechanism in 

place to track disciplinary cases as they progress through the system. Each 

of the three entities in the system maintains its own database. While OPR 

can use its database to track the timeliness of its investigations, neither the 

Board members nor the Deciding Officials can use their databases for that 

purpose. Instead, their databases are primarily repositories of prior 

proposals and decisions, which are used as a reference to ensure 

consistency when determining disciplinary penalties. In 2002 the DEA 

began developing a centralized disciplinary database, which should enable 

the DEA to better monitor timeliness. 

Lack of Management Oversight over the Deciding Officials. We 

found that although the decisions of both OPR and the Board undergo 

review, there is no commensurate accountability for the Deciding Officials. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Specifically, the DEA’s disciplinary system lacks any mechanism to review 

final decisions when there is a significant discrepancy between the findings 

of the investigation, the Board’s proposed charges and penalties, and the 

Deciding Official’s final determination. 

Survey Finds Some DEA Employees Perceive Disparate 

Treatment. In a survey of 50 DEA employees, 70 percent (35 employees) 

stated that they believed the DEA discipline system treated employees 

equitably. The remaining 30 percent stated either that DEA special agents 

or higher-graded employees received more favorable treatment. A complete 

evaluation of disciplinary disparity would require comparison of similar 

offenses and a methodology to account for inherent differences in the 

number and types of offenses that different groups may commit.1 This kind 

of comprehensive analysis was beyond the scope of this review. The data 

that we reviewed for indications of disparity was mixed and inconclusive as 

to whether a dual standard of discipline exists. 

For example, we found that allegations referred to OPR appeared to be 

investigated thoroughly and that, in most cases, the discipline administered 

for confirmed misconduct was reasonable. We also found that DEA special 

agents are investigated and disciplined at a higher rate than they are 

represented in the DEA workforce. Our examination of discipline cases 

involving SES employees found that the penalties appeared to be 

appropriate. We also found that employees in all grade levels were equally 

likely to be disciplined. All of the above facts tend to indicate that special 

agents and higher graded employees are not treated more favorably than 

other DEA employees. However, we also found that of the 13 individuals 

who we found received unreasonably lenient penalties, 12 were special 

agents. We also found that investigations of lower-graded employees 

resulted in termination more often than for other employees. Because the 

data that was available was mixed, we cannot conclusively prove or disprove 

the validity of some DEA employees’ perception that special agents or 

higher-graded employees are treated more leniently. 

 

Weaknesses Leave DEA Discipline System Vulnerable to Abuse. 

The problems we found with the lenient penalties, improper consideration of 

 1 For example, employees who do not carry guns or arrest people are unlikely to, or 

cannot, commit the types of serious offenses that may result from those activities. 

Therefore, an evaluation of disciplinary actions across groups cannot simply compare 

penalties imposed to assess consistency. Instead, to properly evaluate whether different 

groups are treated consistently, each case must be evaluated using a methodology that can 

account for a variety of relevant factors. Such an analysis was beyond the scope of this 

review. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

external factors, incomplete documentation, and lack of management 

oversight of the Deciding Officials leave the DEA discipline system at risk of 

being abused. That risk was borne out in a case that the OIG investigated 

and referred to the DEA for appropriate discipline. In that case, an off-duty 

DEA supervisory special agent detained his stepdaughter’s 17-year-old 

boyfriend at gunpoint after they returned from a late-night rendezvous. The 

DEA agent also failed to inform the police when they arrived that he had 

detained the boy at gunpoint. The Board concluded that the agent had 

committed misconduct and proposed that he be suspended for seven days. 

However, the Deciding Official dismissed the charges, summarily declaring 

that the agent had not committed misconduct without any explanation or 

rationale for his decision. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

We make eight recommendations to help the DEA ensure that its 

disciplinary decisions are reasonable, free of inappropriate external 

influences, well-documented, and timely. These recommendations include 

better guidance for the Board and Deciding Officials in making their 

disciplinary determinations, establishing standards to improve the timely 

processing of disciplinary cases, and requiring more effective DEA 

management of the overall disciplinary process. We recommend that the 

DEA: 

1. Provide better guidance to the Board and Deciding Officials on the 

factors that may be considered in making disciplinary 

determinations by: a) updating the Schedule of Disciplinary 

Offenses and Penalties; b) updating written procedures to guide the 

operations of the Board and Deciding Officials; and c) instructing 

the Deciding Officials to limit their disciplinary considerations to 

the information contained in official DEA files and information 

provided by employees or their authorized representative. 

2. Ensure that the DEA document the Douglas factors considered in 

making its disciplinary decisions. 

3. Require that documentation maintained by the Board and Deciding 

Officials regarding each disciplinary case include: a) the opinions 

of each Board member assigned to review a case and the rationale 

for the Chairman’s proposal in those instances when the individual 

Board members disagree; b) any advice from outside sources, such 

as the Office of Chief Counsel; and c) all oral and written 

statements made by employees to Deciding Officials. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

4. Require that when the final disciplinary decisions differ from the 

proposed charges and penalties, the final decision letter contain a 

detailed explanation of the reasons for the difference. 

5. Require that the Board and the Deciding Officials establish 

performance measures for timeliness, and record the amount of 

time it takes to process each case. 

6. Designate a single office to monitor the three-tiered system and 

prepare reports describing disciplinary activities, including, at a 

minimum: a) the processing timeframes for OPR, the Board, and 

the Deciding Officials; b) statistics on offenses committed and 

disciplinary actions taken; c) trend analyses showing increases or 

decreases in specific offenses committed; and d) a description of 

disciplinary decisions where the final charges or penalties varied 

significantly from the Board proposal. 

7. Require that the DEA Inspection Division periodically review a 

sample of closed disciplinary case files to assess whether the basis 

for the disciplinary decisions was adequately documented. 

8. Delegate responsibility for reviewing instances of routine OGV 

accident and losses of government property cases that do not 

involve misconduct issues to the appropriate special agents in 

charge and office heads. 

 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................1 

 Purpose ...........................................................................................1 

 Background.......................................................................................1 

 Scope and Methodology ...................................................................11 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW.............................................................14 

Reasonableness of Disciplinary Decisions ........................................14 

Recommendations.......................................................................29 

 

Timeliness of Processing Disciplinary Cases.....................................30 

Recommendations.......................................................................36 

 Consistency of the Disciplinary System............................................37 

 DEA Management of the Disciplinary System...................................47 

Recommendations.......................................................................52 

CONCLUSIONS ...............................................................................53 

APPENDIX I: DEMOGRAPHICS OF EMPLOYEES IN TELEPHONE 

SURVEY.........................................................................................55 

APPENDIX II: THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S 

RESPONSE.....................................................................................56 

APPENDIX III: THE OIG’S ANALYSIS OF THE DRUG 

ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE............................60 
U.S. Department of Justice 1

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

INTRODUCTION 

Purpose 

Title 5, United States Code, Chapter 75 establishes the legal 

framework for federal agencies to address employee misconduct through 

adverse actions, such as suspensions, demotions, and removals. It states 

that employees may be disciplined “for such cause as will promote the 

efficiency of the service.” In other words, an agency may take disciplinary 

action when an employee’s misconduct or unacceptable performance 

interferes with the agency’s ability to carry out its mission. In addition to 

the adverse actions delineated in Chapter 75, agencies also impose other 

discipline, such as oral and written admonishments. 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed the DEA’s 

disciplinary system to assess how the DEA investigates allegations of 

employee misconduct, and how it imposes and enforces discipline for 

substantiated allegations. Specifically, we reviewed whether allegations of 

misconduct were properly reported and investigated; disciplinary penalties 

were fair and reasonable; the overall process was conducted in a timely 

manner; and the system was fairly administered. 

Background 

 

To maintain an orderly, productive work environment, each agency 

should implement a disciplinary system for employees that communicates 

the behaviors that are unacceptable, provides penalties to deter employees 

from exhibiting the unacceptable behaviors, and consistently penalizes 

inappropriate behavior. In implementing a disciplinary system, agencies 

should identify standards of conduct that define the actions that interfere 

with the performance of the agency’s mission. Agencies also may issue a 

schedule of penalties that are imposed upon employees who violate the 

standards of conduct. The DEA’s Standard Schedule of Discipline Offenses 

and Penalties was last revised in 1992. 

Federal agencies have leeway in determining disciplinary penalties; 

the only requirement is that the penalty be reasonable. To help determine 

reasonability, in a 1981 decision the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) 
U.S. Department of Justice 2

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

established 12 factors, known as “Douglas factors,” for agency officials to 

consider when determining disciplinary actions.2 

The Douglas factors are used to either mitigate (reduce) or aggravate 

(increase) a proposed penalty when an employee commits an offense. For 

example, a long-term employee with no prior disciplinary history and an 

excellent performance record may receive a reduced penalty compared to an 

employee committing the same offense who has been disciplined previously 

and has a poor performance record. 

Employees who are suspended for more than 14 days, demoted, or 

removed have the right to appeal to the MSPB.3 In the Douglas decision, 

the MSPB established its authority to mitigate agency-imposed penalties 

that it determines are “clearly excessive, disproportionate to the sustained 

charges, or arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.” The MSPB also stated 

that it will mitigate agency-imposed penalties if the agency fails to weigh the 

relevant factors or clearly exceeds the limits of reasonableness. 

History of the DEA Disciplinary System 

 The DEA’s disciplinary system has changed over the years from a 

decentralized to a centralized system. When the DEA was created in 1973, 

regional field directors and headquarters office heads made all disciplinary 

proposals and decisions. This decentralized system resulted in complaints 

from DEA employees of inequitable treatment because they believed field 

managers in different regions were not imposing consistent penalties for 

similar offenses. In February 1977, African-American special agents filed a 

 2 The Douglas factors were established as a result of the case of Curtis Douglas v. 

Veterans Administration, 5 MSPR 280, 5 MSPB 313 (1981). The Douglas factors are: 

(1) the nature and seriousness of the offense, (2) the employee’s position, (3) the employee’s 

prior disciplinary history, (4) the employee’s length of service and prior work record, (5) the 

effect of the offense on the employee’s ability to perform the job, (6) the consistency of the 

penalty with those imposed upon other employees committing the same or similar offenses, 

(7) the consistency of the penalty with the agency’s penalty guidelines, (8) the notoriety of 

the offense, (9) the clarity of the employer’s rules, (10) the potential of the employee for 

rehabilitation, (11) mitigating circumstances, and (12) The adequacy and effectiveness of 

alternative sanctions. The MSPB oversees the federal government’s merit-based system of 

employment and adjudicates employee appeals of personnel actions, such as removals, 

suspensions, or demotions. 

3 Employees have the right to appeal lesser penalties through their agency’s 

administrative grievance procedures. 

 
U.S. Department of Justice 3

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Title VII class action lawsuit against the DEA alleging racial discrimination 

in personnel and disciplinary practices.4 

In response, in 1980 the DEA created the Board of Professional 

Conduct (Board), consisting of two Board members and one Board 

Chairperson, which proposed penalties for cases involving integrity issues or 

official government vehicle (OGV) misuse.5 Despite the creation of the 

Board, the disciplinary system remained largely decentralized because 

special agents in charge (SAC) and office heads still rendered the final 

disciplinary decisions. In addition, SACs and office heads were the 

proposing officials and the deciding officials for disciplinary cases that did 

not involve integrity issues or OGV misuse. 

As a result of the Title VII lawsuit, on February 6, 1981, the United 

States District Court for the District of Columbia (Court) ordered the DEA to 

conduct validity studies for implementing a non-discriminatory personnel 

system, including a disciplinary system. Another Court order, issued on 

February 17, 1982, required the DEA, upon completion of the validity 

studies, to “proceed to develop and implement new, non-discriminatory 

employment systems with respect to...discipline.” 

In October 1982, the DEA centralized its disciplinary system by 

requiring that headquarters officials make all disciplinary decisions for 

proposed penalties in excess of a 14-day suspension. In December 1984, 

the DEA required that the Deciding Officials at headquarters make decisions 

for all proposed disciplinary actions. 

 The DEA subsequently hired a contractor to review the revised 

disciplinary system and “determine whether punishment was being 

administered in a fair, equitable and non-discriminatory manner.” While 

the study primarily reviewed factors related to race and gender, it also 

reviewed other factors such as geographic location of the employee, the size 

of the office, and the employee’s grade. The study, issued in April 1987, 

concluded: 

 4 Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd in relevant part subnom. 

Segar v. Smith, 738 F. 2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied subnom. Meese v. Segar, 471 

U.S. 1115 (1985). 

5 Integrity issues involve violations of the DEA’s Standards of Conduct. Examples 

include perjury or false statements concerning official matters, unauthorized disclosures of 

sensitive information, narcotics use, improper use of official position, evidence tampering, 

and improper associations. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

In general, the centralized conduct and discipline system in 

use appears to be achieving its goals of providing a fair, 

equitable, and non-discriminatory review of serious conduct 

and integrity violations by DEA Special Agents. In addition, 

the system seems to result in fair and non-discriminatory 

disciplinary actions.6

In September 1988, the Court ruled that the DEA’s disciplinary 

system met its requirements. Since then, there have been only minor 

modifications to the disciplinary system, such as the establishment of two 

full-time Deciding Official positions. 

On July 11, 2001, the Attorney General signed an order giving the 

OIG jurisdiction to investigate allegations of misconduct against DEA 

employees. Accordingly, an OIG investigator reviews all allegations of DEA 

misconduct to determine if the OIG will conduct the investigation. The OIG 

normally investigates cases that involve criminal matters, non-criminal 

allegations against senior DEA employees, or cases where there is a 

particular reason for the OIG to investigate, such as if the DEA would have 

a conflict of interest. If the OIG declines to investigate, DEA’s Office of 

Professional Responsibility (OPR) conducts the investigation. 

Overview of the DEA’s Disciplinary System 

 

 The entities that implement the DEA’s disciplinary system primarily 

include OPR, the Board, and the Deciding Officials. OPR is part of the 

Inspection Division; the Board and the Deciding Officials are part of the 

Human Resources Division. OPR investigates the misconduct. The Board 

determines whether the misconduct occurred, based on the OPR 

investigative case file, and, if so, proposes a penalty. The Deciding Officials 

review the investigative case file, the Board’s proposal, and any written 

statement submitted by the employee; consider any oral testimony provided 

by the employee; and make the final disciplinary determination.7 As shown 

 6 A Study of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Current Conduct and Disciplinary 

System, Advanced Research Resources Organization, Arthur L. Korotkin, F. Mark 

Schemmer, and Cheryl D. Bruff (April 1987). 

7 All DEA misconduct cases, except for those involving SES executives and 

attorneys, undergo this process. SES misconduct is investigated by the DEA OPR, and SES 

executives within the employee’s chain of command make disciplinary proposals and 

decisions. DEA attorney misconduct is investigated either by the OIG, DOJ OPR, or DEA 

OPR. Penalties for attorneys of 14-days suspension or less are handled through the normal 

DEA disciplinary channels. For more serious penalties, the DEA’s Deputy Administrator is 
U.S. Department of Justice 5

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

in the chart below, each of the three entities operates independently, with 

no single individual or entity in charge of the overall disciplinary system. 

Figure 1:

Organizational Structure of the DEA Disciplinary Process

Office of

Chief Counsel

Intelligence Division

DECIDING

OFFICIALS

BOARD OF

PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT

Employee

Relations

Unit

Human Resources

Division

Operations

Division

Financial

Management

Division

OFFICE OF

PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY

Office of

Security

Programs

Inspection

Division

Operational

Support

Division

Administrator/

Deputy Administrator

The DEA’s Office of Chief Counsel and the Employee Relations Unit, 

in the Human Resources Division, also have roles in the disciplinary 

system. The Office of Chief Counsel reviews all disciplinary decisions that 

can be appealed to the MSPB, (i.e., those penalties in excess of a 14-day 

suspension); defends agency decisions before the MSPB; and provides legal 

advice, upon request, to OPR, the Board, and the Deciding Officials. 

The Employee Relations Unit maintains the adverse action files, which 

contain documentation related to individual disciplinary decisions, and 

reviews all proposal and decision letters to ensure technical and procedural 

accuracy. The Employee Relations Unit also provides technical advice to the 

Board, the Deciding Officials, and other DEA officials regarding disciplinary 

actions. 

The Office of Security Programs in the Inspection Division also has a 

role in the disciplinary system. OPR investigators provide the Office of 

Security Programs with information regarding investigations in which 

security violations occurred, or when they believe a subject’s security 

clearance may need to be revoked or suspended. Conversely, the Office of 

Security Programs notifies OPR of security issues that are pertinent to an 

investigation. 

 

the proposing official and the DOJ’s Office of Attorney Personnel Management is the 

Deciding Official. 
U.S. Department of Justice 6

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

The operations of the three primary entities involved in the 

disciplinary system – OPR, the Board, and the Deciding Officials – are 

described in detail below. 

The Office of Professional Responsibility 

OPR, managed by a deputy chief inspector and two associate deputy 

chief inspectors, investigates allegations of employee misconduct. As of 

September 16, 2003, OPR’s staff included 6 senior inspectors and 28 

inspectors, all at the GS-14 level or above, assigned to 6 investigative teams 

(2 in Washington, and 1 each in Miami, Newark, Los Angeles, and Dallas). 

Senior inspectors and inspectors are assigned to OPR on 2- to 3-year 

rotations. After completing their rotation in OPR, the inspectors typically fill 

management positions in the field. The inspectors generally are required to 

have ten years of investigative experience as DEA special agents, including 

supervisory field experience. The average DEA experience of the 28 OPR 

inspectors on staff as of September 16, 2003, was 18 years, ranging from 14 

years to 23 years. The DEA experience of the six senior inspectors ranged 

from 16 years to 22 years. 

OPR headquarters staff also includes two intelligence analysts, an 

Integrity Analysis and Support Staff, and an Administrative Support Unit. 

The intelligence analysts assist OPR inspectors by researching law 

enforcement databases, such as the National Crime Information Center and 

the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System, checking financial 

records, analyzing documentary evidence, and accompanying OPR 

inspectors to subject or witness interviews. The Analysis and Support Staff 

maintains OPR’s statistical database and provides statistical analyses at the 

request of OPR management. The Administrative Support Unit provides 

general administrative support to OPR management. 

 
U.S. Department of Justice 7

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Figure 2:

The DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility

Associate

Deputy

Chief

Inspector

Associate

Deputy

Chief

Inspector

Integrity Analysis

and Support

Administrative

Support

Intelligence

Analysts

Investigative

Team A

Washington, DC

Investigative

Team B

Washington, DC

Investigative

Team C

Los Angeles, CA

Investigative

Team D

Miami, FL

Investigative

Team E

Newark, NJ

Investigative

Team F

Dallas, TX

Deputy

Chief Inspector

The DEA’s Standards of Conduct require DEA employees to refer to 

OPR headquarters all cases that involve violations of the standards of 

conduct, criminal or civil violations of laws and departmental codes, or 

where public notoriety reaches a level detrimental to the DEA or the 

Department of Justice (DOJ). OPR also receives allegations from external 

sources, such as law enforcement officials, confidential informants, 

cooperating witnesses, governmental agencies, and the public. During fiscal 

years (FY) 2001 and FY 2002, OPR received 695 allegations from internal 

sources and 134 allegations from external sources. 

As described previously, since July 11, 2001, the OIG has reviewed all 

allegations received by the DEA OPR. For those cases that the OIG declines 

to investigate, one of two OPR Associate Deputy Chief Inspectors determines 

if an OPR inspector will conduct the investigation, or if OPR will delegate the 

investigation to a SAC or headquarters office head. Less serious 

administrative cases are generally delegated for investigation.8 An OPR 

inspector monitors all delegated cases for quality and timeliness. During FY 

2001 and FY 2002, OPR investigated 696 cases and delegated 122 cases to 

SACs or office heads.9 

 8 Administrative issues include issues that do not have an integrity or criminal 

component. Examples include government travel card delinquencies, insubordination, and 

job performance. 

9 Differences in totals between number of allegations received and cases investigated 

are due to timing issues, e.g., allegations received at the end of FY 2002 may not have been 

assigned to be investigated until the beginning of FY 2003. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

 During an investigation, the OPR inspector typically interviews the 

subject, complainant, witnesses, and other pertinent individuals, and 

gathers relevant documents and other evidence. When the investigation is 

complete, the inspector prepares an investigative report, without 

recommendations or conclusions, which is included in the investigative case 

file. According to the OPR Inspector’s Handbook, which contains the 

procedures that all OPR inspectors must follow during an investigation, the 

investigative report “...must be factual and completely unbiased. The report 

should not contain any conclusions based on opinions. It should be a 

factual representation of events/actions.” Both the senior inspector and 

Associate Deputy Chief Inspector review and approve the investigative case 

file before sending it to the Board. 

The Board of Professional Conduct 

The Board reviews OPR investigative case files to determine whether 

the alleged misconduct occurred, and, if so, proposes a penalty. Currently, 

the Board, which reports to the Director of the Human Resources Division, 

is comprised of seven full-time GS-15 employees – a Chairman and six 

Board members. The occupational series of the Board members can vary. 

The Board currently consists of five special agents, one intelligence analyst, 

and one diversion investigator. There is no set term for assignments to the 

Board – members may be replaced at the DEA Deputy Administrator’s 

direction, or at their own request. An analyst, who researches databases 

and performs other analytical functions, and two employee relations 

specialists who write proposal letters to the employees, assist the Board. 

The Board does maintain a procedural handbook, but this has not 

been updated since June 1995. Misconduct cases generally are assigned to 

the Board members based on their current caseload. From one to three 

Board members review each case, depending on the complexity and 

seriousness of the issues. If the Board concludes that the OPR case file is 

incomplete, it returns the case to OPR for further investigation. For 

example, the Board may request that OPR re-interview witnesses, interview 

additional witnesses, or obtain additional documentation or other physical 

evidence. 

After the Board completes its review of the case file, including any 

additional information gathered by OPR, each Board member assigned to 

the case separately prepares a written summary of his or her findings, 

including a determination as to whether misconduct occurred, the offense 

committed, and a recommended penalty. In selecting the recommended 

penalty, the Board members consider certain Douglas factors, particularly 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

the employee’s length of service, prior work record, and prior disciplinary 

history.10 After all the summaries are completed, the Board members meet 

to discuss their conclusions and try to reach a consensus on the offense 

and penalty. If they cannot reach a consensus, the Board Chairman 

determines the proposed offense and penalty. 

Once the Board makes a determination, it may recommend that the 

employee be: 

• given a Letter of Clearance,11

• given a Letter of Caution, 

• given a Letter of Reprimand, 

• suspended without pay, 

• demoted, or 

• removed. 

If the Board proposes formal discipline, it sends a “proposal letter” to 

inform the employee of its findings. 12 The letter lists the offense and the 

proposed penalty, and also includes a statement informing the employee of 

his or her right to review the OPR investigative case file, and to provide both 

a written and oral statement to the Deciding Official. The Board also sends 

copies of all proposal letters and the OPR investigative file to the Deciding 

Officials. In FY 2001 and FY 2002, the Board issued 691 proposal letters, 

including 231 Letters of Clearance, 169 Letters of Caution, and 

291 formal disciplinary actions, and recommended that 174 investigations 

be administratively closed. 

 10 The Board does not consider all the Douglas factors. Only the Deciding Official is 

privy to the employee’s written or oral statement, which generally contains mitigating 

factors. In addition, although the proposal letters we reviewed indicated that other Douglas 

factors were considered, we found no documentation that all the Douglas factors were 

considered. 

11 A Letter of Clearance is issued when it is determined that the employee did not 

commit misconduct. All other actions reflect that misconduct did occur; the severity of the 

penalty varies based on the individual factors of the case. 

12 Letters of Reprimand, suspensions, demotions, and removals constitute formal 

disciplinary action. A Letter of Caution is not formal disciplinary action and therefore does 

not become part of the employee’s personnel record. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

In addition to proposing discipline in misconduct cases, the Board 

imposes final discipline in cases involving OGV accidents and lost or stolen 

government property. For these cases, the field (i.e., personnel assigned by 

the SAC or office head to conduct the investigation) conducts the 

investigations and sends the case directly to the Board. Typically, one 

Board member reviews each case. In FY 2001 and FY 2002, the Board 

issued final decisions for 1,134 OGV accident cases, and 564 lost or stolen 

property cases. 

The Deciding Officials 

The Deciding Officials review the OPR investigative case files, the 

Board’s proposal letters, any oral or written statements provided by the 

employee, and the employee’s Official Personnel Folder (OPF). They 

determine whether the allegations of misconduct are sustained and, if so, 

decide penalties, taking into account both mitigating and aggravating 

Douglas factors. 

There are two full-time Deciding Officials. Each is a GS-15 DEA 

employee. During our review, one Deciding Official was a special agent and 

one was a non-agent, but this make-up may vary. Similar to the Board, the 

Deciding Officials serve an indeterminate term, and may be replaced at their 

request or at the DEA Deputy Administrator’s direction. Generally, the 

Career Board appoints the Deciding Officials. However, Office Heads and 

SACs have the authority to reassign individuals in core GS-14 and GS-15 

positions within their components. The latest Deciding Official was 

appointed by the Director of Human Resources, in consultation with the 

Career Board. 

Cases are assigned to the Deciding Officials based on their current 

caseloads. When deciding a case, DEA’s personnel manual states that the 

Deciding Official “should consider only the reasons specified in the notice 

and the material in the file, and shall consider any answer of the employee 

and his or her representative.” Similar to the Board, if the Deciding Official 

believes that he needs more information before making a decision, he can 

request OPR to investigate further. The Deciding Officials maintain a 

manual, however this manual has not been updated since early 1998. 

After the Deciding Official reviews the investigative case file, the 

Board’s proposal letter, written or oral statements presented by the 

employee, and the employee’s OPF, the Deciding Official: 
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• sustains the charge and penalty, 

• sustains the charge, but reduces the penalty, 

• dismisses the charge, or 

• re-proposes the case with new charges or increased penalties.13 

After the Deciding Official makes a decision, he sends a letter to the 

employee informing him or her of the decision, the penalty, and the date the 

penalty will be imposed. The penalty is imposed even if the employee 

appeals or files a grievance. However, should the employee win the appeal 

or grievance, the agency must make restitution to the employee. In FY 2001 

and FY 2002, the Deciding Officials made 602 decisions in OPR misconduct 

cases. 

 In addition to making final disciplinary decisions for OPR cases 

proposed by the Board of Professional Conduct, the Deciding Officials also 

make disciplinary decisions in certain misconduct and performance cases 

proposed by SACs, Laboratory Directors, and office heads, such as 

unprofessional or disrespectful conduct, inattention to duty, misuse of a 

government credit card, and unauthorized absences. In these cases, field 

personnel conduct the investigation, and the SAC, Laboratory Director, or 

office head proposes the discipline and forwards the case to the Deciding 

Officials.14 In FY 2001 and FY 2002, the Deciding Officials made 43 

decisions in personnel cases. 

Scope and Methodology of OIG Review 

We conducted the fieldwork from October 2002 through July 2003. 

We interviewed DEA headquarters officials from the Office of the Chief 

Inspector, OPR, the Office of Human Resources, the Office of Chief Counsel, 

and the Office of Security Programs. We interviewed the DEA Chief of 

Operations, each member of DEA’s Board, and both of DEA’s Deciding 

Officials. We interviewed all OPR inspectors located at the OPR’s six field 

 13 In cases where the Deciding Official proposes new charges or increased penalties, 

the second Deciding Official becomes the official that makes the final disciplinary decision. 

14All SAC, Laboratory Director, and office head proposals recommending clearances, 

administrative closures, Letters of Caution, or disciplinary action are forwarded to the 

Deciding Officials. SACs, Laboratory Directors, and office heads can issue oral 

admonishments. 
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offices. We also interviewed officials from the OIG Investigations Division 

and from the DOJ OPR. 

We analyzed FY 2001 and FY 2002 workload statistics for OPR, the 

Board, and the Deciding Officials. OPR provided statistics on the number of 

misconduct cases by employee grade level, position, work location, and by 

type of violation and resulting penalty. The Board provided the number of 

closed OGV accident and loss or theft of property cases for FY 2001 and 

FY 2002. The Deciding Officials provided the number of closed personnel 

cases for FY 2001 and FY 2002. 

We also reviewed a sample of 100 closed disciplinary cases from 

FY 2001 and FY 2002 to assess whether the disciplinary penalties appeared 

to be fair and reasonable, and whether the overall process was conducted in 

a timely manner.15 We examined the OPR investigative case files as well as 

documents maintained by the Board and Deciding Officials, and the official 

personnel file of the subject. 

To assist us in assessing the quality of the OPR’s investigations, an 

OIG investigator reviewed a sub-sample of 18 of the more complicated OPR 

cases to determine if OPR investigators: 

• followed appropriate leads and allegations, 

• interviewed subjects and documented the interviews, 

• had DEA employees who were interviewed sign the appropriate 

warnings and assurance forms, and 

• included all pertinent information in the final investigative report. 

To assess the disciplinary actions taken against Senior Executive 

Service (SES) employees, we separately obtained and reviewed the 

investigative case summaries of all OPR investigations of SES employees for 

which a disciplinary decision was made in FY 2001 and FY 2002.16 

 15 The sample included 70 misconduct cases that were investigated by OPR and 30 

other types of disciplinary cases (10 accidents involving government vehicles, 10 losses of 

government property, and 10 personnel-related incidents) for which disciplinary actions 

were determined by the Board or the Deciding Officials. 

16 These did not include those cases that were administratively closed, which are 

closed due to insufficient evidence or where the subject resigned or retired prior to the 

rendering of the disciplinary decision. 
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In addition, we telephonically contacted a random sample of 50 DEA 

employees to obtain their perceptions and feedback on the disciplinary 

system relating to reporting misconduct, timeliness, the thoroughness and 

professionalism of OPR’s investigations, and the fairness and consistency of 

penalties imposed by the Deciding Officials.17

 17 See Appendix I for the sample demographics. 
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RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

Reasonableness of Disciplinary Decisions 

While we found that OPR investigations of employee 

misconduct were thorough and well documented, the 

disciplinary decisions based on these investigations were 

not always reasonable. The DEA sometimes levied 

lenient penalties due to a broad and generic schedule of 

penalties, a process that allows mitigation of penalties 

by both the Board and the Deciding Officials, and the 

failure by senior DEA management to adjust penalties for 

frequent offenses. We also found that Board Members 

and a Deciding Official inappropriately considered 

outside opinions or information when making 

disciplinary decisions. Finally, for some cases we were 

unable to assess the reasonability of imposed penalties 

because the Board and Deciding Officials did not 

document the reasons for their disciplinary decisions. 

OPR Investigations are Thorough and Well Documented. The first 

critical element of the disciplinary system is the investigation of alleged 

employee misconduct. Based on the OPR investigations, the Board and 

Deciding Officials determine whether the employee committed misconduct 

and should be disciplined. We found that OPR’s investigations of employee 

misconduct provided a solid foundation for the disciplinary process. Our 

review of 70 OPR case files found that the OPR’s investigations of alleged 

misconduct were thorough and well documented. The OPR generally 

requires its inspectors to tape record their interviews and to include a 

typewritten, verbatim transcript of the interview in the investigative case file. 

The case files also contained other evidentiary material, such as telephone 

call logs and database search results. Due to the quality of the 

documentation included in the case file, a reviewer could easily follow the 

progress of the investigation from the receipt of the allegation to the 

conclusion of the investigation. 

In addition to our general review of 70 OPR investigations, an OIG 

criminal investigator performed a detailed assessment of the investigation 

conducted in 18 of the more complex cases included in our sample. That 

assessment confirmed that OPR investigated leads and allegations, 

interviewed subjects and documented these interviews; that DEA employees 

who were interviewed had signed the appropriate warnings and assurance 
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forms; and that the final investigative report contained pertinent 

information. 

However, we found that the discipline imposed based on these 

investigations was not always reasonable. 

Reasonability of DEA Penalties. During FY 2001 and FY 2002, OPR 

closed 602 employee misconduct investigations. After reviewing these 

investigations, the Deciding Officials determined that 386 employees had 

committed misconduct and cleared 216 employees of the allegations. In 

those cases in which misconduct was substantiated, about 57 percent of the 

employees received either a Letter of Caution or a Letter of Reprimand, 33 

percent were suspended, and 9 percent were demoted or removed (Table 1). 

Table 1: Final Disciplinary Actions for 

Subjects of OPR Cases Closed During FY 2001 and FY 2002 

 Source: DEA OPR

 a Twenty-eight of the suspended subjects were involved in Title 31 cases, which involve 

willful misuse of an OGV and require, by Federal regulation, a suspension of at least 30 

days. 

 b Total does not equal 100 percent due to rounding. 

 To assess whether the determinations of misconduct and penalties 

imposed by DEA were reasonable, we reviewed OPR investigative case files 

for the 105 subjects in our sample of 70 cases and the documentation 

prepared by the Board and the Deciding Officials in support of their 

determinations. Of the 105 subjects, the Board determined that 56 subjects 

committed misconduct, cleared 19, and closed the cases for the remaining 

30 subjects without a determination.18 We reviewed the case files for the 19 

 18 Cases are administratively closed for reasons such as the resignation or 

retirement of the subject, or the inability to identify a subject from the information in the 

complaint. Cases may be closed administratively at any point in the disciplinary process. 

Disciplinary Action Number of Subjects Percent of Total Subjects 

Letter of Caution 151 39 

Letter of Reprimand 71 18 

Suspension a 129 33 

Demotion 1 Less than 1 percent 

Removal 34 9 

Totals 386 100 b
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subjects cleared of misconduct and found no instances where the Board’s or 

Deciding Official’s determination to clear the subject appeared to be 

unreasonable. 

When misconduct did occur, however, we concluded that the 

penalties imposed were sometimes unduly lenient. We found that for 13 of 

the 56 subjects who committed misconduct, the facts of the case or the 

comments made by Board members in the supporting documentation 

appeared to justify a stronger penalty than was imposed by the Deciding 

Official. For example: 

• An OPR investigation into an alcohol-related OGV accident at an 

overseas post found that a DEA GS-14 group supervisor submitted 

the accident report to DEA two months late, the report provided 

the wrong date and time, omitted the presence of a passenger (his 

supervisor, who was the Acting Attaché), and omitted the fact of 

alcohol use.19 The OPR investigation indicated skepticism at the 

group supervisor’s claim that the errors in the report were 

“accidental,” because of the number and types of errors. The 

group supervisor received a Letter of Caution, while his supervisor 

(who was present in the vehicle, who also did not report the 

incident to his superior, and who approved the erroneous report by 

the employee) received a Letter of Reprimand. The Letter of 

Caution issued to the group supervisor stated: 

I noted that you reported the vehicle damage as an 

incident, which is not allowed when there is alcohol 

usage. Additionally, I note that your memorandum 

was inaccurate and did not report all the facts. This 

failure to report the situation constitutes Inattention to 

Duty and you are hereby cautioned to take greater 

care in your writing. 

3⁄4 OIG analysis. The penalty imposed appears too lenient. 

Despite the strong indications that a DEA group supervisor 

falsified an OGV accident report to cover-up an alcohol-related 

 19 In this case, neither the group supervisor nor his supervisor reported the incident 

to U.S Embassy management. The incident was disclosed when someone anonymously 

provided the Ambassador with a copy of the Marine Security Guard Incident Report, which 

reported that the two subjects arrived at the Embassy in the early morning hours in an 

apparent intoxicated state. Although both subjects were initially charged with 

Unauthorized OGV Use and Violations of the DEA’s Alcohol Policy, the Board dropped these 

charges at the advice of the DEA Office of Chief Counsel. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

incident, the employee received only a Letter of Caution 

informing him to take greater care in his writing. The 

employee’s supervisor received only a Letter of Reprimand 

despite having approved a report that was erroneous. 

• An OPR investigation found that a GS-14 DEA group supervisor 

interfered with a police investigation of a police officer for disability 

fraud by alerting the subject. According to the OPR investigation, 

a search warrant was issued in the police investigation, and the 

court sealed the affidavit of the warrant. After the warrant was 

served at a local firearms training school, the DEA supervisor, who 

was working as a firearms instructor at the school, learned of the 

warrant’s existence and the nature of the investigation and notified 

the suspect officer, who was a friend. The DEA supervisor initially 

stated that he thought his actions were not prohibited because he 

believed that the search warrant pertained to an administrative, 

not a criminal matter, but subsequently admitted he made a poor 

decision. The OPR investigation also determined that the DEA 

supervisor did not have permission from the DEA for outside 

employment and that he was aware that he needed permission. 

The Board proposed a Letter of Reprimand, charging the 

supervisor with Poor Judgment and Unauthorized Employment, 

and questioning the supervisor’s “integrity as a law enforcement 

officer.” The Deciding Official sustained the charges and penalty. 

3⁄4 OIG analysis. We question that the supervisor received only a 

Letter of Reprimand despite the fact that he had revealed the 

existence of a sealed warrant and the nature of a police 

investigation, causing the Board to question the subject’s 

integrity. In addition, the supervisor admitted that he had 

knowingly engaged in outside employment without the required 

approval of DEA. 

• In one case, the OPR investigated allegations from a 

telecommunications company that provided the DEA with 

telephone subscriber and call detail information. The OPR 

investigation found that two special agents had engaged in 

sexually explicit telephone conversations with the company’s 

operators and that one agent had a sexual relationship with an 

operator. The Board proposed that one of the special agents be 

given a Letter of Reprimand and the other a Letter of Caution. The 

Deciding Official sustained these penalties. For the special agent 

who received a Letter of Reprimand, the Board commented: 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

He took advantage of his personal relationship with 

[the operator] through his official capacity to obtain 

phone records without a subpoena. [The operator] lost 

her job because of it...His behavior cast a poor light on 

the professionalism of DEA special agents. 

The Board made the same comments pertaining to the special agent 

who received the Letter of Caution, and added: 

He had sex with [an operator]. Through her position 

with [the telecommunications company], she could be 

considered an SOI [Source of Information]. DEA policy 

prohibits relationships with SOIs. 

3⁄4 OIG analysis. Despite its assertions that the special agents had 

cast a bad light on DEA’s professionalism, and possibly violated 

DEA’s policy on fraternizing with SOIs, the Board recommended 

only Letters of Caution or Reprimand. Nonetheless, while the 

Board observed that the telephone operators lost their jobs over 

the incident, it proposed only minimal penalties for the DEA 

special agents. The Deciding Official agreed with these lenient 

penalties. 

We also identified several deficiencies in the DEA’s disciplinary system 

that encourage decisions that are not reasonable, including a disciplinary 

schedule of offenses and penalties that is overly broad and generic, 2 and a 

failure by management to adjust penalties based on increasing misconduct 

trends. These deficiencies, which lead to lenient penalties, are discussed in 

the following sections. 

Overly Broad and Generic Schedule of Disciplinary Offenses and 

Penalties Provides Inadequate Guidance. The DEA’s schedule of 

disciplinary offenses and penalties includes offenses that are too generic, 

with few offenses related to DEA’s mission, and provides an overly broad 

range of penalties ranging from reprimand to removal for almost every 

offense. As a result, the schedule gives the Board and the Deciding Officials 

insufficient guidance in choosing a penalty. 

 

Other than the possession or use of drugs by employees, the 

disciplinary schedule contained no offenses specific to the DEA’s mission.20 

 20 Even this offense is not entirely DEA-specific, because drug possession or use is a 

common offense on other federal agencies’ disciplinary schedules. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Instead the DEA’s disciplinary schedule is comprised mainly of general 

offense categories used by many federal agencies, such as unauthorized 

absences, failure to honor just debts, misuse of office, and gambling. In 

contrast, we reviewed the disciplinary schedules of ten other federal 

agencies and found that they identify offenses specific to the agencies’ 

missions and priorities.21 For example: 

• The United States Marshals Service’s disciplinary schedule 

includes offenses such as prisoner escapes, failure to properly seat 

a prisoner or guard in a vehicle, and failure to use proper 

restraints when escorting a prisoner.

• The United States Customs Service’s disciplinary schedule 

includes offenses such as improper associations with informants, 

former informants or persons connected with criminal activities; 

discourteous or unprofessional language, gestures, or conduct 

toward the public; and unauthorized use of law enforcement 

equipment, resources, or techniques. 

• The Internal Revenue Service’s disciplinary schedule includes 

offenses such as failure to file income taxes, misuse of enforcement 

statistics, and unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, tax return 

information. 

Besides including agency-specific offenses, other agencies identify 

their priorities by subdividing offenses into different penalty categories. For 

example: 

• The Federal Aviation Administration distinguishes between 

supervisory and non-supervisory offenders in relation to sexual 

harassment, discrimination, and reprisal offenses (with harsher 

penalties for supervisors) and between a Testing Designated 

Position (TDP) and a non-TDP for drug or alcohol offenses. In 

contrast, the DEA does not distinguish between supervisors and 

non-supervisors for the same offenses. 

 

21 The ten other agencies were: the Internal Revenue Service, the United States 

Marshals Service, the Department of Justice, U.S. Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Institutes of 

Health, the Department of the Interior, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the 

Department of State. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

• The United States Customs Service divides the offense of 

inappropriate use of a weapon into five categories, with the severity 

of penalties depending on intent and danger to human life. Again, 

the DEA does not divide this offense into categories. 

• The Internal Revenue Service divides the offense of making a false 

statement into five categories, depending on the circumstances 

under which the statement is made. In contrast, the DEA groups 

all misstatements “in connection with employment, promotion, 

travel voucher, any records, investigation or other proper 

proceedings” into one offense. 

These schedules of penalties set a baseline to which the Deciding 

Officials apply the pertinent Douglas factors. Depending on the results of 

this application, the penalty could appropriately be lesser or greater than 

the baseline. It is important that management set a baseline penalty that 

reflects the agency’s expectations and acts as a deterrent to future 

misconduct. 

We found that the DEA’s disciplinary schedule includes penalties that 

are overly broad, in that nearly all offenses are assigned a range of penalties 

from a Letter of Reprimand to removal.22 The other federal agency 

disciplinary schedules we reviewed assigned penalties more reflective of the 

severity of the offenses. For example: 

• The United States Marshals Service’s offense of negligence 

resulting in the attempted or successful escape of a prisoner 

specifies a penalty between a 7-day suspension to removal for a 

first offense, with a 14-day suspension to removal for a second 

offense. 

• The United States Customs Service’s offense of improper 

associations with informants or criminals assigns a penalty of a 

14-day suspension to removal for a first offense, with removal for 

the second offense. 

 22 DOJ authorizes (but does not require) each of its components to establish its own 

schedule of disciplinary offenses and penalties. According to DOJ Order 1200.1, DOJ did 

not establish an agency-wide schedule of disciplinary offenses and penalties because the 

components are so diverse that a single meaningful table would be a practical impossibility. 
U.S. Department of Justice 21

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

• The Internal Revenue Service’s offense of unauthorized access to 

tax account information assigns a penalty of removal for a first 

offense. 

The DEA Does Not Adjust Penalties to Effectively Deter Misconduct. 

The DEA has not changed its schedule of penalties since 1992. Further, the 

DEA does not routinely attempt to control misconduct by adjusting the 

baseline for disciplinary penalties to reflect increases in misconduct 

offenses. This results in penalties that are insufficient to deter specific 

types of misconduct. 

For example, the DEA’s typical penalty for losing a weapon is a 1-day 

suspension.23 During our review, DEA’s Chief of Operations stated that he 

was concerned with increased incidences of special agents losing their 

weapons. Although the Chief of Operations had expressed his desire to 

increase the penalty to a 3-day suspension, and the Board was accordingly 

proposing that penalty, the Deciding Officials continued to reduce the 

penalty for losing a weapon to a 1-day suspension to remain consistent with 

past practices. The Deciding Officials told us that, absent written policy, 

the Douglas factors required that the penalty be consistent with what was 

imposed in the past.24 

In this instance, DEA management did not take the appropriate steps 

to increase the penalty in response to an increase in the offense. To do so, 

management must first notify employees of the increased penalties, apply 

the increased penalty only to future misconduct, and apply the penalty 

consistently. Although the Deciding Officials are correct to consider past 

practices when applying penalties, management can increase the baseline 

penalty for future offenses. 

The Board and the Deciding Officials Mitigate Penalties. We found 

that both the Board and Deciding Officials consider the Douglas factors 

when choosing penalties, which could result in excessive mitigation of the 

penalties, if not balanced properly. The appropriate application of the 

 23 Although this offense is not specifically included in the DEA’s Standard Schedule 

of Disciplinary Offenses and Penalties, the Deciding Officials stated that the typical penalty 

is a 1-day suspension. This is the baseline; the imposed penalty may be increased or 

decreased based on the application of the Douglas factors. 

24 We also found that the DEA has one of the most lenient penalties among the DOJ 

components for this offense. Other DOJ components typically impose a 3- to 5-day 

suspension. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Douglas factors requires that they be weighed against each other. The 

Douglas decision states: 

Not all of these [Douglas] factors will be pertinent in every 

case, and frequently in the individual case some of the 

pertinent factors will weigh in the appellant’s favor while 

others may not or may even constitute aggravating factors. 

Selection of an appropriate penalty must thus involve a 

responsible balancing of the relevant factors in the individual 

case. 

In the DEA’s disciplinary process, the Board considers some of the 

Douglas factors in determining a proposed penalty and the Deciding 

Officials consider the remaining factors.25 If the deciding official does not 

carefully consider the Board’s mitigation, the potential result is an overly 

lenient penalty, which may no longer reasonably correspond to the offense 

committed. 

For example, the typical penalty for an offense may be a 1-day 

suspension. If the Board determines that the employee who committed the 

offense is a long-term employee who has received excellent performance 

evaluations and who has never been disciplined, the Board may mitigate the 

typical suspension penalty to a proposed Letter of Reprimand. If the 

Deciding Official does not properly consider the Board’s mitigation, 

additional mitigating factors may result in the penalty being further reduced 

to a Letter of Caution. 

A Board member and a Deciding Official expressed concerns that the 

Douglas factors were not being properly considered. The Board member 

stated that he believed that mitigating penalties was the responsibility of the 

Deciding Officials, and expressed concern that if the Board reduced a 

penalty and then the Deciding Official further mitigated it, the penalty 

would be reduced too much. The Deciding Official agreed, stating that he 

believes some of the proposed penalties he receives are already too low. 

However, he believed that if, for example, he identified additional mitigating 

circumstances, he was required to further lower the penalty. This may 

result in an overly lenient penalty. 

 25 The Board considers some of the Douglas factors in determining a proposed 

penalty, particularly those factors pertaining to the employee’s length of service, 

performance evaluations, and prior disciplinary history. Subsequent to receiving the 

proposal letter, the employee can submit, to the Deciding Official, a written or oral 

statement describing additional mitigating factors. 
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Board Members and Deciding Officials Consider Personal 

Experiences or Opinions, or External Information. We found that Board 

members did not limit themselves to examining only the facts determined by 

the OPR’s investigation, but sometimes used personal experiences or 

opinions to influence their determinations. For example, a police 

department chief alleged, and the OPR investigation confirmed, that a GS14 DEA group supervisor had interfered with a police investigation of a 

police officer for disability fraud by alerting the subject (who was a friend) of 

a sealed search warrant. One Board member sympathized with the 

employee, citing the employee’s rationale that he was not trying to warn his 

friend of the investigation, or otherwise thwart the investigation, but was 

acting out of concern for a friend. The Board member wrote: “I buy this. I 

would have done the same.” The employee received a Letter of Reprimand. 

In another case, a member of the public alleged that DEA employees 

committed civil rights violations during the execution of a search warrant. 

The investigation found that when the search warrant was executed, the 

parents were not at home. The 18-year-old son and the 17-year-old 

daughter of the target were handcuffed and transported for questioning. 

Neither teenager was provided with shoes or a coat, even though the 

incident took place in a north central state during the winter. Regarding the 

case, a Board member wrote a list of ten “considerations” to discredit the 

complainant, including the fact that she was a Rastafarian, that she 

admitted to frequently smoking marijuana, and that her letter was written 

poorly and demonstrated that she had a “jail house lawyer” assist her with 

it. Regarding the allegations that the minor female was improperly 

handcuffed and brought in for questioning, the Board member wrote: “I do 

not see what the big deal is. I have handcuffed, detained and arrested many 

juveniles.” Three DEA agents were cleared of the civil rights violations, 

although each received a Letter of Caution pertaining to the inappropriate 

detainment, transportation, and questioning of the minor. 

We also found that one Deciding Official sought outside opinions 

when deciding cases. During our discussions with this Deciding Official, he 

stated that, prior to making a decision, he sometimes contacts the 

employee’s SAC or others familiar with the employee to obtain information 

about the employee. While these actions may be well intended, it is 

improper for Deciding Officials to solicit or use such information in making 

their determinations. According to Section 2752 of the DEA Personnel 

Manual, in making a disciplinary decision the Deciding Official “should 

consider only the reasons specified in the notice [of proposed disciplinary 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

action] and the material in the [investigative] file, and shall consider any 

answer of the employee and his or her representative.” 

Board Determinations Lack Supporting Rationale. To ensure that 

disciplinary decisions are reasonable, the decision should be sufficiently 

documented so that both internal and external entities can clearly 

understand the rationale behind the decisions. Although in general the 

Board’s records sufficiently supported its disciplinary proposals, 7 of the 14 

cases that we reviewed lacked adequate supporting documentation to assess 

the rationale of the Board’s determinations. 26 

We identified the following documentation deficiencies in the 14 

disciplinary cases: 

• Three of the 14 files contained only one Board member’s 

independent summary, although the file indicated that two Board 

members reviewed the case. In one case, the second Board 

member’s opinion was absent. In the other two cases, the second 

Board member simply read the other member’s summary and 

noted that he or she agreed. 

• In three of four cases where the individual Board members 

disagreed, the files contained no rationale for the Chairman’s final 

decision. 

• Two of the 14 files indicated that the Board’s proposed disciplinary 

action was made, in part, based on consultations with DEA’s Office 

of Chief Counsel. In one of these cases, the file did not contain the 

specifics of the consultation.

Deciding Officials’ Decisions Were Not Well Documented in the 

Adverse Action Files.27 Agencies are required to document the basis for 

their disciplinary decisions according to 5 CFR, section 752.101, which 

states, “Copies of the notice of proposed action, the answer of the employee 

if written, a summary thereof if made orally, the notice of decisions and 

 26 We reviewed the Board’s supporting documentation for a sub-sample of 14 cases 

selected from our overall sample of 70 OPR cases. We initially questioned the penalties for 

these 14 cases based on our review of the OPR investigative file. 

27 According to the Deciding Officials, they do not maintain their own files, but 

instead include all the documentation they prepare related to the decision-making process 

in the “adverse action files” maintained by the Human Resources Division. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

reasons therefor, and any order affecting the suspension, together with any 

supporting material, shall be maintained by the agency.”28 The DEA’s 

personnel manual further requires that, “If an oral answer is made, the 

individual hearing the answer must make, or cause to be made, a summary 

of that oral answer.” 

We found that the adverse action files were incomplete and that the 

Deciding Officials did not sufficiently document their decision-making 

rationale in those cases where the final decision deviated from the Board’s 

proposed disciplinary action. As a result, we were unable to evaluate fully 

the reasonableness of the Deciding Officials’ final decisions. 

Employees’ Written and Oral Statements Often Were Not Included in 

the File. The adverse action files should include any written statements or 

summaries of oral statements that the employee provided because they are 

critical in determining the reasonability of a decision. We often found that 

employee statements were missing from the adverse action files or, in the 

case of oral statements, not properly summarized. Specifically, we found:

• Twelve employees in our sample submitted written statements; 

four (33 percent) of these statements were missing from the files.29 

• Nine employees in our sample provided oral statements; six 

(67 percent) of the statements were not summarized. Two of the 

three statements that were summarized consisted solely of 

indecipherable notes. 

 

Deciding Officials Did Not Document the Reasons for Deviating From 

the Board’s Proposals. In 6 of the 70 OPR cases in our sample, the Deciding 

Official’s final penalty deviated from the Board’s proposed penalty. We 

reviewed these six cases to determine whether the adverse action files 

contained documentation supporting the basis for these deviations. We 

found that none of the files adequately documented the reasons for the 

deviations. Even though the Deciding Officials have a standard form on 

which they record the applicability of each Douglas factor, this form was not 

in the six files. 

 28 Title 5 CFR 752.101 relates to penalties involving suspensions of 14 days or less. 

Title 5 CFR 752.301, which relates to suspensions greater than 14 days, demotions, or 

removals, contains essentially the same language. 

29 The DEA could not locate one file. 
U.S. Department of Justice 26

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

We also found that the final decision letters did not always explain the 

specific circumstances that resulted in the changed penalty. In some cases, 

the Deciding Official referred to the employee’s written or oral statement as 

the basis for mitigation. However, five of the six decision letters did not 

contain a sufficient explanation. For example, in one case the Board 

proposed a 14-day suspension, but the Deciding Official’s decision letter 

simply stated, “I find that the charge cited ... is fully supported by the 

evidence and is sustained. However, I have decided to mitigate the penalty 

based, in large measure, on your written response. Therefore, it is my 

decision that you are suspended for 1 calendar day...” In this instance, the 

Deciding Official provided no details on what elements in the written 

statement justified such extensive mitigation. 

DEA officials told us that they did not believe that it was necessary for 

the decision letters to contain lengthy justifications or explanations because 

the proposal letters issued by the Board are very detailed. However, without 

the employee’s written or oral statements, the Douglas factor form, and an 

explanation in the decision letter to the employee as to why the final 

decision differed from the proposed penalty, the justification for the DEA’s 

disciplinary decisions are not apparent and appear arbitrary. The Deciding 

Officials told us that they are primarily concerned with documenting cases 

that can be appealed to the MSPB. In our opinion, it is important to 

document all cases, especially those cases in which the Deciding Officials 

change the proposed penalties or dismiss the charges. 

Example Illustrates the Inability of the System to Ensure 

Disciplinary Decisions are Reasonable. We discuss in detail one case in 

which the Board’s proposed penalty differed considerably from the Deciding 

Official’s final decision without any explanation from the Deciding Official 

discussing the reasons for his decision. 

Because the investigation conducted by the OIG determined that the 

incident had occurred, and the Board found that the incident occurred and 

recommended a suspension, we were troubled that the Deciding Official 

failed to sustain the charges. We interviewed Board members and the 

Board Chairman and they continued to believe that the subject had acted 

inappropriately and should have been suspended. 
U.S. Department of Justice 27

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Case Summary 

The OIG investigated an allegation that a DEA supervisor engaged in off-duty 

misconduct by pointing a handgun at a 17-year old male juvenile. The incident 

occurred after the DEA supervisor discovered that his 15-year-old stepdaughter had 

snuck out of the house during the night and the DEA supervisor and his wife 

suspected that the girl was with a 17-year-old boy who had previously taken her to a

high school dance. The supervisor waited in his car to observe who brought her 

home. At 5:30 a.m., the stepdaughter returned with a 17-year-old boy. The DEA 

supervisor blocked the juvenile’s vehicle with his own vehicle and, with his weapon 

pointed at the boy, ordered the boy to get out of the car and lie prone on the grass. 

The DEA supervisor took the boy’s car keys and detained him until the police 

arrived. The police refused to take action against the boy because the stepdaughter 

had gone out with him voluntarily, so no crime was committed. The DEA supervisor 

did not inform the police that he had pointed his handgun at the boy. The boy’s 

mother subsequently learned that the DEA supervisor had pointed a handgun at her

son and lodged a complaint against the DEA supervisor with the local police 

department. 

The Board reviewed the facts of the case and charged the supervisor with Poor

Judgment and Conduct Unbecoming a DEA Special Agent. The Board proposed a 

7-day suspension for the supervisor, stating: 

Having identified [the juvenile] as the individual who had gone out with 

your stepdaughter previously, your conduct in forcing him to lie on the 

ground for approximately 15 minutes, taking away his keys, and 

further detaining him for the police to arrive when, in fact, you had no 

reason to believe a crime had been committed, constitutes Poor 

Judgment on your part...your action in this matter were... 

inappropriate and were an embarrassment to the DEA and the 

Department of Justice.... Your conduct in minimizing your action and 

in omitting the fact that you pointed a firearm at a juvenile... could 

have called your integrity and the integrity of the agency into question. 

 

The supervisor provided a written response to the Board’s proposal in which 

he did not deny the incident, but stated that he strongly believed that his actions 

were appropriate. The Deciding Official reviewed the case file, the Board’s proposal, 

and the supervisor’s written statement and took an oral statement from the 

supervisor. The Deciding Official then issued a decision letter clearing the 

supervisor of all charges. The Deciding Official’s final decision letter did not provide 

details as to why the charges were dismissed, but merely stated: 

Based on my review of the facts and circumstances in this matter, to 

include your written response [date], and your oral response [date], I do 

not sustain either of the charges proposed. Therefore, I am issuing this 

Letter of Clearance. This case is closed. 
U.S. Department of Justice 28

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Because the Deciding Official failed to provide an explanation in the 

decision letter of why he dismissed the charges, on April 15, 2003, the OIG 

requested that the DEA provide a written explanation from the Deciding 

Official of the reasons for his decision. On May 8, 2003, the DEA provided a 

written statement from the Deciding Official in which he explained that he 

believed the facts of the case demonstrated that the subject did not know for 

sure that his stepdaughter was with the 17-year-old, and therefore he acted 

to ensure his stepdaughter’s safety. Furthermore, the Deciding Official 

stated that he believed there was no evidence to support a finding that the 

supervisor intentionally omitted a fact or was otherwise less than candid to 

the police. He added that the supervisor’s written and oral response 

supported his interpretation. 

We reviewed the documentation maintained by the Deciding Official 

for this case. The Deciding Official told us that because he thought his 

decision would be controversial, he prepared a Douglas factor checklist. In 

this case, however, preparing a Douglas factor checklist was unnecessary 

because it should only be prepared to determine a penalty if the charge is 

sustained, not if the subject is cleared of the charges. The checklist stated, 

as a mitigating factor, that the DEA supervisor “Approached situation that 

was perceived as potentially threatening in a professional law enforcement 

style.” In response to the Douglas factor pertaining to the effect of the 

offense on the subject’s ability to perform the job, the Deciding Official 

wrote, “None based on oral representation re: ongoing relations w/state & 

local officials.”30 

The Deciding Official defended his decision by stating that he “had 

almost been killed once by a 17-year-old”, and that he could therefore 

understand the circumstances. He also stated that the incident could not 

have been that serious because he knew that the stepdaughter and the 

boyfriend continued to date after the incident. 

This case is especially problematic because the conclusion drawn by 

the Deciding Official is so divergent from the unanimous conclusion of six 

Board members and the OIG investigators that a serious offense was 

committed. Moreover, the Deciding Official did not document any reason for 

his decision. And, because the employee is a GS-15 supervisory agent, the 

decision raises a concern that he was given special consideration. 

 30 We found that the case file contained no documentation of the supervisor’s oral 

response, contrary to DEA policy. 
U.S. Department of Justice 29

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 1: The DEA should provide better guidance to the 

Board and Deciding Officials on the factors that may be considered in 

making disciplinary determinations by: a) updating the Schedule of 

Disciplinary Offenses and Penalties; b) updating written procedures to guide 

the operations of the Board and Deciding Officials; and c) instructing the 

Deciding Officials to limit their disciplinary considerations to the 

information contained in official DEA files and information provided by the 

employee or their authorized representative. 

Recommendation 2: The DEA should document the Douglas factors 

considered in making its disciplinary decisions. 

Recommendation 3: The DEA should require that documentation 

maintained by the Board and Deciding Officials regarding each disciplinary 

case include: a) the opinions of each Board member assigned to review a 

case and the rationale for the Chairman’s proposal in those instances when 

the individual Board members disagree; b) any advice from outside sources, 

such as the Office of Chief Counsel; and c) all oral and written statements 

made by employees to Deciding Officials. 

Recommendation 4: The DEA should require that when the final 

disciplinary decisions differ from the proposed charges and penalties, the 

final decision letter contain a detailed explanation of the reasons for the 

difference. 

Recommendation 5: The DEA should require that the DEA 

Inspection Division periodically review a sample of closed disciplinary case 

files to assess whether the basis for the disciplinary decisions was 

adequately documented. 
U.S. Department of Justice 30

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Timeliness of Processing Disciplinary Cases 

During FY 2001 and FY 2002, the DEA experienced 

excessive delays in processing disciplinary cases. We found 

that DEA management failed to monitor the timeliness of 

the disciplinary system or take timely corrective action. In 

addition, some DEA employees criticized the disciplinary 

system for its lack of timeliness, citing the potential 

negative effect on their careers. 

To evaluate the DEA’s timeliness in processing disciplinary cases, we 

tracked the time it took for each of the three entities to process the 70 OPR 

cases in our sample.31 When calculating the entity’s processing time, we 

did not count delays that we identified through file documentation as 

beyond the entity’s control.32 

To define timeliness, we reviewed DEA performance standards or, 

when these were not available, determined reasonable timeframes through 

interviews with DEA officials. Only OPR had established written 

performance standards addressing timeliness. According to Chapter 8310 

of DEA’s Planning and Inspection Manual, OPR should complete its 

investigations within 180 days of receiving the allegation.33 During 

discussions, the Board Chairman and Deciding Officials told us that their 

informal goal was to process cases within 60 days. 

 31 We determined the processing dates as follows: For processing by OPR, we 

tracked the time from the date the allegation was received by OPR through the date the 

completed investigative case file was sent to the Board. For processing by the Board, we 

tracked the time from the date the completed investigative case file was sent to the Board 

through the date the proposal letter was sent to the employee and the Deciding Officials. 

For processing by the Deciding Officials, we tracked the time from the date the copy of the 

proposal letter was sent to the Deciding Officials to the date the final decision letter was 

sent to the employee. 

32 For example, the United States Attorneys’ Office (USAO) might have requested 

that OPR delay an investigation pending the resolution of legal matters pertaining to either 

the subject or a witness. Delays also might have occurred when OPR became aware that 

either the subject or witness was involved in an on-going investigation conducted by local 

or state authorities, or other federal agencies. Subject and witness availability, or delays in 

receiving evidence, also resulted in delays. In addition, the Board or the Deciding Officials 

might have requested that OPR perform additional investigative work, or that the Office of 

Chief Counsel provide a legal opinion. 

33 The Manual also requires that field personnel functioning as delegated OPR 

inspectors should complete their investigations within 90 days. 
U.S. Department of Justice 31

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

The mean processing time of the cases in our sample was 334 days, 

with a median of 327 days. The mean processing time for each entity is 

shown in Chart 1. 

Chart 1: Processing Time for DEA Disciplinary Cases 

Mean = 190 days Mean = 28 days

Mean = 116 days

OPR Board of Professional Conduct Deciding Officials

Source: OIG Sample Review of OPR Cases 

OPR Delays Were Infrequent. We found that OPR exceeded its goal 

of 180 days to complete investigations in 28 of the 70 cases (40 percent) 

that we reviewed. However, in only 6 of these 28 cases (9 percent of the 

total cases) did it appear that the delays were within OPR’s control.34 In 

these six cases, OPR took from 6.8 months to 15.5 months to conduct the 

investigation. 

One of OPR’s Associate Deputy Chief Inspectors reviewed the 

investigative case files for the six cases. She was unable to determine a 

reason for the delays in three cases, and attributed the delays in the 

remaining cases to either re-interviewing a subject due to a faulty tape 

recorder (4-month delay) or DEA personnel taking leave during the holiday 

period. 

 34 We considered delays to be excessive only in those cases where our review of the 

investigative case file showed either gaps of more than two months between interviews or 

other investigative actions, or one interview or less per month. Some of the cases that took 

in excess of 180 days to complete were complex and involved interviewing a large number of 

witnesses. As long as the investigation appeared to progress in a timely manner, we 

considered these to be completed timely. 
U.S. Department of Justice 32

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Board Delays Were Frequent, But Have Diminished. During 

FY 2001 and FY 2002, the Board experienced significant processing delays. 

Of the 70 cases in our sample, 54 had been sent to the Board.35 In 46 of 

those 54 cases (85 percent), the Board took longer than 60 days to issue a 

proposal letter. The mean and median processing times for the 54 cases 

were 116 days. The Board’s processing times for the 54 cases are shown in 

Chart 2. 

Chart 2: Board Processing Time for Sampled Cases 

6

2

10

11

13

6 6

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Number of Cases

1-30

31-6061-90

91-120

121-150151-180

>180

Processing time (in days)

 Source: OIG Sample Review of OPR Cases 

The Board Chairman acknowledged that large backlogs occurred from 

September 1999 through January 2002. According to the Board Chairman, 

during this 29-month period, the Board had a backlog of 60 to 110 cases to 

review, and received an additional 20 new cases each month. As a result, 

cases sometimes remained at the Board for 90 to 120 days before the Board 

Chairman assigned them to a Board member for review. According to the 

Board Chairman, several factors caused the backlogs: 

• The Board was not fully staffed. During this 29-month period, the 

Board consisted of the Chairman and two or three Board members. 

Productivity was further reduced due to frequent turnover of Board 

members and the resultant learning curve. 

 35 Fifteen cases in our sample were administratively closed by OPR due to the 

resignation or retirement of the subject, or the inability of OPR to substantiate the charges 

or identify a subject. One of the case files included in our sample could not be located. 
U.S. Department of Justice 33

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

• The Board Chairman reviewed each case and signed every proposal 

letter, which created a bottleneck. 

• There was only one employee relations specialist to prepare all of 

the proposal letters, which resulted in a bottleneck. 

According to the Board Chairman, in late 2002 the Board was able to 

reduce its backlog, and is able to process accident and loss or property 

cases within 30 days, and most OPR cases in 30 to 60 days.36 He cited 

several factors that have resulted in more timely processing of cases. First, 

after recognizing the large number of cases that the Board reviewed, the 

Chairman requested and received authorization for more Board member 

positions. As a result, three Board members were added in mid-2002 and a 

fourth was added in mid-2003, bringing the total number of Board members 

to six. In late 2000, the DEA temporarily allowed the Chairman to delegate 

signatory authority to another Board member for those cases in which the 

penalty is less than a 15-day suspension. And, in late 2001, the DEA 

assigned a second employee relations specialist to the Board. 

In addition to the delays noted by the Chairman, we identified another 

source of delay – the requirement that the Board review the field reports 

pertaining to routine OGV accidents and losses of government property. 

OPR does not investigate these cases because they do not involve integrity 

or criminal issues. Instead, field personnel investigate these cases and send 

them to the Board for the final decision. We question whether these cases 

should be sent to the Board for the following reasons: 

• During FY 2001 and FY 2002, the Board processed 1,134 routine 

OGV accident reports and 564 loss or theft of government property 

reports. Although the Board claims that reviewing these reports is 

not time-intensive, the volume alone is significant enough to affect 

the timely processing of the more important misconduct cases, 

which involve integrity or criminal issues. 

• It is inconsistent that these types of matters, which are 

administrative in nature, should be handled differently from other 

administrative matters (e.g., travel card delinquencies) normally 

handled by SACs or office managers. 

 36 We were unable to verify his claim because the Board’s database does not track 

timeliness. In determining timeliness for our sample of closed cases from FY 2001 and 

FY 2002, we used the dates from memorandums included in OPR investigative case files. 
U.S. Department of Justice 34

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

• According to the Board, these infractions result only in either 

Letters of Clearance or Letters of Caution and therefore they think 

that SACs or office heads should issue them. 

The DEA Chief of Operations, the Board, and Human Resource 

Division officials were unable to identify any reasons the Board needed to 

review these cases, other than that the Board had always done so. 

Deciding Official Delays Occurred Infrequently. We found that, 

during FY 2001 and FY 2002, the Deciding Officials generally issued 

decision letters timely. The mean processing time was 25 days and the 

median was 15 days.37 The Deciding Officials issued a decision within 60 

days for 48 of the 54 cases (88 percent). The processing times for the 54 

cases are shown in Chart 3. 

Chart 3: Deciding Officials’ Processing Times for Sampled Cases 

38

10

3 3

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Number of Cases

1-30

31-6061-90

>90

Processing time (in days)

Source: OIG Sample Review of OPR Cases

DEA Management Does Not Monitor Timeliness. Because the DEA 

did not track cases as they progressed through the disciplinary system to 

determine when and where delays occurred, excessive backlogs continued 

for more than two years before the DEA took corrective action. 

Currently, OPR, the Board, and the Deciding Officials maintain 

separate databases. While OPR can use its database to track the timeliness 

of its investigations, neither the Board nor the Deciding Officials can use its 

database to track the timeliness of a specific case. Their databases are 

 37 The mean processing time of 25 days differs from the mean of 28 days noted in 

the chart on page 31 because we excluded time delays that were not within the Deciding 

Officials’ control. For example, if the Deciding Officials asked for advice from the Office of 

Chief Counsel, we did not include that time in the Deciding Officials’ processing time. 
U.S. Department of Justice 35

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

primarily repositories of prior proposals and decisions and are used as a 

reference to ensure consistency of disciplinary actions. The DEA is 

currently developing a consolidated disciplinary database for OPR, the 

Board, the Deciding Officials, the Human Resources Division, and the Office 

of Chief Counsel. The DEA’s efforts to consolidate its multiple disciplinary 

databases began in mid-November 2002. The DEA estimates that the 

implementation process will take at least two years. This new system 

should enable DEA senior management to better monitor timeliness. 

 Delays Negatively Impact DEA and its Employees. We found that 

the lengthiness of disciplinary investigations negatively affects DEA 

employee morale. During our telephone survey, we spoke to several DEA 

employees who either had been or were being investigated. They 

complained of the stress of being placed on limited duty for a year or more. 

This lack of timeliness was mentioned by 40 percent of the DEA employees 

we contacted during our telephone survey and was the predominant 

complaint regarding the disciplinary system. These employees tended to 

blame OPR for the lack of timeliness. However, as described earlier, we 

found that while OPR investigations take the greatest portion of time in the 

disciplinary process, OPR generally conducts its investigations in a timely 

manner. During the period that we reviewed, only the Board incurred 

significant avoidable delays. 

In addition to affecting morale, the lengthy disciplinary process is a 

productivity issue for the agency. The work activities and career 

opportunities of employees investigated by OPR may be severely restricted 

while the process is ongoing. Subjects of OPR investigations may be placed 

on limited duty, during which time they are not allowed to work overtime, 

operate an OGV, carry a firearm, or carry DEA credentials or badges. 

According to the DEA’s Agents Manual, special agents on limited duty are 

prohibited from “participating in surveillance, arrests, searches, and... 

developing new enforcement matters.” In addition, employee’s promotions 

and transfers are delayed while they are the subjects of an OPR 

investigation. 

During the two-year period that we reviewed, the DEA investigated 

688 of its employees.38 That represents a considerable portion of the 

agency’s approximately 9,300-person workforce. During the disciplinary 

process, the agency may be denied the full services of these employees. 

 38 The 818 cases opened during FY 2001 and FY 2002 involved a total of 931 

subjects, including 688 DEA employees, 90 non-DEA task force officers, 11 contractors, 

and 142 unknown subjects. Some of the DEA employees may have been investigated more 

than once. 
U.S. Department of Justice 36

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Therefore, more timely processing of disciplinary cases will not only 

minimize the negative impact on employees, but also more quickly return 

the services of those employees who are cleared of misconduct charges, and 

more promptly remove employees who are found guilty of egregious or 

criminal conduct. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 6: The DEA should require that the Board and the 

Deciding Officials establish performance measures for timeliness, and 

record the amount of time it takes to process each case. 

Recommendation 7: The DEA should delegate to the appropriate 

special agents in charge and office heads responsibility for reviewing 

instances of routine OGV accident and losses of government property cases 

that do not involve misconduct issues. 
U.S. Department of Justice 37

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Consistency of the Disciplinary System 

In a survey of 50 DEA employees, 70 percent stated that 

they believed the DEA disciplinary system treated all 

employees equitably. However, 30 percent of DEA 

employees we surveyed believed either that special agents 

receive preferential treatment or that higher-graded 

employees receive preferential treatment in the DEA’s 

disciplinary system. The data that we were able to review 

was mixed and inconclusive as to whether a dual standard 

of discipline exists. 

An effective disciplinary system treats employees consistently. The 

likelihood and severity of discipline should not depend on factors such as an 

employee’s position, grade, race, ethnicity, and gender. To examine 

indications of position and grade level disparity, we analyzed OPR data 

related to DEA disciplinary cases, reviewed individual cases during our 

sample review, and conducted a telephonic opinion survey of a random 

sample of 50 DEA employees. We also reviewed several external studies 

that examined racial, ethnic, and gender issues related to DEA discipline. 

Some DEA Employees Perceive Favoritism in DEA’s Disciplinary 

System. In our telephone survey of 50 DEA employees, we found that 

30 percent of the respondents believed that either special agents or highergraded employees receive more favorable treatment than non-agents and 

lower-graded employees. Regarding disparate treatment according to 

occupational position, 4 of 50 (8 percent) of the employees we surveyed 

stated that they believed special agents are treated more leniently than 

those in other positions. Regarding disparate treatment by grade level, 

11 of 50 (22 percent) of the employees we surveyed stated that they believed 

that managers were less likely to be charged with misconduct and, when 

charged, are more likely to receive lenient penalties. None of the 

respondents provided specific examples of the favorable treatment that they 

believed existed. Comments from DEA employees included: 

• Those involved in the disciplinary system are managers and 

managers tend to take care of their own and cover up for each 

other; 

• Managers are generally given the benefit of the doubt; 

• People at the top tend to know each other; 
U.S. Department of Justice 38

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

• Because OPR inspectors eventually rotate back to the field, they 

are less inclined to be harsh with managers who may become the 

inspectors’ future supervisors; and 

• People at the top found guilty of misconduct tend to be transferred, 

while people at the bottom tend to be removed or otherwise receive 

harsher discipline. 

The remaining 35 respondents to our telephone survey (70 percent) 

stated that they did not perceive any disparity in the DEA’s disciplinary 

system related to grade level or position. In fact, six of the employees cited 

recent cases in which a SAC or an Assistant SAC was disciplined as 

evidence of the lack of favoritism in the system. 

While an evaluation of gross numbers of disciplinary actions across 

groups cannot confirm consistent treatment, we examined the available data 

related to disciplinary actions by employee occupational category and by 

grade level to determine if any clear trends were evident. As described 

below, the data that we were able to review was mixed and inconclusive as 

to whether a dual standard of discipline exists. A complete evaluation of 

allegations of disciplinary disparity would require the comparison of similar 

offenses and a methodology to account for inherent differences in the 

number and types of offenses that different groups may commit. Such a 

detailed analysis was beyond the scope of this review. 

Data Regarding DEA Special Agents. We compared the number of 

investigations conducted in FY 2001 and FY 2002, and how many of those 

investigations resulted in discipline, for special agents, chemists, diversion 

investigators, intelligence analysts, and support/other staff. 39 We found 

that, as compared to their representation in the DEA workforce, DEA special 

agents were more likely to be investigated for alleged misconduct. While 

special agents constitute 49 percent of the DEA workforce, they are the 

subjects of 73 percent of DEA’s misconduct investigations (Table 2). 

 39 Support/other staff includes employees in job categories such as personnel 

specialists, program analysts, and budget, legal, and clerical staff. It does not include 

special agents, diversion investigators, intelligence analysts, or chemists. 
U.S. Department of Justice 39

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Table 2: Subjects Investigated by the DEA OPR (by Position) 

All Cases Opened During FY 2001 and FY 2002 

Position 

Number of 

Subjects 

Investigated 

Percent of 

Subjects 

Investigated 

Percent of the 

DEA’s Workforce 

Special Agents 502 73.0 49.3 

Diversion Investigators 31 4.5 5.6 

Intelligence Analysts 25 3.6 7.6 

Chemists 13 1.9 3.3 

Support/Other 117 17.0 34.3 

Totals 688 100 100 

Source: DEA OPR 

While special agents were more likely to be investigated, we found that 

a slightly lower percentage of those investigations resulted in discipline (as 

opposed to clearance) than did investigations of employees in other 

occupational categories. For closed investigations, 62 percent of the 

investigations of special agents resulted in discipline.40 In contrast, from 65 

percent to 82 percent of the investigations of employees in other 

occupations resulted in discipline (Table 3). 

Table 3: Subjects Disciplined by the DEA 

All Closed Cases (other than Administrative Closure) 

FY 2001 and FY 2002 

Position Percent of Subjects 

Disciplined 

Percent of Subjects 

Cleared 

Special Agents 62 38 

Diversion Investigators 65 35 

Intelligence Analysts 68 32 

Chemists 70 30 

Support/Other 82 18 

Source: DEA OPR 

In reviewing the closed cases that resulted in discipline, we found that 

despite a slightly higher clearance rate, special agents were still more likely 

to be disciplined than other occupations, given their proportions in the DEA 

workforce. Specifically, special agents made up 49 percent of the DEA 

workforce, but were 67 percent of the subjects disciplined (Table 4). 

 40 These did not include those cases that were administratively closed, which are 

closed due to insufficient evidence or where the subject resigned or retired prior to the 

rendering of the disciplinary decision. 
U.S. Department of Justice 40

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Table 4: Subjects Disciplined by the DEA (by position) 

All Closed Cases Resulting in Discipline 

FY 2001 and FY 2002 

Position 

Number of 

Subjects 

Disciplined 

 Percent of 

Subjects 

Disciplined 

Percent of the 

DEA Workforce 

Special Agents 256 67.0 49.3 

Diversion Investigators 20 5.2 5.6 

Intelligence Analysts 13 3.4 3.6 

Chemists 7 1.8 3.3 

Support/Other 86 22.5 34.3 

Totals 382 100 100 

Source: DEA OPR

The greater percentage of special agents investigated for alleged 

misconduct may be attributable to a number of factors. For example, the 

nature of the work of special agents requires them to carry weapons, 

participate in raids, have access to seized drugs and cash, and have more 

contact with the public. Further, many of their activities require judgments 

– for example, the amount of force necessary when arresting a suspect – 

that may be subject to review. Consequently, they are exposed to more 

situations that could lead to misconduct investigations than are non-agents. 

Therefore, despite the higher investigation, clearance, and discipline rates 

for special agents, the above data do not necessarily mean that special 

agents are treated more harshly than other employees. 

In addition to the above data, we noted that in our sample of 70 

cases, of the 13 investigation subjects whom we found to have received 

penalties that appeared too lenient, 12 were special agents. However, the 

small number of cases does not support a systemic finding of favorable 

treatment for special agents. 

Data Regarding Discipline of Higher Graded Employees. We 

compared the investigations and penalties imposed in FY 2001 and FY 2002 

for employees at each grade level. We also identified the distribution of 

employees at each grade level in the DEA population. In reviewing cases 

opened in FY 2001 and FY 2002, we found that, given their relative 

proportions in the DEA workforce, higher-graded employees (i.e., SES, 

GS-15, and GS-14 employees) were slightly more likely to be investigated 

than lower-graded employees. For example, SES employees comprised 0.8 

percent of the DEA workforce, but made up 2.5 percent of subjects 

investigated. In contrast, employees at the GS-8 level and below comprised 
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16.3 percent of the workforce, but were 8.5 percent of the subjects 

investigated. Possible reasons for this variance are that higher-graded 

employees are more likely to be involved in making decisions or taking 

actions that can lead to charges of misconduct. Employees in the middle 

grades (GS-9 to GS-13) were investigated in about the same proportion that 

they appear in the DEA population (Table 5). 

Table 5: Subjects Investigated by OPR (by Grade Level) 

All Cases Opened During FY 2001 and FY 2002 

Grade Level 

Number of 

Subjects 

Investigated 

Percent of 

Subjects 

Investigated 

Percent of the 

DEA Workforce 

SES 17 2.5 0.8 

GS-15 28 4.1 3.7 

GS-14 136 19.8 14.0 

GS-13 239 34.8 34.0 

GS-12 141 20.6 19.3 

GS-11 29 4.2 5.4 

GS-10 2 0.3 0.2 

GS-9 36 5.2 6.3 

GS-8 and below 58 8.5 16.3 

Totals 686 a 100 100 

Source: DEA OPR 

a Total does not equal 688 as in Table 2 because several subjects had unknown grade 

levels. 

 When we examined the closed cases that resulted in discipline, the 

variance between higher-graded employees and lower-graded employees 

decreased, and the distribution of disciplined employees at each grade level 

reflected the distribution of employees by grade level in the DEA population. 

In particular, the percentage of disciplined SES employees (0.8 percent) 

exactly matched the percentage of SES employees in the DEA population 

(also 0.8 percent). Disciplined employees at the GS-08 level and below (13.1 

percent) more closely matched the 16.3 percent proportion these employees 

represent in the DEA population (Table 6). 
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Table 6: Subjects Disciplined by DEA (by Grade Level) 

All Closed Cases Resulting in Discipline 

FY 2001 and FY 2002 

Grade Level 

Number of 

Subjects 

Disciplined 

 Percent of 

Subjects 

Disciplined 

Percent of the 

DEA Workforce 

SES 3 0.8 0.8 

GS-15 12 3.1 3.7 

GS-14 72 18.8 14.0 

GS-13 115 30.1 34.0 

GS-12 69 18.1 19.3 

GS-11 30 7.9 5.4 

GS-10 2 0.5 0.2 

GS-9 29 7.6 6.3 

GS-8 and below 50 13.1 16.3 

Totals 382 100 100 

Source: DEA OPR

We also examined how higher-graded employees were disciplined as 

compared to lower-graded employees. We found that employees at higher 

grade levels received a higher percent of clearances while employees at lower 

grade levels received a higher percentage of removals. Specifically, we found 

that two-thirds of SES employees received a Letter of Clearance, while less 

than one-third of employees at the GS-9 level or below received a Letter of 

Clearance. Further, no SES or GS-15 employees were removed, while 22 

percent of employees at the GS-8 level or below were removed. The 

distribution of penalties by grade level is shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Percentage of Penalties by Grade Level 

OPR Closed Cases (FY 2001 and 2002) 

Number of Cases 9 21 107 193 104 45 2 40 59 

Disciplinary Action SES GS-15 GS-14 GS-13 GS-12 GS-11 GS-10 GS-9 GS-8 - lower 

Letter of Clearance 67 43 33 40 34 33 0 28 15 

Letter of Caution 11 14 34 24 28 13 0 33 22 

Letter of Reprimand 11 14 11 10 13 20 0 5 19 

Suspension 11 29 20 22 23 29 50 20 22 

Grade Reduction 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 

Removal 0 0 3 4 3 2 50 15 22 

TOTAL a 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 

Source: DEA OPR 

a Totals may not equal 100 due to rounding.

 

We examined the variance between the discipline imposed for SES 

employees and the discipline imposed for lower-graded employees and 

concluded that it did not appear to be due to a systemic disparity in 

treatment. For the SES employees, we reviewed 9 cases in which the OPR 

concluded its investigation in FY 2001 and FY 2002.41 We concluded that 

the facts established in the investigations fully supported the 

determinations in these cases, and that the SES employees were disciplined 

appropriately. We also examined the penalties imposed on higher-graded 

employees in our sample of 70 discipline cases. The one SES employee 

included in our sample received a 33-day suspension for Unauthorized Use 

of an OGV and Misuse of Office. Of the remaining DEA management 

personnel, 50 percent of the GS-15 employees and more than a quarter of 

the GS-14 employees received penalties (Table 8). 

 41 The OPR investigated 16 SES employees for misconduct. The remaining seven 

SES employees’ cases were administratively closed. The DEA administratively closes cases 

when either the employee resigns or retires, or when a preliminary investigation determines 

that there is insufficient evidence to either identify a subject or determine that misconduct 

has occurred. Because the OPR database does not provide more specific information, we 

were unable to determine the reasons for the administrative closures of the seven SES 

cases. 
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Table 8: Discipline Imposed in Sample Review, By Grade Level 

Grade Level 

Number of 

Subjects in 

Sample 

Number of 

Subjects Who 

Received 

Discipline 

Percentage of 

Subjects Who 

Received Discipline 

SES 1 1 100 

GS-15 4 2 50 

GS-14 18 5 28 

GS-13 25 3 12 

GS-12 16 6 38 

GS-11 8 4 50 

GS-9 9 2 22 

GS-8 and below 5 3 60 

Unknown 19 0 0 

Totals 105 26 N/A 

Source: OIG Sample Review of OPR Cases 

Note: Unknown subjects include those cases where a subject could not be identified or 

cases involving non-DEA employees, such as contractors or other law enforcement 

officers assigned to a task force. 

In our sample review of 70 OPR cases, employees at all grade levels 

received discipline, including 3 employees at GS-8 or below. We concluded 

that the penalties imposed in these sample cases were appropriate. 

Because we found that the discipline imposed on SES employees and on 

lower-graded employees was appropriate in all the cases that we reviewed, 

we concluded that the variance in the discipline imposed was not based on 

a systemic disparity. 

 

In discussions, DEA officials offered one explanation for the removal 

rates of lower-graded employees. They explained that it may be because 

lower-graded employees are more likely to be in a probationary status. 

During probation, new employees can be removed expeditiously should they 

exhibit behavior, such as committing misconduct, which demonstrates 

unsuitability for permanent career status. Employees in a probationary 

status have no right to appeal to the MSPB. This could be a contributing 

factor to the variance we observed. 

We also noted that some of the higher-graded employees in our 

sample resigned or retired during the disciplinary process. Of the 105 

subjects in our sample, four cases were administratively closed because the 

employee resigned, and five cases were administratively closed because the 

employee retired. Of the retirees, two were GS-13s, two were GS-14s, and 
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one was a GS-15. We were unable to determine whether these employees 

retired to avoid disciplinary action – one retired during the investigation, two 

retired before the Board proposed disciplinary action, and two retired after 

the proposal letter was issued but before the penalty was imposed.42 

As with our review of the data regarding special agents, because a 

detailed analysis that would compare penalties assigned in each case was 

not feasible, and because the data that was available was mixed, we cannot 

conclusively determine whether higher-graded employees are treated more 

leniently than lower-graded employees. 

External Reviews Found No Disparity By Race, Ethnicity, and 

Gender. Our review examined disciplinary action taken by position and 

grade level for all DEA employees. Three external reviews examined the 

influence of other factors, such as race, ethnicity, and gender, on the 

treatment of the DEA special agent workforce. These reviews concluded 

that there was no disparate treatment by the DEA. For example: 

• An April 1987 contractor study examined disparity related to race, 

gender, DEA office size, and geographic region.43 Although the 

study found some statistical differences in certain categories, the 

study concluded that the DEA’s disciplinary system was fair and 

that the expected disciplinary proposals and decisions were the 

same for all races who were charged with similar offenses or 

offenses of the same level of severity.44 

• An August 2001 contractor study focused on the disparity in the 

discipline administered to Caucasian versus African-American 

 42 The Board proposed that one subject receive a Letter of Reprimand and the other 

a 3-day suspension. 

43 A Study of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Current Conduct and Discipline 

System, Advanced Research Resources Organization, Arthur L. Korotkin, F. Mark 

Schemmer, and Cheryl D. Bruff. 

44 The authors of the report attributed the statistical differences to other factors. 

For example, the study found that a higher proportion of GS-12 employees and a lower 

proportion of GS-13 employees were disciplined. The study surmised that this occurred 

because GS-12 employees are more independent and given more latitude, thereby providing 

them with more opportunity for discretionary behavior. On the other hand, the report 

concluded that because GS-13 employees represent the first level of supervision, this may 

result in a more rigid adherence to the rules. 
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special agents.45 This study, which analyzed disciplinary actions 

imposed from 1994 to 2000, found no differences between 

Caucasian and African-American special agents in terms of the 

severity of the punishment issued. 

• A July 2003 study conducted by the General Accounting Office 

(GAO) included a review of racial, ethnic, and gender differences in 

the DEA’s disciplining of special agents.46 This study found that 

the proportion of African-American, Hispanic, and female special 

agents disciplined for misconduct was substantially higher than 

their representation in the DEA special agent workforce. The study 

did not offer reasons for this, but cited the 1987 and 2001 studies 

noted previously in concluding that the DEA’s disciplinary process 

was fair and nondiscriminatory, despite the higher proportion of 

African-American, Hispanic, and female special agents 

disciplined. 47 

 45 Drug Enforcement Administration Discipline System Study, SHL Landy Jacobs: 

Litigation Support Group. 

46 Equal Employment Opportunity: Hiring, Promotion, and Discipline Processes at 

DEA, GAO-03-413. 

47 The GAO study also found an overall perception among DEA minority special 

agents that minorities were disproportionately investigated for misconduct and received 

harsher disciplinary penalties. To address this, the GAO study recommended that the DEA 

make its disciplinary statistics available to the DEA workforce. In its response to the GAO 

report, the DEA agreed to provide data to the general DEA workforce at least annually on 

the types of misconduct sustained. 
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DEA Management of the Disciplinary System 

The DEA does not adequately monitor the overall 

disciplinary system to ensure that it functions properly. 

While the three-tiered system comprised of OPR, the Board, 

and the Deciding Officials provides for oversight over OPR 

and the Board, DEA management does not systemically 

review the Deciding Officials’ actions to ensure that 

decisions are consistent and reasonable. The DEA also does 

not ensure that disciplinary actions are properly 

documented in employees’ official personnel files. 

The DEA’s three-tiered disciplinary system provides some oversight of 

OPR and Board activities to ensure that they are independent. OPR 

conducts fact-based investigations that do not draw any conclusions. To 

ensure objectivity, senior OPR inspectors closely monitor the investigations; 

the final investigative product is reviewed and approved by both the senior 

inspector and one of OPR’s Associate Deputy Chief Inspectors. The Board 

and the Deciding Officials also provide a quality check: if they believe that 

the OPR investigation is incomplete they can request further investigation. 

 There also is oversight over the Board. The Board does not make any 

final decisions, but only proposes disciplinary action. The Deciding Officials 

make the final penalty determinations and may or may not accept the 

Board’s proposed charges and penalties. 

However, there is no oversight over the Deciding Officials. If the 

Deciding Official assigned to a case does not agree with the Board’s 

proposals, the Deciding Official can – without explanation – dismiss the 

charge or decrease the penalty. In addition, DEA management does not 

routinely review cases in which the Deciding Officials’ final decisions varied 

significantly from the charges and penalties proposed by the Board to 

determine the factors responsible for the variance and make systemic 

corrections for future disciplinary decisions. This lack of management 

oversight allows potential abuses in the system in that a Deciding Official 

could inappropriately dismiss charges or mitigate penalties. For example, in 

the case cited on page 27 in which a DEA supervisor pointed a gun at a 

17-year old boy, five of the Board members familiar with the case and the 

Board Chairman told us that they believed that the supervisor had acted 

inappropriately and should have been suspended for his misconduct. 

Based on their review of the case, none could identify a plausible reason 

why the Deciding Official did not sustain the charges. 
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Because the Board and the Deciding Officials rely on the same 

investigative reports in making penalty determinations, instances of 

significant variances in the interpretation of these reports by the Board, the 

Deciding Officials, or both should alert management that there is a systemic 

problem, or a problem with the Board or the Deciding Official relating to a 

particular case. And, although management should not interfere with an 

on-going investigation or attempt to influence a Deciding Official to change a 

particular decision, it is appropriate for management to require the Board 

and the Deciding Officials to justify their determinations. 

Each Board member we interviewed stated that significant variances 

in Deciding Officials’ decisions occur infrequently, approximately two or 

three cases a year. We were unable to specifically identify how often a 

Deciding Official’s decision varied from the Board’s proposed penalty 

because neither the Board nor the Deciding Officials track this information. 

In our sample review of 70 OPR cases, the Deciding Officials varied from the 

proposed penalty in six cases. In only one of the six cases did we conclude 

that the variance was significant. In that case, a proposed 14-day 

suspension was reduced to 1 day, but based on the information in the file 

we were unable to determine the Deciding Official’s reason for mitigating the 

penalty. 

 

Deciding Officials Allege Management Influence and Retaliation. 

While conducting our review, we received an allegation that DEA 

management had attempted to influence a Deciding Official.48 The DEA has 

strict policies against this, as stated in a May 28, 1996, memorandum from 

the Chief Inspector to all DEA employees: 

To maintain the integrity of the disciplinary process, no 

person is authorized to contact the Deciding Officials or the 

Board of Professional Conduct during the pendency of a 

disciplinary or performance based action, other than the 

employee concerned and his/her designated representative. 

During our review, the Deciding Officials told us that a DEA manager 

from the Office of Inspection approached them in July 2002 regarding a 

specific case in which the Deciding Official had not yet made a final 

decision. The manager expressed displeasure at the leniency of the penalty 

proposed by the Board and suggested that the penalty should be harsher. 

(We interviewed the manager who allegedly approached the Deciding 

 48 The Deciding Officials also told us that in the past a previous DEA Administrator 

had interfered in the decision-making process by telling them what penalty he wanted 

imposed, but that this did not occur under subsequent Administrators. 
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Officials and he denied that the incident occurred.) In the final decision 

made in November 2002, the Deciding Official further mitigated the 

proposed penalty based on the application of the Douglas factors. The 

Deciding Official told us that in December 2002 DEA management informed 

him that he had been a Deciding Official too long (five years) and that he 

should start looking for another position within the DEA. He viewed this 

action as retaliatory. 

Five months after the Deciding Official was told to look for another 

position, the Acting DEA Administrator retired. The week following his 

retirement, the Human Resources Director transferred the Deciding Official 

to another position, acting on the request of the former Acting DEA 

Administrator who had retired. The timing of the DEA management actions, 

at best, gives the appearance of reprisal against the Deciding Official, 

although the conflicting statements prevent us from conclusively 

determining whether the incident occurred.

Discipline Was Not Always Documented in Employees’ Official 

Personnel Files. It is important that the official personnel files contain the 

appropriate documentation to ensure that the imposed disciplinary actions 

were taken and to serve as permanent records of employees’ disciplinary 

histories. These files are used in a variety of personnel actions, such as 

promotions, security clearances, and transfers. According to the DEA 

personnel manual: 

All reprimands and adverse actions must be reflected in the 

affected employee’s official personnel folder. Official reprimands 

will be retained in the official personnel folder for a period not to 

exceed two years, at which time they will be removed and 

destroyed...[A reprimand] may be removed and destroyed 

sooner if a grievance over a reprimand is sustained, or if it is 

determined upon request from the employee after one year that 

the reprimand should be removed. In the latter case, a 

reprimand may be removed only by the official who issued the 

reprimand or someone organizationally superior to that official. 

Documentation of adverse actions, other than a Letter of Reprimand 

(i.e., suspensions, grade reductions, and removals), becomes a permanent 

part of the employee’s personnel file unless the penalties are overturned on 

appeal or grievance. 

In our review of 70 OPR cases, we identified 23 employees who 

received formal disciplinary decisions that should have been documented in 
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their official personnel files. Among those 23 employees, 12 received written 

reprimands, 7 received suspensions from 1 to 33 days, 1 received a grade 

reduction from GS-11 to GS-9, and 3 were removed. We reviewed the 

personnel files of the above individuals and specifically looked for either the 

letter of reprimand or, in the case of adverse actions, the SF-50 (Notification 

of Personnel Action). The result of our review is summarized in Table 9. 

Table 9: Personnel File Documentation of Discipline Imposed 

Penalties Support Found For: Support Missing For: 

12 Letters of Reprimand 6 Letters of Reprimand 6 Letters of Reprimand 

7 Suspensions 5 Suspensions 2 Suspensions 

1 Grade Reduction 1 Grade Reduction None Missing 

3 Removals 3 Removals None Missing 

23 Actions 15 Actions 8 Actions 

Source: OIG Review of Official Personnel Files 

Of the six missing Letters of Reprimand, three were issued more than 

a year before we conducted our review. Therefore, it was possible that they 

had been removed at the request of the employee. When asked why there 

was no documentation regarding the remaining three Letters of Reprimand 

and two suspensions, DEA officials were unable to provide an explanation. 

During our review, we also found that one of the files contained a Letter of 

Reprimand more than two years old that should have been removed. 

The DEA Informs its Employees of the Requirement for Reporting 

Misconduct and Penalizes Those Who Fail to Report Misconduct. The 

DEA’s standards of conduct require its employees to promptly report to their 

supervisor, or to OPR, any activity or situation the employee believes to be 

improper, illegal, or otherwise in violation of any of the DEA’s standards of 

conduct. The DEA informs its employees of this requirement in several 

ways. OPR inspectors routinely make presentations at the DEA Training 

Academy in which they describe common misconduct and explain the 

consequences. In addition, the DEA requires all of its employees to certify 

annually that they have read and understand the standards of conduct. 

This precludes those employees who are charged with misconduct from 

claiming that they were unaware of the standards. 

Our survey of 50 DEA employees indicated that the DEA’s actions to 

educate its employees were successful. Each of the 50 employees we 

contacted were aware of the standards of conduct and of the DEA’s 

requirement that they report misconduct. Even employees who stated that 

they sometimes did not report misconduct acknowledged that they were 

aware of the requirement and the potential consequences of failing to do so. 
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We also found that the DEA investigated and penalized employees 

who failed to report misconduct. If an OPR investigation determined that an 

employee (who was not the subject of the original allegation) knew about 

misconduct but failed to report it, OPR would charge that employee with 

Failure to Report OPR Matters. We found that of the total 1,392 charges in 

cases opened during FY 2001 and FY 2002, Failure to Report OPR Matters 

was the fourth most frequent charge, as shown in Table 10.49 

Table 10: Top Five Offense Codes Charged by OPR 

Cases Opened During FY 2001 and FY 2002 

Offense 

Number of 

Offenses 

Percent of 

Total 

Offenses 

Poor Judgment 143 10 

Failure to Follow Written Instructions 120 9 

Conduct Unbecoming an Agent 77 6 

Î Failure to Report OPR Matters 64 5 

Loss or Theft of a Defendant’s Property or Funds 58 4 

All other charges 930 67 

Totals a 1,392 100 

 Source: DEA OPR 

 a Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

Our sample review of OPR cases included eight employees who were 

charged with Failure to Report OPR Matters. For example, while 

investigating a complaint that a SAC had misused his OGV by transporting 

his son in it, OPR learned that a DEA supervisor also was in the vehicle and 

did not report the misconduct. OPR then charged the supervisor with 

Failure to Report OPR Matters. 

Although the DEA encourages employees to report all misconduct, 

11 of the 50 DEA employees we surveyed stated that they did not believe 

that DEA employees reported all misconduct. Three stated that they had 

personally observed misconduct and not reported it. These individuals 

made a distinction between “minor” misconduct (such as using an OGV to 

run errands) which they would not report, and “major” misconduct (such as 

 49 In FY 2001 and FY 2002, OPR used a total of 79 different offense codes to 

categorize charges. Some OPR cases include multiple subjects or single subjects who have 

committed multiple offenses. 
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criminal activity) which they would report. In addition, they believed that 

employees who report misconduct become known and are mistrusted and 

ostracized. The survey respondents also stated that misconduct is not 

reported because the interpretation of misconduct varies, and that everyone 

commits minor misconduct at some point in their career. 

Our survey also found that when employees did report misconduct, 

the DEA acted on the report. Seven of the surveyed employees stated that 

they had reported misconduct. Six of the seven stated that the DEA 

investigated their allegations. The remaining employee stated that her 

second-line supervisor did not agree that misconduct had occurred, and did 

not forward the allegation to OPR, an outcome that was acceptable to the 

employee. In addition, 48 of the surveyed employees believed that their 

managers properly reported misconduct to OPR. 

The DEA is reporting allegations of misconduct to the OIG, as 

required. On July 11, 2001, the Attorney General expanded the 

jurisdiction of the OIG and permitted it to investigate allegations of 

misconduct against DEA employees. Therefore, the OIG has the option to 

investigate any allegation and an OIG investigator reviews all new 

allegations to make this decision. In addition, OPR has developed a 

standard form that indicates the date that the OIG reviewed the allegation, 

whether the OIG accepted or declined the case, and the name of the OIG 

investigator who made the determination. This form is incorporated into 

every OPR investigative case file. We determined that 9 of the 70 OPR cases 

in our sample occurred after July 11, 2001, and that the DEA reported 

these allegations to the OIG as required. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 8: The DEA should designate a single office to 

monitor the three-tiered system and prepare reports describing disciplinary 

activities, including, at a minimum: a) the processing timeframes for OPR, 

the Board, and the Deciding Officials; b) statistics on offenses committed 

and disciplinary actions taken; c) trend analyses showing increases or 

decreases in specific offenses committed; and d) a description of disciplinary 

decisions where the final charges or penalties varied significantly from the 

Board proposal. 
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CONCLUSIONS 

While the DEA disciplinary system appears appropriately structured 

and the OPR investigations of employee misconduct are thorough and 

generally timely, deficiencies in certain areas hinder the effectiveness of the 

system. 

We found that the penalties imposed by the DEA for confirmed 

misconduct were sometimes overly lenient. In our sample, we found 9 cases 

involving 13 subjects in which the facts of the case or comments made by 

Board members in the supporting documentation appeared to justify a 

stiffer penalty than was ultimately imposed by the Deciding Official. We 

identified several factors that appear to encourage the lenient penalties. 

The DEA’s Schedule of Disciplinary Offenses and Penalties does not 

communicate DEA management’s priorities. The defined offenses are 

generic and not DEA-specific, and the penalties – usually ranging from a 

Letter of Reprimand to Removal for each offense – are too broad to serve as 

effective guidance for the Board and Deciding Officials. We also found that 

the DEA continues to impose the same penalty even when increases in 

specific misconduct indicate that more stringent punishment is needed to 

provide an effective deterrent. Another factor that contributed to lenient 

penalties is that both the Board and the Deciding Officials apply mitigating 

factors in making their determinations. The result of this dual mitigation is 

that penalties can be reduced below the level that is appropriate for the 

offense. 

In a sample of 70 closed disciplinary case files, we also found that 

Board members did not always document their independent reviews of a 

case. Written and oral statements provided by employees in response to the 

disciplinary proposal were often missing from the files or, in the case of oral 

statements, were not properly documented. Final decision letters sent to 

the employee generally did not sufficiently explain the reasons for increasing 

or decreasing proposed penalties, or dismissing charges. Because of the 

deficient documentation, we could not always determine whether the 

individual disciplinary decisions were reasonable. 

In addition, we found excessive delays occurred during FY 2001 and 

FY 2002, primarily with the Board. The delays continued for almost 29 

months because DEA management did not take action. At the time of our 

review, only OPR had established standards against which to measure 

timeliness, and the DEA did not have a centralized database to track cases 

as they progress through the entire disciplinary system. Nearly half of the 
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DEA employees that we surveyed complained that discipline cases took too 

long to resolve, resulting in career disruptions. 

Although some DEA employees perceive that special agents and 

higher-graded employees were disciplined inconsistently from non-agents 

and lower graded employees, we found insufficient evidence to conclude that 

a double standard of discipline exists. 

We also found that the DEA’s disciplinary system lacks any 

mechanism to review final decisions when there is a significant discrepancy 

between the findings of the investigation, the Board’s proposed charges and 

penalties, and the Deciding Official’s final determination. Although the 

decisions of both OPR and the Board undergo review, there is no 

accountability for the Deciding Officials. 

We make eight recommendations to help the DEA ensure that its 

disciplinary decisions are reasonable, fair, free of inappropriate external 

influences, well documented, and timely. These recommendations include 

better guidance for the Board and Deciding Officials in making their 

disciplinary determinations, the establishment of standards to improve the 

timely processing of disciplinary cases, and more effective DEA management 

of the overall disciplinary process. 
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APPENDIX I: DEMOGRAPHICS OF EMPLOYEES IN TELEPHONE SURVEY 

By Position: Number of Employees Percent of Total 

HQ Management 1 2% 

Resident Agent in Charge 4 8% 

Special Agent 24 48% 

Diversion Investigator 2 4% 

Intelligence Personnel 6 12% 

Laboratory Personnel 3 6% 

Technical/Clerical Personnel 10 20% 

TOTAL 50 100% 

 

By Grade Level: Number of Employees Percent of Total 

GS-15 2 4% 

GS-14 11 22% 

GS-13 16 32% 

GS-12 10 20% 

GS-11 3 6% 

GS-8 2 4% 

GS-7 6 12% 

TOTAL 50 100% 

 

By Length of Service with DEA: Number of Employees Percent of Total 

Less than 5 years 13 26% 

5 to 9 years 11 22% 

10 to 14 years 7 14% 

15 to 19 years 8 16% 

20 to 24 years 8 16% 

25 to 29 years 0 0% 

30 or more years 3 6% 

TOTAL 50 100% 

 

By Type of Exposure to OPR: a Number of Employees Percent of Total 

As a subject 10 20% 

As a witness 18 36% 

As a delegated inspector 4 8% 

Knows of others investigated 38 76% 

Unspecified role 3 6% 

No exposure 8 16% 

TOTAL 81 N/A 

Source: OIG Survey of DEA Employees 

a Some respondents listed more than one type. 
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APPENDIX II: THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE 
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APPENDIX III: THE OIG’S ANALYSIS OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT 

ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE 

On October 17, 2003, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) sent 

a copy of the draft report to the Administrator for the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) with a request for written comments. The 

Administrator responded to us in a memorandum dated 

December 17, 2003. The DEA fully concurred with six of the eight 

recommendations and is assessing the feasibility of implementing the 

remaining two recommendations. The DEA also provided comments on 

one of the report sections. Our analysis of the DEA’s response follows. 

DEA RESPONSE 

 The DEA concurred with the OIG that the DEA’s disciplinary 

system as a whole was functioning well but that improvements were 

needed. The DEA’s specific comments on the report pertained to the 

section describing the Board members’ and Deciding Officials’ use of 

their personal experiences or opinions, or external information, in 

making disciplinary determinations. Specifically, -the DEA: 1) contended 

that two of the factors cited in the report as being used by a Board 

member to discredit a complainant were legitimate, and not 

inappropriate as the report concluded, and 2) stated that the report’s 

characterization of these two factors as “outside information” was 

incorrect because the information was contained in the investigative file. 

Both of these issues are discussed below. 

Legitimacy of Factors Used by a Board Member to Assess the 

Credibility of a Complainant 

 The disputed section of the report pertains to a case in which a 

member of the public alleged that DEA employees committed civil rights 

violations during the execution of a search warrant. The report 

concluded that some of the comments made by a Board member in 

evaluating the credibility of the complainant appeared to be 

inappropriately subjective. The DEA agreed that some of the comments 

made by a DEA official cited in the report, such as the fact that the 

complainant was a Rastafarian and that her letter was poorly written, did 

appear to be improper or irrelevant. However, the DEA stated that other 

comments, such as the complainant admitting to frequently smoking 

marijuana and having her complaint prepared by a “jailhouse lawyer,” 

were legitimate factors to be considered in assessing her credibility. 
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 In this case, the DEA’s rationale for citing frequent drug use and 

use of a “jailhouse lawyer” as discrediting factors is not clear. If the 

complainant had been present and under the influence of marijuana 

while the search warrant was being executed, the DEA could argue that 

she was not credible because her perceptions were distorted. This, 

however, was not the case as only the complainant’s children were 

present when the search warrant was being executed. It also is not clear 

how using a “jailhouse lawyer” to prepare a complaint would necessarily 

make the complaint less valid. 

Inappropriate Use of the Term “Outside Information” 

DEA is correct in stating that the factors cited by the Board 

member in this case are not “outside information.” This section of the 

report encompasses both the use of personal experiences or opinions by 

the Board, and the use of external information by the Deciding Officials, 

and was incorrectly titled in the draft report. We have revised the title to 

appropriately reflect the contents of the section. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 1: The DEA should provide better guidance to the 

Board and Deciding Officials on the factors that may be considered in 

making disciplinary determinations by: a) updating the Schedule of 

Disciplinary Offenses and Penalties; b) updating written procedures to 

guide the operations of the Board and Deciding Officials; and 

c) instructing the Deciding Officials to limit their disciplinary 

considerations to the information contained in official DEA files and 

information provided by employees or their authorized representatives. 

Status: Resolved – Open. 

Summary of DEA’s Response: The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and agreed to: a) convene a working group to 

determine revisions to the Schedule of Disciplinary Offenses and 

Penalties; b) review and update the Board’s and the Deciding Officials’ 

handbooks; and c) reinforce its instructions to the Deciding Officials 

regarding the parameters of information that they may consider. The 

projected completion dates are January 2004 for reinforcing its 

instructions, June 2004 for revising the Schedule of Disciplinary 
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Offenses and Penalties, and September 2004 for updating the 

handbooks. 

OIG’s Analysis: We consider the recommendation resolved, but 

will keep it open until the DEA provides to us: a) a copy of the revised 

Schedule of Disciplinary Offenses and Penalties; b) documentation that 

the Board’s and the Deciding Officials’ handbooks have been revised; and 

c) a copy of the instructions issued to the Deciding Officials regarding the 

parameters of information that they may consider in making disciplinary 

determinations. 

Recommendation 2: The DEA should document the Douglas factors 

considered in making its disciplinary decisions. 

Status: Resolved – Open. 

Summary of DEA’s Response: The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and agreed to reinforce its policy to document 

information on the Douglas factors considered in making disciplinary 

decisions. The projected completion date is March 2004. 

OIG’s Analysis: We consider the recommendation resolved, but 

will keep it open until the DEA provides to us documentation of the 

reinforcement of its policy.

Recommendation 3: The DEA should require that documentation 

maintained by the Board and Deciding Officials regarding each 

disciplinary case include: a) the opinions of each Board member 

assigned to review a case and the rationale for the Chairman’s proposal 

in those instances when the individual Board members disagree; b) any 

advice from outside sources, such as the Office of Chief Counsel; and 

c) all oral and written statements made by employees to Deciding 

Officials. 

Status: Unresolved – Open 

Summary of DEA’s Response: The DEA stated that it will take 

under advisement and review the merits of this recommendation and any 

potential alternatives. The projected completion date is January 2004. 

OIG’s Analysis: Because the DEA has not yet addressed the 

recommendation, we consider it unresolved. We will keep the 
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recommendation open until the DEA provides to us an appropriate 

response as to how it will implement the recommendation. 

Recommendation 4: The DEA should require that when the final 

disciplinary decisions differ from the proposed charges and penalties, the 

final decision letter contains a detailed explanation of the reasons for the 

difference. 

Status: Resolved – Open 

Summary of DEA’s Response: The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and agreed to issue guidance to the Deciding Officials 

to ensure that when final decisions differ from the proposed charges and 

penalties, the decision letter contains a detailed explanation of the 

reasons for the differences. The projected completion date is January 

2004. 

OIG’s Analysis: We consider the recommendation resolved, but 

will keep it open until the DEA provides to us a copy of the guidance 

issued to the Deciding Officials. 

Recommendation 5: The DEA should require that the DEA Inspection 

Division periodically review a sample of closed disciplinary case files to 

assess whether the basis for the disciplinary decisions was adequately 

documented. 

Status: Resolved – Open 

Summary of DEA’s Response: The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and stated that it will require the DEA’s Human 

Resources Division to conduct annual inspections of closed disciplinary 

case files and to report the inspection results to the Deputy 

Administrator. According to the DEA, the first inspection is scheduled to 

be completed by March 2004. 

OIG’s Analysis: Although we recommended that the DEA 

Inspection Division conduct the inspections, the DEA’s decision to have 

its Human Resources Division conduct the inspections is an acceptable 

alternative. We therefore consider the recommendation resolved, but will 

keep it open until the DEA provides to us the results of the first 

inspection. 
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Recommendation 6: The DEA should require that the Board and the 

Deciding Officials establish performance measures for timeliness, and 

record the amount of time it takes to process each case. 

Status: Resolved – Open 

Summary of DEA’s Response: The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and agreed to establish performance measures for 

timeliness. The DEA also stated that it intends to develop or acquire a 

database to track all disciplinary cases, and agreed in the interim to 

implement an Access database system for tracking purposes. The 

projected completion date for establishing performance measures is May 

2004 and August 2004 for developing requirements analyses for the 

database. 

OIG’s Analysis: We consider the recommendation resolved, but 

will keep it open until the DEA provides to us documentation that 

performance measures have been established and a tracking system has 

been implemented. 

Recommendation 7: The DEA should delegate to the appropriate 

special agents in charge and office heads responsibility for reviewing 

instances of routine OGV accident and losses of government property 

cases that do not involve misconduct issues. 

Status: Unresolved – Open 

Summary of DEA’s Response: The DEA stated that it will 

conduct a review of the impact of this change on the special agents in 

charge and submit a proposal to the Deputy Administrator to address 

the realignment of this responsibility. The projected completion date is 

June 2004. 

OIG’s Analysis: Because the DEA has not yet made a 

determination to delegate this responsibility, we consider the 

recommendation unresolved. We will keep the recommendation open 

until the DEA provides to us an appropriate response as to how it will 

implement the recommendation. 

Recommendation 8: The DEA should designate a single office to 

monitor the three-tiered system and prepare reports describing 

disciplinary activities, including, at a minimum: a) the processing time 

frames for OPR, the Board, and the Deciding Officials; b) statistics on 
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offenses committed and disciplinary actions taken; c) trend analyses 

showing increases or decreases in specific offenses committed; and d) a 

description of disciplinary decisions where the final charges or penalties 

varied significantly from the Board proposal. 

 

Status: Resolved – Open 

Summary of DEA’s Response: The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and stated that the Deputy Administrator’s office would 

be designated as the single office having overall responsibility for 

monitoring the disciplinary system. The DEA further stated that the 

Deputy Administrator’s office will monitor the disciplinary system using 

reports provided by the HR Division and the Office of Professional 

Responsibility. The projected completion date is March 2004. 

OIG’s Analysis: We consider the recommendation resolved, but 

will keep it open until the DEA provides to us documentation officially 

designating this authority to the Deputy Administrator’s office, and 

documentation showing the specific types of information and reports to 

be used by the Deputy Administrator’s office for monitoring purposes. 
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