# FILED
June 26, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE JANUARY 1998 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) No. 03C01-9706-CR-00228 ) Appellee ) ) WASHINGTON COUNTY V. ) ) HON. LYNN W. BROWN, BILLY RAY STOUT, ) JUDGE ) Defendant, ) ) In re AA BONDING COMP ANY, ) (Bond Forfeiture) ) Appellant. ) For the Appellant: For the Appellee: Steven G. Shope John Knox Walkup 620 West Hill Avenue Attorney General and Repor ter Knoxville, TN 37902 Sandy C. Patrick Assistant Attorney Gener al 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243-0493
David E. Crockett District Attorney General Joe C. Crumley, Jr. Assistant District A

ttorney P.O. Box 38 Jonesborough, TN 37659

OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED
William M. Barker, Judge2 OPINION Appellant, AA Bonding Company , appeals from a judgment in the Washington County Criminal Cour

t ordering forfeiture of the appear ance bond for the defendant Billy Ray Stout. The sole issue on appeal is w hether the trial court abus ed its discretion in failing t

o fully exonerate AA Bondi ng Company upon the return of the defendant to custody. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. On March 16, 1995, three affidavits of complain t and the resulting arrest warrants were fil ed against the defendant for three count s of insurance fraud. On April 14, 1995, an appearance bond i n the amount of $30,000 was posted on behalf of the defendant by appellant AA Bonding Company as surety. That appearance bond was to secure defendant’s presence in Criminal Court on May 16, 1995. However, defendant failed to appear and a capias w as issued for his arrest. At that time, the trial court ordered a co nditional forfeiture against A A Bonding Company. Scire facias was issued and serv

ed on appellant on June 16, 1995. On November 9, 1995, the tri al court granted appellant ’s motion to extend the time of final forfeiture 180 days from Dec ember 15, 1995. Seven months later the defendant had still not been returned to custody and the trial court entered judgment for final forfeiture of the $30,000 bond on July 17, 1996. AA Bonding Company returned defendant to custody w ithin 24 hours of the order of final for feiture and petitioned the court for relief from its earlier judgment. Appellant sought full exoneration from liabilit y on the $30,000 bond under Tennessee C ode Annotated section 40-11-203. After a heari ng, the tri al court ag reed that appe llant was entitled to

some reduction in the forfeiture because the defendant was ultimately returned to custody. However, it decli ned to grant full exonerati on to appellant and instead reli eved it of $15,000 of the judgment and ordered appel lant to pay the remaining $15,000.3

Appellant now appeals, all eging that the trial c ourt abused its discreti on in failing to grant full exoneration. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11- 203 grants trial court

s discretion to exonerate a bonding company from liability wher

e the defendant is returned after final forfeiture has been ordered. The discretion afforded the trial court in such matters has been described as “broad and comprehensive” and is to be exercised in accordance with the trial court

’s conception of justice and r ight. State v. Shredeh , 909 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Ten n. Crim. App. 19 95) (quoting Black v. State , 290 S.W. 20, 21 (Tenn. 1927)). The authority

to reliev e sureties o n a bond shoul d be exerci sed only i n extreme cases, such as the death of the defend ant or some other condition making it impossible for the sureties t o surrender the defendant. State v. Frankgos , 85 S.W. 79, 81 (Tenn. 1905); State v. LeQuire , 672 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). The good faith efforts of the surety or the expenses incurred ar e not excuses. Id. In this case, the appellant fails to show that the trial court abused its discreti on. At the hearing for full exone ration, Fred Weaver, the owner of AA Bon ding Company testified that the failur e to return the defendant before final forfeitur e was due to an errant employee. H e testified that the employee conc ealed the conditional forfeiture and the extension of time until February, 1996. H e took over the file and, from that time forward, diligently worked to loc ate the defendant. However, Weaver testified that he was unaw are of the date for final forfeiture until two days before the hearing. Although the defendant w as located within the Sta te and returned to custody within one day follow

ing the final forfeiture, over 13 months had passed from entry of the conditional forfeiture. In its ruling, the tr

ial court noted that it w as unfortunate that Mr. Weaver had an irresponsible employee.However, the tri al court stated that the resul ting situation was “intolerable,” noting that it had been very lenient and granted appellant substant ially1 Gene rally, the defen dant has 180 days from the date o f the con ditional forfe iture within wh ich to surrender. Tenn. Code Ann. §40-11-139 (1990). I n contrast, appellant was given one y

ear to lo cate the defendant and t he trial court didnot actual ly hol d a hearing on the finalforfeiture until one month after the exp iration of that tim e. 4 more time than is permitted by statute. 1 Moreover, it stated that Mr. Weaver should have notified the court of his di fficulties in February to facilitate the return of the defendant and avoid final forfeiture. N evertheless, the trial court found that appellant was entitled to some rel ief for the eventual return of the defendant and reduced the judgment by one-half. In short, appellant has failed to demonstrate circumstances to justify the full exoneration of liability on defendant’s bond, and we do not f ind that the trial court abused its discretion in the matter. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

_______________________________ William M. Barker, Judge
CONCUR:

____________________________ Gary R. Wad e, Presiding Judge

____________________________ Curwood Wi tt, Judge