S. HRG. 114–567 

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE 

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, 

FIRST SESSION, 114TH CONGRESS 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON

NOMINATIONS OF 

HONORABLE ASHTON B. CARTER; MR. PETER K. LEVINE; GENERAL 

JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR.; GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA; GENERAL 

DARREN W. McDEW; GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY; LIEUTENANT 

GENERAL ROBERT B. NELLER; ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON; MR. 

JOHN CONGER; MR. STEPHEN P. WELBY; MS. ALISSA M. STARZAK; 

MR. FRANKLIN R. PARKER; HONORABLE MARCEL J. LETTRE II; MR. 

GABRIEL O. CAMARILLO; MR. JOHN E. SPARKS; VICE ADMIRAL KURT 

W. TIDD; HONORABLE PATRICK J. MURPHY; DR. JANINE ANNE 

DAVIDSON; AND HONORABLE LISA S. DISBROW 

FEBRUARY 4; APRIL 21; JULY 9, 14, 21, 23, 30; NOVEMBER 19; 

DECEMBER 9, 15, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION, 

114TH CONGRESS 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

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24–274 PDF 2017

S. HRG. 114–567 

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE 

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, 

FIRST SESSION, 114TH CONGRESS 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON

NOMINATIONS OF 

HONORABLE ASHTON B. CARTER; MR. PETER K. LEVINE; GENERAL 

JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR.; GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA; GENERAL 

DARREN W. McDEW; GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY; LIEUTENANT 

GENERAL ROBERT B. NELLER; ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON; MR. 

JOHN CONGER; MR. STEPHEN P. WELBY; MS. ALISSA M. STARZAK; 

MR. FRANKLIN R. PARKER; HONORABLE MARCEL J. LETTRE II; MR. 

GABRIEL O. CAMARILLO; MR. JOHN E. SPARKS; VICE ADMIRAL KURT 

W. TIDD; HONORABLE PATRICK J. MURPHY; DR. JANINE ANNE 

DAVIDSON; AND HONORABLE LISA S. DISBROW 

FEBRUARY 4; APRIL 21; JULY 9, 14, 21, 23, 30; NOVEMBER 19; 

DECEMBER 9, 15, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

FEBRUARY 4, 2015

Nomination of Honorable Ashton B. Carter to be Secretary of Defense ............. 1 

Statements of: 

Lieberman, Honorable Joseph I., former U.S. Senator from Connecticut .......... 7 

Carter, Honorable Ashton B., to be Secretary of Defense .................................... 9 

APRIL 21, 2015

Nomination of Mr. Peter K. Levine to be Deputy Chief Management Officer, 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 159 

Statements of: 

Levine, Peter K., Deputy Chief Management Officer, Department of Defense .. 162 

JULY 9, 2015

Nomination of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, to be Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff ....................................................................................... 259 

Statements of: 

Dunford, General Joseph F., JR., USMC, to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff ................................................................................................................... 264

JULY 14, 2015

Nominations of General Paul J. Selva, USAF, to be Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff; and General Darren W. McDew, USAF, to be Commander, U.S. Transportation Command ............................................................ 373 

Statements of: 

Selva, General Paul J., USAF, to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff ................................................................................................................... 378

McDew, General Darren W., USAF, Nominee to be Commander, U.S. Transportation Command ............................................................................................. 379 

JULY 21, 2015

Nomination of General Mark A. Milley, USA, to be Chief of Staff of the 

Army ...................................................................................................................... 477 

Statements of: 

Milley, General Mark A., USA, to be Chief of Staff of the Army ........................ 481 

(III) 

Page

IV 

JULY 23, 2015

Nomination of Lieutenant General Robert B. Neller, USMC, to be General 

and Commandant of the Marine Corps .............................................................. 577 

Statement of: 

Neller, Lieutenant General Robert B., to be General and Commandant of 

the Marine Corps ................................................................................................. 580 

JULY 30, 2015

Nomination of Admiral John M. Richardson, USN, to be Chief of Naval 

Operations ............................................................................................................ 663 

Statements of: 

Richardson, Admiral John M. USN, Nominee to be Chief of Naval Operations 666 

NOVEMBER 19, 2015

Nominations of Mr. John Conger to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense, Comptroller; Mr. Stephen P. Welby to be Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Research and Engineering; Ms. Alissa M. Starzak to be 

General Counsel of the Department of the Army; and Mr. Franklin R. 

Parker to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs .................................................................................................................... 735

Statements of: 

Conger, Mr. John, to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller .................................................................................................................... 739

Welby, Mr. Stephen P., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research 

and Engineering ................................................................................................... 740 

Starzak, Ms. Alissa M., to be General Counsel of the Department of the 

Army ...................................................................................................................... 742 

Parker, Mr. Franklin R., to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower 

and Reserve Affairs .............................................................................................. 743 

DECEMBER 9, 2015

Nominations of Honorable Marcel J. Lettre II to be Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence; Mr. Gabriel O. Camarillo to be Assistant Secretary 

of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Mr. John E. Sparks 

to be a Judge on the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces; and Vice 

Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, USN to be Admiral and Commander, United States 

Southern Command ............................................................................................. 859 

Statements of: 

Lettre II, Honorable Marcel J., to be Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence ................................................................................................................... 863 

Camarillo, Mr. Gabriel O., to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs ........................................................................... 866 

Sparks, Mr. John E., to be a Judge on the Court of Appeals for the Armed 

Forces .................................................................................................................... 867 

Tidd, Vice Admiral Kurt W., USN, to be Admiral and Commander, United 

States Southern Command .................................................................................. 868 

DECEMBER 15, 2015

Nominations of Honorable Patrick J. Murphy to be Under Secretary of the 

Army; Dr. Janine Anne Davidson to be Under Secretary of the Navy; 

and Honorable Lisa S. Disbrow to be Under Secretary of the Air Force ........ 959 

Statements of: 

Disbrow, Honorable Lisa S., Nominee, Under Secretary of the Air Force .......... 962 

Davidson, Dr. Janine Anne, Nominee, Under Secretary of the Navy ................. 963 

Murphy, Honorable Patrick J., Nominee, Under Secretary of the Army ............ 965 

APPENDIX ............................................................................................................... 1105 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF HONORABLE ASHTON B. 

CARTER TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:28 a.m., in room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, 

Lee, Graham, Cruz, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, 

Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

Also present: Senator Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The committee meets this 

morning to consider the nomination of Dr. Ashton B. Carter to be 

the Secretary of Defense, and there are standard questions that by 

committee rule that I would put forth to Dr. Carter at this time. 

Dr. Carter, in order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communication of information. Have you adhered 

to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Dr. CARTER. I have. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

Dr. CARTER. No. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record in hearings? 

Dr. CARTER. I will. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 

and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Dr. CARTER. They will. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 

testify upon request before this committee? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. 

2 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult 

with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or 

denial in providing such documents? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. 

[Pause.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. That concludes our routine questions that we 

ask of the nominees. 

Before the committee proceeds to the business before us today, 

on behalf of all members of the committee, we would like to extend 

our deepest condolences to the family of the brave Jordanian pilot 

brutally murdered at the hands of ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant]. Together with his family, the Jordanian armed 

forces, and the people of Jordan, we mourn the loss of a hero that 

has galvanized the Nation and the world. 

I hope this heinous crime finally leads us to put in place what 

thus far has been lacking, a comprehensive strategy to achieve the 

President’s stated goal to degrade and destroy ISIL. Let there be 

no doubt, we still do not have a viable strategy to counter ISIL. If 

you are not winning in war, you are losing. 

America has no greater ally in the fight against terrorism than 

Jordan, and as we made clear to King Abdullah in our meeting yesterday. This committee’s immediate concern is to ensure Jordan 

has all the equipment and resources necessary to continue taking 

the fight directly to ISIL. Many of us on this committee will be 

sending a letter to the administration on this urgent issue of concern, and we invite all of our fellow committee members to join us 

on that letter. 

I think there was a consensus on both sides yesterday after the 

meeting with King Abdullah that we would send a letter out this 

morning. That letter will be distributed to the members for your 

perusal and signature so we can get that letter out as soon as possible, and I thank all members of the committee for their cooperation. 

I would also like to add that if legislation is required in order to 

achieve the goals that King Abdullah articulated to us yesterday as 

absolutely necessary to defend his nation, we will be considering 

that legislation as well as soon as possible, and I thank all members. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to consider 

the nomination of Dr. Ashton B. Carter to be Secretary of Defense. 

At the outset, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to 

Chuck Hagel for his years of service as an infantry sergeant in 

Vietnam, as a United States Senator from Nebraska, and as our 

Nation’s 24th Secretary of Defense. 

Chuck Hagel is a patriot and honorable public servant, and during his leadership of the Pentagon, the men and women of our 

armed services have had a true ally who always put their interests 

first. This committee wishes Chuck the best in his future endeavors. 

Dr. Carter, even in the best of times, the position for which you 

have been nominated is one of the most challenging in Government. I would like to thank your wife, Stephanie, and your chilVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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dren, Will and Ava, for being here today and for loaning you to our 

Nation in service once again. 

Dr. Carter is one of America’s most respected and experienced 

defense professionals. He has served as assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs; Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and most recently as Deputy Secretary of Defense. In these positions, I have known him and 

members of the committee have known him to be an honest, hardworking, and committed public servant. 

I have had the opportunity to work together with Dr. Carter on 

several issues of shared concern, especially trying to reform the defense acquisition system, improving financial management of the 

Department of Defense [DOD], and rolling back sequestration. On 

these and other issues facing the Nation, we all look forward to 

having you as our partner once more, Dr. Carter. 

But I must candidly express concern about the task that awaits 

you if confirmed and the influence you would have on some of the 

most critical national security issues facing our Nation. Two of 

your predecessors, Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary Leon Panetta, have severely criticized White House micromanagement of 

the Defense Department and over-centralization of foreign and defense policy. 

According to numerous news reports, Secretary Hagel experienced similar frustrations with the insular and indecisive White 

House national security team over issues ranging from ISIL to 

Ukraine, detention policy to sequestration. Dr. Carter, I sincerely 

hope the President who nominated you will empower you to lead 

and contribute to the fullest extent of your abilities because at a 

time of multiplying threats to our security, America needs a strong 

Secretary of Defense now more than ever. 

America is confronted today with a diverse and complex range of 

national security challenges. Iran is on the march. In Iraq, Syria, 

Yemen, and elsewhere across the Middle East, ISIL continues to 

expand its influence and control of territory, as the new Director 

of the Defense Intelligence Agency recently testified to Congress. 

A revisionist Russia and a rising China each, in their own ways, 

present challenges to the liberal international order as we have 

known it since the end of World War II, a system that cherishes 

the rule of law, maintains free markets and free trade, and relegates wars of aggression to their rightful place in the bloody past. 

Amid the present upheaval and conflict, American disengagement can only produce more turmoil and increase in the chance of 

large-scale American interventions at greater cost in blood and 

treasure. That is why we need a coherent national security strategy 

incorporating all elements of America’s national power to sustain 

and defend the international order that has produced and extended 

security, prosperity, and liberty across the globe. 

But crafting a reality-based national security strategy is simply 

impossible under the mindless mechanism of sequestration. Despite 

the growing array of complex threats to our security, we are on 

track to cut $1 trillion out of America’s defense budget by 2021. 

Readiness is falling across the Services, and morale is falling right 

along with it. 

4 

Army and Marine Corps end strength is dropping dangerously 

low. The Air Force is the oldest and smallest it has ever seen. The 

Navy’s fleet is shrinking to pre-World War I levels. Last week, each 

of our Service Chiefs testified before this committee that American 

lives are being put at risk due to sequestration. 

Sequestration represents a failure to meet our most basic constitutional responsibility to provide for the common defense. America’s military can no longer be held hostage to domestic political 

disputes, totally separated from the reality of the threats we face. 

More than 3 years after the passage of the Budget Control Act, 

it is time to put an end to this senseless policy. Rolling back sequestration is necessary to provide our military the strategy-driven 

budget necessary to confront the threats we face. But it will never 

be enough without reforming how the Department procures major 

weapon systems. 

Many of our military’s challenges today are the results of years 

of mistakes and wasted resources. For example, over here, the 

Army’s Future Combat System was initially estimated to be a $92 

billion project to modernize into a cohesive network new Army vehicles and radios. But it more than doubled its price to $200 billion 

without ever getting off the ground. 

Secretary Gates and Congress wisely canceled Future Combat Systems, but only after spending $20 billion with nothing to show 

for it. 

Between these four systems—Future Combat Systems, expeditionary fighting vehicle, Comanche helicopter, and the VH–71 presidential helicopter—we spent $40 billion with nothing to show for 

it. That is $40 billion of training and equipment our military 

doesn’t have today to confront the threats we face. 

The problem continues today. The cost of the evolved expendable launch vehicle has exploded from around $100 million per launch 

to $400 million per launch over the last 15 years after the Air 

Force allowed years of sole-source contracts while, especially over 

the last few months, actively keeping out any other companies from 

competing. Hopefully, this year, we will see the Air Force certify 

a new entrant, and this competition can finally bring down costs 

and end our reliance on Russian rocket engines. 

Like many programs that preceded it, LCS [the littoral combat 

ship’s] cost overruns followed predictably from a chronic lack of 

planning from its very outset in three key areas: undefined requirements, unrealistic initial cost estimates, and unreliable assessments of technological and integrated risk. 

The Gerald Ford-class nuclear aircraft carrier was originally supposed to cost $10.5 billion. It will now cost $12.9 billion, a $2.4 billion increase, and we have no assurance such increases will not 

plague the follow-on ships. This is unacceptable. 

The F–35 Joint Strike Fighter was originally estimated to cost 

around $220 billion to research and engineer and build 2,800 airplanes. Now we are going to spend more than $330 billion, a 50 

percent increase, to buy 400 fewer airplanes. 

Even more astounding than the amount of money squandered 

and wasted is the fact that in each of the weapon systems cases 

I have mentioned, no individual has been held responsible for these 

massive cost overruns and egregious acquisition failures, and the 

5 

result has been the slow degradation of America’s defense technological advantage, which we will lose altogether if we persist with 

business as usual in our acquisition policies. This must change. It 

will be a priority for this committee and for me personally to 

change it. 

Dr. Carter, I look to you as a partner in all of these endeavors. 

If confirmed, I hope you will provide independent leadership and 

work closely with Congress on the issues that matter most: crafting 

a coherent national security strategy to meet today’s threats, rolling back sequestration, continuing to reform the defense acquisition process, modernizing our military compensation system, and 

many others. 

I thank you deeply for your willingness to serve once again, and 

I look forward to your testimony today. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me join you in extending our condolences to the family of the 

brave Jordanian pilot and to the people of Jordan. 

Let me welcome Dr. Carter and thank him for his willingness to 

once again serve the Nation. 

I also want to welcome Stephanie and Ava and Will and thank 

them for their sacrifice and service to the Nation. 

Let me also recognize my colleague and friend, Joe Lieberman. 

Thank you, Senator, for being here today. 

Dr. Carter is the former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under 

Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. You are 

uniquely qualified to lead the Department of Defense at a time 

when, as Henry Kissinger said last week here, the United States 

has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the 

end of the second world war. 

If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, you will be advising the 

President, leading the Defense Department, and working with our 

allies on a staggering number of complex international challenges 

to our National interests. 

Iran. While the Secretary of Defense is not a party to the negotiations relating to Iran’s nuclear program, the Secretary will undoubtedly be responsible for any number of potential contingencies 

relating to the consequences of different outcomes of these negotiations. In the event of a breakdown in the negotiations, the consequences could alter the face of the region for generations and 

generations. 

ISIL. ISIL’s depraved and violent campaign in Iraq and Syria to 

establish an extremist caliphate threatens to erase borders, destabilize the region, and create a breeding ground for foreign fighters 

willing to return to the West to carry out attacks against United 

States interests. The Department must provide critical leadership 

in a coalition effort that includes Arab and Muslim states to degrade and defeat ISIL while being careful to ensure that the 

United States does not end up owning the conflict in Syria and 

elsewhere. 

Afghanistan. The hard-won gains of the past decade are significant but remain fragile. With Afghan security, the Afghan forces 

6 

are taking over responsibility for combating the Taliban and securing Afghanistan. However, United States forces, with our coalition 

partners, must transition to a more limited mission of training and 

assisting the Afghan forces and conducting counterterrorism operations. Yet it remains to be seen whether conditions on the ground 

in Afghanistan will improve sufficiently by the end of 2016 to warrant the pace of further reductions under the current plan. 

Ukraine. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine challenges order 

and progress in Europe. In the past few days, separatists in Eastern Ukraine with substantial Russian equipment, training, and 

leadership have abandoned any pretext of a ceasefire and launched 

a broad offensive against Ukrainian forces. The United States must 

determine how to best support the Ukrainian forces and people in 

defending their country. 

Cyber. For years now, we have devoted significant attention to 

the looming and complex challenge of cyber warfare. The attack on 

the Sony Corporation of America, however, was in important respects a watershed event that should stimulate fresh critical thinking. 

This attack demonstrates that a relatively small and weak rogue 

nation can reach across the ocean to cause extensive destruction of 

a U.S.-based economic target and very nearly succeed in suppression of freedom of expression through cyberspace. The real and 

manifest advantages of the offense over the defense in cyber warfare that enabled a militarily inferior nation to strike successfully 

against the Homeland is a new and worrisome factor for national 

security. 

These issues are only a few of the external challenges facing the 

Defense Department, but there are also significant internal challenges that must be addressed. 

Sequestration. Last week before this committee, General Mattis 

said, ‘‘No foe in the field can wreak such havoc on our security that 

mindless sequestration is achieving today.’’ General Odierno informed this committee that only one third of Army brigades are 

ready to fight. General Welsh testified that less than 50 percent of 

our combat squadrons are fully combat ready. 

Sequestration threatens not only our national security, but risks 

damage to our public safety, health, transportation, education, and 

the environment. While the Department manages through these 

difficult fiscal realities, Congress must find a balanced and bipartisan solution and repeal sequestration. 

Rising costs. The chairman has alluded to this very succinctly 

and very directly. Even without sequestration, the Defense Department would have to tackle rising costs, including personnel costs, 

which consume a third of the Defense Department’s budget. 

Yesterday, this committee heard the testimony of the Military 

Compensation and Retirement Committee. Their recommendations 

are far reaching and would fundamentally change military personnel benefits. But these recommendations must be carefully considered because changes must occur to ensure the Department can 

properly train and equip its fighting men and women. 

The other major cost driver in the Defense Department is acquisition, and while the Department has implemented significant acquisition reforms—many under your leadership—defense acquisiVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tion still takes too long and costs too much. We can and we should 

do more to streamline and improve the system. 

Finally, but most importantly, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, you will be leading 1.3 million Active Duty military, 820,000 

Reserve and Guard, and 773,000 civilians. They are tired and overtaxed from a decade of war and years of fiscal uncertainty. 

They are wrestling with the same issues as civilian society, 

issues like sexual assault and suicide. Yet they committed to protecting this Nation and remain the finest force in the world. 

Dr. Carter, I look forward to discussing these and other issues 

with you and thank you for your service. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

I note the presence of our beloved friend and former colleague, 

a member of this committee since the Coolidge administration, and 

we are very happy to have him here this morning, our beloved 

friend Joe Lieberman. 

Senator Lieberman? 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, FORMER 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and it was a great 

comfort to me when I arrived during the Coolidge administration 

to find that you had already been here several years. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I must say I am delighted to be here, and 

it is really somewhat sentimental for me to be here. I appreciate 

very much the opportunity. 

It is a privilege for me to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee today to introduce Dr. Ash Carter. This is not the 

first time I have had this privilege. In fact, it is the third time. 

The first was on March 26, 2009, when Ash was nominated to 

be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Second was on September 13, 2011, when he was nominated to be Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Today, I suppose I could say I don’t think I have ever been so 

pleased to be asked to repeat myself as I am honored to have been 

by Ash Carter to introduce him to you as President Obama’s nominee to be the 25th Secretary of Defense of the United States of 

America. 

Ash Carter graduated from Yale College summa cum laude with 

a unique combination of majors, physics and medieval history. During his time as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, he temporarily resolved the question, which was on everyone’s mind, I am sure, 

about whether he was primarily a historian or physicist. He earned 

a doctorate at Oxford in theoretical physics. 

Nevertheless, to confound observers and prognosticators, he went 

on to become the Chair of the International and Global Affairs faculty at Harvard at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and 

Co-Director of the Preventive Defense Project at the Kennedy 

School’s Belfer Center. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, it would really be hard to find 

someone to serve as Secretary of Defense who combines as much 

practical Pentagon experience with so deep a background in national security policy as Ash Carter. The fact that you have conVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
8 

vened this morning to consider his nomination means that the talents and abilities of a brilliant and extraordinary strategic thinker 

and public servant and administrator can again be put to use for 

our Nation. 

It also means, as you have said, that Ash Carter has again chosen, with the support of his wife and family, to answer the call to 

duty to serve our country. Over the past 30 years, Dr. Carter has 

worked directly or indirectly for virtually every Secretary of Defense, no matter the political party of the Secretary. He knows the 

department he has been asked to lead very well and, therefore, can 

begin leading it on day one. 

From 1993 to 1996, Ash served as the assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. During that time, he 

worked on the landmark Nunn-Lugar Arms Control Program, and 

I got to know him when we traveled together with Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and Senators Nunn and Lugar to the former Soviet 

Union to observe them destroying nuclear submarines and dismantling missiles and missile sites as part of Nunn-Lugar. 

I think we actually bonded personally at one dinner hosted by 

the high command of the Russian military in which I believe it is 

accurate to say that Ash and I were the only two members of the 

American delegation to keep up with the vodka toasts of friendship 

with our Russian colleagues. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN. When I think back to those days and you 

think of what is happening in Russia today and what Russia is 

doing outside its borders, those memories are really quite poignant. 

Too much has changed for the worse. 

But in thinking about introducing Ash today, he has done so 

much. It is important to note that he spearheaded some developments during that period of time, particularly the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, which, 

needless to say, have and continue to make our world a lot safer 

than it would otherwise be. 

Speaking of travel, Ash had the good judgment, Mr. Chairman, 

to come with us several times to the Munich Security Conference. 

I must say watching him there, I was impressed by the range and 

depth of his relationships with the top level of particularly military, but also foreign policy leaders of our European allies in NATO 

[the North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. 

I would say, and I would guess that members of the committee 

would agree, that Ash Carter’s most important contributions during his past Pentagon service have been in American lives saved 

on the battlefield. He was the driving force in providing 6,500 

MRAP [mine-resistant ambush protected] vehicles to our troops in 

Afghanistan in record time, an action that saved many lives and 

gave our troops the confidence that there was someone in Washington who was working for them. 

Ash Carter’s fierce dedication to our warfighters is well known 

and I think will be one of his greatest legacies. More broadly, the 

improvements he brought about in the Pentagon acquisitions process show his mastery of this complex and critical field and will 

make him an excellent partner for you, Mr. Chairman, in the conVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
9 

tinuing work that I know you, Senator Reed, and this committee 

want to do to improve defense procurement. 

Dr. Carter’s service on boards and commissions includes the Defense Science Board, the Defense Policy Board, the Secretary of 

State’s International Security Advisory Board, and the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. 

Ash Carter has been accurately described as a man for all seasons, a man of enormous talents and experiences. It is also true 

that he has made choices in his life about how he has used his talents and experiences. He has chosen to go where his intellect, his 

values, and his patriotism have called him. 

We are fortunate, indeed, that President Obama has nominated 

Dr. Carter to be our next Secretary of Defense. If I may say so, the 

President is fortunate that he will have so experienced a leader at 

the Pentagon and so wise an adviser in the inner counsels of this 

administration. All of which explains why I am so truly honored to 

introduce Ashton Carter to this great committee at this time. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator 

Lieberman. We are always glad to have you here, and if you would 

like to take a seat on the dais, we welcome it. 

Dr. Carter, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE ASHTON B. CARTER, NOMINEE 

TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, 

all the distinguished members of this committee. Thank you all. 

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you as President 

Obama’s nominee to be Secretary of Defense. 

I am honored by his trust and confidence and also by the prospect of serving once again the troops and the country that I love 

so much. 

If confirmed, I will take the office of Secretary of Defense after 

one of our Nation’s most honorable and conscientious public servants, Chuck Hagel. I worked for Secretary Hagel, and I have 

known him for decades, though not over all of the many decades 

he served our country. 

Among the many traits I admire in Secretary Hagel is the tireless care with which he carried out the most solemn duty of a Secretary of Defense, which is to the relatively few brave young men 

and women who defend the rest of us. 

I also thank Senator Lieberman for his warm and generous introduction—as he noted, it is not the first time he has done so—but 

especially for his service to this body and to the Nation over many 

years. Thank you, sir. 

My perfect wife, Stephanie, and wonderful children, Will and 

Ava, are behind me, as they always are every day, and I thank 

them. 

The President frequently notes that America has the greatest 

fighting force the world has ever known. To the men and women 

of the Department of Defense who make it so and to this committee, which watches over them, I pledge that if I am confirmed 

as Secretary of Defense to keep faith with the dedication that 

brought them into service, to ensure that their training and equipVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
10 

ment are as superb as they are; that the well-being, safety, and 

dignity of each of them and their families is fostered and respected; 

and that decisions about when and where they are sent into harm’s 

way are made with the greatest reflection and care. 

The principal reason that Stephanie and I made a U-turn in our 

life to accept the offer of nomination is our respect and devotion to 

them. 

To the chairman, members of the committee, I will be brief, if 

confirmed as Secretary of Defense, my responsibilities would be to 

protect America and its friends and allies in a turbulent and dangerous world. At the same time, I never lose sight of the fact the 

United States remains the strongest, most resilient, and most influential nation on earth. 

We do, indeed, have the finest fighting force the world has ever 

known. We have an innovative economy that has long set the pace 

for the rest of the world. Our country has friends and allies in 

every corner of the world, and our adversaries have few. This is 

clear testimony to the appeal of our values, our principles, and our 

leadership. 

All this makes me proud and hopeful and determined to grab 

hold of the bright opportunities in front of us, as well as to counter 

the very real dangers we face. These dangers, as the chairman has 

noted, include continuing turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa and the malignant and savage terrorism emanating from it; an 

ongoing war in Afghanistan; the reversion to old-style security 

thinking in parts of Europe; the longstanding tensions from the 

past and the rapid changes in Asia, and the continuing need for the 

stabilizing role of the United States in that region, which is so important to the future; the continuing imperative to counter the 

spread or use of weapons of mass destruction; and new dangers in 

new domains like cyber, as noted by Senator Reed. 

Strategy. Strategy needs to keep all these problems in perspective and to craft lasting approaches to each of them. 

I have promised President Obama that if I am confirmed I will 

furnish him my most candid strategic advice. In formulating that 

advice, I intend to confer widely among civilian and military leaders, including on this committee, experts, and foreign partners. 

When the President makes a decision, I will also ensure that the 

Department of Defense implements it with its long-admired excellence. 

I will also ensure that the President receives candid professional 

military advice. This is not only consonant with the law, as written 

in this very committee, but with good sense, since our military 

leaders possess wide and deep experience and expertise. 

The law also prescribes the chain of command, and if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will be a stickler for the chain of 

command. 

I would also like to say a word about the defense budget. Mr. 

Chairman, members of the committee, I very much hope that we 

can find a way together out of the wilderness of sequester. Sequester is risky to our defense. It introduces turbulence and uncertainty 

that are wasteful, and it conveys a misleadingly diminished picture 

of our power in the eyes of friends and foes alike. 

11 

I am not familiar with the details of the 2016 budget submitted 

just a couple days ago, and if confirmed, I will come back here for 

a full posture hearing to discuss them. But I strongly support the 

President’s request for relief from sequester caps in 2016 and 

through the Future Year Defense Plan. 

If confirmed, I will do my part to assist the President in working 

with Congress to resolve the overall issues of the country’s fiscal 

future, of which the defense budget is a part. But I cannot suggest 

support and stability for the defense budget without at the same 

time frankly noting that not every defense dollar is spent as well 

as it should be. 

The taxpayer cannot comprehend it, let alone support the defense 

budget, when they read, as the chairman has noted, of cost overruns, lack of accounting and accountability, needless overhead, and 

the like. This must stop. 

Every company, State, and city in the country has had to lean 

itself out in recent years, and it should be no different for the Pentagon. In this matter I know I am echoing Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and this committee, which has long called for and taken 

concrete action on reform of acquisition and other parts of the defense enterprise in the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 

2009 and, before that, dating back to the Packard Commission and 

the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

I began my own career in defense in connection with the implementation of the Packard Commission’s recommendations. The 

issues and solutions change over time, as technology and industry 

change. They extend from acquisition, which was highlighted by 

the chairman, in programs like Future Combat Systems and the 

presidential helicopter, which I canceled—I signed the cancellation 

orders for in 2009—to the Ford aircraft carrier, which Senator 

McCain also noted, which was not satisfactorily solved and still 

not, its overruns. I agree with the chairman in that regard. We 

have a lot of work to do. 

The issues and solutions for acquisition reform change over time, 

as technology and industry change, as I noted. They extend from 

acquisition—and this is important—to all other parts of the defense 

budget—force size, compensation, and training, as well as equipment. 

If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I pledge to make needed 

change in the Pentagon, but also to seek support from Congress because I know that in the end, Congress holds the power of the 

purse. I look forward to partnership with this committee in what 

can be a period of historic advance. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the committee, thank 

you. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to come before you. 

If confirmed, I will seek out your thoughts, perspectives, and combat experiences to help me do the best job. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Carter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HONORABLE ASHTON B. CARTER

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you as President Obama’s 

nominee to be Secretary of Defense. I am honored by his trust and confidence, and 

12 

also by the prospect of serving once again the troops and the country that I love 

so much. 

If confirmed, I will take the office of Secretary of Defense after one of our Nation’s 

most honorable and conscientious public servants, Chuck Hagel. I worked for Secretary Hagel and have known him for decades, though not over all of the many decades he has served our country. Among the many traits I admire in Secretary Hagel 

is the tireless care with which he carried out the most solemn duty of a Secretary 

of Defense, which is to the relatively few brave young men and women who defend 

the rest of us. 

I also thank Senator Lieberman for his warm and generous introduction—this is 

not the first time he has done so—and also for his service to this body and to the 

Nation. 

My perfect wife Stephanie and wonderful children Will and Ava are behind me, 

as they always are, every day. I thank them. 

The President frequently notes that America has the greatest fighting force the 

world has ever known. To the men and women of the Department of Defense who 

make it so, and to this committee which also watches over them: I pledge if I am 

confirmed as Secretary of Defense to keep faith with the dedication that brought 

them into service, to ensure that their training and equipment are as superb as they 

are, that the well-being, safety, and dignity of each of them and their families is 

fostered and respected, and that decisions about when and where they are sent into 

harm’s way are made with the greatest reflection and care. The principal reason 

that Stephanie and I made a U-turn in our life to accept the offer of nomination 

is our respect and devotion to them. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I will be brief. 

If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, my responsibilities would be to protect 

America and its friends and allies in a turbulent and dangerous world. At the same 

time, I never lose sight of the fact that the United States remains the strongest, 

most resilient, and most influential Nation on the face of the earth. We do indeed 

have the finest fighting force the world has ever known. We have an innovative 

economy that has long set the pace for the rest of the world. Our country has friends 

and allies in every corner of the world, and our adversaries have few: this is clear 

testimony to the appeal of our values, our principles, and our leadership. All this 

makes me proud and hopeful, and determined to grab hold of the bright opportunities in front of us as well as to counter the very real dangers we face. 

These dangers include continuing turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, 

and terrorism emanating from it; an ongoing war in Afghanistan; the reversion to 

old-style security thinking in parts of Europe; the longstanding tensions from the 

past and the rapid changes in Asia, and the continuing need for the stabilizing role 

of the United States in a region so important to the future; the continuing imperative to counter the spread or use of weapons of mass destruction; and new dangers 

in new domains like cyber. Strategy needs to keep all these problems in perspective 

and to craft lasting approaches to each of them. I have promised President Obama 

that if I am confirmed, I will furnish him my most candid strategic advice. In formulating that advice, I intend to confer widely among civilian and military leaders, experts and foreign partners. When the President makes a decision, I will also ensure 

that the Department of Defense implements it with its long-admired excellence. I 

will also ensure that the President receives candid professional military advice. This 

is not only consonant with the law as written in this very committee, but with good 

sense, since our military leaders possess wide and deep experience and expertise. 

The law also prescribes the chain of command, and if I am confirmed as Secretary 

of Defense I will be a stickler for the chain of command. 

I’d also like to say a word about the defense budget. Mr. Chairman and members 

of the committee: I very much hope that we can find a way together out of the wilderness of sequester. Sequester is risky to our defense, it introduces turbulence and 

uncertainty that are wasteful, and it conveys a misleadingly diminished picture of 

our power in the eyes of friends and foes alike. I am not familiar with the details 

of the fiscal year 2016 budget submitted a few days ago, and if confirmed I will 

come back here for a full posture hearing to discuss them. But I strongly support 

the President’s request for relief from the sequester caps in fiscal year 2016 and 

through the future year defense plan. If confirmed, I will do my part to assist the 

President in working with Congress to resolve the overall issues of the country’s fiscal future of which the defense budget is a part. 

But I cannot suggest support and stability for the defense budget without at the 

same time frankly noting that not every defense dollar is spent as well as it should 

be. The taxpayer cannot comprehend, let alone support the defense budget, when 

they read of cost overruns, lack of accounting and accountability, needless overhead, 

and the like. This must stop. Every company, State, and city in the country has had 

13 

to lean itself out in recent years, and it should be no different for the Pentagon. 

In this matter I am echoing Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and this committee 

which has long called for, and taken concrete action on, reform of acquisition and 

other parts of the defense enterprise, in the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform 

Act of 2009 and before that, dating back to the Packard Commission and GoldwaterNichols. I began my own career in defense in connection with the implementation 

of the Packard Commission’s recommendations. The issues and solutions change 

over time, as technology and industry change. They extend from acquisition to all 

the other parts of the defense budget—force size, compensation, and training as well 

as equipment. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I pledge to make needed change 

in the Pentagon, but also to seek support from Congress, because in the end I know 

that Congress holds the power of the purse. I look forward to partnership with this 

committee in what can be a period of historic advance. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, and members of the committee, thank you for giving 

me the opportunity to come before you. If confirmed, I will seek out your thoughts, 

perspectives, and combat experiences to help me do the best job. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter. 

We will have multiple rounds, but we will have short ones, 5 

minutes, because that will give more opportunity for members to 

ask questions. 

In about an hour, Dr. Carter needs a short break. As we all 

know, he is recovering from recent surgery. So we will take a break 

then for as long as you need, and we will go into this afternoon so 

that all members are able to ask sufficiently the questions that 

they have. 

To start with, Dr. Carter, members of this committee met with 

King Abdullah yesterday. He made a graphic statement about 

needing some weapons and the difficulties he is having with those, 

and we will be signing a letter this morning. As I said, it may require some legislation. 

But are you aware of the problems that Jordanians are having 

with acquiring some of the weapons that they need? 

Dr. CARTER. I am not, Mr. Chairman. I learned of them this 

morning as well. If I am confirmed, I definitely want to find out 

what they are and resolve them because we need partners on the 

ground to beat ISIL, and the Jordanian people have clearly reacted 

the way that encourages us to support them in combating what is 

really a savage and nasty enemy. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Last week, General Mattis was before this committee. He said in 

Afghanistan, we need to consider if we are asking the same outcome there as we saw last summer in Iraq, should we pull out all 

our troops on the administration’s proposed timeline, and the gains 

achieved at great cost against our enemy in Afghanistan are reversible. 

General Keane said all we accomplished in Afghanistan will be 

at risk as it was in Iraq if the troops are pulled out not based on 

the conditions on the ground. How can we not learn the obvious 

and painful lessons from Iraq? 

Do you have a position on the withdrawal from Iraq? Do you believe that it should be calendar based as it is now, or should we 

be looking at the conditions on the ground to base those decisions? 

Dr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you and also thank you for 

your consideration about the back. I appreciate that. 

The campaign in Afghanistan has been close to my heart for all 

the time that I have been associated with the Department of Defense. I have been there a number of times. I think that success 

14 

is possible there but, as you indicate, requires the United States to 

continue its campaign and finish the job. 

I understand we have a plan. The President has a plan. I support 

that plan. At the same time, it is a plan. If I am confirmed and 

I ascertain, as the years ago by, that we need to change that plan, 

I will recommend those changes to the President. 

Chairman MCCAIN. All I can say is it is not a matter of years. 

It is a matter of weeks, actually, because one of the major withdrawals is going to start this coming June. I hope that you will assess that as quickly and as carefully as possible. 

In his testimony to the committee this week, Dr. Kissinger said, 

‘‘In the Middle East, a multiple of evils are unfolding simultaneously. Iran has exploited this turmoil to pursue positions of 

power within other countries.’’ Do you agree with that? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes, I do. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you believe that we need to have a strategy to combat ISIL and the continued successes in many respects 

that they are achieving? 

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you believe we have a strategy at this 

time? 

Dr. CARTER. I believe I understand our strategy at this time, Mr. 

Chairman. I also have the intention, again if confirmed, to make 

it my first priority to go there, to talk to our leaders, military leaders there, to confer with you— 

Chairman MCCAIN. What do you understand the strategy to be? 

Dr. CARTER.—and to—I think the strategy connects ends and 

means, and our ends with respect to ISIL needs to be its lasting 

defeat. I say ‘‘lasting’’ because it is important that when they get 

defeated, they stay defeated. That is why it is important that we 

have those on the ground there who will ensure that they stay defeated once defeated. 

It is different on the two sides of the border. It is one enemy, but 

it is two different contexts. Mr. Chairman, in Iraq, the force that 

will keep them defeated is the Iraqi security forces. That is our 

strategy is to strengthen them and to make them that force. 

On the Syrian side, not to take too long about it, we are trying 

to build the force that will keep them defeated, and that is going 

to be a combination of moderate Syrian forces and regional forces. 

Chairman MCCAIN. It doesn’t sound like a strategy to me, but 

maybe we can flesh out your goals. It sounds like a series of goals 

to me. Do you believe we should be supplying arms, defensive arms 

to Ukrainians? 

Dr. CARTER. I very much incline in that direction, Mr. Chairman, 

because I think we need to support the Ukrainians in defending 

themselves. The nature of those arms I can’t say right now because 

I haven’t conferred with our military leaders or Ukrainian leaders. 

But I incline in the direction of providing them with arms, including, to get to what I am sure your question is, lethal arms. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter. 

Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

15 

One way to evolve a strategy is to first look at the threat. The 

Middle East, do you believe the most immediate threat there to 

United States interests and to the region is ISIL? 

Dr. CARTER. I hesitate to say ISIL only because in the back of 

my mind is Iran as well. I think that we have two immediate substantial dangers in the Middle East. One is ISIL, and one is Iran. 

Senator REED. In terms of our current military operations, they 

are clearly directed at ISIL. 

Dr. CARTER. That is true. 

Senator REED. Is that the appropriate response at this moment 

to the threats in the region? 

Dr. CARTER. It is. 

Senator REED. As you point out, there are two theaters. One is 

Iraq, where we have more traction, and the other is Syria. You 

would think in terms of responding to the threat that our actions 

or our vigorous support of the current Iraqi Government is appropriate in responding to this ISIL threat? 

Dr. CARTER. It is appropriate. As I said, whether and how to improve it will be my first job if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense. 

Senator REED. One of the issues, particularly with respect to 

Iraq, is that not only improvement, as you suggest in your comments, the long-term defeat of ISIL rests not just on military operations, but on political arrangements and what we have witnessed 

in Iraq particularly was a political arrangement that conscientiously and deliberately degraded the Sunni population, at least 

that is their perception, and gave rise. 

Would you acknowledge that part of our strategy has to be constituting an Iraqi Government that is perceived by its own people 

as being a bit fairer and inclusive? 

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely. That is what the previous Government 

of Iraq did not do, and that was instrumental in their military collapse. 

Senator REED. One of the issues that complicates—and you 

pointed out in terms of around being a strategic issue for the 

United States in the region is their relative influence in Iraq and 

throughout the region was enhanced over the last several years by 

the government in Iraq, by the Maliki Government. Is that accurate? 

Dr. CARTER. That is accurate, yes. 

Senator REED. We are now in a position of trying to essentially 

contain the regional ambitions of the Iranians and kinetically defeat the Sunni radical Islamists. Is that the strategy? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes, that sounds right. 

Senator REED. You understand that, and that, to you, is a coherent strategy? 

Dr. CARTER. It is, yes. 

Senator REED. Now that means that you are prioritizing or the 

Administration is prioritizing these actions you have talked about 

and building over time a capability in Syria. In terms of using your 

scarce resources in addressing the most serious threats, is that a 

coherent response in your mind? 

Dr. CARTER. I think it is the beginning of a strategic response. 

I think that, as I noted, on the Syrian side of the border, the asVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
16 

sembling of the force that is going to keep ISIL defeated there, we 

are in an early stage of trying to build that force. We are participating in the building of that force, but I think it is fair to say that 

we are in an earlier stage there. 

On the Iraqi side, we have the existing Iraqi security forces. 

Senator REED. Let me— 

Dr. CARTER. Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Please. 

Dr. CARTER. If I can just note one other thing? It may be something I missed in your line of questioning. 

There is an issue looming over this, which is the role of Iran, in 

the whole region, which is why I pointed that out at the beginning. 

That is a serious complication. 

Senator REED. I agree. Let me turn to the issue of Ukraine, 

which the chairman raised the issue of providing weapon systems 

to defend or allow the Ukrainians to defend themselves. But weapon systems have to be clearly differentiated from a commitment of 

American military personnel. Would that be a clear line of demarcation that you would draw? 

Dr. CARTER. Excuse me. I was suggesting the provision of equipment to the Ukrainian military, yes. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter, for your service. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Wicker? 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. 

Thank you for your testimony, Dr. Carter. I look forward to supporting your confirmation and look forward to working with you. 

At a point some 2 or 3 years ago, the Pentagon, along with the 

Administration, made a decision to rebalance to the Asia Pacific. I 

want to ask you about that. 

Would you agree that our challenges with regard to an expansionist Russian agenda, the situation in Eastern Europe, and other 

areas near the former Soviet Union have become more challenging, 

and that also our challenges in the Middle East are more problematic now than when the decision was made to pivot to the Asia Pacific? 

Dr. CARTER. You are absolutely right. The issues in the Middle 

East and in Ukraine have developed since we first formulated that 

rebalance. That is true. 

Senator WICKER. Tell me this, how do you understand, as a prospective Secretary of Defense, the rebalancing to the Asia Pacific 

will actually work? Can we afford to move resources from Europe 

and the Middle East to the Asia Pacific, given the circumstances 

that we see today in 2015? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you. Thank you for that question. 

The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, as the term goes, is in 

my eyes a commitment to continue the pivotal American military 

role in the Asia-Pacific theater, which has kept peace and stability 

there for decades now. 

It has been that American underwritten peace and stability in a 

region where there are still many historical animosities and 

unhealed wounds of the past, it is that stability underwritten by 

the United States that has allowed the Japanese miracle, then the 

17 

South Korean miracle, then the Southeast Asian miracle, and today 

the Chinese and Indian miracle. It is thanks to us that that environment has been created. 

In a sentence, I think the rebalance is a commitment to keep 

that going. Now you ask can we do that and keep our commitments 

in the Middle East and to Europe at the same time? My view is 

that we can and must. Let me say why that is possible. 

I think that while ISIL and events in Ukraine are terribly important in their own regard and require a lot of attention and take a 

lot of attention. They are on the television. They are in the headlines and so forth. The Asia Pacific is not. 

We have to remember that half the population of the world and 

half of its economy is in that region, and our military presence 

there, the naval presence, the air presence, our allies and partnerships finding new allies, building new partnerships, conducting exercises, those things can be done at the same time that we are 

doing what we need to do in Ukraine and that we are doing what 

we need to do in Iraq and Syria. I think the world needs to know 

the United States can do more than one thing at once and we can 

keep our commitments there. 

Senator WICKER. Is it going to be necessary to move resources 

from the Middle East and from concern over Europe and Russia to 

the Asia Pacific, to move resources? Sounds like you are proposing 

a continuation of longstanding, ongoing policy. 

Dr. CARTER. It is a longstanding, ongoing policy. But to keep the 

American military predominance in the Asia Pacific requires us 

continually to modernize and add to what we have there. We are 

adding ships. We are adding electronic warfare. That is, we are improving our forces qualitatively. We are investing in them. 

A new bomber, which is, importantly, intended for that theater, 

which I think is very important. We are buying new capabilities 

that won’t necessarily have a role in the Middle East or in NATO 

but are principally designed for that theater, and I think we need 

to keep those investments going. 

Senator WICKER. You don’t advocate a diminishment of the resources we are spending with regard to the Middle East or Russia 

and Europe at this point, do you? 

Dr. CARTER. No. I think we need to keep our investments going. 

When it comes to day-to-day deployments—I don’t want to get into 

too much detail here, but I am sure you know this. When it comes 

to day-to-day deployments and the location of ships and so forth, 

we do move back and forth between the Gulf and the Pacific, and 

so there is some tradeoff there on a day-to-day basis. 

But in terms of our fundamental investments in new capabilities 

and remaining ahead of any other military opponent, including in 

Asia, and in building and strengthening our alliances with Japan, 

with South Korea, with the Philippines, with Australia, with Thailand, and new partnerships with other countries like India, we 

need to keep all that going. It is an important part of the world. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly? 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you and your family. 

18 

I also want to thank Secretary Hagel for his service as Secretary 

of Defense and to our Nation. He took the point in Vietnam. He 

took the point for our Defense Department, and we are grateful for 

what he has done. 

I was privileged to travel with some other senators recently to 

the Middle East, and we talked to a number of the Nations there. 

I just want to make sure that in your mind, do you believe when 

we look at ISIL our goal should be to eliminate them on a permanent basis? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes, I do. 

Senator DONNELLY. One of my concerns is time. What I mean by 

that is when you look at the map of where they were a year ago, 

where they are now, they have substantially grown. 

We have windows that we are working in. When we look at our 

plan, I am concerned about how when you look at the depth and 

the size of our plan that what it really does, they have 30,000. We 

are talking hundreds. It gives them time to grow even more, and 

you worry about a tipping point where X crosses Y, and they become much more difficult. 

What kind of time plan are you looking at to get movement on 

this? 

Dr. CARTER. I think it is important to strike back at ISIL as we 

are doing from the air, but to begin to retake territory as soon as 

we can build the forces on the ground, which will be local forces 

that are capable of sustaining defeat when we have achieved defeat 

in a given location. 

I hope that in coming months, and again, I am not in a position 

to have any special information about this or talk to our commanders or so forth. But it is my understanding that in coming 

months, the Iraqi security forces, assisted by us, will begin to take 

back territory from ISIL. 

I think you are right that it is important to get that territory 

back soon because you don’t want them to settle in, and you don’t 

want the population to settle in to having ISIL to rule them in 

their barbaric way. 

Senator DONNELLY. When we talked to the king yesterday and 

to others in the region, what they said is we are not asking you 

to fight our battle, but we need you as a partner, shoulder to shoulder, to help us train, to help us plan, to help us implement. Is that 

what you see our ground role as? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes, I think exactly right. You are referring to the 

assistance we provide to the Jordanians, if I understand the question? Absolutely. 

Senator DONNELLY. Right. And to the other nations that are 

looking at the same thing. 

Dr. CARTER. That is right. 

Senator DONNELLY. Switching themes a little bit, one of the 

things we had testimony on yesterday was in regards to DOD and 

the VA [Department of Veterans Affairs] with drug formularies. We 

lost 479 young men and women to suicide in 2013 who were in the 

military. We lost 132 in combat. We don’t want to lose any more. 

Part of what General Chiarelli was telling us is that with the 

drug formularies, it causes dramatic change for those who are coming off and going into the VA. All of a sudden, they look up, they 

19 

are being forced on different drugs and stuff. As Secretary of Defense, are there things you can do to help us with that? 

Dr. CARTER. I think there definitely are and must be. I think the 

relationship between the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs has to be a relationship like this because 

it is one soldier. They cross the boundary from one to the other 

when they move and become a veteran, but it is one soldier. 

I am familiar, or that is I remember from years back when I was 

in the Department, of this question of the different formularies. 

DOD calls a drug one thing, and VA calls it another thing, and 

they have one set of dosages, and the other a different set. 

We have to get these together. It is one patient. It is one soldier. 

Senator DONNELLY. They get lost in the shuffle. 

Dr. CARTER. Exactly. 

Senator DONNELLY. It is at a most critical time to them personally, and so your absolute commitment to that, and I know it is, 

is going to be critical. 

I wanted to ask you one other thing, as I am starting to get a 

little short on time. That is your expertise in the nuclear area, and 

I was wondering if you are familiar with a report issued by 

Madelyn Creedon [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs] and Rear Admiral Peter J. Fanta [Joint Chiefs of 

Staff]? They did a Department-wide nuclear enterprise review. It is 

classified, but it is very sobering. 

I just want to make sure that—I didn’t know if you had seen it 

yet. If you have, will you take ownership of the issue and ensure 

its findings are addressed? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

I have not had access to that particular report. But with respect 

to the nuclear enterprise, I have a long history in that regard and 

am a strong believer in a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal 

for the United States. That encompasses both the nuclear weapons 

themselves and the delivery systems of the Department of Defense 

and the command and control systems for it. 

I can well understand if they are calling attention to the enduring need to make that a priority. That is another thing that is not 

in the newspapers every day. Thank God, nuclear weapons being 

used aren’t in the newspapers every day. But it is a bedrock of our 

security, and we can never forget that. 

Continuing quality and excellence in the nuclear enterprise is 

very important. I am committed to that. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank the chairman. 

I want to thank you, Dr. Carter, for all your service to the Nation 

and your willingness to serve again. 

I would like to ask you about according to the Director of National Intelligence [DNI], we know that at least 107 terrorists who 

were formerly detained at Guantanamo and then released have 

been confirmed of reengaging in terrorism. In fact, an additional 77 

are also suspected of that. In fact, we know that public reports tell 

us that at least two Guantanamo detainees have also joined ISIL. 

What I would like to ask you, number one, there were reports 

that Secretary Hagel said that he was under pressure to increase 

20 

the pace of transfers of Guantanamo detainees by the Administration. As you know, the statute says that you, as the incoming Secretary of Defense, will have to make the determination, and there 

is a whole set of factors. In particular, you have to determine that 

actions that have been or are planned to be taken will substantially 

mitigate the risk of such an individual engaging or reengaging in 

any terrorist or other hostile activity that threatens the United 

States or United States persons or our interests or I would assume 

our allies as well. 

I would ask you, Secretary Carter—soon to be Secretary Carter, 

thank you. But I would ask you to tell us and to make a commitment to this committee that you will not succumb to any pressure 

by this administration to increase the pace of transfers from Guantanamo. Will you commit to that? 

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. I would also ask you to commit to this committee that you will take with the utmost seriousness because we 

had General Mattis before the committee the other day, and he expressed deep concern over the notion that one of our men and 

women in uniform could confront a terrorist that we had previously 

captured and the implications to them, that you will commit to this 

committee and to all of us that you will not allow the release of 

someone that you think could reengage in terrorism so that our 

men and women in uniform will be confronted with them again. 

Dr. CARTER. I do, Senator. I understand my responsibilities 

under that statute, and as in everything else I do, I will play it absolutely straight. 

Senator AYOTTE. We appreciate that. That is very important because we have seen an accelerated release of detainees. As you 

know, there have been public reports about one of the Taliban Five 

reengaging in terrorist activity. This is something that I think is 

of utmost importance. 

The last thing that one of our men and women in uniform should 

confront is a terrorist that we had previously captured, and I know 

you agree with me on that. 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. I wanted to follow up on the aid to Ukraine, 

and I really appreciate the comments that you made that you are 

inclined to support lethal aid to Ukraine. When we met in my office, you had told me that you were actually there and involved in 

the signing of the Budapest memorandum in 1994. Is that right? 

Dr. CARTER. That is right. 

Senator AYOTTE. As you look at what is happening in Ukraine 

and having been there for the signing of that memorandum, what 

are the implications given that the Ukrainians gave up their nuclear weapons in return for the assurances not only from the 

United States of America, but Russia, who has clearly violated blatantly the Budapest memorandum, if we don’t support Ukraine, 

given that we do not want more nuclear proliferation around the 

world? I would assume that it would send the wrong message if 

you give up your nuclear weapons and we don’t provide you at least 

defensive weapons, why would any country give up their nuclear 

weapons again? 

21 

Could you tell me what you think about the violation of that 

memorandum and the significance of it? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

It is a clear violation. I was there. I remember when that agreement was signed in Budapest in 1994. As I think Senator Lieberman said, I ran the Nunn-Lugar program during that period, and 

I was in Ukraine the day the last nuclear weapon rode across the 

border from Ukraine into Russia. 

That agreement provided for Russia to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which it has obviously not done, and that was 

part of the climate and context in which the Ukrainians agreed to 

give up nuclear weapons in the first place. By the way, the United 

States took on a commitment in the very same agreement to respect, but also assure, as the phrase goes, the ability of Ukraine 

to find its own way as an independent country. 

That is at stake today, and that is why I think I think that we 

need to provide support to the Ukrainian government as they try 

to maintain a position—find their own way in Europe. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. My time is up, but I also think it 

is very important that we also buttress our NATO support for the 

Baltics as well in all of this. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Gillibrand? 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Dr. Carter. 

As we met prior to this testimony, we covered a few issues, and 

I am going to submit questions for the record since we won’t be 

able to cover all of them. They include military sexual assault, 

issues concerning combat integration, military compensation, cyber, 

Iran, and Syria. I will send those so you can answer them in due 

course. 

Specifically, let us focus a little bit on the military sexual assault 

issue, which you know I am very passionate about trying to solve 

this scourge. One of the concerns I have is that last year we had 

20,000 cases of sexual assault and unwanted sexual contact within 

the military, and I would like your view as to whether you believe 

that level of sexual assault today is still the good order and discipline we would want from our Services? 

Dr. CARTER. No, Senator. It is not. You used the word ‘‘passion’’. 

I have the same passion you do. This problem of sexual assault is 

something that persists in our military. It is widespread in our society, but it is particularly offensive in the military community because the military ethos is one of honor and trust. You have to 

trust the person who is, so to speak, in the foxhole next to you. 

These are violations of honor and trust. 

Also in military life, we put people in positions, we put them in 

situations of austere deployment, of a situation where the hierarchy of military life is a necessity in battle, and these also provide 

opportunities, this context, military context for predators. It is 

more offensive in military life even than in civilian life, and we 

have to root it out. 

I know that many members of this committee, but you especially, 

Senator, have led in that regard, and I am grateful for the 

22 

thoughts and, frankly, for keeping the heat on. If I am confirmed, 

I will feel that heat, and I will understand it and be with it. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. The one statistic I was particularly concerned about, the most recent report is that of all those who were 

willing to report the assault openly were retaliated against. Sixtytwo percent of those who reported these crimes were retaliated 

against, experienced some form of retaliation. 

I am highly concerned that the military is still failing in living 

up to their zero tolerance policy. Do you agree? 

Dr. CARTER. I do agree that retaliation is a dimension of the 

problem that, to me at least, is becoming increasingly apparent. 

This is a problem, if I may say, and you know this because you 

have worked so hard on it, but that the more we dig into it, the 

more dimensions of it we come to understand. 

I think the idea that victims are retaliated against not only by 

the hierarchy above them, but by their peers is something that is 

unacceptable that we have to combat also. The survey that you referred to indicated that that is widespread, and we need to get at 

that. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. I understand from your testimony that you 

place a premium on the chain of command, and I fully understand 

that for combat situations the chain of command is not only essential, but necessary in every respect. I would like you to, though, 

consider all options for how you can reform the military justice system, to actually professionalize it, make it more effective. 

When our allies have reformed their military justice system to 

guarantee more civil liberties and to professionalize it and to take 

out biases, they have not seen diminution in the ability to train 

troops, to instill good order and discipline within the troops, and 

to do their jobs. 

I would ask you that you would keep an open mind to look at 

all possible solutions for improving our criminal justice system 

within the military. 

Dr. CARTER. I will. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

Another concern that I have is in terms of the issue of how we 

can create opportunities for women in combat. One of the issues 

that I have looked at is how are each of the Services being able to 

open those positions, opening all positions to women in combat. Because, as you know, in order to become promoted within the military, oftentimes combat missions are required and having certain 

roles that require combat is required for promotion. 

Are you committed to allowing women to serve in all positions 

and to gender neutral standards for each of the Services? 

Dr. CARTER. I am certainly committed to gender neutral standards. What I do know is this, that the Services are examining 

whether there are any positions in the military that should not be 

open to women. 

I strongly incline toward opening them all to women, but I am 

also respectful of the circumstances and of professional military 

judgment in this regard. I have not been involved in those studies. 

If I am confirmed, I would want to confer with our own leaders in 

the Department of Defense, with you and others who have thought 

carefully about that problem, and try to come to a view. 

23 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst? 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Dr. Carter, for being here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Also, Senator Lieberman, thank you for joining us today. 

As we sat down in my office the other day, one thing that, hopefully, was very clear to you was my passion for the National Guard 

and the Army Reserves and all Reserve members, actually. We 

have spent a considerable amount of time talking in this forum 

about sequestration and the effects on our Services, not just our 

Active Duty Forces, but also those that serve as wonderful ‘‘weekend warriors’’. 

I would love for you to please address the panel and just talk to 

us and explain to us those impacts that you have seen regarding 

sequestration and how it has impacted those Reserve and National 

Guard forces, please. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. By the way, thank you for your 

own service. I appreciate it. 

I begin by saying we owe a great debt of gratitude to the Guard 

and Reserve for what they have done over the last 12–13 years. I 

know this from the time I was in the Department of Defense previously and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were at their peak. 

We couldn’t have sustained the tempo of combat in those two locations without the contributions of the Reserve component of our 

military. 

If there was ever a time when their value was made clear, it has 

been in the last 10 to 12 years. They are impacted, as every other 

part of the Defense Department is, by sequester. That is the terrible thing about sequester. It hits everybody, and it hits them 

hard, and it hits them soon, which means that we don’t have time 

to adjust. 

I think the Guard and Reserve component have borne the impact 

of sequester as all the rest of the departments have, sad to say. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you for that. I appreciate that. 

If confirmed, we do have a number of rising threats that we see 

all around the world and specifically in the Middle East right now. 

Considering those threats, with many new possible deployments 

coming up, then, if confirmed, how do we ensure that our Guard 

and Reserve units then maintain their ability to reinforce our Active Duty component as effectively as they have in the past dozen 

years? How do we ensure that they are being supported? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you for that, and that is the key issue, as you 

well know. 

I think that the Reserve component forces need to be as prepared 

to go into action, if they are called to go into action, as any Active 

Duty element. You never want to send anybody into harm’s way on 

behalf of the United States who hasn’t had the training and isn’t 

fully prepared and isn’t adequately equipped to do the job. 

I think it is important that the Guard and Reserve are at a state 

of readiness that is commensurate with the need we have for them. 

One other thing I will add is that they also, not incidentally at all, 

very importantly, play a role in responding to disasters in our own 

24 

country. That is another important and, by the way, also amply 

demonstrated in recent years attribute of having them. 

Both for defensive or to civil authorities and for deployment in 

a national security emergency, they need to be fully ready when we 

need them. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you much, Dr. Carter. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin? 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Carter, thank you so much for, first of all, all the service you 

have given. Having such an esteemed senator introducing you, that 

shows your intelligence there. Next of all, willing to serve at this 

most difficult time. I appreciate all of that because I know how difficult it is. 

We had an unusual day yesterday, and we got to speak to King 

Abdullah. Without revealing too much about it, I am sure that you 

have been briefed on that. But the bottom line was this. We are 

all concerned, I think, and our chairman has taken the lead on 

this, how we are going to accelerate what we do and what we think 

in this committee of quick we can get necessary military equipment 

to the people willing to fight, and the Jordanians are willing to 

fight. 

About the red tape, I just couldn’t believe what I heard yesterday, all the red tape that they have to go through to get something 

on the front lines to help them defend themselves. I didn’t hear so 

much they need our combat troops. They need our expertise and 

our people in the right places to make sure we are efficient. 

They just need the weapons to do the job. Do you have thoughts 

on that or how you can help us on that and break through this 

gridlock? 

Dr. CARTER. I do. I don’t know what you heard, but I could well 

believe what you heard because I have a long experience of frustration with getting equipment to the warfighter—our warfighters, 

never mind partner warfighters—on time. This is an element that 

is important when we talk about acquisition reform. The cost control is very important, but also getting things done. 

When I was working on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it 

was, even for Americans, assistance to our own forces way too 

much red tape stood in the way. You had to constantly try to cut 

through that. 

I guess in the context of the Jordanian circumstance, which I am 

not familiar with. I am sure you know more about it on the committee than I would as a nominee, but I do read the newspapers, 

and I understand the need. I can well believe that it is slower than 

King Abdullah finds acceptable and that you and I would find acceptable. 

I guess all I can say is if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense, 

this is one I am pretty familiar with, and I would work to get those 

things out there the way we did MRAPs. 

Senator MANCHIN. It seems like the greatest challenge is coming 

out of the State Department, and we are going to help them work 

on that, I think. The chairman is committed to that, and the ranking member and all of us are on the same page. This is not a parVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tisan thing. This is basically an American thing we want to get 

done. 

If I can go to that, basically, in the auditing, I am very concerned 

about the cost of our military and if it is being spent efficiently. 

There is not a person in West Virginia, not a person in the country 

that won’t sacrifice for a person in uniform. Not one. 

They will give up something. They will pay more taxes. They will 

do whatever you ask them. But we have to make sure we are 

spending it wisely, and I think that our chairman has been very 

diligent on this for many, many years. I am concerned. 

I am also concerned, we don’t touch on this, is the size of the 

staff. If you look at the size of the staff and how they double and 

quadruple, and every time we get a new change, the staff, and we 

don’t talk about that. We just talk about our readiness and having 

people be able to perform. But no one is checking the staff sizes, 

and I am told from people on top, they don’t need these sizes. But 

no one can get rid of them. 

Put them back where they are needed. Also using our Guard and 

Reserves, but the staff size, that is something you will have oversight on? 

Dr. CARTER. It absolutely will. I agree with you. We need acquisition reform, but we need to reform lots of other things, too. Overhead, headquarters staffs, lots of parts of the Department, for just 

the reason you say. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me tell you why the audit is so important 

and why I am so committed to having an audit of the Defense Department. I think we can help you help yourself of the institution. 

The reason I say that is there is a lot of things that you are 

doing that sometimes you don’t ask for, you don’t want. There is 

equipment being sent your way. There are things being produced 

in different parts of the country just because of who we are, and 

we want to make sure that our people are getting the jobs. 

I agree to that, but I can tell you if there is something we are 

building in West Virginia you don’t need, I will be the first to go 

and tell them we are going to find something else to do. Because 

we are not going to force you to buy something you don’t need or 

don’t want. I think we all have to bite the bullet there, but we have 

to look at this, and we won’t know unless we have an audit. 

I would hope that you are committed to helping us get that audit 

and a complete transparency of what is going on. Also the contractors, I have been here 4 years, and I cannot get an accurate count 

of how many contractors that we have and what branches. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you. 

I am committed on the audit front. I understand what you are 

saying about contractors and agree with that as well, and I appreciate what you say about us working together to make sure that 

we buy what we need and that we buy it well. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. We will have Senator Sullivan, and then we 

will take a break after that. How long do you need? 

Dr. CARTER. Ten, 15 minutes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Fifteen minutes, and then after that, the 

next questioners would be Senator Heinrich and then Senator 

Fischer, and then Senator Shaheen would be in line for the next 

26 

questioners after a 15-minute break. The committee will stand in 

recess for 15 minutes after Senator Sullivan is finished with his 

questions. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Carter, I want to thank you for your service and particularly, 

and you point out, your family, your wife and kids. I know how 

much they go through in these hearings. Sometimes it is tougher 

on them than it is on the nominee. I want to thank them as well. 

I wanted to start with just a little history and geography. In 

1935, General Billy Mitchell, often referred to as the father of the 

Air Force, was testifying in front of Congress. He said that, ‘‘I believe that in the future, whoever holds blank—this place—will hold 

the world. It is the most important strategic place in the world. It 

is the most central place in the world for aircraft, and that is true 

either of Europe, Asia, or North America.’’ 

Do you know what place General Mitchell was referring to in his 

testimony in 1935? 

Dr. CARTER. I think, Senator, it was Alaska. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Correct. It was Alaska. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SULLIVAN. Do you agree with General Mitchell? 

Dr. CARTER. I do. I would point out that one proof of what he 

said, I suppose, is that your State is home to one of our principal 

missile defense batteries, and the reason for that is that it is kind 

of on the way to and from a lot of bad places. 

Senator SULLIVAN. I look forward to hosting you in Alaska soon 

to show you why General Mitchell was correct. But I want to get 

actually to, if confirmed— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Excuse me. Senator Reed says maybe that is 

why he was court-martialed. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SULLIVAN. I think he may have had a drinking problem, 

but I am not sure. His strategic assessment was still very correct. 

A tough part of your job is as a member of the President’s Cabinet. It is also a critically important part of the job, if confirmed, 

is leveling with this committee. You are showing your kind of 

straightforward approach, which I think is great, but also with the 

American people. I think we all recognize there are challenges, but 

in some ways when the President is talking to the American people, his views seem to differ. 

Let me give you a few examples. In his State of the Union, he 

painted a what I would consider a benign, almost delusional view 

of the world environment, with quotes like ‘‘The shadow of crisis 

is past.’’ ‘‘We are stopping ISIL’s advance.’’ ‘‘We are opposing Russian aggression.’’ ‘‘We have halted the progress of Iran’s nuclear 

program.’’ These are all quotes from the President to the American 

people. 

Do you agree with his assessment in these areas? 

Dr. CARTER. I think that if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I am going to be confronting some of the most challenging 

problems that we have had in our national security in a very long 

time. My intention and my obligation will be to help our President 

and help our country confront those problems and provide the advice to the President that will help him deal with, though we have 

27 

many efforts and many successes because we are in the 

indispensible Nation in this world, we have many challenges. 

I think my role for him, if confirmed, is to help him work through 

these challenges. 

Senator SULLIVAN. But again, just in terms of straightforward 

approach, you have been watching the international environment. 

Do you agree with what the President was saying and telling the 

American people? 

I think it is critical that he level, that you level, the Administration levels with the American people on our challenges. I will give 

you another example. He is talking about ending combat operations 

in Afghanistan, and yet we are going to maintain a robust CT 

[countererrorism] presence, which I think is important. 

But a robust CT presence is not ending combat operations. Do 

you agree with what the President was saying in his State of the 

Union on some of these specific quotes that I mentioned? 

Dr. CARTER. I certainly agree with the President’s overall thrust 

and—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. That we have a benign world environment 

right now? 

Dr. CARTER. I would say the world continues to pose serious challenges to international order and that the United States is 

indispensible to the solution of those challenges is what I would 

say. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me ask one final question. In the hearings 

the last 3 weeks that the chairman has had, which have been, I 

think, a great education for all of us, again, for the American people. I think there was consensus that we certainly need to work on 

all instruments of American power to integrate those as part of a 

national strategy to address what I think are significant challenges 

that the President has not laid out. 

One of these instruments that we didn’t have 10 years ago, but 

there was common agreement on is energy and being once again 

the world’s energy superpower in terms of producing oil and gas 

and renewables. Last week, the President took over 20 million 

acres of some of the most prospective lands in America for oil and 

gas development off the table. 

Do you agree that having energy and using that to help our national security is important? Would you agree that taking such 

huge areas of land off the table, billions, potentially billions of barrels of oil, trillions of cubic feet of natural gas, do you think that 

helps or undermines America’s national security? 

Dr. CARTER. I certainly think energy security is an important 

part of national security, and I am incredibly encouraged by the 

progress that the United States has made in developing new resources, both oil and gas in recent years. I think it is showing up 

in terms of our economy, and also it is showing up geopolitically. 

With respect to the particular issue you raise, Senator, I am simply not knowledgeable about it and can’t give you a knowledgeable 

answer. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay. I think those kind of actions undermine 

our national security significantly. 

Dr. CARTER. I understand. 

28 

Chairman MCCAIN. The committee will stand in recess for 15 

minutes and then reconvene. The next questioners will be Senator 

Heinrich, Senator Fischer, and Senator Shaheen. 

[Whereupon, at 10:57 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene 

at 11:19 a.m., the same day.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. The committee will reconvene, and we will 

recognize Senator Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome back, Dr. Carter. It has certainly been a pleasure to 

work with you, and I just want to say it is really refreshing to work 

with someone in this potential position who has both your technical 

background and your ability to work with people across the Services and with Congress. You seem to balance those things remarkably well, speaking as an engineer who struggles with that myself 

sometimes. 

If I remember right, I believe you served as staff director for the 

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the U.S. 

that released its report back in 2009, when I was sitting on the 

House Armed Services Committee. I think that report made some 

very important strategic recommendations. 

In particular, I thought the idea that Los Alamos, Livermore, 

Sandia, should be designated as national security rather than nuclear weapons laboratories was a very important recognition of how 

the threat environment that we face in the world today has 

changed. 

In addition, one of the things the commission recommended was 

that the President issue an executive order formally assigning the 

Secretaries of Defense and Energy, State, Homeland Security, and 

the DNI joint responsibility for the health of these laboratories, 

and you and I discussed this a little bit when we met in my office 

recently. 

I wanted to ask you, based on a recommendation from the Strategic Posture Commission, what sort of joint responsibility do you 

believe that the Department of Defense should have for our National labs? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

I recall our conversation, and you are right. I was executive director of the so-called Perry Schlesinger Commission, which did 

make the recommendation you pointed to. 

The National Laboratories, the so-called National Laboratories of 

the Department of Energy actually are national laboratories. I 

know this because when I worked in the Department of Defense as 

acquisition executive, we used them a lot. We asked them to do 

things because of their technical excellence. 

Those laboratories that were founded to serve the nuclear arsenal of the United States and continue to do so now do lots of other 

things for national security—for the Department of Defense, for the 

Intelligence Community, for the law enforcement community, the 

Homeland security community. I think they call it ‘‘work for others’’. 

Senator HEINRICH. Exactly. 

Dr. CARTER. Which means other than the Department of Energy. 

But it is important, and it was certainly valuable to the DepartVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
29 

ment of Defense when I was there to be able to get that kind of 

technical excellence. 

Senator HEINRICH. I think one of the challenges has been that 

originally work for others didn’t really exist at the National Labs. 

They were solely nuclear enterprises. As that has become a larger 

and larger percentage of what they do, it has been more challenging to sort of feed the underlying foundational aspects of the 

lab, the overhead and other things. 

What I would hope is that if you are confirmed, and I certainly 

hope that you are, that I can count being able to work with you 

to figure out if there is not a way we can formalize that responsibility for the health of DOD and the other agencies I mentioned, 

as well as for the long-term health of those national security laboratories? 

Dr. CARTER. I understand. If I am confirmed, I look forward to 

working with you on exactly that. I understand. 

Senator HEINRICH. I want to move back to Ukraine for a minute, 

and we heard earlier about the issue of providing additional defensive military equipment to the Ukrainians. We have also heard a 

lot of testimony in recent weeks emphasizing the importance of deterring additional Russian aggression in the Baltics—in Estonia, 

Latvia, and Lithuania—particularly by continuing to position more 

NATO troops and equipment in those places. 

I just wanted to get your sense for are we doing enough in that 

region to deter additional Russian aggression in the Baltics? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you. 

I think it is very important that we do deter Russian aggression 

in the Baltics. The Baltic states are part of NATO, after all. It is 

a pretty big deal. 

But to answer your specific question, are we doing enough? I am 

familiar with what we are doing. I have not been in a position to 

discuss it with our commanders there or any of the European leaders and so forth. That is something that I would, if I were confirmed, be a very early priority to see whether we are, in fact, 

doing enough. 

I know we are doing things. We are rotating forces in there to 

serve as a warning and a tripwire that NATO really is there, and 

I certainly support doing that. But everything we are doing I am 

probably not aware of, and what more we can do I have not investigated, but I promise if I am confirmed, I would. It is very important. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cotton? 

Senator COTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Carter, thank you for being here today. Thank you for your 

service to our country. 

Yesterday, we saw the Islamic State burn alive the pilot of one 

of our key allies. In recent months, they have buried women and 

children alive. They have crucified Christians. They have beheaded 

Americans and citizens of our allies. 

The leaders of the Islamic State, the ones who direct and in some 

cases commit these atrocities, have critical knowledge that we need 

to stop them. They know where hostages are being held. They have 

information that would allow us to go after the Islamic State’s fiVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
30 

nancial support. They know where other senior leaders are. In 

short, they have a lot of intelligence value. 

If American forces were to capture one of these leaders, say, Abu 

Bakr al-Baghdadi, or one of his senior lieutenants, would you recommend that the President send him to Guantanamo Bay so he 

could be fully interrogated for intelligence value? 

Dr. CARTER. I would certainly recommend that he be interrogated for his full intelligence value. It would be a legal determination about where he ended up and so forth. But I think it is important that we get that intelligence value if we do capture people like 

al-Baghdadi. 

Senator COTTON. Would you recommend that he stay in American custody or that he be transferred to the custody of an ally? 

Dr. CARTER. As I sit here right now, I don’t know enough to answer that question. That would be a legal determination about his 

ultimate disposition. I think the key from a Secretary of Defense’s 

point of view, prospective Secretary of Defense’s point of view 

would be let us get that intelligence. 

Senator COTTON. Would you want to see him transferred into the 

United States mainland, given his Miranda rights or otherwise put 

in an Article III Federal court? 

Dr. CARTER. Again, I don’t know enough to know what the ultimate disposition would be appropriate. I do know that it would be 

important to interrogate that individual. Whatever the ultimate 

disposition or legal process was, it should make provision for interrogation. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

I want to move to the recommendations of the National Defense 

Panel [NDP] for the overall military budget. The National Defense 

Panel, as you know, is a bipartisan and congressionally mandated 

panel that reviewed the 2014 QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review]. 

That panel stated, ‘‘Congress and the President should repeal the 

Budget Control Act immediately and return as soon as possible to 

at least the funding baseline proposed in Bob Gates’ FY [fiscal 

year] 2012 defense budget.’’ The panel went on to note that while 

even that amount would likely be inadequate, it represents ‘‘the 

minimum required to reverse course and set the military on a more 

stable footing’’. 

Do you concur with the National Defense Panel’s recommendation that Bob Gates’ fiscal year 2012 recommendation for the coming fiscal year is the minimum funding baseline needed for the Department of Defense? 

Dr. CARTER. The 2012 baseline, just to make sure I understand 

correctly, would have removed $500 billion from the defense plan 

at that time. A sequester would have removed twice that. 

I don’t know what the National Defense Panel said, but I would 

say that if what they were saying was that the sequester level was 

unacceptable and that the level that Secretary Gates recommended 

was the one that they supported, I actually supported that, too, 

and continue to think that sequester is a bad idea. 

I am familiar with the results of the National Defense Panel and 

its membership, which is very distinguished. 

Senator COTTON. To be exact, Secretary Gates’ fiscal year 2012 

budget said in fiscal year 2016, the budget should be $610 billion. 

31 

At sequester levels, it would be just under $500 billion. I believe 

the President recommended approximately $535 billion. This would 

be another $70 billion plus that the defense panel recommends for 

the coming year. 

Dr. CARTER. I see what you are saying. Yes. That is absolutely 

right, and I think the Defense Department budget has been under 

pressure now for the last 3 or 4 years in a way that I experienced 

the effects of firsthand, and they are damaging. That is one of the 

reasons why I want to get back on track to getting enough money 

for defense by getting rid of sequester. 

Senator COTTON. While $535 billion or some congressional num- ber in that neighborhood might be better than $500 billion, you 

think $610 billion, as recommended by that panel, is the minimum 

necessary to put our military back on the right course? 

Dr. CARTER. I wouldn’t say it is the minimum necessary to get 

us back on the right course. We are obviously not going to get that 

amount of funding. But I can tell you that the Department of Defense can make good use of the funding the President has requested. 

I will say one other thing. If I am Secretary of Defense, I would 

like to see more spending on defense. I am very open about that. 

I want to get rid of sequester, and I would like to see us spend 

more on defense. 

I think that—and this may have been what the NDP was getting 

at, we are having to accept risk in the execution of our strategy as 

a result of our funding problems which I would rather see us not 

accept. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Dr. Carter, for your past service to this country and 

for your willingness to continue to serve. 

I want to talk a little bit about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I remember being at the Kennedy School when you gave a 

very compelling presentation that showed retiring or dismantling 

some of the weapons through the Nunn-Lugar program. I continue 

to believe that this is one of the most serious dangers we face, both 

in the United States and in the world, particularly with terrorists 

like the Islamic State who seem to be willing to do anything to 

achieve their ends. 

I wonder if you could talk a little bit about how to balance the 

need to address nuclear weapons and material that is still out 

there with the effort of DOD to modernize our weapon systems and 

where you see the priorities are and what we need to do to address 

that? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

I think we need to do both and can do more in the way of securing fissile materials and the other wherewithal of nuclear weapons 

and also biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction 

around the world. I also believe that the United States needs a 

safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. 

Because as much as we would like to see nuclear weapons and 

other weapons of mass destruction rid from the earth, that doesn’t 

look like it is something that is going to happen soon. It is imporVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tant that the American deterrent that we provide to our own country but also to friends and allies who rely upon them is safe, secure, and reliable. I think we need to do both and can do both. 

Senator SHAHEEN. You wrote an article last year for Foreign Affairs, entitled ‘‘Running the Pentagon Right: How to Get the Troops 

What They Need,’’ and you talked about two lessons from Iraq and 

Afghanistan. First, that the Pentagon was not prepared to fight a 

nontraditional enemy and, second, that the length of those wars 

was underestimated, and there was little incentive to pursue acquisitions tailored to the specific fights. 

Can you talk about how, as Secretary of Defense, you would 

avoid repeating those mistakes of the past two wars? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes, thank you, and this is something that I have 

a lot of passion about, which is why I wrote that. The experience 

that I had all too often in trying to support Iraq and Afghanistan 

as the acquisition executive was that when the troops said they 

needed something, the response of the bureaucracy tended to be, 

‘‘Oh, we have one of those. We are making one of those. We have 

one in progress. It will be finished in 10 years.’’ 

Incredibly, that is, in essence, the response that would come back 

from the bureaucracy. We all recognize immediately that that is 

nonsensical because they needed that equipment, counter-IED [improvised explosive device] equipment, vehicles. They needed it now, 

not 10 and 15 years from now. 

Our acquisition system got in the habit, and I think the chairman was referring to this earlier because it is a driver of cost, but 

also this problem, got in the habit during the Cold War of doing 

things very slowly. With the Soviet Union, we always had plenty 

of time. There was the Soviet Union. It was the Cold War. It would 

go on for a long time. 

We would have programs that extended over 10 and 15 years. 

You can’t do that when you are in the middle of a war, and people 

are dying and success depends upon your acting more quickly. I obviously feel passionately about that. I think anybody who observed 

that bureaucratic tendency would have the same attitude I did, and 

we have to turn faster as a military. 

It is one thing when you are in war, when you are in competition 

with other countries that are using the global technology base to 

advance their own military. If we are going to continue to be the 

best military in the world, we can’t make steps in 15-year increments. We have to turn faster than that. I think that is the larger 

meaning, and the meaning going forward, the lesson, to use your 

word, of that experience. 

Senator SHAHEEN. My time is almost over. But you and others 

here today have talked about the importance of procurement reform. I assume that that will be a top priority when you go back 

to the Department, as it has been in the past? 

Dr. CARTER. It would. If I am confirmed, absolutely. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

33 

Dr. Carter, I apologize for not having been here, and I don’t want 

to ask something that has been asked over and over again. We 

have a conflicting meeting that is taking place right now. 

Everyone who has appeared before this committee has talked 

about the mismatch that is out there, unprecedented mismatch, 

and I am talking about all the Service Chiefs. I am talking about 

the old-timers. You know, as you know, we had George Shultz, 

Henry Kissinger, and Madeleine Albright. All of them searched 

their memories and could not find a time in our history when we 

had the level of threats that we are faced with today and the limited resources we have. 

That is the mismatch that they are talking about with the things 

all over the world I mean that are taking place right now. Do you 

agree with that? 

Let me restate that. In the years that you have had such a variety of experience, do you ever remember a time like this? 

Dr. CARTER. I think we are in a time where the number and severity of the risks is not something I have seen before in my life. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Even the President, after what happened 

yesterday, I am sure, is not talking about junior varsity anymore. 

We know that we have a really serious problem with ISIL. We 

have been talking about the fact that they are building a militia, 

and we now have seen the brutality and what they are capable of. 

I would like to have a stronger response from the President when 

the disaster took place yesterday. I fail to see a strategy in terms 

of dealing with ISIL, with that force that is over there. Do you see 

a strategy, and where will you be on this? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you. 

I can describe what I believe to be the strategy, and just to revert 

to what you said at the beginning, when I started my career in defense, it was a simpler world. There was one big problem, which 

was the Cold War and nuclear disaster. 

Senator INHOFE. Those were the good old days. 

Dr. CARTER. To get to your point, I assume that this is what your 

other witnesses were saying, it is a much more complicated world, 

much more many faceted and many more problems and issues for 

the United States to take on. At the same time, I believe we are 

up to it and that we are capable of surmounting all these problems. 

With respect to the strategy for ISIL, I would describe it in the 

following way. Strategy is about connecting ends and means, and 

the end here is the defeat of ISIL and the sustained or lasting defeat of ISIL. To achieve that lasting defeat of ISIL, we are trying 

to rebuild the morale and power of the Iraqi military and the confidence of its government in a multi-sectarian approach so that we 

don’t revisit the Maliki experience, which led to the disintegration 

of the Iraqi security forces. 

On that side of the border, the lasting defeat will be made lasting 

by an Iraqi security forces and associated forces in Iraq that are 

rebuilt. 

One enemy, two locations. To get to the other location, Syria, I 

believe the approach there similarly needs to be to inflict a lasting 

defeat. In order to do that, we need a partner, and we are trying 

to build that partner in terms of a moderate Syrian force and local 

forces from the region that can, with our air power and other kinds 

34 

of assistance, inflict defeat on ISIL and then make it a lasting defeat. 

That is how I would characterize what I see. I am obviously not 

in the counsels of Government, but that is what I infer. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, and I appreciate that very much. Dr. Carter, when you were in my office, we talked about having just returned from Ukraine and also Lithuania. When I first walked in, 

Senator Heinrich was talking about Lithuania, Estonia, and that 

area. Their concern was that all of our attention seemed to be in 

that part of the world, concentrated on Ukraine. 

It is true. I happened to be there when they had their election. 

For the first time in 96 years, they don’t have a Communist in 

their parliament in Ukraine. We have that problem at the same 

time as the others you are addressing, and what do you think 

about our European strength as it is right now? 

Are we adequate? Are we becoming inadequate? 

Dr. CARTER. I think that our strength in Europe is our alliance 

with NATO and the political solidarity that that represents, which 

is very important when it comes to the Baltic states, and also the 

response in Ukraine, which, while not a NATO nation, is certainly 

a European nation, and European unity is an important part of 

that. So one of our strengths is that. 

Another strength, of course, is our military strength. There I understand that we are adding forces, rotational forces to the Baltic 

states as a presence there, as a deterrent to any Russian kind of 

adventurism on the part of Russia in those states. I certainly support that, and if I am confirmed, I would want to look into what 

more we can do to do that. 

I would also say I wish the European states—and many Secretary of Defenses have said this over the years—were investing 

more in their own defense. 

Senator INHOFE. Lastly, I am out of time, but for the record, if 

you would submit this for the record to me. In the event we are 

able to get the perpetrator of the horrible crime that took place, 

would you examine the expeditionary legal complex that we have 

as a place to do our interrogation? 

I heard your response to the first question, but will you at least 

consider that? 

Dr. CARTER. Sure. I will learn more and respond. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The appropriate disposition for a detainee is determined on the basis of all the 

facts and circumstances, including the national security interests of the United 

States and its allies and partners, and the conduct the detainee has engaged in, consistent with U.S. domestic law and international law. Depending on the circumstances, detainees may be prosecuted in the United States, detained in their 

home countries, or detained in a third country. The Department makes assessments 

regarding the appropriate disposition of detainees on a case-by-case basis. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hirono? 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Dr. Carter. 

And thank Senator Lieberman for your continuing presence at 

this hearing. 

Dr. Carter, I appreciate your acknowledging at this hearing the 

importance of and the seriousness of sexual assault in the military, 

and in response to questions that have been submitted to you, you 

35 

have said that you would take a personal role in addressing the 

prevention and dealing with this scourge in a much better way. I 

will have a continuing interest in seeing how you do in that regard. 

I also agree with you that the security of our country is very 

much dependent, I would say, on maintaining the stability in the 

Asia-Pacific area. Of course, we need to continue our commitment 

to the rebalance and at the same time be able to deal with the instability in other parts of the world. 

Now President Obama recently visited India and announced a series of bilateral agreements with Prime Minister Modi. Can you 

talk briefly about the future of the United States-India relationship 

in the context of our rebalance commitment? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

The rebalance is a rebalance not only within Asia—I mean to 

Asia, to the Asia-Pacific area, but within it. Our historic focus has 

been East Asia, and I think that your question points to the importance to pay greater attention to South Asia as well. 

India is, in my view, destined to be a strategic partner of the 

United States. It is a large democracy, shares a lot of our political 

values and values of pluralism. I think that destiny will bring us 

together, but I am for hastening that. 

In the military-to-military area and the defense cooperation and 

technology cooperation areas, I think there is a great deal that we 

can do with India. If I am confirmed, I would take a strong interest 

in doing that. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Do you view U.S. energy security as a vital component to our 

overall national security and clearly on the military side? What 

role, if any, do you believe that the Department of Defense has in 

supporting efforts to increase U.S. energy security? 

Dr. CARTER. I think energy security is an important part of national security, and the Defense Department does play a role, not 

a central role, but a role in energy security. I think every dollar 

we spend of the defense budget we need to be able to justify on defense grounds, and we make some investments in energy technology because they pay off for the defense budget and for the soldier. 

We make investments in batteries, for example, solar cells, insulation, buildings, making them more energy efficient so we can 

save money. In some ways, the Department of Defense, like other 

large institutions in the country, is investing in energy efficiency 

in the future. I think that is an important thing to do. 

Senator HIRONO. DOD is the largest user of energy in the Federal Government. 

Regarding acquisitions, with your experience in the defense acquisition process, including the time in which you led the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Directorate at the Pentagon, as you 

review our DOD acquisition program with its various cost overruns, delays, et cetera, which others have noted, including the 

chairman, what would be your first priority to improve the acquisition process? 

For example, would you look at the kind of contracts that we 

enter into? Training, requirements, process—what would be your 

first priority to improve in that area? 

36 

Dr. CARTER. All of those are important. To take the point you 

made about contract structure, contracts are a way of providing incentives to industry, to control costs and meet schedule. That is an 

important part of negotiating a strategy. 

To get to your other suggestion, in order to negotiate those contracts well, we need people on the Government side who are capable, who understand acquisition and who understand industry. I 

am in favor of reintroducing to the acquisition system the role of 

the customer, which is the chiefs of the military services. I think 

that has been a proposal made by others with which I associate 

myself. 

There is no one silver bullet. There are many things that we 

need to do to improve acquisition. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Fischer? 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Dr. Carter, for your service and your willingness to 

continue that service to our country. 

I appreciated our frank conversation that we had in my office the 

other day and look forward to many more in the future. In that 

conversation and today also, you talk about the deterrence, our nuclear deterrence in this country as being the bedrock of our defense. I appreciate your views on that, and I agree with your views. 

We also talked about modernization and the importance of modernization and how as a country we need to step forward and really 

see that through if we are going to continue to enjoy the security 

that we have as a country. Thank you for your comments on that. 

In 2013, you led the Strategic Choices and Management Review, 

and in that review, one of the decisions was to reduce major headquarters’ budgets by 20 percent by 2019. That plan was required 

in our NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] in fiscal year 

2014. But the GAO [Government Accountability Office] has issued 

several reports that really cast doubt on if that is going to take 

place and even if we have an accurate picture on what the full resources currently are that are devoted to that headquarters staff. 

A couple questions here. Will you, if confirmed, maintain the goal 

of that 20 percent reduction in headquarters budget and staff? How 

are you going to accomplish it if we don’t have any idea of what 

those numbers are? 

Dr. CARTER. I certainly think it is important to diminish headquarters staff and other forms of overhead. I think the 20 percent 

goal was a sound one. 

I do not know where it stands in terms of implementation now. 

If I am confirmed, I will get back to that and try to meet that goal 

because we just have to get rid of the overhead here so that we can 

spend the dollars we have on the warfighter, which is what it is 

all about. 

Senator FISCHER. Have you seen the GAO report questioning if 

those numbers are even out there, if they are even available? If you 

believe that, how are you going to get the numbers? 

Dr. CARTER. I have not seen that GAO report, but I, if I am confirmed, will find out where the Department stands in terms of implementing that goal and, if they are off track, try to get them back 

on track because I think it is a good goal. 

37 

Senator FISCHER. Do you think now is the time that we should 

look at elevating cyber to its own command, or even with the commission that we had yesterday, there is a recommendation in that 

commission for a joint readiness command. When we look at overhead and administrative costs, what would be your initial response 

to those that are promoting ideas for additional commands? 

Dr. CARTER. I am all for paying much more attention to cyber 

and think we need to do that. But the creation of new commands 

and new headquarters in this budgetary environment is something 

I think we need to look at very closely and very cautiously. 

Senator FISCHER. As you know, our chairman, Senator McCain, 

is interested, as we all are, in gaining more knowledge about the 

information sharing with regards to our cybersecurity threats. That 

is one area that I believe has broad support. We know there is support not just from members of this committee and members of Congress, but also the President has discussed the need for information 

sharing on those cybersecurity threats. 

I agree that information sharing and better defense is a first 

step. But do you think that we can achieve relative cybersecurity 

simply by improving those defenses, or do we need to perhaps go 

on the offense and impose more I guess you would say visible costs 

with regards to our actions on cybersecurity? 

Dr. CARTER. I think both are important. We need to improve our 

defenses, but we also need to improve our abilities to respond. 

Those responses can be in cyberspace or in other ways, but certainly they should include the option to respond in cyberspace. 

Senator FISCHER. The option to respond, would you say that 

would include demonstrating that we have the capability to do so? 

Is that part of our deterrence when it comes to protecting our country, our agencies, and private businesses when it comes to cyber attacks? 

Dr. CARTER. I agree with you. I think deterrence requires that 

a potential aggressor know that you have the capability to respond, 

and they obviously can’t know all the details of that or they may 

be able to counter your response. But they certainly should know 

that you can respond. 

Senator FISCHER. And would respond, if necessary? 

Dr. CARTER. And would respond, absolutely. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Dr. Carter. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator McCaskill? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

So many questions, so little time. I want to associate myself with 

the remarks of the chairman about the weapon systems. You are 

in a special position because you have been in the weeds, so to 

speak, on all of this in your previous position, and we worked together on wartime contracting reforms, which now are in the statutes. I know that you will be aggressive about making sure that 

all of those provisions are adhered to. 

I also want to address a question to you for the record on the 

murky line of responsibility on the building of infrastructure during contingencies in theater while we are fighting. I think what we 

have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan through the special inspector 

general’s reports is that this line of passing back and forth responVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
38 

sibility for building roads, building highways, building grids, building health centers, building water systems, building power plants 

between USAID [United States Agency for International Development] and DOD has made it very difficult for us to really hold everyone accountable that needs to be accountable for dramatic failures. 

On that note, I wanted to specifically talk about special inspector 

general’s reports. Last week, I learned that for the first time in 6 

years, the special inspector general’s reports as to the way we are 

accomplishing our mission in Afghanistan for training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces and Afghan police was 

going to be classified by General Campbell. This had never been 

done before. 

Those reports are essential to robust oversight. I kicked up dust 

last week about it, and on Monday, it was announced that General 

Campbell was evidently reversing his decision in some regard. I 

want to ask your commitment to make sure that throughout the 

chain of command, there is an understanding that the decision to 

classify is a very precarious decision because if you don’t do it when 

it needs to be done, it is a problem. But if you overclassify, it removes the ability of us and the taxpayers to hold the military accountable. 

I wanted to bring that up to you and ask you for your commitment in that regard. 

Dr. CARTER. I give that commitment. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I also wanted to briefly talk about sexual 

assault in the military. The report that came out in December, 

while it still shows work to be done, I think it is important that 

on the record we talk about the success that we have had. 

Reporting is up. We have gone from 1 in 10 victims coming forward to 1 in 4 in a matter of a few years. Incidence is down. Importantly, restricted reporting is up. 

Maybe the most important information in that report that hasn’t 

gotten a lot of cover is that in anonymous surveys and focus groups 

with victims, more than two-thirds of the victims said they had 

complete confident in their commanders and how they are handling 

these crimes and that they feel that their privacy is being respected and that they are being supported. That is huge, and I 

wanted to point that out because I do think we are making 

progress. 

But on retaliation, that same report, as Senator Gillibrand pointed out, we still have a 62 percent rate of retaliation. If you look 

at the report, you realize it is not retaliation by the convening authority, by the command that is making the decision as to whether 

or not to go to general court martial. Rather, it is peer and lowlevel command that is causing the problem. 

In our reforms, we made retaliation a crime. We expect to get a 

report on how many instances that crime has, in fact, been pursued 

within the military justice system. The reforms, obviously, just 

went into place a relatively short time ago. 

What do you plan on doing in connection with this retaliation 

problem and with this new crime within the military justice system 

to pursue it? 

39 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, and thank you for everything you have 

done. I have, from the outside looking in, observed and admired the 

ideas and the energy and the commitment you have shown to getting rid of this scourge of sexual assault, and so, first of all, thank 

you for that. 

With respect to retaliation, that is one of the dimensions that I 

think the report you cite uncovered as very prevalent. I think the 

62 percent of victims were reporting experiencing retaliation. As 

you say, not so much—although not to the exclusion of, but not so 

much from the chain of command as from peers and subordinates. 

You are right. This is a crime, and its prevalence suggests that 

we are not doing everything we can, that we need to do to root out 

that crime. 

If I am confirmed, you can count that I am attentive to this issue 

of retaliation and determined to do something about it, and I will 

look forward to working with you if I am confirmed. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter. I look 

forward to working with you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Lee? 

Senator LEE. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter. 

It is a pleasure to have you here. I appreciate your willingness 

to be considered for this position. I appreciated the visit we had in 

my office the other day, and you have certainly proven yourself as 

someone who knows a lot about the Department of Defense, having 

served at its highest levels as Deputy Secretary in the past. 

I want to talk about a few things. First, let us talk about the F– 

35 for a minute. The F–35 is an amazing system, with units at Hill 

Air Force Base that are set to be hosting the F–35 starting this 

fall. It is a program, however, that has been marred by some delays 

and some cost overruns, as you know. 

As the Department of Defense looks at acquiring other new 

weapon systems and equipment to make sure that we maintain our 

technological advantage over our adversaries, I think it is important not only to work time and cost efficiencies in acquisition into 

the equation for such programs, but also to integrate that with logistics and maintenance processes that are absolutely essential to 

make sure that we get our money’s worth. 

With a program like the F–35, the biggest single expenses 

through the lifecycle isn’t just acquiring it. It is also maintaining 

it and making sure that we get our money’s worth out of it. 

Given that the Department of Defense has been reforming the 

acquisitions process in various ways for decades, what would you 

do differently not only to improve that process, but to make sure 

that acquisitions and development and logistics are all aligned in 

a way that increases the lifecycle and increases the efficiency and 

utility of these various weapon systems? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

It is exactly as you say. The lion’s share of the cost of any weapon system is not in buying it, but in having it. Which is why, to 

get to the F–35 example that you cite, the longstanding battle to 

control cost in the Joint Strike Fighter program, which I have been 

part of but is still ongoing and has to go on as long as that program 

is in existence—it is not perfect yet, it is a long way from that— 

has to extend into the sustainment phase of the aircraft. 

40 

We have worked on cost control in development. We have worked 

on cost control in the production of the aircraft, and we need to 

work on cost control in sustainment as well, exactly as you say. 

Senator LEE. Thank you. Thank you, and I appreciate your 

thought on that especially because your experience gives you a real 

strong ability to appreciate the nuances involved there. 

General John Kelly, the commander of SOUTHCOM [United 

States Southern Command], called last year’s border crisis an existential threat to the United States. Do you think that our inability 

to adequately enforce security at our borders does present a security threat to the United States, including a security threat that 

could involve the possibility of terrorists entering into our country 

without our knowledge? 

Dr. CARTER. I think control of our borders is an important part 

of national security, yes. 

Senator LEE. That is something that you would continue to 

watch out for, if confirmed at this position? 

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely. 

Senator LEE. It was reported on February 2nd, just a few days 

ago, that Iran successfully placed another satellite into orbit using 

a two-stage rocket. Do you think that continued development of 

Iranian ballistic missile technology presents a threat to the United 

States, and if so, what do you think we ought to do about it? 

Dr. CARTER. I do. I think it is a threat not only to the United 

States, but friends and allies in the region, and it is just one of the 

things that Iran is doing that is dangerous. 

With respect to ballistic missiles that could threaten the United 

States, I think that is one of the reasons why we need to keep our 

missile defenses, and especially our ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] defenses, current, capable, and large enough in size 

to deal with both a prospective Iranian threat and the also very 

real North Korean ICBM threat. 

Senator LEE. Thank you. 

As has been noted in several capacities that you have had within 

the Department of Defense, including most recently as the Deputy 

Secretary, you have had to confront the issue of sequestration. Now 

many of us, including myself, did not want sequestration to hit. I 

voted against the Budget Control Act in part because I didn’t think 

that we ought to be putting this burden disproportionately on the 

Department of Defense as we were. 

None of us wanted the super committee to not come up with a 

solution even after that happened, and many of us hoped that it 

wouldn’t come to that. Of course, it did. 

One of the lessons that I think we learned from 2 years ago is 

that while it is good to hope for the best, we also have to prepare 

for the worst. What can you do to make sure that we are not 

caught flatfooted and that we are ready for anything that we have 

to confront on that issue? 

Dr. CARTER. We need to continue to adapt our plans to the resources we are given. My own view is that we have made adaptations over the last few years to our strategy to accommodate the 

budget squeeze that are getting to the limits of what it is safe to 

do, and that is why I really want to see an end to sequester. 

41 

We need to do more to spend the defense dollar better, and I am 

all for that as well. But it is also basically the truth that we are 

getting to the point where we have bent the strategy, as the phrase 

goes, and I don’t think it is safe to keep bending it. 

Senator LEE. Thank you. I see my time has expired. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine, but before Senator Kaine, I 

would like to announce that we will break after Senator Kaine and 

then Senator Graham. There is a vote at 2:30 p.m. We will reconvene at 2:45 p.m. for the benefit of the few remaining Senators and 

any second round that any member wants. We appreciate your patience, Dr. Carter. 

Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Carter, for your strong testimony today. 

The chair and the ranking member in their opening comments 

put the issues on the table, and I want to just focus on two of them, 

the elimination of ISIL and Afghanistan. Senator Donnelly asked 

if the elimination of ISIL should be the goal. We all had the experience, as Foreign Relations Committee and SASC [Senate Armed 

Services Committee] members yesterday, of visiting with King 

Abdullah at a very emotional and difficult time. 

I was struck by something he said to us. He said, look, we need 

you desperately. However, this is a fight that is the region’s fight. 

If we are not willing to stand up against extremism in the region, 

there is no amount of outside forces, as powerful as they can be, 

who will be able to beat this fight. He really took ownership of it 

in a way that I thought was pretty courageous. 

Do you think it is possible for the United States military to eliminate ISIL on our own or even with other Western nations if the region doesn’t go all in to combat the homegrown jihadism that is exemplified in its most brutal form by ISIL? 

Dr. CARTER. We have to have regional partners because we have 

to make sure that the defeat inflicted upon ISIL is a lasting defeat, 

and for that, there needs to be conditions created where ISIL is 

now occupying territory that don’t make it a breeding ground for 

victory for that kind of, what is the right word, malignant and vicious kind of terrorism. 

The United States involvement is, I believe, essential. It is necessary, but it is not sufficient to have lasting victory. 

Senator KAINE. I would share your view, necessary, essential, not 

sufficient. It is still my hope that the White House will send to us 

a draft authorization for use of military force. I think after the 

President’s comments in the State of the Union, that seems more 

likely. I don’t think this is a war that can be waged in perpetuity, 

without Congress weighing in and putting our thumbprint on the 

mission and saying that if we are going to ask people to risk their 

lives in the mission, Congress is going to debate and vote and authorize it. 

If we have that debate about the American role, one of the things 

that I think is notable if, in fact, the region has to go all in against 

the ISIL threat, so far 80 percent of the airstrikes that have been 

carried out against ISIL have been United States flown. 

42 

Jordan has been rock solid in doing a lot of airstrikes. But the 

other nations in the region that seem to be directly threatened by 

ISIL, much more directly even than we are threatened by ISIL, I 

think have really not, other than being associated with the coalition, I don’t think they have really stepped forward in showing— 

and been willing to show that they are going all in against this 

threat, which should be an existential one. I think that is going to 

be the subject of some significant debate if we get into a discussion 

on authorization. 

Now second, Dr. Carter, on Afghanistan, I completely agree with 

Senator McCain, the chairman’s point in his opening. I really hope 

we have a conditions-based strategy and not a calendar-based 

strategy. 

Now I think it is okay to have a plan, and you indicated a plan 

is a plan. You can adjust the plan based on the current reality. 

Senator King and I were in Afghanistan in October and talked 

with General Campbell, and it seemed like after those discussions, 

the White House did adjust the plan once already. There were 

some ideas about the way U.S. forces would be used in calendar 

year 2015 that after hearing from General Campbell and others, I 

think the White House adjusted the authorities granted to U.S. 

troops during this calendar year, and I think that was a conditionsbased decision, which was good. 

But I worry for the same reason that you do. We have, at the 

expense of blood and treasure, achieved a lot in Afghanistan. The 

Nation’s life expectancy has gone from 44 to 61 in 10 years. 

My back of the envelope math, I always say 30 million people living on an average 17 years longer, that is 510 million years of 

human life. That seems like a pretty good ROI [return on investment] to me, for as painful as it has been, for as expensive as it 

has been. Why would we want to go backward? 

I think in Afghanistan that what we heard when we were there 

was also a little bit of the Iraq worry. Wow, they have taken their 

eye off the ball before because of things in Iraq and pulled resources away and that this is the perception in Afghanistan. Maybe 

this is getting ready to happen again, as significant a threat as 

ISIL is and that we need to be at it. 

In Afghanistan, they are a little bit nervous that the ISIL threat 

will pull our attention away and that we could lose these gains. I 

hope in your capacity in this new role, as you dig into the plan, 

as you dig into the daily conditions, that we will make the right 

decision about how to keep the progress that we have gained in Afghanistan and that we won’t let a day on the calendar be the determinant of our policy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you want to respond to that, Doctor? 

Dr. CARTER. Two thousand one hundred and six Americans, 

servicemembers have lost their lives in Afghanistan. Afghanistan 

was the place from which the 9/11 attacks emanated, and so I 

think finishing the job there is very important. 

I have been part of that war in my previous time in the Department. It was what I woke up to every morning, and so I am very 

committed to success there. We have adjusted what we have been 

doing continuously as we went along. 

43 

I don’t have anything to add to what you said, except to remind 

that the Afghan security forces are what we increasingly have 

trained to provide security on Afghan territory. They are going to 

need support after 2016. 

In the President’s budget, about which I will appear before you 

in a few weeks, I understand that there is, if my memory serves, 

$3.8 billion requested for the Afghan security forces that carries 

through the end of 2016. Then a question will arise, are we going 

to stick with them, the Afghan security forces? 

It is not just about troops, American troops. It is about the overall commitment so that the Afghan security forces can keep the 

peace there after 2016. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Graham? 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

The idea of Joe Lieberman introducing you is a risky proposition, 

but we will see how that turns out. 

[Laughter.] 

Bottom line, do you agree with the following statement? The only 

reason 3,000 Americans died on 9/11 is that the radical Islamists 

who attacked us could not find a way to kill more of us? 

Dr. CARTER. That is probably true. 

Senator GRAHAM. If they could, they would? 

Dr. CARTER. That is my guess. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, I don’t think it is a guess. I think it is a 

fact. Do you think ISIL represents a threat to our Homeland? 

Dr. CARTER. I do. 

Senator GRAHAM. They say they want to attack us. There is no 

reason to believe they are kidding, right? 

Dr. CARTER. I agree. 

Senator GRAHAM. The head of ISIL was in Camp Bucca, and he 

said, ‘‘I will see you in New York,’’ when he was released. 

Dr. CARTER. Right. 

Senator GRAHAM. Everything they have said they would do, they 

have done. One of the things they want to do is hit us. I couldn’t 

agree more with Senator Kaine about a regional buy-in. If you 

don’t get that, the structural problems really don’t change. 

But it is just not about the region. The reason I am worried 

about ISIL is because I think they want to hit us. They have the 

best platform I have seen since 9/11 in Syria and Iraq to attack the 

United States. They hold a large territory. They are rich. They 

have a lot of crazy people under their control, and they mean it 

when they say they want to hit us, and I want to make sure they 

don’t. 

Do you think al-Nusra wants to hit us? 

Dr. CARTER. I do. 

Senator GRAHAM. They recruited a guy from Florida who was a 

suicide bomber I think in Syria. He came back to Florida before he 

actually became a suicide bomber. They are trying to hit us, too. 

Do you think AQAP [al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] wants 

to hit us? 

Dr. CARTER. Very definitely. 

Senator GRAHAM. Very definitely. They are the people that hit us 

in Paris. 

44 

Do you think the Iranians have to believe that a military option 

is on the table during these nuclear negotiations? 

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. If they don’t, we are making a huge mistake, 

right? 

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think the Russians are being provocative at a time when the world is already in chaos? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think that a cyber Pearl Harbor is a 

potential threat we face? 

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. And we are not ready for it? 

Dr. CARTER. I agree with that also. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think China is intimidating their 

neighbors? 

Dr. CARTER. Certainly trying to. 

Senator GRAHAM. Can you tell me in light of all of this, why in 

the hell would Congress be devastating the military budget? Can 

you explain that to me because I can’t explain it to myself? 

Dr. CARTER. No, I can’t. No, I can’t. As I am a longstanding opponent, I am against sequester. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. I left out a bunch of threats because I just 

have 5 minutes. Canada is in good shape, by the way. We appreciate Canada being a good neighbor. 

In 2017, the plan on the table now is to have 1,000 troops left 

in Afghanistan, Kabul based. Do you agree with me, given the conditions that exist in the region, the likelihood of a reemergence of 

al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups along the Pakistan-Afghan border, we would be wise to have troops outside of Kabul? 

Dr. CARTER. That is not the plan now, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Can you please tell me why I am wrong? It is 

the plan to go down to 1,000 by 2017. They increased the number 

of troops in 2015, but it is the plan. If you are going to be Secretary 

of Defense, you need to understand the plan. The plan is to go to 

1,000. 

I think that is beyond unwise. That will destroy our ability to 

see, hear, and listen to what I think is a reemerging threat along 

the Afghan-Pakistan border. If I am wrong about the plan, please 

correct me. This is something you can go home and check out for 

yourself. 

Dr. CARTER. No, I think you are correct—I think you are correct 

about the plan. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, that plan needs to change. 

Dr. CARTER. That is the understanding I have of the plan. 

Senator GRAHAM. If it doesn’t, we are incredibly stupid as a nation. I want to withdraw from Afghanistan responsibly. I want 

lines of defenses over there so they don’t come here. Doesn’t that 

make sense? 

Dr. CARTER. It does make sense. 

Senator GRAHAM. I am glad Afghans are living longer. I am glad 

that Afghan girls are going to school. I am proud of what we have 

accomplished. But I am worried about Americans living longer. The 

reason I want to continue to invest in Afghanistan, the reason I 

45 

want to deal with ISIL and al-Nusra and all the other groups is 

because they are trying to hit us. 

Do you agree that the only way you can deter radical Islam—you 

can’t deter it, you have to prevent the attack before it occurs? 

Dr. CARTER. Sir, I can’t give a simple answer to that. 

Senator GRAHAM. They don’t mind dying. 

Dr. CARTER. I think that a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy begins foremost with defenses but has other dimensions as well 

in terms of removing the conditions that create safe havens and 

some of the ability for recruiting of terrorists. It is a complex issue. 

But protecting ourselves needs to come first. 

Senator GRAHAM. I will close with this. To me, it is not complex. 

The only way you can keep them from coming back here to America is to stay over there, disrupt their operations. Keep them on the 

run. Do not let them gather strength. Make them poor, on the run, 

and less entrenched. 

I will end with this thought. Syria. How in the world are we 

going to dislodge ISIL from Syria without a ground component? I 

agree with Senator Kaine that that ground component has to be regionally based. 

We just came back from the region. People want to go in. Saudi 

Arabia said you could have our army. The Emir of Qatar said we 

will pay for the war, but you have to deal with Assad. 

How can we train up a Free Syrian Army or send any other force 

into Syria if we don’t first deal with the Assad air threat? How in 

the world could you train somebody to go fight ISIL, and then one 

day they turn on Assad and not expect him to kill them before they 

get the capacity to come after him one day? How does this work 

without dealing with Assad? 

Dr. CARTER. Senator, let me say something about that. It is a 

very important question. The situation in Syria is, as you indicate, 

more than a problem of ISIL. It is a problem of the Assad regime 

as well. The forces that we are supporting there have, first and 

foremost, the job, as we have discussed here this morning, of defeating ISIL. 

But I believe that they also need to be creating the conditions for 

the removal of Assad. That is a much more complex task. I understand that. I am not trying to oversimplify it. But I think that has 

to be at the end of the road, and if that is what you are pointing 

to, I completely agree with you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Could I just say you really didn’t respond, in 

all due respect, Dr. Carter, to sending young Syrians in, training 

them in Saudi Arabia and sending them in to Syria to be barrel 

bombed by Bashar Assad. The morality of that alone, much less the 

unworkability of it, is in contradiction to everything the United 

States ever stood for or fought for. 

I hope you will rethink your answer to Senator Graham’s question. This idiocy of cooperating with the Iranians and also taking 

‘‘ISIL first’’, of which Bashar Assad is the father, is nonsense and, 

as I say, immoral. 

The committee will return at 2:45 p.m., since there is a vote at 

2:30 p.m. Members who seek a second round or those members who 

have not had the opportunity to ask questions will be allowed to 

at that time. We will stand in recess until 2:45 p.m. 

46 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene 

at 2:47 p.m., the same day.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Dr. Carter, for your patience. As 

usual, with the efficiency of this well-oiled machine, we have a vote 

now starting now, so we will be going back and forth. 

Senator King is here, and so I would like to recognize him at this 

time. 

Senator King? 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Carter, I am going to revisit a little bit of the ground that 

we covered this morning. But I want to make a suggestion. I would 

urge that you, upon your assumption of this position, undertake an 

all-agency review of the policy with regard to the leaving of Afghanistan and talk to General Campbell, the military people, the 

intelligence people, and the State Department. Because like many 

of the members here, I am gravely concerned that we will miss an 

opportunity to preserve what we have gained in Afghanistan. 

I was going to say we are in danger of fumbling the ball on the 

5-yard line. I think a better example might be we are in danger of 

throwing a pass when you have Lynch in the backfield on the 1- 

yard line. But we have gained a lot, and to lose it in the end because of an accelerated departure schedule that doesn’t really fit 

the requirements on the ground I think would be tragic. 

We have a partner that wants to work with us now. We have the 

security forces that are standing up and taking casualties, but they 

are going to need some additional support, particularly in the authorities under our air system. I would urge you to have such a review and to really be very strong with the White House. 

You mentioned that you will be candid. I hope you will be candid 

to the point of being annoying. What is the worst thing they can 

do? Appoint you to be Secretary of Defense. Please, I think this is 

of some urgency. 

Number two, in answer to a question, you mentioned that you 

were inclined to support additional arms to Ukraine. I share that 

position. 

On the other hand, we don’t live in a static world, and the danger is we supply arms, Putin sees those arms and matches them 

and raises us, to some extent. I wondered, with your history of 

studying geopolitical issues, strategy, and the like, if you could 

elaborate a little bit on that challenge? 

If we could arm the Ukrainians and give them some strategic advantage, I think that would be great. The problem is we can’t rely 

on the Russians not responding in some way, and then you are in 

an escalation situation. Your thoughts, please? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

I like and remembered, and I think I have used subsequently, 

your expression ‘‘fumbling the ball on the 5-yard line’’. I was superseded by the Super Bowl metaphor, I understand. But this is a war 

that we have carried all those yards, and so I will— 

Senator KING. With some very substantial progress. 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. Very substantial progress. We now have a partner in Ashraf Ghani that is very positive. I promise you I will keep 

47 

working at it, keep an open mind, and tell it like I see it, yes, in 

Afghanistan. 

With respect to Ukraine, you raise an excellent question, and I 

think it is true that in strategy and working on these international 

problems, you always have to ask yourself not the next step, but 

what is the step after that? What happens after? 

To your question, two observations, Senator. One is that I think 

that much as I incline in the direction I indicated this morning, the 

economic and political pressure on Russia has to remain the main 

center of gravity of our effort at pushing back, and the Europeans 

are critical to that. European solidarity and NATO solidarity are 

critical in this regard, as they are to all of European security and 

to dealing with the problem of Putin. 

The other thought that comes to mind is that this is, as I consider what kinds of assistance we may give to the Ukrainian military, one does need to think two and even three steps ahead in this 

matter. Your point is very well taken, and I thank you. 

Senator KING. I would suggest an article in yesterday’s Financial 

Times. It talks about just this issue that I think you would find interesting and informative. I am not expressing a conclusion, but I 

just think we have to think hard about, as you say, one, two, three, 

and four steps down the chess game. 

A final point, and I am close to out of time. I want to reiterate, 

I think Senator Shaheen mentioned, the chairman very articulately 

and forcefully expressed the problem with procurement and money. 

I am also focused on the problem with procurement and time. 

Senator Inhofe had a chart recently from DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] that showed in 1975 it took 

about the same time to bring a new automobile, a new commercial 

aircraft, and a military aircraft from concept to operation, about 

5 1/2, 6 years. Today, those lines have wildly diverged, and the 

automobile is down to 2 years. Commercial aircraft is up to about 

7, but a military aircraft is up to 23 years. 

That just won’t do in terms of, you know, we are going to be 

building obsolete technology. I would urge you, as you focus quite 

rightfully on cost, to also look at how do we bring these products 

to market, if you will, or to operability in a shorter time? A, so we 

can meet the needs of the exigencies of the moment, but also so 

that we are not getting obsolete technology just because of the 

lapse of time. 

I know you are aware of this. I just urge you to focus on that 

as well as the cost. 

Dr. CARTER. I will do so, and I completely agree with you. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Senator King. 

Dr. Carter, every member of this committee signed a letter to 

Secretary Hagel and Secretary Kerry concerning this issue that has 

been raised with you about the Jordanians and the needs that they 

have. Believe me, every member that met with King Abdullah was 

deeply moved by the requirements that he has and his inability to 

do so. 

48 

Finally, on the issue of Ukraine, what does it take? Do they have 

to send in hundreds of more tanks that the Ukrainians have no 

weapons to defend themselves? There are 4,000 dead now. How 

many more do you think before we at least do them what seems 

to be common decency, giving them the ability to defend themselves? 

Certainly, Vladimir Putin has gone literally all in, and there is 

some lessons of history, sir, that of dictators and bullies who have 

troubles domestically have a history of striking out and being more 

aggressive in order to divert attention. This is reminiscent of the 

1930s to me, and Neville Chamberlain might be proud. 

Senator Tillis? 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Dr. Carter. 

First, I think it is very clear with the questions that are being 

asked today, this hearing really isn’t about Ash Carter. I think 

there is a lot of confidence in your ability, and I think there are 

few public servants as qualified as you for the nomination. I think 

you and your family should be very proud. 

I appreciate the time that you and I spent in my office. I think 

that we have already several points of agreement, whether it is acquisition reform, training, or modernization of business practices in 

the Pentagon. I look forward to working with you on that and making progress. 

I also think that defense is an area where you even see in the 

questions where there seems to be a consistent message from most 

of the members up here about our concerns with the safety and security of America and the need for us to work together on a bipartisan basis. Because if we don’t, we fail the thousands of young 

men and women who volunteer to defend our freedom. 

Before I get to a question, I do want to probably echo in slightly 

different terms what Senator Sullivan said this morning. There 

seems to be a disconnect between the reality of the threat that we 

face right now and the way the President portrays it in many instances, most recently with the State of the Union. 

We have Ukraine is ablaze. I think ISIL and al-Qaeda are about 

as strong as ever. You have Chinese generals talking about maybe 

wanting to settle some millennial scores with their neighbors in the 

Pacific Rim. 

We have a situation where I think Israel feels abandoned, and 

I think the prime minister being called a coward by somebody in 

the White House is unacceptable. We are at a very dangerous time 

right now, I think. I believe that you said it very well when you 

said the number and the severity of the threats that we are facing 

is probably as great as our lifetimes, as any time in our lifetimes. 

I believe that you may go into your position maybe in a way to 

where you can work with people in the White House and the National Security Council to get them to work with you, to help us 

address, I think, these safety and security problems across the 

world. 

My first question for you also goes back really to the State of the 

Union, where the President seems to continue to refuse to call the 

enemy what they are. How can we fight an enemy with an administration that refuses to name them? A President who refuses to 

49 

recognize that there is a huge difference between the Muslim religion and the Islamic terrorists that we are facing today? 

Do you agree with that strategy, or can you rationalize for me 

why the President seems to continue that position? 

Dr. CARTER. Senator, I agree with you that there is a difference 

between the Muslim religion and the kind of extremism that leads 

to terrorism that is the threat and the enemy that we are countering. If I understand the reference you are making, it is to the 

President’s statements of a few days ago, which I interpreted as 

saying the same thing. Namely, it is important for Americans to 

make a distinction and show that they know how to make a distinction between the religion of Islam on the one hand and extremists and terrorists on the other. 

I don’t think, in my judgment, that is to minimize what is one 

of the motivating ideologies of the enemies we face, which they will 

say is tied to their Islamic religion. But I don’t think that we serve 

ourselves well as Americans by conflating this kind of barbaric extremism with an entire religion. 

Senator TILLIS. I have another question. It really has to do with 

you in relation to your predecessors. 

Do you feel you can break through the barriers that Gates and 

Panetta seemed to be very frustrated with? You and I talked briefly about the book Secretary Gates wrote. They both seemed to have 

a great deal of frustration in their time in the position you will be 

confirmed with the White House national security team and the 

Pentagon. They left, they seem to have left in part in frustration 

with that. 

I think Senator Gates in his book maybe even called it ‘‘amateur 

hour at the National Security Council’’. How are you going to be 

different in relating to the Pentagon and the President’s national 

security team? 

Dr. CARTER. I intend to be what I have always been in all the 

decades I worked in the Department of Defense, which is I will be 

entirely straight and upfront with the President and make my advice as cogent and as useful to him in making his decisions as I 

possibly can. 

That is what I can do. That is what I have pledged to do. That 

is what I will do. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator REED [Presiding]. Thank you. 

Senator Rounds? 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Dr. Carter, I appreciated the opportunity to visit with you last 

week, and one of the items that we discussed was the need for the 

long-range strike bomber. In that regard, we discussed the fact 

that it would probably be, what, 10 years from now before, under 

the best circumstances, it may be operational. Fair estimate of 

time? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes, although in answering your question, I am 

mindful of what Senator King said just a few moments ago. I would 

rather say ‘‘as soon as possible’’. 

Senator ROUNDS. I understand. In the meantime, we have challenges that have to be responded to with other existing platforms. 

50 

One of which, for conventional purposes, is the B–1B bomber. I 

think right now we probably have 62 or 63 in our fleet that are 

operational sometimes. 

I am concerned about readiness right now, the mission capabilities of those platforms because those are literally on the front lines 

as we speak. Because of their capabilities or multiple types of 

weapons to be delivered out of that same platform, they are being 

utilized, and they are being worn out. 

I think mission capability is somewhere under 50 percent, and I 

don’t have the exact number, but in terms of those platforms. I 

would like you to talk just a little bit, and I really would like to 

give you the opportunity to talk about what sequestration has done 

in terms of mission capability, the need that we have for that platform to get us to the next generation of strike bombers, what your 

thoughts are on getting back to where we need it, and what the 

appropriate number of operational aircraft should be? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

You are right. I don’t know the specific numbers on the B–1 at 

the moment. But in general, sequester has hit readiness very hard. 

In the Air Force, I know, for example, in the summer of 2013, 

I remember very vividly the Nellis training range, Air Force’s premier training range, closed in the summer. First time in my entire 

professional life I had ever seen that. 

The first victim of sequester has been readiness, and so I can 

well believe it has affected the B–1, which is an essential part of 

our arsenal, as you indicate. 

Senator ROUNDS. In your role, and I believe that you will be confirmed, what I am looking for is a commitment that these men and 

women that are literally tasked with keeping these aircraft operational, that they have your full support to get the numbers back 

up to where they ought to be. Right now they are taking out of the 

bone pile to literally harvest parts off to keep those aircraft flying 

today. 

There has to be a better way to do it. Then if we are going to 

continue to do for the next perhaps 10 years, that you have an understanding and a clear commitment that you are going to help 

them get the parts necessary to keep these aircraft flying. 

Dr. CARTER. I have the same understanding you do of the problem, the same commitment you do, and the only thing I would say 

is it is going to take more than my commitment. It is going to take 

money also and ultimately relief from sequester to deal with these 

kind of things. But I see the picture the same way you do. 

Senator ROUNDS. But you are prepared to step in and to assist 

in making sure that those resources are available? 

Dr. CARTER. I am. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, sir. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Rounds. 

We have concluded all the members present with the first round, 

and I will defer any comments I have until the chairman has a 

chance. Senator Wicker, you are recognized. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

How are you feeling, Dr. Carter? 

51 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you for asking. I am fine. Appreciate it, sir. 

Senator WICKER. You are doing well, and we appreciate your 

willingness to serve. 

According to NATO guidelines, we ask our NATO allies to devote 

at least 2 percent of their GDP [gross domestic product] to defense. 

This has been a stunning failure, actually. Only four countries 

spent that much in 2013, Estonia, the United States, the United 

Kingdom, and Greece. 

Do you have any ideas about how we can do better in this regard? 

Dr. CARTER. Secretaries of Defense that I have served for almost 

as long as I can remember have pleaded with the Europeans to 

spend more on their own defense, our NATO allies. With very few 

exceptions, those pleas have not been fully heeded. 

One doesn’t wish adversity on anyone, but one would hope that 

when they look at Russia, when they look at the Charlie Hebdo incidents and so forth, that the European public will come to share 

the view that they need to be part of their own defense and continue to play the role that Europe has always played, of being a 

partner with the United States in keeping peace and order around 

the world. 

I regret that they are not spending as much as they used to. 

Again, I don’t wish adversity upon anyone, but I hope that what 

they see around them reminds everyone you don’t get this stuff for 

free. Security doesn’t come for free. You have to pay for it. 

Senator WICKER. One would hope. I hope you will, going forward, 

help us think of perhaps carrots and sticks and incentives to have 

our allies shoulder their part of the burden. 

I was talking, we had a great discussion with General Scowcroft 

the other day. I asked about what we would do about a Russian 

invasion or incursion into the Baltics. We are a treaty ally of 

Ukraine. We were unable to do anything. We were unable to do 

anything when the Russians moved into Georgia. 

But with a NATO ally, it really is different. General Scowcroft 

mentioned tripwires, stationing troops in the Baltic countries, both 

from the United States and from our NATO allies. What do you 

think of that concept? Is it something you have given any thought 

to, Dr. Carter? 

Dr. CARTER. I have, and it is one I support. I believe it is the 

intention—again, I don’t know this. I am not in these deliberations. 

I think it is the intention behind the rotational introduction of 

United States and other NATO forces into the Baltic countries, to 

reinforce deterrence and to reinforce the principle that this is 

NATO and that Article 5 of the NATO treaty says an attack on one 

is an attack upon all. 

Senator WICKER. Absolutely. 

Dr. CARTER. That is a very important principle, and we need to 

stand behind that and show that we are going to stand behind it. 

I think that is the meaning of the tripwire concept that General 

Scowcroft was thinking of. 

Senator WICKER. If we don’t stand behind our word on that article, then our word really does mean nothing. 

Let me ask you this in conclusion. How was Cap Weinberger to 

work for? 

52 

Dr. CARTER. I enjoyed working for him. I was not at a very senior 

level, but what I did for him was advise him on space, missile defense, nuclear command and control, and the early days in those 

days of what are called the continuity of government efforts, which 

still continue. We were just beginning to put them together at that 

time. 

Senator WICKER. What do you think he would say about our defense posture at this point? 

Dr. CARTER. Secretary Weinberger was an enormous backer of 

defense spending and of the defense budget, and he was tireless in 

explaining the need for an adequate defense. In that respect, he 

was a lot of fun to work for. 

Senator WICKER. Yes, he wouldn’t be overly delighted with sequestration and with the current funding level and proposed funding level going forward? 

Dr. CARTER. Not at all. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. Good luck to you, sir. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you. Thank you, sir. 

Senator REED. Senator King? 

Senator KING. I went before the vote. 

Senator REED. This is the second round, Senator, if you have additional questions. 

Senator KING. Oh, I am sorry. I was surprised to get called upon 

so soon. 

Let me go back to the question that we ended with about the 

timing of weapon systems. You were one of the fathers of the 

MRAP program, were you not? It seems to me that could be a 

model for what we are talking about. 

Could you share lessons learned in that project that might be applicable to other procurement projects? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes, I think you put your finger on it, which when 

you pointed to the critical variable in a program being its duration. 

That is important for two reasons, and you indicated this already, 

Senator, but just to reiterate. Time is money. A 15-year program 

is going to cost more than a 10-year program, the way we do 

things. Cost control, it is essential. 

But the MRAP example points to something even more important, which is technology changes very quickly. Our enemies 

change very quickly today, and you don’t have to be in a war, 

which the MRAP example occasions, to understand that we need 

to be able to turn the corner, add new technology to systems, field 

new systems more quickly than our opponents are doing the same. 

If we have a 15-year timetable and we are competing with any 

modern economy around the world, the same thing is going to happen to you if you are a commercial company that has a 15-year 

product cycle. You are going to lose. 

I think it is very important not just for cost control, but in order 

to remain the best military in the world that we turn the technological corner more quickly. The MRAP example and the war’s example gave me at least a lot of ideas about how we can do that 

even in peacetime. 

Senator KING. I think part of it is instilling a sense of urgency 

in all the way up and down the line. I mean, the accomplishments 

53 

of this country during World War II under extreme duress in terms 

of production were astonishing where I live near Bath, Maine. 

I can’t remember the exact figure, but I think they turned out 

a destroyer during World War II something like once every 17 

days, which is unbelievable. Granted, it was a much simpler machine then than now, and the story of the bombers in World War 

II is also quite extraordinary. 

I think there has to be a sense of urgency. We are if not directly 

at war, we are certainly close to war footing on a number of fronts, 

and that should inform. As you pointed out, this isn’t the Cold War, 

where you can do things with a 5-, 10-, or 15-year lead time. Our 

asymmetric advantage is technology. 

If we are unable to deploy that technology on a timely basis, we 

are basically losing that advantage. I, again, very strongly urge you 

to follow on that. By the way, Frank Kendall, who is in your office, 

I think is a star, and I hope you are going to keep him. 

Dr. CARTER. I can’t resist seconding that emotion. Frank was my 

Principal Deputy when I was Under Secretary, and we are very 

lucky to have an acquisition executive like Frank. 

Senator KING. My philosophy of leadership, which applies to this 

case, is hire good people and take credit for what they do. Frank 

falls into that category. 

Second question. How do we get more value out of our allies in 

terms of support for the work that we are doing? I understand that 

in many countries of Europe, defense as a share of GDP is actually 

going down, which it is here, too. But it is going to 2 and less than 

2 percent. 

Is that part of your mission is to encourage our allies to contribute more to this what is really the common defense? 

Dr. CARTER. I think they need to spend more on their own defense because their own defense is also our defense. That is what 

being an ally is about. I would like to see them carry their full 

weight of being an ally, and as I indicated earlier, I don’t see how 

any American can be satisfied with the general level of defense 

spending among our European allies. I think it should be higher. 

Senator KING. Finally, and I realize my time is running short, 

but it seems to me that one of the great strategic challenges of this 

moment is to enlist Muslim countries and Arab countries in the 

fight against ISIL. They have to realize, and I think the events of 

yesterday may be a galvanizing factor, but they have to realize that 

this has to be their fight. 

If it is our fight, that is what ISIL wants. They want this to be 

the West against Islam. But the fact that they did this horrendous 

murder yesterday of one of their brothers, of a Sunni Muslim, I 

hope will be a wakeup call to the Muslim world that they have to 

deal with these guys most directly. Not simply by holding our coat, 

but by contributing and being involved on the ground, in the air. 

This has to be their fight ultimately. It is not one that we can 

carry on by ourselves. 

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely. 

Chairman MCCAIN [Presiding]. Senator Cruz? 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Carter, thank you for joining us. I enjoyed having the opportunity to visit with you in my office. 

54 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you. Likewise. 

Senator CRUZ. I appreciate your many years of service to our Nation. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you. 

Senator CRUZ. I appreciate your willingness to serve in this incredibly important role at a time of great challenges, great threats, 

and also at a time, unfortunately, when the Defense Department 

faces significant challenges internally. 

I have for some time been critical of the Obama administration’s 

foreign policy, that it has lacked a steady mooring and a focus on 

the very real national security threats facing the country. I would 

like to take the opportunity to briefly discuss a few of those threats 

with you and get your thoughts on them, and I want to start with 

the threat of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons capability. 

In your judgment, what would be the national security implications to the United States if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

In a phrase, ‘‘exceptionally grave,’’ and that is for two reasons. 

First of all, they might use them. But second, their having them 

is likely to stimulate yet others to get them. For both those reasons, very grave. 

Senator CRUZ. Let us perhaps expand on each of them. What is 

it about the regime and Iran that poses a significant threat of their 

actually using nuclear weapons if they had them? 

Dr. CARTER. If you take at face value what they say, they have 

the ambition to wipe off the map other states in the region, namely 

Israel. They have a long history of behaving in a disruptive way, 

of supporting terrorism, of trying to undermine other governments 

of operating around the world. 

I think they give abundant evidence that they are not the kind 

of people you want to have having nuclear weapons. 

Senator CRUZ. Would you agree as well that with radical religious extremism, ordinary notions of deterrence and cost-benefit 

analysis don’t always apply? 

Dr. CARTER. I am concerned that that is the case with people 

who are extremists of that kind, yes. 

Senator CRUZ. Now, Dr. Carter, you also talked about the threat 

of nuclear proliferation and in particular the threat that other Middle East countries in response to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons 

capability would then feel the need themselves to acquire the same. 

For some decades it has been a matter of pretty widespread public 

knowledge that the Nation of Israel has nuclear weapons capability. 

Yet throughout that time, Israel’s Arab neighbors have expressed 

no burning desire to acquire their own nuclear weapons, apparently because they don’t perceive any meaningful threat that Israel 

would use those weapons in an offensive manner. Yet the Arab 

neighbors of Iran are reacting qualitatively different to the prospect of Khamenei and the mullahs acquiring nuclear weapons. 

They are saying, almost without exception, if Iran acquires those 

weapons, they would immediately need to get their own. What does 

that say about the judgment of Saudi Arabia and other countries 

in the region about the magnitude of the threat posed by Iran? 

55 

Dr. CARTER. I think it tends to read for us what we were just 

saying, namely the prospect of Iran having a nuclear weapon is a 

pretty fearful matter, and you don’t have to be just an American 

or an Israeli to get that idea. 

Senator CRUZ. Would you then agree that the consequences of 

getting these negotiations wrong that are ongoing or the consequences of these negotiations facilitating and allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons capability would be severe, both from the 

perspective of the Middle East and our allies, but also from the 

perspective of our own national security? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes, the negotiations have precisely the opposite objective. 

Senator CRUZ. Let me ask you also briefly about ISIL. How 

would you characterize our objective right now with regards to 

ISIL? 

Dr. CARTER. To inflict a lasting defeat upon ISIL. I only add the 

word ‘‘lasting’’ to reinforce the idea that once they are beaten, they 

need to stay beaten, which means you need to create the conditions 

in, in this case Iraq and Syria, so that they stay defeated. 

Senator CRUZ. Okay. A final question. In your professional judgment, what would be required militarily to destroy or, as you put 

it, inflict a lasting defeat on ISIL? 

Dr. CARTER. Militarily, it would be the dismantlement of their 

forces and their networks. To get to the point about lastingly, there 

is a political ingredient of this, which I need to add, which is to 

have them replaced in Iraq and in Syria with a government that 

the people want to be part of, and so they don’t have to be governed 

by maniacs and terrorists. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Dr. Carter. My time has expired. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your longstanding and extraordinarily valuable 

service to our Nation. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I am prepared to overlook your deserting 

the Kennedy School at Harvard to go to Stanford, and I hope you 

will let us know if your back requires you to stand up or take a 

break. 

Dr. CARTER. No, I am fine. Thank you for your consideration. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I will take it out of my time. 

I want to begin with a couple of brief questions, and I hope I 

won’t retrod the ground that you have already covered. From the 

conversations we have had, I assume that you will continue to back 

the current full support for two submarines a year in the construction of our Virginia-class submarines, and the ongoing R&D [research and development] and other programs necessary for the 

Ohio-class? 

Dr. CARTER. I will, because undersea superiority is one of our key 

advantages, and we need to pursue it. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. It is one of those areas where, in a sense, 

we need to be on a war footing because we need to be prepared and 

ready, and the surveillance and intelligence functions, as well as 

56 

the deterrent capabilities, are essential to our National defense. 

Am I correct? 

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me move to another area that is very 

close to my heart, and I again want to thank our chairman, Senator McCain, who joined with me in cosponsoring a measure, the 

Clay Hunt Suicide Prevention Act. Suicide remains a difficult and 

daunting, horrific problem not only among our veterans—22 every 

day commit suicide—but also in our Active military. 

You and I have talked about this problem. I believe you are very 

much attuned to it, and I am hopeful that you will continue the 

military’s commitment and the Department of Defense’s commitment to providing the mental healthcare that is necessary to help 

our warriors deal with these invisible wounds and demons that 

come back from the battlefield with them. 

Dr. CARTER. I am attuned to it, and they are our people, and we 

need to care about them and care for them. Those who are having 

these kind of thoughts need help. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. On the issue of our veterans who have 

suffered from post traumatic stress, as again you and I have discussed, your predecessor, Secretary Hagel, worked with me, responded to my urging him to establish a new policy guidance on 

September 3, 2014, that finally directed proper consideration of 

post traumatic stress by the Boards for Correction of Military 

Records when considering upgrade requests. 

Post traumatic stress was unknown in the Vietnam and Korean 

eras, not unknown because it didn’t exist, but unknown because it 

wasn’t diagnosed. This new policy gives proper recognition to a 

medical condition that simply was never diagnosed at the time but 

may have caused less than honorable discharges. 

I hope that, if confirmed, you will ensure full and forceful implementation of this policy and continue outreach, because it is so vitally necessary, outreach to anyone who may be eligible to apply 

under the new guidelines. 

Dr. CARTER. I will. We have learned a lot about that, sadly, in 

recent years and understand now a lot better that it truly is a malady that we can and need to address. 

Yes, and thank you for taking an interest in it, as you have done 

about the welfare of the troops in so many other ways. In the 

course of the war, I was always very grateful for your attention to 

the well-being of the troops. 

Thank you. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much. I should probably 

stop there, but I do have a couple more questions. I really appreciate your kinds words. 

On the interoperability of the Department of Defense and the 

Veterans Administration, I am the ranking member on the Veterans Affairs Committee of the Senate, and I think there has been 

an ongoing concern, you are aware of it, of the issues relating to 

the integrated electronic health records, integrated disability evaluation system, treating military sexual trauma, other shared efforts that really involve a gap between these two great departments, each with a vital mission. 

57 

I am hoping that you will continue the effort that your predecessor, I think, believed was very important to close that gap and 

make sure that there really is the kind of connection, the vibrant, 

vital connection that is important to our troops and then to our veterans. 

Dr. CARTER. I recognized that gap, and there is only one soldier. 

There are two Cabinet departments. One soldier shouldn’t have to 

worry about two Cabinet departments. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. I would mention to my colleagues 

we are now into the second round of questioning. In deference to 

Dr. Carter’s health, I would request that we be as succinct as possible, but I want everyone to have a chance to continue questioning, if you are all right, Doctor? 

Dr. CARTER. I am, sir. Absolutely. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I will forego. 

Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. I will just pass. 

Chairman MCCAIN. All right. Next is Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. I would like to discuss the transfer of five 

Taliban commanders at Guantanamo Bay for Private Bowe 

Bergdahl. Knowing what we now know about the attempted recidivism of one of those Taliban members, as well as the ongoing investigation into Bowe Bergdahl’s conduct in Afghanistan, do you 

think that it was a correct decision to go forward with that transfer? 

Dr. CARTER. First of all, I don’t know the circumstances. I have 

read the newspaper reports, but I don’t have any other information 

about these individuals. 

What I do know is this. I wasn’t in Government at the time the 

decision was made, but I have read the letters from all the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff to Senator Levin on this matter, all of whom express 

support for the decision. I don’t want to speak for any of them, but 

just speaking for myself, it really boiled down to one thing, which 

you very much from your own distinguished service understand. 

Just to say it, it is that we have for decades and decades and decades gone back decades and decades and decades in time to battlefields to bring home our fallen. It is a sacred duty to bring back 

our fallen. 

That was the motivation that the chiefs cited as motivating their 

support for the Bergdahl decision. It obviously was a difficult decision to make because of the five people that you now cite. But they 

supported the decision, and based on what I know about the circumstances as they were known at the time, I would have supported the decision as well. 

Senator COTTON. I opposed it then, and I would oppose it now. 

We didn’t leave Bowe Bergdahl behind. The thousands of soldiers 

who went after him trying to find him who faced enemy fire trying 

to locate him were not leaving him behind. 

You are right that they tell every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine that they won’t leave us behind. But that doesn’t mean they 

will trade five stone-cold Taliban killers for us. 

58 

When this transfer happened, Congress was not notified as required by the law. Can you assure us that in the future, Congress 

will always receive advance notification, as required by law, for future releases of Guantanamo prisoners? 

Dr. CARTER. I can assure you we will always abide by the law. 

Absolutely, sir. 

Senator COTTON. There have been media reports, most recently 

from Secretary Hagel himself, that he received White House pressure to sign off on the certification that Guantanamo detainees 

could be released. There have been reports that Leon Panetta even 

declined to release these five specific Taliban members at Guantanamo Bay. 

Can you talk to us about how you might resist such pressure if 

you receive it from the White House when it comes to Guantanamo 

Bay releases? 

Dr. CARTER. I sure can. I am going to call it straight. I have an 

obligation under the law with respect to the risk associated with 

transfers of detainees, and I intend to discharge that responsibility 

in a very straight-up way. 

Senator COTTON. Shifting to Bowe Bergdahl, my understanding 

is the investigation is still ongoing into his conduct in Afghanistan. 

Is that your understanding? 

Dr. CARTER. That is my understanding from the newspapers, but 

I don’t have any inside information. 

Senator COTTON. If confirmed, can you assure us that that investigation will proceed without unlawful command influence at any 

level? 

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely. 

Senator COTTON. I would like to shift briefly to Russia and 

Ukraine and the implications for the Baltic states. Right now, there 

is fighting going on in Ukraine, much of it is over the so-called 

Minsk line where the forces were supposed to be separated since 

September. 

One technique that Russia used in Crimea, then they used in 

Eastern Ukraine is the so-called ‘‘little green men’’. By most reports, these are Russian special operations forces, who are operating in advance in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. 

If Russia has uniformed soldiers operating on foreign territory 

without insignia, would that be a violation of the Geneva Conventions? 

Dr. CARTER. What it is, I just don’t know the international legal 

answer to the question you are posing, Senator. But what I do 

know is that is what they have been doing, and I don’t know. I 

think the little green men are part of the big lie, the big Putin lie, 

where he is clearly violating the sovereignty of a neighboring country and then pretending it isn’t him and pretending it isn’t Russia. 

As far as I understand, it very clearly is Russia. It seems to me 

that is very important. I don’t know the legal part of it, but the 

common sense answer is he has violated Ukrainian sovereignty. 

Senator COTTON. I believe there is a strong case that it would 

violate the Geneva Conventions to have soldiers operating without 

insignia. Since you said earlier that you would support putting 

NATO forces in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, I would say I supVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
59 

port that as well, especially recon forces who might be on the lookout for little green men. 

Thank you. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Heinrich? 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman. 

Dr. Carter, you have spoken quite effectively about the need to 

address runaway costs, needless overhead, waste at DOD. I want 

to touch on the fiscal impact of operating the Guantanamo detention facility. 

Maintaining the prison at Guantanamo is costing American tax- payers almost $5 billion since it opened in 2002, an average of $493 

million every year for the last 5 years. In fact, in 2014, we spent 

more than $3 million per Guantanamo detainee. That compares to about $78,000 per prisoner a year that we use 

to house hardened criminals in the Florence, Colorado, supermax 

prison. Do you intend to review the cost effectiveness of continuing 

to operate the facility at Guantanamo versus placing high-risk detainees that need to continue to be detained in a more fiscally responsible setting? 

Dr. CARTER. Senator, I understand the cost numbers that you are 

citing. They broadly correspond to what I understand. I think the 

issue that Guantanamo will ultimately boil down to is what do you 

do with the people at Guantanamo that they need to be incarcerated. If not Gitmo, where are they going to be incarcerated? That 

is a fundamental question that is a very difficult one. 

It is partly a legal one and partly a practical one, and I don’t 

know everything I would need to know about that. But I hope that 

as time goes on and engaging with members of this committee, 

many of whom know much more about this subject than I do, that 

we can discuss what might be done with these people because what 

is plain as day is that they need to be incarcerated, as you indicated, in a supermax-type place. 

Senator HEINRICH. Yes, I appreciate that, and I look forward to 

working with you on that. 

As someone who helped draft the Nunn-Lugar legislation, which 

I think was one of the high water marks for legislation in the last 

decades, what is the right approach to preserving that nonproliferation infrastructure in the current environment? 

Dr. CARTER. The Nunn-Lugar program, since those days, has 

moved on to other very important missions. It is less focused on 

Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union than it once was. 

It is now focused globally. 

It has picked up a big focus on biological weapons, which are also 

very fearsome weapons, as well as nuclear weapons. It still has a 

role to play in keeping us safe. 

It is one of those ways that the Defense Department can act in 

its long-term interest to head off threats that were they to occur 

and materialize would be much more dangerous and much more 

costly to have to counter than if we can stop them from developing 

in the first place. 

Senator HEINRICH. I appreciate that. 

Back in 1995, we had our Nation’s first nuclear posture review. 

At that time, there was some talk about potentially transitioning 

60 

to a monad where land-based missiles and bombers might not be 

utilized. 

We have moved away from that, obviously, in recent years to the 

more traditional triad. What are your thoughts on the nuclear triad 

today, given today’s global security environment? Is that something 

you intend to continue to look at? Do you think it is meeting the 

deterrent requirements that we have, and just generally, what are 

your thoughts on it? 

Dr. CARTER. I think it is meeting our deterrent requirements. I 

think those deterrent requirements are going to be with us as far 

into the future as I can see, and that is why having a safe, secure, 

and reliable nuclear arsenal and all the parts of that that are necessitated is a foundational responsibility of the Department of Defense. 

It is not in the newspapers every day. It is not, you know, as apparent, I suppose, to many citizens. But it is foundational to our 

security. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Dr. Carter. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank the chair. 

I want to thank you, Dr. Carter, for being in such a lengthy hearing and answering so many of our questions. We really appreciate 

it. 

I wanted to follow up on Russia, and specifically in your advance 

policy questions, you had stated that Russian deployment of weapon systems that violate the INF [Intermediate Range Nuclear 

Forces] treaty would pose an increased threat to the United States 

and our allies in Europe and Asia. You have also written that Russia should return to compliance with the INF treaty in a verifiable 

manner. 

I think one of the problem we are facing as we look at the challenges we face, Russia is developing a new mobile nuclear groundlaunched cruise missile, which is in direct violation of that 1987 

treaty, which was likely in development even during the New 

START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] negotiations, which not 

only all the behavior we have seen in Ukraine, but this makes it 

harder for us to have these types of conversations with Russia and 

be able to trust anything that they say. 

What steps should we be taking in response to Russia’s INF violation? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

My answer is not based on any inside information or intelligence 

information, just to be clear, but it is, I am told, quite clear that 

Russia has violated the INF treaty. To the question what are we 

going to do about it? I think you have to remind Russia that this 

was a two-way street. 

That we signed a treaty that said you are not going to do this, 

and we are not going to do it either. If you don’t want to have that 

treaty, why then you are absolved from your restrictions under that 

treaty, well, we are, too. What might we do, therefore, in a military 

sense to respond to this development if it continues on the part of 

Russia? 

I think that there are defensive steps that we can take. There 

are deterrent steps that we can take, and there are counterforce 

61 

steps that we can take. We have military options, too, if they really 

want to get into this kind of game. Obviously, the judgment behind 

the INF treaty was that we both be better off if we didn’t do this. 

That is why we agreed. 

But these are always two-way streets, and I think they need to 

be reminded it is a two-way street. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. I appreciate that very much, Dr. 

Carter. 

I wanted to follow up on two areas. First, on the Guantanamo 

Bay discussion, one of the things that I think is important for people to understand is that we are not at the moment talking about 

transfers. We are talking about releases, and I think that is an important distinction. Something, obviously, as Secretary of Defense, 

you should be looking at, as we talked about earlier, making sure 

that people can’t be in a position to reengage. 

One country in particular I want to ask you about, and that is 

Yemen. Last year, I had an amendment that passed on a bipartisan basis that would have prohibited transfers to Yemen. The situation has gotten markedly worse since that amendment passed in 

this committee. It did not get in the final bill. 

I have 10 pages of incidents in Yemen, and obviously, the recent 

issues with the Houthis, the takeover of the government, as well 

as suicide attacks, et cetera. Do you think it is advisable or would 

you recommend transferring any of these detainees to Yemen? 

Dr. CARTER. That doesn’t sound very sensible in the environment 

in which we are facing ourselves, no. 

Senator AYOTTE. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

I also wanted to follow up, in our office discussion, we had talked 

about the A–10. One thing I had asked of you that I hope you will 

do when you are confirmed, and that is, I have opposed the Air 

Force’s decision to retire the A–10, particularly from what I have 

heard from our men and women on the ground and the fact that 

it is the best close-air support platform for our men and women in 

uniform. 

We have heard from the association that represents 3,300 serving, separated, and retired JTACs [joint terminal attack controller]. 

That is the Tactical Air Control Party Association, and what they 

have said about the A–10, ‘‘We believe that F–15, 16s, and B–1s 

cannot replicate the CAS [close air support] capabilities of the A– 

10. And we know from combat experience that the elimination of 

the A–10 before a viable replacement achieves full operational capability will cost American lives.’’ 

I asked you in my office, and I would like you to confirm again 

that you are willing to sit down with some of our members of this 

association who, as you know, are the ones on the ground calling 

in the strikes and working with our men and women in uniform. 

They work with all of our platforms. 

Dr. CARTER. I remember very clearly. I have the letter that you 

gave me from them, and absolutely, I will. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. This is really important. 

I have one other follow-up request that you had graciously 

agreed to in the office as well, and I think that Senator King from 

Maine will appreciate this as well, and that is that you agreed to 

62 

come to New Hampshire. We, of course, at that point will obviously 

love to show Dr. Carter the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. 

Senator KING. In Maine, you mean? The one in Maine? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator AYOTTE. Where so many of the wonderful workers are 

from New Hampshire. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I would look forward to that. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Dr. Carter. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. It is not necessary, Doctor. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst? 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Again, thank you, Dr. Carter, for being here today. 

As a military, we have moved a very long ways away from using 

the old compass and map. Many of our systems now are very heavily networked. We rely very much on technology for our weapon 

systems, for our command and control systems, and that is really 

our primary tools for achieving dominance over our adversaries on 

the battlefield. 

But what we are seeing now is cybersecurity threat, cyber attacks that are looming out there. A number of countries out there, 

including Russia, China, North Korea, probably many others, have 

very sophisticated means of attacking networks. How do you see 

that impacting our acquisition strategy as we move forward, and 

how do we best protect our equipment, protect our personnel moving forward? 

Dr. CARTER. I think you said it exactly the way I see it. You understand, but perhaps others around the country don’t understand 

that not only is our civilian infrastructure susceptible to cyber attack, but we have to be concerned about our military infrastructure 

because exactly as you say, there is no point in having planes and 

ships and armored vehicles in today’s world if the network is itself 

vulnerable. 

I think, and I hope I can work together, if I am confirmed, with 

this committee on improving our cyber defenses, many aspects of 

cyber. But one is the defense of our own networks in the Department of Defense. That is not where it should be in terms of making 

them immune to attack by a potential enemy that would impair 

our own forces engaged with that enemy. 

I agree with you entirely. 

Senator ERNST. Yes, thank you. We rely on networking so very 

much, from the simple ordering of a part for a Humvee to targeting 

enemy on the battlefield. It goes from every level, from your squad 

level all the way up through the ranks. 

Do you have an opinion on this? Just your opinion because it is 

more than just the military and the Department of Defense and 

our network security. We could look at attacks to our financial institutions, to our utilities as being a security risk for the United 

States also. 

Do you have an opinion on where the Federal Government 

should be in regards to protecting our national security interests 

63 

versus the privacy of individuals out there that might be using the 

network? 

Dr. CARTER. I do. I have some understanding of that issue, and 

I would say that the Federal Government does have a role in protecting the country from cyber attack in the same way that it has 

a role in protecting the country from other kinds of attack. I think 

it can do a lot more to exercise that responsibility without causing 

concerns over invasions of people’s privacy and so forth. 

For example, the Government can share information and knowledge it has collected about threats to private networks with those 

private parties, provided the proper legal safeguards are provided, 

which have less to do with privacy than they do with things like 

antitrust and other aspects that are important. 

I think that the Government can sponsor and conduct R&D that 

improves the tradecraft in network defense for the good of the 

country. I think there is a lot we can do, and we are not anywhere 

near where we should be as a country. 

I think if we were as unprotected in some other domain that was 

more familiar to ordinary people, they would be clamoring for us 

to do more. I think if people fully understand what you understand 

about how vulnerable we are in cyberspace, they would want us to 

do more, not in any way that compromised anybody’s privacy, but 

they would want us to be doing a lot more than I believe we are 

doing now. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. I appreciate that. I think this will 

continue to be a vexing problem for us moving forward. It is a situation we are dealing with in many of our separate committees. But 

I do appreciate your opinion very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, I wanted to go back to the issue 

of Iran for a moment. Under the chairman’s leadership, we have 

had some tremendous witnesses over the last 3 weeks testifying on 

strategic challenges and how to think through them. 

Dr. Kissinger’s testimony in particular was very powerful, and he 

said, as we kind of struggle with these, ‘‘we’’ collectively in the legislative branch, executive branch, these strategic issues and challenges, that we need to ask ourselves questions. The first one, and 

I think in his view the most important one, was what do we seek 

to prevent, no matter how it happens and, if necessary, alone? 

I will repeat that. What do we seek to prevent, no matter how 

we prevent it, and, if necessary, alone? In your view, would preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon fall into that first 

category that Dr. Kissinger laid out? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. Yes. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay. Thank you. 

Second, I want to get back to the issue we were talking about 

a little bit earlier, this issue of kind of being straight up with not 

only Congress and the American people on our challenges. I think 

you have been doing that today in your testimony. 

Again, I have some doubts that that is happening at the highest 

levels. The President’s mention in his State of the Union referring 

to 9/11 and then saying ‘‘The crisis has passed.’’ I don’t think most 

Americans would agree with that. 

64 

But the discussion today about ISIL and you were talking about 

lasting defeat, it really is actually Islamic extremism and the 

threat it poses to the United States and our citizens. What, in your 

view, is the timeline? Because I think this is an issue that really 

hasn’t been discussed. 

Some people think that we are going to declare victory next year, 

2 years? There have been others who have been saying, no, this is 

much more like the Cold War. Former CENTCOM [United States 

Central Command] commander General John Abizaid talked about 

‘‘the long war’’. 

Where do you see this kind of defeat playing out? If it is going 

to take a long time, maybe a generation, shouldn’t we be preparing 

the American people for that, as opposed to saying, oh, we are 

going to defeat ISIL within a year? 

Dr. CARTER. I certainly hope that we defeat ISIL quickly, but 

that won’t be a lasting defeat necessarily, unless we have a political dimension to that defeat as well as a military defeat. That 

won’t be the end of terrorism, Islamist extremism’s terrorism. 

Our experience has been this is a movement that changes and 

morphs and moves around the world. One would like to hope that 

at some point its inherent unattractiveness would cause it to burn 

out, but we can’t be confident of that. 

Senator SULLIVAN. How do you think we should be thinking 

about it from a time standpoint? 

Dr. CARTER. I think we need to be thinking about terrorism, 

more generally, as an enduring part of our national security mission. I believe that Secretaries of Defense, many in the future, even 

if Islamist extremism, which I certainly hope burns itself out at 

some point, will always be facing the problem of the few against 

the many. 

There are aberrant people out there, and technology in today’s 

world gives smaller and smaller groups of people and even individuals destructive power that they would never have had in previous 

eras. It is going to be the job of our security authorities—defense, 

law enforcement, homeland security, and everything—to protect 

our people against these people, whatever their thinking. 

They may not be thinking in the ISIL way. They may have something else on their mind. Or nothing at all on their minds. But I 

do think it is going to be a continuing part of the human condition 

and of defending our people. 

Senator SULLIVAN. I want to just ask one final question. I think 

one thing that is going to be very important is to continue a very 

strong focus on training. Severe, hard training for our troops. 

As you know, in periods of drawdown or changes, as a country, 

historically, we haven’t always done this well. We talked about 

this. When you are an infantry officer in the Marine Corps, you are 

strongly encouraged to read this book called ‘‘This Kind of War’’. 

I encourage you or your staff to take a look at it. It is called ‘‘a 

study in unpreparedness,’’ and it shows what happens when you 

have troops that are not trained. 

If confirmed, you are obviously going to have a myriad of responsibilities, pressures on you. I would like to get a commitment that 

you will keep as certainly one of your top, if not top priorities this 

issue of training—hard, severe training. Because as you know, the 

65 

best way to ultimately take care of the troops is to make sure that 

they are ready to fight, destroy the enemy, and come home safely. 

Can we get that commitment from you? 

Dr. CARTER. You absolutely have it. I just would say your 

authoritativeness on that exact subject is very much appreciated 

and respected. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Carter, I know we are trying to get you out. I will be very 

brief, but I did want to come back to an issue that you and I had 

a chance to talk about briefly when you came in to see me, about 

the importance of our public shipyards and the good work that they 

do. Senator King, I know Senator Ayotte, and I are all very proud 

of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and that you were issued an invitation to visit, which I would second. 

We would love to have you come up. While you are at it, you can 

come to Pease Air National Guard Base and see the home of the 

new KC–46 air refueling tanker, which we are also very proud of. 

One of the challenges of sequestration is the impact on not just 

our men and women serving in uniform, but also on our civilian 

workforce. Can you talk about the threats that is posed by the uncertainty, especially for the engineers, the scientists, the mathematicians that we are going to need to continue to fill those civilian 

jobs to keep our shipyards at their highest level of efficiency and 

production and all of our depots as well? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. Thank you. 

I do want to take the opportunity to express my gratitude for 

what our civilian members of our Department of Defense do. A lot 

of people have the image of the civilian as a bureaucrat sitting behind a desk somewhere, and that is an issue we also need to get 

at because there is that, too, and that is costly in headquarters and 

overhead and so forth. 

But most of DOD civilians are not sitting behind a desk. They 

are actually doing maintenance work and repair work that actually 

needs to get done. They are not a waste. They are there doing 

something essential. 

I think that sometimes we talk about them as though we don’t 

appreciate them, and I think we do need to appreciate them. Even 

as we cut down, as I believe we need to do, the overall number of 

civilians in the Department of Defense, I think you do that by getting rid of the overhead and the unnecessary layers and offices and 

so forth. 

But I don’t think anybody ought to be talking about somebody 

who fixes and maintains an essential piece of equipment. We ought 

to be giving our thanks to those folks for what they are doing for 

the country. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Are you concerned about the impact that sequestration might have on our ability to continue to maintain those 

civilian workers who have the backgrounds that we need to continue to do those jobs? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. Because one of the things that sequester does 

because it hits fast and hard is cause managers in defense to take 

66 

away dollars from exactly that kind of work, and it gets back to the 

readiness issue. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Tillis? 

Senator TILLIS. Dr. Carter, sorry I had to step out. I had another 

committee meeting. If this question has been asked, I apologize. 

In your response to some of the written questions submitted to 

you, there was a concern expressed over the size of our naval fleet 

and how it has reduced in numbers. In your response, you commented that you can’t just look at the absolute number of ships to 

determine what our capabilities are. 

My question for you is what can you share with us that should 

make us feel okay with some reduction in the fleet, if you believe 

that that is okay as a long-term position? Secondly, what do you 

think the long-term plan should be for our naval readiness? 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

It is true that, as you say, that you have to look at quality and 

not just quantity. I mean, that said, I think the Navy’s shipbuilding plan calls for it to increase the number of ships, not to decrease the number of ships. I certainly think that is important. 

Our Navy is the paramount navy of the world, and that is one 

of the things that makes us a global power. It is what allows us 

to be present when things break somewhere. Whether it be a conflict or a natural disaster, you see the Americans show up first in 

either case. Why do they do that? One of the ways they do that is 

through the Navy. 

I have a strong interest in maintaining not just the quality, but 

the quantity as well. Obviously, this gets back to the budget and 

how many dollars we have. Another reason why we need to have 

enough dollars. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

I have another question and final question. It relates to a report 

I am expecting the Secretary of the Air Force to submit to Congress, saying that they are going to be pulling out the Air Force 

assets from Pope Field. You and I touched on this briefly when we 

met. 

I think the result of that is going to be the Army requiring 

planes to be flown in to support training exercises there. I am more 

worried about Pope Field, going forward. It looks like the current 

course and speed, it could wither away, and I think it is an important strategic asset. 

Rather than ask you to take a position on this decision, I would 

like to get your commitment once you are confirmed to meet with 

me and others who have a concern with this not as a North Carolina issue, but as a perhaps not a good strategic decision. Walk 

through this and see if either I can be convinced that it is the right 

decision or you can be convinced it may be something we have to 

rethink. I would appreciate your commitment to doing that. 

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely, you have that. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I am told that Senator Lee is on his way. Is 

his staffer here? 

67 

[Pause.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. From the airport? 

Senator TILLIS. Pope Field. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. I just don’t think we can hold up the witness. 

Can I just say we intend to receive as many written questions as 

necessary by the end of business today. You can review them and 

have your answers returned so that we can get your confirmation 

to the floor early next week. 

If not, as you know, the week after that, we are in a recess. We 

will try and get it accomplished. 

I heard a door close. Yes, go ahead, Jack. 

Senator REED. I just simply want to thank Dr. Carter for his 

service to the Nation, for his testimony today, and thank the chairman for an extremely thoughtful hearing and a very productive 

hearing. 

Thank you. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I just can’t hold the witness any longer. 

[Pause.] 

Senator TILLIS. Senator McCain, I think he is running around 

the ante room to this entrance here. I would expect him to pop 

through in about 10 seconds. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Lee, welcome. 

Senator LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

You have been very patient today and answered a lot of questions, and I just wanted to talk to you briefly about religious freedom within the military. I think the ability to believe according to 

one’s own belief system and to express those views appropriately 

is of utmost importance to the morale of all of our service men and 

women and to their families. 

I think it is also something of a pillar of our society, something 

that we have always expected would be tolerated is a diversity of 

religious viewpoint and religious expression. Certainly one’s religious freedom should never be curtailed merely because one decides 

to serve one’s country in the military. 

I was concerned late last year to hear about a situation in the 

Army in which a chaplain in the course of some suicide prevention 

training was reprimanded for sharing his faith, talking about how 

his faith played a really important role in his personal recovery 

from depression. 

My understanding is that he was reprimanded despite the fact 

that the Army itself, of course, recognizes the importance of spiritual wellness and the importance that faith can play in a person’s 

life in dealing with mental health issues of all kinds and an Army 

that has affirmed the important role that chaplains tend to play in 

our armed services. 

Congress, of course, has acted several times in recent years to 

prioritize protection of religious freedom and religious expression 

within the armed services, respecting the necessity, of course, of 

maintaining good order and discipline and making sure that those 

things aren’t ever compromised. 

What is your view on religious freedom and freedom of religious 

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firmed as Secretary, to make sure that those rights are respected 

and that the obligations imposed by Congress on the military are 

honored? 

Dr. CARTER. I do think it is important, and I don’t think there 

is any inherent conflict between religious freedom and religious expression and good order and discipline. We can have both. 

I don’t know anything about the particular case you adduced, but 

that this idea of having both and that they are not in inherent conflict with one another I think is extremely important and one that 

if I am confirmed in this job, I would want to see to it that no one 

thought that there was an inherent conflict between those two. 

Senator LEE. Thank you. I appreciate that, and I know those who 

serve us certainly appreciate that as well. 

I appreciated what I heard you say earlier. I think it was in connection with a question asked by Senator Ernst regarding the valuable contributions of our National Guard and our Reserve units in 

combat. I hope that as the Services continue to reassess their force 

mixture that those sentiments that you expressed very well will 

continue to be at the forefront of your mind and that you will be 

conscious of those things. 

As I look at the Guard units in my home State of Utah, those 

Guard units have served us very well, and a lot of our 

servicemembers who serve in our Guard units have been deployed 

many, many times just over the last few years. They have served 

exceptionally well, and I hope you will continue to recognize them, 

their contributions, and to utilize them appropriately. 

Dr. CARTER. I will. You just said it very well. They have really 

come through for us. 

Senator LEE. Thank you very much. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, sir. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time is rapidly 

expiring. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Doctor, as I mentioned, we will try to ask our members to get 

in any written questions they have for you by noon tomorrow so 

that you will have time to return those either before the weekend 

or just after. 

We will see, talk to the Majority Leader to see if we can’t get 

your nomination to the floor so that you can get to work. 

We thank you for your patience today and thank you for your appearance and thank you for your willingness to continue to serve 

this Nation. 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to the Honorable Ashton B. Carter by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delinVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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eated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. No. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. I do not see a need for modification of any Goldwater-Nichols Act or special operations provisions at this time. The success of our Armed Forces since the 

enactment of these provisions amply demonstrates that they have served the Department and our Nation well. 

DUTIES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Question. Section 113 of title 10, United States Code, provides that the Secretary 

of Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the 

Department of Defense (DOD). Subject to the direction of the President, the Secretary of Defense, under section 113, has authority, direction, and control over DOD. 

Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of Defense? 

Answer. No. 

Question. What changes to section 113, if any, would you recommend? 

Answer. At this time, I believe that the authorities in section 113 for the position 

of Secretary of Defense are appropriate. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. I have spent more than 3 decades working on defense and national security issues, both in and out of government. Most recently I served in two senior positions in the Department, including as the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. As Deputy 

Secretary of Defense I served as the Department’s Chief Operating Officer with 

management over the Department’s budget and civilian military personnel. During 

my tenure as Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I had responsibility for the department’s efforts to accelerate the production of urgent operational need such as MRAPs which saved countless lives in Afghanistan, increase 

the taxpayer’s buying power, and strengthen the Nation’s defense against emerging 

threats. 

Previously, in the 1990s, I served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy where I was responsible for a variety of strategic issues. 

Between my periods of government service I have served in a variety of academic 

and government advisory roles focused on national security and defense issues. 

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, you will confront a range of critical issues relating to 

threats to national security and ensuring that the Armed Forces are prepared to 

deal with these threats. 

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Secretary of Defense? 

Answer. The challenges include preserving and enhancing the finest fighting force 

in the world and taking care of their families; providing a strategic perspective to 

the threats and opportunities in the world; and implementing significant reforms 

that are crucial in a time of budget uncertainty. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to addressing these challenges by consulting 

with the civilian and military leadership of the Department, seeking the perspective 

of our partners, allies and friends, working closely with my interagency partners, 

seeking the best ideas from outside the government, and working closely with this 

committee and Congress. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of 

issues which must be addressed by the Secretary of Defense? 

Answer. The top priorities are to ensure the security of the American people, defend our vital interests, and fight and win our Nation’s wars. 

70 

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain 

of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct communications to combatant commanders be 

transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function. 

Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and effective chain of command? 

Answer. My understanding of these laws and my experience leads me to believe 

that they establish a clear and effective chain of command, which is an essential 

element to successful military operations. 

Question. In your view, do these provisions enhance or degrade civilian control of 

the military? 

Answer. In my view, these provisions significantly enhance civilian control of the 

military and place the President and the Secretary of Defense in position to best 

exercise civilian control of the military by occupying the top positions in the military 

chain of command. 

Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for U.S. 

military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority outside the chain of command established under title 10, United Sates Code? 

Answer. I believe that U.S. military forces normally should operate under the 

chain of command established under title 10. However, today’s threats are such that 

there may be circumstances involving certain sensitive operations where an exception to that chain of command may be appropriate to provide military support to 

the head of a non-DOD U.S. department or agency. It is my understanding that only 

the President may approve such an exception, as also provided in section 162 of title 

10. If confirmed, I will consider these situations very carefully and provide the 

President with my best advice regarding where an exception to the established 

chain of command may be appropriate. 

ADVICE OF THE SERVICE CHIEFS AND THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS

Question. Section 151 of title 10, United States Code, provides, in part, that the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense and that if any 

member of the Joint Chiefs submits to the Chairman advice or an opinion, in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the 

Chairman, the Chairman shall present that advice or opinion at the same time he 

provides his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the 

Secretary of Defense. Section 163 of title 10, United States Code, provides that the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman for the combatant 

commanders, especially on the operational requirements of their commands. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the distribution of responsibilities 

and authorities for providing uniformed professional military judgment, advice, and 

opinions to the President, National Security Council, and civilian leadership of the 

Department? 

Answer. Based on my understanding of the law and my experience, I believe the 

distribution of responsibilities and authorities for providing professional military 

judgment, advice, and opinions is adequate and functioning well. 

Question. What changes in law, if any, do you think may be necessary to ensure 

that the views of the Service Chiefs and of the combatant commanders are presented and considered? 

Answer. Based on my understanding of the law, and my experience, I do not recommend any changes to the law. 

USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Question. The question as to whether and when U.S. forces should participate in 

potentially dangerous situations is one of the most important and difficult decisions 

that the national command authorities have to make. Prior Secretaries of Defense 

and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have proposed criteria to guide decisionmaking for such situations. 

In your view, what factors should be considered in making recommendations to 

the President on the use of military force? 

Answer. The factors that should be considered are: the necessity of removing a 

critical threat to the U.S. Homeland and citizens and its allies and friends; the prosVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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pects and strategy for achieving lasting success through the use of force; complementary employment, as appropriate, of other instruments of national power; 

and the assistance as appropriate of allies and partners. 

NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET REDUCTIONS

Question. The 2011 Budget Control Act established discretionary budget caps to realize nearly $1 trillion in budget savings spending over 10 years. Half of those 

budget cuts are to national defense discretionary accounts. 

Do you believe that defense spending reductions of this magnitude can be accomplished without significant adverse impact on our national security? 

Answer. No. During my tenure as Deputy Secretary and Acquisition Executive the 

Department developed a comprehensive strategy. I said then, and I will reiterate 

now, that the strategy is not executable under the sequestration-level budget caps 

of the Budget Control Act. 

Question. How would you assess the national military strategy to deal with the 

changed budget environment? 

Answer. Any strategy must continue to protect and advance this Nation’s interests, within the resources the Nation is willing to commit to national defense. If confirmed, I will seek a balance between maintaining an agile and ready force to address today’s demands while investing in the capabilities we need to address future 

challenges. 

Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the adequacy of 

DOD funding? 

Answer. The measure must be, can the Department meet the security challenges 

of today, while also investing adequate resources to prepare for future security challenges, both the expected and the unexpected. 

Question. If confirmed, and given this era of budget austerity, how will you 

prioritize the objectives of meeting ongoing operational commitments around the 

world, re-setting of the force, and investing in the future force? 

Answer. There has to be a balance. The Department should have sufficient capacity to deal with the wide range of challenges we face, yet not maintain more capacity than we can afford to modernize and keep ready, given that we also have a responsibility to the force of the future. 

READINESS OF THE ARMED FORCES

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current readiness of 

the Armed Forces? 

Answer. I believe that readiness has been especially affected by sudden and uncertain budget reductions. Readiness is essential to our security and to ensure 

troops sent in to conflict are fully prepared. The Service Chiefs testified last week 

before this committee that there have been some readiness gains over the last year, 

but that there are still critical readiness deficits in many areas. Any readiness gains 

over the last year appear to me to be extremely fragile and will certainly reverse 

without sufficient resources. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Department’s readiness reporting and monitoring systems, such as the Defense Readiness Reporting 

System (DRRS)? In you view, does DRRS provide civilian and military leaders with 

the information necessary to make informed resource and operational decisions? 

Answer. The readiness systems in place provide senior leaders with the information they need to determine which forces are ready to deploy considering a variety 

of mission criteria. These systems contain current and historical readiness data 

from the tactical to the strategic level. In my view, the DRRS does provide the necessary information to make informed resource and operational decisions. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose making to the Department’s readiness systems to ensure timely and accurate information is available 

for decisions on commitment of military forces and to judge the impact of budget 

conditions on the readiness of the Armed Forces? 

Answer. The Department’s readiness reporting systems, the DRRS in particular, 

contain a variety of readiness resourcing and capability data that is useful for senior 

leaders to gain an understanding of our operational vulnerabilities and shortcomings. 

Question. If confirmed, to what key indications and indicators of a ‘‘hollow’’ or unready military will you pay closest attention? What are the most dangerous risks 

or consequences associated with a ‘‘hollow’’ or unready force in your opinion? 

Answer. Key elements of readiness include the quality of our military personnel 

and the status of their individual training in the military specialties, the manning 

and training of the units in which they serve to meet the mission essential tasks 

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they are given, and the availability of their required equipment from basic small 

arms to major platforms. This individual and unit readiness must be assessed 

against the requirement of the contingency plans of the combatant commanders. I 

have always paid considerable attention to these elements and I will continue to do 

so if confirmed as this is an essential obligation of leaders to the forces we send 

in harm’s way. 

AUDIT READINESS

Question. DOD remains unable to achieve a clean financial statement audit. The 

Department also remains on the Government Accountability Office’s list of high risk 

agencies and management systems for financial management and weapon system 

acquisition. Although audit-readiness has been a goal of the Department for decades, DOD has repeatedly failed to meet numerous congressionally directed auditreadiness deadlines. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the Department’s efforts to 

achieve a clean financial statement audit? 

Answer. My understanding of the Department’s efforts is that the Department 

has made progress in the last 5 years following the strategic plan and priorities established early in this Administration. If confirmed, I will get a detailed assessment 

from my Chief Financial Officer, and hold him responsible and accountable for making auditability one of my top business reform priorities. 

Question. Do you believe that the Department is likely to meet the current 2017 

statutory objective for ensuring that its financial statements are validated as ready 

for audit? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will be in a better position to inform Congress on the 2017 

objective after I have the results of the ongoing military departments’ audits. 

Question. What is the likeliness that this audit will produce a clean opinion? In 

your view, how long is it likely to be from the time when the Department certifies 

its financial statements as ‘‘ready for audit’’ to the time when the Department 

achieves a clean audit opinion? If confirmed, what specific actions would you propose taking to promote compliance with the statutory objective? 

Answer. Experience throughout the government, with agencies that are far smaller and less complex than DOD, demonstrates it takes several years to move from 

an initial audit to a clean opinion. So I do not think it is realistic to expect that 

a first year audit of the entire Department will produce a clean opinion. If confirmed, I will continue to make this a high priority and hold our senior leaders, civilian and military, accountable for positive progress towards a clean opinion. 

Question. What is your understanding of what the validation of audit readiness 

means? What steps will the Department go through to validate its financial statements as ready for audit and when will these steps be taken? 

Answer. My understanding is that a validation of audit readiness is an independent assessment to ensure key elements required by a financial audit are in fact 

part of the day-to-day processes and internal controls and can be demonstrated to 

show they are compliant with accounting standards. If confirmed, I will develop a 

complete understanding of the department’s validation of audit readiness in order 

to hold the Chief Financial Officer responsible and accountable to monitor key critical path milestones so the Department is ready for audit in fiscal year 2018. 

Question. What steps do you believe that Congress and/or the Department should 

take if the Department fails to meet the statutory objective, given that the current 

administration will not be in office in 2017? 

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to do everything I can to position the Department 

to comply with the statutory guidance. The Chief Financial Officer should lay out 

a clear set of interim critical path milestones and ensuring those gates are met. If 

confirmed, I will ensure that this receives an appropriate priority and that accountability is instilled into the performance appraisals of senior leaders. I believe Congress should continue to provide constructive oversight to ensure full understanding 

of the Department’s direction and progress and to help when applicable. 

Question. In your view, what evidence, if any, can we point to today that provides 

Congress and taxpayers confidence that the Department’s resources are being spent 

appropriately given its inability to pass a financial statement audit? 

Answer. The Department continues to meet the mission of defending our country’s 

basic values with a world-class military. It trains and equips our men and women 

to carry out critical missions to protect us and our allies around the world. While 

the department currently falls short of having a clean audit of our financial statements, we do receive positive audit opinions on a significant amount of our resources, and there are numerous controls in place to ensure taxpayer resources are 

spent as intended by the Congress. Independent of auditability, the department has 

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a detailed track of where the money goes and what it supports. If confirmed, I intend to demonstrate to the taxpayers that DOD is a good steward of our resources 

and worthy of their confidence. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS COLLABORATION

Question. DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have in recent years increased collaboration to support servicemembers as they transition to veteran status. This support includes access to health and mental health care, improved disability evaluation, and coordination of compensation and other benefits. 

If confirmed, what would you do to ensure that the DOD and VA fully cooperate 

with each other to develop simplified processes to achieve seamless transition as 

servicemembers move to veteran status? 

Answer. We must be unwavering in our commitment to our veterans and their 

families. DOD and the VA continuously collaborate to better support transitioning 

servicemembers. This effort includes the Transition Assistance Program to ensure 

our servicemembers receive the skills and tools necessary for a successful transition 

from Active Duty to civilian life. In addition, I am aware that the two Departments 

have improved information sharing, such as timely availability of Service Treatment 

Records to VA and enhanced sharing of health information, and are working toward 

greater interoperability of their records systems. If confirmed, I will continue to direct those responsible in DOD to work toward a seamless transition from recovery 

to reintegration or transition for our servicemembers, especially those who are 

wounded, ill, or injured. 

INTEGRATED DISABILITY EVALUATION SYSTEM

Question. The Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) integrates the 

DOD and VA disability systems to improve and expedite processing of 

servicemembers through the disability evaluation system. Servicemembers continue, 

however, to experience lengthy delays getting their disability ratings. Although 

DOD has shown progress in meeting IDES timeliness goals, IDES casework remains 

backlogged in the VA’s portion of the system. 

What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the IDES? 

Answer. DOD must continually evaluate its disability evaluation system to identify and implement process improvements. A key initiative underway is the development of a DOD Disability Evaluation System (DES) IT system to provide new capabilities to support end-to-end DES case management—tracking, reporting, and electronic case file transfer. We need to continue to work with VA to ensure our IT systems for evaluating and compensating disabled servicemembers and veterans are 

interoperable. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the VA Secretary to ensure both 

DOD and VA meet or exceed timeliness goals through each phase of the multi-step 

disability evaluation process? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to engage directly with the Secretary of the 

VA and at DOD with senior leaders in the Services. I will direct the DOD to collaborate with our VA partners to identify necessary changes and appropriately address 

them. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD maintains an effective joint and integrated disability program. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. What is your assessment of the Department’s progress on implementing 

recent legislative changes intended to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in the 

military? 

Answer. First, I want to make clear that I consider sexual assault absolutely and 

without exception unacceptable. It is reprehensible in any aspect of society but particularly consequential in the military, which must operate quickly with complete 

trust and delegates so much authority to commanders and where missions often require long deployments in austere environments. I understand the Department is 

implementing many new provisions of law, mandating many changes in programs 

and procedures. I am told that implementation of the provisions in the NDAA for 

fiscal year 2014 is ongoing. I believe DOD needs to do better in its prevention efforts 

and in responding to the needs of survivors compassionately, quickly and effectively. 

My understanding is the Department is also working on the implementation of 

the relevant Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon NDAA for fiscal year 2015 

sections, which were enacted in December 2014. If confirmed, I will personally continue to make this a top priority and continue the collaboration with Members of 

Congress, which is crucial in identifying issues and crafting solutions. 

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Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the 

Services have in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will take a personal role in assessing these issues and 

holding people accountable for outcomes. I am aware that training exists for all 

servicemembers, at all levels, and it is tailored specifically to resonate within each 

Service and rank’s culture. I will continue to assess the effectiveness of this training, and ensure adjustments are made as necessary. It is my understanding that 

the investigators in recent years have largely changed from an incident-focused investigation to an offender-focused investigation, which emphasizes that an offender’s 

behavioral history may extend beyond the confines of any one particular incident. 

I am also aware that the relevant agencies have developed training that helps investigators better understand the impact of trauma on memory. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department continues to work to refine and improve training. 

Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the Services, and 

military commanders in particular, to hold assailants accountable for their acts? 

Answer. A top priority of DOD must be to hold assailants appropriately accountable for their acts. This must be carried out by the Services and military commanders. 

Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals 

to remove from military commanders’ disposition authority over violations of the 

Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assaults? 

Answer. Leaders have offered thoughtful perspectives on both sides of this issue. 

As a matter of first principle, I believe that the Secretary of Defense and other leaders need to be able to hold everyone in an organization accountable. I understand 

the Department is concerned that this change could tell commanders that it is not 

their job to root out the evil of sexual assault. I further understand that a congressionally-mandated independent panel found no evidence that removing commanders 

from the process would improve accountability of offenders or reporting by victims. 

If confirmed, I will take a direct personal role in this issue. 

Question. What is your assessment of the results of the recently reported survey 

of military members on the prevalence of sexual assault in the Armed Services? 

Answer. The existence of sexual assault within our ranks is deeply disturbing and 

the conduct is utterly unacceptable. The Department must continue its work to 

eliminate sexual assault. The incidence of sexual assault and the percentage of victims who are retaliated against or concerned about retaliation remain unacceptably 

high. I am particularly concerned by the finding that a substantial portion of victims 

perceived some level of retaliation associated with their sexual assault report, including alienation and other forms of social ostracism from their peers. This destroys good order and discipline and fosters a climate that is inconsistent with the 

dignity and respect that our servicemembers deserve. 

Question. What is the status of the review of the Manual for Courts-Martial directed by Secretary Hagel and when do you anticipate the Department will provide 

a report on this review to this committee? 

Answer. I understand that at Secretary Hagel’s direction, the DOD’s Military Justice Review Group (MJRG) is conducting a comprehensive review of the military justice system. It is my understanding that the MJRG will issue two reports, one in 

March 2015 recommending changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and one 

in September 2015 recommending changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial. If confirmed, I anticipate directing the relevant DOD components to review the reports 

and recommendations for appropriate action, and if necessary, proposed legislation. 

Question. Secretary Hagel conducted a weekly oversight review to ensure continued progress on implementing legislative changes intended to combat sexual assault. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior level direction and 

oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults? 

Answer. If confirmed, my personal involvement will be frequent and regular, 

which will guide the Department to adapt its sexual assault policies and systems 

with agility. If confirmed, I plan to continue this personal commitment to eliminating sexual assault in our ranks and restoring victim confidence in our response 

system. I recognize that it will be critical to work closely with Congress and Service 

leaders to deliver consistent and effective prevention initiatives to influence behavior with the goal of eliminating the crime of sexual assault across the Department. 

Question. What is your assessment of the military’s protections against retaliation 

for reporting sexual assault? 

Answer. Based on the recent report to the President, they are not adequate. The 

report underscores the need to better understand the complex ways in which the 

retaliation manifests itself, and to ensure that victims of sexual assault have choices 

in the form of assistance they engage to address this behavior. If confirmed, this 

effort will be a priority of mine. 

75 

Question. What is your assessment of military programs for the prevention of domestic abuse, including spousal rape? 

Answer. The Department is committed to addressing the prevention of and response to domestic abuse, including spousal rape, which is a serious public health 

issue. The Family Advocacy Program (FAP) is a comprehensive Department-wide 

program that provides victim advocacy and counseling for victims and offender 

treatment programs. FAP utilizes evidenced-based programs to address domestic 

abuse, and works in collaboration with Command, medical, legal, and law enforcement to support victims of domestic abuse and child abuse and neglect. FAP collaborates closely with the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office and shares 

best practices on victim assistance. 

ROLE OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Reserve components’ 

size and force structure, including mix of capabilities and capacities, to meet the requirements of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the current National Military Strategy? 

Answer. The seven Reserve components have proven essential during 13 years of 

war and natural disasters at home. I understand that questions about the size and 

makeup of the Active component and Reserve component are currently under consideration as the Department continues to implement the new defense strategy and 

respond to the current fiscal environment. If confirmed, I will insure that the Military Departments, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the combatant commanders work closely together to determine the most effective mix and makeup of 

Active, Reserve, and Guard personnel to maximize the value of these organizations 

in a way that is balanced against needs. 

Question. In your view, what is the definition of ‘‘operational Reserve’’ when referring to the Reserve components? 

Answer. In my view, the term ‘‘operational Reserve’’ refers to our need to have 

a Reserve component that is made ready and available to operate in peacetime, in 

wartime and in support of civil authorities. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of how the concept of an 

‘‘operational Reserve’’ is currently used by the Department for Reserve component 

sizing, force structure, readiness reporting and evaluation, and resourcing? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose regarding the use of the concept 

of an ‘‘operational Reserve’’ with respect to the Reserve components? 

Answer. The National Guard and Reserve is a critical source of many of the capabilities required in ongoing operations and contingency surge requirements. As an 

operational Reserve the Reserve component would make certain capabilities available on a continuing basis and others to augment and reinforce the Active components when mobilized over time. 

Question. In your view, what are the most significant challenges to the realization 

of the Reserve component as an ‘‘operational Reserve’’? If confirmed, what actions 

would you propose taking, if any, to deal with these challenges? 

Answer. In my view, some of the most significant challenges in employing the 

Total Force are declining resources and the subsequent impacts on the Services’ 

abilities to man, train and equip the Force. If confirmed, I will insure the Service 

Chiefs, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the combatant commanders 

work together to balance the Total Force. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of current statutory authorities for the mobilization and utilization of members of the Reserve component? 

If confirmed, what changes in law would you propose, if any, to make Reserve component mobilization and utilization more efficient and effective or to enhance their 

ability to perform various national security or domestic support to civil authorities 

missions? 

Answer. Current statutory authorities make the Reserve component an accessible 

force. If confirmed I will insure the Service Chiefs, the Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau, and the combatant commanders review lessons learned after over a decade 

of unprecedented mobilization to determine if changes are needed to make mobilization and utilization of our Reserve component more efficient and effective. Key considerations in this review are early notification for deployments, mobilization 

lengths, dwell-to-mobilization targets and predictability for the service personnel, 

families and employers. 

ACTIVE DUTY AND RESERVE COMPONENT END STRENGTH

Answer. The Department is implementing its 5-year plan to reduce Active Duty 

end strengths by over 100,000 servicemembers by 2017, and the Reserve compoVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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nents by another 21,000 over the same period. These cuts do not include any additional personnel reductions that could result from sequestration or any agreement 

to avoid sequestration. 

Do you agree with this plan to reduce Active Duty and Reserve component end 

strengths? 

Answer. My understanding is that these planned reductions reflect an effort to 

balance the capability, capacity, and the readiness impacts of budget reductions 

with the requirements of the defense strategy. 

Question. How will these reductions impact the Armed Forces’ ability to meet national defense requirements? 

Answer. Fiscal uncertainty and new operational demands driven by unforeseen 

world events have the potential to jeopardize the Services’ ability to both provide 

ready forces for today’s fight and guarantee ready forces for tasked operational 

plans. 

Question. What additional military personnel reductions do you envision if the Department is required to operate under the budget caps for fiscal year 2016 as currently set out in law? 

Answer. If sequester returns in 2016, I believe the Services may be compelled to 

implement additional force structure reductions. The consequences of sequestration 

have been significant for the Joint Force and its ability to meet our strategic objectives. The Department needs to continually examine the force structure and personnel levels required to meet our national security objectives. 

Question. In your view, what tools do the Department and Services need to get 

down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these require congressional 

authorization? 

Answer. My understanding is that Congress has supported the Department with 

the force shaping tools necessary to meet the drawdown under its current plan. 

However, further budget reductions would make it necessary to revisit the size of 

all components of the Total Force—Active Duty, Reserve component, DOD civilians, 

and contractors. Consequently, future assessment may require us to request additional congressional authorization for force shaping tools. 

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. Do you believe that the services are conducting appropriate and objective evaluations to inform decisions on the integration of women into previously 

closed units and military occupations? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Services and U.S. Special Operations 

Command have been conducting evaluations in accordance with their respective implementation plans. If confirmed, I will closely monitor their progress and ensure 

they stay on track and meet the Department’s timelines. If I receive requests for 

exception to policy, I will carefully consider them when the time comes. 

Question. In your view, should the Military Selective Service Act be amended to 

require females to register for possible military service? 

Answer. I understand a recent law requires the Department to provide an analysis of the constitutionality of continued application of the Military Selective Service 

Act to only men. 

Question. In your view, and if the Military Selective Service Act is so revised, in 

a future exigency in which the Nation may need to implement a draft, are there 

any reasons why qualified males and females should not be subject to the draft? 

Answer. Given that the Armed Forces have waged the longest continuous conflict 

in our history with an All-Volunteer Force, and the fact that most military career 

fields are now open to women, a review of the military selective service act would 

be prudent. This is not solely a Defense issue, but rather part of a much broader 

national discussion. 

COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of the Department’s 

rising health care costs on military readiness and overall national security? 

Answer. In a constrained fiscal environment, if confirmed, I will seek a balanced 

approach to control rising health care costs by continuing to drive greater efficiencies within the system and to pursue reasonable health benefit reforms that offers exceptional value to our beneficiaries. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to mitigate the effect of the 

Department’s rising medical costs on DOD’s budget top-line while simultaneously 

implementing programs to improve health outcomes and to enhance the experience 

of care for all beneficiaries? 

77 

Answer. Controlling health care costs is a priority for the Department. In recent 

years, additional emphasis was placed on achieving savings and efficiencies within 

the operational environment of the Military Health System (MHS). However, these 

internal savings initiatives are not enough to curb the projected increase in health 

care costs for the Department in the coming years. In addition to internal savings, 

I understand that DOD is trying to reform TRICARE into a more integrated health 

care system, which is less complex and provides greater choice and value to our 

beneficiaries. 

The Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission report 

provides another set of proposals that require careful review and consideration. If 

confirmed, I will work with Congress on all responsible efforts to improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of the health system. 

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to create a value-based military health 

system—a system that creates value for beneficiaries and the Department by ensuring the delivery of quality health care and improving health outcomes for beneficiaries at reasonable costs to beneficiaries and DOD? 

Answer. A value-based military health system starts with the department’s ability 

to meet the DOD mission. Unlike civilian healthcare systems, the primary mission 

of the MHS is to ensure a medically ready force and a medical force that is ready 

to carry out its wartime mission. The Army, Navy, and Air Force medical services 

maintain that primary mission through the Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs). 

The MTFs alone cannot provide the care for all beneficiaries and therefore the 

TRICARE program is a critical component to the integrated health system. 

DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY

Question. In 2013, as Deputy Secretary of Defense, you signed a DOD directive 

that chartered a new Defense Health Agency (DHA) to reform the governance and 

management of the Military Health System. 

What efficiencies and related savings have resulted from establishment of the 

DHA? 

Answer. Although it’s still in its infancy, the DHA stood up ten shared services 

and I understand it is reducing performance variation across the MHS. The DHA 

was critical to facilitating a coordinated implementation of the MHS Review, which 

focused on access to care, quality, and patient safety. The DHA’s focus on business 

process reengineering is looking to achieve a net savings in such areas as pharmacy 

operations, health information technology and medical logistics. Another goal is to 

improve coordination of care in our largest health care markets, now being governed 

as enhanced multi-service markets. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure continued progress towards making 

the military health system a more efficient health care delivery system while improving health outcomes for beneficiaries? 

Answer. The MHS, like most other health care systems in this country, needs to 

provide efficient, quality health care that is safe and effective, whether delivered on 

a battlefield or in one of our hospitals. If confirmed, I will direct those responsible 

to look for ways to improve not only the efficiency and performance of the system, 

but I will insist that critical medical capabilities are ready to support our 

warfighters anywhere and anytime. 

INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD (EHR)

Question. Last year, DOD published a RFP for a modern EHR with plans to 

award a contract in 2015 with an estimated total life cycle cost of over $11 billion. 

Considering the many problems the Department has experienced with its existing 

EHR and its failure to deploy a modern EHR over many years despite strong congressional support, do you have confidence that the Department will finally be successful with this effort? 

Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review the program status since leaving the Department, but, if confirmed, I will direct those responsible to keep me 

fully informed of its status. 

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure this procurement comes in 

on time and on budget without any waste of taxpayers’ money? 

Answer. I am committed to ensuring that our EHR solution meets the needs of 

our servicemembers while providing maximum value for the taxpayer. The timely 

and cost-effective acquisition and deployment of a new, modern EHR system is one 

of the department’s top priorities in the health care area. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the VA secretary to ensure DOD 

and VA will seamlessly share real-time health information electronically? 

78 

Answer. If confirmed, I fully intend to personally continue the close collaboration 

that has been ongoing between the DOD and VA, and will personally engage with 

Secretary McDonald. Interoperability of our medical records system with theirs will 

be essential to the success of the EHR solution. 

HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND ACCESS TO CARE IN THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM (MHS)

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take with respect to each of the 

following: 

Eliminating performance variability throughout the MHS; 

Answer. I am aware that the MHS Review ordered by Secretary Hagel demonstrated that there is performance variability both among and within our Military 

Treatment Facilities (MTFs). We need to develop a more robust enterprise-wide capability to establish common performance measures, identify associated standards, 

monitor performance relative to those standards, and mitigate critical deficiencies. 

I understand the Department has begun to create these capabilities, and I will 

make it a priority to oversee their successful implementation. 

Question. Improving health outcomes of the Department’s beneficiaries in the direct and purchased care components of the MHS; 

Answer. If confirmed, I will direct that the MHS has a well-developed performance management system that permits data-driven decisions. Leaders will be held 

accountable for continuous improvement of outcomes in both the direct and purchased care systems. 

Question. Delivering quality health care at lower cost to create value for beneficiaries and the Department; and 

Answer. Improved readiness, better care and better health outcomes for our beneficiaries while operating the MHS more efficiently and at lower cost will create better value for those we serve as well as the taxpayers. The MHS should continue the 

enterprise management reforms to standardize business and clinical processes with 

a goal to optimize utilization, effectiveness and reduce variability. 

Question. Promoting transparency of information that will help beneficiaries become more involved in making their healthcare decisions. 

Answer. The department has developed a plan to increase transparency throughout the MHS for beneficiaries and key stakeholders. If confirmed, I will ensure that 

those directly responsible will review this plan and its implementation to make certain the Department and the MHS has met its obligation to meet the information 

needs of beneficiaries so that they can make important decisions about their 

healthcare. 

MENTAL HEALTH CARE

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in theater and to 

servicemembers and families upon return to home station locations with insufficient 

community-based mental health resources? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will support efforts to reduce the stigma associated with 

seeking mental health care, encourage help-seeking behavior and increase the use 

of available resources among servicemembers and their families. This would include 

an integrated approach for ongoing mental health research, prevention, and evidence-based treatment efforts that will continue to allow the Department to provide 

high-quality, timely mental healthcare services. Finally, I will continue to work with 

the VA and Department of Health and Human Services to coordinate mental health 

initiatives on behalf of servicemembers, Veterans and their families. 

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure that robust mental health 

resources are available for Guard and Reserve members and their families? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure those directly responsible remain committed 

to ensuring the Reserve components receive all medical and mental health resources 

necessary to meet their needs and promote smooth re-integration. This begins with 

ensuring pre and post-deployment health and mental health assessments with 

prompt referral for those identified as having needs. Additionally, I will ensure 

those directly responsible work with the VA leadership to improve processes for 

‘‘hand-offs’’ to prevent lapses in services. I will continue to assess the adequacy of 

family support/re-integration programs that are vital to support servicemembers 

and their families who are facing mental health problems. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. If confirmed, how would you maintain a strong focus on preventing suicides in the Active and Reserve components and in their families? 

79 

Answer. DOD has a strong and longstanding relationship with public and private 

partners and has recently adopted the National Strategy for Suicide Prevention, 

which is being integrated into the Department’s strategy. If confirmed, I will ensure 

those directly responsible support all efforts to examine gaps and overlaps in efforts 

across the Department to ensure we provide the best policies and programs to both 

prevent suicide and build resilience. 

PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

Question. What do you believe to be an appropriate percentage of the Department’s budget for military personnel costs? 

Answer. While military personnel costs have historically been roughly one-third 

of the Department’s overall budget, pegging these costs to a specific percentage of 

the budget is not a useful metric for managing the force or executing the national 

defense strategy. The Department must maintain the force at sufficient levels with 

the right capabilities to meet the national defense strategy. Providing an appropriate pay and benefits package is essential to this task, but compensation and benefit costs must be balanced with readiness and modernization requirements to ensure we maintain the highest quality, ready, and modern military force now and for 

the future. 

Question. If this percentage remains constant as overall defense spending flattens, 

or even declines in real terms, what would be the impact on the size of the force 

and the Department’s ability to execute the national defense strategy? 

Answer. If overall defense spending flattens or declines in real terms, military 

personnel costs will increase as a percentage of the budget in the short-term and, 

therefore, require larger reductions to readiness and modernization. In the longerterm, additional force reductions will likely be required to balance the program. The 

resulting smaller force would create additional risk to meet our security challenges. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact on other areas of the Department’s budget if military personnel costs continue to rise while the overall defense 

budget remains flat, or even declines in real terms? 

Answer. If military personnel costs were to continue to rise within a flat budget, 

consuming ever larger portions of that budget, the Nation will face the prospect of 

a hollow force—with resulting decreasing capability and readiness and a dwindling 

technological edge on the battlefield. 

Question. What actions do you believe can and should be taken, if any, to control 

the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending? 

Answer. Personnel costs are a significant portion of the Defense budget. During 

the past several years the Department engaged in a number of broad-based reviews 

in search of efficiencies and generated proposals to reduce spending. The Congress, 

too, created the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission 

in search of ways to attract and retain the quality people we need while controlling 

these personnel and entitlement costs. If confirmed, I will seek ways to keep our 

current and future force and our defense program in balance within the resources 

Congress provides. 

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MILITARY COMPENSATION AND RETIREMENT

MODERNIZATION COMMISSION

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2013 established a commission to review all elements of the military compensation and retirement systems and to make recommendations to modernize those systems to ensure the long-term viability of the All-Volunteer Force, enable a high quality of life 

for military families, and to achieve fiscal sustainability for the compensation and 

retirement systems. That Commission will release its report on January 29, 2015. 

If confirmed, what will be your plan to review the report and to provide recommendations to the President? 

Answer. I appreciate the difficult task that was presented to the Commission. If 

confirmed, I intend to carefully review and evaluate the Commission’s recommendations on reforming military compensation and retirement. 

Question. Will you instruct the Department to take the Commission’s recommendations into consideration within the base budget request for fiscal year 

2017? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect the Department to fully consider the recommendations of the Commission in future budgets. 

RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN THE MILITARY

Question. In your view, do DOD policies concerning religious accommodation in 

the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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liefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who 

have different beliefs, including no religious belief? 

Answer. The current DOD policies appropriately accommodate the free exercise of 

religion by all servicemembers. The Department respects, and supports by its policy, 

the rights of individuals to express their own religious beliefs, including the right 

to hold no religious beliefs. 

Question. Do you agree that the primary role of the chaplaincy is to provide for 

the free exercise of religion by all servicemembers and that chaplains are sufficiently trained to perform or provide for this constitutional right in today’s pluralistic military community? If not, why not? 

Answer. The Service Chaplaincies advise and assist commanders in the discharge 

of their responsibility to provide for the free exercise of religion in the context of 

military service and to assist commanders in managing Religious Affairs. Chaplains 

also serve as the principal advisors on all issues regarding the impact of religion 

on military operations. I believe Military Chaplains should be sufficiently trained 

to carry out their assigned duties. 

Question. Do you believe it is the role of the chaplaincy to provide for the religious 

and spiritual well-being of all members of the Armed Forces, regardless of their 

faith beliefs? 

Answer. In today’s pluralistic military environment, the Chaplaincies of the Military Departments recruit, access, train, and equip chaplains with the knowledge 

and skill to balance their own faith practices with their role in assisting commanders in providing for the free exercise of religion and spiritual well-being of all 

servicemembers, including those who may hold different or no religious beliefs. 

Question. Do you believe that current policies provide sufficient guidance to chaplains who conduct non-religious command training where attendance is required or 

encouraged to allow chaplains to discuss their religious faith anecdotally and respectfully in a pluralistic setting to support the training objectives? 

Answer. It is my understanding that DOD policies provide sufficient guidance to 

chaplains concerning respectful incorporation of religious and belief principles that 

support training objectives in a pluralistic setting. Such policies also protect the 

right of a chaplain to refuse, without any adverse action, this type of duty if it is 

contrary to his or her conscience, moral principles or religious beliefs. 

STRATEGY

Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR, U.S. forces 

should be able to ‘‘defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.’’ 

In your opinion, is the QDR’s force sizing construct an adequate approach given 

the dynamics of the current and projected geostrategic and fiscal environments? 

Answer. The 2014 QDR envisioned a complex and variable security environment 

coupled with fiscal uncertainty. Therefore, it directed the Department to size and 

shape the Joint Force to respond to a wide range of challenges. At the fiscal year 

2015 President’s budget level, the force planning construct depicts the challenges 

that the Department must be prepared to respond to and frames its efforts to deliver agile, technologically advanced forces of sufficient size to defend our Nation 

and secure our interests globally while preventing America’s adversaries from 

achieving their objectives. However, as underscored in the QDR, the force planning 

construct cannot be fully resourced at sequestration-level funding, casting significant doubt on the Department’s ability to implement its overall defense strategy at 

that reduced budget level. 

Question. In your view, are the services currently adequately sized to meet the 

requirements of the QDR and current National Military Strategy? 

Answer. U.S. forces remain able to prevail in more than one conflict at a time, 

but at higher levels of risk given the cumulative effects of reduced funding, an uncertain budget process, and unrealized force structure and compensation savings. 

The force will need to become smaller and more efficient over the next 5 years to 

offset the costs of gradual modernization and improved readiness. Provided sequestration is avoided, the QDR indicated that the Joint Force will remain able to defeat 

a regional adversary while denying the objectives of, or imposing unacceptable costs 

upon, a second aggressor. In addition, the force will remain able to conduct sustained, distributed counterterrorism operations and protect the Homeland. However, 

the QDR also indicated even in the best case, the margin for error in executing the 

defense strategy is smaller than it has been in many years and requires close cooperation between the administration and Congress to realize necessary savings in 

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force structure and compensation reform to ensure that the strategy can be implemented. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to manage the risk associated with 

the demands placed upon the Department by the National Security Strategy, the 

requirements of the National Military Strategy, the geostrategic environment, U.S. 

international security commitments, and the availability of military capability in an 

era of declining resources? 

Answer. Risks associated with the demands upon the Department must be managed by striking a balance between force capacity, readiness, and modernization in 

order to be prepared for an uncertain and complicated future. In some cases, and 

in line with the 2014 QDR, capacity will be reduced to allow for necessary modernization and readiness. The Department plans to continue several internal measures to manage risk, including developing innovative business practices, capabilities, 

and operational concepts; revising and updating operational plans; enhancing collaboration with allies and partners; reviewing overseas access and basing agreements; resetting the force after two wars; and striving for efficiencies and compensation reform. A return to Budget Control Act-level funding in fiscal year 2016 would 

increase risks, prolong readiness recovery, and delay necessary modernization programs. 

Question. In your view should we accept higher risk with current strategy, change 

the strategy, or increase resources to increase or preserve military capability and 

capacity? 

Answer. The Department concluded that the fiscal year 2015 budget, combined 

with Congressional support for the Department’s proposed reforms, will enable our 

military to execute the current strategy. If sequestration level cuts return in fiscal 

year 2016 or if we do not gain congressional support for proposed force structure 

reductions and compensation reforms, we may need to revisit the strategy as updated in the 2012 QDR. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of excess capacity or capabilities, if any, relative to the National Military Strategy? In your view, if there is 

excess capacity or capability relative to the strategy should it be reallocated across 

services to reduce risks in areas for which there are gaps? 

Answer. The 2014 QDR assessed that after more than twelve years of conflict and 

amid ongoing budget reductions, the Joint Force was out of balance with respect to 

capability, capacity, and readiness. As those wars have come to a close, the Department has sought to return these Services to a sustainable budget level and end 

strength. Looking forward, the Department, with congressional assistance, needs to 

continue the process to ensure we deliver agile, technologically advanced, ready 

forces of sufficient size to defend our Nation and secure our interests while evolving 

threats and challenges. 

DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum 

issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, 

regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, 

dated September 5, 2006? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and 

plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and 

tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 

and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be 

based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the 

risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact 

on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, 

should they be captured in future conflicts? 

Answer. Yes. 

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

Question. In light of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the growth of the Islamic 

State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its control over large areas of Syria and 

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Iraq, and a more muscular China, do you believe that the current National Security 

Strategy and National Military Strategy should be updated to more accurately account for a changed global security environment? 

Answer. Although it is impossible to predict exactly how challenges will develop, 

we must continue to reexamine global threats to ensure our resources match the 

threats and opportunities ahead. 

The 2010 National Security Strategy is undergoing a necessary revision, to be released in early 2015. Any revisions should address the challenges to the international order and stability that are posed by Russia’s occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and the growth of ISIL, recognizing that the United States is 

strongest when it employs all elements of national power to address security threats 

in a coordinated fashion. The United States welcomes the rise of a prosperous, 

peaceful, and stable China that respects international law and settles disputes without the threat or use of force. The National Military Strategy should be revised to 

align with the 2015 National Security Strategy, once it is released. 

Question. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance called for U.S. forces to 

be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, and to retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been gained over the past 10 years of operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, the Strategic Guidance states that, ‘‘U.S. 

forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.’’ 

In your view, how should strategic guidance for the DOD manage risk and articulate the types of missions or operations U.S. forces will or will not be expected to 

execute? 

Answer. The Department’s strategic guidance documents—especially the QDR and 

National Military Strategy—need to identify the kind of security environment that 

we anticipate in the future and seek an appropriate balance between capability, capacity, and readiness. As a full spectrum force and a global leader, the U.S. military 

should continue to be prepared to execute missions in the national interest across 

the threat spectrum. A full spectrum, ready and modern Joint Force is the best risk 

mitigation measure. 

Question. In your view, what are the appropriate roles and responsibilities, if any, 

of DOD and between DOD and other departments and agencies of the Federal Government in the planning and conduct of stability operations? 

Answer. Because of its unique capabilities, the Department should support other 

U.S. Government departments and agencies in the planning and execution of stability operations efforts. History has shown that coordinated and integrated interagency and international efforts are essential to successful stability operations. 

Under the right circumstances, the Department should conduct stability operations 

activities to establish security, restore essential services, repair and protect the most 

critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance. As security and public 

order are established or restored, the Department should transition responsibility 

to other agencies, foreign governments, or international governmental organizations. 

Question. If confirmed, in developing the capabilities necessary for stability operations, what adjustments, if any, would you propose making to prepare U.S. forces 

to conduct stability operations without detracting from their ability to perform combat missions? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would assess the requirements for U.S. forces to conduct 

stability operations successfully without detracting from or degrading their ability 

to perform combat missions. After nearly 2 decades of serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, 

the Balkans, and elsewhere, United States forces have made great strides in their 

abilities to conduct stability operations under difficult circumstances. If confirmed, 

I would seek to maintain the stability operations expertise the Department has 

gained, and ensure that the Military Departments have the mechanisms necessary 

to expand their capacities when required. 

Question. In your view, does the U.S. Government need to define or reallocate responsibilities and authorities among Federal agencies, and establish new procedures 

to manage stability operations? If so, why? 

Answer. Our efforts abroad over the past 13-plus years highlight the importance 

of collaborative and coordinated planning with interagency and international partners, which is fundamental to the successful management and effectiveness of stability operations. As we have seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it takes a robust 

interagency effort, as well as international participation, to develop institutions that 

can contribute effectively to peace, security and stability. If confirmed, I would review the Department’s policies and procedures with respect to stability operations 

and make appropriate recommendations to ensure our success, both as a department and as part of the U.S. Government as a whole. 

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Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to improve 

U.S. Government approach to planning, resourcing, and conducting stability operations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with other departments and agencies to explore opportunities to integrate and coordinate the full range of available interagency stabilization tools and make appropriate recommendations. 

STRATEGY IN IRAQ AND SYRIA

Question. On 10 September 2014, President Obama said ‘‘Our objective is clear: 

We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.’’ 

What criteria do you believe should be used to evaluate whether or how much 

ISIL is degraded and what is your assessment of the progress to degrade ISIL in 

Iraq and in Syria? 

Answer. The United States is at the beginning of what could be a long campaign 

to degrade and inflict a lasting defeat on ISIL. DOD’s contributions are one part 

of a whole-of-government strategy and an effort that includes many of coalition partners to create both the political and military conditions needed for success. Ultimately the Iraqis must offer a national program of reform and reconciliation in 

order for the Iraqi Security Forces to succeed. The coalition effort must also involve 

strengthening and working with the Iraqi Security Forces and affiliated Kurdish 

and tribal elements, who are critical to inflict a lasting defeat of ISIL. If confirmed, 

I will consult closely with my military commanders, civilian advisors, foreign partners, interagency counterparts and Members of Congress to examine progress and 

offer my best strategic advice to the President on this complex and vitally important 

campaign. 

Question. Do you believe the strategy against ISIL needs to include both conventional and counterinsurgency elements given that ISIL has demonstrated significant 

conventional and insurgency capabilities? 

Answer. Yes. I believe that a strategy for countering ISIL must bring to bear all 

elements of national power, including military force as well as diplomatic, intelligence, economic, humanitarian assistance, and other key tools. Many of these tools 

are important in a counterinsurgency as well as a conventional campaign. If confirmed, I would continue to support a whole-of-government approach. 

Question. What does the end state President Obama has declared to be the objective of our operations—‘‘ultimately destroy ISIL’’—look like in your opinion? 

Answer. I believe that ISIL must no longer be a threat to Iraq, the region, the 

United States, and our partners. 

Question. A large part of the support for ISIL and other extremist groups like al 

Nusrah by the local Syrian population is based on the fact that these groups pledge 

to go after President Assad, to remove him from power. 

Is removing Assad part of the current United States strategy in Syria? If not, 

what is your assessment of the impact of not going after Assad on our ability to 

work with the Syrian population to counter ISIL and other extremist groups like 

al Nusrah? 

Answer. As the President has said, Assad has lost legitimacy and cannot be a part 

of the long-term future of Syria. However, the most immediate threat to United 

States national interests is ISIL—and there is no sustainable solution in Syria without addressing the threat of ISIL. If confirmed, I will consult with my military commanders, civilian advisors, interagency partners, foreign counterparts and Members 

of Congress to formulate by best strategic advice for the President. 

Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2015 authorizes assistance in Iraq to ‘‘local 

security forces with a national security mission’’ including ‘‘tribal security forces or 

other local security forces.’’ 

How important do you consider arming of the Sunni tribes in Anbar province to 

degrading ISIL and how do you assess progress to date? 

Answer. Political inclusion in Iraq is a key element of countering ISIL in a lasting 

way. Integrating Sunni tribal fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces and enabling 

them to combat ISIL is therefore important to ultimately defeating ISIL. I have not 

been briefed in detail on this effort. If confirmed, I would continue to work with the 

Department of State, coalition partners, and the Government of Iraq to encourage 

efforts to arm and integrate Sunni tribal forces into the Iraqi Security Forces to 

fight ISIL. 

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AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY

Question. What lessons should we learn from the experience of a calendar-based 

drawdown of United States troops in Iraq as they apply to executing the drawdown 

of United States and international troops in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Each country has a unique set of underlying governance, security, and 

cultural circumstances. With the United States-Afghanistan Bilateral Security 

Agreement in place, and with the support of the Afghan Government, the Department’s train, advise, and assist mission with the Afghan security forces is intended 

to help ensure continued progress in developing Afghanistan’s security capabilities 

and preserve the security gains we have made collectively. Based on what we have 

learned in Iraq, progress on political reform is key to this effort. I believe that the 

new government in Kabul will be the biggest driver in whether Afghanistan has a 

positive future. I welcome that President Ghani has stated that a continued United 

States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence is an important component of his strategy for Afghanistan. That provides a key foundation for 

the transition to a robust, sustainable security relationship in the future. I am 

mindful of the new and dynamic global threat environment, and you can be assured 

that if there are instructive lessons from Iraq or anywhere else that are relevant 

to Afghanistan, I will always take them into account in the advice I offer to the 

President. 

Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to the United 

States strategy in Afghanistan? 

Answer. The next 2 years represent an important transition period from more 

than a decade of war toward an enduring defense relationship with an Afghan partner that is capable of providing for its own security and preventing al Qaeda and 

other extremists from threatening United States interests. The NATO-led train, advise, and assist mission and the United States counterterrorism mission are cornerstones within our overall strategy that will provide the Afghans an opportunity to 

make progress on the security situation in Afghanistan, and serve as a balance 

against terrorist exploitation of Afghan territory. If confirmed, I will continue to 

seek the advice of our military leadership and partners. 

Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the campaign in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Over the last 13 years, our campaign in Afghanistan has placed constant 

pressure on al Qaeda and prevented Afghanistan from being used to launch terrorist 

attacks against the United States Homeland. The United States Government has 

supported the Afghan people and protected United States national interests by helping Afghanistan strengthen the capacity of its security forces. The Afghan National 

Security Forces (ANSF) have continued to progress, and have proven increasingly 

capable in leading operations and prevailing over insurgents. Although I am encouraged by the positive strides made in Afghanistan, it is clear that much work remains to be done. We must stay engaged with our Afghan partners and support 

them, as they own the fight. This must be an interagency and international effort 

– with appropriate funding for the ANSF as well as economic and diplomatic support for the Afghan people. 

Question. If reports of ISIL operating in southern Afghanistan are true, and ISIL 

is fighting with the Taliban, how should that affect the United States strategy for 

Afghanistan? 

Answer. I support the President’s strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL, 

wherever it may attempt to establish a foothold. I am aware of recent press reporting that ISIL is attempting to recruit militants in Afghanistan and is considering 

expansion to the region. If confirmed, I will learn more about these developments 

and will work with the Afghan Government and our coalition partners to address 

all terrorist threats to United States personnel in Afghanistan and to prevent any 

terrorist groups from using Afghanistan to threaten the United States and our allies 

and partners. 

Question. If security conditions on the ground in Afghanistan degrade in 2016, 

would you consider recommending to the President revisions to the size and pace 

of the drawdown plan announced by the President in order to adequately address 

those security conditions? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. In your opinion, should the authorities granted to the commander of 

United States forces in Afghanistan take into account the security conditions on the 

ground faced by United States troops? 

Answer. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will take seriously my responsibility to ensure that our commander in Afghanistan has the authority needed to 

85 

execute the missions directed by the President effectively, and that these authorities 

allow U.S. forces to take the appropriate measures to protect themselves. 

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional 

and effective ANSF? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess this issue firsthand but my assessment has 

been positive. I will ensure that the Department continues building the ANSF’s institutional capabilities, and I will work with our allies and partners to retain critical 

coalition support to the ANSF where capability gaps remain, particularly in the 

areas of close air support, intelligence, special operations, sustainment, and Afghan 

security ministry capacity. 

Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the 

ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges? 

Answer. I understand that the main challenges to address with the ANSF are 

fielding and integrating capabilities such as close air support, special operations, 

and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and developing the capacity of 

the Ministries of Defense and Interior to manage planning, programming, budgeting, logistics, force generation and force sustainment. Corruption and the flow of 

funding from illicit narcotics is also a significant challenge that requires an international and interagency response. If confirmed, I will assess our progress in helping the ANSF develop these areas and will focus on solutions to identified gaps. 

Question. What are the key enablers in security force capabilities that need to 

continue to be developed to ensure the long term efficacy of the ANSF against the 

Taliban and other extremists and when do you forecast those capabilities will be in 

place? 

Answer. I understand that the NATO Resolute Support mission places a high priority on developing the ANSF’s capability to provide fire support from the air, and 

on developing organic airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

capabilities to maintain advantages over the Taliban and other extremists. 

Question. Do you support plans for building and sustaining the ANSF at 352,000 

personnel? 

Answer. Based on the information available to me and given Afghanistan’s current security challenges, I support the current authorized level of 352,000 ANSF 

personnel and will work with Congress to ensure that our efforts to sustain this 

force are appropriately resourced. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department will 

continue to work with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior to determine 

the timing for reducing the ANSF to an appropriate size, given available resources, 

capabilities, and the magnitude of the threat. 

Question. Do you agree that any reductions in the ANSF from this 352,000 level 

should be based on security conditions in Afghanistan at the time those reductions 

would be expected to occur? 

Answer. Although the security condition on the ground will be a critical factor in 

determining any future reductions in the ANSF, we must also look closely at the 

Afghan ability to sustain the ANSF financially. My understanding is that current 

Resolute Support mission efforts are focused on optimizing the effectiveness of the 

ANSF force structure while increasing the Afghan capability to sustain that structure. I believe we have an obligation to the Afghan people, our allies, and United 

States taxpayers, to ensure that the ANSF is a combat-effective, sustainable, and 

affordable force in the long-term. 

RECONCILIATION

Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United States in any reconciliation negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and other insurgent groups? 

Answer. The United States supports an Afghan-led political peace process in 

which all opposition groups, including the Taliban, engage in a dialogue about the 

future of their country. I believe the United States should continue to support President Ghani’s efforts to engage in peace talks, as long as any outcome of reconciliation includes that the Taliban and other armed groups end violence, break ties 

with al Qaeda, and accept Afghanistan’s constitution—including its protections for 

women and minorities. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, should the United States be taking to 

help advance the reconciliation process? 

Answer. President Obama has made clear that an Afghan-led peace and reconciliation process is the surest way to end the violence and ensure lasting stability for 

Afghanistan and the region. It is my understanding that President Ghani is putting 

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considerable effort into re-energizing reconciliation and is reaching out to regional 

partners and the international community to take part in the process. I believe the 

United States should support these new initiatives and, if confirmed, I look forward 

to engaging with my Afghan counterparts on how DOD can best support reconciliation efforts. 

Question. In your view, what should be the role of Afghanistan’s neighbors, in particular Pakistan, in the reconciliation process? 

Answer. Afghanistan’s neighbors should play constructive and supportive roles in 

an Afghan-led reconciliation process, since a stable and peaceful Afghanistan will 

promote long-term stability and prosperity for the entire region. I hope signs of improved Afghanistan-Pakistan relations provide fresh opportunities for Pakistan to 

reinforce President Ghani’s efforts toward peace talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban. 

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

Question. What would you consider to be areas of shared strategic interest between the United States and Pakistan? 

Answer. Counterterrorism cooperation remains a critical shared strategic interest. 

Pakistan still faces a real and potent threat from several militant groups within its 

borders, such as the Pakistani Taliban, responsible for the recent school attack in 

Peshawar. 

We also share Pakistan’s strategic interest in improved relations between 

Islamabad and Kabul. I believe that the United States and Pakistan should continue to work to promote peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan and to improve 

regional security. 

Question. In what areas do you see United States and Pakistani strategic interests diverging? 

Answer. It is important that the United States continues to engage with Pakistan 

in areas where our strategic interests diverge, including the direction of Pakistan’s 

nuclear program and its tolerance of terrorist organizations like the Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e Taiba. In addition to threatening United States forces in Afghanistan, these groups threaten regional security, endanger the prospects of a political settlement in Afghanistan, and undermine Pakistan’s own stability. I understand that Pakistan has pledged to target all militant groups operating within its 

borders, including the Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e Taiba. If confirmed, I will 

ensure that the Department holds Pakistan to this pledge, and works against actors 

who are exploiting Pakistani territory to destabilize the region. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend for United 

States relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-military relations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to work on improving our relationship 

with Pakistan by collaborating where our strategic interests converge and engaging 

where they diverge. Moving forward, I believe it is in the United States’ interest 

to expand counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan in our fight against al-Qaeda, 

and to counter any emerging threats. Additionally, I would seek to facilitate cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and encourage communication between Pakistan and India, as these relationships will continue to be vital to stability 

in the region. 

UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant military assistance to Pakistan. In addition, the United States has provided significant funds to 

reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with military operations conducted by 

Pakistan along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. 

In your view, how effective has the assistance and other support that the United 

States has provided to Pakistan been in promoting United States interests? 

Answer. I understand that since last summer, Pakistani forces have been clearing 

militants from their strongholds along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Pakistan’s 

military has been able to carry out these operations at a more effective pace and 

scale in part thanks to United States reimbursements for Pakistan’s operational expenses. Additionally, I understand United States security assistance programs have 

provided the Pakistan military with many of the tools necessary to conduct successful operations in this region. Continued U.S. support will remain critical to the success of these efforts. 

Question. Do you support conditioning United States assistance and other support 

to Pakistan on Pakistan’s continued cooperation in areas of mutual security interest? 

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Answer. If confirmed, I will consult within the Department and the United States 

interagency on how best to incentivize Pakistani action that is in the mutual interest of the United States. The United States and Pakistan do work together on common objectives, and I believe we should carefully examine the impact of conditions 

on Pakistani cooperation. If confirmed, I will evaluate what additional support 

would be appropriate from the U.S. Government. 

LIBYA

Question. Following the evacuation of the United States Embassy in Tripoli on 

July 26, 2014, there is no longer an active American presence in the country and 

the situation in country remains dire. 

What role, if any, should the United States have in Libya moving forward? 

Answer. The United States has a national security interest in a stable Libya and 

in preventing its use as a terrorist safe haven. The United States should assist the 

ongoing United Nations-led political process to bring moderate Libyans into a unity 

government and bring an end to the conflict—which exacerbates the terrorist 

threat—and take measures to prevent terrorists from using Libya as a safe haven. 

When circumstances allow, the United States should once again consider supporting 

official Libyan security forces and their development. 

U.S. MARINE CORPS SUPPORT TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT EMBASSY EVACUATIONS

Question. The Accountability Review Board for Benghazi supported the ‘‘State Department’s initiative to request additional marines and expand the Marine Security 

Guard (MSG) Program—as well as corresponding requirements for staffing and 

funding. The Board also recommended that the State Department and DOD identify 

additional flexible MSG structures and request further resources for the Department and DOD to provide more capabilities and capacities at higher risk posts.’’ The 

NDAA for fiscal year 2013 authorized up to 1,000 additional marines in the MSG 

program to provide the additional end strength and resources necessary to support 

enhanced Marine Corps security at United States embassies, consulates, and other 

diplomatic facilities. 

In your view, should the current arrangements between the Department of State 

and U.S. Marine Corps be modified? 

Answer. I understand that DOD has taken measures to expand the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program, and has taken the additional step of creating the MSG 

Security Augmentation Unit, which may be used to provide additional security at 

diplomatic facilities as threats change. In 2013, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and 

the Department of State (DOS) signed a new Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on 

Marine Security at DoS facilities. I understand that DOD and DOS are reviewing 

policies, programs, roles, and responsibilities—including the MSG program—to 

maximize the protection of our overseas diplomatic facilities and personnel, and 

would support this review if confirmed. 

Question. In your view, would it be beneficial to the security of diplomatic facilities, many of which house U.S. military personnel, to have appropriate DOD personnel to assist in the conduct of vulnerability assessments of such facilities? 

Answer. Yes. To that end, the Department has directed its Geographic Combatant 

Commands (GCCs) to conduct planning and coordination with Chiefs of Mission at 

high-threat, high-risk posts identified by DoS. The GCCs are also directly engaged 

with the Chiefs of Mission to plan and coordinate response options. Likewise, GCC 

Security Assessment Teams have deployed to numerous high threat posts such as 

Baghdad and Sana’a to help Embassy staff with their security and evacuation planning. I would review these issues if confirmed and offer my best recommendation. 

AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula (AQAP) to the United States? 

Answer. AQAP poses a significant terrorist threat to the United States Homeland 

and United States interests in the Middle East. Since 2009, AQAP has attempted 

at least three attacks on the United States, including through the use of sophisticated concealed explosive devices. Additionally, AQAP attack plotting led to the temporary closure of several United States Embassies in the Middle East in August 

2013. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current United States strategy to 

counter AQAP, specifically in Yemen? 

Answer. Countering AQAP should be a top priority for the U.S. Government. The 

United States counterterrorism (CT) strategy in Yemen focuses on a mix of partnership activities and limited direct action against those who threaten the United 

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States. The United States Government, in partnership with its allies and the Yemeni Government, have made a number of important gains against AQAP, including 

the removal of numerous AQAP leaders and the disruption of plotting against the 

United Sates, although AQAP remains resilient and we must maintain our vigilance 

in addressing this threat. If confirmed I intend to receive a detailed briefing to inform my assessment. 

YEMEN

Question. What are United States national security interests in Yemen? 

Answer. Our primary national security interest in Yemen is to disrupt, dismantle, 

and defeat AQAP and eliminate the ungoverned territory that AQAP or any hostile 

group may seek to exploit to threaten the United States, our regional interests, and 

those of our partners. We also have an interest in a stable government in Yemen, 

and support a responsible transition to an inclusive and capable government that 

helps achieve those objectives. 

Question. What is your assessment of United States strategy in Yemen to date? 

Answer. I believe that although the United States Government has helped the 

Yemeni Government build the capabilities of its security forces, the political instability that has long plagued Yemen—particularly in recent weeks—hinders Yemen’s 

ability to respond the threat posed by AQAP. 

Question. What are the implications of recent events in Yemen for United States 

counterterrorism policy both in Yemen and globally? 

Answer. Continued political turbulence in Yemen risks further hindering Yemeni 

efforts against AQAP and enabling AQAP to continue to plot attacks and recruit 

operatives in Yemen’s ungoverned spaces. AQAP’s claim of responsibility for the 

Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris demonstrates that AQAP continues to pose a threat 

to the United States and its allies and partners. The political situation in Yemen 

is difficult and fluid, and it remains to be seen how this will affect our relationship 

with the Yemeni Government. Nevertheless, I believe the United States should continue to maintain pressure on AQAP by using all necessary means to eliminate terrorist threats to our national security. 

NORTH AFRICA

Question. In recent years, there has been a growth of terrorist networks, capabilities, operations, and safe havens throughout North and East Africa, including 

groups that have the intention to target United States and western interests. In the 

face of growing instability and threats, the U.S. counterterrorism effort in the region 

has been described as an ‘‘economy of force’’ effort. 

Do you agree with that characterization of the situation in North and East Africa 

and the United States counterterrorism efforts to combat the related threats? 

Answer. I would characterize United States counterterrorism efforts in North and 

East Africa as working by, with, and through our allies and regional partners. In 

North Africa, the United States works with allies such as the French and regional 

partners such as Tunisia, Niger, and Chad. Specifically, DOD has supported their 

combined operations against groups such as al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Murabitun. In East Africa, the United States has continued 

training, equipping, and enabling the African Union Mission to Somalia troop contributing countries in their efforts to stabilize Somalia and counter the threat posed 

by al-Shabaab. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. counterterrorism strategy 

in the region? 

Answer. I understand the current United States strategy seeks to prevent and 

disrupt terrorist plots that threaten United States interests at home and abroad, 

while helping the Yemeni government build its own CT capabilities to combat AQAP 

over the long run. I am aware that the United States has removed several key 

AQAP operatives from the battlefield and disrupted AQAP plots. In 2012, Yemeni 

forces, with training and advisory support from the Department, succeeded in driving AQAP from large areas of Yemen. However, I believe the turbulent political situation in Yemen will complicate these efforts, and will require adapting the strategy 

to these changes. 

Question. In your view, is the U.S. military allocating adequate resources to effectively address the terrorism threat in the region? 

Answer. In my view, given the counterterrorism challenges we face in numerous 

areas, United States military resources are adequately balanced to meet the many 

competing counterterrorism requirements in North and East Africa. 

Question. General Rodriguez noted in his March 2014 testimony that ‘‘North Africa is a significant source of foreign fighters in the current conflict in Syria.’’ 

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What is your understanding of the foreign fighter flow from North Africa to the 

conflict in Syria and Iraq? 

Answer. I believe foreign fighters pose a threat to the United States, and that this 

threat is exacerbated by the ongoing political and security instability in Libya. If 

confirmed, I will focus attention on the foreign fighter flow as the Department works 

with regional partners in North Africa to address the challenge posed by the terrorist safe haven in Libya and broader counterterrorism issues. 

Question. In your view, is it likely that many of these fighters will eventually return home from Syria and Iraq to North Africa and continue their fight against regional governments? 

Answer. There is a real possibility that as we address the situation in Syria and 

Iraq, some of these fighters may choose to return home to North Africa. This could 

pose a serious challenge for our regional partners. These returning fighters will 

have the benefit of training and combat experience. It is therefore important that 

the United States continue its close collaboration on counterterrorism with our partners in North Africa so that they are prepared to respond in the event that the 

fighters decide to take up arms upon their return. 

We must also work closely with the neighbors of Syria and Libya to build up their 

security capabilities to counter instability and the negative regional impact it could 

cause. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD supports the diplomatic efforts to secure a political solution in Libya, work closely with Libya’s neighbors to ensure regional stability, and maintain an active and robust counterterrorism presence in the 

region. 

COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

Question. Since September 11, 2001, collaboration—both analytical and operational—between DOD and the Intelligence Community has grown increasingly 

close. On one hand, seamless collaboration is a vital component of effective and 

rapid responses to non-traditional threats, and bringing together the strengths of 

the full spectrum of defense and intelligence missions creates opportunities for solutions to complex problems. On the other hand, such collaboration—without effective 

management and oversight—risks blurring the missions of agencies and individuals 

that have cultivated distinct strengths or creating redundant lines of effort. 

What are your views regarding the appropriate scope of collaboration between 

DOD and the Intelligence Community? 

Answer. Collaboration between DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC) is an 

essential element for supporting our national security objectives. For example, DOD 

depends on capabilities provided by the IC to support weapons systems acquisition 

and to enable military operations. The IC depends on capabilities provided by DOD 

to support special forces. This collaboration is essential to make progress toward dismantling and strategically defeating al Qa’ida, to counter the proliferation of WMD, 

to defend against space and cyber threats, and to operate in denied areas. 

Question. In your view, are there aspects of the current relationship between the 

Department and the Intelligence Community that should be re-examined or modified? 

Answer. I am not aware of any specific areas requiring immediate modification, 

however, if confirmed, I will look for opportunities to build on the existing strong 

relationship. 

RUSSIA

Question. Crimea was formally annexed when President Putin signed a bill to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014, and Russia continues 

to fuel instability in eastern Ukraine despite a ceasefire agreed to in September 

2014. 

How effective do you assess the sanctions of the United States and the European 

Union have been in deterring additional aggression by Russia? 

Answer. United States and European Union sanctions, combined with declining 

oil prices, have significantly impacted the Russian economy and highlight the consequences of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Unfortunately, despite these costs, Russia 

has not abided by its commitments in the Minsk agreements and is continuing to 

foment instability in eastern Ukraine. If confirmed, I would work with U.S. departments and agencies to review and adjust our sanctions regime as appropriate. 

Question. In your opinion, what other specific actions has the United States taken 

that have helped to deter additional Russian aggression in Eastern Europe? 

Answer. The United States has taken action, both bilaterally and within the 

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sure European Allies. These include the establishment of the European Reassurance 

Initiative (ERI), which provides an enhanced rotational presence in Europe; support 

to United States allies and partners in the region; and increased training and exercises. If confirmed, I plan to take a close look at what additional actions we might 

take to deter Russia and impact Putin’s calculus. 

Question. In your opinion, what steps have proven or are likely to prove most effective at deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would take a close look at what actions may have worked 

best, and what additional actions we might take, to deter Russia from aggression 

in Eastern Europe. 

Question. Do you believe that Moldova and Georgia are at a heightened state of 

vulnerability given Russian willingness to take aggressive action in Ukraine? 

Answer. Yes. Russia has long fomented ‘‘frozen conflicts’’ in Moldova and Georgia 

in order to limit their freedom of action and hinder their Euro-Atlantic ambitions. 

Following Russia’s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia 

have increased their efforts to deepen cooperation with the United States and 

NATO. 

Question. Russian tactics in eastern Ukraine have been called ‘‘hybrid’’ and combine hard power with soft power, including elements such as lethal security assistance to separatists, the use of special forces, extensive information operations, withholding energy supplies and economic pressure. 

If confirmed, what elements should make up the strategy you would recommend 

to counter this ‘‘hybrid’’ approach? 

Answer. Through the European Reassurance Initiative and the NATO Readiness 

Action Plan, the United States is supporting our Allies and partners in Eastern Europe with training activities, rotational presence, and capacity-building programs. 

These efforts focus on making our allies and partners more resistant to asymmetric 

threats; demonstrating United States resolve to support European and global security; and deterring Russian aggression. If confirmed, I would seek opportunities to 

support and work with our Allies and partners in creating more activities, training, 

and exchanges that build their resistance to asymmetric, or hybrid, methods of coercion. 

Question. In light of Russia’s actions in 2014, what do you believe are appropriate 

objectives for United States-Russian security relations? 

Answer. As I understand the situation, DOD suspended military cooperation with 

Russia as a result of its occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea. Russia’s 

behavior is inconsistent with that of a responsible, global stakeholder, and I support 

this response. If confirmed, I would be open to seeking measured avenues that allow 

more productive engagement with Russia, but only on issues where we have a clear 

national interest. 

NATO ALLIANCE

Question. The reemergence of an aggressive Russia has resulted in NATO developing the Readiness Action Plan that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 

called ‘‘the biggest reinforcement of our collective defense since the end of the Cold 

War.’’ NATO also continues to be central to our coalition operations in Afghanistan 

and elsewhere, even as many NATO members have significantly reduced their national defense budgets in response to economic and fiscal pressures. 

In your view, particularly in light of the Russian Federation’s aggression against 

Ukraine, what are the major strategic objectives of the NATO Alliance in the coming years? 

Answer. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend its territory and populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic 

Treaty. The best way to protect our populations and territories is to cooperate with 

Alliance partners to deter challenges to our security from emerging; to effectively 

manage challenges when they do emerge; and to be prepared to mount a strong defense if deterrence fails. When allies feel threatened—as many do as a result of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—it is important for the Alliance to carry out the 

necessary training, exercises, and planning and to provide visible reassurance to 

vulnerable Allies in order to reinforce confidence in Article 5 and sustain Alliance 

solidarity. NATO must also remain prepared to undertake its other ‘‘core tasks’’ of 

crisis management and cooperative security, drawing on its unique political and 

military capabilities to prevent and respond to crises and to work with partners and 

other international organizations to address threats that emanate from outside Alliance territory. 

Question. What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for 

NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next 5 years? 

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Answer. NATO’s greatest opportunities lie in how it deals with the expanding 

range of challenges it will face over the next five years. While I cannot predict all 

the challenges the alliance will face, NATO’s ability to respond effectively and with 

resolve against Russia’s aggression; to counter non-state actors that threaten the alliance and its periphery, such as ISIL; and to manage the transition in Afghanistan 

will be critical over the next 5 years. Managing these myriad challenges will require 

the political will, solidarity, and adequate defense investment to fulfill the vision of 

the Wales Summit. Ensuring that happens will be NATO’s greatest challenge over 

the next 5 years. 

Question. In light of the reductions in national defense spending by some NATO 

members, are you concerned that the Alliance will lack critical military capabilities? 

If so, what steps, if any, would you recommend be taken to address potential shortfalls in Alliance capabilities? 

Answer. The United States should be concerned about continued reductions in defense investment by our Allies, particularly the NATO Allies that have been our 

most reliable partners for managing global security issues. These capabilities can 

be costly, but we need to ensure that in the future the United States is not the only 

Ally with such capabilities. That means holding Allies to the Defense Investment 

Pledge they agreed to at the Wales Summit and working with Allies on defense 

planning to ensure they maintain the specific capabilities that are needed. 

Question. What do you see as the proper role, if any, for NATO in addressing the 

threat posed by ISIL and in addressing the problem of illegal immigration across 

the Mediterranean Sea? 

Answer. NATO nations have a vested interest in defeating ISIL, both to promote 

stability in the Middle East and to eliminate the threat posed by ISIL to NATO nations and partners. If confirmed I would work with NATO Allies to appropriately 

scope our collective efforts. To date, NATO nations have committed forces to counter 

ISIL under unilateral and multilateral efforts. On illegal Mediterranean immigration, NATO should continue its efforts to share information gained through maritime situational awareness operations. If Allies agree, NATO could also help address regional security crises and instability, or humanitarian crises, which are 

often associated with displaced populations and flows of refugees. 

Question. The concept of defense cooperation between NATO members was emphasized at the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012. 

What areas or projects would you recommend, if confirmed, that NATO nations 

cooperate in to improve NATO alliance capabilities? 

Answer. Cooperation among allies on capabilities is increasingly important in 

light of the worldwide challenges and the fiscal straits facing allied nations. If confirmed, I would work to ensure allies honor their recent Summit pledge to move toward the two percent defense spending target, which also called for focusing those 

resources on specific alliance capability needs, such as command and control and 

joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 

Question. Under what conditions, if any, would you envision further enlargement 

of NATO in the coming years? 

Answer. The door to Alliance membership remains open to those European nations deemed ready for membership by the 28 allies. The United States and our allies, through Partnership for Peace and other Partner programs, work with candidates to help prepare for membership, such as through improving military capabilities and interoperability. If confirmed, I would ensure DOD is working both at 

NATO and bilaterally to ready candidates to be considered for membership. 

Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries? 

Answer. NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance for as long as nuclear weapons 

exist. The Alliance’s nuclear force is an effective deterrent. Allies reaffirmed this 

stance at the Wales Summit last September, and I support the conviction that 

NATO must maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to maintain Alliance 

security, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense 

capabilities. 

Question. Turkey continues to be a gateway for foreign fighters proceeding to and 

from Syria and Iraq. 

What steps would you recommend, if confirmed, to encourage Turkey to address 

this threat? 

Answer. The threat posed to the United States and the west by foreign fighters 

moving in and out of Syria—many of whom transit through Turkey—remains a concern. If confirmed, I would continue to support United States interagency efforts to 

assist Turkey in disrupting this threat—including strengthening the Department’s 

partnership on this issue with the Turkish military—as well as to assist the source 

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countries for foreign fighters around the world in doing more to identify and halt 

potential violent extremists before they travel. 

KOSOVO

Question. Approximately 700 United States troops remain in the Balkans as part 

of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) that first deployed to Kosovo in 1999 and today is comprised of over 4,600 personnel from 30 countries. Spikes in violence in 2011 required 

the deployment of the NATO operational Reserve Force battalion of approximately 

600 soldiers to bolster KFOR and maintain a secure environment. Progress is required in both the military and political realms before further troop reductions can 

be made. 

What major lines of effort do you think are required to further reduce or eliminate 

United States and NATO presence in Kosovo? 

Answer. The key line of effort that will define United States and NATO presence 

in Kosovo is the continued normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, 

under the EU facilitated dialogue that led to a normalization agreement in April 

2013. A further line of effort is the transition of the Kosovo Security Forces into a 

Kosovo Armed Force that integrates the various ethnic communities of Kosovo and 

contributes to the strength of national governing institutions. 

Question. In your view, can the European Union play a more significant role in 

Kosovo? 

Answer. The EU plays a significant role in Kosovo as one of the three major guarantors of Kosovo’s peace and stability, along with the Kosovo national police and 

NATO’s Kosovo Force. The EU-facilitated political dialogue between Serbia and 

Kosovo, along with the reforms and concessions the EU requires of Serbia as it 

seeks EU membership, are major factors contributing to the normalization process 

between Kosovo and Serbia. This active engagement by the EU has been an essential part of the progress made to date. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The 2006 and 2010 QDRs mandated significant growth in our Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) and enablers that directly support their operations. The 

most recent QDR released in 2014 QDR capped this growth at 69,500, approximately 2,500 below the original planned growth. 

In light of the increase in terrorist threats worldwide, do you believe the revised 

end strength for SOF is sufficient to address such threats? 

Answer. Since 2001, the Department has continuously examined the U.S. Special 

Operations Command (SOCOM) force structure to ensure that there are adequate 

SOF capabilities and capacities to meet the worldwide terrorist threat. The Department has invested in SOF readiness and modernization efforts to meet emerging requirements and to address the needs of the future security environment. If confirmed, I would work closely with my interagency counterparts to develop options 

for the best use of these capabilities and with those responsible in the department 

to examine this issue further. 

Question. SOFs are heavily reliant on enabling support from the general purpose 

force. 

In light of current fiscal challenges, do you believe sufficient enabling capabilities 

can be maintained within the general purpose forces and that such capabilities will 

remain available to SOFs? 

Answer. I believe that it is important for our SOFs to receive excellent support 

from the Services. If confirmed, I would work closely with those responsible in the 

Department to ensure the Department achieves an appropriate balance. 

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and associated 

forces to the United States Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western interests 

more broadly? Which al Qaeda affiliates and associated forces are of most concern? 

Answer. Al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents continue to pose a significant 

threat to the United States, its interests, and the interests of our key western allies. 

The recent attacks in Paris, which have been linked to AQAP demonstrates this 

fact. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Department’s role in the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism? 

Answer. DOD has a two-fold role in carrying out the President’s guidance contained in the 2011 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. First, the Department’s principal function in support of this strategy is to work with key partners 

around the globe to build their own capacity to take action against terrorist groups 

93 

and networks both internally and within their particular regions. Capacity building 

efforts are part of a broad multi-departmental and multi-agency effort in support 

of the strategy’s long-term goal to advance effective democracies. Second, the Department actively works to prevent terrorist network attacks by collecting and sharing intelligence with key partners, conducting information operations, and, when appropriate, conducting U.S. operations to capture or kill terrorists who pose a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons. 

Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and agencies? 

Answer. In the decade following the events of September 11, the U.S. Government 

learned many lessons relating to the value of active cooperation and sharing among 

the various departments and agencies. DOD has internalized many of these lessons 

as part of our institutional culture; it routinely coordinates and collaborates with 

other Federal departments and agencies to combat terrorist networks and threats 

to U.S. interests. Success in today’s complex threat environment requires an interagency approach. 

Question. In your opinion, how does the fighting between ISIL and al Qaeda for 

preeminence among terrorist organizations alter the nature or scope of the global 

security threat as it relates to violent extremists? What elements of our strategy 

best take advantage of the infighting between major terrorist groups? 

Answer. The fighting between ISIL and al Qaeda for preeminence of the global 

jihadist movement does not significantly alter the scope of the threat posed to the 

Homeland, our overseas bases, and our deployed personnel. We must remain vigilant against all threats to the United States Homeland, overseas infrastructure, and 

interests, and we must remain flexible to meet the threat posed by either ISIL or 

al Qaeda, and potentially other violent groups as necessary. However, there exists 

the potential that competition between the groups could escalate the threat we face, 

as each group increases external plotting efforts in an attempt to bolster their credentials within the global jihadist movement. 

As opportunities may emerge for the United States to further disrupt their activities. I would direct the Department to monitor these opportunities and recommend 

steps to address them as needed. 

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan NDAA for fiscal year 2005 (Public 

Law 108–375), as amended by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support 

(including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and 

individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. SOFs to combat 

terrorism. 

What is your assessment of this authority? 

Answer. It is my understanding that section 1208 authority is an effective tool 

to support U.S. SOFs conducting counterterrorism operations. If confirmed, I would 

look for ways to maximize our return on the investments we are able to make in 

support of partner forces under section 1208 authority. 

MASS ATROCITIES PREVENTION

Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as well as a core moral interest, in 

August 2011 under Presidential Study Directive 10. 

What are your views on the role the United States plays in the prevention of mass 

atrocities and genocide? 

Answer. The United States can help prevent mass atrocities and genocide worldwide. That role is consistent with our values, and is in our national security interest. The military has unique capabilities to counter atrocities; in a recent example, 

United States air strikes helped protect Yezidi refugees on Mount Sinjar in Iraq. 

There is more to atrocity prevention than use of military force, however. For example, adequate warning mechanisms and international pressure, including sanctions, 

can also help prevent atrocities and genocide. 

Question. What are your views on the adequacy of the Department’s tools and doctrine for contributing to this role? 

Answer. I believe the Department has effective tools and doctrine to help deter 

both mass atrocities and genocide. These tools include providing humanitarian assistance and helping secure territory to protect civilians. If confirmed, I would continue to look for ways to enhance the tools and doctrine available to us in preventing mass atrocities and genocide. 

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UNITED STATES FORCE POSTURE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

Question. The Defense Department’s January 2012 strategic guidance, ‘‘Sustaining 

U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century’’, states that ‘‘while the U.S. 

military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.’’ Likewise, the 2010 report of the QDR states 

that the United States needs to ‘‘sustain and strengthen our Asia-Pacific alliances 

and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure sustainable peace 

and security in the region,’’ and that, to accomplish this, DOD ‘‘will augment and 

adapt our forward presence’’ in the Asia-Pacific region. 

What does the ‘‘rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region’’ mean to you in terms 

of force structure, capabilities and funding? 

Answer. The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, as announced by the President, 

incorporated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, and reinforced by the 2014 

QDR, has resulted in a significant rebalancing of U.S. force structure and capabilities to this region, commensurate with its vital importance to U.S. security interests 

and global peace and prosperity. As we plan for the future, we will need to prioritize 

investments in advanced capabilities that are critical for the future operational environment. If confirmed, I will continue to support the ongoing efforts to increase 

DOD presence in the region and invest in and deploy critical advanced capabilities. 

Question. If sequestration cuts move forward as planned beginning in fiscal year 

2016, do you feel DOD has adequate resources to implement the January 2012 strategic guidance? 

Answer. If we return to sequestration-level cuts in fiscal year 2016, we will face 

significant risks across the board, and may have to reassess the defense strategy. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to help solve this pressing 

problem. 

Question. What do you see as the United States security priorities in the AsiaPacific region? 

Answer. First and foremost, we must work tirelessly to protect security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which is vital to the prosperity of all Pacific nations, 

including the United States. The United States faces a range of challenges in the 

Asia-Pacific region, including provocations by the DPRK and the growth of its ballistic missile programs, the emergence of new technologies intended to prevent open 

access to the air and maritime domain, widespread natural disasters and 

transnational threats, and territorial disputes. 

To address these challenges, I believe the Department must continue to modernize 

U.S. alliances and partnerships, which provide a critical role in underwriting regional security. The Department should also continue to strengthen our ability to 

deter threats to the U.S. Homeland and our allies and citizens overseas, enhance 

United States force posture and capabilities in the region, work with China to encourage greater transparency about how it will use its growing military capabilities; 

and encourage the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with 

international law. 

Question. Do you believe that it is a ‘‘necessity’’ to rebalance the United States 

military toward the Asia-Pacific region? If so, why? 

Answer. Yes. The United States has been—and always will be—a Pacific nation, 

due to both our geography and our critical interests in the region. The Asia-Pacific 

region is home to over half of the world’s population, half of the world’s GDP, and 

nearly half of the world’s trade. It is also home to some of the world’s fastest growing economies and largest democracies. 

The United States military presence has played a vital role in undergirding peace 

and stability in the Asia-Pacific region for over 60 years. Our presence deters potential adversaries; protects core principles, such as freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of conflicts; and reassures key allies and partners. I believe this presence is critical to the continued security of the region and the future prosperity of 

the United States and our allies and partners. 

Question. Do continuing operations in the Middle East hamper this pivot? 

Answer. It is important to continue to advance the force structure changes, new 

forces station plans, improvements in advanced weapon systems, and other measures that make up the military aspects of the rebalance, as well as to continue the 

political and economic aspects, even as U.S. forces respond to other global contingencies. 

Question. Why, if at all, do you believe it is important for the United States military to maintain and even augment its forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region, 

and what are the advantages to having a forward presence? 

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firmed, I will continue ongoing efforts to achieve a more geographically distributed, 

operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture in the Asia-Pacific 

in order to reassure allies and partners and deter aggressive acts by adversaries. 

I believe that improving access and presence enables building regional partner capacity that is a force multiplier for U.S. military forces in the event of a contingency 

or humanitarian crisis in the region. 

Question. Secretary Hagel has said that the Army could ‘‘broaden its role,’’ after 

more than a decade of continuous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, ‘‘by 

leveraging its current suite of long-range precision-guided missiles, rockets, artillery 

and air defense systems’’ to build a modern coastal defense force that could contribute to operations in anti-access/area-denial environments. 

Do you concur that U.S. defense policy would be served if the Army were to adopt 

such a mission? What do you see as possible obstacles to the Army taking on such 

a mission? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support Army’s ongoing efforts to improve its integrated air and missile defense capabilities. In the coming years, the drawdown in 

Afghanistan will allow the Army to focus on resetting, to look forward to new missions, and to invest in innovative technologies and concepts of operations that will 

contribute to the resiliency of the joint force. 

Question. Are you confident the Guam Distributed Laydown Plan can be executed 

at the cost estimate and under the political assumptions previously presented by the 

Department? 

Answer. The Joint Force is developing Guam into a strategic hub for the region. 

Following the submission of the Guam Master Plan to Congress in July 2014, execution of the Guam program is moving forward. I understand that the new plan is 

comprehensive, but I am not fully briefed on the updated details at this time. If confirmed, I will direct that efforts continue within the Department to scrutinize costs 

and program execution, as well as to engage with my Japanese counterparts on 

their continued contributions. 

Question. Do you see value in the Department conducting another East Asia 

Strategy Report, as was last done in the late 1990s? 

Answer. Yes, I believe it is in the Department’s interest to clearly articulate our 

priorities and security objectives in this vital region of the world. The report required section 1251 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2015 provides the Department with 

the opportunity to address these issues. 

Question. Do you see a need for enhanced United States security engagement in 

the Indian Ocean, and if so, in what areas and with whom? 

Answer. Yes. The Indian Ocean is one of the world’s busiest trade corridors and 

the United States and our regional partners have a shared interest in ensuring safe 

and secure access to its maritime routes. As Asian economic growth continues to increase traffic in the Indian Ocean, it will increase the potential for threats in the 

region, including piracy, extremist attacks, or illegal trafficking. The United States 

has a strong interest in working with long-time allies and partners such as India 

and Australia to combat these threats, while also increasing security assistance and 

military-to-military engagement with other strategically positioned states such as 

Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. 

CHINA

Question. From your perspective, what effect is China’s expanding economy and 

growing military having on the region at-large and how does that growth influence 

the United States security posture in the Asia-Pacific region? 

Answer. China’s economic growth can be a positive force in the Asia-Pacific region, and the United States and many countries in the region welcome China’s economic rise. However, China’s increasing military might, in the absence of greater 

transparency from China, is causing rising concern throughout the region and must 

be closely watched. China’s military expenditures continue to grow annually at double-digit rates even as China asserts territorial and maritime claims in ways contrary to international norms. These developments are spurring other Asia-Pacific 

countries to modernize their militaries and causing increased demand in the region 

for security cooperation with the United States. 

The United States should continually evaluate our force posture and capabilities 

in order to sustain peace and stability in the region. If confirmed, I will work to 

ensure that the United States remains the preeminent military power in the AsiaPacific region in order to sustain the conditions that have fostered peace and prosperity. 

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fident that the United States is investing in the right programs, posture, and operational concepts to sustain a favorable military balance with China? 

Answer. It is necessary for the United States to continue to monitor closely trends 

in Chinese military modernization, strategy, doctrine, and training, and in concert 

with allies and partners, to adapt investment programs, posture, and operational 

concepts to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific security environment and a 

favorable military balance with China. 

Question. What can the United States do, both unilaterally and in coordination 

with allies and partners, to counter the increasing challenge posed by China in the 

East and South China Seas? 

Answer. As a Pacific nation, the United States has a vested interest in maintaining peace and stability, the free flow of commerce, and freedom of navigation and 

overflight in the East and South China Seas. United States security presence, including our strong alliances and partnerships, as well as our force posture and capabilities, have protected these interests and helped maintain maritime stability for 

more than 60 years. 

The United States must continue to encourage China to clarify its claims in the 

South China Sea in accordance with international law. We should also reaffirm our 

strong commitment to our allies and partners and the need for all parties to develop 

confidence-building measures that will increase transparency and reduce risk. 

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the United States sustains its ability to 

deter aggression and coercion and maintain free and open access to the maritime 

domain in the Asia-Pacific region. To this end, I will continue the Department’s efforts to modernize U.S. security alliances and partnerships, enhance U.S. force posture, and update our military capabilities. 

Question. United States-China military-to-military dialogue has been strained 

over the past several years and efforts to establish and maintain mutually beneficial 

military relations has been hampered by China’s propensity for postponing or canceling military engagements in an apparent effort to influence United States actions, although there is some evidence that the relationship is improving. 

What is your view of the purpose and relative importance of sustained militaryto-military relations with China? 

Answer. It is profoundly in the United States’ and China’s interests that we find 

ways in the overall relationship, as well as in the military-to-military relationship, 

to increase cooperation where our interests overlap and to manage our differences 

where we disagree. In recent years, the Department’s sustained and substantive 

dialogue with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has enabled both the 

United States and China to reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculation, as 

well as to deepen practical cooperation in areas ranging from humanitarian assistance to military medicine. In addition to making investments that ensure our technological advantages in all domains, the military-to-military relationship is an important component in managing competition. 

I believe we should continue to use our military engagement with China to establish deeper cooperation where there is clear, mutual benefit and to enhance dialogues to reduce risk and manage our differences. As the Department continues to 

develop the military-to-military relationship with China, it will be important to also 

adapt forces, posture, and operational concepts in cooperation with our allies and 

partners to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific region. 

Question. Do you believe that we should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes would you suggest 

and, given Chinese resistance to military-to-military dialogue, how would you implement them? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to strengthen the United States-China military-to-military relationship in ways that best serve the interests of the United 

States and our allies and partners. Military-to-military ties are beginning to demonstrate positive outcomes. China is devoting more attention to operational safety 

and preventing incidents that could seriously harm the overall relationship. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue a sustained, substantive dialogue that aims to reduce risk and manage our differences, while building concrete, practical cooperation 

in areas of mutual interest. 

NORTH KOREA

Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean 

peninsula? 

Answer. The United States-ROK alliance continues to be the critical linchpin to 

deterring North Korean aggression and maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. 

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North Korea remains one of the most intractable security problems for the United 

States and our allies and partners in the region. North Korea continues to take actions that are destabilizing for the region, including its December 2012 missile 

launch, February 2013 nuclear test, series of short-range ballistic missile launches 

in 2014, and its recent cyber-attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment. 

The limited information we have on Kim Jong Un, his regime, and North Korea’s 

motivations also add to my concern. Despite the recent signals from both North and 

South Korea about openness to inter-Korean engagement, the United States should 

remain vigilant against the strong possibility that North Korea will use brinkmanship and provocations to try to coerce the United States and its allies and partners 

back into negotiations on its own terms. If confirmed, I will ensure that the United 

States-ROK Alliance continues to strengthen alliance capabilities to counter North 

Korea’s increasing missile and nuclear threat. 

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and 

its allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of 

those capabilities? 

Answer. North Korea’s ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

capabilities clearly present a serious and direct threat to United States forces postured in the Asia-Pacific region as well as to our regional allies and partners. These 

capabilities, although untested at longer ranges, could also pose a direct threat to 

the United States. Moreover, North Korea’s history of proliferation activities amplify 

the dangers of its asymmetric programs. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that we draw upon the full range of our capabilities 

to protect against, and to respond to, these threats. 

Question. In your view, what additional steps should the United States take to 

defend against the North Korean ballistic missile threat and dissuade North Korea 

from its continued pursuit of ballistic missile technology and to stop or slow North 

Korean proliferation of missile and weapons technology to Syria, Iran, and others? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to strengthen our strong defense posture against the North Korean ballistic missile threat. This includes supporting our 

current efforts to increase the number of ground-based interceptors in California 

and Alaska, enhancing DOD’s ability to highlight and disrupt the illicit proliferation 

networks that North Korea uses, and promoting cooperation with partners to interdict vessels and aircraft suspected of transporting items of proliferation concern. 

Question. What is your view on Kim Jong Un’s proposal to cease future nuclear 

tests in exchange for the United States cancelling annual military exercises in 2015 

with South Korea? 

Answer. I believe the United States annual combined exercises with the Republic 

of Korea, including Key Resolve and Foal Eagle during the first part of 2015 and 

Ulchi Freedom Guardian during the summer of 2015, are routine, transparent, and 

defensive exercises that are meant to strengthen military readiness and Alliance 

preparedness. There is no equivalence between conducting these exercises and 

North Korean nuclear tests, which are violations of United Nations Security Council 

resolutions. 

INDIA

Question. What is your view of the current state of the United States-India security relations? 

Answer. India and the United States have built a strong strategic partnership. 

India is an important net provider of security in the region, and a partner on issues 

ranging from maritime security to humanitarian assistance to broader regional stability. The past decade has been transformative in the United States-India relationship, and we are seeing greater convergence in our interests and concerns than ever 

before, particularly between our rebalance to Asia and India’s ‘‘Act East.’’ Strengthening the United States-India defense relationship was a priority for me as Deputy 

Secretary of Defense and, if confirmed, I will continue to prioritize the steady 

growth of this relationship. 

Defense plays a vital role in United States-India relations, which includes a robust series of military exchanges and exercises, a strong track record on defense 

trade, and increasingly close consultations on regional security issues. DOD also remains committed to technological cooperation with India through the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), under which the President announced four pathfinder projects, a working group on aircraft carrier cooperation, and the possibility 

of cooperating on jet engine technology. As Deputy Secretary of Defense, I launched 

DTTI, now led by Under Secretary Frank Kendall. If confirmed, I will lean-forward 

to expand DTTI with additional co-production and co-development activities. 

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Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to find ways to strengthen our military-tomilitary relationship by expanding the scope and complexity of our exercises, and 

ensure the consistency of our engagement. I will prioritize exchanges at all levels 

of our military, and encourage frequent high-level visits. I will also build upon the 

progress achieved under the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). This 

includes pursuing additional opportunities for co-production/co-development projects, 

developing the defense trade relationship into increasingly sophisticated areas, and 

encouraging broader defense S&T engagement with India. Finally, I will continue 

to look for ways to expand upon our maritime security relationship and identify specific areas for increased cooperation, including in the Asia-Pacific. 

Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between India and China 

and how does that relationship impact the security and stability of the region? 

Answer. As with the United States and China, India’s relationship with China 

displays both cooperative and competitive aspects. It is hampered by a trust deficit 

stemming from China’s long-time, close relations with Pakistan; a long-time border 

dispute; and on-going competition for resources. Efforts to mitigate this mistrust are 

further complicated by a growing competition for influence in the South and Southeast Asian regions, a trade imbalance in China’s favor, and recent Chinese naval 

activity in the Indian Ocean region. 

Despite these factors, the two countries often find common ground in international groupings, such as the BRICS and G20, due to shared interests and a desire to shape the international system to ensure their respective domestic development and economic growth. This cooperation helps to maintain stability in Sino-Indian ties and preclude more overt security competition. The United States, India, 

and China all have an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the region and a rules-based order. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

Question. DOD serves as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring 

of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing toward the U.S. On an 

annual basis, DOD’s counter narcotics (CN) program expends nearly $1 billion to 

support the Department’s CN operations, including building the capacity of U.S. 

Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and certain foreign governments, and providing intelligence support on CN-related matters and a variety of 

other unique enabling capabilities. 

In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD in counterdrug efforts? 

Answer. DOD should continue to play an important role in identifying counter 

narcotics networks and supporting the interdiction of illicit drugs entering the 

United States. In addition, DOD should continue to support U.S. law enforcement 

and partner nations’ enforcement capabilities by facilitating training, providing 

equipment, and improving infrastructure that strengthens their operational reach 

and their own sustainment capabilities. 

Question. Do you believe that the United States broadly, and the U.S. military 

more narrowly, has been effective in achieving its counterdrug objectives? 

Answer. The United States has supported the interdiction of hundreds of tons of 

illegal drugs by law enforcement personnel annually. The United States has also, 

through multi-agency efforts, put pressure on major drug trafficking organizations 

and their leaders. The Department’s efforts to build the counter narcotics capacity 

of partner nations’ security forces also contribute to counterdrug objectives by 

strengthening security institutions and by equipping and training security personnel 

to disrupt, degrade, and deter drug trafficking networks in both source and transit 

countries. 

Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United States in countering 

the flow of narcotics to nations other than the United States? 

Answer. I believe that the United States, along with other countries, should continue to assist other nations in the fight against drug trafficking by supporting efforts to enhance the capacity of these nations to disrupt and degrade narcotics trafficking networks. 

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Question. Transnational criminal organizations are having a debilitating impact 

on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people. DOD is by no means the U.S. Government’s law enforcement 

agency, but it does bring unique enabling capabilities to our Nation’s Federal law 

enforcement agencies. The NDAA for fiscal year 2015 expanded several of the DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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partment’s primary counterdrug authorities to include ‘‘countering transnational organized crime (TOC)’’ as an approved activity to reflect the increasingly diverse nature of these illicit, global networks. 

What is your understanding of the President’s strategy to combat transnational 

criminal organizations? 

Answer. The President’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime recognizes that TOC has expanded in size, scope, and influence over the past 20 years, 

and now poses a significant and direct threat to national and international security. 

The Strategy, with amplifying implementation guidance, calls for combatting networks that pose a strategic threat to U.S. interests, and ultimately aims to reduce 

TOC networks from a national security threat to a manageable public safety problem. 

Question. What role, if any, should the Department play in combatting 

transnational criminal organizations? 

Answer. The President’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime declares TOC a threat to national security, and calls on the U.S. Government to build, 

balance, and integrate the tools of national power to combat TOC and related 

threats. Although DOD does not serve as the lead for combatting TOC, it can provide unique and critical support to U.S. law enforcement efforts. Specific DOD capabilities include military intelligence support and counter-threat finance support, 

training of foreign partners, and detection and monitoring. The expanded authorities provided by Congress in the NDAA for fiscal year 2015 provide additional opportunities for DOD to support efforts to counter illicit networks and to contribute 

further to the achievement of U.S. Government objectives. 

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

Question. DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC) have begun investing more 

resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist 

networks and illicit trafficking, but the opportunities for tracking and degrading illicit financing flows are not yet matched by the effort and resources devoted to 

them. Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and facilitation routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism, production of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other significant national security threats could have an 

outsized impact on confronting these threats. 

What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance activities? 

Answer. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other adversaries rely heavily on licit 

and illicit funding sources to support their activities. I believe it is essential to engage all available tools to track and halt the flow of money and to fight our adversaries’ ability to access and use global financial networks. Although DOD is not the 

lead agency for Counter-Threat Finance (CTF). CTF can be important to achieving 

DOD goals. I am aware that the Department works with other departments, agencies, and partner nations to provide planning, network analysis, and intelligence 

analysis. 

Question. Are you aware of any policy, legal authority, or resource shortfalls that 

may impair U.S. counter threat finance efforts? 

Answer. I understand that the Department has concerns that we do not have 

enough fidelity on the sources of corruption that can impact our ability to achieve 

our goals in partner nations and, in non-terrorism cases, there are still difficulties 

fully sharing relevant information between law enforcement and intelligence entities. 

Question. In your view, how should DOD coordinate and interface with other key 

agencies, including the Department of Treasury and the Intelligence Community, in 

conducting counter threat finance activities? 

Answer. I am aware that DOD works with other U.S. Government departments 

and agencies, including the Department of the Treasury and the Intelligence Community, on counter-threat finance efforts to limit our adversaries’ ability to use global financial networks. 

CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO

Question. During a March 13, 2014, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, 

General John Kelly, Commander of United States Southern Command, stated that 

the ‘‘unprecedented expansion of criminal networks and violent gangs is impacting 

citizen security and stability in the region’’ which has led the United Nations to 

characterize Latin America ‘‘the most unequal and insecure region in the world.’’ 

Despite this reality and the region’s proximity to the U.S. Homeland, DOD efforts 

in the region have routinely been plagued by resource shortfalls, which have only 

been exacerbated by sequestration. To this point, General Kelly stated before the 

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committee: ‘‘the severe budget cuts are now reversing the progress and forcing us 

to accept significant risks. Because of asset shortfalls, we’re unable to get after 74 

percent of suspected maritime drug trafficking. I simply sit and watch it go by.’’ 

General Kelly went on to state that ‘‘the cumulative impact of our reduced engagement won’t be measured in the number of canceled activities and reduced deployments, it will be measured in terms of U.S. influence, leadership, relationships in 

a part of the world where our engagement has made a real and lasting difference 

over the decades.’’ 

Do you share General Kelly’s concerns about the impact of DOD resource shortfalls to our operations and security interests in the region? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What are your views on the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations in this region and their impact on U.S. security interests? 

Answer. Transnational criminal organizations have become entrenched in places 

like the Northern Triangle of Central America, where they take advantage of weak 

government institutions, endemic corruption, large under-governed spaces, and the 

lack of viable economic opportunities. Many of our partners in the region are challenged to control the influence of transnational criminal organizations, which 

present a real threat to stability and expose vulnerabilities to the southern approaches to the United States. 

Question. What is your assessment of DOD’s role and current activities in Mexico 

and Central America? 

Answer. DOD supports the broader U.S. interagency effort to promote security 

and stability in the region. The Department’s security cooperation activities in Central America focus on professionalization, respect for human rights, building capacity of local security forces, including maritime, and facilitating internal defense institutional reform efforts that will help those governments plan, resource, and maintain enhanced capabilities. The Department contributes to efforts to help Mexico address internal and transnational security challenges, as well as to support Mexico’s 

growing regional and international defense leadership role. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you propose to DOD’s current role and activities in this region? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would direct my team to examine whether there is more 

DOD could do to support U.S. strategies to address the root causes of insecurity in 

the region. Steps the U.S. Government can take include supporting efforts to 

strengthen government institutions and fight corruption, develop infrastructure, address control of under-governed spaces and help diminish criminal organizations. 

Lasting solutions will require an interagency approach by the United States and 

will require the United States to cooperate and coordinate with other partners in 

the region. 

CUBA

Question. On December 17, 2014, President Obama announced changes in the diplomatic relationship between the United States and Cuba which includes the easing 

of several longstanding restrictions. 

Would you recommend the establishment of military-to-military engagement between the United States and Cuba? If so, what, if any, prerequisites should there 

to their establishment? 

Answer. I believe that with the recent efforts to begin normalizing relations with 

Cuba there is an opportunity to consider carefully whether to expand defense relations. If confirmed, I would examine this issue carefully and work to ensure any 

military-to-military engagement is nested within a larger, comprehensive U.S. Government engagement strategy. 

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in 

recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature. 

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative 

interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere? 

Answer. It is critical to draw lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq. A key 

lesson is that strategy requires a close integration of military, economic, intelligence, and diplomatic elements and the full range of American power. Increased 

collaboration, transparency, and communications among the interagency are important. If confirmed, I will focus on maintaining and improving these relationships to 

ensure that interagency collaboration is as effective as possible. 

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Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved? 

Answer. Given the complexity and scope of the national security challenges we 

face, a whole-of-government approach is essential to our success in order to harness 

the full capabilities of all U.S. departments and agencies. We must work with interagency partners to evaluate continually the effectiveness of our coordinated efforts 

and make adjustments where necessary. We must also acknowledge that every tool 

is not appropriate for every task. 

Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured in military doctrine and adopted as ‘‘best practices’’ for future contingency operations? 

Answer. We must have a rigorous approach to capturing our lessons learned and 

including them in our professional military education system and doctrine review 

process. If confirmed, I would keep these principles in mind as I work with the military departments and the combatant commands to maintain and cultivate enduring 

and agile partnerships with key departments and agencies across government. 

STRATEGIC REVIEWS

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD processes for 

analysis, decisionmaking, and reporting results for each of the following strategic reviews: 

The Defense Strategy Review (section 118 of title 10, United States Code, as 

amended by Public Law 113–291); 

Answer. The purpose of the QDR is to articulate the Nation’s defense strategy in 

support of the President’s National Security Strategy. DOD is tasked, per Title 10 

U.S.C. Section 118, with conducting a comprehensive examination of the national 

defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget 

plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward 

establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. In my experience, effective 

QDRs incorporate inputs from various stakeholders, both within and outside the Department, and provide effective guidance to develop U.S. military force structure, 

plans, and programs. 

Question. The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10, United States 

Code); 

Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepares the National Military 

Strategy (NMS) in order to assist the President and Secretary with unified strategic 

direction of the Armed Forces. The Chairman uses a robust Joint Strategic Planning 

System to develop the NMS and biennially submits the strategy to the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate. The strategy specifies military objectives, 

strategic and operational missions required to achieve those objectives, and the necessary capabilities to carry out each mission. The NMS also describes the strategic 

and operational risks associated with accomplishing the strategy. 

Question. Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10, United States 

Code); and 

Answer. The Global Defense Posture annual report to Congress, authored by the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

offers an operational view of the Department’s military personnel and facilities, and 

assesses changes to overseas posture required to meet evolving security environment and strategic priorities outlined in documents such as the QDR. DOD global 

posture decision-making processes continually review the appropriate mix of deployed and forward stationed U.S. forces, the distribution of enduring locations, and 

status of international agreements to meet national security requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure this thorough process continues to meet the Congressional intent. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to change 

title 10, United States Code, and to improve DOD’s processes for analysis, policy formulation, and decision making relative to each review above? 

Answer. I have no specific recommendations at this time. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Members of Congress to ensure that these reviews continue 

serving the needs of both DOD leaders and Congress. 

TACTICAL FIGHTER PROGRAMS

Question. Based on the current defense strategy, defense planning scenarios, and 

force-sizing construct, what are your views on the ability of the Department to meet 

combatant commander requirements with regard to fighter force capability and capacity now and into the future? 

Answer. U.S. fighter forces currently enjoy technical superiority and will continue 

to contribute to the overall success of our forces. Other nations are making significant investments in modernizing their fighter fleets and in building advanced air 

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defenses. The U.S. must maintain the ability to control the air space in any current 

and future operations. 

The largest and most costly modernization effort we will face over the next several 

years is the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program to upgrade our tactical aviation forces to fifth generation technologies. 

Question. Based on current and projected threats, what are your views on the continued requirement for and timing of this program? 

Answer. While the F–35 program has experienced a number of program delays 

and other significant acquisition issues, when fielded it will provide a significant 

edge in the number of high capability aircraft. The 5th generation technology that 

is the backbone of this system will be required for success in future conflicts. 

Question. What is your assessment of whether the restructuring of the JSF program that we have seen over the past several years will be sufficient to avoid having to make major future adjustments in either cost or schedule? 

Answer. The restructuring initiated in 2010 put the F–35 program on better footing. However, a program of this scope and importance requires continued aggressive 

management attention. 

Question. Are there any initiatives you would propose to help reduce operating 

and support costs for the JSF program? 

Answer. There are many factors that drive the operating and support costs for a 

weapons system like the F–35. Aggressive management of these initiatives will be 

required because the operating and support costs will be a major part of the JSF’s 

overall cost. I understand that the F–35 program is undertaking a number of reliability and maintainability initiatives that are focused on improvement in those 

areas. 

STRATEGIC BOMBER

Question. Secretary Hagel said on January 13, 2015, ‘‘I think the Long-Range 

Strike Bomber is absolutely essential for keeping our deterrent edge.’’ 

What are your views on the requirement for this capability, and how to acquire 

such a platform while providing the best value for the American taxpayer? 

Answer. I believe the Department requires global power projection capabilities 

across the full spectrum of conflict in order to deter and dissuade potential aggressors. To maintain these capabilities, the Air Force requires a new generation of 

stealthy, long-range strike aircraft that can operate at great distances, carry substantial payloads, and operate in and around contested airspace. If confirmed I will 

work with the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to 

ensure that the program will provide best value for the American taxpayer by ensuring the program is based on mature technologies and through program competition across a highly capable industrial base. 

NAVY SHIPBUILDING

Question. Today’s Navy is at its smallest size in decades and could decline further 

without additional urgent shipbuilding recapitalization efforts. Over the past several 

years, successive Chiefs of Naval Operations have concluded that the Navy requires 

a fleet of at least 306 ships to perform its mission. The Navy’s current naval battle 

force is only 289 ships, and will not be at the 306 level until sometime after 2020. 

What are your views regarding the CNO’s conclusions about the appropriate size 

and composition of the fleet, and the adequacy of the Navy’s current and projected 

plans to achieve a fleet with that number of ships? 

Answer. A strong and capable Navy is essential to meet our Nation’s strategic requirements across the spectrum of operational demands. Therefore the Navy needs 

a broad set of capabilities among the mix of ships in its inventory. Ship count is 

only one metric to measure to evaluate fleet effectiveness. If confirmed, I will work 

with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to ensure that 

the appropriate force structure requirements are fully identified and supported. 

Question. At about that same time (2020) the Navy will need to begin acquiring 

the Ohio Replacement Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs). The new Ohio class 

boats are projected to cost well over $10 billion per ship and the Navy has publicly 

indicated it cannot afford to buy both the new SSBNs as well as procure at least 

nine other ships annually. 

Do you believe the Navy can meet its goals for the size of the fleet in the current 

budget climate particularly in light of the Ohio Replacement Program? 

Answer. Procurement of the Ohio Replacement SSBN, as well as recapitalization 

of the other elements of the nuclear triad, poses significant resourcing challenges 

to the DOD. The Ohio Replacement Program will present unique constraints on the 

Navy’s shipbuilding plan, particularly if the DOD is required to be funded at the 

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levels specified in the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. The Secretary of the Navy 

and the Chief of Naval Operations have stated that recapitalizing our ballistic missile submarine force is the top shipbuilding priority for the Navy and have taken 

steps to reach the affordability targets of the Ohio Replacement Program. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy and the Congress to manage the impact of this 

critical endeavor on the rest of the shipbuilding programs and ensure naval forces 

are structured to meet our national defense needs. 

Question. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Nation procured the initial Ohio SSBN submarines within the Navy’s shipbuilding (SCN) account, do you believe using the 

SCN is possible for Ohio replacement or is a new method needed? 

Answer. I believe the important decision is to make the commitment to modernizing the ballistic missile submarine fleet. It is a vital component of our nuclear deterrence strategy. The Department needs adequate resources for modernization in 

order to ensure we can make the orderly transition to this new generation ballistic 

missile submarine. Which account it is funded in is of lesser importance. It makes 

the most sense to include the Ohio Replacement in the shipbuilding account, but 

this is a decision that can be made in the future. 

To maintain a Navy fleet with roughly 300 ships would require an annual new 

construction build rate of about 10 ships per year, assuming ship service lives of 

30 years. The fiscal year 2015 President’s Budget request included only 7 new construction ships. 

Question. Do you believe that the Navy’s goal can be achieved without recapitalizing the fleet at a larger rate? If not, will you recommend to the President that 

he significantly increase funding levels for the Navy to support both: 

(1) buying ships at an annual rate of at least 10 new ships per year; and 

(2) in particular replacing our Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN)? 

Answer. I understand DOD remains committed to sustaining the force structure 

required to maintain our Nation‘s security, and that recapitalization of the Nation‘s 

sea-based strategic deterrent is critical to this mission. If confirmed, I will work 

with the Navy to reduce risk in their force structure with particular focus on Ohioclass replacement submarines and other high priority ships. 

Question. The Navy has in recent years proposed the long-term lay up of CG–7 

class cruisers and LSD–41 class amphibious ships in order to achieve manpower 

cost avoidance savings and stretch out the life of these ship classes in order to defer 

new build replacement ships. Congress has consistently rejected the Navy’s proposal 

noting the Navy’s initial investment of more than $11.6 billion in the nine CG/LSD 

ships and the fact these ships are very unlikely to return to service after a lengthy 

layup approaching 5 years in some cases. Retiring these ships before the end of 

their planned service life creates unnecessary and unaffordable future shipbuilding 

requirements. 

What are your views on the Navy’s proposed plan to lay up in a reduced operating 

status both CG–47 class and LSD–41 class ships? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy and other Department leadership to better understand and assess how the Navy would execute 

the proposed plan, to ensure that it appropriately balances the needs of current 

readiness, modernization and future force structure to make the best use of existing 

assets. 

Question. Would you support modernizing these ships within the Navy’s SCN account to ensure they can serve out their full service lives? 

Answer. The SCN account, like virtually all modernization accounts, is under 

enormous pressure to finance the shipbuilding program the Nation needs. Difficult 

tradeoff decisions have been made and will need to be made in the future. It is important that the Congress and the Department find a way to move forward on the 

appropriate funding. 

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Question. DOD has repeatedly reaffirmed, despite budget pressures, that the 

United States is committed to maintaining a fleet of 11 nuclear powered aircraft 

carriers (CVNs), and maintaining carriers on patrol in the Persian Gulf. Yet, in the 

Department’s fiscal year 2015 budget request only 10 carriers were funded. We also 

understand carrier deployments have been extended for as long as 9 months. The 

NDAA for fiscal year 2015 reiterated the statutory requirement for the Department 

to maintain not less than 11 carriers. 

If confirmed as Secretary of Defense will you ensure the Department adheres to 

the statute requiring that the Navy shall include not less than 11 operational carriers? 

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Answer. I understand that the Department has reported that if it is forced to operate at sequestration level funding, it would have to seek relief from the 11-carier 

requirement. 

Question. Can you articulate for this committee your views on the number of 

CVNs that need to be maintained, and whether naval forward presence, particularly 

in areas such as the Persian Gulf, should be maintained and can be maintained 

without an urgent recapitalization of the fleet? 

Answer. I understand that a sizable carrier force is required to support our current strategy and provide sufficient carrier strike groups to meet overseas presence 

requirements. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy to ensure that we resource 

a sustainable level of presence that continues to support our Nation’s strategic 

goals. 

FUTURE ROLE OF THE ARMY

Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2015 directed the establishment of a National 

Commission on the Future of the Army to review the size and structure of all three 

components of the Army: regular Army, U.S. Army Reserve, and Army National 

Guard. The Commission will also consider and evaluate key policies concerning the 

make-up, training and the distribution of Guard resources across the states. Additionally, the commission will review the Army’s Aviation Restructure Initiative 

which recommended the transfer of National Guard Apache helicopters to the regular Army. The legislation allows the Army to transfer 48 Apache helicopters in fiscal year 2016. 

What are your views regarding the National Commission on the Future of the 

Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support the commission as enacted by law. 

Question. In your view, what are the key factors in determining the role of the 

Active and Reserve components in their support of the National Military Strategy? 

Answer. In my previous time in the Department I have seen the value of the operational contributions of all components. Their response in crisis has been and will 

be a Total Force response. The key factor is insuring the Total Force has the appropriate mix to support the requirements to the combatant commanders. 

Question. General Raymond Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, has stated that 

the Army will continue to be an indispensable part of the joint force and that there 

is a synergy that is gained of all the services in order for the military to meet the 

Nation’s needs. He has also said the Army provides more than Brigade Combat 

Teams—the Army is the largest contributor to SOFs and it provides a broad range 

of essential services to combatant commanders to include intelligence, surveillance, 

reconnaissance; air and missile defense; logistical support; and signal communication support. 

In your view, what are the most important considerations or criteria for aligning 

the Army’s size, structure, and cost with strategy and resources? 

Answer. Our national security requirements are the most important considerations when aligning the Total Army’s size, structure, and cost with strategy and 

resources. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to properly align 

the Army’s size and structure with the requirements of security strategies and the 

likely availability of resources? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review how the Department should align the Army’s 

size and structure to the strategy in the same way that it would align those of any 

other component of the Joint Force: based on appropriate security environment, examining the demands of the missions that are most relevant to that component, and 

then determining how best to provide the capabilities required to accomplish those 

missions. If confirmed, I will work closely with military and civilian leaders to balance maintaining the skills needed to meet our most pressing national security demands within the limits of acceptable risk and within existing resources. 

ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance of January 2012 called for the reduction of Army end strength and force structure over the next 5 years to 490,000 personnel and eight fewer combat brigades. The Army has accelerated these plans and 

intends to reduce endstrength to 490,000 by the end fiscal year 2015. Additionally, 

the Army intends to reduce endstrength to 450,000 Active, 315,000 Army National 

Guard, and 195,000 Army Reserve with even more severe reductions possible. Senior Army and National Guard leadership has testified that the Army will assume 

medium-to-high risk to meet the requirements of the National Security Strategy at 

these levels. 

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In your view, can the Army’s Active component end strength be drawn down 

below the announced and planned reduction to 450,000? If so, what in your view 

would be the impact on strategic risk, if any, and, in your view would that strategic 

risk be acceptable or unacceptable? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the level of funding specified in the Budget 

Control Act, and the appropriate levels for the total force army. I share the concern 

by our Army, Army Reserve and the National Guard leaders of the risks inherent 

in the sequester funding levels. 

Question. How do you define the resulting strategic risk? 

Answer. A strategic risk would be a lesser ability to support the highest priorities 

in our national defense strategy. 

Question. If confirmed, what size or force structure changes, if any, would you propose for either the Army Reserve of the Army National Guard? 

Answer. The Active and Reserve components of the Army must be sized and 

shaped to support our strategy. The Army National Guard provides critical capabilities to the Governors and States, while also retaining capacity to support vital Federal missions. The Army Reserve is also a key partner with the Active Army and 

the Army National Guard for Homeland support and warfighting missions. I understand that the Army Commission will examine some of these areas and if confirmed 

will look forward to their recommendations. 

ARMY MODERNIZATION

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s record with 

respect to equipment modernization? 

Answer. This record is mixed, and I believe it can be improved. 

Question. What actions, if any, would you take to ensure that the Army achieves 

a genuinely stable, achievable, and affordable modernization strategy and program? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Army’s modernization strategies to ensure 

that stable and affordable modernization programs are adopted and implemented. 

I will stress the continued need for Army programs that incorporate practical and 

realistic development strategies, affordable and technically feasible requirements 

and sufficient and stable resources. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the Army’s capabilities portfolio review process and its current modernization priorities and investment strategy? 

Answer. I have not examined any recent changes the Army may have introduced 

so I am unable to assess the Army’s specific processes for reviewing military requirements or establishing modernization priorities. 

Question. What actions, if any, would you take to sustain the momentum of these 

reviews in stabilizing the Army’s modernization strategy and priorities? 

Answer. If confirmed I will support the Army’s efforts to improve its modernization strategy and priorities. 

UNFUNDED PRIORITIES

Question. Section 1003 of Public Law 112–239 (NDAA for fiscal year 2013) expressed the sense of Congress with respect to the annual submission by the Service 

Chiefs and Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command of their critical unfunded priorities that are not included in the President’s annual budget request. 

If confirmed, will you allow the Service Chiefs and Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command to comply with this sense of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2015 expresses the Sense of the Congress that 

it is a national priority to defend the U.S. Homeland against the threat of limited 

ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate). 

Do you concur with Congress on this fundamental point? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you support each of the following steps—currently planned by 

DOD—for improving the capability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System 

to meet evolving ballistic missile threats (if not, please explain why): 

(1) Correct the problems associated with recent flight test failures; 

Answer. Yes. 

(2) Enhance homeland defense sensor and discrimination capabilities; 

Answer. Yes. 

(3) Redesign the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle, including realistic testing; and 

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Answer. Yes. 

(4) Design a next generation exo-atmospheric kill vehicle to take full advantage 

of improvements in sensors, discrimination, kill assessment, battle management, and command and control, including the potential to engage multiple 

objects? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Forward deployed United States military forces, and our regional allies 

and partners, face a growing regional ballistic missile threat, especially from nations 

such as North Korea and Iran. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) 

is intended to provide increasing levels of defensive coverage of NATO Europe 

against Iranian ballistic missiles, including an Aegis Ashore site in Romania in 2015 

and one in Poland in 2018. 

Do you agree that it is a priority to defend our forward-deployed forces, our allies, 

and partners from the threat of regional ballistic missiles? 

Answer. Yes. Our deployed forces as well as our allies and partners in the Middle 

East and in the Asia/Pacific region are within range of hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. 

I agree that the United States must prioritize capabilities to deter regional adversaries from launching a ballistic missile attack and to defend against such an attack 

if necessary. 

Question. Do you believe that the current phased and adaptive approach to regional missile defense is appropriate to meeting the operational needs of our regional combatant commanders, given the threat and current resource constraints? 

Answer. Yes. I understand the current United States policy is to develop regional 

approaches to ballistic missile defense in Europe, the Middle East, and the AsiaPacific region that are tailored to the unique deterrence and defense requirements 

of each region. 

I believe that such approaches provide the best option for managing our own highdemand, low-density ballistic missile defense forces and for developing allied and 

partner ballistic missile defense capacity in support of Combatant Commander requirements. 

Question. Do you believe the EPAA schedule is achievable and appropriate for defending NATO Europe against the current and projected threat from Iranian regional ballistic missiles? 

Answer. I believe the three phases of the EPAA were constructed to allow the 

United States to deploy existing or new capabilities in time to meet the projected 

threat from Iran. If confirmed, I will review the progress on this effort with the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Question. Do you agree that the United States should encourage our regional allies and partners to increase their missile defense capabilities to contribute to regional security and help reduce the burden on U.S. forces and requirements? 

Answer. I understand that building international cooperation and seeking appropriate levels of partner contributions are key tenets of our regional ballistic missile 

defense policy. I also understand that over time we have developed substantive ballistic missile defense relationships with our allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region, which have led to advances in fielding our own 

capabilities as well as those of our allies and partners. 

I view continuing these partnerships as critical to developing effective security architectures that deter and, if necessary, can be used to defend against the threat 

of ballistic missile attack. Accordingly, if confirmed, I will promote strong bilateral 

and multilateral ballistic missile defense cooperation in these key regions of U.S. interest. 

SPACE

Question. China’s test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a turning point for 

the United States in its policies and procedure to ensure access to space. As a Nation heavily dependent on space assets for both military and economic advantage, 

protection of space assets became a U.S. national priority. 

Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of space assets 

should be a national security priority? 

Answer. Yes. Space situational awareness is important to understand and characterize the space environment, detect interference with space systems, and enable 

timely attribution and response. Equally important is the protection of our space capabilities. 

Question. In your view, should China’s continued development of space systems 

inform United States space policy and programs? 

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Answer. Yes. China is rapidly developing space capabilities of its own that both 

mirror United States capabilities and could threaten our access and use of space for 

national security purposes. If confirmed, I will review the Department’s efforts to 

address China’s developments in space, and will coordinate closely with other 

United States departments and agencies. 

Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to National Security Space 

Policy and Programs? 

Answer. The National Security Space Strategy clearly highlights the growing 

challenges in the space domain. If confirmed, I will insist on policies, programs, and 

other measures that ensure U.S. warfighters can continue to depend on having the 

advantages that space confers. 

Question. What role do you believe offensive space control should play in National 

Security space policy and programs? 

Answer. Offensive space control, in addition to other elements of national power, 

should be carefully considered in protecting our forces from threats posed by an adversary’s space-enabled capabilities. 

Question. If confirmed, would you commit to reviewing the overall management 

and coordination of the national security space enterprise? 

Answer. Yes. I understand that the Department’s recent strategic portfolio review 

of space highlighted challenges with our overall space posture. If confirmed, I look 

forward to working with Congress to make adjustments to address those challenges. 

Question. What is your view on weapons in space? 

Answer. The United States depends upon space capabilities to enable operations 

in all domains. Other nations are working to challenge those capabilities as well as 

to field their own. If confirmed, I intend to work with Congress to determine the 

best way to defend U.S. space systems and to deny those advantages to those who 

would use space to target U.S. warfighters. 

Question. The administration is proposing to free up 500 MHz of spectrum for 

broadband use, a candidate portion of which includes the band 1755–1850 MHz, 

which is used heavily by DOD and other national security agencies. 

Do you support this initiative? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you support section 1602 of P.L. 106–65, which requires the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 

certify that any alternative band or bands to be substituted for spectrum currently 

used by DOD and other national security agencies provide ‘‘comparable technical 

characteristics to restore essential military capability that will be lost as a result 

of the band of frequencies to be so surrendered’’? 

Answer. Yes. This provision is necessary to ensure that the Department maintains access to spectrum necessary to operate critical military capabilities. Preserving this provision is essential to the ability of DOD to continue to successfully 

contribute to the President’s broadband goals, especially given the increased focus 

on spectrum sharing. 

Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to comply with section 1602 in light 

of the 500 Mhz initiative? 

Answer. I understand Secretary Hagel recently signed, along with the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Commerce, certification for the 

1755–1780 MHz frequency bands that were auctioned as part of the Advanced Wireless Service 3 (AWS–3). I will ensure that any future auctions involving spectrum 

used by the Department are certified in accordance with P.L. 106–65, section 1062. 

Question. Do you intend to insist that DOD be compensated fully for the cost of 

relocating, if required to do so? 

Answer. Yes, I intend to insist that DOD be compensated fully for the cost of relocating, if required to do so in accordance with section 1062. 

Question. How do you propose the Department make more efficient use of communications spectrum through leasing of commercial satellites? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the DOD Chief Information Officer to continue 

to leverage the efforts which the DOD and commercial satellite communications providers are already pursuing to more effectively and efficiently utilize the communications spectrum. Based on that review, I will determine if additional opportunities should be pursued. 

Question. Do you support more competition in the launch of DOD payloads? 

Answer. I have been, and continue to be, whenever possible, a staunch advocate 

for competition across all of the Department’s acquisition programs. Regarding 

space launch for national security space (NSS) missions, I fully support competition 

and, if confirmed, will review provisions for competition of future NSS launch missions. 

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Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to encourage new entrants to the 

medium and heavy lift launch of DOD payloads while balancing affordability, mission assurance, and maintaining the viability of the existing launch provider? 

Answer. Mission assurance remains the cornerstone of the Department’s approach 

to space launch for NSS missions. If confirmed, I will encourage competition from 

new entrants by ensuring the Department has a clear understanding of the certification process and by making every effort to certify all capable new entrants as 

quickly as possible. 

Question. Do you support commercial hosting of DOD payloads and if so how? 

Answer. The Department should explore and consider the full range of options. 

Commercial hosting may help diversify the space architecture, improve mission assurance and potentially reduce costs of U.S. Government space-based capabilities. 

If confirmed, I will explore the full range of options, including commercial hosting, 

for providing future space-based capabilities when appropriate. 

Question. What is your long-term vision and support for the Space Based Infrared 

Sensing system? 

Answer. I understand the Department is executing a comprehensive Analysis of 

Alternatives for the SBIRS follow-on capabilities. If confirmed, I will assess the alternatives and recommendations with the objective of affordably providing and assuring critical missile warning and battlespace awareness capabilities. 

Question. What is your long term vision and support for the Advanced Extremely 

High Frequency system? 

Answer. I believe that AEHF is a critical component of the Department’s Nuclear 

Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) capability. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure the Department provides the needed NC3 capability for the President. 

Question. Do you support splitting the systems sensors up to lower overall cost 

of the system? 

Answer. I support exploring the full range of approaches to reliably and affordably 

providing space-based capabilities 

CYBER DETERRENCE

Question. Do you believe we are deterring and dissuading our adversaries in 

cyberspace? 

Answer. An effective deterrence strategy requires a range of cyber policies and capabilities to affect a state or non-state actors’ behavior. In addition to continuing 

efforts to improve U.S. cyber defenses and cybersecurity capabilities, the United 

States should continue to respond to cyber-attacks against U.S. interests at a time, 

in a manner, and in a place of our choosing, using appropriate instruments of U.S. 

power and in accordance with applicable law. The U.S. Government should continue 

to combine its cyber and non-cyber capabilities into a comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy. If confirmed, I will do all that I can to contribute to the development 

and execution of that effort. 

Question. Do you agree that, consistent with section 941 of the NDAA for fiscal 

year 2014, there is a need for an integrated policy to deter adversaries in cyberspace 

and that the President should promptly provide that policy to Congress as specified 

in law? 

Answer. Deterrence cannot be achieved through cyberspace alone, but requires a 

multi-faceted effort across the totality of the U.S. Government’s instruments of national power, including network defense measures, economic actions, law enforcement actions, defense posture and response capabilities, intelligence, declaratory 

policy, and the overall resiliency of U.S. networks and systems. If confirmed, I will 

ensure that DOD is in full compliance with its reporting requirements to this committee and to the Congress as a whole. 

Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to reduce the 

frequency and severity of cyber intrusions from the Chinese Government? 

Answer. This is a serious problem and the Department should continue to take 

strong actions to address China’s use of cyber theft to steal United States companies’ confidential business information and proprietary technology. I am aware that 

the Administration has raised this as an issue of concern with the highest levels 

of China’s government. If China does not take meaningful action to curb this behavior, it will undermine the economic relationship that benefits both our Nations. Such 

activity undercuts the trust necessary to do business in a globally connected economy. Further, military involvement in such theft raises additional concerns that 

misunderstandings about China’s intentions could result in unintended escalation 

between our countries. The U.S. Government should continue to use all instruments 

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of national power, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, to 

prevent and respond to these intrusions. 

Question. What agencies should the Department coordinate with in tracking and 

eliminating cyber threats? 

Answer. I believe a whole-of-government approach is required to address the cyber 

threats we face now and will increasingly face in the future. DOD must continue 

to work closely with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice (specifically FBI), and the Intelligence Community, as well as with other Federal partners, to identify, mitigate, and defend against cyber threats. 

REPORTING AND SHARING OF INFORMATION ON INTRUSIONS INTO OPERATIONALLY

CRITICAL CONTRACTORS

Question. What are your views on the conclusions of the Senate Armed Services 

Committee’s report: Inquiry Into Cyber Intrusions Affecting U.S. Transportation 

Command Contractors, 113th Congress, 2nd Session? 

Answer. Although I have not had the opportunity to fully review the report, I understand that the Senate Armed Services Committee’s inquiry into cyber intrusions 

affecting U.S. Transportation Command contractors contained important findings 

that the Department takes very seriously. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress, Departments and Agencies, and the private sector to strengthen the Department’s information sharing processes and to protect the Department’s ability to execute its mission. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the communication 

gaps that exist between TRANSCOM and the various investigating agencies are 

closed? 

Answer. The Department’s ability to execute its mission depends greatly on the 

integrity of our networks and the networks of our private sector partners. If confirmed, I will work to improve information sharing between the relevant investigative agencies and U.S. Transportation Command. 

ACT OF WAR IN CYBER

Question. What do you believe would constitute an act of war in cyberspace? 

Answer. Cyber-attacks can affect our critical infrastructure, the national economy, 

and military operations. I believe that what is termed an act of war should follow 

the same practice as in other domains, because it is the seriousness, not the means, 

of an attack that matters most. Whether a particular attack is considered an ‘‘act 

of war,’’ in or out of cyberspace, requires a determination on a case-by-case and factspecific basis. Malicious cyber activities could result in death, injury or significant 

destruction, and any such activities would be regarded with the utmost concern and 

could well be considered ‘‘acts of war.’’ An attack does not need to be deemed an 

‘‘act of war’’ to require a response. 

Question. Does North Korea’s attack on the Sony Corporation of America—a costly 

destructive attack on a United States company—rise to the level of an act of war? 

If not, why not? 

Answer. To my knowledge, the damage caused by this cyber-attack consisted of 

the deletion of data, the destruction of some Sony network infrastructure, and the 

unauthorized disclosure of personal information. While serious and deserving of a 

response, this does not seem to me to rise to the level of an ‘‘act of war.’’ 

CHINA’S AGGRESSIVE THEFT OF UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Question. A recent report by the National Counterintelligence Executive confirmed 

the widespread belief that China is engaged in a massive campaign to steal technology, other forms of intellectual property, and business and trade information 

from the United States through cyberspace. The previous Commander of U.S. Cyber 

Command has referred to this as the greatest transfer of wealth in history and, 

along with others, believes this is a serious national security issue. 

Do you believe that China’s aggressive and massive theft of technology in cyberspace is a threat to national security and economic prosperity? 

Answer. Yes. The theft of intellectual property through cyber means is a clear 

threat to the economic prosperity from which the Nation derives its national security. Our competitive economic advantage and our military technological advantage 

rest on the innovations of a highly knowledge based U.S. industry. Any nation-state 

that engages in the theft of our intellectual property through cyber means jeopardizes both our national security and economic prosperity. 

Question. The Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon NDAA for fiscal year 

2015 authorized the President to impose sanctions, pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), on persons determined 

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to knowingly request, engage in, support, facilitate, or benefit from economic or industrial espionage in cyberspace against U.S. persons. 

What are your views on the potential impact of this legislation? 

Answer. Addressing cyber threats requires a whole of government approach, 

which coordinates and integrates all the instruments of national power. Cyber legislation is an important part of this effort. If confirmed, I look forward to working 

closely with Congress on appropriate legislation to address a broad array of cybersecurity issues. 

Question. What additional steps do you believe are needed to deter China from 

such activities in the future? 

Answer. We need to continue to use all the instruments of national power to deter 

this kind of behavior, including diplomatic, financial, network defense, law enforcement, and counterintelligence. I concur in the administration’s approach of raising 

this as an issue of concern at the highest levels of the Chinese government. I also 

support the State Department’s efforts to work with like-minded countries to make 

China’s leadership increasingly aware that elements of their government and military are on the wrong side of an emerging norm of responsible behavior in cyberspace. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department’s interagency partners 

to explore what additional whole-of-government approaches might help deter this 

unacceptable behavior. 

DOD’S ROLE IN DEFENDING THE NATION FROM CYBER ATTACK

Question. What is your understanding of the role of DOD in defending the Nation 

from an attack in cyberspace? In what ways is this role distinct from those of the 

homeland security and law enforcement communities? 

Answer. The Defense Department is responsible for defending the Nation from all 

attacks, including those that occur in cyberspace. DOD is also responsible for defending its own networks against cyber-attacks. DOD plans, coordinates, and conducts cyber operations to ensure the reliable operation of and to defend DOD systems and infrastructure. If directed, DOD can conduct cyber operations to defend 

the Nation, defend military networks, and support military operations in all domains. If required, DOD may provide support to the private sector and State and 

local governments. 

The Defense Department also works closely with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DoJ) in their missions. DHS is the lead 

agency for protecting, mitigating, and recovering from domestic cyber incidents. DoJ 

investigates, attributes, disrupts, and prosecutes cybercrimes that fall outside of 

military jurisdiction and provides domestic response to national security incidents. 

NEXT CHALLENGES IN GROWING OPERATIONAL CYBER CAPABILITIES

Question. DOD, in a significant milestone in the maturation of the cyber warfare 

mission, is successfully organizing and training personnel for units to conduct military operations in cyberspace. 

What challenges does the Department face in developing the command and control, operational planning, mapping and situational awareness, battle damage assessment, tools and weapons, and infrastructure capabilities necessary to conduct 

large-scale operations in cyberspace? 

Answer. I understand that DOD is in its third year of building a Cyber Mission 

Force. This force is intended to defend DOD networks, defend the Nation from 

cyberattack, and provide full-spectrum cyberspace options for the combatant commands. I am aware of several challenges that should be addressed to ensure the Department can conduct military operations in cyberspace, among them effective command and control, and meeting the challenge of effectively incorporating National 

Guard teams. 

IRAN

Question. Negotiations on the Iran nuclear program have been extended with a 

deadline now of March 1, 2015, for agreement in concept with 4 months after that 

to finalize a comprehensive agreement. 

What are the elements of a nuclear agreement with Iran that you consider critical 

to ensuring that it is a ‘‘good’’ deal for U.S. national security interests? 

Answer. In my view, a ‘‘good’’ deal is one that resolves the international community’s concerns with Iran’s nuclear program and prevents it from acquiring a nuclear 

weapon. The best way to do that is through a comprehensive solution that, when 

implemented, will ensure that, as a practical matter, Iran cannot acquire a nuclear 

weapon and that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively and verifiably peaceful. Any 

deal must effectively cut off the four pathways Iran could take to obtain enough 

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fissile material for a nuclear weapon including a uranium pathway, through its activities at Natanz and Fordow; a plutonium pathway, through the Arak heavy water 

reactor; and a potential covert pathway. It must include tight constraints and strict 

curbs on Iran’s nuclear program. And finally, it must require robust monitoring and 

transparency measures to maximize the international community’s ability to detect 

quickly any attempt by Iran to break out overtly or covertly. Any sanctions relief 

in exchange should be phased and tied to verifiable actions on Iran’s part. Such relief should be structured to be easily reversed so that sanctions could be quickly reimposed if Iran were to break its commitments. 

Question. If Iran is allowed to maintain a monitored and limited uranium enrichment program, do you believe that other states in the region will want to develop 

enrichment programs of their own and what is your rationale for that view? 

Answer. Yet another reason to ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon 

is to prevent proliferation in the region. States seeking to develop enrichment programs of their own in pursuit of nuclear weapons would face significant costs, in 

crippling sanctions and political and diplomatic isolation. The United States has a 

longstanding framework for providing alternative mechanisms to ensure that states 

have access to the benefits of civil nuclear energy without the need to pursue enrichment. 

Question. With the international community focused on the Iran nuclear negotiations, in your opinion, has there been a neglect of countering Iranian malign activities in the region to include support for Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in the West 

Bank, and Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria? How do you think those threats should 

be addressed? 

Answer. Countering Iranian destabilizing activities must be an important priority. 

Regardless of the outcome of nuclear negotiations, I firmly believe that the United 

States must also counter these destabilizing regional activities, including Iran’s support to terrorists and militant groups. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the Department is focused on these issues. 

Question. If the tide of ISIL is pushed back in Iraq and Syria, what, if, any, friction points do you anticipate between United States and Iranian interests in those 

two countries to come to the forefront? In your opinion, what is the best way to 

manage those friction points should they emerge? 

Answer. In Syria, I believe that Iran’s continued support for Assad and instability 

will cause continued friction between the United States and Iran. The United States 

has an interest in a stable, united, and inclusive Iraq with support from all of Iraq’s 

communities. I have concerns about the sectarian nature of Iran’s activities in Iraq. 

The United States must continue to make clear to the Iraqi Government that Iran’s 

approach in Iraq undermines the needed political inclusion for all Iraqi communities, which is required to ultimately defeat ISIL. 

Question. On March 2012, President Obama said he would ‘‘keep all options on 

the table to prevent a nuclear Iran.’’ 

Do you agree with the President’s view that ‘‘all options should be on the table’’ 

to prevent a nuclear Iran? 

Answer. Yes. I strongly support the President’s view that all options should be 

on the table to prevent a nuclear Iran. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim 

of creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for 

the continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and 

Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to the Congress the continued 

safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. 

As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest challenges 

with respect to assuring the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile? 

Answer. The greatest challenge will be achieving and maintaining the necessary 

balance among three critical nuclear areas to allow continued certification that our 

nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and effective. First, is the capability to continue to provide the science and engineering needed to assess an aging stockpile 

without underground testing. Second, is maintaining and strengthening the ability 

to extend the life of the warheads through a program of component refurbishment, 

replacement or rebuilding. The final area is sustaining and modernizing the aging 

infrastructure that provides the materials, components, and testing facilities essential for tomorrow’s nuclear enterprise. 

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Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President’s plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a 

critical national security priority? 

Answer. I support the President’s policy of maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist, and agree that funding the 

sustainment and modernization plan is a critical national security priority. As indicated in the report prepared pursuant to section 1251 of the NDAA for fiscal year 

2010, this includes sustaining and modernizing nuclear weapon delivery platforms, 

sustaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, and modernizing 

the nuclear weapons complex. 

Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you believe it would 

be prudent to consider reductions below New START Treaty limits for either the deployed or non-deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons? 

Answer. The President has stated that we can meet our current objectives with 

a reduced force structure. Any consideration of further nuclear weapon reductions 

below New START treaty limits should focus on measures that will maintain or 

strengthen deterrence of potential adversaries, assurance of our allies and partners, 

and strategic stability. 

Question. What role does the Nuclear Weapons Council play in helping to establish key stockpile stewardship goals and modernization objectives? 

Answer. I previously chaired the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) which facilitates cooperation and coordination, seeks consensus, and sets priorities between the 

two departments (DOD and Department of Energy), as they fulfill their dual-agency 

responsibilities for nuclear weapons stockpile management. The NWC works toward 

jointly agreed to priorities and strategies for weapon life extension programs, stockpile stewardship, and infrastructure modernization objectives. The NWC priorities 

and strategies in turn provide requirements for both departments to formulate 

budgets and develop implementing plans to achieve our Nation’s goals of a safe, secure and effective stockpile. 

Question. Do you support a more active role of the Office of Cost Analysis and 

Program Evaluation (CAPE) in ensuring the programs within the Department of 

Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration are appropriately tailored 

for the best investment of funds possible to achieve a safe, effective and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile? 

Answer. Yes. 

CURRENT NUCLEAR FORCES

Question. Section 1052 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014 established a ‘‘Council 

on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control and Communications 

System’’. You have had a long and active history in this area of DOD. 

What do you see as the most pressing challenges in nuclear command, control, 

and communications from a policy and acquisition perspective? 

Answer. Nuclear command and control must be an enduring priority of which one 

challenge is to sustain existing capabilities until new, modernized capabilities can 

be fielded. Another challenge is providing an assured, survivable, and enduring nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) system that takes advantage of 

the technological advances of modern communication capabilities while at the same 

time is secure and hardened against attacks ranging from cyber to the most severe 

kinetic attacks. 

Question. What do you see as the most pressing challenges in overall national 

leadership communications from a policy and acquisition perspective? 

Answer. One challenge is to sustain existing capabilities until new, modernized 

capabilities can be fielded. Another challenge is providing an assured, survivable 

and enduring communications capability that allows senior defense advisors to communicate with the President, the combatant commands and strategic allies during 

normal day-to-day operations and during national crises from a fixed, mobile or airborne location. The ability to provide our national leadership secure, reliable voice, 

video and data communications is a critical capability. 

Question. Will you actively support section 1052 and in an ex officio capacity attend meetings when possible? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. In 2014, Secretary Hagel has conducted an assessment of the state of 

nuclear deterrence operations of DOD. 

Do you agree with its findings? 

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to receive a full briefing about this important assessment. 

Question. Will you actively support the findings and their implementation? 

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Answer. I look forward to fully reviewing these findings, if confirmed, and taking 

appropriate steps to ensure the U.S. maintains the capability to carry out the nuclear deterrent mission. 

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

Question. The President’s June 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy affirmed that 

the United States will maintain a nuclear triad, noting that ‘‘Retaining all three 

TRIAD legs will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging 

against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities.’’ 

Some commentators suggest it will be financially challenging for the current and 

future administrations to fulfill nuclear modernization commitments over the next 

10 to 20 years. Yet, as Deputy Secretary of Defense, you noted in August 2013, ‘‘nuclear weapons . . . are not a big swinger in our budget. That’s just a fact.’’ 

Do you share Secretary Hagel’s view that our nuclear deterrent ‘‘is DOD’s highest 

priority mission?’’ 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Will you provide us your commitment to ensure that DOD, working 

closely with the Department of Energy, will make every effort to invest what is 

needed to modernize each leg of the nuclear triad, and to address the recent recommendations of the DOD Nuclear Enterprise Review? 

Answer. Yes. 

RUSSIAN VIOLATION OF THE 1987 INF TREATY

Question. During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on December 10, 2014, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Brian 

McKeon, told the panel that ‘‘if Russia does not return to compliance, our end will 

be to ensure that Russia gains no significant military advantage from its violation.’’ 

In your view, what are the consequences for U.S. national security of Russia’s actions in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty? 

Answer. I believe that the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty contributes to the national security of the United States and its allies and partners. 

I also believe the INF Treaty contributes to Russian national security. Russian deployment of weapon systems that violate the INF Treaty would pose an increased 

threat to the United States and our allies in Europe and Asia. 

Question. What military advantage, if any, did Russia gain by acting in violation 

of its INF obligations? 

Answer. We must ensure that Russia does not gain a military advantage. Russia 

should return to compliance with the INF Treaty in a verifiable manner. 

Question. What do you believe would be appropriate responses for the United 

States to take in order to: (1) convince Russia to return to compliance with the INF 

Treaty, or (2) ensure that United States national security is maintained if Russia 

does not return to compliance? 

Answer. The United States should consider a comprehensive strategy of diplomatic, economic, and military responses that address both of these goals. Russia’s 

continued disregard for its international obligations and lack of meaningful engagement on this particular issue require the United States to take actions to protect 

its interests and security as well as those of its allies and partners. United States 

efforts should continue to remind Russia why the United States and Russia signed 

this treaty in the first place and be designed to bring Russia back into verified compliance with its obligations. I believe that any United States responses should be 

designed to make the United States and our allies and partners more secure by negating any advantage Russia might gain from deploying an INF-prohibited system. 

The range of options we should look at from the Defense Department could include active defenses to counter intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles; 

counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks; and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces. 

U.S. responses must make clear to Russia that if it does not return to compliance 

our responses will make them less secure than they are today. 

Question. How long do you believe we should wait to see if Russia returns to compliance? 

Answer. I support the current efforts focusing on convincing Russia to return to 

verifiable compliance and preserving the viability of the INF Treaty, which I believe 

continues to serve U.S. and allied interests. Such efforts must be allowed to produce 

the desired effect. If Russia does not return to verifiable compliance, I support a 

path that ensures that Russia gains no significant military advantage from its violation of its INF Treaty obligations. 

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Question. What does Russia’s INF violation suggest to you about the role of nuclear weapons in Russian national security strategy? 

Answer. Russia’s INF Treaty violation is consistent with its strategy of relying on 

nuclear weapons to offset United States and NATO conventional military superiority. 

MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES INITIATIVE (MCMI)

Question. The administration has produced an interagency strategy for the advanced development and manufacture of medical countermeasures (MCM) to defend 

against pandemic influenza and biological warfare threats. In this strategy, DOD 

will be responsible for the rapid development and manufacture of medical countermeasures to protect U.S. Armed Forces and DOD personnel. 

Do you support this interagency strategy and the MCM Initiative and, if confirmed, would you plan to implement them? 

Answer. Yes. 

DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM

Question. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) was designed to ensure that new defense acquisition programs start on a sound footing, 

to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the acquisition process. 

What are your views regarding WSARA since its implementation in 2009? 

Answer. In my view, WSARA enacted a number of steps to improve weapons system acquisition, which has contributed to improving trends in the Department’s acquisition performance. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of the acquisition 

process requirements, acquisition, and budgeting? 

Answer. In my judgment, more should be done to link and streamline these three 

processes and, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with those responsible 

in the department and the committees to drive the necessary improvements. All 

three must be closely coordinated as the problems and the resulting solutions 

change over time. This is not a static system and we must all remain open to continuous improvement. In the requirements area we need to insure they are feasible 

and disciplined and not subject to constant change and that we don’t initiate programs that are unaffordable. As we move into the acquisition phase, we need to 

push to field the initial system within five years and avoid delays by constantly adding capabilities that could be done thru block improvements later. Time is money. 

We must incentivize industry to control costs and likewise incentivize the government acquisition workforce to do the same. Those responsible for budgeting, particularly the Service Chiefs, need to be engaged in all three processes. And we should 

strengthen accountability in all phases and at all levels. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you improve acquisition accountability? 

Answer. As before, more can be done here as well. There are two basic challenges 

in improving accountability. First is an overly complex acquisition system that distributes authority across too many offices and individuals; and second, assignment 

policies in the government rotate senior program managers and officials too frequently. If confirmed, I will engage our department leaders in addressing these 

challenges and also work with the Congress to both obtain your ideas and to push 

thru the required fixes. We must also insure our industry partners achieve this increased level of accountability. 

Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems 

is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in major systems, costs of current 

operations, and asset recapitalization? 

Answer. The constrained budget environment facing the Department puts enormous pressure on the Department to continually strive to control costs and reexamine all areas of the budget for affordability. Even before the passage of the Budget 

Control Act of 2011 I strongly believed that unacceptable cost growth in individual 

programs had to be reversed. If confirmed, in addition to the improvements I cited 

in earlier answers, I will insure the Department ensures programs are affordable 

to buy and operate, and that programs are managed so as to stay affordable as they 

progress through the life cycle. 

Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and guard against 

the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would emphasize the need for continuous improvement addressing the challenges identified earlier as well as ensuring all aspects of WSARA 

and the Department’s ongoing work with the Better Buying Power initiatives continue to be implemented as broadly as possible. I would welcome the opportunity 

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for the Department to work with Congress where new legislative measures, or relief 

from existing legislative constraints, would improve acquisition performance. 

RELIABILITY OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Question. The Department’s process for procuring major weapons systems places 

insufficient emphasis on reliability and maintainability and, therefore, produces systems that are increasingly costly to operate and sustain. Given that these ownership 

costs comprise most of a given weapons systems’ overall lifecycle cost, these increased costs could undermine considerably the Department’s ‘‘buying power.’’ 

How would you ensure that the defense acquisition system produces more reliable 

weapons systems? 

Answer. I recognize that a strong emphasis on reliability is critical to achieving 

affordability. A disciplined approach to life cycle reliability in acquisition policy 

must continue and we need to use sustainment affordability caps when appropriate. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that our acquisition programs address reliability and 

maintainability through appropriate requirements and sound engineering practices 

at each stage of a weapon system’s development. 

Question. If confirmed, what measures would you recommend the Department 

take to drive down sustainment costs? 

Answer. It is important to influence system designs that address key drivers of 

sustainment costs early in the development process, and to have program managers 

include sound sustainment strategies early in a system’s life cycle. The Department 

has established sustainment affordability caps under the Better Buying Power initiatives to drive that process with its Program Managers. 

If confirmed, I will emphasize those elements in our acquisition programs such 

as requirements, design, contracting strategies, and sustainment strategies which 

drive down sustainment costs. 

EXCESSIVE CONCURRENCY IN MAJOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

Question. Major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and major automated information systems have experienced excessive cost-growth and schedule delays. In 

some instances, this appears to be the result of excessive concurrency between development and production. It also appears that the Department lacks the ability to 

identify, price, and therefore effectively manage program risk, (e.g., technological, 

developmental, integration, and manufacturing risk) 

What specific changes need to be made in the acquisition system to ensure the 

delivery of MDAPs and major information systems on time and on budget? 

Answer. Comprehensive changes in acquisition practice have been made in recent 

years via WSARA and BBP. But more needs to be done, and the measures needed 

will change over time as technology, industry, and budgets change. Skilled and experienced acquisition professionals, reduction of paperwork and overhead, and effective contract incentives are enduring keys to cost and schedule control. 

Managing concurrency and other program risks is a fundamental challenge of acquisition program management. The department needs to ensure its acquisition professionals have the experience, tools, and good judgment needed to make data-driven decisions appropriate to the risks they face leading these programs in order to 

properly plan programs. 

SERVICES CONTRACTING

Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become progressively more 

reliant upon contractors to perform functions that were once performed exclusively 

by government employees. As a result, contractors now play an integral role in 

areas as diverse as the management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In many 

cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and 

task forces, and perform many of the same functions as DOD employees. 

In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors to support the basic 

functions of the Department? 

Answer. I believe DOD must manage its total force of military, civilian, and contractor personnel in a way that avoids inappropriate or excessive reliance on contractor support for basic Department functions. 

Question. Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on contractor support for military operations? 

Answer. Based on my experience, I do not believe the Department is too reliant 

on contractor support for military operations. 

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Question. What risks do you see in the Department’s reliance on such contractor 

support? What steps do you believe the Department should take to mitigate such 

risk? 

Answer. Over-reliance on contractor support may lead to an unbalanced total 

force that sub-optimizes the civilian and military contribution, a loss of governmentheld corporate knowledge, and the potential for contractors inappropriately exercising authority in performance of inherently governmental functions or those closely associated with inherently governmental functions. 

Active management of the total force is necessary to mitigate these risks. Decisions on how to cost-effectively meet requirements should take into account the 

management of all three components of the total force. 

Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized and staffed 

to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield? 

Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, in concert with the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has issued guidance on roles and responsibilities for planning for and managing contractors on the battlefield. I believe that investments 

made in the Department’s acquisition workforce, as well as the implementation of 

recommendations made by the Commission on Wartime Contracting and the GAO, 

have improved the Department’s ability effectively to plan for and manage contractors on the battlefield. I believe that the combatant commanders recognize that contractors are their responsibility as part of the total force. 

Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should take to improve 

its management of contractors on the battlefield? 

Answer. I believe appropriate requirements definition and increased oversight are 

critical to improve management of contractors on the battlefield. The heightened 

focus on services acquisition reinforces this with proper planning, management, 

training, and oversight tools. 

EFFICIENCY IN DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS

Question. In your view, what latitude must be given to the Joint Chiefs to enact 

cost-saving reforms? 

Answer. The Military Service Chiefs of Staff already have broad latitude to develop, propose and implement cost-saving measures across the spectrum of doctrine, 

organizational structure, and personnel to and with their Military Department Secretaries, the Combatant Commands, and the Secretary of Defense. I will continue 

to encourage them to bring forward cost-saving reform ideas even if those ideas 

challenge the current structures and arrangements of the Department as a whole. 

As in the past, I value the Chiefs’ unswerving focus on the essential missions of the 

Department, and the perspectives that motivation brings. 

Question. Do you support the administration’s request for the authority to conduct 

additional Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC) to eliminate unneeded facilities? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If so, what would be your priorities in carrying out a round of BRAC? 

Answer. Should Congress authorize the Department to carry out another BRAC 

round, I would direct it to focus on efficiency and consolidation rather than transformation. BRAC 2005 was skewed by the fact that a large number of its recommendations were focused on transformation, had high upfront costs, and were 

never expected to yield savings. However, those recommendations that were focused 

on efficiency had impressive payback and accounted for a small portion of the 

costs—much like the 1993 and 1995 rounds. If confirmed, this is the approach I 

would direct the Department to adopt. 

UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

Question. There has been much discussion about streamlining the current Unified 

Command Plan. 

What are your views on the ability of the current Unified Command structure to 

address emerging global, regional and ethnic threats and the potential need to reduce the number of the geographic commands or their staffs to help reduce overhead 

costs? 

Answer. In my view, the current Unified Command structure is quite capable of 

addressing a range of emerging threats and challenges. Effective United States responses to such varied challenges as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and 

Ebola, demonstrate the flexibility of the current structure. However, the Department periodically reviews the Unified Command Plan to ensure its structure is optimized for emerging threats and challenges. As such a review is underway now; it 

would be premature to speculate on the types of changes that will be reflected in 

its final recommendations on the structure. 

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Question. What is your opinion of the critique that geographic combatant commands have made U.S. foreign policy ‘‘too militarized’’? 

Answer. I am sensitive to this critique, but understand that some degree of tension is inevitable in the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives. As long as the 

United States maintains forward presence around the world, we will continue to 

rely on our military leadership to build meaningful relationships with their counterparts. These relationships are essential to our continued forward presence in peacetime, building partner capacity with key allies and partners, and to our ability to 

secure access in the event of a contingency, from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to combat operations. Provided our activities are well coordinated with 

other stakeholders within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, there is no reason 

why both military and other foreign service professionals cannot contribute to the 

same U.S. objectives. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current Unified 

Command Plan? In your view, is there a need to undertake a major reevaluation 

toward modification of the current Unified Command Plan? If so, explain why? 

Answer. The Unified Command Plan establishes the combatant commands’ missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibility (when applicable). In 

my view, the established, periodic review cycle of the Unified Command Plan should 

be maintained. 

Question. In your view, are their opportunities for greater effectiveness and efficiencies in the consolidation of the roles and responsibilities two or more current 

geographic combatant commands, such as U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command? If not, please explain why. 

Answer. The Department reviews the Unified Command Plan periodically to ensure its structure is optimized for emerging threats and challenges, and for effective 

and efficient distribution of roles and responsibilities among combatant commands. 

Such a review is underway now; it would be premature to speculate on the types 

of changes that will be reflected in the final structure. 

PROLIFERATION OF JOINT TASK FORCES

Question. There is a trend of continued proliferation of task forces, including joint 

task forces, in support of geographic combatant and functional commands. Some of 

these joint headquarters are temporary or for a short duration, but others evolve 

into enduring long term and larger force structure. 

What is your understanding and assessment of DOD’s policy guidance for oversight of the number, scope of operational responsibility and authority and duration 

of joint task forces? 

Answer. I understand that the Department’s policy guidance for oversight of joint 

task forces that support combatant commands is established and exercised through 

the global force management process. Through this process, combatant commanders 

request authorities and forces to support their operational requirements and the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluates such requests and makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. I have been away from the department 

for some time and therefore unable to make a specific assessment of the current policy and guidance. 

Question. If confirmed, what would be your plan to evaluate and manage task 

forces? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would remain committed to the best use of resources in 

the pursuit of the department’s priorities and objectives and would scrutinize recommendations to standup and/or continue support for enduring joint task forces. 

TEST AND EVALUATION (T&E)

Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to ensure that the Department 

as a whole and each of the Services specifically maintains its testing organizations, 

infrastructure, and budgets at levels adequate to address both our current and future acquisition needs? 

Answer. I recognize the critical role that test and evaluation provides to the acquisition process. 

Question. A natural tension exists between major program objectives to reduce 

cost and schedule and the T&E objective to ensure performance meets specifications 

and requirements. 

What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between the desire to reduce 

acquisition cycle times and the need to perform adequate testing? 

Answer. I don’t believe these objectives are necessarily incompatible. Adequate 

testing prior to committing to production is essential to discover performance problems that can take even more time and money to rectify before proceeding. 

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Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe we should procure 

weapon systems and equipment that has not been demonstrated through test and 

evaluation to be operationally effective, suitable, and survivable? 

Answer. It may be necessary to field a system prior to operational testing in cases 

where it is necessary to fill a critical capability gap identified in ongoing operations. 

Even then, testing should be accomplished to ensure basic operational performance 

and system safety. 

Question. Congress established the position of Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation to serve as an independent voice on matters relating to operational testing of weapons systems. As established, the Director has a unique and direct relationship with Congress, consistent with the statutory independence of the office. 

Do you support the continued ability of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s to speak freely and independently with the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

FUNDING FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T) INVESTMENTS

Question. Do you support increasing DOD’s S&T investments? 

Answer. I support investment in S&T to develop and deliver near-term capabilities and maintain long-term options for the Department. However, the investment 

in S&T must be balanced with modernization, operational, and personnel accounts 

within the Department. 

Question. How will you assess whether the science and technology investment 

portfolio is adequate to meet the current and future needs of the Department? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and others to assess the adequacy of the 

science and technology portfolio to provide the most affordable military advantage 

to our warfighters. 

Question. What specific technological areas should the Defense Department 

prioritize for investment in order to develop next generation operational capabilities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review changes to the investment portfolio that have 

occurred since I left, and I will prioritize efforts to provide substantial capability advances or those that impose disproportionate cost to adversaries. 

Question. Given limited resources, what technological areas can be de-emphasized 

in order to free resources to support priority areas? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to review the entire investment portfolio in 

R&D and if required adjust the investment, to favor new, unique capabilities that 

could provide an operational advantage to our forces. Technologies that can be obtained from commercial sources should be de-emphasized for S&T investments by 

the Department. 

Question. Are you satisfied with the quality of the DOD research, laboratory, and 

engineering workforce and infrastructure, especially relative to its industry and academic peers, and global competitors? How do you plan to maintain that quality in 

the future? 

Answer. The subject of DOD laboratory quality, both for personnel and infrastructure, has been studied over the past several decades. Scientists and engineers play 

a very important role in our overall national security and accessing and retaining 

top talent is a priority for the DOD. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in his efforts to assess the current quality of our science and engineering workforce, and determine what changes, 

if any, are needed to maintain the proper quality. 

Question. What specific goals will you set for the recently announced Defense Innovation Initiative? What metrics will you use to assess the success of this initiative? 

Answer. I understand the Defense Innovation Initiative is pursuing creative ways 

to sustain and advance our military dominance in the 21st century. If confirmed, 

I will review this initiative in detail and if necessary work with Deputy Secretary 

Work to refine goals and metrics. 

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Question. The latest QDR addressed the need for strengthening the defense industrial base. Specifically, it said: ‘‘America’s security and prosperity are increasingly 

linked with the health of our technology and industrial bases. In order to maintain 

our strategic advantage well into the future, the Department requires a consistent, 

realistic, and long-term strategy for shaping the structure and capabilities of the deVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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fense technology and industrial bases—a strategy that better accounts for the rapid 

evolution of commercial technology, as well as the unique requirements of ongoing 

conflicts.’’ 

What is your understanding and assessment of the current state of the U.S. defense industry? 

Answer. The Department relies on an industrial base that is now far more global, 

commercial, and financially-complex than ever before. I am concerned about what 

impacts further defense budget cuts would have on the ability of the industrial base, 

particularly small firms, to provide the broad range of products and services that 

the Department and our Nation need. While only a small fraction of our industrial 

base capabilities may be at risk, in some key industrial capabilities vital to our future national security the United States is in danger of losing essential domestic 

sources, or going down to a single qualified source. 

Question. Do you support further consolidation of the U.S. defense industry? 

Answer. I support the review of each proposed merger, acquisition, and teaming 

arrangement on its particular merits, in the context of each individual market and 

the changing dynamics of that market. I believe the government must be alert for 

consolidations that eliminate competition or cause market distortions that are not 

in the Department’s best interest. 

Question. What is your position on foreign investment in the U.S. defense sector? 

Answer. Foreign investment can play an important role in maintaining the vitality of the U.S. defense sector through capital injection, the introduction of innovative technologies, and facilitating interoperability with our coalition partners. However, foreign investment can also expose the U.S. defense sector to a number of risks 

associated with supply assurance, product integrity, and technology transfer. Therefore, I support policies that encourage foreign investment when it is consistent with 

the national security interests of the United States. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps if any do you believe DOD should take to most 

effectively and efficiently manage risk and ensure the continued health of the U.S. 

defense industrial base? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department proactively monitors the 

defense industrial base to identify risks and mitigate those risks when necessary. 

During my time as the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Deputy Secretary, the Department took steps to improve and preserve competition in defense procurements, and I would support the creation or continuation of competitive opportunities. 

RESET AND RECONSTITUTION FUNDING

Question. The Department has a substantial backlog of maintenance availabilities 

due to the high tempo and demand of more than a decade of combat operations. 

Senior DOD officials have testified that they will require 2–3 years of additional 

funding to restore readiness through reset and reconstitution of their equipment 

and personnel. 

Do you agree with the assessment that the DOD will need 2–3 years of additional 

funding for reset and reconstitution? 

Answer. I understand that the cumulative effect of more than a decade of war has 

placed a significant strain on the Department’s reset and reconstitution requirements. The current level and diversity of global operations has added to this strain 

and must be part of the reset calculus. If confirmed, I would review the reset and 

reconstitution funding and assumptions. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you balance maintenance and reset requirements 

with fiscal realities and future risk in developing your budget request? 

Answer. Maintenance and reset of DOD’s current equipment would be a priority 

for me in order to restore and preserve long-term readiness. . If confirmed, I would 

work with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and others to assess the appropriate balance of resources and risk. 

OPERATIONAL ENERGY

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and 

Programs published a policy that any alternative drop-in replacement fuel procured 

for DOD-wide use and distribution within the Class III (Bulk) supply chain must 

compete with petroleum products and any awards will be based on the ability to 

meet requirements at the best value to the government, including cost. 

What is your view of this policy? 

Answer. This policy was issued while I was Deputy Secretary, and I believe it is 

the right approach, and it is consistent with section 316 of NDAA for fiscal year 

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bility, it should only buy large volumes of alternative fuels when they are cost-competitive with petroleum products. 

Question. What is your assessment of section 526 of the Energy Independence and 

Security Act of 2007 and how it should apply to military operations of DOD? 

Answer. My understanding is that section 526 prevents Federal agencies from entering into contracts to procure alternative or synthetic fuels that have higher 

greenhouse gas emissions than conventional petroleum. This provision has not restricted the Department from purchasing the bulk fuel needed to support worldwide 

military operations. 

Question. Considering the potential of further cuts to Defense budgets and the importance of energy security, do you believe DOD should jointly invest with other 

government agencies in the construction of a commercial biofuels refinery? 

Answer. Over the long-term, I believe the Nation will benefit from a competitive, 

domestic renewable fuels industry, and, as a major consumer of liquid fuels, the Department would benefit from such competition. I am aware the DOD has partnered 

with the Departments of Energy and Agriculture and the private sector to accelerate 

the development of cost-competitive advanced alternative fuels for both the military 

and commercial transportation sectors but I am not current on how those partnerships are performing. 

Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish for Defense investments in and deployment of energy technologies? 

Answer. Consistent with the need to increase military capabilities, reduce risk, 

and mitigate costs through our use and management of both operational and facility 

energy, I would prioritize improvements to both operational effectiveness and efficiency—improving the energy performance of aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and 

military bases; reducing the vulnerability of our energy supply chains; and diversifying the kinds of energy used by the Department. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Secretary 

of Defense? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

U.S. SECURITY COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN

1. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Carter, the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances 

form the cornerstone of United States-Taiwan relations and affirms our commitment 

to maintain Taiwan’s self-defense capability. How do you and the administration 

plan to continue to implement our policy under this framework? 

Dr. CARTER. I am firmly committed to maintaining Taiwan’s self-defense capability, consistent with our one-China policy, which is based on the three joint United 

States-China communique ́s and the Taiwan Relations Act. This is a policy that has 

endured across multiple Administrations of both Republicans and Democrats, and 

has served as an important element of our approach to the Asia-Pacific region for 

more than thirty-five years. 

Consistent with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, the Department of 

Defense should continue to evaluate Taiwan’s defense needs and provide defense arVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00126 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ticles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense 

capability. The United States should also maintain the capacity to resist any resort 

to force or coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social and economic 

system, of the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department 

continues to work closely with our partners on Taiwan, and with Congress, to fulfill 

these obligations and thereby support the maintenance of peace and stability in the 

Taiwan Strait. 

2. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Carter, what do you believe should be the priorities for 

United States military assistance to Taiwan? 

Dr. CARTER. I believe the Department should prioritize continuing to assist Taiwan’s effort to incorporate asymmetric concepts and capabilities into its defense. 

The United States should encourage Taiwan to prioritize investments in infrastructure and weapon systems that are survivable, and able to capitalize on Taiwan’s 

natural advantages. Furthermore, I believe the Department should continue to focus 

on defense cooperation in support of Taiwan’s transformation to a volunteer force, 

assisting it improve doctrine, training, and readiness. The Department of Defense 

should work with Taiwan to support its defense transformation and identify procurement priorities that enable it to deter aggression, resist coercion and maintain 

stability across the Taiwan Strait. 

CHINESE MILITARY COERCION

3. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Carter, over the last several years, China has engaged 

in coercive diplomacy to achieve its political and territorial aims in the East and 

South China Seas. The administration has responded with efforts to build partner 

capacity and strengthen regional institutions, but this will take years if not decades 

to bear fruit. Beyond private diplomacy with the Chinese, which appears to be insufficient, what steps do you believe we should take to deter Chinese assertiveness in 

the short- and medium-term? 

Dr. CARTER. The United States has a strong interest in maintaining peace and 

stability, the free flow of commerce, and the freedom of navigation and overflight 

in the East and South China Seas. In addition to diplomacy to resolve territorial 

disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law, the United States 

should deter assertiveness in the region with a robust force posture, sustained presence, and commitment to building the capacity of its partners and allies. The United 

States also should encourage China to be more transparent about how it will use 

its growing military capabilities. The United States should also continue to modernize and strengthen its security alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of 

Korea, Philippines, and Thailand. The United States should also deepen relationships with and among its partners in South and Southeast Asia to build capacity 

and reduce vulnerabilities. If confirmed, I will continue to prioritize our investments 

in posture, presence, and partnership capacity in the Asia-Pacific region to deter aggression and underwrite peace and stability. 

4. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Carter, do you share the view that China’s actions have 

violated United States national interests in the Freedom of Navigation, the free flow 

of commerce and the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law? 

Dr. CARTER. The United States has a longstanding national interest in preserving 

the freedom of navigation, and in the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance 

with international law. I am concerned that recent Chinese actions, including its 

unilateral and uncoordinated announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone 

(ADIZ) that overlapped the previous existing ADIZ in the East China Sea, its unilateral promulgation of fishing regulations covering much of the South China Sea, its 

pursuit of land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, and its use of economic pressure on other claimants, has raised regional tensions and complicated efforts to peacefully manage and resolve territorial disputes. The United States should 

remain committed to the preservation of the freedom of navigation, and all the other 

rights provided under international law. If confirmed, I would carry forward that 

commitment, and I would work to ensure that disputes are addressed in a manner 

that both reflects that commitment and that serves the goal of resolving disputes 

peacefully. This approach would apply to my dealings with China and with all other 

countries. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCE MISMATCH

5. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, what is your assessment of our force structure and 

readiness given the current and expanding global security environment? 

Dr. CARTER. The Joint Force has been engaged in uninterrupted warfare for over 

13 years, while the changing security environment has generated greater demand 

for forces across the globe. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review assessed that the 

future security environment will continue to be volatile and dynamic. The high 

tempo of operations, coupled with constrained resources and disruptive budget actions that led to reduced readiness and force structure pressures in recent years, 

has challenged the Services in their efforts to reconstitute full-spectrum readiness. 

If sequestration returns in FY 2016 and beyond, the Department’s readiness could 

deteriorate even further. 

6. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, how do you plan to shape our military to ensure we can deter and/or defeat today’s and tomorrow’s threats? 

Dr. CARTER. The Department must rebalance the Joint Force to ensure it remains 

modern, capable, and ready for today’s requirements and an uncertain future. The 

2014 QDR outlined specific steps for the Department to take to adapt, reshape, and 

rebalance our military in order to sharpen our ability to address threats across the 

spectrum, from ongoing terrorism challenges to potential nation-state adversaries 

with a full range of technologically advanced capabilities. If confirmed, I will actively guide the Department’s efforts to achieve the right balance of capability, capacity, and readiness in the Joint Force to address today’s threats while setting the 

foundation to meet future challenges. 

MILITARY COMPENSATION AND RETIREMENT MODERNIZATION COMMISSION REPORT

7. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, what are your thoughts on maintaining an All-Volunteer Force and how these recommendations could impact retention and recruiting? 

Dr. CARTER. The All-Volunteer force has successfully supported our national security requirements particularly during the last 13 plus years of combat. I am aware 

the White House and the Department’s senior civilian and military leadership are 

examining each of the Commission’s specific proposals in detail. If confirmed, I will 

review the Commission’s recommendations and the Department’s analysis and provide my views to the President as required in the legislation. I will ensure that the 

Department’s review focuses on the potential impact the Commission’s recommendations could have on the long-term viability of the All-Volunteer Force, of which recruiting and retention are essential elements. I look forward to working with the 

Committee on these issues. 

8. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, how would you ensure we will not 

break faith with the men and women who serve in uniform and their families? 

Dr. CARTER. The men and women of our uniformed force and their families deserve our respect and committment. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department’s detailed review and my input to the President on the specific proposals of the Commission provides for their needs. I am mindful of our obligations to both the current 

force as well as the future force and I am committed to ensuring that any change 

to the retirement system will retain the option to ‘‘grandfather’’ currently serving 

members. 

9. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, what direction will you give your 

team regarding the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) assessment due in 

April? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I will direct the Department to carefully review and 

evaluate the Commission’s recommendations to ensure they sustain the All-Volunteer Force, provide the benefits to our servicemembers that are required, and 

achieve fiscal sustainability. I look forward to working with the Committee in this 

regard. 

ISLAMIC STATE STRATEGY

10. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, would you recommend placing bootson-the-ground to Congress and the administration to deal with the Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria (ISIS)/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) threat, if required? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I would, in close consultation with our senior military 

leaders, provide the President with my best strategic advice as to how to most effecVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tively counter the ISIL threat. In formulating my advice, I will not hesitate to consider all options. 

GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL BASE

11. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, how much risk would you accept to 

American lives when considering releasing detainees from Guantanamo Bay Naval 

Base (GTMO)? 

Dr. CARTER. Congress has set a clear standard for the Secretary of Defense, and 

I will follow it faithfully if confirmed. I will not, and cannot, approve a transfer unless I determine that actions have been, or will be taken, to substantially mitigate 

the risk of the detainee engaging in terrorist or other hostile activity that threatens 

the United States. The law also requires that the Secretary of Defense determines 

it is in the national security interest to approve the transfer. If confirmed, I will 

take this obligation seriously and closely examine every proposed transfer to ensure 

that these conditions are met. 

12. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, what is your position with regard to the President’s policy of trying detainees in civilian courts versus military commissions? 

Dr. CARTER. I understand the Administration’s policy to be that the determination 

of whether to try detainees in civilian courts versus military commissions is made 

on a case-by-case basis. If confirmed, I will support this policy and make my recommendation based on the circumstances of a particular case, in consultation with 

my senior military, legal, and other advisors. 

MILITARY LENDING ACT

13. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, the Department of Defense (DOD) has proposed 

draft regulations, under the Military Lending Act (MLA), to require lenders to verify 

against DOD’s own database the military status of customers. Currently, such 

verification is voluntary by lenders, used to verify a customer’s claim to military status. Under the proposed regulation, lenders would be required to verify military status whether claimed by the customer or not. What plans are in place to ensure that 

DOD’s database will be able to handle the great increase in inquiries so that it is 

available at all times and that it is accurate so that credit-worthy customers—both 

military and non-military—will not be held up from getting timely access to loans 

for which they qualify? 

Dr. CARTER. I am not fully informed on this issue at this time, and am reluctant 

to express an opinion on this matter until I have more information. If confirmed, 

I will ensure those responsible for this area provide me with the required information so I can provide you the thoughtful response you deserve. 

14. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, when Congress passed the MLA in October 2006, 

it was targeting certain loans, such as payday loans, tax refund anticipation loans, 

military installment loans, and car title loans, based on DOD’s August 2006 study, 

‘‘Report on Predatory Lending Practices Directed at Members of the Armed Forces 

and Their Dependents.’’ DOD adopted implementing regulations that covered the 

loans identified in its report. In its current proposal, DOD cites evidence and data 

that payday loans and title loans are being designed to circumvent the regulations 

and are harming our military personnel and their families. In such circumstances, 

it makes sense to adjust the regulations. What is the evidence of harm or circumvention behind the elements of the proposal that would reach beyond those 

predatory loans to mainstream products, such as credit cards, student loans, car refinance loans, and other such loans offered by banks and credit unions that are not 

affected by current MLA regulations? 

Dr. CARTER. I am not familiar with the details of this issue at this time, and am 

reluctant to express an opinion on this matter until I have more information. I am 

committed to ensuring the Department is vigilant in guarding its servicemembers 

against unfair and predatory lending practices that could harm them or their families. If confirmed, I will ensure those responsible for this area provide me with the 

required information so I can address any issues. The Department clearly has an 

interest in helping to protect servicemembers from fraudulent lending practices. 

15. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, DOD, in its proposed new regulations to the 

MLA, indicates that it wants credit cards to continue to be available to military personnel and their spouses. To what extent has DOD conducted an analysis as to 

whether the terms of its proposed new Military Annual Percentage Rate—which is 

different from the Annual Percentage Rate calculations for non-military families— 

will restrict the access to credit cards by military personnel and their spouses? 

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Dr. CARTER. I am not familiar with the specific details of the proposed regulation 

at this time. I am committed to ensuring the Department is vigilant in guarding 

its servicemembers against unfair and predatory lending practices that could harm 

them or their families. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department has an appropriate analysis of the impacts of any such regulations. 

TAIWAN

16. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, Taiwan is currently planning to develop its Indigenous Defense Submarines (IDS) program. What is your opinion and position on 

Taiwan’s IDS program? 

Dr. CARTER. I understand that Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) program is a recent concept put forward by Taiwan’s Navy to design and build a submarine domestically. Taiwan has publicly requested international support for its 

program, but to my knowledge, it is still in the process of developing a basic design 

and determining what the submarine’s missions or desired capabilities would be. If 

confirmed, I will direct DOD to continue to consult closely with Taiwan on this matter, and will assess the program as it progresses. 

17. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, what can the administration do to assist Taiwan 

in improving its undersea self-defense warfare capability? 

Dr. CARTER. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the administration can assist Taiwan by evaluating the projected threat from China, consulting closely with 

Congress, and providing recommendations on defense articles and services appropriate for Taiwan, particularly in the undersea domain. 

I am aware that the Department has identified a number of areas where Taiwan 

could invest in asymmetric, innovative capabilities to improve its ability to operate 

in the undersea domain. For example, the Department has recently delivered P–3C 

long-range patrol aircraft to Taiwan. The Department has also provided support to 

Taiwan’s capabilities for using sea mines, which are particularly cost effective defensive weapons. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD continues to work with Taiwan as develops 

its requirements to determine what support the Department could provide. 

18. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 indicates that 

to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character is the policy of the United 

States. How do you and DOD under your leadership plan to continue to implement 

the U.S. policy under the Act? 

Dr. CARTER. I am firmly committed to maintaining Taiwan’s self-defense capability, consistent with our one-China policy, which is based on the three joint United 

States-China communique ́s and the Taiwan Relations Act. I believe the Department 

should continually evaluate, assess, and review Taiwan’s defense needs, while also 

providing defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to deter threats. 

The United States should also maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force 

or coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social and economic system, 

of the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department will continue to work closely with our partners on Taiwan to bolster their military preparedness, sustain the credibility of Taiwan’s deterrent, and support military modernization efforts. 

19. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, how do you define the priorities for United States 

military assistance to Taiwan? 

Dr. CARTER. I define priorities for United States military assistance to Taiwan 

based on an evaluation and assessment of its requirements to maintain a credible 

defense and deterrent. Taiwan faces a much larger adversary who is spending 14 

times more on defense. Because of the growing military threat, the Department’s 

should encourage and continue to assist Taiwan in its effort to incorporate asymmetric concepts and capabilities into its defense. As Taiwan transitions to a volunteer force, the Department should also help Taiwan improve its doctrine, training, 

reserves, and readiness. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

20. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, what more can DOD do to support humanitarian 

operations and assistance in the Kurdistan region? 

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Dr. CARTER. DOD should support humanitarian operations when the Department 

has a unique capability to contribute to the U.S. Government’s response. If confirmed, I will assess humanitarian operations and assistance in the Kurdistan region, and will ensure that the Department is poised to consider options to support 

the Administration’s whole-of-government effort to provide humanitarian assistance 

to the Kurdistan region. 

21. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you return to this committee 

with additional options on how DOD can assist the nearly 1.6 million refugees and 

internally displaced persons (IDP) currently located in the Kurdistan region? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. 

MILITARY BENEFITS

22. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, defense commissaries are an integral part of life 

for deployed troops. Recently, the Defense Commissary Agency (DECA) initiated an 

acquisition strategy to transition delivery of produce to the Asia-Pacific region that 

eliminates the current second destination transportation policy and moves to an 

Free on Board (FOB)-destination model. According to detailed market study, this 

transition threatens the availability, quality, and price of the food available at overseas commissaries. Last year, your predecessor testified to this committee that there 

would be no cuts to overseas commissary benefits, yet DECA has acknowledged that 

this move will increase costs to patrons. Is it your position that commissary costs 

should rise for deployed troops in the Asia-Pacific region? 

Dr. CARTER. I understand that the Department is looking at how to make the defense commissary system more efficient and effective. If confirmed, I will look for 

ways to achieve these goals for the commissaries while remaining mindful of the impact on their customers who are our service personnel active and retired and their 

families both at home and deployed. 

23. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, should this policy transition be delayed while a 

study mandated in the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) studies the cost impacts to our troops of this proposal? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I will review the current status and determine if such 

a delay would be warranted. 

TAIWAN

24. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, United States policy towards Taiwan is governed 

by the Taiwan Relations Act. This important legislation forms the legal basis for 

United States military sales to Taiwan, which should be determined based on Taiwan’s defensive needs. In light of the People’s Republic of China’s naval modernization and growing cross strait military imbalance, is it critical that we continue to 

implement this longstanding commitment? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. 

25. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, what will be your priorities in terms of military 

assistance to Taiwan? 

Dr. CARTER. The Department should continue to focus on defense cooperation in 

support of Taiwan’s transformation to a volunteer force, assisting it improve doctrine, training, and readiness. Further, the Department should also work with Taiwan to support its defense transformation and identify procurement priorities that 

enable it to deter aggression, resist coercion and maintain stability across the Taiwan Strait. 

26. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, Taiwan currently operates four diesel submarines, two of which were acquired from the U.S. Navy former Guppy II-class vessels delivered in 1973. Taiwan has expressed strong interest in acquiring modern 

defensive diesel submarines, and in an effort to boost their asymmetric undersea capabilities, they recently announced plans to kick off the IDS program. Do you believe it is in our interest for Taiwan to acquire new submarines? If so, what can 

we do to assist Taiwan? 

Dr. CARTER. I understand that Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) program is a recent concept put forward by Taiwan’s Navy to design and build a submarine domestically. I also understand that Taiwan is still in the process of developing a basic design and determining what the submarine’s missions or desired capabilities would be. If confirmed, I will direct DOD to consult closely with Taiwan 

on its efforts to boost its asymmetric undersea capabilities, and assess what support 

would be appropriate. 

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

27. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, the United States has faced tremendous difficulty 

in the past rallying consensus and participation by our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Afghanistan. Collective action is inherently complex. Consensus-building often results in delayed military action. How difficult will it be to 

achieve consensus at NATO on next steps against ISIL? 

Dr. CARTER. I believe the United States and NATO have a shared interest in defeating ISIL. I understand that NATO leaders affirmed at the September 2014 

NATO Summit that NATO would cooperate in several areas through the NATO– 

Iraq partnership, and explore NATO roles to coordinate humanitarian assistance 

and to share information and intelligence. If confirmed, I will seek to build on this 

cooperation, assess obstacles to achieving greater consensus, and work closely with 

our NATO Allies to address the common threat of ISIL. 

28. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, each member of NATO has its own unique geopolitical, economic, and energy interests. As such, what is your assessment of where 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine stands as a test-case for NATO’s effectiveness and relevancy in a post-9/11 world? 

Dr. CARTER. Although NATO does not have a formal treaty obligation to Ukraine, 

NATO’s response to Russia’s aggressive actions have shown the shared commitment 

of NATO to promote its shared values and to enlarge the zone of peace, security, 

and stability in Europe. If confirmed, I will work with NATO to reassure our Allies 

and respond to the challenge from Russia. 

29. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, what approach would you suggest for the socalled ‘‘grey’’ states that are not in NATO but are intent on resisting Russian hegemonic advances such as Ukraine and Moldova? 

Dr. CARTER. I reject the notion that Russia should be afforded a ‘‘sphere of influence.’’ If confirmed, I will continue to encourage United States partners, such as 

Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, to build their security capacity and military interoperability with NATO. 

30. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, according to NATO guidelines, member countries 

should spend at least 2 percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense. 

Only four countries spent that much in 2013: Estonia, Greece, the United States, 

and the United Kingdom. Are there any carrots and sticks we can use to encourage 

all members of the alliance to make the necessary investments toward their national security? 

Dr. CARTER. At the September Wales Summit, the Allies pledged to increase defense investment. If confirmed, I will work personally to encourage all Allies to meet 

that pledge. I would underscore the shared threats NATO members face, and the 

critical need to continue to invest in defense capabilities to strengthen the Alliance. 

I would urge Allies with larger economies to invest in military capabilities that that 

can be used to impose costs on any opponent with minimal cost and risk to Alliance 

forces. For Allies with smaller economies, I would encourage them to invest in capabilities that are needed by the Alliance, and in which they may have a comparative 

advantage. 

COMBATANT COMMANDER REQUIREMENTS FOR INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND

RECONNAISSANCE

31. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, our combatant commanders are demanding increasing amounts of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and emphasizing persistence surveillance. That persistence comes at significant cost, and 

in certain regions of the world many ISR needs are going unmet. Further, most of 

the U.S. manned and unmanned aerial assets have durations of 8 to 24 hours, making long range/long endurance capability extremely difficult if not impossible in 

many theaters of operation. 

I am aware that in June 2014, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) issued 

a Joint Emerging Operational Needs Statement for long endurance ISR (AF–0005) 

ISR. It is my understanding a Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Memorandum of December 22, 2014, acknowledged the capability gaps outlined in the 

Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEON) as valid and tasked the Battlespace 

Awareness group to consider solutions and report back by April 30, 2015. 

Recent press reports reveal that the Air Force is managing a program known as 

Orion unmanned aerial system (UAS), which has proven significant endurance capability far beyond currently available air assets. Orion was selected in 2009 as a 

Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD), a process in which several of 

127 

the combatant commands voted for Orion. This result was reflected in the President’s Budget under the MAGIC (Medium Altitude Global ISR and Communication) 

program within Air Force Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E). 

If confirmed, will you direct DOD to brief the appropriate Congressional committees on DOD’s plans to continue Orion platform development and speed operational 

test and evaluation of such a platform in order to meet urgent, and rapidly growing, 

combatant command requirements for additional long range/long endurance ISR capability? 

Dr. CARTER. The Department has invested significant resources over the past decade to meet critical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance needs through 

Quick Reaction Capabilities, Joint Urgent Operational Needs and flexible, responsive, programs of record. If confirmed, I will ensure the appropriate congressional 

committees are briefed on combatant command requirements, and the broad spectrum of both airborne and space-based ISR assets, including ORION, to provide 

long-range/long-endurance ISR capability. 

SYRIA

32. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, it is my understanding that the Free Syrian 

Army utilizes a secure mobile wireless network known as the Free Syria Network 

for communications purposes. I also understand that DOD and agencies within the 

Intelligence Community may have utilized this system to successfully communicate 

with the leadership of the Free Syrian Army. If confirmed, will you direct the appropriate entity within DOD to brief the appropriate Congressional committees on the 

efficacy of the Free Syria Network and, if appropriate, DOD’s plans to protect, and 

potentially expand and enhance, this critical communications tool for the Free Syrian Army? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I will support briefings to appropriate congressional 

committees on the details of the Department of Defense’s train-and-equip program 

in Syria to include those aspects outlined in your question. 

SEAPOWER

33. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, I have the honor of serving as Chairman of the 

Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee this Congress. 

Should you be confirmed, I look forward to working with you on Navy and Marine 

Corps priorities during the months to come. 

In fiscal year 2013, the Navy implemented numerous cuts in response to sequestration. This included cancellation of five ship deployments and the delayed deployment of a carrier strike group to the Middle East. Since 2013, we’ve witnessed the 

rise of ISIL, the deteriorating situation in Yemen, Russia’s aggression in Eastern 

Europe, and a belligerent North Korea. The world is more dangerous today than it 

was in 2013. 

What is your view on how sequestration would threaten the Navy and Marine 

Corps’ ability to decisively project power abroad? 

Dr. CARTER. The Seapower Subcommittee has a long and productive history in 

providing for a strong Navy and Marine Corps. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you as Chairman of the Subcommittee and the other members of the Subcommittee in furtherance of this goal. A return to sequestration could have a serious 

effect on the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ ability to project power. Both Services could 

become smaller, less ready, and less modern. The shipbuilding industrial base, a 

critical component of sea power, could suffer, and deployments would be borne by 

a smaller Marine Corps, which could be stretched thin. 

34. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, what is your assessment of the impact sequestration would have on our amphibious forces and our Navy and Marine Corps’ ability 

to execute DOD’s pivot to Asia-Pacific? 

Dr. CARTER. A return to sequestration could negatively affect the Navy and Marine Corps’ ability to support DOD’s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Both services could necessarily be smaller, less ready, and less modern, resulting in fewer 

forces available to support operations in this vital region. These forces are a key 

component of our forward regional presence in support of our allies and partners. 

35. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, certain sectors of the defense industry—such as 

shipbuilding—are extremely capital intensive. Our fiscally constrained environment 

threatens to close production lines that would take years to restart. Given your prior 

experience as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 

what is your vision on how best to maintain the vitality of the industrial base given 

our current budget environment? 

128 

Dr. CARTER. A healthy industrial base is critically important to the Department’s 

long-term success. The keys to maintaining the world’s finest fighting force are 

high-quality people who have constant and realistic training and are equipped with 

cutting-edge technology. The Department must be prepared to act if key parts of the 

industrial base are threatened. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department actively monitors the industrial base to identify risks and to preserve critical capabilities. 

WALTER REED DISPOSITION

36. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, the NDAA for fiscal year 2015 identified 13.2 

acres, including the American Institute of Pathology building, of the former Walter 

Reed Army hospital site that would be ideal for medical research purposes. The Senate Armed Services Committee and I continue to believe that it is in the best interest of the taxpayer to convey this building to a research institution, especially when 

one considers the millions of dollars spent in recent years to update and renovate 

the facility, as well as the future economic impact of medical innovation. 

Unfortunately, I learned this week that—despite a letter I received from the Secretary of the Army stating the Army’s intent to expeditiously transfer the land to 

a children’s research facility—the parcel of land at Walter Reed may be transferred 

to the State Department. It would be an incredible waste of taxpayer dollars to 

allow the State Department to spend tens of millions of dollars to tear down a world 

class research building, which is ready for a new tenant immediately, in order to 

build an undefined, unplanned foreign embassy at some undetermined date in the 

future. 

What are your views as to how the land should be dispersed? 

Dr. CARTER. I do not have sufficient information to answer this question at this 

time. It is my understanding that the Department has been working this matter 

with the State Department, public health advocates including Children’s Hospital, 

and the District of Columbia. If confirmed, I will ensure that effort is concluded 

without unreasonable delay, consistent with the requirements of the legislation. 

37. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you direct DOD to provide the 

Senate Armed Services Committee and other appropriate Congressional committees 

with an explanation as to the holdup of the Walter Reed land transfer to a medical 

research entity? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I will ensure the appropriate congressional committees 

are provided with the Department’s plans and the timing for the disposition of Walter Reed, including any transfer to a medical research entity. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

MILITARY HOUSING AT CAMP HUMPHREYS, KOREA

38. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, United States Forces in Korea are engaged in a 

massive realignment that will result in the consolidation of U.S. Forces onto fewer, 

larger installations. One such installation is United States Army Garrison Camp 

Humphreys. I am concerned about reports of the potential housing shortage at 

Camp Humphreys that could result in both long bus rides for children attending 

new schools on post, and a failure to meet the Commanding General’s goal for 40 

percent of accompanied families to live on-post. 

I have received information that suggests despite the fact that some current housing facilities are slated for demolition, there is no final agreement for on-post family 

housing because DOD has not approved a special on-post Overseas Housing Allowance District despite the inclusion of this districting in the solicitation for bids. 

I understand that in your last tour in the Pentagon you were involved in the family housing situation at Camp Humphreys. If my information is correct, do you know 

why the on-post housing contract is still delayed? 

Dr. CARTER. I am very aware of the importance of Camp Humphreys to our posture on the Korean Peninsula. At this time, I am not familiar with the current status of the on-post housing contract at Camp Humphreys, including why it may have 

been delayed. If confirmed, I will review this matter and take appropriate action 

and ensure you get a prompt answer to your question. 

39. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, will you provide your assurance that soldiers and 

their families will have the on-post housing they deserve as the military relocates 

to Camp Humphreys? 

129 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the on-post housing at Camp 

Humphreys meets operational requirements and provides quality residences for as 

many of our soldiers and their families as possible. 

40. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, do you know whether a contract has been awarded for the construction of on-post housing at Camp Humphreys? If so, has construction begun? If not, why not? 

Dr. CARTER. I am not privy to the construction schedules at this time. If confirmed, I will review the Department’s plan for meeting Camp Humphrey’s on-base 

housing requirements and ensure you receive full and timely answers to your questions. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET

41. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, if the President’s Budget Request for DOD is 

funded at the $499 billion level mandated by the congressional budget caps instead 

of the $585 billion requested, what will be the breakdown of cuts to each Service 

by program, project, and activity (PPA)? 

Dr. CARTER. Should Congress appropriate the Department’s full FY 2016 request 

while failing to amend the Budget Control Act (BCA), my understanding is that the 

mechanical sequestration process would then cut any funding provided above the 

BCA caps in a mindless across-the-board fashion. I further understand that the Department is preparing a report to the Congress on those potential impacts. The only 

discretion in that event would be how the President exercised his authority to exempt the military personnel accounts from those across-the-board cuts. 

Should the Congress chose to appropriate only the amount allowed by the BCA 

for FY2016, the Congress would make its own decisions on how to reduce the Department’s budget. My hope is that we would not face this alternative but, if we 

do, that those actions would be taken in consultation with the Department. 

AFGHANISTAN

42. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, in the advance policy questions, you were asked 

if you would consider recommending to the President revisions to the size and pace 

of the drawdown in Afghanistan if the security conditions on the ground deteriorate 

in 2016. You answered yes. What specific conditions on the ground in Afghanistan 

would cause you to recommend to the President a change to the size and pace of 

the drawdown? 

Dr. CARTER. Should security conditions in Afghanistan degrade such that the efficacy of the United States strategy is in doubt, or result in a significant increase in 

risk to our people there, I would consult with my senior military and civilian advisors and provide my best strategic advice to the President about the need for any 

changes to the size or pace of the drawdown. 

READINESS DEFICITS

43. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, in your responses to the advance policy questions, 

you write that there ‘‘are still critical readiness deficits in many areas.’’ Based on 

your prior service in DOD and your preparation for this hearing, can you provide 

more details on those readiness deficits? 

Dr. CARTER. It is my understanding that the Services are working to rebuild core 

skill sets and reorient their manning, training and equipping processes in order to 

broaden their readiness profile after years of operational commitments in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and elsewhere. Their progress to date does not undo the loss of fullspectrum readiness across the Department. These institutional readiness deficits 

took years to create, were exacerbated by the sequester level funding and, as such, 

will take years to remedy. Their progress to date has not reversed the loss of fullspectrum readiness across the department affecting all services and all force elements. 

OHIO REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

44. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, the Chief of Naval Operations has testified that 

maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is his number one priority. The Navy will be challenged to recapitalize our ballistic missile submarines, 

known as the Ohio Replacement Program, within historic levels of shipbuilding 

funding. What is your position on the importance of the Ohio Replacement Program 

and how DOD should fund it? 

Dr. CARTER. The Ohio Replacement Program is a vital component of our nuclear 

deterrence strategy. The Ohio Replacement Program will present challenges to the 

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Navy’s shipbuilding plan, particularly in the years after 2020. The Department 

needs adequate resources for modernization in order to insure we can make the 

transition to the new generation ballistic missile submarine. Which account it is 

funded in is of lesser importance. It makes the most sense to include the Ohio re- placement in the shipbuilding account but this is a decision that can be made in 

the future. If confirmed, I will work within the Department and with the Congress 

to explore options to address this challenge. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT

45. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, over the last 3 years, numerous provisions have 

been enacted to reform the military justice system and to improve the armed services’ ability to combat sexual assault. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring the 

timely, full, and robust implementation of all sexual assault provisions in previous 

years’ NDAAs? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. If confirmed, I plan to continue the Department’s efforts to effectively implement each provision. I recognize that it is critical to work closely with 

Congress, so that legislative efforts and the Department’s initiatives are consistent 

and complement each other. 

AUDITING THE PENTAGON

46. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, ensuring DOD achieves full auditability has been 

a major priority of mine since coming to the Senate. Every dollar wasted is a dollar 

we don’t have to provide our troops with the training and equipment they need to 

protect themselves and accomplish their missions. However, the Pentagon’s audit 

timeline and structure continue to evolve and experience delays. If you are confirmed, do you commit that you will make achieving audit milestones and objectives 

a major priority? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I will make this a high priority and hold our senior 

leaders, civilian and military, accountable for making progress towards a clean opinion. DOD must demonstrate that internal controls are in place to prevent waste and 

provide a level of confidence to the taxpayers that we are good stewards of their 

funds. I understand that the Department is following the audit strategy it has outlined to the Congress. If confirmed, I intend to keep Congress apprised of the Department’s progress. 

47. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, do you commit to achieve current timelines for 

auditability? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. I am committed to the current timelines for getting the Department under audit. Keeping this initiative on track is an important priority. If confirmed, I will stress to the Department’s senior military and civilian leaders, to including the Secretaries of Military Departments and defense agency heads, the importance of meeting our obligations on auditability. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOM COTTON

RUSSIA INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

48. Senator COTTON. Dr. Carter, as you are no doubt aware, last year the United 

States State Department in its annual Arms Control Compliance Report stated that 

Russia had violated the terms of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 

As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I’ve reviewed the evidence and Russia is clearly in violation. 

Earlier this year, before the House Armed Services Committee, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Brian McKeon, stated that DOD was considering responding to the violation by developing and deploying increased defensive 

capabilities to counter the non-compliant missile, counter-force capabilities to prevent cruise missile attacks; and counter-vailing strike capabilities. Do you agree 

with Secretary McKeon? Isn’t this the minimum we should be doing? 

Dr. CARTER. The United States goal should be to convince Russia to return to 

compliance with the INF Treaty in a verifiable manner. If Russia refuses to return 

to compliance, the United States should prevent Russia from achieving a military 

advantage from its violation. Potential military responses are a critical component 

of a strategy directed towards convincing Russia to return to compliance with the 

INF Treaty or, if Russia does not return, denying it significant military advantage 

from violating the Treaty. 

I agree that DOD should consider a range of options, including active defenses 

to counter intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles; counterforce capaVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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bilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks; and 

countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces. U.S. responses 

must make clear to Russia that if it does not return to compliance our responses 

will make them less secure than they are today. 

49. Senator COTTON. Dr. Carter, General Breedlove, the United States European 

Command (EUCOM) Commander stated last year that ‘‘A weapon capability that 

violates the INF that is introduced into the greater European land mass is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with. It can’t go unanswered.’’ Do you agree? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. 

RUSSIA OPEN SKIES TREATY

50. Senator COTTON. Dr. Carter, I am a member of the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence in addition to this committee. I have become concerned with Russian 

misuse of the Open Skies Treaty. Have you reviewed any of the assessments of this 

treaty and its potential national security implications? 

Dr. CARTER. I have not had the opportunity to familiarize myself with the assessments to which you refer. 

51. Senator COTTON. Dr. Carter, are you aware that the Commander of EUCOM 

non-concurred last summer when the administration sought to approve the use of 

a new sensor over Europe but the Commander’s concerns were ignored and the sensor was approved anyway? 

Dr. CARTER. No, I am not aware of the situation you mentioned. 

52. Senator COTTON. Dr. Carter, would you please commit to promptly reviewing 

the assessments of the commanders of United States Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM), EUCOM, and United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) as 

to the Open Skies Treaty and let me know, within the next 2 weeks, if you agree 

or disagree with their assessments of the potential harms to our European allies 

and the United States? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I would ensure a prompt review is conducted of any concerns expressed by combatant commanders regarding the Open Skies Treaty. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

STRATEGIC LOCATION OF ALASKA

53. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, in a week or two, the Army will be conducting 

force reduction and realignment listening sessions across country. Two of these sessions will be conducted in Alaska; one on Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and the 

other Fort Wainwright. Given our strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific and a renewed 

focus on the Arctic, do you believe that the forces in Alaska are uniquely suited to 

help address strategic needs in our Pacific Pivot and new Arctic Strategy? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes, United States forces in Alaska play a critical role in our posture 

in the Asia-Pacific region. 

54. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, can I have your assurance that decisions are 

not made to eliminate units which are best positioned to quickly and effectively respond to threats in the Pacific Region in strategically important places like Alaska? 

Dr. CARTER. Any changes to United States force posture need to ensure that the 

United States can continue to quickly and effectively respond to threats in the Pacific Region. 

55. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, should the Army decide to eliminate one or 

both brigade combat teams (BCT) in Alaska, how do you expect Kim Jong-un to 

react to this news? 

Dr. CARTER. An important purpose of United States force posture in the Pacific 

Region is to deter aggression on the Korean Peninsula. That should be clear to the 

government of the DPRK. 

56. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, how would Vladimir Putin view it? 

Dr. CARTER. An important purpose of our posture in the Asia Pacific region is to 

deter aggression by any power, including Russia. 

57. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, how about our friends and partners like Japan, 

Korea, and Singapore, how would they interpret it? 

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Dr. CARTER. An important purpose of our posture is also to assure our friends and 

partners, such as Japan, Korea, and Singapore, that the United States is fully committed to the security of the Asia-Pacific region. 

RUSSIAN ARCTIC ACTIONS AND LACK OF UNITED STATES ACTION

58. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, recent news articles have reported increased 

Russian involvement in the Arctic. This involvement, which some have called the 

militarization of the Arctic, includes creation of a new Arctic Command, the construction of as many as 13 new airfields and 10 air-defense radar stations, an increase in Russian Long-Range Air Patrols, continued investment in the world’s largest ice-breaker fleet, and the recent activation of an Arctic Brigade. Additionally, 

Russia has made several large territorial claims into the Arctic, including the expressed desire to expand its Arctic borders by more than 460,000 square miles. 

Meanwhile DOD has issued a 16-page Arctic Strategy; just 13 pages if you don’t 

count the cover, the forward, and the 1-page map. How are we not falling behind 

in the Arctic? 

Dr. CARTER. The U.S. approach to the Arctic should support our core objectives 

to ensure security and promote defense cooperation. If confirmed, I will direct our 

combatant commanders and Services to regularly review the security environment 

to ensure the U.S. is investing in required capabilities in a timely manner. 

59. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, what is your 50-year vision for the Arctic? 

Dr. CARTER. My 50-year vision is for an Arctic region that remains stable and free 

of conflict, where nations continue act responsibly in a spirit of trust and cooperation, and where economic and energy resources are developed in a sustainable manner that respects both the fragile environment and the interests and cultures of indigenous peoples. Although the Arctic Ocean may be ice-free for several months during the summer by 2065, it will still be ice-bound during the long, dark polar winter. 

If confirmed, I will work with my interagency partners to support the work of the 

Arctic Council during the upcoming U.S. Chairmanship to lay the foundation for addressing the enduring challenges to human and environmental safety and security 

in the region. 

60. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, what resources do we need as a Nation to effectively project power into the Arctic Region? 

Dr. CARTER. To effectively project power into the Arctic Region, the United States 

needs to maintain the aircraft necessary to patrol our skies and respond to Russian 

long-range aviation when our sovereignty is challenge. Given that the Arctic is frozen much of the year, submarines are also vital to our power projection capability. 

DOD is able to accomplish its mission against existing threats in current Arctic conditions with its current capabilities. At some point in the future, the United States 

will also need ships capable of operating in the marginal ice zone or near ice in the 

summer months when the Arctic is accessible. If confirmed, I will continue to assess 

those needs to determine what resources the U.S. requires. 

ARCTIC COLLABORATION

61. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, besides our participation on the Arctic council, 

how can we more effectively collaborate with Arctic nations? 

Dr. CARTER. The United States can work to advance its defense and security partnerships with partners in the Arctic through engagement in international venues 

such as the International Maritime Organization, where a Polar Code for Arctic 

shipping is under development, and the new Coast Guard Arctic Forum. The U.S. 

can also seek to enhance research and academic collaboration through institutions 

like the new Coast Guard Center for Arctic Study and Policy, and the International 

Arctic Research Center at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. The United States 

should continue to work with its Arctic partners through the Northern Chiefs of Defense Conference to bolster security and defense cooperation. The U.S. can also seek 

additional opportunities for business collaboration through the new industry-led 

Arctic Economic Council. Finally, the United States can also take a leadership role 

in promoting the rules that underpin the freedom of the seas and provide legal certainty on the world’s oceans, including exercising internationally recognized navigation and overflight rights in the Arctic Ocean, as appropriate. 

62. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, how can we improve military-to-military relations with our arctic friends and partners? 

Dr. CARTER. The U.S. can improve military-to-military relations with its Arctic 

friends and partners by working with them to confront the same challenges the 

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United States faces: Arctic operations are expensive and can be dangerous for military forces that are unprepared for the austere operating environment. 

For example, the United States can participate in Arctic search and rescue exercises in collaboration with the Coast Guards and Navies of other Arctic friends and 

partners. A combination of at-sea interaction and in-port engagements that address 

common challenges such as communications, situational awareness, and cold weather operations can improve interoperability and strengthen military-to-military relationships. Another avenue to improve military-to-military relations is through collaborative Arctic research with organizations. Finally, militaries should continue to 

exchange concerns and lessons learned in forums such as the Arctic Security Forces 

Roundtable, and through joint exercises. 

ARMY ROLE IN ASIA

63. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, last year at the annual Association of the U.S. 

Army conference, Secretary Hagel has said that the Army could ‘‘broaden its role,’’ 

after more than a decade of continuous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, ‘‘by 

leveraging its current suite of long-range precision-guided missiles, rockets, artillery, and air defense systems’’ to build a modern coastal defense force that could 

contribute to operations in anti-access/area-denial environments. Do you concur that 

such a capability would offer benefits for United States defense policy in the AsiaPacific and other maritime theaters? 

Dr. CARTER. I support the Army’s ongoing efforts to improve its integrated air and 

missile defense capabilities. The coming years will allow the Army to focus on resetting and looking forward to greater investment in Asia-Pacific missions, including 

building partner capacity of counterpart forces in that region. 

CHINESE COERCION

64. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, over the last several years, China has engaged 

in coercive diplomacy to achieve its political and territorial aims in the East and 

South China Seas. The administration has responded with efforts to build partner 

capacity and strengthen regional institutions, but this will take years if not decades 

to bear fruit. Beyond private diplomacy with the Chinese, which appears to be insufficient, what steps do you believe we should take to deter Chinese assertiveness in 

the short and medium term? 

Dr. CARTER. The United States has a strong interest in maintaining peace and 

stability, the free flow of commerce, and the freedom of navigation and overflight 

in the East and South China Seas. In addition to diplomacy to resolve territorial 

disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law, the United States 

should deter assertiveness in the region with a robust force posture, sustained presence, and commitment to building the capacity of its partners and allies. The United 

States also should encourage China to be more transparent about how it will use 

its growing military capabilities. The United States should also continue to modernize and strengthen its security alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of 

Korea, Philippines, and Thailand. The United States should also deepen relationships with and among its partners in South and Southeast Asia to build capacity 

and reduce vulnerabilities. If confirmed, I will continue to prioritize our investments 

in posture, presence, and partnership capacity in the Asia-Pacific region to deter aggression and underwrite peace and stability. 

65. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, do you share the view that China’s actions have 

violated United States national interests in the Freedom of Navigation, the free flow 

of commerce, and the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law? 

Dr. CARTER. The United States has a longstanding national interest in preserving 

the freedom of navigation, and in the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance 

with international law. I am concerned that recent Chinese actions, including its 

unilateral and uncoordinated announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone 

(ADIZ) that overlapped the previous existing ADIZ in the East China Sea, its unilateral promulgation of fishing regulations covering much of the South China Sea, its 

pursuit of land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, and its use of economic pressure on other claimants, has raised regional tensions and complicated efforts to peacefully manage and resolve territorial disputes. The United States should 

remain committed to the preservation of the freedom of navigation, and all the other 

rights provided under international law. If confirmed, I would carry forward that 

commitment, and I would work to ensure that disputes are addressed in a manner 

that both reflects that commitment and that serves the goal of resolving disputes 

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peacefully. This approach would apply to my dealings with China and with all other 

countries. 

AMERICAN ENERGY

66. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, 10 years ago, we would have never expected 

the United States to be in the current position as an energy superpower. How do 

you foresee the United States utilizing this power to our advantage abroad? 

Dr. CARTER. The profound changes in the global energy market, and the United 

States’ increasing role as an energy superpower, are significant developments in the 

global landscape. They present a range of opportunities and challenges, which influence the international security environment and the Department’s ability to fulfill 

its global responsibilities. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department accounts 

for the security implications and possibilities of this critical but volatile market in 

its strategic calculus and works with the U.S. interagency and our international 

partners to leverage it properly. 

67. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Carter, what actions will DOD take to ensure we maintain this role and what can Congress do to help maintain this power as well? 

Dr. CARTER. Although the Department is not the lead agency for energy policy, 

I do support a whole-of-government approach for U.S. national security that factors 

in energy use and production. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE LEE

U.S. GLOBAL ROLE

68. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, in discussing the foreign interests of the United 

States, early U.S. Presidents like Washington and Jefferson warned against entangling the United States in the business of other nations. I’d like to get your thoughts 

on what you believe the role of the U.S. is, as a global superpower, and how we 

can balance this status while not becoming overly involved and burdened in situations that do not impact our Nation’s security? 

Dr. CARTER. The United States continues to be the preeminent global superpower 

and remains the strongest, most resilient, and most influential Nation on the face 

of the earth. We have allies and friends in every corner of the world and our adversaries have few: this is clear testimony to the appeal of our values, our principles, 

and our leadership. However the world continues to be dangerous place: turmoil in 

the Middle East and North Africa, an ongoing war in Afghanistan, the reversion to 

old-style thinking in parts of Europe, and the long-standing tensions from the past 

and the rapid changes in Asia. This calls for the continuing need of the stabilizing 

presence of the United States throughout the world, while working closely with our 

allies and partners to address threats to U.S. interests. 

69. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, where do you believe DOD should be reprioritizing 

its focus, either programmatically or geographically, in order to maximize attention 

to its primary responsibility of securing the freedoms and rights of U.S. citizens? 

Dr. CARTER. I believe DOD priorities should include preserving and enhancing the 

finest fighting force in the world and taking care of their families; providing a strategic perspective to the threats and opportunities in the world; and implementing 

significant reforms that are crucial in a time of budget uncertainty. From a programmatic perspective, DOD should protect and prioritize investments in innovative 

technology and operational concepts to maintain the most advanced capabilities in 

the world. 

NATIONAL GUARD

70. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, how do you plan to build upon the combat experience gained by National Guard and Reserve units and take advantage of 

the cost-benefits of the Reserve Forces identified by the Reserve Forces Policy Board 

and Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) reports in order to preserve 

combat power for the military, especially while adjusting to potential budget constraints? 

Dr. CARTER. Each component is critical to the total force. If confirmed, I will review the reports and ensure that all force structure decisions take into account the 

comparative cost, capability, and operational capacity and experience of each component to attain the best force mix. 

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71. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, as you know, the Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) calls for the transfer of all Apache attack helicopters from the National 

Guard to Active Army. There are thousands of men and women in the National 

Guard currently assigned to the Apache battalions, many who have years of combat 

experience and decades of training with this equipment. Are you concerned that we 

are losing a valuable national security asset that we already have in these personnel by carrying out this initiative? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed I will review the Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) as well as take into account the recommendations of the Army Commission established by the Congress to review this issue and make independent recommendations 

72. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, do you have any concerns that this initiative would 

reduce the strategic depth of the Army aviation? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed I will review the Aviation Restructuring Initiative and 

look forward to receiving the views of the Army, the Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau, and the Council of Governors and the results of the Army Commission. 

AIR FORCE

73. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, at the end of last year, the Air Force announced that 

if it was not authorized to retire weapons systems (the A–10) as requested in the 

fiscal year 2015 Budget Request, there would be a shortfall of maintainers to train 

and transition into new equipment, which could potentially delay Initial Operational 

Capability (IOC) and Full Operational Capability (FOC) for new weapons systems 

(F–35). To what extent are you aware of this issue, and how do you intend to address any Air Force maintainer shortfall if confirmed? 

Dr. CARTER. I am not fully informed on this issue. If confirmed, I will direct the 

Secretary of the Air Force to address this issue and develop a solution as necessary. 

STRATEGIC FORCES

74. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, the United States Government last year accused 

Russia of violating the INF Treaty, something that has been largely suspected for 

some time. What do you believe should be an appropriate response to Russia’s violation of this treaty from DOD and the United States Government as a whole? 

Dr. CARTER. In response to Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty, the United States 

should consider a comprehensive strategy of diplomatic, economic, and military responses. Russia’s continued disregard for its international obligations and lack of 

meaningful engagement on this particular issue require the United States to take 

actions to protect its interests and security as well as those of its allies and partners. United States efforts should continue to remind Russia why the United States 

and Russia signed this treaty in the first place and be designed to bring Russia back 

into verified compliance with its obligations. I believe that any United States responses should be designed to make the United States and our allies and partners 

more secure by ensuring that Russia does not gain any significant military advantage from deploying an INF-prohibited system. 

The range of options we should look at from the Defense Department could include active defenses to counter intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles; 

counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks; and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces. 

United States responses must make clear to Russia that if it does not return to compliance our responses will make them less secure than they are today. 

75. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, do you believe that the United States should undertake any further nuclear forces reductions while Russia is still in violation of this 

or any other treaty? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I would assess the current situation, consult with my 

senior military advisors, and recommend a course of action. 

76. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, Secretary Hagel spoke recently about the importance 

that our Nation’s nuclear deterrence still plays in U.S. security and in support of 

the new long-range strike bomber project. Many of us support the nuclear deterrence mission and want to ensure that future modernization and acquisition projects 

are executed in the most cost- and time-efficient manner, and that the viability of 

deterrence missions are not jeopardized by cost overruns and delays. If confirmed, 

how do you plan to address the modernization and acquisition needs of our strategic 

deterrence while guaranteeing their budgetary viability? 

136 

Dr. CARTER. A safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent is essential to national 

security, and, if confirmed, ensuring the viability of plans for its future needs will 

be a priority for me. 

CYBERSECURITY

77. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, many of us are concerned about the improved abilities of both state and non-state actors to conduct cyber-attacks against government 

and non-government entities alike. What, in your opinion, is necessary for DOD to 

deter and defend against these attacks, and how should the United States calibrate 

responses to cyber attacks? 

Dr. CARTER. Defending against cyber-attacks requires a whole of government effort. DOD employs an array of techniques and capabilities to defend its own networks while providing support to other departments and agencies as appropriate. 

Greater resiliency for DOD networks and systems and more robust information 

sharing will be crucial to defending against these attacks. 

The U.S. should calibrate responses to cyber-attacks by establishing all the facts 

and conducting case-specific analysis, determining an appropriate proportional response, and should consider the broader strategic context, security, and foreign policy considerations of any attack and response. 

78. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, when would you consider a cyber attack to be an act 

of war? 

Dr. CARTER. Cyber-attacks can affect our critical infrastructure, the national economy, and military operations. I believe that what is termed an act of war should 

follow the same practice as in other areas, because it is the seriousness, not the 

means, of an attack that matters most. Whether a particular attack is considered 

an ‘‘act of war,’’ in or out of cyberspace, requires a determination on a case-by-case 

and fact-specific basis. Malicious cyber activities could result in death, injury or significant destruction, and any such activities would be regarded with the utmost concern and could well be considered ‘‘acts of war.’’ An attack does not need to be 

deemed an ‘‘act of war’’ to require a response. 

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA

79. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, do you believe that President Bashar Assad has to 

be removed, either peacefully or by force, from power in order to protect the United 

States from the threats emanating from this conflict? 

Dr. CARTER. Assad has lost all legitimacy and cannot be part of the future of 

Syria. A stable Syria will require both defeating ISIL and a political transition in 

which Assad is removed from power. 

80. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, one of the enduring images that many Americans 

have seen from the conflict in Iraq and Syria are of ISIS fighters parading through 

urban streets or in desert convoys in United States-made armored vehicles captured 

from surrendering Iraq Security Force units. Recently, the United States has sent 

hundreds of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to Iraqi and Kurdish forces, and the Iraqi Government has requested armored vehicles and equipment, such Abrams tanks and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 

(HMMWV). If confirmed, what will you recommend the United States do to ensure 

that such lethal equipment does not end up in the hands of ISIS fighters, and that 

the United States is not inadvertently arming ISIS in Iraq? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I will continue to support the efforts of the Department 

of Defense to train, advise, and assist the Iraqis to reconstitute a credible and combat capable security force. Cohesive, well-trained, well-led and properly supported 

forces reduces the risk that those forces will surrender or abandon the equipment 

the U.S. has given them. I will also ensure that DOD uses all appropriate end use 

monitoring tools and practices. 

81. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, what role should DOD play in disrupting the flow 

of foreign fighters flowing into and out of the conflict in Syria and Iraq? 

Dr. CARTER. United States military action, in concert with coalition partners, can 

have an impact on ISIS’s capabilities and reduce its ability to flow fighters in and 

out of Syria. I believe it is important that the United States continue its close collaboration with other governments to stop the flow of foreign fighters into the region. If confirmed, I will focus attention on the foreign fighter flow, and their support networks, and assess what changes may be needed. 

137 

82. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, do you believe that the U.S. military action against 

ISIS can be successful at defeating the threats to our country if the United States 

and international community are not able to significantly stop the flow of fighters, 

funds, and weapons into this conflict? 

Dr. CARTER. No. 

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

83. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, at the NATO summit in Wales last September, 

NATO members agreed to reverse trends in declining defense spending and maintain a defense budget of 2 percent GDP, a spending level that, as you know, has 

been a NATO goal for over a decade but few countries have achieved. Do you believe 

that it is in the interests of the United States as a deterrent to Russian aggression 

for our NATO allies to reverse declines in defense spending and work towards meeting these goals? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. 

84. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, what will you do to assist and encourage NATO members to prioritize defense spending in their own countries to meet 

the Russian threat? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I will emphasize the importance of strong U.S. leadership within the NATO, including for collective defense planning. I will urge Allies 

with larger economies to invest in military capabilities that that can impose costs 

on any opponent with minimal cost and risk to Alliance forces. For Allies with 

smaller economies, I will encourage them to invest in capabilities that are needed 

by the Alliance, and in which they may have a comparative advantage. 

AFGHANISTAN

85. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, what is your assessment of the quality and capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and the relationship between 

the political leadership and the military leadership in Afghanistan? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I will assess these issues first hand, but my assessment 

based on public information has been that President Ghani has a positive relationship with both military leaders and the Afghan forces, and that the ANSF have 

steadily improved. It appears that the ANSF are increasingly effective at leading 

operations and prevailing over insurgents with limited assistance from U.S. and coalition partners. 

I understand the relationship between the ANSF and Afghan political leadership 

has significantly improved since President Ghani took office. I believe President 

Ghani has embraced his role as commander-in-chief, and has demonstrated his commitment to focus on improving ANSF effectiveness and security for the people of Afghanistan. 

86. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, if the ANSF fails to provide security for the country 

as expected during the U.S. drawdown, what threats to the United States do you 

believe could develop in Afghanistan? 

Dr. CARTER. The objective of strengthening the ANSF’s ability to provide security 

is to protect the Afghan people and to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a base 

for attacks upon the United States. If confirmed, I will be committed to countering 

the al-Qaeda threat in the region and addressing any other terrorist elements in Afghanistan that pose a threat to our nation. 

YEMEN

87. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, the Yemeni Government has collapsed and a strong 

possibility exists of full-scale civil war there as al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula 

(AQAP), Shiite rebels backed by Iran, and the remnants of the government all fight 

for control of territory and authority. What do you identify as the greatest threat 

to the United States stemming from the conflict in Yemen? 

Dr. CARTER. AQAP in the Arabian Peninsula poses the greatest threat to United 

States interests from the conflict in Yemen. Therefore, the primary United States 

national security interest in Yemen is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQAP. Continued political instability in Yemen also risks our joint efforts with the Yemenis 

to combat AQAP. 

88. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, do you believe that there are any necessary changes 

to the administration’s current strategy to protect the United States from threats 

growing there? 

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Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I will assess the current strategy and make any recommendations I believe are needed. I do not have any recommendations at this time 

based on the information currently available to me. I understand that United States 

counterterrorism strategy in Yemen focuses on a mix of partnership activities and 

limited direct action against those who threaten the United States. The United 

States Government, in partnership with its partners and the Yemeni government, 

have made a number of gains against AQAP, including the removal of numerous 

leaders and the disruption of plotting against the United Sates. AQAP remains resilient and the political instability that has long plagued Yemen—particularly in recent weeks—hinders Yemen’s ability to respond to the threat posed by AQAP. If 

confirmed, I intend to receive a detailed briefing to inform any changes I would recommend. 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

89. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, what threats to United States national security do 

you see developing out of Latin and South America and do you believe any changes 

need to be made in U.S. policy towards that region to address these threats? 

Dr. CARTER. I believe that threats developing out of Latin and South America include weak governmental institutions, corruption, under-governed spaces, 

transnational crime, narcotics, and natural disasters. These threats could increase 

instability in the region and threaten U.S. interests. To address these threats, I understand the Department of Defense, in support of the broader U.S. interagency effort, is focused on defending the southern approaches to the United States, strengthening hemispheric security, and encouraging further defense integration and collaboration on regional and global security affairs. If confirmed, I will assess these 

efforts and, if necessary, recommend changes to our strategy. 

90. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, do you believe that United States national security 

would benefit from increased ISR assets in the United States Southern Command 

(SOUTHCOM) area of operation? 

Dr. CARTER. ISR continues to be in high demand in each Combatant Commander’s 

Area of Responsibility, including in United States Southern Command. If confirmed, 

I will evaluate requests for ISR in the context of needs across all the Combatant 

Commands. 

TAIWAN

91. Senator LEE. Dr. Carter, as you know, the United States for decades has benefited from a strong security and economic relationship with Taiwan. If confirmed, 

what would you do to carry on and enhance the execution of U.S. policies that assist 

in maintaining Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities? 

Dr. CARTER. I am firmly committed to maintaining Taiwan’s self-defense capability. The Taiwan Relations Act states that ‘‘the United States will make available 

to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be 

necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability’’ and will 

‘‘maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other 

forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.’’ If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of 

Defense is continually engaged in evaluating, assessing, and reviewing Taiwan’s defense needs, while also providing defense articles and services necessary to enable 

Taiwan to deter threats. I will also ensure that the United States maintains the 

planning and posture to resist any coercion against Taiwan. If confirmed, I will also 

ensure that the Department will continue to work closely with our partners on Taiwan to bolster their military preparedness, sustain the credibility of their deterrent, 

and support their military modernization effort. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LINDSEY GRAHAM

MILITARY COMPENSATION AND RETIREMENT MODERNIZATION COMMISSION REPORT

92. Senator GRAHAM. Dr. Carter, do you have any concern that the removal of all 

attack aviation from the Army National Guard through the Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative will reduce the Army’s operational combat depth? 

Dr. CARTER. The Army National Guard has been and will continue to be a crucial 

component of the total aviation force and the total army. If confirmed, I will review 

the Aviation Restructuring Initiative and work with the Department of the Army 

and the Chief of the National Guard bureau to understand and assess its impact 

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viewing the recommendations of the Army Commission established by the Congress 

with your sponsorship. 

93. Senator GRAHAM. Dr. Carter, given the overwhelming success of the operational Reserve model in Iraq and Afghanistan according to commanders in the 

field, how do you intend to maintain combat, combat support, and combat service 

support operational experience in the Reserve components during a time of lower 

operational demand? 

Dr. CARTER. The use of the Reserves during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 

was a major factor in the Department’s success. The CJCS and Service Chiefs have 

highlighted leader development as a key to sustaining the lessons learned from the 

last 13 years of war. Our Defense and Service institutions must ensure that we capture lessons learned and continue to grow leaders armed with that knowledge and 

shared experience. Another key element to maintaining operational experience is to 

retain the key officers and enlisted personnel with combat experience as well as ensure sufficient funding and readiness for the Reserve Component to meet operational requirements. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

MILITARY LENDING ACT PROTECTIONS FOR SERVICEMEMBERS

94. Senator REED. Dr. Carter, last November, 40 Senators wrote to Secretary 

Hagel in strong support of the proposed Military Lending Act (MLA) rule. If and 

when confirmed, will you work to ensure that the Department of Defense produces 

a final MLA rule that, like the proposed one, robustly enhances protections for 

servicemembers and their families and imporves military readiness? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure the final Military Lending Act rule 

supports robust protections for servicemembers and their families. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

INTEGRATION OF WOMEN

95. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Carter, in 2013, DOD announced the elimination of the 

direct combat exclusion policy and plans to more fully integrate women into all occupational fields by 2016. Do you commit to work with the Services to keep this effort 

moving forward and keep Congress apprised of DOD’s process? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. If confirmed, I will closely monitor the Department’s progress 

to ensure we meet our timelines and I will keep Congress apprised of our progress. 

96. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Carter, I understand that the Services and U.S. Special 

Operations Command (SOCOM) are studying whether to open all previously closed 

units and military operations to women and will have to submit specific requests 

if they wish to keep units or operations closed. What criteria will you and DOD use 

when evaluating any such requests to ensure consistency across DOD? 

Dr. CARTER. In accordance with the 2013 Direct Ground Combat Definition and 

Assignment Rule rescission memo, all requests for exceptions to policy must be narrowly tailored and based on a rigorous analysis of factual data regarding the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for the position. If confirmed, and if I receive requests for exception to policy, I will carefully consider them in this light. 

BIOFUELS

97. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Carter, last September, the Departments of Navy, Energy, and Agriculture awarded contracts to three companies to construct and commission bio-refineries to produce drop-in biofuels to help meet transportation needs. 

Can you speak to the strategic importance of the military transiting away from a 

strict dependence on petroleum to biofuels? 

Dr. CARTER. Over the long-term, I believe the Nation will benefit from a competitive, domestic renewable fuels industry, and, as a major consumer of liquid fuels, 

the Department would benefit from such competition. Similarly, the certification 

and qualification of alternative fuels for our equipment mean the Department will 

be better positioned to acquire and use a variety of fuels, as needed, to accomplish 

the mission. 

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DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

98. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Carter, when you served as Deputy Secretary of Defense, you said that ‘‘(s)maller firms, start-ups, and new entrants provide needed 

new technology, new face, and new ideas to the defense industry,’’ and that ‘‘a key 

part of our defense industrial strategy is to encourage new entrants (that) offer competition, renew and refresh the technology base, and ensure that defense is benefiting from the main currents of emerging technology.’’ You added ‘‘we must accordingly work constantly to lower barriers to entry.’’ What do you have planned to ensure a culture of embracing small start-ups and new entrants? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I would support policies that remove barriers to commercial technology utilization. I would also ensure that the Department has aggressive outreach to the small business community and other innovative firms. If confirmed I would direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics to develop and implement policies that achieved these goals. 

BERRY AMENDMENT AND BUY AMERICAN ACT

99. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Carter, last November the DOD Inspector General (IG) 

filed a report on the Army’s compliance with the Berry Amendment and Buy American Act. The IG recommended that the Services perform training for their contracting officers on the details of these purchasing requirements. What can DOD do 

to ensure that both contracting officers and the industry have a mutual understanding and appreciation for these extremely important laws? 

Dr. CARTER. Although I am not familiar with the IG report, I know the Department has a number of learning tools available to assist the acquisition workforce 

in understanding all statutory requirements. If confirmed, I would direct the Under 

Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to report to me on the steps 

that have been taken and on any recommended improvements to enhance the training for government contracting officers to enhance their understanding and trust of 

their industry partners. 

100. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Carter, what steps have been taken thus far to address the concerns raised in the IG report? 

Dr. CARTER. I am not familiar with the IG report or the steps that have been 

taken to address the concerns raised in the report. If confirmed I will ascertain what 

steps have been taken and respond appropriately. 

SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION RESEARCH

101. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Carter, I know you have been a strong supporter of 

small business and the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. As you 

know, the SBIR Reauthorization Act that was signed into law 3 years ago requires 

DOD to use SBIR technology to the greatest extent practicable and requires the Secretary to establish goals and incentives for using SBIR technology. How will you ensure that these provisions are fully implemented? 

Dr. CARTER. Before I left the Department as Deputy Secretary of Defense, I approved the interim version of DOD Instruction 5000.02 ‘‘Operation of the Defense 

Acquisition System,’’ that included SBIR goals and incentive provisions. I understand that those provisions are also included in the recently approved final version 

of this Instruction. If confirmed, I will direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to oversee the implementation of this important 

initiative, and to ensure I am kept apprised. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

MILITARY COMPENSATION AND RETIREMENT MODERNIZATION COMMISSION REPORT

102. Senator GILLIBRAND. Dr. Carter, I have been concerned by what appears to 

be a haphazard approach from DOD to reforming pay and benefits. Last week, the 

Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission released its report with a series of recommendations. At the same time DOD sent us back the 

same proposals it sent us last year, but with some changes. I was concerned last 

year about how DOD’s recommendations would impact lower enlisted troops and 

their families. How do you see these two sets of recommendations and how do you 

ensure we continue to support lower enlisted troops and their families? 

Dr. CARTER. I appreciate the difficult task that was presented to the Commission. 

If confirmed, I intend to carefully review and evaluate the Commission’s recommendations on reforming military compensation and retirement and will ensure 

141 

I meet the deadlines established in the law for my input to the President. I was 

not privy to the details of the FY 2016 budget prior to my confirmation hearing. 

If confirmed, I will be prepared to comment on the FY 2016 budget proposals at the 

posture hearing the Committee is planning in early March. 

CYBER

103. Senator GILLIBRAND. Dr. Carter, I want to be helpful to DOD in recruiting 

the best talent and acquiring the best tools for our cyber mission. What do you think 

are our two most important cyber needs for the next 5 years? 

Dr. CARTER. The most important aspect of the Department’s strategy for countering these threats is manning, training, and equipping a cyber-force that can fulfill its missions. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Committee 

on this issue. A top priority is recruiting and retaining the most highly skilled professionals, which is challenging because cyber is a highly technical domain. In addition, DOD must work in closer partnership with the Intelligence Community, the 

Department of Homeland Security, and other government agencies to identify cyber 

threats, deter attacks, and improve defenses for our networks. 

104. Senator GILLIBRAND. Dr. Carter, how will you incorporate cyber forces, especially in the National Guard, into our Homeland defense strategy? 

Dr. CARTER. DOD is in its third year of building a Cyber Mission Force of approximately 6,000 personnel. I believe that the National Guard and Reserve are a tremendous resource of talent and of surge capacity for DOD, and these skilled personnel can contribute greatly to the cyber mission. It will be critical to recruit the 

right talent, and we must take a strategic approach to leveraging our National 

Guard and Reserve forces as part of our overall structure. DOD is already using 

some Guard and Reserve personnel in the cyber mission area, and they have proven 

to be of tremendous value enhanced by their civilian skills. The Guard and Reserve 

should be part of the Cyber Mission Force and also create additional Cyber Protection Teams to augment Service capacity. This expertise and support should be made 

available to the States in traditional missions like responding to natural disasters 

as well as less traditional missions in cyberspace. If confirmed, I look forward to 

working with the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Services, and the 

States through the Council of Governors to ensure the National Guard and reserve 

forces cyber capabilities are sufficiently augmented and incorporated into the Department’s force planning construct. 

105. Senator GILLIBRAND. Dr. Carter, please provide your thoughts on the relationship between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOD in terms 

of global cyber-security roles and responsibilities. 

Dr. CARTER. The Department of Defense has the responsibility to defend the Nation from attack in cyberspace. This cyber mission necessitates a close partnership 

with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in its role of protecting U.S. critical infrastructure, securing non-Department of Defense unclassified government 

networks, and coordinating the national protection from, prevention of, mitigation 

of, and recovery from cyber incidents. The Department of Justice, with the FBI, is 

also a critical member of this operational partnership and all three Departments 

work closely together in an effective operational cybersecurity partnership. 

Cybersecurity requires a whole-of-government approach, and DOD synchronizes 

its international engagement with its interagency partners. DOD joins DHS and 

other Departments and agencies in whole-of-government dialogues around the globe, 

and DOD and DHS work closely together to build robust international relationships 

that reflect and promote our core commitments and common interests in cyberspace. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE REVIEW

106. Senator DONNELLY. Dr. Carter, following up on my questions in the hearing, 

if confirmed, will you commit to reading the Creedon-Fanta Nuclear Enterprise Review report and getting back to the committee with your views and whether you 

agree with its findings? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. 

NATIONAL GUARD

107. Senator DONNELLY. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you work to maintain the 

National Guard as an operational Reserve? 

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Dr. CARTER. The National Guard and Reserve are a critical source of many of the 

capabilities required in ongoing operations and contingency surge requirements both 

abroad and at home. As an operational Reserve, the Reserve components need to 

make certain capabilities available on a continuing basis and others to augment and 

reinforce active components when mobilized over time. If confirmed, I will work to 

ensure that the Guard and Reserve components are supported so that they are 

ready to operate in peacetime, in wartime and in support of civil authorities. 

DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER

108. Senator DONNELLY. Dr. Carter, what is your approach to the administration 

of the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), specifically regarding adequate 

staffing, funding and data security, in order to maintain and increase the accuracy, 

reliability, and integrity of the DMDC database? 

Dr. CARTER. The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) systems and information are critical to ensuring eligibility and providing benefits to all DOD personnel, 

and also provide the vital interface to operate numerous other DOD-wide systems, 

including physical security, healthcare, and personnel security programs. The Department has an obligation to provide these capabilities, to ensure the data security, 

and to protect the privacy of these information systems. If confirmed, I will work 

closely with Congress to ensure that DMDC has the necessary resources to execute 

its mission. 

109. Senator DONNELLY. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you commit to providing me 

and the committee with information on DOD’s plans to address the capabilities of 

the DMDC, particularly its capability to assist in the effort to ensure that 

servicemembers eligible for Servicemember Civil Relief Act benefits and protections 

can be proactively identified in a timely and accurate manner? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

MISSILE DEFENSE

110. Senator HIRONO. Dr. Carter, I understand that DOD is systematically implementing upgrades to the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, including sensor 

and discrimination improvements. Within this area of improvement is the planned 

Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) to improve defense of the United States 

against a long-range North Korean missile threat. While DOD is improving our 

overall Homeland missile defense capability, I want to ensure that Hawaii is well 

protected – especially as North Korea continues to evolve its capabilities. If confirmed, will you commit to looking into our capability to defend Hawaii against such 

a North Korean threat, and keeping me informed of the progress in this important 

area? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. 

RETENTION OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

111. Senator HIRONO. Dr. Carter, women are a great asset both to the diversity 

of our military and to its success. This past October the military appointed its third 

female four-star officer. While that is a fact to be celebrated, women leave the service at a rate nearly twice that of men. As we have seen with other types of diversity 

within the military, retention of women for senior leadership positions has a significant influence on the success through mentoring of junior female military members. 

If confirmed what measures will you consider for increasing retention of women in 

the military and achieving the diversity needed to mentor future female leaders? 

Dr. CARTER. I believe that the Department of Defense must compete for the best 

and brightest talent our Nation has to offer as it expands opportunities for all qualified individuals at all levels through our most senior general and flag officers. If 

confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the need for retaining a high quality and 

diverse force in an environment free from personal, social, or institutional barriers 

that prevent servicemembers from rising to the highest level of responsibility possible. 

MENTAL HEALTH CARE FOR VETERANS

112. Senator HIRONO. Dr. Carter, a memorandum published by the Secretary of 

Defense on September 3, 2014, implemented new policy guidance to be used in the 

respective Services’ review of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)-related disVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00148 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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charge upgrade requests. The memorandum also called for ‘‘a public messaging campaign by the Services’’ in order to ensure outreach and notification. Should you be 

confirmed, are you committed to continuing this policy and outreach directive so 

that Vietnam veterans diagnosed with PTSD who received less-than-honorable discharges be allowed liberal consideration for a discharge upgrade? 

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, I will continue to work with all parties concerned to 

ensure that veterans of all periods of service receive a fair hearing and obtain appropriate relief. We will also continue to work with Veterans and Military Support 

Organizations and legal service providers to ensure veterans receive assistance in 

the review process. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR. 

ATHLETIC FOOTWEAR FOR NEW RECRUITS

113. Senator KING. Dr. Carter, on April 25, 2014, Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Christine Fox confirmed in a letter that DOD’s athletic footwear policy for recruits would be modified to include the following provision: 

‘‘As Berry Amendment-compliant shoes come on the market, we will assess them 

for cost and durability to ensure they are comparable to other models available to 

recruits. If one or more Berry Amendment-compliant shoe models correspond to a 

shoe type category, only these shoes will be made available for purchase using the 

one-time cash allowance.’’ 

Do you commit that, if confirmed, DOD’s athletic footwear policy for new recruits 

will remain consistent with the provisions of Acting Deputy Secretary Fox’s April 

25, 2014, letter? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

114. Senator HEINRICH. Dr. Carter, the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise released its final report in November 

2014. After considering a number of alternative leadership structures, the panel 

concluded the current structure with a ‘‘separately-organized’’ National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is fundamentally flawed. The panel recommended 

amending the NNSA Act to replace the separately-organized NNSA with a new Office of Nuclear Security (ONS) within the Department of Energy (DOE) charged 

with performing the missions currently performed by NNSA. The panel’s objective 

was to enable an Energy Secretary who sets the policy and a Director of ONS who 

is fully empowered to implement the policy. 

Based on your many years of experience with the nuclear weapons complex, what 

thoughts do you have on improving the existing governance structure of DOE’s Nuclear Security Enterprise? 

Dr. CARTER. I believe DOD can work effectively with the Department of Energy 

and the National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) under the current 

structure or an alternative arrangement as long as DOE/NNSA continues to execute 

its primary mission of warhead and infrastructure life extension programs that 

meets DOD military requirements. If confirmed, I will direct the consistent engagement with senior leadership through the interagency process of the Nuclear Weapons Council, which is charged to manage the nuclear weapons stockpile and maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. 

ISLAMIC STATE

115. Senator HEINRICH. Dr. Carter, 2 weeks ago, former national security advisor 

Zbigniew Brzezinski testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee about 

the Islamic State and the three civil wars that were essentially raging in the Arab 

world today. Brzezinski explained: ‘‘I think getting involved in the internal dynamics, religious conflicts, sectarian animosities of the region is a prescription for a protracted engagement of the kind that can be very destructive to our national interests.’’ 

How important is it that the fighting on the front lines against the Islamic State 

be conducted by the Iraqis and other regional, Arab members of the coalition and 

not the United States? 

Dr. CARTER. To inflict a lasting defeat on ISIL, it is very important that regional 

coalition partners, including Iraq, be fighting on the front lines. Building the capacVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00149 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
144 

ity of these local security forces must be a central part of the U.S. strategy. The 

Iraqi Security Forces, including Kurdish Peshmerga and Sunni tribal elements, are 

on the front line force in the current fight. If confirmed, I will support the effort 

to train, equip, advise, and assist local forces to enhance their ability to defeat ISIL. 

NATIONAL LABS

116. Senator HEINRICH. Dr. Carter, beyond current and future life extension programs (LEP), do you believe a sustained funding commitment is necessary at our 

national laboratories to preserve the intellectual infrastructure and sustain the scientific base of the weapons program? If so, how do you propose formalizing this commitment? 

Dr. CARTER. The Department of Energy National Laboratories are important to 

the Department of Defense’s technology base and laboratory enterprise, particularly 

with respect to the science and engineering that underpins the Nation’s nuclear 

weapons program. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Energy and the 

President to ensure that the unique capabilities of the national laboratories are 

maintained and available to DOD in support of national defense missions. 

[The nomination reference of the Honorable Ashton B. Carter follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 7, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Ashton B. Carter, of Massachusetts, to be Secretary of Defense, vice Charles Timothy Hagel. 

[The biographical sketch of the Honorable Ashton B. Carter, 

which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ASHTON B. CARTER

Education: 

• Oxford University 

• 1976–1979 • Ph.D., Theoretical Physics • Senior Scholar, St. John’s College • Best Participant Prize, NATO Center for Subnuclear Physics 

• University of Edinburgh 

• Fall, 1974, no degree 

• Yale University 

• 1972–1976 • B.A., summa cum laude • Honors in Medieval History • Honors in Physics • Phi Beta Kappa • Andrew D. White Essay Prize in European History 

Employment Record: 

• Senior Executive, Markle Foundation (2014–present) 

• Stanford University (2014–present) 

• Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution 

• Lecturer, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies 

• U.S. Department of Defense 

• Deputy Secretary of Defense (2011–2013) 

• Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (2009– 

2011) 

• Harvard University 

145 

• Chair, International and Global Affairs Faculty 

• John F. Kennedy School of Government 

• 2006–2009 (leave of absence 2009–2011) 

• Harvard University 

• Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs 

• John F. Kennedy School of Government 

• 1996–2009 

• Preventive Defense Project, Harvard and Stanford Universities 

• Co-Director (with William J. Perry) 

• 1997–2009 

• U.S. Department of State 

• Senior Advisor to the North Korea Policy Review 

• 1998–2000 

• U.S. Department of Defense 

• Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy 

• 1993–1996 

• Harvard University 

• Director, Center for Science and International Affairs 

• 1990–1993 

• Harvard University 

• Professor, and Associate Director, Center for Science and International Affairs 

• 1988–1990 

• Harvard University 

• Associate Professor 

• 1986–1990 

• Harvard University 

• Assistant Professor 

• 1984–1986 

• Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

• Research Fellow, Center for International Studies 

• 1982–1984 

• U.S. Department of Defense 

• Program Analysis and Evaluation 

• 1981–1982 

• Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress 

• International Security and Commerce Program 

• 1980–1981 

• Rockefeller University, New York 

• Research Associate 

• 1979–1980 

• Oxford University 

• Physics Instructor (‘‘Tutor’’ in the Oxford system) 

• Quantum Mechanics and Relativity 

• 1977–1979 

• Brookhaven National Laboratory 

• Experimental Research Associate 

• 1976 

• Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory 

• Experimental Research Associate 

• 1975 

Honors and Awards: 

• Henry L. Stimson Pragmatist and Idealist Award, Stimson Center, 2014. 

• W. Stuart Symington Award, Air Force Association, 2014. 

• Distinguished Public Service Medal, Department of Defense (awarded five 

times), 1994, 1995, 2010, 2012, and 2013. • Joint Distinguished Service Medal, from the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, 2013. 

• Nunn-Lugar Award, Nuclear Threat Institute, 2011. 

146 

• Defense Intelligence Medal, from the Defense Intelligence Agency, 1998. 

• Forum Award, American Physical Society, 1988. 

• Ten Outstanding Young Americans, United States Jaycees, 1987. 

• Senior Scholar, St. John’s College, 1978–1979. 

• Best participant prize, NATO Center for Subnuclear Physics, 1978. 

• Rhodes Scholar, 1976. 

• See above under ‘‘Education.’’ 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by the Honorable Ashton B. Carter in connection with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Ashton Baldwin Carter (Ash Carter). 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Secretary of Defense. 

3. Date of nomination: 

January 7, 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

September 24, 1954, Philadelphia, PA. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married. Wife: Stepanie DeLeeuw Carter. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. 

Abington High School, Abington, PA, 1968–1972, High School Diploma 1972. 

Yale University, New Haven, CT, 1972–1976, B.A. 1976. 

University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, Fall, 1974, no degree. 

Oxford University, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1976–1979, D. Phil., 1979. 

147 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Self-employed, Ashton Carter LLC—Sole proprietorship, Washington, DC, 2014– 

Present. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2011–2013; U.S. Department of Defense—Washington, DC. 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, 2009–2011; 

U.S. Department of Defense—Washington, DC. 

Chair, International & Global Affairs faculty, 2006–2009 (on leave of absence 

2009–2011); John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University—Cambridge, MA. 

Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs, 1996–2009; John 

F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University—Cambridge, MA. 

Co-Director (with William J. Perry), Preventive Defense Project, 1997–2009; Harvard & Stanford Universities—Cambridge, MA. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Member, National Council on Federal Labor-Management Relations (2012–2013). 

Member, President’s Management Council (2011–2013). 

Member, White House Government Accountability and Transparency Board 

(2011–2013). 

Chair, National Security Strategy and Policies Expert Working Group, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, 2008–2009. 

Member, Department of Defense Agency Review team, Obama-Biden Transition, 

2008–2009. 

Co-Chair, Review Panel on Future Directions for DTRA (Defense Threat Reduction Agency) Missions and Capabilities To Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 

2007–2008. 

Member, International Security Advisory Board to the Secretary of State, 2006– 

2008. 

Member of National Security Advisory Group to Senator Tom Daschle, then Senator Reid, chaired by William J. Perry, 2005–2008. 

Co-Chair, with Ronald Lehman, of Policy Advisory Group to Senator Richard 

Lugar, 2005–2008. 

Member National Academy of Sciences Committee on Science and Technology for 

Countering Terrorism, 2001–2003. 

Member, National Missile Defense White Team, 1998–2009. 

Member, Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, U.S. Department of Defense, 

1998–2002. 

Member, Defense Science Board, 1991–93, 1997–2001. 

Member, Defense Policy Board, 1997–2001. 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, U.S. Department 

of Defense, 1993–1996. 

Member, National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and 

Arms Control, 1990–1993. 

Member, Sandia National Laboratory, President’s Advisory Council, 1992–93. 

Member, Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, Advisory Panel on 

START Verification Technologies, 1991–92. 

Member, National Academy of Sciences Panel on National Security Export Controls, 1990–91. 

Member, National Research Council Naval Studies Advisory Committee on the 

Future of the Aircraft Carrier, 1990–91. 

Member, White House, President’s Council of Advisers on Science and Technology, 

Panel on National Security, 1990–91. 

Member, Defense Science Board Task Force on New Scenarios and Intelligence, 

1990. 

Member, Congressional Office of Technology Assessment Advisory Panel on 

START Verification Technologies, 1989–90. 

148 

Member, Joint Chiefs of Staff Advisory Group on the Future of U.S.-Soviet Military Relations, 1988–89. 

Member, Commission on The Presidency and Science Advising, 1988. 

Consultant, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, 1986– 

1988. 

Member, Advisory Panel on Military Uses of Space, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1985–86. 

Analyst, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Pentagon, 1981–1982. 

Analyst, International Security and Commerce Program, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1980–1981. 

Experimental Research Associate, Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1976. 

Experimental Research Associate, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, 1975. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

a. Senior Executive, Markle Foundation, New York, New York, 2014–Present. 

b. Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution and Lecturer, Freeman 

Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 2014–Present. 

c. Advisor, Box Inc., 2014–Present. 

d. Advisor, Palo Alto Networks, 2014–Present. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

a. Aspen Strategy Group, 1997–2009 (now emeritus member). 

b. Council on Foreign Relations, 1989–present. 

c. Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1989–present. 

d. American Physical Society, 1976–present. 

e. American Association of Rhodes Scholars, 1977–present. 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

a. List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

c. Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for 

the past 5 years. 

None. 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

(1) Henry L Stimson Pragmatist and Idealist Award, Stimson Center, 2014. 

(2) W. Stuart Symington Award, Air Force Association, 2014. 

(3) Distinguished Public Service Medal, Department of Defense (awarded five 

times), 1994, 1995, 2010, 2012, and 2013). 

(4) Joint Distinguished Service Medal from the Chairman and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, 2013. 

(5) Nunn-Lugar Award, Nuclear Threat Institute, 2011. 

(6) Defense Intelligence Medal, from the Defense Intelligence Agency, 1998. 

(7) Forum Award, American Physical Society, 1988. 

(8) Ten Outstanding Young Americans, United States Jaycees, 1987. 

(9) Senior Scholar, St. John’s College, 1978–1979. 

(10) Best Participant Prize, NATO Center for Subnuclear Physics, 1978. 

(11) Rhodes Scholar, 1976. 

(12) Summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa graduate, Yale University, with honors in medieval history and physics (B.A. 1976). 

(13) Andrew D. White Essay Prize in European History, Yale University, 1976. 

149 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

Publications. Books. 

Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future. Editor (with John P. White) 

and author of three chapters. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001. 

[translated into Chinese, Military History and Translation Office, MND, ROC, 

2002]. 

Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America. With William J. 

Perry.Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999. 

[translated into Russian by arrangement with Brookings Institution Press, 2003] 

[translated into Arabic by arrangement with Brookings Institution Press, February/March 2002] 

[translated into Chinese, CIP, 2000] 

[translated into Korean, Bestun Korea Agency, 2000] 

Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds. Editor with Graham Allison, 

Steven E. Miller, and Philip Zelikow. Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1993. 

A New Concept of Cooperative Security. With John D. Steinbruner and William 

J. Perry. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992. 

Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World. 

With John Alic, Lewis Branscomb, Harvey Brooks and Gerald Epstein. Boston, MA: 

Harvard Business School Press, 1992. 

Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet 

Union.With Kurt Campbell, Steven Miller and Charles Zraket. Cambridge, MA: 

Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, November 1991. 

Ashton B. Carter on Arms Control. Kenneth W. Thompson, ed. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, January 1990. 

Managing Nuclear Operations. Editor (with John Steinbruner and Charles A. 

Zraket) and author of three chapters. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 

1987. 

Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space. Washington, DC: Office of Technology 

Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1984. 

Ballistic Missile Defense. Editor (with David N. Schwartz) and author of two chapters. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984. 

MX Missile Basing (with Classified Annex). Author of chapters on ‘‘Launch Under 

Attack’’; ‘‘Ballistic Missile Defense’’; ‘‘Air Mobile Basing’’; ‘‘Land Mobile Basing’’; and 

(with Theodore Postol) ‘‘Command, Control, and Communications’’.Washington, DC: 

Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1981. 

Articles 

‘‘Running the Pentagon Right: How to Get the Troops What They Need’’ Foreign 

Affairs, (January/February 2014), pp. 101–112. 

‘‘Super Hercules in the Himalayas: How the United States is Strengthening Defense Ties with India.’’ Foreign Policy, (20 November 2013), online. 

‘‘Managing Defense Spending Through ‘Better Buying Power’, Not Sequestration.’’ 

Defense One, (13 November 2013), online. 

‘‘Running the Numbers on MRAPs, Reliable Data Proves the Vehicles are Worth 

the Money.’’ With J. Michael Gilmore. Foreign Affairs, (9 October 2012). 

‘‘The Pentagon is Serious About Saving Money.’’ The Wall Street Journal, (21 September 2012). 

‘‘A Law to Strengthen our Cyberdefense.’’ With Jane Holl Lute, The New York 

Times, (2 August 2012). 

‘‘Restoring Affordability.’’ Defense News, (19 July 2010). 

‘‘The Way Forward on Missile Defense.’’ With Michele Flournoy. The Wall Street 

Journal, (17 June 2010). 

‘‘Defense Management Challenges for the Next American President.’’ Orbis, A 

Journal of World Affairs, (Winter 2009). 

‘‘Report of the Strategic Security Studies Issues Delegation to Taiwan and the 

People’s Republic of China.’’ With William Perry, Joseph Prueher, Robert Blackwill, 

Stephen Orlins, David Lampton, Kurt Campbell, Ashley Tellis, Evan Medeiros and 

Jan Berris. Harvard Belfer Preventative Defense Project, (July 2008). 

‘‘After the Bomb.’’ With William J. Perry and Michael M. May. The New York 

Times, (12 June 2007), A–24. 

‘‘The Day After: Action in the 24 Hours Following a Nuclear Blast in an American 

City.’’ With Michael M. May and William J. Perry. Report based on April 19, 2007 

150 

workshop hosted by the Preventive Defense Project, Harvard and Stanford Universities, (31 May 2007). 

‘‘China on the March.’’ With William J. Perry. The National Interest, no. 88 

(March-April 2007), 16–22. ‘‘How Washington Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 

India’s Bomb.’’ Foreign Affairs (foreignaffairs.org), (10 January 2007). 

‘‘China’s Rise in American Military Strategy.’’ With William J. Perry. In China’s 

March on the 21st Century: A Report of the Aspen Strategy Group, Kurt M. Campbell and Willow Darsie, eds. Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, (2007), 107–117. 

‘‘Plan B for Iran: What if Nuclear Diplomacy Fails?’’ With William J. Perry. Report based on May 22, 2006 workshop hosted by the Preventive Defense Project, 

Harvard and Stanford Universities, (10 September 2006). 

‘‘The Case for a Preemptive Strike on North Korea’s Missiles.’’ With William J. 

Perry. TIME (time.com), (8 July 2006). 

‘‘America’s New Strategic Partner?’’ Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (July-August 2006), 

33–44. 

‘‘If Necessary, Strike and Destroy.’’ With William J. Perry. The Washington Post, 

22 (June 2006), A–29. 

‘‘Toolbox: Containing the Nuclear Red Zone Threat.’’ With Stephen A. 

LaMontagne. The American Interest 1, no. 3 (Spring 2006), 28–40. 

‘‘A Fuel-Cycle Fix.’’ With Stephen A. LaMontagne. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January-February 2006), 24–25. 

‘‘The U.S. Military: Under Strain and at Risk.’’ With William J. Perry (chair), 

Madeleine K. Albright, Graham T. Allison, Samuel R. Berger, Gen. Wesley K. Clark, 

Thomas E. Donilon, Michele A. Flournoy, John D. Podesta, Susan E. Rice, Gen. 

John M. Shalikashvili, Wendy R. Sherman, Elizabeth D. Sherwood-Randall and 

James B. Steinberg (members). National Security Advisory Group, (January 2006). 

‘‘Origins of the Nunn-Lugar Program.’’ Presentation to the Presidential Conference on William Jefferson Clinton, Hofstra University. (11 November 2005). 

‘‘Interim Report on Nuclear Threat Reduction and the Fuel Cycle.’’ Memo to Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. With 

Ronald Lehman II (co-chair, with Ashton Carter), Robert Einhorn, Alan A. Foley, 

Arnold Kanter, David Kay, Susan Koch, Lawrence Scheinman, and William Schneider, Jr (members). Policy Advisory Group on Nonproliferation, (1 July 2005). 

‘‘Worst Weapons in Worst Hands: U.S. Inaction on the Nuclear Terror Threat 

since 9/11, and a Path of Action.’’ With William J. Perry (chair), Madeleine K. 

Albright, Graham T. Allison, Samuel R. Berger, Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Thomas E. 

Donilon, Michele A. Flournoy, John D. Podesta, Susan E. Rice, Gen. John M. 

Shalikashvili, Wendy R. Sherman, Elizabeth D. Sherwood-Randall and James B. 

Steinberg (members). National Security Advisory Group, (July 2005). 

‘‘Worst People and Worst Weapons.’’ Statement before The 9/11 Public Discourse 

Project’s Hearings on ‘‘The 9/11 Commission Report: The Unfinished Agenda.’’ (27 

June 2005). 

‘‘A Failure of Policy, Not Spying.’’ The Washington Post, 5 April 2005, A–23. 

‘‘Conversations with The Forum: Perspectives on Preemption and National Security.’’ Interview with Dr. Ashton Carter. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 29, 

no. 1 (Winter 2005), 9–12. 

‘‘The Essential Features of a Focused Strategy to Deal with the Proliferation 

Challenge: What Has Been Done and What Is to Be Done?’’ In The Challenge of 

Proliferation: A Report of the Aspen Strategy Group, Kurt M. Campbell, ed. Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 2005, 141–152. 

‘‘How to Counter WMD.’’ Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (September-October 2004), 72– 

85. 

‘‘Overhauling Counterproliferation.’’ Technology in Society: An International Journal—Special Issue: Technology and Science: Entering the 21st Century, George 

Bugliarello and A. George Schillinger, eds., 26, nos. 2/3 (April/August 2004), 257– 

269. 

‘‘Good Nukes, Bad Nukes.’’ With Arnold Kanter, William J. Perry, and Brent 

Scowcroft. The New York Times, (22 December 2003), section A, 31. 

‘‘The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism.’’ Countering Terrorism: Dimensions of Preparedness, Arnold M. Howitt and Robyn L. Pangi, eds. 

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, (2003),17–36. 

‘‘A Dedicated Organization in Congress.’’ With Gerald L. Epstein. Science and 

Technology Advice for Congress, M. Granger Morgan and Jon M. Peha, eds. Washington, DC: RFF Press, (2003), 157–163. 

‘‘The Korean Nuclear Crisis: Preventing the Truly Dangerous Spread of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction.’’ Harvard Magazine, (September-October 2003), 38–41. 

‘‘An American Security Policy: Challenge, Opportunity, Commitment.’’ With William J. Perry (chair), Madeleine K. Albright, Samuel R. Berger, Louis Caldera, Gen. 

151 

Wesley K. Clark, Michele A. Flournoy, Alfonso E. Lenhardt, John D. Podesta, Gen. 

John M. Shalikashvili, and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall (members). National Security Advisory Group, (July 2003). 

‘‘A Prescription for Peace.’’ Review of No More Killing Fields: Preventing Deadly 

Conflict by David A. Hamburg. Science, (30 May 2003), 1374. 

‘‘Alternatives to Letting North Korea Go Nuclear.’’ Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. (6 March 2003). 

‘‘The Loose Nukes Crisis in North Korea.’’ Memorandum to the Senate Democratic 

Leadership from the National Security Advisory Group. With William J. Perry 

(chair), Madeleine K. Albright, Samuel R. Berger, Louis Caldera, Wesley Clark, 

Michele Flournoy, Alfonso E. Lenhardt, John D. Podesta, John Shalikashvili, and 

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall (members), (5 March 2003). 

‘‘A Scary Thought: Loose Nukes in North Korea.’’ With William J. Perry and John 

M. Shalikashvili. The Wall Street Journal, (6 February 2003), A–18. 

‘‘The Crisis Last Time.’’ With William J. Perry. The New York Times, (19 January 

2003), section 4, 13. 

‘‘Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism.’’ With Lewis M. Branscomb, Richard D. Klausner, et al. Washington, DC: 

The National Academies Press, (2002). 

‘‘Nuclear Over North Korea: Back to the Brink.’’ The Washington Post, (20 October 2002), B–1 & B–5. 

‘‘Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age.’’ With Zoe Baird, James 

L. Barkdale, Philip Zelikow et al. (The Markle Foundation Task, Force on National 

Security in the Information Age). Markle Foundation, (October 2002). 

‘‘Throw the Net Worldwide.’’ The Washington Post, 12 June 2002, A–31. ‘‘Counterterror’s Management Style.’’ The New York Times, (8 June 2002), A–27. 

‘‘Trip Report: Nunn-Lugar Sites in Russia. A memo to colleagues of the Preventive 

Defense Project.’’ (3 June 2002). 

‘‘A New Era, A New Threat.’’ With Richard Lugar. Financial Times, (23 May 

2002), 15. 

‘‘Understanding Terrorism: A Harvard Magazine Roundtable.’’ With Eva Bellin, 

Philip B. Heymann, David Little, Louise M. Richardson and Jessica E. Stern. Harvard Magazine (January-February 2002), 36–49. 

‘‘The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism.’’ International Security 

26, no. 3, (Winter 2001/02), 5–23. 

‘‘How Ridge can secure the homeland.’’ The Boston Globe, (4 October 2001). 

‘‘National Security Strategy.’’ In American Military Strategy: Memos to a President, Philip D. Zelikow, editor. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, (2001), 

33–48. 

‘‘National Innovation to Combat Catastrophic Terrorism.’’ In FirePower in the 

Lab: Automation in the Fight Against Infectious Diseases and Bioterrorism, Scott 

P. Layne, Tony J. Beugelsdijk, and C. Kumar N. Patel, eds. Washington, DC: Joseph 

Henry Press, (2001), 187–191. 

‘‘Beyond the Counterproliferation Initiative.’’ With L. Celeste Johnson. In TwentyFirst Century Weapons Proliferation: Are We Ready?, Henry Sokolski and James M. 

Ludes, eds. Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, (2001). 

‘‘Keeping America’s Military Edge.’’ Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1 (January-February 

2001), 90–105. 

‘‘Adapting U.S. Defence to Future Needs.’’ Survival 41, no. 4 (Winter 1999–2000), 

101–123. 

‘‘Beyond the Counterproliferation Initiative to a ‘Revolution in Counterproliferation Affairs.’ ’’ With L. Celeste Johnson. National Security Studies Quarterly 5, no. 

3 (Summer 1999), 88–90. 

‘‘Defining NATO’s Purpose.’’ With William J. Perry, and Hilary D. Driscoll. In 

NATO at Fifty: Perspectives on the Future of the Atlantic Alliance, Susan Eisenhower, ed. Washington, DC: The Center for Political and Strategic Studies, (1999). 

‘‘Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger.’’ With John M. Deutch and 

Philip Zelikow. Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6 (November-December 1998), 80–94. 

‘‘Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy.’’ With John M. Deutch 

and Philip Zelikow. Preventive Defense Project publications, vol. 1, no. 6, Center for 

International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, (October 

1998). 

‘‘Grand Terrorism: A New Threat to National Security.’’ Peter L. Hays et al., eds. 

Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. New York: 

McGraw-Hill, (1998). 

‘‘Fulfilling the Promise: Building an Enduring Security Relationship Between 

Ukraine and NATO.’’ With Steven E. Miller and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall. CamVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00157 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
152 

bridge, MA and Stanford, CA: Preventive Defense Project publications 1, no. 4 

(1998). 

‘‘Move Closer to China, Not Far, for Security.’’ With John M. Deutch and William 

J. Perry. USA Today, (11 June 1998). 

‘‘The Content of U.S. Engagement with China.’’ With William J. Perry. Cambridge, MA and Stanford, CA: Preventive Defense Project publications 1, no. 2 (July 

1998). 

‘‘NATO After Madrid: Looking to the Future.’’ With Coit D. Blacker, Warren 

Christopher, David A. Hamburg, and William J. Perry. Cambridge, MA and Stanford, CA: Preventive Defense Project publications 1, no. 1 (June 1998). 

‘‘No Nukes? Not Yet.’’ With John M. Deutch, Wall St. Journal, (4 March 1997). 

‘‘The Imperatives for Cooperation.’’ With Janne E. Nolan, John D. Steinbruner, 

Kenneth Flamm, Steven E. Miller, David Mussington, and William J. Perry. In 

Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the Twenty-first Century, Janne 

E. Nolan, ed. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, (1994). . 

‘‘Cooperative Security and the Former Soviet Union: Near-Term Challenges.’’ With 

Steven E. Miller. In Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the Twentyfirst Century, Janne E. Nolan, ed. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 

(1994). 

‘‘Export Control Reform in High Technology.’’ Statement to the House Committee 

on Science, Space, and Technology, Field Hearing, no. 57 (13 August 1993), 160– 

170. Washington: USGPO, (1993). 

‘‘The Role of Intelligence in Managing Proliferation.’’ With Robert D. Blackwill. In 

New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy, Robert D. Blackwill and Albert 

Carnesale, eds. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, (1993). 

‘‘Reducing the Nuclear Dangers from the Former Soviet Union.’’ Arms Control 

Today 22, no. 1 (January-February 1992). 

‘‘Technical Demarcations for ASAT and BMD Systems.’’ With Donald L. Hafner 

and Thomas H. Johnson. In Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of 

Definition for the Prevention of an Arms Race, Bhupendra Jasani, ed. New York: 

Taylor& Francis, (1991). 

‘‘Emerging Themes in Nuclear Arms Control.’’ Daedalus 120, no. 1 (Winter 1991). 

‘‘New Scenarios for American Defense.’’ Defense Science Board, report of the Scenarios and Intelligence Task Force, (September 1990). 

‘‘New Thinking and American Defense Technology.’’ With William J. Perry. Report 

of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government. (August 

1990). 

‘‘Command and Control of Nuclear Forces.’’ In A Primer for the Nuclear Age, Graham T. Allison et al., eds. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, CSIA Occasional Paper, no. 6 (1990). 

‘‘Testing Weapons in Space.’’ Scientific American, (July 1989). 

‘‘Underlying Military Objectives’’ and ‘‘Limitations and Allowances for SpaceBased Weapons.’’ In Defending Deterrence: Managing the ABM Treaty Regime into 

the 21st Century, An American Academy of Arts and Sciences Study, Antonia 

Chayes and Paul Doty, eds. Pergamon-Brassey, (1989). 

‘‘Telecommunications Policy and National Security.’’ In Changing the Rules: Technological Change, International Competition, and Regulation in Communications, 

Robert Crandall and Kenneth Flamm, eds. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, (1989). 

‘‘Permitted and Prohibited Space Testing Under the ABM Treaty.’’ In Technologies for Security and Arms Control: Threats and Promises, ed. Eric H. Arnett. 

American Association for the Advancement of Science, (1989). 

‘‘Analyzing the Dual Use Technologies Question.’’ Harvard University, Science, 

Technology, and Public Policy Program Discussion Paper 89, no. 5 (1989). 

‘‘A New Era in Science Advising.’’ Science and Technology Advice to the President, 

Congress, and Judiciary, William T. Golden, ed. Pergamon, (1988). 

‘‘Nuclear Command and Control: The Next Thirty Years of Technological Change.’’ 

With John S. Quilty and Charles A. Zraket. In The Future of Nuclear Weapons: The 

Next Thirty Years. Los Alamos National Laboratory, (1988). 

‘‘The Structure of Possible U.S.-Soviet Agreements Regarding Missile Defense.’’ In 

On the Defensive?: The Future of SDI, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and James A. Schear, eds. 

Lanham, MD: University Press of America, (1988). 

‘‘Crisis Stability and Nuclear War (with others)’’. American Academy of Arts and 

Sciences and the Cornell University Peace Studies Program, (January 1987). 

‘‘Current and Future Military Uses of Space.’’ In Seeking Stability in Space: Anti 

Satellite Weapons and the Evolving Space Regime, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and James 

A. Schear, eds. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, (1987). 

153 

‘‘Interpreting the ABM Treaty: Agreed Limitations on Military Activities in 

Space.’’ Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Pugwash Conference on Science and 

World Affairs, Gmunden am Traunsee Austria, (1-6 September 1987). 

‘‘Military Uses of Space.’’ In The High Technologies and Reducing the Risk of 

War, H. Guyford Stever and Heinz R. Pagels, eds. Annals of the New York Academy 

of Sciences 489, (1986). 

‘‘The Relationship of ASAT and BMD Systems.’’ Daedalus (Spring 1985). 

‘‘Command and Control of Nuclear War.’’ Scientific American (January 1985). 

‘‘Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible.’’ International Security 

10, no. 4, (Spring 1984). 

‘‘CP Violation in 8-Meson Decays.’’ With A.I. Sanda, Physical Review D 23, no. 7 

(April 1981): 1567–1579. 

‘‘CP Nonconservation in Cascade Decays of B Mesons.’’ With A.I. Sanda. Physical 

Review Letters 45, no. 12 (September 1980): 952–954. 

‘‘Perturbative QCD in a Covariant Gauge.’’ With C.H. Llewellyn Smith. Nuclear 

Physics, B162 (1980):397–439. 

‘‘Weak Δ I= 1/2 Rule and the Dynamical Higgs Mechanism.’’ With Heinz Pagels. 

Physical Review Letters 43, no. 25 (December 1979): 1845–1847. 

‘‘Polarization of Prompt Muons Produced at Rt = 2.15 GeV/c by 400-GeV Proton 

Interactions.’’ With M.J. Lauterbach, et al. Physical Review Letters 37, no. 21 (November 1976): 1436–1438. 

‘‘Polarization of Prompt Muons.’’ With R.K. Adair, et al. Physical Review Letters 

36, no. 17 (April 1976): 1011-1013. 

‘‘Production of Prompt Muons in the Forward Direction by 400-GeV Proton Interactions.’’ With R.K. Adair, et al. Physical Review Letters 35, no. 24 (December 

1975): 1613–1616. 

‘‘Quarks, Charm and the Psi Particle.’’ Yale Scientific. 50 no. 1 (October 1975). 

‘‘CIA: Victimized?’’ Yale Daily News (January 22, 1975) 

16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

I have delivered a large number of speeches in my capacity as Deputy Secretary 

of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology & Logistics, 

and, previously, as Chair of the International and Global Affairs Faculty at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. Since leaving the DOD in 2013, I have delivered one formal speech, the Fubini Lecture indicated below and several times have 

delivered informal remarks. In these cases, I have delivered these speeches using 

no notes, or using hand-written notes that have not been archived. Almost all of 

those speeches are derived from, or form the basis of, written publications or testimony, and their content can be found in my response to the previous question. 

1. Remarks to Steel Tube Institute of America, Coral Gables, Florida. 17 November 2014. 

2. Remarks to JMI Equity CEO Conference, Baltimore, MD. 2 October 2014. 

3. Remarks to Barclays Geopolitical Risk and Defense Policy Roundtable, Washington, DC. 7 September 2014. 

4. Remarks at Aerospace Corporation Board Dinner, Rancho Palos Verdes, California. 12 June 2014. 

5. Fubini Lecture, MIT-LL. Boston, MA. 29 May 2014. 

6. Remarks at Ashton Carter’s official farewell ceremony. Pentagon. 2 December 

2013. 

7. Troop Talk at U.S. Consulate. Herat, Afghanistan. 14 September 2013. 

8. Remarks at the Combined Federal Campaign Kickoff Ceremony. Pentagon. 05 

September 2013. 

9. Remarks at the Medal of Honor Ceremony for Ty Carter. Pentagon. 27 August 

2013. 

10. Remarks at the Aspen Security Forum. Aspen, CO. 18 July 2013. 

11. Remarks on Defense Priorities in an Era of Constrained Budgets at the Center 

for a New American Security. Washington, DC. 12 June 2013. 

12. Remarks at Christine Fox’s Farewell Ceremony. Pentagon. 25 June 2013. 

13. Remarks at Air Force Secretary Michael Donley’s Farewell Ceremony. Pentagon. 21 June 2013. 

14. Remarks at the OSD Junior and Senior Enlisted Service Members of the Year. 

Pentagon. 19 June 2013. 

15. Remarks at the Pentagon Presidential Rank Awards Ceremony. Pentagon. 18 

June 2013. 

16. Remarks at the SOUTHCOM 50th Anniversary Ceremony. Doral, Florida. 4 

June 2013. 

154 

17. Remarks on Better Buying Power at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, DC. 23 May 2013. 

18. Remarks to the Aerospace Industries Association Board of Governors. Washington, DC. 23 May 2013. 

19. Troop Talk at Camp Lemmonier. Djibouti, Djibouti. 11 May 2013. 

20. Remarks at the EUCOM Change of Command Ceremony, Stuttgart, Germany. 

10 May 2013. 

21. Remarks at the Public Service Recognition Week Award Ceremony. Washington, DC. 8 May 2013. 

22. Remarks at the National Press Club. Washington, DC. 7 May 2013. 

23. Remarks at the NOIA Eisenhower Awards. Washington, DC. 18 July 2013. 

24. Remarks at the 2013 Ronald Reagan Missile Defense Award Ceremony. Washington, DC. 23 April 2013. 

25. Remarks on the U.S. Defense Rebalance to Asia at the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies. Washington, DC. 8 April 2013. 

26. Remarks at the U.S. Embassy. Seoul, South Korea. 18 March 2013. 

27. Remarks at the National Defense University Foundation Tribute. Washington, 

DC. 13 March 2013. 

28. Remarks on Sequestration at the McAleese/Credit Suisse investor conference. 

Washington, DC. 12 March 2013. 

29. Remarks at the Munich Security Conference. Munich, Germany. 2 February 

2013. 

30. Remarks at the F-35 Lightening II Change of Command Ceremony, Washington, DC. 6 December 2012. 

31. Remarks at the Cooperative Threat Reduction Symposium. Washington, DC. 

3 December 2012. 

32. Remarks at the Von der Heyden Fellows Program Endowment Fund Lecture 

Series at Duke University. Durham, NC. 29 November 2012. 

33. Remarks at Center for Nonproliferation Studies Advisory Board Meeting. 

Washington, DC. 15 November 2012. 

34. DOD News Briefing on Better Buying Power 2.0 with Deputy Secretary Carter 

and Under Secretary Kendall from the Pentagon. 13 November 2012. 

35. Remarks at New York City’s Veterans’ Day Parade Opening Ceremony. New 

York, NY. 11 November 2012. 

36. Remarks at 57th Annual DOD Distinguished Civilian Award Ceremony. The 

Pentagon. 7 November 2012. 

37. Troop Talk at Minot Air Force Base. Minot, North Dakota. 2 November 2012. 

38. Remarks to L–3 Communications Board of Directors. Arlington, Virginia. 24 

October 2012. 

39. Remarks at the AUSA Annual Meeting and Exposition. Washington, DC. 24 

October 2012. 

40. Remarks aboard the USS Eisenhower. 19 October 2012. 

41. Remarks at a Base in Southwest Asia. 17 October 2012. 

42. Remarks at the North American Forum. Ottawa, Canada. 13 October 2012 (off 

the record; not for attribution). 

43. Remarks at Defense Attache ́ Association. Washington, DC. 11 October 2012. 

44. Remarks at Aspen Institute Roundtable Luncheon. Washington, DC. 10 October 2012. 

45. Remarks at Navy’s 237th Birthday Celebration. Pentagon Auditorium. 9 October 2012. 

46. Remarks to USAF Cadets: ‘‘On Strategy and Leadership.’’ United States Air 

Force Academy. 4 October 2012. 

47. Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Washington, DC. 3 October 2012. 

48. Remarks at the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Program Transition Ceremony. The Pentagon. 1 October 2012. 

49. Remarks at Raytheon Workforce Town Hall. Tucson, Arizona. 26 September 

2012. 

50. Remarks at White House Rhodes Scholar Event. The White House. Washington, DC. 24 September 2012. 

51. Remarks at Combined Federal Campaign Kickoff. The Pentagon. 24 September 2012. 

52. Remarks at the Department of Defense’s National POW/MIA Recognition Day 

Ceremony. 21 September 2012. 

53. Remarks at the Politico Pro Defense Forum, Washington, DC. 20 September 

2012. 

54. Remarks at the Annual Air & Space Conference and Technology Exposition. 

19 September 2012. 

155 

55. Remarks at Partnership for Public Service Sammies Gala. Washington, DC. 

13 September 2012. 

56. Remarks at Council of Chief Executives Dinner. The Four Seasons, Washington, DC. 12 September 2012. 

57. Remarks at Rhode Island Business Leaders Day. Hart Senate Office Building, 

Washington, DC. 12 September 2012. 

58. Remarks at APEX SES Orientation Program. The Pentagon. 12 September 

2012. 

59. Remarks at NDU Economics and National Security Symposium. Fort McNair, 

Washington, DC. 6 September 2012. 

60. Remarks at Award Ceremony for Jo Ann Rooney. The Pentagon. 4 September 

2012. 

61. Remarks at Joint Staff Global Readiness Conference. The Pentagon. 23 August 2012. 

62. ‘‘The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defense Perspective.’’ The Asia Society, New York, NY. 1 August 2012. 

63. Remarks at OSD Junior/Senior Enlisted Service Members of the Year Ceremony. The Pentagon. 31 July 2012. 

64. Remarks to Troops at Camp Humphreys. 26 July 2012. 

65. ‘‘Toward a Joint Vision for U.S.-lndia Defense Cooperation. Remarks to the 

Confederation of Indian Industry. New Delhi, India. 23 July 2012. 

66. Remarks aboard the USS Blue Ridge, Yokosuka, Japan. 23 July 2012. 

67. Remarks aboard the Battleship Missouri. 18 July 2012. 

68. Address to NATO Parliamentary Assembly Members. The Pentagon. 9 July 

2012. 

69. Remarks at Foreign Defense Attache ́ Reception. The State Department. Washington, DC, 28 June 2012. 

70. Remarks at Al Volkman Retirement Ceremony. The Pentagon. 25 June 2012. 

71. Remarks at CTBT Workshop. Hay Adams Hotel, Washington, DC. 22 June 

2012. 

72. Remarks at Joint Base Charleston. Charleston, SC. 18 June 2012. 

73. Remarks at Presidential Rank Award Ceremony. The Pentagon. 5 June 2012. 

74. ‘‘Cybersecurity and Its Role in National Defense.’’ Address at West Point Senior Cyber Security Conference. United States Military Academy. West Point, NY. 4 

June 2012. 

75. ‘‘Budget Priorities for 21st Century Defense: A Conversation with Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter.’’ The American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 

DC. 30 May 2012. 

76. Keynote Address at PenFed Night of Heroes Gala. Ritz Carlton, Washington 

DC. 24 May 2012. 

77. Address to Senior Executive Service Town Hall on Achieving Audit Readiness. 

The Pentagon. 23 May 2012. 

78. Remarks at BENS Annual Washington Forum. Grand Hyatt, Washington, DC. 

22 May 2012. 

79. Remarks to the Aspen Group U.S.-lndia Dialogue. Riggs Library. Washington, 

DC. 12 May 2012. 

80. Remarks at Rep. Adam Smith District Day. Library of Congress, Washington, 

DC. 10 May 2012. 

81. Address at NDU Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Fort 

McNair, Washington, DC. 9 May 2012. 

82. Remarks at the Spirit of Service Ceremony. The Pentagon. 9 May 2012. 

83. Remarks at Vanguard Executive Development Program. The Pentagon. 3 May 

2012. 

84. Remarks at Navy Office of General Counsel Conference. Alexandria, Virginia. 

2 May 2012. 

85. Remarks at Sam Nunn/Bank of America Policy Forum Lunch. Atlanta, Georgia. 16 April 2012. 

86. Remarks at Farewell Ceremony for David Van Buren. The Pentagon. 23 

March 2012. 

87. Remarks at Farewell Ceremony for Regina Dugan. The Pentagon. 23 March 

2012. 

88. Remarks at Institute for Defense Analysis Lunch Colloquium. Alexandria, Virginia. 20 March 2012. 

89. Remarks at APEX SES Orientation Program. The Pentagon. 19 March 2012. 

90. Remarks to Harvard Zuckerman and Gleitsman Fellows. The Pentagon. 13 

March 2012. 

91. Remarks at NDIA Dinner. Army-Navy Club. Washington, DC. 12 March 2012. 

156 

92. Remarks at 50th Annual U.S. Senate Youth Program Reception. The Pentagon. 9 March 2012. 

93. Remarks at Credit Suisse/McAleese Conference on 2013 Defense Programs. 

Arlington, Virginia. 8 March 2012. 

94. The Paul C. Warnke Lecture on International Security: ‘‘Defense Strategy and 

Budget Priorities for the 21st Century.’’ The Council on Foreign Relations. New 

York, NY. 6 March 2012. 

95. Remarks at the ARPA-E Innovation Summit. Gaylord Convention Center, National Harbor, Maryland. 29 February 2012. 

96. Keynote Address at the RSA Conference. San Francisco, California. 28 February 2012. 

97. Remarks at Combined Federal Campaign Award Ceremony. The Pentagon. 17 

February 2012. 

98. Remarks at Atlantic Council Dinner. Metropolitan Club, Washington. DC. 15 

February 2012. 

99. Remarks at CNAS 5th Anniversary Celebration in honor of William J. Perry. 

The W Hotel, Washington, DC. 31 January 2012. 

100. Remarks at Professional Services Council Meeting. The Four Seasons 

Georgetown, Washington, DC. 30 January 2012. 

101. Remarks at the Major Budget Decisions Media Briefing. The Pentagon. 26 

January 2012. 

102. Remarks at Colonel Ronald F. Lewis Promotion Ceremony. The Pentagon. 20 

January 2012. 

103. Remarks at Enduring Security Framework Executive Steering Group. Washington, DC. 19 January 2012. 

104. Remarks at Farewell Ceremony for Gordon Heddell. The Pentagon. 13 January 2012. 

105. Remarks at the Defense Strategic Guidance Media Roundtable. The Pentagon. 5 January 2012. 

106. Remarks at Defense Industrial Base Task Force Meeting. Aerospace Industries Association, Arlington, VA. 22 December 2011. 

107. Iraq End of Mission/Return of the Colors. Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. 20 December 2012. 

108. OSD Senior/Junior Enlisted Service Member of the Year Awards Ceremony. 

The Pentagon. 2 December 2011. 

109. Remarks at VADM Thompson Retirement and DLA Change of Command 

Ceremony. Fort Belvoir, VA. 18 November 2011. 

110. Welcome Ceremony Remarks. Pentagon Auditorium. 9 November 2011. 

111. Remarks at 55th Annual DOD Distinguished Civilian Awards. The Pentagon. 

4 November 2011. 

112. Remarks at Afghan Strategic Review Panel. Crystal City, Virginia. 26 October 2011. 

113. Remarks at AUSA Eisenhower Luncheon. 11 October 2011. 

114. ‘‘Defense Budgets, American Power, and the National Security Industrial 

Base.’’ Remarks at the Brookings Institution. 15 July 2011. 

115. Remarks at Heritage Foundation Conference, ‘‘The Pentagon Efficiency Initiative: Enough to Stave Off More Defense Cuts?’’ 20 April 2011. 

116. ‘‘Doing More Without More: Obtaining Efficiency and Productivity in Defense.’’ Remarks at the Center for a New American Security.‘‘ 22 February 2011. 

117. Remarks at Aviation Week’s R&D Technology & Requirements Conference. 

Washington, DC. 16 February 2011. 

118. ‘‘The Defense Industry Enters a New Era.’’ Remarks to Cowen Investment 

Conference, New York, NY. 9 February 2011. 119. Remarks at Center for American Progress Conference, ‘‘A $400 Billion Opportunity: 10 Strategies to Cut the Fat out of Federal Procurement.’’ 16 November 

2010. 

120. ‘‘Acquisition Process.’’ Remarks before the Air Force Association Conference. 

15 September 2010. 

121. ‘‘Remarks at Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition, Gaylord Convention 

Center, Washington, DC. 4 May 2010. 

122. Remarks at Defense Logistics Modernization Conference. Center for Strategic 

and International Studies. 2 April 2010. 

123. Remarks at 38th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy 

and Policy, ‘‘Air, Space, and Cyberspace Power in the 21st Century.’’ 20 January 

2010. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

157 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

ASHTON B. CARTER

This 13th day of January, 2015 

[The nomination of the Honorable Ashton B. Carter was reported 

to the Senate by Chairman McCain on February 10, 2015, with the 

recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on February 12, 2015.] 

(159) 

NOMINATION OF MR. PETER K. LEVINE TO BE 

DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER, 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

TUESDAY, APRIL 21, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Ayotte, 

Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Reed, McCaskill, Manchin, Donnelly, 

Hirono, and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. All right, Peter. We have done enough 

schmoozing. 

This committee is always gratified to be in a position to help the 

Senate confirm nominees that previously distinguished themselves 

as esteemed members of its staff. That is why I am especially delighted to welcome Peter Levine who appears before us today as 

the President’s nominee to serve as Deputy Chief Management Officer [DCMO]. I would also like to welcome his wife Mary Ellen and 

his son Daniel. We thank you both for lending Peter to his country 

in service once again. 

Having served as staff director and before that as general counsel to the Senate Armed Services Committee [SASC], Peter has 

gained keen insight into how the Department of Defense [DOD] operates and how it is managed. He has an in-depth understanding 

of the challenges that confront its senior most managers and ensuring that the Pentagon provides our Nation’s defense effectively and 

responsibly. Peter also knows how inherently challenging the position of DCMO is. He has seen how the Department does business, 

especially in the area of financial improvement and business transformation, critical areas over which the DCMO has a critical oversight role. 

Peter, the task lies ahead of you. Few people outside Washington 

truly appreciate the challenge that the Department faces in the 

area of management, business transformation, and financial management. Measured by dollars, people, or global missions, the Department of Defense is quite possibly the largest, most complex single organization in the world. With this size and complexity comes 

difficulties in management. The Comptroller General, Congress’ 

160 

independent watchdog, has continually listed DOD as high risk and 

vulnerable to fraud, waste abuse, and mismanagement. 

The Department of Defense is unique in that it is the only large 

Federal agency that cannot even undergo a financial statement 

audit of its balance sheet. This committee, with Mr. Levine’s help, 

has spent a great deal of time and energy working on specific challenges at DOD in the areas of weapon systems acquisition, business transformation, IT [information technology] system implementation, financial management, and supply chain management. To 

date none of these risk areas have been removed from GAO’s [the 

Government Accountability Office] high risk list, but I am optimistic that with Mr. Levine’s leadership and partnership with this 

committee we will make great progress which will benefit both the 

warfighter and the taxpayer. 

While efforts to improve business systems, cut costs, and find 

waste at the Department of Defense are used to identify savings, 

it is also to gain knowledge and understanding about how the Department works. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said 

back in 2011, ‘‘The current apparatus for managing people and 

money across the DOD enterprise is woefully inadequate.’’ That 

came from the Secretary of Defense at the time. He went on to say 

it was, ‘‘nearly impossible to get accurate information and answers 

to questions such as how much money did you spend and how 

many people do you have.’’ 

Secretary Gates also mentioned that the result of these shortfalls 

in information was that he could not measure results or make judgments about priorities for the military. There is something very 

wrong when the Secretary of Defense cannot get answers to simple 

questions or know how or whether the agencies under his control 

achieve their intended results. 

Fixing these weaknesses and improving the management of the 

Pentagon is not the job of any one person. All Pentagon leaders 

must be invested in this work from the Secretary on down, and 

Congress must never forget its critical role in this area. But this 

work goes directly to the heart of what the Deputy Chief Management Officer is all about, empowering the Secretary of Defense 

with timely and accurate information to assess whether the Department is achieving its goals, streamlining bureaucracy and cutting through red tape to enable the Military Services to put their 

full effort toward achieving their missions, not filling out paperwork, and holding leaders accountable for failing to change or 

adopt better practices, while at the same time rewarding managers 

who learn from mistakes and succeed in transformation. 

Peter, this is no small task, but I assure you that, if confirmed, 

you will have a committed partner in this committee. 

Again, I thank the witness for his willingness to serve and look 

forward to hearing from the witness on this important matter. 

This committee has the well-deserved reputation for acting 99 

percent of the time in a bipartisan fashion. A lot of that comes from 

the interaction between the staffs on both sides of the aisle, no 

matter who is in the majority. Peter, over many years as service 

to Senator Levin as well as other members of this committee, you 

have made a significant contribution to maintaining that environVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00166 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
161 

ment of bipartisanship, not to mention though, however, that you 

and I have had spirited conversations on occasion in the past. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

echo your comments about the spirit that Peter has helped keep 

alive, and I know he will continue to do that at the Department 

of Defense. 

I want to welcome Peter and Mary Ellen and Daniel. Thank you 

very much. 

One indication of success that the people that you led are strongly behind you—literally they are because the entire Democratic 

PSM [professional staff members] staff is here for this hearing to 

cheer you on and secretly send messages to you so that you get the 

answers right. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator REED. The chairman has gone into great detail and very 

accurate detail about the incredible contributions you have made to 

the committee. You originally came in 1996. You have been the 

general counsel, the staff director. You have been a trusted advisor 

to Senators on both sides of the aisle. You have been a mentor to 

the professional staff. You have made us all a little wiser and a little better prepared to face the challenges of a very difficult and 

dangerous world. 

Many of the pieces of legislation that you worked with have profoundly reshaped the Pentagon, and there is a lot more that has 

to be done. You have been a major force in developing Governmentwide procurement reform initiatives—for the Pentagon, I should 

say—including the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 

2009. That was really due to your staff efforts with the leadership 

of Senator Levin and Senator McCain. This was a tribute to their 

vision, as well as your efforts. 

You have developed mechanisms to streamline the Department’s 

workforce to help the Pentagon to maintain this workforce. You 

have also led efforts in the Senate to combat waste, fraud, and 

abuse in the Pentagon acquisition, stretching back to your days not 

just on this committee but when you were on the Government Affairs Committee. 

We will miss you, your knowledge of the laws, your analytical 

ability, your determination, your professionalism. But we will recognize that we are benefiting and the Pentagon is benefiting and 

the Nation is benefiting from those skills in your new position as 

Deputy Chief Management Officer for the Department of Defense. 

The DCMO position is charged with improving the management 

of the Department of Defense and it does need improvement. As 

such and especially in these constrained budget times, you will be 

challenged to support warfighters while making very difficult 

choices about eliminating low priority functions, cutting costs, but 

maintaining capacity and, in fact, enhancing capacity. Those are 

very difficult, in fact sometimes contradictory, challenges. You will 

be charged with leading the modernization efforts, and we have 

every confidence you will do it well as you have done everything 

well. 

162 

We look forward to working with you. 

Again, let me thank the chairman for scheduling this hearing. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Before your statement, as you know, there are standard questions that have to be answered for the record, which I will go into 

now. 

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, 

it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress be able to receive testimony, briefings, and other 

communications of information. Have you adhered to applicable 

laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Mr. LEVINE. I have. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

Mr. LEVINE. I have not. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record in hearings? 

Mr. LEVINE. I will. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 

and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Mr. LEVINE. I will. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Mr. LEVINE. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 

testify upon request before this committee? 

Mr. LEVINE. I do. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner 

when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with 

the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Mr. LEVINE. I do. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PETER K. LEVINE, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. LEVINE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the committee, first let me thank you for those very generous remarks that 

you made at the outset. 

You are absolutely right about the challenges, management challenges, facing the Department of Defense. As I, if confirmed, take 

those on, it will be a great comfort to know that this committee is 

supportive of that effort. 

It is my pleasure to appear before you today as the President’s 

nominee for the position of Deputy Chief Management Officer of 

the Department of Defense. I would like to thank the President, 

Secretary Carter, and Deputy Secretary Work for selecting me for 

this position. 

163 

I would also like to thank my wife Mary Ellen and my son Daniel, both of whom are with me today. I mention them for all their 

love, support, and understanding over the years, and I would not 

be here without them. 

This committee established the DCMO position in an effort to address the broken business practices and bureaucratic inefficiencies 

that caused DOD management programs and support functions to 

take too long, cost too much, and produce less than optimal results. 

I believe that an active DCMO, with the support of the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, can make a real difference. If confirmed, 

I will strive to institute more effective management practices and 

take on the waste and inefficiency that needlessly squander the 

taxpayers’ money and the Department’s resources. 

Mr. Chairman, it has been my privilege and honor to serve on 

the staff of the Armed Services Committee for almost 20 years. I 

could not have asked for a more rewarding place to work, for better 

people to work with and for, or for a better learning experience. I 

thank all of you, members and staff, for that. 

I know that I have more to learn, but if confirmed, I will bring 

a piece of the Armed Services Committee with me to the Department of Defense. 

That concludes my opening statement, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levine follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. PETER LEVINE

Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, Members of the Committee—Thank you for 

scheduling this hearing. It is my pleasure to appear before you today as the President’s nominee for the position of Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) of the 

Department of Defense. 

I would like to thank the President, Secretary Carter, and Deputy Secretary Work 

for the confidence they have shown in selecting me for this important position. I 

would also like to thank my wife Mary Ellen and my son Daniel, both of whom are 

here with me today, for their understanding and support over the years. I would 

not be here without them. 

This committee established the DCMO position in an effort to address the broken 

business processes and bureaucratic inefficiencies that cause DOD management programs and support functions to take too long, cost too much, and produce less than 

optimal results. The committee also expected the DCMO to help the Department develop and implement the sound business systems and practices that will be needed 

to produce an auditable financial statement. 

I understand that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has directed the DCMO to conduct a review of the organizations and business processes of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the defense agencies, with the objective of streamlining 

organizations and improving business processes. I do not believe that there are any 

significant management processes in the Department of Defense that cannot be 

streamlined and made more efficient. 

Making process improvements will be difficult and time-consuming and may require changes to the culture of the Department. However, I believe that significant 

improvements are not only possible, but essential to enable the Department to reduce the size and composition of its management headquarters and achieve needed 

savings without creating bottlenecks that would undermine the mission. If confirmed, I will devote my fullest effort to this project. 

Mr. Chairman, it has been my privilege to serve on the staff of the Armed Services Committee for almost twenty years. I believe that this committee is unique in 

the Senate because of its productivity, having produced a National Defense Authorization Act every year for the last 53 years. It is unique because of its tradition of 

bipartisanship, with Members and staff on both sides working together to solve common problems. And it is unique because of its dedication to a common purpose— 

doing what is best for our men and women in uniform and the national defense. 

164 

If confirmed, I pledge to bring this spirit of productivity, bipartisanship, and dedication to our men and women in uniform with me to the Department of Defense. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

The issue of continuing interest to this committee, as you know, 

is the inability of the Department of Defense to pass a financial 

statement and audit. The current audit deadline is, starting in 

2017, that DOD will be audit-ready. Do you think that is going to 

be the case? 

Mr. LEVINE. Mr. Chairman, I have always tried to be honest with 

members of this committee and give my best assessment, and I 

have always been skeptical that the 2017 deadline will be met and 

I cannot change my stripes just because I am sitting down here at 

the witness table. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Why do you think that they have never been 

able to do that? People ask me that all the time. 

Mr. LEVINE. Looking at the problem of an auditable financial 

statement for the Department of Defense, you have to keep in mind 

that it is the biggest entity in the world. We have hundreds of millions of transactions every year and billions of historic transactions. 

An individual taxpayer or a small business may be able to put 

their receipts in a shoebox and add them at the end of the year and 

balance their books, but an entity the size of the Department of Defense simply cannot do that. We have to have systems and processes in place that work and that produce good financial information, and when we get those systems and processes in place, it will 

not only provide us an auditable financial statement, but it will answer that question that Secretary Gates had about why he cannot 

get good answers to his questions when he needs to make a decision. 

I think we have made significant progress really going back to 

when Deputy Secretary England took this on as a challenge in 

about 2005 when he became Deputy Secretary. I think that Mr. 

Hale as Comptroller continued that effort, and I think that it is 

now foreseeable to me that we can get to an auditable financial 

statement. I just do not believe we will make it by 2017. 

Chairman MCCAIN. As you remember, a couple years ago, as part 

of not the Department of Defense but my role—and I was a member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations—we discovered that the Air Force spent over $1 billion, many years of mismanaging what was supposed to be a commercial, off-the-shelf system. It was known as the expeditionary combat support system 

[ECSS]. No one was held responsible. What do I tell the taxpayers 

at the next town hall meeting that we wasted $1 billion on a program that never even begun at all, and no one was held responsible? What is your solution to that? 

Mr. LEVINE. Senator, first I worked with your staff on that review. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I remember. 

Mr. LEVINE. I share their views and your views of that. It is absolutely unacceptable. What I will say is the failures that you identified in your report on ECSS, lack of planning, lack of a firm requirement, changing requirements, lack of commitment to the comVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00170 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
165 

mercial nature of the system, are systemic problems that we have 

in the acquisition of business systems for the Department of Defense, and we created the DCMO in part to make sure that that 

does not happen. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I take it that one of your priorities is going 

to be to hold people responsible because just your appointment is 

not going to eliminate those. 

Mr. LEVINE. It will be one of my jobs to review business system 

programs for the Department of Defense to make sure that they 

are doing the planning that they need to do, that they have the 

governance processes to make sure this does not happen again. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Does that mean you are going to hold people 

accountable? 

Mr. LEVINE. Senator, the people that need to be held accountable 

do not actually report to the DCMO. So it will be the job of—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you identify them? 

Mr. LEVINE. Yes. Yes, Senator, I will help identify people who 

need to be held accountable. I think that is a fair—yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

In a recent audit, GAO noted that a majority of major IT programs did not—and we know how important in this day and age 

IT programs are—establish baseline costs and schedule estimates 

within 2 years of program initiation. In fact, it took over 5 years 

and nearly half a billion dollars to be spent before baseline costs 

and schedule estimates were created for 12 major IT systems. 

Is the IT system issue not of highest importance? 

Mr. LEVINE. I will make it an issue of the highest importance. 

Yes, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you think you can fix the problem? 

Mr. LEVINE. I think we can do far, far better than we have done, 

and we need to do far, far better than we have done. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you have the confidence of the Secretary 

of Defense? 

Mr. LEVINE. I believe that I will, yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good. 

As you know, from time to time, as a member of the staff of this 

committee, we have been frustrated with sometimes the lack of 

complete and timely information from the Department of Defense, 

and I hope that you will also make sure that we do receive that 

information in a timely and accurate fashion. 

Mr. LEVINE. I have shared that frustration, and I will do my best 

to be as responsive as possible. I certainly understand the problem. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Some of your comments I will keep on record 

to provide to you in case we do have difficulties in that area, Peter. 

Mr. LEVINE. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. It was my beloved friend, Morris Udall, who 

once said the politician’s prayer is that the words that I utter today 

be tender and sweet because tomorrow I may have to eat them. 

Thank you. [Laughter.] 

Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, Peter, thank you for your service to Congress. 

166 

You were there in 2008 when this office was created. Briefly, can 

you give an assessment of what it has done positively and where 

are still the failings that it has not lived up to? 

Mr. LEVINE. This committee was responsible for creating the position of DCMO, and it was created for the reasons that Senator 

McCain laid out in his opening statement, because the committee 

did not believe that Department was paying enough attention to 

the management issues that end up leading to waste and inefficiency and costing the Department so much money. It actually 

started with an amendment by Senator Byrd to create a second 

Deputy Secretary who was going to be a Deputy Secretary for management, and it evolved to where the Deputy Secretary would be 

the CMO [Chief Management Officer] and he would be assisted by 

a DCMO. 

The idea was to elevate the issue of management within the Department and give it top level attention so that we could address 

some of these problems that just seemed to go on from year to year 

to year and never be solved. 

There has been only one DCMO to date, one Senate-confirmed 

DCMO to date. I think she worked hard. I do not think she had 

the support at the top level of the Department that she needed to 

really take on some of these bigger problems. I have been assured 

that I will have that support, and I hope to have that support and 

I hope to take on the big management problems that have been of 

concern to this committee for so long. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Senator McCain alluded to in his questions about the IT systems. 

The Pentagon is the biggest enterprise in the world, but there are 

lots of big companies that are audited every year and they are pretty complicated and complex. I guess it begs the question, what can 

you learn from the private sector, not just studying them but 

adopting some of their mechanisms, getting advisors coming in who 

are management experts to tell you how you should do things differently at the Pentagon? 

Mr. LEVINE. We need to do all of that. There are some mechanisms in the Department for doing that. There are some authorities 

we have given the Department to do that kind of thing, and the 

Department has not taken full advantage of the authority it has in 

that regard. We will want to bring in expertise from the private 

sector and do whatever we can to draw on that. 

Senator REED. I know the Secretary has a business sort of advisors group. I do not know the official title. 

Mr. LEVINE. The Defense Business Board. 

Senator REED. I would assume you are going to be looking to 

them or work closely with them for advice and insight. 

Mr. LEVINE. My understanding is that they are available to assist in these areas and to provide advice, and I hope that we will 

be able to draw on that advice. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. One aspect too here of the auditability and everything is that sometimes the fault is not in our stars but in ourselves, and some of the congressional requirements that we place 

make it very difficult to manage. Are you going to look also at the 

structures we give you to operate? We do not have the same type 

of capital budget, for example, in the Pentagon that you find in 

167 

most big, private enterprises. Are you going to be able to give us 

advice too about what changes we should make? 

Mr. LEVINE. Senator Reed, I think there is an awful lot that can 

be done to improve the way the Department works without legislation. I think there are lots of ripe targets there. If I identify something that does need legislation or an area where we do need congressional help, of course I will come back to you and ask for that. 

Senator REED. Just the final point and more of a comment than 

a question. Information technology is so critical to businesses today 

to be agile, to be proficient and productive, and some of the systems that you are operating are antiquated, to be kind. 

Mr. LEVINE. I am hearing about COBOL-based systems and 

FORTRAN-based systems. Yes. 

Senator REED. That is encouraging because those are the last 

computer languages that I learned in 1967 and 1969. So there is 

a place for me over there programming FORTRAN and BASIC. 

[Laughter.] 

Maybe I will withdraw the question. 

[Laughter.] 

But you know, you are right. You are looking at systems which 

are 20 years out of date, and the irony, of course—at least the perception that I have—is in the 1950s and 1960s and 1970s, the Pentagon was where the really spectacular information technology 

breakthroughs and automation were going on. It was business that 

was trying to catch up, and now it is completely reversed. 

Mr. LEVINE. Particularly in the area of business systems, all of 

the initiative is now on the private sector side. You are talking 

about accounting systems or purchasing systems or personnel systems, those kinds of IT systems. The key is in order to make use 

of those, you need to address the problems that Senator McCain referred to earlier with the ECSS system where we tried to buy a 

commercial system but then we refused to change our processes. 

We ended up having to hire a squadron of computer programmers 

to try to reinvent a system that was working perfectly well in the 

commercial sector. What we need to do is to change our business 

processes so that they make sense and that they can be appropriately automated rather than automating an old process that 

really is not very efficient in the first place. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. Again, thank you for your 

service and your personal support systems in Congress. 

Mr. LEVINE. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, Peter, I find it difficult to believe the many, many 

years that I have personally had the honor of working with you I 

never met any of your family before. Mary Ellen, it is really nice 

to meet you. For the benefit of my fellow Senators up here, Daniel 

is at Harvard in computer science right now and he made a real 

sacrifice to be here today. You will be very much rewarded to know 

how much everyone thinks of your daddy because I do not recall 

anyone at any of these hearings who is more loved than he is. 

In fact, the chairman said that 99 percent was nonpartisan in his 

past and talked about a few spirited conversations. I cannot reVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00173 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
168 

member any spirited conversations in the past that you and I have 

had. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Peter can. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator INHOFE. No. That he and I have had. I understand that. 

Even at the time with the Big 4, I remember 2 years ago with 

the Big 4, we got to know each other pretty well. It was really a 

great experience. 

Anyone, if you just listen today to all of these people that are 

running for President of the United States, when they talk about 

the military and they talk about the Department of Defense, they 

talk about the Pentagon, they talk about waste, fraud, and abuse. 

In fact, that term was made by Senator Reed a minute ago. We 

hear a lot about that, and it is a very popular thing. But it seems 

like no one has ever really done anything about it maybe because 

we have never had anyone in this new position. I think the world 

of Beth McGrath, but she did not have the background that you do. 

Now, you have been in the trenches. You know these problems 

that exist. It is going to be a real tough thing for you to do. In reading the mission statement here, it said in 2008 DOD formally chartered the office of DCMO to better synchronize, integrate, and coordinate the business operations of the Department and ensure the 

optimum alignment and all that stuff. If there is anyone who has 

a background that is more conducive to that, it would be you. 

In your opening statement, you said that reductions should not 

take the form of across-the-board cuts. Cutting personnel without 

improving management processes or divesting functions will result 

in fewer people to do the same work, creating bottlenecks and 

backlogs that are counterproductive to the mission of the Department. 

I think everyone knows the easy thing to do is the meat axe approach. Then it is somebody else’s problem. But you are going to 

have to—and you have already done this—deal with OSD [the Office of the Secretary of Defense], deal with the combatant commands. When they come and testify here or the ones that we talk 

to in the field, and they talk about what they could do, sometimes 

it is just not something that is really easy in our system. 

Does anything come to your mind now on how you are going to 

be able to focus these cuts and these efficiencies that we are depending upon you to do that specifically you are going to dive right 

in? You know the job, and you know about this from a position of 

knowledge. What are you going to be doing? 

Mr. LEVINE. Senator, you know I have never shied away from 

taking on a difficult problem. If confirmed, in the near future I will 

have about a year and a half to work with, and I figure I have to 

take on some very specific targets to identify five or six priorities 

to go after. The Deputy Secretary has already asked the DCMO to 

review the organization of OSD and to look for places where we 

have redundant or superfluous organizations, and we will continue 

that. I have a couple of areas that I want to look at specifically. 

I think the acquisition decision-making process is incredibly inefficient, and it has to be improved and it is not only too costly but 

it slows things down in a way that is counterproductive. 

169 

I think that the civilian personnel system can be dramatically 

improved. We need to streamline processes and we need to look at 

organizations and make that process more efficient and less costly. 

There are several others like that, but I think that what I am 

going to have to do is to target specific issues and go after them 

and I intend to do that. 

Senator INHOFE. In a comment you made—I do not know if it 

was a response to a question or your opening statement. I cannot 

remember, but you talked about the one person who was predecessor in this job sometimes may not have had the support of the 

top management. I am going to ask you that if you run into that, 

you can come to us because I do not recall having heard from that 

office before that there were some problems. I would say this—and 

I think everyone here looking at it up here at this table—that if 

you are not getting the full support, there is one thing you can do 

about it and that is come to us and we will make sure you do get 

the full support. Is that all right? 

Mr. LEVINE. Yes, absolutely, Senator. I think that that is something that will help as I have to work with under secretaries and 

tell them that we are going to have to take on issues in their organizations or chiefs or deputy chiefs of staff. If they understand that 

the committee stands behind that and really wants these efficiency 

measures and really wants to make improvements necessary, that 

will be very helpful. Thank you. 

Senator INHOFE. That is good because they are going to have to 

know that we are behind you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hirono? 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was looking at the advance policy questions that have been submitted to you, and the first question is what is your understanding 

of the relationship between the Deputy Chief Management Officer 

and each of the following. I noted that there were at least 14 sets 

of individuals and their offices, everybody from the Secretary of Defense to the business transformation offices of the Military Departments. That is a lot of people that you are attempting to work with 

to do the kinds of modernization that you have told us you want 

to do. 

How many people do you have in your office to help you deal 

with 14 individuals and offices? 

Mr. LEVINE. I cannot remember. I think the staff of the DCMO 

is about 100 people. 

What I would say is, first of all, in listing all those people that 

the office has to deal with, your staff was very good and very thorough in putting together those advance policy questions. 

Second, I do think I have something of an advantage in taking 

it on in that from my work with the committee, I already know all 

those people that I will have to interface with and have worked 

with them over the years. I think that that will put me in a position to do that. 

Senator HIRONO. I think those relationships are critical because 

anytime that you are dealing with folks who are already in place 

who are supposed to be doing many of the things that you are 

doing within their own Services, without that kind of relationship, 

170 

they do not necessarily have to listen to you. I commend you for 

that. 

Now, going to acquisition reform, you said that it obviously needs 

to be much more efficient and less costly, and you said you would 

target specific issues in the area of acquisition reform and go after 

those. Could you tell us what your first specific target issue for acquisition reform would be? 

Mr. LEVINE. I need to be careful here because the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics is the 

acquisition policy official for the Department of Defense. The 

DCMO has a role here, as in other areas, in looking at process. We 

had a GAO report that the committee received recently that indicates that for a program manager of a major program in the Department to get a milestone decision can take 2 years and 2,000 

man-hours. They may have to go to 200 different offices to get their 

approval. That kind of process where you have to go to all these 

different offices—the program managers should not have to do 

that. They are spending all their time briefing people and changing 

slides to get approval rather than working on the substance of the 

program. I think that process—without changing the acquisition 

policy, which this committee will do, the Under Secretary for Acquisition Technology will decide what the policy is. The process can 

be significantly improved, and I hope to work with Frank Kendall 

and others in the Department to do that. 

Senator HIRONO. I am really hopeful that you will be able to 

move the ball because I know that the chairman has had all kinds 

of questions, as have many of us, regarding acquisition reform. It 

is not exactly transparent. For example, if you would be looking at 

things like contracts, the kind of contracts we put in place, the requirement process. Would you agree that the more specific we are 

as to what it is we want, that would limit the changes that we 

make that just add to the cost? There is a whole range of things 

that are very specific to the acquisition process, complicated as it 

is. 

Mr. LEVINE. Yes, Senator. There are a whole range of things like 

that that need improvement. This committee has made significant 

strides in the past, and I understand that the chairman has made 

it a priority to address that issue again this year. I know it continues to be a priority for the Department, and I will make whatever contribution I can if confirmed. 

Senator HIRONO. We have had questions relating to cybersecurity. I think that is one of these most vulnerable areas of vulnerability across departments. Can you talk a little bit more about 

how you would make sure that DOD addresses is cybersecurity 

needs in an appropriate way? 

Mr. LEVINE. I should defer that question to my son who is the 

IT expert in the family. 

[Laughter.] 

The DCMO works closely with the Chief Information Officer 

(CIO), of the Department who really is more the technology person, 

the IT technology side. The DCMO is more on the business process 

side. If confirmed, I would work closely with Terry Halvorsen, who 

is the Chief Information Officer of the Department and is heavily 

focused on cybersecurity issues. One of the things that you look at 

171 

in the chaotic systems environment the Department has where we 

have so many different systems run by so many different people is 

that that presents too many targets. One of the things that Mr. 

Halvorsen is working on is streamlining that system, consolidating, 

which not only enables you to be more efficient and have a better 

business process but also should enable a more secure environment. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEVINE. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Rounds? 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Levine, I understand that you have been here for a long 

time, a lot longer than I have been. It would appear to me that before you would have made a major change moving from this side 

to that side, that you would have had a number of conversations 

with the individuals who will employ you and you would have had 

discussions about your capabilities and your ability to actually get 

the job done. I would like to explore just a little bit. 

You have indicated that, number one, as the DCMO you are 

going to be responsible for the processes, but I am just curious. In 

the discussions that you have had to convince you to want to do 

this job in the first place and one that I suspect might make you 

more frustrated than a former Governor coming into the U.S. Senate is—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ROUNDS.—what did you receive in terms of an assurance 

of resources available to you, the assurances themselves that you 

would have the ability to get in and actually look at the different 

processes, open access, and finally your access to the guys who can 

hire and fire and make a difference? What types of discussions and 

where are you at right now in that process? 

Mr. LEVINE. When the Deputy Secretary, Secretary Work, talked 

to me about the job and asked me if I would do it, I said, so you 

want to make me the most unpopular person in the Pentagon. He 

said, yes, and I will be right there with you. That was the assurance that I needed that he understood that what the DCMO has 

to do is to go into basically other people’s rice bowls and tell them 

they are not doing it right and they need to do it differently, and 

that is never going to be something that is popular in any organization and certainly not an organization like the Pentagon. He understands that that is what the DCMO needs to do and he said he 

stands fully behind it and will be absolutely supportive of it. 

I did not get any assurance of more resources, and I do not think 

that that would have been an appropriate—if there is some specific 

project that needs something, we will try to find resources within 

the Department and available resources. But I think that building 

a new office or a new bureaucracy is not the way you fight bureaucracy. We need to make use of the resources we have and not create 

some new structure to try to do that. 

Senator ROUNDS. Do you believe the resources that are available 

to you will be capable? Do you have the resources available to 

make a dent? 

172 

Mr. LEVINE. Senator, I do not believe that the resources of the 

DCMO office alone are sufficient. I do not think that any one office 

could be sufficient for that. What I believe is that with the commitment of the Deputy Secretary, I will be able to draw on other offices in the Department and other expertise in the Department. For 

example, if we are going to look at acquisition, we are going to 

have to work with the acquisition people, with Frank Kendall and 

his organization, and the Service acquisition executives and their 

organizations. They do have expertise, and we are going to have to 

draw on that expertise. We are going to have to draw on expertise 

from the private sector through the Defense Business Board and 

other mechanisms that are available to do that. I think there are 

mechanisms to provide the support that we need and to provide the 

resources we need, but I do not think the answer is to build a huge 

new office. 

Senator ROUNDS. You indicated that when we talk about the 

chain of command, specifically you felt comfortable coming back to 

us. Do you think that under the current chain of command and the 

responsibility that you have to those individuals that will be your 

superiors, that you have access and that you believe you can come 

directly to this committee and ask for the resources or the assistance to get something done? 

Mr. LEVINE. I think that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary understand very well where I am coming from and the background 

that I have and understand the relationship I have with this committee and look at that as a positive rather than a negative. Yes, 

I do think that is the case. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, sir. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LEVINE. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator McCaskill? 

Senator MCCASKILL. So many questions, so little time. 

Mr. LEVINE. Senator, it is very strange to see you all from this 

side. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I can imagine. 

Mr. LEVINE. I am seeing you face to face for the first time, rather 

than seeing the back of your heard. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I can imagine. My swivel, where I go first 

to Jason and then to Peter—I do not know how this is going to 

work out. 

First, I want to talk about the audit stuff. I was really disappointed when I found out in March that they have pulled the 

clean audit finding from the Marine Corps. 

Mr. LEVINE. Yes, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. People that have been at this longer than 

I have, but I have certainly since the day I got here tried to figure 

out, coming in as a former auditor, how in the world we had gotten 

to the point that the Department of Defense was incapable of being 

audited. 

My false sense of optimism that the Marine Corps had finally 

come up with a clean audit, to now have it pulled because we found 

out about these suspense accounts at the Department of the Treasury, and now not only do we not have a clean audit of the Marine 

173 

Corps, that is going to call into question the ability of us to get 

clean audits anywhere. 

Briefly, can you give me any sense of what we can do about fixing this suspense account problem at the Department of the Treasury for all of these commingling of funds that sound like to me 

funds that are looking for an appropriation but have not found 

them? 

Mr. LEVINE. Senator, I do not know the answer to that. 

Now, I do know that one of the even more troubling things about 

the Marine Corps audit is that I believe that it was a 2011 clean 

audit that got the clean opinion, which means that we have done 

2012, 2013, and 2014, and now we are told that we have the problem. Not only is the 2011 audit not good, but that means that the 

subsequent audits would not be good either. I do not know why it 

took us 4 years to get to the point where that problem was discovered. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Could you find the answer to that question? 

Mr. LEVINE. Yes, Senator. If confirmed, I will look into that and 

get back to you on that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I would really like to know the answer to 

that because the fact that it took them years—I cannot figure out 

why this is so hard. 

Mr. LEVINE. It seems to me that if there was a problem with the 

2011 audit, we should have known that in 2012, and we would 

have been working on it for 3 years by now and figuring out how 

to get traceability and fix it. We should not be hitting the point in 

2015 where we learn about the problem. All I can say is I do not 

understand it, and if confirmed, I will look into that and get back 

to you about it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I also want to make a comment that I am 

hopeful that no matter who gains the White House in 2016, regardless of which party, that I am hopeful that the work that you have 

done on this committee will serve you well and hopefully the next 

commander in chief would want to utilize continually your expertise that you have. You just start so much further down the line 

than anybody else who would take this job because of your incredible working knowledge of the labyrinth that is the process of acquisition and how they spend money and the way they mess it up. 

I just hope that you stick around. 

I know you cannot get this done in a year and a half, but I am 

still going to keep banging about this contractor manpower thing. 

We had the hearing back in 2012. You remember it. In July of last 

year, I sent a letter to the Department asking for specific information about the implementing of a department-wide contractor manpower reporting application. We have to know what we are buying 

through contractors, and we need to know it department-wide. We 

cannot evaluate whether or not we are getting a good deal with 

contractors or a bad deal with contractors if we do not even know 

how many contractors we have. I really would like you and would 

like a commitment from you today that you would at least help me 

figure out what the stall is here. Why is this so hard? If you would 

comment on that, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. LEVINE. Yes, Senator. We have this requirement for a contractor inventory, for an inventory of the service contractors workVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00179 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
174 

ing for the Department. I know this is an issue that is important 

to Senator Manchin as well. 

There is an inventory system in place. It does produce a number. 

I checked yesterday and I was told that the number of service contractors we currently have working for the Department of Defense 

is 629,000. In fact, it was not just 629,000. It was 629,000 and so 

many hundred and such. It was a very precise number. 

The problem, now that I have told you that there is a number, 

is accuracy as with so many of the Department systems. Contractors are hard to count, and the universe of contractors is hard to 

define because when you are doing service contracts, we have times 

when we hire service contracts by the person, and so we have a 

number of people. You also have places where you hire for a result. 

If you have an elevator maintenance contract, you do not care 

whether you have six people working on it or five. You are contracting to have the elevator operating. We have places where it is 

easier to count and places where it is harder to count. 

We have different systems of counting in the different Military 

Departments. The Army has a system where they go out and they 

put as a term of all their contracts with service contractors, you 

have to tell us how many people you working on it. The other Military Departments have a conversion factor where they say we are 

spending this number of dollars. We figure it must be this number 

of people. 

The number sounds very precise, but it is a lot less precise than 

it sounds because of the techniques that they use to gather that information. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Exact numbers may not be as important as 

the ability to compare apples to apples, branch to branch, Service 

to Service, whether or not we are getting value. If the elevator operators that are maintaining elevators in the Army are making 

three times as much as the elevator operators that are maintaining 

elevators for the Navy, we need to know that. That is why this inventory is so important. 

Mr. LEVINE. You need to have more information, not just about 

how many you have but how you are hiring them and whether you 

are hiring them in the right way. Yes, Senator, I agree. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Get to work. We will be watching. 

Mr. LEVINE. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King, can you follow that act? 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Peter, I would like to talk about two versions, one about personnel and the other about purchasing and contracts, which we 

have been talking about. 

Often I think it is as much about process as it is policy. An example of this is personnel management. What do you think about 

human resources [HR] reform within the Department of Defense, 

and what can Congress do to help facilitate more efficient HR practices? 

Mr. LEVINE. The Defense Business Board reported earlier this 

year that the human resources area is an area where they think 

that there are significant efficiencies that can be achieved by the 

Department, that it is an area where we have too many layers of 

management, too many managers with a small span of control. You 

175 

have one person, for example, managing three people, and those 

people managing five people. You have too many layers of middle 

management. That is something we are going to have to look at. 

We are also going to have to look at efficiencies of specific processes. We have a civilian hiring process, and I am told it takes at 

least 6 months and maybe 8 months or more to hire a single individual to work at the Department of Defense. That is just crazy. 

You lose some of the most talented individuals you are trying to 

hire because you cannot offer them a job even though you know 

you want them to come work for you. 

Senator KING. This is a problem throughout Government. 

Mr. LEVINE. It is a problem throughout Government. 

Senator KING. When you layer on the security clearance part, it 

could go up to 2 years. 

Mr. LEVINE. Yes. The security clearance is hard to deal with. 

There are changes that we are looking at in that area that this 

committee has asked the Department to look at with what is called 

a continual security clearance process. 

But I think there are significant improvements also that can be 

made in the hiring process, and this relates to the issue of sort of 

too much bureaucracy. If you add in extra layers, then your different human resources offices spend time negotiating with each 

other instead of getting the job done, and we need to cut out some 

of those middle boxes and simplify the process. 

Senator KING. I take it that you see this as part of your responsibility to build a team to tackle this particular problem? 

Mr. LEVINE. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator KING. We have talked about contracting and procurement. I have a modest suggestion that I utilized when I was Governor, which is pick some typical cases. Take five or six different 

cases from the mundane—you know, Fort Bragg needs five new 

sinks in their kitchens to acquisition of a tank or something larger—and ask your people to prepare a chronology of all the steps 

necessary so that you can see it. Rather than talking in the abstract, you are saying, okay, why did it take 12 approvals to buy 

a sink? The same thing with services. I have found they can blow 

the smoke at you when you are talking in generalities, but when 

you say why did it take this long to get this printer in this office— 

specific cases. 

I used to also call the 800 numbers for the public and see who 

answers, how long does it take, what do they tell you. I will never 

forget calling the tourism office in Maine. Everything went fine 

until they said we will send you a brochure in 3 to 6 weeks and 

it was June. In 3 to 6 weeks in Maine, the summer is over. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KING. The point is you learn from reaching into in a direct kind of way. I hope you will try out some of those. 

Mr. LEVINE. Senator, I am going to have to chose my targets 

carefully with a limited amount of time, but one of the targets I 

hope to chose is the acquisition process and particularly the acquisition milestone decision-making process that we use for major 

weapon systems. I think you are exactly right, that what we are 

going to need to do is we hear that program managers have to go 

176 

to 200 different offices we are going to have to document for several 

programs. 

Senator KING. Take a real life case. 

Mr. LEVINE. It may be one from each of the services or something. Who is it you have to go to? What does this process actually 

look like when you diagram it so that we can say you cannot do 

that anymore. It cannot be that complicated. 

Senator KING. This may be a moment in time where the stars 

are literally aligned, starting with the chairman of this committee 

to Ash Carter to Frank Kendall to you. That is a very special constellation of people who are very aware of this problem and that 

it has to be addressed. We may not have an opportunity like this 

for years. I hope that you will be a real irritant on this subject. As 

I mentioned to you yesterday, you do not want to look back 10 

years from now and say, gee, I wish I had pushed on this. 

Mr. LEVINE. Senator, some people tell me I am too good at being 

an irritant. But, yes, I will do my best. 

Senator KING. I had that experience once in a court where I said, 

Judge, I do not want to beat my head against a stone wall. He said, 

Attorney King, I know of no one in Maine better qualified for that. 

[Laughter.] 

I appreciate your willingness to take this on, and I do hope you 

will view this as an extraordinary opportunity. Working with a 

great team, and with the support of this committee, I think some 

good things can be done for America both in terms of security and 

in terms of our taxpayers. Thank you. 

Mr. LEVINE. I appreciate that. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. An incredibly wise judge. 

Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. First of all, Peter, I am so thrilled that you are 

going to be nominated for this. I have been so impressed with your 

work on SASC. The Department is very fortunate to have someone 

of your caliber to go over and serve there. I am really enthusiastically looking forward to voting for you and I am very glad that you 

have translated your service in the Senate over to help and take 

that knowledge over to the Department of Defense. 

Mr. LEVINE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, and thank you to your family for all 

the sacrifices they have made over the years for many of us on 

SASC and all the questions we have asked. We appreciate it. 

I know that many of the questions that I had have already been 

asked, I am looking forward to your spending some time on the 

high risk list that GAO puts together and really focusing on that 

and trying to address some of those concerns. I know that that has 

already been directed at you. 

Mr. LEVINE. Yes, Senator. That will be a priority. 

Senator AYOTTE. One of the things I think we have struggled 

with here and thought about is just the size of management and 

headquarters organization at the Department of Defense. It has 

really grown fairly significantly over the last 15 years. Given the 

challenges that we are facing in terms of resourcing and what we 

need to do to defend the Nation, I wanted to get your thoughts on 

how the size, the composition at the Department of Defense management headquarters—what thoughts you have to make that 

177 

more efficient. Is it the right size or should we be looking at shifting what happens there? 

Mr. LEVINE. Senator, I think that, first of all, it cannot be the 

right size. We have to make it more efficient. We have to make it 

smaller. We have to find cuts. I think that is hard to do. It is hard 

to get your arms around management headquarters at the Department. You have shifting definitions. I know there is a case that 

Senator McCain was concerned about, for example, where the Air 

Force claimed to have downsized some of its headquarters, and apparently they moved something to a separate command or created 

a separate command to do it. That kind of thing does happen, you 

know, changing definitions so you do not have to change the numbers. 

I believe we have to change the processes. We have to change the 

structures, and we have to find things that we have been doing 

that we can either do better or not do at all. That to me is the core 

is to take on those issues. But we have to get smaller. 

Senator AYOTTE. Terrific. 

I think so too especially as you look at just the growth in the size 

and obviously the priorities that we need to have and what we are 

trying to accomplish. I think all of us are looking forward to working with you I in this new position, and I look forward to enthusiastically supporting you. Thank you for your willingness to do 

this. I appreciate it. 

Mr. LEVINE. Thank you, Senator. I, of course, can come talk to 

you anytime if you have specific concerns in these areas as we go 

forward. 

Senator AYOTTE. Terrific. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin? 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, Mr. Levine, Peter for me, thank you for the service you 

have given to this body in the Senate and to this committee for 

many, many years. We really, all of us, I think in a bipartisan way 

leaned on you pretty heavy, and you did a great job. 

Mr. LEVINE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator MANCHIN. I want to thank you for taking that experience 

level that you have to this next level. You could have very easily 

have taken another path. But staying in what you know and what 

you have been able to do over the years, knowing our concerns, 

means a great deal to all of us on this committee, and we thank 

you on behalf of the committee. 

Let me just say that, Peter, every time we have talked and we 

get the money crunch, it is all a reduction of staff. I always hear 

about reduction of staff. We throw the frontline soldier out there 

first. I know you have heard the concerns we have had, and you 

and I have talked about contracting, procurements, all the things 

and the waste that we have. There is not a person who does not 

want to defend this country and make sure that we support our 

troops. 

With that being said, I have been particularly concerned with the 

growth of the headquarters staff. Every time we talk about reduction of staff, no one ever talks about headquarters staff in light of 

the drawdown of what we are talking about in the military services. It is sometimes hard to get visibility as to whether their cuts 

178 

to headquarters staffs are actually creating more efficient organizations or simply reshuffling the deck chairs on the Titanic. 

Is that something in your bailiwick that you will be able to get 

a hold of? 

Mr. LEVINE. It will be, Senator. The Deputy Secretary has asked 

the DCMO office, as I understand it, to review the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, which is I guess—I do not know the number—somewhere in the order of 2,000–3,000 people and figure out 

where there can be cuts made. Now, that is civilian personnel in 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This is one of the misleading 

things about management in headquarters is that, of course, there 

is contract support and there are other support elements in there 

that you do not see on the surface. But I expect it is something that 

we will look at actively and see where we can bring it down. Not 

just the Office of the Secretary of Defense because one of the problems with the Department is we have so many different management headquarters, and we need to focus on all of them. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me just say this. I do not want to take a 

lot of time. You know, when you look at the support and look what 

is going on, we spend—what—$600 billion, $650 billion on defense 

right now. When you look at all the other countries combined and 

where we are—we are a superpower and we want to remain that 

superpower and we want to make sure that our people are the best 

trained, best equipped, and have the latest technology. We are always on the vision of the cutting edge of what is the next technology we need to keep world peace. I am in favor of every bit of 

that. 

I have to look people in the eye in West Virginia and basically 

say, well, we have to cut here, here, and here because we had to 

spend here, here, and here. Efficiencies. Without the audits, without knowing what is going on, without proving business decisions, 

running an organization, the largest in the world, the size of the 

Pentagon, it is going to take tough management. Someone is going 

to bite the bullet here. 

When you come back to us and say, listen, we have looked at everything humanly possible and with all of our incurred costs, we 

just cannot, that is fine. But if there are ways to run it better— 

and that is where I think there is more efficiencies to be gotten out 

of this, that is what I am looking for. 

Mr. LEVINE. Yes, Senator. You have had the testimony before the 

committee of the Service Chiefs telling you that with the sequestration level budgets, we do not have the money to support the force 

structure we have now. Absolutely, wherever we can find efficiencies, wherever we can get savings from the infrastructure and 

the support services, we need to do that. 

Senator MANCHIN. When I look at the Guard, being a former 

Governor—and I know Senator King being a former Governor—we 

are really fond of our Guard because of what we ask them to do 

every day. This is not the Guard that we knew. This is not the 

Guard of 20 years ago. This is a whole different Guard. They are 

going on the front lines prepared, ready to go. I do not know why 

we do not utilize them more for cost savings than going into the 

contracting route that we have gone. That just does not make any 

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sense to me. I am anxious to get that report. I know that Senator 

McCaskill asked you about that. 

Mr. LEVINE. Yes. Of course, you have the Independent Commission on the Army which will be looking at that issue and coming 

back to you within the next year or so. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. I have one final question. Senator McCain and I 

were talking back forth about how we have told the Pentagon to 

get an audit. The question is there are agencies—and Senator 

McCain reminded me—Homeland Security has a private outside 

auditor that comes in. But I think we are jumping over a basic 

question which is can the Department of Defense be audited? Has 

anyone ever asked the outside experts to come in and just answer 

the first question, i.e., yes, it can be audited but you have to have 

these changes, these changes, these changes, these changes? I 

think we have assumed it is auditable, and then you have not been 

able to do it. It is frustrating. Will one of the first questions you 

ask be, can we audit this place? 

Mr. LEVINE. Back in 2001 or 2002, I helped write a piece of legislation, advised the committee on a piece of legislation which said 

essentially do not even try to audit the Pentagon right now. What 

it said is you need to determine that you are at a state where your 

books and records are in a good enough shape that it is worth hiring an auditor and spending the money on an auditor before you 

plunge money into that because right now they are so bad that you 

are just sending good money after bad. You cannot do it right now. 

There is now a process, which we have in law and it has been 

in law for several years, which says the Department has to assert 

that they are audit-ready before they can spend money for auditors. They are now reaching a point where they are willing to make 

those assertions. As I say, there has been a definite progress over 

that period of time. We are not where we need to be. 

Frankly, I think that one of the things that the committee needs 

to think about and the Department needs to think about is if I am 

right and we do not make the 2017 deadline, how do we keep that 

pressure on after 2017 because the 2017 deadline has put some 

real pressure on the Department to make improvements. But you 

have to think, okay, so if you get to 2017 and it did not happen, 

how do we make sure that the same pressure remains on in 2018 

and we do not just say, well, we blew it, now we are going to give 

up and go home because we cannot afford to do that. 

Senator REED. Just a final quick point. I thank the chairman for 

his indulgence. 

That process is sort of self-certification. We are ready. 

Mr. LEVINE. Right. 

Senator REED. Would it not make sense to have a private auditor 

to come in and say, yes, they are ready, we have looked at it, the 

systems are in place, et cetera? Because I think some of the problems are, ala the Marine Corps, we are ready. 

Mr. LEVINE. The Comptroller is working with major accounting 

firms on that exact process. In fact, one of the issues they have had 

over time is they have to have audit firms consult with them on 

that issue. They are also going to have independent audit firms 

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come in and help in the audit when it takes place. They have to 

make sure they get them lined up so that they are not all conflicted 

out because they have to have both audit firms to advise them and 

audit firms to conduct the audit. But, yes, they are doing that. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Just to pursue that line again, I see nothing 

wrong with bringing in an outside auditor to look at the whole situation and see if they cannot do the auditing. The Department of 

Homeland Security somehow was able to get audited—they are a 

pretty big organization—by an outside auditor. They have been 

screwing around for 15 years now. 

Mr. LEVINE. We have to get it done. I agree with you, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. An outside auditor I think is at least an option that we ought to explore or even try. 

I congratulate you again on your appointment. We look forward 

to working with you. I want to assure you the next hearing will not 

be nearly as pleasant as this one was. 

[Laughter.] 

We congratulate you and also appreciate you very much, and 

congratulations to your wonderful family. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:32 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Peter K. Levine by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between the Deputy 

Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense and each of the following? 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for all programs and activities 

of the Department of Defense. Accordingly, the Deputy Chief Management Officer 

(DCMO) is responsible and accountable to the Secretary in the performance of his 

duties. In addition, as a result of a recent reorganization within the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the DCMO is directly responsible to the Secretary for the management and support of the OSD staff; the management and protection of the Pentagon reservation; and selected intelligence oversight matters. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. Under section 132 of title 10, U.S.C., the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

serves as the Chief Management Officer (CMO) of the Department of Defense. Section 132a provides that the DCMO shall assist the Deputy Secretary in the performance of his duties as CMO. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has delegated duties 

and authorities to the DCMO to assist in effectively and efficiently organizing the 

business operations of the Department. 

Question. The Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC). 

Answer. I understand that section 901(c) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ 

McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 repealed the requirement for the DBSMC. The functions of the DBSMC have been absorbed as a 

part of the Deputy’s Management Advisory Group (DMAG). Business reform, DOD 

strategy and budget discussions are all subjects of the DMAG. The DMAG is cochaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and includes as members the Under Secretaries of the military departments, the military vice chiefs, and key OSD staff. If confirmed, I would serve 

as a voting member of the DMAG and would be responsible for bringing business 

management agenda items to the DMAG. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Financial Management (Comptroller). 

Answer. The DCMO works with the Comptroller to improve the financial management of the Department and move toward an auditable financial statement by improving the business systems and processes of the Department. 

181 

Question. The Other Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. The DCMO works with the Under Secretaries to review and improve key 

business processes, modernize business systems, and implement Department-wide 

management initiatives. The DCMO is currently working with the Under Secretaries to carry out the Business Process and Systems Review (BPSR) directed by the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. The DCMO works with the Assistant Secretaries to modernize and improve the business systems and processes of the Department of Defense. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the Secretaries of the military 

departments to ensure that the business management and modernization objectives 

of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense are carried out by 

the military departments. 

Question. The Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The Under Secretaries of the military departments serve as the CMOs 

of their respective organizations and, as such, have enterprise responsibility for 

overseeing business operations within their departments. The Office of the DCMO 

interacts routinely with these officials on business transformation initiatives. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the CMOs of the military departments to carry 

out the business management and modernization objectives of the Secretary and the 

Deputy Secretary. 

Question. The Investment Review Boards of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The DCMO provides direction and guidance to the pre-certification authorities of the military departments to ensure the consistency and rigor of the investment management process throughout the Department. The Defense Business 

Council, which is co-chaired by the DCMO and the CIO, reviews of the results of 

the service investment reviews. 

Question. The Comptrollers of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The DCMO works with the Comptrollers of the military departments to 

modernize financial systems and processes, and ensure that business modernization 

efforts within their areas of responsibility are carried out in a manner consistent 

with the goals and objectives established by the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. The DCMO also serves as a member of the Financial Improvement and 

Audit Readiness Governance Board. In this capacity, the DCMO works with the 

Comptrollers of the military departments to further their efforts toward achieving 

financial audit readiness. 

Question. The Business Transformation Offices of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The Under Secretaries of the military departments, in their capacity as 

CMOs, oversee the business transformation offices (BTOs) of their respective departments. The DCMO works with the CMOs and the BTOs to ensure that the military 

departments carry out the business management and modernization objectives of 

the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. 

Question. The Inspector General of the Department of Defense. 

Answer. The DCMO responds to inquiries and recommendations of the Government Accountability Office and the DOD Inspector General relative to defense business operations and the operation of the Office of the DCMO. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense. 

Answer. The DCMO receives legal advice and guidance from the General Counsel 

of the Department of Defense on matters relating to defense business operations 

and the operation of the Office of the DCMO. 

Question. The Directors of the Defense Agencies. 

Answer. Under a recent OSD reorganization, the DCMO is responsible for two Defense Agencies, the Washington Headquarters Service and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency. The DCMO works with other Defense agencies to further the Department’s business transformation goals. 

DUTIES OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

Question. Section 132 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense serves as the Chief Management Officer (CMO) of the Department of Defense. The Deputy Secretary is to be assisted in this capacity by a Deputy Chief 

Management Officer (DCMO). The NDAA for fiscal year 2015 includes several 

changes to the CMO and DCMO structure scheduled to take effect in 2017. 

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the CMO and 

DCMO of the Department of Defense? 

Answer. The duties and responsibilities of the CMO and DCMO, as prescribed by 

the Secretary of Defense, are to: (a) ensure that the Department can carry out its 

182 

strategic improvement plans; (b) ensure that the core business missions of the Department are optimally aligned to support the warfighting mission; (c) establish performance goals and measures for improving and evaluating overall economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and monitor and measure the progress of the Department; 

and (d) develop and maintain a Department-wide strategic plan for business reform. 

In general, the duty of the DCMO is to assist the CMO in carrying out those objectives and, if delegated, assume primary responsibility for those functions. As a result of a recent OSD staff reorganization, the DCMO is also accountable to the Secretary of Defense for the effective organization and operation of the OSD staff; the 

effective operation and protection of the Pentagon reservation; and for the execution 

of select intelligence oversight responsibilities. 

Question. What specific duties and responsibilities do you expect the Deputy Secretary to assign to you in your capacity as DCMO? 

Answer. I understand that the Deputy Secretary has directed the DCMO to conduct a review of the organizations and business processes of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the defense agencies, with the objective of streamlining 

organizations and improving business processes. I expect that the Deputy Secretary 

may also direct the DCMO, in coordination with the CMOs of the military departments, to ensure that similar reviews are conducted by the military departments. 

If confirmed, I expect to play a key role in these efforts. 

Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify 

you to perform these duties and responsibilities? 

Answer. For the last 18 years, I have served on the staff of the Senate Armed 

Services Committee as minority counsel, General Counsel, and Staff Director. In 

this capacity, I have helped to advise committee members on defense management 

issues, including the committee’s oversight of DOD business systems and processes. 

I have also participated in committee reviews of previous efforts to streamline business processes and achieve management efficiencies in OSD and the military departments. Through this work, I have developed a familiarity with key DOD organizations and business processes and I have worked closely with DOD leaders responsible for managing and overseeing those organizations and processes. I believe that 

the knowledge and experience I have gained through my work for the Armed Services Committee provides a solid foundation for the work I will be asked to perform 

as DCMO. 

Question. Do you believe that the CMO and DCMO have the resources and authority needed to carry out the business transformation of the Department of Defense? 

Answer. I do not believe that any one component of the Department of Defense 

has the resources, knowledge, and capabilities necessary to carry out the comprehensive business transformation that the Department needs. However, I believe 

that the DCMO, with the support of the Deputy Secretary, has both the capacity 

to bring together needed resources, knowledge, and capabilities from key organizations throughout the Department and the authority to direct those resources as necessary to carry out the business transformation effort. 

Question. What role do you believe the CMO and DCMO of the Department of Defense should play in the planning, development, and implementation of specific business systems by the military departments? 

Answer. I believe that the military departments should retain full responsibility 

for planning, developing and implementing their own specific business systems. 

Oversight for the acquisition of new business systems has been delegated to the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, not the 

DCMO. The role of the CMO and the DCMO is to ensure that the military departments conduct appropriate business process reengineering before acquiring new systems or modernizing existing systems, that appropriate governance processes are in 

place to keep the customization of commercial, off-the-shelf business systems to a 

minimum, and that new and existing business systems of the military department 

are consistent with the business enterprise architecture of the Department of Defense. The CMO and the DCMO can also play an important role in identifying gaps 

and deficiencies in the business systems and processes of the military departments 

and components and ensuring that the military departments and components work 

to address those gaps and deficiencies in an expeditious manner. 

Question. Do you believe that the DCMO should have clearly defined decisionmaking authorities, or should the DCMO serve exclusively as an advisor to the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO? 

Answer. I understand that the DCMO has some statutorily-assigned decisionmaking authorities, particularly in the investment review process conducted pursuant to section 2222 of title 10, U.S.C.. The DCMO may be assigned additional decisionmaking responsibilities by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. However, I believe 

183 

that the DCMO can only be effective if he works closely with the Deputy Secretary 

and has the full support of the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the DCMO? 

Answer. I believe that the two major challenges facing the DCMO are: (1) to help 

the Department achieve the management efficiencies and savings that it will continue to need in an austere budget environment; and (2) to help the Department 

implement the business systems and processes needed to produce a clean audit and 

provide senior managers with sound information on which to base management decisions. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. With regard to the first challenge, if confirmed I expect to play a key role 

in carrying out the review of management organizations and processes directed by 

the Deputy Secretary. This review provides an important opportunity to streamline 

management organizations, align resources with priorities, and improve business 

processes throughout the Department. It should also provide an opportunity to identify and address DOD business processes that have become dysfunctional—taking 

too long, costing too much, and producing less than optimal results. It is my hope 

that this review will not only result in significant savings, but also in more effective 

management and improved outcomes. 

With regard to the second challenge, the military departments and defense agencies have already committed to major investments in new business systems. In the 

limited time remaining in this Administration, dramatic changes of course for these 

investments would probably be counterproductive. However, I believe that that the 

DCMO can help optimize ongoing investments by enforcing the investment review 

process and ensuring that the military departments and defense agencies continue 

to reengineer and improve their business processes, institute appropriate governance structures to minimize customization of commercial, off-the-shelf systems, and 

take full advantage of the capabilities of their new and existing business systems. 

PRIORITIES

Question. What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed, with respect to 

issues which must be addressed by the DCMO? 

Answer. My top priorities, if confirmed, will be to address the two major challenges addressed in response to the previous question: achieving management efficiencies and improving the business systems and processes of the Department. 

MANAGEMENT GOALS

Question. If confirmed, what key management performance goals would you want 

to accomplish, and what standards or metrics would you use to judge whether you 

have accomplished them? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to focus on maintaining and improving support to 

the Department in its business operations while reducing the overall cost of those 

operations. I would expect to develop standards or metrics based on savings and on 

customer-oriented results per unit of cost expended to achieve the results. I understand that the ongoing benchmarking initiative implemented by OMB contains some 

relevant metrics that could serve as examples, such as the cost of human resource 

support per population supported. 

Question. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) makes the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense—as the Chief Management Office (CMO) and Chief Operating 

Officer (COO)—responsible for improving the management and performance of the 

department. The Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) serves as the agency 

Performance Improvement Officer under GPRAMA and is to advise and assist the 

CMO in areas such as performance planning and measurement. 

If confirmed, what actions would you and your office take to prioritize as well as 

improve DOD’s ability to plan for and manage achievement of performance goals 

across the department? 

Answer. I understand that Office of the DCMO has started to reform performance 

goals to ensure they are more appropriately aligned to the Department’s objectives. 

I am not yet in a position to judge the effectiveness of that effort. If confirmed, I 

expect to use my role as the DCMO and as a member of the DMAG to advocate 

alignment of measures to the Department’s priorities. 

Question. As required by GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, the Administration 

has established certain cross agency priority goals, such as benchmarking of mission 

support operations, cybersecurity, and security clearances, to which DOD must contribute. 

184 

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that DOD is contributing to 

government-wide success on cross agency priority goals? 

Answer. I understand that one of the duties of the DCMO is to serve as the Department’s representative to the President’s Management Council, which has responsibility for cross-agency priority goals. If confirmed, I expect to coordinate DOD 

support for appropriate cross-agency goals to ensure the success of both the Department and the success of the broader Federal agency community. 

Question. In July 2008, DOD issued its first Strategic Management Plan, which 

was intended to serve as the department’s highest-level plan for improving defense 

business operations. This plan and its subsequent iterations were to outline DOD’s 

priority business goals, objectives, measures, and initiatives, and advance the department’s performance management activities. They were also to be aligned with 

the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Performance Budget. However, DOD’s 

Strategic Management Plan has not fully met these expectations nor does it fully 

meet the GPRAMA requirement of an Agency Strategic Plan to be issued by 2014. 

If confirmed, what actions would you and your office take to ensure the timely 

development of a department-wide strategic plan that can effectively improve business operations while support the warfighter during an environment of continued 

budget austerity? 

Answer. I understand that work is underway on a revised Agency Strategic Plan 

that more closely conforms to the GPRAMA requirements. If confirmed, I will work 

with the Department to complete this plan and improve the Department’s ability 

to objectively assess its performance and ensure that resources are applied to key 

challenges. 

STAFFING AND RESOURCES

Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2014 contains a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for streamlining Department of Defense management headquarters by reducing the size of staffs, eliminating tiers of management, 

cutting functions that provide little or no addition value, and consolidating overlapping and duplicative program offices. 

GAO has recently reported that ‘‘DOD’s data on its headquarters personnel lacked 

the completeness and reliability necessary for use in making efficiency assessments 

and decisions.’’ Further, that ‘‘DOD did not have an accurate accounting of resources 

being devoted to management headquarters to use a starting point for tracking reductions to such headquarters.’’ 

In your view, is the GAO correct? If so and if confirmed, what will you do to address these issues? 

Answer. I believe that the GAO conclusions quoted above are correct. As I understand it, the statutory baseline for measuring the size of DOD management headquarters was established in the 1990s and was not as clearly defined as it should 

have been even then. With the extensive changes to DOD organizational structures 

that have taken place over the last two decades, measurements against the original 

baseline would probably not be meaningful even if they were possible. 

In my view, the meaningful measurement of DOD streamlining efforts will require the establishment of a new baseline that is relevant to the Department’s current management structure. It is my understanding that, as a part of the review 

directed by the Deputy Secretary, the DCMO has begun to collect data that could 

be used to establish such a baseline. If confirmed, I will endeavor to carry forward 

this process. 

Question. What is your view on reductions to the size and composition of Department of Defense management headquarters? 

Answer. I believe that significant reductions to the size and composition of DOD 

management headquarters are not only possible, but essential. Ideally, cuts should 

be made not only at headquarters, but through entire management processes. However, I do not believe that reductions should take the form of across-the-board cuts. 

Cutting management personnel without improving management processes will result in fewer people to do the same work, creating bottlenecks and backlogs that 

are counterproductive to the mission of the Department. 

I do not believe that there are any significant management processes in the Department of Defense that cannot be streamlined and made more efficient. Making 

process changes will be difficult and time-consuming and may require changes to 

the culture of the Department of Defense. However, significant improvements can 

and should be made to enable the Department to reduce the size and composition 

of its management headquarters and achieve savings without undermining the mission. 

185 

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in ensuring savings are 

achieved? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to help direct the Deputy Secretary’s initiative to 

streamline the management processes of the Department of Defense. This initiative 

should provide an opportunity to achieve the reductions in the size and composition 

of DOD management headquarters described above. 

Question. Do you believe that the Department of Defense can achieve significant 

additional savings in this area? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What types of expertise do you believe the office of the DCMO needs 

to effectively carry out its mission? 

Answer. The DCMO needs expertise in business systems, business process reengineering, business case analysis, and program assessment. It also needs personnel with a thorough understanding of the organization and business processes 

of the Department of Defense. 

Question. What mix of employees, contractors, and individuals detailed from other 

organizations inside and outside the Department of Defense should the DCMO rely 

upon to provide it with needed expertise? 

Answer. I understand that the office of the DCMO has some organic capacity and 

some contractor support in each of the areas described in response to the previous 

question. To successfully streamline the Department’s management processes, the 

office will need to draw on other centers of expertise in the Department and to partner with the principal offices responsible for the management processes under consideration. 

Question. Do you believe the Office of the DCMO has the staffing and resources 

needed to effectively carry out its mission? 

Answer. I do not believe that any one component of the Department of Defense 

has the resources, knowledge, and capabilities necessary to carry out the comprehensive business transformation that the Department needs. However, I believe 

that the DCMO, with the support of the Deputy Secretary, has both the capacity 

to bring together needed resources, knowledge, and capabilities from key organizations throughout the Department and the authority to direct those resources as necessary to carry out the business transformation effort. 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR BUSINESS MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION

Question. The Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 converts the Deputy Chief Management Officer 

(DCMO) to the Under Secretary of Defense for Business Management and Information, who will also serve as the Chief Information Officer. This new position, to 

begin in February 2017, is expected to provide greater authority to supervise management of business operations and systems. 

What are your views on this new Under Secretary of Defense for Business Management and Information position? 

Answer. I support the legislation. I believe that the merger of the DCMO position 

with the CIO position will serve to strengthen both positions. In my view, however, 

the title and responsibilities of the position are less important to the success of the 

mission of the office than the alignment of the position with the Deputy Secretary 

and the Deputy Secretary’s ongoing support for, and engagement in, that mission. 

Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities prior to the implementation 

of the new position in February 2017, and what actions would you take and what 

resources would you need to achieve those priorities? 

Answer. I understand that some preliminary planning and guidance will be needed before February 2017 to ensure that the new position can get off the ground in 

a timely and effective manner. If confirmed, I will work to identify the necessary 

steps and ensure that they are completed. 

Question. The Government Accountability Office reported in December 2007 on 

key strategies for implementing Chief Operating Officer (COO)/Chief Management 

Officer (CMO) positions in government, which includes defining the specific roles 

and responsibilities of the COO/CMO position, and ensuring that the COO/CMO has 

a high level of authority and clearly delineating reporting relationships, among 

other strategies. 

What do you believe would be the most effective approach to implementing the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Business Management and Information position, and 

what additional resources or flexibilities would be needed to do so? 

Answer. I believe that the alignment of the DCMO and, in the future, the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Business Management and Information with the Deputy 

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Secretary of Defense is the most promising approach to ensure the success of the 

position. 

I am not aware at this time of any additional resources or flexibilities that will 

be needed to implement the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Business 

Management and Information. If I become aware of any such requirements, I will 

work with the committee and the Department to address them. 

BUSINESS ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE AND TRANSITION PLAN

Question. Section 2222 of title 10, U.S.C., requires that the Secretary of Defense 

develop a comprehensive business enterprise architecture and transition plan to 

guide the development of its business systems and processes. 

What is your understanding of the role of the DCMO in the implementation of 

the business enterprise architecture and transition plan required by section 2222? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has chosen to implement the 

requirement for a business enterprise architecture and transition plan through a 

‘‘federated’’ approach in which the DCMO is responsible for developing and maintaining the top level architecture, while leaving it to the military departments to 

fill in most of the detail. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of DOD’s comprehensive 

business enterprise architecture and transition plan? 

Answer. While the Department has made considerable progress in refining its 

business enterprise architecture since the enactment of section 2222, I do not believe that the business architecture and transition plan developed by the Department is as mature as Congress hoped it would be when the provision was enacted. 

In particular, I do not believe that the current transition plan provides the comprehensive roadmap needed for the replacement, upgrade, or decommissioning of 

legacy business systems that are outdated, duplicative, or unreliable. 

Question. Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the successful transformation of DOD’s 

business systems? 

Answer. I believe that the Department can make, and has made, significant 

progress by developing more limited plans that have helped to guide specific portfolios of business systems. However, I do not believe the Department will ultimately 

be able to complete the transformation process without a comprehensive, integrated, 

enterprise-wide approach—regardless whether that approach takes the form of a 

single plan or the federated plans currently envisioned by the Department. 

Question. What are your views on the importance and role of timely and accurate 

financial and business information in managing operations and holding leaders accountable? 

Answer. DOD leaders are called upon to make business decisions on a day-to-day 

basis—for example, decisions on whether to hire additional employees, whether to 

extend contracts, whether to reduce the number of managers in an organization, or 

whether to enter into multi-year contracts. On occasion, they must make much larger decisions—for example, decisions on whether to shut down a command and realign its functions, whether to rely on the active force or the Reserves to perform 

a mission, or whether to upgrade an existing weapon system instead of acquiring 

a new one. Financial and business data is crucial to all of these business decisions, 

and in my view, better data is likely to result in better decisions. 

Question. How would you address a situation in which you found that reliable, 

useful, and timely financial and business information was not available for these 

purposes? 

Answer. I do not think that the Department can afford to be paralyzed by the inadequacy of its financial and business information. A decision not to act—for example, a decision not to reform a defective business process or consolidate duplicative 

organizations—is every bit as much of a decision as the decision to act. I believe 

that DOD managers have a responsibility to make use of the best business and financial data available, even if that data is less than perfect, and exercise their best 

judgment on a case-by-case basis. 

Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial and business information 

available to DOD managers? 

Answer. The quality of financial and business information available to DOD managers should improve as the Department’s business systems and processes improve. 

Sound controls, improved interfaces, and the elimination of unnecessary manual 

transmission of data should improve data quality. Business process reengineering 

should result in data that is more relevant to the tasks to be performed. 

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Although the DCMO is not directly responsible for the acquisition of new business 

systems, the DCMO can contribute to the improvement of business systems and 

processes through the ongoing investment review process and the business transformation process launched by the Deputy Secretary. 

Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in assuring that appropriate business process re-engineering efforts associated with business system programs have been undertaken? 

Answer. One of the key responsibilities of the DCMO is to ensure that appropriate 

business process re-engineering efforts are undertaken before any new business system is acquired or any existing business system is upgraded. Business process reengineering is not a one-time effort, and there is also much that the DCMO can do 

to ensure continuing reengineering efforts to optimize the fielding of business system programs and to ensure that their capabilities are fully realized. If confirmed, 

I will take these responsibilities very seriously. 

Question. What metrics do you believe should be used to ensure that the business 

process supported by the defense business system program is or will be as streamlined and efficient as practicable? 

Answer. I understand that there is a body of practice in the commercial sector 

that can be brought to bear on the question of measuring the success of a defense 

system business program in improving the business process. Examples of these 

metrics include reduced processing time; improved accuracy of information; better 

responsiveness to customers and overall reduction in cost of operations. 

Question. What metrics do you believe should be used to ensure that the need to 

tailor commercial-off-the-shelf systems to meet unique requirements or incorporate 

unique requirements or incorporate unique interfaces has been eliminated or reduced to the maximum extent practicable? 

Answer. I understand that there is a body of practice from the commercial sector 

that would suggest appropriate metrics to include measures of requirements stability, numbers of ‘‘RICE’’ objects (the reports and extensions that have to be configured), and actual numbers of interfaces. Loss of control of these elements would suggest either a weak management structure, or alternatively, a bad initial assessment 

of the applicability of a commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) product. To avoid unnecessary and expensive customization of COTS business systems, the Department needs 

not only sound metrics, but also effective governance systems. 

Question. Section 2222 requires that the DBSMC review and approve all major 

defense business system modernization programs to ensure that they are in compliance with the Department’s business enterprise architecture and transition plan. 

What is your understanding of the extent to which the process for the Defense 

Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) review and approval has ensured that business system modernization programs are fully coordinated with the 

business enterprise architecture and transition plan, as intended? 

Answer. As indicated above, I do not believe that the current business enterprise 

architecture and transition plan is as comprehensive as Congress intended it to be. 

I do not have any reason to believe that the investment review process has failed 

to coordinate business system modernization programs with the architecture, but 

that coordination has probably not been as helpful as it might have been, had the 

architecture been more complete. 

Question. How meaningful do you believe DBSMC review and approval has been? 

Answer. I believe that the DBSMC review and approval process has contributed 

to the Department’s understanding of its business systems programs and provided 

a useful incentive for business process reengineering. However, I am concerned that 

the current low thresholds for DBSMC review may have contributed to a review and 

approval process that has failed to recognize its full potential. If confirmed, I plan 

to review this issue and seek appropriate changes. 

Question. Do you believe that the DBSMC has the expertise and resources needed 

to conduct a meaningful, independent review of proposed business system modernization programs, or is the DBSMC reliant on the representations made by the 

military departments and their program managers? 

Answer. I believe that the DBSMC has important expertise and resources, and 

can draw on other resources of the Department, for this purpose. However, I am 

concerned the current low thresholds for DBSMC review may have resulted in a 

tendency to rely too much on representations made by the military departments and 

their program managers. 

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving or changing 

the DBSMC review process? 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to review the DBSMC process and look for opportunities to make the process more rigorous. 

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL HIGH RISK LIST

Question. The Department of Defense remains on GAO’s High Risk List in the following areas: 

(1) Business Transformation 

(2) Business Systems Modernization 

(3) Support Infrastructure Management 

(4) Financial Management 

(5) Supply Chain Management 

(6) Weapon System Acquisition 

(7) Contract Management 

What is the role of the DCMO for enabling DOD to be removed from the GAO 

High Risk list in each of these areas? 

Answer. The DCMO is the senior official of the Department of Defense with primary responsibility for business transformation. This transformation will require an 

enduring effort over a period of years. If confirmed, I plan to give the effort my highest priority. 

Individual business systems modernization programs are carried out by the military departments and defense agencies. Through the investment review process, the 

DCMO exercises considerable influence over these programs. If confirmed, I will emphasize the need for continued business process reengineering to optimize the fielding of business system programs and to ensure that their capabilities are fully realized. 

The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is the senior official of the Department of Defense with primary responsibility for financial management. The DCMO 

can contribute to the financial management effort by working to improve the business systems and processes of the Department, so that the financial data generated 

by those processes is more timely and reliable. If confirmed, I expect to work closely 

with the Comptroller in the effort to move the Department toward an auditable financial statement. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is the 

senior official of the Department of Defense with primary responsibility for support 

infrastructure management, supply chain management, weapon system acquisition, 

and contract management. The DCMO can contribute to improved management in 

these areas by working with the Under Secretary to assess existing management 

practices and identify areas for potential streamlining and reengineering. If confirmed, I will actively look for opportunities to improve these management processes. 

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Question. What is your understanding of DOD’s efforts and progress toward the 

goal of being able to produce auditable financial statements? 

Answer. I have long been skeptical of the ability of the Department to achieve the 

statutory timeline for producing auditable financial statements. However, I believe 

that the Department has made considerable progress toward this objective and is 

much closer to being able to produce auditable financial statements today than it 

was five years ago. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current version of the Financial Improvement Audit Readiness (FIAR) plan prepared by the Department of Defense? 

Answer. I believe that the FIAR plan has steadily improved over the years. While 

I am sure there are still gaps and inconsistencies in the FIAR plan, I believe that 

it largely serves its purpose by providing helpful guideposts for the Department’s 

efforts to achieve auditable financial statements. 

Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to improve the 

FIAR plan? 

Answer. This is an issue that I will review closely, if confirmed. 

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the Department’s efforts to produce auditable financial statements? 

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is the senior official of the 

Department of Defense with primary responsibility for financial management. The 

DCMO can contribute to the financial management effort by working to improve the 

business systems and processes of the Department, so that the financial data generated by those processes is more timely and reliable. I understand that the DCMO 

also plays a role in the governance process for the FIAR plan. If confirmed, I expect 

to work closely with the Comptroller in the effort to move the Department toward 

an auditable financial statement. 

189 

Question. Do you believe that the Department is likely to meet the current 2017 

statutory objective for ensuring that its financial statements are validated as ready 

for audit? 

Answer. I have long been skeptical of the ability of the Department to achieve the 

statutory timeline for producing auditable financial statements. Senior officials of 

the Department have expressed a greater degree of optimism that this timeline can 

be met. If confirmed, I will work with them to understand whether or not this optimism is realistic. Regardless whether the statutory objective is achieved, I believe 

that it has served a useful purpose by prompting aggressive action by the Department to make improvements to business systems and processes without which an 

auditable financial statement would not be possible. 

Question. What is the likeliness that this audit will produce a clean opinion? In 

your view, how long is it likely to be from the time when the Department certifies 

its financial statements as ‘‘ready for audit’’ to the time when the Department 

achieves a clean audit opinion? If confirmed, what specific actions would you propose taking to promote compliance with the statutory objective? 

Answer. I do not believe it is likely that the first round of audits is likely to 

produce a clean opinion. As I understand it, financial audits are a learning process 

through which the Department expects to identify continuing deficiencies in its financial data, which can then be remedied. Based on discussions with financial professionals, I believe that it could take several cycles before the Department achieves 

a clean audit opinion. If confirmed, I will work with the Comptroller to identify 

steps that the Department can take to improve its business systems and processes, 

so that those systems and processes can produce the quality of financial data needed 

to produce a clean audit. 

Question. What is your understanding of what the validation of audit readiness 

means? What steps will the Department go through to validate its financial statements as ready for audit and when will these steps be taken? 

Answer. As I understand it, validation of audit readiness means that Department 

has performed an internal test to assure itself that appropriate controls are in place 

and functioning prior to asserting readiness for inspection by an external auditor. 

I understand that the Department already has taken action to validate preparation 

for audit including the hiring of qualified financial process consultants to help review internal controls; testing of financial systems in accordance with the GAO’s 

Federal Information Systems Audit Controls Manual (FISCAM) and developing associated corrective action plans; and conducting trial runs of audits in assessable 

areas. I understand these internal validation checks will continue as the Department seeks to achieve full audit readiness. 

Question. How will the costs and delays of implementing major Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems in the Department affect its ability to achieve an 

auditable Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR)? 

Answer. I understand that the military departments and defense agencies have 

been working on back-up plans to ensure that they are able to produce auditable 

data in areas where ERPs and other upgraded business and financial systems have 

not yet been fielded. These plans appear to include building new controls into existing business processes and measures to ensure data traceability in legacy business 

systems. If confirmed, I will work with the Comptroller to understand the efficacy 

of these interim measures. 

Question. The National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal year 2010 and fiscal 

year 2013 require that DOD validate the audit readiness of DOD’s Statement of 

Budgetary Resources (SBR) by September 30, 2014. Why has the Department 

missed this audit deadline? 

Answer. The Department validated the audit readiness of its Schedule of Budgetary Activity (SBA) prior to September 30, 2014, but was unable to validate its 

SBR by that time. The difference between the SBA and the SBR is that the SBA 

includes only current-year budgetary activity, while the SBR also reflects prior-year 

transactions. 

As I understand it, the Department has determined that its business systems and 

processes are now capable of producing auditable financial data on ongoing transactions. However, the Department concluded that it would be prohibitively expensive to fully document earlier transactions, which were conducted in legacy systems 

without appropriate controls. 

Section 1005 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2013, which 

established the 2014 objective, also directed the Department to avoid ‘‘an 

unaffordable or unsustainable level of one-time fixes and manual work-arounds’’ in 

its effort to meet that objective. For this reason, I understand that the Department 

chose to take a more affordable and sustainable path to a full SBR audit by rolling 

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in the audit over time, covering a longer period of budget activity with each successive year. 

BUSINESS PROCESS AND SYSTEMS REVIEW

Question. In August 2014, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Deputy 

Chief Management Officer and Chief Information Officer to co-lead a review of business processes and the supporting information technology systems within the organizations of the Principal Staff assistants (PSA) and their associated defense agencies and field activities. This review is intended to provide the PSAs with information that will help them clarify whether their organizations are aimed at department-wide outcomes as well as identify resources allocated to outcomes, obstacles 

to achieving those outcomes, and activities that might be improved or eliminated. 

This effort has already identified potential savings. 

If confirmed, what actions would you and your office take to ensure that the potential savings from these business process and system reviews are achieved? 

Answer. As I understand it, the DOD Business Process and Systems Review 

(BPSR) process will take place in two phases. The first phase will identify potential 

changes to DOD organizations, activities, and processes that could yield savings. 

The second phase will further study those organizations, activities, and processes 

to quantify the potential savings and establish a plan of action for achieving those 

savings. I understand that the first phase of the BPSR process has been completed 

for some OSD organizations and their associated defense agencies and field activities. The DCMO and the CIO are currently working to initiate the phase 2 process 

for those organizations and activities, and to schedule phase 1 reviews for the additional OSD organizations and activities. If confirmed, I will aggressively pursue this 

process. 

Question. What other DOD components—beyond the reviews of headquarters and 

Office of the Secretary of Defense entities already underway—could benefit from a 

similar review to identify potential savings from, among other things, improving or 

eliminating activities? 

Answer. I believe that every management headquarters element of the Department of Defense, including at a minimum the organizations and entities listed in 

section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2014, could 

benefit from a review to identify potential savings through changing or reducing the 

size of staffs, eliminating tiers of management, cutting functions that provide little 

or no added value, and consolidating overlapping and duplicative programs and offices. 

Question. What role should Congress play in the reduction of personnel or the divesting of owned or leased facilities that might result from this review? 

Answer. Congress plays an important role in prompting the Department of Defense to do the hard work of conducting management reviews to identify potential 

savings through reductions in personnel. Congress also plays an essential role in 

providing the authority to achieve needed efficiencies by reducing personnel and divesting owned or leased facilities that are excess to needs. 

I believe that significant reductions to the size and composition of workforce are 

possible. However, I do not believe that reductions should take the form of acrossthe-board cuts. In my view, cutting personnel without improving management processes or divesting functions will result in fewer people to do the same work, creating 

bottlenecks and backlogs that are counterproductive to the mission of the Department. 

BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION

Question. Since 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has designated 

the Department of Defense’s approach to business transformation as ‘‘high risk’’ due 

to its vulnerability to waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement. However, GAO has 

recently found that the Department has not implemented leading performance management practices for Federal agencies in the area of business transformation. GAO 

also found that DOD’s performance measures are ‘‘not clear, comprehensive, or 

aligned with its strategic goals.’’ 

Do you believe that the Department needs to more clearly define roles and responsibilities, as well as relationships among key positions and governance entities? 

Answer. I understand that the Department has continued to refine its governance 

processes, including making more explicit the role of the DCMO in business management transformation. The Deputy Secretary has reshaped the structure and 

functions of the Deputy’s Management Advisory Group (DMAG), to include making 

the DCMO a full member of that body. If confirmed, I will review this issue and 

determine whether further action is necessary. 

191 

Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department should take to achieve 

this objective? 

Answer. If confirmed, I review this issue and determine whether further action 

is necessary. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to more clearly define 

the Department’s strategic planning process, including mechanisms to guide and 

synchronize efforts to develop strategic plans; monitor the implementation of reform 

initiatives; and report progress, on a periodic basis, towards achieving established 

goals? 

Answer. I understand that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has recently undertaken a series of reforms to improve the strategic planning process, including the 

reshaping of the DMAG. If confirmed, I will work with the Deputy Secretary and 

others to identify and pursue potential improvements to these processes. 

ACQUISITION OF MAJOR AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Question. A number of the Department’s Major Automated Information Systems 

are over budget and behind schedule. GAO recently reported that even new programs are failing to establish initial baselines for cost, schedule, and performance. 

What is your assessment of the extent of the problems the Department faces in 

its acquisition of Major Automated Information Systems? 

Answer. It is my understanding that virtually every DOD acquisition of a major 

business system has suffered from cost overruns, schedule delays, customer resistance, and failure to meet performance requirements. In some cases, the Department 

has been able to work through these problems, but in other cases the problems have 

become so extreme that they have led to system failure and program cancellation. 

Question. What do you see as the root causes of these problems? 

Answer. In my view, there are three closely related root causes for most of these 

failures: failure of leadership, failure of planning, and failure to perform adequate 

business process engineering. Too often, the Department has sought to address deficiencies in its business systems by acquiring commercial solutions without adequately understanding its own business processes and planning the changes that 

will be needed to implement commercial solutions. 

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the DCMO in the management and oversight of Major Automated Information Systems? 

Answer. Although the DCMO is not directly responsible for the acquisition of new 

business systems, the DCMO plays a key role in the management and oversight of 

business systems through the ongoing investment review process. The role of the 

DCMO is to ensure that the military departments and defense agencies conduct appropriate business process reengineering before acquiring new systems or modernizing existing systems, that appropriate governance processes are in place to keep 

the customization of commercial, off-the-shelf business systems to a minimum, and 

that new and existing business systems of the military department are consistent 

with the business enterprise architecture of the Department of Defense. The DCMO 

can also play an important role in identifying gaps and deficiencies in the business 

systems and processes of the military departments and defense agencies, and ensuring that they work to address those gaps and deficiencies in an expeditious manner. 

GEOGRAPHIC AND FUNCTIONAL COMBATANT COMMAND MISSION AND HEADQUARTERSSUPPORT COSTS: 

Question. In May 2013 and June 2014, the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) reported on the considerable growth that has occurred over the last several 

years in the mission and headquarters-support costs of the geographic and functional combatant commands. GAO found that the commands do not conduct comprehensive, periodic evaluations that would help them ensure that they are properly 

sized and structured. As a result, there is little assurance that these commands can 

manage resources efficiently and meet their assigned missions. Through its Business Process and System Reviews of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and associated defense agencies, the Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer has 

identified opportunities for savings through restructuring and reorganizing resources to ensure that they are properly aligned with desired outcomes. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the GAO’s findings as well as the 

potential savings already identified as part of the Business Process and Systems Reviews currently underway? 

Answer. I am aware that the GAO found considerable growth in the size and cost 

of the combatant commands over the last decade. I understand that GAO identified 

some steps that the Department has taken to control those costs, but concluded that 

192 

more could be done in this regard. I am not aware that the BPSR review process 

has been extended to the combatant commands. 

Question. If confirmed, would you recommend that the geographic and functional 

combatant commands be subject to such reviews? If so, what actions would you propose or take to require and implement such reviews? 

Answer. I am in general agreement with the findings and recommendations of the 

two GAO reports referenced. I believe that every management headquarters element 

of the Department of Defense, including the combatant commands, could benefit 

from a review to identify potential savings through changing or reducing the size 

of staffs, eliminating tiers of management, cutting functions that provide little or 

no added value, and consolidating overlapping and duplicative programs and offices. 

I do not have a position as to whether the BPSR process is the best mechanism conducting such a review of the combatant commands. 

Question. In your view, how might the results of such reviews, if conducted, be 

used to improve the strategic analysis and decision making processes associated 

with the Unified Command Plan? 

Answer. I believe that the Unified Command Plan should be informed by a sound 

understanding of the existing organizations and capabilities of the combatant commands. In advance of conducting a review, I do not believe it is possible to determine how that review would improve the processes referenced. 

DOD CONFERENCE POLICIES

Question. What role will you play, if confirmed, establishing DOD conference approval processes? 

Answer. I understand that the DCMO is responsible for the overall DOD conference approval policy. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that this policy appropriately balances the benefits of DOD presence at appropriate conferences with the 

need to be judicious in expending the Department’s resources, consistent with applicable legal requirements. 

Question. How will you assess the impact of these policies on the missions of DOD 

organizations and the value of the policies relative to the costs of their implementation? 

Answer. I believe that many conferences have a genuine professional value in 

terms of peer exposure, training, and professional growth. Examples include professional conferences for accounting and finance; for the medical community; and for 

the scientific community. I am also concerned that the DOD conference approval 

process could be interpreted to extend to important meetings that are not conferences at all. If confirmed, I expect to work with the functional communities within the Department to ensure that the conference policy does not unnecessarily detract from the missions of DOD organizations and the development of DOD personnel. 

Question. The GAO recently recommended that ‘‘the Secretary of Defense direct 

the Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with the Office of the 

DCMO, to establish time frames for providing conference review and approval decisions based on applicants’ needs. 

Do you agree with this recommendation? Why or why not? How would you develop the time frames that GAO recommends? 

Answer. I agree with the recommendation. If confirmed, I will work with involved 

stakeholders to address concerns about the timeliness of the review and approval 

process. 

SERVICES CONTRACTING

Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become progressively more 

reliant upon contractors to perform functions that were once performed exclusively 

by government employees. As a result, contractors now play an integral role in 

areas as diverse as the management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In many 

cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and 

task forces, and perform many of the same functions as DOD employees. 

In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors to support the basic 

functions of the Department? 

Answer. Contractors have always played a valuable role in supporting the operations of the Department of Defense. However, I believe that there are areas in 

which the Department has become so reliant on contractors that it risks losing the 

organic capability to manage its own operations. 

193 

Question. What risks do you see in the Department’s reliance on such contractor 

support? What steps do you believe the Department should take to mitigate such 

risk? 

Answer. I believe that it is important that government officials remain accountable and responsible for the actions taken by Federal agencies, including those listed in the question. In my view, responsibility and accountability are possible only 

if the government retains not only final decisionmaking authority, but also the organic capability to fully understand the range of options available and to make informed choices among them. 

Question. What advantages do you see in using contractors to perform functions 

for the Department of Defense? 

Answer. I believe that the use of contractors to perform commercial and industrial 

functions can leverage private sector capabilities to improve efficiency and lower 

costs. With regard to the performance of core government functions, contractors can 

and do support decision-making by providing knowledge and expertise that would 

not otherwise be available to the Department of Defense. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the 

DCMO? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

8(A) DIRECT AWARDS TO NATIVE COMMUNITY-OWNED CONTRACTORS

1. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, in March 2015, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) issued a report to Congress ‘‘Assessment of Justification and Approval Requirements Implemented Under section 811 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for fiscal year 2010 (section 811).’’ The report found that in fiscal year 2014 no 

8(a) sole-source contracts were awarded that required an 8(a) justification and approval. DOD stated it cannot conclude the cause for this decline. There have been 

numerous reports from firms that the decline in awards is due to scrutiny on the 

firms themselves, not the sole-source contracts that could be awarded to these firms. 

How would you encourage DOD to work more effectively with Native communityowned contractors, particularly regarding 8(a) sole-source contracts? 

Mr. LEVINE. It is my understanding that the Competition in Contracting Act 

(CICA) requires the use of competitive contracting throughout the Federal procurement system, subject to certain exceptions. While the Department of Defense may 

use sole source contracts in appropriate circumstances, these circumstances are an 

exception to the general preference of the use of competitive procedures. For this 

reason, the Department does not generally encourage the use of sole source contracts of any kind. 

The DCMO is not an acquisition official, and if confirmed, I would not be in a 

position to establish acquisition policy for the Department of Defense. However, I 

would expect DOD acquisition officials to work with Native community-owned contractors to grow the over-all level of contracting by ensuring that: (1) these firms 

are aware of, and prepared for, opportunities to compete for DOD contracts, includVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00199 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
194 

ing in competitions limited to 8(a) firms; and (2) they understand the exceptions to 

the Competition in Contracting Act and the circumstances in which it might be appropriate for the Department to award a sole-source contract. 

2. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, the March 2015 DOD report listed 10 instances 

of guidance issued regarding the implementation of section 811. Can you please provide a copy of each communication? 

Mr. LEVINE. The Department has provided me with the attached implementing 

documents highlighted in the Department’s Report to Congress on section 8135(a) 

of the 2015 Consolidated Appropriations Acts. These documents include an interim 

FAR rule effective March 16, 2011; a final FAR rule effective April 18, 2012; a 

memo from Director for Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy issuing guidance to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies; and other guidance documents issued by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. [See Appendix A] 

3. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, has the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 

(OFPP) issued any guidance to the Department of Defense or other agencies regarding section 811 and can you provide this guidance? 

Mr. LEVINE. The Department informs me that under the leadership of the Office 

of Federal Procurement Policy, the FAR Council held three Tribal consultation and 

outreach meetings to discuss rulemaking associated with section 811. The meetings 

took place during October 2010 in Washington, DC; Albuquerque, NM; and Fairbanks, AK; and were publicized in the Federal Register on August 31, 2010 (75 FR 

53269). The FAR Council analyzed the comments provided at the public meetings 

and published an interim FAR rule, with a request for requesting public comments, 

in the Federal Register on March 16, 2011 (76 FR 14559) to implement section 811 

in the FAR. The interim rule encouraged agencies to maximize the effective use of 

competition by making certain that contracting officers provide a proper justification 

and obtain approval before awarding a sole-source contract over $20M as required 

by section 811. After extensive analysis of public comments received in response to 

the interim rule, the FAR Council subsequently published a final FAR rule in the 

Federal Register on April 18, 2012 (77 FR 23369), that made no changes to the interim rule. 

4. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, the March 2015 DOD report states the Army 

issued guidance to the Principal assistants Responsible for Contracting and policy 

chiefs. According to the report, the guidance highlighted the FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulation] case and ‘‘the need for additional scrutiny’’. What date was this 

guidance issued? 

Mr. LEVINE. The Department informs me that the acting Deputy assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement) issued this guidance in a memorandum entitled 

‘‘Extensive Use of High Dollar, Sole-Source 8(a) Contracts’’ on January 5, 2011. 

5. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, a January 2011 Army memorandum, ‘‘Extensive 

Use of High Dollar, Sole-Source 8(a) Contracts’’ noted, ‘‘Pending issuance of an interim or final rule on this subject, I expect you to scrutinize all proposed awards 

of sole-source 8(a) contracts . . . [emphasis added]’’ The memorandum indicates that 

the additional scrutiny was required in absence of formal FAR guidance. Do you 

think the ‘‘additional scrutiny’’ requested by this memo has remained in effect, despite clear guidance of the action required to issue an 8(a) sole-source award greater 

than $20 million? 

Mr. LEVINE. The Department informs me that this guidance is no longer in effect. 

6. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, since the FAR Council has issued formal guidance regarding section 811, do you believe it is appropriate for the Army and other 

agencies to rescind any guidance that required increased scrutiny of such contracts 

that could be interpreted as anything other than the now implemented justification 

and approval process? 

Mr. LEVINE. The DCMO is not an acquisition official, and if confirmed, I would 

not have any role in this issue. However, since the Army memo was predicated on 

the lack of FAR guidance once the guidance was issued it would appear that the 

Army guidance should no longer be necessary. 

7. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, section 811 does not prohibit direct awards 

greater than $20 million. How would you encourage such awards, when appropriate, 

to Native community-owned contractors given the additional scrutiny experienced by 

these firms? 

195 

Mr. LEVINE. As indicated above, it is my understanding that the Department does 

not generally encourage sole-source contract awards of any kind. Although the 

DCMO is not an acquisition official and does not set acquisition policy for the Department of Defense, I would expect the Department to encourage competitive 

awards to Native community-owned contractors and to ensure that such contractors 

are aware of the circumstances in which it might be appropriate to award solesource contracts. 

8. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, section 811 only requires a justification and approval of 8(a) sole-source awards. Do you believe it is appropriate for DOD contracting officers to issue such awards provided a justification and approval is performed? 

Mr. LEVINE. While the DCMO is not an acquisition official and does not set acquisition policy for the Department of Defense, I believe that it is appropriate for a 

DOD contracting officer to award an 8(a) sole-source contract upon the issuance of 

a justification and approval in accordance with the requirements of section 811. 

9. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, would you support a requirement to require a justification and approval for any sole-source contract greater than $20 million that 

is not currently subject to a justification? 

Mr. LEVINE. I am not aware of significant categories of sole-source contracts in excess of $20 million that are not subject to a requirement for justification and approval. While the DCMO is not an acquisition official and does not set acquisition 

policy for the Department of Defense, it seems to me that a requirement for justification and approval of any such category of contracts would be consistent with 

the competition policy established in CICA. 

10. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, would you support a repeal of section 811? 

Mr. LEVINE. The DCMO is not an acquisition official and does not set acquisition 

policy for the Department of Defense. However, I believe that, consistent with the 

general preference for competition in Federal procurement, all significant categories 

of sole-source contracts should be subject to a requirement for justification and approval. For this reason, I do not see the need for repeal of section 811. 

11. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, would you support an increased threshold for 

contracts subject to an 8(a) justification and approval? 

Mr. LEVINE. It is my understanding that most categories of sole-source contracts 

are subject to a much lower dollar threshold for justification and approval than the 

$20 million threshold set in section 811. For this reason, while the DCMO is not 

an acquisition official and does not set acquisition policy for the Department of Defense, I do not see the need for an increase to the $20 million threshold. 

12. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, would you consider other changes that could 

reduce potential inappropriate scrutiny of Native community-owned contractors receiving sole-source awards, while ensuring value to the taxpayer? 

Mr. LEVINE. The DCMO is not an acquisition official and does not set acquisition 

policy for the Department of Defense. However, I believe that all categories of solesource contracts should be subject to careful scrutiny to ensure that they are properly justified, in order to ensure value to the taxpayer. Subject to this general rule, 

I do not believe that Native community-owned contractors receiving sole-source 

awards should be subject to additional, inappropriate scrutiny. 

13. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, do you think section 811 applied more scrutiny 

to 8(a) sole-source contracts than sole-source contracts covered by the Competition 

in Contracting Act? 

Mr. LEVINE. I am not aware of any independent reports or reviews that address 

this issue. In the absence of such a report or review, I do not feel that I have the 

information needed to answer this question. 

14. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Levine, does section 811, similar to the Competition 

in Contracting Act, allow for the approval of a justification for an 8(a) sole-source 

to be approved by someone other than the Head of Agency and can the Head of 

Agency have the legal ability to delegate the approval authority for an 8(a) justification? 

Mr. LEVINE. It is my understanding that section 811 allows the approval authority 

for sole-source contracts to be delegated to the same levels of officials as the Competition in Contracting Act. In particular, section 811(a)(2) provides that a justification and approval must be ‘‘approved by the appropriate official designated to apVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00201 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
196 

prove contract awards for dollar amounts that are comparable to the amount of the 

sole-source contract.’’ Section 811(c)(3) defines ‘‘appropriate official’’ to mean the 

same officials to whom approval authority may be delegated under CICA. Consequently, I do not believe that there is any difference between the two statutes on 

this point. 

197 

APPENDIX A 


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3

Web-Based Tool 

• Software application which allows users to submit a webbased Justification Form to the NAVAIR Community of 

Interest (COI). 

• Forms will provide pull-downs, required fields, and business 

logic where feasible to minimize errors upon submission. 

• Form will auto-populate user’s credentials based on CAC login. 

• Each section to be filled in by the user will offer sample 

language and help in completing each field to minimize rewrites. 

• Form is routed among stakeholders in e.POWER. 

• The form will auto-generate an MS-Word document in the 

current Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN(RDA)) format. 

4

Web-Based Tool (cont.) 

• Form will allow for continuous saving and updating until it 

is submitted to the next status. 

• Tool will track “status” of the form as follows: Draft, 

Review, Rework, Approve, Cancel. 

• When status is changed within the tool, automatic email 

notification will be provided. 

• Tool will provide a document repository. 

• The Help Desk referenced herein is: National Help Desk 

https://homepages.navair.navy.mil/NHD/

 Phone: 1-888-292-5919 or 301-342-3104 

The current system administrator (with limited rights) in 

contracts is Chris Juron / 301-757-6556 / 

christine.juron@navy.mil 


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5

• Getting into the Contracts Justification tool 

– Starting from e.POWER website 

https://teamworkflow.navair.navy.mil/epwfactivator/ 

• Save this link as a bookmark for future. 

– Starting from MyNAVAIR website (see next slide). 

https://mynavair.navair.navy.mil/portal/server.pt/commu

nity/mynavair/206

• Under the Acquisition Resources section, Click J&A Submission. 

• Justification tool access through the MyNAVAIR website

(https://teamworkflow.navair.navy.mil/janda/) has been 

discontinued 

• There are 8 blocks to fill out with a choice of 3 different 

forms (J&A, LSJ, FOJ). 

• As is typical for web sites, there is a 30 minute timeout. 

Users should save their forms within 30 minutes or risk 

losing work. 

. 

Getting Started 

6

3⁄4 If going to the MyNAVAIR website, you will now receive the screen above. 

3⁄4 If you do not already have an e.POWER account, one will be automatically 

created for you and CAC-enabled once you access the screen above.

3⁄4 Click the e.POWER button to access and login to the e.POWER system. 

Getting Started – From MyNAVAIR 


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7

Logging into e.POWER 

• The URL to access e.POWER is: 

https://teamworkflow.navair.navy.mil/epwfactivator/. 

• Save this link as a bookmark for future. 

• e.POWER is CAC enabled, so Click OK on the initial pop-up message and 

then SUBMIT WITHOUT entering a password. If you are not CAC enabled, 

use the forgot password link and follow instructions or contact the National 

Help Desk for assistance. 


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9

Logging into e.POWER – 

Worklist Screen 

 After your User Preferences are set, you will need to set your Process 

(on your initial login only). This is done at the Worklist screen. It is 

possible to have more than one option in this list. Select the 

“Justification and Approval” option, make sure the Basket is set to “All 

Worklists” and click the GO >> button. 

10

Originator 


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11

Creating forms in e.POWER – 

New Object 

 To create a new Contracts Justification form, select the New Object icon 

on the top toolbar. The next two slides show the layouts of the J&A, LSJ, 

and FOJ forms that can be created within e.POWER. 

Note: Clicking/un-clicking on a field from within the PPT Slide Show view 

will show/hide comments about the fields on the next three slides. 

12

Create J&A Form 

Justification Type 

LSJ: Limited Source 

Justification 

FOJ: Justification for Exception 

to Fair Opportunity 

J&A: Justification for Other 

than Full and Open Competition 

•For more detailed Justification 

Type info, select the “Types of 

Justification” link.

**Warning: Always wait for the 

form to load completely before 

making selections!** 

Is this a Class J&A? Yes or No 

from drop-down 

Justification Number: Autogenerated by e.POWER 

Select Contracting Officer from 

Select Contract Specialist drop-down (Originator)

from drop-down (PCO) 

Select the Legal Representative from drop-down (PCO) 

Enter “Description of Supplies/Services”. Select “Guiding Text” or “Example” for further information.

Enter “Description of Efforts Made to Solicit Offers from as Many Offerors as Practicable”. Select “Guiding 

Text” or “Example” for further information.

•Click on the >> button to select 

type of funds. If you don’t see 

the proper funding site then it 

will need to be added by calling 

the Help Desk. 

•Select the funding start year 

by selecting from the dropdown. 

•Populate funding by fiscal 

year. 

•Funds need to be specified in 

Thousands of Dollars. 

•Click Add Row for additional 

funding lines. 

•Once funds have been 

populated, click Total, and your 

funds will automatically be 

added by appropriation and 

fiscal year and provide an 

overall total. 

Enter “Description of Supplies/Services”. Select “Guiding Text” or “Example” for further information.

Enter “Rationale Justifying Use of Cited Statutory Authority”. Select “Guiding Text” or “Example” for further 

information. 

Enter “Determination of Fair and Reasonable Cost”. Select “Guiding Text” or “Example” for further 

information. 

Enter “Actions to Remove Barriers to Future Competition”. Select “Guiding Text” or “Example” for further 

information. 

Enter “Actions to Remove Barriers to Future Competition”. Select “Guiding Text” or “Example” for further 

information.

Enter “Description of Efforts Made to Solicit Offers from as Many Offerors as Practicable”. Select “Guiding

Text” or “Example” for further information.

Enter “Determination of Fair and Reasonable Cost”. Select “Guiding Text” or “Example” for further 

information.

Enter “Rationale Justifying Use of Cited Statutory Authority”. Select “Guiding Text” or “Example” for further 

information.

Select the appropriate 

Authority from the dropdown matching the rationale 

discussed in Block 5. 

Enter “Description of the Action being Approved”. Sele Enter “Description of the Action being Approved”. Select “Guidin ct “Guiding Text” or “Example” for further information. g Text” or “Example” for further information.

Select Contracting 

Activity from drop-down. 

Form Status: 

Read-Only 


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13

Create LSJ Form Justification Number: Autogenerated by e.POWER 

Select Contracting Officer from 

drop-down (Originator)

Select Contract Specialist 

from drop-down (PCO) 

Select the Legal Representative from drop-down (PCO) Justification Type 

LSJ: Limited Source 

Justification 

FOJ: Justification for 

Exception to Fair Opportunity 

J&A: Justification for Other 

than Full and Open 

Competition 

•For more detailed 

Justification Type info, select 

the “Types of Justification” 

link. 

**Warning: Always wait for 

the form to load completely 

before making selections!**

Select Contracting 

Activity from drop-down. 

Enter “Nature and/or Description of Action Being Approved”.

Enter “Description of the Supplies or Services Required to Meet the Agency’s Needs (including the estimated 

value)”.

Enter Supporting Information for “Identification of the Justification Rationale (see FAR 8.405-6(b)) and, if applicable, a 

Demonstration of the Proposed Contractor’s Unique Qualifications to Provide the Required Supply or Service”.

Enter “Determination by the Ordering Activity Contracting Officer that the Order Represents the Best Value 

Consistent with FAR 8.404(d)”.

Enter “A Description of the Market Research Conducted Among Schedule Holders and the Results or a 

Statement of the Reason Market Research was not Conducted”.

Enter “Any Other Facts Supporting The Justification”.

Enter “A Statement Of The Actions, If Any, The Agency May Take To Remove Or Overcome Any Barriers That Preclude The Agency From 

Meeting The Requirements Of FAR 8.405-1 And FAR 8.405-2 Before Any Subsequent Acquisition For The Supplies Or Services Is Made”.

Enter “Nature and/or Description of Action Being Approved”.

Enter “Description of the Supplies or Services Required to Meet the Agency’s Needs (including the estimated 

value)”.

Enter Supporting Information for “Identification of the Justification Rationale (see FAR 8.405-6(b)) and, if applicable, a 

Demonstration of the Proposed Contractor’s Unique Qualifications to Provide the Required Supply or Service”.

Enter “A Description of the Market Research Conducted Among Schedule Holders and the Results or a 

Statement of the Reason Market Research was not Conducted”.

Enter “Any Other Facts Supporting The Justification”.

Enter “A Statement Of The Actions, If Any, The Agency May Take To Remove Or Overcome Any Barriers That Preclude The Agency From

Meeting The Requirements Of FAR 8.405-1 And FAR 8.405-2 Before Any Subsequent Acquisition For The Supplies Or Services Is Made”.

Enter “Determination by the Ordering Activity Contracting Officer that the Order Represents the Best Value 

Consistent with FAR 8.404(d)”.

Select the appropriate 

Justification Rationale 

from the drop-down. 

Form Status: 

Read-Only 

14

Justification Number: Autogenerated by e.POWER 

Select Contracting Officer from 

drop-down (Originator)

Select Contract Specialist 

from drop-down (PCO) 

Select the Legal Representative from drop-down (PCO) Justification Type 

LSJ: Limited Source 

Justification 

FOJ: Justification for 

Exception to Fair Opportunity 

J&A: Justification for Other 

than Full and Open 

Competition 

•For more detailed 

Justification Type info, select 

the “Types of Justification” 

link. 

**Warning: Always wait for 

the form to load completely 

before making selections!**

Select Contracting 

Activity from drop-down. 

Enter “Nature and/or Description of Action Being Approved”.

Enter “Description of the Supplies or Services Required to Meet the Agency’s Needs (including the estimated 

value)”.

Enter Supporting Information for “Identification of the Justification Rationale (see (FAR 16.505(b)(2)) and, if applicable, a

Demonstration of the Proposed Contractor’s Unique Qualifications to Provide the Required Supply or Service”.

Enter “A Determination by the Contracting Officer that the Anticipated Cost to the Government will be Fair and 

Reasonable”.

Enter “A Description of the Market Research Conducted Among Schedule Holders and the Results or a 

Statement of the Reason Market Research was not Conducted”.

Enter “Any Other Facts Supporting The Justification”.

Enter “A Statement of the Actions, if any, the Agency May Take to Remove or Overcome any Barriers that Led to the Exception to Fair 

Opportunity before any Subsequent Acquisition for the Supplies or Services is Made”.

Enter “Nature and/or Description of Action Being Approved”.

Enter “Description of the Supplies or Services Required to Meet the Agency’s Needs (including the estimated 

value)”.

Enter Supporting Information for “Identification of the Justification Rationale (see (FAR 16.505(b)(2)) and, if applicable, a

Demonstration of the Proposed Contractor’s Unique Qualifications to Provide the Required Supply or Service”.

Enter “A Description of the Market Research Conducted Among Schedule Holders and the Results or a 

Statement of the Reason Market Research was not Conducted”.

Enter “Any Other Facts Supporting The Justification”.

Enter “A Statement of the Actions, if any, the Agency May Take to Remove or Overcome any Barriers that Led to the Exception to Fair 

Opportunity before any Subsequent Acquisition for the Supplies or Services is Made”.

Enter “A Determination by the Contracting Officer that the Anticipated Cost to the Government will be Fair and 

Reasonable”.

Select the appropriate 

Justification Rationale 

from the drop-down. 

Form Status: 

Read-Only 

Create FOJ Form 


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15

Filling out Form Fields in 

e.POWER 

Notes for filling out fields from the previous two slides: 

**Warning: Always wait for the form to load completely before performing 

actions!!** 

• If you are unsure of what belongs in the form text boxes, click on 

Guiding Text for help. If you want a sample of what the language may 

look like, click on Example. (Note: These options are only available on 

the J&A form.) 

• You can cut and paste from any word document or from the example 

box, then edit to fit your needs. Be conscious of the maximum characters 

and special characters that may cause errors. 

• In the Contracting Officer, Contract Specialist, or Legal Representative

drop-down menus, if you don’t see the appropriate individual in the dropdown menu, alert that person so they can take appropriate action to be 

added. 

• If your Funding Table Total exceeds $85.5 million dollars, you will receive 

a warning message in the event that this was an erroneous figure. 

16

Submit Contracts Justification 

Form into Workflow 

 After the form fields have been filled-out for either the J&A, LSJ, or FOJ 

form, select the Ok button on the left-hand button menu. This will insert 

the form into workflow (see workflow map on next slide). 


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18

Sending Contracts Justification 

Form to the PCO 

 Your form has now been submitted to the workflow. Click the Refresh

button on the left-hand button menu until your form shows up in your 

worklist. Next, click the icon to open up the form to make any 

additional changes before processing to the PCO.


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19

Final Changes before Sending 

Form to the PCO 

 After updating your form with any additional changes, click the Process 

Workitem icon on the top toolbar menu. (Note: All form fields must be 

completed before your form can be submitted to the PCO or you will 

receive a warning message.)

20

Submit Contracts Justification 

Form into Workflow 

 From the Release Workitem screen, to process your form to the PCO at 

the PCO Assign Specialist task, select the default route of Ready for 

Assignment. To cancel your form and send it out of workflow select the 

Cancel route (do not confuse this with the Cancel button which will 

cancel the Release Workitem action and send you back to the Worklist 

screen). Enter any comments, if desired, and click the Ok button to 

process. 


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22

PCO 

(Procuring Contract Officer) 


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24

Opening the Justification 

• Once logged into the tool, the list of Justifications requiring action will 

show in your Worklist. 

• Open the Justification by clicking on the blue circle with the white “I” in 

it at the Justification desired. 

• If you need to find a Justification that is not in your inbox, use the 

search functionality. The search icon is the magnifying glass (refer to 

slide 57 for more instructions on the search). 


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38

Return to Originator for 

Rework 1 of 2 

• The Originator should open the Justification by clicking on the 

blue circle with the white “I” in it at the Justification for which 

rework is required. 


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39

• Once all revisions to the document have 

been made, select Process WorkItem. 

Return to Originator for 

Rework 2 of 2 


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43

Return to Specialist for Rework 

1 of 2 

• To return the Justification to the Specialist for 

changes, click Process Workitem. 


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46

Send to Legal for Review 1 of 2 

• Once the Contract Specialist and the PCO are 

satisfied with the Justification, the PCO sends to 

the Legal Representative for Legal review. 

• Select the lawyer from the drop-down illustrated 

above and process to legal. 

• A system generated e-mail will be sent to the 

legal recipient’s Outlook inbox. Click the link to 

get into your e.POWER inbox. 

• The Justification can be printed in draft (see 

slide 35) by legal. 


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47

• After legal completes their review, the form is sent back to the PCO. 

• Legal has two review options: 

– Concur and send back to PCO 

– Changes Required and send back to PCO 

• Legal can type in the document, in the comment block or use Notes. 

– Refer to Slides 29-33 on using notes. 

• When Legal selects Concur, it is routed to the PCO. The PCO is then 

able to process the Justification as Approve/Print. 

Send to Legal for Review 2 of 2 


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v 


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51

• Choose Return to Specialist for Changes from 

the Route drop-down box then click Ok. 

Return to Specialist for 

Changes (if necessary) 

2 of 3 


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54

Establish Proxies 1 of 3 

• Users can establish proxies in e.POWER to grant other 

users access to their e.POWER account. Proxies are 

assigned from available e.POWER user names. Users 

grant proxy assignments for a specific time period with 

a given start and end date. A proxy can be edited to 

extend or shorten the time period, or a proxy can be 

deleted when no longer desired. 

• Select the settings button. The Worklist Display 

Settings window opens. 

• Select the set proxy button. The Proxy window opens. 

• From the top toolbar, select the Create New Proxy 

button. The New Proxy Properties window opens: 


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59

•Type your logon name in the By field 

and click apply. 

•Ensure your name is checked and click 

Ok. 

•Click the folder Icon to create the 

document. 

Uploading Documentation 

2 of 3 

60

Uploading Documentation 

3 of 3 

•Click the Browse button and attach the document as 

you would for any attachment in Outlook. 

•After you have attached your document, click Upload. 


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61

Viewing Attached Documentation 

•When documentation is available, the Justification 

form is automatically collapsed. 

•To open the form click on the + icon. 

•To view the document, click the eye glasses icon. 

•Clicking the eye glasses icon will open the document 

in a new window. 

62

Document Actions 

•One can view metadata about the file by clicking the 

“i” icon.

•The document can be checked out and locked for 

updating by clicking the paper icon. The document 

repository will keep the different versions of the 

document. 

•To remove an attached document double-click the 

appropriate checkbox and click Remove. 

•If more than one document is attached they will be 

listed in additional rows. 


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[The nomination reference of Mr. Peter K. Levine follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

March 4, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Peter K. Levine, of Maryland, to be Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense, vice Elizabeth A. McGrath. 

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Peter K. Levine, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF PETER LEVINE

Education: 

Harvard Law School 

• September 1980 to June 1983 

• J.D., magna cum laude 

Harvard College 

• September 1975 to June 1979 

• A.B., summa cum laude 

Employment Record: 

Senate Armed Services Committee 

• Staff Director 

• March 2013 to January 2015 

• General Counsel 

• January 2006 to March 2013 and May 2001 to January 2002 

• Minority Counsel 

• January 2002 to January 2006 and August 1996 to May 2001 

Office of Senator Carl Levin 

• Counsel 

• January 1995 to August 1996 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Senate Governmental 

Affairs Committee 

• Counsel 

• January 1987 to January 1985 

Crowell & Moring 

• Associate 

• September 1983 to January 1987 

• Summer Associate 

• June 1982 to August 1982 

Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison 

• Summer Associate 

• June 1981 to August 1981 

Honors and Awards: 

• Editor, Harvard Law Review, 1982 to 1983 

• Phi Beta Kappa, 1979 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

255 

The form executed by Mr. Peter K. Levine in connection with his 

nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Peter Levine. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Deputy Chief Management Officer, Department of Defense. 

3. Date of nomination: 

March 4, 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

July 29, 1957; Santa Monica, California. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Mary Ellen Myers (Levine). 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. 

Harvard Law School, 1980 to 1983, J.D., 1983. 

Harvard College, 1975 to 1979, B.A., 1979. 

University High School, Los Angeles, CA, 1972 to 1975, graduated 1975. 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee, 2013–2015. 

General Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee, 2001–2002, 2007–2012. 

Minority Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee, 1996–2001, 2003–2006. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Counsel, Office of Senator Carl Levin 1995–1996. 

Counsel, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 1987–1994. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

None. 

256 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

American Bar Association (member). 

District of Columbia Bar (member). 

Montgomery Sycamore Island Club (member). 

Mohican Hills Pool Association (member). 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. February 20, 2014: $100 to Daniella Levine Cava for Dade County Commissioner. 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

None. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

None. 

16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

None. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

PETER K. LEVINE.

This 13th day of March, 2015 

257 

[The nomination of Mr. Peter K. Levine was reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on April 30, 2015, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on May 23, 2015.] 

(259) 

NOMINATION OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. 

DUNFORD, JR., USMC, TO BE CHAIRMAN OF 

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THURSDAY, JULY 9, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Graham, Cruz, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, good morning. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to consider 

the nomination of General Joseph Dunford to be the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

General Dunford is certainly no stranger to the members of this 

committee. We have known him as Commandant of the Marine 

Corps and our commander in Afghanistan and many posts before 

that. He is a warrior and a leader of the highest quality, and we 

are grateful for his 38 years of distinguished service. 

We are also thankful for the sacrifices General Dunford’s family 

has made over the years and their willingness to lend him to the 

Nation in service once again. As is our tradition, at the beginning 

of your testimony, we welcome you, General Dunford, to introduce 

the members of your family joining you this morning. I would, however, like to take this moment to express our special thanks to your 

wife, Ellyn. We know how much of your husband’s service and his 

future absence will rest on you and we honor the sacrifices you are 

making through your continued support to our Nation, not to mention the downgrade in your residence that will be part of this. 

[Laughter.] 

The next Chairman will have to prepare our military to confront 

the most diverse and complex array of global crises since the end 

of World War II. 

In Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL’s) terrorist army has continued to succeed on the battlefield, 

including taking Ramadi and other key terrain in Iraq, capturing 

over half the territory in Syria, and controlling every border post 

260 

between Iraq and Syria. The lack of a coherent strategy has resulted in the spread of ISIL around the world to Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, and even to Afghanistan where I visited last weekend. 

There, our troops are supporting our Afghan partners in sustaining a stable and democratic future. But even as ISIL and the 

Taliban threaten this future, the President remains committed to 

a drastic reduction in U.S. presence at the end of 2016 before the 

Afghan government and security forces are fully capable of operating effectively without our support. This would create a security 

vacuum, and we have seen what fills similar kinds of vacuums in 

Syria and Iraq. Given your experience in Afghanistan, General 

Dunford, we will be interested to hear your thoughts about the appropriate U.S. and coalition presence going forward. 

Meanwhile, Iran continues to threaten peace and stability across 

the Middle East through its support of terrorist proxies, pursuit of 

nuclear weapons, and development of missiles needed to deliver 

them to targets far beyond its shores. 

In Europe, Vladimir Putin’s Russia continues its onslaught in 

Ukraine. But even as Russian troops and equipment execute this 

neo-imperial campaign to undermine Ukraine’s government and 

independence, the United States has refused Ukraine the weapons 

it needs and deserves for its defense. 

In the Asia-Pacific, China is continuing a pattern of destabilizing 

behavior, its reclamation and militarization of vast land features in 

the South China Sea, its continued military buildup designed to 

counter U.S. military strengths, and its blatant and undeterred 

cyber attacks against the United States. While our rebalance to the 

Asia-Pacific has shown some successes, especially in deepening of 

our alliances, this policy has not deterred China from its increasingly assertive course. 

Yet, while worldwide challenges like these grow, the Defense Department has grown larger but less capable, more complex but less 

innovative, more proficient at defeating low-tech adversaries but 

more vulnerable to high-tech ones. Worse, the self-inflicted wounds 

of the Budget Control Act and sequestration-level defense spending 

have made all of these problems worse. 

Army and Marine Corps end strength is dropping dangerously 

low. The Air Force is the oldest and the smallest that it has ever 

been. The Navy’s fleet is shrinking to pre-World War I levels. With 

the present operational tempo and drastic reductions to defense 

spending, we will continue the downward spiral of military capacity 

and readiness that will compromise each service’s ability to execute 

our Defense Strategic Guidance at a time of accumulating danger 

to our national security. 

Budget cuts have also slowed critical modernization priorities, 

imperiling our Nation’s ability to preserve its military technological 

advantage. This is not just about the weapons systems we hear the 

most about; fighter aircraft, submarines, or armored vehicles. 

These are important, but budget cuts also threaten our ability to 

seize the future and make vital investments in cyber, space, and 

breakthrough technologies such as directed energy, autonomous vehicles, and data analytics. 

The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated that 

even if the Defense Department receives the additional $38 billion 

261 

above the budget caps that the President’s Defense Budget requests, our military would still, quote, ‘‘remain at the lower ragged 

edge of manageable risk in our ability to execute the defense strategy.’’ More worrisome, every one of our military service chiefs, 

yourself included, has testified that continued sequestration-level 

defense spending puts American lives at greater risk. Unless we 

change course, eliminate sequestration, and return to strategy-driven defense budgets, I fear our military will confront depleted readiness, chronic modernization problems, and deteriorating morale. 

No matter how many dollars we spend, we will not be able to 

provide our military the equipment they need with a broken defense acquisition system that takes too long and costs too much. 

With this year’s National Defense Authorization Act, this committee has embarked on a major effort to reform this system, including ways to empower our service leaders to manage their own 

programs in exchange for greater accountability. General Dunford, 

we are very interested in hearing your views about improving the 

defense acquisition system based on your years of service. 

Finally, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal 

military advisor to the President. More than ever, we need an honest and forthright leader that offers his best and unvarnished military advice. The President will not always take your advice, but it 

is my hope that he will always have an appreciation of the military 

dimensions of the difficult problems our Nation confronts with you 

at his side. 

Thank you for your willingness to serve once more. We look forward to your testimony. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let 

me join you in welcoming General Dunford and to take this opportunity to thank him for his extraordinary service to the Nation. 

During his 38 years of military service, General Dunford has 

served with courage and distinction, and I am confident he will 

continue to do so as the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Finally, let me also recognize and thank his family. Ellyn, thank 

you. Patrick, thank you for being here today. I know Joe and Kathleen wanted to be here, but they are serving elsewhere. But thank 

you very much for what you have done to serve the Nation and the 

Marine Corps. 

Last week, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

General Dempsey, released the 2015 National Military Strategy. In 

his forward, General Dempsey stated that the current ‘‘global security environment is the most unpredictable’’ he has seen during his 

military service and that ‘‘global disorder has significantly increased while some of our comparative military advantage has 

begun to erode.’’ 

Without question, the United States faces a wide range of challenges around the world. If confirmed as the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, you will be advising the President and the Secretary of Defense on these complex international issues facing our 

national interests. 

262 

Possibly the gravest and most complex issue for the next Chairman will be countering the security threat from ISIL in Iraq and 

Syria and its spread beyond the Middle East region. As the President said earlier this week, our counter-ISIL campaign will be 

long-term and employ all elements of American power, including 

military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic. 

If confirmed, General Dunford, you will be responsible for advising on the U.S. military’s role in supporting our broader counterISIL campaign, including denying ISIL safe havens and building 

the capacity of local forces to counter ISIL, with training, assistance, and air support from the international coalition. The success 

of these efforts will ultimately depend on a broader, complementary 

effort to address the conditions that gave rise to ISIL and allowed 

it to thrive. I look forward to hearing your views on the situation 

in Iraq and Syria and your thinking on the most effective role the 

military can play in supporting efforts on the diplomatic front. 

Regarding Iran, while there remains no clear outcome to the P5 

Plus 1 negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, no matter what 

happens, the Department of Defense will play a key role in reaffirming our shared priorities with our partners in the region, confronting common threats, and working to de-escalate or, where possible, resolve these threats. 

General Dunford, if confirmed, you will also bring invaluable experience to oversight of the Department’s missions in Afghanistan 

where you have led the U.S. and coalition forces with distinction. 

While the Afghan Security Forces have fought courageously against 

Taliban attacks, more needs to be done to build the Afghan forces? 

capabilities and deny any safe haven for extremists. The next 

Chairman will play a critical role in the President’s review later 

this year of the size and footprint of U.S. forces in Afghanistan for 

2016 and beyond. 

Another security challenge going forward will be deterring additional Russian aggression toward Ukraine and its European neighbors and reinforcing the Minsk ceasefire accords. Congress has 

made clear its support of military assistance to Ukraine, including 

defensive weapons, to help the Ukrainian people defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will be interested in your 

views of the security situation in Ukraine and what additional 

steps you would recommend for assisting Russia’s neighbors in protecting themselves from the kinds of hybrid warfare tactics employed in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. 

Our men and women in uniform remain the committee’s top concern, and I know they are your top concern also. Our Armed Forces 

are nothing without its people, and the Department continues to 

juggle the twin goals of providing a high quality of life through fair 

pay and compensation and exceptional service through adequate 

levels of training and equipping. In my view, it is incumbent on 

Congress and the Nation to provide a sufficiently sized, trained, 

and equipped military of the necessary quality of character and talent to meet national defense requirements. Sometimes that means 

making hard choices, especially in the budget constrained environment we find ourselves. 

To that end, as you well know from your time as Commandant, 

the Department and Congress have for several years considered 

263 

various proposals for changes in compensation and health care to 

slow the growth of personnel costs so that those savings can be redirected to buy back readiness and modernization benefits. I would 

be particularly interested in your views on such proposals and the 

impact if such changes are not enacted. 

Now, during consideration of the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, this committee had a robust debate on 

how best to fund defense programs. I have repeatedly stated that 

sequestration is not the approach that we need to address our Nation’s fiscal challenges, and more pointedly, it undermines our national military readiness. Defense budgets should be based on our 

long-term military strategy—that is the point the chairman made 

very eloquently—not sequestration-level budget caps. Even a 1-year 

increase in OCO spending does not provide DOD with the certainty 

and stability it needs when building its 5-year budget. As a consequence, this instability undermines the morale of our troops and 

their families who want to know that their futures are planned for 

more than 1 year at a time and the confidence of our defense industry partners we rely on to provide the best technologies available to our troops. I hope you will share your thoughts on this topic 

with the committee today. 

General Dunford, thank you again for your willingness to serve 

our Nation. I look forward to discussing these issues. 

Chairman MCCAIN. General, before your statement, there are 

standard questions that the committee always asks of military 

nominees. So we have always done that, and so I would like to proceed with that before your testimony. 

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, 

it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and 

other communications of information. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

General DUNFORD. I have, Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if these views differ from the administration in 

power? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

General DUNFORD. I have not. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you ensure your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record in hearings? 

General DUNFORD. I will, Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 

and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

General DUNFORD. I will, Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

General DUNFORD. They will. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 

testify, upon request, before this committee? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Chairman. 

264 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or consult 

with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or 

denial in providing such documents? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much for complying with 

that formality. Thank you. Please proceed with your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, TO 

BE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DUNFORD. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, 

distinguished members of the committee, good morning and thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am truly honored to be nominated as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

I want to thank the President and the Secretary of Defense for 

their confidence me, and I want to recognize General Dempsey and 

his wife Deanie for their extraordinary to our Nation, our men and 

women in uniform and our military families. 

Joining me today is my wife Ellyn and our son Patrick. Our son 

Joe and Kathleen were not able to be here. Ellyn has been a great 

mother to our children and has served as a tireless advocate for 

military families. I refer to her as the MVP in the family. Her 

sense of humor, flexibility, and endurance have been tested in over 

30 years as a military spouse, and I would not be here today without her love and support. 

I would like to begin by thanking the committee for your commitment to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Due to your 

support, they comprise the most well trained, well equipped, and 

capable military force in the world. 

As I appear before you this morning, I am mindful of the complexity and volatility of the current security environment. Chairman, you mentioned that. This committee is also well aware of the 

pressing challenges we face in Europe, the Pacific, the Middle East, 

Africa, space, and cyberspace. While dealing with these and other 

issues, we also face the need to restore readiness and modernize 

the joint force in the context of fiscal challenges and budget uncertainty. 

If confirmed, I will provide the Secretary of Defense and the 

President with my best military advice in a full range of military 

options for addressing the current and future challenges to our national security. 

When asked, I will provide the Congress with my best military 

advice. When delivering best military advice, I will do so with candor. 

I will also work with the Joint Chiefs, our civilian leaders, and 

members of the committee to maintain a joint force that is capable 

of securing our national interest today and tomorrow. 

Most importantly, if confirmed, I will dedicate myself to properly 

leading, representing, and keeping faith with the men and women 

in uniform and our civilian workforce who volunteer to serve our 

Nation. 

Thank you again for allowing me to appear this morning, and I 

am prepared for your questions. 

265 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much, General. 

The day before yesterday, we received testimony that so far with $500 million committed, there have been 60 individuals who have 

been trained to go into Syria and fight against the Islamic State 

in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). What do you know about that particular 

situation? 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, what I know is that we have got 

Major General Mike Nagata who has been working that for some 

months. Those numbers are certainly much less than what he estimated. The feedback I have received is those numbers are largely 

attributable to the vetting process, that they think they have 

learned some things during the process of these first 60. They have 

made some other contacts. But, frankly, Chairman, until I have an 

opportunity to get on the ground and speak to the commanders, 

what I really know about that now is secondhand. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you believe that we should be getting a 

pledge from these recruits that they will only fight against ISIS 

and not Bashar Assad? 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, what I understand right now is 

that we do not have the authority to take action against Assad’s 

forces. So unless that policy would change, then that pledge would 

be required. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Given your experience in the military, do you 

think it is a good idea to train people and send them into a conflict 

to be attacked and barrel-bombed by another entity and not defending them? 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, I do not. If we train those individuals and they go back into Syria to fight, then I think we need to— 

if we expect them to be successful, we need to provide them with 

enabling capability that will allow them to be successful. 

Chairman MCCAIN. In other words, prevent them from being barrel-bombed by Bashar Assad, which is routine now? 

General DUNFORD. I think, Chairman, we need to provide them 

with a full range of capability for them to be successful. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I recently was over in Afghanistan over the 

Fourth of July, and there is great concern both amongst our military and with Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah and other Afghans about 

the present proposal to have our force in Afghanistan down to a, 

quote, embassy-centric force by 2017, meaning that we would be 

giving up or turning over our bases in Bagram, Kandahar, and a 

force that is only based in the U.S. embassy. A great concern was 

voiced concerning this plan or articulated, announced plan by the 

President of the United States. 

As you know, the Taliban did not respect the non-fighting season. As you know, the Afghan casualties are extremely high, higher 

than they have ever been. We now have ISIS getting a hold, and 

we also have the Iranians providing Taliban with weapons. 

Is this a wise decision on your part to have a calendar-day withdrawal of American troops rather than a conditions-based withdrawal? Given your background and experience there, I think you 

are probably pretty well qualified to make that judgment. 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, I am aware of the consequences of 

our mission, the importance of our mission in Afghanistan, and 

clearly I also have a degree of personal commitment, having spent 

266 

time there. I can assure you, if I am confirmed, I will provide advice to the President that will allow us to meet our desired end 

state, and I think that that will be based on the conditions on the 

ground, as you have articulated. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Rather than a calendar-based decision. 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, my experience has been that 

sometimes the assumptions that you make do not obtain particularly with regard to time, and that is certainly the case in Afghanistan. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

In Ukraine, it is obvious that the Russians continue their military buildup. I was in eastern Ukraine and watched the surveillance video that was made by the Ukrainians showing the gradual 

buildup of Russian forces inside Ukraine. 

Do you believe that we should give the Ukrainians with the 

counter-battery systems with which to defend themselves from 

mass Russian artillery and rocket strikes, and should we provide 

them with Javelin or tube-launched, optically-tracked, wirelessguided (TOW) anti-tank missile systems to defeat the Russian T– 

90 tank parades? 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, from a military perspective, I 

think it is reasonable that we provide that support to the Ukrainians. Frankly, without that kind of support, they are not going to 

be able to protect themselves against Russian aggression. 

Chairman MCCAIN. General Dunford, I just would like to repeat 

again my appreciation for your service, and I am confident that you 

will serve with distinction. You are the principal military advisor 

to the President of the United States, and that is a unique role as 

designed in the 1947 act I believe. So I hope that you will keep in 

mind your obligation to the President but also to the men and 

women who are serving who we may have to send into harm’s way 

and make sure they are provided with the best capabilities. 

Finally, I hope in answer to some of these questions, because I 

have run over time, you will talk about the devastating effects of 

sequestration on our ability to defend the Nation. Maybe you will 

just make a brief comment on that now. 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, I have dealt with the issue of sequestration as a service chief, and quite frankly, if we go into sequestration, we will be unable to support the current strategy that 

we have to protect our Nation. Quite honestly, the readiness of the 

joint force and modernization of the joint force will suffer, what I 

will describe and without exaggeration, catastrophic consequences. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank you, General Dunford. 

Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Once again, thank you, General, for your service and your sacrifice. 

Following a bit on Senator McCain’s final question about sequestration, the administration—and Secretary Carter made this 

clear—has adopted an anti-ISIL campaign with nine lines of effort, 

two principally controlled by the Department of Defense. Are you 

comfortable with that overall approach at this point? 

General DUNFORD. Senator Reed, I am comfortable with that 

overall approach. 

267 

Senator REED. The other lines of effort are controlled by other 

elements of the Government, State Department, Homeland Security, et cetera. Apropos of Senator McCain’s question about effects 

of sequestration on the Department of Defense, are you concerned 

that these partners in this effort could be hamstrung just as much 

as you would be if the Budget Control Act (BCA) went into effect 

for them? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, very much so. I would say that not 

only do we just represent two of the nine lines of effort, but we cannot be successful in either Iraq or Syria or, frankly, in any of our 

other endeavors with out a whole-of-government approach. 

Senator REED. Let me just ask you since you are the expert. You 

were in Afghanistan. We had a significant military effort, but we 

also had a significant civilian agency effort, the State Department, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration, all of these agencies. I would assume you considered them 

to be integral and essential parts of your effort, and without them 

or without their ability to provide resources, you could not have accomplished what you did. Is that fair? 

General DUNFORD. Sir, I think it is absolutely fair. Although we 

have challenges remaining, I think we have accomplished quite a 

bit over the last few years, and from my perspective, that is because we have been able to integrate the capabilities of those organizations that you mentioned. In particular, I think the relationship that we have with the State Department in Afghanistan was 

absolutely critical to our success. 

Senator REED. One of the most difficult issues you face is building the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces, and this has been an 

endeavor frankly that we have tried for a long time. Do you have 

any sort of sense at this juncture of what we can or should be doing 

differently of how do we do this? We have heard colleagues come 

before the committee—your colleagues—and suggest that there are 

gaps of leadership at the upper levels. Just your perspectives on a 

length of time and the efforts we have to undertake to get a credible Iraqi force in the field, which will secure the country. 

General DUNFORD. Sir, with the caveat that I have been away 11 

months, but certainly, if confirmed, will go back almost immediately, the areas of most concern were intelligence, logistics, special operations capability, and the aviation capability, and then 

more broadly the ministerial capacity. Frankly, our estimates always were that that was a long-term endeavor. It would take years 

to grow the kind of capacity that we have in this country, and 

frankly, what we are not trying to do is develop the capability that 

we have in this country, something far less than that, but the ability at the ministerial level, at the minister of defense and the minister of the interior to support tactical-level organizations. So I 

think continue to stay the course in the plan that General Campbell has and recognizing that is going to require continued resources and patience is the way for us to be successful. 

Senator REED. Now, I focus for a moment—I know your practical 

experience is Afghanistan and other places, but in Iraq there are 

the same capability problems. Does your analysis apply there also 

in terms of the long-term need to build up the Iraqi Security Forces 

and ministries? 

268 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it does. In some ways the situation 

is the same. There are also some vast differences. I think one of 

the biggest challenges in Iraq has been when Prime Minister 

Maliki was there, he eliminated many of the capable quality leaders that were in the Iraqi Security Forces. So I think at the tactical 

level, it is fair to say today the Afghan forces actually have some 

pretty solid leaders. We have seen them. We have developed them. 

They have gone to our schools. I feel pretty good about where we 

are with the Afghan leaders. I think we have some work to do to 

rebuild the Iraqi Security Forces, frankly to get them back to perhaps where they were a few years ago. 

Senator REED. There is one other aspect—in fact, there are many 

aspects of the situation in Iraq, but one is this tension, sectarian 

and geographic tensions in the country. But our policy is to support 

a unified government in Baghdad and work with them so that they 

are able to integrate their ethnic communities. Is that the approach 

that you think makes much sense? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that is going to be very difficult to 

do, but at this point I believe that is the best prospects for longterm success is a unified, multi-sectarian government in Iraq. 

Frankly, if confirmed, if at any point I no longer believe that is possible, then my advice to the President will be adjusted accordingly. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, sir, and again, thank you 

for your service. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In responding to one of the chairman’s questions, you were talking about you did not have the authority to go after Assad. Is that 

not what you said that you do not have the authority to go after 

Assad? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, my understanding is that we do not 

have the legal authority at this time to go after the Assad regime, 

and it is also the policy of the administration not to go after the 

Assad regime militarily. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Well, I think for the record I would like 

to have you expand a little bit on that as to whether or not it would 

be desirable for you to have that authority. 

[The information follows:] 

President Assad’s policies contributed to the rise of ISIL and motivate some members of ISIL today. However, the current military campaign in Syria is designed to 

degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL, not the Assad regime. If our policy changes, I 

will be prepared to provide a range of military options in support of broader political 

efforts to resolve the conflict. 

Senator INHOFE. We have been talking for a long time and with 

you also at these hearings about the amount of risk that we are 

at right now. You were quoted as saying our combatant commanders face increasing risk. So we are talking about the risk that 

is out there. You know, risk equals lives. We talk about this in all 

these areas. 

But how do you define too much risk? Are we there yet? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe today we are capable of providing adequate security to protect our national interests. I also believe that we are at the razor’s edge, and that has certainly been 

a subject of testimony several times before this committee is that 

269 

our readiness level is at the point right now where were we to go 

below this level, we would have to adjust the ends of our strategy. 

We would no longer be able to support our strategy. 

Senator INHOFE. That is similar to the responses we get, whether 

it is General Odierno or any of the rest of them. They are very 

much concerned about the level of risk that we are accepting now 

that we never had to accept in the past. 

In the Ukraine—I am particularly sensitive to that. I happened 

to be there when they had the election that resulted in, for the first 

time in 96 years, no communists serving in their parliament. 

We talked about what they really should be having there. Are 

there obstacles, if you were to make that determination, as to giving them more to defend themselves, the things that we agree that 

they should have? Is there an obstacle that we could help with, or 

do you think you have that authority now? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, from a military perspective, additional capability to the Ukrainians would clearly help them to deal 

with both the separatist and the Russian threat in the Ukraine. 

There are some policy issues associated with that that do not fall 

into the Department of Defense (DOD) and military— 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, I understand that and I appreciate that answer. 

Kind of the same thing with the Kurds. Now, they have a need 

for, I guess, anti-armor, mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) 

vehicles, and a lot of these things. I get two conflicting stories, one 

from some of the top people in charge saying that by sending 

through Baghdad, you have a problem in getting it up to the fight. 

Yet, I heard just yesterday from someone who is charge that that 

problem has been resolved now. Is that really resolved? Do we have 

a problem getting the equipment that they need up there and those 

fighters to effectively fight? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I watched carefully the hearing on 

Tuesday and the exchange that took place on this particular issue. 

You know, I have been briefed that in fact the issues have been resolved and the support is getting to the Kurds right away. But this 

would be one of those issues that, if confirmed, again Iraq, Afghanistan, and places where our young men and women are in harm’s 

way would be the first places I would go to visit. This issue, because it is so important, would be one issue that I would look into 

personally. 

Senator INHOFE. Good. I appreciate that. 

In this morning’s ‘‘The Hill,’’ General Petraeus had a couple 

quotes in there, and I will just read these. He said we can schedule 

an end to our role in that—talking about Afghanistan—in that nation’s conflict, but we cannot schedule an end to the war there or 

an end to the threat from Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, or other extremist elements of the global jihad. Going to a zero option next 

year would be playing roulette with Afghanistan’s future. 

Is Petraeus right? 

General DUNFORD. Sir, I think he is absolutely right with regard 

to the war would continue whether or not we are there or not, and 

I think you can assume that the war would get worse were our 

presence not to be there. Again, my assessment is that our presence ought to be based on the conditions on the ground, and I will 

270 

certainly go over there and check those as soon as—and if confirmed. 

Senator INHOFE. Very good. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Nelson? 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, ISIS with regard to Iraq and Syria. Would you generally 

ascribe to the fact that in Iraq it is going to require the Iraqis to 

have the will to fight to meet ISIS in Iraq and be successful? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, our current campaign is dependent 

on the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces to deal with ISIL. 

Senator NELSON. Go over to Syria. Now, that is a hodgepodge. 

How much do you think that the Assad regime staying in power 

would complicate the issue of us being able to take down ISIS in 

Syria? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, my assessment is it plays a significant role. I think Assad’s brutality to his people was certainly the 

primary factor giving rise to ISIS is at least one of the assessments, and I ascribe to that particular assessment. I think his remaining in power has certainly continued to inflame people and 

gives ISIS the recruits and the support that they need to operate 

inside of Syria. 

Senator NELSON. I agree with that. 

Then the question is, when do we really press to have some kind 

of political settlement for Assad to exit? Do you have any thoughts 

on that? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do not. I am not involved in the 

dialogue today in that regard. The political resolution is one of the 

lines of effort that is part of our overall strategy. While I do not 

know, I would assume that today that issue is being addressed, 

and certainly if confirmed, I expect to be part of those conversations and know a bit more than I do today. 

Senator NELSON. General, someone of your stature is going to be 

very comforting to us to have the confidence to know that those 

very tough decisions that will be made with regard to limiting the 

effectiveness and ultimately defeating ISIS will be made with you 

sitting there at the table giving counsel. 

If you just look at a map of who is in control of Syria in the different geographical areas of Syria, it is a mess. How you bring 

order—thank you. Senator McCaskill has shown this is Syria and 

the different colors representing the different entities that in fact 

are in control in that geographic area. So it is comforting to know 

that you are going to be there giving your wise counsel. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

271 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sessions? 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dunford, with regard to the Budget Control Act, which 

includes the sequester, the Budget Committee, the Armed Services 

Committee, with a bipartisan strong vote, has voted out legislation 

that will add, I believe, $23 billion above last year’s spending for 

the Defense Department. I believe the Appropriations Committee 

has already voted out that same spending level, and it is on the 

floor. 

The problem is that the commander in chief, the President of the 

United States, is insisting on blocking that bill, encouraging Democrats to filibuster it until there is an agreement to spend an equal 

amount on non-defense. I just believe that the fact that we have 

a crisis internationally and we need to spend more on defense does 

not require that this Nation spend more on non-defense. So that is 

the difficulty we face. You will be seeing more of that, I guess, as 

time goes by. 

General Dunford, with regard to Iraq and this ISIS situation, is 

it not true that the threat in Iraq is not just a threat to Iraq but 


709ful1.eps
272 

it implicates the national security interests of the United States 

and that we have a national security interest in blocking a takeover of Iraq by this extremist group ISIS that chops off heads and 

does other extreme things? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would agree that the issue of ISIS 

has both regional issues—it is creating regional instability, but absolutely we have U.S. national interests in a stable Iraq that is not 

a sanctuary for extremists. 

Senator SESSIONS. So I think it is a mistake sometimes to just 

sit back and say, well, we are going to wait on the Iraqi army to 

get its act together. We have trained the Iraqi army for over a decade. They have battalions and companies and organizations. They 

are not well led, and their morale is not good. But they have an 

army. The question is can we help encourage them to be more effective in fighting back against ISIS. Would you not agree? 

General DUNFORD. I do agree with that, Senator. I would just 

say, despite the challenges, we have had, as you know, some thousands of men and women from the United States Central Command that have been in Iraq and conducting strikes into Syria over 

the last year. Despite the challenges in pretty difficult conditions, 

I think they have had some accomplishments over the past year 

that we can be proud of. Clearly we are going to do more. I think 

Secretary Carter made that clear on Tuesday. Clearly we need to 

do more to assist the Iraqis in moving forward, and I think that 

is the plan. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, the President’s press conference 2 days 

ago did not encourage me and did not clarify in my mind that we 

have a good strategy for Iraq. Frankly, I think General Dempsey 

and Secretary Carter following up on that were not very persuasive 

either in convincing me or the American people that we have a 

good plan. 

Now, based on your experience, is it not a fact that if we had a 

limited number, just five, special forces embedded with an Iraqi 

battalion of 600, that that can give confidence to that battalion, 

help improve their morale, and help them be more effective on the 

battlefield? 

Senator SESSIONS. Senator, it has been my experience that when 

U.S. forces have accompanied Iraqis—or for that matter, my experience in Afghanistan—that those units are more effective. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, General Dempsey said he has not yet 

recommended that we embed a limited number, a very small number, of such forces in the Iraqi army, but he would do so if he 

thought it was appropriate. Do you not think it is time for us to 

maybe move from being in Baghdad in headquarters and actually 

move out to help provide this kind of confidence, the air cover, the 

direction of munitions, giving confidence of resupply and American 

commitment? Is it not time for us to move forward in that direction? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, without appearing to be evasive, 

what I really would like to do, if confirmed, is have the opportunity 

to get on the ground, speak to the commanders, and frankly provide a more comprehensive recommendation to how we can move 

the campaign forward in Iraq without focusing on one or another 

of the factors. 

273 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I hope you will do that quickly. 

Just one more thing. Senator McCain warned yesterday that we 

could be facing the same situation that he warned about Iraq in 

2011 when we pulled out prematurely. Now we are going to be facing this decision in Afghanistan. I hope that you will be clear and 

firm in your recommendation to the President if you believe this 

plan we have today, date-specific withdrawal, is in error, and I 

hope you will do that. Will you do so if you think it is in error? 

General DUNFORD. I will do that, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator McCaskill? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

My good friend and colleague, Senator Sessions, and I have 

worked together on matters of fiscal accountability and trying to 

spend less money, but I have a different take than he does on 

where we are in terms of the military budget. 

I cannot figure out any reason why we would be putting the $40 

billion increase into the war fund instead of into the base budget. 

I cannot think of any reason to do that other than one of misleading the American people about whether or not we are balancing something because that is the only place they can put the 

money and not have to pay for it. So they put it there so it did not 

have to be paid for and completely short-changed national security 

for our country in the form of cybersecurity, port security, airport 

security, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), all of which I know you would acknowledge, 

General Dunford, is a very important part of the role of keeping 

America safe. Would you agree with that? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would absolutely agree that all 

those organizations play an inextricable role in keeping us safe. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let us make very clear, if in fact we go 

down this path of pretending we are balancing something by putting it in a fund that we do not have to pay for, will in fact the 

Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funds, or the war fund as 

I like to call them—will they do anything to avoid the force structure cuts that are looming across our Nation if we do not get off 

of this path of misleading the American people about what we are 

balancing? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think all of the service chiefs that 

have to balance a budget and certainly me included where I sit 

right now would much prefer that money to be in the base budget 

because that provides a degree of predictability that we can get 

after the two main issues that we have to deal with. One is modernization of force, and the other is to get the readiness back to a 

level that we are comfortable with. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So the cuts that we have seen this week 

that General Odierno announced—they are a drop in the bucket as 

to what is coming if we continue on this bizarre idea of putting all 

of this money in the war fund as opposed to in the base budget 

where force strength belongs. Correct? 

General DUNFORD. If the budget level goes below what has been 

requested in the President’s Budget 2016, there will be significant 

additional cuts made. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

274 

You know how hard we have all worked on the problem of sexual 

assault in the military. I am pleased that the incidents are down. 

I am pleased that reporting is up. I am pleased that the efforts 

that are being made to measure victim satisfaction with command 

look good. I think it is too early to declare success, obviously. We 

have a lot more work to do. 

But the thorny problem that remains, General, and one that I 

really want to make sure you have at the top of your list is retaliation. I know that there have been some initiatives begun, but I 

would like to see a written plan from you as Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs with all of the chiefs signing off on what is your path to getting at this culture. The problem is not, based on the survey, the 

command. The problem is primarily lower level command, unit 

command, and peer-to-peer, not that there may not be some 

outliers there, but that is the bulk of the problem. That is a culture 

issue, and that means from the top. 

I am disappointed that we have not had more prosecutions. Retaliation is a crime. I know it is new. I know people might be very 

reluctant to bring somebody up on those charges because of what 

that might mean within their unit. But that is where you guys 

come in. I would like a commitment from you today that you would 

be willing to put a plan in writing that we could follow. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would make that commitment. I 

think you have correctly identified peer retaliation as the real issue 

that we are trying to grapple with in the wake of the Research and 

Development (RAND) report. I can assure you that the leadership 

across the Department has been carefully looking at that issue in 

an effort to set the right command climate where retaliation is unacceptable. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I will put a question for the record about 

the unused building report that Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) pointed out in Afghanistan. I 

know there was an investigation. You, of course, were not found to 

be a problem in this, but it is a problem the investigation found 

no problem and in reality there was a huge problem, that somebody signed off on a building for $36 million that is never going to 

be used and is sitting empty. We have got to make sure we avoid 

that. 

My final question is—if you do not have time to do it now—I am 

just about out of time. I want to make sure that we get your take 

on ISIS in Afghanistan. I know they are trying to move everywhere. Obviously, this is a Shia-Sunni issue and that is something 

that is prevalent throughout the region. With your experience in 

Afghanistan, are you comfortable that we have a handle on what 

ISIS is trying to do in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, what I know from General Campbell’s reports and intelligence is that we have seen a number of 

Taliban rebrand themselves as ISIS. But beyond that, I do not 

have a good feel at this time for the depth of the problem, but certainly it would be one of the issues I would look into if confirmed. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Wicker? 

275 

Senator WICKER. General Dunford, I think you are just the man 

for the job, but let me tell you you have got a lot of crises to preside 

over. I would simply ask you, during the course of your term in office, tell us what you need. Come back to us and be honest and tell 

us what our men and women in uniform need to succeed and get 

the job done because I do not think we are quite there. 

I was privileged to lead a bipartisan delegation of House and 

Senate Members over the past week to Ukraine. We met with 

President Poroshenko in Kiev, and he is grateful for the $300 million that this Government provided in military assistance during 

the past year. He also mentioned the need for Javelin anti-tank 

missiles. I think your testimony earlier today is that that is a reasonable request on the part of the president of Ukraine, and it will 

be necessary for him to get those in order for him to defend his 

country. Was that your testimony? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it was. From a military perspective, 

those kinds of capabilities in my judgment would be necessary for 

him to deal with both Russian aggression and the separatism issue 

that he is dealing with in Ukraine. 

Senator WICKER. Separatists that are backed by the Russian hierarchy. 

Would you also agree that it is unacceptable that this month’s 

transfer of 100 armored Humvees to Ukraine took over a year to 

process due to bureaucratic delays at DOD and State? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, if it took a year to do that, it would 

be unacceptable. I am not personally aware of that issue. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Well, look into that for us. 

I also led the delegation to Helsinki for the The Organization for 

Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) parliamentary assembly. Before the delegation left—before the Russian delegation left 

en masse because of a dispute over five delegates being on the European Union (EU) sanctions list—the head of the delegation, 

Nikolay Kovalev, said that Russia’s neighbors have no reason to be 

threatened by Russia. Now, of course, Russia has—under Mr. 

Putin’s leadership, Russia has twice invaded neighbors, Georgia in 

2008, Ukraine last year. We see now that there is a Russian official 

investigating the legality of Mr. Kruschev’s transfer of Crimea back 

in the day saying that this perhaps was not an invasion because 

Crimea was never legally transferred to Ukraine by the Russian 

Federation. 

It concerns me that this same official is now investigating whether the transfer of the Baltic States, whether the giving of independence to the Baltic States, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, was also 

legal. Perhaps that was not legal at all, this Russian official suggests. 

We can get to the issue this way. I just want to ask you this 

about our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitment. I can envision a situation where there are small jurisdictions 

within Latvia that have a majority of Russian speakers, small jurisdictions within Estonia that have a majority of Russian speakers. A pretext of a plebiscite is created at that point. I realize I am 

posing something to you that is hypothetical, but in light of pronouncements from officials in the Russian Federation, I think it is 

something to be concerned about. 

276 

Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke to this committee earlier this year 

and said we need to create a trip wire in the Baltics and that this 

trip wire should communicate clearly to Russia that NATO will not 

tolerate violations of the territorial integrity of our allies. 

What do you think of this idea and can you highlight to this committee the steps DOD needs to take under leadership to send a 

credible message that this sort of pretext by the Russian Federation would absolutely not be tolerated by the United States and our 

NATO allies? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think our experience in Ukraine 

and in the other examples that you used highlights the fact that 

we need to update our deterrence and response model to deal with 

the kind of threat that we have today, which has been described 

as a hybrid threat from Russia, which combines political instruments, unconventional warfare, as well as support for separatists 

in these countries. Quite frankly, that needs to be a priority. You 

are asking what should the Department do. We frankly need an effective deterrent model for the 21st century to deal with the kind 

of threats that we are now seeing in Russia because, quite frankly, 

I think that kind of asymmetric threat is one we will continue to 

see in the future and certainly we are going to continue to see that 

in the European context. 

Senator WICKER. Would an incursion of Russian troops or Russian-back separatist troops in small jurisdictions of Russian-speaking majorities within Latvia and Estonia—would that be completely unacceptable to this Government? 

General DUNFORD. From a policy perspective, Senator, I cannot 

answer that. From a personal perspective, it certainly looks like a 

violation of sovereignty to me. 

Senator WICKER. Under article 4 of NATO, in my view it would 

be absolutely unacceptable. We need to make it clear. This administration needs to make it clear. This Congress needs to make that 

we will do what is necessary to prevent this sort of idea from ever 

being considered in the first place. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I agree with that, and I think this 

also applies to the cyber threat as well, again, the idea of deterrence in response to a changing threat in the 21st century, and I 

think we need to update our models for both. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin? 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, for your service to our great country, your 

family’s dedication and sacrifice they have made with you I know 

over the years. 

Sir, I am sure you have had the opportunity to form opinions on 

what our threats have been and what our threats are today. What 

would you consider the greatest threat to our national security? 

General DUNFORD. My assessment today, Senator, is that Russia 

presents the greatest threat to our national security. 

Senator MANCHIN. Would you want to elaborate on that to a certain extent? 

General DUNFORD. Well, Senator, in Russia we have a nuclear 

power. We have one that not only has the capability to violate the 

sovereignty of our allies and to do things that are inconsistent with 

277 

our national interests, but they are in the process of doing so. So 

if you want to talk about a nation that could pose an existential 

threat to the United States, I would have to point to Russia. If you 

look at their behavior, it is nothing short of alarming. 

Senator MANCHIN. I have been very much concerned about the 

same issue. I think we have talked about it briefly before when you 

visited my office. But I have been told by major scholars that the 

Cold War is colder today than it was when it was declared because 

of the lack of communications, the lack of inter-party affiliations. 

Do you find it to be true, and can you change that course in your 

new position? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, certainly the relationship of Russia 

a few years ago, if you recall—we actually were including them in 

NATO meetings and so forth, and those kinds of exchanges have 

stopped. From my perspective, my role would be even as the relationship is challenged and even with the difficulties that we face 

right now, I think it is important that we attempt to maintain a 

military-to-military relationship, an effective military-to-military 

relationship, with our Russian counterparts to the extent possible 

to mitigate the risk of miscalculation and begin to turn the trend 

in the other direction in terms of trust. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, General. 

Also, going back to Iraq—it has been spoken previously, but 

could you find yourself at some time recommending to the President for a three-state solution in Iraq versus staying the course of 

a united Iraqi government? 

General DUNFORD. Well, Senator, from my perspective, I can 

imagine two states in Iraq. I have difficulty imagining a third separate state given the lack of resources that would be available to the 

Sunni. Frankly, I think if it was in thirds without a Federal Government, I think we would have some difficulty, the same difficulty 

that we have today exacerbated by the fact that there is not a central government. 

Senator MANCHIN. Basically you are acknowledging that the 

Kurds are strong, prepared, ready to go if they were given that opportunity? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, you know, again it is probably out of 

my lane to talk about what the organization of Iraq might be in 

the future. But I think from just a pure economic resources and 

governance perspective, the Shia and the Kurds are certainly much 

more equipped to set up a separate state than the Sunni would be 

at this time. 

Senator MANCHIN. I know it has been spoken about also, the mistake of us leaving Iraq, pulling our troops out when we did. Did 

we have an option to stay? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I was not involved in the discussion 

at that time. The assessment of the administration at that time 

was we did not have an option to stay. 

Senator MANCHIN. So basically those of us who believe that 

maybe there could have been some forces left there or basically the 

evaluation Maliki was not doing his job, once we went down the 

path of democracy democratizing that country, we did not have the 

option to go back and stay there. 

278 

General DUNFORD. Given what we were demanding of the Iraqis, 

they were not meeting our demands. I am not sure I would say 

that meant we had no option to stay. 

Senator MANCHIN. I have spoken many times about the lack of 

an audit. The only agency in the Federal Government that we do 

not audit is the Pentagon. Defense. The Marines have made an effort. I will say they have made more of an effort than any other 

branch of the military to do an audit, but it has not been fulfilled. 

What would your commitment be, sir, for us to have an audit, 

especially for us to know about our contractors, how much money 

we spend on contractors, how many contract forces that we have 

doing the job that I believe maybe our military and definitely our 

National Guard could be supporting in that effort that we are not 

doing today? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we cannot be effective as a 

warfighting organization and we certainly cannot be efficient with 

the taxpayers? dollars if we do not have an effective audit. As you 

alluded to, we worked that pretty hard in the Marine Corps. I 

worked it both as an assistant Commandant and then over the last 

year as the Commandant. We did make a significant amount of 

progress. We were able to get to the point where we could internally audit all of the resources that were directly under the cognizance of the Marine Corps with some database challenges outside. But I can assure you that, if confirmed, you will have my commitment to continue to press hard in that direction and to support 

the efforts across the Department to make sure that we can come 

to you with a clean audit. 

Senator MANCHIN. General, I again want to thank you. You do 

have my support and I think the confidence of the American people, definitely the West Virginians. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. General, I just want to thank you for all that 

you have done for the country, and I think that you will do a tremendous job as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I want to 

thank Ellyn and your family for what they have done for the country and continue to do. We appreciate it. 

I wanted to also add my support to what Senator McCaskill said 

about the issue of retaliation. I think this is a very important issue 

as we focus on the work that we have done in this committee to 

eliminate and to work to prevent sexual assault in the military and 

to support victims and to hold the perpetrators accountable. So I 

think that is excellent. I look forward to seeing that proposal from 

you. 

I wanted to ask about the situation, as we look at Iran and their 

support for regional terrorism. How would you assess Iran’s current activities and where are they engaging in support either directly or through proxies for efforts that are undermining security 

in the region? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, Iran is clearly a malign influence in 

the most destabilizing element in the Middle East today. They are 

providing support to the Huthis down in Yemen. They obviously 

provide support. Hezbollah is a clear malign influence in Lebanon. 

There are indications they are involved in Syria, and certainly they 

are involved and trying to expand their influence into Iraq. They 

279 

are creating I think—they are exacerbating at least the Sunni-Shia 

sectarianism across the region. 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to follow up more on that, but I also 

want to ask you. I saw reports that they were also engaged in supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan more now. Is there anything 

you can share with us on that? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I have seen those same reports, and 

from my perspective, what I have seen in the reports is that they 

have provided some support to the Taliban in an effort to counter 

ISIL. 

Senator AYOTTE. Do you believe, as we think about your experience—I know you commanded troops in Iraq. But certainly Iran 

has the blood of American soldiers on its hands for the explosive 

materials that they provided to the Shia militias in Iraq that killed 

many of our men and women in uniform. So do you think, as we 

look at the situation in Iraq and what is happening with the Shia 

militias you referred to, how could they be a malign influence in 

the longer-term solution in Iraq? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, they clearly could be a malign influence, which is why I believe we should not provide any support to 

those forces unless they are directly under the Iraqi Government 

and not provided support by the Iranians. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

I wanted to also ask you about the situation on cyber because the 

FBI Director—we have received briefings on the Office of Personnel 

Management (OPM) breach, but the FBI Director has said that he 

believes this is an enormous breach. Millions and millions of individuals who provided background information have been breached. 

Director Clapper has said that they believe it is the Chinese who 

have done this breach. 

When we look at the threats facing our Nation, how grave do you 

think the cyber threat is? Also, how would you assess our current 

posture with the Chinese and how we should be addressing the situation? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would agree with you. The cyber 

threat is clearly very significant. Frankly, every week we learn a 

bit more about the OPM breach. My number one concern, obviously, as a service chief is for the data and the wellbeing of the 

men and women whose data that is having been compromised. 

One of the challenges is, of course, attribution. But from my perspective, if confirmed, my role will be to provide the President with 

a full range of options to deal with these cyber attacks, which is 

what the OPM breach was. 

Senator AYOTTE. So I know that Senator Manchin had asked you 

what you believe our gravest national security threat was, and you 

identified Russia. Certainly we have seen this aggression by Putin 

in Russia certainly invading other countries essentially. 

But what is it—as you look at the National security situation, 

you think about immediate threats to the country, what keeps you 

up at night the most? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, what keeps me up at night the most 

is our ability to respond to the uncertain. I am very confident— 

very confident—in the joint force today and our capabilities and capacities to deal with the challenges that we have today, albeit we 

280 

need improvement in cyber, other capabilities, but on balance, the 

force that we have today is able to deal with the challenges that 

we know. There is very little residual capacity. This is the issue 

that has been discussed many times before this committee and that 

you have had some personal engagement on. It is the readiness to 

respond to the uncertain, frankly, that keeps me up at night as a 

service chief and certainly one that would keep me up at night 

were I to be confirmed as the Chairman. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Gillibrand? 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 

Member. I appreciate this hearing. 

Thank you, General Dunford, for your service. I am grateful for 

your wife and children being here with you. We all know you serve 

together. 

I want to continue along the line that Senator Ayotte started 

with with Iran. We are expecting a potential nuclear agreement between P5 Plus 1 as early as today. Are you concerned that lifting 

sanctions on Iran might allow that country to invest more money 

in terrorist activities in the Middle East, and what can we do to 

address those concerns? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there is no question that signing an 

agreement will change the dynamic in the Middle East. The first 

thing I guess I would say is that, if confirmed, I know I would have 

the responsibility to develop options for the President to deal with 

the changing dynamic. 

With regard to increased resources for malign activity, I think it 

is reasonable to assume that if sanctions are lifted, the Iranians 

would have more money available for malign activities. But I would 

probably say that regardless of whether there is an agreement or 

not, my expectation is that Iran will continue the malign activity 

across the Middle East that we have seen over the past several 

years. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. I also want to continue the line started by 

Senator McCaskill about retaliation. Senator McCaskill was correct 

when she said this is something we are all very concerned about, 

and she said it is not just peer-to-peer. She mentioned unit commanders. I want to be specific about this issue so you know the 

problem you are dealing with. 

So 53 percent was peer-to-peer retaliation, but 35 percent was 

adverse administrative action. 32 percent was professional retaliation, and 11 percent was punishment for an infraction. So you have 

to recognize some of this retaliation is being perceived by survivors 

to be done by unit commanders or someone within the chain of 

command because administrative retaliation or perceived administrative retaliation or professional retaliation is serious. So there is 

still a climate issue that the chain of command is responsible for, 

particularly unit commanders and lower level commanders, that is 

not getting the right message. 

In fact, the recent RAND survey said that 60 percent of women 

who said they experienced sexual discrimination or some kind of 

negative behavior came from their commanders, their unit commanders. So you have to recognize there is a climate issue that is 

281 

not being adequately addressed. So when you do your report for 

this committee, I would like you to look at that issue as well. 

You also have the challenge that in the reported cases, 1 in 7 of 

the perpetrators who were alleged have committed rape, sexual assault, or unwanted sexual contact was also in the chain of command. So you have a challenge with lower level commanders that 

is not yet being addressed that I would like your report to cover 

as well. 

Somewhat related, I want to talk about combat integration. I 

strongly believe that we should have standards that meet the 

needs of each position and then allow anyone in who meets those 

standards to compete. You have not been very vocal on this issue, 

but if confirmed, you will be one of those individuals who are advising the Secretary of Defense about whether the services should receive any exceptions to policy. 

Do you expect the services, especially the Marines, who I assume 

you have been tracking most closely, to ask for exceptions? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I am not able to answer that question right now, and I can just explain the process in the Marine 

Corps. We have looked at this issue pretty hard. As you know, we 

put together a task force that is just completing. In fact, they will 

stand down this week. I expect the data that we have collected over 

the past 18 months in a very deliberate, responsible way to be 

available to me in the August-September time frame. We will meet 

the timeline established by Secretary Panetta and General 

Dempsey in a letter from 2012. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Okay. 

Will you be looking across the services to see if one asks for exception in a position whose equivalent another service does not request an exception for? Will you be doing a comparison between 

services? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, my understanding of the way it will 

work now, again, if I am confirmed, sitting as the Chairman, is 

that I will have a responsibility to look at each one of the requests 

on its own merits and make a recommendation to the Secretary of 

Defense. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Okay. 

Then with my remaining 30 seconds, I want to address cyber. We 

are constantly being confronted by our need for a capable cyber 

force. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and the services have been 

building out those capabilities, but there is still work to be done. 

How do you envision the force, and what do you see the role as the 

Reserve component? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I envision the force, as you mentioned—it is certainly going to grow, and I would support the plans 

that Admiral Rodgers—and I think he has testified here before the 

committee. I think he is setting the right path in terms of growing 

the capacity of the cyber force. 

The Reserve component is going to be very important. In fact, in 

many cases and certainly as a service chief who looked at this, 

some of the skill sets that are unique to cyber are available to us 

in the Reserve Force. We need to figure out a way to maximize and 

leverage those capabilities. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

282 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Fischer? 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Dunford, for your many years of service to 

this country and to the men and women under your command. I 

would like to also thank your family, your wife, your son who is 

present today, and your niece who is here as well. So thank you, 

sir. 

I was pleased to see that you listed modernizing the nuclear enterprise among the top challenges that you do expect to face in 

your response to the committee’s advance questions. You also described our nuclear deterrent as the Nation’s top military priority. 

Do you believe it is critical that we maintain the full triad of our 

delivery vehicles? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, given the nature of the threat today, 

I do believe that. 

Senator FISCHER. Do you support a bomber leg of the triad that 

is armed with both the gravity bombs and the cruise missiles? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. 

Senator FISCHER. The gravity bombs, as you know, and the 

cruise missiles—they are entirely different capabilities. So one does 

not make the other redundant. Is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. It is, Senator, and my understanding of the 

issue is it adds a degree of complexity for the threat and gives us 

a greater assurance of being able to deliver, should that be required. 

Senator FISCHER. Great. Thank you. 

As you know, modernization has been delayed and deferred for 

some time, and we are now at a point where the life of the delivery 

systems cannot be extended any further. As Deputy Secretary 

Work put it recently, the choice right now is modernizing a losing 

deterrent capability in the 2020’s and the 2030’s . 

Some have argued that these bills are simply too large and we 

cannot afford to retain our nuclear deterrent. But, according to the 

Department’s calculation, at its peak the nuclear mission would be 

about 7 percent of the nuclear budget. I think it is a little confusing 

when we hear about our deterrent described as unaffordable, and 

to me the alternative, letting that deterrent age out—that has the 

unaffordable cost to us. 

Do you have any thoughts on that? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would say I would pose the question—you know, some people would ask whether we can afford it. 

I would probably flip that around and say I think we need to think 

about how we will fund it. It is a capability that is required. Again, 

we have identified that as the number one capability that we need 

to have to protect the Nation, and nuclear weapons certainly create 

an existential threat. So for me, it is a question more of how do 

we work together moving forward to fund this as opposed to whether or not we can afford to do it. 

Senator FISCHER. That is 7 percent of the budget at its peak, 

though, and being the number one priority, should that not be 

what we fund first? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, frankly, it is more complicated to me 

than that, and I have some experience with that inside the DepartVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00288 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ment of the Navy. When I looked at the Ohio class replacement, 

as an example, and what that would do to pressurize the shipbuilding account, we would have to make some very difficult decisions inside the Department from a capability perspective. So while 

it is clear that that is the priority, it is not an issue of exclusivity. 

So balanced capabilities is what the joint force needs, and so I 

think we need to approach it from that perspective. 

Senator FISCHER. Fair enough. 

I also appreciate the connection that you made between the modernization and the reductions to the hedge of our non-deployed 

weapons. I think that this linkage is often overlooked, and I think 

it is based on simple logic. If you have a modern stockpile and you 

have a responsive infrastructure, you do not keep as many spares. 

I think you are more insulated as well from what is happening in 

the world. You are more insulated from those surprises and also 

from technical failure. 

But to be clear, do you believe that it would be premature to 

make any significant changes to the hedge before we have a modern stockpile and before we have a responsive infrastructure? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, my understanding at this time from 

the briefings I received is that would be the most prudent course 

for us to take. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, sir. 

With respect to further nuclear arms reductions, do you believe 

that any reductions below the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) force levels must be achieved through a negotiated 

treaty and also be verifiable? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do. I do not believe we ought to 

take unilateral action in that regard. 

Senator FISCHER. Should non-strategic nuclear weapons be included as well? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would like to take that particular 

question for the record. 

[The information follows:] 

New START does not include any limitations on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. 

Any change to our nuclear deterrence posture, including both strategic and nonstrategic forces, must maintain strategic stability and sustain effective deterrence with 

the current strategic environment, and must also protect our ability to hedge 

against future technical and geopolitical changes. I agree that any future negotiated 

treaty must be verifiable. Given the current environment, we must also ensure existing arms control obligations are being met before concluding additional arms control agreements. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Do you agree that any arms control negotiations must take into 

account Russia’s current behavior, especially its compliant record. 

You mentioned at the beginning that you feel that Russia is our 

greatest threat. 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly? 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to also thank General Dempsey and his family for everything they have done for the country. 

General Dunford, you and your family—thank you very, very 

much for stepping up to the plate. We are really in your debt. 

284 

As you know and we have discussed in the past, I believe one of 

the greatest threats to our troops is when they find themselves in 

a personal place where they start to think about something like 

suicide. We lost over 400 young men and women in the past year. 

I know you have worked very hard in this area. You have done a 

lot of rigorous screening in the Marine Corps. 

Will you have that same screening used across the branches 

when you look at recruits and early on in their careers? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, one of the thoughts I had as a service chief was to ensure that once we identified a better way to 

screen, as you said, and identified people at risk and take appropriate action, that we would share that as best practices across the 

services. I would certainly look to facilitate that if confirmed. 

Senator DONNELLY. Then the other question I wanted to ask you 

in this area is a lot of times, in talking to the parents, there has 

been a stigma for the young men and women to seek help. I know 

that you are committed to removing that stigma. Are we going to 

make sure that everybody knows, look, it is a sign of strength to 

try to get some help, to talk to somebody, as opposed to any weakness? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, absolutely. You know, this is one of 

those areas where you are never complacent, you are never satisfied with where you are. But I would tell you this. I really believe 

this: Over the past probably 5 or 7 years, the issue of stigma as 

it associates with suicide has changed dramatically. Even the way 

we deal with families in the wake of suicide, if you think about 

where we were a decade ago, is completely different. I do think the 

command climate is much more receptive to somebody today seeking help than it was in the past and making sure that help is accessible and, where appropriate, anonymous. But, again, I am not 

suggesting that we are satisfied with where we are, but I do believe 

we have made a lot of progress in that particular regard. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you. 

Last week, I was on a trip led by Senator Kaine. We went to Iraq 

and met with a number of our forces there, some of the leadership. 

One of the greatest concerns was the Iraqi troops, and when you 

look at the number of ISIS fighters in Ramadi compared to the 

Iraqi troops, it was a very sparse number of ISIS fighters, but they 

won the day anyhow because the Iraqi troops turned and left. 

I know that that has to be a focus of the leadership of the Iraqi 

forces. Are we going to send the message that the only way through 

Ramadi is through Ramadi; that there is no back door anymore in 

these kind of efforts? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, again, you have been on the ground 

more recently than me now, and I know you have talked to the 

commanders there. I did have an opportunity to listen to General 

Austin the other day, and I have seen General Terry’s plan, and 

I think they have made it very clear to the Iraqi Security Forces 

how important Ramadi is. In fact, they have been working hard 

over the last couple months to set the conditions for the Iraqis to 

be successful in Ramadi. It probably is one of those issues where 

it is a tactical action to go back in Ramadi, but there is no question 

in my mind that from an information operations perspective and 

285 

frankly from a perception of the campaign, it is a strategic action. 

I think the Iraqis understand that. 

Senator DONNELLY. One of the other groups we met with—and 

I know the marines have shed so much blood and treasure in 

Anbar Province over the past years. We met with a lot of the Sunni 

tribal leaders, and they said, look, we are still united with you but 

we need to know that you are in this, that you care, that you will 

be there. I mentioned this the other day to Secretary Carter and 

General Dempsey. One of the council members from Haditha said, 

we have got people eating grass in our town now. These are people 

who worked with the United States. They are now eating grass. 

There is no milk for our children. We need you to help in this humanitarian crisis. 

So I think we not only have to win the battles, we have to reacquire the hearts and minds of the people there. They said, if you 

do, we will move these folks out. I just wanted to get your views 

on that. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I agree, and I think with regard to 

Anbar, I have got both a personal and a professional stake, having 

lived in the province for a year and developed relationships with 

some of the people in the Anbar Province. I could not agree with 

you more that their confidence in our commitment, their trust in 

our commitment will absolutely have an impact on the success of 

our campaign not only from the military perspective, but from the 

perspective of the people’s willingness to support us. 

Senator DONNELLY. The last thing I wanted to mention is Syria. 

It appears that the plan we have right now is really no plan. You 

know, we have talked about buffer zones when we were in Saudi 

Arabia—Chairman McCain with a group of us. We talked about 

creating no-fly zones there. So we seem to be in search of a plan. 

My fear is that Assad is going to fall, and we are hearing that from 

a lot of folks in the area that he is on very shaky ground right now. 

Do we then look up the next day and see a race between ISIS and 

al-Nusra to take over the rest of the country, which is a nightmare 

scenario at that point? So you are stepping into a real challenging 

position, but I think one of the very, very front on the lens is Syria 

is going to change. It is going to change quickly, and we had best 

be prepared for that change and be ahead of it or else we are going 

to look up and an entire country is going to be gone. 

Thank you. 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cotton? 

Senator COTTON. General Dunford, thank you for being here 

today. Thank you for your years of service. Mrs. Dunford, thank 

you for your years of service. 

General Dunford, you said earlier that you believe Russia is the 

gravest threat that the United States faces. I take it that is because, in large part, Russia is the only country with a nuclear capability to destroy the United States and our way of life? 

General DUNFORD. That is one of the reasons, Senator, and of 

course, that is combined with their recent behavior. 

Senator COTTON. Given that Russia, according to the administration, is currently in ongoing violation of the Intermediate Nuclear 

286 

Forces Treaty, do you believe the United States should consider 

withdrawing from that treaty? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would like to take that for the 

record. 

[The information follows:] 

We view Russian violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty with 

great concern. But it is not yet time to consider withdrawal. Our goal remains to 

return Russia to compliance and preserve the viability of the Treaty. At the same 

time, we must not allow the Russian Federation to gain a significant military advantage through their violation of an arms control treaty. It is my understanding, 

the Department is developing and analyzing potential response options for the 

President, and will consult with our Allies. 

Senator COTTON. Okay. We would like to hear a response to that 

for the record because as it currently stands, Russia and the 

United States are the only parties to the treaty, and Russia is violating it. It means that the United States is the only country in the 

world prohibited from developing missiles with a range of 500 to 

5,000 kilometers. 

The President currently has a proposal to preposition some 

equipment in our eastern NATO allies? countries as a response not 

just to the capability that Russia has but also the intention they 

have displayed to put stresses on our alliance. I find that proposal 

somewhat underwhelming, although a step in the right direction. 

Are there barriers to stationing troops in those countries up to the 

battalion or even brigade level? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think that proposal is part of a 

wide range of activities. One is to have infrastructure that we can 

support deployments. The other is to preposition equipment so we 

can rapidly move forces into Europe. Then the other piece of it is 

actually rotational forces, as you are suggesting. So I think rotational forces are envisioned as part of the whole package that Secretary Carter announced at the defense ministerial in NATO a 

month ago. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

I would like to move now to Iran. As far as I know, there has 

still not been an announced nuclear agreement with Iran. But 

under any such agreement, Iran will probably get a signing bonus 

of billions and billions of dollars. How do you expect Iran will use 

that signing bonus? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, again, from the outside looking in, 

there are two challenges they have. One is their economy internally 

and the disaffection of the Iranian people as a result of that economy, and the other is that they use resources that they have available to support their malign activity across the region. 

Senator COTTON. So you believe that at least part of that money 

can go to terrorist organizations they support like Hezbollah, as 

well as to destabilize governments in the Middle East like support 

for the Huthis in Yemen or Shiite militias in Iraq. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think it is reasonable to assume 

that. 

Senator COTTON. Does the United States have the military capability to destroy Iran’s nuclear program? 

General DUNFORD. My understanding is that we do, Senator. 

287 

Senator COTTON. You have served in Iraq and Afghanistan. Do 

you know how many soldiers, marines underneath your command 

were killed by Iranian activities? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I know the total number of soldiers, 

sailors, airmen, and marines that were killed by Iranian activities, 

and the number has been recently reported as about 500. We were 

not always able to attribute the casualties that we had to Iranian 

activity, although many times we suspected it was Iranian activity, 

even though we did not necessarily have the forensics to support 

that. 

Senator COTTON. So about 500 confirmed, but many more suspected killed in action and even more wounded in action. 

You have a reputation for being particularly thoughtful when you 

deal with the families of fallen servicemembers. What would you 

say to family members of a soldier, sailor, airman, or marine that 

was killed by Iranian activity if we make a nuclear agreement with 

Iran before they change their behavior in the region? 

General DUNFORD. Well, Senator, what I would say is that my 

expectation is that regardless of there being an agreement or not, 

Iran will continue to be a malign force and influence across the region. Then if confirmed as the Chairman, I will make sure that our 

leadership has a full range of military options to deal with Iranian 

activity. 

Senator COTTON. It has been reported that your nickname is 

‘‘Fighting Joe.’’ Is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, actually it is not one I use. 

Senator COTTON. But it is one that has been given to you. Correct? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, perhaps by my wife. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator COTTON. Do you care to tell us the origin of that nickname given to you that you choose not to use? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would prefer to talk about that in 

private, if you do not mind. 

Senator COTTON. So I have heard it reported that it was because 

of your activities as a commander in the early days of the Iraq war 

as an infantry officer. 

Given whatever budget agreement we reach, it will probably be 

inadequate to meet the forces that we face and the long-term modernization needs that we have, whether it is the long-range strike 

bomber or the F–35, the Ohio class replacement submarine. Are 

you worried about the next generation of infantrymen in the Marine Corps and the Army, that we are going to be taking money 

from our ground troops to put in major capital investments, which 

are clearly needed? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I am concerned, and I think it is 

broader than just the infantry piece. I mean, I think experience 

tells us we need a balanced inventory of capabilities and capacities 

in the joint force to be successful. 

When I answered the question of Senator Ayotte earlier when 

she asked me what kept me up at night, I talked about the need 

to respond to the uncertain. What concerns me are people who actually think they know what the future is going to look like because our experience tells us we do not. So having a full range of 

288 

capabilities that includes effective marines and soldiers from my 

perspective is the prudent thing to do. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

In your long and distinguished career, I think we put ground 

forces at a minimum into Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Somalia, the 

Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq again, and there is no doubt that we 

may be called upon again in the future. So I hope in your tenure 

that even if you do not want to be called ‘‘Fighting Joe,’’ that you 

will be on the lookout for all the Fighting Joes in the Marine Corps 

and the Army so the country will have them ready to serve once 

again. 

General DUNFORD. I will do that, Senator. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. The committee will not review how the Senator from Arkansas got his nicknames here in the Senate. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Dunford, to you and your family. 

General Dunford, with the President’s recent announcement 

about 500 more advisors going into the anti-ISIL mission in Iraq 

and Syria and in the region, we are now up to 3,500 troops that 

are serving abroad in that battle serving as advisors, as trainers, 

special forces coordinating air campaigns, conducting ground 

strikes. The war passed its 11-month anniversary yesterday. 2 days 

ago, General Dempsey was here and testified that he believed in 

a mission of this complexity, it was likely to be a multiyear effort 

that would require a sustained commitment by the United States 

to defeat ISIL. 

Do you think it would be received positively by the troops who 

we are asking to deploy far from home and risk their lives if Congress were to have a debate and authorize and affirm the U.S. mission against ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do think it would be positive from 

a couple perspectives. One, the reason you mentioned is—I think 

what our young men and women need—and it is really all they 

need to do what we ask them to do—is a sense that what they are 

doing has purpose, has meaning, and has the support of the American people. So that is the first reason. 

But I also think that there is a second benefit from such a debate, and that is to send a clear and unmistakable message to our 

adversaries and to our allies that we are committed to this endeavor. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, General. 

With respect to the anti-ISIL effort, I want to pick up on something Senator Reed was talking about earlier. The whole-of-government approach, as you referred to it, has sort of nine lines of effort, 

and just for the record—I think we know these, but for everybody 

there—supporting effective governance in Iraq, denying ISIL safe 

haven, building partner capacity, enhancing intelligence collection 

on ISIL, disrupting ISIL finances, exposing ISIL’s true nature, disrupting the flow of foreign fighters, protecting the homeland, and 

humanitarian support. Those nine lines—two are purely DOD, denying ISIL safe haven and building partner capacity. The DOD has 

289 

a piece of some of the others, but the others are generally nonDOD. 

You have testified that you think the effect of sequester on the 

DOD mission could be catastrophic. But given the fact that seven 

of these line items are non-DOD, would you agree that the allowance of sequester cuts to come back full force October 1 would also 

significantly hurt the other seven lines of effort, which are critical 

to defeating ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do. If you just do not mind, I would 

just like to talk about the relationship between the two lines of effort in the DOD and the other seven because I think it highlights 

the issue. 

Senator KAINE. Please. 

General DUNFORD. From my perspective, the two lines of effort 

that we have right now—one, deny sanctuary and to build partnership capacity in both Iraq and Syria—really are buying time and 

space for those other seven lines of effort to work. But to be quite 

honest, you know, I do not see how we can have an enduring success unless those other seven lines of effort are addressed, and they 

are, in the final analysis, more important. 

I think the military lines of effort will set the conditions for those 

other seven lines of effort to be put into effect, but I certainly cannot see us being successful without all of them being properly 

resourced. When you talk about threat finance, when you talk 

about moving foreign fighters, and as importantly, when you talk 

about the State Department’s efforts to negotiate to develop effective governance in both Iraq and Syria, those are going to be very 

important actions to be taken for us, again, to have enduring stability in the region so we can actually deal with this issue once and 

for all. 

Senator KAINE. I think there has been some suggestion that if we 

fix sequester for defense, that is all that we need to do. But even 

for important defense priorities like defeating ISIL, the testimony 

you have just given about the connection between non-defense investments and defense investments in defeating ISIL is really important. I will just note, by my count, 95 of 100 Senators are now 

on record either by voting in the budget or voting in the National 

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) or in their public statements for 

supporting the notion that sequester should be fixed both for defense and non-defense accounts. It is my hope that we will do that. 

With respect to training and equipping opposition in the antiISIL battle, just two items. Senator McCain first raised in September in a hearing—I think it was in this room—the question of 

if we train folks to fight ISIL in Syria and they get attacked by the 

Assad regime, will we protect them? He still has not gotten an answer to it. He asked it again yesterday. So by my count, September 

to now, that is 9 months without a clear answer. 

We were told in theater last week that the current rules of engagement still would prohibit U.S. effort to support U.S.-trained 

anti-ISIL fighters in Syria if they come under attack by the Assad 

regime. I have asked questions for the record to get that clarified, 

and I would like to know if that is in fact the policy, if DOD intends to change the policy, when they will change the policy, and 

if not, what do we need to do to change the policy because I do not 

290 

believe we should be sending U.S.-trained folks into a theater of 

war without giving them a guarantee that they will be protected. 

Those questions will be record questions from the hearing 2 days 

ago, but I just want to let you know that those are coming and we 

view that as a very important matter. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General and Ms. Dunford, I want to thank you for your service 

to the country taking on this new responsibility. I certainly know 

that marines all over the country, whether on active duty or retired, take great pride in the fact that you are only the second marine ever nominated for this post. I know your career has exemplified the values of honor, courage, and commitment that are the values of the Marine Corps. I certainly plan on voting for you with enthusiasm and encourage my colleagues to do so as well. So we look 

forward to seeing you tomorrow night at the parade. 

I wanted to ask a few questions about the military relationship 

with the Congress, even though your role is going to be principal 

advisor to the President. 

First, in the area of force posture, this committee occasionally 

weighs in through the NDAA and other means on key force posture 

issues, number of ships, basing of troops, aircraft like the Fairchild 

Republic A–10 Thunderbolt (A–10). When this happens, how important is it that the military follow the defense guidance of the Senate or the Congress? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think it is very important, given 

how explicit it is in the Constitution what the responsibilities of 

the Congress are in that regard. 

Senator SULLIVAN. So let me provide a couple examples. So let 

us say there was an amendment from the chairman and it was 

about the number of aircraft carriers, passed unanimously through 

the committee, votes on the Senate floor. Do you think the CNO 

should say, well, the chairman does not know that much about the 

Navy anymore, we are going to blow that advice in the NDAA off? 

Is that an appropriate role for the military? 

General DUNFORD. If Congress passes a law, Senator, it would 

not be appropriate to ignore it. 

Senator SULLIVAN. So how about an NDAA amendment that says 

it is the sense of Congress, in support of the President’s rebalance 

in the Asia-Pacific strategy, to increase forces in the Pacific Command Area of Repsonsibility (PACOM AOR)? Is it appropriate to ignore that or even significantly decrease forces? What do you think 

our response to that should be if that is happening? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, first, obviously, the sense of Congress ought to inform all the actions— 

Senator SULLIVAN. There is a recent amendment that says exactly that. 

General DUNFORD. Right. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me provide a second area that we have 

talked about a little bit in terms of emerging threats. You know, 

sometimes the Department of Defense civilian and military officials, because there are so many threats out there, miss certain 

291 

threats. Let me provide an example of one that everybody seems 

to be focused on with the exception of the Department of Defense. 

You may have seen ?Newsweek? this week had a cover story on 

the Arctic and what they called ?In the Race to Control the Arctic, 

the U.S. Lags Behind.? It is a very long article. It talks about how 

this is the world’s newest great game, Kipling’s term for the struggle between major powers to dominate the earth’s remote but very 

strategic places. It talks about how the Russians are very, very aggressively moving military forces into the Arctic, serious military 

exercises, and how, whether it is the Coast Guard or the Secretary 

of Defense saying this new kind of geopolitical cold war the U.S. 

is in danger of losing. We are not even in the same league as the 

Russians. We are not even playing this game at all. So I think it 

is safe to say the Department of Defense has been asleep at the 

switch on this. 

Congress has been more attuned to this issue. In this year’s 

NDAA, there is a section that requires the Department of Defense 

to provide Congress with a military strategy, given the new threat 

levels, and an Operation Plan (OPLAN) for the Arctic based on the 

increased interests and threats. 

Does it make sense to cut any of America’s limited number of 

cold weather-trained warriors in the Arctic before this congressionally mandated strategy is completed? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I guess I am not sure which forces 

you are alluding to be cut. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Well, there are only certain forces in the Arctic right now. They are all in Alaska. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would like to take that for the 

record. I am not aware of the full range of decisions that are being 

made right now and what the implications are. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department’s 2013 Arctic Strategy is aligned with the 2013 National Strategy 

for the Arctic Region. Our current capabilities and posture protect U.S. interests, 

and we are evaluating requirements against the evolving security environment to 

ensure we continue to meet our global defense responsibilities. Further development 

of cooperative strategic military partnerships with, for example, Norway and Canada, will underpin the Department’s balanced approach to a region that is receiving 

increased attention. 

The reduction of cold weather trained personnel is a result of the ongoing need 

to balance the growing importance of Arctic security with current operational priorities and resource constraints. DOD has a wide range of capabilities that can be deployed with proper preparation in a variety of operating environments, including the 

Arctic. As we continue to review requirements, we will review DOD’s recent Arctic 

Strategy as well. If confirmed as Chairman, I will meet the NDAA mandate to provide Congress with a military strategy for the Arctic. 

We are and will continue to train and operate regularly in the Arctic to meet our 

primary objectives of ensuring security, supporting safety, and promoting defense 

cooperation while preparing for a wide range of challenges and contingencies. 

Senator SULLIVAN. General, I mean, I think it is important to 

recognize, you know, it is hard to figure out appropriate force levels 

and capabilities in the Arctic without having a plan. We have mandated the desire and need for a plan, and I think we are getting 

a little bit of the cart before the horse, cutting forces before we 

even know what our plan is. But we certainly recognize that there 

is an increased threat. Congress has, and we hope the DOD will 

recognize it is as well. 

292 

General DUNFORD. Senator, if confirmed—I know I have had 

some conversations with both the current Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Coast Guard about the implications 

for the Arctic. The commitment I would make to you is that we 

will, in fact, develop an appropriate role for the military in support 

of our economic and political interests in the Arctic. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hirono? 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General 

Dunford and Mrs. Dunford and your family, for your service. 

I just wanted to pick up very briefly on the issue of sexual trauma in the military and the concerns about retaliation. I think that 

you had noted that you would determine the root causes and continue to work to ensure that the culture does not support retaliation. 

I would ask you to have a sense of urgency as you respond to this 

committee on how you are going to address and resolve the issue 

of retaliation because even as we downsize our military, it is even 

more important that our troops? morale remain strong and that 

there is cohesion, and there could not be strong morale or cohesion 

if some of your troops are encountering sexual assault and harassment and retaliation. I just wanted to make that point. 

Could you share very briefly your views on the rebalance to the 

Asia-Pacific? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can. It is absolutely critical that we 

do that, given both the demographics in Asia but also our economic 

future. So there is no question about it. That is going to require 

us to modernize our alliances, and I think you have seen some 

progress in that regard, our relationship with South Korea, our relationship with Japan, our relationship with the Philippines, Vietnam, India, Australia have all been adjusted here in recent 

months. I think we have an unprecedented level of exercises and 

engagement right now in the Pacific again to assert our influence 

and to provide a stabilizing presence. 

The most important thing I think the rebalance to the Pacific 

does is it provides a security infrastructure within which we could 

advance our National interests. That is what has existed for the 

past 7 years, and I think the rebalance to the Pacific, as we know 

it today, is designed to modernize that security infrastructure and 

make sure it is in place so that just as we protect our National interests over the past 7 years, we can do that in the indefinite future as well. 

Senator HIRONO. I just got information on the cuts that will happen to Pacific Command (PACOM) as a result of the budget necessities. I am glad to know that General Odierno did say that the 

cuts were with regard to the importance of a rebalance, and therefore, we want to make sure—and this is something that I know 

that Senator Sullivan shares with me—that the rebalance to the 

Asia-Pacific remains a very strong commitment on our part. 

You mentioned that Russia is the greatest threat to our National 

security. Where would ISIL, China, and North Korea fall with regard to our National security dangers? 

293 

General DUNFORD. Senator, if I had to rack and stack them 

today, I would have Russia down as number one. I would have 

China down as number two. 

Senator HIRONO. Could you explain why briefly? 

General DUNFORD. Sure. Russia, of course, because of nuclear capability and their aggression. 

China because of their military capability, their growing military 

capability, and their presence in the Pacific and our interests in the 

Pacific. So it is a relationship between their capabilities and our interests. It does not necessarily mean they are a current threat. It 

does not mean they view China as an enemy. But, again, as someone in uniform, I get paid to look at both somebody’s intent and 

their capabilities. So when I look at Chinese capabilities relative to 

our interests in the Pacific, I would have to consider China as an 

area of concern for security, again as distinct from a threat. 

Clearly, North Korea with ballistic missile capability and the potential to reach the United States and attack the homeland is high 

on that list. 

Then ISIL. 

But, you know, Senator, I just want to make it clear. As I go 

down that list and prioritize, I do not view that meaning that we 

can attack those issues in sequence or that a prioritization of one 

at the expense of the other is necessarily something we would have 

to do at this particular time. All four of those security issues are 

ones that require the Department to look at. They all create a challenge that needs to be addressed. 

Senator HIRONO. That is why we live in very complicated times. 

I would like to focus on our distributed laydown in the Pacific. 

Specific to Japan, I am aware of the concerns of the Okinawan population and of their leadership’s desire to halt construction of the 

Futenma replacement facility. Can you characterize our relationship and the challenges for relocating our forces from and within 

Japan? Because that is very much a part of the rebalance that we 

are committed to. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks. I recently did visit Japan. I 

was encouraged by my visit. I met with a number of their senior 

leaders, to include the minister of defense. I received nothing but 

their full commitment to continue with the Futenma replacement 

plan. So my sense is that the Japanese Government is committed 

to that. They recognize that that is important for us to continue 

with the preferred laydown that you alluded to. So my sense right 

now is that our relationship with the Japanese and their stated 

commitment—we are in a pretty good place with regard to the 

Futenma replacement facility. 

Senator HIRONO. Do you view the Okinawa situation as mainly 

a concern that should be dealt with within Japan and their government? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we—and I specifically now talk 

about the marines in Okinawa. We need to be good neighbors and 

set the conditions for a positive relationship with the Okinawan 

people. So I think we can make a contribution. But at the end of 

the day, the issue of the Futenma replacement facility from my 

perspective is in fact an internal Japanese political issue that has 

to be worked by the Japanese Government. 

294 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Heinrich? 

Senator HEINRICH. General Dunford, welcome to you and your 

family. In your written testimony, you state, as Senator Fischer 

pointed out, that our nuclear deterrent is the Nation’s top military 

priority. That leads me to a specific question related to how we 

plan for that priority over time. 

The health of our Nation’s whole nuclear weapons complex is 

critical to our nuclear deterrent. One of the things you wrote in 

your written testimony is that we must recruit and train our next 

generation workforce capable of certifying stockpile requirements 

and to modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure. 

Can you share with me your thoughts specifically on LDRD, or 

laboratory-directed research and development, and the life extension programs that are going on at our National labs and their role 

in achieving recruitment and retention of that next generation nuclear workforce? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that is an issue that in my current 

capacity I frankly have not developed any level of expertise, and I 

would like to take that one for the record. 

[The information follows:] 

While I am not familiar with these programs in my current capacity, I understand 

the warhead Life Extension Programs and LDRD represent the broad nature of the 

workload at the Department of Energy’s national security laboratories. These programs are necessary to deliver near-term warhead commitments while advancing 

science and technology for future national security needs. Furthermore, they contribute towards maintaining a steady, sustainable, and meaningful workload for the 

laboratories and are critical for attracting and retaining the highly technical workforce required to sustain our Nation’s nuclear deterrent. 

Senator HEINRICH. That would be fine. I look forward to engaging you on that in the future. I think it is going to be really important for us to view some of the particulars of how we manage the 

labs and particularly the things that bring people into the pipeline 

at the front end with the greatest amount of expertise and then 

they stay in those positions, rise up through the labs, and provide 

the continuity that it is going to take to make sure that we have 

the kind of modern deterrent that we need. 

I want to focus my next question on some of the challenges here 

at home. In my view, defense innovation is moving too slowly, oftentimes in cycles that last years, while commercial innovation can 

be measured in cycles of months. 

This committee included a section in this year’s NDAA to authorize funding, about half of which would be dedicated for directed energy to accelerate the fielding of a variety of important offset technologies including, in addition to directed energy, things like lowcost, high-speed munitions, cyber capabilities, autonomous systems, 

undersea warfare, and intelligence data analytics. 

What role do you think the development of these new technologies like directed energy and robotics will play in our National 

security posture? What steps should we take to develop and deliver 

operationally useful systems more quickly? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, in my capacity as the Chairman, if 

I am confirmed, I view the future of the joint force as being one 

of my critical responsibilities. A key piece of that is making sure 

295 

we keep apace of innovation so that we not only get better at doing 

what we are doing today, but we find fundamentally different ways 

to do things in the future that are more effective and they maintain our competitive advantage. So I think what you are outlining 

is certainly an area of concern for me. Even as a service chief, I 

would tell you that over the past decade our efforts at innovation 

probably were at a lower priority than they ought to be, and we 

have, over the past year, tried to energize that. I would certainly 

bring that same focus and attention if I was confirmed as the 

Chairman. 

Senator HEINRICH. I appreciate that. 

One other challenge at home here is that the Air Force’s remotely piloted aircraft career field is under really severe strain, 

largely through increased combatant commander requirements, insufficient personnel policy actions to improve manning levels, and 

just the basic reality that the Air Force is losing more remotely piloted aircraft pilots than it is training. We have heard from Secretary James and General Welch. They have assured this committee that they are dedicated to resolving the shortfall, but I also 

want to get your commitment to helping resolve this issue. So if 

confirmed, I would just ask that you make that a priority. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would maybe just comment quickly 

that those men and women that are in that field represent a core 

capability in the joint force, and their effectiveness, their morale, 

their willingness to continue to serve is absolutely important. I 

have spoken to General Welch about this particular issue, but I 

will certainly reinforce the efforts of the Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force and the Secretary of the Air Force to make sure that those 

individuals are appreciated and that they have a climate within 

which they want to remain airmen. 

Senator HEINRICH. I appreciate that deeply. I think it is an area 

where we are seeing some severe strains and where folks really 

need our support. So thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Tillis? 

Senator TILLIS. Good morning, General Dunford. Thank you for 

your service and for your family’s longtime serving our Nation. 

I leaned over to Senator Sullivan during some of your comments, 

and I also thoroughly appreciate your precise answer to questions. 

It is refreshing to get that in the committee. 

I would like to go back to a question or build on a question that 

Senator Sessions asked of you, and it had to do with the plus-up 

of spending and the use of OCO as a way. But we all know that 

that is not the best way to do what you need to do, primarily for 

the purposes that you pointed out, the certainty. It still does not 

give you long-term certainty. 

But my question to you is have you given thought to how you 

could potentially use this funding, although it is not a long-term 

commitment, to take the edge off of sequestration and any ideas on 

precisely how you would? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we started to look at that, and it 

would really require a change in the rules for using OCO for us to 

be able to do that. Right now, if you gave us OCO, given the current rules, we would not be able to use it in the places where we 

most need it. Much of the money that we requested, in addition to 

296 

the BCA level in the President’s Budget for 2016, was really focused on modernization. That is the thing that has suffered the 

most over the last 2 years, in addition to readiness. So we have 

looked at it, but there are some very practical limitations in our 

ability to apply OCO to some of the areas that we need it applied 

to. 

Senator TILLIS. Will you be making specific recommendations for 

things that we need to look at to make sure you get the most productivity you can out of it? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I will certainly do that through the 

Secretary of Defense as he works this issue. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

I wanted to go back to also questions that were asked about Afghanistan and Iraq. I visited both countries and spoke with a number of people while we were there. It seems like in Afghanistan we 

have got the right mix. We have got them in the right roles and 

the Afghanis have proven that they can fight successfully. 

In Iraq, I understand what you said about some of the political 

decisions of the past administration have caused a problem. Those 

structural issues have to be addressed. 

But have you given any thought to, assuming that you get to the 

point to where you have the right command infrastructure among 

the Iraqis, what we may need to actually create a credible, trained, 

effective fighting force for the Iraqis beyond the 3,000 currently 

present troops? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, you know, I can address that conceptually in terms of their ability to develop combined arms and in 

terms of their ability to develop institutional training and in terms 

of their ability to develop the capacity at the ministerial level to 

support tactical-level forces. But frankly, it has been a few years 

since I have been on the ground in Iraq, and what I would like to 

do is take the opportunity, if I am confirmed, to visit Iraq, talk to 

the commanders on the ground and again develop a comprehensive 

recommendation that would help us to move the campaign forward. 

Senator TILLIS. On the flip side, I know the Afghanis have made 

a lot of progress, but I think they still rely on us heavily for our 

train, advise, and assist role and our Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the region. I know that I have 

heard you say we cannot have a calendar-based approach towards 

reduction in forces. But the sense that I got when I was in Kabul 

was that those who are very much in touch with the situation on 

the ground now think that it would be a very bad idea to substantially reduce our current presence over the near term. Now, I assume that that is because they are looking ahead to 12 months, 18 

months from now and saying we are still not going to at a place 

where the Afghanis can be completely independent. Do you share 

that view? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, what I can tell you is the assumptions that we made in the recommendation that was delivered in 

December of 2013. So it is now some 19 months ago. Some of the 

assumptions affected the timeline. We certainly did not expect 

there to be as much of a delay in the elections process of 2014, and 

there was. That was a great distracter in our efforts to develop 

ministerial capacity. When I was on the ground, it was very difVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00302 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ficult to get my counterparts to focus on some of the practical side 

of growing ministerial capacity when they were involved in a very 

real challenge of providing security for the election. So it delayed 

our efforts in growing ministerial capacity. 

There have been other areas where we made some assumptions 

about things that could be done within a certain period of time that 

we actually did not in the event get done during that window of 

time. 

So from a distance now—and again, another area where I would 

go over and talk to General Campbell and General Austin down at 

Central Command, if confirmed, immediately. From a distance, it 

certainly makes sense to me that the timeline that we originally 

identified in 2013 as being possible has probably been affected by 

the political events inside of Afghanistan and other events associated with the enemy. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, General Dunford. I look forward to 

supporting your confirmation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your service, General, and thank you to your family who are here today for their service as well. 

I want to begin with what you assessed as the primary threats 

from Russia and China and talk about a weapons platform or system that has not been raised today, our submarine force. I recognize that is not immediately part of your background, but obviously 

a grave responsibility, if you are confirmed. I certainly am going to 

strongly support your confirmation as the next Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The Ohio replacement program is critical to our nuclear deterrence, and the cost of that program has been estimated in the 

range of $100 billion. The Navy has said that it cannot pay for it 

out of its Navy budget. I am wondering whether you will consider 

and whether you will support looking at the Defense Department 

budget as a whole to fund the Ohio replacement program, which 

I am assuming you agree is critical to our nuclear deterrence. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks. 

First, I do agree it is critical. It is the most survivable part of 

the triad and a critical capability for us to modernize. 

I am very familiar with the budgetary implications of the Ohio 

class replacement on the Department of the Navy’s long-range 

shipbuilding plan. What I can tell you with a degree of surety is 

that were we to fund the Ohio class replacement out of the Department of the Navy, it would have a pretty adverse effect on the rest 

of the shipbuilding plan, and the estimates are somewhere between 

two and a half and three ships a year. Again, we are not anywhere 

near where we need to be right now. So the 30-year shipbuilding 

plan was intended to get us where we need to be. 

So I do think a broader mechanism for the Ohio class replacement makes sense. Otherwise, we are going to have some pretty 

adverse effects on the Navy. As I mentioned a couple times in testimony today, one of my perspectives coming into this role would be, 

if confirmed, is that we need to have some balance, and that includes a balanced Navy. So as important as the Ohio class replaceVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00303 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ment is, the United States Navy, in terms of the forward presence 

they provide, in terms of their warfighting capability, has many 

other capabilities that are critical to our Nation as well. It would 

be difficult to balance those were the Ohio class replacement to be 

paid for within the current Department of the Navy’s projected resources. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you for that answer, General. I am 

hoping that you would agree with equal surety that the continuing 

program to build two subs a year, two Virginia class subs a year, 

should continue as planned right now. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, here is where I defer to my partner, 

the Chief of Naval Operations. But that is certainly his plan, and 

I trust his judgment in that regard. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Going to another area that I do not think has been raised yet, 

I know of your very passionate and admirable commitment to the 

men and women who are our greatest asset in the United States 

Armed Forces, their wellbeing and their welfare. I hope that you 

can commit that you will continue the effort to coordinate better 

with the Veterans Administration for men and women who are 

leaving active duty on everything from transfer of medical records 

to drug formularies to a range of issues. I do not need to expound 

on them for you, but I hope that you will focus and continue those 

efforts. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, absolutely. Just so you know, I view 

keeping faith with our men and women in uniform as one of the 

primary responsibilities of leadership, and that is both when they 

are in uniform and when they are out of uniform. We have an expression, you know, certainly in the Marine Corps that once a marine, always a marine. From my perspective, once you have served 

our country, the service and support that you should get in return 

as part of that bargain that we make with young men and women 

who enlist is something that is pretty sacred. I absolutely will continue to support the efforts to make sure that the health care transition that our young men and women make when they are in uniform to the Veterans Administration is as seamless as possible. I 

think we owe them that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. One last question, General. Your predecessor, General Dempsey, has stated repeatedly—and I am 

quoting—we have the capability to use a military option if the Iranians choose to stray off the diplomatic path. End quote. 

My question to you is are you satisfied that our Nation has done 

enough to prepare militarily for the option—and the President has 

said that all options should be on the table—if necessary, to use a 

military option there, as much as we all may wish that the negotiations should succeed? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, my understanding today is that we 

have both the plans in place and the capability in place to deal 

with a wide range of eventualities in Iran. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. Thanks very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cruz? 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dunford, congratulations on your nomination and thank 

you for your 38 years of distinguished service and your leadership 

299 

as Commandant of the Marine Corps. Our Nation is fortunate to 

have a military leader such as you serving at a time of great peril. 

I want to ask a question of you that is the same question I asked 

your predecessor, General Dempsey. If the objective were to destroy 

ISIS, not to weaken them, not to degrade them, but to utterly destroy them within 90 days, what would be required militarily to accomplish that objective? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, my assessment is that it would not 

be possible to destroy ISIL within 90 days, and I also do not believe 

that we can develop an enduring solution simply with military 

force against ISIL although I do think the military aspect of the 

campaign is critical. 

Senator CRUZ. Well, if the time frame I have suggested is not 

feasible, let me ask you a follow-up question which is what would 

be required to destroy ISIS and what time frame is necessary. Specifically if that were the objective, what would be required to accomplish it militarily? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, if I am confirmed, I will continue to 

look at this issue, but my perspective today is that this is a longterm endeavor. This is on the order of years not months in order 

to defeat, destroy in your words, ISIL. 

Senator CRUZ. What would be required to do that in whatever 

time period is necessary? 

General DUNFORD. From a military perspective, the two things 

that we are doing I think we would need to continue to do, and 

that is, to take action to deny ISIL sanctuary wherever it may take 

root both in Iraq and Syria and elsewhere. That would require us 

to build local forces, build partnership capacity, if you will, of the 

local forces that would be the real defeat mechanism for ISIL in 

the respective countries, given the way that it is spread right now. 

You would have to have effective governance so that you had the 

conditions set for long-term stability where ISIS could not then get 

traction again in the future. It would have to address the foreign 

financing of ISIS, where they get their money, as well as their economic assets within each one of those countries. You would have 

to address the movement of foreign fighters back and forth. Probably as importantly, the one thing we need to do, Senator, is we 

need to undermine the narrative of ISIL and discredit the narrative of ISIL. 

Senator CRUZ. In your personal judgment, are you concerned 

about the rules of engagement for our current use of airpower, that 

it is overly constraining the effectiveness? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I am not. One of the reasons is when 

we go to war, we go to war with our values, and we conduct proportionality in the planning and discrimination in execution. The thing 

that we are doing now is ensuring that we do not have civilian casualties. I think that, frankly, supports our narrative and gives us 

the credibility we need to be successful long term in this campaign. 

Senator CRUZ. In recent days, the administration has informed 

Congress that we are arming the Kurds. This is something I have 

called for for a long time. I spoke this week with a senior Kurdish 

leader who reported that the commanders on the ground of the 

Peshmerga are not confirming that. What can you tell this committee about the extent to which we are providing serious arms to 

300 

the Kurds and it is actually getting to them rather than being 

bogged down in Baghdad? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, first, I would agree with you. The 

most effective ground forces both in Syria and Iraq today are in 

fact the Kurds. 

My understanding is that the issues associated with supporting 

the Kurds have been addressed, and they are now getting the material support that they need, as well as the training that they 

need. If I am confirmed, I will certainly, as a matter of priority, go 

over there, visit, and make sure that I am able to make my own 

personal assessment based on the facts on the ground. 

Senator CRUZ. Will you commit to providing this committee with 

specific details in terms of what is being done to arm the Kurds? 

General DUNFORD. I will do that, Senator. 

Senator CRUZ. Let me ask concerning Iran. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, what is the National security risk in your 

judgment to the United States of that occurrence? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think it is significant, particularly 

if accompanying that is intercontinental ballistic missile technology. It is a significant threat to our Nation. It is also a destabilizing action in the Middle East. I think we can expect a proliferation of nuclear arms as a result of Iranian possession of nuclear weapons. 

Senator CRUZ. So, General, my final question. I am concerned 

about morale in the military. We have discussed in this hearing 

how the world is getting more and more dangerous, and yet at the 

same time, I think we are dramatically undermining our readiness, 

our ability to defend this Nation. The ?Military Times? did a survey where in 2009 they asked soldiers whether overall the quality 

of life is good or excellent. 91 percent said yes. In 2014, that number had dropped from 91 percent to 56 percent. Likewise, they 

asked whether the senior military leadership has my best interest 

at heart. In 2009, 53 percent agreed. In 2014, that had dropped in 

half to roughly 27 percent. 

Do you share the concerns about declining morale in the military, and if so, what do you see as the causes of it and the proper 

approach to fix it? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks for the question. 

First of all, with regard to the morale of our force, it is clearly 

one of the things that distinguishes us. I was able to say in my 

opening statement that we have the most capable military force in 

the world today, and that clearly is rooted in the men and women 

that we have in uniform and their willingness to do what we have 

asked them to do in the last decade. It is not something I would 

be complacent about. 

I do have concerns as a service chief about how hard we have 

been running our men and women over the last few years. As an 

example, Senator, we had had a plan where we wanted to have a 

1-to-3 deployment-to-dwell ratio. That means our forces would be 

deployed about 7 months, home for 21 months. That allowed us to 

get adequate training. It allowed us to take care of families, allowed the marines to kind of be what I describe as a sustained rate 

of fire. Many of our units now inside the Marine Corps are at or 

below a 1-to-2 deployment-to-dwell rate. So they are home for less 

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than twice as much time. So they will be deployed for 7 months, 

home less than 14 months, and back out again, and that continues 

on and certainly has an effect on the families and, again, our ability to train across the range of military operations. 

If I am confirmed, Senator, this is absolutely going to be one of 

the areas that I focus on. I think I have a responsibility to lead the 

young men and women in uniform. I think I have a responsibility 

to represent them, and when I say represent them, that means to 

articulate to our leadership, both here on the Hill, as well as the 

executive branch, what material support, what leadership, what resources they need to remain the finest fighting force in the United 

States. 

It bothers me greatly if our young men and women do not have 

confidence in their senior leadership, and I can tell you that every 

day when I wake up, if I am confirmed, that will be an issue of 

priority for me, that that will be exactly what I seek to do is gain 

the trust and confidence of our young men and women and let 

them know that they are in fact properly represented back here 

Washington, D.C., and that we as leaders recognize that we are 

asking them to do a lot. They do not ask much more in return than 

to have the wherewithal to accomplish the mission with minimal 

loss of life or equipment. I will commit to you that is exactly what 

I will do. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Has sequestration not bred uncertainty 

which has contributed to this drop in morale? 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, thanks. I should have mentioned 

that when I talked about how busy the forces are. There is a tremendous amount of angst across the force, and a large part of that 

is driven by the uncertainty about how big the force will be, what 

will happen to their particular careers, and will we have the equipment necessary to accomplish the mission. So I do think, Chairman, that sequestration is a factor. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan had one follow-up question, 

and then we will turn to Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I just wanted to get back to the issue of the military’s 

role in relationship with Congress. Do you think it is an important 

role that we have to make sure that our services do not replicate 

missions and core competencies, particularly in an austere budget 

environment like we have right now? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me just provide a quick example. I believe 

one of the core competencies that the Army has is large-scale airborne units that can deploy in a moment’s notice anywhere in the 

world. Do you think that is one of their core competencies? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. 

Senator SULLIVAN. A few months ago, a military general testified 

in front of one of the subcommittees here about putting troops and 

helicopters on naval shipping for, quote, expeditionary maneuver 

throughout the Pacific. What service’s core competency would you 

associate that mission with? 

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General DUNFORD. I would associate that with the United States 

Marine Corps, Senator. 

Senator SULLIVAN. So if I told you that was an Army general describing the Army’s new Pacific Pathways strategy, would that surprise you? 

General DUNFORD. It would not, Senator. I have seen that description in the open source. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Do you think that costly new Army mission 

is a redundant mission to the United States Marine Corps? mission, and is that a good use of America’s taxpayer and military 

spending? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, given the shortfall of the amphibious 

lift—I am speaking now as a service chief—I think the priority 

ought to go to the United States Marine Corps. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Would be it an appropriate role of this Congress to try to limit such redundancies by making sure military 

funding goes to core competencies like much-needed Army airborne 

brigades in the Asia-Pacific and the Arctic as opposed to redundant 

activities like troops and Army helicopters on naval shipping? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do agree that the Congress has a 

critical role in ensuring that we have a proper division of labor 

within the Department of Defense and that the joint capabilities 

and capacities that we have are right-sized. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you for that single follow-up question. 

Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for getting back so late. I was in an Appropriations markup. 

But, General Dunford, thank you very much to you and your 

family for your service in the past and for your willingness to continue to serve. I have to say after watching you before the crowd 

of New Hampshire business folks and hearing from them, how impressed they were. I look forward to the impression that you are 

going to make as the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 

I wanted to follow up on Senator Wicker’s questions about Europe and the concerns in Europe because I recently returned from 

a visit to Poland and to Latvia where I saw the NATO exercises 

in Latvia at Adazi Base and heard extreme concern about the potential for Putin to engage, as you pointed out, in an asymmetric 

instigation in the Baltics and in other eastern European countries. 

I am concerned about the failure to date of Europe to commit to 

the 2 percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for defense 

spending and wonder if you have thoughts about what more we 

might be able to do to encourage them to ante up. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do think it is important that our 

NATO partners bear their share of the burden. That is an issue 

that I know Secretary Carter and his predecessors all addressed. 

They came out of the Wales conference with a commitment for all 

those nations to meet that 2 percent. 

From my perspective, given the shortfall of capabilities and capacities in Europe in areas like intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, defensive cyber capabilities, strategic lift, and so forth, 

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I think it is going to be absolutely critical for our partners to develop those capabilities and capacities. 

I would also add that I have seen firsthand in my previous assignment in Afghanistan when our NATO partners are properly 

resourced, they do have capabilities and capacities that can be integrated to great effect. So I do think the alliance, were it to be properly resourced, can be a very effective force for stability in Europe, 

as well as for out-of-Europe operations. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I agree and hopefully we will see that commitment followed through on because clearly the threat from Putin 

and from Russia continues, and our eastern European allies are 

very concerned about that. 

I want to ask you about—you talked about the deployment pressures on our military. I wonder if you could give me your perspective on the appropriate active-to-Reserve ratio and the importance 

of the National Guard and Reserve and continuing the military 

mission that we have in this country. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can. Of course, one of the things we 

have to do when we talk about using the Reserve and the Guard 

is balance the concerns of employers, concerns of families with the 

willingness and the desire frankly for the Guard and Reserve to 

continue to serve in what is more of an operational or strategic 

sense. What I mean by that is there was in the past the sense that 

the Guard and Reserve would be something—in the case of a major 

war, we would mobilize the Guard and Reserve. I think we found 

today, particularly with the size of our U.S. military force and our 

commitments to the Guard and Reserve, is much more operational 

in that they are useful and necessary on a day-to-day basis. 

My sense is as a service chief—and I will certainly look at the 

implications across the other services if I am confirmed—is about 

once every 4 years is a reasonable time for a major deployment, although in many cases, depending on what their employment is and 

so forth, individuals can be available on a much more routine basis. 

But for whole units, probably about 1 to 4 years, 1 year deployment 

and mobilization and then 4 years back focused on their families 

and employers, seems to be sustainable. But, again, if I am confirmed, I will certainly consult with the appropriate leadership in 

the Guard and Reserve to make sure that I have a full appreciation 

for their challenges, as well as the other service chiefs. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you. We have seen in New Hampshire the significant contribution of the Guard and the integration, 

particularly with the air refueling, of active duty and Guard in providing that mission. So I think it is very important. 

Let me ask you if you would commit to two things. One is in 

2013, the Department announced the elimination of the direct combat exclusion policy and announced plans to fully integrate more 

women into all occupational fields. I hope that you will continue 

that effort and see it through. As we know, women are making up 

a greater percentage of our military these days, and making sure 

that they have the ability to compete in all areas I think is significant. 

The other question. I noticed this week that the Navy announced 

that they have tripled the maternity leave policy for women serving 

in the Navy, and I would urge you to consider that across all 

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branches of the military. Again, as women are making up more of 

our troops, I think it is important to address the family issues that 

they have, and certainly maternity leave is a big part of that. So 

I hope you will do that. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator. I will look at both of 

those issues. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator REED [presiding]. Senator Graham? 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

General, I think you are an outstanding choice. The President 

could not have chosen a better person to be Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. So congratulations to you and your family for a lot 

of great service. The best is yet to come. 

When it comes to stopping ISIL—that is the stated goal is to degrade and destroy—what if we fail in that goal? What can America 

expect? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, if we were to fail in stopping ISIL, 

I think you will see an expansion of ISIL not only across the Middle East but outside the Middle East. We have, obviously, seen now 

elements of ISIL in the Maghreb all the way over to Afghanistan. 

Senator GRAHAM. So they are an expanding power, as we speak? 

General DUNFORD. Well, Senator, I think they are expanded in 

terms of geographic location. I have not yet concluded that they are 

expanded in terms of capability. 

Senator GRAHAM. Got you. But I remember when we were talking in the office, you said if we do not stop these guys, we can expect a tsunami of ISIL and their sympathizers. Is that fair? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think it is fair. That is exactly 

what I said, and I stand by that comment. 

Senator GRAHAM. So at the end of the day, I do not want the tsunami to come, so we are going to have to stop these guys. 

Is it fair to say that Iraq and Syria need to be viewed as one battle space when it comes to ISIL or to stop them in Iraq if you do 

not address their presence in Syria? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Senator. The enemy does not respect the boundaries that we see on the map. 

Senator GRAHAM. Can you envision a scenario where you have a 

regional army made up of Arabs and maybe Turkey that would go 

into Syria and fight ISIL alone, leaving Assad off the table? Would 

they join up for such a fight? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it is hard for me, watching the politics from the outside right now, to see that degree of integration, 

given the divergent interests that those countries have. But I can 

certainly see where that would be an effective way to deal with this 

is to have a regional army that would be willing to deal with ISIL. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. But my question is if you did not put 

Assad’s removal on the table, it would be hard to get them to join 

up just to fight ISIL because they are worried about Syria becoming a puppet of Iran. 

General DUNFORD. That is right, Senator. Most of the countries 

that you spoke about all have a shared goal of removing Assad 

from power. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree with me that Assad’s presence is sort of a magnet for Sunni extremists? 

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General DUNFORD. I think if not the proximate cause of the ISIL 

movement, certainly one of the primary drivers of the ISIL movement was the abuses of the Assad regime. 

Senator GRAHAM. If we go down to a thousand Kabul-centric U.S. 

forces in 2017 in Afghanistan, do we substantially lose our counterterrorism mission? 

General DUNFORD. My assessment is we would have a significant 

degradation of our counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan, were 

we to do that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would we lose our eyes and ears along the Afghan-Pakistan border that we enjoy today? 

General DUNFORD. We would, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would in your view that create a lot of risk to 

the gains we have achieved over the last decade if we did not have 

those eyes and ears and counterterrorism forces? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there is no question it would create 

risk. 

Senator GRAHAM. When it comes to 60 Free Syrian Army troops 

being trained under the current regime, would you agree with me 

it is going to be very hard to recruit people to go into Syria if you 

do not promise them protection from Assad because if they get any 

capability at all in fighting ISIL, Assad would assume that capability would be turned on him one day and he is not going to sit 

on the sidelines and watch a force mature and develop without hitting them? Does that make sense to you? 

General DUNFORD. I agree with that assessment, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. So the most logical consequence of training a 

force to go into Syria to fight ISIL alone is that Assad will see them 

as a threat to his regime and most likely attack. 

General DUNFORD. I agree with that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. It would be very, I think, immoral to put someone in that position knowing that is coming their way with some 

capability to defend themselves. Does that make sense to you? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, my assessment is that if we train 

moderate Syrian forces, the new Syrian army, then we ought to 

also provide them with the wherewithal to be successful. 

Senator GRAHAM. If this war in Syria continues the way it is 

going for another year, do you worry about stability in Jordan? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you worry about stability in Lebanon? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. So the consequences of going into Syria with 

a regional force and all of the problems associated with it have to 

be balanced against the consequences of ISIL surviving and thriving. 

General DUNFORD. I agree with that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. In your view, over the long haul, is it in America’s national security interest to do things necessary to degrade 

and destroy ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. I do believe that is absolutely in our National 

interest to do that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that whatever regional 

army we may form, there are certain American capabilities that 

would be outcome determinative in any fight against ISIL, and it 

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would be in our National security interest to provide those capabilities? 

General DUNFORD. I agree with that, Senator, particularly in the 

case of aviation, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and 

probably special operations capabilities. 

Senator GRAHAM. Finally, if a soldier or a member of our military falls in Iraq or Syria trying to destroy ISIL, would you agree 

with me that they died protecting their homeland? 

General DUNFORD. I would, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. That is the reason some of them may have to 

go back. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there is no question in my mind that 

the young men and women that we have deployed right now, the 

3,500 that are inside of Iraq and those that are in the surrounds 

working through CENTCOM in this campaign, are protecting our 

Nation. 

Senator GRAHAM. God bless them. God bless you. Best of luck. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator REED. General, on behalf of Chairman McCain, let me 

thank you for your testimony, thank you for your service and the 

service of your family. 

Also on behalf of the chairman, I will now adjourn the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., 

USMC by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers 

supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. On previous occasions you have answered the Committee’s policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the last time 

being in connection with your recent nomination to be Commandant of the Marine 

Corps. You indicated that you did not see a need for modifications to GoldwaterNichols Act provisions. 

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms 

changed since you testified before the Committee at your last confirmation hearing? 

Answer. No. 

Question. In light of your experience as Commandant of the Marine Corps, do you 

see any need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what modifications do 

you believe would be appropriate? 

Answer. I do not currently anticipate the need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act. 

DUTIES

Question. Based on your experience as Commandant of the Marine Corps, as Commander of United States Forces and the International Security Assistance Force in 

Afghanistan, and as Vice Director of Operations for the Joint Staff, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions set forth 

in section 152 through 155 of title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of the 

Department of Defense (DOD), that pertain to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff 

in general? 

Answer. I do not presently have recommendations to change the law or regulations. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Chairman and other officials. Please describe your underVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00312 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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standing of the relationship of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must have a close working relationship with the Secretary of Defense. Under Title 10, the Chairman is assigned 

several duties that guide this relationship to include serving as the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of 

Defense. The Chairman also performs other duties assigned by the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The National Security Advisor. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the National Security Advisor to 

ensure that our military efforts and options are synchronized with civilian efforts 

across the government. Since the Chairman is also the principal military advisor to 

the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council, I also will work with 

the National Security Advisor to inform and implement Presidential decisions. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. Existing directives grant the Deputy Secretary of Defense full power and 

authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As a result, I expect the relationship of the Chairman 

with the Deputy Secretary will be similar to that of relationship with the Secretary. 

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. Current DOD directives and Title 10, U.S. Code establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary 

regarding matters related to their functional areas. Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions within their respective areas. In carrying out their duties, they may issue instructions and directive memoranda to implement policies approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD 

components. When directed by the President and Secretary of Defense or when carrying out their responsibilities, Under Secretaries typically transmit communications to commanders of the unified and specified commands through the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense. 

Answer. The DOD General Counsel serves as the chief legal officer of the Department of Defense consistent with Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 140. The DOD General 

Counsel generally is responsible to oversee legal services, establish policy, and administer the DOD Standards of Conduct Program. The DOD General Counsel also 

establishes policy and positions on specific legal issues and provides advice on significant international law issues raised in relation to major military operations, the 

DOD Law of War Program, or the legality of weapons reviews. Communications between the combatant commanders and the DOD General Counsel are normally 

transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The office of the 

DOD General Counsel works closely with the Office of Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Question. The Department of Defense Inspector General. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to cooperate with and provide support to the 

Department of Defense Inspector General as required. The Department of Defense 

Inspector General performs the duties, has the responsibilities, and exercises the 

powers specified in the Inspector General Act of 1978. 

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs the duties prescribed for 

him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there 

is a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the 

Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the 

Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I intend to discuss potential duties with the Vice Chairman as part of our 

close working relationship. I have not yet determined any additional duty assignments that I would to assign the Vice Chairman beyond those prescribed in law. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The Secretaries are the heads of their respective military Departments 

and are responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of 

their respective Departments. Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 165 provides that, subject 

to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to 

the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to 

unified and specified commands. The Chairman advises the Secretary of Defense on 

the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military 

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lished for requirements of the Combatant Commands. The Secretaries of the Military Departments also are responsible for such other activities as may be prescribed 

by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services. 

Answer. The Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of 

command as a result of the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but this change 

does not diminish their importance with respect to Title 10 responsibilities. The 

Chiefs of Staff of the Services serve two significant roles. First, they are responsible 

for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without 

the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no Combatant Commander 

can assure the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President. Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, the Chiefs are advisers to the President, National Security Council, and the 

Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. In 

this function, they play a critically important role in shaping military advice and 

developing our joint capabilities. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with 

the Service Chiefs to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements. 

Question. The Combatant Commanders. 

Answer. The combatant commanders are responsible to fight our wars and conduct joint military operations around the world. By law, and to the extent directed 

by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman for the combatant 

commanders and is charged with overseeing their activities. He provides a vital link 

between the combatant commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense, and as directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication 

between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense. If 

confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the combatant commanders to enable 

their warfighting capability and to provide support. If confirmed, I also will ensure 

that I consider and work to de-conflict any issues or decisions than span multiple 

combatant commands. 

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. The Chief of the National Guard heads a joint activity of the Department 

of Defense and is the senior uniformed National Guard officer responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, programs and plans affecting more 

than half a million Army and Air National Guard personnel. Appointed by the 

President, he serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. He is also the 

principal adviser to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary 

and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard issues. As National Guard 

Bureau Chief, he serves as the department’s official channel of communication with 

the Governors and Adjutants General. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau has the specific responsibility of addressing 

matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions. 

Question. The Commander, U.S. Forces—Afghanistan. 

Answer. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security 

Council, he is not in the chain of command of the Commander, U.S. Forces—Afghanistan (USFOR–A). The Commander, USFOR–A reports to the Commander, 

USCENTCOM, who, in turn, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. This reporting relationship is prescribed in 10 USC Section 164(d)(1). The Commander, 

USFOR–A does not have a formal command relationship with the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he coordinates with him through the Commander, 

USCENTCOM on a regular basis. The Commander, USFOR–A sends his advice and 

opinions related to Operation Resolute Support to the Commander, USCENTCOM, 

who, in turn, presents them to the Chairman. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you expect 

to face if you are confirmed? 

Answer. The current security environment is extraordinarily complex and volatile. 

We face challenges from state actors including Russia, China, Iran, and North 

Korea. We are also engaged in a long-term fight against violent extremist organizations. We are in the midst of a critical transition in Afghanistan. While dealing with 

these issues, we face the need to modernize the Joint Force in the context of fiscal 

challenges and budget uncertainty. Particular areas of concern are our cyber capabilities, space capabilities, modernizing the nuclear enterprise, and assuring all doVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00314 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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main access for the Joint Force. We must navigate this environment while maintain 

our flexibility to deal with the unexpected. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. First, I will energize our efforts to develop a framework for deterrence 

that will address the full range of threats that we face in the 21st Century. I will 

also work closely with the services and combatant commanders to ensure we strike 

the right balance between dealing with current operations, being prepared for the 

uncertain, and developing the Joint Force of the future. Given the nature of the 

challenges we confront, it will also be critical that we enhance our integration with 

other elements of the Interagency in partnership with Congress. 

PRIORITIES

Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your 

priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what other priorities, beyond those 

associated with the major challenges you identified in the section above, would you 

set for your term as Chairman? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would focus on contributing to the development of a comprehensive and sustainable Interagency strategy to address the challenges associated with violent extremism. I would also be decisively engaged in restoring the 

readiness of the Joint Force. Finally, I would focus on shaping the capabilities and 

capacities of the future Joint Force with a particular focus on leader development. 

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain 

of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct communications to combatant commanders be 

transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function. 

Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and effective chain of command? 

Answer. Yes. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of 

Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant 

commands. If confirmed, I will continue to inform decisions as appropriate and 

transmit directions as directed. However, there will be no ambiguity about the chain 

of command: the combatant commanders receive their orders from the Secretary of 

Defense. 

Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for U.S. 

military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority outside the chain of command established under title 10, United States Code? 

Answer. The Armed Forces should ordinarily operate under the chain of command 

established in Title 10. In the case of certain sensitive military operations, it may 

be appropriate for the President to establish other temporary command relationships. However, in all cases U.S. Armed Forces supporting such operations are still 

governed by the law of armed conflict, remain accountable to the Title 10 chain of 

command, and are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice for disciplinary 

matters. If confirmed, I would provide the President with my best military advice 

regarding any operation in which an exception to the established chain of command 

may be warranted. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the authorities and 

agreements which are in place to allow U.S. military personnel to carry out missions 

under the authorities contained in title 50, United States Code? Do you believe any 

modifications to these authorities are necessary? 

Answer. Title 50 of the U.S. Code tasks the Secretary of Defense to ensure that 

the military departments maintain sufficient capabilities to collect and produce intelligence to meet requirements of the DNI, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, and 

COCOMs. Title 50 of the U.S. Code also authorizes the Secretary to use such elements of the DOD as may be appropriate for the execution of the national intelligence program functions described in section 3038 of title 50. While I believe that 

our military forces are generally most effective when they operate under a military 

chain of command, there are circumstances in which exceptions to this general rule 

are appropriate; authorities and agreements exist to facilitate the granting of such 

exceptions. In some cases, the Secretary of Defense may approve this exception and 

in other cases only the President has approval authority. I believe the current authorities strike the appropriate balance between enabling DOD to operate within its 

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independent Title 50 authorities, providing necessary and appropriate support to 

other agencies of the U.S. government under Title 50, and ensuring critical oversight of sensitive operations. 

Advice of the Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders, and Chief of the National 

Guard Bureau 

Question. Section 163 of title 10, United States Code, provides that the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman for the combatant commanders, 

especially on the operational requirements of their commands. Section 151 of title 

10 provides for the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit their advice 

or opinion, in disagreement with or in addition to the advice or opinion of the Chairman, and requires the Chairman to provide that advice at the same time that he 

presents his own advice to the President, National Security Council, or Secretary 

of Defense. 

What changes to section 151 or 163, if any, do you think may be necessary to ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs, combatant commanders, and 

the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are presented and considered? 

Answer. I do not see a need to change section 151 or 163. 

OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff you would have significant 

responsibilities with regard to joint officer management policies. 

Answer. If confirmed, what modifications would you make to provide the Department of Defense and the military services the force management tools necessary to 

meet the needs of the 21st century joint, all-volunteer force? 

The Department, the Joint Staff, and the Services already possess a wide range 

of force management tools which provide ample flexibility in meeting the needs of 

the 21st century joint, all-volunteer force. However, if confirmed, I will continue to 

examine the joint operational and strategic environment to determine if there are 

opportunities for, or capability gaps that require, reform to make the Joint Force 

even more capable of meeting both today and tomorrow’s needs. 

Question. Do you believe the current DOD and service procedures and practices 

for reviewing the records of officers pending nomination by the President are sufficient to ensure the Secretaries of the military departments, the Secretary of Defense, and the President can make informed decisions? 

Answer. In conjunction with existing statutes, the current Department and Service policies provide a sound framework for the Services’ evaluation of the qualifications, previous performance, and potential of their officers. I believe these frameworks provide the necessary information to allow the Services to make sound decisions regarding the promotion and utilization of each Service’s officers. 

Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair and reasonable for 

the officers involved? 

Answer. Yes. I believe these procedures and practices are fair and reasonable for 

the officers involved. 

Question. What modifications, if any, to the requirements for joint officer qualifications are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to attain meaningful 

joint and service-specific leadership experience and professional development? 

Answer. I feel the current combination of Joint Professional Military Education 

and requisite experience gained through joint assignments, training, and exercises 

adequately prepares officers to operate effectively at both the strategic and operational level in steady-state and wartime conditions. Therefore, I do not currently 

recommend any modifications to the requirements for joint officer qualification. 

Question. In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification requirements on 

the ability of the services to select the best qualified officers for promotion and to 

enable officer assignments that will satisfy service-specific officer professional development requirements? 

Answer. It is certainly challenging for Services to ensure that officers are adequately prepared to operate effectively as senior leaders in both the Service and 

joint environment. Although satisfying qualification requirements may curtail the 

time available for the Services to develop their officers’ Service-specific skill sets, 

current requirements produce a cadre of well-rounded and competitive officers, who 

are capable of integrating Service functions with national directives in both strategic 

and operational environments. In my opinion, officers with these capabilities possess 

the greatest potential for success in positions of senior leadership. As such, they are 

the most qualified, and hence most competitive, for promotion. 

Question. In 2008, Congress created the requirement that the Legal Counsel to 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be selected by a board of officers convened 

by the Secretary of Defense. This process remains the only joint duty officer position 

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specifically selected by a selection board from among qualified officers of the Armed 

Forces. 

Do you consider the selection process required by section 156 of title 10, United 

States Code, to be an efficient and effective process for selecting officers from among 

the services to serve in this joint position? 

Answer. Based on available information, I believe the selection process for the position of the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an efficient, equitable, and effective means to select an officer for this position from a pool 

of talented judge advocate leaders across the Services. 

Question. What lessons, if any, have been captured from this joint officer selection 

board process that could improve the processes for selection of officers in the military services? 

Answer. I’m not aware of any lessons that could improve the processes for selection of officers in the military service. The process to select the legal counsel to the 

CJCS was informed by service processes. 

Question. Would you support expanding the process used to select the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to other joint billets? Why or why 

not? 

Answer. I do not see a need to expand our selection process to other joint billets 

as currently established processes used to select general/flag officers to joint positions are sound. First, our process for identifying officers gives the Combatant Commander and the Chairman flexibility. We can select from across the Services (to include the Coast Guard) and the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components to ensure 

we get the right individual with the appropriate skills and experience. Second, the 

current process is efficient in that it gives the commander and other senior leaders 

an opportunity to quickly review a slate of nominated officers, and conduct interviews as necessary. Finally, our process is extremely responsive to emerging or unexpected requirements. We can quickly alert the Services to identify eligible personnel, select candidates, nominate them, and have them in position in as little as 

90 days, if necessary. 

HEADQUARTERS STREAMLINING

Question. The Senate reported Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization 

Act directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters functions of the Department of 

Defense and the military departments. 

If confirmed, and if the provisions in the bill become law, what would be your role 

in identifying and implementing streamlining and reductions in the Joint Staff? 

Answer. The current Chairman directed an enterprise-wide functional review with 

a detailed evaluation of tasks and activities associated with primary Joint Staff directorates. This review identified a range of potential areas for reduction, realignment, or elimination within the staff, and some of the recommendations have already been implemented. I would continue to use this functional review as a roadmap to quantify the efficiency of past actions and spur organizational streamlining 

by reducing, realigning or eliminating redundant or conflicting requirements. 

Question. What Joint Staff areas, specifically and if any, do you consider to be the 

priorities for possible consolidation or reductions? 

Answer. There are a number of potential areas for consolidation or reduction. For 

example, the Joint Staff J6 is currently working with the U.S. Army Information 

Technology Agency (ITA), the Washington Headquarters Services (WHS), and the 

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to determine which IT functions can 

be consolidated within the Pentagon to improve our IT capabilities while reducing 

costs and unnecessary redundancies. Further areas for efficiencies include consolidating support functions common to the Joint Staff directorates and eliminating duplicative functions accomplished by the OSD, Joint Staff and Defense Activities. 

Question. To the extent that the Joint Staff has functions that overlap with the 

Department of Defense and the military departments, what would be your approach 

to consolidating and reducing redundancy? 

Answer. The first, and most important step, would be to determine whether those 

functions are currently codified in statute. Some duplicative efforts may be due to 

the responsibilities being laid out in law with some respective pieces executed by 

the Department, some by the Joint Staff, and some by the military departments. 

Consolidation and reduction of redundancy may require legislative changes. Second, 

I would recommend a combined review by the OSD, the Services, and the Joint Staff 

to determine the most appropriate ways to reduce, realign, or eliminate duplicative 

functions. 

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TRAINING AND ASSIGNMENT OF GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS

Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of general and flag officers have 

advanced training and degrees in scientific and technical disciplines? 

Answer. Yes. Rigorous and deliberate Service accession, training, and development processes generate the technical and scientific capability needed in sufficient 

numbers to meet DOD needs. I will work closely with and support the Service 

Chiefs and other leaders to continue to ensure we maintain an appropriate pipeline 

of specialized, technical officer talent. 

Question. Are the career paths for officers with technical skills appropriate to ensure that the Department and the services can execute complex acquisition programs, adapt to a rapidly changing technological threat environment, and make informed investment decisions? If not, what will you do to address this deficiency? 

Answer. I believe the Department has grown, and continues to grow, world-class, 

technically-astute officers who are ready to take on the challenges inherent in a rapidly changing and technical acquisition environment. While the Services vary with 

respect to their use of officers in acquisition, each Service tailors officer career paths 

to meet their particular mission priorities, to include successfully executing critical 

major acquisition programs. Each Service has career path models that are appropriately aligned with their force management process. 

Question. In your view do current general and flag officer assignment policies provide and incentivize qualified officers to serve in acquisition programs? Do tour 

lengths for those assignments enable and empower such officers to effectively manage acquisition programs? If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to improve the effectiveness of senior officers assigned those duties? 

Answer. Yes. Senior officers are assigned with adequate tenure and are empowered to effectively manage their programs. The Services demonstrate flexibility in 

adjusting tour lengths to match logical progression points in acquisition programs. 

That said, I will support the Service Chiefs, Service acquisition executives, and OSD 

leaders in their efforts to ensure we continuously improve the development and assignment of highly-motivated and qualified officers in acquisition positions. 

Question. Are you satisfied that the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, and 

the military services have in place sufficient training and resources to provide general and flag officers, and Senior Executive Service employees the training they 

need to make informed, ethical decisions? If not, what actions would you take, if 

confirmed, to address your concerns? 

Answer. Yes. I judge that sufficient training and resources are in place to achieve 

the desired outcome. The ability to make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the profession of arms is identified as a specific Desired Leader Attribute for 

leaders throughout the military and is foundational to all Joint and Service developmental efforts. The ethical foundation is laid at the outset of an officer’s career and 

is further developed and reinforced in formal education and training settings 

throughout their progression through the ranks. 

Question. It has been observed that despite numerous changes in the law, the requirements and the process for attaining joint officer qualifications is still beset by 

systemic challenges. Some of these challenges appear to force the services to make 

officer assignments to ‘‘check the box’’ for joint qualifications at the cost of depriving 

the services of flexibility to assign officers to other career enhancing and professional development opportunities. Officers not assigned to a designated joint billet 

on an operational staff receive joint credit while other officers supporting the same 

joint commander do not receive joint credit unless they submit a package to have 

their assignments qualify for joint service. As operational tempo remains high and 

as end strength continues to decline to historically low levels, some exceptionally 

qualified officers will be unable to serve in qualifying assignments to earn joint 

credit because the Nation demands they perform other critical duties. As a result 

those officers may be disadvantaged professionally as compared to their peers for 

promotion eligibility. Given the substantial resources invested in the developing officers to serve successfully in, and to support or lead joint forces, more must be done 

to improve the joint qualification system or to replace it with a system that is more 

effective. 

If confirmed, I will work to identify inequities or inefficiencies in the current system and implement change where appropriate. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to review the joint qualification 

requirements to ensure that the qualification process is matched to the increasingly 

joint service environment in which many officers serve throughout their careers? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we have a process in place to continuously review our qualification process and drive appropriate revisions. 

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Question. Should the formal requirement for joint qualifications be eliminated as 

a consideration for promotions and assignments? 

Answer. No. I believe we need to continue to ensure that our future senior leaders 

are well prepared to operate within both the Services and the joint environment in 

steady-state and wartime conditions. This is best accomplished through a continued 

mixture of mandatory formal professional military education and hands-on experience in positions dealing with both joint and Service matters. 

SECURITY STRATEGIES AND GUIDANCE

Question. How would you characterize current trends in the range and diversity 

of threats to national security we face today? 

Answer. The range and diversity of potential threats is increasing. We face both 

state and non-state adversaries who are more capable in terms of military capabilities, and more empowered by the diffusion of technology. Both types of adversaries 

are developing new ways to counter our traditional military advantages. 

Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance issued January 2012 took into account 

a $487 billion dollar reduction in defense resources. 

With the additional $500 billion in cuts to the Department of Defense as a result 

of sequestration, is the Defense Strategic Guidance still valid? 

Answer. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review superseded the 2012 Defense 

Strategic Guidance, and provided new DOD guidance for capabilities, capacity, and 

readiness. We cannot execute the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review with an additional $500 billion in cuts as the result of the Budget Control Act further exacerbated by Sequestration. 

Question. In your view, as Russian aggression and the emergence of ISIL have 

occurred since the Defense Strategic Guidance was issued in January 2012, is that 

strategic guidance still appropriate for the threats we face today or do you think 

an update is warranted? 

Answer. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review superseded the 2012 Defense 

Strategic Guidance. This QDR did not fully anticipate growing Russian aggression, 

the emergence of the ISIL threat, and the increase in cyber intrusions. 

Question. In your view, are our defense strategy and current establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the military departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. forces properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet 

security challenges the Nation faces today and into the next decade? 

Answer. I believe our defense strategy is sound but we must continually adapt 

it to address emerging threats and a dynamic strategic landscape. I also believe that 

the current defense establishment is effective with an appropriate distribution of 

roles and missions. I am concerned with the readiness of the force today and I believe we need to review the capabilities and capacities that will be needed to meet 

future security challenges. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the capabilities, structure, roles, and missions of the defense establishment? 

Answer. The defense establishment is extremely complex. If confirmed, I will work 

with the Service Chiefs, combatant commanders, and Joint Staff to identify needed 

change to the capabilities, structure, roles, and missions of the defense establishment. Our cyber, space, and nuclear capabilities will be areas of particular emphasis. 

STRATEGIC RISK

Question. How and over what periods of time, if at all, will reductions to Army 

and Marine Corps end strength increase strategic risk? 

Answer. Reductions to Army and Marine Corps end strength must be considered 

in the context of the current security environment and our military objectives. If 

confirmed, I will be decisively engaged in ensuring that we have a clear understanding of risk as we make changes to the capabilities and capacities of the Joint 

Force. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army and Marine 

Corps’ decision to reduce active end strength to 450,000 and 182,000 soldiers respectively by the end of 2017? 

Answer. I am confident that the Marine Corps can meet its requirements at 

182,000. If confirmed, I will work to better understand the requirement for Army 

end strength. 

Question. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if any, to reduce 

or mitigate this strategic risk? 

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Answer. If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice to the Secretary of 

Defense and the President to include an assessment of risk and proposed actions 

to mitigate risk. 

Question. Upon issuance of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the fiscal year 2015 budget reduced projected defense budgets by $113 billion over five years. What 

was the incurred strategic risk of this reduction relative to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance? 

Answer. Overall, the strategic and military risk to our ability to accomplish the 

objectives laid out in the QDR and DSG have increased. I would be happy to discuss 

the details of this increased risk in a classified venue. 

CHAIRMAN’S RISK ASSESSMENT

Question. In his 2013 risk assessment, Chairman Dempsey identified for the first 

time six National Security Interests that were derived from four enduring interests 

contained in the 2010 National Security Strategy. The April 2013 assessment identified several areas of broad and significant risk to national security as a result of 

current budget issues. 

How would you characterize the trends of risk in these areas (whether they are 

increasing or decreasing)? 

Answer. Overall, both strategic risk and military risk are increasing. I would be 

happy to discuss risk further in a classified venue. 

Question. What is your current assessment of the risk to combatant commanders 

in their ability to successfully execute their operational plans? 

Answer. In an unclassified response I cannot go into much detail. Generally, however, our combatant commanders face increasing risk. 

TRANSFORMATION

Question. Military ‘‘transformation’’ has been a broad objective of the Armed 

Forces since the end of the Cold War. 

In your view, what does military ‘‘transformation’’ mean? 

Answer. Military transformation involves leveraging new concepts, organizational 

constructs, or technologies to fundamentally change the way we fight. In the end, 

transformation is about innovating to maintain a competitive advantage. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the progress made by 

the Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, toward 

transforming the Armed Forces? 

Answer. Transformation is more of a journey than a destination. We can never 

be satisfied with our progress. I believe we need to energize our Joint exercise and 

experimentation efforts. 

Question. If confirmed, what goals, if any, would you establish during your term 

as Chairman regarding military transformation in the future? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would develop a detailed concept for Joint exercises and 

experimentation. My initial assessment, from the perspective of a service chief, is 

that our operational tempo over the past decade has adversely impacted us in this 

area. Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a larger role in transformation? If so, in what ways? 

Answer. I believe, consistent within the statutory responsibilities of the Chairman, that the Joint Staff has a leading role in the transformation of the Joint Force. 

MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY

Question. In your opinion, do current military plans include the necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in the 2014 QDR? Where are areas of 

higher risk? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense to ensure that 

the committee continues to receive a quarterly report in response to this question. 

I will personally engage in this area. 

Question. Does the 2014 QDR specify the correct set of capabilities to decisively 

win in future high-end engagements? 

Answer. I believe so from the perspective of my current assignment. I believe this 

is an area that requires continuous review. 

Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR, American 

forces should be able to ‘‘defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased 

campaign, and deny the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.’’ 

In your opinion, does the Department’s force sizing construct provide adequate capability to address the country’s current threat environment? 

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Answer. Yes, the force sizing construct, with its emphasis on a range of military 

options, provides adequate capability to address the country’s current threat environment should deterrence fail. 

Question. Are the services adequately sized to meet this construct? 

The Services are currently able to provide forces to support the construct to ‘‘defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.’’ 

Resource constraints, however, have eroded readiness and extended the timeline by 

which forces can be made available to fulfill combatant commanders’ requests and 

respond to emerging requirements. 

Question. What will you advise if the Department cannot meet the demands 

placed on it? 

Answer. I would advise we carefully prioritize the most important missions necessary to meet our military objectives and protect our national security interests. 

I will also provide the Secretary of Defense and the President with a clear articulation of risk. 

FUTURE ARMY

Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) of January 2012 articulated the 

need to shift strategic emphasis toward the Asia-Pacific region while continuing to 

engage in the Middle East. 

Do you agree that future high-end military operations, as envisioned by the DSG, 

will primarily be naval and air engagements such that the Army will have difficulty 

justifying the size, structure, and cost of the number and equipment its combat formations? 

Answer. We cannot predict where or when we will be asked to fight. Hence, we 

need a full-spectrum, balanced military force capable of responding to various 

threats to our national security. 

Question. In your view, what are the most important considerations or criteria for 

aligning the Army’s size, structure, and cost with strategy and resources? 

Answer. In my view, our Nation requires an Army able to conduct full spectrum 

operations as part of the Joint Force. The Army is realigning and resizing consistent 

with the 2014 QDR. I believe that is appropriate. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to properly align 

the Army’s size and structure with the requirements of security strategies and the 

likely availability of resources? 

Answer. As force structure changes are made within both the active and reserve 

components, we will continue to assess the impact of these changes and make adjustments as necessary to ensure we maintain the health of the force, retain an effective balance of active and reserve forces, and continue to meet the needs of our 

strategy. 

DEFENSE REDUCTION

Question. In your view, what have been/will be the impacts of the following budget 

reductions on the military, their capability, capacity, and readiness? 

Answer. 

Initial Budget Control Act reduction of $487 billion 

The abrupt, deep cuts resulting from the Budget Control Act forced our military 

to make topline-driven decisions, such that we now have a strategy with little to 

no margin for surprise. Therefore, we are operating at higher levels of risk to our 

defense strategy. To limit adverse consequences, we need the certainty of a more 

predictable funding stream, time to balance force structure, modernization, compensation, and readiness, and the flexibility to make trade-offs. 

Sequestration in fiscal year 2013 

The sequestration cuts in fiscal year 2013 reduced already-strained readiness, 

which takes resources, principally time and money, to restore. To date, sequestration has resulted in cuts to training, exercises, deployments and maintenance, in civilian furloughs and a hiring freeze, and in disruptions to modernization and force 

morale. If sequester continues, our military will be forced to make sharp cuts with 

far reaching consequences, including limiting combat power, further reducing readiness, and rewriting our defense strategy. We are doing what we can to support our 

all-volunteer force, as well as protect necessary funding for our deployed forces and 

nuclear enterprise. 

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Reduction of $115 billion in projected spending in the fiscal year 2015 budget, 

in line with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review 

The fiscal year 2015 budget request assumes higher risks in some areas, but this 

budget helps us to remain the world’s finest military—modern and capable even 

while transitioning to a smaller force and resetting readiness over time. The $115 

billion reduction refers to the difference between the PB15 (FYDP) submission and 

the BCA sequestration levels across fiscal year 2015–19. Funding to the sequester 

levels removes the flexibility to respond to emergent challenges (i.e., increasingly 

contested space and cyber domains, a resurgent Russia, the Ebola response, and the 

rise of ISIL), while also being able to execute our defense strategy. 

Sequestered Budget Control Act discretionary caps starting in fiscal year 2016 

onward 

Question. If sequester level cuts return in fiscal year 2016, then we will see further increased risks and fewer military options to defend our Nation and its interests. The impact of sequestration and other budget constraints will further reduce 

unit readiness. The effects caused by deferred maintenance will impose significant 

strain on long-term institutional readiness. Ultimately, reduced readiness (i.e., reduced training cycles, deferred maintenance, and the continuing pace of current operations) will damage the credibility and the morale of our military. 

The fiscal year 2016 budget request assumes that the Budget Control Act will be 

amended in fiscal year 2016. The fiscal year 2016 budget resolution passed by the 

Senate and House of Representatives do not assume this but instead provides $38 

billion of the necessary spending through OCO budget. 

Should this funding not be available, what recommendations would you have, if 

confirmed, for how the Department of Defense should manage the $35 billion in cuts 

for fiscal year 2016? 

Answer. Ongoing cuts will threaten our ability to execute the current defense 

strategy. Our military remains hopeful that Congress can once again come together 

in a manner that avoids the abrupt, deep cuts of sequestration. We will continue 

to reduce costs through efficiencies and reforms, but an fiscal year 2016 budget at 

BCA cap levels will create risks requiring a new defense strategy. Should we be cut 

$35 billion in fiscal year 2016, we will be forced to further reduce the size of the 

force, delay readiness restoral, and reduce modernization and investment programs. 

Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could have on readiness? 

Answer. These cuts would have a dangerous impact on readiness and future force 

generation capability of the Department, which are critical to our ability to execute 

the defense strategy. Losing $35 billion from the fiscal year 2016 defense budget 

would force us to mortgage ongoing readiness recovery efforts, equipment recapitalization and force modernization in favor of supporting currently deployed and nextto-deploy forces, all within a context of expanding global threats. We rely on sufficient and predictable resourcing to ensure our military readiness and ability to meet 

additional operational demands. 

Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could have to military capabilities? 

Answer. Quite simply, these cuts would make our military smaller and less capable. We would be forced to disproportionately reduce funding for operations and 

maintenance, procurement, RDT&E, and military construction. Fiscal year 2016 

cuts would increase risk, prolong readiness recovery, and delay necessary modernization programs. Funding for hundreds of program line items, large and small, 

will be significantly reduced. Cuts in funding for research and development will ultimately slow discovery and advancement, erode the technological superiority enjoyed 

by U.S. forces and translate into less desirable military outcomes in future conflicts. 

READINESS FUNDING

Question. Given the reductions in readiness funding, what is your assessment of 

the current readiness of the Armed Forces to meet national security requirements 

across the full spectrum of military operations? 

Answer. The Joint Force’s overall readiness remains at levels posing significant 

risk to our ability to execute our National Military Strategy. While specific details 

cannot be addressed in this unclassified forum, it is understood that sequestration 

exacerbated an already declined state of readiness fueled by sourcing over a decade 

of exceptional demand. The Bipartisan Budget Act restored some resources, and provided much needed fiscal certainty and stability, thereby preventing further decline 

in readiness. The Department has since experienced minor Service readiness gains, 

which show continued promise as long as funding and commitments remain conVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00322 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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stant. However, this recovery is fragile. Recent gains are dependent on a combination of recovery time paired with sufficient and predictable resourcing allowing the 

Services to rebuild the necessary capabilities for full spectrum operations. 

Question. What is your assessment of the near term trend in the readiness of the 

Armed Forces? 

Answer. If current funding levels prevail, I expect the Department’s readiness to 

remain at significantly-less-than-optimal levels for the foreseeable future. Any additional operational demands and/or a loss of resourcing will introduce a significant 

amount of risk to ongoing military operations, limit military options the Department 

can offer to respond to emerging crises, and increase the Department’s risk in meeting the requirements of our National Security Strategy. 

Question. How critical is it to find a solution to sequestration given the impacts 

we have already seen to DOD readiness in fiscal year 2013? 

Answer. Sufficient and predictable resourcing is absolutely critical to restoring the 

Joint Force’s ability to provide the full range of military capabilities at a sufficient 

capacity required to meet the challenges posed by today’s dynamic international environment. Current funding and OCO allow the Department to conduct operations 

at their present level of commitment. However, recovering to the readiness posture 

needed to sustain these operations, meet additional commitments, and restore our 

comparative advantages through modernization will only come from a robust and 

predictable funding profile. Without adequate funding, maintaining current operations will come at the expense of long-term development and sustainment efforts, 

thereby exacerbating our readiness challenges. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the methods currently 

used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of military equipment? 

Answer. The method for funding equipment maintenance is requirements-driven 

based on a variety of factors to include: force structure, operations tempo, schedule, 

nature and usage rate of the equipment, and safety. The Services develop detailed 

maintenance plans that balance operational availability to the warfighter with 

maintenance requirements. However, perturbations in the budget process and funding uncertainties will have a negative effect on the workload scheduling at Service 

depots. These negative effects ripple beyond the current year and can extend for 

months and even years. 

Question. Given the backlog in equipment maintenance over the last several 

years, do you believe that we need an increased investment to reduce this backlog? 

Answer. The Services have relied upon OCO funding to supplement their equipment maintenance backlogs over the past several years. This is because OCO was 

used for deliberate reset of equipment used to support OIF and OEF combat operations. Also in the past, baseline funding of maintenance accounts has been at levels 

below the Services’ enduring requirements. While some level of backlog is normal 

in the repair cycle process, shortfalls in baseline funding cause increased maintenance backlog and drive greater future funding needs. We need consistent and predictable base budget funding to reduce the maintenance backlog. 

Question. How important is it to reduce the materiel maintenance backlog in 

order to improve readiness? 

Answer. It requires continuous attention. The accumulation of backlog or deferred 

maintenance beyond what is manageable may not be immediately apparent, but it 

reduces readiness. These manifest as reduced equipment availability rates, less reliable systems, and shortened service life. 

Question. How important is it to receive OCO funding two or three years after 

the end of combat operations in order to ensure all equipment is reset? 

Answer. It remains very important. OCO has been a necessary funding source to 

conduct ongoing operations and restore equipment readiness for future operations. 

The Services have done well in prioritizing their equipment for reset and filling 

shortfalls in deployed and deploying units. However, much work remains to reduce 

the accumulated backlog of scheduled and deferred maintenance. As our operations 

tempo remains high, this funding is necessary to fully restore equipment readiness 

levels to support the National Security Strategy. 

Question. In years past, Congress has based additional readiness funding decisions on the Service Chief unfunded priorities lists. However, in recent years those 

lists have either been nonexistent or have arrived too late in our markup process. 

Do you agree to provide unfunded priorities lists to Congress in a timely manner 

beginning with the fiscal year 2017 budget request? 

Answer. I will always strive to be compliant with Congressional direction. 

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DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM

Question. Congress is considering a number of acquisition reform measures designed to reduce the costs and development timelines of major systems, and to 

streamline access to innovative commercial technologies and systems. 

What are your views regarding acquisition reform and the need for improvements 

in the Defense acquisition process? 

Answer. I am a strong proponent of acquisition reform based upon the following 

key principals: 

a. The responsibility and authority for acquisition system outcomes should be 

clearly identified within the DOD; 

b. The requirements’ sponsor should be an integral part of delivering needed capability and remains accountable throughout the acquisition process, and; 

c. There is a continued effort to reduce overhead and increase efficiencies across 

defense acquisition. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of the acquisition 

process requirements, acquisition, and budgeting? 

Answer. I would work with the Department leadership and the Congress to bring 

about necessary reform. 

Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems 

is warranted given increasing historic cost growth in major systems, costs of current 

operations, and asset recapitalization? 

Answer. I am concerned that acquisition, procurement, and operations and support costs will continue their historic growth profiles, further exacerbating shortfalls 

under a sequestered budget. Although recent cost and schedule trends have shown 

improvement, we will continue to scrub our processes, including our warfighter requirements, to ensure they are aligned with strategy and available resources. 

Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and guard against 

the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth? 

Answer. I will partner with Secretary Carter to refine our processes, and work 

closely with our combatant commanders and the Services to mitigate cost growth 

on our highest priority investments. I will continue to drive the requirements process to consider cost-informed performance tradeoffs to assist in mitigating cost and 

schedule growth perturbations across our investment accounts and advocate for 

versatile capabilities that are both affordable and sustainable. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and prioritized? 

Answer. As the Department’s senior validation authority for joint military requirements, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) continues to make 

improvements to the Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS). 

These refinements to JCIDS ensure the appropriate rigor in validating realistic, 

technically achievable, prioritized, and cost-informed requirements. If confirmed, the 

necessary refinements to the requirements process will continue during my tenure 

as Chairman. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that resources are programmed for acquisition programs that are consistent with their cost 

estimates and schedules? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will participate in the Department’s program and budget 

process, and advocate for major system resource allocation consistent with the Secretary’s cost and schedule position. 

Question. What should the role of the combatant commanders, Service Chiefs, 

Service Acquisition Executives, and Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics be in the acquisition process? 

Answer. The role the combatant commanders and Service Chiefs play today in the 

requirements generation process is crucial to the success of the acquisition process. 

Likewise, their proactive engagement with the Service Acquisition Executives (SAE) 

and the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) 

throughout the acquisition life-cycle ensures that major systems stay relevant, timely and cost-effective. USD(AT&L)’s role in reviewing Service plans at discrete milestones associated with major Department resource commitments ensures programs 

are affordable and executable, and that they follow sound business and risk management practices. This role should continue in conjunction with the efforts of the 

Service Acquisition Executives. 

Question. Are there specific new roles or responsibilities that should be assigned 

to the Service Chiefs or Service Secretaries in the acquisition process? 

Answer. I am supportive of current efforts that would provide additional authority 

and accountability to the Services as long as it does not undermine the statutory 

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responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense. Any potential changes should hold the 

Services accountable and streamline the bureaucratic processes involved. 

TACTICAL FIGHTER PROGRAMS

Question. The F–35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, which is the largest and most 

expensive acquisition program in the Department’s history, and was formally initiated as a program of record in 2002, with a total planned buy of 2,443 aircraft for 

the U.S. The program has not yet completed the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase, and is not due to enter full rate production until 2019, 17 

years after its inception. At projected procurement rates, the aircraft will be procured by the Department well into the 2030 decade to reach its total quantity buy. 

The requirement for 2,443 aircraft was established nearly 20 years ago; do you 

believe that requirement is still valid in light of countervailing pressure to reduce 

force structure to conserve resources and to improve capability to respond to prospective adversary technological advances and increased capabilities with regard to 

establishing contested combat environments, combined with updated threat assessments and an evolving national defense strategy? 

Answer. With projected adversarial threats challenging our current capabilities in 

coming years, the Joint Strike Fighter is a vital component of our effort to ensure 

the Joint Force maintains dominance in the air. Given the evolving defense strategy 

and the latest Defense Planning Guidance, we are presently taking the newest strategic foundation and analyzing whether 2,443 aircraft is the correct number. Until 

the analysis is complete, we need to pursue the current scheduled quantity buy to 

preclude creating an overall near-term tactical fighter shortfall. 

Question. Do you believe the Nation can afford to procure these aircraft at a cost 

of $12B to $15B per year for nearly the next 20 years for an aircraft design that 

will be 30 years old at the completion of the program procurement phase? 

Answer. Fifth-generation fighter aircraft, including the F–35, are critical as we 

contend with the technological advancements of near-peer competitors. We must ensure that we do not allow shortfalls in fighter capability or capacity to develop. The 

Department has been working diligently to make the overall cost per F–35 more affordable. Additionally, there will continue to be critical updates throughout the life 

cycle of the F–35 that will ensure the platform maintains a tactical advantage. 

Question. Do you believe the Department’s current and planned force mix of shortrange fighters and long-range strike aircraft, whether land- or maritime-based, is 

sufficient to meet current and future threats around the globe, and most especially 

in the Asia-Pacific theater of operations where the ‘‘tyranny of distance’’ is such a 

major factor? 

Answer. The Department continually assesses our ability to meet current and future threats, especially concerning short-range fighters and long-range aircraft. Over 

the past three years, DOD has made significant progress in developing new alliance 

initiatives, securing new rotational access for U.S. forces, and enhancing both the 

quantity and quality of U.S. forces and capabilities in the Pacific region. The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region is an important component of our effort to ensure 

we are postured to address the ‘‘tyranny of distance’’ and succeed militarily if required. 

Question. The Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying S. 1376, 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, would require the Secretary of Defense to assess the current requirement for the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter total program of record quantity, and then to revalidate that quantity or identify 

a new requirement for the total number of F–35 aircraft the Department would ultimately procure. 

What will be your role in assisting the Secretary to revalidate the F–35 total program quantity? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will advise the Secretary as he assesses the delicate balance of the capacity and the capabilities of the future Joint Force. This advice will 

be informed by the extent to which the F–35 program conforms to the priority requirements identified by combatant commanders and the Department’s strategic 

plans. 

Question. The Air Force has proposed several times over the last decades to retire 

the A–10 close air support aircraft fleet, but each time Congress has rejected the 

proposals due to lack of a sufficient replacement capability. The Air Force’s latest 

proposals to retire the fleet in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 were again rejected by 

Congress. 

Do you believe a need exists for a dedicated capability to provide close air support 

for American troops in close quarters battles? 

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Answer. I believe America’s troops in close quarters battles must have effective 

close air support. 

Question. What will be your role in ensuring our land forces receive the air support they’ll need to survive and succeed while fighting the nation’s land battles? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense 

concerning our ability to deliver effective air support to the Joint Force. 

The Secretary of the Navy recently remarked that he believed the F–35 would be 

the nation’s last manned fighter aircraft. 

Question. Do you believe this to be true? 

Answer. While robotic and autonomous systems technology has advanced greatly 

over the past decade, I believe it is premature to rule out manned fighter aircraft 

without a more thorough analysis of the technologies currently available, as well as 

those likely to be available in the future. Decisions about future platforms should 

also take into consideration the threats our aircraft will face and their required missions. 

Question. If so, what will be your role in leading capabilities and requirements 

development to increase the role of unmanned aerial combat systems in the Department? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to lead the ongoing development of a joint 

concept for robotics and autonomous systems. This concept will establish a vision 

to establish capability requirements and to guide the subsequent development, fielding, and employment of robotics and autonomous technology in the Joint Force. 

Question. If not, how do you see the future balance developing between manned 

and unmanned combat aircraft for the Department’s future force structure? 

Answer. I expect that the rapid growth in robotic and autonomous systems technology we have seen in the past decade will only increase in the coming years for 

all weapons systems, not only combat aircraft. With this growth will come opportunities for increased capability across the Joint Force through the complimentary use 

of manned and remotely operated systems. The Joint Staff is currently developing 

a Joint Concept for Robotic and Autonomous Systems that will help guide the Joint 

Force as it incorporates these new technologies and determines how to balance 

manned and remotely operated systems to maximize effectiveness. 

SPACE

Question. China’s test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a turning point for 

the United States in its policies and procedure to ensure access to space. As a Nation heavily dependent on space assets for both military and economic advantage, 

the United States has to make protection of space assets became a national priority. 

Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of space assets now 

has the appropriate level of national security priority? 

Answer. No. Both are in need of attention in order to securely and effectively 

project U.S. military power. 

Question. In your view, how should China’s continued development of space systems inform U.S. space policy and programs? 

Answer. China is rapidly developing space capabilities of its own that both mirror 

U.S. capabilities and could threaten our access and use of space for national security 

purposes. If confirmed, I will review our efforts to address China’s developments in 

space, and will coordinate closely with the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. If confirmed would you propose any changes to National Security space 

policy and programs? 

If confirmed, I will continue to review our policies and programs to ensure U.S. 

warfighters can continue to depend on having the advantages that space confers. 

ACCESS TO RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM

Question. What actions would you take to ensure that the Department continues 

to have access to radiofrequency spectrum that is necessary to train and to conduct 

its operations? 

Answer. Overall, it is recognized that electromagnetic spectrum superiority is essential to all joint operations, and spectrum has become increasingly important to 

the Department’s missions. Spectrum is also critical to the economy of the nation. 

If confirmed, I will continue to work diligently with the Interagency and industry 

on spectrum sharing in order to ensure that the Department maintains assured access to the spectrum necessary to train and conduct operations, while enabling access for commercial broadband. 

Additionally, Public Law 106–65 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2000) requires the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense and the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to certify that any alternative band or bands to be subVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00326 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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stituted for spectrum currently used by DOD provide ‘‘comparable technical characteristics to restore essential military capability that will be lost as a result of the 

band of frequencies to be so surrendered.’’ Preserving this provision is absolutely 

necessary to ensure that DOD maintains access to spectrum necessary to operate 

critical military capabilities. 

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

Question. Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next 15 plus years, DOD will also 

have to sustain the current strategic nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking. 

Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to afford the costs 

of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the rest of the DOD commitments? 

Answer. The strategic, operational and fiscal environments we face pose significant challenges for the Department of Defense. The modernization of strategic delivery systems and the sustainment of the strategic nuclear enterprise are important 

to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. I support the continued investment in sustainment and modernization as a priority for defense spending. I am, of course, concerned about the impact of future budget resource reductions on our ability to meet these requirements. Therefore, if confirmed, I plan to 

continue to request budget certainty, stability, and flexibility to ensure we continue 

to modernize and sustain our nuclear capabilities, while balancing DOD priority 

commitments. 

Question. If confirmed will you review the modernization and replacement programs to ensure that they are cost effective? 

Answer. Yes. 

MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE BOOST PHASE

Question. The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) mission is to develop, test, and 

field an integrated, layered ballistic missile defense system to defend the United 

States and its allies against all ranges of enemy ballistic missiles in all phases of 

flight. While MDA is conducting research into next generation laser concepts that 

could be mounted on high altitude unmanned aerial vehicles, there is no program 

of record designed to intercept missiles during the boost phase of flight, when they 

are potentially most vulnerable. 

Do you agree with the Commander of Northern Command, when he said on April 

7, 2015, referring to missile threats that ‘‘we need to be able to start knocking them 

down in the boost phase . . . and not rely on the midcourse phase where we are 

today?’’ 

Answer. Yes. We should continue to support research and design efforts to defeat 

threats in the boost phase if operationally, technically and economically practical. 

Current capabilities are limited to denial in the midcourse and beyond phases; we 

need to look for solutions across the entire ballistic missile kill chain. The science 

shows a ballistic missile is comparatively easy to detect and track while boosting. 

Further, countermeasures on a missile, such as decoys designed to distract defensive 

systems, are not typically deployed until after the booster burns out. As such, boostphase intercept is an attractive missile defense alternative. 

Question. Would you support an increase in the priority of technology investments 

to develop and deploy a boost phase airborne laser weapon system for missile defense in the next decade, if technically practicable? 

Answer. Yes, but only if operationally, technically and economically practical. The 

current budget supports pursuit of a laser demonstrator. A laser potentially would 

be capable of acquiring, tracking, and eventually destroying an enemy missile at a 

much lower cost than existing systems. 

DOD’S COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

Question. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which is focused historically on accounting for, securing or eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) and materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, has 

started to expand its focus to other countries. With this expansion the CTR program 

is widening its focus to biological weapons and capabilities including biological surveillance and early warning; and encouraging development of capabilities to reduce 

proliferation threats. 

Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. government 

agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts, e.g., the Department of Defense, 

the Department of Energy, and the State Department? 

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Answer. I understand that the Departments of State, Energy, and Defense in conjunction with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Combatant Commands, 

make extensive efforts to conduct both formal and informal coordination across the 

different WMD threat reduction efforts on a regular basis. These efforts also include 

placement of DTRA liaison officers at U.S. Embassies where significant activities 

take place. 

Question. About 60 percent of CTR resources are proposed for biological programs. 

With the very real threat of chemical weapons use and/or proliferation as we saw 

in Libya and are seeing in Syria, why is there such a large percentage of resources 

directed toward biological issues? 

Answer. The DOD CTR Program remains postured to eliminate state-based WMD 

programs, including chemical weapons programs, if opportunities arise. At the same 

time, current scientific, economic, and demographic trends are magnifying the risks 

posed by outbreaks of infectious diseases of security concern, whether they are the 

result of a laboratory accident, a bioterror attack, or natural transmission. Such 

events are difficult to contain, pose a high threat to the health of U.S. citizens, drain 

economic resources and can potentially undermine geopolitical stability. As seen 

with the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak, due to the ease and speed of global travel, 

a bio-incident anywhere in the world may lead to dangerous regional and global security consequences when states are unable to provide basic services for their citizens, potentially creating environments enabling terrorists to act with impunity and 

increasing the risk of pathogens of security concern being stolen or diverted due to 

insecure storage. 

PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that the United States 

will continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has been 

no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the effort is early in the 

technology and testing phase. 

In your view, what is the role for a conventional prompt global strike capability 

in addressing the key threats to U.S. national security in the near future? 

Answer. Future circumstances may require the capability to address high value, 

time sensitive, and well-defended targets from outside the range of current conventional technology. I support the continued exploration of alternatives to existing 

strike system technologies and operational concepts to address these threats. The 

joint requirements process will continue to evaluate the alternatives to make informed recommendations for capability development balancing potential operational 

employment against costs. 

Question. What approach (e.g. land-based or sea-based or both) to implementation 

of this capability would you expect to pursue if confirmed? 

Answer. I would expect to continue support of a sea-based approach as articulated 

in established joint requirements. If confirmed, I will monitor the review of potential 

alternatives that support this capability. 

Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence capabilities 

would be needed to support a prompt global strike capability? 

Answer. In an unclassified response, I cannot go into much detail. If confirmed, 

I will seek to better understand and identify the capability improvements necessary 

to address any intelligence gaps discovered in the development this requirement. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim 

of creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for 

the continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and 

Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to the Congress the continued 

safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. 

As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest challenges, 

if any, with respect to assuring the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile? 

Answer. To sustain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile, we must prudently 

manage our stockpile and related warhead Life Extension Programs. Our success in 

executing these programs will largely depend on our people and our infrastructure. 

We must recruit and retain our next-generation workforce capable of certifying the 

stockpile without underground testing. We must maintain and modernize the nuclear weapon infrastructure to ensure we have the full range of capabilities available to produce components required for our Life Extension Programs. 

Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program could no longer confidently support the annual certification of the stockpile 

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as safe, secure, and reliable, would you recommend the resumption of underground 

nuclear testing? What considerations would guide your recommendation in this regard? 

Answer. Any decision to resume underground nuclear testing should not be taken 

lightly. I would strongly consider recommendations from the Department of Energy 

and the National Laboratory Directors before making my recommendation to the 

Secretary and President. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Department of Energy to maintain the critical skills, capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile without underground testing if practicable. 

Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President’s plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a 

critical national security priority? 

Answer. Yes, funding the President’s plan for sustaining and modernizing our nuclear weapons delivery platforms, sustaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear 

weapons stockpile, and modernizing the nuclear weapons infrastructure is a critical 

national security priority. Our nuclear deterrent is the nation’s top military priority. 

The President’s plan for modernizing the complex aligns funding with this priority. 

Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you believe it would 

be prudent to consider reductions below New START Treaty limits in the deployed 

stockpile of nuclear weapons? 

Answer. Yes, I believe it is prudent to consider options for future reductions below 

New START Treaty limits, both in the deployed stockpile and in non-deployed weapons. However, I strongly believe that any further reductions should be accomplished 

‘‘hand-in-hand’’ with Russia and focus on measures that will maintain or strengthen 

deterrence of adversaries, assurance of our Allies and partners, and strategic stability. 

Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes to the non-deployed 

hedge stockpile of nuclear weapons? 

Answer. I support reducing the size of the stockpile consistent with deterrence objectives and warfighter requirements. The United States retains a force of non-deployed nuclear warheads to hedge against technical failure and geopolitical developments that might alter our assessment of U.S. deployed force requirements. Completion of life-extension programs that improve safety, security and reliability of the 

stockpile and infrastructure modernization efforts that improve responsiveness may 

provide opportunities to change the non-deployed hedge while still effectively managing stockpile risk. 

COUNTERING THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT IN IRAQ & SYRIA

Question. To ‘‘degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL’’ 

the Department of Defense seeks to deny ISIL safe-haven and build partner capacity. 

If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate ISIL degradation and what 

is your assessment of the progress to degrade ISIL in Iraq and in Syria? 

Answer. I view ISIL’s inability to hold key terrain and lines of communication, 

and ISIL’s failure to resupply or refit its fighters as indicators of degraded capability. I would additionally consider the rate at which ISIL recruits and replaces 

fighters on the battlefield. I would also view large groups of displaced persons returning to their homes and working to restore their former way of life, in cities like 

Tikrit, as another positive indicator of degraded ISIL influence. DOD will continue 

to work closely with the U.S. Intelligence Community, using its databases and analytic tools to run assessments on these and other indicators as necessary. 

If confirmed, I will visit the region to make a personal assessment of our progress 

in degrading ISIL in Iraq and Syria. 

Question. A large part of the support for ISIL and other violent extremist groups 

like al Nusrah by the local Syrian population is based on the fact that these groups 

seek to remove President Assad from power. 

What limitations, if any, do we face by failing to have the removal of Assad as 

an objective in Syria? 

Answer. President Assad’s policies contributed to the rise of ISIL and limits effective C–ISIL operations in Syria today. 

Question. In Iraq, what is the importance of arming the Sunni tribes in Anbar 

province to degrading ISIL and how do you assess progress to date? What is your 

understanding of the current plan to train and equip Sunni fighters to help in the 

campaign against ISIL? 

Answer. Support to Sunni tribes is an important component of the effort to defeat 

ISIL. Sunni tribal fighters have the potential to be a credible ground force, and are 

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necessary to protect Iraqis in Anbar and other Sunni-dominant areas. PM Abadi 

and the GoI have made some progress in mobilizing Sunni tribes, supported by our 

efforts at airbases like Al Asad and Al Taqaddum. Much additional work remains. 

Question. What is your assessment of the fall of Ramadi to ISIL last month and 

what adjustments, if any, to U.S. and coalition strategy do you believe need to be 

made? 

Answer. Ramadi was a tactical setback, and it shows that ISIL is an agile and 

adaptive adversary. CENTCOM and the Iraqis have learned from this setback, and 

are adjusting the implementation of the strategy accordingly. If confirmed, I’ll review the military campaign to make sure it will allow the non-military lines of effort 

the time and space they need to succeed. This will be a long campaign. 

Question. What is your assessment of the coalition air campaign in Iraq and Syria 

and what adjustments, if any, do you think need to be made? 

Answer. The Coalition air campaign is making some progress toward degrading 

ISIL’s military capabilities and disrupting key ISIL enablers like oil production and 

communications. These efforts limit ISIL’s freedom of movement, constrain its ability to recruit and reinforce its fighters, and impede its command and control. Coalition air support has enabled some key achievements for local forces, including ISF 

efforts to clear Tikrit and the recent success of anti-ISIL forces who took control of 

Tal Abyad. The air campaign is creating time and space for our ongoing diplomatic 

and political efforts and the development of credible ground partners in Iraq and 

Syria. 

If confirmed, I will consult with commanders on the ground and make recommendations on how to improve our effectiveness. 

Question. What is your assessment of the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces 

to respond to the threat posed by ISIL and other security challenges? 

Answer. Our strategy is dependent upon having a trained, capable, and motivated 

partner on the ground. We have seen that with effective training, equipping, command and control, and Coalition air support, Iraqi and Kurdish forces can fight and 

achieve success against ISIL. However, it will take time to repair the damage 

caused by sectarian policies and corrosive leadership and to build the capability and 

capacity of our Iraqi partners on the ground. If confirmed, one of my first trips will 

be to Iraq to assess the current situation for myself. 

Question. What lessons do you assess need to be taken from the fighting in Tikrit 

in March and April of this year? 

Answer. We learned that Iraqi forces supported by Coalition air power have the 

potential to achieve success against ISIL. Iraqi leaders learned that Iranian support 

comes with conditions, and that there is no substitute for U.S. power. 

Question. Does the current troop limitation of 3,100 give U.S. commanders, in conjunction with Iraqi security forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, tribal and local security 

forces, and coalition partners, in Iraq enough capability to successfully degrade and 

ultimately destroy ISIL? 

Answer. I think our troop levels, including the recent addition of another 450 

troops in al Taqqadum, is sufficient for us to advance the strategy’s two military 

lines of effort in the near term. However, as conditions change on the ground, it may 

become necessary to adjust how we implement the military campaign. In the long 

term, the success of our advisory forces’ efforts must be matched by the commitment 

and capacity of credible Iraqi ground partners in order to degrade ISIL. Our Iraqi 

partners must own this fight, and we must continue to enable their forces. 

Question. What do you see as the principle role or roles of the Office of Security 

Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy in Iraq? 

Answer. The Office of Security Cooperation is the Department’s primary interlocutor for traditional security assistance and cooperation, in support of the U.S. Embassy. OSC–I, along with the Foreign Military Sales program, enables military programs to enhance the professionalization of the Iraqi Security Forces. 

Question. What is your assessment of the success of the current strategy against 

ISIL? 

Answer. We are only in month nine of a long campaign, but we have seen that 

well-led and determined Iraqi forces supported by Coalition air power potentially 

can have success against ISIL. Iraqi and Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria have repelled ISIL advances in several towns, halted their advances following large-scale 

attacks, and cleared and secured lines of communication, which disrupts ISIL’s ability to replenish combat power and supplies. 

Militarily, we are making moderate progress. ISIL has lost ground overall since 

the beginning our campaign. However, the current strategy depends on the development of reliable ground partners and on progress toward inclusive political systems 

in Iraq and Syria. If we get an indication that the other lines of effort cannot make 

the necessary progress, we should re-examine the strategy. Any enduring solution 

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to the challenge that ISIL and other VEOs pose requires a generational effort, and 

our military efforts must be part of a whole of government approach. 

Question. Do you assess that the training and equipping of Syrian opposition 

fighters by the United States and coalition partners under section 1209 of the fiscal 

year 2015 NDAA will produce enough fighters to make a strategic difference on the 

battlefield in Syria? 

Answer. The outcome of the T&E program remains to be seen, but we face significant challenges in recruiting and vetting suitable volunteers at the scale necessary 

to have strategic effects. If confirmed, I plan to visit the region and assess our approach in Syria to develop a better understanding of this immensely complex and 

challenging situation. 

Question. In your view, what military support, if any, will the Syrian opposition 

fighters who receive support under section 1209 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA need 

from the United States and coalition partners when they return to Syria? 

Answer. We will provide equipment, such as basic military gear, some mobility 

assets in the form of trucks and vehicles, and small arms and ammunition so that 

they can better defend themselves. The United States is committed to the success 

of the personnel we train, and we have legal and ethical responsibilities to support 

them. We are still considering the full complement of assistance we might provide 

to the T&E forces. 

Question. What are the lessons learned from the drawdown and post-combat operations in Iraq that should be applied to the drawdown and post-combat operations 

in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Iraq demonstrated that decisions about the drawdown and post-combat 

operations in Afghanistan should be based on conditions on the ground, with the 

flexibility to make adjustments as those conditions evolve. In addition, the drawdown from Iraq shows that whole-of-government cooperation is required to sustain 

security gains. We learned that U.S. forces can only mitigate the effects of security 

threats that are fueled by underlying political or sectarian problems. Ultimately, it 

is critical to have credible and capable local partners. 

AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN

Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan? 

Answer. The initial forward momentum of the Resolute Support mission has been 

stymied by delays in forming the full new 25-member Afghan cabinet. In general, 

the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are better trained and 

equipped than insurgent forces, and continue to demonstrate tactical proficiency as 

they work together across the security pillars. The ANDSF’s most critical gaps remain in aviation, intelligence, and special operations, all linked to the ANDSF’s targeting capability. These gaps will endure for some time, even with the addition of 

key enablers. RS advisors are also working to address developmental shortfalls in 

the areas of logistics, medical support, and counter-IED exploitation. 

Question. In May of 2014 President Obama said ‘‘ . . . by the end of 2016, our military will draw down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul . . . ’’ 

What is your understanding of what military forces comprise a ‘‘normal embassy 

presence’’? 

Answer. A normal embassy presence will have counter-terrorism and security operation components; it will consist of a Defense Attache ́ Office, an Office of Security 

Cooperation, and a special operations element. A deliberate and measured transfer 

of enduring security cooperation activities is required to maintain continuity of 

ANDSF development and maintain our relationship with Afghanistan as an enduring counter-terrorism partner. Planning for this presence is underway at 

CENTCOM and its size will depend upon factors such as security force assistance 

objectives, ANDSF capabilities, Afghan government requests, and force protection 

concerns. 

Question. What lessons should we learn from the experience of a calendar-based 

drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq as applied to the drawdown of U.S. and international troops in Afghanistan? 

Answer. We have learned that transitions must be conducted in a manner that 

properly balances our end state with conditions on the ground. 

Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? 

Answer. I support our overall approach in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will visit 

Afghanistan to make an assessment of our current progress toward achieving our 

objectives. That visit will inform any recommendations I may make for changes to 

our strategy. 

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Question. What is the effect of ISIL operations in Afghanistan and/or coordination 

with the Taliban for the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan? 

Answer. ISIL is a competitor with other groups that have traditionally operated 

in Afghanistan, which may result in increased violence between the various extremist groups. The Taliban has declared that it will not allow ISIL in Afghanistan. The 

coalition and the Afghan government are closely watching ISIL’s attempt to expand 

its reach to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The ANDSF, National Directorate of Security (NDS), and Afghan political leadership are also collaborating closely to prevent 

this threat from expanding. 

Question. If security conditions on the ground in Afghanistan degrade in 2016, 

would you recommend to the President revisions to the size and pace of the drawdown plan in order to adequately address those security conditions? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Should the authorities granted to the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan take into account the security conditions on the ground faced by U.S. 

troops? 

Answer. Yes. 

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional 

and effective Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) and what recommendations would you make to address challenges to building ANSF capacity? 

Answer. My assessment is that the ANDSF are strong at the tactical level and 

still needs assistance at the corps and institutional levels. They still need help in 

developing the systems and processes necessary to run a modern, professional army 

and police force. They also need sustained support in addressing capability gaps in 

aviation, intelligence, sustainment, and special operations. To address these gaps, 

our advisory mission and mentorship will continue to be vital. Our advisors are at 

the security ministries, at the army corps level, and in the police zones—those remain our main efforts. 

Question. Do you support plans for building and sustaining the ANSF at 352,000 

personnel and, if so, what factors influence your recommendation about the proper 

size of the ANSF? 

Answer. Yes, for the near-term the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) are the right size and possess the right capabilities to address 

the security situation in Afghanistan. Long-term, we will need to evaluate and assess the threat and security situation, and work with the Afghan government to 

right size the force to a level consistent with its long term security requirements 

and funding limitations. 

RECONCILIATION

Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United States in any reconciliation negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and other insurgent groups? 

Answer. The United States should continue to support a political process that enables Afghans to sit down with other Afghans to determine the future of their country. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, should the United States take to advance 

the reconciliation process? 

Answer. We remain strongly supportive of an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process whereby the Taliban and the Afghan government engage in talks 

toward a settlement to resolve the conflict in Afghanistan. 

Question. In your view, what should be the role of Afghanistan’s neighbors, in particular Pakistan, in the reconciliation process? 

Answer. We believe regional partners have an important role to play in ensuring 

a stable, democratic Afghanistan. We have encouraged stronger ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan and have been pleased with their recent bilateral efforts to 

address their security concerns. 

An audit report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

(SIGAR) raised concerns about Department of Defense plans to purchase PC–12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters for the Afghan Special Mission Wing and recommended 

suspending the contracts for these purchases. The Department of Defense and the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission—Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan did not concur with the SIGAR’s recommendation on contract suspension. 

Question. What is your assessment of current plans to equip the Afghan Special 

Mission Wing with PC–12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters? 

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Answer. These programs are long term and are moving in the right direction and 

will have a significant impact on ANDSF’s ability to provide security to Afghanistan. If confirmed, however, I will assess all options to support the Special Mission 

Wing (SMW). With the ANDSF assuming full responsibility for security, and an associated significant decrease in coalition air support, the demand for air support in 

the form of ISR, airlift, aerial fires, and CASEVAC is likely to increase significantly. 

Question. What is your assessment of the impact to effectiveness of current Afghanistan counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts of the PC–12 aircraft and 

Mi-17 helicopters? 

Answer. Both the Mi-17s and PC–12s have enhanced the ANDSF’s capability to 

conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. The Mi-17 fleet remains the workhorse of the Afghan Air Force (AAF), conducting personnel transport, CASEVAC, resupply, close combat attack, aerial escort, and armed overwatch 

missions. The SMW uses its Mi-17 helicopters to provide Afghan special forces with 

medium-lift air assault, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and quick reaction force capabilities. The PC–12 aircraft is Afghanistan’s first fixed-wing ISR platform, and it 

has expanded the SMW’s capability to locate and identify threats using enhanced 

video and other intelligence collection capabilities. These platforms have improved 

the SMW’s ability to conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield, provide mission overwatch during the infiltration and exfiltration of forces, and gain access to 

areas prohibitive of vehicular traffic. Both of these aircraft provide the ANDSF with 

increased capabilities to overmatch the Taliban. 

U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to 

Pakistan? 

Answer. The key U.S. strategic interests in Pakistan are 1) preventing al-Qaeda’s 

resurgence in Afghanistan and Pakistan to limit its ability to attack the homeland, 

2) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology, and 3) promoting 

regional stability (including a peaceful outcome in Afghanistan). 

Question. What would you consider to be areas of shared strategic interest between the United States and Pakistan? 

Answer. The United States and Pakistan share the common strategic interests of 

defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist threats, ensuring regional stability, and furthering the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. We also share the 

goal of a stable peaceful Afghanistan. 

Question. In what areas do you see U.S. and Pakistani strategic interests diverging? 

Answer. Areas of divergent interest with Pakistan include our views on the use 

of proxies and the importance of a positive and stable Pakistan-India relationship. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-military relations? 

Answer. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is fundamental to our vital national security interests. We will need to continue cooperation with Pakistan to defeat alQaeda, support Pakistan’s stability, and achieve a lasting peace in Afghanistan. If 

confirmed, I would continue to evaluate the specifics of the relationship based on 

my assessment of our shared interests with Pakistan and its effectiveness of achieving our shared goals. I will continue to evaluate the efficacy of the mil-to-mil cooperation we have with Pakistan and identify ways in which we can work with 

Pakistan to enhance regional stability. 

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant military assistance to Pakistan. In addition, the United States has provided significant funds to 

reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with military operations conducted by 

Pakistan along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. 

As U.S. troop presence draws down in Afghanistan, what recommendations, if 

any, would you have regarding the reduction or cessation of Coalition Support 

Funds that currently reimburse Pakistan for military support in connection with 

U.S. military operations in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Pakistan has been, and remains, the largest recipient of CSF. It is in our 

interests to have an enduring partnership with Pakistan. As our mission in Afghanistan transitions, there remains a need for our mutually beneficial relationship. If 

confirmed, I will provide military advice and recommendations regarding our support for their operations based on my assessment of Pakistan’s effectiveness and the 

larger strategic environment. . 

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Question. In your view, how effective has the assistance and other support that 

the United States has provided to Pakistan been in promoting U.S. interests? 

Answer. Our assistance has enabled operations in Afghanistan and operations 

against al-Qaeda and helped secure our strategic interests. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Pakistani military to ensure that they continue to do more. 

Question. Do you support conditioning U.S. assistance and other support to Pakistan on Pakistan’s continued cooperation in areas of mutual security interest? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan? 

Answer. The current relationship appears to have improved since the election of 

President Ghani. It is clear that security in Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked. 

Both sides are working to ensure that concrete steps are taken to enhance their bilateral relationship and cooperation. 

Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan’s cooperation with the United 

States in counterterrorism operations against militant extremist groups located in 

Pakistan? 

Answer. Pakistan has cooperated with the United States in our operations against 

al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Their actions in North Waziristan and 

other areas of western Pakistan have disrupted groups that are a threat to U.S. personnel and objectives in Afghanistan. We will continue to work with Pakistan to do 

more. 

Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan’s efforts to maintain transit and 

provide security along the ground lines of communication (GLOCs) through Pakistan? 

Answer. The GLOCs are open and Pakistan’s support has been commendable. We 

currently rely on multiple lines of communication, to include the Pakistani GLOCs 

to support operations in Afghanistan and do not foresee any issues that would constrain our ability to operate. 

Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan’s efforts to counter the threat improvised explosive devices, including efforts to attack the network, go after known 

precursors and explosive materials? 

Answer. Pakistan recognizes that improvised explosive devices (IED) are a shared 

problem. They suffer significant casualties within Pakistan due to IED attacks. We 

are making progress in the area of counter-IED cooperation, and Pakistan is taking 

demonstrable steps to disrupt the IED network, to include placing new restrictions 

on the distribution of precursor materials and hosting regional discussions to discuss the IED problem with international partners. More progress needs to be made 

though, particularly as it relates to interdicting explosives through increased border 

security. 

IRAN

Question. What is your assessment of the military and political threat posed by 

Iran? 

Answer. Iran, the foremost state sponsor of terrorism, is both a regional and global security threat. Iran attempts to export its influence and protect its governing 

regime through support for proxy terrorist groups like Hezbollah; weapons trafficking; ballistic missile procurement and advancement; and maritime assets that 

threaten and harass international waters in the Straits of Hormuz and beyond. 

Question. What is your assessment of the threat of Iran’s influence in Iraq to U.S. 

interests? 

Answer. Iran’s goals and actions are inconsistent with our interests. Iran’s goal 

in Iraq is not to build an inclusive government; rather, it is to create a compliant, 

Shia-dominated buffer state. 

Question. In your view, what are the risks, if any, associated with reducing U. 

S. presence in the Middle East with respect to the threat posed by Iran? 

Answer. Reducing our presence in the Middle East could leave space for Iran to 

pursue its hegemonic goals. U.S. military presence gives credibility to the military 

options in the Middle East that both demonstrate our commitment to our regional 

security partners and deters Iran from employing its large conventional army or ballistic missiles and from interdicting the Strait of Hormuz. Nothing we say can 

match the message we deliver with our military presence or lack thereof. 

Question. Negotiations on the Iran nuclear program have been extended with a 

deadline now of June 30, 2015 to finalize a comprehensive agreement. What are the 

elements of a nuclear agreement with Iran that you consider critical to ensuring 

that it is a ‘‘good’’ deal for U.S. national security interests? 

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Answer. A good deal rolls back Iran’s nuclear program; provides the international 

community with unprecedented access and transparency into Iran’s nuclear facilities 

and nuclear supply chain; and preserves critical sanctions on conventional arms and 

ballistic missiles. A finalized deal based on the 02 April political framework satisfies 

all three of these criteria and clearly makes it more difficult for Iran to move towards a nuclear weapon. 

Question. If Iran is allowed to maintain a monitored and limited uranium enrichment program, do you believe that other states in the region may seek to develop 

enrichment programs of their own and why or why not? 

Answer. Any response I would make at this time would be speculation. If confirmed, I will make an assessment based on intelligence and my engagement with 

regional partners. 

Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in countering Iran’s support of 

international terrorism? 

Answer. The DOD’s role is to deter and counter Iran’s support of international 

terrorism and support our interagency partners’ efforts. We deter Iran through our 

own responsive military presence in the Middle East and through defensive infrastructure and tactics for both ourselves and our allies. To counter Iran, we enable 

our partner nations through counter terrorism training and equipment sales, multinational exercises, and information sharing, which when combined help to both 

weaken terrorist groups and Iran’s ability to support them. 

THE 2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Question. What is your understanding of the scope and duration of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), including with respect to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant? 

Answer. The United States is in an armed conflict against al-Qaeda and its associated forces. An associated force is defined as a group that (1) is an organized armed 

group that has entered the fight alongside al-Qaeda and, (2) is a co-belligerent with 

al-Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. These are 

the same terrorist threats that carried out the grievous attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, and the AUMF still serves as the legal basis under U.S. domestic 

law to employ military force against these threats. Since September 2014, the Administration has stated that the 2001 AUMF is interpreted to permit the use of 

military force against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). ISIL, previously known as al-Qaeda in Iraq, has been subject to the use of force under the 

AUMF since at least 2004, when it entered the conflict against the United States 

and joined Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization. While there are tensions between ISIL and parts of bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network, ISIL views itself as the true 

executor of bin Laden’s legacy of global jihad, and continues its violent campaign 

against the United States, its citizens, and interests. 

Question. What factors govern Department of Defense determinations as to where 

the use of force is authorized, and against whom, pursuant to the AUMF? 

Answer. The May, 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) governs direct action 

against terrorist targets located outside the United States and areas of active hostilities. This document establishes the procedures necessary for the DOD to conduct 

these types of military operations. The PPG and its underlying operational plans 

provide clear standards and procedures for DOD concerning where, how, and 

against whom military force may be used. The DOD meticulously adheres to the formalized procedures of the PPG to ensure that decisions in these counter-terrorist 

operations are informed by sound military and policy advice, and are based the most 

up-to-date intelligence and the expertise of our national security professionals. Senior commanders, with the advice of their legal counsel, carefully review all operations for compliance with U.S. and international law before a decision is rendered 

by the Secretary of Defense or the President. 

Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities, including the AUMF, 

enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at 

the level that you believe to be necessary and appropriate? 

Answer. In its current form, the 2001 AUMF provides the necessary and sufficient 

authorities to counter al-Qaeda and its associated forces. Furthermore, the 2001 

AUMF and the 2002 AUMF provide statutory authority for the current operations 

against ISIL. 

ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by ISIL to the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more broadly? 

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Answer. ISIL is currently focused on strengthening and expanding its self-declared caliphate in Iraq and Syria and, to a lesser extent, on strengthening its affiliates in Libya and Nigeria. If ISIL were to refocus its efforts on attacking the U.S. 

homeland or other Western countries, it would have access to a pool of operatives 

from which to draw. ISIL already poses a threat to the U.S. and Western interests 

abroad, particularly U.S. persons traveling in the region. 

Question. How would you describe the U.S. strategy to counter ISIL? 

Answer. We have a whole-of-government strategy. The ‘‘ends’’ are defined as degrading ISIL over the course of 36 months and ultimately defeating ISIL, in coordination with the international coalition. Nine lines of effort across the USG constitute the ‘‘ways’’ in which we will achieve that objective, including supporting effective governance in Iraq, disrupting ISIL’s finances, disrupting the flow of foreign 

fighters, and protecting the homeland. DOD is responsible for two of those lines of 

effort: to deny ISIL safe haven and to build partner capacity. The Department’s 

‘‘means’’ include: kinetic strike operations, advise/assist operations, training/equipping efforts, and our military posture in the region. 

The military campaign, as one component of the broader strategy, provides time 

and space for progress along the other lines of effort, particularly the development 

of inclusive and legitimate governments in Iraq and Syria. 

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of that strategy in achieving its objectives? 

Answer. We are seeing some military progress, but it is early in the campaign. 

In both Iraq and Syria, ISIL’s ability to mass and maneuver forces is degraded, its 

leadership cells are pressured, and its command-and-control and supply lines are 

being severed. We have reduced ISIL’s ability to produce, process, and transport oil. 

However, challenges remain, and this will be a long campaign. 

The current strategy depends on the development of reliable ground partners and 

on progress toward inclusive political systems in Iraq and Syria. If we get an indication that the other lines of effort cannot make the necessary progress, we should 

re-examine the strategy. Any enduring solution to the challenge that ISIL and other 

VEOs pose requires a generational effort, and our military efforts must be part of 

a whole of government approach. 

Question. What do you assess to be the greatest impediments to implementing the 

strategy to counter ISIL? 

Answer. Poor governance and sectarian divisions create the greatest challenge to 

our efforts to counter ISIL. Political systems that foster inclusive and legitimate 

governance remain the most likely path to enduring stability and security in Iraq 

and Syria over the long-term. 

Question. What modifications, if any, would you recommend be made to the strategy to counter ISIL? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the military lines of effort to ensure that they 

are providing the time and space necessary for the non-military lines of effort to 

succeed. I also will evaluate the efficacy of our efforts to train and equip security 

forces in Iraq and Syria, and assess whether we can make adjustments to increase 

their effectiveness. A final area I would examine is whether and how we would need 

to adjust our efforts to respond to ISIL’s shifting geographic reach to confront ISIL 

not only where it exists today, but also where it is most likely to take root in the 

future, As with any strategy, I expect that continued assessment and refinement of 

both the strategy and its implementation is ongoing. As a key component of the 

overall strategy, we will continue to adjust implementation of the military campaign 

based on changes on the ground in Iraq and Syria. 

AL QAEDA

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates to the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more 

broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern? 

Answer. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates continue to pose a threat to the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more broadly despite ongoing 

counterterrorism (CT) pressure and competition from ISIL. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula (AQAP) remains the affiliate of most concern. 

YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Question. What are the U.S. national security interests in Yemen? 

Answer. We seek a stable Yemen, with an inclusive and legitimate government, 

that is willing and able to confront violent extremist organizations. Continued instability in Yemen not only imposes significant humanitarian costs on civilians, it also 

enables AQAP to thrive—a group which poses a direct threat to the U.S. homeVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00336 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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land—and allows groups to threaten freedom of navigation in the Gulf, particularly 

in the Bab al Mandeb Strait. 

Question. What is your assessment of U.S. strategy in Yemen to date? 

Answer. Our current U.S. strategy in Yemen is founded upon three related pillars: 

(1) support political transition, namely National Dialogue, Constitutional reform, 

and Elections, (2) provide continued economic and humanitarian assistance, and (3) 

lay the groundwork for security reform, specifically counterterrorism capacity building, border security, and critical infrastructure protection. The first step is for political parties to return to negotiations and establish a legitimate government. That 

would enable the United States to resume cooperation with the Yemen government 

in the future, particularly on countering AQAP. At this time we are challenged to 

conduct effective CT operations. 

Question. What are the implications of recent events in Yemen for U.S. counterterrorism policy both in Yemen and globally? 

Answer. The current turmoil in Yemen has hampered DOD CT operations against 

AQAP. Although, the United States still maintains a diminished capability. Prior to 

a Houthi takeover, DOD worked with the Republic of Yemen Government (RoYG) 

military units to combat the significant terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland emanating from AQAP. However, security concerns in Yemen led to an evacuation of 

all U.S. personnel, hindering efforts to combat AQAP. AQAP continues to pose an 

immediate security threat to Yemen, the region, and the United States. When the 

political and security situation allows, DOD will resume our counterterrorism partnership with the Yemeni government. 

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness and capability of coalition 

operations led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen? 

Answer. Coalition airstrikes are slowing Houthi expansion in Yemen. Saudi-led 

Coalition operations can be sustained at least in the near term. However, these operations have not compelled the Houthis to withdraw from cities they captured earlier this year nor deterred Houthi attacks along the Saudi border. 

SOMALIA AND AL SHABAB

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Shabab? 

Answer. Al-Shabaab is primarily a threat in Somalia, Kenya, and other regional 

countries. It specifically targets countries providing forces to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as well as government facilities and Western targets in 

and around Mogadishu. 

Question. In your view, does al Shabab pose a threat to the United States and/ 

or western interests outside of its immediate operational area? 

Answer. Al-Shabaab does not pose a direct threat to the U.S. homeland or Europe 

at present. Nevertheless, the group poses an ongoing threat to U.S., Western, and 

other allied interests in East Africa, to include Somalia and Kenya. 

Question. What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy in Somalia and 

the role of DOD in that strategy? 

Answer. The current U.S. strategy on Somalia that was put in place in May 2014 

focuses on two main security lines of effort: (1) Continued support to the African 

Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), to stabilize the short term security situation 

and (2) Promoting Somali security sector reform by expanded support to the Somali 

National Army, to advance longer term security and stabilization. DOD had an integral role in developing the strategy and we are playing an important role in its execution. These security efforts promote the stabilization of the political and economic 

situation which allows for the creation of responsive and functioning governmental 

institutions at the federal, regional, and local level. 

Question. What role should DOD play in building the capacity of the Somali national military forces? 

Answer. DOD continues to work closely with our colleagues at the Department 

of State to build the capacity of Somali security services that are loyal to the federal 

government and are composed of a mixture of clans and regional backgrounds. We 

intend to increase our support to the Somali National Army in the next year, with 

programs designed to provide equipment and logistics capacity to units of the Somali National Army to support their continued efforts alongside the African Union 

Mission in Somalia to defeat al-Shabaab. 

AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM)

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM)? 

Answer. Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliated 

groups pose a local and regional threat. AQIM will likely continue to target Malian 

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government and military targets and Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization in 

Mali (MINUSMA) forces and facilities, as well as pursue kidnapping for ransom tactics in Niger and Mali. 

Question. In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United States and/or 

western interests outside of its immediate operational area? 

Answer. No, AQIM does not presently pose a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. 

We see no indications the group views conducting attacks outside North Africa and 

the Sahel as a priority in the near term. 

Question. What capacity has AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out actions 

threatening U.S. interests? 

Answer. AQIM has the capacity to threaten U.S. and Western interests within 

North and West Africa, where it has conducted or attempted attacks in several 

countries (i.e. Mali, Niger, Algeria, and Mauritania). The group will likely continue 

to bolster its ties to al-Qaeda-associated terrorist groups throughout the region to 

influence and support attack planning. 

Question. In your view, what has been the impact of the recent expansion of 

AQIM’s area of operations in northern Mali on the group’s capacities and aims? 

Answer. AQIM’s expansion in northern Mali has increased its freedom of movement and enabled it to institute its own severe brand of sharia in territories it controls, implementing policies that are particularly brutal for women. AQIM remains 

capable of conducting small-scale improvised explosive device (IED), indirect fire 

(IDF), and mortar attacks against Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) and Malian interests in the north. 

LIBYA

Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation in Libya? 

Answer. Libya’s civil war has created a security vacuum and the country will remain volatile in 2015. Two rival governments are seeking to establish legitimacy, 

and their aligned militias are vying for control of territory and key infrastructure. 

ISIL also has declared the country part of its caliphate, and ISIL-aligned extremists 

are trying to institute sharia in parts of the country. 

Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. strategy with regards to Libya 

and the role of DOD in that strategy? 

Answer. The United States maintains a national interest in stabilizing Libya and 

preventing terrorists from using it as a safe haven. The United States and our allies 

are supporting the United Nations-led efforts to help the warring Libyan factions 

reach a political solution by forming a national unity government. Currently, the 

role of DOD in the U.S. strategy is to leverage military relationships with regional 

partners to encourage support for a political solution. A unity government containing both secularists and Islamists provides the best the long term partner to 

counter VEOs in Libya. Should diplomatic efforts to form a unity government succeed, the United States will be prepared to revisit security assistance efforts for the 

legitimate Libyan security forces. 

Question. How would you assess its effectiveness in achieving its objectives? 

Answer. Political reconciliation has yet to materialize. Libya’s political landscape 

is severely fragmented and the country is in the midst of civil war. The UN-led negotiations have so far failed to gain traction, however negotiators remain optimistic 

that an agreement can be reached and a unity government formed. 

Question. What do you assess to be the greatest impediments to implementing the 

strategy and protecting U.S. interests in Libya? 

Answer. The greatest impediment to advancing U.S. goals in Libya is the severe 

fragmentation of Libya’s political and security landscape, which has significantly 

complicated the negotiations. Libya has disintegrated into a complex mix of rival political factions, tribes, militias and other armed groups, interspersed with local and 

foreign extremists. Competition between these rival groups poses a challenge to 

building enduring political consensus, while violent extremists exploit this window 

of uncertainty to compromise regional stability. 

NORTH AFRICA

Question. In recent years, there has been a growth of terrorist networks, capabilities, operations, and safe havens throughout North and East Africa, including 

groups that have the intention to target U.S. and Western interests. In the face of 

growing instability and threats, the U.S. counterterrorism effort in the region has 

been described as an ‘‘economy of force’’ effort. 

Do you agree with that characterization of the situation in North and East Africa 

and the U.S. counterterrorism efforts to combat the related threats? 

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Answer. North and East Africa are important areas in our fight against extremists. Multiple different terrorist networks are indeed active in North and East Africa, as well as West Africa. These networks have primarily local ambitions—seeking 

increased influence over resources or territory, and threatening the stability of our 

regional partners and safety of civilians on the ground. Some have, at times, also 

demonstrated a willingness to target U.S. and Western interests. AFRICOM is continually working to identify, prioritize and target these networks, in partnership 

with host nations. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. counterterrorism strategy 

in the region? In your view, is the U.S. military allocating adequate resources to 

effectively address the terrorism threat in the region? 

Answer. DOD assets have been allocated based on the level of threat and the potential for collaboration with partner nations. Based on that criteria, our current allocation of resources appears appropriate, however if confirmed, I will consider 

whether additional investments are required in order to stem the growth of violent 

extremism in the region. 

Question. General Rodriguez noted in his March 2014 testimony that ‘‘North Africa is a significant source of foreign fighters in the current conflict in Syria.’’ What 

is your understanding of the foreign fighter flow from North Africa to the conflict 

in Syria and Iraq? 

Answer. North Africans make up the vast majority of foreign fighters entering 

Iraq and Syria; however, increasingly many are choosing to remain in North Africa, 

and join the ISIL affiliate in Libya. Tunisians provide the largest contingent of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq, followed by Morocco, Libya, and Algeria. 

Question. In your view, is it likely that many of these fighters will eventually return home from Syria and Iraq to North Africa and continue their fight against regional governments? 

Answer. Yes, it is likely that North African foreign fighters will eventually return 

home to conduct attacks in their home countries; however, it is currently unknown 

if these individuals would be tasked by ISIL to conduct attacks or if it would be 

of their own accord. 

RUSSIA

Question. Crimea was formally annexed when President Putin signed a bill to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014, and Russia continues 

to fuel instability in eastern Ukraine despite a ceasefire agreed to in September 

2014. 

How effective do you assess the sanctions of the U.S. and the European Union 

have been in deterring additional aggression by Russia? 

Answer. Sanctions alone are unlikely to deter future Russian aggression; deterring combined Russian-separatists actions against Ukraine requires a whole of government approach that is aligned with our NATO allies and friends in Europe. However, U.S. and EU sanctions have had an impact on Russia’s economy and send a 

clear signal to Moscow that aggression against Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial 

integrity entails costs. 

Question. What other specific U.S. actions helped to deter additional Russian aggression in Eastern Europe? 

Answer. Congressional support for the European Reassurance Initiative has enabled DOD, via Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR), to conduct military exercises and training on land, in the air and at sea, while sustaining a rotational presence across Europe; and increase the responsiveness of U.S. forces to reinforce 

NATO by pursuing the prepositioning of equipment and enhancing reception facilities in Europe. Our bilateral efforts as well as our continued support of NATO adaptation measures all support the goal of deterring additional Russian aggression. 

Senior defense and diplomatic officials travel and consult with our allies and friends 

to affirm Alliance resolve and bolster approaches to deter Russian aggression. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, are likely to prove most effective at deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate current measures and take a 

close look at potential adjustments and adaptations. Of key concern to me is wisely 

channeling U.S. military efforts and resources to ensure our allies and partners are 

militarily capable and interoperable. 

Question. Are you concerned that Moldova and Georgia may be at a heightened 

state of vulnerability given Russian willingness to take aggressive action in 

Ukraine? 

Answer. Yes. Russia has demonstrated both in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine today 

its willingness to use force, violate sovereignty, and exploit the vulnerabilities of 

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these fragile democracies to achieve its strategic objectives. Georgia, Moldova and 

Ukraine all contain Russian occupied separatist regions that the Kremlin exploits 

for its own purposes. 

Question. Russian tactics in eastern Ukraine have been called ‘‘hybrid’’ and combine hard power with soft power, including elements such as lethal security assistance to separatists, the use of special operations forces, extensive information operations, withholding energy supplies and economic pressure. 

If confirmed, what steps would you recommend as part of a strategy to counter 

this ‘‘hybrid’’ approach? 

Answer. We need to remain alert to Russian strategic intent and capabilities— 

and their integration of military and non-military tools in the gray space. Most importantly, we must lead in order to maintain Trans-Atlantic resolve to resist Russian coercion now and in the future. I will continue to emphasize efforts and investments that enable our allies and friends to defend against a range of threats—and 

to do so collectively. Increasingly, there is a non-military dimension to security that 

requires whole-of-government and multinational approaches. Military power is just 

one aspect of these approaches. 

Question. In light of Russia’s actions in 2014, what do you believe are appropriate 

objectives for U.S.-Russian security relations? 

Answer. Cooperation with Russia in areas of mutual interest within the military 

sphere remains possible if Russia assumes the role of a responsible international 

actor moving forward, not isolated and moving backward as it is today. If confirmed, 

my intent for the military-to-military relationship is to reduce the chances of miscalculation or escalation through professional, candid communications and behaviors. 

NATO ALLIANCE

Question. The reemergence of an aggressive Russia has resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) developing the Readiness Action Plan that 

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called ‘‘the biggest reinforcement of our 

collective defense since the end of the Cold War.’’ NATO also continues to be central 

to our coalition operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, even as many NATO 

members have significantly reduced their national defense budgets in response to 

economic and fiscal pressures. 

How important is the NATO alliance to U.S. national security interests? 

Answer. The Alliance is essential to our national security. The bedrock of NATO’s 

collective defense obligation is Article 5, but NATO’s importance extends beyond Article 5. NATO has been fundamental to sustaining Trans-Atlantic unity, prosperity 

and security. This has enabled Europe to contribute to security and prosperity on 

a global basis. The Alliance maintains a persistent air, land, and maritime presence 

in and around the territories of our European allies, demonstrating a commitment 

to defend its territory against any aggression. NATO is a fundamental contributor 

to international order. NATO conducts military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, 

the Mediterranean Sea, and off the Horn of Africa to support stability to those 

areas. NATO also assists nations in North Africa and the Middle East to develop 

local capabilities to stem the growing instability and transnational threats in and 

around their countries and to prevent those threats from spreading to Europe or 

threatening the U.S. homeland. 

Question. In light of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, what 

do you see as the major strategic objectives of the NATO Alliance in the coming 

years and what are the greatest challenges in meeting those objectives? 

Answer. NATO must affirm Trans-Atlantic Unity by adapting its collective defense against state and non-state threats across a broad spectrum. NATO’s unity 

is fundamental, and that requires us to be attentive to the challenges confronting 

all members. The Russian Federation’s aggression in Ukraine consolidated attention 

on the Alliance’s clearest responsibility, which is to protect and defend its territory 

and populations against attack, per Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO 

must also remain prepared and continue to undertake its other ‘‘core tasks’’ of crisis 

management and cooperative security. Violent extremist non-state actors and Russian coercion and subversion in ‘‘gray space’’ test the Alliance’s ability to adapt Article V to these challenges. As Allies, we must thereby ensure that the Defense Investment Pledge at the 2014 Wales Summit meets these challenges and threats. 

Question. What do you see as the proper role, if any, for NATO in addressing the 

threat posed by ISIL and in addressing the problem of illegal immigration across 

the Mediterranean Sea? 

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Answer. A unified Europe can and must do more than one thing at a time. But 

NATO must be judicious about prioritizing its engagement given limited resources 

to address the threats and challenges to the southern and eastern flanks. 

Information sharing is a useful contribution NATO could make to counter ISIL 

and/or to support Mediterranean Allies and friends managing border security and 

immigration challenges.. 

Question. The concept of defense cooperation among NATO members was emphasized at the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012. 

What areas or projects would you recommend, if confirmed, that NATO nations 

cooperate in to improve NATO alliance capabilities? 

Answer. Cooperative efforts among Allies on developing capabilities have become 

increasingly important in light of the worldwide challenges and the fiscal straits facing many Allied nations. If confirmed, I would use my office to influence Allies to 

implement Wales Summit pledge to move toward the two percent defense spending 

target as soon as possible. In doing so, I would encourage Allies to focus their resources on specific Alliance capability needs, such as developing command and control and joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and maintaining and improving readiness and interoperability. 

Question. Under what conditions, if any, would you envision further enlargement 

of NATO in the coming years? 

Answer. Enlargement should be reserved for those candidates deemed ready to accept the obligations of membership, who are prepared to make the necessary reforms that further NATO’s principles, and who contribute to the unity and security 

of the Alliance. 

Question. Turkey continues to be a gateway for foreign fighters proceeding to and 

from Syria and Iraq. 

What steps would you recommend to encourage Turkey to continue to address the 

threat posed by foreign fighters proceeding to and returning from Syria and Iraq? 

Answer. Turkey acknowledges the foreign terrorist fighter threat and is taking 

steps to bolster its law enforcement and border security efforts, including increased 

monitoring, border security, and counter-illicit finance measures. If confirmed, I 

would support the Department’s contributions to interagency support of Turkish enhance border security enhancements, to include strengthening critical information 

sharing with the Turkish military. Moreover, I would support international efforts 

to help source countries identify and disrupt foreign fighter transit through Turkey. 

Question. At the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, NATO leaders declared their 

‘‘aim to move towards the 2 percent guideline [of GDP for defense spending] within 

a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO’s 

capability shortfalls.’’ 

In your view, what impact have national defense budget cuts had on the capabilities of the NATO alliance, and what do you believe needs to be done to address any 

capability shortfalls? 

Answer. National defense budget cuts and fiscal austerity measures by our Allies 

have limited their ability to address long standing Alliance capability shortfalls such 

as in joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. These capabilities can be 

costly, but we need to ensure that in the future the United States is not the only 

Ally with such capabilities. The rhetoric of the Wales Defense Investment Pledge 

must be matched by real resources to build capability. The United States is committed to working with Allies on defense planning to ensure they maintain or develop the specific capabilities that the Alliance is lacking. 

Question. What are the greatest military capability shortfalls that you see in the 

NATO alliance? 

The most significant shortfalls that I see in the Alliance are: cyber defense, defense institution-building, enabling capabilities such as joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air-to-air refueling and strategic lift. The Alliance places 

heavy reliance on the United States to provide these limited but high-demand capabilities. Other Allies should be encouraged to develop these capabilities through national and multinational investment. 

Question. In light of the reductions in national defense spending by some NATO 

members, are you concerned that the Alliance will lack critical military capabilities? 

If so, what steps, if any, would you recommend be taken to address potential shortfalls in Alliance capabilities? 

Answer. The United States is engaged in political, diplomatic and military channels to address continued reductions in defense investment by our Allies. We are 

particularly focused on NATO Allies that have been our most reliable partners for 

managing global security issues and those with the largest Gross Domestic Products. Alliance capability shortfalls will increase as national defense spending decreases. Most Allies have gone as far as they can go in wringing out efficiencies in 

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their defense spending. The key step for addressing capability shortfalls is to arrest 

the decline in national defense investment and move to meet the Defense Investment Pledge made at the 2014 Wales Summit. 

Question. What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for 

NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next five years? 

Answer. The greatest opportunity and challenge are the same: adapting NATO to 

better meet current and future security challenges while preserving Trans-Atlantic 

unity. The events in both Europe and the Middle East have provided the catalyst 

for adapting NATO’s political, military and institutional processes and focus. NATO 

leaders—including our President—have committed to this adaptation which will 

make NATO more responsive and ready to face, or deter, challenges. Following thru 

on this adaptation is the greatest opportunity for NATO; gaining the consensus to 

do this in a focused, proactive manner is the greatest challenge. 

Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries? 

Answer. The 2010 Strategic Concept for the Alliance states NATO will remain a 

nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist. Further, the 2012 NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, the DDPR, concluded NATO’s current mix of 

conventional, nuclear, and missile defense capabilities remains appropriate. I concur 

with both of these judgments by the Alliance. Finally, in the context of recent Russian behavior, including their development of dual capable intermediate-range missile systems that directly threaten our NATO allies, now is not the time to eliminate 

a capability that has been an effective centerpiece of Alliance cohesion, resolve and 

deterrence for decades. 

U.S. FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE

Question. The Department of Defense continues to review its force posture in Europe to determine what additional consolidations and reductions are necessary and 

consistent with U.S. strategic interests. 

How would you define the U.S. strategic interests in the European area of responsibility (AOR)? 

Answer. As the National Security Strategy states, the United States maintains a 

profound commitment to a Europe that is free, whole, and at peace. According to 

the National Military Strategy, NATO’s collective security guarantees are strategically important for deterring aggression, particularly in light of recent Russian aggression on its periphery. 

Question. Do you believe that additional consolidation and reductions of U.S. 

forces in Europe are consistent with U.S. strategic interests in that AOR given the 

increase in Russian aggression in the last 15 months? 

Answer. Yes. The current U.S. footprint in Europe—including the recent changes 

announced by Secretary Carter—supports garrison operations, training facilities and 

power projection capabilities for operations inside and outside the AOR. However, 

the credibility and effectiveness of our response to Russian aggression in the East 

depend not only on the operational scale and geographic scope of our operations, but 

also on their longevity. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure the persistent, appropriate 

level of rotational presence is retained in Europe to effectively assure allies and 

deter Russian aggression. 

U.S. FORCE POSTURE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Question. The Department continues the effort to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific as announced in the January 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance. 

Are you satisfied with the rebalance efforts to date? 

Answer. Yes. I am satisfied with our Rebalance efforts to date. The rebalance to 

the Asia-Pacific region has resulted in a significant adjustment in U.S. force structure and capabilities. As indicators of our success, we have negotiated new comprehensive force posture and access agreements with key allies and partners to support broader U.S. goals and objectives in the region. We have strengthened our alliances and greatly expanded partnerships with countries like Singapore, Vietnam 

and India. We have moderated tensions in East and South China Sea maritime disputes and reinforced our position as the security partner of choice for most nations 

in the region. An added benefit of these strengthened ties is the commitment of military forces and assets of several countries to the anti-ISIL coalition. 

Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the Asia-Pacific region 

over the next couple of years and what specific capabilities or enhancements are 

needed in to meet those priorities? 

Answer. The United States faces a range of challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, 

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grams; China’s development of new technologies intended to prevent open access to 

the air and maritime domain; widespread natural disasters and transnational 

threats; and territorial disputes. Going forward, we must prioritize investments in 

advanced capabilities that are critical for the future operational environment. I will 

support the ongoing efforts to increase U.S. military presence in the region and invest in and deploy critical advanced capabilities. 

I believe we must not only continue to modernize U.S. alliances and partnerships, 

which provide a critical role in underwriting regional security, but also help grow 

the ISR, HADR and maritime security/domain awareness capacities of our allies and 

partners in the region. The Department must continue to enhance U.S. force posture 

and capabilities and work with China to encourage greater transparency about how 

it will use its growing military capabilities. 

Question. Do the budget cuts and resource constraints associated with sequestration threaten your ability to execute the rebalance to the Pacific? 

Answer. If we return to sequestration-level cuts in Fiscal Year 2016, we will face 

serious risks across the board, and may have to reassess the rebalance strategy. If 

confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department and Congress to help 

solve this pressing problem. 

Question. As the United States realigns its forces in the Asia-Pacific Theater, do 

you believe we have the air and maritime lift required to support the distribution 

of Marines across North and Southeast Asia? 

Answer. No. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Services and the 

U.S. Pacific Command to address this challenge. 

KOSOVO

Question. Approximately 700 U.S. troops remain in the Balkans as part of the 

Kosovo Force (KFOR) that first deployed to Kosovo in 1999 and today is comprised 

of over 4,600 personnel from 30 countries. Spikes in violence in 2011 required the 

deployment of the NATO operational Reserve Force battalion of approximately 600 

soldiers to bolster KFOR and maintain a secure environment. Progress is required 

in both the military and political realms before further troop reductions can be 

made. 

What major lines of effort do you think are required to further reduce or eliminate 

U.S. and NATO presence in Kosovo? 

Answer. Continued progress in the EU implementation of the April 2013 accord 

between Serbia and Kosovo will go a long way to stabilizing the Western Balkans 

and ending Kosovo’s ethnic partition thus setting the security conditions appropriate 

for further reducing or eliminating U.S. and NATO presence in Kosovo. 

Question. In your view, can the European Union play a more significant role in 

Kosovo? 

Answer. The EU plays a significant role by contributing to the security of Kosovo 

through its European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX–Kosovo) in addition to ongoing efforts to implement the 2013 Accord. The EULEX mission supports Kosovo on its path to a greater European integration in the rule of law area 

by investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating sensitive cases using its executive 

powers as well as by monitoring, mentoring, and advising local counterparts in the 

police, justice and custom fields to achieve sustainability and EU best practices in 

Kosovo. The EU’s active engagement has helped facilitate political dialogue between 

Serbia and Kosovo and will continue to be an essential part of progress. 

SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean 

peninsula and of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by the current 

state of North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons capabilities? 

Answer. North Korea remains one of the most challenging security problems for 

the United States and our allies and partners in the region. North Korea continues 

to take actions that are destabilizing for the region, including its December 2012 

missile launch, February 2013 nuclear test, series of short-range ballistic missile 

launches in 2014, and the cyber-attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment. 

North Korea’s ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities clearly present a serious and direct threat to U.S. forces postured in the AsiaPacific region as well as to our regional allies and partners. These capabilities could 

eventually pose a direct threat to U.S. territory. Moreover, North Korea’s history of 

proliferation amplifies the dangers of its asymmetric programs. 

The US–ROK alliance continues to be the linchpin to deterring North Korean aggression and maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. If confirmed, I will ensure that the U.S.-ROK Alliance continues to strengthen alliance capabilities to 

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counter North Korea’s increasing missile and nuclear threat. I will also ensure that 

we draw upon the full range of our capabilities to deter, defend, and respond to 

North Korean ballistic missile and WMD threats. 

Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take to ensure 

that North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology to Syria, Iran 

and others? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to strengthen our strong defense posture against the North Korean ballistic missile threat. This includes enhancing 

DOD’s ability to highlight and disrupt the illicit proliferation networks that North 

Korea uses, and promoting cooperation with partners to interdict vessels and aircraft suspected of transporting items of proliferation concern. 

Question. What is your view regarding the timing of transfer of wartime operational control from the U.S. to the ROK? 

Answer. At the 2014 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, SecDef Hagel and 

ROK Minister of Defense Han decided that in light of the evolving security environment in the region, we will implement the ROK-proposed, conditions-based approach to the transition of wartime OPCON. 

The ROK will take wartime OPCON when critical ROK and alliance military capabilities are secured and the security environment in the region is conducive to a 

stable wartime OPCON transition. 

CHINA ASSERTIVENESS

Question. How has China’s aggressive assertion of territorial and maritime claims, 

particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea, affected security and stability in the region? 

Answer. China’s actions in the South and East China Seas, as well as its rapid 

military modernization and growing defense budgets, have led many in the region— 

including the United States—to question its long-term intentions. It has still not 

clarified its expansive 9–Dash Line claim, and it continues to conduct large scale 

land-reclamation activities in the South China Sea. Such behavior has been destabilizing. 

CHINA MIL-MIL

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of the U.S.-China military 

relationship and your views regarding China’s interest in and commitment to improving military relations with the United States? 

Answer. I view the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship as a critical component to our overall bilateral relations. It allows us to increase cooperation on 

areas of mutual interest and reduces risk as our forces come into closer contact. The 

Chinese leadership has expressed the view that the military-to-military relationship 

is useful as vehicle for stability in the overall bilateral relationship. The relationship 

has room for improvement. 

Question. What is your view of the purpose and relative importance of sustained 

military-to-military relations with China? 

Answer. As an enduring Pacific power, the United States has a clear interest in 

sustaining military-to-military contacts with China. I will continue to seek a milmil relationship that builds sustained and substantive dialogue, practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest, and mitigates the risk of miscalculation. 

ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL

Question. Over the past few years, much has been made of the emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the U.S. military’s freedom of movement and action in certain regions. Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities are a concern? 

Answer. Yes. One of the keys to our nation’s success is our ability to rapidly 

project power around the globe. Our power projection capability is essential to deterring our adversaries and maintaining global stability. Russia, Iran, and China are 

developing technologies, most notably missiles, designed to limit U.S. military’s freedom of movement. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to ensure that we sustain 

our ability to project overwhelming combat power into any theater at a time of our 

choosing. 

Question. If so, what do you believe the U.S. Armed Forces need to be doing now 

and in the next few years to ensure continued access to all strategically important 

segments of the maritime domain? 

Answer. The United States is committed to keeping the global commons, especially maritime, free. We will continue to invest in the personnel and technological 

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advantages that will allow us to meet that commitment, especially to counter antiaccess and area denial capabilities of our potential enemies. However, any discussion of specific actions and investments associated with our counter A2AD strategy 

and capabilities are more appropriate for discussion in a classified forum. 

Question. If confirmed, you would play an important role in the process of transforming the U.S. Armed Forces’ capability and capacity to meet new and emerging 

threats. 

Answer. Concerning capability and capacity to meet new and emerging threats, 

what are your goals regarding transformation of the U.S. military? 

Question. If confirmed, I would develop a detailed concept for Joint exercises and 

experimentation. My initial assessment, from the perspective of a service chief, is 

that our operational tempo over the past decade has adversely impacted us in this 

area. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES

Question. Despite the ongoing drawdown in Afghanistan, demand for intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of every kind remains very high 

due to the enhanced situational awareness and targeting capabilities they bring to 

our commanders. Almost all of the geographic combatant commands still have validated ISR requirements that are not being met. 

What is your assessment of the Department’s current disposition of ISR assets 

across the various combatant commands? 

Answer. Demand for ISR continues to outpace available supply. The Services are 

operating at maximum capacity; therefore, sourcing for new requirements is a zero 

sum game. Assets are primarily reallocated from other combatant commander operations to meet new demands. 

The Department’s allocation strategy remains focused on leveraging our ISR capabilities to maximize effects. To support counter-terrorism and force protection, we 

have allocated nearly 90 percent of our remotely-piloted full-motion video assets to 

USCENTCOM, with the remaining sourced primarily to USAFRICOM. In 

USEUCOM and USPACOM’s sensitive reconnaissance operations areas, we have leveraged assets with standoff capabilities to maximize indications and warning collection. 

Question. As our forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan, should existing ISR assets be re-postured to support combatant command needs in other regions, or can 

we afford to reduce ISR capacity? 

Answer. The Department continually evaluates our capabilities against evolving 

combatant command requirements, ensuring a balance across operational, force 

management, and institutional risks. When appropriate, ISR assets can be repostured to support emerging combatant commander needs across other regions. For 

example, within the last year, we shifted some ISR from Afghanistan to monitor 

ISIL activity in the Middle East. Additionally, we made the challenging decision to 

return medium-altitude ISR capacity to a steady-state 60 flights a day, from an almost continual surge of 65, reducing risk to the long-term sustainability of the 

USAF’s unmanned pilot force. 

Question. Most of the highest-value ISR assets acquired after 9/11 are aircraft 

that were not designed to be survivable in high-threat air defense environments, although in some cases unmanned aerial vehicles were designed to be deployed in 

large numbers in the expectation of substantial combat attrition. 

Do you believe that the Department needs a major shift towards ISR platforms 

that are survivable in high-threat situations, or merely an augmentation of the capabilities we now have, with the assumption that air superiority can be gained rapidly enough to operate today’s assets effectively? 

Answer. We have learned a great many ISR lessons from more than ten years of 

conflict. It is in the best interest of the United States to invest in ISR platforms, 

sensors, and communications capabilities designed to penetrate and survive in highthreat and denied environments; not just in the air domain, but in space, surface, 

and sub-surface domains as well. These systems also offer the potential to improve 

pre-conflict warning. These capabilities are expensive to develop and field, but are 

a necessary component of balanced efforts to maintain our warfighting advantages. 

However, existing ISR systems remain very relevant for today’s operations and future scenarios; particularly in support of ongoing counter-terrorism missions. So the 

right path appears to be augmenting the capabilities we have today to fill critical 

capability and capacity gaps. 

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AIRCRAFT CARRIER-LAUNCHED UNMANNED SYSTEMS

Question. The Navy’s current plan for the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne 

Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system aircraft is to develop an airframe optimized for unrefueled endurance (14 hours) and the ISR mission. 

Given the combat radius of the planned carrier air wing, are you concerned the 

carrier will lack the ability to project power at relevant distances given emerging 

anti-access/area-denial threats? 

Answer. Yes. That’s why it’s critical that we continue to develop concepts and capabilities that will allow us to maintain a competitive advantage in an A2AD environment. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The 2006 and 2010 QDRs have mandated significant growth in our special operations forces (SOF) and enablers that directly support their operations. The 

most-recent QDR released in 2014 capped this growth at 69,500, approximately 

2,500 below the originally planned growth. 

In light of the growing global terrorism threat, do you believe the currently 

planned end-strength for SOF is sufficient to meet global requirements? 

Answer. The last two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) directed significant 

growth in our special operations forces (SOF) along with enablers that directly support their operations. We will continue to carefully balance the need for further 

growth in SOF with our need to address other capability demands in light of increased budgetary pressures. 

Question. SOF are heavily reliant on enabling support from the general purpose 

force. In light of current fiscal challenges, do you believe sufficient enabling capabilities can be maintained within the general purpose forces and that such capabilities 

will remain available to special operations forces? 

Answer. Special operations forces depend on general purpose forces for many enabling capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), logistics, and medical evacuation. I believe that we have sufficient and trained general 

purpose forces to support high priority special operations missions. 

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS

Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 

2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated 

that the United States ‘‘is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to UN peacekeeping operations.’’ 

What is your view on whether the U.S. should contribute more military personnel 

to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations? 

Answer. I believe we should focus on how best to increase the effectiveness and 

efficiency of UN peacekeeping operations. Deliberate and strategically crafted placements of personnel to key positions within the UN can advance U.S. influence and 

interests. 

Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the 

DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support 

from multilateral institutions like the United Nations? 

Answer. Over the past year the Joint Staff has provided multiple officers to the 

UN to include the head of the UN’s military planning service. The recent administrative waiver extension provided by the UN to the United States will help ease future assignments, when warranted. 

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in 

recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature. 

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative 

interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere? 

Answer. Military power is necessary, but not sufficient to achieve our national security objectives. The non-military dimensions of national security are increasing in 

their importance. Our adversaries understand this and have adapted to challenge 

us outside or short of our military redlines. Whereas the U.S. military provides a 

range of options to employ force, our diverse civilian partners provide potent and 

diverse options to exert and sustain American influence. Much of the incremental 

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progress bringing civil and military capacities together in the field is waning. Agencies and Departments must deliberately and jointly invest in civil-military strategy, 

doctrine, training and operations to meet the tests of this era, whether State-based 

coercion in ‘‘gray space,’’ non-state violent extremism, or cyber threats to our homeland and overseas interests. If confirmed, my military advice to the President, NSC 

and Congress will reflect the need to invest, apply and sustain deliberate civil-military approaches to national security. 

Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved? 

Answer. It begins with leadership. If confirmed, I will consult early and often with 

Secretary Carter, other members of the NSC and Congress to understand specific 

ways the Joint Force can support or enable the non-military dimensions of our national security. My focus will remain on the military instrument of power. I will establish expectations that the Joint Staff parallel my efforts by pursuing a more collaborative and engaged posture in NSC fora and with departments, agencies and the 

private sector. 

Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured in military doctrine and adopted as ‘‘best practices’’ for future contingency operations? 

Answer. The Department’s Joint Force Development process that takes observations from operational practice, joint training and concept development, analyzes 

them, and synthesizes them into Joint Doctrine for the operational preparation and 

employment of the force. As an example, the current average age of the Department’s 81 Joint Doctrine publications is about 2 years old, a refresh rate that is 

about 3-times faster than it was in the years after 9/11. We should look at making 

doctrine more adaptable to the dynamic environment and accessible to the joint 

force. But we must also infuse learning into our joint education and joint exercise 

programs to ensure that its impact is aligned at the strategic, operational and tactical echelons within OSD, the Military Departments and Services, combatant commands and defense support activities. 

Question. Interagency collaboration on an operational or tactical level tends to address issues on a country-by-country basis rather than on a regional basis (e.g. 

international terrorists departing Mali for safe havens in Libya). 

How do you believe regional strategies that link efforts in individual countries can 

best be coordinated in the interagency arena? 

Answer. Combatant commanders develop Theater Campaign Plans and Functional Campaign Plans that address regional and trans-regional issues. They seek 

input from interagency partners in the development of these plans to de-conflict and 

complement efforts. We need to change our paradigm. The State Department has 

initiated regional, functional and country strategies and supporting processes. DHS 

is maturing its scenario-based planning process. Our military paradigm needs to 

shift from expecting others to integrate into military plans and processes. This reinforces the tendency for DOD to become the option of first resort and the default integrator. We need to be more engaged with OSD to support and influence foreign affairs and homeland security planning and resourcing processes and integrate those 

into military plans and processes. 

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Question. The U.S. Government has recognized the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ 

(R2P)—that is, the responsibility of the international community to use appropriate 

means to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 

crimes against humanity, by encouraging states to protect their own populations, by 

helping states build the capacity to do so, and by acting directly should national authorities fail to provide such protection. In its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, 

the Department of Defense names ‘‘preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities’’ as one of a long list of potential contingencies that DOD might be called on 

to address. DOD has begun to explore some of the implications of R2P, by considering ‘‘mass atrocity prevention and response operations’’ (MAPRO). 

Question. In your view, how high a priority should the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ 

be for the U.S. Government as a whole? 

Answer. My role is not to set policy priorities but rather to design and employ 

the military instrument in support of policy decisions. The military instrument can 

be used to meet many priorities as directed by the President. The U.S. military has 

often taken an active role in helping to prevent and responding to mass atrocity situations. 

Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, if any, in fulfilling the 

responsibility to protect? 

Answer. The role of DOD is to support the broader U.S. government’s response 

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tions, assess the risk associated with those options, and execute selected options as 

needed. 

Question. In your view, what is the proper application of R2P doctrine with respect to the situation in Syria? 

Answer. We incorporate R2P considerations, and civilian security considerations 

more broadly, when we weigh the acceptability and feasibility of our military strategies, whether in Syria or elsewhere. The U.S. Government is working with allies 

and partners and with the Syrian opposition to provide humanitarian assistance 

within Syria and across the region. Since fiscal year 2012, the United States has 

provided over $4.4 billion in aid to help the victims of this conflict, including emergency medical care and supplies, food, and shelter. Of that, over three quarters of 

a billion dollars have already been spent in fiscal year 2015. 

OPERATION OBSERVANT COMPASS & THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY

Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) and 

efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support them, elements of the Lord’s 

Resistance Army (LRA)—including Joseph Kony—continue to operate and commit 

atrocities against civilian populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan. Some observers have identified operational 

concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are trying to find 

an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of California, much of which is covered 

in thick jungle; (2) technical support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from 

the defense and intelligence community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations personnel to 

accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations, thereby limiting the 

level of direct support they can provide. 

In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass? 

Answer. Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS has four main objectives: 

1) Increase protection of civilians affected by the LRA 

2) Promote defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of LRA 

fighters 

3) Remove Joseph Kony and LRA leaders from central Africa 

4) Increase humanitarian access and provide relief 

Our African partners, with DOD and interagency assistance, have made progress 

in achieving these mission objectives. 

Question. Do you support the continuation of DOD’s current level of support to 

this mission? 

Answer. I am sensitive to the resource constraints we face, especially in the Africa 

area of operations, and am open to exploring other options to achieve our stated policy goals. I recommend resourcing at a level appropriate to the threat the LRA poses 

to our national interests in the region. 

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are 

also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats 

that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director 

of National Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as ‘‘an 

abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,’’ and stated that 

‘‘rising drug violence and corruption are undermining stability and the rule of law 

in some countries’’ in the Western Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released 

his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging 

Threats to National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the 

strategy is ‘‘enhancing Department of Defense support to U.S. law enforcement.’’ 

What is your understanding of the President’s strategy to combat transnational 

criminal organizations? 

Answer. The President’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime integrates all elements of our national power to combat transnational organized crime 

and related threats to national security—and urges our partners to do the same. 

The strategy seeks to reduce transnational organized crime from a national security 

threat to a manageable public safety concern in the U.S. and strategic regions 

abroad. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Department’s role within the President’s strategy? 

Answer. The Department of Defense provides support to other U.S. government 

agencies who lead our efforts to combat transnational organized crime. 

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Question. In your view, should DOD play a role in providing support to the U.S. 

law enforcement and the Intelligence Community on matters related to 

transnational organized crime? 

Answer. Consistent with current and recently expanded authorities provided in 

the fiscal year 2015 NDAA, the Department provides unique capabilities that support U.S. law enforcement and Intelligence Community activities as part of a wholeof-government approach to address the national security threat posed by 

transnational criminal organizations. Intelligence support, counter-threat finance 

support, building partner capacity, and detection and monitoring are specific DOD 

capabilities which support the interagency and partner nations. 

MASS ATROCITIES PREVENTION

Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as well as a core moral interest, in 

August 2011 under Presidential Study Directive 10. 

Among interagency partners, what is DOD’s role in addressing atrocity threats, 

and what tools does DOD have for preventing or responding to atrocities? 

Answer. DOD has developed Joint Doctrine for conducting Mass Atrocity Response Operations. Based on this doctrine, atrocity prevention and response is now 

incorporated into DOD plans and planning guidance. In addition, DOD has conducted a comprehensive review of training in this area and is working to strengthen 

the capacity of UN peacekeeping operations to respond to atrocity situations. 

Question. Has DOD developed planning processes toward this effort so that it will 

be able to respond quickly in emergency situations? 

Answer. Yes, DOD has developed planning processes toward this effort. All DOD 

components have been directed to integrate atrocity prevention and response into 

their policies and plans. Specific plans are further developed and implemented at 

the Geographic Combatant Command level, in coordination with the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the interagency as appropriate. 

Question. In your view, is the situation in Syria a mass atrocity? 

Answer. Assad’s actions against his own people have harmed civilians and undermined security in Syria and the region, with over two hundred thousand combatant 

and non-combatants deaths and over four million displaced. 

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

Question. DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC) have begun investing more 

resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist 

networks and illicit trafficking, but the opportunities for tracking and degrading illicit financing flows are not yet matched by the effort and resources devoted to 

them. Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and facilitation routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism, production of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other significant national security threats could have an 

outsized impact on confronting these threats. 

What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance activities? 

Answer. Many terrorists, criminal networks, and other adversaries who threaten 

U.S. strategic interests rely heavily on licit or illicit financial networks to support 

and sustain their operations. DOD policy is to work with other U.S. government entities and partner nations to effectively deny, disrupt, degrade, and defeat our adversaries’ ability to access and utilize financial resources. If confirmed, I will review 

our level of integration across the interagency and with our foreign and institutional 

partners with the goal of maximizing cooperation and effectiveness in countering 

these activities and networks. 

Question. Are you aware of any policy, legal authority, or resource shortfalls that 

may impair U.S. counter threat finance efforts? 

Answer. Lack of sufficient insight and fidelity on the sources of corruption in partner nations can hinder our ability to achieve counter threat network goals. Additionally, in non-terrorism cases, there is room for improvement with respect to the full 

and timely sharing of relevant information between law enforcement and intelligence elements in a timely manner. 

Question. In your view, how should the Department of Defense coordinate and 

interface with other key agencies, including the Department of Treasury and the Intelligence Community, in conducting counter threat finance activities? 

Answer. The Department should, and currently does, use its unique capabilities 

to augment and support the efforts of other U.S. government entities, including the 

Department of Treasury and the Intelligence Community. The result is a well-coordinated, capable, and robust counter threat finance posture. If confirmed, I will 

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continue to remain fully engaged in the interagency process to diminish adversary 

use of both licit and illicit financial networks. 

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular 

forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations 

by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism. 

What is your current assessment of this authority? 

Answer. Section 1208 funding allows the U.S. government to reduce our reliance 

on unilateral Direct Action operations and increase the role of our foreign partners 

in combatting terrorism around the globe. It is an effective Advise and Assist program that can be rapidly established to advance U.S. counterterrorism objectives in 

areas that do not possess the will or capacity to fight terrorism. It can serve as a 

bridging solution to future programs focused on building partner nation capacity. 

ACTIVE-DUTY AND RESERVE COMPONENT END STRENGTH

Question. Last year DOD announced its 5-year plan to reduce active-duty end 

strengths by over 100,000 servicemembers by 2017 and the reserve components by 

another 21,000 over the same period. These cuts do not include any additional personnel reductions that could result from sequestration or any agreement to avoid 

sequestration. 

What is your view of the role of the reserve components as the active components 

draw down? 

Answer. As an integral part of our Total Force, the Reserve Components provide 

much of the operational capability and strategic depth needed to meet our nation’s 

defense requirements. The drawdown of both active-duty and reserve end strength 

requires us to rebalance some capabilities between the active and reserve components to maintain the force structure required by our National Military Strategy. 

This balance between components provides us with the agility to meet strategic objectives while managing our current fiscal constraints. I see the Reserve Components as continuing to provide much of the operational capability needed to support 

current operations while maintaining the strategic depth required in responding to 

the more demanding global contingencies. Our nation’s investment in the Reserve 

Components has generated a well-trained, fully integrated, and capable force that 

will continue to fulfill these roles. In addition, we will continue to capitalize upon 

the broad skills and experience our Reserve Component servicemembers bring to the 

force from their civilian occupations. 

Question. What additional military personnel reductions do you envision if the sequester continues into 2014 and beyond? 

Answer. PB16 FYDP manning levels already reflect the maximum acceptable risk 

in executing our defense strategy. If sequestration continues, we will further reduce 

total personnel numbers, known as end-strength, consistent with the numbers we 

have provided since the Strategic Choices Management Review (SCMR) of 2013– 

2014. These numbers were highlighted by all of the Service Chiefs in their combined 

testimony to the SASC on January 28, 2015. 

Question. In your view, what tools do DOD and the Services need to get down to 

authorized strengths in the future, and which of these require Congressional authorization? 

Answer. The Department and Services’ current force management tools provide 

adequate flexibility to enable the drawdown to authorized Service end strengths, 

and, at present, the Services do not seek additional authorities in this regard. 

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. American military personnel routinely deploy to locations around the 

world where they must engage work effectively with allies and with host-country 

nationals whose faiths and beliefs may be different than their own. For many other 

cultures, religious faith is not a purely personal and private matter; it is the foundation of their culture and society. Learning to respect the different faiths and beliefs 

of others, and to understand how accommodating different views can contribute to 

a diverse force is, some would argue, an essential skill to operational effectiveness. 

In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different beliefs, 

including no religious belief? 

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Answer. Yes. I believe current policies appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on 

those who have different, or no, religious beliefs. Department of Defense policy regarding religious accommodation, set forth in DODI 1300.17, affirms the rights of 

individuals to express their sincerely held beliefs, whether they be matters of conscience, moral principles, or religious beliefs. The Department of Defense places a 

high value on the rights of individuals to do so, or not do so. This is held in balance 

with the need of the Military Departments to maintain military readiness, unit cohesion, and good order and discipline. 

Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and good order and discipline? 

Answer. Yes. The current policies regarding religious accommodation provide a 

clear means by which individual expressions of belief, including apparel, grooming 

and worship practices, can be considered by commanders. Denial of religious accommodation requests may only occur when it furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Unit cohesion 

and good order and discipline are compelling interests, but they must be preserved 

in the least restrictive manner that is practicable for mission accomplishment. 

Question. In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and respects open 

and candid discussions about personal religious faith and beliefs in a garrison environment contribute in a positive way to preparing U.S. forces to be effective in overseas assignments? Would a policy that discourages open discussions about personal 

faith and beliefs be more or less effective at preparing servicemembers to work and 

operate in a pluralistic environment? 

Answer. In my view, a military climate that welcomes and respects open and candid discussion about personal religious faith in garrison can positively prepare U.S. 

forces to be effective in overseas assignments. In a world that appears to be increasingly committed to expressing religious belief, possessing this skill is necessary to 

not only understand our adversaries, but also understand our partner nations (consistent with the National Strategy on Integrating Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement into U.S. Foreign Policy). Any policy that discourages open discussion diminishes our ability to develop these skills. However, there must be clear 

guidance about the importance of mutual respect and trust. 

PREVENTION OF AND RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULTS

Question. In 2014, there was what the Department described as an ‘‘unprecedented 53 percent increase in victim reports of sexual assault. In fiscal year 2014, 

victims made 4,660 Unrestricted Reports and 1,840 initial Restricted Reports of sexual assault. Also in fiscal year 2014, the Department saw the number of victims who 

converted Restricted Reports to Unrestricted Reports increase from an average of 

15 percent to 20 percent. According to the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study 

approximately 72 percent of servicemember victims who indicated they made a sexual assault report said they would make the same decision to make a report if they 

had to do it over again. The Rand Study also indicated the percentages of active 

duty personnel who experienced unwanted sexual assault declined in 2014, from 6.1 

percent to 4.3 percent for women and from 1.2 percent to 0.9 percent for men. The 

Department also concluded the estimated gap between reporting and prevalence of 

sexual assaults was at the narrowest point since the Department began tracking 

this data. 

What is your assessment of the current DOD sexual assault prevention and response program? 

Answer. The Department’s response to sexual assault continues to improve, but 

work remains. The Services have developed a number of reforms and policy changes 

designed to increase victim confidence and enhance access to victim advocacy and 

legal support. To reinforce these changes, as the Services have instituted unique 

training for investigators and prosecutors who handle sexual assault crimes. They 

have also increased bystander intervention training and sexual assault awareness 

across the entire force. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. Victim care remains a top priority for the Department. We face the same 

challenges that society faces in dealing with incidents of sexual assault—balancing 

care to victims with prosecuting offenders. Unrestricted reporting automatically initiates a criminal investigation. After learning some victims were choosing to forego 

support services rather than initiate an investigation, the Department offered the 

restricted reporting option. Offering both forms of reporting provides a means to 

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protect a victim’s privacy while also providing access to medical care and support 

services. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of DOD oversight of military service implementation of the DOD and service policies for the prevention of 

and response to sexual assaults? 

Answer. The Department has put a considerable amount of effort into the development of policies and procedures designed to address sexual assault. The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office provides oversight for sexual assault policy 

and works with the Services to execute their prevention and response strategic 

plans. The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s partnership with OSD provides the operational 

perspective to the sexual assault program in support of initiatives to improve oversight and accountability. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these observed changes in sexual assaults have occurred? 

Answer. Establishing an appropriate culture where victims are treated with dignity and respect starts at the top. Commanders are accountable for what happens 

in their units and they set the leadership tone. Commanders are crucial to our ability to effect institutional change and leaders at all levels must foster a command 

climate where sexist behavior, sexual harassment and sexual assault are not condoned or ignored. 

Question. Surveys report that up to 62 percent of victims who report a sexual assault perceive professional or social retaliation for reporting. If confirmed, what will 

you do to address the issue of retaliation for reporting a sexual assault? 

Answer. First of all, any form of retaliation goes against our core values and has 

no place in our military. While the latest surveys confirmed that victims perceive 

retaliation, the data did not provide the depth needed to understand this challenging problem or to develop appropriate solutions to the problem of peer retaliation. If confirmed, I, along with the Joint Chiefs, will continue to support efforts to 

better define the problem and determine root causes. I will also continue to work 

to ensure that the joint force culture is one of respect and that retaliation is not 

tolerated, especially among peers. 

Question. Sexual assault is a significantly underreported crime in our society and 

in the military. If confirmed, what will you do to increase reporting of sexual assaults by military victims? 

Answer. In order to increase reporting of sexual assaults by military victims, we 

must improve victim confidence in our ability to respond to incidents of sexual assault. We must also establish a climate in which victims are treated with dignity 

and respect, and where any form of retaliation or reprisal is unequivocally unacceptable. If confirmed, I will continue the partnership with OSD to assess current programs and develop initiatives to enhance support services and improve our systems 

to hold perpetrators appropriately accountable. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command, instead of a military commander in the grade of O– 

6 or above as is currently the Department’s policy, to determine whether allegations 

of sexual assault should be prosecuted? 

Answer. I support the Department’s current policy. The Uniform Code of Military 

Justice operates as both a criminal justice system and a critical component of a commander’s authority to maintain good order and discipline. I believe our military 

members and national security will best be served by retaining the military commander’s key role in the military justice decision process. While I greatly value the 

legal analyses and recommendations provided by our highly proficient judge advocates, and fully expect all leaders in the Services to take the greatest advantage of 

this expertise, I firmly believe the military commander’s role is indispensable in the 

prosecutorial process. 

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. As you know, the Department in January rescinded the policy restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission of 

engaging in direct ground combat operations, and has given the military services 

until January 1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request 

an exception to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that 

must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary 

of Defense. The services are working now to develop gender-free physical and mental standards for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those 

standards. 

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If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these standards? 

Answer. The Services are in the final stages of validating their standards. In my 

current capacity, I have been involved in the process. Military Department Secretaries must certify that their standards are gender-neutral and in compliance with 

all applicable Public Laws by 30 Sept. If confirmed, I will be engaged in the development and implementation of standards that affect joint warfighting. 

Question. Will you ensure that the standards will be realistic and will preserve, 

or enhance, military readiness and mission capability? 

Answer. Yes. The Services and USSOCOM worked with various scientific and research agencies to ensure the standards are current, occupationally valid and tied 

to the operational requirement. Preserving readiness is a key tenant of the guiding 

principles established in the Jan 2013 memorandum. 

Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on bona 

fide military requirements? 

Answer. Yes. Decisions to open positions will be based on rigorous analysis of the 

Services and USSOCOM integration studies and the recommendations of the Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Question. If so, what steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that such decisions are made on this basis? 

Answer. As the senior military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, I will provide 

sound advice from a Joint operational perspective to ensure that we preserve unit 

readiness and maintain the best qualified forces to meet mission requirements. 

Question. Some family members have expressed concerns about assigning women 

to what are currently male-only combat units. 

To what extent do you believe that this will be a problem in the implementation 

of this policy? 

Answer. As with any institutional change, we can expect there will be concerns 

from a variety of sources. I respect the concerns of our military families, but I do 

not see this as a problem as we implement the policy. Women are already serving 

in units that provide direct support to combat units. 

Question. If it is a problem, what steps would you take if confirmed to address 

it? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to engage with military families our 

servicemembers to discuss their concerns and explain our policies. 

MILITARY HEALTH CARE REFORM AND MODERNIZATION

Question. Congress authorized the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2013 to conduct a review of the military compensation and retirement systems and 

to make recommendations to modernize those systems. The Commission released its 

report in January 2015. 

What is your view of the Commission’s findings regarding the military health system? 

Answer. I agree with the Commission that DOD needs to continue to improve the 

military health care system. I also believe the health care reforms proposed in the 

fiscal year 2016 budget are a good first step and offer servicemembers, retirees, and 

their families more control and choice over their health care decisions. I’m open to 

working with Congress to develop additional reform proposals for consideration in 

the fiscal year 2017 budget. 

Question. Do you believe the Department’s fiscal year 2016 proposal to consolidate 

TRICARE adequately addressed the Commission’s findings on military health care? 

Answer. Yes. The TRICARE proposal in the President’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget 

more effectively achieves the aim of providing family members and retirees with 

greater choice and control over their healthcare decisions without the risk of an untested, and potentially infeasible, overhaul of the Military Health System. If confirmed, I will work closely with DOD leadership and Congress to ensure the proposal is implemented as efficiently and effectively as possible. 

Question. What is your view of the Commission’s recommendation to establish a 

Joint Readiness Command? 

Answer. I agree with the Commission’s overall objective of protecting medical 

readiness across the joint force including establishment of essential medical capabilities (EMCs). However, a new, four-star readiness command is not necessary as 

the Department has sufficient processes and governance structures in-place to identify, track, and measure the readiness status of enterprise wide and Service specific 

EMCs. 

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Question. What is your assessment of progress the Defense Health Agency has 

made to create efficiencies and generate cost savings by combining the medical support functions of the Services? 

Answer. The Defense Health Agency (DHA) will reach Full Operational Capability 

(FOC) on 01 October 2015 and I am told they are on track to meet this goal. Once 

FOC, DHA will receive a Combat Support Agency Review Team Assessment 

(CSART) from the Joint Staff NLT 2017 to determine its responsiveness and readiness to support the operating forces. 

Question. Do you believe the Defense Health Agency should be replaced with a 

new combatant command, a Unified Medical Command? 

Answer. The Defense Health Agency (DHA) will reach Full Operational Capability 

(FOC) on 01 October 2015 and I believe it is premature to make a determination 

if DHA is able to meet its mission. As a Combat Support Agency (CSA), DHA will 

receive Combat Support Agency Review Team Assessment (CSART) in early 2017 

to determine its responsiveness and readiness to support the operating forces. In addition, in my role as the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, I was 

directly involved in Department’s review of the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission recommendations. As such, I agree with the Secretary’s assessment of not supporting creation of an additional new four-star combatant command for the purpose of ensuring joint medical readiness. 

WOUNDED WARRIOR SUPPORT

Question. Servicemembers wounded and injured in combat operations deserve the 

highest priority from their Service for support services, healing and recuperation, 

rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty 

when appropriate, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. 

What is your assessment of the progress made by the Department of Defense, the 

Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Services to improve the care, management, 

and transition of seriously ill and injured servicemembers and their families? 

Answer. DOD, the VA, and the Services have made considerable progress in ensuring the Nation’s wounded, ill, and injured recovering servicemembers (RSMs), 

their families, and caregivers receive the support they need for recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration. The NDAA for fiscal year 2008 directed DOD to improve the 

care, management, and transition of recovering servicemembers. It established the 

office now known as Warrior Care Policy (WCP) to develop policies for the Department and provide the oversight of those policies to ensure proper execution and outcomes. The policy and oversight areas for WCP include the Recovery Coordination 

Program, the Integrated Disability Evaluation System, the Military Adaptive Sports 

Program, Operation Warfighter, the Education and Employment Initiative, and the 

Caregiver Support Program. 

The Department continuously evaluates our wounded warrior and caregiver programs, and implements improvements. We are incorporating lessons-learned and 

best practices to update policies and programs to improve support for RSM and 

their families. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase support for wounded servicemembers and their families, 

and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. The recovery care coordinators are a crucial resource for Wounded Warriors and their families, and we must continue to fund and evaluate the effectiveness of this resource over time. The Joint Staff conducted a thorough review of the 

Service’s policies and procedures related to returning our Wounded Warriors to service, and found that all Services were operating within OSD guidance. We provided 

constructive feedback to OSD which will allow the Services to retain flexibility to 

develop programs unique for their Service needs and culture, while also providing 

guidance that better supports Wounded Warriors. This guidance provides clarity on 

how to navigate the ‘‘reassignment and retraining’’ process if they desire (and qualify for) continued service. If confirmed, I am committed to continued improvement 

on our efforts and results with regards to the care and support of our Wounded 

Warriors and their families. 

Question. What is your assessment of the need to make further improvements in 

the Integrated Disability Evaluation System? 

Answer. The Department continuously evaluates IDES to identify improvements. 

DOD has implemented several actions that have resulted in the IDES reaching a 

critical milestone in timeliness and overall servicemember satisfaction. As of May 

2015, Active Component case timeliness averaged 223 days against a 295-day goal, 

Reserve Component timeliness averaged 298 days against a 305-day goal, and 87 

percent of servicemembers expressed overall satisfaction with the IDES process. If 

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confirmed, I will ensure my staff and I support improvements to the Disability Evaluation Process that benefit both our servicemembers and the Department. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION AND MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues to concern the 

Committee. 

In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in shaping policies 

to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members of the reserve 

components? 

Answer. Suicide prevention is an important responsibility I share with the Service 

Secretaries and Service Chiefs. We have joined forces with agencies across DOD and 

Interagency, the White House and civilian sector to better understand the factors 

leading to suicide and refine our prevention programs. As leaders, we have the responsibility to not only seek to build strong and resilient individuals, but also to 

grow strong and resilient organizations. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental 

health resources are available to servicemembers in theater, and to the 

servicemembers and their families upon return to home station? 

Answer. Adequate mental health staffing must remain a priority to ensure the 

highest delivery of mental health services. I support several initiatives underway to 

improve access to mental health care, increased provider availability, and more effective recruitment and retention of mental health providers. The continued embedding of Mental Health personnel across the deployed force is critical with required 

in-theater periodic mental health assessments. These initiatives in conjunction with 

the cooperative efforts underway between the VA and DOD work to ensure continuity of mental health care for deployed and returning servicemembers. It is imperative that these efforts continue to address the long-term mental health needs 

of servicemembers and their families. 

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. The Committee is concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life 

programs for military families, such as family support, child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget challenges. 

If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of intense downward pressure on 

budgets? 

Answer. I don’t have any recommendations for enhancement at this time. If confirmed, I will continue to engage in the maintenance and development of effective 

quality of life programs. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Military members and their families in both the active and reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns 

among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the 

long separations that go with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for 

servicemembers and their families? 

Answer. Every family has unique needs, requiring a flexible and responsive network of services to deliver support at the right time, using the most effective methods. From pay and benefits, to deployment forecasting to wellness plans, military 

families have valid concerns that should be addressed. Our research indicates that 

military families are most concerned about pay and benefits, including retirement. 

Other critically important issues are health care, education, and housing. 

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global 

rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end strength? 

Answer. If confirmed I will continue to work with the Services to meet the changing needs of our military families. Community-based partnerships will be key to improve education, employment, and wellness support for current and transitioning 

members. The Services have also adjusted force size and rotation, redoubled transition support, and invested in world-class health care for our wounded. Family support programs that are flexible, responsive, and communicate and coordinate with 

interagency and non-governmental family services are critical to meet the enduring 

needs of our servicemembers and their families, whether they live on, near, or far 

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ciencies and enhance the accessibility of support when and where it is needed and 

at the right level. 

I remain committed to building and retaining ready, resilient servicemembers and 

families. Readiness/retention efforts must look beyond reactive financial incentives 

to emphasize total servicemember and family wellness. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as 

to active duty families who do not reside near a military installation? 

Answer. We must continue outreach, education, awareness, and engagement 

strategies to promote servicemember and family readiness programs within the Reserve Component. Since 2008, the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program has led our 

support efforts with this population, providing access to deployment cycle information, resources, programs, services, and referrals to more than 1.53 million 

servicemembers and their families. The Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program eases 

transitions for servicemembers and families as they move between their military 

and civilian roles. Our geographically diverse populations are also supported by Department of Defense Military One Source Consultants that works to build capacity 

to identify and meet evolving needs at the local community level. To augment and 

enable that local support, Military OneSource provides support to military families, 

military leadership, and military and civilian service providers through delivery of 

information, referrals, specialty consultations and non-medical counseling. 

OPERATIONAL ENERGY BUDGETING

Question. Since Congress created the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Operational Energy Plans and Programs, much progress has been made in a few 

short years in these programs. 

In what specific areas, if any, do you believe the Department needs to improve 

the incorporation of energy considerations into the strategic planning and force development processes? 

Answer. The Joint Staff and Combatant Commands will continue to analyze, 

evaluate, and assess where increased energy demand necessary for improved combat 

capabilities intersects with operational energy and energy security constraints or 

vulnerabilities. We will further refine and improve plans, strategy, procurement, 

force development and policies regarding energy considerations as it relates to mission success. 

Question. In what specific areas, if any, do you believe the Department should increase funding for operational energy requirements, energy efficiency, alternative 

energy, and renewable energy opportunities? 

Answer. I am mindful of our need to increase military capability, reduce risk, and 

mitigate operational costs through our use and management of energy. As a result, 

I believe that we should make additional investments to increasing both operational 

effectiveness and efficiency. This will be accomplished by improving the energy performance of aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and military bases, reducing the vulnerability of our energy supply chains, and diversifying the kinds of energy accessible 

to our combatant commanders. Additional funding applied towards alternative energy solutions for contingency operations would be particularly welcomed given ongoing and anticipated operational requirements. 

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. Officials of the Department of Defense, including previous Chairmen of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated for accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. 

Do you support United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the 

Law of the Sea? 

Answer. I support accession to the Convention. Being a party to the Convention 

enhances the United States’ security posture by reinforcing freedom of the seas and 

rights vital to ensuring our global force posture. The Convention provides legal certainty in the world’s largest maneuver space. Access would strengthen the legal 

foundation for our ability to transit through international straits and archipelagic 

waters; preserve our right to conduct military activities in other countries’ Exclusive 

Economic Zones (EEZs) without notice or permission; reaffirm the sovereign immunity of warships; provide a framework to counter excessive maritime claims; and 

preserve or operations and intelligence-collection activities. Joining the Convention 

would also demonstrate our commitment to the rule of law, strengthen our credibility among those nations that are already party to the Convention, and allow us 

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nally, it would secure for us a leadership role in shaping and influencing future 

maritime developments. 

Question. How would you respond to critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States? 

Answer. There are significant national security impacts from failing to join the 

Convention. By remaining outside the Convention, the United States remains in 

scarce company with Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, and Syria, and foregoes the 

most effective way to counter undesirable changes in the law or to exercise international leadership. By not acceding to UNCLOS we deny ourselves the ability to 

challenge changes to international law as a result of the practice of nations at the 

local, regional, or global level. As some states seek to interpret treaty provisions in 

a manner that restricts freedom of navigation, U.S. reliance on customary international law as the legal foundation for our military activities in the maritime becomes far more vulnerable and needlessly places our forces in a more tenuous position during operations. Moreover, by failing to join the Convention, some countries 

may come to doubt our commitment to act in accordance with international law. 

Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of 

the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime disputes such as in the 

South China Sea and in the Arctic? 

Answer. Acceding to the Convention would strengthen our credibility and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. While we do not take sides in 

the various territorial disputes in the South China Sea, we do have a national security interest in ensuring disputes are resolved peacefully, countries adhere to the 

rule of law, and all nations fully respect freedom of the seas. However, we undermine our leverage by not signing up to the same rule book by which we are asking 

other countries to accept. As for the Artic, the other Arctic coastal nations (Russia, 

Canada, Norway and Denmark (Greenland)) understand the importance of the Convention and are in the process of utilizing the Convention’s procedures to establish 

the outer limits of their extended continental shelves (ECS) in the Arctic. The 

United States has a significant ECS in the Arctic Ocean, but cannot avail itself of 

the Convention’s mechanisms to gain international recognition of its ECS. We must 

put our rights on a treaty footing and more fully and effectively interact with the 

other seven Arctic Council nations who are parties to the Convention. 

DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

Question. Recent Department of Defense operations in Iraq and Syria highlight 

the need for a continued detention capability for both interrogation and law of war 

detention. 

What recommendations do you have for ensuring that the Department of Defense 

maintains sufficient detention capabilities for capture operations against ISIL and 

other affiliated terrorist groups to remain a viable option? 

Answer. The United States needs a viable detention capability to support our 

counterterrorism strategy. If confirmed, I will work with civilian and military leadership to ensure our commanders on the ground have the capability to lawfully detain as part of capture operations. 

Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum 

issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, 

regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, 

dated August 19, 2014? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and 

plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and 

tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 

and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be 

based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the 

risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact 

on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines are treated, 

should they be captured in future conflicts? 

Answer. Yes. 

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OFFSET TECHNOLOGIES

Question. During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key technologies to offset 

the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces: precision guided munitions, 

stealth technology, and satellite-based navigation. These three technologies have 

given U.S. forces unparalleled superiority until now. However, with advancements 

by our emerging adversaries, it seems like the military technological superiority is 

beginning to erode. As a result, it is critical that the United States once again focus 

on offsetting the technology advantages being gained by our adversaries. 

Which technology priorities do you believe the Department of Defense should be 

pursuing to maintain the military technological superiority of the United States? 

Answer. To offset advances in anti-access and area-denial weapons and other advanced technologies that are proliferating around the world, the Department will 

identify, develop, and field breakthroughs in cutting-edge technologies and systems—especially from the field of robotics, autonomous systems, miniaturization, big 

data, and additive manufacturing. 

Question. What strategies would you recommend that Secretary Carter implement 

to develop these technology priorities? 

Answer. I strongly support Secretary Carter’s vision and strategy as captured in 

the Defense Innovation Initiative. This multi-faceted effort recognizes that more 

than just developing new technology priorities is required, and acts as the organizing and integrating construct weaving cutting-edge technology recommendations 

developed by our long-range research and development planning program into new 

innovative operational concepts. We must also make sure that our investments in 

operational concepts and human capital proceed apace with our efforts to pursue innovative solutions through technological means. Our greatest asset will remain our 

servicemembers. 

Question. What role do the services have to play in their development? 

Answer. The Services will have a key role, as part of the Defense Innovation Initiative team and as the Department’s primary organizations for developing and acquiring weapons systems. The Services identify combinations of new and existing 

technologies that are necessary to project power globally, and to prevent the erosion 

of our technological superiority in other areas. Ultimately, the Services integrate 

technology, training, and operational concepts to produce capabilities and generate 

fielded forces for the combatant commanders. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit to the warfighter. In this regard, 

it is critical that advancements quickly transition from the development phase into 

testing and evaluation and ultimately into a procurement program for the 

warfighter. 

What are some of the challenges you see in transitioning technologies effectively 

from research programs into programs of records? 

Answer. There are three challenges that I see in in transitioning technologies effectively into programs of record. The first is establishing a compelling case and the 

necessary ‘‘head-room’’ in the budget. The second is maintaining momentum in the 

program and budgeting process given the competing and evolving strategic demands 

placed on the U.S. military. The third is achieving the promise of the research technology in a timely manner at a reasonable cost. 

Question. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what steps will you take 

to ensure that the services are benefitting more quickly and directly from the research being performed by the defense research enterprise? 

Answer. As the primary advocate for warfighter requirements, I will ensure that 

the resourcing and acquisition processes are well-informed on the priority and timing of capability needs. I will also continue to use the Chairman’s Gap Assessment 

and the Chairman’s Program Recommendation to communicate directly to Secretary 

Carter my thoughts on promising research being performed by the research enterprise. 

Question. Do you feel that defense technologies and systems, especially in areas 

such as mobile communications, computing, and robotics, are keeping pace with 

global and commercial technological advances? If not, what do you suggest that the 

Department do to keep up with the pace of global technological change? 

Answer. I believe the Department is challenged keeping pace with global and commercial technology advances. The Secretary’s Defense Innovation Initiative is focusing the Department on maintaining our military’s technological edge in an increasingly competitive technology environment. 

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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the Administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

FORCE STRUCTURE AND DETERRENCE

1. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, does our military have the force structure, 

training and equipment to meet requirements in the National Military Strategy? 

General DUNFORD. My initial assessment is yes. However, if Budget Control Act 

level cuts return, we will need to reassess our ability to execute the strategy with 

an acceptable level of risk 

2. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, in your opinion, why is the United States 

being challenged around the globe? 

General DUNFORD. The United States is being challenged because our comparative military and technological advantages over adversaries are eroding. Moreover, 

the pace and diffusion of technology advancement makes it easier for both state and 

non-state actors to challenge us. 

3. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, does our military have the capability and 

credibility to deter aggression around the globe? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. I believe the Services have maintained our military capabilities to provide credible deterrence against potential aggressors across the globe. 

However, the capabilities of potential aggressors are expanding and modernizing. 

We need to update our deterrence model for emerging threats, which are more 

asymmetric and hybrid in nature. We must now focus on resetting and reconstituting capabilities that have degraded over the past fifteen years, while also incorporating new capabilities so we can continue to provide a credible deterrent. 

4. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, do you believe our potential adversaries 

have that perception? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, I do, although it is certainly difficult to know exactly how 

potential adversaries view our capabilities and credibility. As we develop an effective deterrence model, understanding and shaping the perceptions of adversaries 

about our capabilities and credibility must be a major component. 

AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

5. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, are their benchmarks established to determine if conditions on the ground dictate the time and level of a withdrawal of U.S. 

forces? 

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General DUNFORD. Yes, in Afghanistan we continually validate our assumptions 

and assess the conditions on the ground using eight ‘‘Essential Functions’’ as our 

benchmark and the overall security environment with the country and within the 

year. These functions identify the areas where Coalition efforts support the Afghan 

security institutions to more effectively enable Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Over time, ANDSF will require less U.S. participation to train, advise, 

and assist Afghan security institutions as they build sustainable capabilities. 

If security conditions on the ground in Afghanistan degrade against these benchmarks, I will continue to reassess the size and pace of the drawdown plan and provide my best military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense. 

If confirmed, I will visit Afghanistan to make an assessment of our current 

progress. That visit will inform any recommendations I may make for changes to 

our strategy. 

6. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, how do we avoid the same mistake we made 

in Iraq? 

General DUNFORD. Iraq demonstrated that decisions about the drawdown and 

post-combat operations in Afghanistan should be based on conditions on the ground, 

with the flexibility to make adjustments as those conditions evolve. In addition, the 

drawdown from Iraq shows that whole-of-government cooperation is required to sustain security gains. U.S. forces can mitigate the effects of security threats that are 

fueled by underlying political or sectarian problems, but ultimately, it is critical that 

we have credible and capable local partners and an enduring political solution. 

ARMING THE KURDS

7. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, if confirmed, will you take steps to ensure 

the Kurds receive weapons and equipment they need to fight ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

8. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, will you also look into the process used to 

approve which weapons are giving to the Kurds and report back to this committee 

any issues with the process, recommendations on how to improve the process, and 

status of the Kurds receiving the equipment they need to fight ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

TAIWAN

9. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, the Taiwan Relations Act and the ‘‘Six Assurances’’ affirm our commitment to maintain Taiwan’s self-defense capability. 

What is your view towards this longstanding policy? 

General DUNFORD. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. remains 

firmly committed to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services in 

such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient selfdefense capability. It has been over 35 years since the TRA was enacted, and we 

will continue to support Taiwan through the robust unofficial relationship contemplated in the TRA. We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo on either 

side of the Strait, and we support peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences in 

a manner acceptable on both sides. 

10. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what do you believe are the priorities for 

U.S. military assistance to Taiwan? 

General DUNFORD. The priority for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan is to provide defensive systems and capabilities in order for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient 

self-defense capacity. This long-standing policy contributes to the maintenance of 

peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait by providing Taiwan with the confidence to pursue constructive interactions with the PRC. 

11. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, due to Taiwan’s geo-strategic position and 

close bilateral cooperation, Taiwan can potentially play an important role in our rebalance to Asia strategy. Do you plan to help improve Taiwan’s asymmetric capability to deter potential threats from the PRC? 

General DUNFORD. The U.S. conducts robust security cooperation with Taiwan, 

and both sides carefully examine Taiwan’s defense needs. Cost-effective, asymmetric 

capabilities are important for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. 

355 

12. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, do you believe Taiwan should be invited 

to participate in regional maritime security and humanitarian assistance/disaster 

relief operations? 

General DUNFORD. The U.S. military has deepened and expanded its cooperation 

with Taiwan’s military in recent years and HA/DR is one of many important areas 

in which this has occurred. Going forward, we will continue to evaluate every opportunity for Taiwan’s participation, based on specific training objectives. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RODGER F. WICKER

RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE

13. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, last week I met with President Poroshenko 

in Kyiv. While he is grateful for the $300 million in military assistance authorized 

in our Senate-passed National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Poroshenko told 

me that Ukraine urgently needs Javelin anti-tank missiles to counter Russian advances in the East. Would you agree with me that the United States not providing 

defensive arms to Ukraine could send a message to Putin about a lack of resolve 

on Ukraine from the administration? 

General DUNFORD. The U.S. is delivering substantial security assistance and 

training, which demonstrates resolve. Defense institution building is essential. From 

a purely military perspective, enhancing Ukraine‘s capabilities to deal with Russian 

aggression would help Ukraine protect its sovereignty. 

14. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, would you also agree that it’s outrageous 

that this month’s transfer of 100 armored Humvees to the Ukrainians took over one 

year to process due to bureaucratic delays at DOD and State? 

General DUNFORD. We must improve our processes and increase efficiency. In this 

case, the White House announced approval of the transfer of 30 armored and up 

to 200 unarmored HMMWVs to Ukraine on 11 March 2015. Ukraine took delivery 

of 30 armored HMMWVs later that month and 100 unarmored HMMWVs on 16 

July 2015. One hundred additional unarmored HMMWVs will be delivered based on 

Ukraine’s schedule. These are provided as Excess of Defense Articles which means 

the country determines the number, and pays for delivery and any refurbishment. 

15. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, earlier this year, former national security 

advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski proposed to this committee the creation of a ‘‘tripwire’’ 

in the Baltics that communicates clearly to Russia that NATO—in particular, the 

United States—will not tolerate violations of the territorial integrity of our allies. 

Can you highlight to this committee the steps the Department of Defense (DOD) 

should take to send a credible message to Russia about our red-lines in Eastern Europe? 

General DUNFORD. We must continue to take actions to deter Russian aggression 

and remain alert to its strategic capabilities. Most importantly, we must also help 

our allies and partners resist and defend against Russian coercion now, and over 

the long term. I will continue to emphasize a package of security cooperation, rotational presence, and deterrence measures. These measures will further affirm alliance intent and capability to deter and defeat asymmetric threats. I will continue 

to evaluate current measures and recommend or make appropriate adjustments. 

16. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, for too long, Europe has relied on the 

American taxpayer for their security. According to NATO guidelines, member countries should spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. Only four countries spent that much in 2013–Estonia, Greece, the United 

States, and the United Kingdom. Given the fragility of the economies of many European states, how would you engage and encourage our NATO allies to live up to 

their commitments to invest in their militaries? 

General DUNFORD. If confirmed, I would encourage my Allied counterparts to invest in specific capabilities that address both the Alliance needs and support to their 

nations’ defense modernization efforts. 

SEQUESTRATION

17. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, in fiscal year 2013, the Navy implemented 

numerous cuts in response to sequestration. This included cancellation of five ship 

deployments and the delayed deployment of a carrier strike group to the Middle 

East. Since 2013, we’ve witnessed the rise of ISIL, the deteriorating situation in 

Yemen, Russia’s aggression in Eastern Europe, and a belligerent North Korea. The 

356 

world is more dangerous today than it was in 2013. What is your view on how sequestration would threaten DOD’s ability to decisively project power abroad? 

General DUNFORD. Funding to sequester levels removes flexibility to respond to 

emergent challenges while maintaining our forward presence to deter threats sequestration will require that we develop a new strategy. If sequester continues, our 

military will be forced to make cuts with deep and enduring consequences. These 

consequences include limiting combat power, limiting decisive power projection 

abroad, reducing the size of our military units and further reducing readiness. We 

will incur significant risk to mission and risk to force. Our ability to maintain 

present commitments to allies and partners will be degraded. 

18. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, what is your assessment of the impact sequestration would have on our amphibious forces and DOD’s ability to execute 

DOD’s pivot to Asia? 

General DUNFORD. A return to sequestration would necessitate a revision of the 

Defense Strategic Guidance and the Quadrennial Defense Review. It would also 

compel me to revise the national military strategy. Funding cuts would force us to 

further delay or cancel critical warfighting capabilities to amphibious capabilities include amph reduce readiness of forces needed for steady-state and contingency response operations, and further degrade warfighting capacity and capability. Sequestration presents serious risk to executing the military aspects of the rebalance to 

the Asia-Pacific and supporting our contributions to other aspects of the rebalance. 

Sequestration level cuts would compel us to re-evaluate our Asia Pacific rebalance 

in a way that emphasizes budgets above national interests, regional goals, and military missions. 

19. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, certain sectors of the defense industry– 

such as shipbuilding–are extremely capital intensive. Our fiscally constrained environment threatens to close production lines that would take years to restart. Given 

your prior experience Commandant of the Marine Corps, what is your assessment 

of the risks to DOD industrial base given our current budget environment? 

General DUNFORD. The current budget environment creates significant risk to the 

industrial base. The volatility and unpredictability affects the quality of the workforce and creates inefficiencies for industry that ultimately affect our buying power. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

U.S. ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE ADJUSTMENTS (FISCAL YEARS 2016–2017): 

20. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, in your personal opinion, do U.S. Army 

Force structure reductions in Alaska make strategic sense, especially given an increasingly aggressive Russia and China, an unpredictable North Korea, and the 

need to reassure our Arctic and Pacific allies against these threats? 

General DUNFORD. The department faces numerous pressing challenges across the 

globe, to include the Arctic and Pacific. Force structure decisions are informed by 

strategy, but intrinsically tied to fiscal realities. As a result of the current fiscal environment, the Department has been forced to make difficult choices that affect our 

force posture. The Army force structure reduction in Alaska were made in that context. 

21. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, in your personal opinion, should the U.S. 

Army reduce the ONLY ABCT in the Pacific AOR and does doing so hurt the credibility of–or entirely undermine–the Obama administration’s strategic rebalance to 

the Asia-Pacific Region? 

General DUNFORD. The Army has been constrained by the requirement to reduce 

overall force structure. The reduction of the ABCT in Alaska is part of their solution 

to that requirement. To mitigate, they have reorganized in order to effectively meet 

PACOM requirements with sufficient capabilities on a smaller scale. 

22. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, do these large Army reductions in the 

Asia-Pacific area of responsibility (AOR) make the Rebalance more rhetoric than 

substance? 

General DUNFORD. The Army has reorganized in light of force reductions to effectively meet PACOM requirements with sufficient capabilities on a smaller scale. The 

reductions do not affect the level of U.S. engagement in the Pacific AOR. The Rebalance is about more than force structure: it includes an increased footprint, expanded 

agreements, enhanced partnerships, and economic development in the region. These 

357 

factors, combined with the sustainment of capabilities necessary to meet PACOM 

requirements, ensure a substantive effort. 

23. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, in your personal opinion, what alternatives should the U.S. Army have considered, as opposed to reducing strategicallyimportant forces in Alaska and Hawaii? 

General DUNFORD. The Army states that they considered all possible options to 

retain its warfighting capability with a trained and modern force. The reductions 

are designed to maintain the proper balance between force structure, readiness, and 

modernization. The Army’s stationing plans are designed to leverage existing installation capabilities, minimize future construction costs, and posture the force to support the defense strategy. 

24. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, what is the exact number of soldiers that 

will be reduced in Alaska and can you provide an installation-specific profile of how 

many soldiers will reduced from each installation and how many soldiers will remain following the reductions? 

General DUNFORD. I understand that the Army is planning to reduce 2,704 soldiers in Alaska. Fort Wainwright will be reduced by 73 soldiers and maintain authorization for 6,223. Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson will be reduced by 2,631 and 

maintain authorization for 1,895 soldiers. I will continually look across the Joint 

Force to ensure each service is best postured to support combatant commands in the 

present, while simultaneously equipping and training to counter future threats. 

25. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, specifically, what elements of are being 

reduced in Alaska and specifically what elements are being kept? 

General DUNFORD. I understand the Army plans to reduce the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson to an infantry 

battalion task force and maintain a Striker Brigade Combat Team at Fort Wainwright. 

26. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, what are the exact dates that these reductions in Alaska officially begin and end? 

General DUNFORD. Reductions are scheduled to be complete by the end of fiscal 

year 2017. 

27. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, what specific cost/strategic factors did 

the United States use to make this decision and can you provide all of that information to me? 

General DUNFORD. It is my understanding the Army used a comprehensive analysis of mission requirements and installation capabilities that included public participation. Total Army Analysis, Focus Area Review Groups and Military Value 

Analysis were used to determine necessary reductions. For specific details, I defer 

to the Chief of Staff of the Army. 

28. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, what will be the remaining combat elements of the 4–25 ABCT, what missions will they be capable of, and what missions 

will they no longer be capable of? 

General DUNFORD. The 4–25 ABCT will become an infantry battalion task force, 

which includes engineer, field artillery, and support elements. This task force will 

allow USARPAC to retain an airborne capability for rapid deployment. 

29. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, in terms of threats in the region and the 

AOR, including North Korea, China, and Russia, what are the specific risks that 

the U.S. Army is assuming in relation to each of these threats, and in your personal 

opinion, is the U.S. Army accepting too much risk? 

General DUNFORD. Any assessment of military risk must include analysis of all 

Joint Force capabilities. However, as long as we do not return to BCA-level funding, 

the Army assesses that it will have the necessary force structure to counter these 

regional threats. The Army used extensive analysis including Total Army Analysis 

(TAA) and Military Value Analysis (MVA) as well as COCOM component input to 

arrive at a force structure to best posture a smaller Army to fulfill strategic requirements and world-wide operational demands. 

30. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, if confirmed, would you want to have a 

say in the highly strategic force structure decisions of each Service? Do you believe 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) should have a say and did the curVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00363 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
358 

rent CJCS–or the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)–weigh into this recent Army decision? 

General DUNFORD. In accordance with Title 10, I will advise the Secretary on the 

extent to which Service program recommendations and budget proposals conform 

with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established 

for the requirements of the combatant commands. In addition, if in my judgment 

these priorities and requirements are not being met, I will provide alternative program recommendations. 

31. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, in your personal opinion, given what the 

Russians are doing and the importance of the Rebalance, shouldn’t both the 

SECDEF and the CJCS weigh into decisions like this one, which involve key national security priorities? 

General DUNFORD. In accordance with Title 10, I will advise the Secretary on the 

extent to which Service program recommendations and budget proposals conform 

with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established 

for the requirements of the combatant commands. In addition, if in my judgment 

these priorities and requirements are not being met, I will provide alternative program recommendations. 

32. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, if confirmed, would you advise the 

SECDEF to have input in force structure decisions that affect our national security, 

like those in the Arctic? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. In accordance with Title 10, I will advise the Secretary 

on the extent to which Service program recommendations and budget proposals conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the combatant commands. In addition, if in my judgment these priorities and requirements are not being met, I will provide alternative 

program recommendations. 

33. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, in your personal opinion, are the U.S. 

Army’s reductions in fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 more driven by Sequestration or the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)? 

General DUNFORD. The Army’s reduction to 980,000 Soldiers (450,000 Active, 

335,000 National Guard, and 195,000 Reserve) reflects their assessment of the minimum force necessary to execute the defense strategy as outlined in the 2014 QDR 

that end strength was informal by the resources available. Should fiscal year 2016 

be funded at BCA sequestration levels, programmatic decisions will be driven by sequestration, which, as you know, is a fiscal topline not based on strategy. At sequestration funding levels, as stated in the QDR, Army end strength would go down to: 

(1) Active duty end strength, 420,000; 

(2) Army National Guard, 315,000; 

(3) Army Reserves, 185,000. 

34. General Dunford, in the U.S. Army’s decision, what, if any, thought was given 

to the recent actions of President Putin and the Russians in the Arctic and how 

heavily were his recent aggressive actions weighed? 

General DUNFORD. I will defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army for specifics on 

how Russian activities weighed into the decisions. If confirmed, I will work with 

leaders to maintain a full range of options to protect our interests in the Arctic. Any 

future force structure reductions or realignments will be evaluated against the everevolving security environment to ensure we consistently meet our global defense responsibilities. 

35. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, recently, General Brooks, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) alluded that he could respond to contingencies in the South China 

Sea, specifically at Fire Cross Reef, utilizing the 4–25 ABCT and could do so ‘‘tonight.’’ Following these reductions, would this still be a true statement? 

General DUNFORD. I am not familiar with General Brooks’ specific comments. 

However if confirmed as Chairman, I will continually look across the Joint Force 

to ensure each service is best postured to support Combatant Commands in the 

present, while simultaneously equipping and training to counter future threats. 

36. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, how do these reductions in Alaska impact the response to a Korean Peninsula contingency and what specifically is that 

impact? 

359 

General DUNFORD. Although this action may change the sourcing allocation for 

our plans, we have the necessary forces and capabilities to respond to a treat on 

the Korean Peninsula. 

37. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, how do these reductions in Alaska impact the Army’s ability to quickly respond to contingencies in the Arctic? 

General DUNFORD. The Armed Forces possess sufficient capabilities to respond to 

a wide-range of contingencies across the globe, including the Arctic. U.S. Northern 

Command and U.S. European Command, as the combatant commands with geographic responsibility for the Arctic region, are continually assessing the security 

environment to ensure we can meet assigned or potential missions. 

38. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, how much excess facility capacity will 

Fort Richardson have after the 4–25 ABCT is reduced and specifically what excess 

facilities will those be? 

General DUNFORD. This analysis is ongoing and will incorporate a number of strategic factors. When complete, the final force structure results will inform the 

amount of excess infrastructure capacity generated. As part of a Joint Base, the 

force structure decision calculus is conducted by the Army while the Air Force, as 

the lead Service for Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, will make the facility decisions. 

39. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, will the reduction of the 4–25 negatively 

affect the DOD/VA Joint venture hospital on Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson 

(JBER)? 

General DUNFORD. The withdrawal of the U.S. Army’s 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry 

Division will not affect the DOD/VA joint venture hospital at Joint Base Elmendorf 

–Richardson. The reduction in active duty forces and families should increase the 

hospital’s available capacity, enabling more Veterans to receive medical care at the 

medical facility. 

40. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, how much input did U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) have in the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska and Hawaii and what specifically was that input and how heavily was it weighed? 

General DUNFORD. It is my understanding that USPACOM was represented by 

U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) throughout the process that determined the recently 

announced Army Force structure decisions. 

41. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, how much input did U.S. European Command (EUCOM) have in the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska and 

what specifically was that input? 

General DUNFORD. EUCOM, as represented by USAREUR, participated in the 

Army’s comprehensive process that facilitated the recent force structure decisions. 

Their input, like that of every other geographic combatant command, helped inform 

a decision to best posture a smaller Army to fulfill strategic priorities, including the 

Asia-Pacific rebalance and world-wide operational demands. 

42. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, I have been told that the final decision 

to reduce forces in Alaska and Hawaii came down to tradeoff between those forces 

and the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. Is this accurate, 

and if so, specifically what strategic considerations (location, deterrence, proximity 

to threats, access to nearby or organic lift, and capabilities) went to making this decision? 

General DUNFORD. I do not have insight at this level of detail about the force 

structure decisions of the other services. I defer to Chief of Staff of the Army. 

43. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, how much input did U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) have in the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska and 

what specifically was that input? 

General DUNFORD. NORTHCOM, as represented by ARNORTH, participated in 

the Army’s comprehensive process that facilitated the recent force structure decisions. Their input, like that of every other geographic combatant command, helped 

inform a decision to best posture a smaller Army to fulfill strategic priorities, including the Asia-Pacific rebalance and world-wide operational demands. 

44. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, to what extent was the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska coordinated with Alaska Command (ALCOM) and 

what concerns were raised/mitigated from this coordination? 

360 

General DUNFORD. ALCOM, a sub-command of NORTHCOM, as represented by 

ARNORTH, participated in the Army’s comprehensive process that facilitated the 

recent force structure decisions. Their input, like that of every other geographic 

combatant command, helped inform a decision to best posture a smaller Army to 

fulfill strategic priorities, including the Asia-Pacific rebalance and world-wide operational demands. 

45. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, to what extend was this decision coordinated with the Air Force side of JBER and what concerns were raised/mitigated 

from this coordination? 

General DUNFORD. Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, like the other 29 installations at which substation Army forces are stationed, helped inform and facilitate the 

Army’s decision process through participating in two environmental and socio-economic analyses, providing input to the Military Value Analysis and facilitating ‘‘listening sessions’’ for installation communities. Commands were solicited to ensure 

the accuracy of data and HQDA awareness of issues and concerns associated with 

their installations. While analysis focused on potential losses at the former Fort 

Richardson, it considered impacts to Joint-Base Elmendorf-Richardson as a whole. 

46. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, to what extent were our South Korean 

Allies consulted on the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska? 

General DUNFORD. I defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army to characterize any 

engagement with our Allies regarding their decision to reduce forces in Alaska. 

47. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, if so, what were their concerns and how 

much were those concerns weighed? 

General DUNFORD. I defer to Chief of Staff of the Army. 

48. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, to what extent were our Japanese Allies 

consulted on the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska? 

General DUNFORD. I defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army to characterize their 

engagement with our Allies regarding the decision to reduce forces in Alaska. 

49. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, if so, what were their concerns and how 

much were those concerns weighed? 

General DUNFORD. I defer to Chief of Staff of the Army. 

50. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, to what extent was section 1043 of the 

NDAA for fiscal year 2016 considered in the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces 

in Alaska? 

General DUNFORD. I defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army on how/if Section 1043 

informed their decision to reduce forces in Alaska. If confirmed as Chairman, I will 

pay close attention to what is required to meet our strategic military objectives in 

the Arctic, including consideration of how we best posture forces in and around that 

region. I will seek to ensure a balanced approach to the posturing of our global 

forces. 

51. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, in your personal opinion, is it strategically wise to reduce forces in the Arctic before we have a new Arctic strategy and 

OPLAN? 

General DUNFORD. The reduction of personnel in Alaska, as well as elsewhere, is 

a result of the need to balance current operational priorities and resource constraints. These force structure decisions best posture a smaller Army to meet global 

commitment. The Department is continually reviewing the security environment 

and operational requirements in the Arctic and will reprioritize resources as needed. 

I look forward to participating in this process. 

52. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, to what extent was section 1262 of the 

NDAA for Fiscal Year 2016 considered in the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces 

in Alaska? 

General DUNFORD. I defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army on how/if section 1043 

informed their decision to reduce forces in Alaska. If confirmed as Chairman, I will 

pay close attention to what is required to meet our strategic military objectives in 

the Arctic, including consideration of how we best posture forces in and around that 

region. I will seek to ensure a balanced approach to the posturing of our global 

forces. 

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53. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, to what extent were Alaska’s, and specifically JBER’s organic strategic airlift and close proximity to large and robust 

training areas, weighted in the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska? 

General DUNFORD. The Army considered all possible options to retain its 

warfighting capability, to include strategic airlift and training area location. Ultimately, these reductions are designed to maintain the proper balance between force 

structure, readiness, and modernization. The Army’s stationing plans are designed 

to leverage existing installation capabilities, minimize future construction costs, and 

posture the force to support the defense strategy. 

54. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, what countries has the 4–25 ABCT 

worked closely with and possibly trained with and what is the impact of this reduction on the military-to-military relationships with those countries following the reduction of this unit? 

General DUNFORD. I defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army for any specific details 

on the 4–25 ABCT’s training history. 

55. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, following the Air Force’s initial decision 

to remove a squadron from Eielson, senior Air Force officials soon went up to Fairbanks and North Pole communities to explain the decision. When will this be done 

in the case of Fort Richardson and who will be sent? 

General DUNFORD. Engaging our communities on basing decisions is important. 

I understand the Department of the Army conducted extensive community outreach. 

I defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army on the specifics of the community engagement plan. 

56. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, what impact has the Army assessed will 

occur to the greater Anchorage housing market and to the greater Anchorage economy as a result of the decision to reduce the 4–25 ABCT? 

General DUNFORD. Analysis of the Anchorage housing market and greater economy was part of the Army’s overall analysis in determining force structure changes. 

I defer to the Department of the Army to provide specific detail regarding your request. 

57. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, will installations with reductions be allowed to access DOD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) funds to mitigate the 

effects of these reductions? 

General DUNFORD. If an Army installation is selected for reduction, impacted 

areas may qualify for assistance from OEA. I understand the Army intends to distribute letters and brochures to the most impacted areas, based on job loss, and that 

OEA will consider all applications for assistance. 

58. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, what effects with the U.S. Army’s reductions in Alaska have on U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK) and USARAK’s headquarters? 

General DUNFORD. I defer to the Department of the Army for specific detail on 

impacts to the HQ reduction. I am aware that the Army’s force structure analysis 

included Total Army Analysis (TAA), Military Value Analysis (MVA), as well as environmental and socio-economic analysis. 

59. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, in what way does the U.S. Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska impact Alaska-based joint training exercises such 

Red Flag-Alaska, Northern Edge, and Alaska Shield? 

General DUNFORD. The U.S. Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska could potentially limit their ability to operate the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex 

(JPARC). The JPARC provides joint combined arms training support to all of the 

Services for exercises such as Red Flag-Alaska, Northern Edge, and Alaska Shield. 

60. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, before you are confirmed, can you please 

provide the Military Value Analysis (MVA) Model and the Total Army Analysis used 

to make all of the Army’s fiscal year 2016–2017 force structure decisions? 

General DUNFORD. I will work with Army leadership to ensure the committee has 

access to the documents necessary for the committee to provide oversight. 

61. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, can you provide more information on the 

U.S. Army’s possible desire to convert at National Guard brigade at Joint Base 

Lewis-McChord (JBLM) to Styker brigade? 

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General DUNFORD. The decision to convert a National Guard brigade to a Stryker 

Brigade rests with the Department of the Army. They can provide the best information regarding any planned force structure change. 

62. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, if confirmed, do you pledge to ensure 

that the U.S. Army is completely transparent about the entire fiscal year 2016–2017 

force reductions and makes all the documents used to make all of these decision 

available to Congress? 

General DUNFORD. If confirmed, I will work with the Army leadership to provide 

requested information regarding the fiscal year 2016–2017 force reductions to Congress. 

63. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, if confirmed, do pledge to fully review the 

Army’s reductions decisions, especially in light of the emerging concerns in the AsiaPacific, the Arctic and given that there is a pending Arctic strategy? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

64. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, as the Army has told me that they hope 

to reverse the decision in Alaska. If confirmed, will you work with me, and them, 

to bring all the U.S. Army forces back to my State and the Arctic? 

General DUNFORD. If confirmed, I will work with all the Services to determine the 

right size, capabilities, and posture to best support our National Security. 

MARINE CORPS IN ALASKA

65. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, what opportunities and challenges would 

exist to either permanently stationed marines in Alaska, specifically at JBER—or 

developing rotational forces at JBER—as a part of the Rebalance from Okinawa? 

General DUNFORD. The state of Alaska, and specifically Joint Base ElmendorfRichardson, is important to our nation’s security in protecting the homeland and 

projecting power in the Pacific and beyond. As the global security environment 

evolves, we will continue to assess the optimal strategic footprint across the services 

in the PACOM AOR. 

U.S. SECURITY COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN

66. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the 

‘‘Six Assurances’’ form the cornerstone of U.S.-Taiwan relations and affirms our 

commitment to maintain Taiwan’s self-defense capability. How do you and the administration plan to continue to implement our policy under this framework? 

General DUNFORD. The U.S. remains firmly committed to supporting Taiwan 

within the overall framework of our one-China policy, based on the three joint U.S.- 

China communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. We also remain committed to 

the Six Assurances. Accordingly, we will continue to promote cross-Strait stability 

by ensuring that Taiwan maintains a sufficient self-defense capability. 

PACIFIC PATHWAYS

67. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, in your personal opinion, in a budget 

constrained environment, can we afford to have an Army mission in the Pacific that 

is redundant with another service’s longstanding mission? 

General DUNFORD. The Army’s mission in the Pacific remains a critical component 

of the Joint Force’s broader mission and presence. Each service provides unique, valuable capabilities in executing joint responsibilities in the region based on national 

strategic interests. 

68. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, is Pacific Pathways redundant with the 

mission of the U.S. Marine Corps? 

General DUNFORD. When it comes to increasing U.S. presence in the Pacific for 

peacetime engagement or the maintenance of forces to support the execution of contingency plans, the United States Army remains a critical component. Their efforts 

in the Pacific are consistent with broader department efforts and support combatant 

commanders requirements. 

THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC LIFT IN THE PACIFIC AOR

69. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, you have said in multiple forms (hearings, public speaking engagements, answers to Advanced Policy Questions from the 

Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)) that lift capacity to support the shifting 

laydown of forces in the Pacific theater will be insufficient and constitutes a major 

363 

concern for you. In your response to the committee’s questions, you stated that you 

‘‘look forward to working with the Services and the U.S. Pacific Command to address the lift needs in the Pacific.’’ If confirmed, what are some of the ways you 

would consider to address this pending shortfall? 

General DUNFORD. The Pacific force laydown is a challenge exacerbated by the 

fact that we have a shortfall of amphibious lift to meet global demand whether it 

is support to peacetime or contingency operations. I will work with the Secretary 

of Defense to ensure the department’s priorities reflect the lift requirements in the 

pacific. I will also support efforts to work with our allies and partners to advance 

initiatives that mitigate this challenge. 

70. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunford, as Admiral Roughead testified to this 

committee in April, do you believe we should also consider moving additional naval 

and maritime assets forward into the theater to support our peacetime and contingency lift? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, we should continue to consider how we can best posture 

our naval assets in the Pacific. The movement of forces around the Pacific is a challenge given the tyranny of distance, and this challenge is exacerbated by a shortfall 

of amphibious lift to meet global demand, whether in support of peacetime or contingency operations. We continually evaluate our force posture in the Pacific theater, 

and all theaters, based on global threats. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE LEE

TEST AND TRAINING RANGES

71. Senator LEE. General Dunford, one of the most important, yet often overlooked, assets DOD is our test and training ranges. Many of these are located in 

western states and are utilized by all branches of the military, as well as other Federal agencies, to train members on a variety of threats and environments and to 

research and test new systems vital to the future of our national security. In order 

to adapt their training to the rapidly changing spectrum of threats facing the military, it is imperative that we work to modernize our training ranges and protect 

these assets from issues like encroachment and cumbersome environmental regulations. What is your assessment of the state of our military test and training ranges, 

and do you agree that we need to modernize and prioritize our military readiness 

against future threats? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. Test and training ranges are critical assets for enabling 

our nation’s military to prepare and respond flexibly across the wide range of potential threats, both now and in the future. Currently, many of our weapons systems 

exceed the contiguous space capabilities that our U.S. ranges can support. In addition, meeting the Department of Defense’s Endangered Species Act (ESA) responsibilities, along with competition for frequency spectrum, will continue to challenge 

our management of test and training ranges. Modernization of our ranges to assure 

military readiness is critical to addressing threats posed by our adversaries. 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE UNITS

72. Senator LEE. General Dunford, you have been a combat commander in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, what is your assessment of the performance of our National Guard 

and Reserve units in these conflicts? 

General DUNFORD. Throughout the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, our Reserve 

Component forces performed admirably. Our Reserve Component forces were an integral part of our operations in both theaters and they often brought unique civilian 

skills that proved invaluable on the battlefield. 

73. Senator LEE. General Dunford, if confirmed, how do you plan to build upon 

the combat experience gained by National Guard and Reserve units and take advantage of the cost benefits of the Reserve Forces that have been identified by the Reserve Forces Policy Board and CAPE reports in order to preserve combat power for 

the military, especially while adjusting to potential budget constraints? 

General DUNFORD. The National Guard and Reserves are integral to our operational force and our strategic reserve. The challenge we face is striking the right 

balance between what is needed in the active component to meet emergent or shortnotice requirements and what can be maintained in the reserve components and activated as required. The studies conducted by the Reserve Forces Policy Board and 

CAPE will certainly help inform these decisions. If confirmed, I will work with the 

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Services to leverage the capabilities and experience inherent within our reserve 

components. 

ACQUISITIONS

74. Senator LEE. General Dunford, one of the topics of great concern to this committee has been reforming the acquisition process in DOD to streamline efforts and 

find savings, especially for big-ticket acquisitions that have experienced major cost 

overruns in the past. Equally important to better allocation of funding and resources 

across DOD is ensuring that weapon system sustainment concerns are addressed beginning in the acquisitions process and aligned throughout the system’s entire 

lifecycle. I am pleased by steps that the Air Force has taken to bring sustainment 

issues into the acquisition process and look forward to seeing those efforts continue. 

If confirmed, what ideas do you have for acquisition and sustainment efforts to increase the total life-cycle efficiency and decrease overall costs of weapons systems? 

General DUNFORD. I am an advocate of the Air Force’s ‘‘Bending the Cost CureWeapon System Sustainment Initiative’’ focused on significantly reducing weapon 

system sustainment cost growth and the Navy’s ground-breaking work in the field 

of renewable energy to power ‘‘the Great Green Fleet’’ driven by 50–50 blends of 

biofuels. 

We need to press forward on efforts to promote commonality across weapons systems where it makes sense, establish competition at all phases of the acquisition 

cycle, and demand the incorporation of life-cycle efficiency considerations into the 

basic DNA of every weapon system we build. 

ISIS/SYRIA/IRAQ

75. Senator LEE. General Dunford, the stated objective of the United States in the 

conflict against ISIS is to defeat the group and leave a stable, unified government 

in Iraq and a post-Assad state in Syria. Some of my colleagues earlier this week 

discussed with Secretary Carter and General Dempsey the viability and appropriateness of supporting the modern borders of Iraq and Syria given the region’s cultural, religious, and tribal histories. While I do not think it is the role of the United 

States to partition and re-draw borders on the other side of the world, I am also 

greatly concerned that we could be ineffectively employing our national security resources by continuing to support governing constructs that may be flawed in the 

first place. 

You have extensive experience in Iraq and in the Middle East. Do you believe that 

in order to protect Americans from the terrorist threats that are physically or ideologically generated in this region that we must absolutely continue supporting the 

concept of an Iraqi and Syrian state as currently drawn? 

General DUNFORD. Protecting American citizens, our homeland, and our interests 

abroad will remain our top priority. Supporting the current strategy to defeat ISIL, 

which assumes Iraq and Syria as nation states, is our best option to mitigate 

threats in the region. If, in the future, I assess that Iraq and/or Syria are not viable 

as nation states, I will adjust my best military advice accordingly. 

76. Senator LEE. General Dunford, how significant of an investment in forces, 

funding, and time would be necessary to overcome the sectarian divisions that exist 

inside and outside of these borders? 

General DUNFORD. Ultimately, the solution to overcome sectarian divisions must 

come from the leaders and communities within the region. No amount of U.S. investment alone will be sufficient. 

77. Senator LEE. General Dunford, Secretary Carter stated on Tuesday to this 

committee that the Department of Defense is currently training only 60 Syrian 

rebels under the $500 million program authorized last year, with the goal of graduating thousands of recruits by the end of the year. How would you define success 

in this program, and specifically what do you view as the timeline for achieving success? 

General DUNFORD. The Syria train and equip program is a long-term effort that 

is only one component of our broader approach. The impact of the T&E program remains to be seen, but we currently face significant challenges in recruiting and vetting suitable volunteers at the scale necessary to have strategic effects. If confirmed, 

I plan to visit the region and assess our approach in Syria to develop a better understanding of this immensely complex and challenging situation. 

78. Senator LEE. General Dunford, what will you do to ensure that the weapons 

and training we supply are not used by or to the advantage of ISIS and other exVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00370 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tremist forces that share a common enemy with the groups we are supporting in 

Syria? 

General DUNFORD. The first step is to accurately identify those groups with whom 

we wish to train. Next, we need to ensure a stringent and rigorous vetting process 

to better understand the backgrounds and motivations of those we are training. 

Last, we must have a well-designed end use monitoring program, in order to verify 

our equipment is being used according to U.S. objectives and our high standards of 

battlefield conduct. 

IRAN/P5+1

79. Senator LEE. General Dunford, the P5+1 negotiations on the Iranian nuclear 

program have passed two deadlines for a final deal, and concerns exist over the ability of any deal under the parameters of the framework released earlier this year 

to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability in the future. What impact will Iran maintaining a path to a nuclear weapon capability, or the lack of sufficient verification and inspection agreements, have on our strategic posture in the 

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area and the actions of Arab countries? 

General DUNFORD. If Iran maintains a path to a nuclear weapon capability it 

would have a destabilizing impact within the region and constitute a threat to our 

national interests. 

BORDER SECURITY

80. Senator LEE. General Dunford, last year, the commander of U.S. Southern 

Command, General John Kelly, stated that the security along our southern border 

and the migration crisis were existential threats to U.S. national security. In addition to the drugs and crime that can enter into the United States from the Southern 

border, we know that terrorist organizations have connections with drug cartels and 

other contacts in that region. Are you concerned about the security threats that are 

presented by unsecure borders, and what is your overall assessment of security in 

the western hemisphere? 

General DUNFORD. I appreciate the complexity of securing borders as vast as ours 

and recognize the challenge they present. I am concerned about the security of our 

borders. Within the Western Hemisphere, we have seen the negative influence of 

Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) on security and the rule of law, especially in Mexico and Central America. While there is always a potential for convergence between violent extremists (VE) and Transnational Criminal Organizations 

(TCO) in the Western Hemisphere, TCOs are motivated by profit and the ability to 

operate unimpeded by law enforcement. Within our hemisphere, TCOs generally understand that supporting terrorists or terrorist activities would bring increased U.S. 

attention and negative impacts to their operations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL

SIGAR UNUSED BUILDING REPORT IN AFGHANISTAN

81. Senator MCCASKILL. General Dunford, in May, the Special Inspector General 

for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) released a report on a 64,000 square foot 

regional headquarters built in Afghanistan at a cost of $36 million that was never 

occupied. Its findings implicated a senior Army general who ignored requests to cancel the construction, and also the Army’s own investigation of the matter. SIGAR 

recommended that disciplinary action be taken against the senior Army general who 

conducted the investigation ‘‘in light of his failure to carry out a fulsome investigation in compliance with General Dunford’s orders.’’ This investigation was ordered 

by you while serving as commander of the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR–A). While SIGAR did not find any 

fault with your actions, as the officer who ordered the investigation you ultimately 

signed it. General Dunford, given SIGAR’s findings, are you concerned that the investigation into this matter was inadequate? 

General DUNFORD. No. However, I fully recognize the necessity for the military 

to be effective stewards of the resources we are provided. This facility was constructed prior to my assumption of command. When I became aware of the issue, 

I directed an investigation. The investigation did not find criminal behavior, but 

rather identified incorrect assumptions made in a combat environment. We should 

and must learn from these incorrect assumptions. I am committed to responsible 

stewardship of both the resources Congress appropriates and taxpayer trust. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

ISIL/IRAQ

82. Senator SHAHEEN. General Dunford, what is your assessment of the effectiveness of the current collation air campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant (ISIL)? 

General DUNFORD. From a military effectiveness perspective, coalition airstrikes 

since August 2014 have blunted ISIL’s initiative, removed a number of ISIL leaders, 

and degraded the ability of the group to operate openly in Iraq and Syria. ISIL’s 

total area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged as the group has offset 

the losses of Kobane and territory in Raqqah province with gains in As Suwayda, 

the Damascus countryside, and Homs Province. 

Coalition airstrikes have also degraded ISIL’s capability to mass and stage fighters, forcing the group to rely more heavily on asymmetric terrorist tactics such as 

suicide attacks, car bombs, and assassinations. 

83. Senator SHAHEEN. General Dunford, what do you assess would be the impact 

on the campaign of deploying U.S. forward air controllers to Iraq to call in close support during combat? 

General DUNFORD. Employing Forward Air Controllers or accompanying Iraqi 

ground forces in the past has, in my experience, made those units more effective 

at the tactical level. Adjustments to our military support campaign will further enable Iraqi forces to gain the skill and confidence necessary for improved combat effectiveness. 

84. Senator SHAHEEN. General Dunford, do you favor this shift in policy? 

General DUNFORD. If confirmed, I would take an early opportunity to get on the 

ground to speak to commanders so I could provide a more comprehensive recommendation as to how we can support our broader campaign objectives in Iraq. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER

85. Senator DONNELLY. General Dunford, the Defense Manpower Data Center 

(DMDC) is an important resource for ensuring that servicemembers receive the benefits and protections they are entitled to under the law. The use of the DMDC system has been designated as a resource to enhance compliance with the 

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA). In view of the growing importance of the 

DMDC for a wide variety of purposes, what steps has the Department taken to 

strengthen the capabilities of the DMDC? 

General DUNFORD. The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) plays a vital role 

in ensuring our servicemembers, retirees, and their family members receive all the 

entitlements and benefits provided under the law. The department has taken steps 

to strengthen the DMDC, for example, when DOD saw the use of the 

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) database increased from approximately 490 

million searches in 2012 to over 2.9 billion searches in 2014, DOD provided additional resources to improve the SCRA website to meet this demand. I am confident 

the Department will continue to provide DMDC the necessary resources to carry out 

its critical mission. 

SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT (SCRA) AND MILITARY LENDING ACT (MLA)

86. General Dunford, are the staffing, funding, and security levels appropriate to 

ensure the accuracy, reliability and integrity of the SCRA and MLA database systems? 

General DUNFORD. It is my understanding that the SCRA and MLA database systems are appropriately staffed, funded, and secured to ensure the accuracy, reliability, and integrity of the systems. 

87. Senator DONNELLY. General Dunford, if there are shortfalls in maintaining 

and improving the SCRA and MLA databases, what are your requests to bring them 

to a level you feel would place them at the highest levels of accuracy, reliability and 

integrity? 

General DUNFORD. I am not aware of shortfalls in maintaining the SCRA and 

MLA databases. 

367 

88. Senator DONNELLY. General Dunford, how is the Department ensuring that

the SCRA and MLA databases provide adequate protection of servicemembers’ personal information? 

General DUNFORD. The SCRA and MLA databases conform to all federal requirements for the protection of personal information. Protections include Information 

Assurance certification and accreditation of the SCRA and MLA databases, 

encryption of traffic to and from the databases, best practices for data security and 

data retention, and protection of information as required by the Privacy Act of 1974. 

89. Senator DONNELLY. General Dunford, how is the Department ensuring that

the SCRA and MLA databases have the capability to provide timely and accurate 

data to enable servicemembers eligible for SCRA benefits? 

General DUNFORD. The Department maintains the SCRA and MLA databases 

with near real-time data supplied directly by the Military Services. The SCRA and 

MLA databases are publicly accessible and available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 

(barring periodic maintenance), which allow the Department to meet the highest 

standards for providing timely and accurate verification data. 

90. Senator DONNELLY. General Dunford, does the SCRA and MLA databases

have the capability to prevent delays with military consumers seeking credit or receiving their benefits? 

General DUNFORD. The SCRA and MLA databases are publicly accessible 24 

hours a day, 7 days a week (barring periodic maintenance). Those seeking to determine eligibility for benefits or seeking credit may use the SCRA or MLA databases 

to verify status anytime with the most up-to-date information 

[The nomination reference of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., 

USMC, follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

May 21, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and appointment in the United States Marine Corps to the grade indicated 

while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., 

sections 152 and 601: 

To Be General

General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., 0000. 

[The biographical sketch of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., 

USMC, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the 

nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC 

Source of commissioned service: 

Platoon Leaders Class (PLC) 

Educational degrees: 

Saint Michael’s College, BA, 1977. 

Georgetown University, MA, 1985. 

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, MA, 1992. 

Military schools attended: 

Basic Officer Course, 1977. 

Infantry Officer Course, 1978. 

U.S. Army Ranger School, 1980. 

Amphibious Warfare School, 1984–1985. 

U.S. Army Airborne School, 1987. 

Static Line Jumpmaster School, 1988. 

Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1991–1992. 

368 

U.S. Army War College, 1998–1999. 

Capstone, 2005. 

Combined/Joint Force Land Component Commander, 2007. 

Pinnacle, 2009. 

Senior Executive EEO Seminar, 2010. 

Promotions: 

Promotions Dates of appointment 

2nd Lt. 8 Jun 77 

1st Lt. 8 Jun 79 

Capt. 1 Feb 82 

Maj. 1 Jul 89 

Lt. Col. 1 Sep 94 

Col. 1 Oct 99 

Brig. Gen. 1 Jan 05 

Maj. Gen. 2 May 09 

Lt. Gen. 8 Aug 08 

Gen. 23 Oct 10 

Major duty assignments: 

From To Assignment 

Oct 14 ..... Present Commandant of the Marine Corps (Gen.) 

Feb 13 .... Aug 14 Commander, International Security Assistance Force—Afghanistan; and Commander, United States 

Forces—Afghanistan (Gen.) 

Dec 12 .... Feb 13 Special Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Gen.) 

Oct 10 ..... Dec 12 Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (Gen.) 

Sep 09 .... Oct 10 Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force; and Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces 

Central Command (Lt. Gen.) 

Aug 08 .... Aug 09 Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (Lt. Gen.) 

Jun 07 ..... Aug 08 Vice Director for Operations, J–3, Joint Staff (Brig. Gen.) 

Jul 05 ...... Jun 07 Director, Operations Division, Plans, Policies and Operations (Brig. Gen.) 

Jul 04 ...... Jun 05 Assistant division Commander, 1st Marine Division (Brig. Gen./Col.) 

May 03 .... Jul 04 Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division (Col.) 

May 01 .... May 03 Regimental Commander, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Col.) 

Jun 99 ..... May 01 Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Chief, Global and 

Mulitlateral Affairs Division, J–5, Joint Staff (Col./Lt. Col.) 

Mar 96 .... Jul 98 Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, 2d Marine Division (Lt. Col.) 

Jul 95 ...... Mar 96 Executive Officer, 6th Marines, 2d Marine Division (Lt. Col.) 

Dec 92 .... Jul 95 Senior Aide-de-Camp to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Lt. Col./Maj.) 

Jun 92 ..... Dec 92 Commandant of the Marine Corps Staff Group (Maj.) 

Jun 88 ..... Jun 91 Marine Officer Instructor, College of the Holy Cross (Maj./Capt.) 

Jul 87 ...... Jun 88 Plans Officer, 2d Air Naval Gunfire Line Company, 2d Force Service Support Group (Capt.) 

May 85 .... Jul 87 Company Commander, Rifle Company, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, 2d Marine Division (Capt.) 

Dec 81 .... Jul 84 Head, Reserve, Retention & Reenlistment Unit; Admin Officer, Headquarters Marine Corps (Capt./ 

1st Lt.) 

Nov 80 .... Dec 81 Aide-de-Camp, 3d Marine Amphibious Force (1st Lt.) 

Mar 78 .... Nov 80 Company Commander; Executive Officer; Platoon Commander; S-Liaison Officer, Company K, 3d 

Battalion, 1st Marines, 1st Marine Division (1st Lt./2nd Lt.) 

Jul 77 ...... Feb 78 Student, The Basic School, Quantico, Virginia (2nd Lt.) 

369 

Summary of joint assignments: 

Date Grade 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force—Afghanistan and Commander, United States Forces—Afghanistan.Feb 13–Aug 14 General 

Special Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ..................................... Dec 12–Feb 13 General 

Vice Director for Operations, J–3, Joint Staff ........................................................ Jun 07–Aug 08 Brigadier General 

Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Chief, 

Global and Multilateral Affairs Division, J–5, Joint Staff.

Jun 99–May 01 Colonel/Lieutenant 

Cololonel 

Summary of operational assignments: 

Date Grade 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force—Afghanistan; Commander, United States Forces—Afghanistan.Feb 13–Aug 14 General 

Chief of Staff; Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division Operation 

Iraqi Freedom II.

Jun 04–Mar 05 Brigadier General/ 

Colonel 

Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division Operation Iraqi Freedom II ............................ Mar 04–May 04 Colonel 

Regimental Commander; Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division Operation Iraqi 

Freedom/Enduring Freedom.

Jan 03–Oct 03 Colonel 

U.S. Decorations and Badges: 

Decorations Quantity 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal ...................................................................................................................... ×1 

Defense Superior Service Medal w/bronze oak leaf cluster .................................................................................... ×2 

Legion of Merit w/Combat V .................................................................................................................................... ×1 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal .......................................................................................................................... ×1 

Meritorious Service Medal ........................................................................................................................................ ×2 

Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal ....................................................................................................... ×4 

Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal ........................................................................................................... ×1 

Combat Action Ribbon ............................................................................................................................................. ×1 

Presidental Unit Citation-Navy ................................................................................................................................ ×1 

Joint Meritorious Unit Award .................................................................................................................................... ×2 

Navy Unit Commendation ........................................................................................................................................ ×1 

Navy Meritorious Unit Commendation ..................................................................................................................... ×1 

National Defense Service Medal .............................................................................................................................. ×2 

Afghanistan Campaign Medal ................................................................................................................................. ×1 

Iraq Campaign Medal .............................................................................................................................................. ×2 

Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal ......................................................................................................... ×1 

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal .................................................................................................................. ×1 

Sea Service Deployment Ribbon .............................................................................................................................. ×7 

NATO Medal-ISAF Afghanistan ................................................................................................................................. ×1 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC in 

connection with his nomination follows:] 

370 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

3. Date of nomination: 

21 May 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

23 December 1955; Boston, Massachusetts. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Ellyn A. Dunford (Maiden name: Ellyn A. Sartucci). 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None. 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution. 

None. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

Member, Marine Corps Association. 

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

Awarded Colonel Donald Cook Award for Citizenship, from St. Michael’s College, 

Vermont. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from 

the Administration in power? 

371 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR.

This 23rd day of May, 2015 

[The nomination of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC was 

reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on July 23, 2015, with 

the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 29, 2015.] 

(373) 

NOMINATIONS OF GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA, 

USAF, TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND GENERAL 

DARREN W. McDEW, USAF, TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

TUESDAY, JULY 14, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Ayotte, 

Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed, McCaskill, 

Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, and Kaine. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Please take seats, gentlemen, and we’ll begin 

the hearing. And thank you. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to 

consider the nominations of General Paul Selva to be the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Darren McDew 

to be the Commander of U.S. Transportation Command 

(TRANSCOM). 

We welcome you here this morning, as well as members of the 

Selva and McDew family. As is our tradition, at the beginning of 

your testimony, we welcome each of you to introduce the members 

of your family joining you this morning. We know the sacrifices 

your families make, and we’re grateful to them for their continued 

support to our Nation. 

Please proceed, General Selva. 

General SELVA. Senator McCain, I’d like to introduce you to my 

wife, Ricki, who’s sitting right behind me. She’s been with me for 

every day of my 35-year career. In fact, we are classmates from the 

U.S. Air Force Academy. She wore the uniform of our Air Force for 

9 years. She’s probably the only person in the world that can give 

me the kind of feedback I need when I stray from centerline. And 

she is a lifelong friend, and I love her for being by my side. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, thank you, General. And welcome. 

General McDew. 

General MCDEW. You know, they trained me to do this, and the 

first thing I did was not do it. 

[Laughter.] 

374 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed. 

Behind me I have the folks that have been behind me for a long, 

long time. First, my beautiful wife, Evelyn, who’s been with me for 

40 years. We’ve been married for 31, we’ve known each other for 

40. We have been blessed to have two children, who continue to 

grow our family. We have my favorite daughter, Keisha. We also 

have our son, Keith, our daughter-in-law, Becca, and the most wonderful human in the world, our grandson, Henry, who’s 5 weeks 

old—5 months old this week. But, also behind me—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Henry looks pretty healthy to me. 

[Laughter.] 

General MCDEW. And if he could just play, here, with my uniform, he’d be fine, but, otherwise, he’ll probably sleep. 

We also have behind us a very close friend and colleague, Dr. 

William R. Sutherland. I call him ‘‘my buddy, Bert.’’ My buddy, 

Bert, has pinned on every rank since colonel, and he’s been a colleague, a friend, and a mentor. And I thank all of them for being 

here today and as they’ve been along the way. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. We are so pleased to see the families here today. 

General Selva and General McDew, you come before this committee today amid a sweeping transition in military leadership that 

will take place over the coming months. In addition to your nominations, this committee is currently considering the nominations of 

a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, new Service Chiefs for 

the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, and potentially others in the 

near future. This team of military leaders will be soon—will soon 

be responsible for preparing our military to confront the most diverse and complex array of global crises since the end of World 

War II. 

The list of challenges for our national security is as daunting as 

it is drearily familiar: the rampage of ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq 

and Syria] terrorist army, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and 

support for its destabilizing proxies, revisionist Russia’s invasion of 

Ukraine, and China’s continued military buildup and aggressive 

behavior towards its neighbors. And yet, while worldwide challenges like these grow, the Defense Department has grown larger 

but less capable, more complex but less innovative, and more proficient at defeating low-tech adversaries but more vulnerable to 

high-tech ones. And worse, the self-inflicted wounds of the Budget 

Control Act and sequestration-level defense spending have made all 

these problems worse. 

Over the past 4 years, we’ve seen drastic reductions to defense 

spending that have cut Army and Marine Corps end strength dangerously low and slowed critical modernization priorities across the 

Services, placing at risk our Nation’s military technological superiority. At the same time, our military has maintained an accelerated 

operational tempo and, as a consequence, entered a dangerous 

downward spiral of military capacity and readiness that risk compromising each Service’s ability to execute our defense strategic 

guidance at a time of accumulating danger to our national security. 

The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated 

that, even if the Defense Department receives the additional $38 

billion above the budget caps that the President’s defense budget 

375 

requests, our military would still ‘‘remain at the lower ragged edge 

of manageable of risk in our ability to execute the defense strategy.’’ More worrisome, every one of our military Service Chiefs has 

testified that continued sequestration-level defense spending puts 

American lives at greater risk. Unless we change course and return 

to strategy-driven defense budgets, I fear our military will confront 

depleted readiness, chronic modernization problems, and deteriorating morale. No matter how many dollars we spend, we won’t be 

able to provide our military the equipment they need with a broken 

defense acquisition system that takes too long and costs too much. 

For example, an Army study looked at the time it would take to 

go through all of the AT&L [Acquision, Technology, and Logistics] 

reviews and buy nothing. What was the answer? Ten years. Ten 

years to buy nothing. Our adversaries are not shuffling paper, 

they’re building weapon systems, and it’s time for us to do the 

same. 

General Selva, if confirmed as the next Vice Chairman, in addition to your many responsibilities supporting the next Chairman, 

you would serve as the chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and an executive member of the Defense Acquisition 

Board. In these—in this combination of roles, you will have a critical role in the defense acquisition system, from identifying and approving joint requirements to assessing cost, schedule, and performance. Members of this committee will be very interested to 

hear your thoughts on acquisition reform. In particular, we will be 

interested to hear your views on how we fix blurred lines of accountability inside the defense acquisition system that allow its 

leaders to evade responsibility for results. This is the central problem this committee is trying to address in the acquisition reforms 

adopted in the Senate’s defense authorization bill. There are diverse views on acquisition reform, but one thing is for sure: The 

status quo is unacceptable. And we need a Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs who recognizes that. 

General McDew, as the Commander of Air Mobility Command, 

you are well aware of the challenges facing TRANSCOM [United 

States Transportation Command] in projecting and sustaining 

forces around the world amid ongoing budget cuts. But, 

TRANSCOM isn’t just providing capability to support other commands in confronting escalating global threats. Some of these 

threats are aimed at TRANSCOM itself. For example, just last 

year, this committee conducted an exhaustive investigation of the 

cyberthreats facing TRANSCOM. The report documented at least 

20 advanced cyberintrusions targeting TRANSCOM contractors, all 

attributed to China. That’s because, according to the Pentagon, 

Chinese military analysts have identified logistics and mobilization 

as potential U.S. vulnerabilities, and their military doctrine advocates targeting these networks to impact our ability to operate during the early stages of conflict. 

Given TRANSCOM’s dependence upon the private sector and the 

fact that the vast majority of their business is conducted on unclassified networks, there’s still important work left to be done to enhance the Defense Department’s ability to share information with 

its critical transportation contractors and assist them in detecting 

and mitigating cyberattacks. 

376 

General Selva, General McDew, we thank you for—both for appearing before us today. We look forward to your testimony. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me join you in welcoming General Selva and General 

McDew. Thank you for your service and for your sacrifice, and also 

for your families’ service and sacrifice. 

Let me, too, welcome Ricki, and thank you, ma’am, for your service as well as your support. 

General McDew, your wife, Evelyn—Evelyn, hello—and Keisha 

and Keith and Becca and, the most important person here, who 

just left, Henry. 

I also want to commend Keith for his service in the Coast Guard. 

Thank you for your service. 

Finally, Dr. Sutherland, thank you for being here, also. 

The United States, as the Chairman indicated very astutely, 

faces challenges across the globe that are unprecedented in nature. 

And, if confirmed, you’ll both be playing an important role in addressing these complex international issues. 

Last week, we had General Dunford before the committee, the 

designated-to-be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he testified that the threats confronting the United States are multifaceted and varied, they include the campaign against ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]; building local forces to counter ISIL; 

deterring additional Russian aggression toward Ukraine and its 

European neighbors; our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific theater; and 

how best to address sequestration and the ongoing fiscal challenges 

of the Department. General Selva, if confirmed as Vice Chairman, 

you’ll be working closely with General Dunford to address each of 

these issues. We’re looking forward to your views on all the issues 

that I’ve mentioned and that the Chairman has mentioned. 

In addition, if confirmed, you will assume a number of distinct 

responsibilities as the Vice Chairman. In the past, the Vice Chair 

has been an integral participant in the interagency process, working closely with senior policymakers within the Department and at 

the National Security Council on critical national security issues. 

Additionally, the Vice Chairman oversees the Joint Retirement— 

Requirements Oversight Council, JROC, which is charged with reviewing requirements for acquisition programs to ensure they are 

reasonable and necessary. And finally, as a senior member of the 

Nuclear Weapons Council, the Vice Chairman plays a central role 

in ensuring the United States safely maintains its nuclear weapons 

stockpile. And I look forward to hearing more from you, General 

Selva, about how you’ll prioritize and execute all these responsibilities as Vice Chairman. 

General McDew, you’ve been nominated to be Commander of 

TRANSCOM. It encompasses the Air Force’s Mobility Command, 

the Navy’s Military Sealift Command, and the Army’s Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, and is really the backbone of 

our strategic mobility. And, for the past several years, TRANSCOM 

has played a critical role in supplying our operations in Iraq and 

377 

Afghanistan, as well as bringing home our troops and equipment 

after deployments. 

Given the myriad of national security challenges facing the 

United States and the long-term effects of sequestration on our defense budget, we will certainly look to your views on the challenges 

TRANSCOM must tackle in this environment. And, as the Chairman indicated, one of those challenges is cyberintrusions. It will 

become more of a problem as the days go on, rather than less of 

a problem. And your views are absolutely critical, and your actions 

will be critical, going forward. 

So, Mr. Chairman, again, let me join you in welcoming our nominees and thanking them for their service. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

I’d like to mention to the witnesses, we have standard questions 

that are asked of all military nominees. I would now like to read 

them to you. 

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, 

it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other 

communications of information. Have you adhered to applicable 

laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if 

those views differ from the administration in power? 

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which 

would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

[Both witnesses answered in the negative.] 

Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established 

for requested communications, including questions for the record in 

hearings? 

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon request, 

before this committee? 

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic 

forms of communications, in a timely manner when requested by 

a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing 

such documents? 

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Thank you very much. 

General Selva, and then General McDew, please proceed. 

378 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, NOMINEE TO 

BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General SELVA. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of 

the Senate Armed Services Committee, it’s a great honor to appear 

before you today as President Obama’s nominee to become the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

First, I want to thank all of you for your undying support for our 

soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen who guard 

our liberty every single day, specifically those who serve today in 

TRANSCOM. 

Leading the men and women of Transportation Command has 

been a distinct honor, and I have no doubt that they are representative of the servicemembers across our institution who are the 

best-trained, best-led, best-equipped, and most-capable military in 

the world. 

I would like to acknowledge and congratulate my close friend and 

colleague, General Darren McDew, testifying beside me today. I 

can think of no person more qualified to lead the men and women 

of TRANSCOM. I wish him and Evelyn the greatest of success, 

subject to your confirmation. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the senior leadership in the Department of Defense (DOD), the combatant commanders, our friends, allies, and partners around the world, key 

members of the executive branch and the interagency process and 

Members of Congress, including this committee, to address a wide 

spectrum of challenges confronting our Nation. We are increasingly 

at risk in space, across the networks of cyberspace, and face a cast 

of regional and near-peer competitors who are fielding increasingly 

sophisticated conventional and nuclear arsenals. While these 

threats represent a clear and present danger to our security, we 

continue to front—to confront violent extremists, such as ISIL, who 

shock the very core of our beliefs and threaten to further destabilize a very strategic reason—region that includes several of our 

key allies. 

Effectively confronting these threats, as diverse as they are, requires a whole-of-government approach. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen truly are the heart and soul of 

our competitive advantage, and they are far more effective when 

the full weight of our country’s power is working in unison. If confirmed, I look forward to being an advocate for those men and 

women who wear the uniform of our Nation, and their civilian 

counterparts in our Department. 

Lastly, I want to say that I am humbled by the President’s nomination and the Secretary’s confidence in putting me before this 

committee as the nominee to be the Vice Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. I’m grateful for the opportunity to appear before 

you today, and look forward to working with you, subject to your 

confirmation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Selva follows:] 

379 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA. 

Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the 

Senate Armed Services Committee, it’s a great honor to appear before you today as 

President Obama’s nominee to become the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

First, I want to thank all of you for your undying support for our soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen who guard our liberty every single day, specifically those who serve today in the United States Transportation Command. 

Leading the men and women of Transportation Command has been a distinct 

honor and I have no doubt that they are representative of the servicemembers 

across our institution who are the best trained, best led, best equipped and most 

capable military in the world. 

I would like to acknowledge and congratulate my close friend and colleague, General Darren McDew, testifying beside me today. I can think of no person more qualified to lead the men and women of the United States Transportation Command, and 

I wish him and Evelyn the greatest of success, subject to your confirmation. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the senior leadership in the Department of Defense, the combatant commanders, our friends, allies and partners 

around the world, key members of the Executive Branch and the interagency process and members of Congress, including this committee to address a wide spectrum 

of challenges confronting our nation. 

We are increasingly at risk in space, across the networks of cyberspace, and face 

a cast of regional and near-peer competitors who are fielding increasingly sophisticated conventional and nuclear arsenals. While these threats represent a clear and 

present danger to our security, we continue to fund—to confront violent extremists 

such as ISIL who shocked the very core of our beliefs and threatened to further destabilize a very strategic reason—region that include several of our key allies. 

Effectively confronting these threats, as diverse as they are, requires a whole of 

government approach. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Cost Guardsmen 

truly are the heart and soul of our competitive advantage, and they are far more 

effective when the full weight of our country’s power is working in unison. 

If confirmed, I look forward to being an advocate for those men and women who 

wear the uniform of our Nation and their civilian counterparts in our department. 

Lastly, I want to say that I am humbled by the President’s nomination and the 

Secretary’s confidence in putting me before this committee as the nominee to be the 

vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I’m grateful for the opportunity to appear 

before you today and look forward to working with you, subject to your confirmation. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General McDew. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL DARREN W. McDEW, USAF, NOMINEE TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

General MCDEW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Reed, and distinguished members of the committee. It is, indeed, 

a great honor for me and my family to sit before you today. 

For 31 years, Evelyn and I have treated every single person that 

we’ve had the privilege to lead in our commands as an extension 

of our family. If confirmed, we look forward to welcoming the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen of Transportation Command to our extended family. 

Before I go any further, I also owe a debt of gratitude to my esteemed colleague, General Paul Selva, for his support of Air Mobility Command and his dedicated leadership of Transportation Command. I have no doubt that, if confirmed, General Selva’s service 

as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will benefit our Nation. 

Members of the committee, thank you for your steadfast support 

of 118,000 men and women of Air Mobility Command. They are our 

Nation’s finest. I hope I have the opportunity to tell you more 

about them during questioning. 

If confirmed, I am excited to continue working with the men and 

women of TRANSCOM—Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian, 

380 

as well as the vast network of commercial carriers that support 

American forces worldwide. These unheralded professionals are the 

business end that project military power around the globe. I cannot 

overstate the importance of the often thankless work accomplished 

at TRANSCOM, and I am humbled to be considered to be their 

commander. 

Members of the committee, I am committed to working with you 

and other committees to ensure our servicemembers and civilians 

have everything needed to support and defend the United States of 

America. If confirmed, I will provide the leadership the men and 

women of Transportation Command expect and deserve. I appreciate the trust and confidence the President, the Secretary of Defense, and General Dempsey have placed in me by considering me 

for this position. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman and the members of the committee, 

for continuing—for conducting this hearing. And I look forward to 

your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, thank you very much, General. Thank 

you. 

General Selva, we had a hearing with the prospective Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of staff a few days ago, as you know, and one 

of the many members—I believe it was Senator Manchin—asked 

the prospective Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dunford, 

what he believed was the greatest threat that the United States 

faces in the world today. And, to the surprise of some, General 

Dunford responded: Russia. What is your opinion on that response 

to that question, General? 

General SELVA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would put the 

threats to this Nation in the following order: Russia, China, Iran, 

and North Korea, and all of the organizations that have grown 

around the ideology that was articulated by al-Qaeda early in the 

turn of this century. And that’s not to say that each or any of those 

present a clear and present danger today. But, in that order, you 

see the countries that are peer and near-peer competitors who are 

developing conventional and nuclear weapons that match our own. 

You see opaque governments that have ideologies that we don’t 

agree with. And you see the broad base of terrorist threats that 

might threaten our interests abroad, our— 

Chairman MCCAIN. I got all that. 

General SELVA.—abroad, and our Homeland. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I got all that. What—your—you agree with 

General Dunford that the first would be Russia? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Because? 

General SELVA. Because Russia possesses the conventional and 

nuclear capability to be an existential threat to this Nation, should 

they choose to do so. 

Chairman MCCAIN. And you place ISIS last of those four priorities? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir, I do. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Because? 

General SELVA. Because right now ISIS does not present a clear 

and present threat to our homeland and to the existence of our NaVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00386 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
381 

tion. It is a threat we must deal with, and we must help our regional partners deal with, but it does not threaten us at home. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Does it threaten us at home when these 

young men who have gone to Iraq and Syria and become 

radicalized and then return to the United States, that the Director 

of the FBI and the Director of Homeland Security have said is a 

direct threat to the United States? That’s their testimony. 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. I would agree with their assessment. 

However, I would qualify it with the following. Those do not 

present an existential threat to the existence of the Nation. ISIL 

does not possess the tools or the capabilities to threaten the existence of the United States as we know it. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I would like your and General McDew’s comments and assessment of the effects of sequestration on our ability 

to defend the Nation, and its effect on the risk to the men and 

women who are serving, and the effect on their morale as they face 

this uncertainty that is dictated by sequestration. Beginning with 

you, General Selva. 

General SELVA. Mr. Chairman, I think sequestration presents a 

direct threat to the morale of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, who deserve the best-maintained and best equipment available to fight the threats that face this Nation. And, as we see the 

effects of sequestration and the potential declines in the defense 

budget affecting readiness, they affect our ability to train those 

young men and women to do their work, they affect our ability to 

maintain and reset the equipment that they have been using for 

the better part of the last decade and a half in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they affect our ability to retain the best of those soldiers, 

sailors, airmen, and marines as they make the decision on whether 

or not they believe they have the full support of the Nation in the 

work that they do to defend our freedom and liberty every day. 

So, I do believe sequestration has readiness impacts, it has impacts on our ability to maintain the force, and it has impacts on 

our ability to sustain the morale of the men and women who have 

committed to defending our freedom and liberty around the world. 

Chairman MCCAIN. The Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) 

funding is a bandaid. 

General SELVA. Sir, I believe the OCO funding is a 1-year incremental fix to a long-term problem that we all need to address together. And, if confirmed, I look forward to working with this administration, with this Congress, and with this committee, and others, to try and find a long-term solution to that problem. 

Chairman MCCAIN. General McDew. First, the answer on the 

greatest threat, and then the second, if you would. 

General MCDEW. One of the greatest threats that faces our Nation is our ability to deal with the cyberthreat. I will separate it 

slightly from the other discussion that you were having with General Selva, and focus on one that impacts Transportation Command 

and our network more readily today, and that is our ability to figure out how we will continue to work with commercial industry 

that we’re required to work with, and need to work with. Ninety 

percent of our work is done on the commercial networks, and that 

is a threat that I have got to face, going forward, if confirmed. 

382 

Chairman MCCAIN. It’s an interesting perspective. So, right now 

there is the possibility that adversarial nations could shut down 

your business? 

General MCDEW. There is always that threat that adversarial 

nations could shut down our Nation. But, what I—and I think this 

is something that the entire Nation and a lot of folks in the wholeof-government—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. But, particularly, your ability to get things 

to the warfighters. 

General MCDEW. Senator, that threat is there. I believe that 

TRANSCOM has put some things in place to make that less likely. 

But, as we go forward, the threat only gets worse. Our ability to 

deal with it must evolve, and we have to find ways to do better 

with it, going forward. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both, gentlemen, for your testimony. 

And, General Selva, getting to one of your specific roles as Vice 

Chairman—that’s the Council of—for the Command and Control— 

National Leadership Command and Control Council of Nuclear 

Weapons—can you comment about that? It appears that this issue, 

particularly over the last several years with our land-based forces, 

has become even more prominent with respect to not just aging infrastructure, but leadership issues, a whole host of issues. Can you 

just comment upon how you perceive your role and what you will 

do? 

General SELVA. Senator, I believe the statutory roles that are defined for the Vice Chairman with respect to management of the 

Nuclear Weapons stockpile, the Nuclear Leadership Command and 

Control Network, as well as the National Deterrence Oversight 

Panel, are fairly clear. They require me to be able to assert with 

confidence that we have a safe, secure, and reliable arsenal that is 

connected to our leadership by a reliable, secure, and resilient command-and-control network, and that that puts the President of the 

United States, as the authority for use of those weapons, in direct 

control of the decisions that would accrue to our nuclear weapons 

inventory. And so, I look forward to working with this committee, 

if confirmed, to make sure that all the legs of our nuclear triad and 

all of the capabilities that make our nuclear deterrent believable 

and ready are in place to give us that capability. 

Senator REED. Looking forward, there’s going to have to be a significant recapitalization of the nuclear enterprise, both land, air, 

and sea bases. Do you think we’re fully prepared for that, in terms 

of—particularly in terms of the issues the Chairman raised about 

sequestration and these budgets? 

General SELVA. Senator Reed, I’ve only been recently studying 

the issues that accrue to the nuclear weapons enterprise as it relates to the nominations for this new position. To be honest, I 

haven’t had the time to look at all of the detail that would be required to answer that question. I would look forward to answering 

it in a classified environment with a lot more detail. 

383 

Senator REED. But, I would assume your initial impression is 

that we have a big bill to pay, going forward, to maintain our current strategic dominance. 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. My understanding is that the current 

weapons stockpile and the current delivery platforms require significant maintenance and upgrades. But, I’m also aware of the requirement to invest in the long-range strike bomber, the Ohio-class 

replacement, and potentially a follow-on intercontinental ballistic 

missile, to keep all three legs of our nuclear triad viable. 

Senator REED. Let me switch gears, General McDew. You’ve really, I think, in your questions with the Chairman and your opening 

statement, put your finger on the cyber issue. It seems to me that 

that’s the first stage of any conflict today, which would be a 

cyberattack. In fact, it’s unclear when you cross the line into something that’s a probing action or an act of war. Not only do you have 

to maintain the infrastructure of DOD, but you have numerous 

contractors. Can you comment on the challenge that you have with 

some of your contractors to maintain their cybersecurity, and the 

steps you’re taking to ensure that, if they were compromised, it 

wouldn’t cascade into your system? 

General MCDEW. Senator, I am beginning to understand the 

vastness of the network. I am more familiar with the Air Mobility 

Command portion and its contractors. However, in some of the 

study that I’ve done so far, which has not been in great depth, I 

see that TRANSCOM has put some things in place in their contracting system to allow the contractor to show assuredness of their 

network and to provide for requirements to report intrusions in 

their network. Those are, I think, very beneficial. I think, if confirmed, I will want to look deeper into that and to see where we 

can strengthen those places where we can. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

General Selva, a final question. And just—you will also, as the 

JROC Chair, have a great deal to do about acquisition policy. Can 

you—general comments about the efforts underway to engage the 

Services more actively in acquisition? 

General SELVA. Senator, I’m aware that there is an active effort 

inside the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to reinvigorate 

the relationship with the stakeholders who bring requirements to 

the table, and to look at the authorities and responsibilities for actually delivering the military capabilities as an outcome. If confirmed, I look forward to working with that body and with this 

committee as we continue the process of looking at the duplication 

of effort that might exist across the enterprise, and to come back 

to you with any potential legislative proposals that might be required to remove requirements that are currently articulated in 

statute. That is the extent to which I’ve studied that process. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me mention something that’s not very often talked about. I 

have briefly mentioned it to each one of you. The fact that the airlines are anticipating hiring about 20,000 pilots over the next 7 

years due to the mandated retirement age of 65. In fact, I authored 

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the amendment that raised it from 60 to 65. Maybe we should have 

put it at 70. It would have maybe put off that problem. But, it is 

a serious thing. RAND [Research and Development Corporation] 

did a release—a study that the airlines have an average of 2,000 

per year over the next 10 years, and that they will be upwards of 

5,000 after that. That compares, over the last 10 years, to 1,500. 

So, this is something that’s out there. And it’s something that we— 

first of all, I’d like to ask each one of you, consider this a problem, 

do you have any ideas right now that might help alleviate it? 

General SELVA. Senator, the problem of pilot inventory in this 

Nation, I believe, is going to become a readiness issue over time. 

It’s—it is not upon us, but it is approaching quickly. 

Three dynamics play out that cause that to happen. First is the 

exponential expansion of the airline industry, internationally, 

which places a huge demand on the pilot inventory in the United 

States as the preference to have an English-speaking pilot in the 

cockpits is internationally known. The second, as you mentioned, is 

the approaching age of retirement for many of our pilots. The third 

is the decline in production of military pilots that are a preference 

across the network. And so, each of those three will conspire over 

time to place heavier demands by the industry on the military inventory of pilots that are their preference. 

And so, working with the airlines on innovative ways to bring civilian-educated pilots out of our higher learning institutions directly into commercial air service is one of the initiatives that we’ve 

begun working with the airline industry. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, yes. I understand. This is not—right now, 

we’re putting out the fires that are burning today, but this is something that we know is coming. I’ve talked to General Welsh about 

this several times, and he agrees that the logical place for them to 

go is going to be going to the military. We spend the money training them. The—I guess, the cost of getting a pilot to an F–22 capability is about $9 million. And so, this is a huge issue that’s—it’s— 

I’d suggest it’s here. Any further thoughts on that, General 

McDew? 

General MCDEW. Senator, the one thing I would add is that, although the numbers don’t say that it’s here with us today, the discussion is in our cockpits today. There is not a pilot that serves 

anywhere in any capacity across our Nation that doesn’t understand— 

Senator INHOFE. But—— 

General MCDEW.—the demand. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. We tried something a year ago, when we 

stood down 17 combat-coded squadrons. That was supposed to be 

til the end of the year, which would have been 6 months. Then, 3 

months later, they changed their mind and then stood them up 

again. It’s my understanding that that actually costs more than 

what was saved during that 3-month period. I don’t—I’m not asking you if you were aware of that, but, nonetheless, it’s something 

I believe. 

I—let me throw out three ideas here and just have you, maybe 

for the record, comment on each one of them. 

First of all, the idea the—of the cost of the training, $9 million 

to get a pilot up to that—those standards, and the fact that, with 

385 

their aviation bonuses over the next 9 years amount to $225,000. 

So, those are two things that we have to face as a reality. 

The second thing that, to me, from my personal conversations 

with pilots, is the fact that they’re not flying the sorties that they 

were flying before. They want to fly. And it used to average about 

six sorties a week, and now it’s down to about three, from what 

we’ve found out. And then the additional duties, since we’ve 

downsized, a lot of the pilots are doing things that were heretofore 

not done by pilots. 

So, on those three issues, any comments you want to make now 

are fine, but why don’t you—for the record, if the two of you would 

respond to those as problems that are there. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

SENATOR INHOFE. What are we doing to address the upcoming pilot shortage— 

both within DOD and outside DOD? 

GENERAL SELVA AND GENERAL MCDEW. In 2014, the AF stood up a Total Force 

Aircrew Management division to seek efficiencies and ways to better utilize Active 

Duty, Air National Guard and AF Reserve aircrew. Additionally, the Air Force developed the Total Force Aircrew Management Amplified Affiliation Program, which 

was implemented in March 2015 to encourage separating pilots to affiliate with the 

ANG and AF Reserve. 

Working outside of the DOD, the Air Force developed the National Pilot Sourcing 

Forum (NSPF) to foster collaboration between the Total Force and Major Airlines 

on a quarterly basis. This Forum works to find ways to best utilize this ‘‘National 

Asset’’ from recruitment to production through retirement. 

SENATOR INHOFE. What factors will lead to pilots departing the service—pay, 

training, flying hours, deployments, family, etc.? 

GENERAL SELVA AND GENERAL MCDEW. Pilots leave the service for many of the 

same reasons as other career fields. One of the biggest reasons we see them leaving 

today is the increased OPTEMPO of a smaller force. As the administrative and personnel functions of the military have been reduced, increased additional duties and 

non-flying duties have been added. More non-flying duties coupled with insufficient 

flying/training opportunities and increased deployments (which restrict training to 

all mission sets) make job satisfaction and quality of life reduced. Finally, the outside active duty opportunities are growing every day to include flying for the airlines. 

SENATOR INHOFE. Are bonuses enough to keep our pilots in our military? 

GENERAL SELVA AND GENERAL MCDEW. No. Bonuses alone are not enough. The 

Aviator Bonus has historically proven to be an effective tool to assist with pilot retention, but monetary compensation is not the only factor for separating from the 

military. The new dynamics of increased OPSTEMPO, manpower shortages, an improving economy, and major airline hiring, all influence servicemember retention decisions. Current bonus caps also restrict the services from increasing incentives, 

which limits flexibility in reducing the influence of greater compensation outside of 

the service. Bonuses themselves are not a sole solution, but can reduce some of the 

causal factors for separation. 

SENATOR INHOFE. How do the flying hours our pilots are getting today compare 

a decade ago? How do they compare with our Allies and adversaries? 

GENERAL SELVA AND GENERAL MCDEW. The United States Air Force currently 

flies approximately 2.0 million flying hours per year, including all training and operational missions. However, these flying hours vary a great deal depending on weapon system type, pilot end-strength, numbers of squadrons/aircraft, and operations 

tempo. 

In fiscal year 2004, the Total Force ‘‘peacetime training hours’’ were programmed 

at 1.7 million flying hours. The same Total Force ‘‘peacetime training hours’’ in fiscal year 2014 were programmed at 1.2 million flying hours. 

386 

The table below provides a breakdown of these averages by requested weapon system type and provides the average of annual flying hours per pilot from fiscal year 

2004 and fiscal year 2014: 

FY04 FY14 

Mobility: 360 230 

Tanker: 405 200 

Bombers: 200 225 

Fighters: 205 160 

Current Average Flying Hours per Pilot USAF: 

Average 223 

European Allies: 

Average 183 

Russia: 

Average 120 

China: 

Average 110 

SENATOR INHOFE. Are our pilots getting enough flight hours and training to remain fully combat ready in all the mission areas? 

GENERAL SELVA AND GENERAL MCDEW. Yes. There are many factors that influence a pilot being fully combat ready. Our peace time flight hours are designed to 

provide training opportunities to achieve full spectrum readiness, while deployed 

contingency flying may provide only a partial opportunity to train to the designed 

capability of the weapon system and crew. A balance of training opportunities, and 

adequate resources, in relation to peacetime and contingency flying is necessary for 

the Air Force to improve readiness. 

SENATOR INHOFE. Are you also going to have issues with aircraft maintenance 

manning shortfalls? 

GENERAL SELVA AND GENERAL MCDEW. The United States Air Force requires approximately 3,000 additional maintainers to meet readiness requirements based on 

current force structure projections. Retention of legacy aircraft is driving additive 

maintenance manpower requirements to beddown the F–35 and support legacy 

maintenance shortfalls. F–35 Phase I Manning Plan meets Initial Operational Capability requirements; however, subsequent F–35 growth (new unit standups) are at 

risk. Additive force structure requirements vice unit conversions compound the challenge of providing experienced maintainers to meet F–35 and legacy maintenance 

manning requirements. 

Completed actions to date to alleviate the maintenance manning shortfall include: 

• Moved 39 Active Association Active Duty (AD) maintenance personnel to F–35 

bases. 

• Transferred 18 A–10s to Backup Aircraft Inventory, enabling 130 A–10 maintenance personnel to move to F–35 bases. 

• Established 2-year contract maintenance for F–35 Aircraft Maintenance Unit 

(AMU) at Luke AFB. 

• Converting F–16 maintainers to F–35 at Hill AFB, UT in fiscal year 2015/2016. 

Then the last thing I wanted to mention is—General McDew, in 

your written testimony, you talked about infrastructure shortfalls, 

and you didn’t say anything about that in your abbreviated testimony. Is there anything you want to mention about the infrastructure problems that we’re having right now? 

General MCDEW. Senator, I have to get a little bit more depth, 

but one of the concerns I have is the ability to recapitalize the infrastructure, both on the sea, air, and land. There are considerable 

things that will need to be addressed over the next 5 to 10 years 

that will be problematic if we hit sequestration as we know it. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

I am aware of several infrastructure issues that could impact TRANSCOM, and 

if confirmed, I will continue efforts across the Combatant Commands, the Services, 

other agencies as applicable, and industry to find long term solutions. 

In terms of port infrastructure, my biggest concern is Military Ocean Terminal— 

Concord (MOTCO). As the main strategic seaport for shipping ammunition to the 

Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR), no other port on the West 

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Coast can meet MOTCO’s ammunition throughput capacity. Much of MOTCO’s infrastructure dates back to World War II. Although substantial funding has been programmed to address major deficiencies, additional infrastructure projects are still 

needed to address remaining deferred maintenance issues and maintain operational 

readiness. 

Additionally, while en route infrastructure has improved over the last few years, 

there remain key infrastructure shortfalls in the European Command (EUCOM) and 

PACOM AOR which could hinder strategic mobility operations. My intent is to advance efforts underway to highlight these shortfalls in the posture planning efforts 

and budgetary processes in order to enhance the ability to rapidly respond globally. 

I am also concerned with continuation of aircraft modernization efforts to replace 

aging components in the existing organic fleet. The vast majority of the air refueling 

fleet is over 50 years old and vulnerable to potential fleet wide maintenance issues 

due to aging. Bringing the new KC–46 on line as scheduled is essential to help mitigate this vulnerability. 

With respect to sealift, the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), the key first response 

strategic sealift component for moving U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps units to 

the fight, must also remain ready to meet the needs of Geographic Combatant Commands. As 1.6 million square feet of RRF roll-on/roll-off capacity ages out of service 

in the next 10 years, an executable recapitalization plan must be in place to ensure 

long-term viability of surge sealift. 

DOD uses a combination of self-deployment, trucks, and rail to get equipment to 

ports of embarkation. The primary issue with surface moves supporting full scale 

deployment operation is a large portion of the current fleet of commercial chain tiedown railcars is facing age-mandated retirement before 2020. 

Finally, one of the greatest challenges to our Nation is the existing cyber threat 

to logistics and mobility systems including supporting infrastructure. The ever 

present risk posed by our cybersecurity vulnerabilities across this complex and 

interdependent enterprise requires responsive, reliable and resilient joint deployment and distribution command and control capabilities. These essential capabilities 

enable TRANSCOM the freedom to operate as needed on all networks across the 

joint deployment and distribution enterprise to meet mission objectives. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Appreciate that very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Selva and your family, thank you very much. General 

McDew and your family, thank you very much. Both of you are 

very lucky guys to have such wonderful families. 

General Selva, last week a new study showed that suicide attempts are most common in the newest enlisted soldiers who have 

never been deployed. In June, the Los Angeles Times brought attention to an unbelievable statistic. For women ages 18 to 29, 

women veterans have committed suicide at a rate nearly 12 times 

the rate of women non-veterans of the same age. And so, this— 

these are folks who were Active Duty not too long before that time. 

And I want to know, if you’re confirms, will you prioritize mental 

health as a critical readiness issue? 

General SELVA. I will, Senator, and I look forward to working 

with this committee to make sure that we have the mental health 

providers that are available to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

marines, particularly those in crisis. So, subject to your confirmation, I commit to doing so. 

Senator DONNELLY. And how will you work to reach female 

servicemembers who face unique stressors, as well as also young 

enlisted troops who confront and worry about things like stigma regarding mental health care? 

General SELVA. Senator, I believe that there should be no stigma 

attached to a soldier, sailor, airmen, or marine who has the courage to seek mental health care when they’re in crisis. I will do evVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00393 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
388 

erything in my power, in this job and any other job, to make sure 

that we try to remove that stigma from our military. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. I would also encourage you to keep in 

mind some of the unique challenges that our female 

servicemembers face every single day. 

In regards to what Senator McCain said before about General 

Dunford’s testimony regarding Russia as perhaps the most dangerous threat to our country, there’s recent reports that just came 

out about a directed energy weapon they’ve developed. This is incredibly troubling. It can disable sophisticated guidance systems, 

navigation systems, communications systems. And I was wondering 

if there has been any discussion as to how to counter this threat 

at this time? 

General SELVA. Sir, in the position I hold at TRANSCOM, I’m 

not aware of any conversations, but I will endeavor, if confirmed, 

to get briefed up on any—— 

Senator DONNELLY. If you could, that would be very, very helpful, because it, from the description, seems to be an incredibly troubling and dangerous weapon that is being worked on right now. 

Second is—and you’re with Transportation Command—but, second is in regards to North Korea. I was recently there, and—not 

in North Korea, but in South Korea—met with the leadership there 

and met with some of the leaders in China to talk about this 

threat. And I’d like to get your perspective of how you assess that 

threat from North Korea, and what plans you’re aware of right now 

to deal with it. 

General SELVA. Senator, North Korea represents one of those 

opaque governments that we have very little visibility into. So, assessing the intentions of the North Korean government is something that requires a very careful intelligence analysis of what we 

can learn about the country. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Office of Defense Intelligence, as well as the interagency and the Intelligence Community, to try to unpack the 

threat that is North Korea, not only from a perspective of their capabilities, but of their intentions. 

Senator DONNELLY. General McDew, I was in Iraq a few weeks 

ago with a group led by Senator Kaine, who’s sitting next to me. 

And one of the things we talked about was with some Sunni tribal 

leaders. And one of them was from Haditha. And he said that his 

city was surrounded, at the present time, by ISIS, that many of the 

people who live there were eating grass because there is no food 

coming in, that babies were not able to get milk, and that the population was in an extraordinarily dire situation. We had discussed 

with the military there about having an airlift come in to Haditha. 

It was mentioned, in testimony here about a week or so ago by one 

of the witnesses, that, ‘‘Well, the Iraqi air force has the ability to 

put a C–130 in there, but they have not.’’ And you will be in 

TRANSCOM. And so, I would ask you to take a look at this particular problem. I would love to discuss it further with you in the 

next few days. But, we have people who are starving, in effect, and 

we have the ability to try to do something about it. 

Last, I would like to mention to you, General McDew, about the 

breach that we saw at OPM [the Office of Personnel Management]. 

It began in May 2014 with hackers using a contractor’s comVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00394 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
389 

promised username and password. And you had mentioned about 

working with our commercial partners and civilian partners. I 

think it’s critical, in your position coming up, to make sure to work 

with them to harden their networks, to harden their abilities. And 

I was wondering if you could talk to me a little bit about appropriate measures you think we need to take, moving forward. 

General MCDEW. Senator, if confirmed, I will do all the things 

that you suggest. It is a threat that we must deal with. And I believe TRANSCOM has done some things to date that are 

foundational. We would just try to extend those and strengthen 

them. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Fischer. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Selva, as you know, the Department is currently building a cyber mission force of about 6,000. Overall, how do you measure things like readiness or force structure adequacy when we’re 

largely unable to do those conventional net assessments of our adversaries’ capabilities? 

General SELVA. Senator, I think the first measure of our readiness in the cyberdomain is our ability to defend the networks that 

allow us to provide command and control of our military. And, as 

a result of that work, the cyber mission teams and the cyber protection teams have been put in place to protect those networks that 

our combatant commanders depend on to execute command and 

control over their fielded forces. 

I think three things have to accrue to cyber on a broader sense. 

The first is our ability to attribute whether or not the 

cyberintrusion is criminal activity, amateur hackers, or sponsored 

nation-state activity, because that then will condition the response 

of the Nation. Will we respond to the Nation-state, will we respond 

to the criminal threat, or will we respond to the amateur hacker? 

And I think that will ultimately be the measure of the wisdom of 

how we have put together the cyberprotection teams on the cyber 

mission force. 

Putting a number of 6,000 against it may or may not be the right 

measure. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Admiral 

Mike Rogers, in his roles in the National Security Agency as well 

as U.S. Cyber Command, to try to get to that definition and continue to advocate the capability that will allow us to defend our 

cybernetworks. 

Senator FISCHER. And as you look at those different threats and 

the sources of the—those different threats, how are you willing to 

step forward, I guess, to look at developing a policy in what our response should be to each of those threats? And again, when you 

look at the size of the force, with 6,000, do you differentiate within 

that cyber mission force the direction that each of those members 

will take once the threat is identified, the source of that threat is 

identified? 

General SELVA. Senator, I think—— 

Senator FISCHER. But, my real question is, What are we going to 

do with policy? 

390 

General SELVA. Senator, that was exactly where I was headed, 

which is, in the absence of statutes that define the responsibilities 

and authorities of our law enforcement agencies and our military 

capability to react in cyber, we run into those policy questions as 

a consequence of the nature of the threat. And so, I think one of 

the more powerful things we can do is to put the power of statute 

behind those authorities and responsibilities so that we can define 

the lanes in the road and allow law enforcement to work those 

issues that are uniquely law enforcement, and allow the military 

to respond to those military threats that emerge in cyber. And I 

look forward to be—to working with the committee on those kinds 

of policies as we move forward on this issue. 

Senator FISCHER. I look forward to working with you on those 

issues, as well, because I think cybersecurity in all realms is a priority of this country, and should be, and we need to take action on 

it. 

When General Rodriguez stated that Libya-based threats to the 

U.S. interests are growing and that Libya is emerging as a safe 

haven where terrorists are able to train, where they’re able to rebuild with impunity, I think all of us on the panel realize that was 

the case, but my question to you is, Do you think that we are doing 

enough to prevent those terrorist groups from establishing these 

safe havens in Libya? And, down the road, what are the lessons 

that we’ve learned from our experiences in Syria with regards to 

what is now happening in Libya? 

General SELVA. Senator, I’m aware of the work we’re doing with 

our allies, partners, and friends across all of North Africa to look 

at the growing threat from al Qaeda and al Qaeda-related terrorist 

organizations. I have not had an opportunity to dive into some of 

other issues that are going on right now in the ungoverned regions 

in Libya, specifically. But, I think the lesson of the last decade and 

a half is, in areas that are poorly governed or ungoverned, those 

radical elements are given the freedom to develop their violent capabilities and to inflict damage on U.S. interests and our citizens 

abroad. And the extent to which those areas are left ungoverned, 

they have the freedom to do that. So, I look forward to working 

with Dave Rodriguez and his team in AFRICOM [United States Africa Command], and Congress and the committee, to look at opportunities to continue to counter those threats across North Africa. 

Senator FISCHER. When we look at the time that we’ve watched 

Syria fall into chaos and again become a training ground for terrorists, and we compare that to what’s happening in Libya, though, 

what—at what point do you say, ‘‘Enough. This is—it is time now 

for the United States to step forward?’’ What have we learned in 

Syria? 

General SELVA. Senator, I think the policy of the United States 

is an issue that we ought to discuss about our position in the—in 

regards to all of the parties that are fighting in Syria. And we have 

to make a decision. And that decision shouldn’t be the consequence 

of one person’s opinion, but the collected opinions of the people who 

have studied the area. And so, I worry a little bit that we not jump 

to a conclusion on what the best outcome would be for Syria, that— 

but we take a reasoned approach to our national interests in the 

391 

region and to the stability of the region, writ large, with respect to 

all of the parties that are now fighting in Syria. 

Senator FISCHER. I know you served at SAC [Strategic Air Command], and you’ve recently been at STRATCOM [United States 

Strategic Command]. I welcome you back anytime so we can continue our discussion on the need for modernization of our triad. 

General SELVA. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Selva, the conflict in Syria has been 

going on for 4 years. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to our witnesses. Congratulations on your nominations. 

Just to pick up on Senator Fischer, I also agree that the policies 

around cyber is really important for us to continue to dialogue 

about. We had testimony within the last year, I think it was from 

Admiral Rogers—it was somebody connected with Cyber Command—and the testimony was, with respect to a particular 

cyberattack, if there was this kind of cyberattack, it could lead to 

war. And so, my followup question is, Well, so then a cyberattack, 

in and of itself, is not war? It’s some prewar kind of an attack? And 

then the answer to that was pretty hazy. I have been on this committee for 21⁄2 years now. I don’t really have an understanding for 

what our cyberstrategy is. Do we have a line by which we would 

say a cyberattack constitutes war? Do we have a clear doctrine for 

the kind of response that we should make to cyberattack? What is 

the policy with respect to cyberdeterrence, cyberdefense, and then 

offensive use of cyber so that—this is not really sort of 

TRANSCOM. I’m not directing a question to you. But, it’s more to 

colleagues on the committee. I think we need to educate ourselves 

more and challenge our military brass to understand what the current dimension of cyberstrategy is. I appreciate Senator Fischer’s 

questions in that regard. 

A compliment to each of you with respect to TRANSCOM. I think 

TRANSCOM is a great example of integration. I mean, 

TRANSCOM is cross-service. It is public and private. You probably 

do as good a job of—at balancing Active, Reserve, and Guard as 

any of the components of the military. Senator Donnelly and I were 

in Iraq, and the folks flying us around in C–130s were—I think 

they were Pennsylvania air reservists on a 4-month stint. And 

that’s pretty common. I hope that, in your new role, General 

McDew, as the head of TRANSCOM, and General Selva, taking 

that lesson from TRANSCOM to the Vice position with the Joint 

Chiefs, I hope you’ll take that—the lessons of that kind of integration—public/private, cross-service, Guard/Active/Reserve—and 

spread how that can be done more generally throughout the DOD 

[Department of Defense]. If you want to just comment upon that, 

I’d love to hear what you have to say. 

General SELVA. Senator, I appreciate the compliment to 

TRANSCOM. It is true that the Command absolutely depends on 

the total force and the contribution of our commercial partners to 

our strategic lift around the world. If confirmed for the job as Vice 

Chairman, I look forward to bringing some of those lessons into the 

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Joint Staff and into the interagency. And I look forward to working 

with this committee and finding ways to make that possible. 

Senator KAINE. General McDew? 

General MCDEW. If you allow me, Senator, just to brag on the 

men and women of the—my current command, Air Mobility Command, they do it better than anyone, because they’ve lived through 

this together since 1968. We have had these bonds and these alliances and—with the Guard and Reserve—and we cannot operate 

without them. 

Senator KAINE. General Selva, the military leadership at the 

Pentagon that gets over the finish line on audited financial statements, they’ll have a star put on the sidewalk up here. I hope that 

you’re going to be part of the team that gets us there. We’ve got 

a 2017 date by which we’re supposed to be there. This is a question 

that Senator Manchin has been a real bird-dog about, always asking about it. Talk to us about the status of the move toward audited financial statements for the Department of Defense (DOD). 

Because it sure makes it a lot easier for us to advocate, for example, about sequester relief if we know that we are on a path to be 

able to do that. 

General SELVA. Senator, from my position at TRANSCOM, we 

are one of the combatant commands that will have to assert our 

audit readiness as a consequence of managing a working capital 

fund that moves all of our equipment and personnel around the 

world. From that perspective, I can tell you, we’re making significant progress towards audit readiness: towards being able to account for every dollar that we spend. 

Across the Department, I’m going to need some time to take a 

look at where each of the individual Services are, but I will continue to be an advocate, across the enterprise, that we be prepared 

for our audit readiness deadline of October 2017. If confirmed, I 

look forward to working with all of the Service Chiefs and Secretaries to make that happen. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

And just one last comment. I think we’re about 24 hours into the 

Ramadi campaign in Iraq, and it’s going to be a real test of the 

training and the work we’ve done with the Iraqi military and 

Sunni leaders in the last year, the success of this campaign. And 

I just know that we’re all thinking about that and monitoring the 

success of that mission carefully. 

Thank you for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Rounds. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you both for your service. Thank you also to 

your families for their backing of you, and their sacrifice. It is 

greatly appreciated, and it does not go unnoticed. 

Let me just begin. I find it interesting that both of you have— 

or that you have identified, General Selva, in your opening comments or in response to the Chairman, the list of where you see 

our greatest threats. I’m just going to identify that, in the new national military strategy, General Martin Dempsey, current Chairman, describes the need to counter revisionist states that threaten 

international peace and security. The strategy identifies Russia, 

393 

China, Iran, and North Korea as the four principal revisionist 

states. General Dempsey also writes that the U.S. military advantage has begun to erode and that future conflicts will come more 

rapidly, last longer, and take place on a more technically challenging battlefield. 

In which areas—General Selva, in which areas has the U.S. military advantage begun to erode, if you agree with his statement? 

Where would you recommend that DOD focus its investments in response to this erosion? 

General SELVA. Senator, I think there are four principal areas 

where that erosion has started to take place. The first is space. Up 

until the turn of this decade, the United States had pretty much 

dominance in space. That’s no longer true. Across the networks of 

cyberspace, we see intruders and nation-states acting to counter 

our capability to provide the command and control for our military 

that gives us the speed of decision on the modern battlefield. Then, 

I’d—it wouldn’t be fair not to highlight the fact that our opponents 

are look—and our potential adversaries are looking for 

asymmetries across our conventional and nuclear capabilities. As 

they detect and act against those asymmetries, they erode the capability that we have within our current force structure to react to 

threats that might emerge. 

So, I would place the four in about that order. 

Senator ROUNDS. Okay. 

General McDew, you identified cyber as being an item of major 

concern. I agree with your assessment. I’m just curious, though, 

it—with regard to whether we’re talking about policy or as we talk 

about statutory assistance, if you’ve looked at, and you’ve begun, 

the process, where do you see the most important statutory 

changes, if any, that DOD would be required to make recommendations with regard to cyber capabilities and operations? Are there 

specific statutes that you’ve identified yet in your review? 

General MCDEW. Senator, I have not had that level of depth to 

have specific statutes. But, if confirmed, I will endeavor to do so. 

Senator ROUNDS. General Selva? 

General SELVA. Senator, the only area that, as the TRANSCOM 

commander, that I looked for increasing capabilities is the ability— 

having looked into contract law and the imposition of specific requirements for reporting on intrusions to work across the interagency, to make sure that any location, any organization that received a notification of an intrusion into a commercial or military 

network had an affirmative obligation to report that intrusion so 

that we could defend the networks that make us successful. That 

authority is tied up in a variety of statutes that prevent agencies 

from speaking to each other clearly across law enforcement and the 

military. 

Beyond that, I have not spent the time and effort yet to work 

with Admiral Rodgers at Cyber Command to look at the broader 

national issue of cyberdefense. 

Senator ROUNDS. Okay. 

You identified, as one of those four existential threats, the country of Iran. In your view, is Iran still the leading state sponsor of 

terror? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir, they are. 

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With the proposed nuclear treaty or nuclear agreement which 

was announced this morning, if Iran is provided economic sanctions 

relief, do you believe Tehran would use some of these funds to enhance its military capabilities in support for terrorist organizations? 

General SELVA. Senator, I haven’t yet had the opportunity to 

study the entire agreement, but, on its face, what I’ve heard from 

the press, the immediate lifting of sanctions or the sequential lifting of sanctions will give Iran the access to more economic assets 

with which to sponsor state terrorism, should they choose to do so. 

And I think we need to be alert to that possibility. And, as the military, we have an obligation to provide the President with a full 

range of options to respond. So, if confirmed, I look forward to 

working with the Department to examine those issues more deeply. 

Senator ROUNDS. How do you respond to any additional Iranian 

aggression that may be forthcoming with their additional capabilities for procuring weapons? 

General SELVA. Senator, absent the actual context of that specific 

intervention and that specific sponsorship of terrorism or other malign activities, it’s difficult me—for me to actually give you an answer to that question, other than to say we need to have a range 

of available options with which to respond, whether it’s militarily, 

diplomatically, economically, or otherwise. 

Senator ROUNDS. But, you clearly recognize that the additional 

threat would now exist. 

General SELVA. Absolutely. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks, both of you all, for your service. And also, congratulations on your nominations. And I’m looking forward to working 

with you in the future. 

Let me just say—and maybe, General Selva, if I may ask this 

question, because I think both of you have answered, and General 

Dunford answered the question I asked last week and Senator 

McCain just asked again—the greatest threat—and I think you all 

identified Russia—is that opinion held by most of our military 

higher echelon, if you will? 

General SELVA. Senator, I believe it is, but I would actually 

quote an article I read early this morning from Dr. Andy 

Krepinevich. A quote in the article said that, over the better part 

of the last decade and a half, and in the years that preceded it, this 

Nation was able to look at the threats to our security through a 

periscope. And today we find ourselves having to analyze them 

through a kaleidoscope. And so, as each facet of the threat becomes 

apparent to us, we have to have the capability to react. And so, my 

reaction to the four major threats to the security of the United 

States comes from a military perspective. I’m not necessarily indicating that any of those states has a current intent to attack the 

United States. 

Senator MANCHIN. Sure. 

General SELVA. But, all of them have the capability. And so, we 

need to be ready to respond. 

395 

Senator MANCHIN. I’ve had the opportunity to have some dialogue with some of the people that were concerned about the relationships of the United States and Russia. And with that being 

said, could you comment on the state of the relationships, the dialogue going on, and what you would do to either improve, change, 

or have a different direction? 

General SELVA. Senator, I haven’t personally been involved in 

the dialogue, so it wouldn’t be fair for me to comment on the dialogue itself, but what I will say to you—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Do we have one, of your knowledge? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. And what I will say to you and the committee is, if confirmed for the position of Vice Chairman, I think 

it is very important that our senior military leaders maintain an 

open dialogue with the senior military leaders of competitor nations so that we can minimize the chance of miscalculation or 

missteps in any military operation anywhere in the world. That 

goes for Russia and China, specifically, and for any other country 

that might wish us ill. We need to open those dialogues to make 

sure that we— 

Senator MANCHIN. What I’m—and we’re speaking about Russia 

being our greatest challenge right now, and the greatest threat, or 

possible threat, because of their capabilities. With that being said, 

I’ve spoken to some people from that arena, and they’re telling me 

that the Cold War is colder today than it was when it declared. 

General SELVA. Senator, I don’t know that to be true or false, 

other than that they have said it. But, what I will tell you is that 

my experience is that the dialogue between senior leaders across 

our militaries has been open and frank. That helps us avoid miscalculation, and— 

Senator MANCHIN. I’m just saying we’re not hearing an awful lot 

of dialogue about this relationship or lack of a relationship. And 

now, when two of our top people who basically are on the verge of 

being nominated to lead our military forces have identified it, and 

not hearing anything before, I think it kind of caught a lot of us 

by surprise, if you will— 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Senator MANCHIN.—that that would be your direction. 

With that being said, I know the Iran nuclear deal we just talked 

about, it was revealed today that we have tentative agreement on 

that. I think, when we asked for your response on policy, you 

said—when we asked what would be a good deal for the U.S. from 

a security standpoint, your response was ‘‘Important outcomes includes rolling back Iran’s nuclear program, providing the international community with necessary access and transparency while 

preserving the sanctions imposed on conventional arms and ballistic missiles.’’ And I believe some of those, conventional arms and 

ballistic missiles, have expired terms on them at time—do you consider that a concern or a problem? 

General SELVA. Senator, my understanding is that those sanctions have a 5-year and an 8-year term, having read the open press 

this morning. I haven’t seen the details of the agreement and how 

those sanctions will be rolled back. But, it is my understanding, 

within the agreement, that there are snap-back provisions, that if 

we find Iranian behavior not to comport with the agreement, that 

396 

we can snap back the original sanctions. What I don’t know is 

whether that applies to the conventional weapons and the ballistic 

missile technologies. So, if confirmed, I’m committed to taking a 

much deeper look at the text of the agreement to determine where 

our maneuvering— 

Senator MANCHIN. One final question I have. Shortly after the 

fall of Ramadi, Secretary Carter stated the Iraqi forces showed no 

will to fight despite vastly outnumbering ISIS fighters. There is at 

least one group in Iraq that I have no doubt has the will to fight, 

and that are the Kurds. And we’ve spoken about that. Are there 

ways to empower the Kurds and the Sunnis to engage and to help 

them without undermining, I guess, the one-country solution or 

one-state solution, if that’s our policy?—which I’m not certain I 

agree with, but, for the sake of discussion, if you would have any 

comment on that. 

General SELVA. Senator, our policy is to continue to work 

through the government in Iraq to empower all of the parties in 

Iraq that are willing to fight against ISIL and to defend Iraqi sovereignty. I would need more time to be able to examine the issue 

of whether or not supporting one party over the other makes more 

sense, or not. If confirmed, I look forward to doing so. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, sir. 

My time is expired. 

General SELVA. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. TRANSCOM is 

always very exciting to me. I am a transporter and a logistician, 

so I appreciate your service, especially in that area, very, very 

much. 

General McDew, I’d like to start with you. Senator Kaine had 

pointed out the fact that TRANSCOM does work between the National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserves, Active Duty component, and 

many, many contractors, wonderful civilians who fill in those gaps. 

So, I would just like to visit with you a little bit about your 

thoughts on the role of the National Guard in supporting 

TRANSCOM’s mission to provide full-spectrum mobility solutions 

and enabling capabilities. And, obviously, I have strong opinions 

there, but I’d like to hear yours, General McDew. 

General MCDEW. Senator, I believe we may share the same opinion. 

Senator ERNST. I think so. 

General MCDEW. I am a strong supporter, and I am a huge fan, 

of our National Guard and Air Force Reserves. We could not operate without them. It is vital to the defense of this Nation and vital 

to everything we do in the transportation business. I can’t imagine 

doing it without them. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. And do you see that there are ways 

that we could further enhance working with our Reserve and our 

National Guard units? Is there a way to complete that bridge that 

we have existing out there? 

General MCDEW. I believe, Senator, that we need to continue to 

look at the authorities which our guardsmen and reservists come 

to work under, look at the different statuses they work in, and see 

397 

where those can be streamlined. We also need to be very careful, 

though, that we understand and fully appreciate the differences between the Active Duty, the Guard, and the Reserves, and work 

with employers to ensure that that remains as strong as we think 

it ought to be. 

Senator ERNST. That’s exceptional. I appreciate that very much. 

And you brought up a great point that we don’t often discuss is our 

employees that do see us gone for an extremely long periods of 

time, whether it’s just from a 2-week annual training period or an 

IDT [inactive duty training] weekend to the year-long deployments 

that we have seen overseas. But, I do believe that the National 

Guard and Reserve components within transportation are essential 

to supporting any mission that we have overseas. And so, I thank 

you for that. I’d like to thank our employers out there for being 

willing to support our men and women that serve in uniform in a 

Reserve and Guard status. 

General Selva, of course, let’s go back to U.S. TRANSCOM, as 

well. And what lessons learned, significant events, are you taking 

forward from TRANSCOM into the Vice Chair’s position? What are 

some of the greatest assets that you will bring forward, having 

those types of responsibilities with TRANSCOM? 

General SELVA. Senator, I think the greatest lesson I carry forward into any job is the dedication of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

and marines, and coastguardsmen, and all of their civilian counterparts, both in and out of government, to get the job done. They depend on us for sound leadership and for advocacy. And so, what I 

will take into the position as Vice Chairman, if confirmed, is that— 

that undying obligation to be an advocate for the soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen who lay their lives on the 

line for all of us every day. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you very much. 

I just want to score again—or underscore again what some of the 

conversation has been today with regards to the Iran deal. And 

while we continue as legislators to work through what this deal entails, as well, I did hear you say, General Selva, that you do believe 

that Iran with potential nuclear capabilities is a great threat to the 

United States. Is that correct? 

General SELVA. Iran with nuclear capabilities would be a threat 

to our regional partners, to our allies, our friends, and to the 

United States. And so, the extent to which this agreement forestalls their ability to build a nuclear weapon, I think we ought to 

look at all of the provisions therein to make sure that we’re ready 

to respond for whatever else might come. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. 

And again, as well, with sanctions relief providing approximately 

$100 billion to Iran, I also believe that this would serve Iran’s purpose of funding proxies throughout that region and being a state 

sponsor of terrorism. So, I do have great concerns with this deal. 

I have great concerns with Iran, overall, as well as a number of 

issues that we have worldwide. But, that’s for yet another day. 

Thank you, General Selva. Thank you, General McDew. I appreciate your service very much to our Nation. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King. 

398 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I want to thank our witnesses for their service. 

And, General Selva, you and I have met before. You are a extraordinarily thoughtful and straightforward officer, and I hope to 

encourage you, in your new position, which is one of the most important in our government, where you will be directly advising the 

President, particularly the—being on the Deputies Committee of 

the National Security Council. Will you be straightforward, honest, 

and courageous in providing your best advice, and not be intimidated by the circumstances that surround your being in that position? 

General SELVA. I will, Senator. That’s the only person I know 

how to be. 

Senator KING. Well, I certainly hope so, because in situations 

like this, policymakers don’t need ‘‘yes’’ men, they need criticism 

and straightforward advice. And I certainly hope that you’re prepared to provide that. That, to me, is really the fundamental responsibility of this position. 

To go to a more specific question, we had a—an explosion in Afghanistan a few days ago. Apparently over 30 people were killed. 

Do you have a view of the security situation in Afghanistan, and 

what we can and should do in order to maintain the progress that’s 

been made in that country? 

General SELVA. Senator, it’s been some time since I traveled to 

Afghanistan, but my overall impression is that the Afghan national 

security services, both their military and their national police, are 

making progress. And they are confronting the Taliban, insurgents, 

and terrorists where they present themselves. And so, my view is 

that we need to empower them to continue that work. They have 

taken ownership of the sovereignty of the country of Afghanistan, 

and that is the place where we want them to be. And so, I think 

we need to be careful about the assumptions we made, relative to 

the timelines for their willingness and ability to manage their own 

sovereignty. And that goes to the stability of the government and 

the central government’s command and control over those forces. 

And I think that’s the place we need to go, it’s to think that 

through in that domain. 

Senator KING. So, I take it your advice would be that our disengagement should be based upon conditions on the ground and 

not arbitrary dates in a calendar. 

General SELVA. Senator, I believe that’s true. 

Senator KING. Thank you. I hope you will pass that advice on in 

the strongest possible terms. 

We’ve talked a lot about cyber this morning. And I think there’s 

plenty of responsibility to be spread around. I think it’s one of the 

great disappointments of my 21⁄2 years here that we have not yet 

brought significant cyber legislation to the floor of the U.S. Senate. 

And when we have a catastrophic breach, to go home to our constituents and say, ‘‘Well, we couldn’t do it because four different 

committees had authority, and we really just couldn’t get our act 

together,’’ that’s not going to be satisfactory to the people of the 

United States. So, certainly there needs to be action here in Congress. And hopefully that will be forthcoming this year. 

399 

On the other hand, it seems to me that we need to be thinking 

about doctrine and the development of a doctrine of cyber, which 

we don’t seem to have now, other than defense. And in my view, 

the—there has to be an offensive capability which our adversaries 

understand, and understand will be applied. The only good thing 

about the theory of deterrence and the mutually assured destruction which applied to our nuclear posture for 70 years is that it 

worked. And it just seems to me logical that if our policy is strictly 

defensive, we’re like a guy in a fight who won’t be allowed to 

punch. Eventually, you’re going to lose that fight. I would urge you 

to think about this. And I’d appreciate your thoughts. Assuming we 

can identify it’s a state actor, not an amateur hacker or a criminal 

conspiracy, but a state actor, it seems to me there has to be some 

price to be paid. Would you agree, General? 

General SELVA. I do agree, Senator, and I look forward to working with the committee, if confirmed, to examine the doctrine for 

the offensive use of cyber capabilities, both as a deterrent and as 

an offensive weapon in warfare. 

Senator KING. And I hope not only with the committee and with 

Congress, but also with that all-important Deputies Committee of 

the National Security Council. That’s where it seems to me this 

policy has to emanate, and then we can work it over here. 

General McDew, I assume you agree? 

General MCDEW. I do agree, Senator, in that the role of attribution—the interesting part, for me, as I evolve my knowledge of the 

cyberthreat, is that it is such a low cost of entry, and so much damage can be wielded from it. 

Senator KING. Without consequence. 

General MCDEW. Right. 

Senator KING. And we need to be talking about—there need to 

be consequences. 

Well, I hope you gentlemen will pursue that, because right now 

we’re playing defense, and we’re not winning very—we’re not getting very far. We’re getting—it’s getting more and more serious, 

and we are facing a catastrophic attack, in my view, akin to the 

next Pearl Harbor. Both we in Congress and the administration 

have to be thinking about a more comprehensive doctrine and not 

just talking about how do we work together for defensive purposes. 

Again, gentlemen, thank you very much. 

General McDew, I understand your early flying career took place 

at Loring Air Force Base in northern Maine, and delighted to have 

you before us. 

Congratulations on your nominations. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service, and congratulations on 

your nomination. 

General McDew, I just want to add a compliment. At least in my 

career, I’ve had the opportunity to work with some of the 

TRANSCOM military members and, you’re correct, I think, in 

many ways, unheralded workhorse for the U.S. military in many 

ways behind the scenes. So, I just want to commend all of your 

400 

members on a great job, and want to commend your families for 

their service, as well. 

General Selva, I just wanted to touch briefly—it’s obviously getting a lot of press right now—on Iran. And in one of the most powerful testimonies we had in front of this committee in the last half 

year was Henry Kissinger, who came in and talked to this committee about devising strategy. And one of the things he mentioned, that one of the most important things we need to ask ourselves as we’re putting together strategy is, What do we seek to 

prevent as a country, no matter how it happens, and, if necessary, 

alone? Kind of his top strategic thought for this committee. 

I had asked Secretary Carter, during his confirmation hearing, if 

he thought preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon would 

fall into that category? What do we seek to prevent, no matter how 

it happens, and, if necessary, alone? He said yes, absolutely. Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Now, that was during his confirmation testimony. It’ll be interesting to see if he still 

believes that, given the agreement that’s been announced. If—do 

you agree with him on that? 

General SELVA. I agree with Dr. Kissinger, that if we can find 

no allies, partners, and friends to help us achieve the results that 

we believe are important, we have to be willing and able to go it 

alone. 

Senator SULLIVAN. But, do you think that preventing Iran from 

obtaining a nuclear weapon falls into that category, like Secretary 

Carter did in his confirmation hearing? 

General SELVA. Senator, I agree that preventing the Iranians 

from getting a nuclear weapon is a critical national interest. 

Senator SULLIVAN. So, if this agreement, once we unpack it, allows for a pathway to develop a nuclear weapon after 10 or 15 

years, would you disagree with it—— 

General SELVA. I will reserve—— 

Senator SULLIVAN.—in your personal view? 

General SELVA. I will reserve judgment until I’ve had the opportunity to look at the entire agreement. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Well, I’m just posing a hypothetical. In your 

personal view, if the agreement, in 10 to 15 years, allow the Iranians to have a pathway to obtain a nuclear weapon, do you think 

that’s in the national interest of the United States? 

General SELVA. Then we will have to have the capability to address that eventuality when it’s presented, Senator. 

Senator SULLIVAN. You’re not answering my question, General. 

General SELVA. Sir, I am opposed to the Iranians possessing a 

nuclear weapon. 

Senator SULLIVAN. In 15 years? 

General SELVA. Ever. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay. 

General SELVA. Because— 

Senator SULLIVAN. So, if this agreement allows that in 15 years, 

you would think that’s not in the interest of the United States? 

General SELVA. Correct. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Let me ask a question. You know, you’ve spent a lot of time, in 

your career, in the Asia-Pacific. This committee’s been very interVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00406 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ested in the rebalance strategy. The NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] that just passed with bipartisan numbers had a 

strong provision in supporting the President’s Asia-Pacific rebalance. The countries that you actually mentioned as the top threats 

are all in the Asia-Pacific. And what we were trying to do in that— 

in the NDAA is provide additional credibility to the President. In 

that kind of defense guidance from Congress, should DOD be listening to Congress? 

General SELVA. Senator, I think the Department always has an 

obligation to listen to the will of Congress. 

Senator SULLIVAN. So, if there’s provisions in the NDAA that say 

we should not be decreasing, but increasing our force posture in the 

Asia-Pacific to enhance and provide credibility to the President’s 

Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy, the DOD should be doing that? 

General SELVA. To the extent that supports our national objectives globally, yes, sir. 

Senator SULLIVAN. If it seems that we’re not doing this, if you’re 

confirmed, will you work with this committee to make sure that 

DOD is implementing Congress’ defense guidance to increase forces 

in the Asia-Pacific? 

General SELVA. Senator, I will commit to you and to any Member 

of Congress to work with Congress to make sure that we have a 

balanced approach to the reaction that we have to have to the fiscal environment we live in. If that means we have to adjust our 

force structure on any part of the globe, I’ll make sure that I articulate the position that the Services and the combatant commanders have taken in making that happen. 

Senator SULLIVAN. But, Congress said we need to be increasing 

forces in the Asia-Pacific. Should DOD be doing that, given that 

that’s what we’re saying here, in terms of our constitutional oversight role for the defense of the Nation? 

General SELVA. Sir, the extent to which Congress funds the capabilities and provides the Department the flexibility within those 

funds to make the will of Congress happen, yes, sir, we should. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here today and for your willingness 

to continue to serve. 

I want to just follow up a little bit on the cyber comments—discussion that has been made this morning, because I notice that we 

are opening a Silicon Valley outreach office, called the Defense Innovation Unit, experimental. I wonder if you could speak to what 

the goal of that office is. 

General SELVA. Senator, I’m not aware of the detail of that specific office, but I am aware of broad outreach across the Department to try and examine opportunities to better understand our capacity to defend and protect the networks that are represented 

across all of our infrastructure, commercial and military, in cyber. 

I look forward to actually digging into that particular issue a little 

bit, if confirmed for the position of Vice Chairman. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

I appreciated the opportunity for us to talk a little bit before this 

hearing. And one of the things that we talked about when we met, 

402 

General Selva, is the challenge that we’re facing from Russia, and 

that one of the areas where it’s a real problem is the Russian propaganda campaign that, particularly in eastern Europe, in the Baltics, they are dealing with. So, can you tell me what we’re doing 

to respond to that Russia propaganda campaign, and whether you 

believe the DOD is coordinating as—in the best way to address 

that with the Department of State? 

General SELVA. Senator, subject to our meeting, I did a good bit 

more research on that subject, and it is my understanding that 

there is an operational and tactical-level capability inside the Department to react to propaganda campaigns against our allies, 

partners, and friends. But, that is done in close collaboration with 

the Department of State and their broader responsibility for public 

diplomacy. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And so, do you have thoughts about whether 

there are more efforts that can be undertaken, where we can, not 

only cooperate more closely, but be more proactive in our response 

to what Russia is doing? 

General SELVA. Senator, I think we need to evaluate each of the 

situations where the Russians are imposing their will on their close 

neighbors, some of whom are our allies, and make sure that we 

are, in fact, telling the truth when Russian intervention threatens 

the security of those sovereign states. 

Senator SHAHEEN. General Selva and General McDew, as you’re 

both aware, one of the real costs within DOD is for energy. And, 

as you’re—you have an overlapping responsibility for TRANSCOM, 

can you talk—I guess, General McDew, I will go to you first—about 

efforts to reduce energy use across the Department and why that’s 

important? 

General MCDEW. As the largest user of energy in the Federal 

Government, it is very important that we get our act together on 

how we do that. Our chief scientist and several people in my command, in Air Mobility Command, have worked with TRANSCOM 

and the Department of Transportation at a lot of—a number of initiatives, from how we fly our routes, how we configure our airplanes. We have done a number of initiatives to take weight off airplanes. It seems like not a big deal, but if you talk about 1 or 2 

percent on an airplane that flies as often as we fly, it becomes actually significant. Flying in formation with another airplane, and all 

the things we can do to take the guesswork out of some of the 

things we do, there’s more than that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, talk, if you will, about the targeted savings that we’re looking for—that we saw last year, that we’re looking for this year, and what potential you think there is in the future. 

General Selva? 

General SELVA. Senator, I would point out two within the transportation enterprise. First is an initiative to more effectively package the commodities that we ship over the ocean. The normal process, years ago, had us at about a 55-percent utilization rate of the 

space in the containers that travel over ocean. We have raised that 

metric to 85 percent, and are on a pathway to raise it to 90 percent, by volume. The same has been applied to our aircraft, where 

we build the cargo loads to a higher density. We have combined 

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that with an algorithm that tells us where it’s the cheapest to buy 

the fuel that we carry. All in combination, those initiatives, have 

yielded about a billion and a half in savings over the last 18 

months. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So, it’s significant to the Department. 

General SELVA. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Let me also—I only have a little time left, but 

I understand, General McDew, that you have experience flying the 

KC–135s, and you may be aware that Pease Air Base in New 

Hampshire is the first base to receive the new KC–46A aerial refueling tankers. We are a lot proud of that. I wonder if you could 

talk about the importance of that program and also its future role 

in supporting military operations around the world. 

General MCDEW. Absolutely, Senator. The unit at Pease has a 

strong history in air refueling and will be a valuable partner for 

decades to come. I have personally been to that unit. I have flown 

with members of that unit, and I’ve known that unit for a long 

time. The KC–135 has been the backbone of our air-refueling fleet 

for decades, and will be for decades to come. The KC–46 will bring 

new capabilities and a younger airplane to the fight. And it is great 

to have Pease partner. You have embraced our airmen, our Active 

Duty airmen who have joined that unit, and we can’t thank you 

enough for the work that’s done at Pease to bring on that airplane. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you. I think it’s a great model for 

integration between Active Duty and the Guard. And hopefully we 

will continue to see the role of the KC–46 be more prominent as 

we look at what’s happening around the world. 

Thank you both very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you for that commercial, General 

McDew. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank both of you for being here and 

for your service to the Nation. 

Following up on that commercial very much, I wanted to ask you 

right now, as I understand, with Pease and the 157th receiving the 

first National Guard unit to receive the basing of the KC–46A, 

there actually is the Site Activation Task Force right now at Pease, 

today, and that means approximately 60 subject-matter experts 

from the National Guard Bureau Air Mobility Command and the 

Program Office at Wright-Patterson are at Pease to prepare for the 

arrival of the KC–46A. I just want to ask both of you—General 

Selva, General McDew—is Pease still scheduled to receive 12 primary aircraft in December 2017? 

General MCDEW. Absolutely. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Pease ANGB is still programmed to receive the first KC–46 aircraft in February 

2018. Barring any further changes to the aircraft delivery schedule, Pease is slated 

to receive its 12th aircraft by the end of fiscal year 2018. 

General SELVA. I will echo my colleague. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, that’s terrific. And they’re ready to receive 

them, and looking forward to it. So, we’re glad that the Site Activation Task Force is there today. 

In addition to that, you’ve spoken, General McDew, about having 

actually flown with the 157th and the outstanding work that 

404 

they’ve done for the Nation. And one of the things that’s important 

is the strategic location of Pease in the Northeast, and the ability 

that we’ve been able to provide that support for TRANSCOM. And 

so, one of the things that I think makes it strategic is also the facilities that we have there. 

General Selva and General McDew, do you believe it’s important 

to maintain the existing facilities, including specifically the aircraft 

parking ramps, to support the day-to-day operations and contingency operations supporting TRANSCOM in the Northeast from 

Pease? 

General SELVA. Senator, as the combatant commander responsible for managing air refueling, the ability to deploy from, and employ from, sufficient ramp space that has hydrant refueling capable 

of handling tankers is a strategic asset up and down the eastern 

seaboard. Pease is one of several locations that has that capability, 

but it is one we use significantly. 

Senator AYOTTE. General McDew, do you think it’s important 

that we maintain that, especially with the basing of the new KC– 

46A at Pease? 

General MCDEW. I do, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. I appreciate it, General. 

I also wanted to follow up on some of the cyber questions that 

you’ve been asked. And what is it that we’re seeing, in terms of 

TRANSCOM, with additional cyberattacks? What do you believe 

are the biggest challenges for this area of command which is so 

critical to everything else we do in our ability, obviously, to defend 

the Nation? 

General SELVA. Being in the awkward position of having the sitting TRANSCOM Commander and the nominated TRANSCOM 

Commander at the table, let me open. 

As a consequence of the work that this committee did in addition 

to work that the Intelligence Community had been—had ongoing 

on the threats to TRANSCOM, we’ve actually completely rewired 

the way we do cyberdefense and cyberhygiene within the Command. So, we have put our forces, essentially, on the offense, looking for people that are intruding into the network. And the extent 

to which those are in law enforcement issue, we have a liaison from 

the FBI and local law enforcement in our headquarters that attends to those parts of the issues. We have members of the intelligence community that provide the liaison into the interagency intelligence community if it’s an intelligence issue. And then we have 

the capacity to turn those intrusions over to Cyber Command for 

our cyber mission team to begin defensive, and potentially offensive, action, if required. We exercised that in a recent exercise. 

Without getting into the classified results, we had a pretty good 

outcome with the Red Team trying to attack our networks. So, 

management of our cybercapability to do the command and control 

work that we do across such a broad network is incredibly important to us. 

Senator AYOTTE. Is that model that you’ve talked, which sounds 

like a very important model, and obviously I’m glad to hear you’re 

seeing some success with it—is that something that we’re going to 

see, now that you’re nominated to be the Vice Chairman, being implemented in other commands? 

405 

General SELVA. Senator, we’ve taken all the benchmarks from 

that set of lessons learned and shared them with all the other combatant commanders and with CYBERCOM. I will commit, if confirmed to becoming the Vice Chairman, to make sure that all the 

combatant commanders continue to share those kinds of lessons 

learned and improve our cyberdefense capability. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I think that’s really important. I appreciate it. And I want to thank both of you for your service—and your 

family—to the Nation. We deeply appreciate it. 

General SELVA. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Would the Senator from Maine have any additional comments about the criticality of Pease Air Force Base to 

western civilization as we know it? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KING. I was just going to comment that if I were running 

out of fuel over the North Atlantic, I would want the Maniacs from 

101st Air Refueling Wing in Bangor to come and—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Ah, I see. I thank the Senator from Maine. 

Senator KING. There are other air refueling wings in New England. I’m glad—I appreciate the chairman’s opportunity to make 

that point. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your service, and thank you to your families, as 

well, for their extraordinarily valuable support and service. 

I want to talk about a subject that has not been covered so far, 

small business set-asides. I’m a strong supporter of small business 

set-asides and the American shipping industry and our country’s 

domestic merchant marine sector. A number of constituents of 

mine have raised this issue with me, saying that DOD has moved 

away from the dedicated service contract model, and started using 

a new system, called Universal Service Contracts, to transport 

goods via ocean from the U.S. mainland to U.S. military installations around the globe. My constituent has raised concerns with 

TRANSCOM regarding the statutory requirement to use small 

businesses and mandatory small business preferences, but those 

concerns have not been met. I suspect others have raised similar 

kinds of concerns from other States. And so, I’m going to ask you 

whether, if you’re confirmed, you will work with my office to ensure 

that the statutory requirement to use small business and mandatory small business preferences is complied with. 

General MCDEW. Senator, I will do so, if confirmed. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Are you aware of this change of policy? 

General MCDEW. I am not aware of that one, Senator, specifically. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Could you look into it and get back to me? 

General MCDEW. I can, Senator. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

USTRANSCOM is an advocate for small business utilization and as of the end of 

the fiscal year 2015 second quarter, has already surpassed the fiscal year 2015 

Small Business goal of 15 percent (of prime contracts), established by the Department of Defense and as required by the Small Business Act, by achieving 22.17 percent small business utilization. Additionally, USTRANSCOM is fully compliant with 

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) small business requirements, as evidenced by 

406 

the ‘‘Highly Satisfactory’’ rating assigned following a May 2014 Small Business Administration (SBA) Surveillance Review. 

USTRANSCOM’s number one priority is readiness and the readiness of the global 

distribution enterprise to extend America’s helping hand or project combat power, 

anywhere, anytime. USTRANSCOM has moved some efforts previously accomplished under a dedicated service model to the USC–7 contract when circumstances 

warranted, such as where a significant change in cargo volume occurred and dedicated service was no longer feasible. The work performed under the USC–7 contract 

is in full accordance with the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. § 644(a)), the FAR, and 

all other laws and regulations. USTRANSCOM will continue to evaluate whether 

requirements are appropriate for set aside under the USC–7 contract in accordance 

with the Small Business Act. 

If confirmed, I will look into how USTRANSCOM accomplishes small business 

awards and will ensure that USTRANSCOM continues to follow the law that applies to use of small businesses. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And, if confirmed, what steps or policy 

changes can you take to ensure that small businesses, in fact, have 

a fair shot at doing business with TRANSCOM? 

General MCDEW. Senator, I’ve been a proponent and advocate for 

small businesses for my entire career. I will pledge to you, if confirmed, I will look deeply into this. And I can’t imagine us having 

a process that discounts small businesses, so I’ll have to see how 

we can encounter small business. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. What changes or policies in the course of 

your commitment, your past commitment—and I welcome it—have 

you seen DOD undertake? What kinds of initiatives? 

General MCDEW. I can—well, other than the fact that I can tell 

you DOD measures how often we actually contract with small businesses in several different categories, there is a grade for an organization inside, at least I’m familiar right now, the Department of 

the Air Force, on how we do with small businesses. So, I am very— 

I’m somewhat surprised by your comments right now, Senator. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, I hope that it is a surprise that is 

based on a misunderstanding that can be easily corrected. And I 

welcome your comments. Thank you very much. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service, along with your families. 

On behalf of Chairman McCain, I would declare the hearing adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:09 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to General Paul J. Selva, USAF 

by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied 

follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. In connection with your recent nomination to be Commander, U.S. 

Transportation Command you answered the Committee’s policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. You indicated that you did not 

see a need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions. 

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms 

changed since you testified before the Committee at your last confirmation hearing? 

Answer. No. 

Question. In light of your experience as Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, do you see any need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what modifications do you believe would be appropriate? 

407 

Answer. No. I do not presently foresee the need to make any modifications to the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

DUTIES

Question. Based on your experience as Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and 

functions set forth in section 154 of title 10, United States Code, and in regulations 

of the Department of Defense, that pertain to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff in general? 

Answer. At present, I do not recommend changes to the law or regulations. 

JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the chairman 

of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which has the responsibility 

to review and validate Service requirements. Are there any recommendations that 

you would make to modify the JROC or its authority or the requirements process? 

Answer. No, I do not believe any additional authorities or process changes required at this time. 

Question. Has the ‘trip-wire’ process, to bring troubled programs back to the 

JROC for a review and to consider performance trade-offs to mitigate further cost 

growth and/or schedule delays before the program faced a Nunn-McCurdy review, 

been regularly employed on large programs that have experienced significant cost 

growth and schedule delays? 

Answer. Yes. The JROC ‘‘trip-wire’’ process was put in place to address potential 

program difficulties prior to triggering a Nunn-McCurdy breach and subsequent review. A 2012 Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) guidance update incorporated additional unit-cost criteria in order to address schedule 

and quantity trip-wire criteria. It has been employed on several occasions to review 

and adjust requirements on large programs when appropriate to avoid follow-on 

Nunn-McCurdy breach criteria. 

Question. Has the JROC altered requirements, either for performance or procurement quantities, as a result of such reviews? 

Answer. Yes, the JROC has altered or revalidated requirements as a result of 

such reviews. Example programs include the warfighter information network—tactical (WIN–T), advanced anti-radiation guided missile, and the E–6B Block 1. 

Question. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) required the 

Secretary of Defense to ensure that trade-off analyses are conducted on cost, schedule, and performance as part of the requirements development and approval process. 

Such analyses enhance DOD’s understanding of what performance factors are the 

critical ones driving costs and schedules. What is your view of the modifications to 

the JROC process made by WSARA? 

Answer. The modifications resulting from the 2009 WSARA have benefited JROC 

deliberations and the supporting JCIDS process. The continuing refinements to 

JCIDS, the most recent review and update completed in February 2015, ensure the 

continued focus on trade-off discussions and resulting requirements validation decisions. 

Question. What additional steps do you believe that Congress or DOD should take 

to ensure that trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance objectives for 

major weapon systems are made at an appropriately early point in the acquisition 

process? 

Answer. The Department routinely evaluates opportunities for trade-offs among 

cost, schedule, and performance for major weapons systems. As an example, in 2012 

the Department revised the JCIDS instruction to ensure the JROC reviews a system’s Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to inform and shape Milestone A activities. As 

further steps are warranted, I will adjust the JCIDS policy and process and work 

with USD(AT&L) accordingly. 

Question. Are there any other recommendations that you would make to modify 

the JROC or its authority or the requirements process? 

Answer. No. At this time, I do not have any recommendations regarding modifications to the JROC or its authorities and the requirements process. If confirmed, I 

will continue to focus on the statutory responsibilities and authorities to ensure the 

appropriate rigor in validating realistic, technically achievable, prioritized, and cost 

informed requirements. 

Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the DOD acquisition process? 

Answer. I would judge the effectiveness of the JROC by how successfully it works 

in coordination and partnership with the leaders and primary stakeholders in the 

408 

requirements, acquisition, and resourcing processes to deliver capability to the 

warfighter within cost, schedule, and performance parameters. Over the past few 

years, the coordination between these processes and leaders has improved, and if 

confirmed, I intend to continue this close coordination. 

Question. What is your vision for the role and priorities of the JROC in the future? 

Answer. My vision is for the JROC to play a key role in developing the future 

joint force by providing a rigorous requirements basis, consistent with statutory responsibilities, to aid senior leader decision-making. If confirmed, I will ensure the 

development of a superior joint force remains a priority. 

Question. Do you believe the JROC process is sufficient to understand and identify 

where there are opportunities for multi-service collaboration or where programs 

could or should be modified to take advantage of related acquisition programs? 

Answer. Yes. One of the major responsibilities of the JROC process is to promote 

Service collaboration on joint requirements and raise awareness across the force on 

opportunities to modify or adapt related acquisition programs. 

Question. What principles guide your approach to inviting, and helping ensure the 

sufficient participation of other stakeholders in the JROC? 

Answer. Inclusiveness and frank discussions of key issues will guide my approach 

in my role as the chair of the JROC and requirements process leader. The recently 

updated JROC charter details roles and responsibilities of the Council, its subordinate boards, and other organizations with equity in JCIDS. 

Question. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report to accompany the fiscal 

year 2016 NDAA directs the Secretary of Defense to revalidate the total program 

of record buy quantity of each variant of the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter. How do you 

see the JROC’s role in this revalidation process? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service and Program Sponsor 

principals as well as the Department’s acquisition professionals to assess and validate joint military requirements identified by combatant commanders. I will take 

a deliberate look at balancing the capacity and the capabilities of the future Joint 

Force, including the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter program. 

JOINT CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS (JCIDS)

Question. What is your perspective on the responsiveness of the JCIDS process 

in addressing joint capabilities needs? 

Answer. I believe JCIDS is very responsive when addressing joint capability 

needs, whether in the normal course of the deliberate review and validation lane 

or when evaluating joint urgent or joint emergent operational needs. In addition to 

having urgent/emergent lanes within the process, the requirements process is flexible and the timeline to review and validate requirements has been tailored for additional timeliness when necessary in the past. If confirmed, I will ensure it continues 

to be flexible in its execution when appropriate. 

Question. What level of involvement in the joint requirements process and the 

JROC do you believe is appropriate for the COCOMs? 

Answer. I believe the combatant commands are key customers of, and stakeholders in, the requirements process. Combatant commands participate at every 

level, to include the JROC, Joint Capability Board, Functional Capability Boards 

and associated working groups. The recently updated JROC charter details the roles 

and responsibilities of the JROC, its subordinate boards, and other organizations 

with equity in JCIDS. If confirmed, I will ensure that combatant commands continue to play the appropriate role in the requirements process. 

Question. Do you think that JCIDS needs to be changed? If so, what are your 

views on the how it could be improved to make the process more responsive to users’ 

needs while efficiently investing resources in a fiscally constrained budget environment? 

Answer. No, not at this time. The Department recently updated JCIDS guidance 

documents and adjusted the JCIDDS process. If confirmed, I will monitor the 

changes put in place and adjust the process when and where necessary. 

Question. The requirements development process is not a stand-alone process, but 

instead is required to work collaboratively with the acquisition and budgeting processes. What steps are needed to better align the requirements development process 

with the acquisition and budgeting processes to make for a more efficient and effective process for delivering capabilities? 

Answer. Continued collaboration between the requirements’ process stakeholders 

and DOD leadership will be needed to more efficiently and effectively deliver capabilities to the war fighter. There have been substantial improvements in recent 

409 

years, which if confirmed I intend to continue, such as quarterly leadership forums 

among the Vice Chairman, Under Secretary for AT&L, and Director of CAPE. 

ACQUISITION REFORM AND ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

Question. What is your view of the changes made by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA)? 

Answer. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 has been 

instrumental in avoiding the high cost of fixing problems late in the acquisition 

process. WSARA also jump-started acquisition reform within Department and initiated a mindset of continuous process improvement as exemplified by Secretary 

Carter’s Better Buying Initiatives that I strongly endorse. 

Question. What role, if any, do you believe the JROC should play in the oversight 

and management of acquisition programs after requirements have been established? 

Answer. I believe that the JROC continues to play a key role in requirements 

oversight and portfolio management, maintaining visibility into acquisition programs developing capability solutions to meet validated/established requirements. 

There may be cases where validated requirements need to be reviewed and revalidated based on new conditions such as technology challenges, fiscal constraints, or 

changes in the threat environment. If confirmed, I will ensure the requirements 

process remains flexible and responsive to address requirements reviews as needed. 

Question. What role if, any, do you believe the JROC should play in reviewing the 

progress of major defense acquisition programs or other acquisition programs? 

Answer. The JROC already plays a role in reviewing the progress of major defense acquisition programs. The JROC considers the progress of programs in the 

yearly Chairman’s Gap Assessment and Chairman’s Program Recommendation. The 

JROC also receives yearly Portfolio Review assessments which include a review of 

major acquisition programs conducted by the Functional Capability Boards. 

Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Chairman or the 

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition management processes? 

Answer. No, I do not see a need for any change. 

Question. What is your view of the role played by Configuration Steering Boards 

in preventing cost growth due to requirements creep? 

Answer. When proactively utilized by the Service Acquisition Executive, Configuration Steering Boards have been highly effective in preventing cost-growth and 

identifying opportunities for requirements relief. 

Question. What do you see as the proper relationship between Configuration 

Steering Boards and the JROC in managing requirements for acquisition programs? 

Answer. The Configuration Steering Boards (CSBs) are responsible for reviewing 

acquisition programs on a regular basis to address issues causing hurdles to their 

success in delivering capability to the warfighter. The CSBs should continue to propose requirements reviews/changes to the applicable requirements validation body, 

to include the JROC. If confirmed, I will ensure the requirements process remains 

flexible and responsive to address those CSB-recommended reviews/changes needing 

JROC validation in a timely manner. 

Question. What is your view of the Nunn-McCurdy requirements for Major Defense Acquisition Programs that fail to meet cost, schedule, and performance objectives? 

Answer. I believe that the Nunn-McCurdy requirements for designated programs 

provide the necessary review for cost, schedule, and performance issues as needed. 

Question. What do you see as the proper relationship between the JROC and 

those DOD officials charged with implementing the Nunn-McCurdy requirements? 

Answer. The JROC supports USD(AT&L) in the Nunn-McCurdy process as detailed in the statutory language. As the validation body, the JROC reviews the program requirements to determine whether program continuation is essential to national security. If confirmed, I will ensure the JROC and the JCIDS process continues to provide prompt and robust support to the Nunn-McCurdy process and the 

designated lead official. 

URGENT NEEDS PROCESSES

Question. In your view, what specific steps should the Department take to better 

manage the joint urgent needs process? 

Answer. I believe the Department has taken robust action over the past several 

years to better manage the joint urgent needs process. Examples are the updated 

JCIDS and acquisition guidance that governs the Joint Urgent Operational Needs 

(JUONs), Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEONs), and component-specific urgent operational needs processes. Another example is the focus of the Warfighter 

410 

Senior Integration Group (W–SIG) to facilitate delivery of solutions to validated 

JUONs/JEONs/component-specific urgent operational needs. 

Question. What is your sense of where the DOD might consolidate urgent needs 

entities and/or processes and how cost savings could be achieved through such consolidation? 

Answer. My sense is that DOD is making good progress in consolidating urgent 

needs entities/processes and focusing remaining resources in improving delivery of 

validated urgent operational needs. 

Question. Do you believe that the Joint Staff should take steps to integrate the 

Joint Urgent Needs process with the individual services’ processes? If so, please explain? 

Answer. No. I believe there is an appropriate distinction between a componentspecific urgent operational need and a Joint Urgent/Emergent Operational Need. If 

confirmed, I will maintain awareness of the processes and propose changes when 

and where appropriate. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will to 

serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council. 

What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)? 

Answer. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal is vital to ensuring our Nation’s survival and central to the responsibilities of the NWC. I will work 

closely with the other NWC members to develop a plan for the Nuclear Enterprise 

to ensure the appropriate capabilities are available to sustain our nuclear arsenal 

for the long term. 

Additionally, I will work with the other NWC members to modernize our aging 

nuclear facilities, invest in human capital, accelerate dismantlement of retired warheads, and improve our understanding of foreign nuclear weapons activities. 

Question. What changes if any would you recommend to the organization, structure, or function of the NWC? 

Answer. USC Title 10 Section 179 sets forth the organization, structure and function of the NWC. While I am aware of the recent Congressional advisory panel that 

reported on this subject in detail, I have no recommendations at this time. However, 

if confirmed, I will work with the NWC chairman and other members to assess the 

organization, structure and function of the NWC, and where warranted, provide recommendations for change to increase effectiveness and value in support of the nuclear mission for national security. 

SPACE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Question. In many instances the military and intelligence space programs have 

experienced technical, budget, and schedule difficulties. In some instances these difficulties can be traced to problems with establishing realistic, clear, requirements 

and then maintaining control over the integrity of the requirements once established. If confirmed as chairman of the JROC you will be involved in determining 

these requirements. How in your view can or should the space systems requirements process be improved? 

Answer. It is my understanding that in order to address the specific issue of space 

systems the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) has been 

updated to allow for more trades between cost, performance, technology, and risk. 

If confirmed, I will continue to work with my 

counterparts in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense to ensure future space systems have robust and achievable requirements. 

Question. In general, space programs take many years to move from conception 

to launch. The result is that the technology in the satellites is significantly outdated 

by the time the satellites are launched and operational, which in turn, can lead to 

a decision to terminate a program early, and look to a newer technology. This vicious cycle results in significantly increased costs for space systems as sunk costs 

are never fully amortized. How in your view can this cycle be addressed? 

Answer. I believe one means of minimizing the use of outdated technology is to 

allow for technology insertion points into the acquisition process, balanced with limits on any requirements creep that could possibly derail the capability from achieving its core functionality. This allows for newer technology to influence the development program at specific points in the procurement of the space system enterprise. 

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Question. If confirmed you will continue to be a member of the Nuclear Weapons 

Council, and work closely with the National Nuclear Security Administration and 

its Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

What, in your view, are the longer-term Stockpile Stewardship Program goals and 

what are the key elements that should be addressed from a DOD perspective? 

Answer. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim of 

creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to enable the 

continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable 

without the need for nuclear weapons explosive testing. The Secretaries of Defense 

and Energy are required by statute to certify annually to the Congress the safety, 

security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. 

I believe these goals are appropriate and the program is effective, as evidenced 

by our ability to certify the stockpile for over 20 years without the need for underground testing. That said, while the National Nuclear Security Administration has 

made significant investments in the tools and facilities that have made this possible, 

we must now leverage those investments and turn our attention to executing Life 

Extension Programs so we can sustain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile for the 

future. If confirmed, I will work across the interagency to ensure an appropriate balance between Life Extension Programs and science-based stockpile stewardship. 

Question. In your view is the Stockpile Stewardship Program providing the tools 

to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing and if not what tools are needed? 

Answer. Yes. I believe the Stockpile Stewardship Program provides the requisite 

tools, as attested to by the directors of the nuclear weapons design laboratories in 

their annual assessment letters. 

Question. Do you believe the Administration’s 1251 report sets forth an appropriate road map for the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and the strategic delivery systems? 

Answer. Yes, the Administration’s section 1251 report describes an appropriate 

roadmap for ensuring the future safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile and associated delivery platforms, including the steps necessary to modernize 

the aging infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex. This plan represents a 

strong commitment to the nuclear mission and is an important element of assurance 

that the U.S. deterrent remains strong. Additionally, this plan reflects the work of 

the Nuclear Weapons Council in developing a responsible and affordable long-term 

plan for the Nuclear Enterprise. 

Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President’s plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a 

critical national security priority? 

Answer. Yes, full funding of the 1251 report is a critical national security priority. 

The President’s fiscal year 2016 Budget Request includes a significant commitment 

from the Department of Defense to modernize the nuclear weapons complex and 

support the long-term plan for extending the life of our enduring stockpile. If confirmed, I will support the continued modernization and sustainment of our nuclear 

weapons delivery systems, stockpile, and infrastructure. 

Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort do you believe it would be 

prudent to consider reductions below New START Treaty limits for either the deployed or nondeployed stockpile of nuclear weapons? 

Answer. It is my view that any reductions in the numbers of deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons, either strategic or non-strategic, would need to be negotiated in a manner that strengthens deterrence of potential adversaries, maintains 

strategic stability with Russia and China, and assures our allies and partners. The 

timing and size of reductions, if any, would have to be closely coupled to the status 

of the modernization effort. If confirmed, I will support the Department’s continuing 

assessment of the proper force size and capabilities required for an effective nuclear 

deterrent. 

CYBERSECURITY

Question. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s inquiry into U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) determined that TRANSCOM was subjected to 

many cyber intrusions that were not reported. TRANSCOM also suffered from a 

lack of awareness by other law enforcement and national security agencies regarding cyber intrusions on TRANSCOM contractors as well as misunderstandings by 

TRANSCOM personnel on the rules and processes for sharing cyber intrusion-related information with necessary officials. 

Have you reviewed this report? 

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Answer. Yes, I have reviewed the report. Cybersecurity has long been a high priority for USTRANSCOM, and we immediately went to work to address the findings 

identified in the report. 

Question. What actions did TRANSCOM take in response to the Senate Armed 

Services Committee report’s findings? 

Answer. TRANSCOM worked with OSD and the Joint Staff to implement the recommendations. We established a Cyber Mission Analysis Task Force which used incident scenarios to refine the implementation actions. These actions included updating our critical contractors list and sharing it with the Defense Cyber Crime Center; 

enhancing our relationship with key mission partners, including the FBI and the 

DHS; encouraging our commercial partners to participate in the Defense Industrial 

Base Cybersecurity and Information Assurance Program; and engaging in professional associations, such as the National Defense Transportation Association. In addition, the command standardized cyber defense contracting language according to 

DOD acquisition guidelines and adopted widely-recognized standards from the National Institutes of Standards and Technology. 

Question. Do you feel that the Department of Defense is responding appropriately 

given recent events such as the threat nation intrusions into databases on U.S. personnel including DOD employees? 

Answer. Yes, I do. We continue to support key interagency partners in recovery 

and mitigation actions and we have increased our internal focus on strengthening 

cyber readiness and enforcing basic cyber hygiene. Additionally, protection of personal information has been part of our recurring operations security training for 

many years now. With respect to the recent intrusions, the Department has used 

a variety of means, including town hall meetings, to proactively inform our people 

how they can protect themselves from possible identity theft. 

Question. What actions do you plan to take, if confirmed, as the Vice Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that DOD reduces the risk of cyber intrusions? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the Department’s partnership with other 

U.S. agencies to defend the U.S. Homeland and U.S. interests from cyber-attack. 

Foremost, the DOD must continue to implement current initiatives in the DOD 

Cyber Strategy, including developing a ready and capable Cyber Mission Force and 

associated cyber workforce. Next, we must continue to improve our network security 

architecture and shift the focus from protecting service-specific networks to securing 

the DOD enterprise in a unified manner through the deployment of the Joint Information Environment. Additionally, I will focus on requirements for new weapon systems to be designed and developed to operate and survive against capable cyber adversaries. Finally, because the DOD cannot guarantee that every cyberattack will 

be denied successfully, I will ensure our forces train to operate within a degraded 

cyber environment. 

Question. Do you believe that the current posture of the Department of Defense 

is sufficient to deter adversaries in cyberspace? 

Answer. Cyber deterrence is complex and challenged by the number of actors and 

diversity of their capabilities and motivations. Effective cyber deterrence requires 

both policies and capabilities that are aligned with all the elements of our national 

power. The Department must continue to develop capabilities to attribute and deter 

cyberattacks from both state and non-state actors. 

Question. Do you believe a robust offensive cyber capability is required to counter 

the activities of our adversaries and hold their cyber-enabled capabilities at risk? 

Answer. Yes. One of the tenets of the Department’s cyber strategy is the ability 

to provide the President a variety of cyber options, to include offensive options when 

directed. The Department, in conjunction with other interagency partners, must provide those capabilities should the need arise. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Vice Chairman and other officials. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 

the following officials: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Vice Chairman performs duties assigned to him and other duties as 

assigned by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. In the 

absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as the Chairman and 

performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or until the absence or disability ceases. These duties include providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense. The Vice Chairman may also provide the Secretary of Defense 

advice upon the Secretary’s request in his capacity as a military adviser. 

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Question. The National Security Advisor. 

Answer. The Vice Chairman works closely with the Chairman and the National 

Security Advisor to ensure that military efforts and options are synchronized with 

other department and agency efforts across the government. When performing the 

duties of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman serves as an advisor to the National Security Council and works with the National Security Advisor to inform and implement Presidential decisions. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated 

full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon 

which the Secretary is authorized to act. 

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. The Under Secretaries of Defense are the principal staff assistants and 

advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas, and 

they exercise policy and oversight functions within their respective areas. In carrying out their duties, the Under Secretaries issue instructions and directive memoranda to implement the Secretary’s approved policies. When carrying out their responsibilities as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, Under Secretaries typically transmit communications to commanders of the unified and specified 

commands through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the Chairman is 

absent or disabled, they can communicate through the Vice Chairman as necessary. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense. 

Answer. The DOD General Counsel serves as the chief legal officer of the Department of Defense, and generally is responsible to oversee legal services, establish policy, and administer the DOD Standards of Conduct Program. The DOD General 

Counsel also establishes policy on specific legal issues and provides advice on significant international law issues raised in relation to major military operations, the 

DOD Law of War Program, or the legality of weapons reviews. Communications between the combatant commanders and the DOD General Counsel are normally 

transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The office of the 

DOD General Counsel works closely with the Office of Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Question. The Department of Defense Inspector General. 

Answer. The Department of Defense Inspector General performs the duties, has 

the responsibilities, and exercises the powers specified in the Inspector General Act 

of 1978. 

The Vice Chairman must cooperate with and provide support to the Department 

of Defense Inspector General as required. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him as a member 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as assigned by the Chairman, with 

the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of 

the Chairman, or during the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor 

is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I look forward to a 

close working relationship with the Chairman. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The Secretaries are the heads of their respective military Departments 

and are responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of 

their respective Departments. Subject to the authority, direction and control of the 

Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, 

the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. When the Chairman is absent or his office is vacant, the Vice Chairman advises the Secretary of 

Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of 

the Military Departments conform to priorities in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the Combatant Commands. The Secretaries of 

the Military Departments also are responsible for such other activities as may be 

prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services. 

Answer. The Vice Chairman has a close, collaborative relationship with the Service Chiefs. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are not in 

the operational chain of command. However, this change does not diminish their importance with respect to their Title 10 responsibilities. The Chiefs of Staff of the 

Services serve two primary roles. First, they are responsible for the organization, 

training, and equipping of their respective Services. They cooperate with and support the combatant commanders to assure the preparedness of assigned forces for 

414 

missions as directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President. Second, as 

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs are advisers to the President, National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. In this function, they play a critically important role 

in shaping military advice and developing our joint capabilities. The Vice Chairman 

works closely with the Service Chiefs to fulfill war-fighting and operational requirements. 

Question. The Combatant Commanders. 

Answer. The commander of a combatant command is responsible to the President 

and to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions assigned to that 

command by the President or by the Secretary with the approval of the President. 

Additionally, the Chairman serves as the means of communication between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense when directed by the 

President. When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the absence or 

disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman when interacting 

with the combatant commanders. The Vice Chairman should work closely with the 

combatant commanders to enable their war-fighting capabilities and provide other 

support and coordination as required. 

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. The Chief of the National Guard heads a joint activity of the Department 

of Defense and is the senior uniformed National Guard officer responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, programs and plans affecting Army 

and Air National Guard personnel. Through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau is the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on National Guard matters. He also serves as the principal adviser to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary and Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard and Air National Guard issues. The 

National Guard Bureau Chief also serves as the department’s official channel of 

communication with both the Governors and Adjutants General. As a member of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces 

in support of homeland defense and civil support missions. The Vice Chairman 

works closely with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to provide support as 

required. 

Question. The Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan. 

Answer. The Chairman and the Vice Chairman are not in the chain of command 

of the Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR–A). The Commander, 

USFOR–A reports to the Commander, USCENTCOM, who, in turn, reports directly 

to the Secretary of Defense. The Commander, USFOR–A does not have a formal 

command relationship with the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, but he coordinates with the Chairman through the Commander, 

USCENTCOM on a regular basis. The Commander, USFOR–A sends his advice and 

opinions related to Operation Resolute Support to the Commander, USCENTCOM, 

who, in turn, presents them to the Chairman. When there is a vacancy in the office 

of Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman 

acts as Chairman when interacting with the Commander, U.S. Forces—Afghanistan. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you expect 

to face if you are confirmed? 

Answer. The most significant challenge I expect to face, if confirmed, is the combination of a highly complex and volatile security environment, a Joint Force coming 

off a fourteen year war footing, and continued fiscal uncertainty. We must simultaneously contend with both near-peer (and rising near-peer) states as well as with 

increasingly capable and global non-state actors who seek to threaten the U.S. 

homeland, our interests, and our allies. Meanwhile we are working to rebuild the 

capacity, capability, and readiness of our Joint Force. Furthermore we must do this 

with one hand tied behind our back without the predictability of an annual base 

budget and without the authority to implement necessary and cost-saving reforms 

within the Department. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Department and interagency leadership 

and with the Congress to identify, communicate, and manage the operational and 

fiscal risks while continuing to advocate for the authorities and resources needed 

to develop and field a Joint Force capable of meeting the demands of the Nation 

today as well as prepare for future threats. 

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PRIORITIES

Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your 

priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what other priorities, beyond those 

associated with the major challenges you identified in the section above, would you 

set for your term as Vice Chairman? 

Answer. My priorities will be focused on developing necessary capabilities, concepts, and forces to defend the Nation in the 21st Century. This includes modernizing our aging nuclear enterprise, protecting our assured access to space, protecting 

DOD cyber networks and developing offensive cyber options for the President. It 

also includes supporting the Defense Innovation Initiative and supporting Secretary 

Carter’s Force of the Future Initiative to develop and care for the best All Volunteer 

Force the world has ever seen. 

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain 

of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct communications to combatant commanders be 

transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function. 

Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and effective chain of command? 

Answer. Yes. The law is clear that the chain of command runs from the President 

to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders 

of the combatant commands. Military doctrine reflects these command relationships. 

If confirmed, I will enable the decision-making process and transmit orders as directed. 

Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for U.S. 

military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority outside the chain of command established under title 10, United States Code? 

Answer. U.S. military forces should normally operate under the chain of command 

established in Title 10. There may be times, such as in the case of certain sensitive 

military operations, where it may be appropriate for the President to direct other 

temporary command relationships. However, in all cases U.S. armed forces supporting such operations remain bound by the law of armed conflict, are accountable 

to the Title 10 chain of command, and are subject to the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice for disciplinary matters. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the authorities and 

agreements which are in place to allow U.S. military personnel to carry out missions 

under the authorities contained in title 50, United States Code? Do you believe any 

modifications to these authorities are necessary? 

Answer. Under Title 50, the Secretary of Defense is charged with ensuring that 

the military departments maintain sufficient capabilities to collect and produce intelligence to meet requirements of the DNI, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, and 

COCOMs. Title 50 further authorizes the Secretary to use such elements of the 

DOD as may be appropriate for the execution of the national intelligence program 

functions described in section 3038 of title 50. As a general rule, our military forces 

are most effective when they operate under a military chain of command. However, 

there are circumstances in which exceptions to this general rule would permit our 

forces to be employed more effectively. There are existing authorities and agreements to facilitate the review and approval of such exceptions. I have no recommendations for changes to this framework at this time. 

ADVICE OF THE SERVICE CHIEFS, COMBATANT COMMANDERS, AND CHIEF OF THE

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

Question. Section 163 of title 10, United States Code, provides that the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman for the combatant commanders, 

especially on the operational requirements of their commands. Section 151 of title 

10 provides for the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit their advice 

or opinion, in disagreement with or in addition to the advice or opinion of the Chairman, and requires the Chairman to provide that advice at the same time that he 

presents his own advice to the President, National Security Council, or Secretary 

of Defense. 

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What changes to section 151 or 163, if any, do you think may be necessary to ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs, combatant commanders, and 

the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are presented and considered? 

Answer. I presently do not see a need to change section 151 or 163. 

OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff you would have significant responsibilities with regard to joint officer management policies. 

If confirmed, what modifications would you make to provide the Department of 

Defense and the military services the force management tools necessary to meet the 

needs of the 21st century joint, all-volunteer force? 

Answer. The Department, the Joint Staff, and the Services have worked over the 

past 10 years to develop force management tools to meet the challenges of the 21st 

century joint force. If confirmed, I will take every opportunity to examine the strategic environment to ensure that the tools remain relevant. 

Question. Do you believe the current DOD and service procedures and practices 

for reviewing the records of officers pending nomination by the President are sufficient to ensure the Secretaries of the military departments, the Secretary of Defense, and the President can make informed decisions? 

Answer. The current procedures and practices provide the Department and the 

Services the policies and procedures to identify officers for future leadership positions. The Services’ evaluations of the qualifications, previous performance, and potential of their officers provides the information to make informed decisions regarding the promotion and utilization of the Services’ officers. 

Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair and reasonable for 

the officers involved? 

Answer. I believe the procedures and practices are fair and reasonable for the officers involved. 

Question. What modifications, if any, to the requirements for joint officer qualifications are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to attain meaningful 

joint and service-specific leadership experience and professional development? 

Answer. I believe the requirement for officers to be educated, trained and oriented 

in joint matters through challenging joint experiences appropriately prepares officers for the challenges at both the strategic and operational level. I currently do not 

recommend any modifications to the joint officer qualification requirement. 

Question. In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification requirements on 

the ability of the services to select the best qualified officers for promotion and to 

enable officer assignments that will satisfy service-specific officer professional development requirements? 

Answer. Although there is limited time to meet the developmental requirements, 

the Services have proven they are able to develop their officers’ and provide a cadre 

of well-rounded and competitive officers capable of integrating service functions at 

both the strategic and operational level. I believe the end result provides the Department with officers who possess the greatest opportunity in senior leadership positions. 

Question. In 2008, Congress created the requirement that the Legal Counsel to 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be selected by a board of officers convened 

by the Secretary of Defense. This process remains the only joint duty officer position 

specifically selected by a selection board from among qualified officers of the armed 

forces. 

Do you consider the selection process required by section 156 of title 10, United 

States Code, to be an efficient and effective process for selecting officers from among 

the services to serve in this joint position? 

Answer. Yes. The selection process for this unique statutory position is efficient 

and effective. 

Question. What lessons, if any, have been captured from this joint officer selection 

board process that could improve the processes for selection of officers in the military services? 

Answer. My understanding is the lessons gleaned from the joint board process are 

specific to the joint environment and therefore would not apply to Services’ officer 

selection. 

Question. Would you support expanding the process used to select the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to other joint billets? Why or why 

not? 

Answer. We have a codified process which allows the Department to select qualified officers into established joint positions. Expanding our selection process, at this 

time, is unnecessary. Established processes used to select general/flag officers to 

417 

joint positions are sound. The process for identifying officers gives the Combatant 

Commander and the Chairman flexibility. We can select from across the Services 

(to include the Coast Guard); Active, Guard, and Reserve Component, to ensure we 

get the right individual with the right skills and experience. The process also gives 

the commander and leadership an opportunity to quickly review a slate of nominated officers, and conduct interviews as necessary. Finally, the process is extremely 

responsive to emerging or unexpected requirements. We can quickly alert the Services to identify eligible personnel, select, nominate and have them in position in as 

little as 90 days if necessary. 

HEADQUARTERS STREAMLINING

Question. The Senate reported Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization 

Act directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters functions of the Department of 

Defense and the military departments. 

Answer. If confirmed, and if the provisions in the bill become law, what would 

be your role in identifying and implementing streamlining and reductions in the 

Joint Staff? 

If confirmed, I will engage with the Chairman and Joint Staff to consider organizational streamlining by reducing, realigning, or eliminating redundant or conflicting requirements. 

Question. What Joint Staff areas, specifically and if any, do you consider to be the 

priorities for possible consolidation or reductions? 

Answer. An example of consolidation efforts that I would consider, if confirmed, 

is the potential consolidation of IT services and maintenance activities within the 

Pentagon to reduce costs and unnecessary redundancies. The Joint Staff J6 is currently working with U.S. Army Information Technology Agency (ITA), Washington 

Headquarters Services (WHS) and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to 

identify potential consolidation options. Additional potential areas for consolidation 

or reduction that I would consider, if confirmed, include the consolidation of support 

functions within Joint Staff directorates and the elimination of duplicative functions 

accomplished by the OSD, Joint Staff and Defense Activities. 

Question. To the extent that the Joint Staff has functions that overlap with the 

Department of Defense and the military departments, what would be your approach 

to consolidating and reducing redundancy? 

Answer. First we will have to determine if duplicative or redundant functions are 

directed by statute. Some duplicative responsibilities are laid out in law with some 

portions executed by the Department, some by the Joint Staff and some by the military departments. Legislative changes may be required to consolidate and reduce 

redundancies. A combined review by the OSD, Services and the Joint Staff may be 

the best course of action to identify duplicative functions to reduce, realign, or eliminate. 

TRAINING AND ASSIGNMENT OF GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS

Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of general and flag officers have 

advanced training and degrees in scientific and technical disciplines? 

Answer. Yes. The Joint Staff continues to work closely with the Service Chiefs 

and other leaders to ensure an appropriate pipeline of specialized, technical officer 

talent is available with the right-skilled and experienced leadership. We also have 

a rigorous and deliberate Service accession, training and development processes generate the technical and scientific capability needed in sufficient numbers to meet 

DOD mission needs. 

Question. Are the career paths for officers with technical skills appropriate to ensure that the Department and the services can execute complex acquisition programs, adapt to a rapidly changing technological threat environment, and make informed investment decisions? If not, what will you do to address this deficiency? 

Answer. While the Services vary with respect to the use of military in acquisition, 

each Service tailors officer career paths to meet Service mission priorities, which includes successfully executing critical major acquisition programs. I believe the Department has, and continues to grow, world-class, technically astute officers ready 

to take on the challenges of a rapidly changing technical and acquisition environment. Each Service has career path models that are appropriate and aligned with 

their force management process. 

Question. In your view do current general and flag officer assignment policies provide and incentivize qualified officers to serve in acquisition programs? Do tour 

lengths for those assignments enable and empower such officers to effectively manage acquisition programs? If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to improve the effectiveness of senior officers assigned those duties? 

418 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen communication processes between Vice Service Chiefs, Service Acquisition Executives and OSD leadership to 

make sure we continuously improve our policy, development and assignment of top 

motivated, qualified military personnel in Defense Acquisition. Senior officers are 

assigned with adequate tenure to effectively manage their programs and the Services demonstrate flexibility in adjusting tour lengths to logical progression points in 

acquisition programs. 

Question. Are you satisfied that the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, and 

the military services have in place sufficient training and resources to provide general and flag officers, and Senior Executive Service employees the training they 

need to make informed, ethical decisions? If not, what actions would you take, if 

confirmed, to address your concerns? 

Answer. Yes. The ability to make ethical decisions based on the shared values of 

the profession of arms is identified as a specific Desired Leader Attribute for leaders 

throughout the military and is 

common to all Joint and Service developmental efforts. The ethical foundation is 

laid at the outset of an officer’s career and is further developed and reinforced in 

formal education and training settings throughout their progression through the 

ranks. If confirmed, I will ensure these high standards are upheld. 

Question. It has been observed that despite numerous changes in the law, the requirements and the process for attaining joint officer qualifications is still beset by 

systemic challenges. Some of these challenges appear to force the services to make 

officer assignments to ‘‘check the box’’ for joint qualifications at the cost of depriving 

the services of flexibility to assign officers to other career enhancing and professional development opportunities. Officers not assigned to a designated joint billet 

on an operational staff receive joint credit while other officers supporting the same 

joint commander do not receive joint credit unless they submit a package to have 

their assignments qualify for joint service. As operational tempo remains high and 

as end strength continues to decline to historically low levels, some exceptionally 

qualified officers will be unable to serve in qualifying assignments to earn joint 

credit because the Nation demands they perform other critical duties. As a result 

those officers may be disadvantaged professionally as compared to their peers for 

promotion eligibility. Given the substantial resources invested in the developing officers to serve successfully in, and to support or lead joint forces, more must be done 

to improve the joint qualification system or to replace it with a system that is more 

effective. 

If confirmed, what steps would you take to review the joint qualification requirements to ensure that the qualification process is matched to the increasingly joint 

service environment in which many officers serve throughout their careers? 

Answer. Developing officers to successfully serve in or lead joint forces is very important and worth the resources invested. Services must actively manage the officers’ careers to ensure the most talented officers obtain the joint qualification. Officers who do not develop these skills, no matter how exceptional their performance 

at the tactical level, are not adequately prepared to accept challenging joint assignments when compared to their peers. The joint officer qualification process provides 

a tested and flexible means to ensure officers develop the skills necessary for successful service at the operational and strategic levels. The current process also already includes the means for officers in non-joint operational assignments to receive 

credit toward joint qualification if their duties lead to the acquisition of significant 

experience in joint matters. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the joint officer qualification requirements, process, and resource investments continue to deliver the 

Joint Force necessary to meet the demands of the Nation. 

Question. Should the formal requirement for joint qualifications be eliminated as 

a consideration for promotions and assignments? 

Answer. No. I believe we need to continue to ensure our future senior leaders are 

well-prepared to operate in challenging joint environments. The promotion requirement incentivizes both the Service and the officer to obtain joint experience. 

SECURITY STRATEGIES AND GUIDANCE

Question. How would you characterize current trends in the range and diversity 

of threats to national security we face today to national security? 

Answer. The range and diversity of threats are increasing. Both potential state 

and non-state adversaries are projected to possess increased military capabilities, 

and will continue to benefit from the rapid diffusion of technology. Likewise, future 

adversaries are also developing new ways to counter our traditional military advantages. 

419 

Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance issued January 2012 took into account 

a $487 billion dollar reduction in defense resources. 

With the additional $500 billion in cuts to the Department of Defense as a result 

of sequestration, is the Defense Strategic Guidance still valid? 

Answer. If sequestration proceeds we receive less funding, then we will be forced 

to make further decisions with regard to capabilities, capacity and readiness—which 

will result in increased risk for our combatant commanders. Sequestration will have 

a direct impact on the readiness of the Joint Force to execute operations and support the goals outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance. 

Question. In your view, as Russian aggression and the emergence of ISIL have 

occurred since the Defense Strategic Guidance was issued in January 2012, is that 

strategic guidance still appropriate for the threats we face today or do you think 

an update is warranted? 

Answer. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense 

Review provide broad guidance to meet the full range of potential threats, from 

high-end state adversaries to non-state organizations. As threats evolve, it is appropriate to review the assumptions made in formulating a strategy. If confirmed, I will 

work with the Joint Staff and the Department to determine the necessity for an update to the strategic guidance. 

Question. In your view, are our defense strategy and current establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the military departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. forces properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet 

security challenges the Nation faces today and into the next decade? 

Answer. With planned, stable funding, I am confident we will be able to balance 

capability, capacity, and readiness. If BCA returns, the Services will have to make 

additional cuts to their forces, impacting capabilities, capacity and readiness, leading to increased risk to meeting current and future security challenges. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the capabilities, structure, roles, and missions of the defense establishment? 

Answer. If confirmed as Vice Chairman, I would focus on finding the balance between capacity, capabilities, and readiness for the Joint Force in order to best prepare for current and future threats. Our cyber, space, and nuclear capabilities will 

be an area of particular emphasis. 

STRATEGIC RISK

Question. How and over what periods of time, if at all, will reductions to Army 

and Marine Corps end strength increase strategic risk? 

Answer. Army and Marine Corps forces are an important part of our ability to 

respond to multiple, simultaneous, or near-simultaneous, crises and to deter conflicts. Our soldiers and Marines also play a key role in reassuring our allies and 

shaping conditions overseas through security cooperation activities. End strength 

levels must be considered in light of these missions, the strategic environment, readiness levels, and operational tempo. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army and Marine 

Corps’ decision to reduce active end strength to 450,000 and 182,000 soldiers respectively by the end of 2017? 

Answer. I believe that any change in end strength needs to be understood in 

terms of risk. Reducing our Army and Marine Corps end strength increases risk and 

may impact our ability to shape world conditions, assure allies, and deter conflicts. 

However, I believe our current strategy is still achievable at these end strengths, 

though at increased risk. Any further cuts though, would dramatically increase our 

strategic risk. 

Question. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if any, to reduce 

or mitigate this strategic risk? 

Answer. I believe we would have to prioritize what we are asking our forces to 

do on a daily basis. For some missions, we should look to our allies and partners 

to help mitigate risk. In other missions, we would need to look for different ways 

to operate. Ultimately, consistent with our funding levels, we need to align resources to counter our most dangerous threats. 

Question. Upon issuance of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the fiscal year 

2015 budget reduced projected defense budgets by $113 billion over five years. What 

was the incurred strategic risk of this reduction relative to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance? 

Answer. A reduction on defense resources in an increasingly complex strategic environment will introduce strategic risk to our defense strategy (both the QDR and 

DSG). I am happy to discuss further details in a classified venue. 

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CHAIRMAN’S RISK ASSESSMENT

Question. In his 2013 risk assessment, Chairman Dempsey identified for the first 

time six National Security Interests that were derived from four enduring interests 

contained in the 2010 National Security Strategy. The April 2013 assessment identified several areas of broad and significant risk to national security as a result of 

current budget issues. 

How would you characterize the trends of risk in these areas (whether they are 

increasing or decreasing)? 

Answer. Overall, strategic and military risk trends are increasing. I would be 

happy to discuss risk in a classified venue. 

Question. What is your current assessment of the risk to combatant commanders 

in their ability to successfully execute their operational plans? 

Answer. In an unclassified forum I am reluctant to go into much detail. Generally, 

our combatant commanders face increasing risk, especially if BCA goes back into 

effect. We ask a lot of our commanders, and we must be prepared to resource them 

appropriately. I will say that all military operations entail risk, but we are committed to providing the President a range of options given any threat to U.S. interests. 

TRANSFORMATION

Question. Military ‘‘transformation’’ has been a broad objective of the Armed 

Forces since the end of the Cold War. In your view, what does military ‘‘transformation’’ mean? 

Answer. Military transformation means building a Joint Force that is intellectually and organizationally capable of seizing and capitalizing on emerging technological or organizational opportunities, not just adapting or reacting to conditions 

that the world presents. Military transformation is realized over time through constant innovation in our organizational structures, doctrine, education, leader development and material capabilities. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the progress made by 

the Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, toward 

transforming the Armed Forces? 

Answer. My understanding is that we are making progress, but there is more 

work to be done. We are continuing the implementation of the Joint Operational Access Concept, a concept that provides a framework to ensure the Joint Force can 

continue to conduct operations to gain access based on the requirements of the 

broader mission despite growth of anti-access and area-denial threats. We’re also 

making progress in the Joint Information Environment, implementing innovation 

change across the Department that enhance mission effectiveness and cyber security. Ultimately, our goal is a versatile, responsive, decisive, and affordable Joint 

Force. 

Question. If confirmed, what goals, if any, would you establish during your term 

as Vice Chairman regarding military transformation in the future? 

Answer. If confirmed, I believe we should be selective in the capabilities we choose 

to reconstitute as we draw down in Afghanistan, while ensuring that lessons 

learned over a decade of war are retained. As we get smaller, we must become increasingly versatile, agile and opportunity-seeking. I intend to use my role in the 

JROC and innovation initiatives to advance this transformation. 

Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a larger role in transformation? If so, in what ways? 

Answer. I believe the Joint Staff has an increasingly important role to play in developing a common understanding of future challenges and how the Joint Force 

must evolve for success in the future operating environment. To this end, the Joint 

Staff has a number of useful and unique mechanisms at its disposal. These include 

military strategy development, joint concepts, war gaming, future joint force requirements, and joint training. I see the Joint Staff increasingly as an aligning 

mechanism across all the different Joint Force development processes in the department. 

MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY

Question. In your opinion, do current military plans include the necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in the 2014 QDR? Where are areas of 

higher risk? 

Answer. In an unclassified forum I am reluctant to go into much detail. The Joint 

Staff and the Services constantly review our capability portfolios in order to ensure 

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we can achieve our objectives against potential adversaries. The committee receives 

a quarterly classified report that details gaps in our current military plans. 

Question. Does the 2014 QDR specify the correct set of capabilities to decisively 

win in future high-end engagements? 

Answer. I believe future engagements may be characterized by increasingly sophisticated adversaries employing advanced weapons and challenging the access 

and advantages in space and cyberspace that U.S. forces currently enjoy. The 2014 

QDR calls for continued investment in new systems and development of operational 

concepts to address these evolving threats. The recently released National Military 

Strategy reinforces the QDR’s guidance; prioritizing investments to counter anti-access area denial threats, as well as space, cyber, and hybrid threats. 

Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR, American 

forces should be able to ‘‘defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased 

campaign, and deny the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.’’ 

In your opinion, does the Department’s force sizing construct provide adequate capability to address the country’s current threat environment? 

Answer. Yes, the force sizing construct, with its emphasis on a range of military 

options, provides adequate capability to address the country’s current threat environment. This particular excerpt applies to situations where deterrence has failed. 

The first portion of the force sizing construct states that the U.S. military will be 

‘‘capable of simultaneously defending the homeland; conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and in multiple regions, deterring aggression and 

assuring allies through forward presence and engagement.’’ The construct involves 

more than just capability, it also provides a framework to evaluate capacity and 

readiness. To this end, we need support from Congress to ensure that we have sufficient resources to conduct a wide spectrum of missions globally, while maintaining 

a thoughtful balance of capability, capacity and readiness to respond to a crisis and 

win decisively. 

Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR, American 

forces should be able to ‘‘defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased 

campaign, and deny the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.’’ Are the services adequately sized to meet this construct? 

Answer. I believe the Services are able to provide forces to meet the construct. 

Resource constraints have eroded the readiness of the joint force, however, and extended the timelines to make forces available to respond to combatant commander 

needs. Lack of reliable funding levels hinders our ability to field trained, read forces 

to meet combatant commander demand. 

Question. What will you advise if the Department cannot meet the demands 

placed on it? 

Answer. I would advise that we carefully prioritize the most important missions 

necessary for meeting our military and defense objectives and for protecting our national security interests. I would also advise that we consistently work with Congress to ensure the Department has sufficient resources to meet the demands the 

Nation places upon it. 

FUTURE ARMY

Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) of January 2012 articulated the 

need to shift strategic emphasis toward the Asia-Pacific region while continuing to 

engage in the Middle East. Do you agree that future high-end military operations, 

as envisioned by the DSG, will primarily be naval and air engagements such that 

the Army will have difficulty justifying the size, structure, and cost of the number 

and equipment its combat formations? 

Answer. Looking only at current threats in a particular region as a way to justify 

force structure is unwise. We must have a robust and capable military ready to respond to multiple threats. The Army has, and will always have, an essential role 

in the Asia-Pacific region as well as in the rest of the world. If confirmed as Vice 

Chairman, I would support the Chairman in seeking a fully-trained joint force ready 

to defend our national security wherever it is threatened. 

Question. In your view, what are the most important considerations or criteria for 

aligning the Army’s size, structure, and cost with strategy and resources? 

Answer. Our Nation needs an Army that conducts full spectrum operations as 

part of the joint force. It must be appropriately sized, structured, and equipped to 

in order to defend the Nation and defeat our adversaries. The Quadrennial Defense 

Review deemphasized long duration stability operations and reinforced the importance of defeating and denying the objectives of an adversary. The Army continues 

realigning and resizing consistent with this guidance. 

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Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to properly align 

the Army’s size and structure with the requirements of security strategies and the 

likely availability of resources? 

Answer. The Department has assessed our ability of all Services to execute the 

defense strategy with their programmed force structure, including the Army. We 

can execute our strategy at current funding levels with acceptable risk. With the 

Army, and all of the Services, we must continually assess threats and make adjustments to ensure we have a healthy force, with the right mix between the active and 

reserve components. 

DEFENSE REDUCTION

Question. In your view, what have been/will be the impacts of the following budget 

reductions on the military, their capability, capacity, and readiness? 

Initial Budget Control Act reduction of $487 billion 

Answer. The initial Budget Control Act resulted in an immediate and substantial 

reduction to the Department’s topline and forced our military to make difficult resource decisions, such that we now have a strategy with little to no margin for surprise. The BCA reduction translates to increased risk to our strategy, across the 

board. 

Question. Sequestration in fiscal year 2013 

Answer. Due to the nature of sequestration, the fiscal year 2013 cuts reduced already-strained readiness. To date, sequestration has resulted in cuts to training, exercises, deployments and maintenance, all of which have a negative impact on force 

morale. Further, the sequester reductions disrupted modernization efforts and resulted in civilian furloughs and a hiring freeze. 

Question. Reduction of $115 billion in projected spending in the fiscal year 2015 

budget, in line with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review 

Answer. The fiscal year 2015 budget request assumes higher risks in some areas, 

but this budget helps us to remain a modern and capable military even while 

transitioning to a smaller force and resetting readiness over time. The $115 billion 

reduction refers to the difference between the PB15 (FYDP) submission and the 

BCA sequestration levels across fiscal year 2015–19. Funding to the sequester levels 

would result in reduced force structure, decreased readiness funding, exacerbating 

the existing readiness shortfalls, and reductions to modernization efforts. It would 

erode our ability to respond to emergent challenges (i.e., increasingly contested 

space and cyber domains, a resurgent Russia, the Ebola response, and the rise of 

ISIL), and our ability to execute the defense strategy. 

Question. Sequestered Budget Control Act discretionary caps starting in fiscal 

year 2016 onward 

Answer. If sequester level cuts return in fiscal year 2016, then we will see increased risks and fewer military options to defend our Nation and its interests. The 

impact of sequestration and other budget constraints will further reduce unit readiness and disrupt modernization. The effects caused by deferred maintenance, and 

lost training will impose significant strain on long-term institutional readiness. Ultimately, reduced readiness (i.e., reduced training cycles, deferred maintenance, and 

the continuing pace of current operations) will damage the effectiveness, credibility 

and the morale of our military. Continued sequester cuts will create a situation 

where our defense strategy may no longer be viable. 

Question. The fiscal year 2016 budget request assumes that the Budget Control 

Act will be amended in fiscal year 2016. The fiscal year 2016 budget resolution 

passed by the Senate and House of Representatives do not assume this but instead 

provides $38 billion of the necessary spending through OCO budget. Should this 

funding not be available, what recommendations would you have, if confirmed, for 

how the Department of Defense should manage the $35 billion in cuts for fiscal year 

2016? 

Answer. We remain hopeful that Congress can halt the abrupt, deep, and blunt 

cuts of sequestration and we will continue to reduce costs through increased efficiency and reforms, some requiring Congressional support. But an fiscal year 2016 

budget at BCA cap levels will create risks requiring us to revisit the defense strategy. With a $35 billion cut in fiscal year 2016, we will be forced to further reduce 

the size of the force, delay readiness restoration, and reduce modernization and investment programs. 

Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could have on readiness? 

Answer. The loss of $35 billion from the fiscal year 2016 defense budget would 

gravely undercut the Department’s readiness and future force generation capability. 

We would be forced to mortgage readiness recovery, equipment recapitalization, and 

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force modernization in order to support currently deployed and next-to-deploy forces. 

Placing all of this in the context of expanding global threats, we would be unable 

execute the defense strategy. Sufficient and predictable resourcing is critical in our 

ability to maintain both military readiness and to meet additional operational demands. 

Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could have to military capabilities? 

Answer. Because of the nature of the sequester mechanism, funding for operations 

and maintenance, procurement, RDT&E, and military construction suffer disproportionately. The result of these cuts would be a military that is smaller and less capable. While our military would continue to provide presence and respond to crises, 

the fiscal year 2016 BCA cuts would increase risk, prolong readiness recovery, and 

delay necessary modernization for hundreds of programs, large and small. Cuts in 

funding for research and development would erode the technological superiority enjoyed by U.S. forces and increase risk in future conflicts. 

READINESS FUNDING

Question. Given the reductions in readiness funding, what is your assessment of 

the current readiness of the Armed Forces to meet national security requirements 

across the full spectrum of military operations? 

Answer. The current readiness of the Joint Force poses significant risk to our ability to execute the National Military Strategy. Sequestration exacerbated the existing 

state of poor readiness as a result of over a decade of exceptional demand in defense 

of the Nation. The Bipartisan Budget Act restored some resources, and provided 

much needed fiscal certainty and stability, thereby inhibiting any further readiness 

decline. Fully restoring readiness of the Armed Forces to meet national security requirements across the full spectrum of military operations requires readiness recovery time coupled with sufficient and predictable resourcing. 

Question. What is your assessment of the near term trend in the readiness of the 

Armed Forces? 

Answer. Near-term trends will remain significantly-less-than-optimal for the foreseeable future unless and until Congress provides sufficient and predicable funding 

and the authorities for the Department to implement critical cost-saving reforms. 

The loss of additional resourcing and/or the advent of increased operational demands would introduce a significant amount of additional risk to ongoing military 

operations. 

Question. How critical is it to find a solution to sequestration given the impacts 

we have already seen to DOD readiness in fiscal year 2014? 

Answer. It is critical to find a permanent solution to sequestration and to provide 

the Department with sufficient and predictable resourcing in order to restore the 

Joint Forces’ ability to provide the full range of sufficient military capabilities. The 

present approach of augmenting base budget with OCO funds is unsustainable and 

will prevent the Department from fully recovering, meeting additional commitments, and restoring our comparative advantage through modernization. Without a 

sufficient and predictable funding profile, current operations can only continue at 

the expense of long term development and sustainment efforts, further complicating 

existing readiness challenges. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the methods currently 

used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of military equipment? 

Answer. Service methods for funding equipment maintenance continually assesses 

the requirements of post-conflict reset— a combination of balancing reset, unit readiness and the sustainment of core capabilities—and developing detailed maintenance plans that balance operational availability with maintenance requirements. 

However, starts and stops in the budget process and funding uncertainties have a 

negative effect on the workload scheduling at Service depots. These negative effects 

ripple beyond the current year and can extend for months and even years. 

Question. Given the backlog in equipment maintenance over the last several 

years, do you believe that we need an increased investment to reduce this backlog? 

Answer. Without consistent and predictable base budget funding at requested levels, the Services will continue to rely on OCO to maintain equipment readiness. Inadequate funding of enduring and contingency sustainment requirements results in 

increased maintenance backlog. Equipment maintenance funding is driven by unit 

readiness requirements and based on a variety of factors to include force structure, 

operations tempo, schedule, nature and usage rate of the equipment, and safety. 

The Services used OCO funding for reset of equipment in support of OIF and OEF 

combat operations. In the past, this resulted in funding of baseline sustainment accounts at levels below Service enduring requirements. 

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Question. How important is it to reduce the materiel maintenance backlog in 

order to improve readiness? 

Answer. It requires continuous attention to ensure the accumulation of backlog 

does not grow beyond what is manageable. Excessive backlog can eventually lead 

to reduced equipment availability rates, less reliable systems, and potentially shortened service life. OCO funding, beyond the end of combat operations, and adequate 

funding of Service baseline budget levels are important if we are to improve the 

trend in equipment readiness. 

Question. How important is it to receive OCO funding two or three years after 

the end of combat operations in order to ensure all equipment is reset? 

Answer. It remains critically important to maintain funding levels well beyond 

cessation of current operations to fully restore equipment readiness and support the 

National Security Strategy. In the near to mid-term, OCO dollars for enduring requirements and equipment reset is necessary for Joint Force readiness. OCO is still 

required to adequately address maintenance, repair and overhaul requirements. 

Question. In years past, Congress has based additional readiness funding decisions on the Service Chief unfunded priorities lists. However, in recent years those 

lists have either not been provided or have arrived too late in our markup process. 

Do you agree to provide unfunded priorities lists to Congress in a timely manner 

beginning with the fiscal year 2017 budget request? 

Answer. Should the Services have such priorities, the process allows the Joint 

Chiefs to make recommendations that are responsive to Congress after first informing the Secretary of Defense. Should I be confirmed, I will support the use of this 

process when warranted. 

DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM

Question. Congress is considering a number of acquisition reform measures designed to reduce the costs and development timelines of major systems, and to 

streamline access to innovative commercial technologies and systems. What are your 

views regarding acquisition reform and the need for improvements in the Defense 

acquisition process? 

Answer. I believe that acquisition reform in the Department should be based upon 

the following key principals: 

a. The responsibility and authority for acquisition system outcomes should be 

clearly identified within the DOD; 

b. The requirements’ sponsor should be an integral part of delivering needed capability and remains accountable throughout the acquisition process, and; 

c. The effort to reduce overhead and increase efficiencies across defense acquisition should be continued. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of the acquisition 

process B requirements, acquisition, and budgeting? 

Answer. The Department’s acquisition processes are constantly evolving in order 

to reduce overhead, increase efficiencies, and remain agile and responsive to the 

needs of our warfighters. The Department regularly reviews and updates the Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and has recently incorporated many ‘‘Better Buying Power’’ initiatives. If confirmed, I would strongly support the Department’s acquisition reform vision. 

Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems 

is warranted given increasing historic cost growth in major systems, costs of current 

operations, and asset recapitalization? 

Answer. It’s my understanding that recent cost and schedule trends show improvement, but I am still concerned that acquisition, procurement, and operations 

and support costs will continue their historic growth profiles. This growth will further exacerbate shortfalls under a sequestered budget and threaten our ability to 

meet our partner and ally security guarantees. 

Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and guard against 

the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will use the JROC to scrub weapon system requirements 

and consider cost-informed performance tradeoffs early and often to drive out requirements-related weapon-system cost growth. I will also advocate for versatile future capabilities that are both affordable and sustainable as a hedge against legacy 

weapon systems’ cost growth. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and prioritized? 

Answer. As the lead of the Department’s senior validation body, I would ensure 

the JROC continues to make adjustments and improvements to the JCIDS process 

as appropriate. A major review and update was just completed in Feb 2015. The upVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00430 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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date continues to focus appropriate rigor in validating realistic, technically achievable, prioritized, and cost-informed requirement. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that resources are programmed for acquisition programs that are consistent with their cost 

estimates and schedules? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate in the Department’s resource allocation process for major system resource funding that is consistent with the Secretary’s cost 

and schedule position. 

Question. What should the role of the combatant commanders, Service Chiefs, 

Service Acquisition Executives, and Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics be in the acquisition process? 

Answer. Service Chiefs and combatant commanders play a vital role in requirements generation and are pivotal to acquisition process success. Their engagement 

with the Service and Defense Acquisition Executives during the acquisition life-cycle 

of a weapon system also prevents requirements growth. USD (AT&L)’s role in reviewing Service plans at discrete milestones associated with major Department resource commitments ensures programs are affordable and executable, and that they 

follow sound business and risk management practices. 

Question. Are there specific new roles or responsibilities that should be assigned 

to the Service Chiefs or Service Secretaries in the acquisition process? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will examine the idea of new roles and responsibilities. 

I believe that any change should not undermine the statutory responsibilities of the 

Secretary of Defense. However, I am supportive of changes that promote Service accountability in the acquisition process and further streamline the bureaucratic processes. 

TACTICAL FIGHTER PROGRAMS

Question. The F–35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, which is the largest and most 

expensive acquisition program in the Department’s history, was formally initiated 

as a program of record in 2002, with a total planned buy of 2,443 aircraft for the 

U.S. The program has not yet completed the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase, and is not due to enter full rate production until 2019, 17 years 

after its inception. At projected procurement rates, the aircraft will be procured by 

the Department well into the 2030 decade to reach its total quantity buy. The requirement for 2,443 aircraft was established nearly 20 years ago; do you believe that 

requirement is still valid in light of countervailing pressure to reduce force structure 

to conserve resources and to improve capability to respond to prospective adversary 

technological advances and increased capabilities with regard to establishing contested combat environments, combined with updated threat assessments and an 

evolving national defense strategy? 

Answer. The F–35 remains an integral part of the Department’s future capabilities portfolio as we prepare for contingencies. In many of the scenarios we may face, 

the advanced capabilities of the Joint Strike Fighter are essential. If confirmed, I 

will support ongoing analysis looking at whether 2,443 is the right number of aircraft, but I do not anticipate reductions to the required capacity at this time. 

Question. Do you believe the Nation can afford to procure these aircraft at a cost 

of $12B to $15B per year for nearly the next 20 years for an aircraft design that 

will be 30 years old at the completion of the program procurement phase? 

Answer. I believe the Department cannot allow shortfalls in fighter capability or 

capacity to develop. Fifth-generation fighter aircraft, including the F–35, are critical 

as we contend with the technological advancements of near-peer competitors. We 

have been working diligently to make the overall cost per F–35 more affordable. Additionally, there will continue to be critical updates throughout the life cycle of the 

F–35 that will ensure the platform maintains a tactical advantage. 

Question. Do you believe the Department’s current and planned force mix of shortrange fighters and long-range strike aircraft, whether land- or maritime-based, is 

sufficient to meet current and future threats around the globe, and most especially 

in the Asia-Pacific theater of operations where the ‘‘tyranny of distance’’ is such a 

major factor? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will support continual assessments to assure our ability 

to meet current and future threats, including those concerning short-range fighters 

and long-range strike aircraft. To ensure we are postured to address the ‘‘tyranny 

of distance’’ and succeed militarily, the DOD, over the past three years, has made 

significant progress in developing new alliance initiatives, securing new rotational 

access for U.S. forces, and enhancing both the quantity and quality of U.S. forces 

and capabilities in the Pacific region. 

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Question. The Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying S. 1376, 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, would require the Secretary of Defense to assess the current requirement for the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter total program of record quantity, and then to revalidate that quantity or identify 

a new requirement for the total number of F–35 aircraft the Department would ultimately procure. What will be your role in assisting the Secretary to revalidate the 

F–35 total program quantity? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Chairman, in consultation with the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), in advising the Secretary in the review of 

the level of capability and capacity required to fulfill the established joint military 

requirements. This advice will ensure the appropriate balance is struck consistent 

with the level of priorities identified by the defense strategy and combatant commander requirements. 

Question. The Air Force has proposed several times over the last decades to retire 

the A–10 close air support aircraft fleet, but each time Congress has rejected the 

proposals due to lack of a sufficient replacement capability. The Air Force’s latest 

proposals to retire the fleet in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 were again rejected by 

Congress. Do you believe a need exists for a dedicated capability to provide close 

air support for American troops in close quarters battles? 

Answer. No. The interoperable underpinning of joint requirements enables effective close air support utilizing a range of multi-role aircraft. Lessons from the last 

fourteen years of combat have institutionalized tactics, techniques and procedures 

integrating a number of manned and unmanned systems supporting these missions. 

Translating these lessons into joint requirements continues to advance our ability 

to provide close air support with advanced sensors and precise lethality of our weapon systems. 

Question. What will be your role in ensuring our land forces receive the air support they’ll need to survive and succeed while fighting the nation’s land battles? 

Answer. If confirmed, in consultation with the advisors to the JROC, I will ensure 

the appropriate capabilities are identified, assessed, and approved to meet the requirements of our land forces. I will also recommend alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, where necessary, to achieve this end. 

Question. The Secretary of the Navy recently remarked that he believed the F– 

35 would be the nation’s last manned fighter aircraft. Do you believe this to be true? 

Answer. Despite the rapid advance of robotic and autonomous technologies over 

the past decade, I believe that the intellect and judgment of the human pilot remain 

integral to the combat capability provided by fighter aircraft. Decisions about future 

platforms will be informed by human and systems capabilities as well as mission 

requirements. 

Question. If so, what will be your role in leading capabilities and requirements 

development to increase the role of unmanned aerial combat systems in the Department? 

Answer. If confirmed, in my role as Chairman of the JROC, I will identify, assess 

and approve opportunities for increased employment of unmanned systems across 

the Joint Force. This includes leveraging validated capabilities identified in the 

Joint Concept for Robotics and Autonomous Systems now in development. I will also 

work with industry, science and technology, and academia to identify emerging technologies and align them with Joint Force requirements. 

Question. If not, how do you see the future balance developing between manned 

and unmanned combat aircraft for the Department’s future force structure? 

I believe that the continued growth in robotic and autonomous systems technology 

will significantly impact the ongoing development and fielding of all future weapons 

systems, not just combat aircraft. The Joint Concept for Robotic and Autonomous 

Systems currently under development will help incorporate these new technologies 

to maximize the effectiveness of the Joint Force. 

SPACE

Question. China’s test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a turning point for 

the United States in its policies and procedure to ensure access to space. As a Nation heavily dependent on space assets for both military and economic advantage, 

the United States has to make protection of space assets became a national priority. 

Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of space assets now 

has the appropriate level of national security priority? 

Answer. Yes. Space situational awareness underpins our ability to operate safely 

in an increasingly congested space environment. It is vital that the U.S. protect national space assets to maintain the benefits and advantages dependent on our access 

to space. 

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Question. In your view, how should China’s continued development of space systems inform U.S. space policy and programs? 

Answer. China is rapidly developing space capabilities of its own that mirror U.S. 

capabilities and could threaten our access and use of space for national security purposes. If confirmed, I will review the U.S. Military’s efforts to address China’s developments in space, and will coordinate closely with the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. If confirmed would you propose any changes to National Security space 

policy and programs? 

Answer. The National Security Space Strategy clearly highlights the growing 

challenges in the space domain. If confirmed, I will insist on policies, programs, and 

other measures that ensure U.S. warfighters can continue to depend on having the 

advantages that space confers. 

ACCESS TO RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM

Question. What actions would you take to ensure that the Department continues 

to have access to radio frequency spectrum that is necessary to train and to conduct 

its operations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Interagency and industry partners on spectrum sharing in order to maintain DOD’s assured access to the spectrum necessary 

to train and conduct operations while also enabling access for commercial 

broadband. I will also continue to support Public Law 106–65 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000), which requires the Secretaries of Commerce 

and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to certify that any alternative band or bands to be substituted for spectrum currently used by DOD provide 

‘‘comparable technical characteristics to restore essential military capability that 

will be lost as a result of the band of frequencies to be so surrendered.’’ This provision is necessary to ensure that DOD maintains access to spectrum necessary to operate critical military capabilities. 

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

Question. Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next 15 plus years, DOD will also 

have to sustain the current strategic nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking. 

Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to afford the costs 

of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the rest of the DOD commitments? 

Answer. Yes, I am concerned that in the current budget environment completing 

these modernization programs will be a challenge. If confirmed, I will give full attention to these programs as they develop and mature. Modernizing the strategic 

delivery systems and sustaining the strategic nuclear enterprise are vital to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, which is essential to deterring potential adversaries and assuring our allies. As with any funding choices, we 

will make decisions that balance fiscal prudence with appropriate risk to provide the 

best possible capabilities. 

Question. If confirmed will you review the modernization and replacement programs to ensure that they are cost effective? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Section 1052 of the fiscal year 2014 NDAA established a ‘‘Council on 

Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control and Communications System’’. 

What do you see as the most pressing challenges in nuclear command, control and 

communications from a policy and acquisition perspective? 

Answer. Nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) is an enduring 

priority where we face the challenge of sustaining existing capabilities until new, 

modernized capabilities can be fielded. We must provide an assured, survivable and 

enduring NC3 system that simultaneously takes advantage of modern communication capabilities while remaining secure and hardened against attacks ranging from 

cyber to the most extreme kinetic attacks. 

Question. What do you see as the most pressing challenges in overall national 

leadership communications from a policy and acquisition perspective? 

Answer. Providing our national leadership with secure, reliable voice, video and 

data communications is a critical capability. This capability must be assured, survivable and enduring; allowing senior defense advisors to communicate with the 

President, the Combatant Commands and strategic Allies during normal day-to-day 

operations and during national crises from a fixed, mobile or airborne location. The 

major challenge from both a policy and acquisition perspective is to sustain existing 

capabilities until new, modernized capabilities can be fielded. 

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Question. If confirmed will you actively support section 1052 and work with outgoing Vice Chairman Winnefeld to understand the importance of this Council in ensuring the President has at all times control of nuclear weapons? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If confirmed will you agree to attend meetings as a member listed in 

its statue? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. In 2014 Secretary Hagel has conducted an assessment of the state of 

nuclear deterrence operations of the Department of Defense. 

Do you agree with its findings? 

Answer. Yes, I agree with the conclusion of both the internal and external reviews 

that while our nuclear forces are currently meeting the demands of the mission with 

dedication, significant changes are required to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the force in the future. 

Question. Will you actively support the findings and their implementation 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will devote significant attention to the state of our 

nuclear deterrence enterprise and will ensure the appropriate corrective actions are 

implemented. 

MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE BOOST PHASE

Question. The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) mission is to develop, test, and 

field an integrated, layered ballistic missile defense system to defend the United 

States and its allies against all ranges of enemy ballistic missiles in all phases of 

flight. While MDA is conducting research into next generation laser concepts that 

could be mounted on high altitude unmanned aerial vehicles, there is no program 

of record designed to intercept missiles during the boost phase of flight, when they 

are potentially most vulnerable. Do you agree with the Commander of Northern 

Command, when he said on April 7, 2015, referring to missile threats that ‘‘we need 

to be able to start knocking them down in the boost phase . . . and not rely on the 

midcourse phase where we are today?’’ 

Answer. Yes. Ballistic missiles are easier to detect and track in their boost phase, 

and typically countermeasures such as decoys are not deployed until after booster 

burnout. These factors make boost-phase intercept an attractive option to investigate. 

Question. Would you support an increase in the priority of technology investments 

to develop and deploy a boost phase airborne laser weapon system for missile defense in the next decade, if technically practicable? 

Answer. MDA’s budget supports design of a laser demonstrator that is potentially 

capable of acquiring, tracking, and even destroying an enemy missile. This is an approach that we’ve studied for many years and, if it proves out, could potentially, 

come at lower cost than the existing system of kinetic interceptors. However, leapahead technology must be paired with corresponding evolutions in doctrine, policy, 

concepts of operations, and other non-materiel considerations to be militarily useful. 

DOD’S COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

Question. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which is focused historically on accounting for, securing or eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) and materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, has 

started to expand its focus to other countries. With this expansion the CTR program 

is widening its focus to biological weapons and capabilities including biological surveillance and early warning; and encouraging development of capabilities to reduce 

proliferation threats. 

Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. government 

agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts, e.g., the Department of Defense, 

the Department of Energy, and the State Department? 

Answer. Yes. The Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 

Program informally and formally coordinates on a regular basis with the Combatant 

Commands, other DOD partners, interagency partners including the Departments 

of State and Energy, and international partners on CTR Program WMD threat reduction efforts. Part of this interagency coordination includes placing Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) liaison officers at U.S. Embassies where programs 

are highly active to further enhance coordination of activities in country and in the 

immediate regions where engagements occur. Additionally, in order to eliminate duplication of efforts, ensure safety and security is being considered in health capacity 

building programs, and work together to develop effective and sustainable detection 

and reporting systems, CTR is working very closely with USG civilian agencies to 

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plan and execute efforts that both meet threat reduction goals and contribute to the 

Global Health Security Agenda objectives. 

Question. About 60 percent of CTR resources are proposed for biological programs. 

With the very real threat of chemical weapons use and/or proliferation as we saw 

in Libya and are seeing in Syria, why is there such a large percentage of resources 

directed toward biological issues? 

Answer. The DOD CTR Program is designed to posture the United States to eliminate state-based WMD programs, if and when opportunities emerge. At the same 

time, numerous scientific, economic and demographic trends are increasing the risks 

that infectious diseases outbreaks pose to U.S. and global security, to include 

through natural transmission, bioterror attacks or laboratory accidents. Such outbreaks challenge our ability to protect the health of U.S. armed forces, U.S. citizens 

at home and abroad, and U.S. allies, drain economic resources, and ultimately risk 

undermining geopolitical stability. The Ebola Virus Disease outbreak demonstrated 

how, in an interconnected global environment, a bio-incident anywhere in the world 

can lead to dangerous consequences when governments are unable to provide basic 

health and diagnostic Services for their population. This creates environments in 

which destabilizing outbreaks can potentially provide terrorists with opportunities 

to gain access to deadly pathogens for their purposes due to insecure storage. For 

this reason, the percentage of funding devoted by the CTR Program at this time to 

reduce biological threats in the most vulnerable locations worldwide is appropriate. 

PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that the United States 

will continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has been 

no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the effort is early in the 

technology and testing phase. In your view, what is the role for a conventional 

prompt global strike capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national security in the near future? 

Answer. The Joint requirements process has identified the emerging challenge of 

high value, time sensitive, and defended targets that exist outside the range of conventional weapons systems. I support the continued evaluation of alternative technology and concepts that balance the potential operational employment against costs 

and the priority of this capability requirement. 

Question. What approach (e.g. land-based or sea-based or both) to implementation 

of this capability would you expect to pursue if confirmed? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assist acquisition officials in identifying the appropriate solutions to validated Joint military requirements. Unless an appropriate alternative is presented, I would expect to support a sea-based approach to fulfill this 

requirement as previously identified by the JROC. 

Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence capabilities 

would be needed to support a prompt global strike capability? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will lead periodic reviews of joint military requirements 

and assessments of Combatant Commander integrated priority lists to identify, assess, and approve the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy improvements necessary to close any intelligence gaps discovered in the development this requirement. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim 

of creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for 

the continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and 

Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to the Congress the continued 

safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. 

As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest challenges, 

if any, with respect to assuring the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile? 

Answer. Our ability to sustain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile rests largely 

on our people and our infrastructure. As a significant wave of personnel begins to 

retire over the next decade, we must recruit and retain the next-generation of nuclear weapons stewards capable of certifying the stockpile without underground testing. At the same time, we must remain vigilant about recapitalizing and modernizing the infrastructure we need to design and produce components required for our 

Life Extension Programs, even as we continue operations in aging facilities. 

Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program could no longer confidently support the annual certification of the stockpile 

as safe, secure, and reliable, would you recommend the resumption of underground 

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nuclear testing? What considerations would guide your recommendation in this regard? 

Answer. Our current nuclear stockpile is assessed as effective. It is certified and 

does not require further nuclear testing. I am committed to working with the Department of Energy to maintain the critical skills, capabilities, and infrastructure 

needed to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile without underground testing if practicable. 

However, the stockpile is aging. I understand there are, and will always be challenges in identifying and remedying the effects of aging on the stockpile. I would 

strongly consider recommendations from the Department of Energy and the National Laboratory Directors before making any recommendation to the Secretary and 

President regarding a need to resume underground testing. 

Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes to the non-deployed 

hedge stockpile of nuclear weapons? 

Answer. Our non-deployed nuclear weapons stockpile allows us to manage risks 

of technical failures in our stockpile and changes in the geopolitical environment. 

Implementation of the 3+2 Strategy for nuclear weapons modernization will enable 

further reductions in the number of hedge warheads required. Furthermore, modernization of key production facilities will improve the responsiveness of the nuclear 

weapons infrastructure and may provide opportunities to make additional adjustments to the non-deployed hedge stockpile. I am committed to reducing the size of 

the stockpile to the lowest level consistent with deterrence objectives and warfighter 

requirements. 

COUNTERING THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT IN IRAQ & SYRIA

Question. To ‘‘degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL’’ 

the Department of Defense seeks to deny ISIL safe-haven and build partner capacity. 

If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate ISIL degradation and what 

is your assessment of the progress to degrade ISIL in Iraq and in Syria? 

Answer. I view degraded capability as an inability to hold key terrain and influence population centers. As anti-ISIL forces in both Iraq and Syria gain momentum 

and achieve tactical and operational successes, I would consider ISIL’s failure to resupply or refit its fighters as additional indicators. Large groups of displaced persons returning to their homes in Tikrit and working to restore their former way of 

life serve as an example. By leveraging the resources of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the DOD will continue to analyze and assess ISIL capabilities, while identifying additional indicators of degradation. 

Progress is being made. However, we must continue to exercise patience during 

the long campaign to degrade ISIL, and understand that our efforts cannot exceed 

those of our partnered ground forces in Iraq and Syria. 

Question. A large part of the support for ISIL and other violent extremist groups 

like al Nusrah by the local Syrian population is based on the fact that these groups 

seek to remove President Assad from power. 

What limitations, if any, do we face by failing to have the removal of Assad as 

an objective in Syria? 

Answer. While seeking a negotiated political settlement is U.S. policy, the immediate objective is countering ISIL in both Syria and Iraq. Transition of power from 

the Assad regime may have implications and negative consequences on Syrian and 

regional stability, so it is important that we continue to work with our regional partners to counter both the threat of ISIL as well as sequencing an orderly transition 

from the Assad regime. 

Question. In Iraq, what is the importance of arming the Sunni tribes in Anbar 

province to degrading ISIL and how do you assess progress to date? What is your 

understanding of the current plan to train and equip Sunni fighters to help in the 

campaign against ISIL? 

Answer. Sunni tribal mobilization is an important component of the counter-ISIL 

fight. They are a credible ground force we have only begun to empower, and they 

are necessary to protect Iraqis in Anbar and other Sunni-dominant areas. I understand PM Abadi and the GOI continue to make marginal gains mobilizing Sunni 

tribes, but much work remains. We must continue to pressure the GOI to embrace 

the integration of these tribes into Iraqi Security Forces’ efforts. U.S. and Coalition 

support at airbases like Al Asad and Al Taqaddum are enhancing these efforts. 

Question. What is your assessment of the fall of Ramadi to ISIL last month and 

what recommendations, if any, would you have for the U.S. and coalition strategy, 

if you are confirmed? 

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Answer. Ramadi was a tactical setback, and I certainly expect setbacks, as well 

as gains, over the course of a 36-month campaign to degrade ISIL. Despite tactical 

or operational shifts in either direction, I believe our strategy remains the correct 

one. This is a whole-of-government strategy and, at times, may require an adjustment to the military campaign to allow the non-military aspects of the strategy the 

time and space required to succeed. 

Question. What is your assessment of the coalition air campaign in Iraq and Syria 

and what recommendations, if any, would you have for the air campaign, if you are 

confirmed? 

Answer. ISIL’s critical enablers are its ability to move rapidly through 

ungoverned regions and their ability to generate revenue, both of which are degraded and disrupted by the Coalition air campaign. The air campaign also creates 

time and space for local ground forces to develop their capability as legitimate security forces. Anti-ISIL forces’ successes, including the recapture of Tal Abyad, were 

enabled by Coalition strikes. 

The legitimacy of the Coalition and the success of the air strikes are also dependent on our commitment to minimize collateral damage. I support tactical patience 

and commander’s decisions to withhold munitions in situations where strike effects 

could be detrimental to local forces or civilian populations. We should continue to 

avoid the trap of pursuing short-term tactical gains over the long-term strategic effects of losing the support of our partners in both Syria and Iraq. 

Question. Does the current troop limitation of 3,100 give U.S. commanders, in conjunction with Iraqi security forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, tribal and local security 

forces, and coalition partners, in Iraq enough capability to successfully degrade and 

ultimately destroy ISIL? 

Answer. Yes, I believe our current troop levels are sufficient to advance the military lines of effort in the near term. I understand our strategy depends on a credible 

ground force in Iraq, and our commitments must align with the capability and pace 

of our Iraqi partners. Iraqis must own this fight, and we may require adjustments 

in our troop commitments to continue to enable their forces over the long term. 

Question. What do you see as the principle role or roles of the Office of Security 

Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy in Iraq? 

Answer. The Office of Security Cooperation is the Departments primary interlocutor for traditional security assistance and cooperation in support of the U.S. Embassy. OSC–I supports the development of military programs to improve the 

professionalization of the Iraqi Security Forces in concert with providing warfighting 

capability through the Foreign Military Sales program. 

Question. What is your assessment of the success of the current strategy against 

ISIL? 

Answer. We are seeing some successes, but we need to take a long view and understand that there will be both successes and failures early in the campaign. In 

both Iraq and Syria, ISIL’s ability to conduct massed offensive operations is degraded, its leadership cells are pressured, and its command-and-control and supply 

lines are being severed. We have reduced ISIL’s oil production, processing and 

transportation infrastructure. We continue to work the military lines effort with our 

coalition partners and in conjunction with all lines of effort in the strategy. 

Question. Do you assess that the training and equipping of Syrian opposition 

fighters by the United States and coalition partners under section 1209 of the fiscal 

year 2015 NDAA will produce enough fighters to make a strategic difference on the 

battlefield in Syria? 

Answer. From my understanding, it’s too early to tell. The number of Syrians who 

are currently volunteering to participate in the Syria Train and Equip program is 

growing. The current number of trainees is small but are properly vetted and have 

objectives that match our own. Larger numbers of unknown or unqualified trainees 

would not necessarily be better and might work counter to our interests. It will take 

time to establish a credible partner on the ground in Syria and we are continuously 

making adjustments based on our lessons learned as we progress. 

Question. In your view, what military support, if any, should the Syrian opposition fighters who receive support under section 1209 of the FY2015 NDAA need 

from the United States and coalition partners when they return to Syria? 

Answer. The U. S. is committed to their success. We will be providing basic equipment such as military gear, mobility capabilities such as trucks and vehicles, and 

small arms and ammunition. If confirmed, I will examine the full range of support 

that we can provide our T&E forces as the program progresses. 

Question. What are the lessons learned from the drawdown and post-combat operations in Iraq that should be applied to the drawdown and post-combat operations 

in Afghanistan? 

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Answer. I think an important lesson we can take from our Iraq and Afghanistan 

experiences is that withdrawal decisions must be conditions-based. I also think we 

have learned that a military solution alone does not guarantee success. Governance 

and economic development are required to sustain military and security gains. 

When security threats are fueled by underlying political or sectarian problems U.S. 

troops can only address the effects, not the cause. 

AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN

Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Overall, the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) 

continue to grow their tactical proficiency. However, the lack of a Minister of Defense has had a negative impact on the Resolute Support mission. Critical gaps still 

remain in aviation, intelligence, and special operations, all impacting the ANDSF’s 

targeting capability. These gaps will remain for some time, even with the addition 

of key enablers. RS advisors continue to address developmental shortfalls in the 

areas of logistics, medical support, and counter-IED exploitation. 

Question. In May of 2014 President Obama said ‘‘ . . . by the end of 2016, our military will draw down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul . . . ’’ 

What is your understanding of what military forces comprise a ‘‘normal embassy 

presence’’? 

Answer. A normal embassy presence will have a counter-terrorism and security 

component consisting of a Defense Attach ̋ Office and a Security Cooperation Office 

under a Senior Defense Official with a military reporting chain through CENTCOM. 

CENTCOM is still planning for the Security Cooperation Office–Afghanistan. Its 

size will depend upon factors such as security force assistance objectives, ANDSF 

capabilities, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) requests, 

and force protection concerns. 

Question. What lessons should we learn from the experience the drawdown of U.S. 

troops in Iraq as applied to the drawdown of U.S. and international troops in Afghanistan? 

Answer. The transfer of security cooperation activities should be deliberate and 

measured. 

‘‘Time’’ allows for the ownership of the tactical fight to be transferred from coalition forces to the ANDSF; allowing the coalition to focus on issues, critical to the 

long term viability of the force. The ANDSF continues to prove that they are capable 

of executing the tactical fight; however, sustainment and institutional development 

are critical to their long term success. 

Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Not at this time, but if confirmed I will continually assess and offer recommendations as that strategy unfolds. 

Question. What is the effect of ISIL operations in Afghanistan and/or coordination 

with the Taliban for the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan? 

Answer. The coalition and the Afghan government have closely watched ISIL’s attempt to expand its reach to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The potential emergence 

of ISIL has sharply focused the ANDSF, NDS, and Afghan political leadership, 

which are collaborating closely in order to prevent this threat from expanding. We 

will continue to support Afghanistan’s security through our strategic partnership. It 

is important to note, ISIL is a competitor with other groups in Afghanistan, which 

may lead to increased violence between extremist groups. 

Question. If security conditions on the ground in Afghanistan degrade in 2016, 

would you recommend to the President revisions to the size and pace of the drawdown plan in order to adequately address those security conditions? 

Answer. We must be willing to reevaluate assumptions of previous recommendations and assess the conditions on the ground as the drawdown takes place. If confirmed, I will collaborate with CENTCOM to assess conditions on the ground and 

will modify my input to the Chairman’s recommendations to the President accordingly. 

Question. Should the authorities granted to the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan take into account the security conditions on the ground faced by U.S. 

troops? 

Answer. Yes. Protecting the force is an inherent responsibility of command. 

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional 

and effective Afghanistan National Security Force (ANSF) and what recommendaVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00438 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tions would you make to address challenges to building ANSF capacity, if confirmed? 

Answer. Based on my interaction with the Joint Staff subject matter experts, it 

is my understanding that the ANDSF are tactically capable, but continue to be challenged at the Corps and Ministerial levels. We assess the ANDSF’s capabilities, capacities, and morale will be sufficient to set the conditions for Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation talks. The ANDSF still need assistance with enablers and 

related systems and processes necessary to run a modern, professional army and police force. In particular, they need sustained support for capability gaps in aviation, 

intelligence, sustainment, and special operations. To address these gaps, our advisory mission and mentorship at the security ministries and at the corps and police 

zone level remain vital. 

Question. Do you support plans for building and sustaining the ANSF at 352,000 

personnel and, if so, what factors influence your recommendation about the proper 

size of the ANSF? 

Answer. Yes, at least for the near term. Although we’ve made important gains, 

GIRoA and the ANDSF will continue to face threats from external regional actors 

and internal threats from a resilient insurgency. The current ANDSF Plan of Record 

supports the need for 352,000 ANDSF along with 30,000 ALP at least through 2018. 

Evaluating the security situation (and prior assumptions) is continual and drives 

my recommendations on ANDSF size. Committed contributions from partners are 

also important. Afghan and NATO goals remain generally congruent regarding the 

denial of terrorist safe havens. 

RECONCILIATION

Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United States in any reconciliation negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and other insurgent groups? 

Answer. The United States supports an Afghan-led political process to determine 

the future of their country. Our relationship with Pakistan as a key stakeholder in 

the region can also have a positive impact. As part of the outcome of any process, 

the Taliban and other armed Afghan opposition groups must end violence, break 

any associations with international terrorism, and accept Afghanistan’s constitution, 

including its protections for women and minorities. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, should the United States take to advance 

the reconciliation process? 

Answer. We remain strongly supportive of an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process where the Taliban and the Afghans engage in direct talks to resolve the conflict in Afghanistan. In President Ghani’s inauguration address, he 

called on the Taliban to enter political talks, and has made reconciliation central 

to his foreign policy. We can also continue to encourage stronger ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan—and have been pleased with their recent efforts to address 

their shared security concerns. 

Question. In your view, what should be the role of Afghanistan’s neighbors, in particular Pakistan, in the reconciliation process? 

Answer. Regional partners have an important role to play in enabling a stable, 

democratic Afghanistan, and our relationship with Pakistan as a key stakeholder 

in the region can have a positive impact. We continue to encourage all regional partners to support President Ghani’s reconciliation efforts. We are in close communication with President Ghani on these matters and we remain committed to supporting 

his efforts toward peace. 

U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to 

Pakistan? 

Answer. Our strategic interests and national security goals remain to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda (and other potential transnational insurgent threats) 

and to prevent the return of safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We also have 

an interest in a stable Pakistan and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and 

technology. 

Question. What would you consider to be areas of shared strategic interest between the United States and Pakistan? 

Answer. The U.S. and Pakistan share the common goals of eliminating Al Qaeda 

(and other potential transnational insurgent threats), promoting regional stability 

and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. 

Question. In what areas do you see U.S. and Pakistani strategic interests diverging? 

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Answer. We diverge from Pakistan in their policy on leveraging non-state, extremist proxies to attain their national security objectives and in their perception of Indian intentions in the region. Our bilateral interests with Pakistan can also be 

made more complex by Pakistan’s deepening ties with China. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-military relations? 

Answer. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is important to our vital national security 

interests in the region and will remain so for the foreseeable future. We will need 

to continue cooperating with Pakistan on defeating transnational insurgent threats, 

supporting Pakistan stability, and reaching a lasting peace in Afghanistan. We 

should continue mil-to-mil cooperation to improve on ways we can assist enhanced 

border security and stability, consistent with Leahy considerations. 

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant military assistance to Pakistan. In addition, the United States has provided significant funds to 

reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with military operations conducted by 

Pakistan along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. 

As U.S. troop presence draws down in Afghanistan, what recommendations, if 

any, would you have regarding the reduction or cessation of Coalition Support 

Funds that currently reimburse Pakistan for military support in connection with 

U.S. military operations in Afghanistan? 

Answer. It is in our best interest to have a long term strategic partnership with 

Pakistan. Coalition Support Funds are a mechanism to advance our security interests with and through Pakistan, however the funding needs to be tied to a broader 

set of expectations and outcomes, not just ongoing border operations in Pakistan. 

Question. In your view, how effective has the assistance and other support that 

the United States has provided to Pakistan been in promoting U.S. interests? 

Answer. U.S.-Pakistan mutually agreed security objectives include improving 

Pakistan’s capacity to counter militancy, developing a stronger bilateral defense relationship, and fostering a better relationship between Pakistan, Afghanistan and 

India. In support of these objectives, U.S. security assistance has enhanced the 

Pakistan Military’s ability to attack militants, terrorists groups, and other 

transnational threats. U.S. assistance has bolstered Pakistani capability while also 

preserving the mil-mil relationship that is a key component of the U.S.-Pakistan 

strategic partnership. 

Question. Do you support conditioning U.S. assistance and other support to Pakistan on Pakistan’s continued cooperation in areas of mutual security interest? 

Answer. Yes. It is important that we maintain a strategic relationship with Pakistan, not a ‘‘transactional’’ one, as we condition our assistance. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan? 

Answer. There is some potential for a more constructive ‘‘new normal’’ going forward. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have improved since the election 

of President Ghani in Afghanistan. Although gradual, the two sides continue to 

work to improve border coordination and establish standards for information sharing, communication, and complementary operations near the border. 

Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan’s cooperation with the United 

States in counterterrorism operations against militant extremist groups located in 

Pakistan? 

Answer. Pakistan’s cooperation on counterterrorism has not always met our expectations, particularly their policy of leveraging proxies to advance national security objectives. Since 2009, Pakistan has undertaken counterinsurgency operations 

against extremist organizations in the northwest, namely the Swat, North and 

South Waziristan, Mohmand, and Bajaur with mixed results. Security assistance, 

Coalition Support Funding reimbursements, and cross-border coordination with 

ISAF and Afghan forces have helped enable these operations. It is in our interest 

that Pakistan continues this campaign as effectively and comprehensively as possible. 

Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan’s efforts to maintain transit and 

provide security along the ground lines of communication (GLOCs) through Pakistan? 

Answer. We have received support from Pakistan in the use of their GLOCs. Currently we rely on multiple GLOCs, including Pakistan’s to support our operations 

in Afghanistan. We do not anticipate any GLOC problems in the foreseeable future. 

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Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan’s efforts to counter the threat improvised explosive devices, including efforts to attack the network, go after known 

precursors and explosive materials? 

Answer. Pakistan suffers significant casualties as a result of IED attacks. They 

are taking concrete steps to disrupt the networks, placing new restrictions on the 

distribution of precursor materials and providing Regional Leadership on the issue. 

We continue to encourage and pressure them to do more. 

IRAN

Question. What is your assessment of the military and political threat posed by 

Iran? 

Answer. Iran’s authoritarian regime poses both a regional and global security 

threat. The world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism seeks to export its revolutionary ideology in the Middle East through a large conventional army; terrorist 

proxies; weapons trafficking; ballistic missile proliferation; and maritime weapons 

and threats to the Strait of Hormuz. Through its emergent nuclear and established 

cyber programs, Iran can threaten and undermine the international institutions and 

conventions that underpin global security. The Supreme Leader will continue to 

take advantage of opportunities to enable Iran’s domestic, hardline political factions’ 

malign policies that value regime survival over international integration. 

Question. What is your assessment of the threat of Iran’s influence in Iraq to U.S. 

interests? 

Answer. Iran’s ambitions in Iraq are not to help create a sovereign, functional 

government. Iran wants to influence Iraq through the lens of a Shia-dominated buffer state. Currently, Iran is using its influence vis-&-vis Shia militias to offset ISIL 

behavior. This comes with the risk that one day these militias could possibly threaten Iraqi or U.S. forces. In the future, expect Iran to utilize its political and military 

instruments of power to control Iraq along sectarian lines. 

Question. In your view, what are the risks, if any, associated with reducing U. 

S. presence in the Middle East with respect to the threat posed by Iran? 

Answer. Real or perceived U.S. disengagement from the Middle East could create 

opportunity for Iran to increase its support to terrorist organizations. Right-sized 

U.S. military presence in the Middle East demonstrates not only a commitment to 

the region, but a commitment to our regional security partners. As a result, a continued U.S. military presence in the region will further deter Iran from conducting 

nefarious activities such as blocking the Strait of Hormuz or threatening other Gulf 

States. Finally, a continued U.S. military presence in the region is the single most 

important indicator of our overall commitment to a secure, peaceful and prosperous 

Middle East. 

Question. Negotiations on the Iran nuclear program have been extended with a 

deadline now of July 7, 2015 to finalize a comprehensive agreement. 

What are the elements of a nuclear agreement with Iran that you consider critical 

to ensuring that it is a ‘‘good’’ deal for U.S. national security interests? 

Answer. From a security standpoint, important outcomes include rolling back 

Iran’s nuclear program providing the international community with necessary access and transparency, while preserving the sanctions imposed on conventional 

arms and ballistic missiles. 

Question. If Iran is allowed to maintain a monitored and limited uranium enrichment program, do you believe that other states in the region may seek to develop 

enrichment programs of their own and why or why not? 

Answer. Saudi Arabia’s and other Gulf countries’ decisions on whether or not to 

enrich uranium are not solely tied to a deal with Iran; under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories are allowed enrichment programs as part of 

a peaceful nuclear program. Unlike Iran, which endures sanctions, isolation, and 

economic distress due to a covert attempt intent on developing nuclear weapons, our 

Gulf partners could choose to pursue nuclear energy in compliance with the NPT. 

The U.S. military will continue to provide options in support of the overall U.S. 

strategy. 

Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in countering Iran’s support of 

international terrorism? 

Answer. DOD’s role is to support an interagency and regional effort to deter and 

counter Iran’s support of international terrorism. We deter Iran by maintaining a 

responsive military capability in the region and ensuring a robust defensive infrastructure for ourselves and our allies. To counter Iran, we work by, with, and 

through partner nations by conducting counter terrorism training, providing equipment sales, participating in multi-national exercises, and sharing information. When 

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combined, these efforts—along with those of our partners—help to weaken terrorist 

groups and hinder Iran’s ability to support them. 

THE 2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Question. What is your understanding of the scope and duration of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), including with respect to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant? 

Answer. There is an ongoing armed conflict between the United States and Al 

Qaeda, including its associated forces. Al Qaeda’s associated forces are those groups 

that (1) are an organized armed group that has entered the fight alongside Al Qaeda 

and, (2) is a co-belligerent with Al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States 

or its coalition partners. The AUMF enacted following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 remains the legal basis under U.S. domestic law for use of military 

force against these threats. Since September 2014, the Administration has applied 

the 2001 AUMF for the use of military force against the Islamic State of Iraq and 

the Levant (ISIL, previously known as Al Qaeda in Iraq). ISIL has been subject to 

the use of force under the AUMF since at least 2004, when it entered the conflict 

against the United States as part of the Al Qaeda organization. Despite internal 

power struggles within ISIL and other factions of the Al Qaeda network, ISIL asserts that it is the true heir to bin Laden’s legacy of global jihad, and continues its 

unlawful campaign against the United States, its citizens, and interests. 

Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities, including the AUMF, 

enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at 

the level that you believe to be necessary and appropriate? 

Answer. Yes. The 2001 AUMF provides the necessary authorities to counter Al 

Qaeda and its associated forces, including ISIL. With respect to ISIL, the 2002 

AUMF provides additional statutory authority for the current operations against 

ISIL both in Iraq and, to extent necessary to achieve the purposes of that AUMF, 

in Syria. 

ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by ISIL to the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more broadly? 

Answer. ISIL does pose a threat to the homeland as well as to U.S and Western 

interests abroad. ISIL is focused on strengthening its self-declared caliphate in Iraq 

and Syria as well as expanding into other areas in the Middle East and Africa. In 

so doing, ISIL is integrating foreign fighters that could attempt to return to their 

countries as operatives. In addition, ISIL sympathizers pose a risk should they heed 

ISIL calls to conduct attacks against the U.S and the West. 

Question. How would you describe the U.S. strategy to counter ISIL? 

Answer. Our strategy is a whole-of-government and regional approach to degrade 

and ultimately defeat ISIL. Our strategy leverages capable ground partners supported by an International Coalition. The nine lines of effort serve as a guide to 

achieve this objective, and include: supporting effective governance in Iraq, disrupting ISIL’s finances, disrupting the flow of foreign fighters, and protecting the 

homeland. DOD is only primarily responsible for the military campaign to deny ISIL 

safe haven and build partner capacity. Coalition kinetic strike operations, advise/ 

assist operations, training/equipping efforts, and posture in the region combine to 

achieve these lines of efforts. The military campaign provides time and space for 

progress in the other lines of effort, particularly inclusive governance. 

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of that strategy in achieving its objectives? 

Answer. We are seeing limited but steady success, and we need to be patient as 

there will be both successes and failures throughout the campaign. In both Iraq and 

Syria, ISIL’s ability to conduct massed-offensive operations is degraded, its leadership cells are pressured, and its command-and-control and supply lines are being 

severed. We have degraded ISIL’s oil producing, processing and transportation infrastructure. We continue to work with our coalition partners along several lines of effort to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. We must also be wary of ISIL’s destabilizing potential outside of Iraq and Syria and leverage our regional partnerships 

accordingly. 

Question. What do you assess to be the greatest impediments to implementing the 

strategy to counter ISIL? 

Answer. Conflicting interests on the ground and rampant sectarianism combined 

with poor governance and disenfranchised populations are the greatest challenges 

to defeating ISIL. Only through governments that foster inclusive and legitimate 

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governance, as well as through robust commitments from regional and international 

stakeholders, will the strategy be successful. 

Question. What modifications, if any, would you recommend be made to the strategy to counter ISIL, if confirmed? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Chairman’s assessment of the military 

lines of effort to ensure that they are providing the time and space necessary for 

the non-military lines of effort to succeed. I also will work to identify additional opportunities to bolster our ongoing efforts to train and equip security forces operating 

in Iraq and Syria, and recommend adjustments to increase their effectiveness if necessary. Finally, I would look for opportunities to combat ISILs trans-regional reach 

and influence to complement the efforts in Iraq and Syria. Continued assessment 

and refinement are paramount to any strategy and its implementation. 

AL QAEDA

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates to the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more 

broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern? 

Answer. Despite ongoing counterterrorism (CT) pressure and competition from 

ISIL, Al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more broadly. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains the affiliate of most concern. 

YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Question. What are the U.S. national security interests in Yemen? 

Answer. The 2015 National Security Strategy states ‘‘the U.S. has no greater responsibility than protecting the American people. Yet, our obligations do not end at 

our borders.’’ The continued presence of AQAP in Yemen and the emergence of ISIL 

present threats to our homeland and to the American people. We act in Yemen in 

the interest of our security. 

Question. What is your assessment of current U.S. strategy in Yemen? 

Answer. I believe the U.S. should continue its policy of support to the Republic 

of Yemen Government (RoYG) in combatting terrorism and addressing instability 

within its borders. The U.S. requires a stable and reliable partner in order to accomplish its counterterrorism objective of countering AQAP and violent extremist organizations. We seek stability in Yemen through: 1) political transition, namely National Dialogue, Constitutional reform, and Elections; 2) continued economic and humanitarian assistance; and 3) security reform, specifically counterterrorism capacity 

building, border security, and critical infrastructure protection. 

Question. What are the implications of recent events in Yemen for U.S. counterterrorism policy both in Yemen and globally? 

Answer. I believe the current conflict in Yemen has hampered some CT operations, but the U.S. still maintains a capability, albeit diminished, to counter AQAP. 

AQAP remains an immediate threat to Yemen, the region, and the United States. 

When the political and security situation allows, I believe we should resume our 

previous partner-based DOD counterterrorism activities with the Yemeni government. 

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness and capability of coalition 

operations led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen? 

Answer. Saudi-led Coalition operations can be sustained at least in the near term. 

Airstrikes are slowing Huthi expansion in Yemen, but have not prevented Huthi attacks along the Saudi border nor forced the Huthis to withdraw from cities they captured earlier this year. 

SOMALIA AND AL SHABAB

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Shabab? 

Answer. Al-Shabaab poses a threat to countries providing forces to AMISOM such 

as Kenya. The group also targets Somali government facilities and Western targets 

in and around Mogadishu. 

Question. In your view, does al Shabab pose a threat to the United States and/ 

or western interests outside of its immediate operational area? 

Answer. Al-Shabaab does not currently directly threaten the U.S. Homeland or 

Europe. The group continues to pose a threat to U.S., Western, and allied interests 

in East Africa, to include Somalia and Kenya. 

Question. What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy in Somalia and 

the role of DOD in that strategy? 

Answer. The U.S. strategy on Somalia was implemented in May 2014. It has two 

major security components: (1) Supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia to 

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stabilize security in the short term, and (2) Expanding support for the creation and 

training of the Somali National Army, which will provide long term stability and 

security. DOD contributes significant assets towards the U.S. strategy’s success. 

Question. What role should DOD play in building the capacity of the Somali national military forces? 

Answer. The Department of State has been leading efforts to create Somali security services that are loyal to the federal government and representative of the ethnic and clan diversity in Somalia. I believe DOD should continue to support that 

effort through building partner capacity, logistics, and encouraging joint operations 

with the African Union Mission in Somalia. 

AL QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM)

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM)? 

Answer. Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliated 

groups continue to target local and regional government and Western interests. The 

group poses a threat to the Malian government and military targets, and Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization in Mali (MINUSMA) forces and facilities, and 

U.S. and Western persons in Niger and Mali, who are vulnerable to kidnapping for 

ransom. 

Question. In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United States and/or 

western interests outside of its immediate operational area? 

Answer. AQIM does not pose a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. The group currently does not view conducting attacks outside North Africa and the Sahel as a priority. 

Question. What capacity has AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out actions 

threatening U.S. interests? 

Answer. AQIM is able to threaten U.S. and Western interests within North and 

West Africa, where it has conducted or attempted attacks in several countries to include Mali, Niger, Algeria, and Mauritania. AQIM will likely strengthen its ties to 

other Al Qaeda-associated terrorist groups in the region to influence and support attack planning. 

Question. In your view, what has been the impact of the recent expansion of 

AQIM’s area of operations in northern Mali on the group’s capacities and aims? 

Answer. AQIM has increased freedom of movement throughout the region and implemented its own brand of sharia in the breakaway northern territories in Mali. 

AQIM uses small-scale improvised explosive device (IED), indirect fire (IDF), and 

mortar attacks to further conduct attacks in northern Mali to expel Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). 

LIBYA

Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation in Libya? 

Answer. Libya currently has two governments competing for control, and their 

aligned militias are struggling to establish dominance of the country. However, at 

this point neither government is capable of providing domestic security or addressing transnational threats, such as terrorism or the ongoing migration crisis. 

Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. strategy with regards to Libya 

and the role of DOD in that strategy? 

Answer. I believe the U.S. maintains a national interest in stabilizing Libya and 

impeding extremists from using it as a refuge. The U.S. and our allies support the 

United Nations-led efforts to help the opposing Libyan groups reach a political resolution by establishing a national unity government. The role of DOD in the U.S. 

strategy is to use military relationships with regional partners to increase support 

for a political solution. Should diplomatic efforts to form a unity government succeed, I believe the U.S. should be prepared to revisit security assistance programs 

for legitimate Libyan security services. 

Question. How would you assess its effectiveness in achieving its objectives? 

Answer. Libya’s political landscape is fragmented and the country is embroiled in 

a civil war. UN-led negotiations have yet to yield lasting results. I believe the DOD’s 

role in a political solution is necessary, but alone it is not enough to drive resolution. 

Question. What do you assess to be the greatest impediments to implementing the 

strategy and protecting U.S. interests in Libya? 

Answer. I believe the greatest obstruction is the severe division of Libya’s political 

and security landscape, which has seriously complicated negotiations. Libya has degenerated into a complex mix of competing political factions, tribes, militias and 

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other armed groups which are intermixed with local and foreign extremists. These 

influences continue to make protecting U.S. interests in Libya difficult. 

Question. What is your assessment of the threat to the U.S. and our allies from 

terrorist groups, including ISIL, in Libya. 

Answer. Extremists and terrorists from Al Qaeda -affiliated and allied groups are 

using Libya’s permissive security environment as a safe haven to plot attacks, including against Western interests in Libya and the region. ISIL considers Libya a 

key part of its caliphate and ISIL-aligned extremists are trying to institute sharia 

law in parts of the country. 

NORTH AFRICA

Question. In recent years, there has been a growth of terrorist networks, capabilities, operations, and safe havens throughout North and East Africa, including 

groups that have the intention to target U.S. and Western interests. In the face of 

growing instability and threats, the U.S. counterterrorism effort in the region has 

been described as an ‘‘economy of force’’ effort. 

Do you agree with that characterization of the situation in North and East Africa 

and the U.S. counterterrorism efforts to combat the related threats? 

Answer. Diverse and active terrorist networks in North and East Africa (as well 

as West Africa) are seeking to influence local resources and territory. Some have, 

at times, also demonstrated a willingness to target U.S. and Western interests. 

These groups threaten the stability of our regional partners and safety of local civilians. AFRICOM, in partnership with host nations and interagency partners, is 

working to identify, prioritize, and target these networks. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. counterterrorism strategy 

in the region? In your view, is the U.S. military allocating adequate resources to 

effectively address the terrorism threat in the region? 

Answer. I believe the U.S. military is allocating adequate resources based on the 

level of threat and the potential for collaboration with capable partner nations. If 

confirmed, I will continuously evaluate the adequacy of our strategy and allocation 

of resources, especially following changes in local threat levels and when new opportunities for potential collaboration with our partners arise. 

Question. General Rodriguez noted in his March 2014 testimony that ‘‘North Africa is a significant source of foreign fighters in the current conflict in Syria.’’ What 

is your understanding of the foreign fighter flow from North Africa to the conflict 

in Syria and Iraq? 

Answer. The largest portion of foreign fighters entering Iraq and Syria come from 

North Africa, specifically Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Algeria. Many of the fighters 

however are now choosing to stay in North Africa and join the ISIL affiliate in Libya 

instead. 

Question. In your view, is it likely that many of these fighters will eventually return home from Syria and Iraq to North Africa and continue their fight against regional governments? 

Answer. Yes, many Northern African foreign fighters will likely return home to 

conduct attacks in their home countries. We do not know if these fighters are being 

tasked by ISIL to attack Western of U.S. interests or whether, having been 

radicalized by ISIL are acting on their own accord. 

RUSSIA

Question. Crimea was formally annexed when President Putin signed a bill to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014, and Russia continues 

to fuel instability in eastern Ukraine despite signing ceasefire agreements in September 2014 and February 2015. 

How effective do you assess the sanctions of the U.S. and the European Union 

have been in deterring additional aggression by Russia? 

Answer. I believe sanctions by themselves are unlikely to deter future Russian aggression. Deterring combined Russian-separatists actions against Ukraine requires 

a whole of government approach in concert with Europe and NATO. Nevertheless, 

it’s my understanding that U.S. and EU sanctions have impacted Russia’s economy 

and I believe they send a clear signal to Moscow that aggression against Ukraine’s 

sovereignty and territorial integrity entails costs. With the EU’s recent decision to 

extend sanctions for an additional six months, the United States and EU have made 

clear that sanctions will not be lifted until Minsk is fully implemented. I believe 

these actions have contributed to deterrence. 

Question. What other specific U.S. actions helped to deter additional Russian aggression in Eastern Europe? 

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Answer. Congressional support for the European Reassurance Initiative has enabled DOD, via Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR), to conduct military exercises and training on land, in the air and at sea, while sustaining a rotational presence across Europe; and increase the responsiveness of U.S. forces to reinforce 

NATO by exploring initiatives such as prepositioning of equipment and enhancing 

reception facilities in Europe. Our bilateral efforts as well as our continued support 

of NATO adaptation measures all support the goal of deterring additional Russian 

aggression. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, are likely to prove most effective at deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of our current 

measures and I will remain alert to potential adjustments. Of key concern to me 

is wisely channeling U.S. military efforts and resources to ensure our allies and 

partners are militarily capable and interoperable. 

Question. Are you concerned that Moldova and Georgia may be at a heightened 

state of vulnerability given Russian willingness to take aggressive action in 

Ukraine? 

Answer. Yes. Russia has demonstrated both in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine today 

its willingness to use force and exploit the vulnerabilities of these fragile democracies to achieve its strategic objectives. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine all contain 

Russian occupied separatist regions that Russia could potentially exploit for its own 

purposes. 

Question. Russian tactics in eastern Ukraine have been called ‘‘hybrid’’ and combine hard power with soft power, including elements such as lethal security assistance to separatists, the use of special operations forces, extensive information operations, withholding energy supplies and economic pressure. 

If confirmed, what steps would you recommend as part of a strategy to counter 

this ‘‘hybrid’’ approach? 

Answer. I believe we must continue to take actions which deter Russian aggression, remain alert to its strategic capabilities, and most importantly help our allies 

and partners resist Russian coercion over the long term. I will continue to emphasize training activities, rotational presence, and capacity-building to make our partners more resilient against asymmetric threats and demonstrate U.S. resolve. 

Question. In light of Russia’s actions in 2014, what do you believe are appropriate 

objectives for U.S.-Russian security relations? 

Answer. Although we disagree with Russia’s recent conduct against its neighbors 

and will continue with our efforts to deter future actions, I will leave open the possibility for collaboration with Russia in areas of mutual national security interests. 

If confirmed, I will also keep lines of communication with my Russian counterpart 

open as a means for crisis management. 

NATO ALLIANCE

Question. The reemergence of an aggressive Russia has resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) developing the Readiness Action Plan that 

NATO Secretary General 

Jens Stoltenberg called ‘‘the biggest reinforcement of our collective defense since 

the end of the Cold War.’’ NATO also continues to be central to our coalition operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, even as many NATO members have significantly reduced their national defense budgets in response to economic and fiscal 

pressures. 

How important is the NATO alliance to U.S. national security interests? 

Answer. The Alliance is critical to our national security interests. This involves 

both Article 5 and other non-Article 5 related NATO operations. NATO maintains 

a persistent air, land, and maritime presence in and around the territories of our 

European allies, committed to defend its territory against any aggression. But it efforts extend beyond Article 5 with military operations supporting stability in 

Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Mediterranean Sea, and off the Horn of Africa. NATO is 

also assisting nations in North Africa and the Middle East to develop local capabilities to counter growing instability and transnational threats to prevent those 

threats from spreading to Europe. 

Question. In light of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, what 

do you see as the major strategic objectives of the NATO Alliance in the coming 

years and what are the greatest challenges in meeting those objectives? 

Answer. As a result of Russia’s aggressive actions, NATO has refocused its attention on the Alliance’s Article 5 responsibilities to protect and defend its territory and 

populations against attack. Concurrently, NATO must also continue to perform its 

other ‘‘core tasks’’ of crisis management and cooperative security. Among the chalVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00446 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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lenges to achieving these objectives are: first, declining national defense budgets 

that result in capability shortfalls; and second, the required adaptation of NATO’s 

institutional processes to the changing European security environment. 

Question. What do you see as the proper role, if any, for NATO in addressing the 

threat posed by ISIL and in addressing the problem of illegal immigration across 

the Mediterranean Sea? 

Answer. Due to its long-standing partnerships and experience with Defense Capacity Building missions, NATO has the potential to play a role in addressing both 

issues. Within Iraq, NATO could provide expert advice and capacity-building support to the Government of Iraq in areas such as security sector reform and the development of a national security strategy. To address illegal immigration across the 

Mediterranean Sea, NATO could potentially support efforts of the Mediterranean 

Allied nations and the European Union by sharing information gathered through its 

maritime operations in the Mediterranean Sea. 

Question. The concept of defense cooperation among NATO members was emphasized at the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012. 

What areas or projects would you recommend, if confirmed, that NATO nations 

cooperate in to improve NATO alliance capabilities? 

Answer. Cooperation among Allies on developing capabilities provides a cost effective approach to addressing global challenges. If confirmed, I would urge Allies to 

increase their defense investments in both national and multinational projects and 

areas that address Alliance capability needs, such as developing command and control and joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and maintaining and improving readiness and interoperability. In support of that objective, I would also encourage Allies to honor their recent Summit pledge to achieve the two percent defense spending target. 

Question. Turkey continues to be a gateway for foreign fighters proceeding to and 

from Syria and Iraq. 

What steps would you recommend to encourage Turkey to continue to address the 

threat posed by foreign fighters proceeding to and returning from Syria and Iraq? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Department’s contributions to interagency support of Turkish efforts to enhance border security, to include strengthening critical information sharing with the Turkish military. Moreover, I would support international efforts to help source countries identify and disrupt foreign fighter transit to Turkey. 

Question. At the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, NATO leaders declared their 

‘‘aim to move towards the 2 percent guideline [of GDP for defense spending] within 

a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO’s 

capability shortfalls.’’ 

In your view, what impact have national defense budget cuts had on the capabilities of the NATO alliance, and what do you believe needs to be done to address any 

capability shortfalls? 

Answer. There is a direct correlation between national defense budget cuts and 

increased Alliance capability shortfalls, such as in joint intelligence, surveillance 

and reconnaissance. To arrest this negative trend, Allies need to be held to the Defense Investment Pledge they agreed to at the Wales Summit. If confirmed, I will 

work with Allies on defense planning to ensure they maintain or develop the specific 

capabilities that the Alliance is lacking. 

Question. What are the greatest military capability shortfalls that you see in the 

NATO alliance? 

Answer. The most significant shortfalls are in so-called enabling capabilities such 

as joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air to air refueling and strategic lift. These limited capabilities are the ones that the Alliance places heavy reliance on the United States to provide. If confirmed, I would encourage Allies to invest in developing these capabilities through national and multinational efforts. 

Question. In light of the reductions in national defense spending by some NATO 

members, are you concerned that the Alliance will lack critical military capabilities? 

If so, what steps, if any, would you recommend be taken to address potential shortfalls in Alliance capabilities? 

Answer. I am concerned about continued reductions in defense investment by our 

Allies because Alliance capability shortfalls will increase as national defense spending decreases, thus requiring a greater reliance on U.S. capabilities. The most effective step to counter these potential capability shortfalls is to arrest the decline in 

national defense investment and move to meet the Defense Investment Pledge that 

was agreed upon at the NATO Summit in Wales. 

Question. What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for 

NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next five years? 

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Answer. NATO’s evolving security environment, highlighted by the events witnessed in both the Middle East and Europe, has made it necessary for NATO to 

adapt its political, military and institutional processes and focus. Our President and 

other NATO leaders have committed to this adaptation that will make NATO more 

responsive and ready to face future challenges. This commitment to adaptation provides the greatest opportunity for NATO; gaining the consensus to do this in a focused, proactive manner will be the greatest challenge. 

Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries? 

Answer. The 2010 Strategic Concept for the Alliance states NATO will remain a 

nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist. Allies reaffirmed this stance 

with both the 2012 NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review and the 2014 

Wales Summit. I support NATO maintaining the full range of capabilities necessary 

to ensure Alliance security, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, 

and missile defense capabilities. 

U.S. FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE

Question. The Department of Defense continues to review its force posture in Europe to determine what additional consolidations and reductions are necessary and 

consistent with U.S. strategic interests. 

How would you define the U.S. strategic interests in the European area of responsibility (AOR)? 

Answer. Europe is the home of most of our willing and capable Allies and partners. Our immediate security interests include helping Europe defend against potential security threats from Russia and violent extremists from the south as well as 

continued strategic interest in reassuring our Allies and partners of the United 

States’ unquestionable commitment to NATO. 

Question. Do you believe that additional consolidation and reductions of U.S. 

forces in Europe are consistent with U.S. strategic interests in that AOR given the 

increase in Russian aggression in the last 15 months? 

Answer. Yes. Regarding facilities, we are maintaining a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe as the Department gains efficiencies through the Secretary’s directed European Infrastructure Consolidation. Regarding forces, our focus 

on rotational presence is consistent with our strategic interests and existing resource constraints. However, the credibility and effectiveness of our response to Russian aggression in the East depend not only on the operational scale and geographic 

scope of our operations, but also on their persistence and longevity. If confirmed, 

I will seek to ensure the persistent, appropriate level of rotational presence is retained in Europe to effectively deter Russian aggression. 

U.S. FORCE POSTURE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Question. The Department continues the effort to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific as announced in the January 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance. 

Are you satisfied with the rebalance efforts to date? 

Answer. Yes. The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, as announced by the President, incorporated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, and reinforced by the 

2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, has resulted in a significant rebalancing of U.S. 

force structure and capabilities to this region, commensurate with its vital importance to U.S. security interests and global peace and prosperity. As we look ahead, 

we will continue to prioritize the Asia-Pacific region for positioning our most advanced capabilities that are critical for the future operational environment. If confirmed, I will continue to support the ongoing efforts to increase the Department’s 

presence in the region and invest in and deploy critical advanced capabilities. 

Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the Asia-Pacific region 

over the next couple of years and what specific capabilities or enhancements are 

needed in to meet those priorities? 

Answer. First and foremost, we must work tirelessly to protect security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which is vital to the prosperity of all Pacific nations. 

The U.S. faces a range of challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, including provocations by the DPRK and the growth of its ballistic missile programs, the emergence 

of new technologies intended to prevent open access to the air and maritime domain, 

widespread natural disasters and transnational threats, and territorial disputes. 

To address these challenges, I believe the Department must continue to modernize 

U.S. alliances and partnerships, which provide a critical role in underwriting regional security. The Department should also continue to strengthen our ability to 

deter threats to the U.S. homeland and our allies and citizens overseas, enhance 

U.S. force posture and capabilities in the region, specifically in terms of intelligence 

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surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and missile defense, work with China to encourage greater transparency about how it will use its growing military capabilities; 

and encourage the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with 

international law. 

Question. Do the budget cuts and resource constraints associated with sequestration threaten your ability to execute the rebalance to the Pacific? 

Answer. Yes. As stated in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the United 

States has prioritized its ability to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific 

region through presence and power projection. The Department remains committed 

to the rebalance despite the challenges of fiscal uncertainty and ongoing operations 

in the Middle East. U.S. long-term economic and security interests are inextricably 

linked to developments in the Asia-Pacific region, and the Department will continue 

to prioritize investments in those capabilities most relevant to the region. 

Question. As the United States realigns its forces in the Asia-Pacific Theater, do 

you believe we have the air and maritime lift required to support the distribution 

of Marines across North and Southeast Asia? 

Answer. I believe we will need more lift in certain contingencies, but we have 

enough capacity for a range of scenarios. That said, it is critical for the U.S. military 

to evolve its forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region to respond to the changing 

strategic environment. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Services and 

U.S. Pacific Command to address this challenge. 

KOSOVO

Question. Approximately 700 U.S. troops remain in the Balkans as part of the 

Kosovo Force (KFOR) that first deployed to Kosovo in 1999 and today is comprised 

of over 4,600 personnel from 30 countries. Spikes in violence in 2011 required the 

deployment of the NATO operational Reserve Force battalion of approximately 600 

soldiers to bolster KFOR and maintain a secure environment. Progress is required 

in both the military and political realms before further troop reductions can be 

made. 

What major lines of effort do you think are required to further reduce or eliminate 

U.S. and NATO presence in Kosovo? 

Answer. Continuation of the EU’s implementation of the 2013 Brussels Accord between Serbia and Kosovo is a fundamental line of effort, necessary to stabilizing the 

Western Balkans and setting the conditions for improved security and follow-on 

troop reductions. 

Question. In your view, can the European Union play a more significant role in 

Kosovo? 

Answer. The EU already plays a significant role in fostering improved security 

and stability in Kosovo through its European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 

(EULEX–Kosovo). EULEX is part of the EU’s broader effort to promote peace and 

stability in the Western Balkans and supports Kosovo, as they adopt and implement 

necessary reforms on its path toward a greater European integration. 

SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean 

peninsula and of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by the current 

state of North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons capabilities? 

Answer. North Korea’s ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

capabilities present a serious and direct threat to U.S. forces postured in the AsiaPacific region as well as to our regional allies and partners. These capabilities could 

eventually pose a direct threat to United States territory. Moreover, North Korea’s 

history of proliferation amplifies the dangers of its asymmetric programs. If confirmed, I will ensure that the U.S.-ROK Alliance continues to strengthen alliance 

capabilities to counter North Korea’s increasing missile and nuclear threat. I will 

also ensure that we draw upon the full range of our capabilities to protect against 

and respond to North Korean ballistic missile and WMD threats. 

Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take to ensure 

that North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology to Syria, Iran 

and others? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to strengthen our strong defense posture against North Korea. This includes supporting our current efforts to increase 

the number of ground-based interceptors in California and Alaska, enhancing the 

Department’s ability to highlight and disrupt the illicit proliferation networks that 

North Korea uses, and promoting cooperation with partners to interdict vessels and 

aircraft suspected of transporting items of proliferation concern. 

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Question. What is your view regarding the timing of transfer of wartime operational control from the U.S. to the ROK? 

Answer. At the 2013 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, then-Secretary of 

Defense Hagel and ROK Minister of Defense Han decided that in light of the evolving security environment in the region, we will implement the ROK-proposed, conditions-based approach to the transition of wartime OPCON. The ROK will take wartime OPCON when critical ROK and alliance military capabilities are secured and 

the security environment in the region is conducive to a stable wartime OPCON 

transition. 

CHINA ASSERTIVENESS

Question. How has China’s aggressive assertion of territorial and maritime claims, 

particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea, affected security and stability in the region? 

Answer. China’s actions are adding tension to the Asia-Pacific region, and subtly 

undermine the regional order that has sustained 70 years of security and prosperity 

in the Asia Pacific. For example, its claims to nearly the entire South China Sea 

are inconsistent with international law. The international community continues to 

call on China to settle such issues cooperatively and without coercion. China has 

responded with aggressive land reclamation efforts on a pace and scale far surpassing other claimants that will allow it to position military forces astride vital 

international sea lanes. 

Through a persistent military and law enforcement presence and the announcement in November 2013 of a new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the 

East China Sea, China continues to engage in actions that appear designed to challenge Japan’s administration of the Senkaku Islands. 

CHINA MIL-MIL

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of the U.S.-China military 

relationship and your views regarding China’s interest in and commitment to improving military relations with the United States? 

Answer. Regarding our military-to-military (mil-mil) relations with China, it is 

profoundly in our shared interests that we find ways to increase cooperation where 

our interests overlap and to manage our differences where we disagree. In recent 

years, the Department’s sustained and substantive dialogue with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has enabled both the United States and China to reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculation, as well as to deepen practical cooperation in areas ranging from humanitarian assistance to military medicine. In 

addition to making investments that ensure our technological advantages in all domains, the military-to-military relationship is an important component in managing 

competition. 

Question. What is your view of the purpose and relative importance of sustained 

military-to-military relations with China? 

Answer. At their most basic level, U.S.-China defense contacts and exchanges provide opportunities to establish and maintain open lines of communication that will 

be essential to managing a crisis or preventing unintended escalation. The militaryto-military relationship also allows us to explore and expand cooperation in areas 

of mutual interest, as well as manage security competition and other frictions in the 

relationship in a way that supports overall stability. Our high-level leadership and 

policy interactions have allowed us to address with China at the strategic-level differences in areas such as nuclear and strategic stability, operations and standards 

in the space, cyber and maritime domains, and regional security issues such as Afghanistan, North Korea, South and East China Seas, and others. 

ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL

Question. Over the past few years, much has been made of the emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the U.S. military’s freedom of movement and action in certain regions. Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities are a concern? 

Answer. Emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities (A2AD) are a concern. 

China is developing missiles and other military technologies that are intended to 

limit U.S. military’s freedom of movement in the Western Pacific. Russia is developing its A2AD capabilities, including missiles, in order to constrain U.S. and Allied 

freedom of movement on its periphery. Iran maintains a layered A2AD capability 

through the employment of road mobile ballistic missiles, an integrated air defense 

system, anti-ship cruise missiles, and naval assets stationed in the Persian Gulf. 

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Question. If so, what do you believe the U.S. armed forces need to be doing now 

and in the next few years to ensure continued access to all strategically important 

segments of the maritime domain? 

Answer. As the President outlined in the 2015 National Security Strategy, the 

U.S. is committed to freedom of navigation and the safety and sustainability of maritime environment. The Department will therefore invest in critical personnel and 

technological advantages to meet the President’s commitment, especially to counter 

anti-access and area denial capabilities of our potential enemies. Details of specific 

actions and investments are more appropriate for a classified discussion. 

Question. If confirmed, you would play an important role in the process of transforming the U.S. armed forces’ capability and capacity to meet new and emerging 

threats. 

Concerning capability and capacity to meet new and emerging threats, what are 

your goals regarding transformation of the U.S. military? 

Answer. My goals would include addressing emerging threats through capability 

and capacity advancement across the spectrum of defense activities. The Department is exploring new ‘‘offset strategies’’—combinations of technologies, operational 

concepts, and organizational constructs to meet these challenges which we can discuss in a classified setting. If confirmed, I will also emphasize the development of 

a new model for deterrence in the 21st Century to ensure that emerging domains— 

such as cyber—are incorporated into our thinking. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES

Question. Despite the ongoing drawdown in Afghanistan, demand for intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of every kind remains very high 

due to the enhanced situational awareness and targeting capabilities they bring to 

our commanders. Almost all of the geographic combatant commands still have validated ISR requirements that are not being met. 

What is your assessment of the Department’s current disposition of ISR assets 

across the various combatant commands? 

Answer. The Department has insufficient ISR assets to meet the global demand. 

Meeting new requests required reallocating assets from other Secretary of Defenseapproved operations. The Department must therefore allocate ISR assets to meet 

our highest priorities. To support counter-terrorism operations, we have allocated 90 

percent of our remotely-piloted full-motion video assets to USCENTCOM in support 

of our counter-terrorism operations, with the remaining sourced primarily to 

USAFRICOM. We are leveraging other assets with increased standoff ranges and 

enhanced defensive capabilities to support USEUCOM’s indications and warning 

collection requirements and to support USPACOM’s sensitive reconnaissance operations areas. 

Question. As our forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan, should existing ISR assets be re-postured to support combatant command needs in other regions, or can 

we afford to reduce ISR capacity? 

Answer. To ensure a balance across operational, force management, and institutional risks, the Department continually evaluates our capabilities against evolving 

combatant command requirements. When appropriate, we can reposition ISR assets 

to support emerging needs across other regions. For example, within the last year, 

we sourced nearly all of our current ISR for Syria and Iraq from operations in Afghanistan. Additionally, we made the tough decision to return Air Force MQ–1 and 

MQ–9 capacity to a steady-state 60 flights a day, reducing risk to the long-term sustainability of the USAF’s unmanned pilot force. 

Question. Most of the highest-value ISR assets acquired after 9/11 are aircraft 

that were not designed to be survivable in high-threat air defense environments, although in some cases unmanned aerial vehicles were designed to be deployed in 

large numbers in the expectation of substantial combat attrition. 

Do you believe that the Department needs a major shift towards ISR platforms 

that are survivable in high-threat situations, or merely an augmentation of the capabilities we now have, with the assumption that air superiority can be gained rapidly enough to operate today’s assets effectively? 

Answer. I believe we should invest in ISR platforms, sensors, and communications 

capabilities designed to penetrate and survive in high-threat and denied environments, across all domains. It is faulty to assume we will rapidly gain superiority 

in the air or other domains in future conflicts. We must find the right balance of 

ISR capabilities. Future scenarios will require assets capable of penetrating and 

surviving in high-threat and denied areas. While these capabilities are expensive to 

develop and field, they are a necessary component of balanced efforts to maintain 

our strategic advantage. 

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AIRCRAFT CARRIER-LAUNCHED UNMANNED SYSTEMS

Question. The Navy’s current plan for the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne 

Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system aircraft is to develop an airframe optimized for unrefueled endurance (14 hours) and the ISR mission. Given the combat 

radius of the planned carrier air wing, are you concerned the carrier will lack the 

ability to project power at relevant distances given emerging anti-access/area-denial 

threats? 

Answer. Yes. That is why it is important for the Department to continue development of concepts and capabilities that allow us to project power when faced with 

an A2AD environment to maintain competitive advantage. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The 2006 and 2010 QDRs mandated significant growth in our special 

operations forces (SOF) and enablers that directly support their operations. The 

most-recent QDR released in 2014 capped this growth at 69,500, approximately 

2,500 below the originally planned growth. In light of the growing global terrorism 

threat, do you believe the currently planned end-strength for SOF is sufficient to 

meet global requirements? 

Answer. Any changes to end-strength, whether conventional or special operations 

forces (SOF), require continual analysis to meet current and predicted threats while 

informed by fiscal realities. 

Question. SOF are heavily reliant on enabling support from the general purpose 

force. In light of current fiscal challenges, do you believe sufficient enabling capabilities can be maintained within the general purpose forces and that such capabilities 

will remain available to special operations forces? 

Answer. I firmly believe that we have trained general purpose forces for these 

missions and we will continue to have this capability going forward. 

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS

Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 

2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated 

that the United States ‘‘is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to UN peacekeeping operations.’’ 

What is your view on whether the U.S. should contribute more military personnel 

to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations? 

Answer. The Department should focus its contributions to the UN in areas that 

will help make systemic changes to increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of UN 

peacekeeping operations. Select placements of personnel to key positions within the 

UN can help facilitate this objective. 

Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the 

DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support 

from multilateral institutions like the United Nations? 

Answer. Over the past year we have provided multiple officers to the UN to include the head of the UN’s military planning service. The recent administrative 

waiver extension provided by the UN to the U.S. facilitates future assignments. If 

confirmed, I will explore methods to be more responsive to requests for personnel 

support to multilateral institutions. 

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in 

recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature. 

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative 

interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere? 

Answer. The military element of national power will always be critical, but 

achieving lasting national security objectives requires an integrated whole of government approach. We have learned a great deal about this over the past decade 

and our capabilities for interagency collaboration have progressed substantially. If 

confirmed, I will work to ensure we do not lose that ability as we refocus on full 

spectrum proficiency. 

Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved? 

Answer. If confirmed, my focus must remain on the military instrument of power 

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agency and private sector. I want to maximize interagency partners’ integration into 

our training and education programs, in order to strengthen the relationships that 

are essential when facing a national security challenge. 

Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured in military doctrine and adopted as ‘‘best practices’’ for future contingency operations? 

Answer. Joint Doctrine must adapt quickly to innovation in the dynamic environment of current operations. In turn, we must infuse doctrine quickly into the education and joint exercise programs. We have made great strides in this over the last 

decade. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department’s Joint Force Development process analyzes lessons learned from operational practice, joint training and concept development and moves them rapidly into Joint Doctrine for the operational preparation and future employment of the force. 

Question. Interagency collaboration on an operational or tactical level tends to address issues on a country-by-country basis rather than on a regional basis (e.g. 

international terrorists departing Mali for safe havens in Libya). 

How do you believe regional strategies that link efforts in individual countries can 

best be coordinated in the interagency arena? 

Answer. Our performance in crisis situations rests on how well we collaborate on 

a routine basis. Therefore, I support a whole-of-government planning, operations 

and resourcing framework to ensure our country plans are mutually-reinforcing. The 

military develops Theater Campaign Plans and Functional Campaign Plans that address regional and trans-regional issues. We seek input from interagency partners 

in the development of these plans to de-conflict and complement efforts. State is beginning to develop Joint Regional Strategies to address regional foreign policy priorities and drive country strategies. This new regional perspective will improve our 

ability to coordinate The Department’s plans with State’s plans. 

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Question. The U.S. Government has recognized the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ 

(R2P)—that is, the responsibility of the international community to use appropriate 

means to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 

crimes against humanity, by encouraging states to protect their own populations, by 

helping states build the capacity to do so, and by acting directly should national authorities fail to provide such protection. In its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, 

the Department of Defense names ‘‘preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities’’ as one of a long list of potential contingencies that DOD might be called on 

to address. DOD has begun to explore some of the implications of R2P, by considering ‘‘mass atrocity prevention and response operations’’ (MAPRO). 

In your view, how high a priority should the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ be for the 

U.S. Government as a whole? 

Answer. The United States does not currently view the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ 

as a legal basis for the use of military force. Without legal standing, it is not a practice to rank order by priority. However, the Department undertook an active role 

and remains prepared to act, if directed, to help prevent and respond to mass atrocity situations. 

Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, if any, in fulfilling the 

responsibility to protect? 

Answer. The use of military force is only one instrument of national power. The 

role of the Department is to support our government’s decided response in any situation as part of a whole-of-government approach. The Department should provide 

options and provide the risk assessment of those options for our political leaders’ 

use in their decision making. 

In your view, what is the proper application of R2P doctrine with respect to the 

situation in Syria? 

Answer. It would be a political vice military decision to use R2P as a basis for 

intervention. However, the U.S. Government continues working with its allies, partners, and with the Syrian opposition to provide humanitarian assistance within 

Syria and across the region. The United States already has provided over $4.4 billion in aid since fiscal year 2012 to help the victims of the conflict, including emergency medical care and supplies, food, and shelter. The U.S. Government has spent 

over three quarters of a billion dollars in fiscal year 2015. 

OPERATION OBSERVANT COMPASS & THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY

Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) and 

efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support them, elements of the Lord’s 

Resistance Army (LRA)—including Joseph Kony—continue to operate and commit 

atrocities against civilian populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic 

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Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan. Some observers have identified operational 

concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are trying to find 

an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of California, much of which is covered 

in thick jungle; (2) technical support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from 

the defense and intelligence community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations personnel to 

accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations, thereby limiting the 

level of direct support they can provide. 

In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass? 

Answer. It is my understanding that Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS has four 

main objectives: 

1) Increase protection of civilians affected by the LRA 

2) Promote defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of LRA 

fighters 

3) Remove Joseph Kony and LRA leaders from central Africa 

4) Increase humanitarian access and provide relief 

With U.S. government assistance, our African partners are making considerable 

progress achieving these mission objectives. 

Question. Do you support the continuation of DOD’s current level of support to 

this mission? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate for the Department to continue resourcing 

this operation at a level appropriate to the threat the LRA poses to our national 

interests in the region. 

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are 

also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats 

that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director 

of National Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as ‘‘an 

abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,’’ and stated that 

‘‘rising drug violence and corruption are undermining stability and the rule of law 

in some countries’’ in the Western Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released 

his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging 

Threats to National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the 

strategy is ‘‘enhancing Department of Defense support to U.S. law enforcement.’’ 

What is your understanding of the President’s strategy to combat transnational 

criminal organizations? 

Answer. The President’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime integrates all elements of our national power to combat transnational organized crime 

and related threats to national security—and urges our partners to do the same. Ultimately, the strategy seeks to reduce transnational organized crime from a national 

security threat to a manageable public safety concern in the U.S. and in strategic 

regions abroad. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Department’s role within the President’s strategy? 

Answer. The Department of Defense provides a valuable supporting role to other 

U.S. government agencies with the lead to combat transnational organized crime. 

Question. In your view, should DOD play a role in providing support to the U.S. 

law enforcement and the Intelligence Community on matters related to 

transnational organized crime? 

Answer. The Department provides unique capabilities to address the national security threat of transnational criminal organizations by supporting U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community as part of a whole of government approach, 

consistent with current and recently expanded authorities provided in the fiscal year 

2015 NDAA. Intelligence support, counter-threat finance support, building partner 

capacity and detection and monitoring are specific Department capabilities which 

support the interagency and partner nations. 

Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as well as a core moral interest, in 

August 2011 under Presidential Study Directive 10. 

Among interagency partners, what is DOD’s role in addressing atrocity threats, 

and what tools does DOD have for preventing or responding to atrocities? 

Answer. The Department has developed Joint Doctrine for conducting Mass Atrocity Response Operations. Based on this doctrine, atrocity prevention and response 

is now incorporated into military plans and planning guidance. In addition, the Department has conducted a comprehensive review of training in this area and is 

449 

working to strengthen the capacity of UN peacekeeping operations to respond to 

atrocity events. 

Question. Has DOD developed planning processes toward this effort so that it will 

be able to respond quickly in emergency situations? 

Answer. Yes, the Department has developed planning processes toward this effort. 

All DOD components have been directed to integrate atrocity prevention and response into their policies and plans. Specific plans are further developed and implemented at the Geographic Combatant Command level, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. 

Question. In your view, is the situation in Syria a mass atrocity? 

Answer. The situation in Syria is truly tragic considering the estimates of over 

two hundred thousand combatant and non-combatants deaths, with over four million displaced. There is no military solution in Syria when the violence occurs due 

to a brutal regime that attacks its own citizens. There can be no peace in Syria with 

Asad in power, only a negotiated political settlement will solve Syrian crisis. 

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

Question. DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC) have begun investing more 

resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist 

networks and illicit trafficking, but the opportunities for tracking and degrading illicit financing flows are not yet matched by the effort and resources devoted to 

them. Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and facilitation routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism, production of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other significant national security threats could have an 

outsized impact on confronting these threats. 

What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance activities? 

Answer. The Department’s policy is to work with other U.S. government entities 

and partner nations to effectively deny, disrupt, degrade, and defeat our adversaries’ 

ability to access and utilize financial resources. If confirmed, I will work to further 

integrate our efforts with those of the interagency, intelligence community, and our 

foreign and institutional partners to more effectively counter threat finance activities and networks. 

Question. Are you aware of any policy, legal authority, or resource shortfalls that 

may impair U.S. counter threat finance efforts? 

Answer. Lack of sufficient insight and fidelity on the sources of corruption in partner nations can hinder our ability to achieve counter threat network goals. Additionally, in non-terrorism cases, there are still difficulties sharing timely and relevant 

information between law enforcement and intelligence elements. 

Question. In your view, how should the Department of Defense coordinate and 

interface with other key agencies, including the Department of Treasury and the Intelligence Community, in conducting counter threat finance activities? 

Answer. The Department should, and currently does, augment and support the efforts of other U.S. government entities, including the Department of Treasury and 

the Intelligence Community, with its unique capabilities to conduct counter threat 

finance capabilities. The result is a well-coordinated, capable, and robust counter 

threat finance posture. If confirmed, I will continue to remain fully engaged in the 

interagency process to diminish adversary use of both licit and illicit financial networks. 

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular 

forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations 

by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism. 

What is your assessment of this authority? 

Answer. Section 1208 funding is a good tool enabling the U.S. Government to leverage our foreign partners and reduces U.S. unilateral Direct Action operations to 

combat terrorism. 1208 funding allows the U.S. to quickly advance counterterrorism 

objectives in areas that would otherwise allow terrorism to go unchecked. The U.S. 

can build on programs to transition into building partner capacity so that foreign 

partners can deny terrorists a safe haven within their sovereign country. 

ACTIVE-DUTY AND RESERVE COMPONENT END STRENGTH

Question. Last year DOD announced its 5-year plan to reduce active-duty end 

strengths by over 100,000 servicemembers by 2017 and the reserve components by 

another 21,000 over the same period. These cuts do not include any additional perVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00455 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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sonnel reductions that could result from sequestration or any agreement to avoid 

sequestration. 

What is your view of the role of the reserve components as the active components 

draw down? 

Answer. As the total force draws down, the role of the Reserve Component will 

continue to be critical in meeting the requirements of our National Military Strategy. Because much of the Total Force’s essential capabilities reside in the National 

Guard and Reserves, we simply cannot meet our global commitments without them. 

However, I cannot stress enough that we need both statutory authorities and a reliable funding stream to maintain the readiness of our active duty component and assured access to our trained and ready reserve components. Without assured access, 

we cannot adequately program and properly plan for integrating and employing this 

critical asset in support of our national interests. 

Question. What additional military personnel reductions do you envision if the sequester continues? 

Answer. The PB16 FYDP manning levels reflect the maximum acceptable risk in 

executing our defense strategy. If sequestration continues, we will further reduce 

total personnel end-strength consistent with the 2013 Strategic Choices Management Review and subsequent SASC testimony by the Service Chiefs. 

Question. In your view, what tools do DOD and the Services need to get down to 

authorized strengths in the future, and which of these require Congressional authorization? 

Answer. I believe the Department and Services’ force management tools are flexible enough to drawn down to authorized Service end strengths. I know of no request 

for increased tools or authorities at this time. 

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. American military personnel routinely deploy to locations around the 

world where they must engage effectively with allies and with host-country nationals whose faiths and beliefs may be different than their own. For many other cultures, religious faith is not a purely personal and private matter; it is the foundation of their culture and society. Learning to respect the different faiths and beliefs 

of others, and to understand how accommodating different views can contribute to 

a diverse force is, some would argue, an essential skill for operational effectiveness. 

In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different beliefs, 

including no religious belief? 

Answer. Yes. The Department of Defense is committed to accommodating the free 

exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who have different 

beliefs or no religious belief. 

Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and good order and discipline? 

Answer. Yes. Law and policy accommodate individual expressions of belief as long 

as they do not impact mission accomplishment, good order and discipline, and unit 

cohesion. 

Question. In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and respects open 

and candid discussions about personal religious faith and beliefs in a garrison environment contribute in a positive way to preparing U.S. forces to be effective in overseas assignments? Would a policy that discourages open discussions about personal 

faith and beliefs be more or less effective at preparing servicemembers to work and 

operate in a pluralistic environment? 

Answer. In my view, it is important to have a military climate that welcomes and 

respects open and candid discussion about personal religious faith. Expressing personal belief in a manner that is respectful of other’s views helps strengthen cohesion 

within a unit. At the same time, it helps U.S. forces to develop a deeper awareness 

and understanding of other perspectives, which is important in overseas assignments. Policies that discourage open discussion would be short-sighted in their understanding of the world in which we live. 

PREVENTION OF AND RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULTS

Question. In 2014, there was what the Department described as an ‘‘unprecedented 53 percent increase in victim reports of sexual assault. In fiscal year 2014, 

victims made 4,660 Unrestricted Reports and 1,840 initial Restricted Reports of sexual assault. Also in fiscal year 2014, the Department saw the number of victims who 

converted Restricted Reports to Unrestricted Reports increase from an average of 

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15 percent to 20 percent. According to the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study 

approximately 72 percent of servicemember victims who indicated they made a sexual assault report said they would make the same decision to make a report if they 

had to do it over again. The Rand Study also indicated the percentages of active 

duty personnel who experienced unwanted sexual assault declined in 2014, from 6.1 

percent to 4.3 percent for women and from 1.2 percent to 0.9 percent for men. The 

Department also concluded the estimated gap between reporting and prevalence of 

sexual assaults was at the narrowest point since the Department began tracking 

this data. 

What is your assessment of the current DOD sexual assault prevention and response program? 

Answer. We have taken strong action to address the climate within the military 

and to bring perpetrators to justice. We hold commanders accountable for both. We 

have made progress but must continue to work hard, particularly in reforms designed to improve victim confidence, enhance access to victim advocacy and legal 

support. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs are committed to the safety 

of our men and women and will not relax our comprehensive efforts to combat sexual assault. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. The unrestricted and restricted reporting options were designed to assist 

victims. Because unrestricted reporting automatically initiates a criminal investigation, some victims were choosing to forego support services rather than initiate an 

investigation. The restricted reporting option allows a victim access to medical care 

and support services without initiating an investigation. Offering both forms of reporting provides a means to protect a victim’s privacy and time to cope with the 

trauma of sexual assault. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of DOD oversight of military service implementation of the DOD and service policies for the prevention of 

and response to sexual assaults? 

Answer. The Department has provided close oversight and strong support to the 

Services. The collaboration between the OSD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office and Services led to many advancements, including the development 

of metrics which will not only improve oversight but will also help better understand the effectiveness of our response efforts. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these observed changes in sexual assaults have occurred? 

Answer. The chain of command is fundamental of our military culture. Our ability 

to effect institutional change rest with leaders at all levels but starts with the commander. Commanders are accountable for what happens in their units and must foster a command climate of dignity, respect and trust where sexist behavior, sexual 

harassment and sexual assault is not condoned or ignored. 

Question. Surveys report that up to 62 percent of victims who report a sexual assault perceive professional or social retaliation for reporting. If confirmed, what will 

you do to address the issue of retaliation for reporting a sexual assault? 

Answer. Any form of retaliation goes against our core values. The Department is 

focused on this issue and working to understand what causes this problem and develop solutions. If confirmed, I will work with the OSD and the Services to ensure 

our servicemembers understand that our culture fosters dignity and respect and retaliation is not tolerated. 

Question. Sexual assault is a significantly underreported crime in our society and 

in the military. If confirmed, what will you do to increase reporting of sexual assaults by military victims? 

Answer. We must improve victim confidence in our ability to respond to incidents 

of sexual assault, and in their well-being after an incident. If confirmed, I will continue to work hard with OSD to assess current programs and best practices that 

build victim confidence in our systems and our ability to hold perpetrators appropriately accountable. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command, instead of a military commander in the grade of O– 

6 or above as is currently the Department’s policy, to determine whether allegations 

of sexual assault should be prosecuted? 

Answer. I value the legal analyses and recommendations of our military judge advocates. However, I firmly believe the military commander’s role is indispensable in 

the military justice process. The Uniform Code of Military Justice a criminal justice 

system, but it is also a critical aspect of a commander’s authority to maintain good 

order and discipline. I believe our servicemembers and our national security are best 

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served by retaining the military commander’s key role in the military justice decision process. 

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. The Department, in January 2014 rescinded the policy restricting the 

assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission of engaging 

in direct ground combat operations, and has given the military services until January 1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that must be 

approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. 

The services are working now to develop gender-free physical and mental standards 

for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards. 

If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these standards? 

Answer. The Services are in the final stages of validating their standards. Military Department Secretaries must certify that their standards are gender-neutral 

and in compliance with all applicable laws by 30 Sept. If confirmed, I look forward 

to working with OSD and the Joint Chiefs to monitor the effectiveness of the standards. 

Question. Will you ensure that the standards will be realistic and will preserve, 

or enhance, military readiness and mission capability? 

Answer. Yes. Our success is contingent upon establishing a ready and capable 

military force. Our standards must prepare us to meet any contingency. 

Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on bona 

fide military requirements? 

Answer. All decisions impacting our armed forces should be based on a complete 

analysis of mission requirements. 

Question. If so, what steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that such decisions are made on this basis? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure decisions 

are made that reflect joint operations requirements. 

Question. Some family members have expressed concerns about assigning women 

to what are currently male-only combat units. 

Answer. I believe our final standards, along with sound leadership, will address 

any concerns . 

Question. To what extent do you believe that this will be a problem in the implementation of this policy? 

Answer. I do not believe this will be a problem that will impact implementation. 

Question. If it is a problem, what steps would you take if confirmed to address 

it? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will take every opportunity to ensure our military family 

members concerns are addressed. 

MILITARY HEALTH CARE REFORM AND MODERNIZATION

Question. Congress authorized the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2013 to conduct a review of the military compensation and retirement systems and 

to make recommendations to modernize those systems. The Commission released its 

report in January 2015. What is your view of the Commission’s findings regarding 

the military health system? 

Answer. I agree with the Commission that the military must continue to improve 

the military health care system. The health care reforms proposed in the President’s 

fiscal year 2016 budget are a good first step and offer servicemembers, retirees, and 

their families more control and choice over their health care decisions. As we prepare the fiscal year 2017 budget, we will work with Congress to determine if additional reform proposals are needed. 

Question. Do you believe the Department’s fiscal year 2016 proposal to consolidate 

TRICARE adequately addressed the Commission’s findings on military health care? 

Answer. Yes. The Department’s fiscal year 2016 proposal to consolidate TRICARE 

effectively provides family members and retirees with greater choice and control 

over their healthcare decision without the risk of an untested, and potentially infeasible, overhaul of the Military Health System. If confirmed, I will work closely with 

Department leadership and Congress to ensure the proposal is implemented as efficiently and effectively as possible. 

Question. What is your view of the Commission’s recommendation to establish a 

Joint Readiness Command? 

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Answer. A new, four-star readiness command is not necessary as the Department 

has sufficient existing processes and governance structures to identify, track, and 

measure the readiness status of Department-wide and Service-specific essential 

medical capabilities. 

Question. What is your assessment of progress the Defense Health Agency has 

made to create efficiencies and generate cost savings by combining the medical support functions of the Services? 

Answer. I have been briefed that the Defense Health Agency (DHA) is on track 

to reach Full Operational Capability on 1 October 2015. In order for the DHA to 

be successful, the difference between policy and execution must be clear to the Services, Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff. This clarification and along with the 

DHA’s ability to meet its assigned mission essential tasks will be validated by the 

Joint Staff NLT 2017 when a Combat Support Agency Review Team Assessment 

(CSART) is conducted by the Joint Staff. 

Question. Do you believe the Defense Health Agency should be replaced with a 

new combatant command, a Unified Medical Command? 

Answer. No. The Defense Health Agency (DHA) will reach Full Operating Capability (FOC) on 01 October 2015 and it is premature to make a determination if the 

DHA will meet mission demands. As such, I agree with the Secretary Carter’s assessment that an additional four-star command for the purpose of ensuring joint 

medical readiness is not required now. 

WOUNDED WARRIOR SUPPORT

Question. Servicemembers wounded and injured in combat operations deserve the 

highest priority from their Service for support services, healing and recuperation, 

rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty 

when appropriate, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. 

What is your assessment of the progress made by the Department of Defense, the 

Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Services to improve the care, management, 

and transition of seriously ill and injured servicemembers and their families? 

Answer. The establishment of the Warrior Care Policy (WCP) Office is probably 

one of the most significant improvements we’ve made in support of our wounded, 

ill, and injured recovering servicemembers (RSMs). The WCP is solely focused on 

developing policies for the DOD and provides oversight to ensure proper execution 

and outcomes. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase support for wounded servicemembers and their families, 

and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. Although the Services and Department have made strides in caring for 

many different aspects/needs of wounded, ill, and injured recovering servicemembers 

(RSMs), more can be done with regards to standardizing policy across the Services 

(related to retention). There needs to be more clarity or communication of the procedures and processes which each Service has when a servicemember desires to return 

to active duty. 

Question. What is your assessment of the need to make further improvements in 

the Integrated Disability Evaluation System? 

Answer. My understanding is the Department makes every effort to improve our 

key processes and IDES is one of those areas. In the last few years, DOD has identified and executed numerous improvements that have resulted in achieving higher 

servicemember satisfaction as well as more timely processing. As a result, as of May 

2015, Active Component case timeliness averaged 223 days with a goal set at 290 

days. The Reserve Component has achieved a 298 days metric while the goal is 305 

days. Servicemember satisfaction is at a new high of 87 percent. I believe we are 

moving in the right direction and if confirmed will continue to make improving this 

process a priority. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION AND MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues to concern the 

Committee. 

In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in shaping policies 

to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members of the reserve 

components? 

Answer. Preventing suicide among members of the Armed Services is one of the 

most important challenges we share with the Services. We have joined forces with 

agencies throughout DOD and civil society to better understand the factors leading 

to suicide. We are shaping policy to foster a culture of Total Force Fitness that enVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00459 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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hances wellness, promotes resilience, and sustains a military force fit in mind, body, 

and spirit. In addition to educating the force on suicide prevention, we are providing 

additional training and support to our first responders (chaplains, senior enlisted 

leaders, legal counsel, and mental health providers) to ensure that they are as 

equipped as possible to prevent suicides. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental 

health resources are available to servicemembers in theater, and to the 

servicemembers and their families upon return to home station? 

Answer. I believe we reduce the stigma associated with servicemembers seeking 

mental health care. I also believe that prevention by early intervention for both 

servicemembers and their family is a key component of mental health care. Additionally, having adequate care providers at the appropriate locations for 

servicemembers to seek out support is critical. Specifically, I continue to support 

embedding mental health personnel across the deployed force and the requirement 

of an in-theater periodic mental health assessment for all servicemembers deployed. 

The long-term mental health of our servicemembers and their families cannot be understated and if confirmed I will continue making progress in supporting them in 

this area. 

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. The Committee is concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life 

programs for military families, such as family support, child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget challenges. 

If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of intense downward pressure on 

budgets? 

Answer. One of the chief priorities within military quality of life that I would like 

to see pursued, is a greater focus on program evaluation and outcomes. The Military 

Family Readiness Counsel was established in 2008 specifically to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of the quality of life and family readiness programs, and the 

Joint Staff participates in this venue. We need to see more concrete recommendations from this body to the Secretary of Defense on how utilize evidence to improve 

our social support programs, especially in light of downward pressure on budgets. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Military members and their families in both the active and reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns 

among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the 

long separations that go with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for 

servicemembers and their families? 

Answer. I consider pay, benefits and retirement on of the top issues for 

servicemembers and their families. This has been an intense area of examination 

and discussion within the recent Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC) efforts and among the Services. A family’s finances have 

a direct impact on the stress level and readiness of the servicemember and their 

families. Changes are coming with the introduction of the new blended retirement 

package. We need a plan to communicate the value of this new retirement system 

and educate our members on the financial decisions they must make as the changes 

are implemented. 

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global 

rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end strength? 

Answer. I understand that the Services have already made plans to adjust for 

force size and rotation, and family readiness is a responsibility of each Service; however, we can encourage more collaboration with community-based organizations to 

maximize non-DOD resources. Family support programs that are flexible, responsive, and communicate / coordinate with interagency and non-governmental family 

services will be critical in meeting the needs of our servicemembers and their families. The Department can find efficiencies within its own programs through better 

evaluation practices, and we can also enhance the accessibility to DOD and NonDOD support programs. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as 

to active duty families who do not reside near a military installation? 

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Answer. Over the past fourteen years of war, one of the best support programs 

developed for the reserve component (RC) families has been the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP). The YRRP continues to evolve and change with the 

deployment operational tempo and fiscal constraints, but if confirmed I am committed to ensuring that its essential services receives proper funding to meet the 

unique needs of our RC community. 

OPERATIONAL ENERGY BUDGETING

Question. In what specific areas, if any, do you believe the Department needs to 

improve the incorporation of energy considerations into the strategic planning and 

force development processes? 

Answer. Our ability to project and sustain power depends on the assured delivery 

of energy. Through the Joint Staff’s and Combatant Commands’ operational experience, campaign analyses, and wargames, we have demonstrated the tradeoffs and 

risks that accompany our need for large amounts of energy. To increase warfighting 

effectiveness, we will continue to analyze and improve the broad energy enterprise 

through overarching policy and strategy, global posture, acquisition management, 

and force development. 

Question. In what specific areas, if any, do you believe the Department should increase funding for operational energy requirements, energy efficiency, alternative 

energy, and renewable energy opportunities? 

Answer. We must continue to take a balanced approach to improve our 

warfighting capabilities from an operational energy perspective while reducing risk 

and cost. Energy enables operational capability with improved range, endurance, 

and force reliability, therefore we should make additional investments to improve 

the energy performance of our weapon systems, equipment, and their modifications; 

our enduring and non-enduring installations; by reducing energy supply-chain 

vulnerabilities; and by increasing energy security through diversification. 

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. Officials of the Department of Defense, including previous Chairmen of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated for accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. 

Do you support United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the 

Law of the Sea? 

Answer. Yes. The United States is a maritime Nation and joining the Convention 

will enhance our capability and credibility in ensuring freedom of the seas for both 

military and economic activities on, under and above the world’s oceans. The Convention’s various navigational and overflight provisions provide global mobility for 

our Armed Forces. 

Question. How would you respond to critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States? 

Answer. Our non-party status diminishes our influence in defending the Convention’s existing norms that enable the access, mobility, and sustainment of our military forces and commercial fleet. I also detracts from our ability to lead developments in the maritime domain, and enables emerging powers to advance their contrary interpretations of the Convention. As the global security environment changes, 

it will become increasingly important for the United States, as the world’s foremost 

maritime power, to use all elements of national power and lead from inside the 

framework of the Convention rather than observe from the outside. 

Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of 

the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime disputes such as in the 

South China Sea and in the Arctic? 

Answer. Accession would improve our ability to shape the outcome of ongoing and 

emerging maritime disputes. Our position to influence these key interests is diminished when we seek to enforce the Convention’s navigation and over flight rights 

guaranteed to all nations when we are one of a very small group of nations that 

is not a party. In the Arctic, we are the only Arctic nation that is not a party to 

the Convention. As a non-party to the Convention, the United States cannot utilize 

the Convention’s mechanisms to gain international recognition of its ECS. 

DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

Question. Recent Department of Defense operations in Iraq and Syria highlight 

the need for a continued detention capability for both interrogation and law of war 

detention. 

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What recommendations do you have for ensuring that the Department of Defense 

maintains sufficient detention capabilities for capture operations against ISIL and 

other affiliated terrorist groups to remain a viable option? 

Answer. I believe that the Department will continue to require a detention capability. If confirmed, I will advocate to civilian and military leadership to provide 

commanders on the ground the ability to lawfully detain as part of future capture 

operations. 

Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum 

issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, 

regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, 

dated August 19, 2014? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and 

plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and 

tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 

and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be 

based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the 

risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact 

on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines are treated, 

should they be captured in future conflicts? 

Answer. Yes. 

OFFSET TECHNOLOGIES

Question. During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key technologies to offset 

the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces: precision guided munitions, 

stealth technology, and satellite-based navigation. These three technologies have 

given U.S. forces unparalleled superiority until now. However, with advancements 

by our emerging adversaries, it seems like the military technological superiority is 

beginning to erode. As a result, it is critical that the United States once again focus 

on offsetting the technology advantages being gained by our adversaries. Which 

technology priorities do you believe the Department of Defense should be pursuing 

to maintain the military technological superiority of the United States? 

Answer. As anti-access and area-denial weapons and other advanced technologies 

proliferate, the Department will likely turn to breakthrough technologies in the 

fields of robotics, autonomous systems, miniaturization, big data, and additive manufacturing to restore our military advantage. 

Question. What strategies would you recommend that Secretary Carter implement 

to develop these technology priorities? 

Answer. The purpose of the Defense Innovation Initiative strategy laid out by Secretary Carter is to develop our future technology priorities. Complimenting this effort by the warfighters is the development of new innovative operational concepts. 

If confirmed, I will make sure that the investments in operation concepts and 

human capital—as our greatest asset will always be our servicemembers—proceed 

apace with our efforts to pursue innovative solutions through technological means. 

Question. What role do the services have to play in their development? 

Answer. By identifying, experimenting, and wargaming combinations of new and 

existing technologies necessary to project power globally, the Services in partnership 

with the Defense Innovation Initiative team will help steer the development of future technology priorities. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit to the warfighter. In this regard, 

it is critical that advancements quickly transition from the development phase into 

testing and evaluation and ultimately into a procurement program for the 

warfighter. What are some of the challenges you see in transitioning technologies 

effectively from research programs into programs of records? 

Answer. Moving an advanced technology from a research program into a program 

of record requires carving out room in the budget based upon a compelling need. 

Once in the budget, maintaining momentum with a particular technology is chalVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00462 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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lenging as it must continue to compete against other ‘‘good ideas’’ year after year 

in our resourcing process. The final challenge, ensuring an advanced technology 

meets its promise in a timely and cost-effective manner as we transition the technology into a warfighting capability. 

Question. As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what steps will you 

take to ensure that the services are benefitting more quickly and directly from the 

research being performed by the defense research enterprise? 

Answer. In my roles as a Defense Innovation Initiative ‘‘core group’’ member and 

Chairman of the JROC, I will ensure that the resourcing and acquisition processes 

are well-informed on the priority and timing of capability needs. In collaboration 

with the Chairman, I will also continue to use the Chairman’s Gap Assessment and 

the Chairman’s Program Recommendation to communicate directly to Secretary 

Carter my thoughts on promising research performed by the research enterprise. 

Question. Do you feel that defense technologies and systems, especially in areas 

such as mobile communications, computing, and robotics, are keeping pace with 

global and commercial technological advances? If not, what do you suggest that the 

Department do to keep up with the pace of global technological change? 

Answer. Keeping pace with global and commercial technology is challenging the 

Department. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary’s Defense Innovation Initiative to focus the Department on maintaining our military’s technological edge in an 

increasingly competitive technology environment. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the Administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOM COTTON

DISMANTLEMENT OF RETIRED NUCLEAR WARHEADS

1. SENATOR COTTON. General Selva, in your responses to the advance questions

to the committee regarding your priorities for the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), 

you indicated that accelerated dismantlement of retired warheads was among those 

top priorities. If our modernization commitments were falling behind, would you 

agree that fully funding those commitments is a higher priority than accelerating 

dismantlement of current warheads? 

GENERAL SELVA. Yes. 

2. SENATOR COTTON. General Selva, in his testimony before this committee, General Dunford, the nominee to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called 

Russia an existential threat. Do you agree with General Dunford’s assessment, and 

if you do, do you still think that accelerating dismantlement should be a priority? 

GENERAL SELVA. Russia’s nuclear capability does pose an existential threat to the 

United States. Accelerating dismantlement is a priority, as long as it does not constrain the resources and infrastructure required to meet U.S. nuclear weapons emVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00463 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ployment planning, achieve deployed stockpile requirements, and address stockpile 

aging and life extension program needs. 

DISTRIBUTED COMMON GROUND/SURFACE SYSTEM-ARMY (DCGS–A)

3. SENATOR COTTON. General Selva, in your role as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), you have stated to the committee that the 

JROC ‘‘trip-wire’’ process has altered performance or procurement quantities after 

programmatic reviews. One particular program, the Distributed Common Ground/ 

Surface System-Army (DCGS–A) has been going down the wrong road for too long. 

Are you aware that DCGS–A has serious capability gaps, and that the Army’s leadership has consistently downplayed warfighter concerns? 

GENERAL SELVA. The Joint Staff carefully monitors all major weapon systems development to ensure not only the Services’, but Joint Forces’ requirements are thoroughly considered in future system development. 

4. SENATOR COTTON. General Selva, what will you do, as JROC chairman, to ensure that DCGS–A meets real world requirements as testified by the warfighter? 

GENERAL SELVA. The Joint Staff expends considerable effort to ensure Service provided capabilities meet warfighter requirements. On 7 July 2015, the JROC validated the conversion of the DCGS–A Capability Development Document (CDD) to 

an Information System (IS) CDD. The approved CDD includes an Ease of Use/ 

Usability Key System Attribute (KSA). The Ease of Use/Usability KSA provides a 

way to ensure warfighter requirements are met. 

5. SENATOR COTTON. General Selva, would you be willing to update the guidance 

from the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and direct the program to reassess requirements based on warfighter input? 

GENERAL SELVA. The JCIDS guidance documents are updated regularly to support 

deliberate, emergent and urgent requirements. The last formal review and update 

to the JCIDS guidance documents, to include the JCIDS Manual, was completed in 

February 2015. Corrections and amplifying details to these guidance documents are 

maintained in an online resource and will be incorporated in a future formal review 

and update. 

6. SENATOR COTTON. General Selva, Army Secretary John McHugh has readily admitted that on major acquisitions the Army scorecard is 0–26. What will you do to 

ensure that the entrenched bureaucracy that has produced this record will adopt reform and adopt commercial off-the-shelf systems such as Palantir? 

GENERAL SELVA. On 7 July 2015, the JROC validated the Information System (IS) 

Capability Development Document (CDD) for DCGS–A and endorsed the Army acquisition strategy featuring open competition for future capabilities. DCGS–A already leverages numerous commercially available products from over 40 vendors 

and has committed to continue to incorporate commercial products that are available and meet requirements. 

The Army and Palantir entered into a Cooperative Research and Development 

Agreement (CRADA) in May 2012 with the objective of collaboratively developing 

and demonstrating new technologies. 

7. SENATOR COTTON. General Selva, critics within the Army bureaucracy describe 

Palantir as a ‘‘front-end’’ or user interface analytical solution, but I know that to 

be untrue. Are you aware that Palantir is in fact a complete solution for data integration? 

GENERAL SELVA. Palantir is a commercial off the shelf data analysis tool with 

software specialized for visualization of different types of data in support of situational awareness, network link analysis, and targeting analysis support. It provides 

some of the capabilities resident in three of the nine components of DCGS–A, but 

I do not believe it can replace DCGS–A. 

8. SENATOR COTTON. General Selva, are you aware that the Army has used time 

and resources to fight against Palantir while persisting with DCGS–A with its 

record of failure and wasted taxpayer dollars? 

GENERAL SELVA. The Army has adopted an open source acquisition model and invited commercial vendors with capabilities that resolve known gaps to participate. 

The Army and Palantir entered into a Cooperative Research and Development 

Agreement (CRADA) in May 2012 with the objective of collaboratively developing 

and demonstrating new technologies that are relevant to the warfighter and U.S. 

Army Programs of Record (PORs) with the intent to enhance operational capabilities. 

9. SENATOR COTTON. General Selva, more than 30 Army units, most of them Brigade and above representing half of the total Army, have requested the comparable 

system Palantir since 2009. Commanders and warfighters are sending a clear message that has not been heard by the Army leadership. An April 2012 Army Test 

459 

and Evaluation Command Report cited that 96 percent of surveyed warfighters stated, ‘‘Palantir is effective in supporting my mission.’’ Shouldn’t we procure programs 

like Palantir’s that exceed the performance and expectations of an internal build 

like DCGS–A? 

GENERAL SELVA. From 2011 thru April 2015, 19 deploying Army units have submitted 28 requests for commercial, advanced analytic capabilities to augment 

DCGS–A. All but three of those 19 have been provided Palantir capability. Three 

units were not approved due to a change in mission, receipt of an updated version 

of DCGS–A, or insufficient time remaining in their deployment to procure Palantir 

software/hardware and train the unit. 

10. SENATOR COTTON. General Selva, at the end of the day, the true test for any

capability is user adoption, so why would you expect the Army to force an inferior, 

failing, over-priced program on the warfighter, especially when it has consistently 

been the solution of choice for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the financial 

sector? 

GENERAL SELVA. The Army is not forcing a particular system, application, or capability on its units. In fact, senior Army leadership provided written guidance stating, ‘‘units in combat currently depend on a diverse range of systems . . . these include the Army’s current enterprise intelligence system, DCGS–A, and Palantir . . . 

’’ The Army has reviewed and assessed every operational requirement for Palantir 

and provided requesting units with Palantir if validated by Army G3/5/7. DCGS– 

A provides an extremely large and diverse set of Intelligence tools across a broad 

range of intelligence disciplines, and relies heavily on soldier feedback to ensure 

warfighter requirements are met. 

[The nomination reference of General Paul J. Selva, USAF, follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

May 21, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment as the Vice Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and appointment in the United States Air Force to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, 

U.S.C., sections 601 and 154: 

To Be General

General Paul J. Selva, 0000

[The biographical sketch of General Paul J. Selva, USAF, which 

was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 

referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF PAUL J. SELVA, USAF 

General Paul J. Selva is commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air 

Force Base, Illinois. USTRANSCOM is the single manager for global air, land and 

sea transportation for the Department of Defense. 

General Selva graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1980, and completed 

undergraduate pilot training at Reese AFB, Texas. He has held numerous staff positions and has commanded at the squadron, group, wing and headquarters levels. 

Prior to his current assignment General Selva was the Commander, Air Mobility 

Command, Scott AFB, Illinois. 

General Selva is a command pilot with more than 3,100 hours in the C–5, C–17A, 

C–141B, KC–IO, KC–135A and T–37. 

Education: 

• 1980 Bachelor of Science in Aeronautical Engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy,

Colorado Springs, CO.

• 1983 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, AL.

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• 1984 Master of Science in Management and Human Relations, Abilene Christian University, Abilene, Texas 1992 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell 

AFB, AL., distinguished graduate. • 1992 Master of Science in Political Science, Auburn University, Montgomery, 

AL. • 1996 National Defense Fellow, Secretary of Defense Strategic Studies Group, 

Rosslyn, VA. 

Assignments: 

1. June 1980–July 1981, student, undergraduate pilot training, Reese AFB, Texas. 

2. July 1981–December 1984, co-pilot and aircraft commander, 917th Air Refueling Squadron, Dyess AFB, Texas. 

3. January 1984–December 1988, co-pilot, aircraft commander, instructor pilot, 

and flight commander, 32nd Air Refueling Squadron, Barksdale AFB, LA. 

4. January 1989–July 1991, company grade adviser to Commander, Strategic Air 

Command, later, manager of offensive aircraft systems and executive officer, Deputy 

Chief of Staff, Plans and Resources, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Offutt 

AFB, NE. 

5. August 1991–July 1992, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell 

AFB, AL. 

6. July 1992–June 1994, instructor pilot and flight commander, 9th Air Refueling 

Squadron, later, Commander, 722nd Operations Support Squadron, March AFB, CA. 

7. June 1994–June 1995, Commander, 9th Air Refueling Squadron, later, Deputy 

Commander, 60th Operations Group, Travis AFB, CA. 

8. July 1995–June 1996, National Defense Fellow, Secretary of Defense Strategic 

Studies Group, Rosslyn, VA. 

9. July 1996–August 1998, assistant to the Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, the Pentagon, Washington, DC. 

10. August 1998–July 2000, Commander, 60th Operations Group, Travis AFB, 

CA. 

11. July 2000–June 2002, Commander, 62nd Airlift Wing, McChord AFB, WA. 

12. June 2002–June 2003, Vice Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center, Scott 

AFB, IL. 

13. June 2003–November 2004, Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center, Scott 

AFB, IL. 

14. December 2004–August 2006, Director of Operations, U.S. Transportation 

Command, Scott AFB, IL. 

15. August 2006–June 2007, Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC. 

16. June 2007–October 2008, Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, and Director, Air Force QDR, Office of the Vice Chief of Staff, Washington, DC. 

17. October 2008–October 2011, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Washington, DC. 

18. October 2011–November 2012, Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Joint-Base 

Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii. 

19. November 2012–May 2014, Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, 

IL. 

20. May 2014–Present, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, 

IL. 

Summary of Joint Assignments 

1. September 1996–August 1998, Assistant to the Director, Office of the Secretary 

of Defense for Net Assessment, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant 

colonel. 

2. November 2004–July 2006, Director of Operations and Logistics, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, Ill., as a brigadier general. 

3. October 2008–October 2011, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant general. 

4. May 2014–Present, Commander U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, Ill. 

Flight Information 

Rating: Command pilot 

Hours flown: More than 3,100 

Aircraft flown: C–5, C–17A, C–141B, KC–IO, KC–135A and T–37. 

Major Awards and Decorations 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal. 

461 

Distinguished Service Medal. 

Defense Superior Service Medal. 

Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters. 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal. 

Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters. 

Air Force Commendation Medal. 

Air Force Achievement Medal. 

Joint Meritorious Unit Award. 

Combat Readiness Medal with oak leaf clusters. 

National Defense Service Medal with bronze star. 

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two bronze stars. 

Southwest Asia Service Medal with bronze star. 

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal Armed Forces Service Medal. 

Effective Dates of Promotion 

Second Lieutenant, May 28, 1980. 

First Lieutenant, May 28, 1982. 

Captain, May 28, 1984. 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by General Paul J. Selva, USAF, in connection 

with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Paul J. Selva. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

3. Date of nomination: 

21 May 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

27 September 1958, Biloxi, MS. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Ricki S. Selva (maiden name: Smith). 

462 

7. Names and ages of children: 

None. 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None. 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution. 

None. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

Air Force Association—Member. 

Airlift Tanker Association—Member. 

National Defense Transportation Association—Member. 

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

None. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testfy upon request before any duly constituted committee of 

the Senate? 

Yes. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from 

the Administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA, USAF

This 5th day of May, 2015 

[The nomination of General Paul J. Selva, USAF was reported to 

the Senate by Chairman McCain on July 23, 2015, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on July 27, 2015.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to General Darren W. McDew, 

USAF by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

463 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. At this point, I don’t see the need for any significant changes. Over the 

last three decades Goldwater-Nichols has led to an unprecedented level of integration and cooperation among the Services. This has not only yielded a far more effective fighting force, it has positioned us well to maintain that effectiveness as we face 

an increasingly constrained fiscal environment and diverse array of threats. However, to build on this success and guarantee a cadre of joint officers in the future 

I do believe we need to continually review joint officer requirements to ensure we 

are building the most qualified joint forces for the future. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. JPME is essential to building a cadre of joint professionals prepared to 

meet the challenges of the future strategic environment. Expanding access to JPME 

to the Total Force community through advanced learning technologies is one area 

for consideration. If confirmed, I will work with Congress, the Secretary of Defense 

and other senior leaders of our military to ensure Goldwater-Nichols continues to 

meet the needs of our armed forces, and will support any changes to the legislation 

that might become necessary. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U. S. Transportation Command? 

Answer. The Commander, United States Transportation Command 

(USTRANSCOM), is responsible for providing air, land and sea transportation for 

the DOD, in peace, crisis and war. USTRANSCOM depends on three Component 

Commands to accomplish this mission: Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC). The Commander is assigned multiple responsibilities in the Unified 

Command Plan (UCP) to include: the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) mission to 

improve the worldwide DOD distribution system; DOD single manager for global patient movement; Global Distribution Synchronizer (GDS) mission to synchronize 

planning for worldwide distribution operations; and facilitating the rapid establishment of joint force headquarters for combatant commanders through its Subordinate 

Command, the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. The USTRANSCOM team 

employs a mix of active and Reserve military members, government civilians and 

commercial industry partners to execute the Command’s missions in support of the 

full range of military operations. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. Throughout my 33 years in uniform, I have had held numerous positions 

in and out of the Department of Defense that have prepared me, if confirmed, to 

perform the duties as the Commander of USTRANSCOM. I was fortunate enough 

to be selected to spend a year as a Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellow at Sun 

Microsystems. During that year in the Silicon Valley, I was exposed to companies 

with reputations for insightful long-range planning, organizational and management 

innovation, and implementation of new information and other technologies. 

As the Director of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, I was 

responsible for providing trusted counsel to the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief 

of Staff, and all other principal military and civilian leaders of the Department of 

the Air Force concerning Public Affairs activities to assist in building public support 

and achieving the Air Force core competencies. I became adept at working with the 

civilian press, DOD and Congressional inquiries. 

While still at the Pentagon, I was chosen as the Vice Director for Strategic Plans 

and Policy on the Joint Staff. In this role, I helped provide strategic direction, policy 

guidance, and planning focus to develop and execute the National Military Strategy. 

Through the Director, I enabled the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide 

military advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security 

Council. 

Finally, I served as Commander of the 18th Air Force which I was responsible 

for providing worldwide rapid, global mobility and sustainment for America’s Armed 

Forces through airlift, aerial refueling, aeromedical evacuation, and contingency response. This position directly led to my selection as Commander, AMC. I command 

over 118,000 Airmen from across our Air Force, Active, Reserve, and Air National 

Guard who provide worldwide cargo and passenger delivery, aerial refueling, special 

464 

air mission and aeromedical evacuation. This includes the crucial role of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to victims of natural disasters both at home and 

around the world. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U. S. Transportation 

Command? 

Answer. As the current AMC Commander I am aware of the breadth of 

USTRANSCOM’s worldwide responsibilities. If confirmed, I will engage with all of 

USTRANSCOM’s component commands, DOD agencies, and our commercial partners to guarantee I fully understand the range of challenges they face in order to 

accomplish USTRANSCOM’s crucial mission. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain 

of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional 

practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. 

Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U. S. 

Transportation Command to the following offices: 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has full power and authority to act for 

the Secretary of Defense when serving as his designated representative in the Secretary’s absence. As such, the USTRANSCOM Commander will report to and 

through the Deputy Secretary when serving in that capacity. The Deputy Secretary 

also is the Chief Management Officer of the Department, responsible for optimizing 

the business environment across the Defense enterprise. USTRANSCOM strongly 

supports these optimization efforts as we strive to improve our support to the other 

Combatant Commands and Defense agencies in a cost-effective and operationally efficient manner. 

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with 

DOD components, including Combatant Commands, which have collateral or related 

functions. In practice, this coordination and exchange is normally routed through 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, as the Distribution Process 

Owner, the USTRANSCOM commander receives oversight from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in his role as the Defense Logistics Executive via the Defense Logistics Board. This relationship works 

very well. If confirmed as a combatant commander, I look forward to the continuing 

collaboration. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. As specified in title 10, the Chairman is the principal military advisor 

to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council and 

Secretary of Defense. The Chairman serves as an advisor, and is not, by law, in the 

chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary to each 

Combatant Commander. The President normally directs communications between 

himself and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. This keeps the Chairman fully involved and allows 

the Chairman to execute his other legal responsibilities. A key responsibility of the 

Chairman is to speak for the combatant commanders, especially on operational requirements. If confirmed, I will keep the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense 

fully informed regarding USTRANSCOM matters. 

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. Although the Vice Chairman does not fall within the Combatant Command chain of command, he is delegated full power and authority to act for the 

Chairman in the Chairman’s absence. If confirmed as a Combatant Commander, 

when he is representing the Chairman, I will keep the Vice Chairman informed as 

I would the Chairman. 

Question. The Director of the Joint Staff. 

Answer. The Director of the Joint Staff assists the Chairman in managing the 

Joint Staff. The Director of the Joint Staff does not fall within the Combatant Commander’s chain of command. However, he enables important decisions to be made 

as the Combatant Commander’s staff interacts with the Joint Staff. The Director is 

also a key interface with Office of the Secretary of Defense Principals and interagency leadership, and can assist combatant commanders working issues below the 

Chairman’s level. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

465 

Answer. Each Service Secretary is responsible for equipping, training, maintaining and administering forces belonging to that Service. Close coordination with each 

Service Secretary providing forces to USTRANSCOM is essential to ensure that 

there is no infringement upon the lawful responsibilities held by a Service Secretary. 

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services. 

Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and equip their respective forces. No Combatant Commander can ensure preparedness of assigned forces 

without the full cooperation and support of the Service Chiefs and their respective 

Reserve Components. As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs 

have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. The experience and judgment 

the Service Chiefs provide is an invaluable resource for every Combatant Commander. If confirmed, as Commander USTRANSCOM, I will continue my predecessors’ frank and productive dialogue with the Service Chiefs and the Commandant 

of the U.S. Coast Guard. 

Question. The other combatant commanders. 

Answer. USTRANSCOM’s primary mission is to support each of the combatant 

commanders in accomplishing the responsibilities they are assigned in the Unified 

Command Plan. Given the complexity of today’s security environment, it is essential 

that all the combatant commanders work together to execute U.S. national security 

policy. If confirmed, I will continue to build upon the trust and mutual support my 

predecessors have fostered with the other Combatant commanders. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES. 

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander, U.S. Transportation Command? 

Answer. Currently, the Command’s number one priority is ‘‘Readiness’’ for the enterprise. USTRANSCOM has the capability to meet existing surge requirements; 

however, major future challenges may erode our key, asymmetric military transportation and logistics advantages. These challenges include: maintaining assured 

Command and Control (C2) in a contested cyber domain; impending mobility capability degradation due to reduced budgets, a shrinking force structure, diminished 

cargo volumes, and increasingly dynamic commercial market trends; and, also, 

growing peer and near-peer adversary’s anti-access and area denial capabilities. 

Additionally, USTRANSCOM focuses on providing both effective and efficient 

transportation solutions for all its customers. Future budget challenges may reduce 

Enterprise readiness and flexibility, subsequently degrading the Defense Transportation System to be less responsive and less resilient. While these challenges are 

formidable, given the talents of the USTRANSCOM team, they are not insurmountable. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my fellow combatant commanders to assess 

risk from these challenges and collaboratively develop mitigation strategies to ensure USTRANSCOM will meet its steady state and surge requirements. I will advance USTRANSCOM’s cyber defenses to protect DOD networks and systems, 

partnering with other U.S. government departments, agencies, and the private sector to improve our cyber security. To overcome readiness challenges, we will work 

within the constraints of Public Law and National policy to leverage operations and 

implement transportation solutions that preserve readiness for both our organic 

forces and the critical surge capacity provided by commercial transportation providers. 

In order to ensure our global distribution network, I will work with 

USTRANSCOM’s commercial partners and the interagency to continue 

USTRANSCOM’s global efforts to secure diplomatic and physical accesses to ground 

and airspace infrastructure for logistics. I will work to improve USTRANSCOM’s 

global ability to deliver to the point of need in the most effective and cost-effective 

ways possible—projecting American influence and power when and where our national interests dictate. This includes collaboratively developing, in concert with our 

fellow Combatant Commands, Services and agencies, innovative concepts and capabilities to overcome the anti-access/area denial efforts of our peer and near-peer adversaries. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will immediately become familiar with the all aspects of 

the defense transportation enterprise with a focus on preserving readiness of the 

Defense Transportation System to meet national objectives and to support the Joint 

Force into the future. Always mindful of our obligation to make the most of our existing resources, I intend to seek process improvement and enterprise synchroniVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00471 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
466 

zation efforts through relationships within the Department, across the U.S. Government, and with commercial and international partners. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Commander, U. S. Transportation Command? 

Answer. As Commander, I will focus on operating a Combatant Command with 

global responsibilities in a challenging environment of declining budgets, smaller 

forces, reduced resources, and global rebalance of force posture. I will ensure synchronization of the entire Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise—a vast 

network of organizations both in and out of the Department of Defense that relies 

heavily on commercial partnerships with industry. Additionally, I will address the 

challenges with operating aging transportation fleets and port infrastructure worldwide. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the focus on preserving readiness and aligning resources for mission success and to further enhance USTRANSCOM’s operational resiliency. USTRANSCOM has made great strides in improving economies 

and efficiencies. I will continue this work by managing readiness, cost, and time 

variables to deliver effective and efficient deployment and distribution solutions 

commensurate with assigned authorities and available resources. While the near future poses many challenges, we must balance costs and benefits, matching our actions to available resources in the near term and adapting our efforts for greater 

economies and efficiencies in the long term. 

EXPERIENCE IN MANAGING LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

Question. You have served as the Commander of the Air Mobility Command. 

What steps do you believe you need to take to achieve a more complete understating of the logistics operations of the other component commands of the U. S. 

Transportation Command? 

Answer. As the current AMC Commander, I am aware of the missions, roles and 

responsibilities of the elements of the USTRANSCOM team. If confirmed, I will 

make it a priority to better understand the capabilities and challenges of the component commands. I will engage with the component commanders, DOD agencies, and 

commercial partners to address the issues they face, work together to resolve logistics challenges, and to better accomplish USTRANSCOM’s vital worldwide mission. 

CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET

Question. The military services rely heavily on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 

to supplement its organic airlift in order to meet its wartime and peacetime transportation requirements. 

What is your assessment of the CRAF’s ability to meet requirements to transport 

any equipment, materials, or commodities for the use of U.S. military operations 

and respond to a humanitarian disaster? 

Answer. Our commercial partners are an integral part of providing global air mobility assets to support military operations and response to humanitarian disasters. 

The combined capability of military and commercial lift gives us the ability to transport any equipment, materials, personnel, or commodities the warfighter will need 

to execute their mission to any point on the globe. If confirmed, I will continue to 

work with our CRAF partners to ensure the business relationships remain solid and 

the contracts continue to support DOD requirements. 

Question. Do the changes in the commercial airline industry, characterized by 

bankruptcies and a move toward smaller and shorter-range aircraft, impact the future viability of the CRAF? 

Answer. The commercial airline industry is a dynamic market and always has 

been. We have adapted to carriers’ fleet changes and benefited by having a commercial augmentation capability ready to answer the call when needed. It is an accurate 

assessment that there are fewer carriers now in the CRAF program than there have 

been in the last decade. I have met with several airline executives over the past 

15 months, and they have all said they will continue to support the DOD and CRAF 

program because it is the right thing to do for our Nation. As we drew down forces 

from Afghanistan, carriers made expected adjustments to capacity to right size their 

fleets for the new business environment. Through Air Mobility Command‘s sponsored research, conducted as part of an extensive CRAF Study, we foresaw these 

changes and have adapted the program. Based on these efforts, we are confident the 

CRAF program will remain viable and capable to meet operational requirements in 

the future. 

467 

1GAO Report 13–564, ‘‘DOD Needs to Take Steps to Manage Workload Distributed to the 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet,’’ Page 9, Government Accountability Office, June 2013, http:// 

www.gao.gov/assets/660/655338.pdf. 

Question. Do you think it is important to maintain an adequate industrial base 

for CRAF carriers? 

Answer. Yes. CRAF provides a capability no other nation can replicate and ensures we can meet national requirements that our organic assets alone cannot provide in times of crisis or conflict. It is critical we maintain both an organic airlift 

capability and commercial augmentation capability that is ‘‘ready’’ to answer the 

call when the next crisis arises. It is important that our CRAF partners sustain necessary capacity to provide the support we foresee to support the National Defense 

Strategy. 

Question. How much should we be relying on CRAF to meet our peacetime and 

wartime airlift requirements? 

Answer. The CRAF program is a critical component in this Nation’s ability to rapidly deploy forces and equipment in times of crisis and peace. Because of the CRAF 

program, we can deploy forces more rapidly and more efficiently than any other nation in the world. In peacetime, this workload changes from year-to-year due to dynamic customer requirements. Our forecast requirements are expected to be much 

lower starting in fiscal year 2016 compared to the past 13 years, which will impact 

both military and commercial capacity. We will continue to strive for the balance 

between military and commercial capacity while trying to garner more business into 

the Defense Transportation System through such recent changes as competitive 

rates for Foreign Military Sales and non-DOD U.S. Government organizations. 

Question. What changes, if any, do you think need to be made to CRAF—authorities, requirements, composition? 

Answer. AMC, in coordination with USTRANSCOM, chartered a study of the 

CRAF program to look at these specific issues. Throughout the study, we engaged 

industry experts for their advice on where the airline industry is headed and what 

to expect. The study team provided recommendations to senior leadership and industry executives, which we expect to implement in Fiscal Year 2016. Additionally, 

USTRANSCOM has begun an Integrated Airlift Management (IAM) approach to 

balance commercial and organic workload and associated risks. This approach ensures active and reserve component readiness through execution of the flying hour 

program, provides appropriate commercial airlift augmentation opportunities to retain necessary commercial airlift capacity, reduces the long-term cost of sustaining 

the organic airlift fleet by placing the minimum time on airframes necessary and 

supports ‘‘global agility’’ by creating a buffer capacity for adaptable military response to priority, short-notice missions. I am confident that these changes will help 

to maintain the program’s viability despite the decrease in available business. 

Question. According to the Comptroller General, ‘‘DOD does not use its process for 

monitoring flying hours to determine when it will exceed required training hours 

and allocate eligible airlift missions to CRAF participants. Therefore, it cannot determine whether it is using CRAF to the maximum extent practicable. As a result, 

DOD may be using its military fleet more than necessary—which officials say is less 

economical—while risking reduced CRAF participation.’’ 1

Do you agree with GAO’s conclusion with regard to flying hours for CRAF? 

Answer. There is a balance between ensuring sufficient training for crews, much 

of which comes from operational missions, meeting the needs of the combatant commander and balancing the use of organic versus CRAF-provided airlift. 

I agree with the need to maintain readiness of all assets required to support national security, including all military and commercial airlift capabilities. 

Question. If so, what steps would you take to better manage these training hours? 

Answer. AMC recently created a process that surveys the number of crew members per flying unit and applies seasoning model criteria that ensure aging rates 

and specific flying currency requirements are met. The output of that model is then 

put into our commanders’ apportionment and allocation process which balances 

readiness against actual combatant commander and mission requirements directing 

the excess to our commercial partners. This Total Force effort has proven successful 

in responding to the readiness needs of all assets used to support the defense transportation system. 

In addition, TRANSCOM has created a readiness and distribution allocation process that looks across all transportation modes to balance readiness needs. One outcome of this process has been an effort to begin buying commercial airlift using forecasts. 

Question. Also, according to GAO, the number of carriers and aircraft for cargo 

in CRAF appear to be dropping from 175 in 2011 to 162 aircraft in 2013—this is 

468 

2GAO Report 13–564, ‘‘DOD Needs to Take Steps to Manage Workload Distributed to the 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet,’’ Page 16, Government Accountability Office, June 2013, http:// 

www.gao.gov/assets/660/655338.pdf. 

in Table 1 on page 16. 2 More recent documents show this may be as low as 144 

as of late last year. 

Why is the number of aircraft participating in CRAF dropping? At what level does 

CRAF become at risk for being too small to meet the military’s airlift needs. 

Answer. We do not measure the capability of the CRAF fleet based on number 

of aircraft, but rather the capacity those aircraft provide. Under the new Defense 

Strategy, the Wide Body Equivalent (WBE) requirement for cargo aircraft in the 

long range international segment of CRAF is 144 and for passenger aircraft it is 

104 WBE. At these levels, the CRAF program is not at risk for meeting our military 

airlift needs. 

CYBERSECURITY

Question. U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) must communicate 

over the unclassified Internet with many private-sector entities that are central to 

DOD’s force generation and deployment operations—in the transportation and shipping industries in particular. Much of the rest of the critical communications and 

operations of the Defense Department can be conducted over the classified DOD 

internet service, which is not connected to the public Internet and is therefore much 

more protected against eavesdropping, espionage, and/or disruption by computer 

network attacks. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee’s inquiry into U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) determined that it was subjected to many cyber intrusions 

that were not reported. USTRANSCOM also suffered from a lack of awareness by 

other law enforcement and national security agencies regarding cyber intrusions on 

USTRANSCOM contractors as well as misunderstandings by USTRANSCOM personnel on the rules and processes for sharing cyber intrusion-related information 

with necessary officials. 

Have you reviewed this report? 

Answer. Yes, I have reviewed the report and from my experience as the AMC 

Commander I understand the importance of Cyber security related to our ability to 

project forces in support of global requirements. 

Question. Are you concerned about the level of reporting of cyber events by command contractors or other U.S. Government agencies to USTRANSCOM? 

Answer. I am concerned, and if confirmed, I will continue to build upon the plan 

of action resulting from the Senate Armed Services Committee report and the resulting Cyber Mission Analysis Task Force held 14–15 April 2015 at Scott Air Force 

Base. Information sharing across the inter-agency process is key for USTRANSCOM 

to continuously assess risk to our operational missions. Communicating our need to 

be informed about cyber intrusions with our commercial contractors is essential. We 

will continue to address our concerns through contract language and forums such 

as the Defense Industrial Base and the National Defense Transportation Association’s cyber security group. 

Question. Do you feel that the Department of Defense is responding appropriately 

given recent events such as the threat nation intrusions into databases on U.S. personnel, including DOD employees? 

Answer. I believe the Department’s response has been holistic in nature, continuing our focus on strengthening cyber readiness, enforcing cyber discipline among 

our users, and providing emphasis and education regarding protection of personal 

information. The recently published DOD cyber strategy provides an appropriately 

broad approach for protecting the Department’s information within our systems and 

networks, as well as defending the U.S. homeland and national interests, and providing the President with cyber options necessary to support potential military operations. As we learn more with concerning these intrusions, we must continue to inform our people with regard to prudent mitigation actions. 

Question. What actions do you plan to take, if confirmed, as Commander, 

USTRANSCOM, to ensure that DOD reduces the risk of cyber intrusions? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will strongly support efforts to implement the Department’s Cyber Strategy, support movement of our critical information towards swift 

realization of the Joint Information Environment, and continue our efforts across 

the inter-agency process to address the need to share information concerning commercial provider cyber intrusions, enabling us to address mission assurance on multiple fronts from a cyber-perspective. 

469 

Question. Do you believe that the current posture of USTRANSCOM and the Department of Defense is sufficient to deter adversaries in cyber space? 

Answer. As in any domain, and especially in cyber, we must continuously assess 

our ability to maneuver, as an enabler to successful operations. In cyberspace, the 

cost of entry for an adversary is relatively low when compared with the domains 

of air, land, sea, and space. In addition, the ability of an adversary (state or nonstate), to acquire ever-evolving and sophisticated technical capabilities increases almost daily, and our ability to attribute an adverse cyber action is very difficult. As 

a result, the ever-increasing cyber threat becomes potentially more complex and potentially dangerous on a daily basis. Therefore, we must continue to press forward 

with our ability to detect, deter, protect, and when necessary, respond with appropriate authority in this domain. 

Question. What do you believe are the critical needs of USTRANSCOM for cyber 

security? 

Answer. USTRANSCOM relies upon the integrity of the information exchanged 

between military and commercial partners in its role as the distribution process 

owner for the Department. Our ability to command and control is highly dependent 

upon getting the right information to the right people at the right time, while protecting it from our adversaries. If confirmed, I will continue the important efforts 

to protect the command’s information equities by working closely with our agency 

and commercial providers to further define roles, responsibilities, relationships and 

authorities for cyber security and to build trust and enhance information sharing. 

Question. How important is it that USTRANSCOM be aware of cyber intrusions 

by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors into the networks of airlines, shippers, 

and other defense contractors that enable TRANSCOM operations? 

Answer. Compromise of a commercial partners’ networks by an APT, is a potential cyber security issue that provides insight into USTRANSCOM operations. 

Awareness of these intrusions is paramount so that we can mitigate their operational impacts. Commercial partners are integral to our mission and ability to provide volume, velocity and efficiency of operations. Vulnerabilities within any organization’s infrastructure, including cyber vulnerabilities, are a risk for all mission 

partners. 

Question. When USTRANSCOM becomes aware of an APT intrusion into an operationally critical contractor, what steps should the command take to determine 

whether operational plans should be adjusted to mitigate the risk of the intrusion 

affecting military operations? 

Answer. As a result of the report and the Cyber Mission Analysis Task Force, 

USTRANSCOM has developed a mission risk assessment process that will enable 

us to consider appropriate operational and technical mitigation actions when we are 

made aware of such intrusions. The level of reporting continues to be a concern and 

is key to our ability to assess potential operational impact. USTRANSCOM has 

overcome some of these challenges with its cyber contract language and partnering 

efforts. If confirmed, I will continue to work with all stakeholders, government, military, and commercial partners to continuously assess our ability to adjust to cyberattacks, including APT intrusions. 

PERSONALLY-OWNED VEHICLE TRANSPORTATION ISSUES

Question. Last year, USTRANSCOM awarded a contract to ship privately-owned 

vehicles for servicemembers, the Global Privately Owned Vehicle Contract III, to a 

company without prior experience in this area. This award was followed by a protest 

from the incumbent contractor. During the summer peak moving season, the new 

contractor was late in delivering several hundred vehicles late and, in some cases, 

the vehicles of servicemembers were damaged. USTRANSCOM took an active role 

in increasing oversight and creating task forces to address the problems related to 

the change in contractors. 

What lessons has USTRANSCOM learned from this experience to prevent the reoccurrence of these problems in the future? 

Answer. USTRANSCOM originally planned for a contract transition during the 

non-peak season. Due to multiple protests the contract transitioned with no overlap 

and at the beginning of the 2014 peak season. This experience confirmed that the 

ideal transition time is in the winter months. In the future USTRANSCOM will consider the impact of unexpected extensions of the transition timeline when determining the contract transition period. 

Question. Under the current contract, Global Privately Owned Vehicle Contract 

III, how is USTRANSCOM able to hold contractors accountable for poor performance? What changes, if any, would you implement to improve accountability? 

470 

Answer. The contract contains several performance objectives, with the primary 

performance measure being on-time delivery. If the contractor does not deliver a vehicle within the required delivery date, they will incur a monetary reduction ranging from as low as $30/day per vehicle up to the entire transportation cost of a vehicle if it is delivered 60 or more days late. In addition, the contractor must also pay 

inconvenience claims directly to the customer for rental cars, lodging, etc. required 

as a result of a late delivery. TRANSCOM continues to seek ways to improve accountability, such as increasing the number of Contracting Officer Representatives 

(COR)s and supplementing COR training. 

Question. Given the fact that servicemembers today are more likely to be married 

with dependents, what else should USTRANSCOM do to reduce the impact of a lost 

vehicles or delayed deliveries on military families? 

Answer. USTRANSCOM will continue to partner with the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), the business process owner for the 

Global Privately Owned Vehicle Contract III. SDDC maintains a continuous dialogue with the Service Headquarters in order to ensure visibility of their servicemember concerns and remediation of those concerns. Since servicemember entitlements for inconvenience have not been adjusted for many years, it is time to evaluate and consider entitlement changes due to financial impact to the servicemembers. 

SUPPORT OF TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. Earlier this year the President stated his intention to keep 9,800 U.S. 

servicemembers in Afghanistan instead of the originally planned force level of 5,500. 

What do you see as the major challenges to USTRANSCOM and the services for 

maintaining this higher troop level? 

Answer. The capacity of the Afghanistan distribution network has diminished 

since our peak in 2010–11 when we supported a force of approximately 100,000. The 

current transportation network of air and surface lines of communication remains 

robust and more than capable of supporting the 9,800 U.S. Force structure in Afghanistan. 

USTRANSCOM, as the Department of Defense distribution process owner, is compelled daily by the nature of our customer base, to view requirements through the 

joint lens. As active members of the Joint Team, Service requirements are communicated and met through a healthy variety of Joint efforts. Although Service challenges exist, none have proven too difficult for the Joint Team, through healthy communications and cross-seam coordination, to resolve. 

Question. How will you ensure that our deployed troops in Afghanistan receive the 

support they require as the Department’s attention turns towards other national security situations elsewhere in the world? 

Answer. USTRANSCOM is the world-wide distribution process owner, and delivers passengers and cargo daily to U.S. force locations regardless of the size of force 

or the remoteness of their location. USTRANSCOM delivers everywhere, to everyone, all the time. With this in mind, globally integrated operations between the Department of Defense, Department of State and other federal agencies will be required to maintain complex political and military relationships. These relationships, 

as well as those of partner nations, support the lines of communication which provide USTRANSCOM the flexibility and agility to meet ongoing and emergent requirements. 

PEACETIME-WARTIME LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT

Question. Our transportation and logistics systems have been significantly altered 

over time to reduce organic military air and sealift capacity and rely on commercial 

aircraft and sealift as well as commercial supply chains to deliver spare parts to 

deployed forces. This was done to reduce costs as well as increase buying power and 

flexibility for the military. 

How does TRANSCOM plan for the risk that this change in providing equipment 

and logistics to deployed forces thousands of miles away in potential combat zones? 

Answer. Commercial providers help mitigate risk of access to challenging theaters 

such as Afghanistan through their ability to leverage intermodal networks—the 

Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which is primarily commercial, is a good example of mitigating risk to access Afghanistan by surface means in case the Pakistan ground lines of communication (PAK GLOC) is not available. 

When deploying and sustaining forces in a combat zone, where the threat level 

prevents commercial assets from delivering to those locations, in general, commercial providers would move requirements to enroute locations, and military assets 

would move those requirements into the theater of operations in order to mitigate 

the risk to commercial providers while leveraging their capabilities. 

471 

Question. How does TRANSCOM utilize commercial partners for logistics in a 

wartime environment? How do you plan to balance logistics capacity between commercial and military logistics systems? 

Answer. When operating in a non-permissive (wartime) environment, 

USTRANSCOM has an outstanding track record of balancing commercial and organic logistics systems. In general, commercial providers move requirements to 

enroute locations outside of the threat environment, and military assets move those 

requirements into the theater. This practice has proven to be cost effective while 

meeting Combatant Commander needs and also ensures commercial providers assume minimal risk in transporting military cargo and personnel. 

Question. The military relies on an extensive network of logistics facilities overseas to support our deployed forces. These overseas depots enable our deployed 

forces to remain on station longer without having to be supported directly from 

CONUS. These depots are in host nations, which are U.S. friends and allies. 

What is the resiliency of these overseas depots, particularly in places near ongoing 

political instability? 

Answer. USTRANSCOM does not own or operate overseas depots. However, as 

the Distribution Process Owner and Global Distribution Synchronizer, 

USTRANSCOM does collaborate closely with Geographic Combatant Commands, 

Military Services, Defense Logistics Agency, and other strategic partners to develop 

and maintain an agile, secure and resilient distribution network to support and sustain overseas depots. We constantly monitor the operational environment and respond to challenges, as appropriate, with the use of alternate distribution routes 

and logistics nodes to ensure the continued viability of those depots. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the Administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U. S. Transportation Command? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND

KC–46A

1. SENATOR GILLIBRAND. General McDew, I recognize that U.S. Transportation 

Command (TRANSCOM) and Air Mobility Command (AMC) will be making decisions regarding how to meet refueling needs in light of the U.S. Air Force’s planned 

retirement of the KC–10, and potential delays in the KC–46A procurement schedule. 

Do you anticipate reassignment and continued use of any KC–135 displaced by KC– 

46A delivery will be necessary to meet refueling demands? 

GENERAL MCDEW. The United States Air Force (USAF) will re-address the KC– 

135 retirement flow in combination with a potential KC–10 retirement flow in a future Program Objective Memoranda (POM) cycle. Although overall air refueling capability includes some risk, I am confident that the KC–46 development and delivery schedule along with disposition of the KC–135 fleet will continue to meet all 

USTRANSCOM mission requirements. 

472 

2. SENATOR GILLIBRAND. General McDew, in assessing current and future refueling demands and the possible need for KC–135 capabilities, can you please address 

these three requirements: Regional Air Refueling Receiver Demand requirements 

within CONUS; support of the Air Bridge to Europe; and support of the overall 

‘‘pivot’’ to the Pacific theater and Asia? 

GENERAL MCDEW. Our aerial refueling capabilities are not solely dedicated to specific regions or missions sets; however, they are managed holistically in an effort 

to respond expeditiously and effectively to support all Combatant Command requirements. These requirements include CONUS Refueling Receiver Demand and support to deployment bridges to both Europe (eastbound) and Asia (westbound). The 

FY 2016 President’s Budget includes an end-state fleet of 479 tanker aircraft to 

meet air mobility operational requirements with moderate risk. The development 

and delivery of the KC–46 combined with the capabilities of the existing tanker fleet 

will reduce risk in aerial refueling capability and ensure the ability to meet all 

worldwide commitments. 

ARCTIC

3. SENATOR GILLIBRAND. General McDew, as you know, the Arctic is emerging as

a strategic region of the world for vessel commerce as well as the production of oil, 

gas, and minerals. TRANSCOM is tasked with the coordination of people and transportation assets to allow the United States to project and sustain forces, whenever, 

wherever, and for as long as they are needed. How important is the Arctic to U.S. 

national security interests and what role do you think TRANSCOM will play in future Arctic operations? 

GENERAL MCDEW. The United States is an Arctic Nation with permanent, vital 

national security interests in the Arctic Region. USTRANSCOM will play an increasingly important role in the Arctic Region as commercial sealift vessels, scientific operations, and national defense assets transit the Arctic Region. To the extent military cargo workload permits, USTRANSCOM supports U.S. security and 

economic interests in the Arctic and other navigable areas around the globe to assure freedom of navigation in support of United States interests. 

4. SENATOR GILLIBRAND. General McDew, do you believe we currently have the

resources and capabilities needed to ensure the nation’s military presence in the 

Arctic? 

GENERAL MCDEW. USTRANSCOM has sufficient resources to support the current 

military presence and similar levels of effort for future contingencies in the Arctic. 

As demands change, we will continue to engage with United States Northern Command, European Command and Pacific Command to ensure we have adequate resources to meet those requirements. 

5. SENATOR GILLIBRAND. General McDew, I am concerned that the U.S. Coast

Guard now only has one operational heavy icebreaker in its fleet. Russia currently 

has six heavy icebreakers and another currently under construction. Do you have 

any concerns about TRANSCOM’s ability to project and sustain forces in the Arctic 

based on the current composition of the U.S. Coast Guard’s icebreakers? 

GENERAL MCDEW. The United States has enduring national, strategic, and economic interests in the Arctic. United States Northern Command establishes requirements for USTRANSCOM’s transportation and distribution capabilities in the Arctic. Although current icebreaker resources meet projected near-term requirements, 

USTRANSCOM supports DOD and DoT efforts to ensure future access and freedom 

of navigation throughout the Arctic region. 

6. SENATOR GILLIBRAND. General McDew, New York’s 109th Airlift Wing is home

to the only LC–130 Ski Birds in the U.S. Air Force. Their unique ability to provide 

air lift on snow and ice has made them a valuable resource for the National Science 

Foundation supporting science missions in Greenland and Antarctica. Based on the 

current types of threats you see in the Arctic, how important is this type of air lift 

capability to the future success of TRANSCOM in Arctic? 

GENERAL MCDEW. The ski-equipped LC–130s from the 109th Airlift Wing in Schenectady, NY, does indeed provide our Nation a very unique capability. Their ability 

to operate on the snow and ice makes them one of only a few organizations in the 

world capable of airlifting assets in and out of the Artic. The capabilities provided 

by the 109th Airlift Wing will continue to be of value to the USTRANSCOM mission. 

7. SENATOR GILLIBRAND. General McDew, do you think we will need more of this

capability in the future as our as our Arctic presence increases? 

GENERAL MCDEW. Based on current requirements in the Arctic, I have no reason 

to believe USTRANSCOM needs more of this capability at this time. Should 

USTRANSCOM be called upon in the future to provide an increased level of support 

473 

in the Polar Regions, I would advocate for the resources needed to ensure we provide the appropriate level of support. 

[The nomination reference of General Darren W. McDew, USAF, 

follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

June 4, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Air Force to the 

grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under 

title 10, U.S.C., section 601: 

To Be General

General Darren W. McDew, 0000

[The biographical sketch of General Darren W. McDew, USAF, 

which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GENERAL DARREN W. MCDEW, USAF 

General Darren W. McDew is Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air 

Force Base, Illinois. Air Mobility Command’s mission is to provide rapid, global mobility and sustainment for America’s armed forces. The command also plays a crucial role in providing humanitarian support at home and around the world. The men 

and women of AMC active duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve and civilians—provide airlift, aerial refueling, special air mission and aeromedical evacuation. 

General McDew was commissioned in 1982 following his graduation from Virginia 

Military Institute. He began his flying career at Loring Air Force Base, Maine. His 

staff assignments include serving as a member of the Air Force Chief of Staff Operations Group, Air Force aide to the President, and Chief of the U.S. Air Force Senate Liaison Division, Washington, D.C. and the Director of Public Affairs, Office of 

the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C. As part of the Joint Staff at the 

Pentagon, General McDew also served as Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy. He has served as the Vice Commander of the 18th Air Force, Scott AFB, Illinois, 

and has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels as well as an Air Force 

direct reporting unit. He has deployed in support of ongoing operations in Central 

and Southwest Asia as an air expeditionary group commander and later as the Director of Mobility Forces. Prior to his current assignment, General McDew was the 

Commander of the 18th Air Force, Scott AFB, Illinois. 

Education 

1982 - Bachelor of Science degree in civil engineering, Virginia Military Institute, 

Lexington 1985 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, AL. 

1994 - Master of Science degree in aviation management, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 1995 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence 

2000 - Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellowship, Sun Microsystems Inc., Palo 

Alto, Calif. 

2003 - National Security Studies, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, NY. 

2005 - Leadership Development Program, Center for Creative Leadership, Greensboro, N.C. 

2008 - Senior Joint Information Operations Applications Course, Air University, 

Maxwell AFB, AL. 

2008 - Air Force Enterprise Leadership Seminar, University of North Carolina at 

Chapel Hill, NC. 

2011 - Department of Defense National Security Studies Program, Defense Policy 

Seminar, Elliott School of International Affairs, Washington, DC. 

2012 - Joint Task Force Commander Training Course, Colorado Springs, CO. 

2013 - Pinnacle Course, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC. 

474 

2013 - Joint Force Air Component Commander Course, Air University, Maxwell 

AFB, AL. 

2014 - Leadership at the Peak Course, Colorado Springs, CO. 

2014 - Cyberspace Operations Executive Course, Air University, Maxwell AFB, 

AL. 

Assignments 

1. October 1982–October 1983, Student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams 

AFB, AZ. 

2. March 1984–June 1989, Standardization and Evaluation Copilot, Aircraft Commander, Instructor Pilot and Flight commander, 42nd Air Refueling Squadron, 

Loring AFB, ME. 

3. July 1989–June 1992, Combat Crew Training School examiner and Instructor 

Pilot, Assistant Deputy Wing Inspector and Wing Executive Officer, 93rd Bomb 

Wing, Castle AFB, CA. 

4. July 1992–April 1994, Rated Force Planner, Directorate of Personnel Plans; 

member, Air Force Chief of Staff Operations Group, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, 

Washington, DC. 

5. April 1994–June 1996, Air Force aide to the President, White House, Washington, DC. 

6. October 1996–June 1997, Assistant Operations Officer, 14th Airlift Squadron, 

Charleston AFB, SC. 

7. June 1997–June 1999, Commander, 14th Airlift Squadron, Charleston AFB, 

SC. 

8. August 1999–July 2000, Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellow, Sun Microsystems Inc., Palo Alto, CA. 

9. July 2000–January 2002, Commander, 62nd Operations Group, McChord AFB, 

WA (September 2001—December 2001, Commander, 60th Air Expeditionary Group, 

Southwest Asia). 

10. January 2002–July 2003, Commander, 375th Airlift Wing, and Installation 

Commander, Scott AFB, IL. 

11. July 2003–January 2005, Chief, U.S. Air Force Senate Liaison Division, Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC. 

12. January 2005–July 2006, Commander, 43rd Airlift Wing, and Installation 

Commander, Pope AFB, NC. (January 2006–May 2006, Director of Mobility Forces, 

Southwest Asia). 

13. July 2006–November 2007, Vice Commander, 18th Air Force, Scott AFB, IL. 

14. November 2007–February 2009, Director of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, DC. 

15. February 2009–December 2010, Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, 

Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, DC. 

16. December 2010–August 2012, Commander, Air Force District of Washington, 

Andrews AFB, MD. 

17. August 2012–April 2014, Commander, 18th Air Force, Scott AFB, IL. 

18. May 2014–present, Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, IL. 

Summary of Joint Assignments 

1. April 1994–June 1996, Air Force aide to the President, Mite House, Washington, DC, as a major. 

2. February 2009–December 2010, Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, 

Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, DC, as a major general. 

Flight Information 

Rating: command pilot. 

Flight hours: more than 3,300. 

Aircraft flown: T–37B, T–38A, KC–135A/R, C–17A, C–141B, C–9, C–21, C–130E/ 

H, and UH–I N. 

Major Awards and Decorations 

Distinguished Service Medal. 

Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster. 

Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters. 

Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters. 

Army Commendation Medal. 

Air Force Achievement Medal. 

Joint Meritorious Unit Award with oak leaf cluster. 

Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with nine oak leaf clusters. 

Air Force Organizational Excellence Award with three oak leaf clusters 

Combat Readiness Medal with three oak leaf clusters. 

475 

National Defense Service Medal with bronze star. 

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal. 

Kosovo Campaign Medal with bronze star. 

Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal. 

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal. 

Armed Forces Service Medal. 

Effective Dates of Promotion 

Second Lieutenant May 15, 1982. 

First Lieutenant May 15, 1984. 

Captain July 13, 1986. 

Major March 1, 1994. 

Lieutenant Colonel Jan. 1, 1997 Colonel April, 2000. 

Brigadier General Sept. 2, 2006. 

Major General Dec. 9, 2008. 

Lieutenant General Aug. 6, 2012 General May 5, 2014. 

(Current as of November 2014). 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by General Darren W. McDew, USAF in connection with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Darren W. McDew. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commander, United States Transportation Command. 

3. Date of nomination: 

4 June 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

29 September 1960; Rantoul, IL. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Evelyn K. McDew (maiden name: Massenburg). 

7. Names and ages of children: 

476 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

N/A. 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution. 

N/A. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

Life Member, Air Force Association. 

Life Member, Daedalians. 

Air Force Sergeants Association. 

American Association of Retired Persons. 

National Society of Black Engineers. 

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

Boys and Girls Club Hall of Fame. 

National Society of Black Engineers Lifetime Achievement Award. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from 

the Administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

GENERAL DARREN W. MCDEW

This 7th day of May, 2015 

[The nomination of General Darren W. McDew, USAF was reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on July 23, 2015, with 

the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 27, 2015.] 

(477) 

NOMINATION OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, 

USA, TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY 

TUESDAY, JULY 21, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker, 

Ayotte, Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Reed, McCaskill, Manchin, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono, and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to 

consider the nomination of General Mark Milley to be the Chief of 

Staff of the U.S. Army. 

We welcome you, General Milley, as well as members of the 

Milley family. As is our tradition, at the beginning of your testimony, we invite you to introduce the members of your family who 

are joining you. We know the sacrifices your family has made, and 

we are grateful to them for their continued support of our Nation. 

General MILLEY. Thank you, Chairman McCain, and thank you, 

Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee for the privilege and opportunity to appear before you today. 

I also appreciate the confidence of the President of the United 

States. 

Chairman MCCAIN. General, I was going to—— 

General MILLEY. Oh, I am sorry, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN.—ask if you would like to introduce your family. First, Senator Reed and I have to emote for a while. 

General MILLEY. In that case, I shall introduce my family. 

[Laughter.] 

My wife is here, Hollyanne, off to my left over here sitting next 

to General Richardson, and my son and daughter are not here. 

They are both working. My son Peter is down in Texas working in 

the oil industry, and my daughter is also working in the oil industry and she is based out of Chicago. I am very, very fortunate to 

have Hollyanne by my side for the last 30 consecutives years of 

service. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, thank you, General, and thank you. 

478 

You come before this committee as part of a major transition of 

American military leadership. If confirmed as Army Chief of Staff, 

you will serve alongside a new Chairman and Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and new Service Chiefs for the Navy and Marine Corps. 

As part of this team, you will lead an Army of volunteer soldiers 

that has proven itself time and again over a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army has endured 70 percent of the casualties in those wars, and as we all know, the untold sacrifices of 

our soldiers and their families did not end with their mission. 

As our Nation confronts the most diverse and complex array of 

global crises since the end of World War II, the next Chief of Staff 

of the Army will be responsible for ensuring the total Army— 

Active, Guard, and Reserve—remains the most decisive land force 

in the world. Unless Washington wakes up to the damage being 

done to our military right now by drastic reductions in defense 

spending, the Army will be forced to carry out its mission with 

fewer dollars, fewer soldiers, and aging equipment. 

Over the past few years, the Army’s end strength has been reduced from a peak of 570,000 Active Duty personnel to 490,000 

troops this year. Just last week, the Army announced it would cut 

an additional 40,000 troops over the next 2 years, reducing its end 

strength down to 450,000. If defense spending cuts continue, there 

is even talk that the Army could shrink to 420,000 troops. What 

is worse, only one-third of the Army’s brigade combat teams are 

ready for deployment and decisive operations. In short, the Army 

is facing a downward spiral of military capacity and readiness that 

increases the risk that, in a crisis, we will have too few soldiers 

who could enter a fight without proper training or equipment. 

We are not cutting the Army because the world has become safer 

or threats to our security have been reduced. In fact, the opposite 

is true. As you have stated, General Milley, this is a budget-driven 

force level reduction, and it rested on a series of assumptions, that 

we were getting out of Iraq and Afghanistan and stepping back 

from the Middle East more broadly, that Europe was secure, and 

United States forces could depart the continent, and that there was 

no need for significant deployments to Africa. Instead, we have 

seen the rise of ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the outbreak of Ebola, and the growing tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. 

I think you would agree, General, that when our assumptions 

about the world change, we must either adapt our conclusions to 

the new realities or scale back our ambitions to meet our reduced 

means. Instead, the administration and many in the Congress are 

trying to have it both ways: asking our soldiers to take on a growing set of missions with fewer and fewer resources. This is not just 

about reversing the effects of sequestration. It is about replacing 

the arbitrary spending cuts on defense that were imposed under 

the Budget Control Act of 2011. That is the only way we will get 

back to a truly strategy-driven defense budget. 

While I believe there is no strategic rationale for the Army’s end 

strength to fall below its pre-September 11 level of 490,000 troops, 

in recent years, the Army’s headquarters and administrative staff 

have grown at the same time it has cut brigade combat teams. 

479 

That too is wrong, and it only hurts the Army’s credibility. This 

committee is embarking on a multiyear effort to make major reductions in headquarters and administration across the Department of 

Defense. If confirmed, General, I want you to be a relentless partner in this effort. 

Another priority for the next Army Chief of Staff is modernizing 

the force. The Army faces an enormous challenge in replacing, repairing, and reconditioning its equipment after 14 years of sustained combat. At the same time, the Army must continue to modernize to meet future threats. Programs like the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle aim to enhance 

tactical mobility, command and control, medical evacuation, and 

other critical combat functions while significantly improving the 

protection and safety of our soldiers. 

Accomplishing these goals will require additional resources, to be 

sure. Perhaps more importantly, it requires the Army to learn the 

lessons of its failed acquisition programs, a record that has been 

particularly dismal. From Comanche to Crusader, Future Combat 

System to the Ground Combat Vehicle, billions of dollars have been 

wasted on programs that never became operational. These and 

other failures also reflect the inefficiency and dysfunction that have 

crippled our defense acquisition system more broadly: unwarranted 

optimism of cost and schedule estimates, funding instability, requirements creep, immature technology, excessive risk-taking, and 

concurrency between testing and production. 

There are diverse views on acquisition reform, but one thing is 

for sure: the status quo is unacceptable. To provide our soldiers the 

equipment they need to defend the Nation, we simply cannot continue to have blurred lines of accountability and evasions of responsibility inside the defense acquisition system. That is why in this 

year’s National Defense Authorization Act, this committee adopted 

reforms to increase the role of the Military Services in the acquisition process and to create new mechanisms to ensure accountability for results. Among these reforms is an enhanced role for the 

Service Chief s. The Army must ensure that its acquisition programs stay on schedule, within cost, and perform to expectations. 

If that does not happen, General, we will be calling you. 

General, thank you again for appearing before this committee 

today, and we look forward to your testimony. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

join you in welcoming General Milley this morning. I would like to 

thank him for his many years of service to out Nation and to the 

Army and for his willingness to continue to serve. General Milley 

is joined this morning by his wife Hollyanne. Thank you, ma?am, 

for your service to the Nation and to the Army. I also wanted to 

acknowledge Mary and Peter and wish them well. 

General Milley, if confirmed, you will oversee the Army during 

a time when the United States faces a multitude of challenges 

abroad. While the conflict areas around the world continue to increase, the amount of resources devoted to the Army continue to 

decrease. Earlier this month, it was announced that over the next 

480 

2 years, the Army would convert two infantry brigade combat 

teams to battalion task forces. These changes were necessary in 

order for the Army to continue to reduce its end strength, with a 

final goal of 450,000 soldiers by the end of fiscal year 2017. In addition to these reductions, the Army also intends to cut approximately 17,000 civilian personnel, although it is my understanding 

that the Army has not identified which installations will be impacted by these reductions. 

If sequestration funding levels remain in place, the situation becomes much more ominous for the Army. Without any relief from 

the budget caps, the Army will need to reduce its end strength further to a level of 420,000 soldiers in the coming years. General, I 

hope you will share with us your views today on how to manage 

these reductions, if in fact they are called for, and what, if any, impact these reductions would have on the readiness of the Army. 

In addition to managing end strength reductions, the Army is 

grappling with how to modernize the force and increase readiness 

levels. In recent years, the Army has had to make tough choices 

on its major modernization programs. As the Army Equipment 

Modernization Strategy, released in March 2015, acknowledges, 

‘‘The Army cannot afford to equip and sustain the Total Army with 

the most modern equipment; therefore, we must acknowledge fiscal 

realities and we will selectively modernize equipment and formations.’’ 

At the same time, the Army continues to cope with reduced readiness levels. General Odierno, the current Chief of Staff of the 

Army, testified before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on 

Defense in March of this year that readiness levels are at historically low levels. Specifically he stated that ‘‘today, only 33 percent 

of our brigades are ready, when our sustained readiness rate 

should be closer to 70 percent.’’ 

General Milley, I look forward to hearing your thoughts on how 

the Army can make targeted investments in modernization while 

also restoring readiness levels. 

The National Guard, has always been an integral component to 

our Nation’s defense. In fact, today they are probably more integral 

than at any time in our history. They serve as the first line of defense when there is a natural disaster at home, and they perform 

a vital homeland security mission. Without question, the role of the 

National Guard and Reserve component played in both Afghanistan and Iraq was critical to our success on the ground. 

However, as the Army draws down and resources become more 

limited, there has been tension between the Active and Reserve 

components, the most notable example being the Army restructuring initiative. To ensure that the Army does not make any irrevocable force structure changes, last year, Congress created the National Commission on the Future of the Army to undertake a comprehensive review of the size and force structure of the Army. The 

commission has been working diligently meeting with stakeholders, 

performing site visits, and conducting hearings in order to provide 

their report to Congress by February 1, 2016. 

General Milley, if confirmed, you will be working with General 

Grass, Chief of the Army National Guard Bureau, and I look forward to hearing from you on how you envision the relationship beVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00486 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
481 

tween the Active Army and the National Guard and Reserve components and what, if anything, can be done to strengthen that relationship. 

Finally, I have repeatedly stated that sequestration is a senseless 

approach to addressing our Nation’s fiscal challenges and it undermines our national security and our military readiness. Defense 

budgets should be based on a long-term military strategy, not sequestration-level budget caps. the chairman has made this point 

eloquently and consistently. I hope you will share your thoughts on 

this topic with the committee today. 

Again, General, thank you for your service. 

Chairman MCCAIN. General, there are standard questions that 

are asked of all military nominees, and I would like to proceed with 

those before your opening statement. 

The questions are as follows. 

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, 

it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and 

other communications of information. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

General MILLEY. I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in 

power? 

General MILLEY. I do, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

General MILLEY. I have not, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you ensure your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record in hearings? 

General MILLEY. I will, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 

and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

General MILLEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

General MILLEY. Yes, they will, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 

testify, upon request, before this committee? 

General MILLEY. I do, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or consult 

with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or 

denial in providing such documents? 

General MILLEY. I do, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. Welcome and please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF GEN MARK A. MILLEY, USA, TO BE CHIEF OF 

STAFF OF THE ARMY 

General MILLEY. Thanks, Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services 

482 

Committee for the privilege and opportunity to appear before you 

today. I appreciate the confidence the President of the United 

States and the Secretary of Defense have shown by nominating me 

to be the next Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. 

Thank you all for your continued and unwavering support and 

commitment to the soldiers and civilians and families of what is 

your Army. As your Army is the strength of our Nation, our soldiers are the strength of our Army, and all of their families are the 

strength of our soldiers. 

Likewise, my family has been my strength throughout my life. 

Both my mother and father served our Nation in World War II as 

part of the greatest generation, with my mother attending the medical needs of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines from the Pacific 

at a military hospital near Seattle, WA, while my father served 

with the 4th Marine Division in the Central Pacific, making the assault landings on Kwajelein, Saipan, Tinian, and the bloody battle 

of Iwo Jima as a young 19- and 20-year-old. 

Sadly, my mother passed over 20 years ago and my father passed 

just last April, a week shy of his 91st birthday. I am absolutely 

sure that they are both very proud from above of their soldier son 

and will always be a source of leadership and guidance for me in 

the years ahead. 

I am also unbelievably lucky to have by my side, as I previously 

introduced, for the last 30 consecutive years of my service the most 

dedicated and strongest woman in the world, my wife Hollyanne. 

She, like my parents, is a constant source of inspiration and love. 

For many years, during seven contingency deployments on various 

operations and thousands of days of training, Hollyanne has essentially been like so many Army spouses, a single parent, who has 

raised two wonderful children who are now young adults, our 

daughter, Mary Margaret, and our son Peter, who unfortunately 

could not be with us today. It is for them and for all of our children 

and the future generations that I and all of us in uniform continue 

to serve and are willing to go into harm’s way to give our todays 

for their tomorrows. 

I would like to just take a moment to recognize Hollyanne as a 

representative of all the Army families, of all the Army spouses, 

and for their incredible resilience, service and sacrifice. 

I would also like to congratulate my predecessor, General Ray 

Odierno, and his wife Linda, who have given over 39 consecutive 

years of distinguished service to our great Nation. I want to personally thank them both for their tremendous leadership as our 

Chief of Staff and leading spouse. Our Nation has been well served 

by this selfless soldier and his entire family. 

Chairman, Senators, service in the U.S. Army is a privilege. It 

is a distinct privilege. It is not a right. It is a privilege and it is 

earned the old-fashioned way, through hard work and meeting exacting standards of discipline and excellence. 

Your Army’s contract with the American people is a combatready force built around our Nation’s most valuable asset, our sons 

and daughters who become soldiers of character and the best 

trained and best equipped Army in the world. Our fundamental 

task is like no other. It is to win and to win in the unforgiving crucible of ground combat. There are many other tasks and roles and 

483 

missions that your Army can do as part of our joint force, and we 

perform those every day in support of our Nation’s interest. We assure allies. We deter adversaries. We shape outcomes and build 

partner capacity and provide foundational capabilities to enable 

other joint forces in a variety of ways. We have provided needed 

help to victims of disaster. 

Our reason for being, our very reason for being at the very core 

of what it means to have an Army, it is to win and to win decisively in ground combat against the enemies of our country so that 

American citizens can enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Every year, 120,000 of America’s sons and daughters raise 

their right hand to take an oath of allegiance to serve our Nation 

in the uniform of your U.S. Army. In return, we make the commitment to develop them as soldiers, as leaders, and importantly as 

citizens. These soldiers are the core of our All-Volunteer Army, 

made up of three components: the Active, the National Guard, and 

the Reserve. We are a total Army. We are in fact one Army. We 

are America’s Army. All of us from private to general come from 

the people, and we are dedicated to give our life and our limb to 

serve the people. We do it with great pride and a cause that transcends ourselves. 

I have huge confidence in our Army today. I have served in it in 

both peace and war. Right now, we have the most skilled and combat-experienced Army in the Nation’s history. In this time of increasing instability, of increasing uncertainty throughout the globe, 

we must squarely face and solve significant challenges as, Chairman, you mentioned, in manpower, readiness, and modernization. 

If confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, I look forward to working with this committee to get the Army the resources 

it needs. I also pledge to be a careful steward on behalf of the 

American taxpayer whom we recognize we all serve as well. 

Finally, if confirmed as Chief of Staff, I want to ensure that the 

Army meets the expectations of the American people. The American people have expected your Army to fight and win our Nation’s 

wars at any time, any place, and your soldiers are ready to do that 

today, as we have done for 240 consecutive years. 

Today we have a great Army and we stand on the shoulders of 

those who came before us. It would be a tremendous honor to lead 

our soldiers of today as their Chief of Staff. I thank each of you, 

without whom we would not even have an Army. 

I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, General. Thank you for your 

strong statement. 

As you know, last week there were four unarmed marines and 

one sailor in Chattanooga, TN, who were murdered. What steps do 

you believe should be put in place immediately to improve the security of Army personnel in the United States, especially at facilities 

like recruiting stations? 

General MILLEY. Senator, first as a son of someone who served 

in the 4th Marine Division, I want to publicly extend my condolences to the families of the four marines and one sailor who were 

killed. It is a horrible tragedy. 

484 

Force protection is a key task for any commander, as it is for all 

of the leaders in the Army and throughout the military. Specifically, there is a wide variety of both active and passive measures. 

As you may know, Admiral Gortney, Commander of NORTHCOM 

[U.S. Northern Command], issued out some increased force protection measures, which I will not discuss publicly exactly what those 

are. 

From my view, there is a variety of both active and passive. 

From the passive standpoint, there is a variety of hardening things 

we can do, bulletproof glass, et cetera. Actively we can increase patrols, work closely with the law enforcement. 

As far as arming recruiters go, I think that is complicated legally, and there are issues involved throughout the country, but we 

will have to come to grips with that, and it certainly should be—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. The legal part of it can be resolved. Do you 

think that they should, under certain conditions, be armed? 

General MILLEY. I think under conditions, both on military bases 

and in out-stations, recruiting stations, Reserve centers, that we 

should seriously consider it. In some cases, I think it is appropriate. 

Chairman MCCAIN. As regards Afghanistan, should we withdraw 

according to a preordained calendar-based plan or a conditionbased plan? 

General MILLEY. I am in favor of a conditions-based plan. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Which right now would you say that the situation would warrant evaluation and revision of the President’s plan 

by 2017 to have an embassy-based force? 

General MILLEY. Right now, I think talking with John Campbell, 

General Campbell, the Commander of the force in Afghanistan, it 

is my understanding that the plan is continually under review and 

that we will execute based on conditions on the ground. 

Chairman MCCAIN. That is your view. 

General Dunford has testified before this committee that even 

with the $38 billion addition, that our Nation’s military, ‘‘would remain at the lower ragged edge of manageable risk in our ability to 

execute the defense strategy.’’ Do you agree with that? 

General MILLEY. I do with respect to the Army as we look out, 

and I concur with General Odierno’s assessment. 

Chairman MCCAIN. That we would be at the lower ragged edge? 

General MILLEY. I would probably agree with that, yes, Senator. 

Then I think he testified to significant risk, and if we go to 

420,000, as Senator Reed mentioned earlier, we would be shifting 

into high risk. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you believe that we should arm the 

Ukrainians with counter-battery systems with which to defend 

themselves from Russian artillery and rocket strikes? 

General MILLEY. Senator, I think providing nonlethal equipment 

is already being done, and I think lethal equipment—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. I am asking about lethal equipment. 

General MILLEY. Yes. Lethal equipment I think is something we 

should consider, and I would be in favor of lethal defensive equipment. 

Chairman MCCAIN. In your view, do we have a strategy to defeat 

ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]? 

485 

General MILLEY. Senator, there is a strategy. I think you are familiar with the nine lines of effort. The military has two. Currently 

there is a strategy. 

Chairman MCCAIN. That strategy also applies to Syria? 

General MILLEY. Syria is part of the overall strategy with respect 

to ISIS, as I understand it. 

Chairman MCCAIN. You believe that we do have a strategy to defeat ISIS. 

General MILLEY. I think there is a strategy, yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you think it will defeat ISIS? 

General MILLEY. Right now, the way the strategy is laid out, as 

I understand it, is that it is going to take a considerable amount 

of time, measured in years, to defeat ISIS if we execute the strategy as it is currently designed. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Maybe you could tell me a little bit about 

that strategy because the President said they have not developed 

it yet. 

General MILLEY. As I understand it, there are nine lines of effort. 

The two that concern the military are providing a variety of enabler capabilities to the Iraqi military and also to provide security 

force assistance and building partner capacity with the Iraqi military. 

Chairman MCCAIN. In your experience, do you believe that we 

need forward air controllers? 

General MILLEY. In my experience, having forward air controllers 

forward with units provides more effective close air support. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, I thank you, General, and thank you 

for your service. We look forward to moving forward with your 

nomination. Congratulations, and all of us would also agree that 

your predecessor is also an outstanding soldier. I thank you. 

General MILLEY. Thank you, Chairman. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, thank you, General Miley—Milley, for your testimony. I 

get confused because up our way it is usually ‘‘Miley.’’ I do not 

know what happened. 

General MILLEY. That is in Rhode Island, Senator. 

Senator REED. I know. You are from Massachusetts, I know. 

[Laughter.] 

Forgive me if I mispronounce things. 

General MILLEY. As long as we both like the Red Sox, we are 

good, sir. 

Senator REED. We like the Red Sox and the Bruins. Well, I will 

stop right there and ask a service question, General. 

You are facing force reductions, 450,000 Active Forces, which 

leads to the question of how do you ensure that you can meet all 

the requirements that are facing the Army. Several possibilities 

that you can comment on—is a much smoother closer integration 

with National Guard and Reserve Forces so they can come into the 

fight earlier. That is one. Two, obviously, continuing to operate 

jointly and train jointly with the Marine Corps, which is a way to 

augment land forces. Three, to continue or to increase, in fact, joint 

operations with foreign militaries that are our allies. Could you 

comment on those approaches? Will that in any way help sort of 

offset the decline in manpower? 

486 

General MILLEY. Well, first, Senator, I think that the reduction 

in manpower down to 450,000 for the Active Force, 920,000 or 

980,000 overall for the total force—and I agree with the current 

Chief of Staff’s assessment that places the Nation at significant 

risk, given our global commitments. In order to mitigate that risk, 

incorporating elements of the National Guard and Reserve component are key, and then working with allies is fundamental. I think 

all of those are necessary to mitigate some of the risk. 

Senator REED. Specifically with respect to the National Guard, 

what is your approach? You know, we speak of one Army, and 

frankly, looking back 30 or more years, it is now much more one 

Army than it was previously. What are you going to do to make 

sure that is more than rhetoric, that there really is one consistent 

Army—National Guard and Reserve, Active Force? 

General MILLEY. We are already doing many things. As the Commander of Forces Command, I have got training readiness, oversight for the Guard and actual command of the Reserves. There are 

many thing we are doing right now. We integrate at both of our 

combat training centers down at Fort Polk, LA, and out in California National Training Center. We are fully integrated with Reserve component and National Guard elements. Integration of 

those forces is key, and we will sustain that and increase that over 

time. 

The second big one I think is we have partnerships. All of our 

Active Component forces are partnered with National Guard units, 

and they are fully integrated for home station training and support 

each other. 

Senator REED. One of the areas of concern—and this has been 

led by Senator McCain’s efforts over many years—has been acquisition reform. He, frankly, indicated a long litany of major systems 

where the Army could not get off the drawing board literally. There 

are proposals today to involve the chiefs more directly not only 

with authority but responsibility. 

Can you comment about the acquisition process and what you 

would like to do as Service Chief in making it more effective? 

General MILLEY. Thanks, Senator. 

In my view, I think the Service Chiefs should have an increased 

role across the entire acquisition process where we are responsible 

for and held accountable for linking the requirements, which we do 

play—the Service Chiefs play a role in that right now. We are not 

or the Service Chiefs are not as engaged as could be with respect 

to the resources and decisions of actual acquisition. Those three 

pieces, linking resources, the requirements, and the actual acquisition—in my view the Chiefs should have increased authority to link 

all three of those throughout the entire process. Not just the inputs 

of requirements but also the outputs of acquisition. 

Senator REED. Just a final point very quickly is that we have 

consistently pointed out that readiness is being challenged in terms 

of brigades when 30 percent of our Army brigades are ready to go, 

and that is way below. That requires some either massive budget 

relief or internal reallocation of resources. If you do not get the 

budget relief, what kind of resources are you prepared to reallocate 

to get training done? 

487 

General MILLEY. Really, there are three pieces, three levers that 

any Chief of Staff can use. One is end strength. The other is modernization, and the other is readiness. Our obligation as an Army 

or any service is to ensure that we have ready forces. There is no 

soldier, sailor, airman, or marine who should ever go into harm’s 

way not fully manned, equipped, well let, et cetera. No one should 

ever go in harm’s way unready. Readiness is the number one priority. It is my number one priority, if confirmed, and it will remain 

the number one priority. 

That leaves only end strength and modernization. Right now, the 

Army has taken a lot of cuts in modernization over time, and then 

we have end strength. If confirmed, I am going to have to take a 

hard look to make sure that we balance those three components as 

we go forward. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Fischer? 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, for being here today. 

When we met earlier this month you mentioned two of your priorities. As you just said, the first one was readiness, and you also 

said investing in future needs. 

Do you believe that the future needs will require the Army to 

primarily focus on modernizing its current capabilities, or do you 

see a shift to new missions and new capabilities? I know there has 

been a lot of talk about the Army’s role in coastal defense. Where 

do you see that headed? 

General MILLEY. Thanks, Senator. 

As you said, two priorities exist for any Chief of Staff really. One 

is maintaining readiness of the force. Second is to posture the force 

to be ready at some point in the future. The period of time that 

I would be looking at in the future, if I were confirmed, would be 

the 2025-2030-2035 timeframe. Right now our modernization strategy is to incrementally improve existing systems. That is okay for 

right now. There are a wide variety of emerging technologies that 

we may or may not have military application 15 to 20 years from 

now. We are going to take a look at those. We are going to explore 

all of those, ask the right questions and see which ones of those 

apply to ground forces. Many already apply to air and naval forces. 

Emerging technology is an area we are going to take hard look at, 

Senator. 

Senator FISCHER. Do you see a shift, though, to any new missions 

that are going to be necessary for the Army to acquire? 

General MILLEY. I think the fundamental missions that currently 

exist in the variety of strategic documents that are out there will 

remain consistent, and I do not see a fundamental shift in the mission for the Army. 

Senator FISCHER. Even with the advancement of new technologies by people who are not our friends? Do you see the Army 

playing any role in that on new missions? 

General MILLEY. The only one that is coming to mind right now 

is cyber. We definitely have increased our capabilities in cyber 

across the joint force, and the Army is building a cyber force. We 

488 

are going to continue to look at that because that is critical for the 

defense of the Nation and for the Army’s capabilities. 

Senator FISCHER. As the current Commander of the Army’s 

Forces Command (FORCECOM), I know that you are responsible 

for providing Army units so you can fulfill the combatant commanders’ requirements. We heard a little bit about the force reduction and the impact that that may have. Right now, are you able 

to fulfill the combatant commanders’ requirements? Where will it 

be when we look at a force that is reduced to 450,000? 

General MILLEY. As Commander of FORSCOM [U.S. Army 

Forces Command], right now we are able, Senator, to fulfill the 

combatant commanders’ requests for forces that have come in. As 

we continue to draw down to 450,000 by 2017–2018, I think we are 

going to incur increased risk, as the current chief has mentioned, 

at the end of it, it will be significant risk. 

We will have to see. We do not know what the future requirements are going to be. Senator McCain mentioned you got issues 

in eastern Europe. You got issues with ISIS. There is a wide variety of other security challenges around the world. If demand continues to increase that it has in the last year, unanticipated demand, then I think we will have to reassess our risk assessment. 

Senator FISCHER. SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] is 

one of the combatant commands that you support as well. I have 

been concerned that reductions across the services are going to impact the conventional force enablers that our special ops guys rely 

upon. How do you work with them to manage that collateral damage that reductions are going to have on their capabilities? 

General MILLEY. We are very, very closely tied as you might 

imagine, with Special Operations Command. 80 percent of U.S. 

special operations comes from the Army. We are very closely tied 

at Fort Bragg. FORSCOM headquarters is also the headquarters 

for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. We are joined at 

the hip. 

One of the big lessons learned that has come out of the last 10 

to 15 years of conflict has been the synergistic effect that we have 

gotten from the interdependence of both conventional and special 

operations. We will continue to work with them very, very closely. 

We have them integrated in all of our major exercises at the combat training centers. We work with them on acquisition development, and obviously, we provide a wide variety of enablers that 

support special operations. We will keep that linkage. That will not 

break. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your commitment 

to making sure that our military men and women are able to perform the missions that they are given. Thank you. 

General MILLEY. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin? 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General. I want to thank you for your service to our 

country and to your family’s support of that service you have given 

us. 

Sir, you and I have had a good conversation on quite a few 

things, and I will ask you the same question I have asked most of 

489 

our conferees. What do you consider the greatest threat that the 

United States of America faces? 

General MILLEY. As a soldier—— 

Senator MANCHIN. The national security for our country. 

General MILLEY. As a soldier, as a military officer, I would have 

to say that it is Russia, and let me explain that and why. Russia 

is the only country on Earth that retains a nuclear capability to destroy the United States. It is an existential threat to the United 

States. It has capability. 

Intent? I do not know. The activity of Russia since 2008 has been 

very, very aggressive. They have attacked and invaded Georgia. 

They have seized the Crimea. They have attacked into the Ukraine. 

That is worrisome. I would put Russia right now from a military 

perspective as the number one threat. 

I would also add China, North Korea, and ISIS, along with Iran, 

including the recent agreement that was signed the other day. 

Those countries—I would not put them in any particular order. 

Each in their own different way represents security threats to the 

United States. 

Senator MANCHIN. Also, we talked about the obstacles that you 

are facing or that we are facing by using the National Guard to the 

full extent, especially the day-to-day operations. If you could expand on that. What are the obstacles that prevent the Army from 

using its Army National Guard to the extent that they should be, 

as well trained as they are today? 

General MILLEY. As you know, Senator, the National Guard has 

been key over the last decade and a half and have served very 

proudly and honorably in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and they are 

fully integrated in a lot of our training operations here in the continental United States. It would help if we had greater access to the 

Guard. Right now, the Guard has state partnership programs overseas with a wide variety of countries. There is a lot of exercises in 

support of combatant commanders that we could use Guard Forces 

for. Its operations, current operations. Some are peacekeeping, 

peace enforcement such as Kosovo and the Sinai. Others are more 

active in Afghanistan and Iraq. Fundamentally access to the Guard 

is key. 

That all links back to the budget. Right now we can only pay for 

bringing Guard units, mobilizing them, bringing them on under 

OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] funding, and many of 

these operations are, in fact, exercises for the COCOMs [combatant 

commands] and they are not covered with OCO funding. Access 

and funding. 

Senator MANCHIN. I am sure we look forward to working with 

you on making that available because I think our Guard could be 

used more effectively than what they are right now, other than private contractors that we are using. That would bring me right up 

to the auditing. What is your understanding of where the Army 

stands in terms of being ready for a full audit by the end of fiscal 

year 2017? 

General MILLEY. I have been briefed that both as a FORSCOM 

Commander but also through the pre-confirmation hearing preparation and briefings I got from the Army staff that the Army is on 

track and will be ready for the full auditing in 2017. 

490 

Senator MANCHIN. If confirmed, will you make improving the 

Army’s acquisition system a priority? 

General MILLEY. Absolutely. 

Senator MANCHIN. I think you would understand the concerns 

that we have with the procurement system that we have right now, 

and it does not seem to work very functionally as far as effective 

or cost-effective especially. Changing those systems—again, it all 

ties back to the auditing as quickly as that can be done. 

Also, do you have any idea on the amount of contractors that we 

have or the Army is using—contract forces? 

General MILLEY. I do not know right this minute Army-wide. I 

do know, for example, I recently commanded in Afghanistan and 

there were one and a half contractors to every soldier that was deployed over there. The amount of contractors that we use is significant. I can get you the exact number. 

Senator MANCHIN. If you could, sir, I would appreciate that because I think the cost of the contractors versus using our own National Guard and Reserves—it makes more sense to use, in my estimation, people in uniform versus people that basically have been 

in uniform and left for the higher pay that the contractors are receiving. That is the rub I have had all along. If you could help with 

that, I would appreciate it. 

General MILLEY. Absolutely. We will do that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

According to United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR–A), which does not break 

out the numbers by Service, as of August 17, 2015, there are 10,917 United States 

contractors in country and another 7,016 Other Country Nationals for a total of 

17,933 contractors. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, and I want to thank your family for their 

service as well to our Nation. 

I wanted to follow up. You confirmed today what General 

Dunford had also testified to this committee before, that Russia is 

our greatest national security threat. I noticed also in your advance 

policy questions that you stated unambiguously that the Army in 

Europe does not have what it needs. What does EUCOM [U.S. European Command] need that it does not have, and how important 

is this as we think about Russia as the most significant threat that 

we are facing? 

General MILLEY. I think there are two parts to that. One is to 

assure our allies, and the other is to deter Russian aggression. I 

think in both cases additional ground capabilities are necessary. 

The Army is already moving out on that to place activity sets over 

there and preposition equipment to either reinforce capabilities 

that are there, forces that are there, or to use that equipment for 

a variety of exercises. There are a lot of tools in the kit bag we can 

use, but I do think we need to increase ground forces on a temporary rotational basis in order either to deter Russia or assure our 

allies. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

I wanted to follow up. You, in answer to Senator Manchin, had 

talked about access to the Guard. One of the things that we have 

491 

seen is a program with the Air Force that is called Total Force Enterprise Active Associate Unit. In other words, it is total force. At 

Pease in New Hampshire, we have had an Active Duty association 

between Active Duty Air Force and our Guard there that has been 

really effective. 

I wanted to ask you if that is something that you would take a 

look at as actually actively partnering certain units together to 

have these Active Duty associations because I think this model— 

the Air Force has had some good success with it and recognizes, as 

well, as you have already indicated today, we would not have been 

able to fight the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan without the Guard 

and Reserve. Being able to actually do some training and work together with certain units I think makes some sense. I wanted to 

get your thought on that and if that is something you would look 

at as a possibility. 

General MILLEY. It is, Senator. In fact, I met with your TAG [Adjunct General] from New Hampshire, along with all the other TAGs 

east of the Mississippi, about—I guess it was—6–8 weeks ago, and 

they brought that up. I am going to try to take a look at that and 

see where it applies to the Army, if that Air Force model can apply 

for greater and fuller integration. 

As you know, the Guard and Reserve were integrated under General Abrams when he was Chief of Staff right following Vietnam. 

The Abrams doctrine has served the Nation well, and we intend to 

fully implement that. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, certainly it is a total force needs in terms 

of what we need to do to defend the Nation. I appreciate your careful examination of that program which has been very successful at 

Pease. 

I wanted to also follow up, General. How important is effective 

and reliable air missile defense to Army operations? Because one 

thing that has been brought to my attention, we have the Patriot. 

Thirteen of our allies also rely on the Patriot to protect their forces. 

Some of our allies have more modern and advanced versions of the 

Patriot than our troops have. I do not agree with that, and I think 

this committee very clearly in the defense authorization—actually 

the Army requested $106 million for Patriot improvement to upgrade our use of the Patriot, and that was actually accepted by this 

committee. 

I wanted to get your sense based on your service in the Army. 

What is your assessment of the Patriot air missile defense system, 

and do you fully support the improvement funding that the Army 

requested for this? How important is this to our troops? 

General MILLEY. Well, Senator, let me take the last part first, 

how important it is. To my knowledge—I am not a military historian, but I do not think the U.S. Army has come under enemy air 

attack consistently since the invasion of Normandy, and that is because of two things. One, we have the most dominant Air Force, 

both naval aviators and the U.S. Air Force pilots and capabilities. 

We want to retain that forever. The other piece is because we have 

a very robust air defense capability that is capable of shooting 

down incoming aircraft. 

Since the modern development of missile technology, that is another component. We have come under missile threat. We were 

492 

under missile threat in the first Gulf War and even in the second 

Gulf War. Patriot plays a key role in not only acquiring and then 

destroying incoming fixed-wing aircraft, but also in intercepting 

and destroying incoming missiles. Patriot is a very, very key system to the air defense of our allies and our own soldiers on the 

ground. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hirono? 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General, to you and your family for your service. 

I appreciated the great conversation we had last week, and 

should you be confirmed, I look forward to, of course, working with 

you during your tenure. 

I know that you realize, General, the importance of MILCON 

[military construction] funding for readiness, particularly for 

Hawaii in light of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. In fact, I spent 

some 4 hours at Schofield Barracks recently and saw the direct effect on facilities there when MILCON funding is cut or deferred. 

Should you be confirmed, I hope you will work with USARPAC 

[U.S. Army, Pacific] to ensure that their facilities are maintained 

and modernized where appropriate so that our troops have the facilities necessary to efficiently perform the important tasks we ask 

of them. 

General MILLEY. I will certainly do that, Senator. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

I also know that you share my view that the rebalance to the 

Asia-Pacific is more than just rhetoric. The Navy’s intentions, for 

example, are to place 60 percent of its ships in this area of responsibility. What do you see as the major components of our rebalance 

strategy? 

General MILLEY. Well, I think that right now, as I mentioned 

earlier, two of that list of threats that were asked to me of Senator 

Manchin included both China and North Korea. The United States 

Army plays a key role. Eight of the 10 largest armies in the world 

are in the Pacific. Clearly, Navy and Air Force and Marines are 

fundamental to success for U.S. national security in the Pacific, but 

the Army is too. We currently have forward-deployed forces in 

Korea that have made a significant contribution to keeping the 

peace for the last 60 years since the end of the Korean War. We 

also have forces, as you are well aware in Alaska, at Joint Base 

Lewis-McChord in Washington State, and most importantly, in the 

State of Hawaii. There is a considerable amount of Army capabilities in the Pacific that play a key role in supporting Admiral Harris as the combatant commander and supporting Admiral Harris’ 

PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] strategy. 

Senator HIRONO. Well, we recognize that because of the budget 

issues that certain force reductions were inevitable, sad to say. Of 

course, while unfortunate, I do appreciate the consideration that 

was given to the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and Hawaii’s strategic location and the decisions that were made regarding the cuts 

to our Army. 

Can I expect that, if confirmed, you will continue to give ample 

consideration to our strategic position—and that, of course, includes Alaska—and to the importance of the rebalance? 

493 

General MILLEY. Absolutely, Senator. As we go forward, balancing of the disposition of the Army forces in accordance with the 

National strategy and balancing that against risk is the key task 

for the Chief of Staff and I will take that. 

Senator HIRONO. This committee has spent considerable time on 

the issue of sexual assault in the military, and it still, of course, 

occurs and harassment persists in our military. From your testimony and our meeting, I know you find it totally unacceptable as 

well. 

However, while efforts are being made to support and encourage 

victims to come forward, we are becoming more aware of the problem of retaliation. 

Can you share with us some of your specific plans to reduce not 

only sexual assault but also to stop the further abuse by retaliation? 

General MILLEY. Well, Senator, as you mentioned, sexual assault 

is just—there is no place for it at all in a disciplined military force. 

2 years ago, there were, I think it was, 24,000 reports of sexual assault. That is an Army corps. It is wrong. It is just not acceptable 

and we cannot accept those kinds of casualties. Really that is what 

they are. Victims become casualties. We cannot accept a corps? 

worth of casualties and think we are going to have a ready Army 

that can deal with the threats that were mentioned earlier. It is 

unacceptable. 

The Army has done a lot over the last many years here, and 

there has been some progress. It is not nearly enough, and I am 

fully committed, if confirmed as Chief of Staff, to continue to work 

the entire problem of sexual assault and bring that to zero. 

Retaliation is a problem that has recently surfaced in the last 

year or so. I saw the recent study which indicated that 60 percent 

of victims report that they have been retaliated against, some by 

chain of command, others by peers. I think that by chain of command retaliation, we can get after that pretty fast through a variety of tools and holding commanders accountable. Peer-on-peer is 

a little bit more complex, and I am going to have to study that to 

figure out exactly what techniques can be used to eliminate peeron-peer retaliation. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. This will be an ongoing area of concern for many of us on this committee. Thank you for whatever can 

do to improve the situation vastly. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst? 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Milley. It is great to have you in front of the 

committee today. I want to thank your wife for being here as well. 

Thank you for the support that you have given over 34 years or 30 

years for your husband. Thank you. 

I will not ask about the National Guard. We have had some very 

in-depth discussions in my office, and I thank you for your willingness to work with our wonderful National Guard and all of those 

great young men and women that provide a great support system 

to our Active component members. Thank you for that. 

I just wanted to mention we do have—you mentioned the ties between our Active component and the Guard, and we do have our 

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494 

tional Guard, rotating through JRTC [Joint Readiness Training 

Center] right now. We do appreciate that partnership. 

I want to tag on with a little bit on what Senator Hirono had 

also brought up, was the cases of sexual assault in the military. I 

was at the West Point Board of Visitors meeting yesterday, and 

this is a topic that we discussed. You have over 34 years of experience in the Army, and so you have seen a lot of changes through 

the years. When it comes to sexual assault and the way the Army 

reports this, prosecutes this, we have seen some changes in recent 

years. I would like your takeaway from what we have seen just in 

the last few years. With those changes, what do you see? Is it improving? The areas where you think we have seen the most impact. 

If you could just expound on that a little bit please. 

General MILLEY. Thanks, Senator. 

As I mentioned, there has been some improvement. It is not good 

enough, though, but there has been some improvement over the 

last couple of years. We know that the prevalence of incidents appears to be down and the numbers of reporting is up. It indicates 

some shift in trust to the chain of command. 

I think the key is to prevent and/or intervene upfront, and that 

comes with a change of culture and fully educating the force, a 

wide variety of training. If an incident does occur, though, the first 

responsibility for that chain of command is to protect that victim 

and then investigate fully with professional investigators, CID 

[Army Criminal Investigation Division] investigators, and then 

hold those perpetrators accountable. I think the entire key is within the hands of the chain of command, and that is staff sergeants 

and platoon sergeants up through first sergeants and company 

commanders, all the way up through general officers. All of us have 

to be fully engaged in order to get after that. 

A couple of things over 35 years that I have used and seen and 

have emphasized. 

One is the role of the commander, absolutely fundamental. An 

engaged commander makes the difference between success and lack 

of success. 

Second I would say is operate in buddy teams. There is great 

value in operating and using buddy team approaches like you 

would in combat. 

Third is control of the terrain, which is the barracks. We cannot 

necessarily control outside the forts, but we surely as commanders 

can control the barracks. Maintaining good order and discipline is 

fundamental to the barracks. Lastly is alcohol. We know that in 

many, many cases of sexual assault, alcohol is a contributing factor. Maintaining good order and discipline again in the proper use 

of alcohol is fundamental. 

I think commanders and the chain of command, the sergeants 

and the captains and the colonels and the generals, are fundamental to getting after sexual assault and bringing it to an end in 

our Army. 

Senator ERNST. I appreciate that very much. I do see where we 

seem to have a lower level of incidents. We have a very, very long 

way to go with this. 

One of the points that we raised yesterday at West Point with 

the Board of Visitors is that it is really difficult when you have 

495 

someone like yourself or even me with a lot of gray hair standing 

there telling these young soldiers do not do this, do not do this. I 

think where we can see a lot of shift in the culture and the environment is when their peers are stepping up and saying do not do 

it. We have talked about ‘‘not in my squad.’’ I think that is an important step. 

We have a long ways to go, General. I look forward to working 

with you on this very important topic and protecting our sons and 

daughters as they serve. Thank you very much. 

General MILLEY. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King? 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Milley, first I want to commend you on your statement. 

I think it is one of the best statements I have ever heard about the 

role and mission of the Army. It should be required reading I think 

for every member of the Army today. 

One of the questions you answered to the chairman was that 

would you commit to provide your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power. You said yes to that 

question. I want to underline the importance of that question. All 

of your experience, all of your knowledge, all of your wisdom that 

you have accumulated over the years are of no value if you do not 

share them. You will be operating in the highest levels of our Government in a situation that often can be intimidating. I want to encourage you to remember that question, and when in doubt, speak 

up. You are where you are because of your knowledge and experience, and you have to share it and sometimes share it aggressively. 

I hope you will remember that question and remember the commitment you made. I think you have a great deal to offer this country, 

and I just want to be sure it gets to the table. 

General MILLEY. Senator, I guarantee that. I have been in a lot 

of combat, and I will be intimidated by no one. 

Senator KING. I believe that, having met you, General. 

A more specific question. Are the Iraqi Security Forces willing to 

fight? 

General MILLEY. When we left in 2011—I was not there in 2011 

but was there shortly before that—and the Iraqi Security Forces 

were willing to fight. In the years between 2011 and today, their 

chains of command have been decimated and they were not getting 

proper pay and training went down the tubes. Bottom line is that 

if 3 or 4 years go by and you lack training, you lack money, you 

lack equipment, you lack spare parts, and most importantly you 

lack a competent, capable, committed leadership, then you can certainly understand why units fell apart last year during the ISIS offensive. 

I think there is nothing inherently prohibiting the Iraqi Security 

Forces from a will to fight with the exception of a lack of proper 

leadership. That is fundamental from where I sit, and I would like 

to get a trip over there and talk to our commanders on the ground, 

talk to General Austin, talk to General Clark, and others. My assessment is they have the potential and the capability to fight, but 

they must be led just like any army must be led to close with and 

destroy the enemies of their country. 

496 

Senator KING. It seems to me that when we think about the strategic challenges of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, the Ukraine, all of 

those are local troops with United States support in one way or another. One of the key challenges is how do you teach the will to 

fight. How do you train? Have we learned that? Are we at a place 

where we know what the pressure points are to develop, for example, the command mentality that is necessary? Because we are in 

a series of disputes around the world, none of which involve directly many, if any, U.S. troops. We are at the mercy of how these 

local people perform. I am wondering about the Army’s sort of 

thinking about how to do training. That may be one of the most 

essential tasks that the new Army has. 

General MILLEY. We in the Army think that we do know how to 

develop leaders. The Army does many, many things and does many 

things well, but we definitely produce lots of good leaders throughout our force on a day-to-day basis. We know also how to do that 

with other armies, with foreign armies, specifically as you mentioned, both Afghanistan and Iraq. We think we can do that. 

Well, how do you do that? Leaders have to have confidence in 

their personal skills and their competence. That is fundamental. 

No soldier is going to follow a leader who is constantly lost, who 

is incompetent, who is a cement head out there and does not know 

how to shoot, move, communicate, and bring fire on the enemy. No 

soldier is ever going to follow that leader. Competence is key and 

teaching them the military skills necessary at the level they are at. 

The other piece is the leader has to demonstrate compassion and 

love for their soldiers. If they see a leader who does not actually 

care for them, they are not going to follow him. 

The third piece I think is a committed leader, a leader who is 

committed to the cause for which they fight. 

If those three elements are combined together in Iraqi leadership 

at the small unit tactical level and at the strategic level, then I 

think the Iraqi Security Forces have a good chance of prevailing. 

Senator KING. A year or so ago, Senator Kaine and I were in 

Lebanon, and we saw the training program that involves bringing 

foreign officers to the United States and also providing the kind of 

training that you are talking about. That struck us as a very costeffective technique, particularly bringing them here because they 

get a lot from their peers when they are at Fort Benning or at Fort 

Hood or wherever they are. Is that a program that you think 

should be continued, strengthened, emphasized? 

General MILLEY. Yes, I so, Senator, absolutely. It has been valuable in the past over many, many decades with many armies 

around the world, and doing foreign military exchange and our 

education system is value added for foreign armies. 

Senator KING. I am a little bit over time, but a very short question. How long would it take us to go from a 450,000 back to, say, 

550,000 if, God forbid, circumstances required it? What is the lead 

time? 

General MILLEY. Yes, I would have to take that one for the 

record for the analysis and get back to you. I would like an opportunity to study that. 

To build a brigade, for example, a brigade combat team, call it 

3,500–4,000 soldiers—it depends on the type of brigade you have. 

497 

To build that from scratch is about a 3- or 4-year period to really 

get them certified and ready to engage in ground combat operations. To regenerate that force from 450,000 to 550,000—it can be 

done, but it is not going to be done in a very, very short amount 

of time. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

It would take three to five years to grow the Active component back to 550,000 

with sufficient funding for incentives and recruitment. 

Senator KING. Thank you. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Wicker? 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you for your testimony and thank you for coming 

by to see many of us before the testimony. 

I want to ask you about the National Commission on the Future 

of the Army, which was established by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 [NDAA], and the Army’s Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI). 

The National Commission’s mandate is to evaluate future missions, evaluate the force mix of the total Army, and evaluate 

whether combat aviation assets from the Army National Guard 

should be transferred to the Army. 

I understand from sources within the Pentagon that the Army 

intends to implement certain elements of the Army’s ARI as early 

as October 1st of this year. As I expressed to you, making these 

irreversible force structure changes to the Guard before we have 

had a chance to see what the Commission has to say about ARI 

would not be advisable and does not make sense to me. The intent 

of Congress was clear. There should be no transfers of helicopters 

away from the Guard until Congress receives and reviews the findings of the Army Commission. 

As such, I would like to know your opinion of the ARI plan, 

which would remove all combat aviation from the Army National 

Guard. Do you support halting transfers of helicopters away from 

the Guard until the Army Commission reports back in February of 

next year? 

General MILLEY. Thanks, Senator. 

It is my understanding that the transfer by October is in accordance with last year’s 2015 NDAA, and the 2016 NDAA and the one 

that is under debate right now is the one that is talking about halting them. The Army is actually executing their last written order, 

which was last year’s authorization, as I understand it. I will look 

into that, though. 

As far as do I support it or not, there are puts and takes to this 

ARI thing. I think the National Guard has some good points. The 

National Guard makes some points that they are concerned that it 

is a slippery slope. I am going to take combat capabilities away 

from them and they will not be able to be the strategic and operational Reserve. Fair enough. 

There are also key points on the Army side. One is fiscal. There 

is a billion-dollar a year savings and $12 billion over time. I think 

that is not insignificant given the current crunch with sequester, 

et cetera. Most importantly, I think there is a readiness issue. If 

we do not execute this ARI, then I think three of the divisions, the 

498 

1st Infantry Division, the 10th Mountain Division, 25th Division in 

Hawaii, are not going to have armed reconnaissance capability, and 

we are going to blind 3 out of the 10 Active Duty division commanders with inability to be able to see a battlefield if they were 

thereby committed. 

On balance, I would favor the transfer. However, I am going to 

await the results of the Commission and I am going to pay attention to their recommendations very closely. I will remain continually engaged with the Guard and try to do the right thing for the 

total Army. 

Senator WICKER. Well, I am glad to know you are going to await 

the findings of the Commission. 

I would just say to you a couple of things. 

From my conversations with many of our people in the Guard, 

they believe that for many of the States, such as Mississippi, our 

program would be set back for a decade. It would take us 10 years 

to get over the loss of these Apaches, and I think would do great 

harm to what we have had over the past, and that is that the Active Army and the National Guard units have operated seamlessly 

as one team since September 11 and it has been good for the country. I think it is unfortunate that policy fights and distrust between 

the Guard and Active Army have become prevalent over the past 

five years. 

What is your assessment of the current relationship between the 

Army and the Army National Guard? Will you acknowledge that 

the relationship has deteriorated to a point where actually it is unseemly? 

General MILLEY. Well, Senator, as Commander of Forces Command, I deal with the National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve 

on a frequent basis. I am coming at this from an operational force 

point of view, from the fielded forces. I do not see that friction in 

the fielded forces. We train together. We operate together. We have 

partnerships together. I have commanded National Guard forces in 

both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Senator WICKER. You do not see that in the field. 

General MILLEY. I do not see that in the field. That is correct. 

Senator WICKER. You see it here in the city, do you not? 

General MILLEY. Maybe some things happen when people come 

to Washington, DC. I do not know. Perhaps there is tension—— 

Senator WICKER. I have heard that. 

General MILLEY. As I understand it, there is tension here 

amongst some of the senior leaders. I will work, along with General 

Grass and General Kadavy, to patch up whatever issues there are. 

From a personal perspective, I think there is one Army. That is 

it. There is one Army. We all wear the same uniform and it says 

U.S. Army on our chest, and that is the way we have to approach 

it. The U.S. Army cannot conduct combat operations in a sustained 

way overseas without the use of the National Guard and the Reserve. We just cannot do it. We can do short-term operations, but 

sustained ops cannot be done without the Guard and Reserve. It 

is one Army. They are critical to our success. 

Senator WICKER. Well, thank you very much for that. This conversation will continue. We had it privately in my office. We are 

discussing it publicly today. I think we can acknowledge that the 

499 

National Guard is a very integral part of what your mission will 

be. I hope these issues can be resolved in a mutually satisfactory 

manner. 

Thank you very much for your service. 

General MILLEY. Thanks, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly? 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you and your family for all you have done for our 

country. Thanks for taking the time to come to my office. I just 

wanted to follow up on that discussion. 

In regards to military suicides, we talked about the importance 

of pushing situational awareness down the chain of command. 

When I met with the Israeli Defense Forces, they said what was 

critical in reducing suicides was pushing it down the chain of command so the squad leader, the platoon leader, who could identify 

it right on the spot, could help. I was wondering what your plans 

are to make sure that at the squad level, the platoon leader, the 

leaders of those squads and platoons are aware of the challenge 

and are ready to try to help in eliminating it. 

General MILLEY. Thanks, Senator. 

I have been in command a lot, and suicide is a horrible, tragic 

thing to see in a unit. The effects, obviously, on the family, the 

unit, et cetera are just like you would have a killed in action in 

combat. It is terrible. It is horrible. 

I think in terms of how we get after it, situational awareness is 

key. Because the Army has done a lot over the last couple years 

to increase situational awareness of the signs and the symptoms 

and then the techniques of intervention, our numbers have dropped 

considerably in suicide. That is one point is to continue sustaining 

and actually increasing situational awareness. 

The second is to continue to reduce the stigma. Behavioral 

health, mental health—my view is there but for the grace of God, 

go I. The human psyche is a very fragile thing, and any one of us, 

regardless of how many patches or Ranger tabs or anything else 

anyone has, is not so hard, not so tough that they cannot break 

under a certain, correct combination of stressors and pressures. We 

have to be alert to those signs and symptoms, and we have to reach 

out and be literally our brother and sister’s keeper. 

That attitude has to happen throughout the force. It has happened considerably better than it was in previous years. In the last 

few years, it has improved significantly, and that is what I think 

is contributing to the reduction in suicides is the increase in situational awareness, the reduction of stigma, and then the intervention on the part of junior soldiers at the most junior level. 

Senator DONNELLY. Well, I would encourage you in your new position to really birddog this and to make sure that the squad leaders and the platoon leaders know, hey, let us know if you see something going sideways for one of the guys, one of the men and 

women, let them know there is no stigma and that they should get 

help. I know you will do that. 

I wanted to switch to Iraq. I was there recently, met with your 

folks, our whole team. It was right before the push into Ramadi 

and Fallujah began. The discussion was just as you said. It is a 

question of good leadership for the ISF, the Iraq Security Forces. 

500 

As opposed to this plan or that plan, I would love to hear your unvarnished advice on what you think our role should be in helping 

the ISF, the Iraqi Security Forces, get their leadership back together. What can we do best to help them do that? 

General MILLEY. Senator, I would like also the opportunity to get 

over and visit and talk to the guys on the ground to answer that 

question in a more informed and holistic sort of way. 

Based on what I know now and my own experience in both Iraq 

and Afghanistan, there is a wide variety of things we need to and 

should do to help the Iraqi Security Forces in our ‘‘advise and assist’’ levels of effort. As I understand it, the constraint right now 

is not so much on what we are doing, but on the amount of trainees 

the Iraqi Security Forces are providing for our trainers to do. Maintaining a robust train, advise, and assist effort, Security Forces assistance effort, with the Iraqi Security Forces over a considerable 

length of time is going to go a long way to shoring them up. 

What Senator McCain mentioned earlier about JTAC’s [joint terminal attack controller] forward I think is something that should 

be seriously considered to improve the effectiveness of the enablers, 

the close air support that is being provided. I think advisors going 

forward with units again is something that should be seriously considered. However, there are lots of issues with that with security 

of our people and the risk associated with it, et cetera. Bottom line is there are things we can do. I would like an opportunity, though, Senator, to talk that over with commanders on the 

ground and give you a more informed answer at a later date. 

Senator DONNELLY. Great. 

I am about out of time. I would just ask you to remember in regards Iraq—and I know you will—when you said the Army’s mission is to win. We have to win there too in order to have success 

in Syria and to help the Iraqi Forces have that kind of leadership. 

The last thing I will say is our Article 5 responsibilities under 

NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] with Latvia, Estonia, 

Lithuania. In Korea, their motto is ‘‘fight tonight.’’ We have to 

make sure we have the same kind of readiness in those areas because we have the same obligations to those countries. They have 

said they would stand with us. We need to do the same for them. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Tillis? 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Milley and Mrs. Milley, congratulations. Thank you for 

your service. 

General Milley, I want to start maybe with going back to something that the chairman mentioned in his opening comments. Incidentally, I am sorry I had to step out. I have a competing committee meeting over in Judiciary that I have to go back to. 

We have sequestration, which I think to a person we all recognize is devastating. We have to get rid of it. It is bad policy. It 

should have never been implemented. 

What are your thoughts, though, about ways that we can save 

money? In new your position—and I look forward to supporting you 

in this nomination. What areas in your opinion do we have the opportunity to bend the cost curve or increase productivity, and how 

would you go about doing that in your new role? 

501 

General MILLEY. I think there are at least three areas that 

should be seriously considered. Senator McCain has already referenced them. One is I think we have to take a hard look at overhead. The Army, but not just the Army, the military across the 

board, all the services, to include Department of Defense are a 

very, very large organization with a big bureaucracy with a significant overhead. 

Second is acquisition. As already previously mentioned, there is 

a considerable amount of cost, and in many cases waste, in the acquisition process. We need to get that under control. 

A third and final piece that I think is worth taking a look at, 

there is a wide variety of emerging technologies that could, in the 

out-years, 15–20 years from now, lend itself to automated processes 

and reducing either manpower or manpower costs, compensation 

costs, over time. 

Those would be three pretty big areas that I would want to take 

a look at if confirmed. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

We have Russia creating a looming threat in Europe. We have 

the Pacific and China’s expansion or, I should say, increased activities there. We have the ongoing war in the Middle East, the fight 

against Islamic extremism. 

General Odierno, I believe said that a 50-brigade Army should be 

adequate to keep these threats in check. Now we are on a trajectory for about a 33-brigade Army. Do you think that managing or 

facing those threats is possible with a 33-brigade Army? 

General MILLEY. Senator, are you talking Active brigades? Are 

you talking the total Army brigades? Because right now, total 

Army, we have 60 brigades today. We have 32 in the Active component today. The plan that was announced a week or 2 ago will take 

us down to 30 brigades, Active component, and we will lose 2 out 

of the Guard. The bottom line is—— 

Senator TILLIS. That was the Active, the 33 brigades. 

General MILLEY. I think from a total Army perspective, we have 

adequate capacity, numbers, of brigade combat teams to handle the 

contingencies that are currently on the books. If we do not drop 

below the 980 force, we have adequate capacity, size, but that is 

with significant risk. That risk is incurred in terms of time, the 

time to the fight, the time to mobilize Guard units, the time to get 

them trained, certified, et cetera, and get them to the fight. Then 

it is also significant risk and potential casualties. 

The second piece is not just capacity but capability, the readiness 

of the force and how capable it is to handle that type of fight, 

which is a different fight than what we have been dealing with for 

the last decade and a half. 

We have got a ways to go in terms of improving our readiness 

with respect to the higher end type of combat operations. 

Senator TILLIS. General Milley, I just want to close by saying I 

look forward to you being in this role. You were one of the first people to reach out to me back before I was even sworn in to offer information and help me ramp up. You were very generous with your 

time when I spent several days down at Fort Bragg, and you have 

been up here several times. I know you to be a very approachable, 

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direct person. I think you are going to be a great addition as the 

Chief of Staff. 

Thanks again to you and your family. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator McCaskill? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you. As everyone has expressed, we appreciate 

you coming by our offices and a chance to visit one on one, and I 

certainly appreciated that. 

I want to talk about the cuts and sequestration and the issue 

that we have in front of us in the next 90 to 120 days here in Congress. 

The installation-level cuts that the Army announced earlier this 

month are based, of course, on us shrinking to 450,000 soldiers. As 

you know and have talked about this morning, there is a significant risk that these cuts will not be the last. If Congress does not 

provide some relief from sequester-level caps, the Army will be 

forced to cut an additional 30,000 Active Duty soldiers. 

This year, the Republicans are attempting to get around the statutory budget caps by using the Overseas Contingency Operations, 

or the war fund, which does not have to be paid for. It can be put 

on a credit card. Would you buy back force structure using this war 

fund? 

General MILLEY. Senator, we would prefer, if possible, the budget 

be in the base. As the recipient of the money, we will take the OCO 

if that is the only mechanism that we can in order to sustain readiness, end strength, and modernization. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me ask one that I think is even more 

difficult because then it kind of tramps on whether or not the OCO 

is being used appropriately because there is also an obligation you 

have to only use the Overseas Contingency fund for what it was 

designed to be and that is, an off-the-budget, unpaid-for, on the 

credit card to be used in an emergency for the purposes of a contingency operation. That is why it is called the Contingency Operations. 

In your advance policy question for this hearing, you noted that 

our technological advantage over current and potential adversaries 

are at risk. We invested in the base budget in technology and research for decades to get us to the point that we are today where 

we are the most technologically force in the world. If we want the 

young men and women we will send to war in the future to have 

the same advantages that the men and women have today with our 

technological superiority, can you make long-term research and development investments using a fund that was designed only to 

apply to a contingency? 

General MILLEY. I would have to get back to you on the actual 

legal use of that fund relative to long-term research. I think the answer would be no. I think OCO funds are specifically targeted to 

named operations, overseas contingency operations. I would have to 

get back to you to see if that could be used. I do not think it could, 

but I will check and get back to you, Senator. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

No. Legally, we can only use OCO funds in this manner if appropriated for this 

purpose by Congress. Current OCO rules and practices stipulate that research and 

development funds are for projects required for combat operations in the theater 

503 

that can be delivered in 12 months. In this context, 12 months is considered to be 

a short-term effort. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The frustrating part of this is the only difference between the commitment to put this $40 billion in the 

budget between my friends and colleagues and us on this side of 

the aisle is the willingness to acknowledge that we are spending 

the money, is the willingness to say this belongs in the base budget, let us put it in the base budget, let us not use an artifice, a gimmick, phoniness, to pretend that somehow we are not making an 

investment in the base needs of our military but rather in an overseas contingency operation. 

It remains a great frustration to me and one that I am hopeful 

that we can work out so that we do not go down this path and create this precedent that I think is very dangerous for the long-term 

stability of our military and you all’s abilities to do your jobs in 

terms of planning and coordinating and having what you need 

going forward. I just think it is a very, very irresponsible precedent. 

On sexual assault, I know that several members have talked 

about it to you already. I do want to mention I know you are getting after the retaliation. I will continue to monitor that. 

I want to mention briefly at the end of my time the incredible 

training that is going on at Fort Leonard Wood for the investigators of sexual assault. This is a special set of training that must 

occur, and I would like your commitment. The forensic experimental trauma interview is now being trained throughout the military and frankly in the civilian world. The expertise that has been 

developed at the fort on this is unparalleled in terms of how you 

get after a sexual assault investigation, particularly interviewing a 

victim. I would like your commitment to familiarize yourself with 

that training and a commitment that you will continue to fight for 

the adequate funding so we can actually get these perpetrators behind bars so they are not, in fact, besmirching the amazing and 

wonderful military that we have in this country. 

General MILLEY. I will absolutely take a deep look at that. As I 

understand it from reports I have, it is the best practice and it 

leads the Nation in its skills. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It does. It does, in fact. 

My thanks to you and your family for your service. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Milley, good to see you. Thank you for your 35 years of 

service and to your family who I know has sacrificed a lot. 

I wanted to talk—I have a number of questions, as you can imagine—about the Army’s decision to cut 40,000 troops recently. I 

know that you were not in the ultimate decisionmaking but you are 

going to be tasked with implementing this and maybe relooking at 

it. I would appreciate some of your thoughts and views. 

You know, General Dunford last week talked about the importance of the military and DOD [Department of Defense] focusing on 

and implementing the defense guidance from the Congress. I gave 

examples of if the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] was told by 

Congress 11 carriers we need or the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 

504 

we need A–10s, even though the service does not like it, they do 

it. 

One of the things that I am concerned about is in the current 

NDAA, we have a lot of focus on the Pacific rebalance, and there 

is very strong language, very directive language. The U.S. forces 

under the OPCON [Operational Command] of PACOM [U.S. Pacific 

Command] should be increased. Any withdrawal of the U.S. forces 

outside the continental U.S. Asia-Pacific region would therefore seriously undermine the rebalance. A lot of focus on the rebalance. 

It was put in there to provide credibility to strategy that this Congress bipartisan supports. 

I have been quite concerned that the Army’s decision pretty 

much ignores this. With all due respect to Senator Hirono, I do not 

think the decisions were inevitable. As a matter of fact, I think 

that what was just announced takes a huge chunk, not only increasing forces, not only keeping them the same, but dramatic increase. As a matter of fact, of the 40,000, a huge proportion was 

from the Asia-Pacific region. 

The idea of fighting tonight, maintaining the rebalance—I think 

it is all undermined. I think it is dramatically undermined. I think 

our allies are going to see it undermined. 

Do you think that the President’s rebalance strategy has been 

undermined by dramatically reducing forces despite this Congress’ 

defense guidance to the Department of Defense to not do that? 

General MILLEY. I do not think it has necessarily been undermined, Senator. From an Army perspective, about 20 percent of the 

Army’s combat power is in the Pacific, even with the reductions. 

More to your point, though, I agree that the Sense of Congress 

should absolutely inform decisionmaking, and we should take that 

seriously and I think we will. 

Senator SULLIVAN. It does not look like you did in this case. 

General MILLEY. Well, as you know, I was not in this—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. I know. Again, General, I have the utmost respect for you. I am talking about the Army’s decision which now 

you are going to have to defend. The Department of Defense, the 

Army did not—did not—abide by the defense guidance of Congress. 

Period. If they read that NDAA amendment. 

General MILLEY. I will take a hard look at the entire issue, and 

I look forward to working with you on it. I do think, Senator, that 

the Army has substantial capabilities committed to the Pacific. 

Senator SULLIVAN. They have been significantly increased in the 

last 2 weeks, according to this decision. The only airborne combat 

brigade in the entire Asia-Pacific has now been gutted. 

General MILLEY. I would say that the airborne brigade was 

brought down to a battalion task force with the specific intent and 

design that it could be reversed if funding becomes available over 

the next couple of years. That brigade does not go to a battalion, 

I do not think, until late 2016 or 2017. It is designed to go to a 

battalion task force with the intent of reversing it if funding is 

made available. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Do you think our allies were supportive of 

this? I mean, the idea of fighting tonight in Korea—that BCT was 

the Reserve cavalry for any contingency in Korea that can get there 

in 7 hours, a very capable, mountain, cold weather unit. Do you 

505 

think that our capability in Korea has been decreased by this decision? 

General MILLEY. The Army, Marines, both have significant 

ground capabilities that are positioned throughout the continental 

United States, Hawaii, Alaska, Fort Lewis, Washington, and Okinawa that can respond. We think that it is a capable response to 

mitigate the threat given the current situation. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, I will have more questions in 

the second round. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Gillibrand? 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking 

Member, for this hearing. 

Thank you so much, General Milley, for your service. Thanks to 

your family. You have done extraordinary things, and I am so 

grateful that you are continuing to serve our country. 

I want to talk a little bit about combat integration. I want to 

applaud the Army for taking steps towards eliminating combat 

exclusion policies for women by opening up over 20,000 combat engineer and associated skill positions to female soldiers in June. 

As you look at the positions that still remain closed, what reasons might there be for the Army to ask for an exception to policy 

for a position? 

General MILLEY. The only reason at all, Senator—and there has 

been no decision yet, but everything revolves around standards and 

readiness. The military occupational specialties that remain closed 

currently are infantry armor, some forward observers in the field 

artillery, and then special operations, special forces. 

There is a gender integration study ongoing right now by Training and Doctrine Command. There is a similar study ongoing by 

the Marines. They are both crosswalking their data. I expect to see 

that information, if I am confirmed, probably in September/October 

and will have to make a decision or a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense whether to seek a waiver or not. I will take a 

hard look at all that data and make that call at that time. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Well, we have seen the success of the cultural support teams in Afghanistan and how vital women were to 

those missions to gather vital intelligence as to where terrorists 

were, where weapons were being housed from women and children 

in those homes. I do hope you will focus every effort to make sure 

our best and brightest and all of our best and brightest are serving. 

I was concerned about the recent news regarding the eight 

women who failed the first phase of the Army Ranger School for 

the second time due to their inability to accomplish subjectively 

evaluated leadership tasks. These women were already officers, 

ranging from captains to majors with years of leadership experience. Why do you think that class of women—why do you think 

these women were in such a historically high attrition rate? Do you 

find it alarming that the U.S. military academy at West Point is 

graduating leaders who, after 5 to 6 years of service, are not able 

to complete leadership tasks that are successfully accomplished by 

specialists and private first classes? 

General MILLEY. Senator, Ranger School is a very, very hard 

course, male, female, no matter who you are. That is a hard course 

with a high attrition rate. The women that failed—one of the key 

506 

tasks that they failed were patrolling tasks, leadership skills, 

which because they are not in the infantry already, they have had 

a limited opportunity to train to those. I expect that those skills 

would improve over time. Right now we have three women who are 

in the mountain phase, as of yesterday anyway—still in the mountain phase of Ranger School, and we are observing that to see how 

that goes. 

The broader issue of women in the infantry, women in armor, et 

cetera—again, there is a very detailed study going on. I want to 

take a hard look at all that and make sure that the standards are 

being met in the readiness force. 

As to whether women can fight or not, there is no doubt. I have 

seen it personally, up close and real. There is no doubt in my mind 

that women can engage in ground combat with the enemies of our 

Nation because they have done it. They have been doing it for 10 

years. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. I also want to associate myself with the remarks from Senator Ernst, Hirono, and McCaskill about sexual assault in the military and how important it is for this committee 

that we solve that problem. 

I do want to just note one thing from your testimony. Retaliation 

is not a new issue. In fact, we have been measuring retaliation over 

the last several years because of our DOD surveys. One of the biggest challenges we have and why Senator McCaskill raised it is 

this year’s survey—62 percent of survivors were retaliated against, 

perceived retaliation, because they reported these crimes. That is 

the same statistic as 2 years ago. It is the same as the 2012 survey. 

We have a real challenge here with retaliation. 

To be clear, the retaliation is fairly diverse. 62 percent is—53 

percent is social retaliation, peer-to-peer. 35 percent is administrative action. 32 percent is professional retaliation. 11 percent is punishment for an infraction. If you look at all those factors, 35, 32, 

and 11, arguably more than half of the retaliation is through the 

chain of command. Please do study that because there is an issue 

of perception by female members of the military of discrimination. 

They said in 60 percent of sexual harassment cases and sexual discrimination cases, it came from the immediate commander. You are 

talking about unit commanders who are perhaps creating a toxic 

climate. That command climate really needs to be looked at aggressively to make sure that these female soldiers know that they can 

succeed and that their immediate supervisor does not have it out 

for them. 

General MILLEY. I will make that a focus area, Senator. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Lee? 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Milley, for your service to our country and 

for your willingness to be considered for this position. 

I really enjoyed our visit last week when we met and enjoyed getting to know you a little bit better. 

I want to first join my colleagues in condemning the deplorable 

attacks against our servicemembers in Chattanooga last week. I 

pray for the friends and family members and the colleagues of the 

507 

five servicemembers who lost their lives, and I pray for a quick recovery for those who were injured. 

The attacks in Chattanooga last week were the latest in a string 

of deadly assaults on military personnel in facilities in the United 

States, including Fort Hood and the Navy Yard, as well as a number of attacks that were planned but that, quite fortunately, were 

disrupted before they could be carried out. In the coming months, 

I hope our military leaders and Congress can work together and 

work in an efficient, effective manner to figure out how we can better protect our men and women in uniform from these types of attacks in the future. 

One of the concerns that I have heard repeatedly from 

servicemembers in Utah and elsewhere is that they feel inadequately informed by military leadership about some of the persistent threats against themselves, their families, and the facilities 

where they happen to work. They see threats on the news or 

through social media, but they do not feel like they have been 

given enough information about what is being done to protect them 

or proper guidance on how to protect themselves at or away from 

their workplace. 

General, what is your assessment of how such information is 

being disseminated through the Army and, if confirmed, what you 

might do to improve the effectiveness of information and guidance 

that is coming from Army leadership on these threats to our Homeland and to our servicemembers in particular? 

General MILLEY. Senator, unfortunately, in today’s world, there 

is no rear area in this battle against the terrorists of ISIS or any 

other terrorist organization. The rear area of the United States is, 

in fact, vulnerable, and we have to do a better job at making sure 

that vulnerability assessments, information awareness is out there 

with our soldiers and their families. There is no doubt in my mind 

we have to increase that throughout the force, throughout the total 

Army, and indeed, throughout the entire military, those things like 

what to look for, signs, indicators of warnings, of reconnaissance 

and surveillance by the enemy, by the terrorists on a particular 

compound or against a particular person. 

Unfortunately, though, a lot of these type of attacks are very ambiguous. This one in Chattanooga may or may not have had recon 

ahead of time or any kind of indicators ahead of time, may or may 

not have been a lone wolf. We do not know yet. It is too early in 

the investigation. A lot of times, these things are very ambiguous. 

Both active and passive defensive measures at all of our installations, with all of our families, with all of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines is going to be a necessary requirement in the 

current environment. 

Senator LEE. Thank you. I appreciate your insight on that. 

I next wanted to follow up on some questions that Senator 

Wicker asked and some comments that he made. 

Among the most contentious issues in this committee over the 

past 2 years has involved the Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative. Now, I understand the Army has been put in a difficult position by budget reductions, and over the past several years has been 

exploring a number of options to maximize combat power while at 

the same time figuring out how to cut costs. 

508 

Congress has similarly been taking a hard look at this, which is 

why the Commission on the Structure of the Army was established 

in the NDAA. 

If confirmed, will you commit to thoroughly reviewing the Army’s 

Aviation Restructuring Initiative and working closely with Congress, once the Commission report is delivered next year, to help 

us figure out the best path forward on restructure issues? 

General MILLEY. I absolutely will, and I look forward to reviewing that Commission report. 

Senator LEE. What do you think are the biggest threats that, 

should you be confirmed, you will have to prepare the Army to address in the coming decade? 

General MILLEY. I think the Army’s fundamental mission of engaging in ground combat, winning in ground combat—I think that 

mission remains sound, and I anticipate that mission will remain 

so in the future. 

Senator LEE. The three key tasks in the national security documents that are out there is to assure our allies, deter opponents, 

and if necessary, fight and win on the ground. All of those are 

going to be challenges in the years ahead as we go forward. 

Thank you very much. I see my time has expired. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, you talked about budget constraints and looking at 

ways to reduce those. One that you did not mention is making sure 

there is no overlap in terms of core competencies and missions. I 

am assuming you think a core competency of the Army—I certainly 

do—is the airborne brigade task force, the ability to deploy anywhere on a moment’s notice, kick in the door. 

General MILLEY. Airborne operations are a core competency in 

the U.S. Army. That is correct. 

Senator SULLIVAN. One of the things that I have been somewhat 

concerned about is when you look at the Army’s Pacific Pathways 

mission—my office has been asking the Army for weeks now on 

what the costs of that are. We have not been able to get any answers on that. To me, do you see the value, in terms of our Nation’s 

defense, of BCT with regard to the Army or putting soldiers on 

naval shipping with helicopters and doing expeditionary maneuvers 

throughout the Pacific? What is a higher value for the Army? 

General MILLEY. I think they are both of value to the Army. I 

do think that Army forces on shipping and moving them around 

the Pacific has been done really for over a century. That is how the 

Army moves, by air and by ship. 

Senator SULLIVAN. You do not see that as redundant to the Marine Corps’ mission in the Asia-Pacific? 

General MILLEY. No, not at all. The reason I say that is because 

they complement each other, but the Marine Corps core competency is amphibious assault not just movement by sea. What we 

are really talking about for Pacific Pathways is the strategic movement of Army forces over the ocean. We are not using any gray 

hulls anyway to do that. We are using black and green hulls to do 

that. 

509 

Senator SULLIVAN. If you had to choose, though, in austere budget times, would the Army want to focus on airborne core competencies or a mission that in some people’s view looks somewhat 

redundant to another service’s? 

General MILLEY. Well, frankly, Senator, the Army has to do both. 

Senator SULLIVAN. No, but I am just asking if you had to choose. 

In this kind of austere budget, you have to choose. 

General MILLEY. We have to be able to do both. We have to. We 

do not have a choice. We have to maintain both capabilities, forced 

entry capability for vertical insertion airborne assault, and we have 

to be able to move forces, both air and sea, to reinforce in a variety 

of contingencies. 

Senator SULLIVAN. We would appreciate it—I would appreciate if 

we can get some numbers on the Pacific Pathways in terms of 

costs. 

General MILLEY. Sure, absolutely. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Army plans to conduct three Pathways per year, with a projected estimated total cost of $45 million per year or an estimated average cost of $15 million per 

Pathway. 

Senator SULLIVAN. I want to turn to another issue, kind of 

emerging threat issues. You and many others who have testified 

have talked about Russia as a principal threat, and certainly that 

is the case in the Ukraine. 

I want to emphasize and talk a little bit more about the Arctic. 

You have probably seen in the last just few weeks there have been 

articles. I just got this in the airport today. Russia has made military buildup in the Arctic a strategic priority. There is article after 

article about the Russians moving huge force posture, huge force 

structure, four new BCTs, big operations that nobody is even aware 

of that are taking us by surprise all through the Arctic. 

You have probably seen this map that has new airfields, 11 new 

airfields, 40 Arctic icebreakers, some nuclear-powered. The United 

States has these forces here. That is it. This recent decision we are 

going to remove a key capability of these and we have this as our 

strategy. This is the 2013 DOD Arctic Strategy. It mentions climate 

change five times and in a footnote mentions Russia. This is a joke 

of a strategy. 

I think during our deliberations for the NDAA, the Congress recognized that this is a serious issue, a serious new threat environment. We had an amendment that came through the NDAA that 

focused on our interest in the Arctic, the need for a much broader 

assessment, for a much more serious look in terms of OPLANS 

[Operation Plan in Complete Format], in terms of a military strategy. That passed unanimously. 

What I was wondering, when you look at—so the Secretary of 

Defense has to put forward this strategy within the next year. Our 

most capable Arctic forces, before we even do the analysis, before 

we do the planning, before we do the OPLAN, we are going to remove the most capable, indeed the most lethal Arctic warriors that 

we have. General, it takes a long time to become proficient in the 

Arctic. 

I am wondering what your thought on that is, and if confirmed, 

I think it make sense to do the analysis first, to do the OPLAN 

510 

first, to do the strategy first before we move any force structure. 

Would you commit to work with this committee to hold off on moving Arctic forces, particularly given the dramatic threat increase 

until after the Secretary of Defense and others have put together 

an Arctic Strategy, has defense guidance from this committee and 

this Congress? Do you think that that is the most logical way to 

do the planning? 

General MILLEY. I appreciate that, Senator. I agree with you. I 

think that having an OPLAN first and then figuring out your task 

organization second is the right sequence, and I think that is in 

fact what is about to happen. I think as you already mentioned, the 

Arctic OPLAN, the Arctic Strategy is going to get reviewed by OSD 

[Office of the Secretary of Defense], and General Dunford mentioned that the other day. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Well, there is no OPLAN [Operation Plan in 

Complete Format]. There is no strategy unless you want to call this 

a strategy. I mean, there is a lot of work that needs to be done. 

General MILLEY. There is a lot of work that needs to be done, 

and it is under review, as I understand it. I think you asked General Dunford to produce an OPLAN, and I think he committed to 

doing that and I look forward to participating in that and will work 

with that over the course of the next year. 

The forces in Alaska do not get reduced, according to the decision 

I think I heard, until end of 2016 and 2017. An OPLAN first, reduction of forces second if still required. I will work with you on 

that. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Good, because to me, again, I think it makes 

strategic sense to put together the plan, see what the combatant 

commanders need in terms of troops, see what the new threat level 

is, and then make the plan on troop levels once you are informed 

by a real strategy, not a 13-page document. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. General, I just would like to say that Senator 

Sullivan raises this whole issue of the Arctic and the recent Russian moves in that region. We need to pay a lot more attention to 

it. We see our friends in Norway, in particular, but also Sweden, 

Finland, those nations there that are experiencing things like Russian overflights and Russian submarine activities and other—I believe that the Russians have—what is it, Senator Sullivan, 50-some 

icebreakers? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Close to 40. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Close to 40 icebreakers. I think we have one. 

Is that correct? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. We have got a very full agenda, but the Arctic I think is another area that we have to be concerned, particularly given Russian behavior. Even Sweden, which is traditionally, 

as we know, a very neutral nation, has become extremely concerned about Russian activity in their territorial waters. As we see 

climate change—as we see areas of the Arctic opening up to being 

areas of navigation, this is an area that I hope we will spend some 

time on. I thank Senator Sullivan for his attention and involvement in what is, I view, a looming situation with Russia. 

I thank you, General. 

The committee is adjourned. 

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[Whereupon, at 11:21 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Mark A. Milley, USA by 

Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provisions? 

Answer. I do not currently anticipate the need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act of 1986. 

Question. If so, what modifications do you believe would be appropriate? 

Answer. I do not currently anticipate the need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act. 

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. Section 3033 of title 10, United States Code, establishes the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Army. 

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief of Staff of 

the Army? 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army is the senior military advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the senior military officer of the Army. In addition to his 

role as an advisor, the Chief of Staff is responsible for the effective and efficient 

functioning of Army organizations and commands in executing their statutory missions. The Chief of Staff also performs the duties prescribed for him as a member 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under section 151 of title 10. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect the Secretary 

of the Army to prescribe for you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the senior military advisor to the Secretary 

of the Army and the senior military officer of the Army and all its components. I 

would expect the Secretary of the Army to assign me the following duties: 

(a) Preside over the Army Staff; 

(b) Transmit the plans and recommendations of the Army Staff to the Secretary 

of the Army and advise the Secretary of the Army on those plans and recommendations; 

(c) Act as the agent of the Secretary of the Army in carrying into effect the plans 

and recommendations of the Army Staff that the Secretary of the Army has 

approved; 

(d) Perform other duties assigned by the President, Secretary of Defense or the 

Secretary of the Army; 

(e) Represent the Army in areas related to my functions and responsibilities, including to the public and the Department of Defense as the Army’s military 

representative to appropriate Department of Defense councils; 

(f) Communicate and advocate for Army policies, plans and programs to external 

audiences, including Congress, interagency partners, foreign governments, 

nongovernmental organizations and the public; 

(g) Assist the Secretary of the Army in fulfilling his compliance functions, including directing the Inspector General to perform inspections and investigations 

as required; and 

(h) Assist the Secretary of the Army in the performance of the following acquisition related functions: 

a. The development of requirements relating to the defense acquisition system; 

b. The coordination of measures to control requirements creep in the defense 

acquisition system; 

c. The development of career paths in acquisition for military personnel; and 

d. The assignment and training of contracting officer representatives when 

such representatives are required to be members of the armed forces because of the nature of the contract concerned. 

(i) Serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provide independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense, Congress, National Security Council 

and the President. To the extent such action does not impair my independence 

in my performance as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would keep the 

Secretary of the Army informed of military advice that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

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render on matters affecting the Army. I would inform the Secretary of the 

Army of significant military operations affecting his duties and responsibilities, 

subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense; 

(j) Represent Army capabilities, programs, policy, and requirements in Joint 

forces; 

(k) Supervise the execution of Army policies, plans, programs, and activities and 

assess the performance of Army commands in the execution of their assigned 

statutory missions and functions; and 

(l) Task and supervise the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, the Army Staff and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Army, elements of the Army Secretariat to 

perform assigned duties and responsibilities. 

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. I am privileged to have over 35 years of service in our Army, during 

which I have commanded at every level from Platoon to U.S. Army Forces Command including command of the 10th Mountain Division and the III Armored Corps. 

Of note, I had the honor to lead soldiers in combat as a Captain and Major along 

with combat leadership as a Brigade Commander, Division Deputy Commander, and 

Corps Commander. With service in Special Forces and conventional units, as well 

as operational experience in a variety of contingencies around the globe, I have a 

comprehensive perspective of the Army, its processes and capabilities. My experience includes operations in the Sinai, Somalia, Panama, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, along with tours in Korea and Columbia. I have participated in Humanitarian Service, Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement and multiple combat operations. During my most recent deployment, as the Commanding General of III 

Corps and ISAF Joint Command, I had the opportunity to apply the full range of 

Army, joint, combined and coalition capabilities in complex environments on my 

third tour in Afghanistan while commanding all the ground forces in combat and 

security force assistance operations. Additionally, I have considerable experience on 

the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff where I saw firsthand 

the importance of teamwork across the Department of Defense and working with 

Congress. Finally, as the Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces Command, I 

am responsible for the training and readiness of the entire U.S. Army’s Operational 

Force based in the Continental United States, which includes most of the Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve and Active component Regular Army—roughly 

about 70–80 percent of the Total Army. If confirmed, the combination of all of these 

assignments as well as the honor of serving closely with our dedicated soldiers, will 

enable me to lead our Army as it meets our Nation’s requirements in a complex 

world. 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, my tenure as Chief of Staff will be marked by continuous 

self-assessment of my ability to perform my duties. As I believe necessary, I will 

employ measures that will improve my ability to lead the Army. It is essential in 

this complex environment that we continue to learn and adapt to ensure that our 

skills remain current and able to meet our future challenges. 

Question. What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign to the Vice 

Chief of Staff of the Army? 

Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff of the Army, I would ensure the Vice Chief 

of Staff is responsible for providing me advice and assistance in the execution of my 

duties, specifically with regard to manpower and personnel; logistics; operations and 

plans; requirements and programs; intelligence; command, control and communications; and readiness. I will review other duties and responsibilities for the Vice 

Chief of Staff of the Army as appropriate after discussions with him and the Secretary of the Army. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship with: 

a. The Secretary of Defense. 

The Chief of Staff of the Army must have a close working relationship with the 

Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense 

and his Deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army 

in accordance with the Secretary of Defense’s guidance and direction. If confirmed, 

as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will serve as a military adviser to the 

President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as appropriate. I will cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Army 

properly implements the policies established by his office. In coordination with the 

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Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Secretary of Defense in articulating the views of the Army. 

b. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and exercises such power 

as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the 

Secretary of Defense, and his deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, for the 

operation of the Army in accordance with the Secretary’s guidance and direction. 

Also, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the 

Deputy Secretary in articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with all 

to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance and direction issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

c. The Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries perform responsibilities that require them, from time to time, to issue guidance and instruction as approved by the Secretary of Defense—and in the case of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direction—to the Military Departments. If confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I 

will communicate with the Under Secretaries in articulating the views of the Army. 

I will work closely with the Under Secretaries to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s guidance and direction. 

d. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the 

President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to 

the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, 

the Chairman plans the strategic direction and contingency operations of the armed 

forces; advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets 

that the combatant command commanders identify; develops doctrine for the joint 

employment of the Armed Forces; reports on assignment of functions (or roles and 

missions) to the Armed Forces; provides for representation of the United States on 

the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations; and performs such other duties 

as the law or the President or Secretary of Defense may prescribe. 

In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the Chief of Staff of 

the Army assists the Chairman in providing military advice to the President, the 

National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed as a member 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will provide my individual military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, it 

would be my duty as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide frank and 

timely advice and opinions to the Chairman to assist him in his performance of 

these responsibilities. If confirmed, and as appropriate, I will also provide advice in 

addition to or in disagreement with that of the Chairman. I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the Chairman, and I will communicate directly and openly with him on any policy matters impacting the Army and 

the Armed Forces as a whole. 

e. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the Chairman in providing 

military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. If confirmed, it would 

be my duty as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that the Vice Chairman receives my frank views and opinions to assist him in performing his responsibilities. 

f. The Chiefs of the Other Services. 

If confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be my duty to 

engage in frank and timely exchanges of advice and opinions with my fellow Service 

Chiefs. I look forward to developing strong working relationships with these colleagues, if I am confirmed. 

g. The Combatant Commanders. 

The combatant commanders are responsible to fight our wars and conduct joint 

military operations around the world. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 165 provides that, 

subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Service Secretaries are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and 

specified commands. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the combatant commanders in performing these administrative and support responsibilities. I will establish close, professional relationships with the combatant commanders and I will 

communicate directly and openly with them on matters involving the Department 

of the Army and Army forces and personnel assigned to or supporting the combatant 

commands. 

h. The Army Component Commanders of the Combatant Commands 

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The Army component commanders of the combatant commands exercise command 

and control under the authority and direction of the combatant commanders to 

whom they are assigned and in accordance with the policies and procedures established by the Secretary of Defense. The combatant commanders normally delegate 

operational control of Army forces to the Army Component Commander. The Secretary of the Army generally delegates administrative control of Army forces assigned to the combatant commander to the Army component commander of that 

combatant command. The Army Component Commander is responsible for recommendations to the Joint Force Commander on the allocation and employment of 

Army forces within the combatant command. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with 

the combatant commanders and Army Component Commanders in performing these 

responsibilities. 

i. The Secretary of the Army. 

If confirmed, I will establish a close, direct, and supportive relationship with the 

Secretary of the Army. Within the Department of the Army, my primary responsibilities as Chief of Staff are to perform all duties assigned to me by the Secretary and 

to serve as the Secretary’s principal military adviser. My responsibilities would also 

involve communicating the Army Staff’s plans to the Secretary and supervising the 

implementation of the Secretary’s decisions through the Army Staff, commands, and 

agencies. My actions would be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the 

Secretary. In my capacity as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would also 

be responsible for appropriately informing the Secretary about conclusions reached 

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and about significant military operations, to the extent 

this would not impair my independence in performing my duties as a member of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely and in concert with the Secretary of the Army to establish the best policies for the Army, taking into account national interests. 

j. The Under Secretary of the Army. 

The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary’s senior civilian assistant and 

principal adviser on matters related to the management and operation of the Army. 

The Under Secretary of the Army performs such duties and exercises such powers 

as prescribed by the Secretary of the Army. The Under Secretary’s responsibilities 

require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army Staff. 

If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary and to the Under Secretary for 

the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. I will cooperate fully 

with the Under Secretary to ensure that the policies that the Office of the Secretary 

of the Army establishes are implemented properly. I will communicate openly and 

directly with the Under Secretary in articulating the views of the Army Staff, commands, and agencies. 

k. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. 

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army serves as the principal advisor and assistant 

to the Chief of Staff. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional 

relationship with Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. 

l. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army. 

The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional responsibilities that, from 

time to time, require them to issue guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army 

as a whole. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with the Assistant Secretaries in order to foster an environment of cooperative 

teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we address the 

Army’s day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements. 

m. The General Counsel of the Army. 

The General Counsel is the legal counsel to the Secretary of the Army and the 

chief legal officer of the Department of the Army. The duties of the General Counsel 

include coordinating legal and policy advice to all members of the Department regarding matters of interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position 

of the Army on any legal question or procedure, other than military justice matters, 

which are assigned to The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I will establish 

and maintain a close, professional relationship with the General Counsel to assist 

in the performance of these important duties. 

n. The Inspector General of the Army. 

The Inspector General reports to the Secretary of the Army and is responsible for 

inspections and certain investigations within the Department of the Army, such as 

inquiring into and reporting to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff regarding discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army with continuing assessment 

of command, operational, logistical, and administrative effectiveness; and serving as 

the focal point for the Department of the Army regarding Department of Defense 

Inspector General inspections and noncriminal investigations, as well as the Department of Defense inspection policy. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a 

515 

close, professional relationship with the Inspector General of the Army to ensure effective accomplishment of these important duties. 

o. The Judge Advocate General of the Army. 

The Judge Advocate General is the military legal advisor to the Secretary of the 

Army and all officers and agencies of the Department of the Army. The Judge Advocate General provides legal advice directly to the Chief of Staff and to the Army 

Staff in matters concerning military justice; environmental law; labor and civilian 

personnel law; contract, fiscal, and tax law; international law; and the worldwide 

operational deployment of Army forces. The Chief of Staff does not appoint The 

Judge Advocate General, and does not have the personal authority to remove her. 

This enables The Judge Advocate General to provide independent legal advice. If 

confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with The 

Judge Advocate General as my legal advisor and I will assist her in the performance 

of her important duties as the legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army. 

p. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau heads a joint activity of the Department 

of Defense and is the senior uniformed National Guard officer responsible for formulating, developing, and coordinating all policies, programs, and plans affecting more 

than half a million Army and Air National Guard personnel. Appointed by the 

President, he serves as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense through the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. He is also the 

principal advisor to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary 

and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard issues. As National Guard 

Bureau Chief, he serves as the department’s official channel of communication with 

the Governors and Adjutants General. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau has the specific responsibility of addressing 

matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, 

professional relationship with the Chief, National Guard Bureau to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard 

Bureau, as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army. 

q. The Director of the Army National Guard. 

The Director, Army National Guard is responsible for assisting the Chief, National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the National Guard Bureau, 

as they relate to the Army National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Director, Army National Guard to 

foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau. This will be essential as we deal together with the day-to-day 

management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army to sustain and 

improve the Army National Guard’s operational capabilities. 

r. The Chief of the Army Reserve. 

Appointed by the President, the Chief, Army Reserve is the advisor to the Chief 

of Staff of the Army on Army Reserve matters, and is responsible for justifying and 

executing the Army Reserve’s personnel, operation and maintenance, and construction budgets. As such, the Chief, Army Reserve is the director and functional manager of appropriations made for the Army Reserve in those areas. In addition, the 

Chief, Army Reserve is responsible for managing the Army Reserve’s Full Time Support Program and submitting an annual report on the state of the Army Reserve 

through the Secretary of the Army to the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will 

establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, Army Reserve as we deal together with the Army’s day-to-day management and long-range 

planning requirements in order to sustain and improve the Army Reserve’s operational capabilities. 

VISION FOR THE FUTURE

Question. What is your vision for the Army of today and the future? 

The U.S. Army is and must remain the world’s premier ground combat force capable of conducting sustained campaigns on land to achieve U.S. National Security objectives and remain true to our national values. The Army is the force, an all volunteer force, uniquely capable of winning a decision favorable to the U.S. In order to 

sustain our edge over any adversary, the U.S. Army must be lethal, agile, adaptive, 

innovative, and expeditionary; armed with leader, technological and training overmatch. Additionally, the Army, combined with the effects of the Navy, Air Force, 

Marines, Cyber, Space, and Special Operations Forces, must present our opponent 

with overwhelming simultaneous multiple dimension problems that paralyze and 

cause his defeat. 

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Question. Given your vision, is the Army ready to meet current demands from 

combatant commanders, downsize the force, modernize and improve readiness while 

transforming? How will you balance these competing demands? 

Answer. I recognize, in the face of increasing demands and declining resources, 

we will be forced to assume risk in some areas. If confirmed, I will ensure we make 

those hard decisions through a rigorous and deliberate process with the assistance 

and input of Congress. I am concerned that the Army has been required to assume 

future risk by underfunding modernization, and if confirmed, I will work to ensure 

that the Army has the resources to meet the current demands of the combatant 

commanders while transforming and modernizing to be successful in the future. 

I have no illusion that balancing competing demands to fulfill the National Security Strategy and the combatant commander’s requirements while significantly 

downsizing the force in a fiscally constrained and uncertain environment will be exceptionally difficult. However the Army, as we have for 240 years, will meet the 

challenge with innovative and adaptive leadership and with disciplined and committed soldiers. If confirmed, readiness will remain an inviolate benchmark and #1 

priority—no American soldier must ever deploy to combat unready. It is my solemn 

commitment that our troops will be rigorously trained, possess the best equipment 

and be led by leaders of character, competence and courage. 

Question. Across the continuum of conflict, as described in the National Military 

Strategy in what areas is the Army currently best prepared for? Is this where the 

Army needs to be given emerging and future threats? 

As the Nation’s principal ground military force, the Army has the obligation to 

be ready to conduct sustained land operations across the spectrum of conflict and 

win in ground combat. We cannot allow ourselves to focus too narrowly on any one 

scenario. Right now, the U.S. Army is highly skilled in counterterrorist and contingency operations along with advisory skills and building partner capacity. Given 

emerging and future threats, we will need to sustain our counterterrorist, counterinsurgency, advisory, and build partner capacity skills while rebuilding our combined arms conventional warfighter skills for offense, defense, and stability. Further, we must improve our mission command, aviation, fire support, engineer, and 

sustainment skills. Lastly, we must develop our cyber force to a much higher level 

of capability. If confirmed, I will continually assess and collaborate with the other 

Service Chiefs and adapt the Army to first meet current needs and position itself 

for the future. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next 

Chief of Staff of the Army? 

Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, ISIS and radical violent extremist organizations currently challenge the United States each in their own way and will likely 

continue for some time into the future. These security challenges exist within a 

wider context of rapid technological change, significant demographic change, global 

economic uncertainty, and geostrategic power shifts of historic proportions. Right 

now the level of uncertainty, the velocity of instability, and potential for significant 

inter-state conflict is higher than it is has been since the end of the Cold War in 

1989–91. These challenges and global context unfold while the U.S. is likely to continue fiscal uncertainty and the U.S. Army will continue to shrink. However, as a 

result of the global situation, the demand for ground forces will continue to increase 

even more so since many of our longstanding allies have significantly reduced their 

military forces over the last 25 years. Maintaining both capacity and capability in 

all three components of the U.S. Army in a rapidly changing and volatile security 

and fiscal environment will be our greatest challenge while simultaneously posturing the Army for the future beyond 2020. The next four years will bring to the 

forefront the challenge of maintaining tactical and operational advantage over our 

adversaries. The Army currently benefits from an overmatch that enables a historically small number of soldiers to accomplish significant operations while minimizing 

casualties. This advantage has a shelf life; the technologies that gave us the advantage today are increasingly available to state and non-state adversaries at dramatically lower cost than even a decade ago. As that overmatch degrades, the risk to 

soldiers increases. Maintaining readiness in the near term and retaining capacity 

while creating capability for the mid and long term will be the Army’s greatest challenge given the threat, global context, and domestic fiscal environment. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Recognizing the environment we are in, I see two near term imperatives for the 

Army. First, we must build and maintain readiness across the Total Force. This 

517 

readiness must reflect both sufficient capacity to meet the demand for Army forces 

and proficiency in the multitude of capabilities that enable the Army to accomplish 

its diverse missions. Second, we must plan and invest for the future. I see this done 

through a deliberate science and technology strategy that seeks to exploit research 

that has the potential for leap ahead capabilities in the areas of ‘‘shoot, move, communicate, and mission command.’’ 

If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Congress and address these challenges. We will continue to refine and update our training programs to ensure all 

our soldiers are fully prepared to deploy to combat. We will continue to review our 

reset, force modernization and acquisition programs in order to more efficiently 

meet the needs and requirements of today and the future threat. I will work closely 

with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army and the combatant commanders to identify those capabilities needed to provide depth and versatility to the 

joint force in order to provide more effective and flexible forces for employment. I 

will continue to review and adjust leader development programs in order to develop 

thinking, adaptable, agile decision makers necessary to operate in an increasingly 

complex and unpredictable environment. I will review our soldier and Family Programs to ensure we are meeting their needs. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army? 

At this point, I am not aware of any problems that would impede the performance 

of the Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time-lines would you establish to address these problems? 

If confirmed, I will vigorously uphold the standards expected by the American 

people and undertake a deliberate review of key policies to ensure that the Army 

is meeting its current responsibilities and is postured to meet the challenges of the 

future. I will work to maintain open lines of communication with this committee, 

and Congress writ large, so that I might benefit from the collective wisdom and experience. 

I will also remain committed to improve, and if necessary, establish management 

systems that provide good stewardship of the precious, limited and valuable resources that the American people have given us to accomplish our mission. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish? 

I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army to establish Army priorities 

within the guidelines of the President and Secretary of Defense. Within that framework, my #1 priority, if confirmed, will be readiness across the Total Force. When 

the Nation calls, the Army must be ready with soldiers that are confident they are 

well trained, well armed, and well led. At the same time, our #2 priority is to invest 

in the technologies, organization, and doctrine that will allow us to maintain overmatch against future adversaries while retaining the ability to adapt to unforeseen 

challenges. Additional priorities will include: 

• Keep faith with the All Volunteer Force. 

• Maintain our values and close relationship with the American People. 

• Protect the Force—Our most valuable asset is our people—soldiers, families, civilians—and each deserve to be treated with dignity and respect and be afforded the best quality of life and an equal opportunity to excel based on their 

merit. 

• Develop leaders of character, competence and resilience that are fit, agile, 

adaptive, and innovative. 

ORGANIZE, TRAIN, AND EQUIP RESPONSIBILITY

Question. The Chief of Staff is responsible for organizing, training and equipping 

forces provided to fleet and component commanders, including the prioritization of 

funding and effort to meet these needs in the near term, while developing capabilities for the far term. 

How would you characterize your experience in force management and capability 

requirement decisions? 

Answer. While leading Forces Command it is my job to ensure that the Army is 

able to provide a sustained supply of highly capable land forces to combatant commanders. In that role, I became intimately familiar with both the combatant commanders’ requirements and the Army forces ready to meet them. Additionally, my 

time serving on the Joint Staff and as the Military Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense provided me significant experiences with the longer term challenges facing 

our military and the critical investment decisions that must be made now to ensure 

we have the capabilities we will need in the future. 

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Question. What innovative ideas are you considering for organizing, training and 

equipping the Army? 

Answer. A decade and a half of war has taught us that the Army must continually 

adapt to the missions assigned and the operating environment. The Army will continue to innovate as we did in Iraq and Afghanistan, focusing our efforts on what 

soldiers and commanders need to accomplish their missions. Our organizational 

structures need agility in order to meet the combatant commanders’ request for 

forces; our training must be realistic so that it meets the unique needs of the units’ 

assigned mission, while developing the skills to fight and win future wars as part 

of the Joint Force. We need to procure equipment that is technologically feasible so 

that we can quickly and cost effectively provide incremental improvements to the 

field. 

There are a wide variety of emerging technologies that may have significant impact on ground warfare including technologies in communications for mission command, robotics, nano-technologies, human performance, explosives and propellants, 

hypersonics, directed energy, cyber, protective materials for personnel and equipment, and a variety of developments in weapons technologies. All of these and more 

are areas of innovation the Army will explore in depth to assess applicability at affordable cost. 

SECURITY STRATEGIES AND GUIDANCE

Question. How would you characterize current trends in the range and diversity 

of threats to national security we face today? 

Answer. The range and diversity of potential threats is increasing concurrent with 

increasing instability in many parts of the world. Our adversaries—both state and 

non-state—recognize the limits of our capabilities and capacity. Both state and nonstate adversaries have employed novel capabilities, created by combining increasingly available military and commercial technologies. Accordingly, our enemies are 

increasingly using ‘‘hybrid’’ warfare methods that blend aspects of conventional and 

irregular warfare. This creates ambiguity and achieves adversary gains below the 

threshold that has historically triggered a U.S. or Allied military response. However, given the increased uncertainty, and velocity of global instability converging 

with rapid technological, demographic, economic, and geo-strategic power shifts, it 

is my view that significant conflict with adversary-state or non-state actors threatening vital U.S. interests is increasing in all likelihood. 

Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance issued January 2012 took into account 

a $487 billion dollar reduction in defense resources. 

With the additional $500 billion in cuts to the Department of Defense as a result 

of sequestration, is the Defense Strategic Guidance still valid? 

Answer. No. The additional cuts imposed by sequestration would impose a significant departure from the level of resources that the Defense Strategic Guidance 

(DSG) assumed. Sequestration will force the Army to reduce end strength, readiness, and nearly halt modernization. The consequences of these forced actions would 

degrade our ability to provide the trained and ready forces that the DSG requires 

and increase risk to the point where the U.S. Army could not fulfill the missions 

assigned to us in our National Security strategic guidance documents. In short, our 

ways and means will be significantly out of balance with our stated ends, which will 

increase risk to an unacceptable level for the Nation. If confirmed, I will provide 

my best military advice to properly balance the national strategic ends-ways-means 

in order to maintain National Security risk at acceptable levels. 

Question. In your view, as the Defense Strategic Guidance was issued in January 

2012, is that strategic guidance still appropriate for the threats we face today or 

do you think an update is warranted? 

Answer. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance was based upon a number of assumptions, such as the duration of conflicts, the contributions of our allies, and the 

nature and location of future threats. Some of these assumptions now appear optimistic, particularly in light of the rise of ISIL, a resurgent Russia, Iran’s actions 

in the Middle East, and challenges in the Pacific region. If confirmed, I will provide 

my best military advice to inform policy and guidance as we move forward to confront current and future threats. 

Question. In your view, is our defense strategy and current establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the Military Departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. forces properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet 

security challenges the Nation faces today and into the next decade? 

Answer. I believe the structure of the defense establishment and the roles and 

missions of the services are sound. In my view, we need to continually reassess our 

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ment. Resourcing levels must also remain predictable and aligned with our national 

objectives. I am concerned that we may underestimate the degree of readiness, end 

strength, and modernization required to confront current and future security challenges. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the capabilities, structure, roles, and missions of the Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a deliberate strategic assessment to identify 

any needed changes to the Total Army’s capabilities, structure, roles, and missions. 

Such assessments will also evaluate capacity. In doing so, I will work with the 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services Chiefs, and combatant commanders along 

with both the Secretary of the Army and Defense to ensure the Army is the right 

size, with the right structure, and doing the right mission to protect the Nation. 

MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY

Question. In your opinion, do current military plans include the necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR) and the 2015 National Military Strategy? Please identify areas of higher risk. 

Answer. The defense strategy provides that the Army, as part of the Joint Force, 

has to accomplish three tasks. The first priority is to defend the homeland; the 

Army can meet our responsibilities in this mission set. The second task is build security globally. While we have the capability required, increasing demand for Army 

forces, while our force is getting smaller, strains capacity. We remain engaged in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea, Europe, the greater Middle East, Africa, South America, 

and the Pacific region. The stress of increased missions on a smaller force is something I am especially concerned about. Tempo will likely increase given the instability around the world and the reduction of defense spending by our allies and partners. Lastly, the defense strategy tasks the Army to project power and win decisively. Here, the risk is significant and trending higher as we train our decisive action capability and meet warplan requirements with a smaller, less resourced force. 

Question. Does the 2014 QDR specify the correct set of capabilities to decisively 

win in future state to state conflict? 

Answer. The 2014 QDR was based on a set of facts and assumptions that did not 

include the current situation in Eastern Europe and Russia, the rise and spread of 

ISIS along with the disintegration of the nation-state in the Middle East, and the 

increasing military capability and foreign policy assertiveness of China. In short, the 

world has become more uncertain and unstable since the 2014 QDR was written 

and consequently we need to review the global assumptions and calculations embedded in the 2014 QDR in order to ensure the capabilities and priorities align to the 

realities of the emerging situation. 

Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR, American 

forces should be able to ‘‘defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased 

campaign, and deny the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.’’ 

In your opinion, is the Army adequately sized to meet the Department’s force 

sizing construct in order to address the country’s current threat environment? 

Answer. The current Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ray Odierno, has testified that the Army size in PB16 of 450,000 Regular Army, 335,000 Army National 

Guard, and 195,000 U.S. Army Reserve is adequate to meet the demands of the current and future threats but at ‘‘significant risk.’’ 

If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 

of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and our combatant commanders to 

match end strength, structure, and tempo in our Army Force Generation rotational 

model to meet global demands as they change. I will continually evaluate the size 

and capability of the Total Army against emerging threats and provide candid assessments on our risk to our senior civilian leadership including the President, The 

Secretary of Defense, The Secretary of the Army, the National Security Council, and 

Members of the U.S. Congress. 

Question. If the Army cannot meet the demands placed on it, how will you address 

this issue? 

Answer. If confirmed, if I ever believe that in my professional military judgment 

that the Army cannot meet the demands in place, I will inform the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of Defense and, if necessary, in my role as a member of the Joint Chiefs, the President. As a Nation, we 

must build our strategy based on the threat, resources available, and tolerance for 

risk. I will always provide my candid best military advice to protect our Nation. 

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SEQUESTERED BUDGET CONTROL ACT DISCRETIONARY CAPS STARTING IN FISCAL YEAR

2016 ONWARD?

Question. The fiscal year 2016 budget request assumes that the Budget Control 

Act will be amended in fiscal year 2016. The fiscal year 2016 Budget Resolution 

passed by the Senate and House of Representatives do not assume this, but instead 

provides $38 billion of the requested spending through the Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) budget. 

Should this OCO funding not be available, what recommendations would you 

have, if confirmed, for how the Army should manage additional cuts for fiscal year 

2016? 

Answer. This $38 billion constitutes the difference between the Fiscal Year 2016 

President Budget request for Base requirements and the BCA funding level for DOD 

($538 billion–$500 billion). The Army’s portion of this $38 billion is $6 billion ($126 

billion–$120 billion). For comparison, the fiscal year 2015 Base funding level is 

$120.6 billion, an amount that has created resourcing and readiness challenges this 

year. 

The President’s Budget request represents the minium resources necessary for the 

Army to support the National Security Strategy. A sequestered level budget will further reduce readiness and disrupt modernization efforts. Should the government not 

provide the $38 billion through additive OCO funding or another source, the Army 

would have no alternative than to further reduce structure, unit readiness and will 

all but stop investment in its Research, Development and Acquisition programs. The 

Army already reduced its force structure and military endstrength to the extent possible in fiscal year 2016. Impacts to readiness will include cancellation of home-station training, reduced maintenance and upkeep of facilities infrastructure; reduced 

logistics and maintenance readiness and IT & Cyber security would be further 

marginalized. The Army would reduce its investment account funding by approximately 12 percent of its requested amount, spread across its RDTE and procurement accounts. 

Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could have on readiness for the Army? 

Answer. The Budget Control Act degrades Army readiness. In the context of increased, unforecasted global demand, it creates the single greatest risk by undermining the Army’s ability to provide the necessary capacity and capabilities for contingency operations, forcing the Army to ration readiness. Regardless of funding levels, if confirmed, I will keep training opportunities at our Combat Training Centers 

(CTCs) a priority. The trade off will mean significant reductions to home-station 

training, except for brigades going to CTCs, which will compound the readiness reductions. Subsequent decisions to commit Army forces will come with high risk and 

force senior leaders to choose between: committing Army units at lower readiness 

levels or delaying military operations. Long term consequences of underfunding are 

significant as operational readiness requires a cumulative investment and consistent 

funding. The Army needs consistent and predictable funding year after year to ensure it maintains a level of readiness commensurate with the current operational 

demands; we don’t have the luxury of long train-up times to react to the emerging 

and immediate contingencies in the current security environment. 

Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could have on Army 

capabilities? 

Answer. Sequestration-level cuts leave the Army unable to meet Defense Strategic 

Guidance, including our ability to shape and prevent conflict in Europe and the Pacific and to deter adversaries across the globe. 

Budget Control Act funding reductions will require the Army to further reduce 

force structure and end strength, and readiness levels and further delay modernization. My concern is the smaller force will lack the capacity to meet the Nation’s security needs as currently outlined in the National Defense Strategy. Furthermore, 

modernization reductions will diminish equipping capacity and capability well into 

the future. 

HEADQUARTERS STREAMLINING

Question. The Senate-passed Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act 

directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters functions of the Department of Defense and the Military Departments. 

If confirmed, and if the provisions in the bill become law, what would be your role 

in streamlining functions, as well as identifying and implementing reductions in the 

Army headquarters? 

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ning and implementation for reductions is already well underway. Associated with 

these reductions, each element of the Headquarters has closely examined the functions they perform with an eye towards streamlining, modernizing or eliminating 

the function. Should legislation impose further reductions, I would expect, if confirmed as Chief of Staff, that I would play a key role in advising the Secretary of 

the Army where I believe we can and cannot accept additional risk in our key Headquarters missions. 

Question. What areas and functions, if any, do you consider to be priorities for 

possible consolidation or reductions within the Army? 

Answer. As a result of continued downward trends in our funding, the Army has, 

over the last four years, made great strides in eliminating unnecessary functions 

and organizations. I am proud of what the Army has been able to accomplish despite losing billions of dollars of base budget funding. Having said that, there are 

always ways to streamline processes and functions. If confirmed, I will continue to 

push for smarter ways of doing business in order to apply maximum resources toward increased readiness. In pursuing these opportunities, the Army needs to go 

where the best value lies, examining each situation with a clear-eyed cost/benefit 

perspective. If confirmed, I intend to continue reducing Headquarters size and functions in order to optimize the tooth-to-tail ratio in favor of combat power in the Operating Force. 

Question. To the extent that the Army has functions that overlap with the Department of Defense, Joint Staff, or other Military Departments, what would be your 

approach to consolidating and reducing redundancy? 

Answer. The Army cannot avoid making tough choices in this budget environment. If confirmed, my priorities will be the readiness of our forces and the care 

and support of our soldiers, their families and our great civilian workforce. If another element of DOD can better accomplish a function currently performed by the 

Army, then I will so advise the Secretary of the Army. Similarly, if a function currently performed by another element of DOD can be better performed by the Army, 

it should be looked at as well. The Army cannot afford to be bound by the way functions and processes have been performed in the past and must make the best decisions for our Nation and our Armed Forces. 

Question. Given the plan the Army announced on July 9, 2015, to downsize the 

regular Army by 40,000 soldiers, is headquarters downsizing a component of this 

plan? If so, what are the goals? 

Answer. The reduction of headquarters is part of the Army downsizing; the planning and implementation of this is well underway. The goal is to reduce all 2-star 

and above headquarters, both military and civilian, as directed by the Secretary of 

the Army. If confirmed, I plan to further review this plan and continue to streamline headquarters strengths in order to retain as much combat power as possible 

and further reduce the Army’s tooth-to-tail ratio. 

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

Question. Interactions between the land forces of different countries are often negotiated at the Chief of Staff level, including international exercises, Foreign Military Sales, educational exchanges, and protocols for operations. 

If confirmed, how do plan to ensure the U.S. Army continues to build strong partnerships, overcome challenges, and exploit opportunities in international cooperation? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize our support to the combatant commanders 

as well as other international engagement programs. These include bilateral staff 

talks with more than two dozen allies and partners; adequate resourcing for our regionally aligned forces to participate in international exercises; sustaining foreign 

student attendance at the War College and Command and Staff College and other 

professional military education; maximizing U.S. participation at their schools 

through the Schools of Other Nations Program; continuing to expand the Military 

Personnel Exchange Program; and continuing to invest in the Army’s Foreign Area 

Officer program. Maintaining strong allied partnerships will be one of my goals as 

Chief of Staff and I recognize that Allies are key to the long-term national security 

of the United States. 

Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with international military 

leaders, forums, and processes? 

Answer. At almost every rank over the course of my 35 year career, I have had 

the opportunity to work closely with our international partners during exercises and 

contingency operations and developed insights into foreign militaries and processes. 

As a Captain, I worked closely with the Columbian Army for nearly eight months. 

As a Special Forces Captain I worked closely with indigenous forces in Somalia. As 

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a Major, I was the S–3 Operations Officer for 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division, 

during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti and worked with multiple allied partners to include Argentinean leaders and those from six Caribbean nations. As a 

Lieutenant Colonel Battalion Commander in Korea, I worked closely with the 1st 

ROK Division along the DMZ. As a Colonel in command of the 2nd BCT, 10th 

Mountain Division, I worked closely with multiple armies in Afghanistan, to include 

international NATO Partners and the Afghan National Security Forces. In Iraq, in 

command of the same brigade, I worked closely with United Kingdom and Polish 

Forces, along with Iraqi Security Forces. As Deputy Commanding General for Regional Command-East in Afghanistan, I worked closely with multiple NATO allies, 

our Afghan Partners, and Pakistani military. As the Commanding General of ISAF 

Joint Command in Afghanistan, I was responsible for the planning and operations 

of coalition partners across the country. The coalition included over approximately 

50 nations and my staff included senior leaders from many of these countries allowing me to incorporate several staff systems from partner nations. Most recently, as 

the Commanding General of United States Army Forces Command, I visited the 

United Kingdom and observed their force generation processes and operational systems and have had visits from several other key allies including Japan. If confirmed, I plan to continue to work closely with our international partners and allies 

throughout the world. 

JOINT OPERATIONS

Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with other Services’ capabilities including how they organize, train and equip their forces? 

Answer. During my 35 years in uniform and through multiple joint assignments 

in addition to seven contingency deployments, I have had the opportunity to serve 

with and develop deep appreciation for the other Services’ unique capabilities. I 

have worked very closely with the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard 

over many years in multiple capacities. If confirmed, I look forward to deepening 

my understanding by working closely with the fellow Service Chiefs as part of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Question. Are there other innovative ideas you are considering to increase Joint 

interoperability and ensure opportunities to improve cross-domain capability and capacity are not missed? 

Answer. The Army is actively involved in joint concept development, war-gaming, 

and experimentation, all designed to improve cross-domain capability and capacity. 

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that sufficient resources are applied to implement change and enhance joint interoperability. This is a key task—the Army will 

always operate as part of the U.S. Joint Force. 

UNITED STATES FORCE POSTURE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Question. The Department continues the effort to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific as announced in the January 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance. 

Are you satisfied with the rebalance efforts to date? 

Answer. Yes, I am satisfied with the Army’s rebalance efforts to the Asia-Pacific 

region to date and I will continue to emphasize the importance of the Asia-Pacific 

region if confirmed. Approximately 20 percent of the Active Army is assigned to U.S. 

Pacific Command. This includes one Corps Headquarters, two Division Headquarters, five Brigade Combat Teams and one Armored Brigade Combat Team’s 

worth of equipment prepositioned on the Korean Peninsula. We are replacing forward stationed units with ready rotational units. For example, the Army is providing USPACOM with rotational forces, such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile batteries and an Armored Brigade Combat Team. Shaping activities 

such as Pacific Pathways builds partner-nation capacity and multinational interoperability while also enhancing U.S. Army unit readiness and fostering an expeditionary mindset across the force. Both the size and importance of the Asia-Pacific 

region defines an integrated multi-service approach as a near imperative. Consistent 

with the Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces policy, the Army’s current force posture 

in the Asia-Pacific ensures that it is prepared to set the theater, shape the security 

environment and respond to contingencies across the full range of military operations in support of the combatant commander and National Strategic objectives. 

Question. What do you see as the United States security priorities in the AsiaPacific region over the next couple of years and what specific Army capabilities or 

enhancements are needed in to meet those priorities? 

United States security priorities in the Asia-Pacific over the next several years 

are to maintain a credible deterrent posture and provide reassuring military presence in the region in order to maintain regional stability. The United States should 

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also work to strengthen and advance alliances and partnerships, continue to mature 

our military relationships, and maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula. We must 

work with our interagency and multinational partners to bring about the verifiable 

elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. I also believe that the 

United States should continue to mature its strategic relationship with India, and 

work with our interagency and multinational partners in the region to counter 

transnational threats. 

The Army contributes to rebalancing these priorities with a variety of Army 

Forces committed to the region in Korea, Japan, Hawaii, Alaska, and at Joint Base 

Lewis-McChord, along with rapid deployment capabilities in the Global Response 

Force. Through routine exercises and engagements such as Pacific Pathways and 

forward deployed forces in the Republic of Korea and Japan, the Army assures allies, deters adversaries and remains capable of responding to contingencies if required. 

Question. Do the budget cuts and resource constraints associated with sequestration threaten the Army’s ability to execute the rebalance to the Pacific? 

Answer. Yes, budget cuts and resource constraints associated with the Budget 

Control Act and sequestration require the Army to reduce force structure, limit 

training and curtail modernization programs. The United States will continue to 

maintain a robust military footprint and pursue international agreements in key locations, to include the Asia-Pacific. Even in smaller numbers, the presence of soldiers is a strong security guarantee to U.S. allies and partners. Further, initiatives 

like Pacific Pathways demonstrate the United States’ commitment to its Allies and 

partners by establishing a dynamic presence in the region. I am confident that our 

partners in the region want us to stand by our commitments to them. 

RUSSIA

Question. What additional steps, if any, are likely to prove most effective at deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe? 

Answer. To best deter Russian aggression, the United States must continue to 

work with allies using all the elements of national power. Militarily, I think it prudent for the Army to continue to work with NATO to strengthen its European posture and demonstrate the combined ability to respond with capable ground forces 

in Eastern Europe through a variety of exercises and prepositioning equipment contingency stocks. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Army supports NATO and 

EUCOM efforts to maintain and adapt capabilities, readiness, and responsiveness 

in our commitment to the sovereignty and security of every ally. In my view, we 

should also continue to fund European Reassurance Initiative at current or increased levels. 

Question. What is the Army doing to help NATO? What more can the Army do? 

Answer. The Army is supporting NATO with a number of initiatives. First, the 

Army demonstrates the United States’ continued commitment to NATO through Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) actions and exercises designed to deter further Russian aggression and reassure NATO Allies and partners by maintaining a persistent 

Army presence in Central and Eastern Europe. Second, the Army uses European 

Reassurance Initiative (ERI) funds to increase the Army’s presence and improve 

military infrastructure on NATO’s eastern flank (to include the creation of a complete armored brigade combat team equipment set). Third, the Army supports 

NATO’s Readiness Action Plan (RAP) with forces for the NATO Response Force 

(NRF). Last, the Army has a forward 2-star command post to assist USEUCOM in 

force employment and mission command of OAR exercises. 

To do more, the Army can expand its support of OAR with additional rotations, 

leverage future ERI investments such as additional prepositioned equipment sets, 

and enhance the NRF by providing enablers. Like USPACOM, resource limitations 

have also affected the Army’s support to USEUCOM. The Army can provide more 

support to Europe by redistributing forces from other theaters, or improve the readiness of uncommitted forces that could respond to Europe. Funding for increased 

readiness (through ERI) would allow the Army to increase the number of rotational 

forces. Specifically, the Army could increase the number of exercises and deploy 

staff expertise to augment our Allied and U.S. headquarters in Europe. Finally, establishing OAR as a ‘‘named operation’’ could allow funds to be used to pay for mobilization and deployment of Army National Guard to Europe as part of an overall 

program to use conventional ground forces to deter Russian aggression. 

Question. Does the Army, as part of a combined joint force, have what it needs 

in Europe? 

Answer. No, because of security condition changes in Europe, the current United 

States Army posture does not support a comprehensive response according to necVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00529 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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essary timelines. However, working with USEUCOM, we are in the process of addressing this posture shortfall and European Reassurance Initiative funding is critical to supporting that effort. 

CHINA

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of the United States-China 

military relationship? 

Answer. The United States-China military-to-military relationship is important to 

the overall bi-lateral relationship. The current state of United States-Sino military 

relations is stable with elements of both cooperation and competition. 

Question. What are your views regarding China’s interest in, and commitment to, 

improving military relations with the United States? 

Answer. I am of the opinion all countries act in what they define to be in their 

national interests. In this respect, I believe China recognizes that it is in its interest 

to have a positive relationship with the United States military. I support those actions that lead to improved United States-China relations, of which the military 

plays a part. If confirmed, I am committed to improving military-to-military relations with China. Improved United States-China military-to-military relationships 

can increase that stability and reduce miscalculations during any crisis or incident 

situation. 

Question. What is your view of the purpose and relative importance of sustained 

military-to-military relations with China? 

Answer. The purpose of sustained military-to-military relations with China is to 

enable a stable, secure, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region in which the United 

States, as an enduring Pacific power, is a key leader. This is of particular significance to our five treaty partners in the region, and the relative importance of the 

region to the U.S. in economic, diplomatic, and military terms. 

I believe we should continue to use our military engagement with China to establish deeper cooperation where there is clear, mutual benefit and to enhance dialogues to reduce risk and manage our differences. 

Question. What role do you see for the Chief of Staff of the Army in this process? 

Answer. If confirmed, my primary role will be to provide trained and ready forces 

to the combatant commander. Beyond that, the Chief of Staff of the Army’s responsibilities include Army to Army engagements, both with China as well as with our 

treaty allies and partners in the region. As the Department continues to develop the 

military-to-military relationship with China, it will be important to also deepen cooperation with our allies and partners to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific 

region. 

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

Question. How do you plan to foster a dedicated, educated, and assigned group 

of strategic thinkers and planners who rise to the rank of general officer within the 

Army? 

Answer. Developing strategic thinkers, planners, and leaders is one of the most 

important things we do, and is grounded in the best possible training, education, 

and experiences. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army 

to make appropriate investments in our officer corps to ensure we provide opportunities for advanced civil schooling, training with industry, joint assignments, multinational experience, and other broadening assignments. 

OFFSET TECHNOLOGIES

Question. During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key technologies to offset 

the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces: precision guided munitions, 

stealth technology, and satellite-based navigation. These three technologies have 

given U.S. forces unparalleled superiority until now. However, with advancements 

by our emerging adversaries, it seems like the military technological superiority is 

beginning to erode. As a result, it is critical that the United States once again focus 

on offsetting the erosion of our technology advantages being achieved by our potential adversaries. 

Which technology priorities do you believe the Army should be pursuing to maintain the military technological superiority of the United States? 

Answer. I understand the concept of the Third Offset Strategy, emphasizing advanced emerging technologies to maintain a qualitative edge over any opponent and 

I strongly support the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Innovation Initiative. The 

Army’s technology priorities enable our future land combat role in the joint fight 

and align to the Army Operating Concept. If confirmed, my priorities will be to look 

at increased range and effectiveness; increased use of autonomy to augment existing 

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capabilities; and technology and approaches that drive down the cost of our systems. 

Specifically, the Army will explore emerging technologies in: 

• Robotics • Autonomous systems • Cyber • Big Data • IT/Communications/Mission Command • Human Performance • Directed Energy weapons/Railguns • Advanced explosives and propellants • Nano technology/miniaturization • Additive manufacturing and 3D printing • Advanced materials for mobility and protection 

Question. What strategies would you recommend be implemented to develop these 

technology priorities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Army’s long range thirty-year planning 

process and determine if our current investment strategies are appropriate for the 

future or need to be adjusted. 

Question. What role should the Army play in their development? 

Answer. The Army must remain globally aware of where and what technology is 

being developed and be ready to refine, leverage, adapt and/or acquire those that 

are necessary to retain dominance. If confirmed, I will ensure the Army remains a 

proponent for the development of these needed technologies—whether they are developed within our own Science and Technology laboratories/Engineering Centers, 

our sister Service/Agency labs, academia, industry or by our allies. 

MODERNIZATION

Question. Is the Army fully modernized to execute its Operating Concept ‘‘Win in 

a Complex World’’? 

Answer. The Army equipment modernization program is designed in conjunction 

with the Army Operating Concept to enhance the lethality, mobility, and protection 

for all of our units and to give them the situational awareness they need in the future. Today, the Army continues to balance requirements for end strength, current 

readiness, and modernization under the Budget Control Act by accepting risk in 

equipment modernization. The Army cannot afford to fully equip and sustain the 

Total Army with the most modern equipment; therefore, we acknowledge fiscal realities by selectively modernizing equipment and formations across the Total Army. 

The Army will mitigate future risk to our forces and mission accomplishment 

through sustained S&T investments, leveraging our current fleets by investing in 

incremental improvements, and building new by exception. Given fiscal constraints, 

the Army will likely have to continue to delay our next generation of platforms until 

they are cost effective and affordable in order to sustain readiness of the force, and 

maintain sufficient capacity to meet the demands of our National Security Strategy 

and combatant commanders’ requirements. 

Question. If it is not, are current acquisition plans adequate to achieve this goal? 

Answer. The Army continues to develop acquisition strategies to address the gaps 

and required capabilities that support the Army Operating Concept (AOC). The acquisition strategies are dependent on stable and predictable resources. Approval of 

funding levels programmed for this requirement will determine how soon we can 

meet the approved AOC. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress to facilitate 

support for the resourcing and acquisition efforts needed to enable implementation 

of the AOC. 

Question. Does the Army have adequate funding for needed research, development 

test and evaluation? 

Answer. The Army has been forced to make some difficult decisions—balancing 

force structure, operational readiness, and modernization. Given these three requirements, modernization is the near-term offset for the other two. Within the 

modernization accounts, I fully support the Army’s continued investment in science 

and technology. Given the fiscal realities facing the Department, I believe that this 

strategy of spending our diminished modernization budget on science and technology is appropriate as the seed corn that will enable the Army to maintain the 

overmatch it has today. 

Question. Is the Army at risk of being out matched by superior capabilities and 

weapons? 

Answer. Proliferation of advanced technologies and information operations are 

leveling the playing field and the Army is at risk of being matched by near-peer 

competitors in the outyears. Additionally, the proliferating commercially available 

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technology is increasingly user-friendly and has empowered the individual, providing access to capabilities that were once the exclusive domain of countries and 

their militaries. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit to the warfighter. In this regard, 

it is critical that advancements quickly transition from the development phase into 

testing and evaluation and ultimately into a procurement program for the 

warfighter. 

What are some of the challenges you see in transitioning technologies effectively 

from research programs into programs of records? 

Answer. In my view, the current acquisition system has not evolved sufficiently 

to keep pace with technological advances in the defense industry and the pace of 

the global commercial market. The rates of technological advancement and associated adaptation in today’s environment have increased exponentially. I think it is 

prudent and necessary to adapt our acquisition system and procurement policies accordingly. I look forward to working with OSD and Congress in this important area. 

Question. As the Chief of Staff, what steps will you take to ensure that the services are benefitting more quickly and directly from the research being performed by 

the defense research enterprise? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Army’s long-range planning process and 

will encourage this process to look holistically at incorporating the capabilities being 

developed within the broader defense research enterprise as part of the Army strategy. As necessary, in conjunction with the other Service Chiefs, I will pursue recommendations that will enable the Department to take advantage of advanced technologies and make the process more timely and effective. 

Question. Do you feel that defense technologies and systems, especially in areas 

such as mobile communications, computing, and robotics, are keeping pace with 

global and commercial technological advances As you know, robust investment in 

S&T underpins technological advances in our military capabilities and is vital for 

maintain our military technological superiority over emerging adversaries. 

Answer. I concur that robust investment in S&T underpins technological advances 

in our military capabilities and is vital to maintaining technological superiority. 

While keeping pace with advances in technology is critical in some areas, there are 

steps to help offset advances in other areas. The Army leverages the latest commercial technologies and invests in critical enabling technologies that are not available 

off-the-shelf. The Army has protected its S&T investments in this fiscally challenging environment. If confirmed, I will continue to support a robust S&T investment. 

Question. If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess whether the Army 

is investing adequately in S&T programs? 

Answer. The Army measures how well S&T transitions into a program, which provides some indication of whether we are investing our dollars wisely. If confirmed, 

I will require our S&T community to appropriately address the most critical needs 

of our Army and establish firm metrics to ensure our soldiers dominate the battlefield. 

Question. How would you assess the value and appropriate investment level for 

basic research programs? 

Answer. The Army’s investment in basic research helps to investigate fundamental science that can be used to develop novel and innovative capabilities that 

benefit the Army. The Army included $425.1 million for basic research in the Fiscal 

Year 2016 President’s Budget request. This is approximately 19 percent of the 

Army’s S&T budget. I have been advised that a reasonable range of investment levels for basic research is approximately 16–20 percent of the Army S&T budget and 

if confirmed, I will continue to support strong basic research. 

Question. What tools would you use to ensure that appropriate technologies are 

transitioning quickly into programs of record? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the LIRA (Long-Range Investment Requirements Analysis) which maps resources to requirements, programs, S&T and logistics. This planning tool, which looks out over 30 years, was designed to ensure that 

a defined plan with resources is in place to connect our valuable S&T efforts into 

our programs at the quickest point possible. I will ensure the LIRA provides a systematic planning of technology insertion into programs of record. 

527 

TECHNICAL WORKFORCE

A significant challenge facing the Department of Defense today is an impending 

shortage of high quality scientific and engineering talent to work at Defense laboratories and technical centers. 

Question. In your view, what are the pros and cons of having Active Duty Army 

personnel trained and working as scientists and engineers within the Army research 

and acquisition system? 

Answer. My view is that Active Duty Army personnel trained and working as scientists and engineers in Army research and acquisition can help operationalize technologies from a soldier’s perspective. The cost, however, requires the Army to commit to advanced civil education for these personnel to ensure necessary professional 

qualifications. The benefit, in my view, outweighs the cost. 

Question. How would you ensure that directors of labs in your service have the 

tools they need to dynamically shape their S&T workforce? 

Answer. I understand that Congress has already provided significant tools to the 

Army that enables the directors of the labs to shape their science and technology 

workforce through various National Defense Authorization Act authorities. Those 

authorities allow additional capabilities such as direct hire authority for qualified 

science and engineering candidates and managing performance through alternative 

personnel systems. If confirmed, I will encourage and support appropriate additional 

authorities the Army may require. 

TEST AND EVALUATION ISSUES

Question. Are you satisfied with the Army’s test and evaluation capabilities, including workforce and infrastructure? 

Answer. Based on what I know now, the Army has sufficient infrastructure and 

the appropriate workforce to provide services to all test customers. In my view, test 

and evaluation is critical to ensuring the Army continues to reduce program lifecycle cost, as well as to ensure future weapon systems are suitable, survivable and 

effective to improve the capabilities of soldiers. If confirmed, I will work closely with 

the Army test and evaluation community and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

test and evaluation leadership to ensure the Army’s test and evaluation infrastructure maintains necessary test capabilities and processes. 

Question. In which areas, if any, do you feel the Army should be developing new 

test and evaluation capabilities? 

Answer. I have been advised the Army is investing in new test capabilities to support unmanned and autonomous systems, survivability, hypersonics, directed energy 

and cyber. The Army is also examining opportunities to upgrade existing test capabilities to reduce high-cost drivers to make current testing methods more efficient. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Army test and evaluation community and 

in concert with the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense test and evaluation leadership to ensure the Army’s test and evaluation infrastructure maintains necessary test capabilities and processes. 

Question. What are your views on the appropriate roles of OSD developmental 

and operational testing organizations with respect to testing of Army systems? 

Answer. It is my understanding that by law, OSD developmental and operational 

test and evaluation organizations are responsible for overseeing all major defense 

acquisition programs, major automated information systems, and other acquisition 

programs. The OSD testing organizations ensure appropriate testing is being conducted and that the right questions at the each level have been asked and answered. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. What do you consider to be the key to the Army’s success in recruiting 

the highest caliber American youth for service and retaining the best personnel for 

leadership responsibilities? 

Answer. The key to successful recruiting is explaining the Army in a manner that 

resonates with ‘‘today’s’’ talented youth. Serving on a cohesive team with trusted 

professionals could be one of the most important things they ever do is a key message to today’s youth who want to serve a purpose greater than themselves. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army to ensure sustaining the 

All-Volunteer Force remains a strategic imperative for our Army. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you feel should be taken to ensure that current 

operational requirements and tempo do not adversely impact the overall readiness, 

recruiting, retention, and morale of soldiers? 

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Answer. We must ensure that soldiers have the time and resources to prepare for 

and recover from their operational missions. With an appropriately sized force we 

can ensure soldiers have adequate dwell time between deployments. Additionally, 

quality leadership, training, meaningful work, and just compensation contribute to 

overall readiness, recruiting, retention, and soldier morale. If confirmed, I will work 

closely with the Secretary of the Army to provide the necessary resources to commanders so they can ensure overall readiness, recruiting, retention and morale of 

their soldiers. 

Question. What impact, if any, do you believe the Department’s proposals aimed 

at slowing the growth of personnel and health care costs will have on recruiting and 

retention in the Army? 

Answer. I need to study the longer-term institutional implications of the personnel 

and health care costs, to include how these may affect recruiting and retention. On 

health care, we must continue to find ways to deliver high quality healthcare to our 

soldiers and families in effective and economical ways without degrading readiness. 

Question. The Army requested a provision for enhanced recruiting authorities for 

the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. What programs does the 

Army plan to implement and what specific recruiting needs will those programs address? 

Answer. No response required; question withdrawn. 

Question. If confirmed, will you review the Department of the Army, to include 

the Army National Guard, use of sports marketing and advertising purchases as a 

means of recruitment? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army and the 

Director of the Army National Guard to review sports marketing and advertising 

to ensure our expenditures in this area are effective, efficient, and ethical in recruiting the high quality soldiers we need. 

MILITARY COMPENSATION

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of military compensation? 

Answer. My sense is that current military compensation is adequate. If confirmed, 

I will work with the Secretary of the Army to re-evaluate and assess compensation 

to ensure we sustain a high quality All-Volunteer Force. 

Question. What recommendations would you have for controlling the rising cost 

of personnel? 

Answer. Controlling the rising cost of personnel will require a holistic look at how 

we compensate our personnel (both monetary and non-monetary). What I know is 

that we must continue to provide fair compensation to our soldiers that is competitive with other opportunities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary 

of the Army to establish a total compensation package that is competitive and maintains a high quality All-Volunteer Force. 

Question. Do you support the Department’s compensation and health care proposals? 

Answer. Yes, I support the Department’s plans for recommendations that preserve 

compensation, health care, and quality of life for soldiers, retirees and their families. 

I think it is important to honor our previous commitments to serving soldiers and 

veterans. 

Question. What is your assessment of military compensation as compared to civilian compensation? 

Answer. Military compensation, in general, is adequate, when compared to civilian compensation. However, the nature of the work and the sacrifice demanded from 

our soldiers and their families does not compare to the civilian sector. If confirmed, 

I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army, to ensure the Army can continue 

to attract our Nation’s top talent and compensate them appropriately. 

Question. What areas of military compensation, if any, do you believe warrant improvement or modernization? 

Answer. I am interested in the details of the Military Compensation and Retirement Commission, specifically the reforms for blended retirement options. Whatever 

decisions are made must be accompanied with a robust training and education program so that our soldiers can make informed financial decisions for themselves and 

their Families. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army and 

the other Service Chiefs to implement any final decisions. 

EDUCATION FOR SOLDIERS

Question. An important feature of the Post-9/11 GI Bill is the ability of careeroriented servicemembers to transfer their earned benefits to spouses and dependents. 

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Answer. What is your assessment of the effect of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on recruiting and retention of soldiers? 

Answer. I think the Post 9/11 GI Bill is a valuable incentive and helps the Army 

attract and retain quality soldiers. 

Question. In your view, what has been the effect of the transferability option on 

retention and career satisfaction of soldiers? 

Answer. I believe a soldier’s ability to transfer his/her Post 9/11 GI Bill benefit 

helps the Army retain quality mid-grade and career soldiers. 

Question. How important do you believe tuition assistance benefits are to young 

soldiers, and what trends do you see in the Army’s ability to pay for such programs 

at current levels over the FYDP? 

Answer. The ability to educate our soldiers is an important benefit and I believe 

it’s one of the primary reasons our young Americans join the military. It is a key 

benefit and incentive to sustain the All Volunteer Force. There are several education 

benefits available, of which tuition assistance is one. In today’s era of reduced budgets, we must balance benefits against the money available. If confirmed, I will strive 

to ensure we balance the benefits desired by soldiers with the funding provided to 

us by the Congress. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to current eligibility criteria for tuition assistance? 

Answer. Tuition Assistance is both a valuable benefit to our soldiers and our 

Army and evidences our commitment and investment in their future. If confirmed, 

I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army to explore potential improvements and ensure policy changes do not adversely affect the force. 

Question. Do you believe that tuition assistance should be used to enhance a soldier’s career while he or she is in the Army? 

Answer. Absolutely. Tuition assistance is a valuable benefit to our soldiers and 

our Army and supports our culture and beliefs in life-long learning. 

Question. Do you agree with the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission that tuition assistance should be limited to courses and education that contribute to a soldier’s professional growth? 

Answer. In principle, I generally agree; however, I am concerned about too narrow 

a scope in defining ‘‘courses and education that contribute to a soldier’s professional 

growth.’’ The Army’s current TA policy requires soldiers to first meet with a counselor in order to establish a degree plan before taking courses and receiving benefits; continued TA benefit receipt is contingent upon working toward that degree 

plan. We want all our soldiers to aspire to be lifelong learners. 

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. As you know, two years ago, the Department rescinded the policy restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission 

of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and has given the Military Services 

until January 1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request 

an exception to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that 

must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary 

of Defense. The services have opened a large number of positions to service by 

women and continue to work to develop gender-free physical and mental standards 

for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards. 

If confirmed, what role, if any, will you play in the development of these standards? 

Answer. My basic position is that all people should be afforded equal opportunity 

to rise in accordance with their merit. Currently, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command is working to validate the standards for all Army occupations. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army and the other Services Chiefs 

to ensure that the Army has the appropriate mental and physical standards for all 

military occupations. 

Question. Will you ensure that the standards will be realistic and will preserve, 

or enhance, military readiness and mission capability? 

Answer. Yes, I am committed to ensuring the standards are realistic for every occupation and that soldiers have the opportunity to serve to their full potential. If 

confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army and the other Service 

Chiefs to ensure that the standards are realistic and will preserve and enhance military readiness and mission capability. 

Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on bona 

fide military requirements, and that assignment decisions should be made solely on 

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the basis of a servicemember’s ability to meet validated gender-neutral occupational 

standards? 

Answer. Yes, positions should be opened based on validated military requirements, tied to specific capabilities, skill sets, and established gender-neutral standards. 

Question. If so, what steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that such decisions are made on this basis? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army to ensure decisions are made based on validated military and force readiness requirements. 

Question. To what extent is the Army coordinating with the Marine Corps in this 

effort? Are results from the assessments being shared between services? 

Answer. The Army and the Marine Corps have collaborated and shared information on their efforts. It is my understanding that the Army has shared results with 

all the Services when preparing the recommendations to open positions, units or occupations. 

Question. If the Marine Corps were to make the decision to not open all positions 

as of January 1, 2016, what effect, if any, will that have on the Army’s decision? 

Answer. If the USMC decides not to open all positions, and if I am confirmed, I 

will work closely to understand the other Services’ position and rationale in order 

to provide a fully informed recommendation to the Secretary of the Army. That said, 

my recommendation to the Secretary of the Army will be based on my best military 

judgment about what is best for the Army. My recommendation will be based on 

standards and readiness requirements. 

Question. What is your position on whether the Selective Service Act should be 

opened to all genders if the decision is made to open all units on January 1, 2016? 

Answer. I believe in maintaining the All-Volunteer Force and that we must do everything in our power to preserve it. The opening of previously closed positions to 

women is a step in the right direction for women who can meet the physical and 

mental standards. If confirmed, I will review if there is a need to change the Selective Service Act and provide my military advice to the Secretary of the Army. 

FORCE MANAGEMENT

Question. Modularity refers to the Army’s fundamental reconfiguration of the 

force from a division-based to a brigade-based structure. Although somewhat smaller in size, modular combat brigades are supposed to be just as, or more, capable 

than the divisional brigades they replace because they will have a more capable mix 

of equipment—such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment. To 

date, the Army has established over 90 percent of its planned modular units, however, estimates on how long it will take to fully equip this force as required by its 

design have slipped to 2019. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s modularity transformation strategy? 

Answer. My understanding is the Army has completed modular transformation of 

combat and support brigades. Modular Transformation reorganized the Army’s Operating Force from large division-sized formations designed to defeat traditional 

threats in conventional campaigns to more versatile and deployable brigade-sized 

units designed to support joint force requirements for full spectrum operations. Importantly, modularity has allowed the Army to organize as we fight, and standardized our brigade combat teams into three configurations—Armored, Infantry, or 

Stryker, and established adaptive, Joint Task Force capable headquarters at the 2- 

star level. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions or changes, if any, would you propose relative 

to the Army’s modular transformation strategy? 

Answer. The Army is constantly changing. If confirmed, I will continue to assess 

the requirements of the national strategy against known and emerging requirements and threats to ensure the Army provides the best force structure (both capacity and capability) to support combatant commanders and the Nation. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the employment and 

performance of modular combat brigades and supporting units in Operations Iraqi 

Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom? 

Answer. I commanded modular brigade combat teams (BCTs) of all types in both 

Iraq and Afghanistan. The modular BCTs have greater utility across a broader 

range of military operations than those of previous brigade designs. In Iraq and Afghanistan, modular BCTs were effective during both combat and stability operations 

and far better at integrating the capabilities of other tactical elements of the Joint 

Force. Command and control functions are streamlined through the permanent task 

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tary intelligence. Additionally, the standardized designs facilitated transitions and 

streamlined logistics. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you propose to the modular design, the mix 

of combat and supporting brigades, or modular unit employment to improve performance or reduce risk? 

Answer. Currently, I have no proposals to change the Army’s modular designs. As 

a matter of routine, the Army analyzes and assesses requirements, threats, performance and risk the optimal force mix and equipment, spread across the Total Force. 

The results of this analysis will continue to inform Total Force Policy, design and 

structure. If confirmed, I will continually review the designs of our units to ensure 

the proper force mix delivers the right capability at the right time to the combatant 

commanders. 

Question. With respect to the Army’s modular combat brigade force structure design, General Dempsey’s June 2011 pamphlet titled ‘‘CSA’s Thoughts on the Army’s 

Future,’’ directs the Army to assess the feasibility of adding a third maneuver battalion to each heavy and infantry brigade. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the need to add a third maneuver 

battalion to the modular heavy and infantry brigades? 

Answer. Adding a third maneuver battalion to our brigade combat teams increases the Army’s operational capability and flexibility and is the direct result of 

the lessons of 14 years of war and operations around the world. The change makes 

the brigade more lethal, flexible, and agile. The reorganization also represents a 

transition to a force that is prepared to effectively operate across a broader range 

of potential missions. 

Question. If confirmed, will you continue to implement the decision to add a third 

maneuver battalion to the heavy and infantry combat brigades? What force structure or capabilities would you propose to reduce in order to increase maneuver 

forces within the combat brigades? 

Answer. Yes, conversion will continue and is planned to be complete in the Active 

Component by the end of fiscal year 2015. The addition of the third maneuver battalion is nearly complete in the Active Component and will begin next year for the 

Army National Guard. I believe the third maneuver battalion in a Brigade Combat 

Team provides the combat power necessary to dominate the battlefield at the tactical level. 

Question. How will you manage this given the current drawdown of the Active 

Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess combatant commander requirements to ensure 

that we provide the best possible mix of capabilities within our end strength to support the National Military Strategy. The addition of a third maneuver battalion has 

been underway for years, and as a result, our brigade combat teams (BCTs) are 

more capable. Recent force structure reductions will diminish the aggregate capacity 

of the Army without affecting the remaining BCT’s capability. 

AVIATION RESTRUCTURING INITIATIVE

Question. The Aviation Restructuring Initiative is intended to fully modernize 

Total Army Aviation by 2028 and reorganize by 2019. Is this effort on track? If not, 

what challenges do you face? 

Answer. The Aviation Restructuring Initiative is on track to ensure our Total 

Army Aviation Force is fully modernized, ready, and tailored to meet mission demand in all three components. However, fiscal and resource constraints have limited 

the Army’s flexibility. 

Any significant changes to the proposed realignment of aircraft and units, or an 

increase in Army Acquisition Objectives will have an adverse effect on unit readiness, modernization programs, and industry partners. Current and projected Army 

force structure and funding levels and current Congressional appropriations allow 

us to keep the best, most modern aircraft; standardize the structure of our aviation 

brigades; and balance the capabilities across the components. 

TOTAL ARMY END STRENGTH

Question. Is the Total Army large enough to execute the National Military Strategy? 

Answer. The current CSA has testified ‘‘yes, but with significant risk.’’ The level 

of resourcing provided under the President’s Budget, the Army has sufficient capacity, although the ability to execute the strategy depends on more than end strength 

alone. Maintaining adequate readiness and capability are also necessary components. Readiness, capacity, and capability require sufficient, predictable budgets to 

plan against. 

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Question. Is an Active Duty Army of 450,000 large enough to execute all potential 

missions for the operational force while maintaining required capabilities in the institutional force? 

Answer. A 450,000 Active Army, 980,000 Total Army force provides the minimum 

capacity to execute the missions envisioned in the current national strategy at significant risk, while maintaining the required level of generating forces in the institutional Army. The risk to the force and missions increases if assumptions in the 

Defense Strategic Guidance (regarding the duration of conflicts, the contributions of 

our allies, and the nature and location of future threats) are invalidated. 

Question. Can the Active Duty Army successfully execute its mission at an end 

strength of 420,000? 

Answer. The U.S. Army cannot execute the missions currently assigned in the National Security strategic guidance documents if the total Army is reduced to 920,000 

(420,000 Active Component, 315,000 ARNG, 185,000 USAR). 

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY

Question. Will you be prepared to receive and act on recommendations from the 

national commission in 2016? 

Answer. Yes. 

‘‘INSTITUTIONALIZING’’ SUPPORT FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE

Question. A major objective of the Department over recent years has been increasing emphasis on lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability type operations—all of which are areas that place a high premium and demands on Army 

capabilities. In order to ensure that a rebalance achieves this objective, and perhaps 

more importantly is then sustainable, senior leaders have stressed the need for the 

Department to ‘‘institutionalize and finance’’ the support necessary for the irregular 

warfare capabilities that have been developed over the last several years and will 

be needed in the future. 

What, in your view, does it mean to ‘‘institutionalize’’ capabilities and support for 

irregular warfare capabilities in the Army? 

Answer. The Army is institutionalizing capabilities and support for Irregular Warfare through the development of appropriate doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF–P) across 

the Army. Building on our experience of the last 14 years, Irregular Warfare has 

been institutionalized into doctrine, leader development and individual and collective training. The DOTMLPF–P is an ongoing and standing process. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of Army efforts to date to 

institutionalize and support these capabilities? 

Answer. The last 14 years has demonstrated the Army’s ability to identify and 

adapt needed capabilities. A key component to institutionalizing any capability is 

to appoint a lead office with responsibility and authority for its oversight. The Army 

has established the following leads for the core activities constituting Irregular Warfare: 

1) The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense) 

2) The U.S. Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

(stability operations) 

3) TRADOC’s Combined Arms Center (counterinsurgency, security force assistance, asymmetric warfare). 

The Army also serves as the Executive Agent for the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance which supports the Joint Force. The Center for 

Army Lessons Learned, the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information 

Management System ensure that the capabilities and skill sets developed over the 

last 14 years of conflict remain relevant. If confirmed, I will continue to assess our 

progress and make any necessary adjustments going forward. 

Question. In your view, what are the obstacles, if any, to institutionalizing this 

kind of support, and what will be necessary to overcome them? 

While force structure and program changes may be necessary, they are unlikely 

to prove sufficient to achieve full institutionalization. The greater challenge may be 

found in changing Army culture, attitudes, management, and career path requirements and choices, for example through adjustments to organization, training, doctrine, and personnel policies. 

Answer. Fiscal uncertainty and the subsequent need to downsize remain the biggest obstacles to institutionalize and support these capabilities. As pressures for 

cuts in defense spending and force structures increase, the Army has to assess 

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ance is a challenge. Maintaining our doctrine and lessons learned databases is 

achievable, but retaining all of the necessary force structure will be more challenging. The Army requires consistent, on-time funding to maintain readiness, 

achieve efficiencies, and ensure that the Total Force is prepared to meet the Defense 

Strategic Guidance and win in a complex world. 

Question. In your view, what are the most important changes, if any, that might 

be necessary to complement programmatic changes in support of the further institutionalization of capabilities for irregular warfare in the Army? 

Answer. The most important changes are how we educate our leaders about the 

conduct of Irregular Warfare, to include Counterinsurgency (COIN), Unconventional 

Warfare (UW), Counterterrorism (CT), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Stability Operations (SO), and Security Force Assistance (SFA). Through our professional military education, we must maintain competent and committed leaders of character 

with the skills and attributes necessary to meet the warfighting challenges of a complex world. 

Question. Institutionalizing support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability 

capabilities in the force does not mean ignoring the requirement for the Army to 

be trained, equipped, and ready for major combat at the high-end of the full spectrum of operations. 

If confirmed, how would you propose to prioritize and allocate the Army’s efforts 

and resources to ensure that the force is prepared for major combat while at the 

same time it increases and institutionalizes support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability operations? 

Answer. Current global instability reinforces that irregular, asymmetric and hybrid threats will continue to be central to the future operating environment. Consequently, in accordance to the Army Operating Concept, we must train and educate 

our leaders to operate effectively in the spectrum of conflict against multiple conflict 

forms. In the training environment, we are replicating those threats and conditions 

to ensure the Army is able to operate in the increasingly complex global security 

environment. We maintain a responsive training system underpinned by a robust 

lessons learned process and professional military education that incorporates both 

regular and irregular war to ensure the Army is ready. In light of changing threats 

and the evolving operating environment, we continuously review all areas in the 

span of DOTMLPF–P to ensure the Army remains well set to face emerging challenges. This ensures the Army is able to respond rapidly to crises and skillfully 

transition between types of military operations as the threat changes. 

EQUIPMENT REPAIR/RESET

Question. In your view, is this level of funding sufficient to not only prepare Army 

forces for operations in Afghanistan but to also improve the readiness of non-deployed forces for other potential contingencies? 

Answer. From my understanding, the Army requested the funding it needs to restore combat capability to the equipment returning from Afghanistan, commensurate with the Army’s enduring need for this equipment. 

Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for reset? 

Answer. From my understanding, our repair depots are meeting our rebuild and 

repair requirements. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be taken to increase 

the Army’s capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and 

training? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the Army’s current capacity to repair and replace equipment and make recommendations if necessary. The Army will continue 

to explore new technologies and emerging methods to fix equipment and support logistic operations. 

Question. What impact is this level of funding likely to have, if any, on the ability 

of Army National Guard units to respond to Homeland Defense and support to civil 

authorities’ missions? 

Answer. Support to the homeland is the Total Army’s highest priority. Homeland 

defense and support to civil authorities centers on the Army National Guard but utilizes assets from all components. Since the Army National Guard is a component 

of the Total Army, it will be affected by decreases in the levels of funding. Decreased 

funding will have a negative impact on the Total Army (Active, National Guard, and 

USAR) readiness levels with decreased capability to respond to Homeland Defense 

and Support to Civil Authorities. 

534 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENABLING CAPABILITIES

Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Commander of USSOCOM 

to address the enabling requirements of Army SOF throughout the deployment 

cycle? 

Answer. The Army works closely with the Joint Staff and USSOCOM in the Global Force Management process to ensure resources are provided to Geographic Combatant Commanders in accordance with Department of Defense priorities. Additionally, Army SOF and conventional interoperability training remains a top priority at 

the Combined Training Centers to ensure units maintain the level of shared understanding developed throughout the last 14 years of conflict. We value our relationship with USSOCOM and continue to evaluate the way we support all Geographic 

Combatant Commands. The continued refinement of the Regionally Aligned Force 

concept and establishment of a Department of the Army level liaison cell within 

USSOCOM should optimize the support the service can provide. Sustaining the 

close relationship that conventional forces and SOF have developed during combat 

operations over the past decade and a half is a key training priority. 

Question. Do you agree that Army special operations personnel should be managed by U.S. Special Operations Command? Please explain. 

Answer. No, the Army has considerable interaction with the U.S. Special Operations Command related to the assignment and development of its personnel. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army to ensure current personnel management policies related to all combatant commands are adequate. 

ACTIVE ARMY READINESS

Question. Does the Army have adequate readiness levels? If not, why? 

Answer. As a result of the Budget Control Act and increased global demand, the 

Army implemented a sustained readiness approach to maintain a contingent response capability and fulfill current requirements. With the implementation of the 

Budget Control Act, the Army has only been able to sustain approximately one-third 

of the Regular Army (Active Component) at acceptable combat readiness standards. 

Our objective is to maintain two-thirds of the Active component at combat ready 

standards. Similarly, we have not been able to maintain Army National Guard units 

at acceptable levels of readiness. The principal driver for this status is inadequate 

funding to maintain appropriate levels of capacity, readiness, and modernization. 

Question. What must be done to improve readiness levels of the Active Army? 

Answer. Consistent and predictable funding is necessary to restore the appropriate balance between modernization, procurement, end-strength and force structure. This will stabilize the resource elements of Army Readiness: Manning, Equipment, Sustainment, Training and Installation Support. This stability coupled with 

continued gains in training proficiency over time will allow the Army to address current global demand, while maintaining the readiness required to support National 

Military Strategy contingency requirements. 

Question. What percentage of Active Army units must be fully ready? 

Answer. Readiness requirements are determined across the Total Force based on 

time, capacity, and capability—against planning contingencies, combatant command 

requirements, and resources. Because of the constrained fiscal environment, only 

about 30 percent of Army brigades are at acceptable levels of combat readiness. The 

U.S. Army BCT combat readiness rate should be between 60–70 percent. 

Question. How would you characterize Army readiness in its deployed and nondeployed units? 

Answer. All Army units and soldiers actively supporting combatant commands deploy at the highest levels of assigned mission readiness. Outside of deployed forces, 

the Army has had to focus resources on a small number of non-deployed brigade 

combat teams and enabling forces for the global response force. For those non-deployed units at lower readiness levels, it will take longer to get them ready to get 

to the fight, potentially losing opportunities with rapid deployment, or sending those 

units quickly but less ready and risking higher casualties. 

118. Do you believe the current state of Army readiness is acceptable? 

Answer. The CSA, GEN Odierno, has testified that currently the Army provides 

a sufficient amount of forces to fulfill all the requirements of the Defense Strategic 

Guidance but at ‘‘significant risk’’ due to readiness. Given current readiness levels 

and uncertain global demands, if confirmed, I will assess our readiness levels closely 

as our #1 priority and provide candid military advice on our capability to meet requirements. 

Question. How do you see operations in Iraq and Afghanistan impacting the readiness of Army forces that may be called upon to respond to an attack or another contingency? 

535 

Answer. Global demand for Army forces continues to consume resources needed 

to rebuild Army readiness required for contingency plans. Iraq and Afghanistan are 

not the sole source of demand. Reductions in planned demand have been supplanted 

by growth in un-forecasted global requirements. With decreasing force structure capacity and resources, the Army prioritizes readiness efforts for Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and elsewhere at the expense of the non-deployed force readiness. The Army will 

need more time to ready and deploy additional forces to meet contingencies, potentially incurring higher casualties or jeopardizing mission accomplishment. 

RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s Reserve components in regard strategic depth? 

Answer. I am mindful that, as established in federal statute, the purpose of our 

Reserve Components—the Army National Guard of the United States and the 

United States Army Reserve—is to provide trained units and qualified persons for 

Active Duty whenever more units and persons are needed than can be provided by 

the Regular Army. As such, our Reserve Components fulfill many operational demands as well as providing strategic depth. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure 

the Total Army is ready to meet the needs of combatant commanders. 

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges to maintaining and enhancing the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as a relevant and capable operational Reserve? 

Answer. As resources and opportunities for training and operational deployments 

decrease, our principal challenges for preserving the Reserve components as an 

operational Reserve are retaining relevant operational experience and readiness. 

Both the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve are critical to the Nation’s defense to provide strategic depth and as an operational Reserve. I am, therefore, deeply committed to maintaining their readiness as a top priority. 

Question. What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve Component 

forces in meeting combat missions? 

Answer. Combat missions are conducted by all types of units from all three of our 

components—Regular Army, Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve. 

The Army must retain the authority to integrate personnel and units from all three 

components to provide our Joint force commanders with the best Army force mix 

for the job at hand. In some cases, depending on the types of units required and 

the specific mission, our Reserve and Guard forces can effectively fulfill early deploying requirements. In other cases, they are better suited for providing operational and strategic depth. The optimal role for Reserve component forces will depend on the specific mission requirement generated by the combatant commanders 

and requires careful analysis of mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, and significantly, the time required to respond to the combatant commander requirement. 

Answer. No. The Nation needs the flexibility to employ personnel and units from 

all three components to fulfill the operational demands of our state governors and 

combatant commanders. 

Question. In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1 year mobilized to 5 years 

at home affect the viability and sustainability of the all-volunteer Reserve force? 

Answer. Soldiers, families, and employers have shown strong support for the one 

year mobilized to five years at home rotation rate goals as established by the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, mobilization experience from the last decade substantiates this as well. The viability of the All Volunteer Force is inextricably linked 

across all components. Sustainment of the All Volunteer Force across all three Army 

components—Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve—is critical to the long term security of the United States. If confirmed, I will remain committed to ensure the operational tempo of all three Army components is structured 

at a pace to sustain the All Volunteer Force. 

Question. Advocates for the National Guard and Reserve assert that funding levels do not meet the requirements of the Reserve components for operational missions. 

Do you agree that the Army’s Reserve components are inadequately resourced, 

particularly in view of the commitment to maintaining an operational Reserve? 

Answer. No, but I do agree that the spending caps under the Budget Control Act 

have placed significant downward pressure on our budget such that a number of 

hard choices have been made and will need to be made if relief does not come. Most 

of those hard choices have been disproportionately taken in the Total Army by the 

Active Component. In fact, as Total Army resources have been reduced since 2011, 

the proportional share of available Total Army resources allocated to our Reserve 

and Guard forces has increased. According to Army projections for fiscal year 2021, 

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Reserve and Guard shares of the Army budget will have increased by 12.7 percent 

and 27.8 percent, respectively, since fiscal year 2001. Resourcing of any Army component or any Army program is a reflection of the total resources provided to Department of the Army to fulfill its statutory and strategic roles and responsibilities. 

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that our Reserve Components are resourced to 

provide the Army both operational Reserve and strategic depth as we train to confront current and future threats. 

NATIONAL GUARD

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of changes in the global 

and domestic roles and missions of the Army National Guard and the National 

Guard Bureau in the last decade? 

Answer. The Army National Guard of the United States remains one of two viable 

and important reserve components in the Army. As the Army’s global and domestic 

roles and missions change, the personnel and units from all three components will 

be employed to meet demand. The experiences of the last decade illustrate this. We 

have learned that ‘‘reserve’’ is no longer solely defined by geography, but also includes both capacity and response time. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s commitment 

to fully fund Defense Department requirements for Army National Guard equipment? 

Answer. PB16 funds Total Army endstrength of 980,000. General Odierno assesses this is as ‘‘significant risk’’ and sufficient to fulfill the 2012 DSG but at ‘‘significant risk.’’ PB16 does not fully fund modernization. These shortages are shared 

across the Total Force. 

At this time, the Army cannot afford to fully fund requirements, to include equipment for any of the components—Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. 

Army Reserve. If confirmed, I will work to balance forces, readiness, and modernization across the Total Army to best fulfill our responsibilities within the Defense 

Strategy given the resources we are given. 

Question. In your view, do Army processes for planning, programming, budgeting, 

and execution sufficiently address these requirements for National Guard equipment? 

Answer. Requirements for National Guard equipment and the two other Army 

components are driven by the process of ‘‘Total Army Analysis’’ of how the Army 

will fulfill the National Military Strategy. The challenge is managing risk by balancing forces, modernization, and readiness across all components to fulfill Army 

roles and responsibilities for national defense. 

The PPBE process is adequate for the Total Force to include the National Guard. 

What is lacking is sufficient funds for all the components. Shortages reflect 

resourcing shortfalls vice processes. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that these equipment needs of the 

Army National Guard are fully considered and resourced through the Army budget 

process? In your view, what is the appropriate role for the Chief of the National 

Guard Bureau in this regard? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of the Army to fulfill the strategic and fiscal guidance provided by the President and the Secretary 

of Defense within the resource levels provided. Federal statute clearly defines the 

advisory role of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. The Director of the Army 

National Guard, on behalf of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, is a full participant in the discussions and deliberations of how we equip the Army and if confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of the National Guard to meet the Total 

Army resourcing challenges. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the role and authority 

of the Director of the Army National Guard, and, in your view, how does this compare with the role and authority of the Chief of the Army Reserve? 

Answer. The Chief of the Army Reserve is also the Commanding General of U.S. 

Army Reserve Command, and exercises command authority over all U.S. Army Reserve personnel and units assigned to the command. As such, the Chief of the Army 

Reserve can more readily adapt Army Reserve forces and programs to dynamic strategic and fiscal guidance. The Director of the Army National Guard on the other 

hand does not command the Army National Guard. By law, when not federalized, 

personnel and units of the Army National Guard are controlled by the Governors 

of the 54 states and territories to which they are apportioned. When federalized, 

they usually fall under the command of the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, before they are provided to a combatant commander in response to a request 

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for Army forces. The Director of the Army National Guard assists the Chief of the 

National Guard Bureau in the performance of his or her duties. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Soldiers and their families in both the Active and Reserve components 

have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational 

deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for soldiers and their families? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to maintain Family readiness by fully supporting the important range of services and programs that provide soldiers peace 

of mind that their Families are being cared for during long deployments, changes 

of station and continued times of high operational tempo. At issue here is adequacy 

of funding to enable our support. I will sustain the Army’s commitment to a high 

quality of life for soldiers, families and civilians. Our program for this is Total Army 

Strong, which provides commanders the ability to tailor services and programs to 

meet the needs of local military community. 

Programs and services such as the Exceptional Family Member Program (considers family members with special needs during the assignments process), Child 

Development Centers (provides soldiers with affordable, quality day care), and the 

Financial Readiness Program (offers soldiers financial counseling throughout their 

careers) are just a few examples of the different ways the Army enables soldier and 

family readiness. 

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of future 

reductions in end strength? 

Answer. If confirmed, my goal would be to maintain an Army of strong and resilient soldiers and families. I would, however, as a result of the Army’s upcoming endstrength reductions, focus on the Army’s Soldier for Life (SFL) initiative that emphasizes the Army’s commitment to those who serve from the day the recruit reports for duty through transition and continued service as a veteran. The SFL program will provide many opportunities for soldiers and families leaving the Army as 

a result of the drawdown. 

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. The Committee is concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life 

programs for military families, such as family support, child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget challenges. 

If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of intense downward pressure on 

budgets? 

Answer. With the restructuring of the Army and the current fiscal climate, if confirmed, I would apply resources to programs and services that have the greatest impact on sustaining soldier and family resilience and thereby Army readiness. I 

would also look to partner with the other Military Departments and local communities to assist the Army in ensuring availability of key programs as reasonable cost 

to all soldiers and families, and to strengthen the Army’s Soldier for Life initiative. 

If confirmed, I would also want to hear from our soldiers and families about those 

programs that are most important to them and those services that they need but 

we are not providing. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s suicide prevention program? 

Answer. We need to do more for our soldiers and family members when it comes 

to preventing suicide and mitigating the factors of suicide and other high risk behaviors. Our Ready and Resilient efforts deliver training, tools, and resources to improve soldiers performance, strengthen their resilience and make them stronger and 

the Army has made good progress in the last few years. However, more work needs 

to be done. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army to continually 

assess this program to ensure we are meeting the needs of our soldiers and that 

we continue to understand the myriad of causes that lead to self-harm. I am committed to prevention and intervention to help soldiers who are suffering and risk 

harm to self. 

Question. In your view, what role should the Chief of Staff of the Army play in 

shaping policies to help prevent suicides and to increase the resiliency of all 

servicemembers and their families? 

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Answer. If confirmed, my role is to work with the Secretary of the Army to provide policy and resources to Commanders to help them prevent suicides and increase resiliency in the force. In my view, suicide preventions continue to be a priority mission for all commanders and soldiers. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental 

health resources are available to servicemembers in theater, and to the 

servicemembers and their families upon return to home station? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that soldiers and their family members have 

access to quality mental health care. As one of my priorities, the Army will continue 

to make quality behavioral health care available in innovative ways, such as embedded providers with combat units in theater and at home station. We will continue 

to lead the DOD in placing providers where soldiers’ families can also easily access 

mental health care. It is critical that soldiers view seeking mental health care as 

a sign of strength. I will maintain the focus on mental health care and take every 

opportunity to improve on the gains made in the past several years. 

MEDICAL CARE FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

Question. Is the Army adequately resourced to provide all needed combat medical 

support in our active theaters? 

Answer. At the current rate of combatant commander demand, we are adequately 

resourced to provide the needed combat medical support in our active theaters. The 

nature of the strategic environment requires the Army to continuously assess its capabilities and force requirements. It has taken years to achieve the medical size, 

structure, and capability required. Total Army Analysis has resulted in a medical 

force sufficient to support combatant commands, that best meets guidance under established resource constraints, and that fulfills the roles and missions we ask of 

these key battlefield enablers. 

Question. Is the Army adequately resourced to care for soldiers in the continental 

United States and overseas garrisons? 

Answer. Current funding levels provide adequate resources to sustain medical 

readiness and provide quality healthcare for soldiers worldwide. Army Medicine continues to seek efficiencies and opportunities to collaborate with other services, the 

Veteran’s Affairs, and the private sector to minimize costs. The successful transition 

to a System for Health is vitally important to the survival of Army Medicine as an 

affordable and viable means to maintain the force. 

Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel 

who have separated from Active service? 

Answer. The Army’s primary system to assist our wounded personnel separating 

from Active service is through the Soldier for Life Transition Assistance Program 

(SFLTAP). This program provides points of contact for assistance once out of the 

military. For the population consisting of the most seriously wounded soldiers, they 

may qualify for the Army Wounded Warrior Program, whose cadre maintains contact with seriously injured veterans to provide a continuum of care and support as 

well as smooth transition to the Department of Veteran Affairs. We also refer 

Wounded Warriors who qualify to the Veterans Affairs Vocational Rehabilitation 

and Employment program that further assists in the transition process. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase the Army’s support for wounded personnel, and to monitor 

their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. Warrior care will remain an Army priority; it is an enduring mission and 

our sacred obligation. The Army will remain committed to ensuring our wounded, 

ill, and injured soldiers have the best health care possible to either successfully remain on Active Duty or transition from Military Service and into communities as 

productive Veterans. Additionally, we will continue our collaboration efforts with 

Veterans Affairs to facilitate the seamless transition for our Wounded. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s disability 

evaluation system? 

Answer. The Army is committed to ensuring that all soldiers receive the care they 

need and the benefits they have earned through their selfless service. It is my understanding that the disability evaluation system (DES) is approaching a steady 

state balance, as soldier disability cases are completed at a rate equal to or greater 

than cases being enrolled on a monthly basis. Collaboration between the Physical 

Disability Agency, Medical Command/Office of the Surgeon General and the Veteran’s Affairs, and the application of increased manpower and resources have dramatically improved capacity, created efficiencies and reduced timelines. Average 

time of completion for Active and Reserve Component Soldier cases now meets and 

exceeds OSD Warrior Care Policy goals. The DES Dashboard provides transparency 

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and predictability for soldiers, families and commanders and soldiers are increasingly satisfied with their understanding of the process and the amount of time it 

takes to complete DES. My assessment is that maintaining timelines and improvements will require continued commitment of resources in order to care for our most 

precious asset—our soldiers. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring we sustain our progress and continue to improve where possible. 

Question. Is the Total Army Health care system adequate to meet the health care 

needs of soldiers, families and retirees? 

Answer. Army Medicine is well prepared to support the health care needs of soldiers, families and retirees. The Army direct care system is made up of 32 primary 

military treatment facilities and smaller clinics across our camps, posts and stations. There is also care available through TRICARE contracts near military bases. 

In addition, beneficiaries may access care through non-contracted providers in the 

areas not supported by TRICARE contracts. There are also virtual resources available to beneficiaries, such as nurse advice line, that supplement face to face care. 

PREVENTION OF AND RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULTS

Question. The Fiscal Year 2014 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual 

Assault in the Military reflects that substantiated reports of sexual assault in the 

Army resulting in preferral of court-martial charges increased by 56 percent from 

272 reports in fiscal year 2013 to 424 reports in fiscal year 2014. 

What is your assessment of this report? 

Answer. Any sexual assault in the U.S. Army is unacceptable. Recent survey data 

estimates that the prevalence of sexual assault in the military is decreasing. At the 

same time, reports of sexual assault have seen unprecedented increases in the last 

three fiscal years. The Army views these results as indicators of a continued growing trust and confidence in our system, as more victims are reporting. However, if 

confirmed, this issue will have my full attention and continued intense focus on this 

issue by commanders at all levels. 

Question. What is your assessment of the problem of sexual assaults in the Army? 

Answer. Sexual assault has no place in our Army and I am personally committed 

to its elimination. Sexual assault not only has a long-lasting effect on the individual 

victim, but it also erodes unit readiness and command climate. If confirmed, this 

issue will have my full attention. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Army sexual assault prevention and response program? 

Answer. As I said earlier, any sexual assault is unacceptable. I see some positive 

progress and have been told the Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and 

Prevention (SHARP) Program is moving in the right direction. However, I also believe that there is still much work to be done. We must continue to increase reporting and eradicate prevalence. We must focus on the issue of retaliation to ensure 

that victims feel safe in reporting and that we have established a command climate 

that demands dignity and respect for all soldiers, civilians and family members. 

This issue will have my personal attention. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. Protecting and supporting the victim of sexual assault is imperative. 

Though Army policy favors unrestricted reporting as a bridge to offender accountability, I understand that some victims do not want an investigation for a variety 

of personal reasons. In those instances, restricted reporting is a vital avenue to 

allow these soldiers to obtain advocacy, medical, mental health, and legal services. 

If we do this right, the services and support provided to victims who initially make 

a restricted report will provide those victims with the confidence to convert to an 

unrestricted report. I believe that allowing victims options and multiple avenues for 

reporting sexual assault has been and will remain critical to our progress. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. Commanders and anyone in a leadership position must set, teach, and 

enforce the best possible standards for supporting victims of sexual assault. Specifically, committed, engaged leadership and grass-roots prevention campaigns at the 

squad leader level are critical to providing the necessary support to victims of sexual 

assault. Commanding officers are also responsible for setting positive command climates that not only help prevent the crime of sexual assault but also provide a safe 

environment where victims feel confident coming forward to report. The entire chain 

of command is absolutely critical in creating a climate that prevents sexual assault, 

protect the victims, and hold the perpetrators fully accountable in accordance with 

appropriate legal processes. Our current focus is on the challenge of retaliation. 

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Commanders must have visibility of any potential retaliation or reprisal and must 

monitor investigations to ensure appropriate accountability. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Army resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help 

they need? 

Answer. The Army provides several resources to aid victims of sexual assault, including local Medical Treatment Facilities, Sexual Assault Response Coordinators 

(SARCs), Victim Witness Liaisons (VWLs), family advocacy, social services, chaplain 

services, and legal services. Army psychiatric counselors and chaplains are confidential counseling channels. 

The Army has transformed response services over the past years, including professionalizing the Sexual Assault Response Coordinators and Victim Advocate education, implementing the Special Victim Counsel (SVC) program, and establishing 

one-stop shops for victims in SHARP Resource Centers. The U.S. Army Medical 

Command sexual assault medical management team is designed to provide immediate and long-term patient care, which includes assessment and treatment of acute 

medical injuries, assessment of risk for pregnancy, options for emergency contraception, assessment of risk of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV prophylaxis, to necessary follow-up care and services. All patients are offered a referral to 

behavioral health at their first medical encounter and are encouraged to receive psychological care and victim advocacy support. In addition, there are long-term care 

plans tailored to meet the individual’s patient’s medical and behavioral health care 

needs. 

The Army SVC Program makes available to all sexual assault victims a specially 

trained and certified military attorney to represent the victim during all phases of 

a case, including investigation, military justice and administrative proceedings. The 

SVC is also a legal assistance attorney who provides both independent representation to the victim in the military justice context, and help with any legal issues the 

victim might have. This allows victims to form an attorney-client relationship with 

one attorney to whom they can turn for all their legal needs. To provide maximum 

coverage across the force and facilitate face-to-face communication between the SVC 

and victim, the Army maintains approximately 75 SVC stationed at 35 locations. I 

believe this is the right model for the Army and adequately protects the legal interest of sexual assault victims. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to prevent additional 

sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

Answer. The Army has made significant, measurable progress to prevent sexual 

assaults both at home and in deployed locations, but there is much more work to 

be done. I have been and will remain committed to combating this serious crime. 

If confirmed, I will build on the hard work that has been done and will ensure that 

Army leaders and soldiers across all our formations know that preventing sexual assault is one of my highest priorities. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the 

Army to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. The Army has one of, if not the best training programs for sexual assault 

investigators in the Nation. The basic two-week course is taught by nationally recognized civilian experts in trauma, alcohol facilitated sexual assaults, and the psychological effects of sexual assault. Course instructors also include experts in the medical aspects associated with child sexual assault, and renowned civilian police experts from highly regarded special victim investigative units. Additionally, I have 

been informed that the course’s lead instructor, Mr. Russ Strand, developed the Forensic Experiential Trauma Interview (FETI) technique. This innovative interview 

technique has been crucial to obtaining thorough and detailed testimonial evidence 

from victims of sexual assault, thereby setting the stage for successful prosecution. 

Mr. Strand was recognized with the Visionary Award by the Ending Violence 

Against Women International Association for his work on this advancement. Furthermore, the sexual assault investigation course and training are being taught to 

civilian law enforcement agencies, and college campus police, throughout the United 

States and Canada. The training has been nominated for the 2015 International Association of Chiefs of Police/Thomson Reuters Award for Excellence in Criminal Investigations. I have been informed that over half of the Army investigators in the 

field have received this training, and are employing its principles and processes 

daily, worldwide. Follow-on training courses focus on domestic violence, child abuse 

and advanced forensic crime scene processing. As a result, the Army’s investigators 

bring unmatched investigative capabilities to the installations’ special victim teams. 

Furthermore, it is my understanding that the Army has resourced its Criminal Investigation Command, with 30 specially trained, expert civilian Sexual Assault Investigators (SAIs), and stationed them at key locations around the world. Each SAI 

541 

brings the wealth of his/her training and expertise to every sexual assault investigation. Additionally, the SAIs use their knowledge and expertise to mentor less experienced investigators. Working hand-in-hand with specially trained sexual assault 

prosecutors, the special victim capability teams on each Army installation work tirelessly to ensure that all available evidence is collected and recorded to ensure successful prosecutions. 

The military justice system has undergone the most comprehensive revision since 

its implementation more than 50 years ago. Time is needed to implement and assess 

these changes. The training and resourcing of specially-selected and trained investigators and prosecutors has been a focus of Army efforts and has resulted in improved proficiencies for accountability. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to focus on these critical functions. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. I firmly believe the role of the commander is central to sexual assault 

prevention within the military including those behaviors and actions that could lead 

to sexual assault. The commanding officer of every unit is the centerpiece of an effective and professional warfighting organization. They are charged with building 

and leading their teams to withstand the rigors of combat by establishing the highest level of trust throughout their unit. 

Commanding officers are responsible for setting and enforcing a command climate 

that demands dignity and respect for all soldiers. Trust in the commander and fellow soldiers is the essential element in everything we do. Developing this trust, 

dedication, and esprit de corps is the responsibility of the commanding officer. They 

do this by setting standards, training to standards, and enforcing standards that 

clearly demonstrate intolerance to sexual assault. If confirmed, I will ensure standards for sexual assault prevention are met. 

Question. Surveys report that up to 62 percent of victims who report a sexual assault perceive professional or social retaliation for reporting. If confirmed, what will 

you do to address the issue of retaliation for reporting a sexual assault? 

Answer. The issue of professional or social retaliation is deeply concerning and the 

Army has been working proactively to address what is a complex and challenging 

aspect of changing a culture. Past efforts have included the expedited transfer program and the implementation of the Special Victim Counsel. Most recently, the 

Army has spoken with and surveyed victims, implemented policy to prohibit retaliation, developed training to assist soldiers in identifying and preventing retaliation, 

and implemented policy to investigate and monitor all allegations of retaliation. 

Based on recent surveys, the Army has sharpened its focus on addressing retaliation. The Army has implemented policy, adapted training, and begun collecting data 

for analysis. Committed, engaged leadership and grass-roots prevention campaigns 

at the squad leader level are critical to solving the problem of retaliation. 

Question. Sexual assault is a significantly underreported crime in our society and 

in the military. If confirmed, what will you do to increase reporting of sexual assaults by military victims? 

Answer. Recent survey data shows the Army is making significant progress in 

strengthening the Army culture in order to reinforce positive command climates 

where victims: are encouraged to report sexual assaults; know they will receive the 

best medical care and support services; their incidents will be thoroughly investigated by independent law enforcement experts in coordination with specially 

trained and selected Special Victim Prosecutors; and feel confident that offenders 

will be held appropriately accountable. 

Indicators of this progress include a significant decrease in prevalence, particularly for female soldiers, combined with an unprecedented increase in reporting. In 

the past year, the Army also experienced the highest conversion rate from restricted 

to unrestricted reports (triggering command notification and law enforcement investigation) since the inception of restricted reporting in 2005. The Army has also seen 

a substantial increase in the percentage of male victims reporting, an encouraging 

trend in one of the most challenging aspects of this fight given the complex nature 

of male on male assault. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command, instead of a military commander in the grade of O– 

6 or above as is currently the Department’s policy, to determine whether allegations 

of sexual assault should be prosecuted? 

Answer. The Commander is responsible for everything the unit does and fails to 

do. This responsibility cannot be overstated. I strongly support the Department’s 

current policy. The Uniform Code of Military Justice operates both as a criminal justice system and a critical component of a commander’s authority to maintain good 

order and discipline. I believe our soldiers and national security interests are best 

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served by retaining the military commander’s key role in the military justice decision process. While I greatly value the advice and recommendations of our highly 

proficient judge advocates, I firmly believe the military commander’s role is indispensable in the prosecutorial process. With this responsibility comes accountability. 

I also strongly support holding those few commanders who fall short of their responsibilities accountable for their actions or inaction. 

When a unit enters combat, success is directly dependent on the Commander’s 

ability to enforce his or her orders and standards. The Commander’s authority to 

refer charges to court-martial, especially for the most serious offenses such as sexual 

assault, is essential. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Army? 

Answer. I am encouraged by the progress the Army has made, but there is much 

more work to be done. If confirmed, I am committed to sustaining the momentum 

and progress. We have focused significant efforts on senior leadership engagement 

to address this cultural issue. To achieve continued progress we will place additional 

emphasis on junior leader/first line leaders taking ownership and helping to achieve 

the culture of dignity and respect required to eradicate sexual assault in our Army. 

Question. What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of recent legislation concerning sexual assault on the capability of Army commanders to prosecute sexual 

assault cases, including cases where prosecution is declined by civilian prosecutors? 

Answer. The Army is in the process of implementing all the requirements of the 

fiscal year 2014 NDAA concerning sexual assault and the capability of Army commanders to prosecute sexual assault cases. It is too soon in the process to evaluate 

the effects of all of the changes. The Army, like the other Services, will be carefully 

studying the effects, both intended and unintended, of all of the rapid and robust 

changes to the military justice system over the past few years and we will share 

our observations with Congress. 

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

American military personnel routinely deploy to locations around the world where 

they must engage and work effectively with allies and with host-country nationals 

whose faiths and beliefs may be different than their own. For many other cultures, 

religious faith is not a purely personal and private matter; it is the foundation of 

their culture and society. Learning to respect the different faiths and beliefs of others, and to understand how accommodating different views can contribute to a diverse force is, some would argue, an essential skill to operational effectiveness. 

Question. In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the 

military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, 

including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief? 

Answer. A number of religious (and belief) accommodation protections are afforded to soldiers beginning with the First Amendment and proceeding through title 

10, DOD Directives, and Army policies. Yes, I believe our current protections appropriately balance the Army’s compelling interest in unit cohesion and good order and 

discipline, on the one hand, and soldiers’ adherence to their religious beliefs, on the 

other. 

Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and good order and discipline? 

Answer. Yes, current law and policy appropriately balance unit cohesion and good 

order and discipline with individual expressions of belief. Leaders at all levels develop soldiers to embody Army values, which emphasize the importance of treating 

others with dignity and respect. These values help create a culture of respect for 

the religious rights and expressions of others, including those who hold to no religious beliefs. 

Question. In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and respects open 

and candid discussions about personal religious faith and beliefs in a home-port environment contribute in a positive way to preparing U.S. forces to be effective in 

overseas assignments? 

Answer. It has been my experience that being tolerant and accepting of differences is a virtue valued by our soldiers, and I believe this has been the case since 

our Nation’s founding. America’s soldiers are diverse. Treating others respectfully 

clearly has a positive impact on operations within or outside of our Nation. 

Question. Would a policy that discourages open discussions about personal faith 

and beliefs be more or less effective at preparing servicemembers to work and operate in a pluralistic environment? 

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Answer. In my opinion, denying varying attitudes or opinions does not provide an 

opportunity to work through any differences that may exist. The Army develops 

leaders and builds teams. Part of that process involves respecting each other’s values and beliefs as Americans, without forcing others to accept those values or beliefs. 

Question. In your view, when performing official military duties outside a worship 

service, should military chaplains be encouraged to express their personal religious 

beliefs and tenets of their faith freely, or must they avoid making statements based 

on their religious beliefs? 

Answer. As I understand current legal protections, all servicemembers’ beliefs and 

the expression of those beliefs are protected. When opinions are expressed, religious 

or otherwise, in thoughtful consideration of those hearing the discussion or comment, an opportunity for meaningful dialogue is opened. All soldiers must treat each 

other with dignity and respect within The Army Profession. 

Question. Do you believe chaplains should be tasked with conducting non-religious 

training in front of mandatory formations, even if they may be uniquely qualified 

to speak on the particular topic, such as suicide prevention or substance abuse? If 

so, do you believe guidance provided to those chaplains on what they should and 

should not say with respect to their faith is adequate? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will seek the advice of the Chief of Chaplains, the member 

of the Army Staff charged with advising me on these and other matters. Chaplains 

serve in two distinct roles as officers in our Army, both as staff officers and religious 

leaders. Chaplains have historically maintained a balance in both of those roles and 

in their functions of providing religious support and advising commanders. If confirmed, I will review the guidance on this topic and assess if it is adequate. 

JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nicholsrequired Joint Qualification System? 

Answer. Without question, Goldwater-Nichols has brought a joint mindset to military operations and in doing so improved the Department of Defense. Clearly collaboration among Services has improved. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army to determine to what extent Goldwater-Nichols supports the 

Force of the Future and what, if any changes might be needed. 

Question. Do you think additional changes in law or regulation are needed to respond to the unique career-progression needs of Army officers? 

Answer. While I do not now see any urgent need for change, if confirmed, I will 

work with the Secretary of the Army to determine to what extent the current laws 

and regulations support the Force of the Future in a changing environment. 

Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with becoming a Joint 

Qualified Officer, including links to promotion to general officer rank, consistent 

with the operational and professional demands of Army line officers? 

Answer. Yes, in my judgment, it is important that Army General Officers be joint 

qualified. 

Question. If not, what modifications, if any, to the requirements for joint officer 

qualifications are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to attain meaningful joint and service-specific leadership experience and professional development? 

Answer. I feel the joint requirements are adequate today and, if confirmed, I will 

work with the Secretary of the Army to manage the officer corps so as to preserve 

the joint qualification process in the future. 

Question. In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification requirements on 

the ability of the services to select the best qualified officers for promotion and to 

enable officer assignments that will satisfy service-specific officer professional development requirements? 

Answer. I feel the joint requirements are adequate today and help identify the 

best officers for promotion. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army 

to manage the impacts on the officer corps. 

Question. Do you think a tour with a combatant command staff should count toward the Joint tour requirement? 

Answer. Yes. Combatant commanders are inherently joint and provide a rich professional experience. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Question. The committee continues to have an acute interest in the Department 

of Defense civilian and contractors who support our soldiers. 

What is your assessment of the current morale of the Department of the Army 

civilian and contractor workforces? 

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Answer. The Army civilian workforce has been nothing short of stellar and steadfast in support of our Army at war. That said, I am concerned with the impact on 

morale of several years of pay freezes, a year without performance bonuses, two 

rounds of furloughs, and messages about downsizing. If confirmed, I will work with 

the Secretary of the Army to ensure we maintain visibility on morale of our workforce. Maintaining positive civilian morale is as important as soldier morale to the 

readiness of the Total Force. 

Question. What do you believe is the appropriate proper balance of manpower between Department of the Army for uniformed personnel, civilian Department employees, and contractor personnel? 

Answer. The appropriate balance should reflect the primacy of the warfighter; the 

Army needs sufficient civilian employees and contract support to ensure the most 

efficient and effective use of uniformed personnel. That differs at each echelon of 

command and by installation and organization. If confirmed, I will work with the 

Secretary of the Army to ensure we maintain an appropriate balance of manpower 

which provides the Nation the most effective use of all available resources. 

Question. What workforce flexibilities do you consider necessary for the Department of the Army to better manage its workforce? 

Answer. The Army requires greater flexibility from Recruiting and Accession to 

Development, Employment, and Transition to better manage its workforce. If confirmed, I’ll work closely with the Secretary of the Army to examine the policies and 

resources required to obtain this flexibility that allows us to retain top talent. 

Question. How will you manage the further reduction of civilian employees? 

Answer. As needed, the Army will continue to promote voluntary measures as 

much as possible to reduce the civilian workforce. Commands are encouraged to use 

reshaping tools such as release of temporary employees, not extending temporary 

and term employees, separation of highly qualified experts (HQE), separation of reemployed annuitants, attrition, management-directed reassignments, hiring controls, the Department of Defense Priority Placement Program and Voluntary Early 

Retirement. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army to manage reductions in a responsible and compassionate manner. 

ACQUISITION

Question. Has acquisition as currently conducted provided the Army weapons, 

equipment and supplies effectively and in a cost efficient manner? 

Answer. The defense acquisition system needs to improve in timeliness and cost 

effectiveness in order to provide our soldiers with the systems, technologies, and 

equipment to dominate our adversaries. 

Question. Does the current acquisition system ensure the Army is fully modernized in a timely manner? 

Answer. The complexity of processes and rules in the defense acquisition system 

limit flexibility and add time and cost to the process of developing and fielding new 

warfighting capabilities. While all involved strive to ensure our soldiers have the 

best equipment, the acquisition process could be simplified and streamlined while 

retaining emphasis on sound program planning and risk mitigation. To achieve this 

goal and ensure our systems can be developed and fielded more quickly, we must 

reduce redundant documentation, provide more flexibility to program managers, and 

place greater emphasis on sound acquisition planning. This will inject much-needed 

agility and flexibility into the process while maintaining robust oversight of taxpayer dollars. 

Question. Should the Chief of Staff of the United States Army have the authority 

and responsibility to control Army acquisition programs? 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army plays a critical role in the development 

of Service requirements and the allocation of funding necessary to successfully develop and field programs. The operational experience and leadership of Service 

Chiefs are invaluable to generating and stabilizing achievable requirements and ensuring the resources necessary to achieve these capabilities. Additionally, the Service Chiefs are ideally positioned to provide strategic priorities and areas of emphasis 

in the development of warfighting capabilities that respond to current and emerging 

operational threats. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army to explore opportunities for an increased role in the acquisition process in order to drive 

requirements, resources, and acquisition to ensure our soldiers have the best possible equipment in a timely manner. 

Question. How will you meet your responsibilities to ensure Army acquisition programs stay on schedule, within cost and perform to expectations? 

Answer. Achievable and affordable requirements, as well as stable and predictable 

funding, are critical to the success of acquisition programs. As a representative of 

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our soldiers’ needs, if confirmed, I will work to validate and prioritize realistic requirements and request stable and sufficient funding be provided to successfully 

meet our capability gaps. This role is especially important during times of decreased 

budgets, such as now, when the Department must implement investment decisions 

with limited resources. Additionally, acquisition programs cannot be successful without a trained, professional, and experienced workforce. If confirmed, I will promote 

the qualifications, expertise and capability of the acquisition workforce by focusing 

on the recruitment, development, and retention of individuals with critical acquisition skill sets in order to provide the Army essential capabilities for continued success. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the Administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Chief of 

Staff of the Army? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JIM INHOFE

READINESS OF THE FORCE

1. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, how do lower readiness levels and a smaller 

force impact our ability to deter aggression? 

General MILLEY. In order to deter aggression, our capability and capacity to rapidly deploy and conduct combat operations to defeat enemy objectives must be understood and believed by our opponents. Readiness is the core requirement, which 

underpins deterrence of rational opponents. High readiness will result in an increased likelihood of deterrence. Size, skills, capability and capacity are required to 

deter rational adversaries. Lower readiness levels and a smaller force decrease the 

likelihood of deterrence and increase the likelihood of aggression with respect to rational actors. 

2. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, if a major or even minor contingency operation 

were executed today given the Army’s current state of readiness and current global 

commitments, is it possible the Army would have to send forces into combat that 

are not fully trained and ready? 

General MILLEY. The possibility that the Army would have to send forces into 

combat that are not fully trained depends greatly on the nature of the contingency, 

combatant commander timelines, and national priorities on our ability to re-allocate 

forces. Given current readiness levels and uncertain global demands, if confirmed, 

I will assess our readiness levels closely as my top priority. I will provide candid 

military advice on our capability to meet requirements to avoid having to send 

forces into combat that are not fully trained and ready. 

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3. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, should the United States be postured to fight 

two Major Contingency Operations simultaneously? What is the impact of only being 

postured to fight one Major Contingency Operation? 

General MILLEY. Yes, the U.S. should be postured to fight two major contingency 

operations simultaneously, which is in accordance with the 2014 QDR. The 2014 

QDR asserts that U.S. forces must be capable of defeating a regional adversary in 

a large-scale, multi-phased campaign and denying the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable cost on—a second aggressor in another region. Being postured to fight 

two major contingency operations simultaneously prevents potential adversaries 

from exploiting a crisis to pursue their objectives and allows us to mitigate the risk 

of unanticipated crises and requirements. Being postured to fight only one major 

contingency operation could force undesirable choices between vital national interests and leave the U.S., allies, and partners at risk. 

4. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, does priority for readiness, training and equipment go to deployed/forward stationed forces followed by forces getting ready to deploy? If so, how does that impact the readiness of follow on forces back in the U.S. 

and their ability to respond to unforeseen crisis? 

General MILLEY. All Army units and soldiers actively supporting combatant commands deploy at the highest levels of assigned mission readiness. Outside of deployed forces, the Army has had to focus resources on a small number of non-deployed brigade combat teams and enabling forces to preserve a small contingency 

response capability. For non-deployed units at lower readiness levels, it takes longer 

to get them ready to respond to an unforeseen crisis, undermining the advantages 

of rapid deployment. 

FORCE STRUCTURE

5. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, the Army recently announced its plan to cut 

40,000 soldiers, many having served multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and will announce specifics on a cut of 17,000 civilians from its ranks in Sep. Is 

this the correct size for our Army given threats around the world and demands for 

ground forces everywhere? 

General MILLEY. This personnel drawdown supports the President’s Fiscal Year 

2016 Budget and is part of the Army’s effort to rebalance endstrength, readiness, 

and modernization efforts to shape a 980,000 Total Army (450,000 AC, 335,000 

ARNG, and 195,000 USAR). This force is capable of supporting the Defense Strategy, but at a ‘‘significant’’ level of risk. I believe that a 1.045M Total Force (490,000 

AC, 350,000 ARNG, and 205,000 USAR) at a level of funding adequate to balance 

end strength, readiness, and modernization could better address an increasingly unpredictable future security environment. 

6. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, there are currently just over 20,000 soldiers 

in South Korea alone. If the Army had to respond to a Korea scenario today given 

its reduced readiness and force structure, would the Army be able to source all its 

combat ready forces from the U.S. or it have to take forces from other theaters such 

as EUCOM and CENTCOM, who are already short of forces and resources? 

General MILLEY. If confirmed, I will thoroughly review the forces required in the 

event of a Korea contingency. However, it is my current understanding, in the event 

of crisis or conflict in Korea, we would first deploy ready units not already committed to other operations in other theaters. The sourcing of forces for contingency 

operations (such as the Korea scenario) is dependent on the state of readiness and 

commitment of all forces in the Army inventory at the time of execution. The possibility exists that the Army would have to draw forces away from other combatant 

commands, such as EUCOM or CENTCOM, in order to respond to a Korea scenario. 

7. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, how do you see the three components of the 

Army contributing most effectively to this Nation’s land power requirements? How 

important is it to balance the three components? 

General MILLEY. Balancing the three distinct and equally important components 

of the Total Army is critical. The optimal blend of each component will depend on 

the specific mission requirement generated by the combatant commanders and requires careful mission analysis and, significantly, the time required to respond to 

the combatant commanders’ requirement. If confirmed, I will assess the Total Army 

force structure and recommend adjustments as necessary. 

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8. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, do you believe our Army has the force structure, training and equipment to meet all the requirements in the National Military 

Strategy today? 

General MILLEY. As outlined in the 2014 QDR, the Army (as part of the Joint 

Force) has to accomplish the three tasks of the defense strategy: defend the homeland, build security globally, and project power and win decisively. The Army has 

the force structure, training, and equipment to accomplish the first mission, but the 

second and third missions present growing challenges. The Army has the capability 

to build security globally, but ongoing force reductions place a greater strain on that 

capacity. Emergent demands and decreased resources may change underlying assumptions, increasing risk to our ability to project power and win decisively as our 

capacity and resources continue to decrease. 

9. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, do you think the Army is accepting too much 

risk given the growing instability around the globe? 

General MILLEY. I concur with GEN Odierno’s assessment that a 980,000 Total 

Army (450,000 AC, 335,000 ARNG, and 195,000 USAR) will be capable of executing 

the defense strategy outlined in the 2014 QDR at a ‘‘significant’’ level of risk. The 

2014 QDR, however, did not account for the growing instability that we now see in 

Russia’s aggression in the Ukraine, the rise of ISIL, the Ebola crisis, and increasing 

challenges in the Pacific region. 

10. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, how will you know when our military has 

accepted too much risk? 

General MILLEY. I will know we have accepted too much risk when the risk to 

mission or risk to force is unacceptable. If the Army’s capacity (i.e., number of 

troops available) is insufficient to meet the National Security and combatant commander requirements, to include war plan contingencies, we have reached an unacceptable level of risk to mission. If the Army has the capacity, but not the capability 

(i.e., skills and readiness) and is not resourced to fix that shortfall before deploying 

the force, we will have reached an unacceptable level of risk to the force. In either 

case, I will know our Nation has accepted too much risk. 

11. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, what are the indicators that you look for? 

General MILLEY. Indicators I look for include the capacity and capability of the 

force to accomplish the mission. Capacity is measured by the force’s size; capability 

by its skill and readiness, where readiness is a function of manning, training, equipping, and leading. A decrease of any of these indicators illustrates or creates increased risk. Additionally, any change in the global security environment (e.g., increasing instability or volatility) is an indicator of risk. Lastly, any increase in our 

adversaries’ relative capability or capacity is an indicator of increasing risk. 

SECURITY OF THE FORCE

12. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, what are your thoughts regarding the security status of Army personnel serving at locations both on and off-post? 

General MILLEY. Force protection is a key task for any commander, and there are 

a wide variety of active and passive measures commanders can employ. In all environments, leaders must balance force protection with mission accomplishment. As 

with everything that we do, Army leaders at all levels conduct risk analysis to ensure that we mitigate risk as low as possible while still maintaining the ability to 

accomplish our missions. For example, commanders can harden structures, e.g. bulletproof glass, increase patrols, and coordinate closely with federal and civilian law 

enforcement. It is especially necessary to reevaluate all measures due to the recent 

shootings in Tennessee, as DOD is currently doing. 

13. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, do we need to reassess our security levels, 

rules of engagement, training requirements, ability to increase manning of armed 

security personnel, and authorization for military personnel to carry government 

firearms both concealed and openly carry to and from duty? 

General MILLEY. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with OSD to assess all those factors. The Army is currently evaluating our options for increasing the security posture of our personnel to include both active and passive security measures. Arming 

well-trained soldiers would fall into the active measure category while increasing 

additional security layers to facility access points qualify as passive measures. Any 

option considered must comply with existing law. Whichever option we decide upon 

must take into consideration not only the safety and security of our soldiers but the 

communities in which they work. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

SHORTFALLS IN EUROPE—DETERRING PUTIN

14. Senator AYOTTE. General Milley, in your advance policy question responses, 

you stated that the Army in Europe does not have what it needs. Specifically, what 

does EUCOM need that it does not have? 

General MILLEY. EUCOM needs additional assets, permanent or rotational, to 

deter Russian aggression and assure allies. The Army is in the process of placing 

activity sets and pre-positioned equipment in Europe manned with forces rotating 

on a temporary basis to assist with this mission. I have been briefed that EUCOM 

is estimating it needs additional armor, sustainment, engineering, intelligence, medical, fires, and signal; furthermore EUCOM may require additional military police 

assets. If confirmed, I will continue to work with EUCOM to further develop these 

requirements. 

NH ARMY NATIONAL GUARD MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

15. Senator AYOTTE. General Milley, in times of fiscal strain, one of the first 

things that gets cut or delayed is military construction. The problem is that these 

cuts exact a growing readiness toll over time. For that reason, I continue to be troubled by the condition of New Hampshire Army National Guard readiness centers— 

a trend that I know is reflected around the country. However, the condition of readiness centers in New Hampshire is particularly unacceptable. According to the Army 

National Guard Readiness Center Transformation Master Plan final report to Congress last year, the average condition index (CI) of New Hampshire Army National 

Guard readiness centers is Poor (64 out of a 100 scale), ranking New Hampshire 

51 out of the 54 states and territories evaluated nationwide. 

In total, the New Hampshire Army National Guard has 1 readiness center rated 

‘Fair’, 12 rated ‘Poor’, and 3 rated ‘Failing’. 

The Manchester readiness center was constructed in 1938 and does not comply 

with building code standards—as well as life, health, safety and Anti-terrorism 

Force Protection standards. Members of the New Hampshire Army National 

Guard—and servicemembers like them around the country—deserve better. 

I am pleased that the Department is finally requesting funding for New Hampshire Army National Guard vehicle maintenance shops in Hooksett and Rochester 

for fiscal year 2017, as well as readiness centers in Pembroke and Concord for fiscal 

years 2018 and 2020, respectively. Considering the poor state of New Hampshire 

Army National Guard facilities, it is essential that these projects not be postponed 

and that they go forward as currently scheduled. 

When confirmed, will you examine the allocation of military construction dollars 

not only between the Active and Reserve component, but also the allocation among 

the state Army National Guards to ensure the optimal allocation? 

General MILLEY. Yes, if confirmed, I will examine the allocation of military construction resources across the Total Army, to include New Hampshire Guard facilities. 

ENDSTRENGTH REDUCTIONS—STRATEGIC RATIONALE?—HOW MANY INVOLUNTARY

SEPARATIONS?

16. Senator AYOTTE. General Milley, under the current plan, the Army will have 

to cut about 40,000 Active Duty soldiers in the next couple of years in order to reach 

an Active Duty endstrength of 450,000 soldiers. In your responses to the advance 

policy questions, you said, ‘‘Right now the level of uncertainty, the velocity of instability, and potential for significant inter-state conflict is higher than it has been 

since the end of the Cold War in 1989–91.’’ You also note that, ‘‘the demand for 

ground forces will continue to increase even more so since many of our longstanding 

allies have significantly reduced their military forces over the last 25 years.’’What 

is the strategic rationale for cutting the size of our Active Duty Army by 40,000 soldiers (8 percent) in the next two years? 

General MILLEY. The Army was forced to make reductions as a result of the Budget Control Act. Within those resource constraints, the Army developed a plan to 

maintain a balance between endstrength, readiness, and modernization. The reductions were informed based on a comprehensive analysis of mission requirements and 

installation capabilities. 

17. Senator AYOTTE. General Milley, if defense sequestration is not reversed and 

the Army must go down to 450,000 or even 420,000 Active Duty soldiers, how many 

well-performing non-commissioned officers and officers will have to be involuntarily 

separated (given pink slips)? 

549 

General MILLEY. The Army anticipates that as it reduces from 490,000 to 450,000 

in the Active Component, it will have to involuntarily separate approximately 

15,000 Noncommissioned Officers and Officers. If the Army is directed to go to 

420,000, it will have to involuntarily separate an additional 13,000 Noncommissioned Officers and Officers (28,000 total). 

18. Senator AYOTTE. General Milley, we talk about not breaking faith with our 

soldiers. When we give a well-performing soldier who has deployed (often multiple 

times) a pink slip simply to meet a budget-drive endstrength reduction, I think that 

is breaking faith.I hope Congress will provide the funding necessary to maintain the 

Army endstrength our national security interests require. When confirmed, will you 

work to minimize the use of involuntary separations of well-performing soldiers? 

General MILLEY. Yes. 

POOR ARMY READINESS

19. Senator AYOTTE. General Milley, in your responses to the advance policy questions, you said that ‘‘only about 30 percent of Army brigades are at acceptable levels 

of combat readiness.’’ You note that number should be between 60–70 percent.What 

is the primary reason for this poor readiness, and what can Congress do to help improve Army readiness? 

General MILLEY. The primary reason is the budget reduction driven requirement 

to make unforecasted trade-offs between endstrength, readiness, and modernization 

and resulting budget uncertainty. Congress can assist by providing the predictable 

funding necessary to restore the appropriate balance between modernization, 

endstrength, and readiness. 

20. Senator AYOTTE. General Milley, what is the optimal balance between having 

the number of personnel the Army needs and having the right equipment to achieve 

today’s strategy? 

General MILLEY. The optimal balance, informed by resourcing, weighs readiness, 

modernization, and endstrength against National Security Requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure no soldier is deployed in harm’s way without the proper training and equipment. Right now, within PB16, the Army can, with ‘‘significant risk,’’ 

field a 980,000 Total Army (450,000 AC, 335,000 ARNG, and 195,000 USAR). If the 

current Budget Control Act funding levels remain in place, I will have to work with 

the Secretary of the Army to reduce the Army, perhaps to 920,000 Total Army 

(420,000 AC, 315,000 ARNG, and 185,000 USAR) in order to ensure we have the 

right balance of readiness, modernization, and endstrength. 

21. Senator AYOTTE. General Milley, there has been discussion recently about the 

balance between light infantry forces, medium forces, and heavy forces. In view of 

requirements and likely missions in the future, what do you believe is the optimal 

balance of these types of forces? 

General MILLEY. The Army continually reassesses mission requirements to inform 

decisions regarding force structure. If confirmed, I will review the COCOM operational planning requirements to ensure the Army has the appropriate force mix. 

ARMY MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS

22. Senator AYOTTE. General Milley, how should the Army balance developing and 

fielding new systems such as the Future Fighting Vehicle versus modernizing existing systems such as the Abrams tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. 

General MILLEY. Deployed soldiers must always have the most advanced capabilities available while the Army must also prepare for future threats. To accomplish 

this, the Army modernization strategy mixes limited development of new capabilities with incremental upgrades to existing platforms while also investing in key enabling technologies to support future efforts. 

In the current fiscal environment, the Army’s Combat Vehicle Modernization 

Strategy focuses on cost-effective replacement of obsolete vehicles, maintenance and 

improvement of proven platforms to ensure relevance, and aggressive pursuit of 

technology development to fill anticipated capability gaps. Until resources are available to fully develop a Future Fighting Vehicle, the Army will continue Science and 

Technology investment in Infantry Fighting Vehicle enabling technologies while focusing its vehicle modernization efforts on procurement of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle and incremental upgrades to the Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker families of vehicles. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JONI ERNST

DRAWDOWN IN FORCES

23. Senator ERNST. In light of troop reductions and growing threats, what recommendations do you have for developing the Army of the future that allows fighting units to be scalable and expeditionary for a variety of missions? 

General MILLEY. The U.S. Army is and must remain the world’s premier ground 

combat force, capable of conducting sustained campaigns on land to achieve U.S. 

National Security objectives while remaining true to our national values. Individual 

and collective training creates capable formations and develops leaders as the source 

of future flexibility. Army units are designed to be scalable and expeditionary in 

order to execute a variety of missions. The Army traditionally task organizes forces 

based on mission analysis and deploys/employs only those units necessary for mission accomplishment. Brigade Combat Teams, for example, can be task organized 

by capability, by capacity, or by function to execute a variety of missions, from support and assistance to major combat operations. If confirmed, I will continually assess and collaborate with the other Service Chiefs and adapt the Army to meet current needs and position itself for the future. 

24. Senator ERNST. How will a reduction in forces affect readiness in the future? 

General MILLEY. The National Military Strategy requires the Army to simultaneously defend the homeland, assure our allies, deter adversaries and, when required, defeat one regional aggressor and deny an aggressor in another region. 

Lower readiness levels, constant demand and a smaller force will erode readiness 

for surge missions. The Army is prioritizing current operations and shaping oversurge capacity. As a result, senior leaders responding to future contingencies will 

soon be forced to decide between committing forces at lower readiness levels and 

partially incurring higher casualties, or delaying the deployment of forces to build 

readiness, jeopardizing mission accomplishment. 

25. Senator ERNST. In conversations with soldiers from the non-commissioned officer to field grade levels, I am told our soldiers are concerned with the operational 

tempo of the Active Duty force. Some of these soldiers claimed Army leaders were 

failing soldiers by not scaling the amount of requirements to the reduced size of the 

force. How will you ensure unit commanders are accurately portraying their ability 

to accomplish assigned tasks and protecting the long-term readiness of the force? 

General MILLEY. The Army relies on the Commander’s Unit Status Report (USR) 

to show the unit’s ability to accomplish assigned tasks. This report requires standard entries which indicate unit readiness trends over time and also allows the commander to raise any concerns. Long-term readiness trends of the force are reflected 

in performance trends at Army training venues, like maneuver combat training centers. The Army strives to communicate combatant command operational tempo with 

the Joint Staff and OSD so that we can prioritize missions for a decreasing Army 

force. Finally, the Army has multiple forums to synchronize, manage and distribute 

mission assignments across the force. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman, 

Secretary of Defense, and Congress on balancing demand with the supply of Army 

forces. I will also personally stress to our commanders that I will accept nothing 

less than their honest assessments on the USR. 

WORLDWIDE THREATS

26. Senator ERNST. If Russia represents our greatest threat, what recommendations would you offer to deter Russia and reassure allies? 

General MILLEY. I would recommend that our Army continue to support the combatant commander’s plans and requirements by increasing our posture on NATO’s 

eastern flank, providing additional rotational forces and prepositioned stocks, and 

building additional combat power capacities to support multilateral training exercises and enable rapid force projection. In my judgment, only a strong posture and 

close cooperation with regional allies will provide this level of both assurance and 

deterrence. Continued funding of the European Reassurance Initiative is critical to 

effect this and support the combatant commander’s strategy. 

27. Senator ERNST. During your testimony, you said that Russia was the greatest 

existential threat to the United States. How will you improve the Army’s support 

to U.S. Army Europe with respect to enhancing military intelligence support to operations and force protection? 

General MILLEY. The Army currently provides military intelligence support, including counterintelligence force protection, at the strategic level with intelligence 

551 

personnel assigned to the United States Army NATO Brigade and the 650th Military Intelligence Group (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; and at the 

operational level through the assignment to U.S. European Command (EUCOM) of 

the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade. The 66th has the ability to downward reinforce tactical units operating within EUCOM area of responsibility, and is currently 

doing so in the form of counterintelligence support to the units forward deployed to 

the Baltics in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. Additionally, the Army has regionally aligned the 4th Infantry Division with EUCOM, which provides additional 

intelligence support and analytic capacity to EUCOM through reachback and 

through a forward deployed detachment of intelligence officers and analysts in Germany. Finally, the 902nd Military Intelligence Group, part of the Army Intelligence 

and Security Command, provides general support to counterintelligence efforts as 

required. If confirmed, I will assess whether this level of support meets the combatant commander’s needs. 

28. Senator ERNST. During your testimony, you said that Russia was the greatest 

existential threat to the United States. How will you enhance the Army’s support 

to U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) with respect to enhancing USAREUR’s ability to 

reassure our allies and deter Russian aggression through the training of Ukrainian 

forces? 

General MILLEY. While the Army is enhancing the U.S. Army Europe’s 

(USAREUR) efforts to build Ukrainian capacity within their National Guard security forces through a moderate training and equipping package, we will remain prepared to increase our assistance to Ukraine by providing similar support to the 

Ukrainian armed forces, if authorized. These efforts, if expanded beyond their police-like National Guard, will certainly improve their interoperability with NATO 

and build capacity to protect their borders and defend their sovereignty, assuring 

our allies and further deterring Russia. If confirmed, I will work closely with 

USAREUR to ensure we are poised to provide ready forces at the right time to meet 

emerging requirements. 

29. Senator ERNST. As the Army considers sending a second brigade’s worth of 

equipment to Europe that would be solely for contingencies as well as dedicating 

the entire 4th Infantry Division to rotating in and out of Europe for training, exercises and partner activities, how will you balance the threat posed by Russia with 

the possible need to place United States troops further forward in the fight against 

ISIL in Iraq? 

General MILLEY. While the Army remains committed to meeting the emergent demands of both combatant commanders, budget cuts and force structure reductions 

present the Army with significant challenges given declining resources and force 

structure. At a 980,000 Total Army (450,000 AC, 335,000 ARNG, and 195,000 

USAR) and structure levels, we can satisfy demand and meet the strategy at significant risk. At lower budget levels at a 920,000 Total Army (420,000 AC, 315,000 

ARNG, and 185,000 USAR), we face an unacceptable risk to these strategies. In either case, the threats posed by Russia and ISIL require different Army capabilities. 

The Army’s support to EUCOM focuses on our armored formations and building regional interoperability and multilateral training, while the current counter-ISIL 

strategy requires more agile and light units trained for advise and assist missions. 

If confirmed, I will work with both combatant commanders to ensure we prudently 

manage risk at whichever end strength the budget allows and provide trained and 

ready forces to meet their differing requirements. 

SMALL ARMS WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MODERNIZATION

30. Senator ERNST. The primary weapon system of the soldier is used to accomplish the Army’s mission to engage and destroy our Nation’s enemies in close combat. Despite this, and 14 years of lessons learned in thousands of ground combat 

engagements with the enemy across the globe, the Army has not prioritized the development and fielding of new small arms weapons. In general, the rifles, pistols, 

and machine guns in the Army provide generally the same capabilities with respect 

to lethality, range, and reliability as they did decades ago. While minor modifications have been made to some M4 carbines, these were only accomplished after 

great resistance by the Army and did not address lethality and range of the weapon. 

How will you seek to prioritize the modernization of the Army’s small arms weapons? 

General MILLEY. The Army developed a Small Arms Weapon Strategy in 2014 to 

ensure our modernization programs provide our soldiers the most capable weapons 

in combat. As you mentioned, all of our current M4 carbines will be upgraded to 

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M4A1’s by 2022. The Army is also conducting a comprehensive Small Arms Ammunition Configuration Study that addresses several criteria, to include lethality, 

range, and reliability. This study will determine a feasible, suitable, and acceptable 

ammunition configuration in order to develop and implement a small arms strategy 

that ensures overmatch at the lowest tactical level in 2025 and beyond. Finally, we 

must ensure our simulators and simulations accurately reflect current small arms 

capabilities to ensure our training is both effective and realistic. If confirmed, I will 

look holistically at our modernization efforts. 

31. Senator ERNST. According to a 2013 RAND study, which was conducted on behalf of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Development (G–8), RAND found that the 

Army dismounted squad had ‘‘the least amount of decisive advantages with respect 

to current and foreseeable threats.’’ How will you seek to modernize the Army’s 

small arms weapons and ammunition inventory for our maneuver squads? 

General MILLEY. Army Training and Doctrine Command is now conducting a 

Small Arms Ammunition Configuration Study, with the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, leading the study. The USMC and SOCOM are participating as well. Completion of the study is expected by Second Quarter fiscal year 

2017. 

The study is investigating emerging and future ammunition capabilities to ensure 

continued overmatch for the dismounted individual soldier, fire team and squad to 

2025 and beyond considering both current and emerging threats. The Army will use 

this foundation to inform and update our Soldier Weapons Strategy. 

The study evaluates conventional and non-conventional calibers used in carbines, 

rifles, and light or medium machine guns. This evaluation includes existing small 

arms ammunition system capabilities, commercial off-the-shelf capabilities, and 

emerging and developmental small arms ammunition capabilities. The study also includes an extensive review of previous ammunition studies by the Army and USMC 

dating from 2006, operational lessons learned collected by the Army, USMC, 

SOCOM, and other joint and coalition forces, and Army post-combat surveys and reports. 

If confirmed, I will work with the Committee to address any concerns with the 

Army’s small arms strategy. 

32. Senator ERNST. Specifically what new materiel technologies is the Army pursuing in small arms to increase range and lethality of the Army’s small arms weapons? 

General MILLEY. The Army is funding research to develop and demonstrate technologies to increase small arms range and lethality. These investments will provide 

the soldier the ability to provide variable effects (from non-lethal to lethal) in a single cartridge at ranges greater than currently available. The investments should 

also yield new ammunition with reduced weight and signature, improved terminal 

performance, and increased soft and hard target penetration. The Army is also developing an advanced fire control capability that rapidly and accurately determines 

the range of a target, sensors that can measure local and downrange conditions, and 

ballistic sensors to reduce trajectory errors. 

33. Senator ERNST. According to U.S. Special Operations Command, Lessons 

Learned/Operational and Strategic Studies Branch, special operations 

servicemembers felt that, ‘‘In Afghanistan, a more rural environment, the majority 

of effective fire is received at greater than 300 meters. So, when in the open, and 

engaging targets at a distance, most prefer the SCAR–H with the 7.62 ammunition, 

but when operating in tighter spaces, the M4A1 is still the preferred weapon.’’ Do 

you concur with this assessment of Special Forces engaged in ground combat in Afghanistan that an assault rifle which uses a larger caliber round than the 5.56mm 

EPR would provide greater effects on targets located at greater ranges than 300 meters? 

General MILLEY. Yes, a larger caliber such as 7.62mm provides greater effects at 

greater range. Although, the caliber of ammunition and target range are important 

to the effects on a target, there are other factors too. The Army Training and Doctrine Command is conducting a Small Arms Ammunition Configuration Study, with 

the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, leading the study. The 

results of the study are important to informing future decisions regarding the right 

mix of ammunition and weapons platforms needed to engage different types of targets at varying ranges across diverse operational environments. I have been advised 

that the Army will use the results of the study to determine the best caliber and 

other weapons characteristics to best achieve the desired target effects at various 

ranges. 

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34. Senator ERNST. According to U.S. Special Operations Command, Lessons 

Learned/Operational and Strategic Studies Branch, special operations 

servicemembers felt that, ‘‘In Afghanistan, a more rural environment, the majority 

of effective fire is received at greater than 300 meters. So, when in the open, and 

engaging targets at a distance, most prefer the SCAR–H with the 7.62 ammunition, 

but when operating in tighter spaces, the M4A1 is still the preferred weapon.’’ Understanding the organic capability provided by a squad designated marksman, do 

you believe with this battlefield assessment’s implication that ‘‘pure-fleeting’’ of 

5.56mm ammunition carbine rifles created a capability gap within maneuver 

squads? 

General MILLEY. At issue is whether the capability gap, if any, creates an unacceptable level of risk to force and mission accomplishment. While a larger caliber 

such as 7.62mm provides greater effects at greater range, the Army’s current assessment is that the inherent capabilities of the M4A1, including extensive modifications over the past 10 years, appropriately mitigates that risk. The M4A1’s M855A1 

enhanced performance round provides greater range and improved down range effect and the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, organic to infantry squads and other 

networked lethality capabilities, provides the ability to engage and destroy point 

targets at 600 meters. Moving forward, the ongoing Small Arms Ammunition Configuration Study is intended to inform the process of determining the optimal ammunition and caliber combinations for future squad small arms, taking into account 

desired target effects at various ranges. 

35. Senator ERNST. During your testimony, you said that Russia was the greatest 

existential threat to the United States. Currently, Russia is aggressively modernizing its small arms and individual soldier equipment as a part of its overall military modernization strategy. Will you prioritize fielding small arms and ammunition 

which will provide the infantry soldier with weapons and ammunition that have 

greater range, reliability, and lethality, than the current legacy small arms weapons 

in use today? 

General MILLEY. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure that, within budgetary constraints, we strive to achieve and maintain overmatch against any adversary, including at the individual soldier level. 

36. Senator ERNST. In my conversations with soldiers who have served in Afghanistan, I am told insurgent forces developed a full understanding of the small arms 

capabilities and limitations of our infantry squads. This understanding caused our 

enemies to use tactics, techniques, and procedures to exploit the limited range of 

the 5.56mm ammunition and the M4 carbine by attacking from distances they knew 

an infantry squad could not return effective fire. While infantry squads have the 

capability of a designated marksman with a 7.62mm weapon, soldiers had difficulty 

concentrating small arms fire on enemy positions outside of the M4’s maximum effective range for a point target. What is your response to these reports from soldiers? Do you believe our infantry squads are currently equipped with the best 

small arms and ammunition against enemies located at the maximum effective 

range of adversary 7.62mm weapon systems? 

General MILLEY. Our Infantry squads possess weapons capabilities to combat 

threats at multiple ranges. Adding to the increased capability of the M4A1 is the 

M855A1 enhanced performance round, which provides greater range and improved 

down range effect. The M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, also organic to Infantry 

squads, provides the ability to engage and destroy point targets at 600 meters. The 

Army will continue to leverage science and technology and use the Small Arms Ammunition Configuration Study to provide our soldiers small arms overmatch capability for 2025 and beyond. 

37. Senator ERNST. Last year the Center for Strategic and International Studies 

(CSIS) found serious issues with the Army’s ability to develop, procure, and field 

equipment for soldiers and squads to include small arms. The report blames a culture of mistrust between Army stakeholders with different chains of command and 

unnecessary paperwork required by neither the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

or by Congress which results in a significant drag on the Army’s acquisition system 

in this area. A potential example of this is that the Army will take more than a 

decade to acquire a non-developmental handgun. Are you willing to conduct an impartial investigation of the issues raised in this report? 

General MILLEY. If confirmed, I will review and assess the issues raised in this 

report. I agree that achieving soldier/squad systems integration is a significant challenge. To address this, the Army approved the first dismounted soldier baseline in 

September 2014, which views soldier systems as a common integrated platform that 

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optimizes size, weight, and power to support the mission. The Materiel Development, Science and Technology, and requirements communities—in particular the 

Maneuver Center of Excellence—work together to more effectively integrate and 

perform trade-offs among disparate systems. To ensure continued innovation, the 

Soldier Enhancement Program, which uses a ‘‘buy, try, decide’’ model to bring innovative solutions into the formal requirement systems, leverages the input from multiple stakeholders to procure the most innovative and effective equipment for our 

soldiers. 

Furthermore, the Army is committed to pursuing improvement in our acquisition 

process by prioritizing proper oversight of weapon system development, prevention 

and mitigation of cost and schedule growth, and reduction of unnecessary bureaucracy. Accordingly, the Army is taking a close look at its own internal acquisition 

policies and processes to remove unnecessary bureaucracy and eliminate unnecessary or redundant requirements on acquisition programs imposed by Army regulation. I have been advised that this effort will be completed later this year. 

SUPPORT OF DEPLOYING AND DEPLOYED UNITS

Senator ERNST. I understand there are currently three pending Operational Needs 

Statements (ONS) from deploying or deployed Army units for the Palantir system. 

The ONSs in question are for the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (#15–20234), 1/1 Special 

Forces Group (#15–20390), and 10th Special Forces Group (#15–20428). These ONS 

were filed between 6 and 8 months ago and have yet to be rejected or approved by 

the Army. The Army approved identical ONSs from the 1st and 5th Special Forces 

Groups earlier this spring, yet it is my understanding the three ONSs in question 

remain in limbo. To help my office better understand the issue I request answers 

to the following questions: 

38. Senator ERNST. What is the current status on these three ONSs? 

General MILLEY. The Army remains committed to providing soldiers with what 

they need to accomplish their missions and recognizes the importance of good stewardship and fiscal responsibility. When an Operational Needs Statement (ONS) is 

received, distinct, in-depth analyses focused on specific considerations of the request 

are completed at different echelons; each of the three actions is at a different stage 

in the process. 

The ONS from 1/1 Special Forces is still being reviewed at the United States Special Operations Command (USASOC) and has yet to be passed to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) for action. USASOC is completing a detailed analysis 

of the request based on its Command priorities and the range of potential solutions. 

They will assess the unit’s current need and the long term operational and 

sustainment impact of introducing a commercial, non-program of record capability 

into the network architecture of multiple combatant commands. For instance, intelligence and signal staffs must coordinate accreditation and authority to operate for 

all new systems introduced to each network. 

The ONS from the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade has been endorsed at USASOC and 

is undergoing a detailed review and assessment at HQDA. The DA review and analysis carefully weighs the impact of a decision to support deployed or deploying commander’s requests for force tailoring against an equally critical requirement to protect the viability of the Army’s tested and competitive acquisition program and its 

related funding stream. The DA review process is iterative in order to clarify the 

requirement. On occasion, the requesting unit is able to modify its concept for capability employment and amend the scope of the request. The 95th ONS is still early 

in the process and has already experienced refinements. 

The ONS from 10th Special Forces has completed the DA review and assessment 

process. It will be presented to the acquisition decision authority for approval by the 

end of the month. 

39. Senator ERNST. When does the Army expect to respond to these ONSs? 

General MILLEY. The original purpose of the Operational Needs Statement (ONS) 

process is to provide deploying commanders a method to request materiel capability 

to address gaps in the unit’s organic means to accomplish assigned missions. The 

urgency of these requests is evident as the unit will be at risk for mission failure 

if the capability is not provided. The analysis required to support this type of request is relatively straight forward. In most cases, decisions to adjust existing 

prioritization and resourcing plans can be reached relatively quickly. 

Over time, and in order to fully capitalize on technical advances and new capabilities developed in the commercial sector, the Army expanded the ONS process to be 

used for force tailoring and enhancement. The calculus surrounding the decision to 

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support this type request is far more complex and time consuming. More important, 

these requests are submitted by units that generally already have a basic, less capable capability for task accomplishment and are not at risk for mission failure. This 

allows the Army to place a premium on getting the answer right. 

The three requests for Palantir fall in this category. As the Army remains committed to providing soldiers with the best available capability to accomplish their 

missions, the Army is equally committed to making the best decisions when confronted with competing priorities. The Army approved 10th Special Forces ONS on 

31 July 2015. The review and assessment of the final two requests will not be complete until later in the summer. 

40. Senator ERNST. Why were identical ONSs filed by 1st and 5th Special Forces 

Groups approved while these ONSs are still pending? 

General MILLEY. The Operational Needs Statements submitted by the 1st and 5th 

Special Forces Groups were endorsed by the United States Army Special Operations 

Command and forwarded to Headquarters, Department of the Army for action more 

than 90 days earlier than the requests from the other units. Although the requests 

are for the same commercial solution, the review, assessment, and eventual validation decision must take into account the specifics of each unit’s situation. The three 

remaining requests each outline distinct concepts for the employment of the requested capability with the requesting units slated to deploy and operate in different regions of the world. The uniqueness of these considerations makes the depth 

and duration of each review different. 

The Department also has resourcing options for requirements identified by units 

deploying into the named operational contingency theater. Without this funding, the 

strategy to support approval of the capability for the later requirements is more 

challenging. Additionally, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade has a significantly different 

organization, mission set and manning posture when compared to the Special Forces 

groups. The unit’s concept for employment of the capability is also unique and requires different certifications and accreditations. 

41. Senator ERNST. What do you view as an acceptable time period for a unit to 

wait for a response to an ONS? 

General MILLEY. The Army regulation governing the Operational Needs Statement (ONS) process does not prescribe a specific timeframe for subordinate unit review and assessment. It does, however, prescribe a total of 14 days for the Army 

G–3/5/7 to lead the DA staff’s review and analysis of the request and provide a response to the requestor. In cases where a requesting unit will be at risk for mission 

failure if the capability is not provided, decisions to adjust existing prioritization 

and resourcing plans can be reached relatively quickly. However, when units that 

already have a basic capability for task accomplishment submit an ONS to obtain 

a new or more advanced capability, the calculus surrounding the decision to support 

is far more complex and time consuming. On these occasions, the Army places a priority on getting the answer right. 

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

42. Senator ERNST. How would referencing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 

(PTSD) as Post-Traumatic Stress help improve the Army’s efforts to de-stigmatize 

PTSD? 

General MILLEY. The Army recommends against referencing Post Traumatic 

Stress Disorder (PTSD) as Post-Traumatic Stress (PTS). Efforts to normalize soldiers’ response to combat stress are important. However, it is essential to clearly 

define PTSD to ensure that soldiers who experience serious impairment receive the 

clinical treatment they need. All behavioral health diagnoses, including PTSD, are 

defined according to the American Psychiatric Association and International Classification of Diseases diagnostic manuals. A term like ‘‘PTS’’ is inconsistent with other 

conditions that can occur as a result of trauma (e.g., major depressive disorder). As 

such, the American Psychiatric Association, RAND Corporation, and VA National 

Center for PTSD have all stated that the term ‘‘PTS’’ should be avoided. 

It is important for the Army, Department of Defense and Veterans Affairs medical 

practice to remain consistent with national clinical standards and diagnostic nomenclature. Clinicians, health care administrators, and insurance companies rely upon 

this standard nomenclature for treatment and disability evaluation purposes. Finally, the strongest predictors of soldiers willingness to engage in behavioral health 

treatment are their awareness that they have a problem and their perceptions of 

behavioral healthcare. According to our medical professionals, both in and outside 

the Army, changing the name PTSD to PTS will not address the known reasons that 

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soldiers are reluctant to seek care. The key is to continue efforts to de-stigmatize 

the condition, regardless of the term. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

EXECUTING A CREDIBLE PACIFIC REBALANCE AND THE ARMY’S FORCE STRUCTURE

43. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, does the U.S. Army listen to and follow the 

President’s strategic guidance? 

General MILLEY. Yes. 

44. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, does this include the President’s Rebalance 

to the Asia-Pacific Region? 

General MILLEY. The Army follows the national strategic guidance given to us by 

the President, including the re-balance to the Asia-Pacific. 

45. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, does the U.S. Army still believe that permanent, forward-stationed units, are critical to deterrence? 

General MILLEY. Yes, a forward presence is critical to both assure our allies and 

deter our adversaries. 

46. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, in your personal opinion, does it make any 

strategic sense for the U.S. Army to reduce forward-based forces at Alaska’s JBER 

by two-thirds since 2012, especially in the middle of Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific? 

General MILLEY. Given the fiscal realities we face, global balancing and disposition of Army forces must be made in accordance with National Strategy. The Army 

is balanced in favor of an Asia-Pacific Rebalance. With nearly 350,000 U.S. Military 

assigned, PACOM is the largest combatant command in terms of manpower. 

PACOM has nearly 3.5 times the number of assigned military personnel than the 

next largest COCOM. Active duty Army personnel committed to PACOM total approximately 80,000; EUCOM is the next largest at 32,000. The Army has and will 

continue to maintain forces both CONUS and OCONUS-based that are ready to respond to threats from any region around the globe. Given approximately 24 percent 

of the Army’s Operational Force’s combat power is in the Asia-Pacific, even with 

continued reductions in endstrength, the reduction of forces in Alaska does not significantly undermine the Rebalance. The Army has substantial ground capabilities 

committed to the Asia-Pacific, positioned throughout continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, Washington State, South Korea and Okinawa that have and will continue to perform security cooperation activities with our Pacific allies, and remain 

ready to respond in crisis. Given the current situation, our posture towards the 

Asia-Pacific presents a capable response to mitigate regional threats. 

47. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, how does reducing forces in Alaska NOT 

undermine the Rebalance to the Pacific? 

General MILLEY. Given the fiscal realities we face, global balancing and disposition of Army forces must be made in accordance with National Strategy. The Army 

is balanced in favor of an Asia-Pacific Rebalance. With nearly 350,000 U.S. Military 

assigned, PACOM is the largest combatant command in terms of manpower. 

PACOM has nearly 3.5 times the number of assigned military personnel than the 

next largest COCOM. Active duty Army personnel committed to PACOM total approximately 80,000; EUCOM is the next largest at 32,000. The Army has and will 

continue to maintain forces both CONUS and OCONUS-based that are ready to respond to threats from any region around the globe. Given approximately 24 percent 

of the Army’s Operational Force’s combat power is in the Asia-Pacific, even with 

continued reductions in endstrength, the reduction of forces in Alaska does not significantly undermine the Rebalance. The Army has substantial ground capabilities 

committed to the Asia-Pacific, positioned throughout continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, Washington State, South Korea and Okinawa that have and will continue to perform security cooperation activities with our Pacific allies, and remain 

ready to respond in crisis. Given the current situation, our posture towards the 

Asia-Pacific presents a capable response to mitigate regional threats. 

48. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, if you were one of our allies in Asia-Pacific, 

would you think that, from an Army force perspective, that our Rebalance is still 

credible? Is our Rebalance still credible? 

General MILLEY. Yes, our rebalance is credible. Approximately 24 percent of the 

Army’s combat power is in the Pacific. The Army is participating in an increased 

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and accelerated exercise and training program. With nearly 350,000 U.S. military 

assigned, USPACOM is the largest combatant command and has almost 3.5 times 

more assigned personnel then the next largest COCOM. 

49. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, even though the U.S. Army has more 

forces OpCon to PACOM and JBLM has increased 54 percent since 2001, don’t more 

forward-stationed troops, like those in Alaska and Hawaii provide more credible deterrence? 

General MILLEY. Forces positioned closest to a threat generally provide a strong 

deterrent capability to known challenges. Also, missions such as Pacific Pathways, 

theater security cooperation with allies, and power projection capabilities, provide 

an additional deterrent. Lastly, the Global Response Force still maintains an airborne IBCT capability with a worldwide 96-hour deploy capability. 

50. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, which forces—those at JBLM or those in 

Alaska and Hawaii—provide a better deterrence posture against threats in the Pacific and the Arctic? 

General MILLEY. No single location provides a ‘‘better’’ deterrent posture. The best 

deterrence is provided by an array of forces forward deployed across the AOR coupled with partner-nation exercises, as we currently have. 

ALASKA’S BCTS (RUSSIA AND ARCTIC IMPORTANCE)

Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, please consider these points when answering 

the next set of questions: 

• Point #1: Thus far, this committee has heard me discuss what the Russians 

are doing the in the Arctic with a huge military build-up. The CRS map included with this document ‘‘207856 Arctic Push Chart’’ is evidence of that. 

• Point #2: Recently, the Finnish Defense Ministry told the WSJ: 

o ‘‘In the Arctic area [the Russians] have twofold objectives. To secure the 

Northern Sea Route and [exploit] the energy-resources potential. They are increasing their ability to surveil that part of the world, to refurbish their abilities for the air force and the Northern Fleet. They are exercising their ability 

to move their airborne troops from the central part of Russia to the north.’’ 

Importantly he added, ‘‘[The Russians] are masters of chess, and if something 

is on the loose they will take it . . . ’’ 

• Point #3: According to recent news reports, 

o ‘‘Moscow has undertaken a construction blitz across the Arctic to establish 

military superiority in the region. Russia is constructing ten Arctic searchand-rescue stations, 16 deepwater ports, 13 airfields, and ten air-defense 

radar stations across its Arctic coast.’’—Business Insider (June 10, 2015) 

• Point #4: According to CRS, the Russians recent conducted a HUGE military 

exercise which included: 

o 38,000 troops 

o 3,360 military vehicles 

o 41 ships 

o 15 submarines 

o 110 Aircraft 

o Elements of Russia’s Western Military District and elite Airborne troops 

o Lasted 5 days and included the long-range destruction of simulated enemy 

land and naval units. 

• Point #5: Just a couple months ago Russia’s Minister of Natural Resources 

Sergey Donskoy said of the Arctic, 

o ‘‘There is no alternative to the fields on the shelf. Even the so-called shale 

revolution in the USA has not stopped the companies’ urge, with support 

from the state, to extract Arctic oil.’’ 

• Point #6: According to our own estimates, the Arctic could hold as much as 15 

percent of the world’s remaining oil, up to 30 percent of its natural gas deposits, 

and about 20 percent of its liquefied natural gas. 

• Point #7: The U.S. Army just announced last night that they are removing 

2,600 airborne soldiers from our Nation’s only Arctic State. 

51. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, in your personal opinion, what is Russia 

doing in the Arctic? 

General MILLEY. Given above Russian actions and behavior, it is my personal 

opinion that Russia is trying to expand its strategic influence in the Artic in order 

to exploit previously unavailable natural resources. Objectively, Russia has increased its military presence in the Arctic, reopened abandoned Soviet-era bases, 

558 

boosted troop presence, built new facilities, and refurbished infrastructure and air 

fields across a region that stretches from Russia’s borders with Norway and Finland 

to the seas off Alaska. Russian President Putin has said a unified system of naval 

bases for ships and next-generation submarines should be created in the region, establishing the Russian Arctic Strategic Command in December 2014. Additionally, 

in October 2015 President Putin said two satellites will be deployed to monitor the 

Arctic, which he described as a priority because of its strategic location and natural 

resources. The Arctic is one of the world’s richest regions in oil and natural-gas 

fields. President Putin has said Arctic zones claimed by Russia are believed to hold 

significant amounts of such resources. Additionally, in recent years, Russia has been 

increasing its military presence in the region, where it has competing territorial 

claims with other countries, including Canada and Denmark. 

52. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, in your personal opinion, how late are we 

to recognizing the importance of the Arctic? In comparison to Russia and their 

forces, their ice breakers, and their large exercises, are we even in the game? 

General MILLEY. We are still in the game. The Army is well-postured to respond 

to combatant commander requirements in the Artic or throughout the Pacific. While 

the U.S. Army is fulfilling the requirements outlined in the 2013 Arctic Strategy, 

I will work closely with the Department as they develop an operation plan. 

53. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, in your personal opinion, does the Administration’s current 13-page Arctic Strategy, published a year before Russia invaded 

a sovereign country, fully address the increased threat environment in the Arctic? 

General MILLEY. I have not yet had the opportunity to discuss the strategy with 

the COCOM Commanders, the Service Chiefs, or the Administration. If confirmed, 

I will work with those commanders to assess the overall strategy and the Army’s 

role in it and participate with the Department in development of an operation plan. 

54. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, in your personal opinion then, does it make 

strategic—or even practical sense—to remove forces from the Arctic and my state 

of Alaska, before we have a strategy? Isn’t this a classic example of putting the cart 

before the horse? 

General MILLEY. Optimally, I would prefer to have a strategic plan prior and then 

determine force structure to support the plan. However, given the reduction of the 

Regular Army by nearly 120,000 soldiers over five years, the Army is faced with 

only undesirable choices. The planned reduction of forces in Alaska is based on a 

comprehensive review of strategic requirements and installation capabilities intended to best posture a smaller Army to balance the full range of strategic demands. That said, the timing of the inactivation and conversion of the 4/25 Airborne 

Brigade Combat Team should allow for completion of the DOD Arctic strategy and 

a review of force structure plans. 

55. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, do you believe that Russia is threat in the 

Arctic, and if so, how big of a threat? 

General MILLEY. While I believe Russian nuclear capability possess the greatest 

and only military existential threat to the United States, they are also a significant 

regional conventional threat. However, I do not believe the Kremlin currently has 

a desire for a direct armed confrontation with the West either in Europe, Asia, or 

the Artic. I define threat as capability plus intent. Russia is clearly increasing its 

capability in the Artic, however it is my opinion that Russia does not currently have 

the intent to militarily confront the United States in the Artic. It is my opinion that 

current Russian intent is to maintain and increase access to resources previously 

unavailable in the Artic by establishing transit routes to exploit various oil and mineral deposits. Historically however, we know that intent can change quickly, and we 

must remain vigilant and monitor Russian activity in the Artic closely. Russia is 

reactivating several Soviet-era bases and constructing ten search-and-rescue stations, 16 deep-water ports, 13 airfields, and ten air-defense radar stations across its 

Arctic coast. Moscow is also creating a Joint Strategic Command North (JSCN) from 

components of the Northern Fleet in order to maintain a permanent military presence in the region. When complete, it will include a naval infantry brigade, two 

mechanized brigades, an air defense division, and a coastal missile defense system. 

ROLE OF THE SECDEF IN ARMY DECISIONS

56. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, in DOD, does SECARMY or the Army CoS 

have the direct responsibility to consult with our international allies and friends, 

or does that responsibility rest more with the SECDEF? 

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General MILLEY. The Army is responsible to the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

for coordination regarding international relations and arrangements. Regarding 

matters the Army has been given the authority to directly coordinate with our allies 

and friends, the responsibility is shared by both the SECARMY and Army Chief of 

Staff—with the SECARMY having ultimate responsibility, and the Army Chief of 

Staff managing the execution of those responsibilities. 

57. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, do you believe that the SECDEF should 

at least have a say in important force structure decisions in strategic OCONUS locations, especially the dynamic threat environment? 

General MILLEY. Yes, I do. 

58. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, should the SECDEF have been consulted 

in the important force decision to remove forces from Alaska and Hawaii? 

General MILLEY. I do not know if SECDEF was consulted on that decision. However, I believe SECDEF should be consulted on major force structure decisions. 

4–25 ABCT CAPABILITIES AND SPARTAN PEGASUS

59. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, where would this Army’s arctic training, 

equipment, and force projection come from, if not from the two BCTs in Alaska? 

General MILLEY. The Army’s center for arctic training and equipment resides in 

the United States Army Alaska within the Northern Warfare Training Center 

(NWTC) at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, which the Army plans to maintain. The 

NWTC is the U.S. military’s premier cold-weather and mountain environment training center, which is also tasked with developing tactics, techniques and procedures 

to enhance the Joint Forces Doctrine. With regard to force projection, in the event 

of a contingency in the region the Army will provide combat-ready assigned, allocated, or apportioned forces to the combatant commander consistent with classified 

contingency plans. Additionally, GEN Brooks has said that the airborne battalion 

task force that will remain after the inactivation of 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat 

Team will serve as a nucleus of arctic/cold weather expertise around which other 

forces can form with prior training to conduct airborne operations in Arctic environments such as Exercise Spartan Pegasus, which this year involved approximately 

150 paratroopers or a company-plus of combat power. The airborne battalion task 

force remaining in Alaska will retain the capability to conduct Exercise Spartan 

Pegasus as well as other operations elsewhere in the Indo-Asia Pacific Region. 

60. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, could Exercise Spartan Pegasus have been 

done with any other Army Airborne unit in the Pacific or in CONUS? 

General MILLEY. The Army’s center for arctic training and equipment resides in 

the United States Army Alaska within the Northern Warfare Training Center 

(NWTC) at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, which the Army plans to maintain. The 

NWTC is the U.S. military’s premier cold-weather and mountain environment training center, which is also tasked with developing tactics, techniques and procedures 

to enhance the Joint Forces Doctrine. With regard to force projection, in the event 

of a contingency in the region the Army will provide combat-ready assigned, allocated, or apportioned forces to the combatant commander consistent with classified 

contingency plans. Additionally, GEN Brooks has said that the airborne battalion 

task force that will remain after the inactivation of 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat 

Team will serve as a nucleus of arctic/cold weather expertise around which other 

forces can form with prior training to conduct airborne operations in Arctic environments such as Exercise Spartan Pegasus, which this year involved approximately 

150 paratroopers or a company-plus of combat power. The airborne battalion task 

force remaining in Alaska will retain the capability to conduct Exercise Spartan 

Pegasus as well as other operations elsewhere in the Indo-Asia Pacific Region. 

61. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, what do you suppose Vladamir Putin or 

Kim Jong-un are thinking now that we are dramatically reducing the only Arcticcapable Airborne Brigade in the Pacific? 

General MILLEY. In my assessment, the reduction of the airborne brigade to an 

airborne battalion task force has not had any real influence on Russian thinking or 

decision-making. NATO has been the primary threat expressed by President Putin 

and driving Russia’s military doctrine in regards to the Arctic. As a general principle, I think that North Korea would welcome any drawdown of U.S. forces in the 

region. 

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62. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, what is the strategic risk that we are assuming by reducing the 4–25, in terms of both the Arctic and Pacific regions? 

General MILLEY. The Army assessed that although 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat 

Team is converting to an airborne infantry battalion task force, it allows USARPAC 

to retain an airborne capability for rapid deployment and vertical insertion as part 

of joint entry operations, or other missions, as needed throughout the entire Pacific 

area of responsibility, to include any potential operations on Fire Cross Reef. Based 

upon approved combatant commander plans and OSD requirements, the Army assessed there is limited strategic risk assumed in both the Arctic and Pacific regions 

by reducing 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team. If confirmed, I will review the 

strategic risks associated with the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team decision. 

SECRETARY GATES’ COMMENTS, THE 2014 QDR, AND THE SEQUESTER

63. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, in your personal opinion, are the President 

and the Pentagon still making Army force size decision based on the comments of 

Former Secretary Gates and the resulting military strategy documents, including 

the most recent 2014 QDR? 

General MILLEY. I have no personal knowledge of planning and budgeting decisions under Secretaries Panetta or Hagel and have not had the opportunity to discuss with Secretary Carter. However, I believe the budget cuts associated with the 

2011 Budget Control Act are the dominant factor in current planning and budgeting 

decisions. Furthermore, I believe the decisions for sizing the Army are fundamentally based upon available fiscal resources and, if confirmed, I will advocate for a 

strategy-based force sizing construct. 

64. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, if the Congress fixes Sequestration, will 

Army Force structure automatically return to 490,000 or above, or will it remain 

at the 2014 QDR level of 450,000? 

General MILLEY. The funding requested by the Fiscal Year 2016 President’s Budget will resource a 980,000 Total Army (450,000 AC, 335,000 ARNG and 195,000 

USAR), and if Congress does not fix sequestration, then the Army would reduce to 

920,000 Total Army (420,000 AC, 315,000 ARNG and 185,000 USAR). If the Congress wants to reverse the reductions to the Army and also to Alaska, the Congress 

and the President would have to avert Sequestration at a funding level higher than 

proposed by the President. I have been advised that to keep the Total Force at 

980,000 (450,000 AC, 335,000 ARNG, 195,000 USAR), the President and Congress 

would have to agree to fund the Army at nearly $6B per year above the President’s 

request. There is no automatic return to 490,000; it must be funded in the President’s Budget and approved by Congress. 

65. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, given that 50,000 of the 80,000 reduction 

came from the elimination of the temporary end strength increase (22,000) and wartime allowance (10,000), reductions to Europe (11,300), and the number of trainees, 

transients, and students (7,300), what type strategic thinking did the U.S. Army use 

to decide remove forward forces from Alaska, before looking at CONUS installations? 

General MILLEY. When making any major force structure decision the Army considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. These include the Military Value 

Analysis (MVA) Model: Training, Power Projection, Well Being and Mission Expansion. The Army takes into account Strategic Considerations, Cost and Efficiencies, 

Readiness Impact, Mission Command, Statutory Requirements, Feasibility, Environmental & Socioeconomic Impacts and Community Input. 

66. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, General Odierno testified that The Army 

size of 450,000 is adequate to meet the demands of current and future threats but 

at ‘‘significant risk.’’ What exactly does ‘‘significant risk’’ mean, said in way the 

American people would understand? 

General MILLEY. ‘‘Significant risk’’ means that it is questionable whether or not 

the U.S. can achieve stated combatant commander objectives without extended 

delay and substantial cost and casualties. 

67. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, your testimony states that some of the assumptions made in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance ‘‘now appear optimistic, 

particularly in light of the rise of ISIL, a resurgent Russia, Iran’s actions in the 

Middle East, and challenges in the Pacific region.’’ In your personal opinion, do 

agree with General Odierno, is 450,000 adequate to meet the threats of ISIL, an 

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aggressive China, a Resurgent Russia, and unpredictable North Korea, and perhaps 

new threats that will emerge in the next few years? 

General MILLEY. I agree with General Odierno that a 980,000 Total Army 

(450,000 AC, 335,000 ARNG and 195,000 USAR) provides the minimum capacity to 

execute the missions envisioned in the current national strategy at ‘‘significant 

risk.’’ I believe, however, that a 1.045 million Total Army (490,000 AC, 350,000 

ARNG and 205,000 USAR) resourced at a level of funding adequate to balance end 

strength, readiness, and modernization would address an unpredictable future security environment at less risk. 

68. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, if not, what is? Is 490,000 sufficient? 

General MILLEY. I believe that a 1.045 million Total Army (490,000 AC, 350,000 

ARNG and 205,000 USAR) at a consistent, predictable level of funding adequate to 

balance end strength, readiness, and modernization would be more sufficient to address an increasingly unpredictable future security environment. 

69. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, is it disingenuous for Administration to entirely blame Sequester for causing Army the drawdowns, when the President’s own 

strategic desires for a smaller Army are largely driving these reductions within the 

Pentagon, regardless of budgets? 

General MILLEY. Budget Control Act funding reductions required the Army to 

make some very difficult decisions in order to find some balance between end 

strength, readiness, and modernization. The Pentagon’s and President’s decision to 

reduce the size of the Army is driven by the QDR 2014. It takes both the Congress 

and the President to pass a law and provide funding to avert sequestration and return the Army to an Active component endstrength greater than 450,000 or 420,000. 

Reducing force structure and end strength, while maintaining the barest acceptable 

level of readiness along with delays in modernization was the only responsible way 

for the Army to execute missions within the budget. As the current Chief of Staff 

of the Army has testified, the Army size in PB16 of 980,000 Total Army (450,000 

AC, 335,000 ARNG, and 195,000 USAR) is adequate to meet the demands of the 

current and future threats, but at ‘‘significant risk.’’ If confirmed, I will assess combatant commander requirements to ensure that we provide the best possible mix of 

capabilities within our resourcing. 

70. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, is this our generation’s Task Force Smith 

moment? 

General MILLEY. If confirmed, I am committed to preventing a repeat of Task 

Force Smith. The historical experience of Task Force Smith graphically illustrates 

the risks our Nation takes when we fail to maintain readiness and invest in modernization. As I assess risk to mission and risk to force, our Army’s history—including Task Force Smith—will inform that assessment. As the Army struggles to balance end strength, readiness, and modernization in a year of fiscal constraint and 

uncertainty, the lessons of Task Force Smith must not—and will not—be forgotten. 

REVERSIBILTY OF THE ARMY’S DECISIONS

71. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, is it accurate that the Brigade Task Force 

left at Fort Richardson, was left there so that the Army’s decision to remove forces 

could be reversed? 

General MILLEY. Converting the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Alaska 

to an airborne battalion task force allows us to preserve combat power and provide 

the foundation for regeneration of combat power in the future. 

72. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, what specific things would have to happen 

for this decision to be reversed? 

General MILLEY. If confirmed, I commit that I will work with you, your staff and 

the Senate Armed Services Committee to ensure the Army remains postured and 

ready to respond to the strategic environment. The reductions of the Brigade Combat Teams in Alaska and Georgia to battalion task forces are designed to be reversible should the fiscal environment improve. 

73. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, if confirmed, do you commit to work with 

me to reverse the Army’s decision and to return forces to my strategically important 

state? 

General MILLEY. If confirmed, I commit that I will work with you, your staff and 

the Senate Armed Services Committee to ensure the Army remains postured and 

ready to respond to the strategic environment. The reductions of the Brigade ComVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00567 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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bat Teams in Alaska and Georgia to battalion task forces are designed to be reversible should the fiscal environment improve. 

AGREE WITH ARMY’S RECENT FORCE STRUCTURE DECISION

74. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, from a strategic location perspective, where 

other than Alaska does placing an airborne BCT best address your top three threats 

of Russia, China, and North Korea? 

General MILLEY. Russia and China are both regional powers with global reach. 

In a resource constrained environment, a CONUS-based airborne brigade combat 

team, which we have with the Global Response Force, is best positioned to respond 

to the complete range of global threats. 

75. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, if your personal opinion then, considering 

the location and the severity of all the threats, do you agree with the U.S. Army’s 

decision to downsize strategically centric forces in Alaska? 

General MILLEY. As I discussed in our office call, if confirmed, I will rigorously 

review the decision to downsize forces in Alaska, and I will visit Alaska soon to personally review the facts on the ground. 

76. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, in your military judgement, is this a strategically-wise decision for the long-term security of the United States against 

threats like Russia, China, and North Korea? 

General MILLEY. Because of budgetary pressure, the Army had to make several 

difficult decisions to meet the requirements outlined in the National Security Strategy while balancing endstrength, readiness and modernization. The Army has and 

will continue to maintain forces—both CONUS- and OCONUS-based—that are 

ready to respond to threats from any region around the globe. 

JBLM

77. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, do units at JBLM give you as much power 

projection into the Pacific as units in Hawaii and Alaska? 

General MILLEY. Power projection is a function of both physical location and colocated or available resources: airfields, position of shipping, port throughput capacities, and rail infrastructure. These variables are taken into account to determine 

deployment timelines. However, without access to that analysis and specific contingency requirements, I cannot directly answer the question. If confirmed, however, 

I will review the Army’s power projection capabilities against the combatant commanders’ requirements. 

78. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, why is a CONUS-based installation (i.e. 

JBLM) seeing dramatic increases as a result of the Rebalance to the Pacific, but the 

two OCONUS states—that lean into the Pacific—are seeing dramatic reductions? Is 

our Rebalance really credible from the continental U.S.? 

General MILLEY. Without question, the Army has had to make very difficult 

choices, consistent with a reduced budget, to ensure we are able to meet National 

Security objectives and combatant commander requirements across all regions. Yes, 

a rebalance is still credible given the facilities, infrastructure, and posture of Army 

forces at JBLM in concert with Alaska and Hawaii. With about 24 percent of the 

Army’s combat power residing in the Asia-Pacific, our posture there presents a credible assurance to our allies and deterrent to our adversaries. Through this posture 

and continued security cooperation activities with our Pacific allies the Army will 

remain ready to respond in crisis. 

79. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, how much longer would it take to deploy 

an airborne or styrker unit from JBLM versus Hawaii or Alaska? 

General MILLEY. Without question, movement of Army forces from CONUS to 

points in the Pacific will take longer than a movement of forces already stationed 

in the Pacific; how much longer is dependent on a host of variables, such as shipping, port throughput, rail, infrastructure, airfield capability, as well as size of the 

force and destination. If confirmed, I am willing to provide the Committee scenariobased timelines in an appropriate classified forum. 

YOUR INPUT INTO THE ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE DECISION

80. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, what was your personal input into this 

force structure decision? 

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General MILLEY. Army Forces in Alaska do not come under U.S. Army FORSCOM 

command or control. Therefore, specific to downsizing forces in Alaska, I did not 

render a recommendation nor participate in discussion with respect to those forces. 

81. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, did you advocate on behalf of CONUSbased forces, and to detriment of Pacifically-aligned OCONUS forces? 

General MILLEY. No. 

TRAINING IN ALASKA (MVA, F–35)

82. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, have you ever trained in Alaska? 

General MILLEY. No, but if confirmed, I look forward to getting to Alaska and seeing firsthand the training opportunities Forts Richardson, Wainwright and Greely 

have to offer. 

83. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, given Alaska’s diverse training lands, the 

size of training space, the possibility for joint training and international training 

that already goes on, does it make any sense to you of how JBER would be in the 

bottom third of the training category? Does this pass your smell test? 

General MILLEY. I have been briefed that Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson’s 

(JBER) ranking in the bottom third of installations at which one or more Brigade 

Combat Teams are stationed was the result of the limited training acreage that is 

part of the installation, the number of ranges, size of impact area and training restrictions. This criteria was based on JBER’s 54K acres as addressed in the 2013 

Programmatic Environmental Assessment. 

84. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, given the F–35 will be the Air Force’s new 

close-air-support platform, and that it will begin to arrive in 2019, did the Army’s 

analysis weight the need for joint training with the F–35 in close-air-support missions? Is there anywhere else in the U.S. other than the JPARC where the Army 

could fully train the CAS mission with the F–35A? 

General MILLEY. To my knowledge, the Military Value Analysis, which informs 

decision making, does not consider any potential future weapons systems capabilities of the other Services. Close Air Support (CAS) can be trained at the majority 

of the Army’s major installations and CAS can also be trained at the three Maneuver Combat Training Centers as part of instrumented Brigade Combat Team live 

fire and force-on-force exercises. 

85. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, before you are confirmed, will you release 

the entire Military Value Analysis (MVA) and Total Army Analysis (TAA) documents for all the bases considered to U.S. Congress? Please include those documents 

in your response. 

General MILLEY. If confirmed, I commit to being transparent with the Senate 

Armed Services Committee and with the entire Congress as I work with the Secretary of the Army to carry out my title 10 responsibilities. In this case, to my 

knowledge, the Army has followed its established processes for decision making. I 

have been briefed the Army has provided the detail requested to the Senate Armed 

Services Committee and Committee staff. If confirmed, I will release any documents 

within my authority that the Committee requests to exercise oversight responsibilities, and I will be happy to sit down with you and any member of the Committee 

to further explain our process and rationale. 

86. Senator SULLIVAN. General Millley, if for any reason you cannot release the 

MVA and the TAA documents, if confirmed, do you commit to doing so once you are 

confirmed? 

General MILLEY. If confirmed, I commit to being transparent with the Senate 

Armed Services Committee and with the entire Congress as I work with the Secretary of the Army to carry out my title 10 responsibilities. In this case, to my 

knowledge, the Army has followed its established processes for decision making. I 

have been briefed the Army has provided the detail requested to the Senate Armed 

Services Committee and Committee staff. If confirmed, I will release any documents 

within my authority that the Committee requests to exercise oversight responsibilities, and I will be happy to sit down with you and any member of the Committee 

to further explain our process and rationale. 

564 

GENERAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE U.S. ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE ADJUSTMENTS

(FISCAL YEAR 2016–17)

87. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, in your personal opinion, what alternatives 

should the U.S. the Army have considered, as opposed to reducing strategically-important forces in Alaska and Hawaii? 

General MILLEY. As stated in my previous testimony and office calls, if confirmed, 

I will participate in the Arctic strategy review with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

will review the reduction of forces as necessary to determine if there are appropriate 

alternatives. As I previously mentioned, I will visit Alaska soon to personally review 

the facts on the ground. 

88. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, what is the exact number of soldiers that 

will be reduced in Alaska and can you provide an installation-specific profile of how 

many soldiers will reduced from each installation and how many soldiers will remain following the reductions? 

General MILLEY. Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) is reduced by ∼2,603 

spaces and Fort Wainwright is reduced by ∼73 spaces for a combined total of ∼2,676 

spaces. JBER retains ∼2000 spaces and Fort Wainwright retains ∼6,223 spaces for 

a combined total of ∼8,223 spaces. 

89. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, specifically what elements of are being reduced in Alaska and specifically what elements are being kept? 

General MILLEY. In addition to conversion of 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team 

to an airborne battalion task force, reductions are also being made to portions of 

a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear company, aviation units, music performance teams, the Stryker brigade combat team, an explosive ordnance company 

and a contingency contracting team. Most of these reductions are based on design 

changes that impact a significant amount of like units across the Army and are not 

limited to the units in Alaska. 

90. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, what are the exact dates that these reductions in Alaska officially begin and end? 

General MILLEY. These phased reductions will begin in January of 2016 and continue until 15 October 2016 when the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team inactivates and becomes an airborne battalion task force. 

91. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, what specific cost/strategic factors did the 

U.S. use to make this decision and can you provide all of that information to me? 

General MILLEY. The Center for Army Analysis used four criteria consisting of 16 

attributes to determine the rank order of the installations to best support the Army 

in meeting defense strategic requirements. The most important criteria for ranking 

installations were Training and Power Projection; the other two criteria analyzed 

were Well-Being and Expansibility. 

The Training criteria considered five key attributes: 1) the number of acres of maneuver area; 2) training area without environmental restrictions; 3) training facilities; 4) volume of restricted airspace and 5) the size of an impact area. Power Projection considered: 1) the rating of surface deployment infrastructure such as rail loading tracks, marshalling area and truck loading ramps; 2) the rating of air deployment infrastructure; and 3) deployment support infrastructure (e.g., container transfer pads, vehicle scales, and vehicle staging areas). 

I have been advised that your comprehensive data request to the Secretary of the 

Army, dated August 4, 2015, for all MVA and TAA related data is under review and 

that you will be advised of the status of that review in the forthcoming response. 

92. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, what will be the remaining combat elements of the 4–25 ABCT and what missions will they be capable of and what missions will they no longer be capable of? 

General MILLEY. A battalion task force will remain from the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team. Planning for its structure is almost complete and it will consist 

of four airborne infantry companies, one field artillery battery, one engineer company and a support company with a total strength of 1050 soldiers. This airborne 

battalion task force will have the capability to conduct combined arms maneuver 

missions in support of the full range of military operations (Phase 0–V) in support 

of a brigade combat team or a division. This airborne task force will have a more 

robust staff and support elements than normally found in other battalions throughout the Army enabling them to operate independently for 24–48 hours, including 

sustainment, support, intelligence, and communications capabilities. In short, the 

565 

airborne battalion task force will be able to conduct a wide range of combined arms 

maneuver and wide area security missions and will be used in conjunction with 

other Army, joint or combined forces to achieve tactical and operational end states. 

93. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, in terms of threats in the region and the 

AOR, including North Korea, China, and Russia, what are the specific risks that 

the United States Army is assuming in relation to each of these threats, and in your 

personal opinion, is the U.S. Army accepting too much risk? 

General MILLEY. Regarding Russia, because of security condition changes in Europe, the current United States Army posture does not support a comprehensive response for timelines or capacity to deter, deny, or defeat Russian aggression. However, working with the United States European Command, the Army is in the process of mitigating this posture shortfall through expansion and prepositioned equipment—the European Reassurance Initiative funding is critical to supporting that effort. 

Regarding the Asia-Pacific, the key United States security priority is to maintain 

a credible deterrent posture and provide reassuring military presence in the region 

in order to maintain regional stability. North Korea’s nuclear weapons are the leading risk to United States Army forces and the security of its partners. We must 

work with our interagency and multinational partners to bring about the verifiable 

elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. To mitigate the risk of contingencies in the Asia-Pacific, the United States Army is working to rebalance its 

forces committed to the region in Korea, Japan, Hawaii, Alaska, and at Joint Base 

Lewis-McChord, enhance the rapid deployment capabilities in the Global Response 

Force, and mature our military relationships through routine exercises and engagements such as Pacific Pathways. 

The budgetary pressures forcing the Army to downsize, defer modernization, and 

potentially ration readiness further delay the time at which these three essential 

elements will finally come into balance. I am concerned that we not underestimate 

the degree of readiness, end strength, and modernization required to confront current and future security challenges in the Pacific AOR and around the globe and, 

I will work to ensure that we do not. 

94. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dunfrod, in your personal opinion, are the U.S. 

Army’s reductions in fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 more driven by Sequestration or the 2014 QDR? 

General MILLEY. The Army’s reductions in fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 

are driven by both the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the 2014 QDR. The Budget 

Control Act reduced the Army’s funding. This funding reduction resulted in the 2014 

QDR, which was the basis for the reduction in the Army’s end strength. 

95. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, in the U.S. Army’s decision, what, if any, 

thought was given to the recent actions of President Putin and the Russian in the 

Arctic and how heavily were his recent aggressive actions weighed? 

General MILLEY. I have been advised that the decision was made with full understanding of Russia’s actions in the Arctic and with equally full knowledge that the 

Army is capable of projecting combat power from the continental United States on 

very short notice. 

96. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, recently, General Brooks (USARPAC) alluded that he could respond to contingencies in the South China Sea, specifically 

at Fire Cross Reef, utilizing the 4–25 ABCT and could do so ‘‘tonight.’’ Following 

these reductions, would this still be a true statement? 

General MILLEY. The Army assessed that although 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat 

Team is converting to an airborne infantry battalion task force, it allows USARPAC 

to retain an airborne capability for rapid deployment and vertical insertion as part 

of joint entry operations, or other missions, as needed throughout the entire Pacific 

area of responsibility, to include any potential operations on Fire Cross Reef. Based 

upon approved combatant commander plans and OSD requirements, the Army assessed there is limited strategic risk assumed in both the Arctic and Pacific regions 

by reducing 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team. If confirmed, I will review the 

strategic risks associated with the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team decision. 

97. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, how do these reductions in Alaska impact 

the response to a Korean Peninsula contingency and what specifically is that impact? 

566 

General MILLEY. Even with the reduction of 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team, 

the United States Military and the United States Army in particular retains sufficient capability and capacity to respond to a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. 

98. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, how do these reductions in Alaska impact

the Army’s ability to quickly respond to contingencies in the Arctic? 

General MILLEY. According to the briefings I have received, the reductions in 

Alaska will not severely limit the Army’s ability to quickly respond to contingencies 

in the Arctic. The Army has substantial ground capabilities committed to the AsiaPacific, positioned throughout continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, Washington State, South Korea and Okinawa. Active duty Army personnel committed to 

U.S. Pacific Command total approximately 80,000, which is more than double those 

Army forces committed to U.S. European Command, the next largest at 32,000. 

Given fiscal realities and our National Strategy, the Army must remain globally balanced given world-wide threats. With that in mind, the Army has and will continue 

to maintain forces both CONUS and OCONUS-based that are ready to respond, including rapid response, to threats from any region around the globe. 

99. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, how much excess facility capacity will Fort

Richardson have after the 4–25 ABCT is reduced and specifically what excess facilities will those be? 

General MILLEY. This analysis is ongoing. Overall, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson’s permanent party Army authorizations will decrease by about 2,600 from fiscal 

year 2015, so the Army anticipates excess capacity will exist. U.S. Army Alaska and 

the 25th Infantry Division will provide revised facility requirements to the Air Force 

Joint Base Commander in the coming months. If confirmed, I will work with the 

Alaska delegation and the Air Force to ensure you are provided this data once available. 

100. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, will the reduction of the 4–25 negatively

affect the DOD/VA Joint venture hospital on JBER? 

General MILLEY. The DOD/VA Joint Venture Hospital at Joint Base Elmendorf 

Richardson is a venture between the Air Force and Department of Veterans Affairs 

(VA). Over the course of the next few months, Joint Base leaders will work with 

U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK) to assess JBER’s end state requirements for mission 

support, infrastructure and personnel, to include the joint venture with the VA. This 

assessment will determine the impact of the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team 

reductions on the DOD/VA Joint Venture Hospital. I have been informed, until 

these requirements are firmly understood, there are no planned reductions of services or personnel. 

101. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, how much input did USPACOM have in

the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska and Hawaii and what specifically 

was that input and how heavily was it weighed? 

General MILLEY. I have been briefed that United States Pacific Command 

(USPACOM) was represented by U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) throughout the 

process that determined the recently announced Army force structure decisions. 

This includes: USARPAC input at the resourcing panels for units and the Council 

of Colonels; 2–Star General Officer Steering Committee; 3–Star General Officer 

Steering Committee; and culminating briefings to Department of the Army Senior 

Leaders for the Total Army Analysis (TAA) and Military Value Analysis (MVA). 

Their input was weighted commensurate with strategic priorities to include the 

Asia-Pacific rebalance, world-wide operational demands, budgetary pressures, and a 

shrinking Army. Even after this reduction of 40,000 soldiers from the Army’s 

endstrength, USPACOM will have more Army forces available to it than any other 

overseas combatant command. 

Additionally, during confirmation preparation, I personally discussed the Army’s 

decision with both GEN Brooks, Commander USARPAC, and ADM Harris, Commander USPACOM. They both indicated to me that the reduction of 4/25 Airborne 

Brigade Combat Team to an airborne battalion task force was within the range of 

acceptable risk. 

102. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, how much input did USEUCOM have in

the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska and what specifically was that 

input? 

General MILLEY. I have been briefed that United States European Command, as 

represented by United States Army Europe, participated in the Army’s comprehensive process that facilitated the recent force structure decisions. Their input helped 

567 

inform a decision to best posture a smaller Army to fulfill strategic priorities, including the Asia-Pacific rebalance, and world-wide operational demands. I do not know 

the specifics of their input or how it was weighted. 

103. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, I have been told that the final decision 

to reduce forces in Alaska and Hawaii came down to tradeoff between those forces 

and the 173rd ABCT in Vicenza, Italy. Is this accurate, and if so, specifically what 

strategic considerations (location, deterrence, proximity to threats, access to nearby 

or organic lift, and capabilities) went to making this decision? 

General MILLEY.I have been briefed this is not accurate. The decision to reduce 

forces in Alaska and Hawaii did not involve a tradeoff with forces of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. 

104. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, how much input did USNORTHCOM 

have in the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska and what specifically was 

that input? 

General MILLEY. I have been briefed that United States Northern Command, as 

represented by United States Army North, participated in the Army’s comprehensive process that facilitated the recent force structure decisions. Their input, like 

others, helped inform a decision to best posture a smaller Army to fulfill strategic 

priorities, including the Asia-Pacific rebalance, and world-wide operational demands. I do not know the specifics of their input or how it was weighted. 

105. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, to what extent was the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska coordinated with ALCOM and what concerns were 

raised/mitigated from this coordination? To what extend was this decision coordinated with the Air Force side of JBER and what concerns were raised/mitigated 

from this coordination? 

General MILLEY. I have been briefed that Alaska Command, as part of Northern 

Command, and represented by Army North, participated in the Army’s comprehensive process that facilitated the recent force structure decisions. 

I have been briefed that Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER), like the other 

29 installations at which substantial Army forces are stationed, helped inform and 

facilitate the Army’s decision process through participation in two environmental 

and socio-economic analyses, providing input to the Military Value Analysis, and facilitating ‘‘listening sessions’’ for installation communities. Commands were solicited 

to ensure the accuracy of data and Army awareness of issues and concerns associated with their installations. While analysis focused on potential losses at the 

former Fort Richardson, it considered impacts to JBER as a whole. In both the 2013 

and 2015 processes, JBER and the surrounding community were informed of the 

substantial potential losses, the command provided data and information to support 

the process, and community listening sessions were conducted in April 2013 and 

February 2015. I do not know the specific concerns raised or how they were mitigated. 

106. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, to what extent were our South Korean Allies consulted on the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska? 

General MILLEY. To my knowledge, our South Korean allies were not consulted 

on pending force structure decisions in Alaska. 

107. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, if so, what were their concerns and how 

much were those concerns weighed? 

General MILLEY. To my knowledge, our South Korean allies were not consulted 

on pending force structure decisions in Alaska. 

108. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, to what extent were our Japanese Allies 

consulted on the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska? If so, what were 

their concerns and how much were those concerns weighed? 

General MILLEY. To my knowledge, our Japanese allies were not consulted on 

pending force structure decisions in Alaska. 

109. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, to what extent was section 1043 of the 

Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA considered in the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in 

Alaska? 

General MILLEY. I have been briefed that section 1043 of the Fiscal Year 2016 

NDAA was considered in the Army’s decision. 

568 

110. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, in your personal opinion, is it strategically wise to reduce forces in the Arctic before we have a new Arctic strategy and 

OPLAN? 

General MILLEY. Optimally, I would prefer to have a strategic plan prior and then 

determine force structure to support the plan. However, given the reduction of the 

Regular Army by nearly 120,000 soldiers over five years, the Army is faced with 

only undesirable choices. The planned reduction of forces in Alaska is based on a 

comprehensive review of strategic requirements and installation capabilities intended to best posture a smaller Army to balance the full range of strategic demands. That said, the timing of the inactivation and conversion of the 4/25 Airborne 

Brigade Combat Team should allow for completion of the DOD Arctic strategy and 

a review of force structure plans. 

111. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, to what extent was section 1262 of the

Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA considered in the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in 

Alaska? 

General MILLEY. I have been briefed that section 1262 of the Fiscal Year 2016 

NDAA was considered in the Army’s decision. 

112. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, to what extent were Alaska’s, and specifically JBER’s organic strategic airlift and close proximity to large and robust training areas, weighted in the U.S Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska? 

General MILLEY. There were four major categories considered in the Military 

Value Analysis with capability and power projection as major areas of study and 

analysis conducted over the last year. All major installations were likewise evaluated and their results were compared. Without question, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, like many installations, maintains outstanding facilities and training areas 

manned with dedicated military and civilian professionals. The results, however, 

when compared to all other installations led to the decisions made. 

113. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, what countries has the 4–25 ABCT

worked closely with and possibly trained with and what is the impact of this reduction on the mil-to-mil relationships with those countries following the reduction of 

this unit? 

General MILLEY. In fiscal year 2015, 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team has 

executed military-to-military engagements with Australia, Thailand, Japan, South 

Korea, Nepal, India, Bangladesh, Canada, Finland, Norway, and Chile. These activities have ranged from individual participants attending partner nation schools to 

airborne and battalion-sized task forces conducting multilateral exercises. Our 

Pacific partners and Allies consider U.S. military-to-military engagements to be a 

key component of reassurance in a volatile region. The Army is still assessing the 

full implication of the reductions, but initial assessments from leaders on the ground 

indicate that this will not impact our commitment to the region and our ability to 

conduct mil-to-mil engagements. If confirmed, this is something that I will watch 

closely. 

114. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, following the Air Force’s initial decision

to remove a squadron from Eielson, senior Air Force Officials soon went up to Fairbanks and North Pole communities to explain the decision. When will this be done 

in the case of Fort Richardson and who will be sent? 

General MILLEY. I have been advised that the outgoing and incoming Commanding Generals, MG Shields and MG Owens, U.S. Army Alaska met with and 

briefed a number of Alaska community leaders, including Senator Murkowski, Senator Sullivan, Congressman Young, the Governor and the Mayor of Anchorage, after 

the notification of reduction of forces was announced in order to explain the Army’s 

decision. I am unware of a townhall type community session held to address local 

questions and concerns. If confirmed, and as I committed to in our office call, I will 

personally visit Alaska and will bring selected members of the Army Staff with me 

to further assess the Alaska installations regarding the force structure decision that 

was made. 

115. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, what impact has the Army assessed will

occur to the greater Anchorage housing market and to the greater Anchorage economy as a result of the decision to reduce the 4–25 ABCT? 

General MILLEY. The housing analysis is ongoing. Overall, Joint Base ElmendorfRichardson’s (JBER) permanent party Army authorizations will decrease by about 

2,600 from fiscal year 2015. On-post housing at JBER is privatized under an Air 

Force housing privatization program. Across the Army, about 60 percent of soldiers 

569 

are married. Of those, about 30 percent typically live on-post. Only a subset of married soldiers living off-post own their own homes. Anchorage’s rental vacancy rate 

is 3.9 percent, and the vacancy rate for ownership is 6.7 percent—both of these are 

significantly lower than the rest of the United States, and are evidence of a housing 

market where supply is lower than demand. 

In the Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Assessment (SPEA), the Army 

used the Economic Impact Forecast System (EIFS) to estimate the impact of force 

structure reductions to the greater Anchorage market area. Although the actual reductions are much lower than the worst-case scenario analyzed in the SPEA, the 

sales volume is estimated to be a loss of $182M. The estimated income loss is 

$176M. Employment (Indirect) is estimated at a loss is 796 non-federal jobs in the 

area as a result of the reduced direct service contracts and reduced demand for 

goods and services. 

116. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, will installations with reductions be allowed to access DOD OEA funds to mitigate the effects of these reductions? 

General MILLEY. As I understand it, depending on each unique local set of circumstances, Army installations affected by force structure reductions may qualify 

for assistance from DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA). OEA provides 

technical and financial assistance to states and communities that are impacted by 

Defense program changes, such as a personnel reduction at local military installations. The Army coordinated the release of the force structure reduction announcements with OEA so that they were prepared and ready to field community inquiries 

regarding possible forms of assistance available through OEA. 

117. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, what effects with the U.S. Army’s reductions in in Alaska have on USARAK and USARAK’s HQ? 

General MILLEY. United States Army Alaska Headquarters will be reduced by ∼14 

spaces as part of the ongoing Department of the Army reduction of two-star and 

above headquarters units. 

118. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, in what ways does the U.S. Army’s decision to reduce forces in Alaska impact Alaska-based Joint training exercises such 

Red Flag-Alaska, Northern Edge, and Alaska Shield? 

General MILLEY. I have been advised that the impact will be minimal. The purpose and intent of these exercises will remain the same—that is, to practice deployment and employ for operations in cold and austere environments. As in the past, 

if the Army forces in Alaska are employed in other theaters the Army will source 

from outside Alaska allowing additional units in the Army to train in the unique 

conditions of Alaska. 

119. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, before you are confirmed, can you please 

provide the Military Value Analysis (MVA) Model and the Total Army Analysis used 

to make all of the Army’s fiscal year 2016–17 force structure decisions? 

General MILLEY.If confirmed, I commit to being transparent with the Senate 

Armed Services Committee and with the entire Congress as I work with the Secretary of the Army to carry out my title 10 responsibilities. In this case, to my 

knowledge, the Army has followed its established processes for decision making. I 

have been briefed the Army has provided the detail requested to the Senate Armed 

Services Committee and Committee staff. If confirmed, I will release any documents 

within my authority that the Committee requests to exercise oversight responsibilities, and I will be happy to sit down with you and any member of the Committee 

to further explain our process and rationale. 

120. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, can you provide more information on the 

U.S. Army’s possible desire to convert at National Guard brigade at JBLM to Styker 

brigade? 

General MILLEY. The plan as I understand it is to convert the 81st Armor Brigade, with units in Washington and California, to a Stryker brigade with units in 

Washington, Oregon and California. This conversion would provide an additional infantry battalion on the west coast and would leverage training available with the 

Stryker brigades located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. 

121. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, if confirmed, do you pledge to ensure that 

the U.S. Army is completely transparent about the entire fiscal year 2016–17 force 

reductions and makes all the documents used to make all of these decision available 

to Congress? 

570 

General MILLEY. If confirmed, I commit to being transparent with the Senate 

Armed Services Committee and with the entire Congress as I work with the Secretary of the Army to carry out my title 10 responsibilities. In this case, to my 

knowledge, the Army has followed its established processes for decision making. I 

have been briefed the Army has provided the detail requested to the Senate Armed 

Services Committee and Committee staff. If confirmed, I will release any documents 

within my authority that the Committee requests to exercise oversight responsibilities, and I will be happy to sit down with you and any member of the Committee 

to further explain our process and rationale. 

122. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, if confirmed, do pledge to fully review the 

Army’s reductions decisions, especially in light of the emerging concerns in the AsiaPacific, the Arctic and given that there is a pending Arctic strategy? 

General MILLEY. Yes. 

123. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, the Army has told me that they hope to 

reverse the decision in Alaska. If confirmed, will you work with me, and them to 

bring all the U.S. Army forces back to my state and the Arctic? 

General MILLEY. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the disposition of Army 

forces in accordance with the national strategy, and provide my best military judgment and advice on the issue to the CJCS, the President and this Committee. 

PACIFIC PATHWAYS AND REDUNDANT MISSIONS

124. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, yes or no, would you agree that the DOD 

needs to avoid mission redundancy in budget constrained environment? 

General MILLEY. Yes. 

125. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, Pacific Pathways is a program which puts 

Army soldiers on Naval Shipping—or commercial shipping contracted by the Navy— 

and lands Army helicopters on ships. Is this Army program mission redundant with 

the core function of the U.S. Marine Corps? Which service is best deploying from 

ships, the U.S. Army? 

General MILLEY. Pacific Pathways is not redundant with the core function of the 

U.S. Marine Corps which is amphibious assault. Pacific Pathways exercises the strategic movement of Army forces by sea and does not involve Army forces conducting 

amphibious assault. Strategic movement of Army forces by sea complements the 

movement of Army forces by air and is a fundamental requirement to ensure the 

Army can move globally to fulfill its core competency of providing relevant and 

ready land power capability to the combatant commanders as part of the Joint 

Force. 

Pacific Pathways are umbrella operations built upon existing exercises. It is an 

evolution in how the Army conducts existing exercises that provide significant return on investment in both readiness and support to PACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan. Each ‘‘Pathway’’ is tailorable and scalable, encompassing either a 

heavy, medium, or light force package based on the Pathway’s exercise scenarios 

and the training objectives of the Pathway unit. The Army plans to conduct three 

Pathways per year, with a projected estimated total cost of $45 million per year or 

an estimated average cost of $15 million per Pathway. 

126. Senator SULLIVAN. General Milley, exactly how much does the program Pacific Pathways cost each year and how much does each individual ‘‘Pathway cost?’’ 

General MILLEY. The Army plans to conduct three Pathways per year, with a projected estimated total cost of $45 million per year or an estimated average cost of 

$15 million per Pathway. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN

STRYKER REPROGRAMMING

127. Senator MANCHIN. General Milley, the Army recently submitted a reprograming request to upgrade the lethality of the Stryker. In light of the situation in 

Ukraine, what is the operational significance of this reprogramming request? 

General MILLEY. The recent aggression against Ukraine presents a significant security challenge to the stability of Europe and impacts all of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization allies. Heavy combat equipment is being prepositioned within 

Europe to mitigate some of that risk. However, the timeline to fully generate decisive combat power, and deploy operational forces to man these equipment sets may 

571 

not set the necessary conditions in the earliest phases of a potential conflict. Currently assigned United States Army ground forces include the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR) Stryker brigade combat team, a Stryker unit designed to be rapidly 

deployable within urban and complex environments with a combination of mobility, 

lethality and survivability. To address the capability gap of achieving lethal effects 

against the most likely threats while providing stand-off against potential threat 

weapons systems, the Army’s priority is to improve lethality of assigned 2CR ground 

forces. Providing an improved direct fire weapon system to support infantry at a 

greater range and improving lethality against a wide array of targets is urgently 

needed. 

128. Senator MANCHIN. General Milley, what would be the impact if this reprogramming request were not approved? 

General MILLEY. Approval of the fiscal year 2015 $9.8 million Research Development Test and Evaluation reprogramming request will enable initiation of developmental engineering and will facilitate Original Equipment Manufacturer competitive source selection. Simply put, if the reprogramming action is not approved, the 

commander’s lethality upgrade will not be met in time to influence, shape, and if 

needed, control potentially volatile situations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

PATRIOT MISSILE

129. Senator SHAHEEN. General Milley, there are currently thirteen U.S. allies

around the world that have purchased and deployed the Patriot air and missile defense system. A number of these partners have turned to the Patriot system as a 

result of emerging threats in Europe and the Middle East. Do you agree that the 

Patriot will be the Army’s premier air and missile defense system for the next few 

decades? 

General MILLEY. Yes, the Patriot is the Army’s premier air and missile defense 

program and a critical enabler to the joint air and missile defense structure. It will 

remain a critical system for the next few decades. The Army intends to comprehensively modernize Patriot, with multiple, phased efforts to maintain and improve system capabilities against an evolving threat environment. This strategy allows us to 

defeat both current and emerging threats while sustaining the system for the long 

term through modifications. 

130. Senator SHAHEEN. General Milley, given the joint environment and cooperation needed to counter these threats, do you believe it is in the interest of our other 

allies and partner nations to defend their air space and improve interoperability 

with the U.S. military, by also deploying Patriot in their armed forces? 

General MILLEY. Integrated air and missile defense must be a shared responsibility with our allies and partner nations. A focus area of the Army’s Air & Missile 

Defense Strategy is to build partner capacity and maintain forward presence. The 

Army continues to pursue increased interoperability with allies and partners 

through exercises and training events such as the recent training exercise with Poland. 

NEW HAMPSHIRE NATIONAL GUARD

131. Senator SHAHEEN. General Milley, the New Hampshire National Guard has

experienced a 32 percent decline in force structure since 2007. This percentage is 

ten times the decrease in the National Guard as a whole during the same period. 

There are seven states with a smaller population than New Hampshire, but have 

a larger guard force structure. What is your assessment of this disproportionate 

reduction? 

General MILLEY. If confirmed, I will coordinate with the Chief of the National 

Guard Bureau and the Director of the Army National Guard to assess the force 

structure of the New Hampshire National Guard. I have already been briefed the 

Army National Guard (ARNG) attempts to balance its force structure across the 54 

states and territories commensurate with the ability of individual states to recruit, 

train and sustain soldiers. I have been advised that in 2007 the New Hampshire 

ARNG had an allocated force structure allowance of 2,254 spaces and assigned end 

strength of 1,645 soldiers (72 percent assigned). As part of the ARNG Rebalance and 

Grow plan, this 609 space end strength deficit was taken into consideration and 

New Hampshire ARNG force structure was cut in order to right size and improve 

572 

readiness. Upon the completion of the fiscal year 2017 Command Plan (May 2015), 

New Hampshire ARNG will have a targeted programmed strength of 1,505,000. 

132. Senator SHAHEEN. General Milley , currently, New Hampshire ranks 51 out

of 54 in terms of the poor condition of its facilities and armories with many of these 

structures being more than a half century old. In your testimony, you emphasized 

the importance of the Army National Guard as part of the ‘‘total’’ or ‘‘one’’ army concept. Given your support of the Guard, how will you ensure the National Guard has 

the resources it needs to upgrade facilities or fund new military construction 

projects? 

General MILLEY. The Army will review the current parity model that is used to 

allocate increasingly scarce resources across the Total Army and will work to ensure 

we make the best possible and fairest use of our resources to ensure Total Army 

readiness. 

133. Senator SHAHEEN. General Milley, the New Hampshire National Guard

employs a unique program called the Care Coordination program. This program provides support to guardsmen and their families throughout the deployment cycle with 

mental health issues, suicide prevention, employment services, and educational assistance to name a few. I would be interested in your perspective on the importance 

of programs like this and the need to ensure that our servicemembers and their 

families have resources available before, during and after overseas deployments. 

General MILLEY. The Army has invested in a wide array of Family Programs that 

support the Total Army’s Soldiers and Families before, during, and after deployments. I strongly believe these programs to be an investment in the Army’s most 

valuable asset—our people. If confirmed, I will be steadfast in my commitment to 

providing soldiers and Families a quality of life commensurate with their service 

and its unique demands, while exercising stewardship of taxpayer dollars. PB16 includes funding to ensure soldiers and families are prepared to face the everyday 

challenges of military life, and to provide for a ready and resilient Total Army. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND

ARMY AVIATION RESTRUCTURING INITIATIVE

134. Senator GILLIBRAND. General Milley, I recently sent a bicameral and bipartisan letter to Secretary McHugh and General Odierno related to the Army Aviation 

Restructuring Initiative and its impact on Fort Drum. Inactivation of any of Fort 

Drum’s squadrons would have significant negative impacts on the economy of northern New York, including the local healthcare and school systems on which the Army 

heavily relies, as well as the Army. Will you ensure that I receive a clear explanation regarding the impact of this year’s appropriations and authorization bills on 

the 10th Mountain Division? 

General MILLEY. Yes. 

[The nomination reference of General Mark A. Milley, USA follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

June 4, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of Staff of the Army and 

appointment in the United States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a 

position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 

3033: 

To Be General

General Mark A. Milley, 0000

573 

[The biographical sketch of General Mark A. Milley, USA, which 

was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 

referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, USA 

Source of commissioned service: 

ROTC 

Educational degrees: 

Princeton University, BA, Political Science. 

Columbia University, MA, International Relations. 

United States Naval War College, MA, National Security and Strategic Studies. 

Military schools attended: 

Armor Officer Basic Course. 

Infantry Officer Advanced Course. 

United States Army Command and General Staff College. 

United States Naval War College. 

Foreign Language(s): 

Spanish 

Promotions: 

Promotions Dates of appointment 

2LT 10 Jun 80 

1LT 28 Nov 81 

CPT 1 Mar 84 

MAJ 1 May 92 

LTC 1 Aug 96 

COL 1 Apr 02 

BG 2 Jun 08 

MG 2 Mar 11 

LTG 20 Dec 12 

GEN 15 Aug 14 

Major duty assignments: 

From To Assignment 

Aug 14 ...... Present ... Commanding General, United States Army Forces Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

Dec 12 ...... Aug 14 ... Commanding General, Ill Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, Texas and OPERATION ENDURING 

FREEDOM, Afghanistan. 

Nov 11 ...... Dec 12 ... Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York. 

Jun 09 ...... Nov 11 ... Deputy Director for Regional Operations, J-3, Joint Staff, Washington, DC. 

Jul 07 ....... Jun 09 .... Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, 

Kentucky and OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan. 

Dec 06 ...... Jul 07 ..... Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, 

DC. 

Jul 05 ....... Dec 06 ... Chief, Global Force Management Division, later Assistant Deputy Director for Joint Operations, J3, Joint Staff, Washington, DC. 

Dec 03 ...... Jul 05 ..... Commander, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York and 

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq. 

May 03 ..... Dec 03 ... Commander, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light), OPERATION ENDURING 

FREEDOM, Afghanistan. 

Sep 02 ...... May 03 ... Deputy Chief of Staff for Transformation, G–7, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, 

Hawaii. 

Mar 02 ...... Sep 02 ... Commander, United States Provisional Brigade/Task Force Eagle, 25th Infantry Division (Light), 

Multinational Division (North), Eagle Base, Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

Jun 00 ...... Mar 02 ... G–3, later Chief of Staff, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. 

Aug 99 ...... Jun 00 .... Student, United States Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. 

Jul 98 ....... Jul 99 ..... Senior Battalion Task Force Observer/Controller, Operations Group, Joint Readiness Center, Fort 

Polk, Louisiana. 

Jul 96 ....... Jul 98 ..... Commander, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States 

Army, Korea. 

Jun 93 ...... Jun 96 .... S–1, later S–3 (Operations), later Executive Officer, 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light), 

Fort Drum, New York and OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Haiti. 

574 

From To Assignment 

Aug 92 ...... Jun 93 .... Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Jan 92 ...... Jul 92 ..... Foreign Area Officer Training Program, United States Defense Attache ́ Office, Bogota, Columbia. 

Oct 90 ...... Dec 91 ... Student, Columbia University, New York City, New York. 

Apr 90 ...... Oct 90 .... Student, Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, California. 

Jan 89 ...... Feb 90 ... S–3 (Operations), 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, 

California and OPERATION JUST CAUSE. 

Jun 86 ...... Jan 89 .... Commander, C Company, later Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, California and MultiNational Force and Observer Task Force, Sinai, Egypt. 

Jun 85 ...... Jun 86 .... Assistant S–2/3, Bayonet Combat Support Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, 

California. 

Oct 84 ...... May 85 ... Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, 

Georgia. 

Jun 82 ...... Oct 84 .... Commander, Operational Detachment ‘‘A’’, A Company, later B Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

Feb 81 ...... Jun 82 .... Assistant Battalion Maintenance Officer, later Platoon Leader, A Company, 4th Battalion, 68th 

Armor Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

Summary of joint assignments: 

Date Grade 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command/Deputy Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, 

Afghanistan. ........................................................................................................... May 13–Feb 14 Lieutenant General 

Deputy Director for Regional Operations, J–3, Joint Staff,Washington, DC. ............. Jun 09–Nov 11 Brigadier General/ 

Major General 

Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)/ 

Combined Joint Task Force–76, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan. Apr 08–Jun 09 Brigadier General 

Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Washington, DC. ..................................................................................................... Dec 06–Jul 07 Colonel 

Chief, Global Force Management Division, later Assistant Deputy Director for Joint 

Operations, J–3, Joint Staff, Washington, DC. ...................................................... Jul 05–Dec 06 Colonel 

Summary of operational assignments: 

Date Grade 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command/Deputy Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan,OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan. .............................................................................................................. May 13 –Feb 14 Lieutenant General 

Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)/ 

Combined Joint Task Force-76, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan. Apr 08–Jun 09 Brigadier General 

Commander, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light), OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq. .................................................................................. Jun 04–Jun 05 Colonel 

Commander, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light), OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan. ............................................................. May 03–Dec 03 Colonel 

Commander, United States Provisional Brigade/Task Force Eagle, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Multinational Division (North), Eagle Base, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mar 02–Sep 02 Colonel 

S-3 (Operations), 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light), OPERATION UPHOLD 

DEMOCRACY, Haiti. ................................................................................................ Aug 94–Jan 95 Major 

Cdr, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Multi-National Force and Observer Task 

Force, Sinai, Eypt. .................................................................................................. May 87–Nov 87 Captain 

U.S. Decorations and Badges: 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal. 

Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster). 

Defense Superior Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters). 

Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters). 

Bronze Star Medal (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters). 

Meritorious Service Medal (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters). 

Army Commendation Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters). 

Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster). 

Combat Infantryman Badge (with Star). 

Expert Infantryman Badge. 

575 

Master Parachutist Badge. 

Scuba Diver Badge. 

Ranger Tab. 

Special Forces Tab. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge. 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by General Mark A. Milley, USA in connection 

with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Mark A. Milley 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Chief of Staff, United States Army. 

3. Date of nomination: 

4 June 2015 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

June 20, 1958, Winchester, MA (Middlesex County, Massachusetts). 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married; May 4, 1985 to Hollyanne (Haas) Milley. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None. 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution. 

None. 

576 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

Member of AUSA, 10th Mountain Division Association, 101st Division Association, 

82d Airborne Division Association, Special Forces Association, 506th Infantry Regiment Association. 

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

MIT Seminar XXI Fellow—National Security Program. 

ROTC Scholarship Princeton University. 

French Airborne Wings (earned and filed). 

Afghan National Army Medal (presented not filed). 

Polish Military Medal (presented not filed). 

French Military Medal (presented not filed). 

Afghanistan Ministry of Interior Symbol of Honor for National Police (presented 

not filed). 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from 

the Administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY

This 15th day of May, 2015 

[The nomination of General Mark A. Milley, USA was reported 

to the Senate by Chairman McCain on August 4, 2015, with the 

recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on August 5, 2015.] 

(577) 

NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL 

ROBERT B. NELLER, USMC, TO BE GENERAL 

AND COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS 

THURSDAY, JULY 23, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain, 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain [presiding], 

Inhofe, Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Reed, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 

Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services 

Committee meets this morning to consider the nomination of Lieutenant General Robert Neller to be the 37th Commandant of the 

Marine Corps. 

General Neller, we thank you for joining us this morning. We are 

grateful for your many years of distinguished service to our Nation 

and for your continued willingness to serve. 

We also welcome members of your family joining us this morning, and thank them for supporting you and our Nation. As our tradition, at the beginning of your testimony, we invite you to introduce any family members that are joining us. 

As our Nation confronts the most diverse and complex array of 

global crises since the end of World War II, the next Commandant 

will be responsible for ensuring that the Marine Corps remains the 

Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness. After more than a decade 

of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, our marines have remained in high 

demand, performing the full range of theater security and crisis response missions across the globe. With instability spreading across 

the Middle East and North Africa, and tension gripping the AsiaPacific, more than ever our Nation is counting on the forward presence, strategic agility, power projection, and rapid response that 

are the Marine Corps hallmarks. 

But, as we confront the realities of a more dangerous world, 

drastic reductions in defense spending are forcing our marines to 

take on a growing set of missions with fewer and fewer resources. 

Over the last few years, the Marine Corps has been cut from 

202,000 Active Duty marines in 2012 to 184,000 today. Over the 

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next 2 years, the Marine Corps will fall to 182,000; and, if sequestration returns again, we will be left with 174,000 marines, a force 

ill-prepared and ill-equipped to respond to a crisis or major contingency. 

The combination of budget cuts, force reductions, and rising demands on our marines has reduced readiness, lengthened deployments, cut training and time at home with families, and put the 

Marine Corps under considerable strain. This madness must stop. 

As I said earlier this week, this is not just about reversing the effects of sequestration. We must replace the arbitrary spending caps 

on defense that were imposed under the Budget Control Act of 

2011. That’s the only way that we will get back to a truly strategic—strategy-driven defense budget. 

As General Dunford emphasized in his most planning—recent 

planning guidance, the Marine Corps is a naval expeditionary 

force. Over this past decade, as the United States was focused on 

the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, America’s potential adversaries 

were investing billions in so-called anti-access area denial capabilities that threat the Marine Corps ability to fight from the sea. At 

the same time, budget constraints have left the Marine Corps short 

of its requirements for amphibious warships. On the current path, 

the Marine Corps will not have the correct mix of amphibious warships until 2024. This is particularly concerning in the Asia-Pacific, 

where the Marine Corps plays an essential role in our rebalance 

policy. Despite growing tensions in the region, our marines still 

lack sufficient sealift and airlift capabilities to respond to a major 

contingency in the Asia-Pacific. We must do better if the United 

States is to accomplish a rebalance that successfully reassures our 

allies and deters our adversaries. 

General Neller, if confirmed, another significant challenge you 

will face is shortfalls in aviation readiness. As you well know, high 

operations tempo over a decade of sustained combat has degraded 

readiness—in marine aviation. Today, nondeployed marine aviation 

squadrons are 20 percent short of the number of aircraft needed to 

train or respond in a crisis. As you will surely agree, the Marine 

Corps aviation bench is simply too shallow to be ready for future 

challenges. We will be interested to hear your views on putting the 

Marine Corps on track to restoring aviation readiness. 

Finally, General Neller, if confirmed, you will be responsible for 

recapitalizing and modernizing for future challenges. In the air, the 

Marine Corps is rapidly approaching a significant milestone with 

the initial operational capability, or IOC, of the F–35B joint strike 

fighter. Concerns remain about the warfighting capability of these 

aircraft reaching IOC. We will be looking to you, General Neller, 

to ensure our marine aviators have safe and reliable aircraft that 

will allow them to effectively carry out their missions. On the 

ground, the amphibious combat vehicle remains the Marine Corps 

top acquisition priority. Given the importance of replacing our 

aging fleet of amphibious vehicles, the Marine Corps must learn 

the lessons of past failures, such as the expeditionary fighting vehicle, and deliver this needed capability on time, at cost, and up to 

expectations. We will be relying on you, General Neller, to make 

sure the job gets done. 

Thank you. We look forward to your testimony. 

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Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to join the Chairman in welcoming Lieutenant General 

Neller to the confirmation hearing regarding his nomination to be 

the 37th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. 

General Neller, welcome to the Armed Services Committee. 

Thank you for your many years of extraordinary service to the 

Corps and to the country. Also, thank your family for their service 

right alongside you every step of the way. 

General Neller, you have an exemplary record of service, and 

you’re highly qualified for the position which you’ve been nominated. You have commanded marines from the platoon level to the 

division level, and are—you are currently the commander Marine 

Corps Forces Command and commander Marine Corps Force Europe. Before this current assignment, you also commanded U.S. 

Marine Corps Forces for Central Command. 

General Neller, as Commandant of the Marine Corps, you will be 

tasked with the recruiting and retaining of quality force and ensuring that force contains the necessary structure and readiness levels 

to meet our Nation’s current challenges and the posture to respond 

to tomorrow’s crises and contingencies. These responsibilities are 

demanding enough on their own; however, you will also be asked 

to assume control at a time of immense financial and fiscal challenge, particularly because of sequestration. I know we will discuss 

a number of these challenges this morning. 

Again, thank you for your service and the service of your family. 

Thank you for your great marines, who make us all proud every 

day. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General, in order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it’s important that this committee and other appropriate 

committees of the Congress be able to receive testimony, briefings, 

and other communications of information. So, would you answer 

the following questions: 

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing 

conflicts of interest? 

[The witness answered in the affirmative.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in 

power? 

[The witness answered in the affirmative.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

[The witness answered in the negative.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you ensure your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record in hearings? 

[The witness answered in the affirmative.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 

and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

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[The witness answered in the affirmative.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

[The witness answered in the affirmative.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 

testify, upon request, before this committee? 

[The witness answered in the affirmative.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult 

with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or 

denial in providing such documents? 

[The witness answered in the affirmative.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Welcome, General. Please proceed. Perhaps you’d like to introduce your family. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT B. NELLER, 

TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS 

General NELLER. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member Reed. 

My wife, Darcy, is here. Our 40th wedding anniversary is next 

month. I already have the present, so I’m in good shape. 

[Laughter.] 

General NELLER. Our three children are not here: Kurt, Brett, 

and Claire. They are off—Kurt lives in Traverse City; Brett lives 

in Houston; and Claire and her husband, Jim, and the most important member of our family, grandson Connor, are in Austin, Texas. 

I’ll talk a little bit about all of them in my statement. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General NELLER. Our parents—our mothers both live in East 

Lansing, Michigan, and both our fathers are deceased and both veterans. My brother is a retired Navy captain. My dad served in the 

Army. Darcy’s dad and her—his three brothers are all World War 

II vets, served in the war. So, we have a history of service in our 

family. 

So, with that, I would like to present my opening statement. 

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

today. 

Before I offer my brief remarks, I do want to express my condolences to the families of the marines and sailor lost in the tragic 

shootings in Chattanooga. Our thoughts are with the families as 

they struggle to cope with this incomprehensible loss. For Gunnery 

Sergeant Sullivan, Staff Sergeant Wyatt, Sergeant Holmquist, 

Lance Corporal Wells, and our shipmate, Petty Officer Smith, you 

will not be forgotten. 

I’ll begin by thanking the President and the Secretaries Carter 

and Mabus for their confidence in nominating me for this office. I 

would also like to thank this committee and the Congress for your 

faithful support for our men and women in uniform under your 

leadership. The Marine Corps today is a much different and better 

force than the one I joined 40 years ago. 

I also want to recognize my partner, friend, and strongest supporter, who sits with me today, Darcy. We started our Marine 

581 

Corps journey at the same time, although she didn’t sign up; she 

just went with it. 

[Laughter.] 

General NELLER. She has an unconditional love for marines and 

their families. She understands the difficulties and stresses of military families, and serves as a strong advocate for their support. 

While I was off doing what was required, she ran the house, 

worked outside the home, volunteered, raised three kids, who all 

have their own lives and careers and are doing very well, thankfully—moved 26 times, to include three times overseas, and allowed me to think that I was contributing to the effort. Now that 

we have our first grandson, Connor, I have moved down in the 

pecking order in the Neller household, beneath him, the children, 

and the dogs. As I said, we’ll be celebrating our 40th anniversary, 

and I’m thankful that she’s here with me today. 

I accepted a Reserve commission in the Marine Corps in June of 

1975 out of the University of Virginia because I wanted to get married and I needed a job. When I joined, we had just come out of 

Vietnam. Discipline was not good, equipment was in poor condition, 

and training was poorly resourced and rudimentary. Though we 

were well led and we trained hard, we were not ready. So, in those 

early years, I learned to expect little and to get less. But, more importantly, I soon realized that being a marine, and an officer in the 

marines, was much more than just that job that I was looking for; 

it’s a profession, it’s a mindset, it’s a life. I came to realize that the 

marines and sailors we serve, and their families, are special people. 

If they are well led by those willing to share the hardship and the 

risk, led by those who firmly but fairly coach, teach, and mentor 

them, and by those willing to ensure they have what they need for 

the mission and for their families, that they could accomplish incredible things. 

I had many teachers in those early days, but the best were the 

Vietnam-era staff NCOs [Non-Commissioned Officers] who, for 

whatever reason, took the time to keep me out of my own way, 

mold me, and advise me when those were—when those times were 

tough. 

I also learned the hard grind of life in the infantry, how to operate, move, and survive in every clime and place, how to lead those 

that were not always willing, and how to build a team. I learned 

why the Marine Air-Ground Task Force [MAGTF], a team of teams, 

is the way we fight and why we win. I learned that we are most 

effective as a maritime force using the sea as maneuver space, and, 

as soldiers of that sea, we hold an advantage over our adversaries 

when we come from our Navy ships both on the surface and in the 

air. I learned that the support and well-being of our families is just 

as important as the ammo, food, and water we need to keep ourselves focused and successful in the fight. 

So, over these past years, through the efforts of great leaders, 

like Commandants Wilson and Barrow and those that followed, to 

include our current Commandant, General Dunford, and his wife, 

Ellen, who have set the conditions for our future success. With the 

support of the Congress and the Nation, we’ve kept at it. We’ve gotten better—better people, better equipment, better facilities, better 

training, better education, better leadership—and we were put on 

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a path to where we are today—a high-quality corps of men and 

women who are smart, fit, disciplined, trained, experienced, take 

care of each other, and are ready to fight tonight and to provide 

what America expects of her Marine Corps: an expeditionary crisis 

response force in readiness. Although material readiness, fiscal and 

other challenges do exist, and which must be addressed, I am immensely proud of where the Corps is today. 

All that said, we cannot rest on our laurels and become complacent. I don’t have to tell this committee that the complexity of the 

global security environment creates a level of uncertainty that increases risk to our Nation, from violent extremism across the globe 

and Cold War-like aggression in Eastern Europe, cyberthreats and 

contested waters in the Pacific. Because of the security environment we face, the President and our National leadership expects 

its military to be able to provide the military options and capabilities to meet these challenges and to protect the security interests 

of the American people. Among those military options they expect 

to have is a Marine Corps that can respond to crisis across the full 

range of military operations. They expect the Marine Corps to be 

the Nation’s force in readiness. They demand that, when the Nation is least ready and needs us most, the Marine Corps will be the 

most ready, will answer the call, and win. 

In order to be that Marine Corps, we must be willing to not just 

be good, but to get better, be able and willing to look at new and 

different ways of performing our craft that maintain an operational 

edge every day. Every marine we recruit and reenlist, every decision we make, all the equipment we procure, all the training we 

do must make us operationally better. Flexibility, innovation, dealing with change, uncertainty, thinking out of the box, all these 

things have to be commonplace and something that is expected 

from marines. It has been in the past, and it must be so in the 

future. 

Finally, if confirmed, I promise to dedicate myself to sustaining 

and providing the Nation that kind of Marine Corps, a Marine 

Corps of the highest-quality young men and women our Nation has 

to offer, the most disciplined, best-trained and -equipped and operationally-capable Marine Corps we can afford, and the best—to the 

best of my ability, to ensure the health, well-being, and opportunities for success of the men and women who accept the challenge to 

be a U.S. Marine. 

Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before you 

this morning. I’m ready for your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, thank you, General. 

Recently, General Dunford stated to this committee, quote, ‘‘We 

cannot execute the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review with the 

budget cuts as a result of the Budget Control Act.’’ He continued, 

stating that ongoing cuts will threaten our ability to execute the 

current defense strategy. Do you agree with that statement of General Dunford’s? 

General NELLER. Chairman, I do believe, if we are held to the 

sequestration level this year and in the following years, we will not 

be able to execute the strategy. 

583 

Chairman MCCAIN. Would this continued sequestration and its 

effects put the lives of the men and women serving in the Marine 

Corps in greater—at greater risk? 

General NELLER. Senator, if our readiness is degraded because 

we can’t resource the training and we can’t modernize the force, if 

we had to commit that force, there would be increased risk. 

Chairman MCCAIN. You know, in the 1970s, you referred to General Wilson and General Barrow, and you referred to the really terrible situation that existed. Do you see a parallel to that today with 

continued sequestration? 

General NELLER. Chairman, anytime we come out of conflict, 

there is always risk to this effect. But, they’re all different. We’ve— 

some—we’ve been able, after 12 years of war, to keep a very qualified and capable force. Because we’ve been resourced and supported 

by the Congress, I don’t believe we’re near that place that you and 

I remember from the ’70s. There’s always risk that things could 

happen that could take us there. I believe that’s what many of us 

are concerned about. But, right now, we’re not there. If confirmed, 

I give you my personal pledge that we’ll do everything in our power 

to never go back to that place again. 

Chairman MCCAIN. We’ve spent a lot of billion dollars on acquisition, as you know. At least in my view, the ongoing scandal is the 

cost overruns, the F–35B, complete testing of the CH–53 heavy-lift 

helicopter—the list goes on and on of cost overruns. Will placing 

service chiefs in a greater position of responsibility of service acquisition programs help fix—address this problem, in your view? 

General NELLER. Chairman, I don’t think any of us who are on 

the receiving end of the acquisition process are totally pleased. I’m 

not a acquisition professional, but I think we all wonder why it 

takes so long, costs so much money, why there’s delays. So, if confirmed, I would look forward to working with this committee and 

then the Secretary of Defense to improve this—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you believe that—— 

General NELLER.—process and involve the service chiefs in the 

process. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you believe that we could make this process more efficient if you played a role in that process—if the service 

chiefs played a role in that process? 

General NELLER. I would like to believe, if confirmed, that I 

could provide value-added to the process and make it more effective, Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

I’m sure you’ve observed the ongoing situation in Ukraine. Would 

you favor providing defensive weapons to Ukraine? 

General NELLER. Chairman, it’s my military opinion, if we provided additional weapons to the Ukrainians, that they would be 

more capable of defending their territory. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I want to go back, just a second, to the budget situation, because there is great controversy on that issue. I’m 

not sure my colleagues on both sides of the Capitol understand the 

consequences, not only for our ability to defend the Nation, but the 

greater risks to the people that we ask to defend us. Maybe you 

could talk to us a little bit about that and the impact on retention 

and morale, and of the—of our All-Volunteer Force. 

584 

General NELLER. Well, Chairman, in my current role as commander Marine Forces Command, I try to get out and speak to marines and sailors as often as I can. This force is very smart. They 

are informed. So, they are aware of what’s going on with the funding. I believe they’re concerned, they’re watching. They want to 

know what’s going to go on with compensation. They want to know 

what’s going to go on with the modernization and training. This 

Congress and this Nation has been very generous to them in the 

last 12 years, so they’ve created a very high—they have a high expectation in their mind of what’s—you know, what’s supposed to be 

right. They don’t have the context I had. They don’t understand 

what it is to go short. They’ll learn, if they have to. 

So, I do have some concerns about retention. I do have marines 

ask me, ‘‘Hey, what’s going to happen about pay and our gear and 

our training and our bases, our housing, and those things?’’ They 

know there’s choices to be made. But, I believe, whatever those 

choices are—and we can explain them to them, and they are reasonable, rational people, and they’ll make the decision—and I believe that they’ll stay. But, that remains to be seen. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, thank you, General, for your service. 

The Marine Corps continues to test, develop, and evaluate gender-neutral occupation standards. I think the expectation, the goal, 

is that every MOS [Military Occupational Specialty] would be 

available to qualified female in Marines, as well as males. You’re 

just opening up the base infantry course to company-grade female 

officers. Can you comment upon the expectations and your commitment to making sure that this is accomplished? 

General NELLER. Senator Reed, first off, just let me say, as I said 

in my statement, that whatever we do, it’s got to at least maintain, 

if not improve, our operational capability. Since the Secretary made 

the decision to open up these MOSs, we’ve done a number of 

things. First, we assign women in MOSs that they already held to 

previously restricted units to begin the process of integration. 

We’ve opened up other MOSs that were previously closed to female 

marines, like maintenance MOSs and light anti-air defense. Right 

now, there’s—94 percent of all MOSs in the Marine Corps are open 

to females. We sent women to Infantry Training Battalion as enlisted marines. They volunteered. We ran them through the training, developed data, and see what their ability was to pass 

through—pass that curriculum. We also allowed women—have continued to allow women to compete in the infantry officers course. 

The last thing we did, in a measured, deliberate way, was to form 

a task force—an integrated task force to put together men and 

women in teams, in units—infantry, artillery, tanks, light-armor 

Amtracs, and run them—prepare them, train them, and run them 

through an evaluation to get some data, because we found there 

was not a lot of data. So, we’re still assessing that data, and that 

data will drive, along with operational views, what the recommendation to the Commandant will be on opening up those remaining MOSs. 

Senator REED. Thank you, sir. This is a challenge for the—not 

only the Marine Corps, but the Army. Just, as we speak, there are 

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three women candidates in the mountain phase of Ranger School 

to see if we can validate and create a—in the Army, a pathway for 

Ranger qualifications for females as well as males. But, thank you, 

and I—for your commitment to that. 

Last year, the Personnel Subcommittee had a hearing, and the 

former senior enlisted advisor to the Commandant, Sergeant Major 

Richard Barrett, stated—and I’ve always listened to sergeant majors, they’re pretty smart people—but, I thought it was remarkable 

what he said. In his words, ‘‘If we do not get hold of slowing down 

the growth of personnel costs, if we do not pay a little more attention to the healthcare that we so generously have received in my 

33 years, I have never seen the level of quality of life, ever—this 

level. We have never had it so good. I make that point because, if 

we do not get a hold of slowing the growth, we will become an entitlements-based, healthcare-provided-based Marine Corps, and not a 

warfighting organization.’’ He further stated, I am told, in colorful 

tones, that marines care most about the next fight, training, and 

modernization. That, I think, is the dilemma that we all face. Can 

you comment upon that? 

General NELLER. I’m not going to speak for Sergeant Major Barrett. I’ve heard the comments. I know Sergeant Major Barrett. I 

think his concern is, is that we created, because of the generosity 

of the Congress and the fact that we were at war, and from—for 

rightful, proper reasons, we did a lot of things with medical care, 

and we had some shortfalls. 

Senator REED. Right, absolutely. 

General NELLER. I mean, our facilities are the best I’ve ever 

seen. So, we’ve taken advantage of the situation and the money 

that was available. So, a young marine coming in today, when he 

walks around, or she walks around, they see what they see; they 

don’t see what it used to look like. You know, Senator Tillis will 

attest to that down at Camp Lejeune. I mean—and the same thing 

at Camp Pendleton—it’s very nice. Not perfect. It’s good enough. 

But, it is—it’s new. We’re going to have to sustain that. 

So, I think Sergeant Major Barrett’s concern is, How do we sustain it? Have we created an expectation that we can meet? If we 

can’t meet that, what are the marines going to do? At the same 

time, that’s important, but it’s as, if not—to me, it’s more important that the training we give them and the equipment we give 

them has parts, it’s maintainable, the training is challenging, demanding, interesting, and it’s going to improve our operational capability. So—and we’ve done that—so, maintaining that level, I 

think, is what his concern is, and much of that is tied to resources. 

Senator REED. Now, my impression has always been that qualifyof-life issues, access to childcare, access to medical facilities, are 

critical, but soldiers and marines understand that, if they’re not 

well-trained, well-equipped, and ready to go, that’s the big qualityof-life issue, because that means they survive or they don’t survive 

and the mission gets accomplished or doesn’t get accomplished. So, 

we’ll have to work with that. 

My time is expired. One other issue I’ll just put on the table. We 

had a brief chat in the office. The sense that the next battle we 

fight, the first phase will be cyber-dominated, so we’ll be fighting 

in the dark. So, perhaps there’ll be an opportunity for other quesVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00591 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tions later this morning about how marines will relearn some of 

those old things, like maps and lensatic compasses and—you know, 

that might be very critical in the next fight, even though we have 

the most sophisticated equipment in the world. 

Thank you very much for your service. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. The Chairman asked you the question about the 

Ukraine. I was glad he did. I was over there when they had the 

parliamentary elections. For the first time in 96 years, they only 

had one Communist on their Parliament. I mean, that’s—that’s for 

us, that’s for the West, that’s their allegiance to us. 

Your answer was very similar to General Dunford when you said, 

‘‘Yeah, we—they should have defensive weapons over there.’’ What 

would be your choice, in looking at them, as to what priorities, 

what types of weapons they need the most right now? 

General NELLER. Senator, I’ve never been to Ukraine. I’ve been 

to Georgia. They’ve made similar requests. I think what they’re— 

what I’ve heard, at least from the Georgians, they’re looking for defensive weapons—antitank guided-missile-type weapons. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, why don’t—for the record, why don’t you 

just, kind of, send your suggestions, your—in looking and making 

those evaluations. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

We should continue the provision of non-lethal supplies and defensive equipment 

(counter fire radars) and ISR support to Ukraine and continue our training of their 

forces. If the future dynamics in the Ukraine change and necessitate a more robust 

military response, I would recommend the provision of weapons and systems—such 

as anti-armor weapons—and the necessary trainers to employ these weapons capable of effectively countering the battlefield threats the Ukrainian military feels they 

need the most assistance in defeating. 

Senator INHOFE. I know that they’ve just finished the B-model 

testing in—of the F–35 out in Yuma. You haven’t had a chance to 

go over and review it. Now, I understand you will—you are in the 

process of doing that now, but what is your opinion so far? Have 

you developed any yet? 

General NELLER. Senator, as you said, VMFA–121 [Marine 

Fighter Attack Squadron 121] is the first F–35B squadron out at 

Marine Corps Air Station in Yuma, Arizona. We—our plan was to 

declare IOC with them this month. That’s still the plan. They did 

an operational readiness evaluation. From what reports I have received, but I have not seen ‘‘the report,’’ they did very well. That 

report is with the Commandant, and he’s going to take a look at 

that and make a recommendation as—to the Secretary, as far as 

them being IOC. I’d—I’m hopeful that they passed. I think they 

passed. I think one of the concerns we have with any new system 

is the number of spare parts that are available to keep the aircraft 

at the requisite level of readiness. But—— 

Senator INHOFE. But, you’re in the process of making that evaluation now, or they are. 

General NELLER. The evaluation—— 

Senator INHOFE. You’ll be inheriting that responsibility. 

General NELLER. Sir, the—General Dunford, I believe, is going to 

make the recommendation on IOC soon. 

Senator INHOFE. General Dunford has forecasted that next decade will be characterized by small-scale crises in and around coastVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00592 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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al areas. I understand that the Marine Corps is changing its plans 

for development of the next-generation armored combat vehicle 

from a self-deploying vehicle to a wheeled vehicle. I always wonder, 

when that happens, and when things are as tight as they are now, 

although what we’re facing now is unprecedented, was that a budget-driven decision or do you think it’s the right vehicle? 

General NELLER. Senator, we had hoped to buy a high-speed 

planing vehicle. It became too expensive and it didn’t have the reliability. We have not given up on high water speed. We’re continuing to do research and development. 

In the meantime, we need a new vehicle. The current amphibian 

tractor is over 40 years old. There’s not a lot of room left to improve it. It’s not very survivable on a modern battlefield. It has a 

flat bottom. It’s made of aluminum. So, we’re pursuing off-the-shelf 

vehicles from vendors, and we’re going to continue to keep the Amtrac or the amphibian alive, and we’re going to select down to two 

vendors, this fall, build—take 16 of their vehicles and test them, 

and then down-select. So, we believe this vehicle will not only 

swim—I believe it will swim—it’ll improve our mobility and survivability on land. 

Senator INHOFE. You know, the tragedy in Chattanooga was one 

that we’re all—you already expressed your sentiments about that, 

and we all share your sentiments—there is a lot of reaction—political reaction. Different people are talking about different levels of 

security that they should be able to use, whether it’s private weapons, issued weapons. Do you have any thoughts on that? 

General NELLER. Senator, I know that there’s a number of studies and investigations ongoing about increasing the force protection 

for those servicemembers of all our services that are outside the 

wire, if you will, outside the major posts and stations where we 

have law enforcement and armed security. There’s some things we 

can do right away, just more physical protection, protection of 

glass, glass that you can’t see inside. Now, that could include arming individuals. There are some potential consequences to that. 

But, I think we need to take a look at it. So—but, at the same 

time, we have recruiters out there, and they’re out to recruit. The 

story in the media this morning is that they got interviewed and 

then they went back to work. They had to go—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. 

General NELLER.—recruit. So—— 

Senator INHOFE. Well—— 

General NELLER.—I don’t want anything that we do that’s going 

to—we need to stay connected to the American people. So, whatever we do has to ensure that we continue to go to schools and go 

out there and find those good young men and women that want to 

be marines. 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah, I understand that. But, in terms of protection, I think most of up here would look to you—to the military, 

to the uniforms—for advice along these lines. So—— 

The last thing I wanted to mention is, we—our schedules didn’t 

get together, because of a bill that I’m involved in right now. Would 

you make a point to come by so we have a personal visit? 

General NELLER. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. 

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Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Neller, thank you so much for your service to our country, your family’s sacrifice, because I know it goes hand in hand. 

Sir, with that being said, I’ve asked this question to everyone 

who’s come through this committee for their approval, and that 

would be, What do you assess as the greatest risk—or, threat the 

United States of America faces from another country? 

General NELLER. If you’re asking me about a country, Senator—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Who poses the greatest threat to the United 

States? 

General NELLER.—I would say another nation-state. I would 

agree with General Dunford that Russia has the most increasingcapable force, and their actions and the fact that they have strategic forces make them the greatest potential threat, although I 

don’t think they want to fight us. Right now, I don’t think they 

want to kill Americans. I think violent extremists want to kill us. 

Their capability is not that great, but their intent is high. The fact 

that they have a message that seems to resonate around the world, 

not just in this country, but in other countries in the Western 

world, they concern me equally. 

Senator MANCHIN. Your overall view, basically with that. So, 

Russia seems to be the one who has the greatest capability of doing 

harm to us, if they would desire that. So, we have to keep our eye 

on the ball. But, we don’t seem to have any relations with them, 

or, if they are, they’re just—I’ve been told that the Cold War is 

colder today than it was when it was declared. So, I don’t know 

how you would interact, as far as trying to build that relationship 

or communicate with your equals in Russia, or do you have open 

lines of communications with them? 

General NELLER. I’ve met with Russian officers in previous 

places, in previous times. I’ve never met with—they have a naval 

infantry or a marine corps. If there were opportunities to meet with 

them, like there are with any other country, it’s—there’s always 

a—it’s always good to talk, even if you disagree. I met with Chinese officers, and we didn’t agree on very much, but we had a nice 

lunch. 

Senator MANCHIN. I appreciate that. 

Second, I would say that, you know, I think all of our hearts go 

out to the families of the marines who lost their life in Chattanooga. We hope that never repeats itself again. What’s your plan 

of doing that, to make sure that the Reserve offices and recruiting 

offices are safe and secure around the Nation? 

General NELLER. Well, Senator, this—whatever we do as a military, it’s going to have to be consistent. Admiral Gortney is the 

Commander of Northern Command [NORTHCOM], so he’s ultimately responsible for the force protection, and we provide advice. 

We have a Marine component with NORTHCOM. So, we would 

work with them to implement whatever policies or procedures that 

we could do. But, in the immediate moment, they’ve increased certain levels and measures that they’ve put in place, which I’m not 

going to discuss here, that I believe are prudent at this time. There 

are some more physical things that they’re going to look at. 

589 

Senator MANCHIN. You know there’s a lot of discussion here on 

the Hill, basically about those who work in that type of an environment should be armed to protect themself with government-issues. 

They’ve even talked about their own private-issues, they’re bringing them on in for protecting themself. So, that seems to be the 

dialogue that’s going on right now. I don’t know if you have an 

opinion on that, if you would like to see those who work—or, if you 

worked in a recruitment office, would you want to have government-issue arms to protect yourself? 

General NELLER. Senator, I think we need to take a look at it, 

but I have some concerns about the second- and third-order effects 

of that, particularly on the recruiting—the recruiters and their access and things they need to do. There are some practical matters 

that have to be worked out. But, I believe that’ll all come out in 

the investigations and the planning that’s going on right now. So, 

I’m going to—I would—I’m not going to discount it, but I think 

that’s probably at the end and the most extreme measure that we 

could take to do what we need to do, which is protect those 

servicemembers out there doing their mission. 

Senator MANCHIN. If I could ask you, just your view, because marines always seem to be the first ones in when we have a conflict. 

With that being said, over in the Middle East is Afghanistan and 

Iraq. What’s your feelings about a three-state solution in Iraq, 

versus trying to continue to keep a one-state Baghdad solution to 

the problem that we have over there? Seems like that we’re not 

getting very much traction on going down the same path we’ve 

been down. So, I don’t know what your thoughts would be on a 

Kurdistan, a Shi’itestan, and Sunnistan, and have Baghdad basically have three separates so they would have the desire to fight, 

where we don’t have the Sunnis’ desire to fight right now, it seems. 

General NELLER. Senator, I would respectfully say that’s way out 

of my lane, to talk about a three-state solution, but I do believe—— 

Senator MANCHIN. But, do you think we have—I’m so sorry, sir, 

because my time is running—but, do you think we have a problem 

with getting the Sunnis the will to fight in that area? 

General NELLER. I was in Anbar for a year. They’ll fight. But, 

they have to believe, like any person who’s fighting, that the government that supports them is going to support them. So, if the 

Iraqi government can convince the Sunni tribes in Anbar, in 

Saladin, in Diyala, it is my personal, professional opinion, they will 

fight. If they can’t do that, they will continue to have a hard time. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you so much, sir, appreciate it. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Thank you, General Neller, for your service, and Ms. Neller, for 

your service and your family’s commitment to defending America. 

I think you answered well when you said, ‘‘Right now, we don’t 

think the Russians want to kill us, but the ISIS [Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria]—ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] 

does,’’ and actually taking action to that end. 

I had the opportunity to be with a wise member of parliament 

of one of our allies recently, and his comment was that our number-one achievable priority now should be to defeat ISIS before it 

grows and becomes even stronger, and that there’s a danger that 

590 

it could grow stronger. How would you think about that, in terms 

of our immediate achievable priority? Should we be taking more effective action to confront the rise of this extremist group in Iraq 

and in the Levant? 

General NELLER. Senator, I believe that the actions we’re taking 

now in support of the Iraqi government, the effectiveness remains 

to be seen. Right now, I mean, they’re in the process of trying to 

regain control of Ramadi. So, I believe that—I believe the Iraqis 

can do this. I believe they have the capability, and, if well led and 

supported, they have the will. 

So, to your bigger question of, Do we need to go after ISIL and 

make sure that they are not able to create a safe haven and to continue to foment their violent theories of how life is supposed to 

be?—yes, sir, I do. If confirmed, I would be—look forward to offering potential other options that we could possibly be more effective. 

But, right now, I think—I think we’re going to see some success, 

here. I may be wrong. But, it’s not going to be overnight. It’s going 

to take some time. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, a key area is al-Anbar region. You were 

there for a year. Were you there when the transformation took 

place—and the marines, I know, were involved in that—when 

they—the tribal leaders reacted against al-Qaeda and basically ran 

them out of the area? 

General NELLER. Yes, Senator, I was. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, you’ve seen that. How did we help them? 

What did we do to convince them that they had the kind of support 

that they could be successful and throw out al-Qaeda? Do you believe that we can do that again? Are they capable of throwing out 

ISIS, which I also believe they do not favor, and oppose, and wish 

were not there? 

General NELLER. We supported, as we are now, the Iraqi Security Forces. The situation was not as—there was—the adversary 

didn’t actually hold as much ground then as they do now. I’m not 

aware—I have not been there since I left, in 2007. I was back in 

2011, right at the end, when the U.S. forces pulled out. So, my 

knowledge base is aged, and I would hope to go back and see it 

with my own eyes, if confirmed as the Commandant, to get a better 

understanding of what’s going on. But, similar to what we’re doing 

now, we provided capability, we provided support, we provided 

training. At the end of the day, our goal was that they would own 

it, because, at the end of the day, they have to fix this. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, they were successful, to a degree that 

many of us didn’t expect. It was a decisive moment in the creation 

of a stabilized Iraq. There’s no doubt about it. I remember, I believe General Stewart—was it Colonel—I don’t know if was colonel 

or general at that time; now he’s a defense intelligence commander—but, he was there, and we did a lot of things that supported them and gave them confidence. Without putting large numbers of forces on the ground, without leading in combat operations 

and conducting those operations, do you think that providing embedded soldiers with the Iraqi forces, with communications systems, with the ability to call in airstrikes, resupply, evacuation, 

those kind of things that an embedded American soldier might provide, and the confidence it provides—could that be a positive factor 

591 

in helping the Iraqi forces have the confidence necessary to get on 

the offensive and once again throw off these extremists? 

General NELLER. Senator, it’s been my experience that if we have 

Americans with foreign militaries providing those capabilities, that 

they do perform at a higher level. But, there have to be other 

things in place so that the force protection of those forces, those 

soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, is also guaranteed. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I thank you, and I trust that you will 

provide the best military advice you can to the President, to your 

superiors, and to the Congress. I’ll ask you, Will you, when asked, 

continue to give your best advice? 

General NELLER. Yes, Senator, I will. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Senator Sessions, that was a great series of questions, because they were the same ones that I had. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KING. So. I appreciate it. 

I just want to touch—refine a couple of those points. 

You’re not only being nominated to be Commandant of the Marine Corps, you’ll be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National 

Security Council Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, Advisor to 

the President. You don’t strike me as a guy that’s going to be shy 

about speaking up when you feel it’s necessary, but I want to urge 

you to do so. Your value, your experience, your wisdom, your judgment is why you’re in this position. If you don’t provide it in an 

unvarnished way, then you’re not fulfilling this job. I deeply hope 

that you will be forthcoming and as straightforward as you have 

been today with the highest levels of the administration, because 

that’s just vitally important. The President isn’t well served if he 

doesn’t have people who tell him the straight truth. Are you committed to that mission? 

General NELLER. I am, Senator. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Again, to follow up on Senator Sessions’ questions about our role 

in Iraq. You were there, as you’ve mentioned. How do we—what 

are the elements of a successful advise-and-assist mission? How do 

we convey the will to fight, other than simply providing weapons 

and supplies? What are the pieces? What did you learn from your 

experience in Iraq that we—because we are going to—we have to 

have these people fight for themselves. If they don’t, this battle is 

lost. 

General NELLER. Senator, there’s—there is the material piece. 

You have to give equipment that’s reliable and works, and then you 

have to train the force to use that equipment, and they have to 

have confidence in it, they have to be competent in its use. They 

have to be able to shoot, use the radios, drive. Then they have to 

be willing to go out and confront their adversary. That requires 

leadership. The most difficult part, I believe, will be—there are 

leaders there. Every—there’s leaders in every unit. You’ve just got 

to find them. You know, one of the frustrations we had previously, 

back many years ago, was, there were Iraqis there, and we had to 

make sure that the right Iraqi was leading the unit. That wasn’t 

always the case. 

592 

So, again, I have not been there. I have not met the officers in 

charge. The marines that are there—from time to time, I hear from 

them. They are not discouraged. They’re pressing. So, they need 

people to train. They need the equipment. They need the ability to 

train them. Then they need—the Iraqi need—Iraqis need leadership. 

So, it’s kind of a stew of things that have to be put together. I 

think we’re trying to help them make that stew. We’ll see, here— 

as they go toward the Ramadi objective, we’ll see if they’re effective 

or not. 

Senator KING. Well, the discussion today has centered on Iraq, 

but we’ve also got the problem of Syria, where we don’t have a security force to be training and working with. My concern is that 

time is running out, in the sense that ISIL is not only gaining 

ground, they’re gaining ground organizationally. There have been 

reports recently that they’re looking more and more like a state. 

They are governing, they are talking about succession of their leadership, and they are consolidating in many of the areas where they 

are. I understand the limits of American force, and that we can’t 

do it all with airpower, but how do we deal with Syria? We’re doing 

some limited training there, but it seems very insignificant, given 

the nature of the threat. We could be very successful in Iraq, but 

you’ve still got that large ungoverned area of eastern Syria that is 

a potential home base for this group. 

General NELLER. Syria, in my mind, is much more complicated 

than Iraq, although—and they are—but they are linked. So, if Iraq 

were able to reestablish their borders, in my military opinion, it 

would facilitate what we would do in Syria. But, right now I think 

the objective to train Syrian opposition fighters against ISIL is— 

with the ability to protect themselves—is a prudent move. It hasn’t 

been as successful as I believe any of us had hoped. But, right now, 

I’m—I think that’s as good as we’re going to get right now. But, 

the Syria situation, again, I follow it, but I don’t—I’m not there, I 

don’t live it every day. It is exponentially, in my mind, more complicated than Iraq. 

Senator KING. I agree. 

Thank you, General. Thank you, again, for your service. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Fischer. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, and your wife, for the service you and your 

family have given to this country. We look forward to your continued service in the future. Thank you, sir. 

When it comes to recruiting and retaining your marines, what’s 

the most important thing? Is it modernization? Is it having that 

up-to-date equipment? Is it operations tempo? Is it compensation? 

What’s the most important to these young people? 

General NELLER. Senator, we’ve done a lot of surveys to try to 

find out, you know, what is the one thing that convinces a marine 

to stay. It—there is not one thing. It’s—could be duty station, it 

could be a chance for special training, it could be opportunity to go 

overseas, could be education, it could be just quality of life and the 

experience that they’ve had. So, every marine is different. So, we 

have to offer kind of a—you know, find out what it is, and, if we 

want to keep them, convince what it is we have to offer them to 

593 

keep them. So, they’re—we’re fortunate that we’ve had a lot of marines, we have not had problems either recruiting or retaining. I’m 

not naive enough to think that that’ll always be the case. But, right 

now, we have sufficient tools, if you will, to convince people to stay. 

I would say, though, for married marines, a lot of them, it’s housing and childcare and medical. 

Senator FISCHER. How are you able to fulfill the combatant commanders’ requirements? You’re looking at reductions as we move 

forward, here, and there are some risks involved with those reductions, I think. Are you able, right now, to fulfill those requirements? Do you think you will continue to be able—and do you 

think you may have to change your role in the future in order to 

meet there requirements required by those commands? 

General NELLER. Senator, right now, we believe we are meeting 

the combatant commanders’ requirements. The combatant commanders have a lot of requirements. Our concern right now, as a 

service—as the Marine Forces Command, my task to the Commandant is to help generate the force to meet those requirements. 

So, we are working—you know, we’re trying to keep the force at a 

2-to-1 deployment ratio. If the force gets smaller and the requirements don’t go down, we’re going to be inside that, which is of concern to us. So, you’re always balancing risk to the force versus risk 

to the mission. 

So, we’ll work with the combatant commanders to see if we can’t 

figure out new, different, innovative ways to give them the capability they need to meet the mission and, at the same time, buy us 

a little more dep-to-dwell [deployment-to-dwell] relief. 

Senator FISCHER. What’s the mission of the Marines? 

General NELLER. The mission of the Marine Corps is to provide 

the Nation’s force in readiness as crisis response and to seize and 

secure advanced naval bases as part of the naval campaign, and to 

do those things as the President may direct. 

Senator FISCHER. Have you seen that mission change during 

your time in the Marines? 

General NELLER. No, ma’am, I have not. 

Senator FISCHER. As we look ahead at different threats that are 

coming up in the future, do you see the development of the antiaccess weapons, like the long-range anti-ship missiles—is that 

going to impact the Marines’ operations at all? 

General NELLER. Clearly, the increasing capabilities of potential 

adversaries and the anti-access area denial battlespace is of concern. We talk about this. We exercise it. We train it. As we’ve gotten our forces off the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, and gotten back on ship, we’re working that with our naval partners as 

part of the naval campaign. There’s both a technical piece to this 

and also a tactical piece to this. We have to be a little more artful 

and skillful in how we approach this, because they have capability. 

So, the days we could sail where we wanted to sail without consideration of that, those days are gone. 

Senator FISCHER. So, you think that will have a strategic impact, 

then, on how marines are going to be deployed in the future? 

General NELLER. We’re going to have to be very wary of these 

capabilities, and we’re going to have to part—as part of a Joint 

594 

Force and a naval campaign, there will have be the conditions set 

so that we can safely project that Marine Corps power ashore. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, sir. It’s an honor to meet you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator FISCHER. Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I know we had an opportunity to discuss, General, sexual assault 

and the problem around it, and the progress that we see in some 

of the numbers, but the stubborn and cultural issue of retaliation. 

You have certainly made a commitment to me that that is going 

to be a priority for you to figure out the best way to get at that, 

in terms of the culture within the Marine Corps. 

I also want to take a moment to acknowledge that the Marines 

have work to do, in terms of recruiting women. As you know, only 

7 percent of the marines are women. If you’re confirmed—when 

you’re confirmed, you’ll have to make a really important decision 

on whether to recommend that any positions remain closed to female marines. What I’m worried about is the pipeline. If we are not 

recruiting more women, you are not going to get women in the various positions that will allow the kind of integration that’s going to 

ultimately make the Marine Corps stronger and better, and make 

our Nation more secure. So, I would love to have some feedback 

from you, after you’re confirmed, about any ideas that you have as 

the chief on how we can do a better job of recruiting more women 

marines. 

General NELLER. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let’s talk about your audit. I’m a former 

auditor. I’m big on audits. You all—you’ve been under audit longer 

than any of the other services. You’ve had the opportunity to gain 

the most from this process. It’s my understanding that, through the 

audit process, the Marine Corps identified that it, historically, was 

requesting too much annual funding for permanent changes of station, and was able to reallocate about 100 million in the 2012 Future Years Defense Plan [FYDP] to make better use of those funds. 

I mean, this is a great example. I think people think an audit is 

like going to the dentist; you know, you know you’ve got do it, and 

it’s going to be painful, and, when it’s over, you’re not sure that it 

really was worth it. But, audits aren’t like that, because audits reveal a lot that help you allocate resources more effectively and figure out where your needs really are and maybe, like you’ve found 

with the FYDP, that there was an ability to move money around 

in a way that was important to the Marines. 

In 2017, all of the services are supposed to have—be audit-ready. 

I’ve been on this, and on this for as long as I’ve been sitting on this 

committee, and I’m skeptical that we’re going to get there by 2017. 

I’m also concerned that it’s the last statutory deadline the services 

and the DOD [Department of Defense] must meet. I would like to 

have your commitment to make the audit process within the Marines a permanent priority, going forward, so we never again get 

to this place where we have a massive amount of resources with 

no transparency. 

General NELLER. Senator, you have my commitment, if confirmed, that we will work this as hard as we can and get a clean 

595 

or a qualified audit that shows that we can account for every single 

penny we spend. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let’s talk about—thank you for that commitment, and I will be like a broken record on the audit thing until 

we get audits from all of our branches and we can begin—it would 

really help us in our jobs. It would help us make the case, if we 

were able to have the transparency that an audit provides. 

Let’s turn to readiness just for a moment. In response to the advance policy questions for this hearing, you noted that the current 

1-to-2 deployment-to-dwell ratio is unsustainable. I want to talk 

about the fact that the challenges posed by ISIS in the Middle East 

and an aggressive Russia, neither one of these were planned for. 

So, what would the effect be on the force if a significant Marine 

Corps response was required to address an unplanned contingency 

overseas in the near future? 

General NELLER. Well, Senator, you’d have to do one of two 

things. You’d have to either grow the force—we believe the optimal 

size force for the Marine Corps is 186,000 marines. We can’t afford 

that. So, if we had an—a commitment elsewhere, we would take 

forces that are currently forward deployed, such as in the Far East, 

in Okinawa, and we would have to reposition them to wherever 

that contingency was. We did that during the combat in Iraq, and 

it’s only through the past few years we’ve been able to reestablish 

our presence that we’ve had, historically, in the Pacific. So, we 

have some options. The other option, the least favorable, is, we go 

all-in. We activate our Reserves, and we go and do what needs to 

be done. We’ve done that before, too. That—you can do that for a 

short period of time, but, as you mentioned, it’s not sustainable. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What is the short period of time? I mean, 

in your best estimate—and I don’t want to hold you to anything 

here, but—I mean, what I’m trying to get a handle on is, we are 

wrestling with very difficult decisions about the Middle East and 

Iran’s nuclear capability. There are some in the Senate that I believe are tempted by the idea that we could go in and bomb Iran 

and set off what could be a war much bigger than any that we have 

been trying—any contingency that we’ve been trying to fight in 

over the last decade in the Middle East. What—I mean, how soon 

would we have to do emergency spending? Is that, in fact, the most 

efficient way and best way to do it? 

General NELLER. Senator, I—it’s a difficult question. I’d have to 

get back to you, as far as the details, without knowing the exact 

size of the force, what the exact mission was, what the combat ratios were, and what we would need to do, what we have to accomplish, militarily, to achieve whatever the political objective was. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I—and I know it was kind of a dumb question in that regard, because it’s very hard for that question to be 

answered without more specifics. I guess I’m just trying to get out 

into the conversation that talking about things in the abstract 

sometimes sound a lot better than what it is in reality. The more 

we are informed about what the reality would be, I think, the better job we can do making sure you have everything you need. 

I appreciate you. I enjoyed meeting your wife. I understand that 

she and I almost share a birthday. I think, with—we are born 

596 

when we’re born, that you’re supposed to be really strong and capable of being mean and capable of taking no prisoners. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, I am pleased—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator McCaskill knows about that. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yeah. I am pleased that she and I might 

share some of those traits. I think she will be a terrific addition 

to the barracks and to the hosting that you do there for so many. 

I know how proud she is of you and how proud we all are of your 

family. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, congratulations on your nomination. 

I also want to echo—I know that many of my colleagues on the 

committee want to echo—what you talked about, in terms of our 

shock and sense of condolences to the families and friends of the 

marines from Chattanooga. We’ve got to make sure that kind of activities don’t happen again. 

I wanted to go back to the issue of readiness. You see, from this 

committee’s questions, you’re going to get a lot of different questions from the committee on a whole host of different subjects. But, 

I wanted to ask about the primary mission of the Marine Corps infantry, which is the heart and soul of the Marine Corps, and it’s 

the mission to close with and destroy the enemies of our Nation. 

Sometimes we don’t talk about that, that what we’re really focused 

on doing in the Marine Corps is being ready to kill the enemies of 

our country. Does that remain the highest priority, in terms of Marine Corps training, particularly infantry training, or do you see 

the Marine Corps being pulled in a variety of different areas, different missions, different mandates, in terms of training? 

General NELLER. Senator, our—you know, we train for a variety 

of missions. I believe—I can only speak for myself, but my professional opinion always been is, if I can do the high end of the mission, the most high-risk, the most dangerous, the most kinetic, 

that—and I’ve trained the force to do that, and they’re disciplined—that I can bring them back down to the other end. There 

are specific things. So, we do practice HADR [Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief] things. We do NEOs [Non-combatant Evacuation Operations]. We do training of foreign militaries. But, our 

primary mission is to be a force in readiness that can fight at all 

parts of the range of military operations, but particularly at the 

high end. 

Senator SULLIVAN. You know, you and the Chairman were talking about the 1970s. As you know, infantry officers in the Marine 

Corps are often encouraged to read a—this book, which I think is 

a great book. It’s called ‘‘This Kind of War,’’ by T.R. Fehrenbach, 

which actually focuses on the 1950s and the Korean War and an 

example of what you mentioned earlier about the Marine Corps 

being a force in readiness when the country was least ready. But, 

do you worry about levels of readiness and training, that we could 

have another Task Force Smith in the next 5 to 10 or 15 years if 

we don’t get our funding and training levels in readiness, properly 

adjusted? 

597 

General NELLER. Senator, that’s also one of my favorite books, 

not because it’s a good story, just because it’s a good lesson. 

I think that’s always in the back of our minds. I think the current fiscal situation kind of brings it a little bit more to the forefront. But, at the same time, as long as we can recruit and retain 

good marines, and our gear is functional, I don’t see us going to the 

point of where—of what happened, historically, to that force when 

it was put on the Korean Peninsula. Could it happen? I’m not going 

to speculate on that. All I can tell you is, if confirmed, I will give 

every ounce of effort I possibly can to not ever allow that to happen, just as I know—not to speak for General Milley or any other 

service chiefs—I know General Dunford—that’s our job. That’s 

why, if confirmed as the Commandant, I’m responsible to you that 

that doesn’t happen. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Let me turn—the Chairman mentioned that the—in his statement, the importance of the Pacific rebalance and the critical role 

that the Marine Corps is playing in that. I think it’s something 

that this committee, this Congress, is trying to support. I think, in 

some ways, the Obama administration undermines their own strategy, in terms of the credibility of the strategy, by slashing Army 

forces in the Asia-Pacific, which is what they’re proposing to do. I 

just have a few questions related to the rebalance. 

Are you satisfied with how that’s going, overall, in terms of the 

credibility of the rebalance for all the services? More particularly, 

are you satisfied with the redeployment of marines from Okinawa 

to Guam, Australia, possibly Hawaii? Do you think that, when we 

do that, that we’re going to have the strategic lift to take what’s 

a concentrated force now in Okinawa to a much more dispersed 

force—will we have the strategic lift to be able to move those forces 

if and when we need them in a contingency? 

General NELLER. Senator, I’m not qualified to make a comment 

on the status of the other services, as I simply am not witting to 

what they’re doing. 

As far as the Marines, we left Okinawa to go to Iraq and Afghanistan. We’re back. The force that was there before is present. 

They’re training, they’re properly equipped, they’re ready to go. We 

have changed our deployment. Now, instead of one of the battalions 

going to Okinawa, it goes to Australia for 6 months, and then eventually, because of the agreements, we’ll distribute the force to 

Guam and put some more marines on, on Hawaii. 

I think the concern is, as you state, that once we do this, our 

ability to move that force—training opportunities on Okinawa, 

mainland Japan, Guam, are limited, and you have to be able to 

move to where the training is. You have to move to other nations. 

You have to be able get to Korea, you have to get to Thailand, you 

have to get to the Philippines. To do that, you need sealift and airlift. 

So, when we do this—and we will do this—we—we’re going to 

have to—that’s going to be the hard part. There are some opportunities with high-speed vessels and things with the Navy and the 

movement of a three-ship ARG [amphibious ready group] from the 

east Coast to the Pacific area, which will give us more lift. So, 

598 

that’s going to have to happen. But, I concur with you that the 

strategic lift is kind of the long pole, potentially, in that tent. 

Senator SULLIVAN. So, right now, you don’t believe that that— 

our strategic lift capability matches our proposed deployment 

laydown? 

General NELLER. It—I believe it will, but it remains to be seen 

once we get on Guam and have to move these forces around. We 

do a pretty good job right now, but, again, we’re not on Guam, and 

we’ve got decent training in Hawaii, up in the—up at the PTA 

[Pohakuloa Training Area]. But, we still have to be able to move 

these forces around. So, I’m concerned about, particularly, grayhull amphibious lift. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Neller, thank you and your family for your service. 

Of course, the Marines are an important part of the military 

presence in Hawaii at Marine Forces Pacific Command and at the 

Kaneohe Bay. We’re going to get more marines as we move them 

out of Futenma, Okinawa. So, thank you very much for all that you 

do. 

I also am very committed to the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. 

You mentioned in your advance questions, quote, ‘‘Our strong Marine presence in the region′′—meaning the Asia-Pacific region— 

′′plays a significant role in promoting the regional security and stability.’’ So, if confirmed, I trust that you will continue to support 

a tangible—tangible rebalance to build and maintain the important 

partnerships that we have in this area of the world. 

General NELLER. Yes, Senator. 

Senator HIRONO. You mentioned, in your—the earlier response to 

Senator Sullivan, how important training is. So, the missions that 

the marines perform, including theater security cooperation, exercises with partner nations’ forces, and contingency operations, require our forces to maintain a high level of readiness and training. 

The availability of training ranges, such as Pohakuloa Training 

Area, which you just noted, on the Big Island and others, are critical to the Marine Corps’ ability to conduct operations in the Pacific. Could you share your thoughts on the importance of training 

ranges, especially as we continue the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific? 

General NELLER. Senator, if we’re going to do what we need to 

do to be ready, we have to have ranges that support our ability to 

use our weapons and to maneuver the force. One of the great advantages of a training area like Pohakuloa is that we’re able to go 

up there and drop bombs and shoot artillery and do a lot of the 

things that we need to do. There is some maneuver space up there. 

Plus, we have the advantage—we have to actually deploy there. So, 

you go up there, it’s like—whether—even though it’s only a matter 

of miles, it doesn’t really matter; you pick up, and you move. So, 

wherever we go as we position this force around the Pacific, we 

have to be concerned that the—that there’s ranges and training 

areas there so that that force can, at a minimum, sustain the readiness that they have once they arrive. 

599 

Senator HIRONO. I think this—this committee is definitely aware 

of the need to have these training areas. We have a number of 

them in Hawaii. But, there are always issues relating to making 

sure that we are in concert with the concerns of the community. 

So, that will remain, especially with regard to Pohakuloa. 

You were asked some questions regarding sexual assault in the 

military, which this committee has spent considerable time on. So, 

you note that it is the responsibility of the commanders to set a 

positive climate. So, beyond command climate surveys, for example, 

what other methods are used to determine a commander’s ability 

to establish a positive command climate, where a marine would feel 

that he or she could report a crime without fear of retaliation? I 

think this becomes ever more important as you integrate women 

into the various positions in the Marine Corps. So, for example, 

what kind of guidance would you give your commanders about specific actions they should take to create an environment in which retaliation, which is a major focal area for our—for many of us on 

this committee, both overt and particularly the subtle forms of retaliations that could occur? 

General NELLER. Senator, we have a very detailed selection process for those that are—have the opportunity and privilege to lead 

marines. So, a part of—their records are reviewed, and a board of 

senior officers determine that they are the best and most capable. 

Once they assume that office, their seniors in the chain of command monitor what goes in that unit, not just operationally, but 

what goes on as far as their discipline. So, that’s being tracked. We 

also have courses, before they assume command, where we talk to 

them about what their responsibilities are. This topic, along with 

other topics, are part of that. So, they understand their legal responsibility, their legal authority, their moral and ethical authority 

to lead their marines. 

Senator HIRONO. We recognize, General, that changing the culture is not an easy task. So, I know you’re aware that this issue 

will be of ongoing concern to all of us. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. General Neller, thank you very much for your 

service. Thanks for coming by the offices to talk to so many of us 

before this hearing. 

How many marines do we have now in the United States? 

General NELLER. In the continental United States right now? 

Senator WICKER. I mean, how—in the United States Marines. 

General NELLER. Just under 184,000, Senator. 

Senator WICKER. You don’t anticipate that number dropping very 

much in the next 4 to 5 years, do you? 

General NELLER. We believe that by the end of fiscal year17, 

we’ll be down to around 182,000. 

Senator WICKER. So, maybe a drop of only 2,000, Marine Corpswide. 

General NELLER. Yes, Senator. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. It would—would it be a mistake to go 

much lower than that? 

General NELLER. If we were to go lower than that, Senator, the 

dep-to-dwell ratios that I’m concerned about, and the ComVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00605 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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mandant’s concerned about, would be—would increase the risk to 

the force and our ability to meet combatant commanders’ requirements. 

Senator WICKER. With those requirements and the ratios that 

you want to maintain, how are we doing with recruiting? Are we 

getting the type of young person we need? What motivates someone 

to join the Marine Corps today? 

General NELLER. We’re doing very well. I think that’s something 

that we’re watching. But, our manpower director, Lieutenant General Brilakis, the other day, briefed us that right now, for the next 

fiscal year, we’ve already signed up 55 percent of the requirement. 

So, those marines are in a pool, waiting to come to recruit training. 

They’re not just marking time, they’re working with their recruiters, voluntarily, to get themselves ready to go. 

The quality of those recruits—potential recruits—is very, very 

high. We have a very high standard, and I think that’s both a credit to our recruiters, and also—reflects in the quality of the force. 

On the officer side, we have at least three college graduates waiting for every spot to go—become a Marine officer. 

So, we’re in a very good place. Again, I don’t take that for granted, but I’m hopeful we can keep that going. 

What inspires or motivates somebody to join the Marine Corps? 

Senator, that varies from individual to individual. It could be something to prove, somebody told them they couldn’t do it, family heritage, want to serve their Nation, want to learn a trade, want to get 

a—the great benefits of the 9/11 G.I. Bill, or they just want to be 

a marine. 

Senator WICKER. You were walking through a student union, and 

a poster caught your eye, back in the ’70s. Is that right? 

General NELLER. Actually, it was a big, tall guy wearing those— 

blue uniform. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. More than a poster. 

What frustrates our Active Duty marines now? 

General NELLER. Oh, I think sometimes they get frustrated with 

their leadership. I think we have to work hard to challenge these 

young men and women. They’re smart. They want to be—they 

want to do important things that keep them engaged, but, when 

they’re done, they want us to say they’re done. That’s fair. So—but, 

they—because we’ve done such a good job, you know, we’re kind of 

victims of our own success. So, we owe them, you know, good training, good gear, good organization, good leadership. Then their end 

of the deal is, show up, bring their A-game every day, work hard, 

train hard, and then, when we’re done, then they can, you know, 

take a little bit of a break; at the same time, knowing they’re 

never, never not a marine. 

Senator WICKER. Let me follow up on your conversation with 

Senator Sullivan about sealift. I want to thank the Marine Corps 

for making the case for the amphibs, and particularly the 12th 

LPD [Landing Platform/Dock]. We—I don’t think we would have 

gotten the 12th LPD through this committee and through the Congress, both houses, on a bipartisan basis, if it had not been for the 

Marine Corps coming and saying that that—we very much needed 

that for us to complete the mission. 

601 

Mr. Brzezinski was here earlier this year and talked about the 

need for the amphibious forces to be in the Baltic. We’ve had discussion about Russia and the seriousness of the Russian threat, as 

well as the more immediate threat of ISIS. But, what is the reason 

for being particularly careful, as Mr. Brzezinski mentioned, about 

the amphib forces in the Baltic Sea area? 

General NELLER. Well, Senator, we just actually did an exercise 

in the Baltic with our U.S. and a number of coalition ships. It was 

called Agile Spirit, I believe, commanded by Vice Admiral Jamie 

Foggo, who is the 6th Fleet commander. So, we did an exercise in 

the Baltic. I’m sure it was paid close attention to by certain countries in that part of the world—— 

Senator WICKER. I hope so. 

General NELLER.—as we—I do, too—and as we projected power 

ashore, did a landing with Poles and Lithuanians and Estonians, 

and then trained ashore, and then with U.S. Army forces there. So, 

there is interest in the Baltic because it’s on the perimeter of certain land masses that you might have to gain access to. Then, 

three NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies are—that 

are very small countries, live on the east end of the Baltic Sea, and 

they’re concerned about potential aggression against them. So, 

we’re there to reassure them. 

Senator WICKER. I would say—it’s fair to say they remember, not 

too long ago, when there was a different dynamic in that area, and 

they appreciate the Marines being there with them and the United 

States being there with them. 

Thank you for your service, and thank you for your testimony, 

sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Neller, and to your family. Congratulations 

on a wonderful service, thus far. 

A few questions. I want to go back to—you talked a bit about 

gender integration earlier, and we’re—I want to kind of get your— 

your take, first, on how it’s going, and then the kind of philosophy 

that the Marine Corps is undertaking to carry out that mission, if 

you could talk about that. 

General NELLER. Senator, when the Secretary made the decision 

to open up all occupational fields, the service chiefs and the services were getting a certain amount of time to take a look at how 

they might do this. We have worked hard to work in a way to figure out how we will integrate. We’ve opened up MOSs, we’ve put 

marine—female marine officers, staff NCOs, and NCOs in units 

where previously women weren’t allowed to serve. They’ve done 

well. We’re going to continue to do that. 

Then, to determine the last part, whether we would, based on a 

standard, allow women to serve in infantry, artillery, tanks, lightarmored reconnaissance, amphibian tractors, and reconnaissance, 

we formed a task force of volunteers, and we put them together as 

a unit. They trained up and they went to 29 Palms into the Mountain Warfare Center and did a series of tests. Those tests are complete. The data has been collected. It’s being analyzed, and it’ll provide information that will inform the Commandant about whether 

or not he will request a waiver for any of those MOSs. 

602 

So, I have not seen all the data. I’ve seen some of it. I’ve been 

involved in this process for some time. When we first sent volunteer female marines, enlisted, to the Infantry Training Battalion to 

try to gain data and determine their ability to complete that 

course—of the number that went, about—they have about a 40— 

36 percent completion rate. Again, you know, we—we’re still looking at this. We are—we have not made any sort of pre-decision. So, 

again, whatever we do, it is about individual standards, it is about 

the capability of the unit, and that unit becoming better, or at least 

as good as it is now. 

So, that decision’s going to come. I believe we had a good process. 

We’ve got information. It’s fact-based. We’re working with the 

Army, and we’re sharing the data with them. I’m sure that General 

Dunford has spoken to—I know he’s spoken to General Odierno, 

and he’ll work with General Milley if he is confirmed as the next 

Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Senator KAINE. Can I ask a question about the standard, kind 

of the philosophy in setting the standard? As you set the standard 

in the areas that are not yet gender-integrated, is the standard-setting just describing the current functions the way we’ve always 

done it, or is the standard-setting a new analysis of what are the 

attributes that are the most needed to do the best job in this particular MOS? 

General NELLER. I have not seen all the different task condition 

standards. They will be functionally-based. They won’t be—I mean, 

there may be a screening process for any marine, male or female, 

but it’ll be not lift so much weight as if you have to load the tank 

main gun, I have to load the Howitzer, I have to prepare the 

charge, I’ve got to carry the projectile, I’ve got to drag the cannon, 

I have to carry the load, I have to go this fast, this far, with this 

much weight. It’ll be those types of things. So, that’s the data we’ve 

got and what the data says about how men and women did. I went 

out and saw the unit that did the test. It was a very hard test. It 

was hard. Regardless of whatever happens, I’m—you know, I’m— 

I can tell you that the marines out there, particularly the women 

marines, they did a great job. It was pretty motivating. 

Senator KAINE. I’m going to switch gears to an area of the Marines that is incredibly important. I’m not sure everybody focuses 

on them. They train in Virginia—and it’s good to have a UVA [University of Virginia] grad before us—the Marine security guards who 

train at Quantico. Everywhere I travel, if I’m ever at a U.S. Embassy, I always stick my head into Post 1 to thank these important 

members of, not only the embassy family, but important members 

of the Marine Corps. This is a job that is getting more attention. 

This is a job where I think, on Armed Services, we’ve devoted more 

resources to it. How familiar are you with that unit, and especially 

in terms of, kind of—Do they have the resources they need? Are we 

training enough? Because we sure need them around the world. 

General NELLER. Senator, I’m not completely conversant in their 

entire training program of instruction. I—like you, when I got to 

embassies, I talk to the marines. They’re very high quality, they’re 

very highly screened. It’s a great retention tool for us to keep marines in. I do worry, because they are so capable that we don’t— 

we don’t get a lot of them to stay after their service. They have— 

603 

they’ve got options. You know, I always ask them, ‘‘How many of 

you are going to stay?’’ If there’s any of them that say they are, 

I immediately volunteer myself to be their career planner so I can 

convince them to stay, because they are some of the very best and 

brightest young men and women we have. But, I think they’re 

trained well, I think they’re resourced well. I’ve never been to an 

embassy where they told me they were wanting or lacking for anything, or the regional security officer. So, I’d have to get back to 

you on any more detail, but my basic rudimentary response is, I 

think they’re in good shape. 

Senator KAINE. Great. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Neller, thank you very much. Darcy, thank you for being 

here today. I appreciate your great service to our Nation. 

I will just fire off one quick question. I apologize, I am going to 

have to step out again. But, one of my top priorities has been ensuring that our soldiers and our marines, those that—who are really engaged in close contact in combat, and those who are taking the 

majority of casualties in our Nation’s conflicts, are armed with the 

best possible weapons available, and give them the will and the 

fight to win. I mean, we have to make sure that they have the best 

possible sidearms, their personal weapons. That’s one of the first 

things our young men and women do, qualify on their individual 

weapon. 

So, with that being said, I am very concerned about the military’s lack of modernizing our small-arms programs. I know the 

marines have recently gone from utilizing the squad automatic 

weapon, the M–249, to the light infantry automatic rifle, the IAR. 

So, I’m glad that they are modernizing in some aspects. They still 

have not modernized the M–4. I would just like your thought on 

the small-arms program, maybe where you see we need to go with 

that, if we do need changes. Just very quickly, sir. 

General NELLER. Senator, I have complete confidence that the 

weapons we equip our marines with are the very best that we can 

get. The M–4 is not that—you know, even the marines in a rifle 

squad carry an M–16A4, they don’t carry an M–4, because we want 

them to have that longer barrel for that longer reach. So, talking 

about weapons is a very emotional subject with marines, but I’ve 

never heard anybody say they didn’t think that what they had was 

going to allow them to be successful in a battle. 

We don’t want it to be a fair fight. The IAR is a good weapon. 

We’re going to keep the SAW [squad automatic weapon], but in a 

different way. We’re always looking at better ways to improve everything we have. We’ve fielded the Javelin, we’ve fielded and improved TOW [tube-launched optical-tracked wire-guided missile], 

we’ve got new Howitzers. We’re always working on the tanks. I 

mean, so, you know, there’s no lack of emotion and energy and enthusiasm, when I walk around, about our weapons. From everything I can tell, I think everybody’s satisfied. Doesn’t mean there’s 

not better ways to do it that we can’t look at it, whether it’s ammunition, whether it’s magazines. But, I—my personal view, in my 

current position, is, we’re in a good place. 

604 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, General. I appreciate that very 

much. 

In the interest of time, I’ll submit my—the other questions for 

the record. 

So, thank you, General Neller, I appreciate it very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to thank your family and your friends who are here with 

you today. It speaks volumes about you. 

General Dunford, as Commandant, worked very hard on the 

mental health issue. I just wanted to make sure to get a commitment from you to prioritize mental health and suicide prevention 

as part of your readiness for all your marines. 

General NELLER. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator DONNELLY. That—as part of that, that there be no stigma in seeking help. 

General NELLER. Senator, we’ve worked this, and I can personally tell you, as hard as we can. I believe we made progress. To the 

best of our ability, every marine knows how—knows they’re out 

there, that what we want to do, first and foremost, is help them 

if they need it. 

Senator DONNELLY. One of the things, you know, in working in 

this area over the past few years, is finding out how critical leadership at the squad and platoon level is to finding out mental health 

problems. You know, I want to make sure that your leaders at the 

squad and platoon level know, ‘‘Make a call, talk to somebody. If 

you see one of your marines going sideways on you or having 

struggles′′—they probably see it before anybody, don’t you think, 

General? 

General NELLER. Senator, I agree completely. I can tell you that 

the focus of our training and—as we do the suicide prevention and 

how to react to that—is focused at that level. I can give you personal accounts of where sergeants, junior staff NCOs, were there 

at the forefront to either give a hand or keep a marine from doing 

something that they probably wish they hadn’t done, and saved 

their lives. 

Senator DONNELLY. General, I spoke this morning to the Governor in an area that you’re very familiar with, Anbar Province. We 

were going over the efforts that are in place right now to retake 

Ramadi and Fallujah, and to protect Haditha and obviously all of 

western Iraq. What is your view on how to best rebuild the relationship with the Sunni tribes and to partner with them against 

ISIS? 

General NELLER. Senator, again, I have not been in Iraq, in 

Anbar, since I left, on my birthday in 2007. I would like to go back 

and see it for myself. But, I don’t think the relationship with the 

Sunni tribes is a real—the issue is not with us, it’s with the government in Baghdad. They have to believe that their central government is going to at least give them some modicum of support, 

that they’re going to fix the roads, let the water run, give them gasoline, make the electricity work, fix the roads, and let them, you 

know, worship as they see fit. So, that relationship that was damaged, it was tenuous, at best; it was damaged by previous governVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00610 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ments in Iraq. If Mr. Abadi can do that, then I think he will gain 

their support. But, he’ll have to work really hard. 

Senator DONNELLY. In Afghanistan, you know, we face significant challenges moving ahead. The Marines have been such an important part of securing entire areas of Afghanistan, of creating secure regions. As you look at that, what do you see, moving forward, 

as some of the keys to success, to stability there, to holding on 

there? 

General NELLER. Senator, I’ve visited Afghanistan a number of 

times, but I never served there, so my experience base is limited. 

But, again, I think it goes back to the Afghan government believing 

that we’re going to be there to support them, that the resources are 

going to be there, and that they have the confidence, and that their 

soldiers have the confidence, that there’s going to be somebody 

there to back them up. They’re similar problems. We need to stay 

there and work with them. I believe, my experience is, that, you 

know, they—if a foreign nation believes that there’s somebody 

that’s behind them, that they’re likely to do the right thing, the 

right way, and hopefully for a longer period of time. 

Senator DONNELLY. Well, I will finish with this. My father-in-law 

was a Guadalcanal marine, and he would be very proud of your 

service, of all your years of service, and would look very much forward to you taking command of the Marine Corps. So, we wish you 

the very best. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Tillis. 

Senator TILLIS. General Neller, Ms. Neller, welcome, and congratulations. Thank you both for your service. 

General Neller, I want to start—and, first, I apologize for having 

to step out. We had to have a quorum in Judiciary Committee, and 

had to step out briefly, so I apologize if I’m asking a question that’s 

already been asked. But, I’d like to start by talking about what will 

be your top ground modernization program priorities. 

General NELLER. Well, Senator, right now, the two top programs—and they are yet to be fielded—is the joint light tactical vehicle and the amphibious combat vehicle. Both of them are—the 

JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle], as I understand it, is close to 

low-rate initial production; and the ACV [Amphibious Combat Vehicle], we should down-select to two vendors with 16 vehicles this 

fall, and then we’ll eventually pick one. So, on those—in that 

area—and there’s a couple of other things, but—a radar—a multipurpose radar and a whole variety of other things—but, right now, 

as far as specific programs, those two are at the top. 

Senator TILLIS. Can you talk a little bit about the reason why 

they’re top and the difference it makes, in terms of your capabilities? 

General NELLER. Well, for the JLTV, we need a wheeled vehicle 

that has more survivability than the Humvee. The Humvee’s been 

around since the mid-’80s. We’ve improved it a little bit, but it’s— 

there’s only so much growth left in the frame. We need something 

that’s going to give us more survivability and traffickability. So, we 

need to recapitalize and get a new vehicle. The decision has been 

made that the JLTV is that vehicle. So, we’re going to buy 5500 

of them, and—I’m assuming that they’re going to meet the requireVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00611 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ment. I have not looked at any of the test data, but—I don’t even 

know who the vendor is. 

On the ACV, same reason. The amphibious vehicle we have 

today is 40 years old. We’ve refurbished it, rebuilt it a number of 

times. It’s okay. It’s okay in the water, and not so okay on the 

ground, particularly if there’s IEDs [improvised explosive devices], 

because it’s flat-bottomed. It’s just not survivable. So, we have to— 

and that, because that vehicle spends 90 percent of its time ashore, 

we have to find something that’s going to give us more survivability ashore, but that yet can still move through the surf and get 

us to the beach. 

Senator TILLIS. That actually leads to the next question I had, 

which has to do with ship-to-shore maneuvers. I got some exposure 

to some of the challenges when I was down at Camp Lejeune, a 

month or so ago. Can you talk a little bit about the ship-to-shore 

maneuvers—all the way from the connectors, LCUs [Landing Craft 

Utilities]—and elaborate on the ACV, in terms of the additional capability it gives you, as compared to what you have today? 

General NELLER. Amphibious warfare is very complicated. It involves a lot of moving pieces. You’re also subject to the vagaries of 

the weather and the sea. So, we’ve got to get to the objective area 

in the—in our amphibious ships. We use air-cushion vehicles and 

landing craft—large landing craft to move heavier loads ashore. 

Neither the Amtrac or what we—the ACV is going to be able to 

give us a long-range launch, so we have to be worried about antiaccess area denial. So, we’ll work through some choreography and 

sequencing of the force. We want to be able to land under cover of 

darkness, take advantage of that for our security. So, this ACV 

that we buy, just like the Amtrac that we have, is—has to have 

some surf capability, some sea-keeping capability, and it’s got to 

move at a certain speed so that we can do this with a—under a 

period of darkness. 

Senator TILLIS. The last question I have for you has to do with 

the size of the force. I know that there have been some studies 

from Marine Corps University that was setting the optimum size 

of the Marines at about 186,000—just below 187,000. We’re at 

184,000. We’re moving to 182,000. That 5,000 differential, that’s a 

lot of marines and a lot of killing capacity. I know, when I met with 

you in my office, you’re the sort of person that’s going to make it 

work, no matter what your—what you—whatever hand you’re 

dealt. But, are you reaching a—I mean, do you think that 182- is 

a workable number, or is that just a number you’re working with 

because that’s where we are with troop reductions? Or do we need 

to look back at getting to that optimal number, if you agree with 

the assertion that 187- is the optimal number? 

General NELLER. Senator, the optimal number for a 3-to-1 deployment ratio, which is what we would aspire to, is 186-. We’ve 

built into the—our plan, as we’ve drawn down, you know, some reversibility of that. We know what units we took down, and cadred, 

and what units we would bring back. 182- is at that point where 

we can meet the combatant commanders’ requirements and provide 

a 2-to-1 dep-to-dwell, which we think is the minimum sustainable 

level. 

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So, yes, we can do it at 182-. 186- would be better. But, right 

now, that’s not affordable. If resources were made available, or we 

were required—or able to do that, we would grow the force back, 

but that would take some time. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, General Neller. I look forward to supporting your confirmation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Gillibrand. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Neller, for being here, your commitment to 

service, all your sacrifices. Thank you for your family to be here. 

We’re very grateful for your dedication. 

You and I had a chance to talk about a lot of these issues in advance, and I was very grateful for that meeting. After our meeting, 

I sent you a report that I did summarizing cases at four bases in 

2013, just as a snapshot to understand what do the cases look like. 

I want to just brief you on that. 

The—in Camp Pendleton, for 2013, they had 50 cases of sexual 

assault alleged. Now, 10 of those cases were from spouses, so you 

have an issue with domestic violence that’s important to look at. 

You also had 18 who were civilian. So, 28 out of 50 are not part 

of our survey. So, when we surveyed—the DOD surveyed sexual assault last year, the estimated 20,000 sexual assaults, that doesn’t 

include civilians or spouses. So, more than half of your Camp Pendleton cases aren’t even counted in those numbers. 

The other statistic is, the servicemembers was 21. Now, the other 

thing I want you to be aware of, because this is a challenge we 

have in responding appropriately—among your spouses, 8 withdrew their complaint within a year, so they didn’t have confidence 

in the system, they just didn’t—no longer wanted to prosecute. Of 

your civilian complainants, 8 withdrew during the year. Then, of 

your servicemembers, 8 withdrew. So, nearly half of the cases that 

were reported—and to report a case, you’ve got to put your name 

on the bottom line, you typically get a rape kit, which is very 

invasive. Any one of these situations, it’s now public. For them to 

withdraw—nearly half to withdraw within a year does not show 

confidence in the system. 

So, that brings us to what Senator McCaskill raised, is this issue 

of retaliation. How much retaliation is existing? We know from the 

survey that last year it was 62 percent of cases, someone who reported a rape was retaliated against during that process. Retaliation comes in all forms, as you know: 53 percent social—peer-topeer; 35 percent administrative; 32 percent professional; 11 percent 

a punishment. So, you know, arguably, more than half of these 

cases, there’s some form of chain-of-command retaliation. 

So, really do look to the lower-level commanders, the unit commanders. We have an issue with sexual harassment and sexual discrimination. In all cases, 60 percent of it comes from the unit commander. So, you really have to dig deep to begin to create a better 

climate, which I think is going to be essential for you to be successful so you have good order and discipline within the ranks. 

So, as we talked about, I look forward to working with you on 

that. I think it’s very vital. 

608 

I appreciated your answer to Senator Kaine about combat integration. One issue that I’d like to raise is, I know that the physical 

fitness tests are gender-normed, and I know that, in the case of 

Colonel Kate Germano, she was trying to create even tougher requirements for them so that they could meet standards. As you 

look at your standard review, and as you look as to whether you’re 

going to waive—ask for a waiver for any positions today, I would 

urge you not to seek waivers, because all you’re saying is, there’s 

no one who can meet the standard today. But, if we begin to create 

tougher standards to come into the Marines, to make them genderneutral, you will have women who can meet those standards. They 

just might not be able to meet the standard today. So, asking for 

a waiver says, ‘‘Under no circumstances can any woman ever meet 

the standard.’’ I would caution you not to take that action, because, 

the future of the force, we want all of our best and brightest. 

So, I’d like to ask you, just basically, When you are going to 

relook at these issues, do you expect that you will ask for an exception or a waiver? 

General NELLER. Senator, I have not seen all the data, and I’m— 

don’t believe we’ve, in any way, shape, or form, presupposed whether we will or not. I have not talked to the Commandant, General 

Dunford, about this. I will, eventually, because he is no longer 

going to be our Commandant, and then—so, he’s going to have— 

I would ask that he would, you know, inform me as to what we’re 

going to do. 

So, I take all your points. Again, I want every marine to have 

the best opportunity to be successful. Nobody joins the Marine 

Corps to fail. Okay? You know, I’m going to ask marines that, 

‘‘Anybody join here to fail? No? Good. So, we’re going to be successful.’’ So, we’ve got to put them in the best place where they can be 

successful and do the best for themselves, but, more importantly, 

for the unit. So, I know this is going to talk close scrutiny, and this 

is not something that anybody takes lightly, but we will—again, we 

want to make sure that we have the most operationally capable 

force. But, I take your points, and I do appreciate all the guidance 

you gave me during our meeting. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Yeah, thank you, General. I’m very grateful 

for your service. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, for your service. As others have said before, 

it’s not only yours, but your family’s, and we’re grateful to you for 

taking on this very important mission. 

No one joins the Marine Corps to fail. That’s for sure. I know 

that you want to give every opportunity to every marine to serve 

to the best of his or her ability. Part of the reasons that marines 

may, in quotes, ‘‘fail,’’ or appear to fail, may be invisible wounds 

of war, like post-traumatic stress. My colleague, Senator Donnelly, 

asked about mental health issues. Post-traumatic stress is the result of combat-related injuries that really have never been recognized in the past as much as they are now, and maybe not now as 

much as they should be. My very distinguished colleague and I— 

Senator McCain—sponsored a bill called the Clay Hunt Veteran 

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Suicide Prevention Act to provide more research as well as more 

care to marines and others who were injured in duty, often in combat, as a result of post-traumatic stress, other invisible wounds, 

and mental health generally, to help prevent suicides that occur 

among them. 

I would welcome your commitment that you will encourage and 

support even more efforts to deal with post-traumatic stress and 

traumatic brain injury and those invisible wounds of war. 

General NELLER. Senator, you have my total commitment to 

those actions. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Do you have any specific initiatives that you’ve contemplated— 

I know it’s early to ask you, but—in that area to encourage more 

marines to come forward, to identify themselves? Senator Donnelly 

asked about the stigma that’s often associated with those kinds of 

wounds, but I just wonder if you have any specific initiative. 

General NELLER. You know, Senator, I don’t, at this time. But, 

all I can tell you is this. You know, we—like everybody else, we 

learned a lot, the last 12 years. You know, unfortunately, we 

learned a lot about some bad things. I do think that the force is— 

that recognizes these invisible wounds—I remember a captain got 

IED’d several times, and we sent him to Landstuhl, and he was berated because he looked like he was fine. But, I honestly believe 

those days are gone. 

That said, and there may be marines out there, or any servicemember out there, who’s still dealing with something that’s bugging them. The marines I talk to, and the marines I serve with 

today, I don’t know anybody that’s not out there, reaching out to 

talk to them, and try to help them. They have to—if they believe 

that you’re going to try to help them, they’ll come forward. There 

are a lot who have. There may be some that—who have not. Those 

with TBI [tramatic brain injury] that have been diagnosed, we 

need to continue to take care of them, because they’re part of the 

force until they’re no longer on this Earth. So, we’re not perfect. We 

still have a lot to learn. Our Wounded Warrior regiment takes care 

of marines and stays in contact with them, even after they’re no 

longer on Active service. So, we owe all of them our best support. 

I commit to you that, if confirmed as Commandant, that they’re 

going to get it from me. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. Well, I welcome and I applaud 

that commitment and your sensitivity on this issue. I can guarantee, without being an expert, that there are marines and soldiers 

and sailors and airmen who are out there with wounds that are 

bugging them, and they need the encouragement to come forward. 

Let me shift to—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Could I just interrupt, Senator? 

Are you familiar with the legislation, Clay Hunt Suicide Prevention Act? 

General NELLER. Sir, I am not. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General NELLER. I will become familiar with it, though, if confirmed, or if—I’m interested now. I wasn’t aware of it, Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

610 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. We’ll make sure that your office receives 

some additional material on it, but Senator McCain has really been 

a champion. I’ve been very proud to work with him on this issue. 

It’s critically important. Twenty-two veterans every day in this 

country, the strongest, best country in the history of the world, 

commit suicide. This bill is an effort to correct that problem. 

If I can just focus, in my remaining seconds, on the F–35 joint 

strike fighter, I know that we have not yet passed the initial operating capability tests and stage. I wonder if you could comment on 

what you see as the importance of this fifth-generation fighter to 

the Marine Corps. 

General NELLER. Senator, we hope, soon, that we will be able to 

declare, based on our readiness evaluation, that we are at IOC. 

As far as the airplane, it’s going to replace three different airframes: the F–18, the Harrier, and the EA–6B. I’m not sure we 

even realized the potential of this airframe, other than the fact 

that it’s a fifth-generation aircraft and we’ll be able to enter airspace of our adversaries that we weren’t able to enter before, and 

safely do whatever the mission is. 

The real exciting thing about this airplane, other than we can 

hold targets at risk as part of the joint force that we didn’t— 

weren’t able to hold at risk before, is the electronics and all the information that this thing is going to be able to gather and eventually disseminate to the force on the ground. I’m an infantry guy. 

Planes are nice, but they’re really nice when they drop bombs and 

they tell me what’s on the other side of the hill. So, that’s really 

what I’m interested in. I think, you know, this airplane, potentially, if it does what we believe it’s going to be able to do, is not 

just going to help us do what we do now better, it’s going to change 

how we do what we do. That’s what we’re going to have to learn 

as we go through this. 

So, it is expensive. The more we build, the more our allies buy, 

the cheaper it will be. So, I’m excited about the potential that this 

provides to—not just to the Marine Corps and the naval force, but 

to the joint force. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much, General. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Chairman. 

I want to thank you, General, for your service to the country, and 

your wife, as well, and your whole family. Appreciate all that 

you’ve done and are willing to take on in this important position. 

Wanted to ask you about Iraq. I know that several others have 

asked you about—but having served our country in Iraq, and just 

seeing that the Director of FBI, James Comey, said, this week, that 

ISIS now poses a greater terror threat to the U.S. than al-Qaeda, 

that’s pretty telling. What is it that we need to do in Iraq now to 

address ISIS that we’re not doing? 

General NELLER. Senator, I’m—my time in Iraq is a bit dated, 

although I’m somewhat informed in my current job as to what 

we’re doing, as far as Marines and the joint force. So, I think we’re 

doing what we need to do right now. We’re training the Iraqis, 

we’re ensuring the provision of equipment and ammunition and 

supplies. We’re working in their operations centers, working with 

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them, advising them. The only thing that we’re not doing is, we’re 

not accompanying them, at least to the best of my knowledge. 

So, at the end of the day, whether we do or not, they are the ones 

that are going to have to do this. They are the ones that are going 

to have to restore their territory. I believe, based on what I’ve seen 

them do in the past, that they have the capability to do that. Because we have to defeat ISIS, we have to get them to a point where 

they’re insignificant and that they’re just some people on the Internet saying a bunch of stuff, but they don’t have any capability or 

anything to back it up. Right now, they are not—that’s not where 

they are. They have land, they have terrain, and they’re 

masquerading as a country. 

Senator AYOTTE. As you look at what is—where we are with Iraq 

and our current force posture in Afghanistan, what we have consistently heard from General Dunford and others is that it’s important that we have a conditions-based withdrawal from Afghanistan, 

as opposed to a calendar withdrawal. Would you agree with that? 

Thinking about what we’ve seen happen in Iraq, post our leaving. 

General NELLER. Senator, it’s my military opinion that a condition-based withdrawal is more effective than one based on time. 

Senator AYOTTE. Because, obviously, your enemy can wait you 

out and know when you’re going to leave, versus what’s happening 

on the ground. You would agree with me on that? 

General NELLER. I would say that’s a accurate statement. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, as—one thing you said, in terms of what 

we’re doing in Iraq right now, that we’ve repeatedly had raised in 

this committee—from your experience on the ground, generally 

does the employment of joint terminal attack controllers [JTACs] 

make airstrikes more accurate and effective? 

General NELLER. I would agree that the provision or that capability or having that within a—with a maneuver unit makes them 

more effective. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, one of the issues that I think needs to be 

addressed, obviously, right now, as I understand it, with Iraqi Security Forces—do you believe that our American military dropping 

airstrikes in Iraq right now would be more effective if JTACs were 

embedded, at the tactical level? 

General NELLER. In principle, yes, Senator, but I—there’s got to 

be some methodology we’ve worked out, that I’m not witting to, 

that—you know, for a pilot to go out there, as good as they are, 

to just find a target, there’s got to be some coordination going on, 

because we do have Americans within their operations centers, so 

there’s got to be some coordination where they’re being given at 

least a general location or a target or something to look at so that 

they’re just not out there flying around. But, I don’t know the answer to that, but—so—but, if we—there were controllers, generally 

a unit is more effective, yes, ma’am. 

Senator AYOTTE. Certainly, that’s what the JTACs do on the 

ground, is help our—help ensure that the targets are more precise 

and effective. 

I wanted to ask you also about—you and I spoke briefly about 

this in my office. With what happened in Benghazi, where brave 

Americans were murdered, where are we today, in terms of—and 

one—I think one of the things that all of us were really upset about 

612 

was the fact that our military couldn’t respond quickly enough to 

help. Wanted to know where we are today. If we had another 

Benghazi-type attack in North Africa or the Middle East tonight, 

would the Marine Corps be in a better position to respond? 

General NELLER. Senator, today, post-Benghazi, in what is referred to as the new normal, the Marine Corps deployed a specialpurpose MAGTF, a ground combat unit, and some MV-22 Ospreys 

to Spain. That force has grown. It’s a full infantry battalion spread 

across three bases, and a squadron of 12 Ospreys. They have an 

alert force on a 6-hour alert. If there was known to be some sort 

of indications or warning, they could position themselves on other 

bases in the Mediterranean or even in Western Africa. There’s a 

number of security locations we’ve established, where we could go, 

with the support of the host nation. 

So, our capability is much greater, particularly if we have some 

idea that something’s going to happen or we know that someone is 

going to go there, and we need to provide them with protection. So, 

we’re in a much better place than we were at that time. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

General, congratulations on your nomination. The Marine Corps, 

in my view, is the—for—pound for pound, the finest fighting force 

that we’ve ever created. So, let’s just keep it that way. 

Is it true that ISIL is targeting military personnel and their families, calling for attacks against our military personnel and their 

families here at home? 

General NELLER. Senator, I’m not aware that they’ve specifically 

targeted American citizens. I am aware that they have put information about American citizens on social media. 

Senator GRAHAM. It’s my understanding that they’ve urged people to come after our military personnel and their families, and 

they’re encouraging people here and abroad to do so. 

If the recruiters had been armed, do you think things would have 

been different? 

General NELLER. Senator, I don’t know. 

Senator GRAHAM. I think they would have been. Here’s the question I don’t want to have ever again, ‘‘I don’t know′′—I mean, the 

answer. Because we’ve got to know. So, I think it would have 

mattered. I know this is not your job, unilaterally, to decide. So, 

it’s now time, in my view, to get real with where we stand as a 

Nation. They’re coming after us here and everywhere else, and 

we’d better get ready for—to be able to defend our people. 

General Dunford said that he thought the greatest threat to 

America today was Russia, not radical Islam. Do you agree with 

that? 

General NELLER. I agree with General Dunford that, as a nationstate, Russia is probably the greatest threat. But, I believe that the 

greatest threat to the American people, because they say they want 

to kill us, is radical extremism. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me, the greatest threat of 

all is a radical Islamic nation-state with a nuclear weapon? 

General NELLER. Any radical organization with a nuclear weapon 

is of great concern, Senator. 

613 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that, if Iran—do you believe that Iran is a radical Islamic nation-state? 

General NELLER. I believe that Iran is a state that is involved 

itself in a number of nefarious activities which have created instability across the Middle East and other parts of the world. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe the Ayatollah really means it 

when he says, ‘‘Death to America’’ and ‘‘Death to Israel′′? 

General NELLER. Senator, I have never spoken to the Ayatollah 

to ask him that question. 

Senator GRAHAM. I doubt if you will. But, given all the behavior 

of Iran and their past activity, would it be smart to assume the 

worst when it came to the Ayatollah, and not the best? 

General NELLER. It would be my military advice to continue to 

watch them closely in everything they do, and judge them on their 

actions, and hold them accountable for those things that they do 

that violate international law and disrupt the stability of the region 

and the world. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree they’re the primary destabilizing influence right now in the Mideast, they’re supporting extremist organizations that have toppled four Arab capitals? 

General NELLER. I believe that they are an extremely destabilizing force in the Middle East. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me, Assad wouldn’t last 15 

minutes without Iranian and Hezbollah help? 

General NELLER. Sir, I’m aware that the Iranians are supporting 

the Assad government. I don’t know, if they withdraw, how long he 

would last or not last. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, but that’s—— 

General NELLER. But, sir—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Put it this way. He’s—they’re Assad’s main 

benefactor. 

General NELLER. They are providing a great deal of support to 

him, yes, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree that the pro-American, pro-Western government in Yemen was toppled because of Iranian support 

for the Houthis? 

General NELLER. I believe that the Houthis received a significant 

amount of support from Iran. To what degree that allowed them to 

topple that government, that—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Let’s put it—— 

General NELLER.—would be conjecture on—— 

Senator GRAHAM.—this way. 

General NELLER.—my part. 

Senator GRAHAM. If Iran stopped supporting the Houthis, do you 

think we’d have a different outcome? 

General NELLER. Senator, that would be speculative on my part. 

I’ve been to Yemen a couple of times. The government they had 

was troubled. They have a huge amount of tribal and factionalism 

in there. Clearly, Iranian support to the Houthis facilitated their 

successful actions in Yemen to topple the Hadi government. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree that Hezbollah would have a 

hard time surviving without Iran? 

General NELLER. They would certainly not have the same capability they have today. 

614 

Senator GRAHAM. So, my point is, from a Marine Corps—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. General, you’re not answering the Senator’s 

questions. Would you answer that question? Do you believe in that, 

or not? 

Senator GRAHAM. General, I’m not trying to put you in a bad box. 

I’m just trying to explain to the American people who the Iranians 

are and what they’re up to. That’s all I’m trying to do. 

Do you agree with me that they are a very destabilizing influence 

in the Mideast, they’re the largest state sponsor of terrorism, and 

we should know that? 

General NELLER. Yes, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Finally, as to the Marine Corps, you’ve indicated that, in 1975, 

the Marine Corps was a place that was in a bad spot. You’ve come 

a long way. Do you agree with me that, if we impose sequestration 

and we fully implement by 2021, the Marine Corps will be in a bad 

spot? 

General NELLER. Yes, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. At a time we need the Marine Corps the most. 

General NELLER. We would not be able to provide the capabilities 

that we need to provide to the Nation. 

Senator GRAHAM. In your time as a marine, have you ever seen 

a more—a larger need for the United States Marine Corps than 

today, in terms of the threats we face? 

General NELLER. Senator, this is a very challenging time, and I 

think it’s a—this is a time when a force like the Marine Corps 

would have a great capability to—for the Nation. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, General, before we close, when you say, 

‘‘We’re doing what we need to do in Iraq,’’ I think—you know, I 

don’t know where you’ve been. Obviously, ISIS is winning in Iraq. 

For you not to be in favor of us having forward air controllers on 

the ground, in some scholastic answer—you know full well, as I do, 

forward air controllers make the difference. There are—75 percent 

of the sorties that are flown return to base without firing a weapon. 

This line about, ‘‘They’re the ones that have to do it 

themselves′′—General, they can’t do it themselves. We know that. 

The Iraqis cannot do it themselves. That’s why they’re losing. 

That’s why they’ve lost their second-largest city. That’s why ISIL 

continues to make gains. The only people that are fighting against 

them are the Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias. 

So, the Iraqis have to do it, but, without American assistance, including airpower, including forward air controllers on the ground, 

we’re going to see the stalemate. For you to say, ‘‘We’re doing what 

we need to do,’’ then maybe you can tell me what we’re doing that 

will win against ISIS. Can you tell me that? 

General NELLER. Senator, what we’re doing, I believe, is providing advisor teams and support to train—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. That’s succeeding, and that’s causing success, is that right? 

General NELLER. It’s stemmed the tide for ISIS, but it is not removing them from Iraq, so it is not—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, you believe that ISIS is—— 

615 

General NELLER.—succeeding right now. 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, you believe that ISIS is losing. 

General NELLER. No, sir, I do not. 

Chairman MCCAIN. You believe they’re winning. 

General NELLER. No, sir, I don’t believe they’re winning, either. 

I believe they’re at a stalemate right now. 

Chairman MCCAIN. They’re at a stalemate. When you have a 

stalemate, then, when the enemy controls the largest—second-largest city in—about a third of it—and the only people that are fighting against them are Shi’a militias backed by Iranians, with 

Suleimani, who was responsible for the deaths, in General 

Dunford’s testimony, of 500 marines and soldiers, orchestrating the 

attacks, I don’t think we are, quote, ‘‘doing what we need to do,’’ 

General. 

I’m going to give you some written questions. I—I’m very disappointed in a number of your answers. 

Let me just go back again. You know what happened in that recruiting station, don’t you? The guy walked up to the door and shot 

and killed four marines. You know—that was in the media. I’m 

sure, no matter what job you’re holding, you knew that, didn’t you? 

General NELLER. Yes, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Then shouldn’t we have had those marines 

be able to defend themselves? 

General NELLER. Senator, the marines needed to have the force 

protection they need. At the recruiting station, there was only one 

individual wounded. It was at the Reserve Center where they 

were—where they killed. But, yes, they should have been able to 

defend themselves, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

I’ll have some questions for the record. 

Chairman MCCAIN. But, General, if you think we’re doing what 

we need to do in Iraq and Syria, then we have a real strong and 

different view of the situation there. We lost too many good marines in the Battle of Fallujah and Ramadi. Senator Graham and 

I were over there. One of my sons fought there. For so—for us to 

say we’re doing what we need to do, I think, frankly, is not in keeping with the appreciation we should have for the sacrifice that 

those brave young people made. 

Senator REED. Well, Mr. Chairman, I just simply want to say I 

don’t think anyone understands the sacrifices that the marines 

made in Iraq better than General Neller. I think his comments are 

his professional opinions, based upon what he knows, not as the 

commander in Iraq, but as the aspirant to be the Commandant. 

But, I certainly think that there’s no one that feels more deeply 

about the situation in Iraq on a personal level, from leading marines there, than General Neller, and that should be part of the 

record. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. This meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General Robert B. 

Neller, USMC by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follows:] 

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QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the 

Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our 

Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by 

clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and 

the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly 

improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among 

other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations. 

Question. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. No, not at this time. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. N/A. 

Question. Should service chiefs be given greater authority over and responsibility 

for their service’s acquisition programs? 

Answer. I am in favor of ensuring that Service Chiefs have an appropriate balance 

of authority and responsibility over their service’s acquisition programs, and believe 

there must be appropriate accountability throughout the process. Understanding 

that many of these programs are lengthy, complicated and expensive, I share the 

frustration of many in the services that we cannot produce an important combat capability in a more timely and affordable manner. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps? 

Answer. Section 5043 in title 10 of United States Code clearly prescribes the duties and functions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Commandant, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Navy, leads the 

recruiting, training, organizing, and equipping of the Marine Corps to support military operations by combatant commanders. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

the Commandant is responsible for advising the President, the National Security 

Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do 

you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. In my over 40 year career as a Marine, I have served in a variety of key 

service and joint assignments that I believe qualify me to perform the duties of 

Commandant. I have commanded Marines at all levels including general officer 

commands as Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division, Commander, Marine 

Forces Central Command, and my current assignment as Commander, U.S. Marine 

Forces Command and Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Europe. Other successful 

general officer assignments have included Director of Operations on the Joint Staff 

and President, Marine Corps University. In addition to these leadership assignments, I have served as the Director, Operations Division, Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O) Directorate, Headquarters Marine Corps, Director of Operations, II 

Marine Expeditionary Force, and Deputy Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) during Operation Iraqi Freedom 05–07. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commandant of the Marine Corps? 

Answer. I do not at this time see the need for significant changes in activities or 

structures to enhance my ability to perform the duties of the office to which I have 

been nominated. However, I am confident that opportunities for improvement can 

and should be pursued. If confirmed, I will continue to study and seek to better understand the full range of issues affecting the Marine Corps and our broader National Security. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and other officials. Please 

describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commandant to the following 

officials: 

Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the President in 

all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Subject to the direction of the 

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President, the Secretary of Defense has authority, direction, and control over the 

Department. 

Question. Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is the Chief Management Officer of the 

Department, acting for and on behalf of the Secretary, performing duties and exercising authority the Secretary of Defense prescribes. Subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Navy, I would be responsible to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the operation of the 

United States Marine Corps. 

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. The Under Secretaries of Defense are the principal staff assistants and 

advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within 

their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. They may 

issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by 

the Secretary applicable to all DOD components. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The President directs communications between himself and the 

Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders via the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and 

the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function. If confirmed, I 

would cooperate fully with the Chairman in the performance of his responsibilities. 

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs his duties as 

a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other duties as assigned by the Chairman 

with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I would cooperate fully 

with the Vice Chairman in the performance of his responsibilities. 

Question. The Secretary of the Navy. 

Answer. The Secretary of the Navy is the head of the Department of the Navy 

and is responsible for, and has authority to conduct, all of its affairs. Except for the 

title 10 duties and responsibilities as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Commandant performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the 

Secretary of the Navy and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The function of 

the Headquarters, Marine Corps, is to assist the Secretary of the Navy in carrying 

out his responsibilities. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant 

is responsible for advising the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Under Secretary of the Navy. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of the Navy is the deputy and principal assistant 

to the Secretary, and acts with full authority of the Secretary in managing the Department. The Under Secretary serves as the Chief of Staff of the Secretariat and 

the Chief Operating Officer of the Department. He acts for and on behalf of the Secretary, performing duties and exercising authority the Secretary prescribes. If confirmed, I would be responsible to the Secretary of Navy and the Under Secretary 

for the operation of the United States Marine Corps. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy. 

Answer. The four Assistant Secretaries of the Navy set the Department of the 

Navy’s strategic direction by developing and overseeing policies and programs within their respective functional areas. If confirmed, I will ensure coordination with the 

Assistant Secretaries in addressing matters that may impact their respective domains. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Navy. 

Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal and ethics officer of the Department of Navy and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other Secretariat officials. 

The General Counsel’s duties include providing legal and policy advice to officials 

of the Department of the Navy, as well as making the controlling legal determinations within the Department. If confirmed, I would establish and maintain a close 

professional relationship with the General Counsel and his staff, and would actively 

seek his guidance to ensure that United States Marine Corps policies and practices 

are in strict accord with the law and the highest principles of ethical conduct. 

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy. 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy provides legal and policy advice 

to the Secretary of the Navy, directs the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, and is 

primarily responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice. In coordination with the General Counsel of the Navy, the 

Judge Advocate General serves as military legal advisor to the Secretary of the 

Navy. The Judge Advocate General maintains a close relationship with the General 

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Counsel and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant on matters of common 

interest. 

Question. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Answer. With the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Commandant has the authority and duties with respect to the Marine Corps as the Commandant delegates or assigns to him. Orders issued by the Assistant Commandant 

in performing such duties have the same effect as those issued by the Commandant. 

If confirmed, the Assistant Commandant and I will work seamlessly to ensure the 

successful operation of the United States Marine Corps. 

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force. 

Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and equip their respective forces. Combatant commanders cannot ensure preparedness of their assigned 

forces without the full cooperation and support of the Service Chiefs. As a member 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs are obligated to provide military advice. The experience and judgment of the Service Chiefs provide an invaluable resource for the combatant commanders and the national command authority. If confirmed, I will continue the close bond between the Commandant of the Marine Corps 

and the Service Chiefs. 

Question. The Combatant Commanders. 

Answer. The combatant commanders are responsible to the President and to the 

Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions assigned by the President or 

by the Secretary with the approval of the President. Subject to the direction of the 

President, the commander of a combatant command performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense; and is directly responsible 

to the Secretary for the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned 

to the command. Title 10 makes the Commandant of the Marine Corps responsible 

for organizing, training, and equipping forces in support of combatant commanders. 

Fundamentally, these duties and responsibilities are to prepare the Marine Corps 

to fight and win on the battlefield. Provision of the service specific and joint capabilities required by combatant commanders to perform their missions—today and in 

the future—forms a large basis of the Commandant’s responsibility. Today’s security 

environment dictates that the USMC work closely with the combatant commanders 

to execute our national military strategy. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES. 

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next 

Commandant of the Marine Corps? 

Answer. The next Commandant of the Marine Corps will continue to be faced with 

the readiness challenges that exist during a period of fiscal austerity. The Marine 

Corps is the nation’s force-in-readiness, and the next Commandant will be responsible for ensuring the Nation has that immediate response capability when they 

need it. Other significant challenges confronting the next Commandant will include 

modernization and recapitalization of equipment for the future force. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. The current Commandant and the Corps’ senior leadership have been 

wrestling with these challenges for the past several years. Today our Marines are 

operating forward around the globe performing the mission of America’s expeditionary force-in-readiness. If confirmed, I will ensure those Marines deployed and 

those next to respond have the resources and training they need to be successful. 

I will also continue some of the initiatives instituted to meet our readiness and 

training challenges such as developing better readiness metrics, improving leaderto-led ratios, identifying key enlisted leader billets and investing more time in the 

development of those key leaders. If confirmed, I will also work with the Congress 

on reforming our acquisitions process to achieve a faster, more cost effective means 

of getting the equipment that our warfighters need for today and tomorrow. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of 

issues which must be addressed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps? 

Answer. If confirmed, readiness will remain a top priority. I will ensure that the 

American people have a Marine Corps that’s ready to respond when the Nation is 

least ready. 

We are a people organization. We have the finest young men and women in our 

ranks that the Nation has to offer. I will look at ways and means to continue to 

recruit and retain the highest quality individuals and provide the best opportunities 

for each Marine to be successful. 

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MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the execution 

of the functions of the Commandant? 

Answer. The most serious problems in the execution of the functions of the Commandant are the ability to meet the title X responsibilities of manning, training, 

and equipping the expeditionary crisis response force needs of the combatant commanders in today’s security environment within the fiscal constraints of the current 

economic landscape. The task of applying resources in a way that successfully addresses both near-term and long-term challenges is a difficult one for every service 

even in a normal budget process. The request for forces in response to the ‘‘New 

Normal’’ security environment challenge clearly presents problems to both the Services who provide forces and combatant commanders who request them. More immediately, the continuation of sequestration or of ‘sequestration-like’ budgeting practices affixes every Service Chief in a position where short-term remediation efforts 

begin to dominate their time, at the expense of long-term service planning, concept 

development and human capital management. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and associated timelines would 

you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will pursue institutional reforms to improve readiness reporting and assessment. To mitigate fiscal challenges I will seek balance between 

current readiness demands and future modernization through a strategy development process that examines today’s security requirements and future challenges. 

ORGANIZE, TRAIN, AND EQUIP RESPONSIBILITY

Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps is responsible for organizing, 

training and equipping forces provided to Corps and component commanders, including the prioritization of funding and effort to meet these needs in the near term, 

while developing capabilities for the far term. 

How would you characterize your experience in force management and capability 

requirement decisions? 

Answer. I would characterize my experience as well versed and justly qualified. 

Over the last three years, I served two years as Commander, Marine Forces Central 

Command, and the last year as Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Command and 

Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Europe. I was primarily responsible for force management and capability requirement decisions in all three capacities to promote regional security, maintain proven partnerships and interagency cooperation, and 

deter and defeat transnational threats. 

Question. What innovative ideas are you considering for organizing, training and 

equipping the Marine Corps? 

Answer. The Marine Corps has proven itself in combat throughout its history, but 

more pertinently, over the past 14 years in Iraq and Afghanistan. The unique organization of America’s force-in-readiness as an air-ground team, naval in character 

and expeditionary in nature, has been proven as relevant to address the nation’s 

crisis and contingency response options. If confirmed, I will continue to exercise the 

title X responsibilities of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to meet this relevant and necessary national requirement. 

I will continue to look at ways to improve how Marines are trained and educated 

to meet future security challenges, exercise experimentation to identify ways to improve how our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) are employed, and leverage new systems and innovative technologies to improve how we perform our mission. 

SECURITY STRATEGIES AND GUIDANCE

Question. How would you characterize current trends in the range and diversity 

of threats to national security we face today? 

Answer. Current trends are producing an increasingly complex security environment. State and non-state actors alike present a challenge to U.S. and international 

security. Proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology among non-nuclear states 

and non-state actors will remain a top concern. Adversaries have access to advanced, dual use technologies, scientific techniques, and open source knowledge that 

could result in the engineering of chemical and biological weapons and improved 

dispersal methods. Terrorists continue to seek capability to conduct a significant attack against the United States, and cyberspace will increase as a contested domain. 

Should major operations and campaigns occur, they are likely to have a significant maritime and littoral dimension. 

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The Defense Strategic Guidance issued January 2012 took into account a $487 billion dollar reduction in defense resources. 

Question. With the additional $500 billion in cuts to the Department of Defense 

as a result of sequestration, is the Defense Strategic Guidance still valid? 

Answer. I concur with what Chairman Dempsey testified to earlier this year, that 

we are on the edge of acceptable risk. Further cuts will require a reassessment of 

the strategy. 

Question. In your view, as Russian aggression and the emergence of ISIL have 

occurred since the Defense Strategic Guidance was issued in January 2012, is that 

strategic guidance still appropriate for the threats we face today or do you think 

an update is warranted? 

Answer. Although Russia has asserted more opportunistic aggression since the 

DSG was published, engagement remains an important means to achieving regional 

stability. Enhancing the capabilities of partner nations and conducting interoperable 

coalition operations remains significant. As for ISIL, DSG objectives of security, 

non-proliferation, countering violent extremists, and upholding commitments remain 

valid. The DSG appropriately identifies continued U.S and allied presence in the region to achieve these objectives. 

Question. In your view, is our defense strategy and current establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the Military Departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. Forces properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet 

security challenges the Nation faces today and into the next decade? 

Answer. The Defense Strategy as laid out in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Defense Strategic Guidance is still valid, with the roles and missions 

of the Military departments adequately distributed to meet current and potential 

threats. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the capabilities, structure, roles, and missions of the defense establishment? 

Answer. I believe continual assessment is necessary to ensure the Department is 

optimally aligned to safeguard our national defense. If I identify an area that needs 

change, I will address it in the appropriate forums. 

MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY

Question. In your opinion, do current military plans include the necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in the 2014 QDR? Please identify areas 

of higher risk. 

Answer. Yes, but I am very concerned that over the past few years, the Marine 

Corps’ ability to recapitalize and modernize for the future security environment has 

been undermined due to lower than optimal budgets and the need to fully resource 

deployed and next-to-deploy Marines. 

Question. Does the 2014 QDR specify the correct set of capabilities to decisively 

win in future high-intensity warfare? 

Answer. The 2014 QDR correctly specifies the set of capabilities needed to win 

decisively in future high-intensity warfare, but the Marine Corps needs to keep its 

technological advantage by investing more in the long-term modernization of its 

warfighting equipment. I do not believe that the current budget levels allow for that 

modernization to occur given the other demands on the Marine Corps. 

According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR, American forces should 

be able to ‘‘defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and 

deny the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.’’ 

Question. In your opinion, does the Department’s force sizing construct provide 

adequate capability to address the country’s current threat environment? 

Answer. The Marine Corps is the Nation’s force-in-readiness and is sized to 

182,000 Marines to meet the current guidance. In my opinion, this is the maximum 

allowable risk that the Marine Corps can accept in the current threat environment. 

We are operating at a 1 to 2 deployment to dwell ratio, which is not sustainable 

over the long term. 

Question. Is the Marine Corps adequately sized to meet this requirement? 

Answer. The Marine Corps is adequately sized to meet the current requirement 

in the short term, but I am concerned about our capacity to meet unexpected operational demands, especially in the event of a Major Contingency Operation. We 

would be ‘‘all in,’’ and would be unable to support other commitments around the 

world to include theater security cooperation. 

Question. If the Marine Corps cannot meet the demands placed on it, how will 

you address this issue? 

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Answer. The Marine Corps is the Nation’s force-in-readiness and I will ensure 

that those Marines deployed and next-to-deploy are fully supported. I will take risk 

in home station units readiness, which is our Ready Force that can respond to crises 

or major combat operations. 

DEFENSE REDUCTION

Question. In your view, what have been/will be the impacts of the following defense budget reductions on the Marine Corps’ capability, capacity, and readiness: Initial Budget Control Act reduction of $487 billion? 

Answer. The passage of the Budget Control Act coincided with our planned reduction in force structure. Since our end strength above 182,000 was financed in OCO, 

we were able to operate effectively. However, we already had to accept risk by reducing our end strength to 182,000. 

Question. Sequestration in FY 2013? 

Answer. The Marine Corps was able to absorb the mandated cuts due to sequestration in 2013 primarily by leveraging unencumbered Overseas Contingency Operations funds and unexpended investment resources. However, the furlough of civilians during the summer of 2013 severely damaged the morale of our Civilian Marines. 

Question. Reduction of $115 billion in projected spending in the FY 2015 budget, 

in line with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review? 

Answer. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 provided the Marine Corps with a stable funding profile for both Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015. Even with this stability, 

the funding levels were below the optimal level to achieve balance across the force 

in terms of readiness and modernization. I have concerns about underfunding our 

investment programs, which is critical to the long-term readiness of the Marine 

Corps. 

Question. Sequestered Budget Control Act discretionary caps starting in FY 2016 

onward? 

Answer. If the Marine Corps budget for FY 2016 and beyond is capped at the 

Budget Control Act levels, the Marine Corps will be unable to meet its obligations 

to the Defense Strategic Guidance and the National Security Strategy. The permanent end strength of the Marine Corps would need to be reduced below the planned 

levels of 182,000. I would need to rely on Overseas Contingency Operations funding, 

which are not subject to the discretionary caps, to meet the obligations under the 

DSG and the NSS. 

The fiscal year 2016 budget request assumes that the Budget Control Act will be 

amended in fiscal year 2016. The fiscal year 2016 Budget Resolution passed by the 

Senate and House of Representatives do not assume this, but instead provides $38 

billion of the requested spending through the Overseas Contingency Operations 

(OCO) budget. 

Question. Should this OCO funding not be available, what recommendations 

would you have, if confirmed, for how the Marine Corps should manage additional 

cuts for fiscal year 2016? 

Answer. Without OCO, the Marine Corps would not be able to meet the requirements of the current Defense Strategic Guidance and would result in a Marine 

Corps with fewer trained and ready Active Duty battalions and squadrons than 

would be required for a single major contingency. 

Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could have on readiness for the Corps? 

Answer. We are relying on OCO funding today for many requirements that have 

become enduring. Without OCO, the readiness of the Marine Corps will be significantly impacted, especially to home-station units. I will shift as many resources as 

needed to ensure the readiness of units deployed and those next-to-deploy. 

Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could have on Marine capabilities? 

Answer. The capabilities of the Marine Corps will be diminished. 

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

Question. Interactions between the naval and marine forces of different countries 

are often conducted at the Chief of service level, including international exercises, 

Foreign Military Sales, educational exchanges, and protocols for operations. 

If confirmed, how do you plan to ensure the Marine Corps continues to build 

strong partnerships, overcome challenges, and exploit opportunities in international 

cooperation? 

Answer. I believe that in order to be postured as the nation’s crisis response force, 

we must continuously engage with ally and partner security forces around the globe, 

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to gain access and build relationships. The Marine Corps does this through its component headquarters to the Combatant Commands. The current security climate 

and fiscal uncertainty call for increased cooperation with our allies and partners to 

encourage burden-sharing, project United States presence, and build security globally. Security Cooperation activities, such as those executed by the Marine Expeditionary Units and Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, enable our own 

operational readiness while developing interoperability with our strategic partners 

and building partner security force capabilities to support more effective coalition 

operations and contribute to their own defense. However, our strategic engagement 

should focus not only on our most capable partners, but also on the partner security 

forces who can benefit from the ethos, professionalism, and relatively smaller size 

of the Marine Corps. 

If confirmed, I would seek to maintain the current initiatives that have made the 

Marine Corps the partner of choice for amphibious operations and combined arms, 

while orienting the Service for the future operating environment. 

Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with international marine 

leaders, forums, and processes? 

Answer. As a result of my previous experiences, including most recently my positions at Marine Forces Central Command and Marine Forces Europe, I am very familiar with international Marine and Naval Infantry leaders, as well as leaders of 

other international allies and partners who share similar mission sets. If confirmed, 

I will continue to leverage various means to build and reinforce personal relationships to cooperatively build a more secure and stable international environment. 

These engagement opportunities will range from senior-level conferences and formal 

staff talks to personal interaction during travel to partner nations or visits by partner nation leaders to the U.S. I will continue to leverage service programs, such as 

Foreign Military Sales and personnel exchanges, to advance U.S. Government and 

Department of Defense objectives. 

JOINT OPERATIONS

Question. Naval operations are becoming increasingly ‘‘joint’’ as Marines plan to 

deploy in larger numbers and on a wider range of ships; the U.S. Army and Air 

Force begin to invest in counter-maritime capabilities; and air and naval forces continue to develop and implement interoperable capabilities to defeat anti-access and 

area-denial (A2/AD) networks—a process that started with the Air-Sea Battle Concept in 2010. 

How would you characterize your familiarity with the other services’ capabilities 

and how they organize, train and equip their forces? 

Answer. In my current position I have become very familiar with how the Army 

and Air Force organize, train, and equip and as Marines we work side by side with 

and share a similar approach to problem solving as the Navy. The most salient aspect of Joint Force capabilities is that we are all reliant on the capabilities of the 

other Services, Special Operations Command, other departments within the U.S. 

Government, and our closest allies to execute the diverse set of missions needed to 

ensure our continued security. 

Question. Are there other innovative ideas you are considering to increase Joint 

interoperability and ensure opportunities to improve cross-domain capability and capacity are not missed? 

Answer. As our Nation’s premier crisis response force in readiness, there is a high 

probability that forward stationed and deployed Marine Expeditionary Forces will 

be the first forces on the scene of a developing crisis. As such Marines will provide 

critical enabling capabilities for follow-on Joint Forces. Therefore, interoperability is 

a must. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Service Chiefs and combatant commanders to increase our ability to share information in an environment where we 

are likely to lose communications or security for periods of time. In the current and 

future threat environment it is essential that the services continue to develop our 

compatibility, through equipment procurement, electronic systems, and training 

regimens. In this way, the Marine Corps, as the Nation’s force in readiness, will not 

only be the most ready when the Nation is least ready, but also be able to bring 

other services into the fight when necessary. 

CAPACITY AND END STRENGTH

Question. Is the Marine Corps’ end strength large enough to execute the 2015 National Military Strategy? (CD&I) 

Answer. The currently budgeted force, which decreases to 182k in FY17, remains 

the force that assumes the maximum allowable risk that can meet the current DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00628 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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fense Strategic Guidance. The Marine Corps has yet to fully analyze the 2015 National Military Strategy to determine if the planned force size is adequate to meet 

the new strategy. 

Question. Is the capacity of the Corp’s sufficient? Is the balance between the institutional support base and the deployable combat units about right? (CD&I) 

Answer. The current budgeted force is the maximum allowable risk that I am 

willing to accept. We are operating at a 1 to 2 deployment to dwell ratio, which is 

not sustainable over the long term. Our capacity to meet unexpected operational demands is stressed, especially in the event of a Major Contingency Operation. 

Question. What is you view as how to best leverage the Marine Corps Reserves? 

Answer. The Marine Corps Reserve and its associated programs exist to augment, 

reinforce and sustain the Active component as an integral part of the Marine Corps 

Total Force. In addition to providing operational and strategic depth, they provide 

individual augmentation to regional Marine Forces and Marine Expeditionary Force 

staffs to reinforce the Active Component across all warfighting functions. 

Question. Are the end strength, capabilities and readiness of the Marine Reserves 

adequate to reinforce the Active component for current operations? For planned contingencies? 

Answer. Yes, however many of the same concerns regarding readiness, training, 

and education that I expressed for the Active Force also apply to the reserves. 

HEADQUARTERS STREAMLINING

Question. The Senate-passed Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act 

directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters functions of the Department of Defense and the Military Departments. 

If confirmed, and if the provisions in the bill become law, what would be your role 

in streamlining functions, as well as identifying and implementing reductions in the 

Marine Corps headquarters? 

Answer. I will appoint key representatives to work with counterparts from the Department of Defense and our sister services to consider functions that could potentially be consolidated or streamlined. We will first and foremost make recommendations and decisions that are critical to the mission. If any decisions result in reductions in personnel, the Marine Corps will make those decisions following a strategic 

review of our workforce. 

Question. What areas and functions, specifically and if any, do you consider to be 

the priorities for possible consolidation or reductions within the Marine Corps? 

Answer. I have no specific recommendations at this time. We would obviously look 

for areas of redundancy or where consolidation or reductions would be the least 

impactful. The potential for consolidation or reduction of functions is not something 

to take lightly. A thorough review and analysis of what we do now, what could be 

done better, what makes sense, and the resulting impact on our personnel, both 

military and civilian, must be completed before any recommendations and decisions 

are made. 

Question. To the extent that the Corps has functions that overlap with the Department of Defense, Joint Staff, or other Military Departments, what would be 

your approach to consolidating and reducing redundancy? 

Answer. These decisions would need to be made on a case-by-case basis. I would 

first require a thorough analysis of what is currently being done by all staffs and 

departments, what could be done better, what makes sense and the resulting impact 

on our personnel, both military and civilian. These steps must be completed before 

any recommendations and decisions are made. If decisions require reductions in personnel, the Marine Corps will make those decisions following a strategic review of 

our workforce. 

Question. Is the Marine Corps on track to reduce the size of its headquarters in 

accordance with Secretary of Defense’s directive of 2013? 

Answer. The Marine Corps is on track to meet the Secretary of Defense’s direction 

to reduce the size of its headquarters, to include the number of civilians and military personnel. I will commit to working with the Secretary and the Congress to 

keep our headquarters as lean as possible while providing support to the operating 

forces throughout the world. 

READINESS

Question. What is your general assessment of the current state of readiness of the 

Marine Corps? 

Answer. For over a decade, Marines have proven their mettle in responding to a 

wide range of crises worldwide. Doing so, however, has caused stress on home station units. We have appropriately prioritized the readiness of those Marines who are 

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forward deployed and in harm’s way. I am concerned about the long term implications to our equipment modernization and infrastructure sustainment should sequestration-level funding return. 

Question. Are the infantry regiments and battalions of the Marine Corps at acceptable levels of readiness? 

Answer. Our deployed infantry battalions and regimental command elements are 

ready to operate across the range of military operations. However, full spectrum 

readiness varies among home station infantry units. We depend on a budget that 

protects current unit readiness and long-term investments—this is all part of balanced institutional readiness. Currently, institutional readiness is out of balance as 

resources that would otherwise have been applied to non-deployed units and investment accounts are re-prioritized to deployed and next-to-deploy units to safeguard 

near-term operational unit level readiness. The availability of amphibious shipping 

for training further complicates the attainment of full spectrum readiness for all infantry units. 

Question. Are units in the key supporting arms (i.e. armored reconnaissance, 

tank, artillery and engineers) at acceptable levels of readiness? 

Answer. Our forward deployed and forward engaged units are ready to operate 

across the range of military operations. However, full spectrum readiness varies 

among home station units. 

Since the Marine Corps deploys task organized forces to meet combatant commander requirements, key supporting arms units continue to balance the demands 

of providing ready units to task organized forces for worldwide employment against 

the requirement to generate whole unit capabilities to operate across the full range 

of military operations. 

Question. What is the level of readiness in the fixed and rotary winged squadrons 

and wings? Is this adequate? 

Answer. Over a decade of sustained combat operations and high operations tempo, 

coupled with chronic underfunding of sustainment activities and the current fiscal 

environment has led to degraded readiness in Marine Aviation. We are currently 

able to meet all operational commitments with ready forces, but these forces often 

achieve the required level of readiness just prior to deployment. Prioritizing forward 

deployed readiness comes at the expense of next-to-deploy and non-deployed units. 

Current levels of readiness are not adequate for our nation’s force-in-readiness. 

Across the Marine Aviation fleet, our non-deployed squadrons are 20 percent short 

of the required number of aircraft needed to train or to respond to contingency or 

crisis. Among the factors contributing to readiness shortfalls are: aviation depot capacity and throughput shortfalls; underfunding in flying hour and other 

sustainment and logistics accounts; lack of experienced and qualified personnel; 

slower than needed procurement funding for recapitalization of legacy aircraft. 

Question. How deep is the ‘‘bench’’ of ready units available for deployment beyond 

the deployed MAGTFs and Special Purpose MAGTFs? 

Answer. Home station units constitute the ready force that would respond to unforeseen crises or major contingency. The Marine Corps retains the capacity to support its portion of the strategy; however, I am concerned about our ability to generate ready follow-on or surge forces should they be requested by the combatant 

commanders. Since the Marine Corps fights as task organized forces, I am particularly concerned about Marine Corps aviation readiness. Our ready aviation ‘‘bench’’ 

is too shallow and does not have the resources it needs to train and be ready for 

future challenges. Specific details cannot be discussed in this unclassified forum. 

Question. Given current operational tempo is the Corps able to maintain its desired BOG dwell ratios for its ground and air units? 

Answer. The Marines Corps seeks to allocate forces supporting current operations 

with a deployment-to-dwell range of 1:2 to 1:3 for the majority of our units. We will 

work with the combatant commanders and provide forces that support operational 

and Service requirements. 

Question. If readiness is not at acceptable levels, what is your vision and plan to 

achieve required levels? 

Answer. The Marine Corps continues to reconstitute to a ready force after over 

a decade of persistent conflict. As the Nation’s ready force, the Marine Corps does 

not have the luxury to take an operational pause after completing major operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. I will prioritize the resetting of Marine Corps equipment 

and restore home station readiness. Near-term readiness remains a top priority. I 

will work with the Department’s leadership and the Congress to ensure the Marine 

Corps is properly resourced to deliver a ready Marine Corps today and in the future. 

Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities for maintaining readiness in 

the near term, while modernizing the Corps to ensure readiness in the out years? 

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Answer. Near-term operational readiness and the readiness of those Marines who 

are forward deployed and forward engaged remain my top priority. I will ensure 

that our manning, training, and equipping processes support the next generation of 

ready Marines to answer the Nation’s call. I will work with the Department’s leadership and the Congress to ensure the Marine Corps is properly resourced to deliver 

a ready Marine Corps today and in the future. 

BUDGET

Question. Is the Marine Corps’ budget adequate to execute operations, maintain 

readiness, procure needed weapons and equipment, modernize, and sustain quality 

of life? 

Answer. The FY 2016 budget represents the limit of acceptable risk for the Marine Corps in terms of both end strength and funding; while we can meet the requirements of the Defense Strategic Guidance today, there is no margin. The budget 

rightly prioritizes near-term readiness at the expense of modernization and facilities, which is not sustainable in the long-term. 

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND AUDIT

Question. The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General recently withdrew its previously clean opinion on the Marine Corps’ FY12 Statement of Budgetary Activity (SBA). This is a significant setback not only for the Marine Corps, 

but also for the Department, as the Marine Corps was supposed to be the first service to attempt an audit, and the clean opinion was initially hailed as evidence of 

the Department’s progress on audit. 

Should the Marine Corps have declared it was audit ready in FY14, given the fact 

it has not corrected its known financial management weaknesses? 

Answer. Yes, we were ready for the FY14 audit. We had successfully completed 

all the work and answered all the audit questions from the auditors for both the 

FY12 and FY13 audits, and we were prepared to do the same for FY14. We also 

knew the nature and impact of previously identified Marine Corps and DOD financial management and system weaknesses, and we understood the status of ongoing 

corrective actions. None of these known weaknesses were showstoppers for the 

audit, and corrective actions frequently take multiple years to fully implement. Conducting the FY14 audit helped identify additional Marine Corps improvement areas, 

and resulted in the DODIG and our Independent Public Accounting firm identifying 

a significant DOD-wide accounting issue. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Marine Corps is implementing corrections to its financial management systems and processes necessary 

to ensure it can undergo audit of its full financial statement in FY18? 

Answer. The Marine Corps has a well-established plan to be ready for the full financial statement audit by FY18 and to implement improvements to its financial 

management and business processes and systems. Success in achieving full 

auditability is a top priority as we demonstrate good stewardship of the nation’s resources, and we are committed to making fiscally informed decisions. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. What do you consider to be the key to the Marine Corps’ success in recruiting the highest caliber American youth for service and retaining the best personnel for leadership responsibilities? 

Answer. The key to Marine Corps’ recruiting success is the continued focus on 

finding highly qualified young men and women who are seeking the challenge of 

serving their nation. Continued access by recruiters to high schools and colleges not 

only assures the opportunity to engage a diverse and quality market, but also a 

market with the proven mental abilities to serve in technically challenging fields. 

Another key component of our recruiting success is the Marine Corps’ image of 

smart, tough, elite warriors. The time proven intangible benefits of service, pride of 

belonging, leadership, challenges, and discipline are what we offer. Those attributes 

are what allows us to remain America’s Force in Readiness. 

Question. What steps do you feel should be taken to ensure that current operational requirements and tempo do not adversely impact the overall readiness, recruiting and retention, and morale of the Marine Corps? 

Answer. Effective recruiting will require that we continue to maintain a high 

quality and properly resourced recruiting force. I also believe sustaining an operational tempo of at least 1:2 will ensure that our readiness, retention, and morale 

remain high. 

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Question. What is your assessment of current recruiting standards, particularly 

DOD-wide criteria for tier-one recruits, and their propensity to accurately predict 

minimal attrition and future success in military service? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully review the compensation reforms and the 

effects on recruiting and retention. 

Question. What impact, if any, do you believe the Department’s proposals aimed 

at slowing the growth of personnel and health care costs will have on recruiting and 

retention in the Marine Corps? 

Answer. I believe the Department’s reforms can promote recruiting and retention 

necessary to maintain the All-Volunteer Force. If confirmed, I will continue to carefully review all compensation reforms for any effects on recruiting and retention. 

Question. Do you believe that if Congress does not support these proposals, the 

resultant pressure on training and modernization resources could begin to harm retention? 

Answer. I believe that all personnel costs—including compensation reforms—must 

be viewed through the lens of overall readiness, to include training, equipping, and 

modernizing our Marine Corps. If confirmed, I will carefully review the compensation reforms and the effects on overall readiness to ensure your Marine Corps has 

the proper balance to maximize its crisis response and warfighter capabilities. 

MILITARY COMPENSATION

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of military compensation? 

Answer. The Marine Corps is meeting our recruiting and retention goals, and the 

current compensation package helps produce the force we need. If confirmed, I will 

continue to assess the adequacy of military compensation to ensure we recruit and 

retain the highest quality Marines. 

Question. What recommendations would you have for controlling the rising cost 

of personnel? 

Answer. Given the fiscal constraints on the Department of Defense, I believe that 

the compensation proposals put forward by the President in the 2016 budget request 

are reasonable measures to slow the growth in military compensation in order to 

strike a balance between personnel costs, training, equipment, and modernization 

that protects readiness. 

Question. Do you personally support the Administration’s compensation and 

health care proposals? 

Answer. Yes, I support these proposals. They slow the rate of compensation 

growth which is necessary for the Marine Corps to maintain readiness under current budget constraints. This budget achieves the necessary and appropriate balance 

in compensation, training, equipment and modernization. It sustains the recruitment and retention of high-quality personnel needed to defend our Nation, while 

still providing quality compensation and health care benefits to our Marines. If confirmed, I will continually assess compensation and health care to ensure that we 

continue to maintain this balance. 

Question. As the Marine Corps has the highest percentage of servicemembers who 

leave after their first term, what is your assessment of the adequacy of compensation and benefits available for non-career servicemembers? 

Answer. By design, the Marine Corps is a young service and purposefully retains 

fewer servicemembers at the first reenlistment decision point than the other services. Today, we are meeting all of our recruiting and retention goals and the quality 

of the force is extraordinary. Based on those facts, I believe compensation and benefits for non-career servicemembers are adequate. 

Question. Former Commandant, General Amos, and the Sergeant Major of the 

Marine Corps Barrett have talked about the nexus between what marines are paid 

today and the dangers associated with becoming, as they put it, ‘‘an entitlementbased, health-care providing based Marine Corps,’’ implying a relationship between 

the military compensation and benefit system and the ethos of military service. 

Do you share these concerns? 

Answer. Our Marines must be paid adequately and their families should be supported through various programs like housing, child care, health care, and commissary and exchanges. However, the Marine Corps’ primary recruiting and retention motivator is our culture and warrior ethos; it is what Marines sign up for and 

what we deliver. 

Question. If so, what are the implications for the All-Volunteer Force? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continually assess compensation to ensure that we 

continue to maintain the right balance between compensation, training, equipment, 

and modernization. 

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EDUCATION FOR MARINES

Question. An important feature of the Post-9/11 GI Bill is the ability of careeroriented Marines to transfer their earned benefits to spouses and dependents. 

What is your assessment of the effect of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on recruiting and 

retention of Marines? 

Answer. I believe that the Post-9/11 GI Bill positively contributes to recruiting 

and retaining high quality Marines. For recruits, education benefits, including the 

Post 9/11 GI Bill, are cited as the most influential benefit in making the decision 

to join the Marine Corps. In regard to retention, the ability to transfer Post 9/11 

GI Bill benefits directly influences retention by requiring 4 additional years of service. In addition, 53 percent of Marines indicated that the ability to transfer their 

benefits was an influence to stay in the Marine Corps. 

Question. In your view, what has been the effect of the transferability option on 

retention and career satisfaction of Marines? 

Answer. According to Marine Corps surveys, for all non-retirement eligible Marines who were required to make an FY15 reenlistment decision, 53 percent indicated that the ability to transfer their benefits was an influence to stay in the Marine Corps. 

Question. How important do you believe tuition assistance benefits are to young 

Marines, and what trends do you see in the Marine Corps’ ability to pay for such 

programs at current levels over the FYDP? 

Answer. Post-secondary education is an important part of individual Marines personal and professional development. Encouraging qualified Marines to utilize any 

and all resources to better themselves via education and training is part of the Marine Corps ethos. This leads to better Marines and in turn better citizens. I understand that the Marine Corps is adequately funded to provide tuition assistance benefits to qualified Marines. In addition, the Post 9/11 GI Bill provides a very generous education benefit. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to current eligibility criteria for tuition assistance? 

Answer. I believe the Marine Corps is properly executing the tuition assistance 

program. I have no recommendations to change current Marine Corps eligibility criteria at this time. However, as with other programs, we are constantly reviewing 

eligibility criteria for efficient and effective use of resources. 

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. The Department in January, 2013, rescinded the policy restricting the 

assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission of engaging 

in direct ground combat operations, and gave the military services until January 1, 

2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception to 

policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. 

The Marine Corps continues to develop gender-free physical and mental standards 

for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards. 

If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these standards? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that during the review, validation and development of Marine military occupational standards, they are operationally-relevant, 

occupation-specific, and gender-neutral. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the standards are realistic and preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on military requirements and that assignment decisions should be made solely on the basis 

of a servicemember’s ability to meet validated gender-neutral occupational standards? If so, what steps would you take to ensure that such decisions are made on 

these bases? 

Answer. Yes. The Marine Corps Force Integration Plan is a deliberate, measured, 

and responsible approach to research, set conditions and integrate female Marines 

into ground combat arms MOSs and units to the maximum extent possible. The Marine Corps’ unwavering focus remains on combat effectiveness and ensuring the fullest success of each Marine. Recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of Defense, and the Congress will be made in that context. 

Question. Do you believe that any marine, male or female, who can meet the performance criteria the Corps is currently testing and validating, should be given the 

opportunity to serve in those occupations, including Infantry? 

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Answer. The Marine Corps’ top priority is combat effectiveness and the accompanying high state of readiness to meet emerging challenges across the range of 

military operations. The Marine Corps will ensure that all individuals regardless of 

gender are assigned to serve in an occupational specialty for which they are most 

fully qualified. 

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE TO THE COMMANDANT OF THE

MARINE CORPS AND COUNSEL FOR THE COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Question. How are the legal responsibilities of the Marine Corps allocated between 

the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant and the Counsel for the Commandant? 

Answer. The Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (SJA 

to CMC) is the senior uniformed legal advisor to the Commandant and Headquarters, Marine Corps staff and agencies. In particular, the SJA to CMC supervises and manages the legal matters arising in the Marine Corps regarding military 

justice, operational law, civil and administrative law, legal assistance, and ethics, 

and any other matters as directed by the SECNAV and the CMC. 

The Counsel for the Commandant of the Marine Corps, as a component of the Office of the General Counsel of the Navy, provides the Marine Corps with legal advice 

in the following areas: acquisition law, including international transactions; business and commercial law; real and personal property law; civilian personnel and 

labor law; fiscal law; environmental law; intellectual property law; ethics and standards of conduct. 

Question. Who has responsibility for providing legal advice on military justice 

matters in the Marine Corps? 

Answer. The SJA to CMC is responsible for delivering military justice advice to 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Headquarters Marine Corps. In all other 

commands throughout the Marine Corps, judge advocates are responsible for providing legal advice on military justice matters. 

Question. What is the role, if any, of the Counsel for the Commandant in the duty 

assignments of Marine Corps judge advocates? 

Answer. The Counsel for the Commandant has no formal role in the duty assignments of judge advocates. The statutory responsibility for the assignment of Marine 

Corps judge advocates remains with the Commandant. By SECNAVINST, the SJA 

to CMC is responsible for advising DC, M&RA on the assignment of judge advocates. 

Question. What is your view of the need for the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant to provide independent legal advice to the Commandant of the Marine 

Corps? 

Answer. The ability of the SJA to CMC to provide independent legal advice to the 

Commandant is paramount. The SJA to CMC’s legal advice is independent because 

he is not subject to evaluation or supervision in the content of his advice from anyone other than the Commandant. Similarly, 10 U.S.C section 5046 prohibits any officer or employee within the Department of Defense (DOD) from interfering with the 

SJA to CMC’s ability to provide independent legal advice to CMC. 

Question. What is your view of the responsibility of Marine Corps judge advocates 

to provide independent legal advice to Marine Corps commanders? 

Answer. Like the SJA to CMC, Marine Corps judge advocates at all levels must 

be able to provide—and commanders must receive—independent advice. 10 U.S.C 

section 5046 also prohibits interference with the ability of Marine judge advocates 

to provide independent legal advice to their commanders. 

JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nicholsrequired Joint Qualification System? 

Answer. I believe that the Goldwater-Nichols joint officer requirements have improved the breadth of experience and overall quality of our senior officers. In addition, the establishment of the ‘experience path’ a few years ago to attain Joint Qualification created another avenue for our best performing field grade officers to be 

fully qualified. It has proved to be a valuable enhancement to Goldwater-Nichols. 

Question. Do you think additional changes in law or regulation are needed to respond to the unique career-progression needs of Marine officers? 

Answer. No. 

Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with becoming a Joint 

Qualified Officer, including links to promotion to general and flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and professional demands of Marine officers? 

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Answer. Yes. The requirements are consistent with the Marine Corps’ ongoing efforts to continue with the alignment, cooperation and coordination between the services and the combatant commanders in joint training, education, and execution of 

military operations. 

Question. If not, what modifications, if any, to the requirements for joint officer 

qualifications are necessary to ensure that Marine officers are able to attain meaningful joint and service-specific leadership experience and professional development? 

Answer. N/A 

Question. In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification requirements on 

the ability of the services to select the best qualified officers for promotion and to 

enable officer assignments that will satisfy service-specific officer professional development requirements? 

Answer. The requirements for joint qualification are complementary with the successful career path of our most competitive officers. 

Question. Do you think a tour with a Combatant Command staff should count toward the Joint tour requirement? 

Answer. Yes. The mission of the Combatant Commands staff is directly related 

to the achievement of unified actions that supports the national security strategy, 

national military strategy and strategic planning of combined operations. 

Question. What factors do you consider most important in the difficulty experienced by field grade Marine Corps officers in satisfying joint requirements for promotion? 

Answer. Given the current high operational tempo, the biggest difficulty in satisfying joint requirements is career timing of the most competitive officers. Naturally, 

there is a high demand within the service for the top officers for both command and 

other key billets. The Marine Corps makes joint assignments a priority as early as 

the rank of Major and nominates the most competitive officers to joint billets that 

complement their professional development. 

Question. Do you think that, in today’s operational environment, these requirements for promotion to O–7 should be modified? 

Answer. No. 

Question. What steps are being taken to ensure that officers who are competitive 

for promotion to general officer rank are able to fulfill all joint education and experience requirements? 

Answer. Field grade officers are assigned to Joint Duty assignments and to JPME 

II producing schools (War Colleges) based on their performance. Our most competitive officers are provided those assignments. 

Question. How do you plan to foster a dedicated, educated, and assigned group 

of strategic thinkers and planners who rise to the rank of flag rank officer? 

Answer. Through a closely monitored manpower process, we will continue to formally screen and select our best officers beginning early in their careers for resident 

joint education, screen them for command of operational units, and assign them to 

key joint billets that complement their professional development. 

MILITARY HEALTH CARE

Question. What is your assessment of the medical care provided to Marines 

wounded or injured on the battlefield? 

Answer. When Marines go into harm’s way, Navy Medicine personnel are with 

them to provide outstanding medical care. Our Marines have a special bond with 

their physicians and corpsmen and this relationship has been well-earned over 

countless generations by caring for our wounded Marines on the battlefield. During 

our most recent conflicts, we have seen significant advances in combat casualty care 

that have led to unequalled survival rates for our injured. Throughout all echelons 

of care—from the battlefield to the bedside—we have improved our capabilities and 

rapidly implemented clinical practices that saved lives. These efforts have transformed trauma care both in the military and the civilian sector. We have also made 

significant progress in treating traumatic brain injuries and post-traumatic stress 

disorder as well as ensured that all our wounded Marines have access to exceptional 

military treatment facilities to aid in their recovery and rehabilitation. 

Question. What is your assessment of the health care available to Marines and 

their families in their home stations? 

Answer. Health care is crucial to mission readiness and an important component 

of quality of life for our Marines and their families. Marines must be medically 

ready to meet their demanding responsibilities and they also must be confident that 

their families have access to high quality health care. Within the Marine Corps, we 

rely on Navy Medicine to promote, protect and restore our health and they perform 

these responsibilities very well. I am pleased that our Marines and their families 

630 

receive exceptional care at our Navy military treatment facilities and will work to 

ensure this remains a priority. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Marines and their families in both the Active and Reserve components 

have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational 

deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the Marine Corps, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are 

addressed and adequately resourced, especially in light of current fiscal constraints? 

Answer. The most important issues are providing timely and accurate communication to our Marines and their families while properly resourcing the support functions on our bases and stations. If confirmed, I will ensure the Marine Corps provides Marines and families with a comprehensive and effective community-based 

support system. In this time of fiscal constraint, I will have to prioritize our core 

programs that support the Marine warfighter and families. 

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including Active Duty and Reserve personnel, retirees, and their eligible family members. 

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Marine Corps MWR 

programs, particularly in view of the current fiscal environment and, if confirmed, 

are there any improvements you would seek to achieve? 

Answer. Our greatest challenges are the fiscal realities of sequestration. If confirmed, I will ensure that we sustain priority programs that support the health, welfare and morale of our Marines and families. Ensuring access to those programs 

that support these priorities is paramount. I will also maintain a dialogue with our 

Marines and families to ensure that our MWR programs adapt to meet their highest 

priority needs. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services continue to be of great 

concern to the Committee. 

If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide prevention programs 

and policies for the Marine Corps to prevent suicide and increase the resiliency of 

Marines and their families? 

Answer. Suicide prevention is a leadership issue. Leadership attention to risk factors has helped reduce deaths; however, we must remain vigilant. If confirmed, my 

priority is to continue the progress the Marine Corps is making in reducing deaths 

by suicide. As leaders, it is our duty to reduce barriers associated with seeking help. 

My strategy is to enhance help-seeking behaviors and provide training to rapidly 

identify and provide assistance to those at heightened risk. The resiliency and wellbeing of our Marines and their families will remain a top priority. 

WOUNDED WARRIOR REGIMENTS

Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from their service and the Federal Government for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, 

successful transition from Active Duty if required, and continuing support beyond 

retirement or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis 

over the past several years, many challenges remain. 

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Marine Corps Wounded Warrior Regiments in facilitating the treatment and management of wounded, ill, and 

injured Marines? 

Answer. The Wounded Warrior Regiment currently meets or exceeds the mandates set forth by Congress regarding the facilitation of medical and non-medical 

care for wounded, ill and injured Marines. Through the Recovery Coordination Program, we provide essential individualized assistance to Marines and families, ensuring we keep faith with those who have served. The Marine Corps continuously evaluates our wounded warrior and caregiver programs and incorporates lessons learned 

and best practices to improve policies and support. While the landscape of warrior 

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care has changed, the Marine Corps remains committed to maintaining the services 

necessary to support Marines and their families. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources you would 

pursue to increase service support for wounded Marines, and to monitor their 

progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. We must continue to fund our recovery care coordinators and the support 

they provide to recovering Marines and their families. At the same time, we will 

evaluate the effectiveness of this program over time. If confirmed, I will ensure that 

we are proactively identifying symptoms and addressing psychological health needs. 

The shift in the demographic of wounded warriors requires that we focus on care 

for those with behavioral health issues and chronic illnesses. I view this as a continuing commitment from the Marine Corps to its Marines. Overall, I believe the 

flexibility of the current program allows the services to develop and implement new 

programs as needs arise, and I support this intuitive process. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. What is your assessment of the problem of sexual assaults in the Marine Corps? 

Answer. Sexual assault has no place in our Corps. It not only has a long-lasting 

effect on the individual victim but it also erodes unit readiness and command climate. The Marine Corps has placed particular emphasis on eliminating sexual assault and I believe we are making progress. If confirmed, I will continue to build 

on the current foundation. The bottom line is that even one sexual assault is too 

many and everyone agrees that more needs to be done. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Marine Corps sexual assault prevention 

and response program? 

Answer. I see positive indicators that our SAPR Program is heading in the right 

direction. From FY12 to FY14, there was a 30 percent decrease in the number of 

Marines experiencing unwanted sexual contact. In that same time period, the number of victims and bystanders willing to file reports increased 94 percent. However, 

I also believe that there is still much work to do. We must continue to increase reporting and decrease prevalence. We need to emphasize prevention, instill in our 

Marines the duty to be active and responsible bystanders, and integrate the SAPR 

Program with other aspects of behavioral health. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. Commanding Officers are responsible for their Marines, including setting 

positive command climates that both prevent the crime of sexual assault and provide a safe, non-retaliatory environment in which victims feel confident coming forward to report. We believe that the increase in sexual assault reporting is, in part, 

due to the faith and trust our Marines have in their chain of command. In addition, 

commanders ensure that any Marine who files an unrestricted report has timely 

and comprehensive access to supportive services. The fact that more Marines file 

Unrestricted Reports—which automatically trigger command notification—shows 

that Marines find this support invaluable. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Navy and Marine Corps 

resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need? 

Answer. I understand that the Marine Corps, with help from the Navy, provides 

and continues to expand each of these services. Naval medical support for sexual 

assault victims is more accessible and sensitive now than ever before. Victims also 

have access to non-medical counseling services; chaplains to provide pastoral care 

during on and off-business hours; a 24/7 Sexual Assault Helpline at each installation provides access to a credentialed victim advocate around the clock; our Victims’ 

Legal Counsel Organization (VLCO) confidentially assists each victim through the 

investigation and prosecution process, ensuring that victims understand their rights 

and remain informed. Since standing up on 1 Nov 2013, VLCO has provided legal 

services to over 1,000 victims, including military dependents and have represented 

clients at all stages of the military justice process to ensure victims’ rights and interests are protected. Every major Marine Corps installation has a VLCO office, and 

to date, no eligible victim of sexual assault has been turned away from VLC services. However, I fully understand that the true measure of the effectiveness of these 

programs is how well they meet the needs of the victim. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Marine Corps has taken to prevent 

additional sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

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Answer. I am encouraged, though not satisfied, by our efforts to prevent sexual 

assault throughout the Marine Corps. Our prevention efforts have focused on command climate and bystander intervention. 

These efforts include the development and refinement of innovative training tools 

and programs for use by commanders to educate their Marines on the impact of sexual assault and how best to prevent it. These initiatives will help us sustain and 

build upon our efforts to reach the stated purpose of the SAPR Program: to reduce— 

with a goal to eliminate—sexual assault from the Corps. 

Regarding sexual assault in deployed locations, I believe, as an expeditionary 

force in readiness, our at-home activities prepare our Marines for a deployed environment. Our efforts at home establish the baseline for those deploying. Besides the 

efforts outlined above, our pre-deployment SAPR training program includes additional bystander intervention and risk reduction strategies. The training also provides information pertaining to host country customs, mores, and religious practices. 

In addition, the training identifies first responders who will be available during deployment, to include law enforcement, legal, sexual assault response coordinators, 

uniform victim advocates, healthcare personnel, and chaplains. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources of the 

Navy and Marine Corps to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. I am encouraged by the progress we have made in many areas of victim 

response, but our goal is to further improve these services so that more victims stay 

engaged in the process and, as a result, more offenders will be held accountable. 

The Marine Corps continues to strengthen the qualification standards for all 

judge advocates handling special victim cases to include increased experience, training and prior court-martial experience. The Marine Corps places a premium on ensuring each counsel is provided with formal training and trial preparation advice, 

in addition to the mentorship and on-the-job training offered by supervisory JAs. To 

this end, the legal community has quadrupled the training budget in the last fiscal 

year. Leading this training and advice effort are the Trial and Defense Counsel Assistance Programs which provide training and advice by serving as centralized resources and helping to spread best practices throughout the regions. In addition, the 

Marine Corps employs six Highly Qualified Experts (HQEs), seasoned civilian attorneys with significant experience in complex criminal litigation. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. I believe the role of the Commander is central to sexual assault prevention within the military. The commanding officer of every unit is the centerpiece of 

an effective and professional warfighting organization. They are charged with building and leading their Marines to withstand the rigors of combat by establishing the 

highest level of trust throughout their unit. Commanding officers are responsible for 

setting and enforcing a command climate that is non-permissive to sexual assault, 

a climate in which the spirit and intent of the orders and regulations that govern 

the conduct of our duties will be upheld. Trust in the Commander and fellow Marines is the essential element in everything we do. Developing this trust, dedication, 

and esprit de corps is the responsibility of the commanding officer. They do this by 

setting standards, training to standards, enforcing standards, and exemplifying 

those standards. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. Removal of commanders’ convening and disposition authority will adversely affect good order, discipline, and combat effectiveness. Commanders are responsible for everything that happens within their command. Based on their responsibility to maintain good order and discipline and to ensure the welfare of every Marine and Sailor in the command, commanders exercise their military justice authority as a moral imperative. 

Commanders meeting their responsibilities, advised by lawyers (SJAs, prosecutors), are in a better position to make a just decision. There is no more demanding 

position than Commander and none more carefully selected or closely scrutinized. 

As a practical matter, removing commanders from the military justice process in 

favor of lawyers will result in fewer sexual assault prosecutions. Prosecutors tend 

to focus on prosecutorial merit. Assuming the threshold for probable cause is 

reached, commanders are more likely than prosecutors to send a case forward irrespective of the chances of getting a conviction. 

Marines must know that their Commander sent a Marine to court-martial, not an 

unknown third-party prosecutor, who plays no daily role in developing and maintaining the bond of trust essential to combat effectiveness. I believe that the trust 

that is required for good order, discipline, and combat effectiveness can only be built 

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and maintained when Marines know that commanders have the authority to hold 

accountable marines who violate that trust. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Marine Corps? 

Answer. I believe we have made progress, but we still have work to do. If confirmed, I plan to further the progress of Marine Corps’ SAPR efforts and ensure that 

all Marines are committed to preventing the crime of sexual assault. We will continue to implement bystander intervention programs, risk reduction measures, focus 

on offenders, and the further integration of SAPR and Behavioral Health issues, 

such as substance abuse. We will also study sexual assault as it relates to other, 

often co-occurring behaviors like sexual harassment and hazing. 

Question. What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of recent legislation concerning sexual assault on the prosecution of sexual assault cases in the military, including cases where prosecution is declined by civilian prosecutors? 

Answer. Since FY12, Congress has passed almost 100 legislative provisions to improve sexual assault prevention and reporting. These have included provisions to 

improve and expand reporting and training, as well as a host of provisions impacting the legal process, such a Victim Legal Counsel and changes to the UCMJ. We 

have implemented or are in process of implementing many of these provisions. We 

believe these changes have helped to increase reporting and provide the victim an 

increased voice in the court-martial process. We think these changes need some run 

time before we feel their full implementation. We appreciate Congress’ concern on 

this important issue. 

AMPHIBIOUS FLEET REQUIREMENTS

Question. How would you characterize the current state of Navy and Marine 

Corps joint operations and what is your vision for the future? What gaps or shortfalls exist today? What changes would you advocate to strengthen or expand Navy 

and Marine Corps joint operations? 

Answer. Our ability to work together remains solid and unparalleled but is somewhat limited by our shortfall in amphibious warships. We currently have only 30 

amphibious warships, which is short of our fiscally constrained requirement of 33. 

We won’t reach 33 until 2018 and will not have the correct mix of amphibious warships until 2024. I would advocate for the authorization of multi-year and block buy 

procurements of amphibious warships, which would sustain the current shipbuilding 

plan and eventually achieve and maintain the required amphibious warship inventory. Further, having additional amphibious capacity will enable us to train both 

our staffs and operating forces in a more routine manner above the Amphibious 

Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit level. 

Question. What alternatives would you consider to augment amphibious ships in 

providing lift to Marine Corps units? In what scenarios would these alternatives be 

necessary and appropriate? 

Answer. There are several alternative platforms that should provide an adequate 

yet limited base of operations. Some of the alternative platforms include Mobile 

Landing Platform (MLP), MLP/Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB), T–AKE and 

other platforms contained in the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) inventory. 

Alternative platforms can be used in a wide range of assigned Marine Air Ground 

Task Force (MAGTF) seabased operations to meet Combatant Commander requirements. These platforms are not warships and have little to no self-protection, thus 

would be more applicable and useful in routine mil-to-mil exchanges and exercises, 

perhaps Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and other Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) engagement roles and missions. 

Question. What is your view of the need for and size of the Navy’s amphibious 

fleet? 

Answer. The Department of the Navy’s investment in amphibious warships represents critical investments that enable Naval forces to execute their assigned forward presence and crisis response missions. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 

and current Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) have determined that the 

force structure required to support a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Assault Echelon is 38 amphibious warfare ships, as communicated to the House and 

Senate Appropriations and Armed Services committees by SECNAV/CNO/CMC letter dated 7 Jan 2009. Given fiscal constraints, the Department of the Navy (DON) 

determined a minimum inventory of 33 total amphibious warfare ships, including 

11 LHD/LHA(R), 11 LPD 17, and 11 LSD 41/49s; this represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship requirement for the Assault Echelon in a two MEB 

forcible entry operation. The Long Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for 

2015 does not meet the 11/11/11 amphibious warship inventory until FY24. It 

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should be noted that with the addition of the 12th LPD, the new agreed to fiscally 

constrained amphibious warship number is 34. This inventory provides only the 

minimum capacity for steady state Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary 

Unit deployments and single-ship deployments for theater security cooperation activities. Furthermore, this inventory does not provide the capacity to support additional independent amphibious warship demands, such as maritime security operations. A reduction in capacity detracts from the ability of the Navy and Marine 

Corps to accomplish forward presence and crisis response missions in today’s exceptionally dynamic and uncertain operational environment. The disadvantage of not 

meeting the requirement of 38 ships results in our Nation accepting higher risk in 

its ability to rapidly respond to surge demand, an emerging crisis, or contingency 

response. 

Question. What alternatives do you for see if the amphibious fleet is allowed to 

decline in size or capabilities? 

Answer. There is no alternative to our existing amphibious warship fleet. However, should future constraints require routine augmentation of the amphibious 

fleet, we will pursue alternative lift platforms in much the same way as we are currently exploring today. However, while these ships will help bridge the gap to the 

Combatant Commander demand signal for upwards of 54 amphibious ships, they 

come with significant limitations and are more useful during routine engagement 

operations during Phase 0 and Phase 1 operations. Reducing the size or capacity 

of the amphibious fleet will significantly increase the risk and reduce the capability 

to deter aggression, respond to crises, and meet current OPLAN requirements. 

Question. What risks are associated with these alternatives? 

Answer. Alternative lift platforms are capable ships and can augment, with multiple limitations, selected amphibious warship mission sets, but these alternative 

platforms are not amphibious warships, and as such, do not possess the necessary 

capabilities for full-scale conflict. They do not meet the requirements necessary to 

embark and deploy an amphibious assault echelon for forcible entry operations. Specifically, they lack adequate force protection and the utility required to operate 

above the permissive level. 

NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT

Question. The DDG–1000 program was initiated to fill the capability gap for naval 

surface fire support. The original requirement for 24 to 32 DDG–1000 ships, each 

with two 155mm Advanced Gun Systems, was reduced to 12 ships, then to 10 ships, 

then to 7 ships, and finally to 3 ships. 

In your view, does the total Navy program, with this significant reduction in the 

number of DDG–1000 destroyers, meet the Marine Corps’ requirement for naval 

surface fire support? 

Answer. Current and projected naval surface fire support is inadequate. With the 

truncation of the DDG–1000 program, a maximum of six 155mm Advanced Gun 

Systems will be available for service in the fleet when all three ships are fully operational at the end of the decade. This will not support the doctrinal capacity requirements of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Current destroyer and cruiser fleets with 

existing 5′′/54 and 5′′/62 (Mk 45) lightweight guns have limited capability beyond 

thirteen nautical miles which diminishes the effects of naval surface fires in an antiaccess, area denial environment. The Marine Corps has established a ninety-six 

nautical mile range requirement to meet current operational employment concepts. 

We are supportive of the Navy’s hyper-velocity projectile as an interim solution and 

the electro-magnetic railgun as a possible solution in the long term. The risk assumed by a lack of surface fires will put additional demand on our already taxed 

tactical aviation assets. 

Question. What other capabilities would you rely upon to help meet naval surface 

fire support requirements? 

Answer. In the absence of adequate naval surface fire support capability and capacity, we will rely on manned aviation platforms and future armed remotely piloted aircraft delivered fires, and ground-based artillery and rockets. Naval Surface 

Fire Support (NSFS), with necessary range and effects to support expeditionary operations in the littorals, is an essential complementary capability to aviation and 

ground-based indirect fires, referred to as the triad of fires. The triad of fires provides a balanced approach. With current capability of NSFS being insufficient, we 

will have to rely on aviation delivered fires, and when feasible, ground-based indirect fires. However, analysis conducted to date indicates that neither will provide 

adequate capacity in some operational scenarios and during different phases of operations (e.g. afloat ground systems will be unavailable to fire in support of maneuvering units and aviation units will be heavily tasked in an A2AD environment). 

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ASIA-PACIFIC FORCE DISPOSITIONS

Question. Do you believe the planned joint force mix of tactical aircraft is sufficient to meet current and future threats in the Asia-Pacific theater of operations 

where the ‘‘tyranny of distance’’ is such a major factor? 

Answer. I would have to defer to the PACOM Commander’s assessment of the 

Joint Force tactical aircraft mix requirement. Marine Corps aviation is prepared to 

do its part in supporting operations in the PACOM Theater. 

My biggest concern in this area is the degraded readiness of the aircraft we currently have on hand. 

Question. Do you believe we have sufficient sealift and airlift capabilities to move 

Marines around the Asia-Pacific Theater for both training and contingency purposes? 

Answer. No. There is not enough amphibious warship capability to support an assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades required for contingency response. The Navy and the Marine Corps have determined that 38 amphibious warships are needed in the inventory to support this requirement. There are 30 amphibious warships in inventory today. 

The Department of the Navy (DON) determined a minimum force of 33 total amphibious warships represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship requirement. Based on a wartime operational availability rate of 90 percent, 33 ships 

[11 LHD/LHA(R), 11 LPD 17, and 11 LSD 41/49] are the minimum number in inventory necessary to meet the requirement for 30 operationally available warships 

while taking into account those ships in heavy maintenance and modernization periods that are unlikely to meet OPLAN timelines. The amphibious force inventory will 

reach the 11/11/11 requirement in FY24 with the delivery of LHA 8. 

Helping to bridge the shortfall of intratheater lift for training is the JHSV. For 

example, a JHSV will be based in Guam in order to fulfill lift requirements for the 

training hub in Guam and the Marianas Islands. JHSV helps to fulfill this requirement by providing the lift for Marines traveling to Tinian to utilize the range proposed for Tinian. JHSV is also planned to be based in other areas in the Asia-Pacific, such as Singapore, to fulfill similar training requirements throughout the 

AOR. 

Question. What alternative concept of operations, platforms, and basing opportunities exist to address potential shortfalls in this area? 

Answer. There are no alternatives that have been developed to mitigate the wartime or contingency response requirement for an amphibious fleet. 

The Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC) maintains numerous auxiliary platforms (T–AKE, MLP, AFSB, LMSR, JHSV, etc.) which have been successfully used 

in Phase 0/1 operations. MARFORPAC routinely uses T–AKEs for Theater Security 

Cooperation events in the Asia-Pacific Theater. The Navy is exploring additional 

Phase 0/1 tasking options for MSC vessels in order to free combatant vessels for 

higher level tasking. 

MSC contracts the high speed transport ship WESTPAC Express to rapidly move 

Marines throughout the Asia-Pacific Theater. The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) 

will complement the requirement for intra-theater lift of Marines when it is deployed to the Asia-Pacific Theater. 

ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL

Question. Over the past few years, much has been made of the emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the maritime freedom of movement and action in 

certain regions. 

Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities are a concern? 

Answer. Yes, the United States faces a growing range of challenges in gaining access and operating freely in the maritime, air, and cyber commons. Most prominently, the proliferation of technologies that allows potential adversaries to threaten 

naval and air forces at greater ranges complicates our access to some regions (antiaccess), as well as our ability to maneuver within those regions (area denial), including the littoral and landward areas. These technologies include long-range ballistic 

and cruise missiles supported by state of-the-art command and control, and integrated targeting networks; guided rockets, artillery, missiles, and mortars; advanced 

submarines and ‘‘smart’’ mines; advanced integrated air defense systems; fifth-generation fighter aircraft with enhanced sensors and weapons; and electronic warfare, 

cyber, and space capabilities. Certainly a distinct challenge during wartime, these 

military technologies are also a concern in peacetime. For example, the free flow of 

goods and services can be threatened or impeded by state or non-state actors employing A2/AD technologies in key maritime crossroads. 

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Question. If so, what do you believe joint forces need to be doing now and in the 

next few years to ensure continued access to all strategically important segments 

of the maritime domain? 

Answer. We need to pursue a multifaceted approach, as we are, in fact, already 

doing. For example, Marines in the operating forces are strengthening and expanding our partnerships with friendly nations that share our concerns. These partnership activities often result in new opportunities for basing U.S. Forces overseas or 

increased options for temporary support during emerging contingencies. Partnership 

activities also help improve interoperability so that we have greater capability and 

capacity to defeat such threats. Concurrently, the Air-Sea Battle concept looked at 

the problem from a system versus system perspective. The insights from that effort 

generated understanding that a limited number of exquisite systems can always be 

overwhelmed by an exponentially larger number of simple, inexpensive systems: a 

six-shot revolver is better than a bow and arrow, and may even defeat six bows and 

arrows, but is quickly overwhelmed by 100 bows and arrows. These ASB insights 

have been subsumed into a more comprehensive effort, Joint Access and Maneuver 

in the Global Commons, which looks at the ways and means to defeat adversary 

strategies, not just systems. That effort will address issues such as the use of all 

domains: air, land, sea, space and cyber to create access. This 5 Domain joint force 

will be capable of creating the conditions to project military power in contested 

areas with freedom of action. This concept will also explore distributed MAGTF maneuver, expeditionary advanced base operations, streamlining and integrating our 

intelligence and operations functions, and fully networking the naval team. What 

we envision is an integrated naval force—a network of sensors, shooters, and information sharers, afloat and ashore. The final goal is not to set conditions everywhere, 

but to set the conditions we require at the right time and place of our choosing to 

achieve superiority in a manner with which the enemy cannot cope. 

Question. If confirmed, you would play an important role in the process of transforming to meet new and emerging threats? 

Answer. The senior leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps convened this past 

June to develop the guidance that is driving the Littoral Operations in a Contested 

Environment concept. I was directly involved with that in my present assignment 

as Commanding General, Marine Corps Forces Command—just as I’ve been directly 

involved in major Navy-Marine Corps exercises, such as Bold Alligator—in improving our ability to operate in A2AD contested regions. If confirmed as Commandant, 

I’ll continue to build upon that unified naval effort, not only by working with the 

Chief of Naval Operations to provide unified guidance and direction, but by ensuring the right leaders are in place at the appropriate subordinate echelons. Further 

our efforts as a naval force will be integrated with our joint and coalition partners. 

On that end I will continue to work on our interoperability and compatibility. 

Question. Concerning capability and capacity to meet new and emerging threats, 

what are your goals regarding transformation of the Marine Corps? 

Answer. The Marine Corps has historically been a very adaptive organization. 

Conceptually, I think we are already on the right track through the development 

of Expeditionary Force 21 and the Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment 

concept. My job as Commandant, should I be confirmed, will be to ensure our organization and processes impart certain time-honored skill sets, knowledge, beliefs, 

and professional judgment to our Marines, while also creating the conditions that 

allowing them to understand and adapt effectively as the future unfolds. We will 

continue to emphasize our expeditionary roots and the ability to deploy, employ, and 

sustain on short notice as our nation’s force in readiness. Finally we need to continually refine how we recruit, train and educate our Marines so that they can fight 

and win regardless of what the future holds. We know that we will face chaotic and 

lethal adversaries. We know that we will often operate in the urban littorals where 

the mental and physical strength of our Marines will be challenged. So we know 

that we must continue to evolve and improve the individual Marine. Finally, we face 

many challenges and it is therefore important that we encourage and foster innovation in everything we do. We’re bringing in great people who want to serve our Nation as Marines. It’s the Commandant’s job to create the conditions that allow them 

to evolve the Marine Corps so that we provide what the Nation requires. 

CHINA

Question. How has China’s aggressive assertion of territorial and maritime claims, 

particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea, affected security and stability in the region? 

Answer. China’s actions in the South and East China Seas, as well as its rapid 

military modernization and growing defense budgets, have led many in the region, 

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including the United States, to question its long-term intentions. China’s vague assertions and enforcement of its unilateral territorial claims, as well as their aggressive land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea have a destabilizing effect in 

the region and have generated territorial disputes with other regional actors. Many 

of these disputes involve U.S. Treaty Allies and partners, with whom we have longstanding cooperation and defense commitments. Our Allies and partners in the region are increasingly looking to the U.S. for leadership and support in the face of 

these challenges, and so our response to China’s challenges to the existing international norms and laws should be firm and consistent. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of the United States-China 

military relationship? 

Answer. The U.S. military-to-military relationship is a critical component of our 

overall bilateral relationship and an important aspect of our regional strategy. This 

is particularly important as China’s military modernizes its capabilities and expands its presence, drawing our forces into closer contact and increasing both opportunities for concrete cooperation, as well as the risk of accidents or miscalculations. 

Currently the military relationship is contributing to overall stability in the region 

by developing patterns of interaction and habits of cooperation through both bi-lateral and multilateral engagements. This stability allows us to increase measured cooperation with China in areas of overlapping interests, while improving our ability 

to manage other aspects of the security relationship. Further improvement of our 

military relationship with China can strengthen trust and transparency. 

Question. What are your views regarding China’s interest in and commitment to 

improving military relations with the United States? 

Answer. I believe China recognizes the United States will have an enduring presence in the Pacific and therefore has a clear interest in sustaining military-to-military contacts. If confirmed as CMC, I will continue to support United States policy 

objectives and strategies toward China in order to develop areas of practical cooperation and risk-mitigation in a way that protects our national interests and supports overall stability in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Question. What is your view of the purpose and relative importance of sustained 

military-to-military relations with China? 

Answer. Military to military relations are an important part of not only our bilateral relationship with China, but is also an important facet of our overall strategy 

to Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. Sustaining a military-to-military relationship with 

China supports our United States objectives by demonstrating to the region that the 

United States and China can engage in practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest to deliver public goods and maintain regional stability. Sustained military 

contact with China at the policy and senior leader level also provides opportunities 

to develop common views on the international security environment and constructively manage any differences. Our overall goal is to promote our national interests 

by reinforcing international norms and standards, and strengthening regional understanding, transparency, and familiarity amongst all nations in the Asia-Pacific. 

Our approach to this relationship with China must be conducted in a thoughtful 

way that promotes the common interest of regional security and stability. 

Question. What role do you see for the Commandant in this process? 

Answer. I believe that the Commandant of the Marine Corps plays a pivotal role 

to personally sustain meaningful working relationships with his counterparts all 

over the world, particularly in the Asia-Pacific where we have more than 22,000 Marines forward stationed or forward deployed west of the International Dateline. I believe that our strong Marine presence in the region plays a significant role in promoting the regional security and stability that have afforded many Asia-Pacific nations, including China, unprecedented economic growth and prosperity. As CMC, I 

would continue to strengthen our regional partnerships, alliances, and the regional 

security architectures that have fostered this positive environment. 

RUSSIA

Question. What additional steps, if any, are likely to prove most effective at deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe? 

Answer. A continued, strong, whole-of-government approach is essential. Political 

and economic consequences are critical aspects of the international response to Russian aggression. Militarily, the U.S. must remain prepared and committed to our 

NATO allies and stand ready to counter military aggression against NATO members. I believe our continued commitment of Article 5-related planning, training, and 

adjustments to U.S. and NATO force posture, to include the basing of forces and 

pre-positioning of material, along with our contributions to Operation ATLANTIC 

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RESOLVE, have enhanced readiness and better prepares the entire alliance to deter 

Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. 

Question. What can the Marine Corps do to help NATO? 

Answer. Ultimately, we stand prepared to provide exceptionally capable expeditionary forces to fight alongside our allies. These forces have been tested in combat 

for more than a decade and maintain constant readiness. These forces also exercise 

and train regularly with our NATO allies—current examples include Exercises 

SABER STRIKE in Lithuania this June and TRIDENT JUNCTURE in Portugal, 

Spain, and Italy, which continues throughout the fall. Such exercises ensure interoperability with NATO maritime nations and strengthen teamwork throughout the 

alliance. 

Question. Does the Marine Corps, as part of a combined joint force, have what 

it needs in Europe? 

Answer. The Marine Corps does not have a large force permanently postured in 

Europe, although we have capable and ready forces available to respond quickly to 

emergent crises. Due to a shortfall in United States amphibious shipping in the European theater, the Marine Corps relies on land-based Special Purpose Marine Air 

Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), based in Spain to serve as the ‘most ready and capable’ Marine crisis response force inside the EUCOM and AFRICOM Areas of Responsibility (AORs). However, it should be noted, that while SPMAGTF–CR–AF is 

a credible and capable response force, the Marine Corps always prefers to respond 

as a U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Team, such as the robust capability sets found 

in the Marine Expeditionary Unit and Amphibious Readiness Group. To further 

mitigate our risk, we pre-position equipment, both afloat in our Maritime Pre-positioning Squadrons, and in storage caves within Norway. The most potent and likely 

Marine Corps force contributions to large-scale operations in Europe would be expeditionary forces, which leverage our strategic mobility and operational flexibility. 

These may include MAGTFs deployed on amphibious shipping or transported to Europe via strategic airlift and linked up with prepositioned equipment in the theater. 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS COOPERATION

Question. What are your views regarding the joint development and acquisition 

of Army and Marine Corps equipment? 

Answer. In my experience, the Marine Corps and the Army collaborate whenever 

our mission profiles converge. From a business perspective, collaboration leverages 

significant Army fiscal, manpower, and test resources in the refinement of operational capabilities requirements and the research, development, and acquisition of 

technical solutions to meet those requirements. Long term benefits include lower average unit costs for both services. 

Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should have a role in synchronizing Army 

and Marine Corps requirements and service programs? 

Answer. The Army and Marine Corps Board (AMCB) works at every level to make 

sure both services collaborate on best practices. I believe the AMCB provides sufficient oversight to synchronize requirements and programs. 

Question. What programs would you consider to be candidates for joint program 

development for the Army and Marine Corps? 

Answer. I am confident in knowing the Marine Corps actively seeks opportunities 

where it makes sense to conduct joint program development. A partial list of collaborative efforts includes, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle; Joint Battle Command-Platform, Blue Force Tracker and Nett Warrior; robotics systems; and more than twenty 

different infantry system programs encompassing direct and indirect fire weapons, 

anti-tank systems, night vision and thermal sighting equipment, individual protection such as body armor and helmets, and reconnaissance gear. 

MARINE CORPS FORCES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC), is a 

subordinate component command to the U.S. Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM) established in 2005. 

What is your assessment of the progress made in standing up and growing 

MARSOC, and what do you consider to be the principal issues that you would have 

to address to improve its operations? 

Answer. MARSOC has made tremendous progress over the last nine years and 

has become not only an important component to USSOCOM, but has also enabled 

better interoperability between the Marine Corps and USSOCOM. MARSOC has 

supported combat deployments to Afghanistan where Marines have both conducted 

Village Stability Operations and partnered with Afghan National Army Commando 

Battalions. Marine Raider Battalions have recently aligned to USAFRICOM, 

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USCENTCOM and USPACOM to ensure Marine SOF provides regionally astute 

and culturally proficient teams and companies to their respective Theater Special 

Operations Commands. 

MARSOC’s professionalization of the force has become commensurate with 

USSOCOM career management and development as the Marine Corps has supported the implementation of career paths for enlisted Critical Skill Operators, and 

recently, for Marine Special Operations Officers. These career paths allow Marines 

to serve in MARSOC, or SOF related billets, in the Joint Force and MAGTF for the 

duration of their career. Although that in itself is significant, improvements are still 

needed in how and to what level we integrate SOF and special operations capabilities in a complementary manner. I believe the SOF–MAGTF linkage is critical to 

ensure the combatant commanders and Joint Force is best supported, not only during crisis-response situations, but also as part of enduring special operations supporting their Theater Campaign Plans. 

RECAPITALIZATION

Question. The Marine Corps intends to concurrently recapitalize several of its 

front line systems. The MV–22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and the Joint Strike Fighter are both in production now. 

Do you believe that these production plans are realistic in light of the demands 

on resources imposed by maintaining current readiness? 

Answer. Yes, absolutely, they are one and the same. Every dollar spent on modernization has a direct and tangible effect on current readiness. Likewise, every dollar decremented from our procurement of future systems increases both the cost and 

complexity of maintaining our legacy systems beyond their projected life. 

The real key to reducing risk in capacity and recovering readiness is in recapitalization. We are roughly halfway through our transition of every aircraft in our inventory and must constantly balance current readiness and modernization to maintain our operational advantage and increase it as we buy a newer force. 

Question. Do you believe that these modernization programs will survive unless 

Congress amends the Budget Control Act to eliminate or reduce the effects of sequestration for fiscal year 2016 and beyond? 

Answer. If we return to the sequestration-level cuts in Fiscal Year 2016, we will 

face serious risks to the modernization plans we currently have and may have to 

reassess the overall modernization strategy. This could result in consequences which 

could lead to reduced readiness rates in highly demanded capabilities. 

Question. Is it your understanding that MV–22 readiness rates in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the United States have achieved desired levels? 

Answer. The MV–22 has met and exceeded every readiness metric during years 

of wartime flying and CONUS training while clearly establishing itself as one of the 

safest aircraft ever flown. The SPMAGTFs have achieved a 75 percent readiness, 

while the MEUs are at 69 percent. Fleet-wide readiness has increased from 53 percent to 62 percent between 2010 to 2015. But, I believe our readiness rates with 

this fantastic aircraft (and all our USMC aircraft for that matter) need to be better 

than that. As a force in readiness I can’t have 25–31 percent of my aviation assets 

‘‘down.’’ In fact right now, across the USMC, 19–20 percent of my aviation assets 

that are supposed to be on the flight line (not in scheduled depot maintenance) 

aren’t able to fly. That is unsatisfactory for the nation’s force in readiness. I intend 

to work with you to turn that around—quickly. 

Question. In your view, will the MV–22 be sustainable over time at an acceptable 

cost? 

Answer. Yes. The vast capabilities of the aircraft outweigh the costs associated 

with a tiltrotor when compared to conventional rotary winged aircraft. The MV–22’s 

ability to travel farther with more payload than conventional helicopters helps reduce the logistical demands of supporting operations with many more conventional 

helicopters. Cost per flight hour has decreased by 21 percent between 2010 and 

2015. ($11,651 to $9,163 per flight hour). We continue to work with all stakeholders 

to identify ways to drive out cost from MV–22 sustainment. 

MODERNIZATION OF CAPABILITIES

Question. The Marine Corps’ current concepts for modernization of its amphibious 

capabilities includes ships, ship to near-shore or shore connectors—such as the 

LCAC—and armored amphibious combat vehicles. Modernization across these systems is complex, technically challenging, and potentially unaffordable given the 

budget environment today and for the foreseeable future. 

What is your assessment of the current capability of amphibious maneuver and 

assault systems in the Navy and Marine Corps? 

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Answer. We currently possess the correct amphibious maneuver and assault systems to support Combatant Commander engagement and demand across the Range 

Of Military Operations (ROMO). Expeditionary Force-21 (EF–21) describes the capability and capacity necessary to execute MAGTF seabased operations from concept 

of employment, technology and specific Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) 

necessary for success. We are also a force in transition as new equipment is fielded 

and optimized for seabased application. We will also continue to improve naval integration and interoperability between Navy and Marine forces as we develop future 

complementary and supporting capacities and capabilities. 

As ACV characteristics and capabilities are developed, they will have to be integrated within our future comprehensive surface connector strategy. We are actively 

considering the capabilities and limitations of the Navy’s current fleet of surface 

connectors and their future development of replacements for those vehicles when developing requirements for ACV procurement to ensure interoperability. The Navy 

and Marine Corps are fully integrated on requirements development for the ACV. 

Finally, we ultimately remain committed to a high water speed vehicle as part of 

a complementary family of surface and air connectors. We’ll continue to work with 

the Navy on requirements within the context of the Surface Connector Council. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to prioritize development and acquisition among needed capabilities for sea basing, connectors, and armored amphibious assault and tactical mobility ashore to achieve your vision for a full spectrum force? 

Answer. In order to achieve a full spectrum force, a balanced approach that procures a family of systems is necessary to deliver the required capabilities. Amphibious warships and the supporting sustainment ships are the foundation for amphibious operations and establishment of a seabase. Interoperability of the Seabase with 

the elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is key when considering maneuver from the seabase to the objective (Operational Maneuver From the 

Sea (OMFTS)/Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM)) and is accomplished by surface 

and vertical connector assets (ACV/LCAC/V–22/HSV/LCU, etc). Current and continued amphibious program development and application will provide the needed capability afloat and ashore for full spectrum operations. Through leadership and careful 

consideration of the needs of this force, we can prioritize procurement in such a 

manner that we maintain our current competencies while pursuing transformational 

modernization as systems become older. This will allow us to avoid equipment obsolescence while building a family of systems ready to confront the challenges of the 

decades to come. 

Question. In your view, what is necessary to ensure that modernization of the amphibious force—ships, connectors, and vehicles—is achievable and affordable in the 

near and long term? 

Answer. Fully fund, sustain, and deliver the current USMC and Navy Programs 

Of Record (POR) for procurement and sustainment of MAGTF warfighting functions 

and equipment . . . and sustain the necessary support for Navy programs that enable 

Navy/Marine seabased force projection and response. We must ensure delivery of 

new/improved capabilities to the fighting force, and equally important, maintain 

current and legacy equipment to operational and tactical design readiness levels. 

We should also accelerate delivery or return to service/improvement of priority programs and equipment that directly contribute to higher unit readiness and operational deployability. For example, accelerate delivery of LHA–8 and the ACV program, and procurement of LX(R) . . . and when feasible due to funding or priority 

constraints/restraints, extend legacy systems/platforms until full operational capability (FOC) of the replacement is achieved. These actions completed through 

thoughtful and deliberate programmatics will ensure a modern and highly capable 

seabased MAGTF force for today and tomorrow. 

Question. In your view, will projected reduction in Marine Corps end strength, if 

implemented, reduce the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ requirement for amphibious 

ships? 

Answer. No. There is no direct correlation between Marine Corps end strength 

and amphibious warfare ship requirements. The amphibious warfare ship requirement is based on forward presence and rotational Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG)/ 

Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) as well as deployment and employment the Assault Echelons (AEs) of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). Regardless of 

end strength, the Marine Corps will always possess the ability to generate forward 

deployed MEUs and rotational forces to support day-to-day combatant commander 

forward presence and shaping requirements, as well the ability to generate the AEs 

of two MEBs to support forcible entry operations contained in major war plans. 

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Question. Given your vision of future high-intensity combined arms combat inland, fighting a peer or near peer opponents, are current modernization plans and 

budgets adequate? 

Answer. While the Marine Corps is postured to conduct operations across the 

range of military operations, our highest priority modernization efforts are those associated with our core competencies: amphibious forcible entry and crisis response. 

These core competencies require continued development of our capabilities for surface and air ship-to-shore movement, command and control from a seabase, operational reach, and Marine Expeditionary Units, Marine Expeditionary Brigades, and 

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. Our high priority modernization 

programs have been protected at the expense of both lower priority modernization 

and infrastructure maintenance or development. Moreover, fiscal constraints and 

rapidly changing technology and our current acquisition processes prevent necessary 

and timely investment in critical capabilities such as: intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyber, electronic warfare, and information warfare. In the end, we 

must maintain the warfighting capacity to ensure that our combined arms Marine 

Expeditionary Forces are trained and equipped to meet an uncertain future. 

Furthermore, a return to BCA-level spending/full sequestration would further exacerbate institutional readiness imbalances. More tradeoffs would be made in acquisitions of needed equipment, essential training, living and work spaces, family support centers, and end strength to protect the Marine Corps’ performance of its statutory obligations. Sequestration impacts on key modernization programs will have 

catastrophic effects on achieving desired capabilities to defeat emerging threats and 

will place an unacceptable burden on legacy programs such as the AAV (40 + y/o) 

and the HMMWV (out of productions since 2012). 

AMPHIBIOUS COMBAT VEHICLE

Question. The Navy/Marine Corps amphibious assault capability today includes a 

large number of self-deploying amphibious assault vehicles (AAV–7) to carry infantry ashore, and a smaller number of small vessels called connectors that can ferry 

other vehicles, such as tanks and artillery, and supplies from ships to shore. 

The Marine Corps has changed its plans for development of a next-generation armored combat vehicle. Instead of investing in development of a new self-deploying 

amphibious assault tracked combat vehicle, the Marine Corps intends to reduce 

technical and fiscal risk by acquiring a wheeled combat vehicle. Currently four foreign designs are being evaluated. A down select to two is scheduled to occur within 

months. The two finalists are to be evaluated in splash tests designed to assess effectiveness in amphibious movement from assault ship to shore. 

Is the USMC confident that these foreign-designed wheeled armored personnel 

carriers as observed to date will be able to swim in combat conditions, and in varying sea states? 

Answer. Yes, we are confident that at least two contractors will be capable of delivering prototypes with the capacity to achieve water mobility performance on par 

with or greater than our existing assault amphibian along with the capabilities 

needed for the landward portion of the ACV mission profile. The Marine Corps has 

conducted extensive open-ocean and surf zone testing of various prototype 8x8 armored personnel carriers that represent current available technology. This testing 

contributed to the development of both our ACV requirements and our over-arching 

modernization strategy. 

It should be noted that only two of the five proposed designs for ACV 1.1 are 

based on foreign designs—one of which was specifically required to enable the conduct of amphibious operations for that nation’s naval infantry. 

Question. If the wheeled vehicles cannot swim, what is the operational risk that 

the U.S. Navy may be unable to carry a sufficient number of connectors to transport 

all of the wheeled personnel carriers ashore within the required time period? 

Answer. In order to rapidly build up combat power ashore we need self-deploying 

amphibious combat vehicles. Our Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy 

(GCTVS) is predicated upon maintaining this capability. Nonetheless, we still rely 

heavily on the Navy to enable our surface movement from ship to shore using the 

inventory of Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 

connectors. If the ACV cannot swim, the number of sorties carried out by surface 

connectors will increase, which will in turn lengthen the time it takes to place decisive capabilities on the objective and place the force and mission at risk. 

Importantly, I believe the basis of this question will prove to be counterfactual. 

I am confident that the ACV will possess the capacity to achieve water mobility performance on par with or greater than our existing assault amphibian. That said, our 

phased modernization strategy mitigates risk to the Marine Corps’ ability to sustain 

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surface forcible entry through the development and subsequent employment of complementary amphibious armored personnel carriers. The current AAV is undergoing 

a survivability upgrade and a focused sustainment improvement regimen. Simultaneously, the wheeled portion or other two thirds of our required armored lift will 

be fielded and incrementally improved to ensure the full range of required capabilities are available via ACV. Finally, the strategy allows for the replacement of the 

upgraded AAV in the mid-2030’s. This replacement will be informed by a mid-2020s 

decision point regarding the achievability and application of high water speed capability and a comprehensive assessment of ship-to-shore options. 

Question. Do you support the Marine Corps’ decision to develop and field a 

wheeled armored vehicle to replace the AAV–7, the current amphibious assault vehicle? 

Answer. Yes, the current phased modernization strategy provides a responsible 

means to realize significant near term improvements in capability while sustaining 

surface assault capacity without high acquisition risk and cost. The combination of 

modernized AAV and incrementally improved and fielded Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACV) is a well thought out portfolio approach that balances the competing demands of performance, cost and, schedule in a period of marked fiscal constraints 

while providing the Marine Corps with multiple options to adapt as the future 

unfolds. The improved capabilities inherent in our current ACV competitors will 

provide our Marines with superior mobility on the modern battlefield. 

Question. In your view, where does armored amphibious assault fit in the set of 

capabilities required to field a credible amphibious operations capability? 

Answer. Armored amphibious surface assault is absolutely essential to our ability 

to field a credible amphibious capability that poses menacing dilemmas simultaneously and in depth across all domains; air, maritime, land, cyber, and space. To 

this end, surface assault elements will complement, and be complemented by, 

vertical envelopment capabilities (CH–53K, MV–22). These maneuver elements will 

work in concert with capabilities that provide Naval and Aviation fires (manned— 

F35 and unmanned—UAS / UAX), and other defensive and offensive (Electronic 

Warfare, Cyber, Information Operations) capabilities. Of course, this dynamic collective capability, which will operate from the sea base—often distributed—will be synchronized with command and control systems and logistics sustainment. With this, 

we must always view amphibious operations within a Joint construct. The salient 

point is that each of these capabilities relies upon one another to generate the synergy, tempo, kinetic, and cognitive effect necessary to impose our will on our adversaries. 

The increased likelihood of operations in the littorals requires a renewed focus on 

the Marine Corps’ responsibility to be organized, trained and equipped, ‘‘for service 

with the fleet in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases.’’ The Naval services have long sought to develop complementary means of conducting vertical and 

surface littoral maneuver from increased distances, and via multiple penetration 

points, using the sea as maneuver space to offset the range and precision of modern 

weapons. 

F–35B REQUIREMENTS

Question. The Marine Corps has stated that its F–35B requirement is 420 aircraft. The total number of F–35s planned for the Department of the Navy is currently set at 680. 

Do you believe that the current plan for 680 aircraft can fully accommodate the 

needs of both the Navy and the Marine Corps? 

Answer. The Marine Corps has looked at this number carefully a number of times 

based on our global commitments, plans, COCOM requirements, and the national 

defense strategy. In 2013 McKinsey and Company was hired by AT&L to do an F– 

35 Operations and Sustainment Cost Reduction Strategy study. The study applied 

requirements of the National Defense Strategy to include deployment and 

warfighting contingencies. The results of that study were that the Marine Corps was 

buying the right number of aircraft. 

Answer. In near term, however, we are not buying enough airplanes. Our legacy 

airframes are aging and have been supporting combat operations for 15 straight 

years. Continuing to repair and modernize those aircraft will only get us so far and 

we are beyond the point now where we need to recapitalize the fleet. We have driven efficiency into our procurement plan and as a result, our total aircraft inventory 

today is 10 percent larger than what our inventory will be at the completion of the 

F–35 transition. 

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Question. How do you assess the progress of the first squadron to be equipped 

with the F–35B as they complete fielding? Are they on track to achieve initial operational capabilities on time? 

Answer. I believe we are on track to achieve initial operational capability. The 

Deputy Commandant for Aviation sent a team to assess the IOC readiness of that 

squadron last week. I’ve been informed that the inspection went well. The current 

Commandant is analyzing the data from the event and is expected to make a statement about it soon. 

–53K

Question. The first flight for the CH–53K has been postponed once again, the latest delay of many for the $25 billion program. 

What is your assessment of the current status of the CH–53K program? Is it on 

track to achieve initial operational capabilities on time? 

Answer. The CH–53K will transition to first flight this year and production is on 

a schedule that meets the timeline for delivering aircraft as currently planned and 

budgeted. The recent CH–53K technical challenges have been overcome and developmental test continues. Progress continues in all phases of the program and we 

have no major emerging concerns. Developmental Test revealed minor developmental discoveries. These discoveries are normal for any new program of this type. 

We believe that finding these issues prior to first flight will ultimately improve testing efficiency. 

Question. What is the effect of the CH–53K delays on the CH–53E fleet? On overall USMC readiness? 

Answer. The CH–53E transition to the CH–53K is already slow due to the shallow 

ramp rate in production and the transition scheduled to be complete by 2028. Consequently, we will have to continue to operate the CH–53E for a longer period of 

time than originally planned. We currently have a shortage of CH–53Es, and that 

problem is exacerbated by the need to operate the legacy fleet longer than anticipated. We have a major four year readiness recovery program in the making to ensure we gain maximum service life and capability from the 53E fleet. However, we 

can’t sustain the 53E indefinitely and any future budgetary reductions to the CH– 

53K program will aggravate this situation. The Marine Corps is strongly committed 

to keeping the program on track and keeping the Program of Record buy in order 

to avoid the inventory shortfalls we are experiencing now. 

JOINT ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

Question. What are your views regarding joint acquisition programs, such as the 

Joint Tactical Radio System and the Joint Strike Fighter? 

Answer. I support joint solutions to common capability gaps. Working with other 

Services is, and always has been, a major element of the Marine Corps overall Research and Development (R&D) and Procurement strategy. Our limited budgets demand that we adhere rigorously to the well-established Department of Defense 

(DOD) hierarchy of materiel alternatives. If we cannot find a solution to our materiel needs in the commercial marketplace, we always look next to take advantage 

of investments that other Services, DOD Components, or our foreign partners are 

making. This reduces our need to spend R&D dollars on unilateral efforts, and it 

gives all participants involved with joint programs the opportunity to reduce unit 

procurement costs, and ultimately, life-cycle operation and maintenance costs. The 

end result is realized in the form of commonality and affordability across the Services making it much easier to share sustainment resources such as training, maintenance equipment, and supplies. 

Question. Do you see utility in encouraging the services to conduct more joint development, especially in the area of helicopters and unmanned systems? 

Answer. Yes. Encouraging joint development begins with collaboration of requirements during the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process 

and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). This is a key element of fostering joint development among the Services. The Marine Corps is working with the 

Army on unmanned systems and robotics. 

Question. If so, what enforcement mechanisms would you recommend implementing more joint program acquisition? 

Answer. Within the Department of Defense, the enforcement mechanisms are well 

established. The JROC plays an important role in harmonizing the Services 

warfighting requirements and ensuring that joint program opportunities are fully 

examined. 

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RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. American military personnel routinely deploy to locations around the 

world where they must engage and work effectively with allies and with host-country nationals whose faiths and beliefs may be different than their own. For many 

other cultures, religious faith is not a purely personal and private matter; it is the 

foundation of their culture and society. Learning to respect the different faiths and 

beliefs of others, and to understand how accommodating different views can contribute to a diverse force is, some would argue, an essential skill to operational effectiveness. 

In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different beliefs, 

including no religious belief? 

Answer. Yes, the religious accommodation policies are sufficient. They strike a 

balance between individual expression of belief and the needs of the Marine Corps 

to maintain good order and discipline, unit cohesion, military readiness, and combat 

effectiveness. 

Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and good order and discipline? 

Answer. Yes, however we must also consider any impact on military readiness 

and combat effectiveness. 

Question. In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and respects open 

and candid discussions about personal religious faith and beliefs in a home-port environment contribute in a positive way to preparing U.S. forces to be effective in 

overseas assignments? 

Answer. The Marine Corps respects individuals’ personal religious faith and we 

believe that the current policy accommodates our Marines and balances individual 

beliefs with the needs of the Marine Corps. 

Question. Would a policy that discourages open discussions about personal faith 

and beliefs be more or less effective at preparing servicemembers to work and operate in a pluralistic environment? 

Answer. The Marine Corps respects individuals’ personal religious faith and we 

believe that the current policy accommodates our Marines and balances individual 

beliefs with the needs of the Marine Corps. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the Administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commandant of the Marine Corps? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

COUNTER-ISIL STRATEGY

1. Senator MCCAIN. Is our current strategy against ISIL succeeding? 

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General NELLER. To date, our strategy is not succeeding. Though we have made 

it difficult for ISIL to operate openly in many areas, and we are supporting allies 

who are confronting ISIL on the battlefield with some success, ISIL still holds many 

of the areas they have gained, and they appear to have traction with and support 

from many in the region. They remain positioned in Iraq, have made gains in Syria, 

have established a presence in Libya and have gained adherence from Boko Haram 

in Nigeria, Al Shabab in Somalia and even some Taliban in Afghanistan. Additionally, and as concerning, is the impact their information campaign has had in gaining recruits willing to travel to join them especially from the Western World and 

to radicalize others in the homeland of the U.S. and our allies, to execute acts of 

terror at home. They are both a threat as a physical force and in their ability to 

incite terrorist actions through their messaging. 

2. Senator MCCAIN. Are the ends, ways and means of this strategy aligned to 

achieve the goal of degrading and destroying ISIL in a duration of time that does 

not pose unacceptable levels of risk to U.S. national security interests? 

General NELLER. To defeat any adversary, all elements of national power must 

be employed with sufficient and comparable effort to do so, and at present this does 

not appear to be the case. I say that tempered by the fact in my current assignment, 

I am not immersed on a daily basis in the national strategy. If confirmed, this would 

be something that would have my personal attention. That said, based on our current level of effort in the military LOOs, and the success thus far achieved in denying a sanctuary and Building Partner Capacity (BPC), unless changed by some yet 

to be seen dynamic, e.g., a change in the leadership of the primary combatants or 

their primary supporters, or a greater commitment of Turkish or GCC forces to 

ground offensive action in Iraq and/or Syria, I believe the campaign timeline to ‘‘defeat’’ ISIL at the current level of effort and the success of the current LOOs must 

be viewed in years. 

3. Senator MCCAIN. You characterized the current conflict with ISIL in Iraq and 

Syria as a ‘‘stalemate.’’ You said that neither side is winning. However, as General 

David Petraeus has said about the fight against ISIL, ‘‘these are fights where, if you 

are not winning, you are probably losing, because time in not on your side? Would 

you agree with that assessment? 

General NELLER. I would agree that a stalemate with ISIL is not an acceptable 

option for the United States or its allies, if only because stalemate, as a resolution, 

permits the establishment and continuation of what would become a nation state 

that is engaged in hostilities with U.S. interests. At the tactical level today, I see 

a stalemate. After the appearance of ISIL on the battlefield in Syria, and then in 

Iraq, they made rapid gains. In Iraq, these gains were partially due to the poor 

leadership and readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces but also due to the disenfranchisement of the Iraqi Sunni in the areas where ISIL made their advances. These 

advances have been stopped and to some degree reversed, due in some part to the 

actions of the U.S. and other coalition members, but until the territorial integrity 

of Iraq is reestablished there will be no ‘‘win.’’ Further, it is important to recognize 

there are financial costs associated with war, and all are aware of fiscal situation 

of this country and many others. In this regard, I believe Gen Petraeus is correct. 

For this to drag on without an end in sight will challenge us not only fiscally, but 

from the perspective of the support of the American people, which is critical to any 

U.S. military effort. The best way to gain the support of the American people is to 

be successful. We are not winning, in the sense that the metrics one would expect 

to see in a successful military campaign are not necessarily evident. 

4. Senator MCCAIN. Have our operations to date seized the strategic and operational initiative from ISIL? If not, why? 

General NELLER. No, to date, they have not. Our actions in support of the Iraqi 

Security Forces did stop the ISIL advance and push it back to the current state. 

Since then Ramadi and Fallujah have fallen and at this time, ISF operations supported by Shiite Popular Militia Forces supported by Iran are attempting to take 

back these towns and to push ISIL back from the Bajii area. The Kurds in the north 

are holding/making some progress. If the Iraqi’s were able to apply pressure on ISIL 

in multiple areas at the same time it would force ISIL to fight on multiple fronts, 

increasing the possibility of collapsing the ISIL forces in Iraq. So at the operational 

level of the campaign they have not seized the initiative. 

Without being there to see with my own eyes I am not well positioned to answer 

the ‘‘why not.’’ Based on what I have read in open source materials, the ISF lacks 

the aggressive spirit and combat leaders to take the fight to the enemy. ISIL is willing to fight and die for their cause. Strategically, I cannot speak of how all the coaliVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00651 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tion, especially the GCC nations who have a stake in this fight, are working together to synchronize their efforts, not just militarily but across all the elements of 

national power. The United States cannot do this alone and must build a coalition 

for both Iraq and for Syria to take the fight to ISIL and stabilize the region as a 

whole. 

5. Senator MCCAIN. Our current counter-ISIL strategy assumes that, with enough 

United States and coalition training, assistance, and support, including air strikes, 

ground forces in Iraq and Syria will develop sufficient capability and will to go on 

the offensive against ISIL, defeat them on the ground, take back territory in their 

countries from ISIL, and put ISIL on the path to defeat. Do you think this assumption about Iraqi and Syrian forces is realistic? If not, how would our strategy have 

to change in order to maintain our goals of degrading and destroying ISIL? 

General NELLER. Based on my experience with the Iraqis, though now somewhat 

dated, I believe the assumption for Iraqi forces is realistic. There is at least a standing force to begin with and I believe they can be trained to defeat ISIL. To do so 

they need equipment and training to fight as a unit. More importantly, they must 

be paid, have a reasonable belief that if wounded they will receive medical care, and 

if they die their family will receive something. Most importantly, they must have 

good leadership. Finally, all of this will be for naught if the Bagdad government 

does not provide an equitable level of support to the Sunni Iraqis and treat them 

in a just way. This is probably the most difficult piece and the part which if it is 

not corrected will continue to fuel a Sunni insurgency against the Baghdad government. At the end of the day, the Iraqis have to fight the fight and win the fight. 

They can do this. 

Though I have met with the Jordanian leadership on several occasions from 2012– 

2013, my sense of the fight in Syria is dated. I have no sense of the quality, skill, 

intelligence, and motivation of those who are being trained to fight against ISIL, 

so based on that and based on the results achieved thus far, my military opinion 

is that this will be much more difficult. As I stated in my testimony, Iraq is complicated but at least all but ISIL are on the same side of the line of contact. Syria 

is exponentially more complex due to all the various players: the Assad regime, Russia, Iran/IRGC, Hezbollah, Lebanon, and Israel, Syrian Opposition factions, Al 

Nusra, Kurds, Turkey, Jordan, the GCC nations and ISIL who fight on one comingled battlespace. 

6. Senator MCCAIN. Given the attacks conducted in Little Rock, Arkansas; Fort 

Hood, Texas; and Chattanooga, Tennessee, should our soldiers, sailors and airmen, 

and marines serving in the United States be armed to protect themselves? If so, 

what should commanders account for in training, operations and threat assessments? 

General NELLER. First and foremost, it must be our absolute priority to provide 

adequate protection to our servicemembers, regardless of duty station. We need to 

remain ever vigilant and prepared to modify our posture based on the threats we 

face. These measures already include the presence of armed security at our gates, 

base security forces/Military Police, and unit duty officers being armed and other 

force protection processes and measures in place. Additional measures can be put 

in place when called for. 

While I am confident that the security of our major bases in the Marine Corps 

is adequate to protect the force and our families on base, security at our approximately 1500 Recruiting Stations/Sub Stations and approximately 150 Reserve Centers, many of which we share with other Services, are somewhat less secure. Our 

Reserve Centers could more easily have armed servicemembers on duty since they 

have weapons present and a means to secure them. I believe we are doing this at 

the present time, in compliance with state and local laws, and where the marine 

bearing the weapon has met all the qualifications to carry a weapon and has received the necessary instruction in the rules of use of force. 

Recruiting stations are the most problematic. At present, there are limitations on 

storage for ammunition and weapons in some locations. We could remedy this, but 

it will take time and funding, all of which can be provided. Another important consideration to me is the time taken away from the recruiting mission to perform and 

sustain these requirements, and more importantly time taken away from efforts to 

find and recruit the best men and women to be U.S. Marines and the potential that 

bearing arms might restrict recruiters’ access to the places where they find these 

same young Americans—high schools and college campuses. 

I have a responsibility to protect all our marines and their families. The safety 

of the force will be among my highest priorities and I will be paying close attention 

to the investigations and Secretary of Defense directed reviews into the recent tragVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00652 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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edy in Chattanooga to identify areas where we can make improvements, including 

examining whether and how to arm the force. I will also seek the views of the recruiting force on this issue. In the meantime, we must look at immediate improvements to harden their facilities as well as other security actions that we can implement now. 

I am not ready to say, at this time, that we should. I will make force protection 

one of my highest priorities, including in appropriate environments and conditions, 

arming the force. 

Regarding what commanders should account for in training, operations and threat 

assessments, the Commandant has directed a review of our authorities for carrying 

weapons and policies regarding qualifications, training levels and frequency, and applicable certifications. That review, and the lessons we glean from the ongoing investigations and Secretary of Defense directed reviews into the tragedy in Tennessee will inform our way forward. What I can say is that we need to proceed with 

caution when introducing additional armed personnel into the public environment. 

IRAN

7. Senator MCCAIN. How would you characterize the Iranian regime’s regional 

ambitions? Do you believe Iran is currently succeeding in achieving those regional 

goals? 

General NELLER. In my opinion, Iran sees itself as the preeminent power in the 

Middle East. They believe this is their historical heritage and right. Their actions 

around the region, in support of other Shiite followers, have caused instability within existing governments, many of whom are allied with the U.S. I believe Iran 

causes problems in Bahrain, and Iranian adventurism will continue to find footholds 

there and elsewhere so long as there is an audience predisposed to receive it. So, 

in varying degrees, Iran is succeeding in shaping and changing the political environment in Yemen, Southern Lebanon, Syria and Iraq to their view and against United 

States security interests. 

8. Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe that the Assad regime in Syria, Houthi forces 

in Yemen, and Hezbollah are as operationally effective as they have been in large 

part due to Iranian support? 

General NELLER. Based on my information and understanding, Iranian support, 

from weapons, training, funding, active participation of Iranian advisors and even 

in some cases units, has been a significant contributor to the effectiveness of each 

of these groups. Hezbollah has probably benefitted the most. They are a de facto 

Iranian state within Lebanon that would not have the weaponry or military capability they do without Iranian support. 

9. Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe that the United States is doing enough to 

counter Iran’s malign influence in Iraq, Syria, and the region at large? If not, what 

more can and should be done? 

General NELLER. Wherever possible we should step up our efforts against Iran’s 

malign activities. We know that Iran is involved or complicit in destabilizing countries from Iraq to Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen and throughout the region. It is also 

clear that Iran uses support to militants, support to terrorist groups, and hybrid 

warfare, all of which are eminently activities NOT in the national security interests 

of the United States. It is in our interest to push back in every possible way against 

these destabilizing and damaging actions. The Iranians must be watched constantly, 

and when they violate treaties and laws such as through the shipment of illegal 

arms to their proxies, they must be confronted. 

We should be more aggressive in this area, to include sharing information about 

their illegal and destabilizing activities. We must never give them a ‘‘pass’’ on things 

they do which are illegal and impact our interests and those of our allies. I will endeavor to provide my best military advice on any requested military options for 

countering Iranian aggression, whether that aggression is direct or through their 

proxies. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR INHOFE

READINESS OF THE FORCE

10. Senator INHOFE. How do lower readiness levels and a smaller force impact our 

ability to deter aggression? 

General NELLER. The Marine Corps is operating with elevated risk in meeting the 

tenets of the defense strategy. At funding below the President’s Budget request, we 

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would have less readiness and inadequate forward presence to assure allies or respond to crisis in the manner needed. The defense strategy requires a sustained 

ability to deter aggression, operate effectively across all domains, and respond decisively to emerging crises and contingencies. The Marine Corps, as the nation’s expeditionary-force-in-readiness, does this by defending the homeland with forward presence. Smaller, less ready forces will produce fewer forward deployed forces, resulting 

in increased risk to our national security interests. 

11. Senator INHOFE. Should the United States be postured to fight two Major Contingency Operations simultaneously? What is the impact of only being postured to 

fight one Major Contingency Operation? 

General NELLER. Given the complex global security environment and the requirements for safeguarding U.S. interests detailed in our national documents such as 

the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the National 

Military Strategy, we must be able to effectively fight our adversaries in more than 

one theater of war, even if our capability only allows for winning in one theater and 

deterring/holding in the other. 

Being postured to fight one Major Contingency Operation reduces the military’s 

deterrent effect and would likely reduce the confidence of our allies and partners. 

12. Senator INHOFE. Given the current force structure of the Marine Corps sized 

at 182,000 and a global environment that is becoming more unstable, how do you 

get the Marine Corps back to a goal of 1 to 3 deployment to dwell ratio without 

growing the Marine Corps knowing the world is not getting safer? How much longer 

can the Marine Corps sustain the 1 to 2 ratio? 

General NELLER. We believe the optimal size force for the Marine Corps is 

186,000 marines. As previous Commandants have testified, the 186K force was designed as a 1:3 deployment to dwell force; however, this force is unaffordable. That 

being said, the American People expect the Marine Corps to be nation’s force and 

readiness, and they demand that when the Nation is least ready and needs us most, 

the Marine Corps will be the most ready, will answer the call and win. At our current size of approximately 184,000, the Marine Corps seeks to allocate forces supporting current operations with a deployment-to-dwell range of 1:2 to 1:3 for the majority of our units. Utilizing that range, we will work with the combatant commanders and provide forces that support operational and Service requirements. As 

an integral part of the Marine Corps Total Force, the Marine Corps Reserve will 

continue to play a key role in providing the essential shock absorber for the Active 

Component. 

182,000 is the minimum force where we can meet the combatant commanders’ requirements and provide a two to one deployment to dwell. We are working with the 

Joint Staff and combatant commanders to develop new, different, innovative ways 

to give the combatant commanders the capability they need to meet the mission, 

and at the same time, buy the Marine Corps more dep-to-dwell relief. If we were 

to go lower than 182,000 marines, the reduced deployment-to-dwell ratios would increase the risk to the force, the time we need to prepare for deployments, and sustain our readiness and our ability to meet combatant commander’s requirements. 

13. Senator INHOFE. Given the Marine Corps current state of tiered readiness and 

current global commitments, if a major or even minor contingency operation were 

executed today in one of the COCOMs, is it possible the Marine Corps would have 

to send forces into combat that are not fully trained and ready? Would you have 

to take forces from other COCOMs? If yes, what would be the impact on operations 

in those COCOMs? 

General NELLER. Today forces that are forward deployed are ready to operate and 

fight tonight. That said, if a major contingency/operation arose and the majority/all 

of the force were required, we would deploy them at their current state of readiness. 

This is not optimal, but if necessary, we will do the Nation’s bidding. Marines do 

not run away from a crisis or fight. Although we are always committed to generating ready forces, a strategic surprise or another situation of vital national interest 

may erupt where national leaders order the deployment of forces that are not sufficiently manned, trained, and equipped—essentially not being fully ready for the 

mission. 

We will do everything in our power to protect the readiness of marines deploying 

into harm’s way and look to the Congress for the support required to guarantee this 

readiness. A return to sequestration level spending puts the military on the path 

to degraded readiness and the hollowing of the force. Deploying such an unready 

force, whose readiness could have been protected, is unacceptable. 

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If we had a commitment elsewhere, we would take forces that are currently forward-deployed, such as in the Far East and Okinawa, and we would have to reposition them to wherever that contingency was. We did that during the combat in Iraq. 

The other option—the least favorable— is we go all in. We activate our reserves and 

we go and do what needs to be done. We’ve done that before, but it’s not sustainable 

for more than a short period of time. 

It’s a difficult question without knowing the exact size of the force, what the exact 

mission was, what the combat ratios were, what we would need to do, and what 

we would have to accomplish militarily to achieve the political objective. Wherever 

they are assigned around the globe, the combatant commanders will get Marines 

who are smart, fit, disciplined, trained, experienced, take care of each other, and 

are ready to fight tonight and to provide what America expects of her Marine Corps: 

an expeditionary crisis response force in readiness. 

SECURITY OF THE FORCE

14. Senator INHOFE. Do we need to reassess our security levels, rules of engagement, training requirements, ability to increase manning of armed security personnel, and authorization for military personnel to carry government firearms both 

concealed and openly carry to and from duty? 

General NELLER. We learned a great deal in the aftermath of the Washington 

Navy Yard shooting and developed a comprehensive list of recommendations that 

was approved by both Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense. The recommendations became a task list that included directed improvements specific to 

both Marine Forces Reserve and Marine Corps Recruiting Command. In addressing 

Chattanooga, we’ve reconstituted the Washington Navy Yard Integrated Product 

Team to ensure that the earlier work informs our observations for the future. 

USMC actions following the 16 July Chattanooga shooting will focus on the following: Arming/Enhanced Security Postures, Improved Physical Security, and Alert 

& Notification/Information Sharing. While a great deal of emphasis is being placed 

on the arming of personnel, we also need to look at the long-term and sustainable 

approach to improving the physical security of our facilities. We know that we have 

challenges in our desire to improve mass notification and warning capabilities at 

our off-installation facilities, and we’re exploring a number of possible solutions; 

nothing is off the table. The recent events have identified a continuing risk that all 

military personnel face every day while carrying out their duties, and we must ensure that we are prepared and ready to address this risk. To continue supporting 

the security and safety of our Marines, a review of security, force protection, and 

arming policies has been conducted. All our commanders have been directed to conduct a review of their current antiterrorism, physical security and force protection 

policies, procedures, and measures. If higher guidance or local conditions were to require the arming of security personnel, commanders are charged to ensure that all 

applicable requirements are properly addressed, documented, and enforced. 

Rules for the use of force are in place, and weapons qualification and training requirements are well-documented. Aboard our installations, we have a cadre of Military Police and Civilian Police officers who provide 24 hour security. Commanders 

have established auxiliary security forces aboard the installations to augment law 

enforcement personnel in the event of increased force protection requirements or 

emergencies. Commanders also have authorities to establish Camp Guard units. 

Commanders have authority to allow personnel to carry concealed weapons in the 

performance of their duties and all authorizations are provided in writing. Open carrying of weapons is currently limited to personnel in an on-duty status. The ability 

to carry weapons to and from duty is limited by policy to General Officers and 

Criminal Investigators. 

PROVIDING LETHAL WEAPONS TO THE UKRAINE

15. Senator INHOFE. In your opinion, what types of lethal weapons and assistance 

should the United States be providing the Ukraine to help defend their terrorist? 

General NELLER. Russian aggression and their support to separatists in Ukraine 

and elsewhere are deeply troubling. That said, given the nature of the crisis, the 

pursuit of a diplomatic solution remains the optimal way to achieve a resolution 

consistent with our national interests and the interests of our allies in the region. 

In the meantime, we should continue the provision of non-lethal supplies and defensive equipment (counter fire radars) and ISR support to Ukraine and continue our 

training of their forces. If, in the future, the dynamics in Ukraine necessitate a more 

robust military response, I would recommend the provision of weapons and systems—such as anti-armor weapons—and the commensurate trainers to employ the 

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weapons capable of effectively countering the battlefield threats the Ukrainian military feels they need the most assistance in defeating. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR COTTON

IRAN

Senator COTTON. General Neller, I am sure during your time at I MEF Deputy 

Commanding General you saw the reports of Marines killed in Iraq, and might have 

known Marines that were killed in the Beirut Marine Corps Barracks bombing in 

1983. Iranian terrorists and proxies have a long, infamous record of killing Americans around the world. The deal cut with Iran on their nuclear program will lift 

sanctions not only for the Iranian economy, but also for some of the worst actors 

within the Iranian regime. These are entities that form a nexus of companies and 

organizations that support not only proliferation and Iran’s attempts to create a 

bomb, but also coincidentally support terrorist groups like Hezbollah, and Iranian 

militias in Iraq who have targeted and killed many American men and women in 

uniform with explosively formed penetrators (EFP). 

16. General Neller, what do you say to the survivors and families of our men and 

women killed by Iranian proxies and bombs over the last 35 years knowing that we 

are going to underwrite their continued terror campaign by lifting sanctions against 

all of these bad actors, including IRGC Quds Force Commander Ghassem 

Suleimani? 

General NELLER. I did know Marines killed in Beirut and like you have seen firsthand death on the battlefield. When I have met and talked with the families of 

those we lost, I did my best to comfort them and to assuage their grief. As you know 

first-hand, this is hard. I tell them that their loved ones did their duty and we who 

knew them are enormously proud to have served alongside such brave men and 

women like those who have lost their lives at the hands of the cowards who hide 

behind weapons of terror. I can only hope and pray that these words and our willingness to talk with them, provides them some comfort. Regardless if we end up 

with an agreement with the Iranians on their nuclear program, I give you my word 

that this regime’s nefarious and destabilizing actions, assuming that they continue, 

will have my closet attention and that Marines will be both aware of this threat 

and be prepared to counter them, wherever they may be. 

ASIA

17. Senator COTTON. Asia is arguably the most important region in the world economically for the United States. Asian nations surpassed Europe as our leading 

trade partners in 1977, and total trade with Asia is double the trade with Europe. 

Asia is our largest source of imports and second largest export market (outside of 

North America), and the region has outpaced every other region on in the growth 

of exports since 2005. The United States trades more with South Korea than with 

Germany, more with Singapore than with France, and more with Japan than with 

the United Kingdom, Germany, and France combined. The U.S. must have a sustained role in the region, and that role is secured by American military might. Marine amphibious forces remain a critical capability in demonstrating American military might. 

As the Commandant will the amphibious combat vehicle remain a top priority for 

the Marine Corps? 

General NELLER. Yes. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is the centerpiece 

of the Marine Corps’ Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS) and 

a key enabler of our operational concept—Expeditionary Force 21. As such, ACV is 

the Marine Corps’ number one ground acquisition program and is critical to our 

ability to conduct expeditionary amphibious operations as well as to provide armored protected mobility and maneuver during the conduct of operations ashore. 

Armored amphibious surface assault and maneuver ashore are absolutely essential to our amphibious capability. The Naval services have long maintained the need 

to possess complementary means of conducting vertical and surface littoral maneuver from increased distances, and via multiple penetration points, using the sea as 

maneuver space to offset the range and precision of modern weapons. The ACV is 

vital to our ability to meet our statutory obligations to the Nation. 

18. Senator COTTON. How important will amphibious capabilities be for our Allies 

in the Pacific? How will you ensure amphibious interoperability with our Allies? 

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General NELLER. Amphibious capability will always be important in areas dominated by the littorals. As such, we prize both the capabilities of our allies in the 

Pacific and our ability to interoperate with them. Further, amphibious capabilities 

are increasingly important for our partners and allies as they are pursuing ways 

to meet Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions and crisis response demands in the region. 

Interoperability is also essential and allows the U.S. to work in inclusive and coordinated ways to counter challenges to regional security and stability. Interoperability is ensured over time by a commitment by each state to work together on 

shared interests. We are able to do this through the Marine Rotational Force—Darwin, a unit we are looking to increase the size and scope; our units stationed in Okinawa and Hawaii; the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) which is based in the 

Pacific; as well as the 11th, 13th, and 15th MEU’s based out of San Diego which 

regularly transit the region. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SULLIVAN

TOP PRIORITY

19. Senator SULLIVAN. General Neller, in your role as commandant you are

charged with manning, training and equipping marines for service as directed by 

the president. When confirmed, what do you see as an area that will require your 

immediate attention, what will be your first priority? 

General NELLER. The current Commandant and the Corps’ senior leadership have 

been wrestling with the current fiscal and readiness challenges for the past several 

years. Today, our marines are operating forward around the globe performing the 

mission of America’s expeditionary force-in-readiness. If confirmed, my number one 

priority will be to ensure those marines deployed and those next to respond have 

the resources and training they need to be successful. I will also continue initiatives 

instituted to meet our readiness and training challenges such as developing better 

readiness metrics, improving leader-to-led ratios, identifying key enlisted leader billets and investing more time in the development of those key leaders. 

PACIFIC LIFT

20. Senator SULLIVAN. General Neller, the current Commandant has said in multiple forms (hearings, public speaking engagements, answers to Advanced Policy 

Questions from the SASC), that lift capacity to support the shifting laydown of 

forces in the Pacific theater will be insufficient and constitutes a major concern for 

you. In your response to the Committee’s questions you stated that you ‘‘look forward to working with the Services and the U.S. Pacific Command to address’’ the 

lift needs in the Pacific. In your prepared questions you state, ‘‘There is not enough 

amphibious warship capability to support an assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades required for contingency response . . . There are no alternatives 

that have been developed to mitigate the wartime or contingency response requirement for an amphibious fleet.’’ General Neller, if confirmed, what are some of the 

ways you would consider to address this pending shortfall? Does Congress need to 

appropriate more funds? 

General NELLER. Increased funding for amphibious warships will certainly be important. It is true that we currently lack the 33 ships in a mix of 11 LHD/LHA(R), 

11 LPD, and 11 LSD/L(X)R required to embark an assault echelon of two Marine 

Expeditionary Brigades (MEB). The current Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels 

for 2015 does not meet the required mix until fiscal year 2024. I’d like to mention 

the fact that the amphibious ship total will actually be 34 because of the wisdom 

of the Congress in providing funds to support the requirement of a 12th LPD. My 

recommendation is to authorize multi-year and block buy procurements to ensure 

that the current shipbuilding plan stays on schedule. This will allow both the service and industry to operate on a predictable and more cost effective schedule which 

will ensure the maturation of this plan and prevent its completion from continually 

getting pushed further into the out years. 

21. Senator SULLIVAN. General Neller, do we have sufficient lift in the Pacific to

accommodate the Marine Corps redeployments from Okinawa? If no, how confident 

are you that we will have it by the time the marines begin redeploying throughout 

the Pacific? 

General NELLER. Amphibious warfare ships provide the best operational capability and embarkation capacity to enable marines to conduct missions throughout 

the Pacific. We currently have 30 amphibious warfare ships in the battle force inVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00657 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ventory, which is below even the agreed upon minimum number of ships in a fiscally constrained environment (33), let alone the optimal number (38) for crisis and 

contingency response. Our first redeployment from Okinawa to Guam is scheduled 

for fiscal year 2021 which pre-dates the completion of the 33 ship amphibious fleet 

by several years. This will further stress an already under-size fleet. All this said, 

we must: focus on recapitalizing our amphibious warship inventory by protecting 

and properly funding the ship building program; improve the readiness/maintenance 

of the ships we have; and continue to develop alternative lift platforms for Phase 

0 and Phase 1 operations. 

22. Senator SULLIVAN. General Neller, as Admiral Roughead testified to the SASC 

in April, do you believe we should also consider moving additional naval and maritime assets forward into the theater to support our peacetime and contingency lift? 

General NELLER. Yes, I agree with Admiral Roughead that the more forward presence we achieve in the Pacific with naval and maritime assets, the better we will 

be able to accomplish our peacetime missions as well as respond to crisis and contingency operations. Additionally, he is correct that simply moving assets around the 

Pacific is not optimal. Creating additional operational capability and embarkation 

capacity will provide us the best freedom of movement and allow us to most effectively handle the significant number of missions in this massive theater. 

PACIFIC PATHWAYS

23. Senator SULLIVAN. General Neller, over the last two years, the U.S. Army has 

been conducting an expeditionary-like set of exercises called Pacific Pathways. During these exercises, U.S. Army forces deploy off ships to exercise with our allies in 

the Asia-Pacific Region. Recently, General McMaster testified in front of the Airland 

Subcommittee stated about the Army’s new Operating concept, ‘‘We’re emphasizing 

really two concepts . . . one is expeditionary maneuver.’’ General Neller, in your personal opinion, in a budget constrained environment, can we afford to have an Army 

mission in the Pacific that is redundant with another service’s long-standing mission? 

General NELLER. The Pacific is a significantly large AO, with such a large number 

of opportunities to train and operate with allies and partners, that there is sufficient 

space for operations of both the Marine Corps and the Army. However, as the service with primary DOD Directive and title 10 responsibility for the development of 

amphibious doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment, our capabilities are reliant 

on the Nation’s investment in our partnered Navy programs. It is therefore imperative that the Marine Corps maintain its historic and habitual relationship with the 

Navy aboard amphibious assault ships in order to respond with well trained and 

well equipped amphibious forces. Insufficient inventory and operational availability 

of the Navy’s amphibious warships for training and readiness of marines makes increased demand problematic. Any U.S. Army expansion to a greater capability in 

amphibious operations should not come at the cost of U.S. Marine Corps amphibious 

training and readiness or negatively impact our historic and habitual relationship 

with the U.S. Navy aboard ships. 

24. Senator SULLIVAN. General Neller, in testimony before the SASC, General 

Milley said that the U.S. Army ‘‘has to do both’’ missions of seaborne capabilities 

and airborne assault capabilities. In your personal opinion, does the U.S. Army have 

to do both, or does the Marine Corps already provide this nation’s amphibious assault capabilities? 

General NELLER. Based on title 10, the Marine Corps is responsible to be organized, trained and equipped to come from the sea across the range of military operations, and therefore provide amphibious assault capabilities. The Marine Corps has 

primary responsibility for the development of amphibious doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment, our capabilities. 

25. Senator SULLIVAN. General Neller, in your personal opinion, what is view on 

Pacific Pathways? Is it redundant to the Marine Corps mission in the Pacific? 

General NELLER. The Pacific Pathways seeks to increase and enhance allied and 

partner engagement and interoperability training throughout the PACOM AOR. The 

Pacific AOR is sufficiently large and complex that it supports operations by both the 

U.S. Marines, and the U.S. Army without it necessarily being redundant. We look 

forward to continuing to work with the U.S. Army to maximize the impact and dividends that accrue to our operations in the Pacific and prevent any redundancies in 

order to achieve the best return on our investments in the region. 

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MARINE CORPS MISSIONS

26. Senator SULLIVAN. General Neller, the Marines Corps has many missions, including producing responsible and engaged citizens, whether they serve four or forty 

years. Can you comment on this mission of the Marine Corps? 

General NELLER. Returning Marines to civilian life as responsible and engaged 

citizens is a hallmark of marine training and culture. It is my goal that our ethos 

of Honor, Courage, and Commitment guides everything we do, whether conducting 

humanitarian assistance overseas in places like Nepal this year, supporting Americans at home like in Hurricane Sandy, or fighting terrorism while building partner 

capacity in places like Iraq. From boot camp to the battlefield and back home again, 

the Marine Corps seeks to set up marines for success. 

One part of this is helping marines transition. Our Transition Readiness Program 

is designed to prepare marines for transition to civilian life. The Marine Corps 

Transition Readiness Program does this by preparing and connecting transitioning 

marines with resources to successfully meet educational, employment or entrepreneurship goals throughout their career to ensure success once they move to civilian 

life. The Personal Readiness Seminar that marines attend after arriving at their 

first permanent duty station helps plant the seed for their future. Topics include 

an overview of personal and professional development services, and financial topics 

such as banking and financial services, savings and investments, living expenses, 

understanding debt, and servicemembers’ consumer rights. The intent is to get marines thinking about transition early, so that they may recognize opportunities while 

they serve that will prepare them for success after service. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SHAHEEN

INTEGRATION OF WOMEN

27. Senator SHAHEEN. Last fall the Marine Corps established the Ground Combat

Element Integrated Task Force to evaluate the performance of women in combat 

units. I understand that this task force is wrapping up part of its evaluation this 

month. Can you discuss the metrics you will use to determine whether or not 

women may serve in infantry units? 

General NELLER. The data which was collected during the GCEITF is still being 

collated and analyzed. It encompasses a number of performance-based metrics that 

will inform whatever decision the Commandant makes to the SECDEF on the integration of women into the ground combat element which includes: infantry, artillery, 

armor (tanks, LAVs and Amphibian Vehicles), combat engineers and reconnaissance 

units. Whatever recommendation is made will be based on the Marine Corps’ unwavering focus on combat effectiveness and ensuring the fullest success of each marine. Any recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of Defense, and 

the Congress will be made in that context. 

28. Senator SHAHEEN. The former commanding officer of the 4th Recruit Training

Battalion at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island in South Carolina has received much attention after being relieved for cause in June. This case has raised 

questions regarding the level of support female recruits receive to ensure their success. While other services have integrated basic training, why does the Marine 

Corps segregate women during boot camp, and would integrated basic training increase combat effectiveness? 

General NELLER. The purpose of recruit training is to make marines out of the 

fine young men and women who step forward to take the challenge to join our 

Corps. The young men and women who arrive at the recruit depots to begin the 

process are generally away from home for the first time. They have brought with 

them diverse perceptions of right and wrong. Equally eclectic is their understanding 

of permissible behavior. Their experiences with authority figures may have been 

good or bad, proper or improper/abusive. In general, they arrive with immature, undeveloped and unfocused thoughts on professionalism and professional conduct. The 

only thing they have in common is their desire to be a marine. By capitalizing on 

that desire, recruit training transforms these individuals from many diverse backgrounds into marines imbued with a common set of values and standards. 

At the recruit depots, civilians are transformed into basic marines. It is a physically and mentally challenging ordeal, one that requires constant supervision. Drill 

instructors control and manage the transformation through 24 hour/day interaction 

with their recruits. They teach core values, institutional rights and wrongs and 

what constitutes proper authority. This teacher-student/father-son/mother-daughter 

relationship is the heart and soul of the recruit training experience and success or 

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failure of the socialization process rests squarely on this process. After much research and analysis, we believe that keeping male and female recruits separate at 

this entry level of training allows for the most effective transformation from civilian 

to marines. 

After recruit training, the Marine Corps, unlike other Services, has a block of 

training entitled Marine Combat Training between recruit training (socialization) 

and military occupational skills training. It is at Marine Combat Training that 

newly forged marines are actually taught combat skills. This training has been integrated since March 1997. The important distinction from other Services is that this 

training occurs after recruit training, after the intense transformation process which 

replaces diverse and confused perspectives of right and wrong with strong and clear 

marine standards of behavior, and after vulnerable, tentative civilians have developed the values, mental and physical toughness, self-reliance and confidence essential to earn the title marine. 

DEPLOYMENT TO DWELL RATIO

29. Senator SHAHEEN. In your advanced policy questions, you state that the Marine Corps is operating at a 1 to 2 deployment to dwell ration. You state that this 

is not sustainable over the long term. Can you discuss in further detail the impact 

high operational tempos have on marines and their families as well as on the reserve force? 

General NELLER. As the Nation’s force-in-readiness, the Marine Corps must maintain a high state of readiness within our home station units as they constitute the 

ready force that would surge to unexpected crises and major contingencies. At a 1 

to 2 deployment to dwell ratio, the time at home station to prepare for the next deployment is compressed, which reduces the time to train and the time after a deployment to be with our families. 

In order to continue operating in a high operational tempo, such as a 1 to 2 deployment to dwell ratio, risk is placed on unit readiness as personnel are sourced 

to protect the readiness of deployed or ‘next-to-deploy’ units. This decision is necessary when validated operational requirements exceed resource availability. To reduce stress and impacts, the Marine Corps will continue to ensure that our quality 

of life programs focus on core requirements and provide support in the critical areas 

that directly impact marines and families; e.g. Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Programs, family readiness programs, and the Military Family Life Consultant Program. Our Reserve Force is fully integrated with the Active Component and, as 

such, deals with the same stresses and impacts as the Active Component under this 

scenario but at a reduced tempo of 1 to 5. Our quality of life programs are developed 

for the needs of our Reservists as well. 

MARINES ON FOREIGN SHIPS

30. Senator SHAHEEN. I understand the Marine Corps is considering deploying 

marines aboard foreign ships to increase response times for contingency operations. 

What are the risks associated with this strategy, and is it driven by fiscal considerations? 

General NELLER. For decades, the Marine Corps has conducted amphibious interoperability training with allies and partners to develop their organic capability and 

our ability to operate with them should a crisis occur. We currently conduct amphibious training with Japan, Australia, Republic of Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, 

the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain. While developing 

the capacity to operate more seamlessly with our allies/partners remains a priority, 

the Marine Corps is not seeking relationships that might compromise the ability to 

command and control U.S. forces. The Marine Corps must retain the capability to 

respond immediately to threats to our Nation’s security. For the Marine Corps, this 

means retaining the maritime flexibility offered by U.S. amphibious ships. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DONNELLY

AMPHIBIOUS COMBAT VEHICLE (ACV) PROGRAM

31. Senator DONNELLY. General Neller, the Marine Corps has identified the Amphibious Combat Vehicle as a top priority program. What capabilities beyond ACV 

1.1 do you want to see in ACV 1.2? 

General NELLER. As I stated during recent testimony, we are confident that ACV 

1.1 will achieve water mobility performance that is on par with our existing assault 

amphibian, yet with significantly enhanced protection and improved land mobility. 

Water mobility and range are obviously very important to us. The sooner we get 

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these—without trading critical armored protected mobility, land mobility, and troop 

carrying capacity—the better. 

Importantly, ACV 1.2 will include our ACV mission role variants. These mission 

role variants include Command & Control and Recovery platforms, but could also 

include other variants identified at a later date. 

32. Senator DONNELLY. What in your view is the future of amphibious combat vehicles for the Marine Corps? 

General NELLER. Future amphibious combat vehicles must have the capability to 

rapidly transition from ship to shore, use the natural and man-made waterways in 

the littoral regions as maneuver space, and once ashore, provide the protected mobility necessary to deliver the infantry to their objectives—be they against an opposing enemy force or in support a host nation’s request for humanitarian assistance. 

Our phased acquisition approach supports this effort. ACV 1.1 will be an amphibious combat vehicle that will provide armored protected lift for two infantry battalions. Near simultaneously, we will be conducting critical survivability upgrades to 

our AAV fleet to provide armored protected lift capability for four infantry battalions. In fielding ACV 1.2, we will modernize the required protected lift for four more 

infantry battalions. Concurrently, the Marine Corps is supporting S&T efforts to 

pursue a High Water Speed (HWS) capability that will enable an Amphibious Force 

to rapidly transition from stand-off distance at a sea base to objectives ashore and 

utilize other littoral and inland waterways as maneuver space. 

The bottom line is that the Marine Corps’ has established an affordable and technologically feasible strategy that will provide the Nation with the ability to use the 

sea as a maneuver space across the range of military operations. 

33. Senator DONNELLY. How important will amphibious capabilities be for our Allies in the Pacific? 

General NELLER. Amphibious capabilities are increasingly important for our partners and allies as they are pursuing ways to meet HA/DR and crisis response demands in the region. Interoperability allows the U.S. to work in inclusive and coordinated ways to counter challenges to regional security and stability. Interoperability is ensured overtime by a commitment by each state to work together on 

shared interests. 

34. Senator DONNELLY. How will you ensure amphibious interoperability with our

Allies? 

General NELLER. The Marine Corps currently promotes interoperability with our 

partners and allies through robust exercise and engagement plans. For example, we 

hold annual service-level staff talks with some of our strongest partners in the AsiaPacific. These staff talks help facilitate our allies’ amphibious development by coordinating activities such as exercises, personnel exchanges, international military 

education and training (IMET), foreign military sales, and general security cooperation efforts between services. 

NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER LAB STRUCTURE

35. Senator DONNELLY. General Neller, Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane in

Indiana is the largest supporter of the Marine Corps across all NAVSEA activities. 

The Marine Corps relies on the Surface Warfare Center lab structure to meet many 

of its RDT&E, depot maintenance and in-service engineering support needs. If confirmed, how will you work with the Navy to ensure Marine Corps requirements are 

adequately prioritized by NAVSEA and the Surface Warfare Centers? 

General NELLER. The Marine Corps has an ongoing, mutually beneficial relationship with the NAVSEA Warfare Centers. This partnership deliberately strengthens 

the understanding of needs and capabilities through continuous communication and 

coordination. For example, we host an annual ‘‘Warfare Center Week’’ at Quantico 

with proven productive working sessions where the participants discuss and gain 

mutual understanding of Warfare Center capabilities, program information, and 

program needs. We conduct this event early in the calendar year to enable and inform resource planning for the following fiscal year. Negotiations on scope of work 

continue through the spring, producing ‘‘Task-books’’ with the coordinated specificity 

to assign the required Warfare Center technical support to individual Program Managers and define the required funding. As an added key link in this teamwork, the 

Warfare Centers have established a Marine Corps Coordination team. The engineering staff at Marine Corps Systems Command participates in biweekly teleconferences with this team to address emerging opportunities and issues. Continuous 

engagement with collaborative processes and open dialogue helps us ensure Marine 

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Corps requirements are fulfilled through the unique capabilities of the NAVSEA 

Warfare Center enterprise. 

SNIPER RIFLE MODERNIZATION

36. Senator DONNELLY. General Neller, in recent weeks media reports have highlighted concerns among current and former marine snipers about the range, accuracy and lethality of the M40A5. What are the top priority capability enhancements 

in the Marine Corps’ current efforts to upgrade from the M40A5 to the M40A6? 

General NELLER. Top priority capability enhancements from the M40A5 to M40A6 

are an improved ergonomic adjustable stock which is lighter and more ergonomically 

adjustable for individual shooters along with an improved and more durable barrel; 

in addition the weapon is lighter and more transportable due to decreased weight 

and length. Each M40A6 will also receive a Scout Sniper Ballistic Calculator adding 

to the enhanced accuracy of the sniper suite by increasing first hit probability. 

37. Senator DONNELLY. Will the new M40 variant have an extended effective firing range beyond that of the M40A5? 

General NELLER. No, the M40A6 like the M40A5 is accurate out to 1000 yards. 

The Marine Corps is continuing its validation of other weapon systems to determine 

if adoption of another system in different calibers is a material solution for our requirements and we are participating in SOCOM and U.S. Army testing and evaluation of the PSR in both 300 Win Mag and .338 Lapua. 

38. Senator DONNELLY. What is your assessment of the feasibility and advisability 

of moving to a .300 or .388-caliber round for use by marine snipers? 

General NELLER. We are evaluating both calibers in conjunction with Special Operations Command and the U.S. Army. Further, we are also looking at the feasibility of replacing M107 SASR with a weapon that uses .300 Winchester Magnum 

or .338 Lapua ammunition. Our current .308 caliber weapon (the existing M40 Sniper Rifle) provides range to 1000 yards and allows us to train on all existing sniper 

ranges. Both .300 Winchester Magnum and .338 Lapua would give us extended 

range to 1200+ m and provide accuracy for the anti-personnel mission. Finally, .338 

Lapua has potential for an anti-material mission. 

39. Senator DONNELLY. General, Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane supports 

Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command with weapons systems like the 

MK–13 .300 WINMAG Precision Sniper Rifle AND THE 7.62 Combat Assault Rifle, 

both of which were developed by NSWC Crane for the Special Warfare community. 

How can the expertise and capabilities available at NSWC Crane be leveraged in 

future conversations about modernizing marine sniper rifles? 

General NELLER. We currently leverage both the expertise and knowledge of 

NSWC Crane and are active participants in many of their programs. We have leveraged them in such things as the SOPMOD kit or M4A1 CQBW kit, we were active 

participants in the SCAR and coordinate with them on most programs especially 

SOCOM weapons and equipment. We will continue to leverage their abilities into 

the future. 

GROUND BASED OPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

40. Senator DONNELLY. General Neller, GBOSS is built by NSWC Crane as the 

Lead System Integrator. How do you believe G–BOSS can impact or improve our 

force protection efforts stateside or abroad to monitor the flow of foreign fighters 

across lines? 

General NELLER. The G–BOSS system originated in 2006 through the Urgent 

Needs Process in support of our marines engaged in OIF and OEF. Their positive 

impact to improving our force protection and intelligence collection efforts against 

our enemies, including foreign fighters, in Overseas Contingency Operations have 

been detailed in numerous lessons learned and After Action Reports. The current 

GBOSS Family of Systems with its three variants—GBOSS Heavy, GBOSS Medium, and GBOSS Light—scale well to our Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 

structure and allow for operations involving units down to the company level. Primarily, G–BOSS is used in support of overseas operations for force protection, check 

point security, route reconnaissance, patrol over-watch, IED emplacement detection, 

intelligence collection, and personnel/vehicle identification. 

In May of 2013, the Deputy Commandant for Plans Policies and Operations (DC 

PP&O) in coordination with Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I) developed a DOTMLPF Change Request requirement document for G–BOSS. The requirement details the interim transition plan for current 

657 

G–BOSS related equipment inventories from post OIF and OEF to steady state operations. It also defines a steady state interim requirement for 41 total G–BOSS 

systems that support Marine Corps’ persistent ground surveillance requirements. In 

2015 a Letter of Clarification increased that requirement through Fiscal Year 2020 

to our currently funded 52 Systems. These 52 systems support deployed Marine 

Forces, Special Purpose (SP) MAGTF–Central Command and the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Augmentation Program (MAP) as well as sustaining home station training. The Marine Corps’ Director of intelligence has initiated comprehensive 

MAGTF sensing strategy to identify how future MAGTFs will ‘‘sense’’ to achieve 

battlespace awareness. G–BOSS and other similar capabilities will serve as key assets in that future strategy. 

The Marine Corps does not intend to use GBOSS as a home station base security 

system in anything other than a short term augmentation role to our existing systems. GBOSS is a tactical system, designed to be expeditionary and rugged with integral power systems including generators that would be as ill matched to long term 

CONUS Bases and Station Force Protection requirements as it would not compare 

favorably in capability for cost against other less tactical purpose built base security 

systems that would require less sustainment, training, and maintenance. 

MUSCATATUCK URBAN TRAINING CENTER

41. Senator DONNELLY. General Neller, the Marine Expeditionary Unit has a vital

role in our post-9/11 force. They have performed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa, Turkey, and Kosovo, to mention just a few. They also have the task of spearheading 

the Humanitarian and Disaster Relief mission so vital to our international partners. 

The Marine Corps has utilized Camp Atterbury and Muscatatuck Urban Training 

Center previously as a cost-saving option for pre-deployment training. How can 

these facilities be of greater service to facilitate more training opportunities for the 

Marine Corps? 

General NELLER. Initial analysis is that we keep both locations gainfully employed throughout the calendar year. Muscacatuck has been scheduled and used frequently by Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), Marine Forces Reserve 

(MFR), Expeditionary Operations and Training Group (EOTG II MEF), Training 

and Education Command (TECG), and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. 

Atterbury has the preponderance of use by a host of elements from MFR, which use 

it as primary training grounds for reserve elements from MO, IL, IN, and TN, as 

well as MARSOC, and Recruiting Station Indianapolis. Loss of either would have 

a huge impact on MFR training for the greater Midwest. 

[The nomination reference of Lieutenant General Robert B. 

Neller, USMC follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

July 15, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment as Commandant of the Marine Corps 

and appointment in the United States Marine Corps to the grade indicated while 

assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 5043: 

To Be General

Lt. Gen. Robert B. Neller, 0000. 

[The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General Robert B. Neller, 

USMC, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the 

nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LT. GEN. ROBERT B. NELLER, USMC 

Source of commission: 

Platoon Leaders Course (PLC) 

Educational degrees: 

University of Virginia, BA, 1975. 

658 

Pepperdine University, MA, 1981. 

Military schools: 

The Basic School, 1976. 

Armor Officers’ Advanced Course, 1983. 

Amphibious Warfare School, 1984. 

Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1991. 

NATO Defense College, 1994. 

Joint & Combined Warfighting School, 1995. 

Capstone, 2004. 

Joint Force Air Component Commander, 2005. 

Navy Strategic Thinking Course/Executive Business, 2010. 

Senior Executive EEO Seminar, 2010. 

Joint Qualified Officer. 

Promotions: 

Promotions Dates of appointment 

2nd Lt. 4 Jun 75 

1st Lt. 4 Jun 77 

Capt. 1 Sep 79 

Maj. 1 May 86 

Lt. Col. 1 Aug 92 

Col. 1 Oct 97 

Brig. Gen. 1 Jan 03 

Maj. Gen. 21 Jan 07 

Lt. Gen. 11 Jan 11 

Summary of assignments: 

From To Assignment 

Jul 14 ....... Present ... Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Command; Commanding General Fleet Marine 

Force Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe (Lt. Gen.). 

Aug 12 ...... Jun 14 .... Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command (Lt. Gen.). 

Jan 11 ...... Aug 12 ... Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff (Lt. Gen.). 

Aug 09 ...... Dec 10 ... President, Marine Corps University (Maj. Gen.). 

Jun 07 ...... Aug 09 ... Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Maj. Gen.). 

Aug 05 ...... Jun 07 .... Deputy Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (Brig. Gen./Maj. Gen). 

Jul 02 ....... Aug 05 ... Director, Operations Division, Plans, Policy and Operations (Col./Brig. Gen). 

Mar 02 ...... Jul 02 ..... Assistant Division Commander, 2d Marine Division (Col.). 

Dec 01 ...... Mar 02 ... Deputy Director of Operations, EC/J–3, U.S. European Command (Col.). 

Jun 01 ...... Dec 01 ... Assistant Division Commander, 2d Marine Division (Col.). 

Jul OO ....... Jun 01 .... Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, 2d Marine Division (Col.). 

Jun 98 ...... Jul 00 ..... Commanding Officer, 6th Marines, 2d Marine Division (Col.). 

Jul 97 ....... Jun 98 .... Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, II Marine Expeditionary Force (Col./Lt. Col.). 

Jul 94 ....... Jul 97 ..... Staff Officer, Policy and Requirements Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (Lt. 

Col.). 

Jun 93 ...... Jan 94 .... Executive Officer, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Lt. Col.). 

Jul 91 ....... Jun 93 .... Commanding Officer, 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, 1st Marine Division (Maj./Lt. Col.). 

Jun 91 ...... Jul 91 ..... Plans Officer, 1st Marine Division (Maj.). 

Jul 88 ....... Jul 90 ..... Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Security Force Company Panama (Maj.). 

Jul 86 ....... Jul 88 ..... Project Officer, Headquarters, Marine Corps (Maj.). 

May 83 ..... Jun 86 .... Instructor; Company Executive Officer, Defense Section Head, The Basic School (Capt./Maj.). 

Feb 81 ...... Sep 82 ... Company Commander, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Division (Capt.). 

May 80 ..... Feb 81 ... Headquarters Element OIC/Personnel Officer, Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine 

Division (Capt.). 

Nov 79 ...... Apr 80 .... Director of Students, Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego (Capt.). 

Nov 78 ...... Nov 79 ... Aide De Camp, Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego (Capt./1st Lt.). 

Jun 77 ...... Nov 78 ... Assistant Series Commander; Series Commander, Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego (1st Lt.). 

May 76 ..... Apr 77 .... Platoon Commander, Company L, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, 3rd Marine Division (2nd Lt.). 

Oct 75 ...... Apr 76 .... Student, The Basic School (2nd Lt.). 

659 

Summary of joint assignments: 

Date Grade 

Director for Operations, J–3, Joint Staff .................................................................... Jan 11–Aug 12 Lt. Gen. 

Deputy Director of Operations, EC/J–3, U.S. European Command ............................ Dec 01–Mar 02 Col. 

Staff Officer, Policy and Requirements Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied 

Powers Europe ........................................................................................................ Jul 94–Ju1 97 Lt. Col. 

Summary of operational assignments: 

Date Grade 

Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division/Operation Enduring Freedom ................ Mar 09–Mar 09 Maj. Gen. 

Deputy Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) ..................... Feb 06–Feb 07 Maj. Gen./ 

Operation Iraqi Freedom ............................................................................................. Oct 05–Oct 05 Brig. Gen. 

Staff Officer, Policy and Requirements Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied 

Powers Europe/Operation Allied Force .................................................................... Jan 97–Feb 97 Lt. Col. 

Commanding Officer, 3d Light Armored Battalion, 1st Marine Division Operation 

Restore Hope .......................................................................................................... Dec 92–Feb 93 Lt. Col./Maj. 

Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Security Force Company Panama Operation 

Promote Liberty ....................................................................................................... Feb 90–Ju1 90 Maj. 

Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Security Force Company Panama Operation 

Just Cause .............................................................................................................. Dec 89–Jan 90 Maj. 

Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Security Force Company Panama Operation 

Contingency Security .............................................................................................. Aug 88–Dec 89 Maj. 

Decorations 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal 

Legion of Merit 

Bronze Star 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal 

Joint Service Commendation Medal 

Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal 

Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal 

Combat Action Ribbon 

Joint Meritorious Unit Award 

Navy Unit Commendation 

Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal 

National Defense Service Medal 

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal 

Iraq Campaign Medal 

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal 

Armed Forces Service Medal 

Sea Service Deployment Ribbon 

Navy Arctic Service Ribbon 

Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Ribbon 

Marine Corps Drill Instructor Ribbon 

NATO Medal 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Lieutenant General Robert B. Neller, USMC 

in connection with his nomination follows:] 

660 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Robert Blake Neller. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

3. Date of nomination: 

15 July 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

9 February 1953, Camp Polk, LA. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to D’Arcy A. Neller (39 years). Maiden name: Dutch. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None. 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution. 

None. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

Lifetime Member, University of Virginia Alumni Association. 

Member, Marine Corps Association. 

Lifetime Member, Third Marine Division Association. 

Member, AARP. 

Military Officers Association of America. 

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

None. 

661 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from 

the Administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT B. NELLER, USMC

This 8th day of July, 2015 

[The nomination of Lieutenant General Robert B. Neller, USMC 

was reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on August 4, 

2015, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. 

The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 5, 2015.] 

(663) 

NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL JOHN M. 

RICHARDSON, USN, TO BE CHIEF OF NAVAL 

OPERATIONS 

THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in Room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed, Manchin, 

Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services 

Committee meets today to consider the nomination of Admiral 

John Richardson to be the 31st Chief of Naval Operations. 

Admiral Richardson, we thank you for joining us this morning. 

We’re grateful for your many years of distinguished service to our 

Nation and for your continued willingness to serve. 

We also welcome members of your family who are joining us this 

morning, and thank them for supporting you and the Nation. As 

is our tradition, at the beginning of your testimony we will invite 

you to introduce any family members that are joining us. 

The next Chief of Naval Operations will lead our Navy in confronting the most diverse and complex array of global crises since 

the end of World War II. With instability spreading across the Middle East and North Africa, more than ever our Nation is counting 

on the forward presence, power projection, and rapid response that 

the Navy uniquely delivers. 

In the Asia-Pacific, China is undertaking an ambitious naval 

buildup that seeks to project power and influence in key waterways 

of the Asia-Pacific and beyond. While our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific has shown some success, this policy has not yet addressed the 

shifting military balance in any serious manner. While some would 

rather avoid a discussion of our competition with China, this relationship will be a serious challenge for our Navy. And yet, while 

worldwide challenges like these grow, the Defense Department has 

grown larger but less capable, more complex but less innovative, 

more proficient at defeating low-tech adversaries but more vulnerable to high-tech ones. And worse, the self-inflicted wounds of the 

664 

Budget Control Act and sequestration-level defense spending have 

made all of these problems worse. 

Now more than ever, a strong Navy is central to our Nation’s 

ability to deter adversaries, assure allies, and defend our national 

interests. And yet, by any measure, today’s fleet of 273 ships is too 

small to address these critical security challenges. The Navy’s requirement is 308 ships. The bipartisan National Defense Panel 

calls for a fleet of 323 to 346 ships. And our combatant commanders say they require 450 ships. With continuing high operational tempo and drastic reductions to defense spending, we will 

conduct the downward—we will continue the downward spiral of 

military capacity and readiness until Congress acts. 

Admiral Richardson, there are several challenges that will require the next Chief of Naval Operations’ personal leadership. I 

look forward to discussing many of these today. 

First, each Ford-class aircraft carrier has experienced more than $2 billion in cost growth. This program continues to be plagued by 

technology immaturity, concurrent development and production, 

and a lack of reliability test data for critical systems. This is unacceptable. I repeat, unacceptable. And I fully expect the Navy’s ongoing study of alternative aircraft carrier designs to provide real 

options. 

Next, the Navy still needs to justify the littoral combat ship’s 

transition to a frigate, which is required in the Senate NDAA, and 

all 3 of the LCS mission packages must overcome major technology 

integration challenges to deliver the promised warfighting capability. 

Several other important new shipbuilding efforts will require the 

Service Chief’s leadership in the coming years, including building 

the first Ohio-class replacement submarine, building the first 

Flight-3 destroyer with the new air and missile defense radar, and 

integrating the Virginia payload module on attack air—submarines. In naval aviation, it will take strong leadership to address 

the strike fighter shortfall, oversee the smooth and timely integration of the F–35 joint strike fighter into the fleet, and ensure the 

right requirements for the first unmanned carrier-launched airborne surveillance and strike system. We must also maintain our 

advantage in the capability and capacity of our munitions. Fielding 

new weapons, like the long-range anti-ship missile, and improving 

existing ones, like the family of standard missiles, will continue to 

be essential. Our ships and planes have been operating at a sustained high operational tempo for over a decade. And it shows. 

Clearing maintenance backlogs and restoring the Navy’s readiness 

will be a priority. 

Finally, we cannot forget about our members of the United 

States Navy. High operational tempo and lucrative opportunities 

outside the Navy continue to drive some our best talent to leave 

the service. I’m interested in your plans to manage operational 

tempo and views on how best to provide a competitive and modern 

compensation package that provides the right retention incentives. 

No matter how many dollars we spend, we won’t be able to provide 

our military the equipment they need with a broken defense acquisition system that takes too long and costs too much. With this 

year’s National Defense Authorization Act, this committee has emVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00670 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
665 

barked on a major effort to reform this system, including ways to 

empower our service leaders to manage their own programs and 

take on greater accountability. 

Admiral Richardson, we are interested to hear your views on improving defense acquisition based on your many years of service. 

Thank you. We look forward to your testimony. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me join you in welcome Admiral Richardson and his family— 

his father, his wife, his daughter. Thank you all very much. We all 

understand that no one serves alone in the Navy or elsewhere, so 

thank you very much. 

You have an extraordinary record of service to the Nation in the 

Navy, and we thank you for that. You have a remarkable record 

as the Director of Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program, your current 

assignment. And, in that assignment, you are familiar with many 

of the issues Senator McCain raised: acquisition. How do you design a program that’s not only effective but is affordable? And those 

are one of the major issues you’re going to confront as the CNO. 

You’ll be asked to ensure that we have a quality force—that’s recruiting, training—and, in this respect, ensuring the highest ethics 

are employed in the service, particularly when it comes to the 

issues of domestic violence, which we’ve seen all too often in the 

military services. That’s another role we expect you to play. 

We have a world that is full of crises, and the Navy is one of the 

major ways that we project force and we deal with uncertainty and 

changing conditions. And it remains that way. But, as the Chairman has pointed out, one of the issues you’ll face is affordability. 

How do we afford all the ships that we need? How do we bring on 

the next class of ballistic missile submarine, the Ohio replacement 

class? And then, these challenges are exacerbated by the prospect 

of looming sequestration or temporary arrangements to get by year 

to year rather than a long-range plan to fund the Navy and the 

other services. 

So, all of these challenges will be before you. I’m confident that 

you will be able to face them, and look forward to your testimony 

this morning. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Admiral, before we continue, let me ask you 

the standard questions that we ask all of military nominees. 

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, 

it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress be able to receive testimony, briefings, and 

other communications of information. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in 

power? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I do. 

666 

Chairman MCCAIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you ensure your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record in hearings? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I will. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 

and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisals for their testimony or briefings? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. They will. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 

testify, upon request, before this committee? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult 

with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or 

denial in providing such documents? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome. And please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN, 

NOMINEE TO BE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Thank you. Chairman McCain, Senator 

Reed, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored 

and humbled to appear before you as the nominee to be our next 

Chief of Naval Operations. I am grateful for the confidence of 

President Obama, Secretary Carter, and Secretary Mabus. 

I’d like to begin by thanking Admiral John Greenert and his 

wife, Darlene, for their magnificent service to our country for over 

40 years, and especially for their role in leading our Navy these 

past 4 years. They have been tireless and superb advocates for our 

sailors, their families, our Navy, and our Nation. 

I’m grateful to have my family here with me today, Chairman, 

as you recognized, as they have been throughout my entire career. 

My dad is here with me today. My dad’s a retired Navy captain 

who served with distinction for 25 years through the Cold War. 

And I remember, like it was yesterday, the nights that my mom 

and we six kids would get together in our living room, and my dad 

would come out in his service dress blues and his seabag. We 

would say goodbye for 6 months, and then we would carry on, supporting each other until my dad came back home. I got my start 

in the Navy from my dad, and he continues to advise me, sometimes vigorously, and make me proud. 

My wife, Dana, is here. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I had the same experience. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. 

[Laughter.] 

Admiral RICHARDSON. My wife, Dana, is also here. Dana and I 

met as classmates in York High School in southern Maine, and we 

667 

married just as soon as we could after I graduated from the Naval 

Academy. And over the last 33 years, Dana has raised our five children while I was away at sea, and has supported Navy families in 

every way possible. She’s always been there with me, challenging 

me and adding perspective that I long ago grew to depend on. 

Our daughter, Rachel, one of our five children, is here representing the Richardson tribe. She’s a student at the University 

of Virginia and is a summer intern in the Amputee Center at Walter Reed. 

Our oldest son, Nathan, is a Navy lieutenant. He and his wife 

are serving overseas in Naples, Italy. Our other son, Daniel, is 

doing research for renewable fuels in Hawaii. Our two youngest 

children, Matthew and Veronica, are visiting family in Oregon before they return home to go back to school. 

If you ask Dana, she would say, ‘‘We’re just a typical Navy family.’’ We have moved 20 times, our kids have attended dozens of 

schools, we’ve lived all around the country and overseas. Today, the 

Richardson family, like so many other Navy families, is ready to 

continue to serve our Nation. 

I am also conscious that I am here before this committee for the 

very first time, and I want to thank you for your leadership in 

keeping our Nation secure and keeping our Navy the strongest that 

has ever sailed the seas. And, if confirmed, I very much look forward to working closely with you to continue that important work. 

I see the naval profession as a bond of trust and confidence with 

the American people and with our sailors. And I hold some core beliefs about our Navy that guide me. The Navy must be at sea, underway. It must be present around the world, protecting American 

interests, enabling access to international markets and trade, responding to crises, and providing security. We are at our best when 

we operate with others, including our fellow services, especially the 

Marine Corps, as well as with our partners and allies. 

The muscle and bones of the Navy are our ships, submarines, 

and aircraft, highly capable, exercised frequently, well equipped, 

and ready to operate from the sea and far from home. But, the 

heart and soul of our Navy are our sailors. Every day around the 

world, our sailors can be found on, under, and over the sea. They 

are smart, resourceful, committed Americans who want to be part 

of something special, to serve their country by being part of a highperforming team. They are rightly proud of what they do. And they 

are a formidable force. Despite a growing set of challenges and 

some significant strains, they continue to go to sea to do what must 

be done today, and to adapt and innovate in order to prevail tomorrow. It is a privilege to work with, and especially to lead, such a 

capable and resilient team. 

America sends us their sons and daughters, their brothers and 

sisters, their fathers and mothers to go to sea with us, potentially 

into harm’s way. In return for that sacrifice, our Navy must provide them a positive and respectful environment where they can 

thrive and achieve their highest potential. 

And finally, the American people demand, as they should, that 

we execute our mission in a prudent and responsible way, worthy 

of their confidence in us. 

668 

The bottom line is that, in any situation, in any competition, and 

certainly in any fight, America expects that their Navy will find a 

way to win. And we will. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed, I will 

give everything I have to honor and strengthen the bonds of trust 

and confidence that your Navy has with our Nation and its people. 

Thank you. And I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

Admiral Richardson, General Dunford recently stated—made a 

couple of statements in his appearance before this committee. One 

was that he said we can’t—we cannot execute the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review with the budget cuts as a result of Budget 

Control Act, known as sequestration. He continues stating that ongoing cuts will threaten our ability to execute the current defense 

strategy. Do you agree with that? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir, I do. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you believe that, as other witnesses 

have—in uniform have stated, that continued adherence to sequestration will put the lives of the men and women serving in the 

Navy at greater risk? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir, I do. 

Chairman MCCAIN. You do. 

Are you seeing what I’m hearing, that there is becoming a morale problem and possibly, over time, a retention problem because 

of the effects of sequestration on ability to plan, ability to train, 

readiness, long deployments, et cetera? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, from my experience, when I get 

around the fleet—and I do a fair amount of that—morale remains 

high, but there is a degree of unsettledness and uncertainty that 

arises from uncertainty in the fiscal environment. And so, as we 

manage our way through continuing resolutions, the looming sequestration—sequestration always looming over us, and manage 

our way through these times of reduced resources, there is an unsettled feeling in the force as this uncertainty clouds the air. They 

remain committed, as I said in my statement, to doing the job that 

they have been given. They want to be trained properly to execute 

the mission. And so, that’s the way I see it right now. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Which sequestration is a hindrance to. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. It is, yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Department of Defense has announced a 2- 

month gap of aircraft carrier presence in the Middle East later this 

fall while we are conducting air operations from the carrier there. 

Does that concern you? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, that does concern me, but I would say 

that the overriding message that I hope is clear is our firm commitment to a naval presence in that region. We’ve been there for decades. 

Chairman MCCAIN. And the absence of the carrier doesn’t really 

authenticate a commitment. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, I think the commitment does remain 

strong, and we’ll work to mitigate—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, does this impair our ability to carry out 

operations, the absence of the carrier? 

669 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, I think we will mitigate the absence— 

any absence of the carrier through other capabilities, using the entire—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Tell me one other—tell me what replaces an 

aircraft carrier, Admiral. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, sir, you could use other air assets, 

strike assets to mitigate that gap. 

Chairman MCCAIN. For example. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Land-based air or—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, now you’re—believe that land-based air 

can replace the presence of the carrier? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, there’s no question about the value of 

an aircraft carrier in the region, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, then that doesn’t comport with what 

you just said. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, I was trying to make the point that— 

about our long-term commitment in the region. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I’m talking about a 2-month gap in the short 

term. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. That gap is a reflection of the earlier strains on the force, long-term commitments—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yeah, but my question was, Is that going to 

hinder our ability to carry out the needed operations in the region, 

where obviously there’s conflict taking place? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Without that carrier, there will be a decrement in our capability there, yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. After more than 2 million—billion dollars in 

cost growth of the first three Ford-class carriers, what—it’s an example, and a glaring example, of cost overruns and schedules 

delays. What extent would giving the Chief of Naval Operations 

greater responsibility for acquisition programs help reduce cost 

overruns, schedule delay, and fix this problem, which, at least in 

the view of many of us, have difficulty justifying to our taxpayers? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, I share your concern about the cost 

overruns of the carrier, and I agree with you that they are unacceptable. From my experience, controlling cost and schedule while 

delivering capability really resides from adhering to a few fundamental principles. One is clear command and control that is lean 

and agile. We’ve got to have a definition of requirements that is informed by available technology and available resources. You’ve got 

to have a stable design and a build plan before you begin production. And finally, you have to have informed and close oversight. 

I think that the Chief of Naval Operations is involved in every 

step—every one of those four steps. And, if confirmed, I look towards—forward to being very involved in acquisition. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, unfortunately, the last Chief of Naval 

Operations testified before this committee that he didn’t know who 

was responsible for it. I hope you’re aware of the changes that 

we’re trying to make in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization 

Act] which would make the Chief of Naval Operations more involved. 

And finally, do you believe that it’s appropriate, or would you be 

supportive of, a provision in the NDAA which calls for examinaVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00675 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tions of alternative platforms for aviation, as opposed to what is basically, right now, the only game in town? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I look very much forward 

to supporting that study completely and seeing what information 

it produces. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Admiral Richardson. 

Following on the Chairman’s questioning, the biggest program— 

new program coming online is the Ohio-class replacement. And you 

talked about sort of getting it right, from the beginning, which is 

requirements. And you’re in a very significant position right now 

with your participation on the nuclear reactor program. Are you 

satisfied with the requirements, as they exist today, of 16 missile 

tubes on the Ohio-class, one of the most significant aspects? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, the current requirements for the 

Ohio replacement program are exactly what we need to continue to 

deliver that capability. 

Senator REED. And not only now, but if you’re the CNO, you’ll 

continue to look closely at those requirements to ensure that 

they’re necessary and sufficient, though. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. The other—what other requirements in—with respect to the Ohio-class replacement do you think are critical, besides the two? Are there any other key, sort of, game changers that 

you’re looking at? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. Certainly, as I look at the Ohio 

replacement program, a program that will be defending the Nation 

well into the—for 50 years—well, potentially into 2080s—there are 

some things that you must build into the ship that you must get 

right from the very start, and then there are some things inside 

the ship where you allow technology to mature and advance. I 

would say that a critical component that must be addressed from 

the start is—in addition to the missile tubes—is stealth. And we’ve 

paid a great—amount of time and energy to make sure that we 

have the stealth requirements of the submarine right. 

Senator REED. Very good. 

One of the things that we have done in the last several years in 

the National Defense Authorization Act is create a sea-based deterrence fund to try to aid the construction and deployment of this 

new class of submarines. And the Navy is developing plans to use 

this sea-based deterrence fund. Do you have any notion of when 

those plans will be forthcoming and available to us? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, first, you know, the creation of this 

fund, I think, highlights the existential importance of this program 

to our Nation, and also that executing this program will require a 

combination both of resources and authorities. We’re conducting a 

study right now to both mature the design and mature the build 

plan. We should get that completed by the fall timeframe, and I 

look forward to collaborating when we have that more mature. 

Senator REED. And the essence underlying this national seabased deterrence fund, the same logic, I presume, will apply—this 

is maybe a comment more than a question—to the necessity as we 

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go forward to replace the air- and land-based legs of the triad, also. 

Because, a service—exclusively service-funded program is very expensive, given competing demand. So, is that your logic? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir, I agree with that logic. Sir, these 

are critical builds to reconstitute our strategic triad. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

One of the other areas which gives us an edge, and we hope increasing edge, an increasing one, is the labs and the test facilities 

and the intellectual infrastructure of the Navy. And it’s all over the 

country. We have the Naval Under-Warfare Center in Newport, but 

there are so many critical aspects of this. Particularly in these difficult budgetary times, do you have any concerns about appropriate 

funding for the laboratories? And will we lose out, in terms of their 

contribution to national security? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, I think it’s absolutely critical that we 

maintain this intellectual capital to inform our decisions, not only 

today, but even more so into the future, addressing your concern 

that programs like Ohio replacement remain attuned and relevant, 

going forward. It’s absolutely critical that we fund this so that we 

can remain relevant. Also look forward to participating in discussions that can make them more agile and competitive with their 

private-sector counterparts, as well. 

Senator REED. Just a final point. I think your comments are 

right on target. You need an infrastructure of research centers, the 

Navy, other services, but they have to be much more agile, much 

more connected to commercial procurement, commercial enterprise, 

and that’s a challenge that you’ll have to take on as you assume 

these duties. 

Thank you very much. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Before I recognize Senator Ayotte, I’d like 

you to affirm that the finest shipyard on earth is the Portsmouth 

Naval Shipyard. Is that correct? 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, thank you, Chairman. I appreciate your 

confirming what we all know, and certainly what Senator King 

agrees with me about, that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is the 

finest naval shipyard on earth. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator AYOTTE. We have a great partnership between Maine 

and New Hampshire on this shipyard. 

And I actually know that you have a history with the shipyard. 

I certainly have been there before, and—— 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, ma’am, I sure do. 

Senator AYOTTE.—we look—— 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I—well, that’s where my wife and I met, 

was up there, and we dated all around Portsmouth. So, we go all 

the—that’s our—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. See? Just as I—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator AYOTTE. So, we will welcome you back to the shipyard, 

and we’d enjoy that. 

672 

But, I thank—I very much thank you and your family for your 

service to the country and willingness to take on this important 

leadership position during these challenging times. 

And yesterday, before the Committee on Readiness, Senator 

Kaine and I hosted a hearing that was focused on best practices 

at our Nation’s public and private shipyards. And I believe my staff 

provided that testimony to you. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator AYOTTE. And one of the things that came out that is 

happening at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is a very strong partnership between labor and management that has driven performance significantly, where they are producing—producing the work 

they’re doing on our attack submarine fleet ahead of schedule, 

under budget. And a takeaway from the hearing was that some of 

these best practices that are being put in place, that we need a better mechanism to share those among the shipyards before—public 

shipyards—to ensure that we can learn from each other to make 

sure that that strong partnership is there for excellent performance 

between labor and management. And I know that the Naval Sea 

Systems Command, NAVSEA, Labor-Management Partnership 

Forum is an important start in that effort, but I think there can 

be more done, based on the hearing we had yesterday. 

So, I wanted to ask you about this issue, and your commitment 

to ensuring that we institutionalize best practices among our workforce and relationships between labor and management among all 

the four shipyards. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, ma’am. First, I would say that they 

just are a magnificent team up in Portsmouth. And all of our public 

yards are absolutely strategic jewels in our Nation’s capability. 

Even in my current job as Director of Naval Reactors, we are very 

involved with the shipyards. And it has been a thrust of my time 

here as the director to do exactly that, ma’am, is that we can share 

best practices, and we can share lessons learned, as well, more effectively. And so, that has been a—an emphasis of my time here, 

and will continue, if confirmed as CNO. 

Senator AYOTTE. I appreciate it. 

As we look at the request for combatant commanders for the support from our attack submarine fleet, and then we look at—we 

have—currently, we have about 54 attack submarines, and we’re 

only meet of half of combatant commanders’ request for. And as we 

look at some of the activity, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, 

we know that there’s—this is very important, to have this capacity. 

And yet, where we’re headed is the number of attack submarine 

fleet—of subs is actually going down to 41 as we look forward to 

2029. And so, one thing that this committee has done is really focusing on having the Navy procure at least two Virginia-class submarines per year. 

What are your thoughts on this shortfall and how we address it? 

Now, overriding everything, of course, is sequester and our need to 

resolve that. But, going forward, assuming we can work together 

to resolve that, which has got to be top priority, what’s your 

thought on making sure that we have what we need? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Ma’am, I think it’s very clear, and can 

show hard evidence that we currently enjoy superiority in the unVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00678 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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dersea domain. But, that domain is hotly contested, and we cannot 

rest for a minute and remain confident. We have to continue to 

keep pressing. 

To address your question, ma’am, exactly as you say, we’ve got 

to continue to try and mitigate that dip in attack submarine force 

level before the—below the requirement of 48, and we are doing everything we can to mitigate that. One is that the two Virginia-class 

submarines per year are a critical part of that program, very highly 

successful, continuing to deliver below budget and ahead of schedule. That must continue, and we must continue to try and reduce 

that construction time. 

As well, we’re looking to do what we can to extend the life of our 

current Los Angeles-class attack submarines and every other thing 

we can to mitigate that trough. 

Senator AYOTTE. I thank you. 

And I know that my time is expired, but I know the Chairman 

would share this concern, since we’re in this public forum, that we 

say something about what Russia did yesterday in the United Nations, in terms of blocking the request for an investigation into 

MH–17. And I think it shows—it’s not related to this hearing, but 

it shows our concerns that we’ve been trying to address in this 

committee on Russia. 

And I thank you for your willingness to serve in this important 

position. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Thank you, ma’am. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I was hoping 

you would introduce me by saying I’m from the home of the greatest Naval Surface Warfare Center in southern Indiana, that naval 

bastion. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I’ll try to do that in the future. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, sir. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator DONNELLY. Admiral, thank you. And, to your family, 

thank you very, very much. Like the Chairman and like you, Admiral, my dad was a Navy veteran. He was a little bit below decks 

on the ship, but loved every minute of having a chance to be part 

of it. 

When we look foreign and we look at the challenges we have in 

the nuclear area in regards to submarine warfare, one of my greatest concerns is the efforts to attack us, cyber-wise, to find out our 

technology, to find out our plans, to find out how we plan to map 

it out, going forward. And so, it’s not only on the naval side, but 

on our contractor side. And I was wondering what is being done to 

make sure that there’s no backdoors open with our contractors that 

other countries can get into. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, I share your concern about activity in the cyberdomain. As we speak today, that is a hotly contested domain. And, just on our defense and Navy networks, we 

are, you know, subject to tens of thousands of attacks per day. Attribution is very difficult, but, just like in other domains, success, 

I think, revolves around being properly organized, trained, and 

equipped. And Navy is moving out in that area with 10th Fleet, the 

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sive and support capabilities, but offensive tools that would be 

available, should our leaders choose to use those. 

With respect to protecting our networks, we use a variety of 

tools. Some of those exact techniques, I’m reluctant to talk about 

in an open forum. 

Senator DONNELLY. Right. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. But, we do maintain, both from a physical 

security, a cybersecurity, and personnel, appropriate measures to 

prevent those sorts of intrusions. 

Senator DONNELLY. And I know you’re working hard on it, and 

working in connection with our contractors to go over best practices 

with them to ensure that every avenue to the technology, to the intellectual capital, is cut off. 

One of the things we do at Crane Naval Warfare Center is, we 

collaborate a lot with the Air Force on systems and how to save 

money and how to kind of be able to—and I know this is a subject 

dear to the Chairman’s heart—How do we make every dollar go a 

little bit further? How do we work in coordination to see if something can fit on—in both the Navy and in the Air Force? And I’m 

sure you would want to continue that effort. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Absolutely. Everywhere we can, not only 

meet the requirements of the mission, but be more efficient and effective, I’m very open to that. And particularly with respect to the 

work there at Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane, and their work 

in fighting the proliferation of counterfeit parts and those sorts of 

things is a big part of maintaining our security in the cyberdomain. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you. And I had the privilege of traveling with you to one of our facilities. And, during that time, we 

had a discussion about the mental health of our sailors. And I am 

sure that you will continue the efforts of Admiral Greenert in making sure that—the mental health challenges our men and women 

face, that you’re there to make sure there’s no stigma and that 

services and assistance are available. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, absolutely will remain fully committed to that, to help our sailors be fully part of a connected team 

so that, when challenges come of any sort, they can fall back and 

feel—and get support. 

Senator DONNELLY. Let me ask you this. What keeps you up at 

night? What is your greatest concern? Number one, logistics-wise, 

what do you need the most? And, number two is, what’s the greatest danger you see out there, in your job? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, I think the Chairman mentioned 

it, and it’s been discussed here already at the hearing. The thing 

that has my attention is the growing complexity and urgency of our 

security environment around the world. Our Nation is pulled in so 

many different directions, not only the Indo-Asia-Pacific, but also 

we mentioned Russia and their activity in Europe, and certainly 

the activity in the Middle East. Contrasting to that is—sequestration, I think, is a symptom of sort of a level of awareness that I 

look forward, if confirmed, to enhancing, to make that message 

more vivid so that we can close the gap between the growing requirements in the security environment, and things like sequestration would—which would threaten the resources to address it. 

675 

Senator DONNELLY. Admiral, thank you for your service to the 

country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. Admiral, thank you very much for your service. 

And thanks, to your family, for their service, as well. The Navy is 

unique among our services, that, in wartime or peacetime, the deployment pace does not really change, and we know it puts strains 

on families. So, both for what you represent for our sailors and 

what you represent for all their families, we’re grateful for all of 

their service. 

Admiral, is China an adversary? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, I think China is a complex nation. They are clearly growing in every dimension. Many of the 

things that they do sort of have an adversarial nature to them. 

They—they’ve got a vastly growing nation. Their activity in the 

South China Sea in land reclamation certainly has potential to destabilize that region. 

Senator COTTON. So, it doesn’t sound like rosy relationship right 

now with China, between the United States and our allies, but various published reports have speculated that civilian—our Civilian 

Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with China that the Obama administration has submitted to Congress may facilitate the transfer 

of sensitive nuclear equipment and technology to the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy. This is very troubling to me. And, given the 

trends you cite, I would imagine any increase in the capability and 

lethality of the PLA navy would also worry you. Do you believe 

that the United States Navy has a appreciable military advantage 

over the PLA navy at this point, especially regarding nuclear naval 

capabilities? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, this is something I obviously 

watch extremely closely. The details of this are very, very technical 

and difficult to discuss in an open forum. I would look forward to 

discussing those in a classified setting with you. 

But, we have taken a look very closely at the successor agreement to continuing to exchange nuclear technologies. I believe that, 

in aggregate, we would be better with a renewed successor agreement than without it. 

Senator COTTON. Even if you suspected or knew that the PLA 

navy was going to divert that civilian nuclear technology towards 

nuclear naval systems? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, again, the details of exactly that 

assessment are classified, but I can say, with a fair degree of confidence, that we are better with this agreement than we are without it. 

Senator COTTON. Okay, thank you. 

Right now, the Navy is on a budgetary path to 260 ships or less. 

Do you agree with the findings of the 2014 National Defense Panel, 

which was a bipartisan and congressionally mandated group of experts, that we should have a target force of between 325–346 ships? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, I think that the strategic environment—you know, we could easily justify an appetite for more ships, 

but another dimension of the strategic environment is the resource 

part of that environment. Our current plan for a 308-ship Navy 

676 

represents, right now, the very best balance to meet the demands, 

not only of the security environment, but also to do that with available resources. 

Senator COTTON. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus has said that 

quantity has a quality of its own. Do you believe that that is true? 

And, if so, is 308 ships going to be enough of a quantity to give 

us that quality of its own kind? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I 100 percent agree with Secretary Mabus 

about the quality of the number of ships. And the current plan does 

allow us to meet our responsibilities in the defense strategic guidance, albeit with some risk. 

Senator COTTON. In the recently issued National Military Strategy, General Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, 

describes the need to counter certain revisionist states—Russia, 

China, Iran, North Korea principally among them. But, he also 

writes that the U.S. military advantage has begun to erode. Are 

there areas in which the U.S. Navy’s military advantage has begun 

to erode, relative to our adversaries? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, this is a very dynamic environment, and the technological environment is changing very rapidly. 

As the Chairman mentioned, we’ve got to become more agile in our 

acquisition systems to stay competitive in that realm. But, I’m confident that, with the support of this committee and with Congress 

and the innovation of the Navy, we will do that. But, as you said, 

you know, some of our readiness is starting to—we’re still recovering from the effects of the 2013 sequestration as we continue to 

build our readiness back up so that we’ve got appropriate responses 

forces for global contingencies. 

Senator COTTON. So, the flip side of what you just said is, without adequate support from this Congress, then our military advantage, as it relates to our Navy, may, in fact, begin to erode? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator COTTON. Well, I hope that we provide you and all the 

sailors that you represent the adequate support you need, both to 

modernize our fleet and to continue to be a forward-deployed force 

to project American power. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Thank you, Senator. I look forward to 

working with you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. We might now hear from the Newport News 

Naval Shipyard, Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. And Norfolk, as well, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Norfolk. Excuse me. Both. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And thanks, Admiral Richardson. And congrats to your cavalier 

daughter, Rachel. We’re glad to have her here, as well, and your 

family. 

You’ve got a big day Saturday. The launch of the USS John Warner, a Virginia-class sub, at the Norfolk base, a former chair of this 

committee, and wonderful colleague. And that’s a great program, 

actually, to exemplify a couple of issues. The Chair asked questions 

about acquisition reform. The Virginia-class program, because of 

this kind of ‘‘coopetition’’ between the shipyard at Newport News 

677 

and Electric Boat in Connecticut, has been a pretty solid program, 

in terms of delivering the subs, as contracted, on time, on budget. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator KAINE. Are there lessons from that acquisition strategy 

that, you know, we replicate on Ohio-class or other platforms? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, we intend to leverage all of those 

lessons to design and deliver the Ohio-class, using many of the 

same tools that have been successful in Virginia. And we hope to 

bring to you a design that is very mature. That was one of the key 

successes to the Virginia program. We hope to provide you a stable 

build plan that, if funded with predictable funds, will allow the 

team of shipyards at Newport News and Electric Boat to allocate 

risk and deliver those submarines, along with the Virginia-class, at 

the lowest possible price. 

Senator KAINE. Another aspect of the USS John Warner is—it’s 

obviously a nuclear sub, and you are the—currently the commander of Navy Nuclear Propulsion. When we talk about sequester 

and the effects of sequester on the defense mission, sometimes I 

think we ought to make sure we’re broadening our view. In your 

current role, you work very closely with the Department of Energy 

around nuclear reactor work, as well, don’t you? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator KAINE. And sequester doesn’t just affect defense by affecting the Department of Defense. The nondefense accounts, Department of Energy being one, that are affected by sequester also 

have a significant effect on our national security, isn’t that correct? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, that’s exactly right. And Secretary Moniz has been very clear about the national security mission that he has in the Department of Energy, not only for naval 

reactors, which he fully supports, but also in the nuclear weapons 

business. 

Senator KAINE. So, if we were just to fix sequester in the defense 

accounts, but not fix sequester in the nondefense accounts, things 

like nuclear research through the DOE that has a direct impact on 

national security would still be compromised, correct? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. That’s true, yes, sir. 

Senator KAINE. I want to ask you about readiness and the measures of readiness. Because Senator Ayotte and I are chair and 

ranking on the Readiness Subcommittee. Let’s get into the metrics 

a little bit. 

My understanding is, normally you have about a third—Navy 

would have about a third of its ships forward deployed to support 

regional commanders, but then have an additional component, usually three carrier strike groups and three ARGs, in a surge status, 

so kind of trained up and ready to deploy within 30 days. Talk to 

us about how sequestration and budgetary uncertainty affects that 

surge capacity, the readiness to respond to the unforeseen contingency. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator, certainly, our priority has been—and Admiral 

Greenert’s made this clear—that we will not deploy forces unless 

they are fully ready. And so, those forward-deployed strike groups 

and amphibious-ready groups will be ready in every respect. But, 

to meet our responsibilities in the Defense Strategic Guidance, we 

678 

also need that surge force to respond to contingencies once those 

forward-deployed forces have done their mission. Currently, you 

know, our requirements are that we have three carrier strike 

groups and three amphibious-ready groups ready to deploy in the 

event of a contingency. Right now, we are at one of those three. We 

are on a path to recover so that we’ve got full readiness in both 

of those areas by 2020, but that also is contingent on stable and 

reliable funding to get us there. 

Senator KAINE. And so, from the earlier testimony, even the forward-deployed—when we end up with this 2-month carrier gap, the 

forward-deployed is affected by budgetary uncertainty, and then, 

up until 2020, our surge capacity and readiness is—has been significantly affected, and we hope to get back to that surge capacity 

that we think is optimal. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator KAINE. Just last item, quickly. Senator King and I were 

in India in October and visited the shipbuilders at the Magazon 

docks in Mumbai. And there was a great deal of pride there, and 

a great deal of desire to partner with the United States. I like the 

fact that you mentioned the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. I view India 

and the Indian navy as a partner of growing importance as we look 

at this pivot to Asia. And I think there’s a strong desire to partner 

with the United States, participate in naval exercises. They do 

more joint exercises with the U.S. than any other nation, and I 

would just like your opinion about that as my final question. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, I agree, there’s tremendous importance to that region, and also potential to further those relationships. And, if confirmed, I look forward to getting personally involved in making those ties stronger. 

Senator KAINE. Great. Thank you so much. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, Admiral, for being here today. And I do want to take 

special time and thank your father, your wife, Dana, and your 

daughter, Rachel, for accompanying you today. 

And, Rachel, a special shout-out to you for serving at Walter 

Reed right now. I have a dear friend that recently went through 

the Amputee Center. So, thanks so much for all your great service, 

as well. 

Admiral, in reference to the Iran nuclear agreement, the Obama 

administration has continuously said, over and over again, that the 

alternative to the Iran nuclear agreement is war. He—the President has made it clear in his statement, that the only alternative 

is war. So, as I’m out visiting with other people, that’s kind of the 

response. It’s picked up, and people are saying, ‘‘Oh, we have to go 

to war if we don’t sign this agreement.’’ 

In your best military judgment, do you believe that the only alternative to this nuclear agreement is war? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, I think—my way of answering 

that would be that a major mission of our Armed Forces, the Joint 

Force and certainly the Navy, is to use all means necessary to 

deter that type of war, not only through preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, but also by deterring any kind of—many of 

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the other tools that they use to disrupt activity in that region. So, 

they’ve got considerable conventional forces, ballistic missiles, surface forces, and they’ve talked about mining the Straits of Hormuz, 

they support terrorist organizations throughout the region. We 

need to use the full set of capabilities that the Joint Force and the 

Navy can deliver to deter that. And that military contribution is 

also just a subset of a whole-of-government approach along with 

our allies in the region. 

Senator ERNST. So, a whole-of-government approach. And I think 

that’s extremely important, that we remember that, that we do not 

have to sign this agreement, and that does not necessarily mean 

that we will be going to war with Iran. Is that your assessment? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Ma’am, I do support a whole-of-government approach and—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Admiral, you were just asked to give your 

personal opinion, if asked for it. The Senator is asking for your 

opinion as to whether there are other options besides going to war 

with Iran. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I think that there are other options besides going to war. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Admiral. 

Thank you. 

Since we’re on that topic, Iran’s military budget is approximately $11 billion per year on defense. Its posture, however, is bolstered 

by a variety of asymmetric and relatively low-cost capabilities and 

tactics, including swarming at sea, artillery rockets, ballistic missiles, and UAVs. And, as you know, through this agreement, Iran 

will gain about $150 billion, due to sanctions relief, and the ability 

to purchase more advanced weapons and equipment through the 

lifting of the U.N. arms embargo. And even if a small portion of 

the sanctions relief money is directed towards their military capabilities in Iran, what types of weapons and equipment do you believe that Iran would purchase to improve its ability to project force 

within the Persian Gulf? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, ma’am, I think that we would, as we 

have been throughout, be sensitive to the proliferation market in 

weapons. And so, I would be very concerned about them increasing 

their ballistic missiles fleet—force, as well as their anti-ship cruise 

missiles, the mines, and the surface combatants that you mentioned, as well. 

Senator ERNST. Okay. Well, I appreciate that. 

And I do think it is something that we have to be ever vigilant 

about. This is a very serious matter that we are facing today with 

Iran and its potentially increased military capabilities in that region. This is not an American problem, this is not an Iranian problem, this is a worldwide problem. 

So, I appreciate your attention to the matter, and I do look forward to supporting you in your confirmation. 

Thank you, Admiral. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Thank you, ma’am. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

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Admiral, in this day and age where people move around so much, 

and particularly service families, it’s hard to determine where 

someone is from. My definition is, it’s where you went to high 

school, so I claim you as a proud son of the State of Maine. Delighted to have you here today. 

A second point. I spent some time, a year ago, on one of your Virginia-class submarines under the ice in the Arctic. When I came 

home, my wife said, ‘‘What most impressed you?’’ And I think she 

expected to hear about the marvelous technology and the amazing 

command center and all of that. And I said, ‘‘No, what really impressed me was the young people on that boat.’’ 

And you have extraordinary people. The officers, of course, were 

excellent. But, what really I noticed was the spirit and dedication 

and pride of the enlisted people, of the sailors. It was their boat, 

and they were so engaged and proud of the work that they were 

doing. I just want to commend you and pass along the observation 

that you are taking command of an extraordinary group of people. 

And, of course, the technology, which we’ve talked a lot about 

today, is important. But, ultimately, it seems to me it’s the people 

that are going to make the difference. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, thank you for that recognition. 

And I could not agree with you more. And I am so privileged for 

the opportunity presented here today. 

Senator KING. One of the questions that the Chairman asked you 

at the beginning—he goes through a set of standard questions—is, 

Will you give your personal opinion when called upon in your position? I want to emphasize that. You’re going to be in the National 

Security Council. You’re going to be in the Oval Office. You’re going 

to be at the upper reaches of the decisionmaking process at the 

Pentagon. You’ve got to speak up. If—you have extensive experience, wisdom, and background to—judgment to be brought to be 

bear on these questions. And I hope there’ll be that—we all experience that moment in a meeting where you say, ‘‘Should I say something, or not?’’ I hope you’ll remember this moment and, even if it’s 

the President of the United States, say, ‘‘Mr. President, I have to 

respectfully disagree.’’ We need that from you, and I think that’s 

one of the most important things that you bring to this position. 

Will you give me a commitment that you’re going to be just this 

side of obnoxious in making your case at the highest levels of the 

United States Government? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, I specialize in going well beyond obnoxious. 

[Laughter.] 

Admiral RICHARDSON. And I look forward, if confirmed, to participating in those discussions. And I will use—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. If you need practice in that, Senator King 

will help you out. 

[Laughter.] 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Thank you, sir. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Your confidence is overwhelming. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KING. I mentioned about the Arctic. I see the Arctic as 

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terize our force structure and capabilities in the Arctic, vis-a-vis 

Russia, particularly in the area of icebreakers. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, the United States is an Arctic nation, and the security environment in the Arctic is changing as 

navigation passages open and access to natural resources, you 

know, opens up, as well. We must remain engaged in the Arctic. 

The Navy is on a—has developed a roadmap to increase our capability in the Arctic to pace this changing security environment. We 

are partnering closely with the whole of government and other sister services, particularly of the Coast Guard, in this area. 

Senator KING. But, isn’t it true that, in terms of icebreakers, 

which are the roadbuilders of the Arctic, we have one little country 

road, and—they have a bunch of interstate highways, or something 

like 40 icebreakers, we have one. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. Senator—Admiral Zukunft, from 

the Coast Guard, has testified, I think, in very clear terms, that 

we need to address this icebreaker situation. 

Senator KING. I think it’s a serious problem that we’re going to 

have to really put some attention to. And I understand it’s in the 

Coast Guard’s jurisdiction, but it’s—it certainly affects your ability 

to operate in that region. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. We’re absolutely closely partnered, no daylight between us on that. 

Senator KING. In your advance policy questions, you mentioned 

that you believed it would be in the national interests that we accede to the Law of the Sea Treaty. Could you expand on that a bit? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, I do believe that. I think that becoming part of that community would give us a great deal of credibility. And, particularly as it pertains to these unfolding opportunities in the Arctic, this provides a framework to adjudicate disputes 

and participate as everybody, you know, moves to, you know, improve their capability and posture in the—— 

Senator KING. Well, in fact, because we’re not members of that 

treaty, we are in—we are literally losing ground in the Arctic, isn’t 

that correct? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I think that becoming part of that treaty 

is an important part of our movement into the Arctic, yes, sir. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you for your service. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Admiral, for that testimony on 

the Arctic. I know that Senator Sullivan will have more on that. 

But, we—it seems to me that the—just the icebreaker situation is 

indicative of the difference in emphasis that Russia and the United 

States seem to place. Would you agree with that? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, if you just look at the resources, 

they’ve been very focused in the Arctic for a long time. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Tillis. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Admiral Richardson, thank you for being here. Congratulations 

to you and your family. And thank you all for your years of service. 

I also want to thank you for the time we spent in my office answering a range of questions. 

One general question that I would have here, and would appreciate your personal opinion and your candor, is—it relates to the 

682 

current advantage that we enjoy with our adversaries, like Russia 

and China, and the specific threats to those gaps being narrowed 

as a result of sequestration if you have to deal with that in 2016. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. As I said, the pace of technological change is just picking up. And so—— 

Senator TILLIS. Can you talk to specific areas where you—that 

are your greatest concern? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I would say that, in particular, the ability 

to use a long-range precision-guided munition, a weapon, to target 

with greater and greater precision at longer and longer distances, 

this anti-access area denial capabilities that we’ve talked about 

many times, are a particular concern. 

Senator TILLIS. The—what advice would you give us, as we’re sitting here and we’re trying to conference the defense authorization, 

and we’re trying to get an appropriations process going—if you’re 

kind of guiding us through what we need to do to help you do your 

job, what do you need to tell us? What do we need to stop doing, 

what do we need to start doing? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, I think that we’ve proposed a 

solid plan, and we’ve mentioned, already, the effects of sequestration and uncertainty in the fiscal environment, the budget environment. And perhaps the greatest thing that we could do together is 

put in place a long-term and predictable stream of funding. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you for that. 

I’m going to get a little bit more parochial now with my marines 

down in North Carolina. And I know the Commandant of the Marine Corps has frequently stated that the combatant command requirement, I think, for amphibious ships across a range of operations exceeds 50. I think the minimum is 38. Yet, we’re at 30 operating today, and it doesn’t look like we’ll obtain a amphibious 

fleet of more than 34 across 30 years of a shipbuilding plan. Are 

you concerned with that? And what more do we need to do? What 

can Congress do to help you overcome that ship shortfall? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, this is an area where Navy and 

Marine Corps have been discussing and, again, have realized together that, although the requirement—the military requirement is 

38, the current fiscal environment is going to drive us to 34. I appreciate the assistance of Congress to getting us to 34. To address 

those—that gap between the requirement and what we can resource, we’re looking at augmenting our lift there with other platforms besides gray hulls. Gray hulls are absolutely, you know, the 

requirement that’s needed for the high-end threat, but there may 

be applications and opportunities to lift marines using other platforms. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

And again, I want to tell you I look forward to you—your confirmation. I wholeheartedly support it. 

I would ask some questions about concerns in the Arctic, but I 

have a feeling that my colleague here is going to do a better job 

of that than I can, because he’s got bird’s-eye view. But, I think it 

is an area that we all share a concern, and would appreciate your 

support in addressing his and all of our concerns. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Gillibrand. 

683 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Ranking Member. 

Thank you, Admiral, for being here. Thank you for your service. 

I’m grateful for your family’s service, as well. We’re very pleased 

to have you in front of this committee. 

I want to talk a little bit about combat integration. I strongly believe that we should have appropriate standards that meet the 

needs of the positions and that allow anyone who meets those 

standards to be able to do those jobs. According to your advance 

policy questions, the Navy will provide a written report to the Secretary of Defense in September of 2015 with validation of standards as gender-neutral. Ninety-five percent of Navy jobs are already open to both men and women. And my understanding is that 

the remaining positions are Special Operations positions. Can you 

tell me how you will work with Special Operations Command to assess if you will need to ask for an exception? And what, if anything, 

would you—would lead you to ask for an exception, particularly 

with regard to the Navy SEALs? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Ma’am, it’s true that, currently, we have 

more than 95 percent of the jobs open, as you said, to women already. I was privileged to be the commander of the submarine force 

as we integrated women into the submarine force, and that integration has gone spectacularly. They’ve—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. That’s good news. 

Admiral RICHARDSON.—really have done a terrific job. 

Those discussions, I think, must begin with mission effectiveness. 

And I’m interested in any plan that would improve our mission effectiveness in those areas. We have really just the Special Operations Forces that remain to be evaluated. I’m not familiar with 

the details of those discussions at those time, but, if confirmed, 

looking forward to getting very involved with Special Operations 

Command to make sure that we give everybody a fair opportunity. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

And a related issue, prevalence of sexual assault in the military 

still remains quite high. And one of the biggest concerns this whole 

committee shares is the rate of retaliation; that, in fact, of all those 

who reported, 62 percent were retaliated against. And that’s the 

same rate as it was 2 years ago. And retaliation takes many forms. 

Fifty-three percent experienced social retaliation, peer-to-peer. 

Thirty-five percent experienced adverse administrative action. 

Thirty-two percent experienced professional retaliation. And 11 

percent received punishment for an infraction. So, arguably, more 

than half of that retaliation is coming from their chain of command 

or from some command structure. 

So, I would urge you to look very heavily at this issue of retaliation, because, unfortunately, the effect of it is, less survivors come 

forward. And if you have less survivors coming forward, you have 

less cases to investigate, and you will convict less rapists. 

And I want to just give you a thumbnail sketch of data that we 

got from one naval base. There were—and this is the—for the year 

of 2013 at Camp Pendleton—there were 15 cases considered, two 

court-martial charges preferred, two proceeded to trial, two convicted of sexual assault. So, two out of 15 went forward. What we 

know about the crime of rape, it has very little false reporting. 

684 

Some estimate between 2 and 5 percent are false reports. So, in 

those cases, you were only able to get about 10 percent cases to 

move forward. So, I think we have to do better, in terms of doing 

the investigations, assessing viability of witnesses and credibility of 

witnesses, and bringing more cases to trial, because two out of 15 

is not a great rate. 

So, those are challenges that you will have. This committee is 

very interested in it. I hope you will make a commitment that you 

will work with me and the rest of us on trying to end the scourge 

of sexual violence, because it does result, unfortunately, in a lot of 

people leaving the military. And so, a lot of your women, a lot of 

your men, are leaving because they are experiencing assault within 

their own ranks. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Ma’am, you have my full commitment that 

I’ll spare no effort to eliminate—we can’t be—we can’t rest until 

sexual assault is eliminated from the services. I can’t think of anything more toxic to teamwork than that insider threat that preys 

upon the confidence between team members. I’m fully committed to 

eliminating this. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. And one of your challenges will be in lower 

command structures, where, in the last survey, women responded 

to experiencing some form of sexual harassment and sexual discrimination. Sixty percent of that harassment, they reported, was 

from their unit commander. So, there’s an issue with some commanders that they really need to be trained better to eradicate sexual harassment and sexual discrimination, because, again, it creates a negative climate that perhaps is more permissive toward 

sexual assault. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, ma’am, I think that is absolutely the 

most productive battleground. If we’re going to solve this, we’re 

going to solve it with the deck-plate leaders, the chief petty officers, 

the officers who are in the spaces and will eliminate not only sexual assault, but those precursor behaviors that start us down the 

road. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Exactly. 

For the record, I will submit a question about cyber. I’m very 

grateful for your interest in cyber. And I—my question for the 

record will be, What career paths do you see for members of the 

Navy who want to make cyber their career? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, ma’am, I’ll look forward to that. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admiral, good to see you again. Great to see your family. 

My father was also a Navy officer, also a father of six kids. When 

I joined the Marine Corps, he reminded me, on a daily basis, that 

the Marine Corps was Department of the Navy. Is that true? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true, yes, sir. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Oh, okay. I’ll make sure he knows that. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SULLIVAN. I do want to touch on the Arctic. The actual 

numbers are, as Senator King mentioned, one icebreaker for the 

United States, about 40 for Russia. They’re building five to six new 

685 

ones. Some of them are nuclear-powered. I mean, we are completely just not even in the game. And you know the importance. 

I must admit, I was a little disappointed by your answer to Senator King, because what’s—what I see is happening is, the Arctic 

and icebreakers are becoming kind of a bureaucratic football. So, 

for example, 4 months ago, I asked Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

Stackley to just give me a straight-up answer on the Arctic, on icebreakers. He kind of did the same thing, ‘‘Well, it’s a little bit in 

the Coast Guard realm.’’ Well, the question is, Is it in the national 

interests of the United States to have more than one icebreaker 

when the Russians are trying to own the Arctic? What’s your answer? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I think the answer is clearly yes. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay. So, I think what we need to do is not 

keep talking about—I’ve never gotten an answer from the Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy. Four months ago. I never got an answer. We 

just need to know, Do we need it? How many? And then, How do 

we get there? No more, kind of, ‘‘Well, it’s the Coast Guard’s problem, not really the Navy’s.’’ In the ’70s, the Navy was the service 

that supplied icebreakers to the country, wasn’t it? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir, I believe so. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yeah. So, I think we need to just get through 

the bureaucratic redtape. It’s clearly in the national interests. You 

just stated it, everybody states that we need to move forward and 

quit kind of doing the football back and forth between the Navy 

and the Coast Guard. Would you agree with that? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, I am not interested in a bureaucratic approach to this. We need to have a plan of action. And I 

look forward, if confirmed, to working with the—our partners in 

the Coast Guard to address this in real terms. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay. And it would be good to hear back from 

Assistant Secretary Stackley. I asked him a question on this 4 

months ago. He said he’d get back me. He never has. 

Just a real quick question, just a yes-or-no answer. We had an 

amendment in the NDAA supporting the Pacific rebalance that 

said it was the sense of the Congress that the services should increase force posture to give credibility to the rebalance. Is it— 

should services be free to ignore the defense guidance of the Congress—just yes or no—in the NDAA? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. No. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay. 

Finally, I want to draw your attention to the chart and some of 

the handouts we had here. This relates to China’s reclamation activities in the South China Sea. This is an example. It’s 18 months, 

before and after, of the Fiery Cross Reef. I’m sure you’re familiar 

with it, Admiral. It’s actually a 2.7 square—2.7 million square meters, 505 football fields, a 3,000-meter airstrip long enough for any 

PRC military aircraft. It’s just a huge—one of their large reclamation projects. 

We were recently in Singapore, a number of us, at the ShangriLa Dialogue, and Secretary Carter gave a speech, that I thought 

was quite strong, on what our policy is. But, there seems to be a 

confusion in the policy. So, Secretary Carter stated, ‘‘We will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.’’ 

686 

He then stated, ‘‘After turning an under-—after all, turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of 

sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime 

transit.’’ 

However, PACOM Commander Harris, just 2 weeks ago at the 

Aspen Security Forum, stated, ‘‘It is U.S. policy to afford a 12- 

minute limit around all of the islands that are in the South China 

Sea. And it’s been a longstanding policy, not because they’re occupied by China or built up by China, but just in general.’’ He later 

clarified his statement to include islands and formations. 

Do you think—first of all, to me, that’s very confusing policy— 

do you think that we need to clarify that? And do you think that 

Admiral Harris’s statement is just a de factor recognition of China’s reclamation strategy? And is it your—in your best professional 

judgment, should we be sailing within 12 nautical miles and not allowing the facts-on-the-ground strategy to be changed by China to 

essentially recognize Fiery Cross Reef and other places? 

It’s a really important issue, and there’s no clarification from the 

White House, State Department, or Department of the Navy. I 

think Secretary Carter and Admiral Harris’s statements are actually very contradictory. That kind of uncertainty can create miscalculations. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, I think it’s absolutely important 

that the Navy continue to be present in that region, for a number 

of reasons, to provide our continued presence, that we are there as 

a matter of routine in international waters. We do have to respect 

the legitimately claimed territorial boundaries. I think that Secretary Carter and Admiral Harris would agree with me there. And 

so—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. But, does that mean respecting that, in terms 

of a 12-nautical-mile radius? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, I’d have to look at exactly which of 

those claims are legitimate. It’s a dynamic situation. There’s competing claims down there. But, the bottom line is, we need to get 

down there, understand the truth, make that very clear, and be 

present in that area so that we don’t get shouldered out of the 

South China Sea. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, I’ll be submitting questions for 

the record to make sure that the policy of the United States is 

clarified on this important issue, because right now it’s very 

murky. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good luck. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I join Senator Sullivan in hoping that this issue is clarified, because I think it is so important to our national security, and I’d 

like to work with him in seeking additional answers. 

And I recognize that those answers will involve more than just 

your input and contribution. But, on your contribution, thank you 

so much for the great work that you’ve done throughout your career to assure that our submarine force is unmatched in the world 

in its power, stealth, and strength. 

And I want to thank you and your family for your service, and 

ask you, first of all, whether you can commit to coming back to 

687 

Connecticut to visit our sub base there as one of your first official 

visits after you’re confirmed, as I expect you to will be. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

On the subject of our submarine force, the Ohio replacement program—you probably know more about it than most anyone else in 

the Navy and in our Department of Defense. And I believe that you 

are committed to it, personally and professionally. Is that correct? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Absolutely, Senator. It’s our number-one 

modernization priority. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And in that regard, as the number-one 

priority of modernization in the United States Navy, the pricetag 

is likely to be in the range of $100 billion, which seems staggering 

and obviously has to be met, even though the Navy has other programs, other modernization efforts, and other shipbuilding projects. 

Have you given any thought to how that will be possible to do? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, as a—as you and I have discussed, this is an absolutely critical program for the country, and 

we are doing everything in the Navy to make sure that we not only 

get the requirements right and stable, but that we treat our cost 

targets like any other performance parameter for that program. 

And we are driving and on a good track to achieve all of those cost 

targets. 

Having said that, as you said, it will be a significant investment 

for the Nation, one that I believe must be done. If we absorb that 

entire cost within the Navy, that will come at a tremendous price, 

in terms of our other responsibilities in ships and aircraft. I don’t, 

either, want to leverage that on our sister services, and so I look 

forward to working closely together with the Department and Congress to address this. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Really, it should be seen as a challenge for 

our entire national defense, not just the Navy, because its ramifications and contributions to our defense range well beyond just 

seapower. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir, I would agree. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me move to another aspect of the 

Navy’s combat capability, the F–35, which, according to the analysis I’ve seen, will be six times more effective than legacy fighters 

in air-to-air combat, five times more effective in air-to-ground combat, six times more effective in reconnaissance and suppression of 

air defenses. Again, another investment—a good word, an appropriate one, I think—to use in our national defense. 

I noted that the fiscal year 2016 (FY–2016) budget request from 

the Navy included 16 fewer F–35 aircraft in the last 3 years of the 

Future Years Defense Plan than were anticipated just 1 year before. Can you shed some light on that request? And also, I’d appreciate your assurance that the F–35 is still a priority for the Navy. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, the Navy remains committed to 

the F–35 Lightning as an essential part of our future air wing. It 

is the aircraft that is designed from the ground up to address, you 

know, the fifth-generation challenges in information warfare. So, 

we do remain committed to that. 

The adjustments in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 

2016, again, just reflect some of the extremely difficult choices that 

688 

we’re making to balance the best way to address the national security challenges within the resources provided. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And the F–35, like the Ohio replacement 

program, is really essential to all of our national defense. Obviously, the other services share in the costs and the benefits of it. 

And I’m hoping that the strategy here will be a combined Department of Defense commitment to the investment that’s required. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, if confirmed, I look forward to exploring all those options. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. I look forward to seeing you 

in New London as the Chief of Naval Operations. Thank you very 

much. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And again, thank you to your family, as 

well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admiral, we appreciate the opportunity to have you with 

us. And I believe you have the background and the dedication and 

the character to lead the Navy. And this Congress, I believe and 

am confident, will support you. I hope that you understand that 

you have to give us the straight facts, tell us what you believe, and, 

if there are problems, I’ll—bring them forward to us, and I believe 

Congress will respond if in any way possible. 

Will you, as you’ve committed, I think, in your written answers, 

but will you give your best judgment to the President of the United 

States and to Congress on all issues of which you’re inquired of? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir, I will. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you for that. 

I see you’ve had background as a submarine development squadron and other submarine effort—other commands. Do you feel that 

that will assist you as we deal with the Ohio-class development? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator SESSIONS. Give us some of the ideas that you bring to 

bear on the development of the Ohio-class, which we all know is 

important and essential, but also we know we’ve got some budget 

constrictions out there that are going to place that program in jeopardy if we don’t watch it. And I think, more than a lot of programs, 

failure on the beginning to get it right in the procurement process 

could endanger that program. So, give us your thoughts about what 

you think needs to be done as we go forward. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. I think you’ve got it exactly right, 

sir, that you’ve got to get that—the requirements set. And the 

Navy has done that. We are working towards providing a mature 

design so you’ve got to have a mature and stable design before you 

begin production so that you’re not dealing in managing costly 

change orders after you’ve begun production. And then I hope to 

provide a program—a build plan that would allow for stable and 

predictable funding. That allows us—the Navy to work very closely 

with the shipbuilders to provide a production line that results in 

the lowest cost per unit. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think most of us have come to understand 

how unpredictability and uncertainty and alterations of schedule 

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can drive up cost. And sometimes that’s Congress, sometimes it’s 

Department of Defense’s fault, other times the contractors have to 

be held to account. But, are you—will you help us remain committed to maintaining the kind of schedule that keeps cost at the 

lowest level? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Absolutely, sir. And what we’ve found is 

that we’ve got tremendous commitment on the part of our shipbuilders. They are as committed to driving costs down as we are. 

And there are ample opportunities to deliver high-end warfighting 

capability at the appropriate price, delivers the capability that’s required for the Nation, and provides businesses a chance to thrive, 

as well. 

Senator SESSIONS. You made reference earlier to the triad, our 

nuclear defense triad—aircraft, submarines, and land-based 

ICBMs. Do you believe that remains a critical part of our defense 

structure? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator SESSIONS. Some have questioned that. And I guess 

you’re familiar with those concerns. I believe you’re correct. I think 

Congress believes you’re correct. But, I hope you will keep us informed on that, because some would suggest otherwise. I think that 

would be a big mistake at this point in time. 

You and I had the opportunity to discuss just efficiencies. I serve 

on the Armed Services Committee and the Budget Committee. I 

feel the tensions there very intensely. It’s been said in—that the 

Defense Department—in and around the Defense Department, but 

each service is committed to maintaining personnel levels. They 

fear that if their personnel levels drive—drop, they’ll be diminished 

in their influence and power. Tell me, Are you committed to maintaining the defense—the Navy fleet at the level it needs to be, but, 

at the same time, maintaining personnel levels, like private businesses have to do, lean and productive? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Senator, absolutely. And so, we must 

maintain—what we deliver is capability. And we want to, particularly as the environment—the technological environment changes, 

there will be new opportunities that open up for our people. We 

want to make sure that we keep our people employed in the very 

best possible way doing things that people do best. And so, I am 

committed to making sure that we do that in as lean and agile a 

fashion as possible. 

Senator SESSIONS. And sometimes rules that we pass in Congress 

make that difficult for you. I hope that you will keep us informed 

on how we can help you achieve that goal. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, Admiral, we thank you for your testimony this morning, and we thank you for responding with your 

personal opinion when it’s requested. You’re taking on a very difficult task in very difficult times, and I’m sure that you are well 

qualified, and we will attempt to make sure that your nomination 

is confirmed before we depart for our ill-deserved August recess. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:00 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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[Prepared questions submitted to Admiral John M. Richardson 

by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied 

follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provisions? If so, what modifications do 

you believe would be appropriate? 

Answer. Goldwater-Nichols was revolutionary in its time and has helped to transform the Department of Defense. However, much has changed in the past 30 years 

in both the Joint Force and the security environment. As such, I believe a review 

would be useful. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of Defense 

and the Secretary of the Navy if such a review were undertaken. 

DUTIES

Question. Section 5033 of title 10, United States Code, describes the duties of 

Chief of Naval Operations and requires that the person nominated to fill the job 

have had significant experience in joint duty assignments, including at least one full 

tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a flag officer. 

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Answer. Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Navy, 

the Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for organizing, training and equipping 

forces that will be provided to combatant, fleet and component commanders; serves 

as the primary maritime advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense; is the 

senior Uniformed Leader of the Navy; and represents the Navy on the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. 

Question. What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do 

you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. My career has afforded me a broad range of experience as a Naval Officer 

and Joint Warfighter. I have been privileged to command the submarine USS Honolulu, Submarine Development Squadron 12, Submarine Group 8, Submarine Allied 

Naval Forces South, Naval Submarine Forces, and served as the Director of the 

Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. 

My Joint assignments included the Naval Aide to the President, the Assistant 

Deputy Director for Regional Operations on the Joint Staff, and the Director of 

Strategy (J5) for U.S. Joint Forces Command. 

I have also served on a number of Navy staffs including U.S. Pacific Fleet, the 

Navy Staff, and U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa. 

Question. Do you meet the joint requirements for the position, including at least 

one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment, or did you require a waiver? 

Answer. I meet the Joint requirements for the position. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Answer. No. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Chief of Naval Operations and other officials. Please describe 

your understanding of the relationship of the Chief of Naval Operations to the following officials: 

Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the President in 

all matters relating to the Department of Defense. As a Service Chief and member 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is a military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, particularly regarding matters of naval warfare, 

policy, and strategy. 

Question. Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on occasion, serves as acting Secretary 

in the absence of the Secretary. During these periods, the CNO’s relationship with 

the Deputy Secretary will essentially be the same as with the Secretary. The Deputy Secretary is also responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Department of 

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retary to provide my best possible professional military advice and the same level 

of support as I would the Secretary. 

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. Under current DOD Directives, Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate 

and exchange information with DOD components, to include the Services, in the 

functional areas under their cognizance. If confirmed as CNO, I will respond and 

reciprocate, and use this exchange of information as I communicate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The CNO is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as such, works 

with and through the Chairman in the execution of duties. Along with the other 

Service Chiefs, if confirmed I will be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked 

with the responsibility for actively reviewing and evaluating military matters and 

offering professional military advice to the President, National Security Council, and 

Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. When functioning as the Acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman’s relationship with combatant commanders is that of the Chairman. Also, the Vice Chairman 

has the same rights and obligations as other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

If confirmed, I would exchange views with the Vice Chairman on any defense matter 

considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Vice Chairman also heads or has a key 

role on many boards that affect readiness and programs and, therefore, the preparedness of naval forces. If confirmed, I will establish a close relationship with the 

Vice Chairman on these critical issues. 

Question. The Secretary of the Navy. 

Answer. The CNO is responsible, under the Secretary of the Navy for providing 

properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support combatant commanders 

in the accomplishment of their missions. In addition, the CNO assists the Secretary 

of the Navy in the development of plans and recommendations for the operation of 

the Department of the Navy. The Navy enjoys a productive, collaborative environment within the Department, and if confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Navy to perpetuate it. 

Question. The Under Secretary of the Navy. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of the Navy is the principal assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and is first in line of succession. The Under Secretary performs 

such duties, and exercises such powers, as the Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, 

I look forward to establishing a close relationship with the Under Secretary to 

achieve the Secretary’s goals. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy work with the Under Secretary to 

achieve the Secretary’s goals. Like the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries 

perform such duties, and exercise such powers, as the Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretaries to achieve the Secretary’s goals. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Navy. 

Answer. The General Counsel of the Navy serves as legal advisor to the Department of the Navy and performs such functions as the Secretary of the Navy shall 

direct and as necessary to provide for the proper application of the law and effective 

delivery of legal services within the Department. If confirmed, I will work closely 

with the General Counsel to achieve the Secretary’s goals. 

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy. 

Answer. Under 10 USC § 5148(d), the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy 

performs duties relating to any and all Department of Navy legal matters assigned 

by Secretary of the Navy. The JAG provides and supervises the provision of all legal 

advice and related services throughout the Department of the Navy, except for the 

advice and services provided by the General Counsel. It is important that the CNO 

receive independent legal advice from his senior uniformed judge advocates. If confirmed, I will work closely with the JAG and seek the JAG’s legal advice. 

Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Answer. A unique historical and operational relationship exists between the Navy 

and the Marine Corps. Many of our capabilities, programs, and personnel issues are 

inextricably linked. Our forces deploy together, and both must be ready on arrival. 

If confirmed as CNO, my relationship with the Commandant of the Marine Corps 

must be exceptionally close and I will be committed to making every facet of the 

Navy-Marine Corps team stronger. 

Question. The Chief of the Navy Reserve. 

Answer. Under 10 USC § 5143, the Chief of the Navy Reserve serves on the staff 

of the CNO and is the principal adviser on Navy Reserve matters to the CNO and 

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is the commander of the Navy Reserve Force. The Chief of the Navy Reserve has 

an essential role in advising CNO of Navy Reserve capabilities alignment to Navy’s 

Total Force mission and operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with 

the Chief of the Navy Reserve to continue and enhance the vast progress and Total 

Force synergies we have achieved. 

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force. 

Answer. Our Armed Forces must work together to recognize each other’s 

strengths and to complement each other’s capabilities. We must achieve and maintain synergy in warfare, training, and procurement to ensure each Service contributes optimally to Joint and combined operations. If confirmed, I am committed to 

working with my counterparts to enhance Joint interoperability and other aspects 

of the Joint relationship in order to improve the war fighting capabilities of the 

United States. 

Question. The combatant commanders. 

Answer. The CNO’s responsibility as a Service Chief is to provide properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to the combatant commanders to accomplish 

their military missions. If confirmed, I will work to foster close working relationships with the Unified and Specified Combatant Commanders. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next 

Chief of Naval Operations? 

Answer. The international security situation is becoming more demanding and 

complex as both state and non-state actors challenge our national interests. Simultaneously, we face an era of fiscal challenges and uncertainty. Against this backdrop, the principal focus of the next CNO will be to provide relevant, ready naval 

forces to meet today’s challenges, as well as to modernize the Navy to protect America’s interests in the future. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will remain focused on providing adaptable, agile, and effective war fighting capabilities. Working with the fleet commanders and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I will continue to work to establish a sustainable forward presence that is consistent with our force structure and can quickly respond 

to crises and deter conflict. As well I will work to ensure that the Navy, operating 

as part of the Joint Force, will remain capable of winning in conflict should deterrence fail. 

As we address increasingly complex security challenges, the Navy has an obligation to deliver present and future capability in a fiscally responsible manner. I will 

work diligently with leadership to ensure that we deliver the most effective Navy 

possible for the resources we are provided. This must include close oversight to drive 

out inefficiencies and waste. 

Finally, the Navy’s success depends on attracting and retaining high quality people. I will devote myself to enhancing the Navy’s ability to develop leaders—for 

today and tomorrow. This must include a comprehensive approach that provides opportunity for each member of the Navy to reach their full potential, that develops 

a diverse and adaptable force, and that supports our Navy families who share in 

the sacrifice to strengthen our Nation. 

Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your 

priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what other priorities, beyond those 

associated with the major challenges you identified above, would you set for your 

term as Chief of Naval Operations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would look forward to more fully exploiting the electromagnetic spectrum and to harnessing the potential of revolutionary advances in information technologies. 

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the execution 

of the functions of the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Answer. For any Chief of Naval Operations, there is always the challenge of balancing the need for the Navy to be ready today and the need to modernize for the 

future. This tension is more acute today because we face uniquely complex problems 

in both the security and fiscal environments—as the security demands increase, the 

resources to address these demands are harder to obtain. 

Exacerbating these diverging trends, the environment demands faster and faster 

responses—as a result we absolutely must be more agile. 

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Question. If confirmed, what management actions and associated timelines would 

you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. Becoming more agile and responsive is relevant in every dimension of the 

CNO’s responsibilities—organizing, training, and equipping. If confirmed, I would 

look forward to working with Defense Department leadership and the Congress to 

improve our Navy’s responsiveness. 

ORGANIZE, TRAIN, AND EQUIP RESPONSIBILITY

Question. The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for organizing, training 

and equipping forces provided to fleet and component commanders, including the 

prioritization of funding and effort to meet these needs in the near term, while developing capabilities for the far term. 

How would you characterize your experience in force management and capability 

requirement decisions? 

Answer. I have years of relevant experience in this area. By virtue of my time 

as commander, Submarine Development Squadron 12, and commander, Submarine 

Forces, I am very familiar with providing ready forces and capabilities to meet combatant commander demands. Through my time as commander, Submarine Group 

Eight, and Deputy Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, I am familiar with defining and 

requesting forces and capabilities to execute combatant commander responsibilities. 

Finally, as a member of the Joint Staff serving in J3 during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, I was responsible for adjudicating all combatant commander requests with the ability of the services to provide forces and capabilities. 

Question. What innovative ideas are you considering for organizing, training and 

equipping the Navy? 

Answer. I anticipate a sustained focus on how the Navy can continue to improve 

both the process and substance of how it organizes, trains, and equips its forces. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretaries of the Navy and Defense, as 

well as with the Congress, to develop initiatives in each of these areas. 

SECURITY STRATEGIES AND GUIDANCE

Question. How would you characterize current trends in the range and diversity 

of threats to national security we face today? 

Answer. As Dr. Kissinger testified in January, I believe that the traditional power 

and state structures in many areas of the world are being challenged by different 

models of governance and power. This trend is manifesting itself concurrent with 

advances in technology that allow both state and non-state actors—even individuals—to act with increasing range, precision, and speed. The Navy faces an increasing array of diverse threats that will challenge our superiority and hamper our access and ability to operate around the world. 

Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance issued January 2012 took into account 

a $487 billion dollar reduction in defense resources. 

With the additional $500 billion in cuts to the Department of Defense as a result 

of sequestration, is the Defense Strategic Guidance still valid? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2016 President’s Budget Request is the minimum funding 

necessary in order to execute the Defense Strategic Guidance and 2014 Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR). Should the budget be cut below the PB16 levels, the defense 

strategy would need to be revised. 

Question. In your view, as Russian aggression and the emergence of ISIL have 

occurred since the Defense Strategic Guidance was issued in January 2012, is that 

strategic guidance still appropriate for the threats we face today or do you think 

an update is warranted? 

Answer. The guidance in the Defense Strategic Guidance and the Quadrennial 

Defense Review remains relevant. No strategy will ever be able to anticipate all surprises. This reality reinforces the imperative to continue to do our best strategic 

thinking even as we develop forces that can remain balanced, responsive, and adaptive to unforeseen challenges. 

Question. In your view, is our defense strategy and current establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the military departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. forces properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet 

security challenges the Nation faces today and into the next decade? 

Answer. I believe our strategy and structure is essentially sound. The reality of 

a dynamic security and fiscal environment demands that both our strategy and 

structure be continually assessed and adapted. Of particular concern is the need to 

remain ready today and to modernize for tomorrow in a fiscally constrained environment. 

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Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the capabilities, structure, roles, and missions of the defense establishment? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to examine options that increase the adaptability and agility of current and planned Naval forces to further enhance the natural advantages they offer through their forward presence and responsiveness. I 

would also look forward to working with other leaders across the defense enterprise 

to identify additional areas where we can improve our ability to address a broadening range of challenges. I see the need to reconstitute our nuclear deterrent forces 

and to fully exploit the potential of information technologies as areas of particular 

priority. 

MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY

Question. In your opinion, do current military plans include the necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in the 2014 QDR? Please identify areas 

of higher risk. 

Answer. The fiscal year 2016 President’s Budget provides for the minimum necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in the 2014 QDR, albeit with 

considerable risk. The strategic environment is very dynamic. If confirmed, I will 

remain personally involved to ensure that maximize the Navy’s capability within 

available resources and to provide leadership with my most accurate and timely assessment of the Navy’s ability to meet strategic objectives. 

Question. Does the 2014 QDR specify the correct set of capabilities to decisively 

win in future high-end engagements? 

Answer. I believe so. This is an extremely dynamic environment, and if confirmed, 

I will remain personally engaged to ensure that I maximize the Navy’s capabilities 

within available resources and provide leadership with my most accurate assessment of the Navy’s ability to win in a high-end fight. 

Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR, American 

forces should be able to ‘‘defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased 

campaign, and deny the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.’’ In your opinion, does the Department’s force sizing construct provide adequate capability to address the country’s current threat environment? 

Answer. Currently yes. But after three years of budget shortfalls and a high operating tempo, the Navy currently operates with considerable risk in its ability to fully 

execute this warfighting mission in accordance with existing plans. The fiscal year 

2016 President’s Budget Request begins to put the Navy on a path to recovery. If 

confirmed, I will work with my fellow leaders to maximize the Navy’s abilities within available resources. 

Question. Is the Navy adequately sized to meet this construct? 

Answer. The Navy’s 2014 update to the 2012 Force Structure Assessment calls for 

a force of 308 ships. Provided sufficient readiness is restored and maintained across 

the Fleet, this fleet size should support the highest priority requirements for both 

presence and ‘‘surge’’ in the event of increased tensions or outright conflict. The fiscal year 2016 President’s Budget puts the Navy on a path to procure the right mix 

of ships as defined by the Navy projections, though there are some capability risks 

of concern—amphibious ships, attack submarines, small surface combatants, aircraft 

inventory, and other modernization efforts. 

Question. If the Navy cannot meet the demands placed on it, how will you address 

this issue? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of the Navy, the 

Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prioritize missions 

to meet the most critical objectives in protecting national security, and evaluate and 

clearly articulate areas of risk. 

DEFENSE REDUCTION

Question. In your view, what have been/will be the impacts of the following defense budget reductions on the Navy’s capability, capacity, and readiness: 

Initial Budget Control Act reduction of $487 billion? 

Answer. The initial reduction from the Budget Control Act of 2011 placed abrupt, 

deep fiscal constraints on the Navy, which required hard choices and prioritization. 

This sudden topline-driven reduction compelled us to accept risk in our defense 

strategy in key areas. The Navy needs the restoration of adequate and predictable 

funding to recover balance, resilience, and adaptability. 

Question. Sequestration in fiscal year 2013? 

Answer. Sequestration in fiscal year 2013 resulted in a $9 billion shortfall to the 

Navy’s budget, compelling reductions in afloat and ashore operations, and particuVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00700 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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larly in ship and aviation maintenance and training. This resulted in degraded readiness and fleet response capacity, ultimately contributing to excessively long deployments for Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups. In addition, the 

Navy cancelled five ship deployments and delayed the deployment of the USS Harry 

S. Truman Strike Group by six months. Civilian furloughs, combined with hiring 

freezes and no overtime for our civilian employees, contributed to reduced maintenance and sustainment output. We are still recovering from these cuts, particularly 

in crisis response capacity. The fiscal year 2016 President’s Budget Request puts the 

Navy on a path to recover by fiscal year 2020. 

Question. Reduction of $115 billion in projected spending in the fiscal year 2015 

budget, in line with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review? 

Answer. Congress’s passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 averted some 

of the BCA cuts in fiscal year 2014–2015, but still resulted in significant funding 

shortfalls in fiscal year 2014–2015 and extended budget caps through fiscal year 

2023. For fiscal year 2015, the funding shortfall compelled the Navy to further reduce procurement of weapons and aircraft, slow modernization, and delay upgrades 

to all but the most critical shore infrastructure. If we are held to current statutory 

budget levels for fiscal year 2016–2019, the Navy would not be able to execute the 

defense strategy as currently written. 

Question. Sequestered Budget Control Act discretionary caps starting in fiscal 

year 2016 onward? 

Answer. If funded at less than the fiscal year 2016 President’s Budget Request, 

the Navy would be unable to execute the defense strategy as currently written. The 

required cuts would force us to further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce 

readiness of forces needed for contingency responses, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego or stretch procurement of force structure as a last resort. 

Question. The fiscal year 2016 budget request assumes that the Budget Control 

Act will be amended in fiscal year 2016. The fiscal year 2016 Budget Resolution 

passed by the Senate and House of Representatives do not assume this, but instead 

provides $38 billion of the requested spending through the Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) budget. 

Should this OCO funding not be available, what recommendations would you 

have, if confirmed, for how the Navy should manage additional cuts for fiscal year 

2016? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2016 President’s Budget is the minimum funding necessary for the Navy to execute its responsibilities in the current defense strategy. 

The severity of those cuts would determine the degree to which critical warfighting 

capabilities would be further delayed, the readiness of forces needed for contingency 

responses would be further eroded, weapons inventories would be further reduced, 

and procurement of force structure would be cancelled or further postponed. 

Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could have on readiness for the Navy? 

Answer. The cuts would have a significant impact on readiness for the Navy. If 

cut, my advice would be to prioritize the readiness of forces forward deployed. This 

would come at the expense of surge and response forces. In addition, ship and aviation depot maintenance backlogs would increase and shore infrastructure would further deteriorate, creating greater risk of mishaps or serious injury. 

Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could have on Navy 

capabilities? 

Answer. These cuts would also have a significant impact on the Navy’s capabilities, resulting in a smaller, less capable force. Modernization and asymmetric capabilities could be slowed, and inventories of critical assets would be insufficient to 

execute the current strategic requirements for the Navy. 

HEADQUARTERS STREAMLINING

Question. The Senate-passed Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act 

directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters functions of the Department of Defense and the military departments. 

If confirmed, and if the provisions in the bill become law, what would be your role 

in streamlining functions, as well as identifying and implementing reductions in the 

Navy headquarters? 

Answer. It is crucial for the Department to carefully align resources to the highest 

priority missions, functions, and tasks, and I am committed to continuing to examine management activities and improve efficiency of operations at all levels. If confirmed, I will work with the Department and Congress to continue to make significant strides in gaining efficiencies and savings through a more appropriate alignVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00701 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ment of workforce to workload, a streamlining of operations, and the optimization 

of mission delivery while reducing redundancies and overhead. 

Question. What areas and functions, specifically and if any, do you consider to be 

the priorities for possible consolidation or reductions within the Navy? 

Answer. Every area and function must be considered as a potential candidate for 

reductions. While I view right-sizing the staff to be a critical responsibility, it requires a thoughtful approach. If confirmed, I will specifically explore areas where 

greater use of advanced processes and technology could add value. I will exchange 

information and best practices with other leaders across the defense enterprise and 

the private sector to ensure we consider all alternatives. 

Question. To the extent that the Navy has functions that overlap with the Department of Defense, Joint Staff, or other military departments, what would be your approach to consolidating and reducing redundancy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will look forward to participating in a Department-wide 

examination of functional overlaps to identify areas for greater streamlining. 

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

Question. Interactions between the naval forces of different countries are often negotiated at the Chief of Navy level, including international exercises, Foreign Military Sales, educational exchanges, and protocols for operations. For example, recent 

former Chiefs of Naval Operations were able to draw on their experience to gain 

international cooperation on the Codes for Unplanned Events at Sea (CUES) by the 

Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the use of France’s aircraft carrier Charles 

de Gaulle in the fight against the Islamic State. 

If confirmed, how do plan to ensure the U.S. Navy continues to build strong partnerships, overcome challenges, and exploit opportunities in international cooperation? 

Answer. I believe we are stronger when we operate together, engaged with allies 

and partners, and if confirmed would enthusiastically continue to take advantage 

of these opportunities. Through activities like leader-to-leader engagements, student 

exchanges, exercises, and information sharing, the Navy is already providing a foundation for strengthening alliances and improving our combined capabilities. I would 

seek to maintain these activities and expand upon them where possible. 

Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with international naval 

leaders, forums, and processes? 

Answer. Many of my assignments have afforded me the opportunity to establish 

solid relationships with international naval leaders and key forums throughout the 

world. If confirmed, I look forward to fostering those relationships and building new 

ones through a robust engagement plan. 

JOINT OPERATIONS

Question. Naval operations are becoming increasingly ‘‘joint’’ as marines plan to 

deploy in larger numbers and on a wider range of ships; the U.S. Army and Air 

Force begin to invest in counter-maritime capabilities; and air and naval forces continue to develop and implement interoperable capabilities to defeat anti-access and 

area-denial (A2/AD) networks—a process that started with the Air-Sea Battle Concept in 2010. 

How would you characterize your familiarity with the other Services’ capabilities 

and how they organize, train and equip their forces? 

Answer. I have been privileged to serve on the Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, 

and on several operational staffs. In these assignments, I gained an appreciation for 

the capabilities and processes that the other Services bring to the Joint Force. 

Question. Are there other innovative ideas you are considering to increase Joint 

interoperability and ensure opportunities to improve cross-domain capability and capacity are not missed? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Service Chiefs and combatant commanders to seek new ways to combine forces in adaptive and responsive 

force packages. I look forward to improving information sharing standards and architectures within the Naval and Joint Forces to enhance interoperability. 

RECAPITALIZING THE FLEET

Question. Despite the Navy’s 308-ship requirement to meet the maritime demands 

of the National Military Strategy, it is currently operating with 272 battle force 

ships. Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has concluded that the 

Navy has underestimated the costs for its shipbuilding plan by approximately 11 

percent. 

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Do you consider the 308-ship force structure requirement to be appropriate given 

the current and future strategic environment? If not, please describe what changes 

may need to be made. 

Answer. Currently, yes. The 308-ship FSA update was completed in 2014 based 

on the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. The 308-ship battle force possesses the 

minimum capability and capacity to continue protecting American interests, to deter 

or contain conflict and, if called upon, to fight and win our Nation’s wars. 

Question. Do you agree with the CBO’s assessment that there is significant cost 

risk associated with executing the Navy’s shipbuilding plan? 

Answer. The Navy and CBO are in relatively close agreement in our cost estimates for the first ten years of the 30 year shipbuilding plan because we have a 

good understanding of the ships’ requirements and costs. Beyond the first ten years, 

our estimates begin to diverge largely due to uncertainty in costing and differing 

inflation projections. As the near term is most relevant from an execution perspective, the relatively small differences pose limited risk to the shipbuilding plan. If 

confirmed, I will be personally engaged to ensure that the Navy maintains accurate 

estimates of costs for shipbuilding. 

What actions do you believe are necessary to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plan 

within the Navy’s budget estimates? 

Answer. An immediate concern is maintaining a viable shipbuilding program 

while also building the Ohio replacement class submarine. I will work with Defense 

Department and Congressional leaders to address this challenge. 

Question. How would you characterize the risks to national security posed by the 

current shortfall in battle force ships and tactical aircraft? 

Answer. Today, the Navy meets all requirements of the current defense strategy, 

albeit with considerable risk. 

Question. What adjustments to the respective shipbuilding programs are necessary and appropriate to reduce operational risk? 

Answer. Based on our current strategy, I believe the fiscal year 2016 President’s 

Budget Request reflects the best balance of available resources to meet our requirements. If confirmed, I will continuously evaluate this question as a critical part of 

my responsibilities. 

Question. What further adjustments would you consider if the Navy’s shipbuilding 

program comes under further pressure due to cost growth? 

Answer. The Navy is working hard to reduce cost growth and increase affordability and stability within our shipbuilding programs. Should these measures prove 

inadequate, if confirmed I will work with Defense Department leaders and the Congress to determine the appropriate responses and to develop acceptable adjustments. 

FORD-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Question. After more than $2 billion in cost growth in each of the first three Fordclass aircraft carriers, the costs of these ships range from $11.5 billion to $13.5 billion. 

Do you support the on-going Navy study of alternatives for future development 

of aircraft carriers that would replace or supplement the Ford-class carrier? 

Answer. I fully support the Department’s decision to consider alternatives to the 

current aircraft carrier design as well as changes to the existing Ford-class design 

to reduce cost while retaining essential capability. The study will provide insight 

into the requirements, capabilities, costs, and alternatives for aircraft carriers. 

Question. In your view, should the Navy build 11 Ford-class aircraft carriers or 

should the Navy pursue a different mix of platforms for sea-based tactical aviation? 

Answer. The current plan for the Ford-class construction is the Navy’s best approach for meeting the demand for an 11-aircraft carrier force. We are not where 

we need to be on costs and are working hard to reduce them—-more effort is needed. 

While providing the needed capability to meet current and projected threats, delivery of this class will also provide major lifecycle savings compared to Nimitz-class 

carriers ($4B/ship due to reduced crewing and maintenance requirements). If confirmed, I look forward to further reducing the acquisition cost of the Ford-class 

ships. 

Question. What options would you pursue to control the cost of aircraft carriers 

and ensure individual responsibility of officials in charge of different aspects of the 

acquisition program? 

Answer. I believe that acquisition discipline arises from adhering to four basic behaviors: 

(1) A clear command and control structure that clearly specifies authorities, responsibility, and accountability; 

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(2) Unambiguous program requirements, defined early in the process and informed by realistic assessments of technological maturity and affordability; 

(3) A stable and mature design and build plan before entering into production; 

and 

(4) A close and knowledgeable oversight process to ensure delivery of the required 

capability on time and within budget. 

The Navy has taken action to incorporate these behaviors and drive improved performance. CVN 79 is now benefiting from design maturity, stable requirements, and 

a cost-effective construction plan. I will seek further opportunities to routinely review and align the requirements and costs for this program. 

Question. If confirmed, how do envision being personally involved in the oversight 

of this program? 

Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Naval Operations, I will be personally involved in acquisition, to include the CVN program. In each of my preceding positions, I have engaged with those in my command to make clear my standards and 

expectations and directly monitor performance in meeting these standards. I would 

continue this approach as CNO. 

Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report states the reliability of four systems—the electromagnetic aircraft 

launching system, advanced arresting gear, dual band radar, and advanced weapons 

elevators—are the most significant risks to the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN–78) for 

successfully completing initial operational test and evaluation. 

What is your understanding of the testing and reliability status of each of these 

key systems on CVN–78, which is scheduled to deliver in March 2016? 

Answer. My understanding for each of these systems is: 

The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS) has nearly completed all initial land based developmental testing with some shared inverter and reliability testing remaining. EMALS is currently conducting 

certification testing of the first production hardware on board CVN–78. 

Over 100 deadloads have been successfully launched in shipboard testing. 

While not meeting its original reliability growth curve, EMALS reliability 

is tracking to the revised reliability growth plan reviewed with DOT&E 

staff in early fiscal year 2015. 

The Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) is conducting land based developmental testing with deadloads, and will begin land based developmental 

aircraft testing at the end of this calendar year. Certification testing of the 

production hardware on board CVN 78 is scheduled to begin in late July 

2015. AAG is not meeting its original reliability growth plan due to technical design issues but a revised plan was reviewed with DOT&E staff in 

early fiscal year 2015. The Navy will commence AAG reliability tracking 

when land based performance testing begins this summer. 

Dual Band Radar (DBR) has been in use at Wallops Island supporting land 

based integration and testing since March 2014; land based testing will continue through June 2016. Shipboard radar subsystem testing began in May 

2015, and shipboard radar testing starts in August 2015. DBR has just 

begun reliability tracking at Wallops Island, and will continue through 

post-delivery testing onboard CVN 78. The DBR reliability growth plan was 

revised and reviewed with DOT&E staff in early fiscal year 2015. 

Finally, the Navy has completed the functional demonstration of the Advanced Weapons Elevator (AWE) at the land based test site. While behind 

schedule, shipboard installation is in progress, and testing will commence 

in August of this year. AWE reliability tracking begins at ship delivery and 

will continue through post-delivery testing. 

Clearly, the maturity and reliability of each of these systems is not where the 

Navy would like them to be. Navy leadership attention is focused on expeditiously 

completing these test programs and demonstrating effective operation and suitable 

reliability to support Initial Operational Test & Evaluation in 2018. 

Question. What is your understanding of the measures being taken to ensure 

these key systems are stable for the next aircraft carrier, USS John F. Kennedy 

(CVN–79)? 

Answer. CVN 79 is benefitting from a much more stable design and near complete 

test programs for the developmental technologies as well as construction experience 

on FORD. For each of these key systems, hardware design is complete and detailed 

test and installation experience is known. Shipboard test performance remains a 

risk. The Navy has incorporated lessons learned from these test programs and shipboard installation into CVN 79 plans. As a cost-saving measure, the Navy is adaptVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00704 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ing a proven off-the-shelf radar (Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR)) to replace the DBR on all future Ford-class hulls and air-capable amphibious ships. 

OHIO-CLASS REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Question. Navy leaders have testified that the Ohio-class Replacement Program 

will require significant investment and will result in equivalent reductions in the 

Navy budget, if a higher Navy topline or outside funding is not provided. 

What is your recommendation for how the Ohio-class Replacement Program 

should be funded? 

Answer. It is absolutely critical for the Nation to replace the Ohio-class submarines. The Navy is doing everything it can to limit requirements and control costs 

for this ship. Without increased shipbuilding funding in fiscal year 2021 and beyond, 

the Ohio Replacement Program will consume the majority of the Navy’s annual 

shipbuilding budget, costing the equivalent of 2–3 ships per year. If confirmed, I 

look forward to working with Defense Department leadership and the Congress to 

address this significant challenge. 

Question. What additional Congressional authorities do you believe are necessary 

for the Ohio-class Replacement Program? 

Answer. Obtaining sufficient funding to build the Ohio Replacement Program 

(ORP) while also preserving other shipbuilding is a significant challenge for the 

Navy. As the ORP design matures and the build plan is mapped out, if confirmed, 

I will work with the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition 

to review the ORP shipbuilding and procurement strategies, including an assessment of additional authorities that might improve the cost and efficiency of ORP 

production and related shipbuilding programs. When that work is complete, I look 

forward to discussing the plan with the Congress. 

Question. Navy leaders have testified that 12 Ohio-class replacement submarines 

must be procured and the Ohio-class Replacement Program schedule cannot be delayed in order to ensure the first deterrent patrol occurs in 2031. 

Do you support the view that there is no room for delay of the Ohio-class Replacement Program? 

Answer. Yes, the Navy has stretched the Ohio-class to the maximum extent possible, from 30 to 42 years. There is no room for further delay of the ORP. 

Question. What is the minimum number of Ohio-class replacement submarines 

that must be procured to meet mission requirements? 

Answer. A 12-ship, 16-missile tube SSBN force has sufficient flexibility and capacity, and satisfies national strategic deterrent requirements in a cost efficient manner. 

Question. What further support could Congress provide to ensure the Ohio-class 

Replacement Program remains on schedule? 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to being personally engaged with Defense Department leaders and the Congress to find ways to fund and execute both the Ohio 

replacement and the rest of the shipbuilding plan. 

Question. Do you assess Ohio-class replacement submarines will have the capabilities and attributes needed to perform their unique mission in the 2030s? 

Answer. Yes. The program is being designed to provide the Nation’s most survivable nuclear deterrent into the 2080s, and will deliver the core essential military 

capabilities required by our Nation in a cost effective and fiscally responsible manner. 

Question. How confident are you that the program will be able to produce Ohioclass replacement submarines that meet current cost estimates (i.e., $14.5 billion for 

the lead ship with plans and $5.2 billion for hulls 2–12)? 

Answer. I am confident the program will deliver at the current cost estimate. 

Question. Congress established the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund in section 1022 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015. 

What are your views on how the Navy should use this Fund to acquire Ohio-class 

replacement submarines? 

Answer. The Navy is currently undertaking a thorough review of the program design and build plan, costs, authorities, and other issues that could affect how the 

Fund might best be used. If confirmed, I look forward to sharing the results of that 

with you in order to inform the best way forward. 

ATTACK SUBMARINE FORCE LEVELS

Question. The Navy’s most recent statement of requirements for attack submarine 

force levels was 48 attack submarines. However, the Navy projects that the number 

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of attack submarines will fall as low as 41 boats and remain below the 48-boat requirement for 16 years. 

What options exist to ensure the Navy deploys attack submarines sufficient to 

meet the requirements of the combatant commanders and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs? 

Answer. The Navy can partially mitigate the attack submarine shortfall through 

multiple parallel efforts: continuing procurement of two Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) per year; shortening the construction timeline for Virginia-class 

submarines; extending the deployments of select Virginia-class attack submarines; 

and extending the service lives of select SSN 688 attack submarines. 

Question. What risks are being incurred by allowing the attack submarine force 

levels to remain below 48 for 16 years? 

Answer. Under current planning guidance, an attack submarine force level below 

48 will increase the risk of gaps in our coverage for indications and warning of potential hostile action, and delay or reduce the arrival of submarines critical to 

warfighting if conflict should arise. 

CHINESE NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES

Question. According to the Department of Defense, in the next decade, in addition 

to expanding its force of nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs), China likely 

will construct a guided missile attack submarine (SSGN) incorporating better quieting technologies. 

What are the implications for the U.S. Navy, as well as U.S. military operations 

in the Pacific, of the deployment by the Chinese of new nuclear submarines incorporating better quieting technologies? 

Answer. Our Nation currently has superiority in the undersea domain. Military 

effects from the undersea domain enable and support joint forces in the air, surface, 

cyber, land, and space domains to gain access and be more effective. It is critical 

that we maintain superiority under sea in order to achieve desired military outcomes and strategic influence. The U.S. advantage is being challenged by China and 

Russia, and we must be alert to an advancing and adapting threat. Quieter and 

more capable submarines will require that the Navy continually improve our undersea capabilities. 

Question. According to the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement submitted 

by the President, ‘‘China’s strategy for strengthening its military involves the acquisition of foreign technology as well as greater civil-military integration.’’ The report 

notes that ‘‘one notable area of interest is China’s selection of domestic manufacturers for the AP–1000, which is a civil nuclear reactor’s canned motor pumps. These 

are the same domestic manufacturers contracted to produce the pumps for China’s 

first generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. 

What are the risks pertaining to the possible diversion of civil nuclear reactor 

technology for military use—particularly for quieting Chinese submarines and providing longer patrol time? 

Answer. These questions are very difficult to discuss in an unclassified environment. As requested by the Congress, in my role as Director, Naval Reactors I submitted a classified report on 24 April 2015. These topics were also discussed at classified briefings with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 11 May 2015 and 

the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 3 June 2015. If desired, I look forward to 

continuing those discussions in a classified setting. 

Question. Can you assure the committee that there will be no risk of military diversion resulting from the United States-China nuclear cooperation agreement? 

Answer. While it is impossible to state that there will be ‘‘no risk,’’ per the terms 

of the successor United States-China Atomic Energy Act Section 123 Agreement 

each party agrees any material, equipment, components, technology, and information transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall not be used for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for 

any military purpose. Enhancements included in the successor Agreement help to 

strengthen enforcement of the terms of the Agreement. 

Question. Given China’s activities in the South and East China Seas, in your 

view, does it make sense at this time to agree to expand civil-nuclear cooperation? 

Answer. The successor United States-China Atomic Energy Act Section 123 Agreement ensures continued United States access to China’s civilian nuclear complex, 

allowing for the development of a culture of best practices on nuclear security and 

safety, as well as the opportunity to ensure Chinese nonproliferation policies are 

consistent with international nonproliferation norms. I believe that the United 

States’ ability to achieve a positive outcome in this effort is enhanced through an 

open and active relationship fostered under this Agreement. 

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Question. What message could this cooperation send to our allies in the region 

who look to the United States to respond to increasing Chinese military and political influence in the region? 

Answer. I believe that the successor United States-China Atomic Energy Act Section 123 Agreement is intended to reaffirm that the U.S. will remain an active partner in the Pacific, and to reassure our partners and allies of the U.S. commitment 

to strategic balance in the region. 

Question. In your role as Director of Naval Reactors, what actions did you take 

to ensure the AP–1000 pump design and its components would not enable the Chinese Navy to advance their submarine reactor pump technologies? 

Answer. The AP–1000 reactor coolant pumps are designed by Curtiss Wright, the 

same company that produces the U.S. Navy’s reactor coolant pumps. The military 

and commercial product lines are segregated at the Curtiss Wright facility. Personnel, cyber and physical security protocols are enacted at Curtiss Wright and our 

other critical military suppliers to protect U.S. Navy technology. 

Question. What role does your office play in reviewing license applications for the 

export of nuclear technology? 

Answer. The Department of Defense, including the U.S. Navy and Naval Reactors, 

is involved in reviewing civil nuclear technology export license requests. These reviews, which are informed by Intelligence Community assessments, evaluate the implications of potential diversion to military programs and are an important part of 

the Interagency process used to adjudicate export license requests. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD)

Question. The Navy plays an important role in defending the Nation against the 

threat of long range ballistic missile attack and in defending allies, friends, and deployed forces against theater ballistic missile threats. 

In conjunction with its 2014 Force Structure Assessment update, the Navy informed the committee that the entire 88-ship large surface combatant requirement 

includes having a BMD capability, with 40 of these needing the advanced BMD 5.X 

capability. Today, the Navy has 33 BMD-capable ships, with just three of these having the advanced BMD 5.X capability. In 2020, the Navy projects having 39 BMD 

ships, with 16 having BMD 5.X. 

Do you view ballistic missile defense as a core Navy mission? 

Answer. Yes, it is a proven capability the Navy provides to the Joint Force. 

Question. What options should be explored to reduce the shortfall in meeting the 

stated requirement of having 88 BMD-capable ships, including 40 with the advanced 

BMD 5.X capability? 

Answer. The Navy is on a path to field 88 large surface combatants, to include 

40 new and modernized DDGs equipped with advanced BMD capability. 

Question. Do you support removing BMD capability from Ticonderoga-class guided 

missile cruisers as part of the Navy’s proposed cruiser phased modernization plan? 

Answer. Given my current understanding of the issue, I do. This represents one 

of the difficult choices forced by tight financial constraints. At this point, the Navy 

has determined that the benefits to investing in DDG modernization, to include its 

BMD enhancements, are greater than those that would result from retaining BMD 

capability on the CGs. 

Question. If so, how do you reconcile having a shortfall to the stated BMD requirement and removing BMD from large surface combatants? 

Answer. Investing in DDG modernization is the most cost effective path to meeting our BMD requirement. 

AMPHIBIOUS FLEET REQUIREMENTS

Question. What is your view of the need for and size of the Navy’s amphibious 

ship fleet? 

Answer. Amphibious ships are a critical element of our joint force capabilities. I 

support the current requirement of 38 amphibious ships and the plan to build 34, 

given fiscal constraints. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the 

Commandant and the Secretary of the Navy to continue to support amphibious shipping. 

Question. What alternatives would you consider to augment amphibious ships in 

providing lift to Marine Corps units? In what scenarios would these alternatives be 

necessary and appropriate? 

Answer. Increased fleet operations have strained combatant scheduling and reduced our fleet commanders’ tasking flexibility. As such, the Navy has evaluated 

methods to use auxiliary ships to augment—not replace—our most capable amphibious ships. We have successfully embarked marine detachments on ships such as 

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the afloat forward staging bases (AFSB), destroyers, littoral combat ships (LCS), 

mobile landing platforms (MLP), and joint high-speed vessels (JHSV). Military Sealift Command (MSC) also maintains additional auxiliary platforms which are successfully operating with marine detachments today. These platforms help mitigate 

shortfalls of amphibious shipping. 

None of these alternatives provide the same breadth or depth of capabilities resident in our amphibious fleet. Their use is most appropriate in settings where the 

risks of combat are believed to be low, and where the greatest needs are for lift, 

rather than the broader suite of military capabilities offered by more capable amphibious platforms. 

If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Marine Corps, the Secretary 

of the Navy, and others to identify the most appropriate solutions to supporting Marine Corps activities and operations around the globe, given existing resources. 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS)

Question. In December 2014, the Secretary of Defense announced his decision to 

upgrade the Littoral Combat Ships, designated LCS–33 through LCS–52, to provide 

a more capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the 

capabilities of a frigate. 

Do you support the Secretary of Defense’s decision to upgrade the LCS? 

Answer. Yes, I believe the modifications to the LCS design will add valuable 

lethality and survivability to the final 20 hulls. 

Question. What is your understanding of the acquisition strategy for the LCS and 

LCS mission modules, as modified by the Secretary of Defense’s decision? 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense’s decision to procure a modified LCS (Frigate) 

to follow the LCS Flight 0+, will produce 32 LCS and 20 Frigates. The acquisition 

strategy procures three LCS per year through fiscal year 2018. Frigate procurement 

starts in fiscal year 2019 with two ships, and continues with three ships per year 

from fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2025. The Navy is updating the mission 

module procurement plan. 

Question. Are you concerned by the personnel and configuration management 

issues that are presented by fielding and sustaining LCS Flight 0, LCS Flight 0+, 

the upgraded LCS (frigate), and ‘‘backfitting’’ frigate-like capabilities on existing 

LCS, as well as the managing the various mission modules and mission module increments? 

Answer. The Small Surface Combatant Task Force examined a range of configurations and platforms before arriving at the plan that was subsequently approved by 

the Secretary of Defense. The Navy is working with the shipbuilders to incorporate 

the changes. If confirmed, ensuring that this plan delivers the best outcome in a 

cost effective manner will be one of my top priorities. 

Question. If so, and if you are confirmed, how would you propose managing and 

simplifying these configuration issues? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess whether any additional steps are required beyond a close collaboration with the program manager and the shipyards. 

Question. What is your view of the peacetime and wartime mission of the LCS? 

Answer. LCS provides the Navy with critical capabilities to address validated 

gaps in Surface Warfare (SUW), Mine Countermeasures (MCM), and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) in both open ocean and the littorals. LCS also supports deployed forward presence to meet combatant commander demand. 

Question. What is your assessment of the requirements for survivability of the 

LCS Flight 0, Flight 0+, and LCS (frigate)? 

Answer. LCS survivability requirements were analyzed by Naval Sea Systems 

Command, which determined they are adequate to meet the missions expected of 

the ship. The work performed by the Small Surface Combatant Task Force identified several survivability enhancements for the Frigate that will be back-fitted as 

practical in LCS. 

Question. What is your assessment of the delivered survivability capability of the 

LCS Flight 0, Flight 0+, and LCS (frigate)? 

Answer. The delivered survivability capability of LCS meets the requirements laid 

out in the LCS Flight 0+ Capabilities Development Document (CDD). 

Question. Do you support the Navy force structure assessment requirement of 52 

small surface combatants? 

Answer. Currently yes. I support the Force Structure Assessment (FSA) requirement of 52 small surface combatants. The Navy plans to meet this requirement with 

a combination of 32 LCS and 20 Frigates. 

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TACTICAL FIGHTER PROGRAMS

Question. The F–35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, which is the largest and most 

expensive acquisition program in the Department’s history, was formally initiated 

as a program of record in 2002 with a total planned buy of 2,443 aircraft for the 

U.S. At projected procurement rates, the aircraft will be procured by the Department well into the 2030 decade to reach its total quantity buy. The program has 

not yet completed its systems development and demonstration phase, and is not due 

to enter full rate production until 2019, 17 years after its inception. 

The Navy’s fiscal year 2016 budget request indicates a program of record of 369 

F–35C, with Navy procurement continuing throughout the life of the F–35 procurement program. 

The overall requirement for 2,443 aircraft was established nearly 20 years ago. 

Since that time, however, there have been countervailing pressures to: (1) reduce 

force structure to conserve resources; (2) improve capability to respond to prospective adversary technological advances and increased capabilities from updated 

threat assessments; and (3) respond to an evolving national defense strategy. 

Do you believe the Navy’s F–35C requirement is still valid? 

Answer. Yes, the F–35C will be a vital part of the future Carrier Air Wing. 

Question. Do you believe the Navy can afford and needs to procure 310 more F– 35Cs with a procurement cost of over $42 billion? 

The F–35C provides essential 5th generation strike fighter capability to our Carrier Air Wings. Without this capability, we cannot achieve air superiority. The Department of the Navy currently has a requirement for 340 F–35Cs. If confirmed, I 

will work with the Chairman and other service chiefs to revalidate the appropriate 

number of aircraft the Navy requires to meet the mission. 

Do you believe that the Navy will still want to buy the F–35C, an aircraft design 

that will be 30 years old before the Navy production is scheduled to finish? 

Answer. The Navy is committed to making the F–35C the next Carrier Air Wing 

fighter, complementing the F/A–18E/F until that aircraft reaches the end of its lifetime in the 2030s. 

Question. Do you believe the Navy’s current and planned force mix of tactical aircraft is sufficient to meet current and future threats around the globe, and most especially in the Asia-Pacific theater of operations where the ‘‘tyranny of distance’’ is 

such a major factor? 

Answer. Currently, I do. There are capability, inventory, and readiness aspects to 

delivering the required force mix. If confirmed, I will work with leadership to determine the best options to pace the threat in a dynamic security and fiscal environment. 

Question. The Secretary of the Navy recently remarked that he believed the F– 

35 should be and would be the Nation’s last manned fighter aircraft. Do you believe 

this to be true? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy to aggressively 

advance the development of unmanned systems. It is crucial that we push the 

boundaries of what unmanned technologies can achieve; the next generation in tactical aviation will play a large part in this transformation. 

Question. What will be your role in leading capabilities and requirements development to increase the role of unmanned aerial combat systems in the Navy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to make the continued development of unmanned 

systems a hallmark of my tenure. I intend to push the Navy into new ways of thinking about combinations of people and technologies to maximize our operational advantage. 

Question. How do you see the future balance developing between manned and unmanned combat aircraft for the Navy’s future force structure? 

Answer. I believe that the advent of advanced information technology is redefining the approach to obtaining the most effective relationship between people and 

technology. There is vast potential to change the balance of manned and unmanned 

platforms in general, and this potential is a key to helping the United States minimize the risk to our people and stay ahead of rapidly evolving threats. 

READINESS

Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of the Navy to meet 

national security requirements across the full spectrum of military operations? 

Answer. While forward deployed Navy forces continue to meet readiness standards, I am most concerned about the Navy’s ability to meet the timelines associated 

with providing either follow-on or ‘‘surge’’ forces should they be requested by combatant commanders. For instance, we are currently not meeting our required crisis 

response capacity and do not fully recover until 2020. 

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Question. What is your assessment of the near-term trend in the readiness of the 

Navy? 

Answer. The 2016 President’s Budget Request provides the minimum resources to 

achieve the levels of readiness to meet requirements by 2020. This plan still includes considerable risk, and does not allow for any unexpected contingencies. 

Question. How critical is it to find a solution to sequestration given the impacts 

we have already seen to readiness in fiscal year 2013? 

Answer. It is absolutely critical. Without relief from the current budget caps, we 

will fall farther below requirements to the point that the Navy will not be able to 

meet our responsibilities in the current strategy. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the methods currently 

used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of Navy equipment? 

Answer. To estimate the resources needed for maintenance, the Navy takes a requirements-based approach that first defines the required level of readiness for a 

given unit at a particular time, for a particular mission. This accounts for personnel, 

equipment, sustainment, training, and ordnance. Efforts are made to ensure that 

units are appropriately ready, balancing the operational availability to the 

warfighters consistent with expected employment. While this analytical approach 

provides discipline and predictability to the system, recent budget perturbations and 

uncertainty makes cost and associated readiness estimates much more complex, and 

drives up the cost/readiness in nearly every case. When readiness suffers—particularly in maintenance—it can take years to recover. 

Question. Given the backlog in equipment maintenance over the last several 

years, do you believe that we need an increased investment to reduce this backlog? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2016 President’s Budget Request, with OCO funding, fully 

funds ship maintenance to continue life cycle maintenance reset of CVNs and surface force ships. To address workload to be completed in our public shipyards, Navy 

also funds additional workforce and will send selective submarines to private shipyards. Navy funds aviation depot maintenance to capacity, increasing funding as 

throughput improves. 

Question. How important is it to reduce the materiel maintenance backlog in 

order to improve readiness? 

Answer. It is very important to the Navy. Maintenance and training backlogs 

have delayed deployments, which have in turn forced extensions for those already 

deployed. Since 2013, many CSGs, ARGs, and destroyers have been on deployment 

for 8–10 months or longer. This comes at a cost to the resiliency of our people, sustainability of our equipment, and service lives of our ships. Readiness shortfalls take 

stable and predictable funding over a period of years to correct, and force operational units to extend beyond sustainable levels. 

Question. How important is it to receive OCO funding 2 or 3 years after the end 

of combat operations in order to ensure all equipment is reset? 

Answer. It is very important. We remain reliant on OCO funding for ongoing overseas operations, reset, and enduring requirements. 

Question. In your judgment, is the current and recent operational tempo adversely 

affecting the readiness or retention of sailors on Active Duty and in the Reserve 

component? 

Answer. There is no doubt that our sailors and their families are mission focused—they are proud to do their job—making significant sacrifices—as they serve 

the Nation. Having said that, in my experience, the dominant factor that is negatively affecting our sailors’ professional experience in the Navy, and the stress that 

their families experience, is the frustration associated with things like delays to getting underway, deployment extensions, training delays and gaps, delays in maintenance periods, and last-minute parts availability. These avoidable unpredictabilities 

are the single biggest detractor to quality of service. 

Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities for maintaining readiness in 

the near term, while modernizing the Navy to ensure readiness in the future? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will strive to achieve the appropriate balance between 

these two imperatives. My first priority will be to deliver a sustainable level of mission-ready forward presence and contingency response capacity to the combatant 

commanders. However, these near-term priorities cannot be made at the expense of 

the capability and capacity of the Navy’s future force. We must maintain commitment to modernize our Navy to meet tomorrow’s challenges, particularly the need 

to modernize our undersea strategic deterrent, and to address emerging opportunities in information technology. If confirmed, I will work with Defense Department 

leadership and the Congress to achieve adequate and predictable resources to meet 

current readiness and employment requirements while investing in the future. 

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Question. In years past, Congress has based additional readiness funding decisions on the Service Chief unfunded priorities lists. However, in recent years those 

lists have not been provided or have arrived too late to help in our markup process. 

If confirmed, do you agree to provide unfunded priorities lists to Congress in a 

timely manner beginning with the fiscal year 2017 budget request? 

Answer. Yes. I will make all efforts to comply with Congressional direction. 

Question. In the past, a number of ships failed inspections by the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV), including Aegis cruisers and destroyers, due to poor material condition. The Navy classified INSURV inspection results in 2008 and stopped 

using pass-fail criteria in 2012. 

Do you support the current policy of keeping INSURV results classified? 

Answer. Yes, getting an unvarnished assessment of our ships is critical to understanding the readiness level of the fleet. Furthermore, the detailed readiness assessment of our forces should be kept from any potential adversaries. 

Question. Do you support the current grading criteria, which lack a pass/fail determination? 

Answer. Yes. I believe that the existing system, which grades ships using a holistic score and compares them to other ships in their class, provides more useful insight about a ship’s condition and the path to correct deficiencies. 

Question. Given INSURV no longer provides failing or unsatisfactory scores, how 

will you ensure Congress is promptly notified when the material condition of a ship 

is unsatisfactory? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the readiness of our fleet is 

promptly known to Defense Department leadership and the Congress. 

Question. Navy leaders have stated rotational deployments will be stabilized and 

more predictable through continued implementation of an improved deployment 

framework called the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O–FRP). 

What is your understanding of the O–FRP? 

Answer. O–FRP is designed to align manning, maintenance, and modernization 

of our platforms with training in order to achieve readiness and meet regional needs 

in the most effective and efficient manner. O–FRP should allow the Navy to achieve 

stable and predictable 7-month deployments, which will help to reset our readiness 

and increase certainty for our sailors and families. 

Question. Do you support implementation of the O–FRP? 

Answer. Yes. As O–FRP goes forward, if confirmed I will work closely with the 

fleet commanders to continuously review effectiveness of O–FRP in meeting our 

strategic objectives. 

Question. To what extent will implementation of the O–FRP improve the material 

readiness of the fleet? 

Answer. O–FRP is designed to improve material readiness by providing greater 

stability and predictability in maintenance schedules. Restoring predictability to 

maintenance periods, when combined with sufficient and predictable resources in 

our shipyards and depots should allow for better maintenance outcomes and improved overall fleet readiness. 

Question. What metrics should Congress use to track the material readiness and 

material condition of Navy ships and aircraft, as well as the effectiveness of O–FRP? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the material readiness of our 

fleet is promptly known to Departmental leadership and the Congress. 

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. Officials of the Department of Defense, including previous Chiefs of 

Naval Operations, have advocated for accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. 

Do you support United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the 

Law of the Sea? 

Answer. I support accession to the Convention. Being a party to the Convention 

enhances the United States’ security posture by reinforcing freedom of the seas and 

rights vital to ensuring our global force posture. The Convention provides legal certainty in the world’s largest maneuver space. Access would strengthen the legal 

foundation for our ability to transit through international straits and archipelagic 

waters; preserve our right to conduct military activities in other countries’ Exclusive 

Economic Zones (EEZs) without notice or permission; reaffirm the sovereign immunity of warships; provide a framework to counter excessive maritime claims; and 

preserve our operations and intelligence-collection activities. Joining the Convention 

would also demonstrate our commitment to the rule of law, strengthen our credibility among those nations that are already party to the Convention, and allow us 

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nally, it would secure for us a leadership role in shaping and influencing future 

maritime developments. 

Question. How would you respond to critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States? 

Answer. There are significant national security impacts from failing to join the 

Convention. By remaining outside the Convention, the United States remains in 

scarce company with Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, and Syria, and foregoes the 

most effective way to counter undesirable changes in the law or to exercise international leadership. By not acceding to UNCLOS we deny ourselves the ability to 

challenge changes to international law as a result of the practice of nations at the 

local, regional, or global level. As some states seek to interpret treaty provisions in 

a manner that restricts freedom of navigation, U.S. reliance on customary international law as the legal foundation for our military activities in the maritime becomes far more vulnerable and needlessly places our forces in a more tenuous position during operations. Moreover, by failing to join the Convention, some countries 

may come to doubt our commitment to act in accordance with international law. 

Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of 

the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime disputes such as in the 

South China Sea and in the Arctic? 

Answer. Acceding to the Convention would strengthen our credibility and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. While we do not take sides in 

the various territorial disputes in the South China Sea, we do have a national security interest in ensuring disputes are resolved peacefully, countries adhere to the 

rule of law, and all nations fully respect freedom of the seas. However, we undermine our leverage by not signing up to the same rule book by which we are asking 

other countries to accept. As for the Artic, the other Arctic coastal nations (Russia, 

Canada, Norway, and Denmark (Greenland)) understand the importance of the Convention and are in the process of utilizing the Convention’s procedures to establish 

the outer limits of their extended continental shelves (ECS) in the Arctic. The 

United States has a significant ECS in the Arctic Ocean, but cannot avail itself of 

the Convention’s mechanisms to gain international recognition of its ECS. We must 

put our rights on a treaty footing and more fully and effectively interact with the 

other seven Arctic Council nations who are parties to the Convention. 

UNITED STATES FORCE POSTURE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Question. The Department continues the effort to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific as announced in the January 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance. 

Are you satisfied with the rebalance efforts to date? 

Answer. Thus far, I am satisfied with our rebalance efforts, as they have resulted 

in a significant adjustment in United States Navy force structure and capabilities 

in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Question. What do you see as the United States security priorities in the AsiaPacific region over the next couple of years and what specific Navy capabilities or 

enhancements are needed in to meet those priorities? 

Answer. The Indo-Asia-Pacific region is becoming a priority not only for the 

United States, but for the world. Rising economies, access to natural resources, critical trade routes, and growing navies all present both opportunities and risks. In 

order to protect our interests, the United States faces a range of challenges in the 

Asia-Pacific region, including provocations by North Korea and the growth of its ballistic missile programs, as well as China’s expansion into the Pacific and Indian 

oceans, supported by their rapidly growing navy. 

Going forward, a whole-of-government approach is warranted. Moreover, I believe 

we must address this challenge in a regional context—continuing to enhance relations with and the capabilities of regional allies and partners. For our part, as this 

is such a vast maritime theater, the Navy must continue to prioritize the full spectrum of our capabilities towards the Pacific. 

Question. Do the budget cuts and resource constraints associated with sequestration threaten your ability to execute the rebalance to the Pacific? 

Answer. Resourcing levels below the fiscal year 2016 President’s Budget Request 

would necessitate reworking the current defense strategy, including the rebalance 

to the Pacific. 

ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL

Over the past few years, much has been made of the emerging anti-access and 

area denial capabilities of certain countries and the prospect that these capabilities 

may in the future limit the U.S. Navy’s freedom of movement and action in certain 

regions. 

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Question. Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities are a 

concern? 

Answer. Yes. The development and proliferation of advanced systems that can 

sense, target and strike ships at increasing ranges and accuracy is a vital concern 

to me. If confirmed, I will work with other defense leaders and leaders in industry 

to develop technologies that assure access by the joint force. 

Question. If so, what do you believe the Navy needs to be doing now and in the 

next few years to ensure continued access to all strategically important segments 

of the maritime domain? 

Answer. The free use of the maritime commons is critical to the global economic 

system and U.S. national interests. The Navy will continue to first and foremost be 

present and exercise freedom of navigation in international waters and to reassure 

our allies and partners. Further the Navy must continue to develop new concepts, 

platforms, and technologies that can effectively address this emerging threat to access. Question. If confirmed, you would play an important role in the process of transforming the Navy to meet new and emerging threats. Concerning capability and capacity to meet new and emerging threats, what are your goals regarding transformation of the Navy? 

Answer. If confirmed, one of my primary goals would be to ensure the Navy fully 

exploits the potential offered by advances in technology, and particularly information technology, to enhance our ability to rapidly and adaptively combine forces and 

capabilities. To support this aim, the acquisition processes that design and build 

these capabilities must become more agile. Finally, we must consider what changes 

must be made to the way that we train and employ our people to ensure that our 

sailors remain on the cutting edge of capability. If confirmed, I will ensure that the 

Navy incorporates these changes swiftly and effectively. 

CHINA ASSERTIVENESS

Question. How has China’s aggressive assertion of territorial and maritime claims, 

particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea, affected security and stability in the region? 

Answer. China’s actions in the South and East China Seas, as well as its rapid 

military modernization and growing defense budgets, have led many in the region, 

including the United States, to question its long-term intentions. China has still not 

clarified its 9–Dash Line claim, and it continues to conduct land-reclamation and 

construction activities in the South China Sea. Such behavior has been destabilizing 

for the region and has increased the risk of miscalculation or conflict among regional actors. Our allies and partners in the region are increasingly looking to the 

United States for leadership and support in the face of these challenges, and so our 

response to China’s challenges to the international maritime order should be firm 

and consistent. 

CHINA

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of the United States-China 

military relationship? 

Answer. The United States-China military-to-military relationship is a critical 

component of our overall bilateral relationship and an important aspect of our regional maritime strategy. Right now, I believe the military relationship is contributing to stability in the region. This stability allows us to increase cooperation on 

areas of overlapping interests, while improving our ability to manage other aspects 

of the security relationship responsibly. The broader bilateral relationship can improve through strengthening trust and transparency between the two militaries. 

Question. What are your views regarding China’s interest in and commitment to 

improving military relations with the United States? 

Answer. I believe China recognizes the United States will have an enduring presence in the Pacific and therefore has a clear interest in sustaining military-to-military contacts. If confirmed, I will continue to use the military relationship as a tool 

to build sustained and substantive dialogue, develop areas of practical cooperation, 

and manage competition in a way that protects national interests and supports 

overall stability in the relationship and the Asia-Pacific region. 

Question. What is your view of the purpose and relative importance of sustained 

military-to military relations with China? 

Answer. Mil-Mil relations are an important part of our bilateral relationship. 

They can be fruitful because of a shared military culture, this is true for navies in 

particular as we operate together in international waters governed by common rules 

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terests by strengthening understanding, transparency, and familiarity. This must be 

done in a thoughtful way that protects our interests. 

Question. What role do you see for the Chief of Naval Operations in this process? 

Answer. I believe the CNO plays a pivotal role to personally sustain a meaningful 

working relationship with all of his counterparts around the world, to the end of 

promoting the international rules and norms that have been the foundation of regional stability for decades and have afforded nations such as China unprecedented 

economic growth and prosperity. 

UNMANNED SYSTEMS

Question. The Navy’s current plan for the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne 

Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system aircraft is to develop an airframe optimized for unrefueled endurance (14 hours) and the ISR mission. 

Given the combat radius of the planned Carrier Air Wing, are you concerned the 

Navy’s aircraft carriers will lack the ability to project power at relevant distances, 

given emerging anti-access/area-denial threats? 

Answer. I am concerned. The rapidly evolving technological and security environments require that we continually work to develop concepts and capabilities that 

will allow us to maintain assured access and project power when needed. That is 

why our planned modernization integrates the warfighting capabilities of the entire 

Air Wing including strike fighter, airborne electronic attack, and command and control modernization to assure access in contested environments. As part of this integrated approach, the UCLASS program is designed to provide both Intelligence, 

Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting and future strike capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward to participating with other defense leaders and industry to 

ensure success in this critical area. 

STRATEGIC THINKING

Question. How do you plan to foster a dedicated, educated, and assigned group 

of strategic thinkers and planners who rise to the rank of flag rank officer? 

Answer. The Navy has several opportunities for an officer to develop into a strategic leader. The Naval War College, Naval Post Graduate School, and other services’ schools provide a rich education in strategy and policy. As well, the Navy has 

programs with other colleges and universities both in the United States and abroad 

that provide opportunities to become educated in strategic thinking. We are and will 

continue to pursue initiatives to improve in this vital area. 

CONVENTIONAL VS. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Question. What role do you see for the Navy in conventional deterrence? 

Answer. Naval forward presence is critical to conventional deterrence. Captured 

in the phrase that the Navy is ‘‘where it matters, when it matters’’ is the ability 

to be forward to enhance stability and deter undesired behavior. 

Question. How do strategic and conventional deterrence complement one another? 

Answer. It is a complementary relationship. Our Nation’s strategic deterrent has 

been a bedrock of peace and stability, precluding major wars for over 50 years. The 

Navy’s contribution to this is the SSBN force, which has provided a survivable and 

responsive capability and 100 percent alert coverage since the 1960s. That force recently celebrated its 4,000th strategic deterrent patrol. Complementing this strategic deterrent, as discussed above, our conventional naval forces are present to be 

seen and to reassure our partners that we have a global reach that protects the 

international system. Both work in tandem within the Joint force to guarantee stability. 

OFFSET TECHNOLOGIES

Question. During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key technologies to offset 

the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces: precision guided munitions, 

stealth technology, and satellite-based navigation. These three technologies have 

given U.S. forces unparalleled superiority until now. However, with advancements 

by our emerging adversaries, it seems like the military technological superiority is 

beginning to erode. As a result, it is critical that the United States once again focus 

on offsetting the erosion of our technology advantages being achieved by our potential adversaries. 

Which technology priorities do you believe the Navy should be pursuing to maintain the military technological superiority of the United States? 

Answer. The advances in information technology—via cyber capabilities and in 

the electromagnetic spectrum—present significant future potential. Related, these 

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technologies, when coupled with precision guidance and sensors, present significant 

opportunities for unmanned systems. The advent of additive manufacturing (3D 

printing) technology is another area that should be aggressively pursued. Finally, 

advances in power generation and conditioning allow for opportunities in directed 

energy weapons. Just as important as any technology, the process by which the 

Navy develops and fields new capabilities must become more agile. We must learn 

and adapt faster. 

Question. What strategies would you recommend be implemented to develop these 

technology priorities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing the momentum the Navy has 

established to develop and deploy innovative technologies and to refine our staff organization and processes to become more adaptable and agile. My sense is that closer collaboration with industry will enhance our effectiveness in this endeavor. 

Question. What role should the services play in their development? 

Answer. The Services play a vital role in resourcing the research and development 

to address needs, lead creative thinking about the future, and ensure that promising 

approaches survive the leap from research to production. If confirmed, this will get 

my personal attention. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit to the warfighter. In this regard, 

it is critical that advancements quickly transition from the development phase into 

testing and evaluation and ultimately into a procurement program for the 

warfighter. 

What are some of the challenges you see in transitioning technologies effectively 

from research programs into programs of records? 

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work with Defense Department leadership and 

the Congress to enhance the Navy’s ability to develop capabilities that can be rapidly prototyped and tested in the field, and if successful, integrated into the fleet. 

I believe this will accelerate the learning cycle and allow capability to enter the 

Navy at a pace more comparable to the private sector. This must be done thoughtfully, keeping in mind that Naval systems must operate reliably for extended periods of time in hostile maritime environments. Continued mission success and the 

safety of our sailors depend on these capabilities. 

Question. As the Chief of Naval Operations, what steps will you take to ensure 

that the services are benefitting more quickly and directly from the research being 

performed by the defense research enterprise? 

Answer. Leveraging the research being conducted elsewhere in the defense enterprise, ensuring we don’t duplicate efforts unnecessarily, and bringing the technical 

communities together to share information are all high priorities for me. Our technical workforce needs to be able to spend time interacting with researchers and attending professional workshops. If confirmed, I will engage with universities, industry, and research institutions to work on our toughest challenges. 

Question. Do you feel that defense technologies and systems, especially in areas 

such as mobile communications, computing, and robotics, are keeping pace with 

global and commercial technological advances? If not, what do you suggest that the 

Department do to keep up with the pace of global technological change? 

Answer. Global technological advancements are profound, and I believe that we 

should monitor and leverage them that at every opportunity, as they represent a 

source of tremendous advantage. If confirmed, I look forward to identifying specific 

areas where we can trust commercial markets to produce capabilities that are suitable—even preferable—to independently developing them ‘‘in house.’’ 

Question. As you know, robust investment in S&T underpins technological advances in our military capabilities and is vital for maintain our military technological superiority over emerging adversaries. 

If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess whether the Navy is investing 

adequately in S&T programs? 

Answer. Given the challenges associated with identifying a benefit, it may be most 

useful to ensure that a fixed percentage of overall funding remains allocated to basic 

research. I believe the Defense Department, to include the Navy, must have a robust understanding of the areas of basic research that are likely to provide those 

advances most relevant to its missions, and invest in those that are least likely to 

attract adequate funding from other sources. If confirmed, I would ensure that the 

Navy’s analysis in this area remains robust. 

Question. How would you assess the value and appropriate investment level for 

basic research programs? 

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Answer. I believe that our current investment in basic research is appropriate 

given the current fiscal reality. 

Question. What tools would you use to ensure that appropriate technologies are 

transitioning quickly into programs of record? 

Answer. If confirmed, this will be an area of keen interest during my tenure as 

CNO. At every level of this organization, we recognize that delivering technological 

superiority to our warfighters is of paramount importance yet often happens too 

slowly. I would assist the Secretary in the acquisition process to ensure that the 

warfighter’s needs are properly articulated, prioritized, and resourced, and that the 

requirements process is agile enough to drive an even faster pace. The Navy has 

already started moving in this direction with Task Force Innovation, establishing 

a DASN for unmanned systems, and establishing the office of OPNAV N99 to focus 

on transitioning new technologies more quickly. 

TECHNICAL WORKFORCE

Question. A significant challenge facing the Department of Defense today is an 

impending shortage of high quality scientific and engineering talent to work at Defense laboratories and technical centers. 

In your view, what are the pros and cons of having Active Duty Navy personnel 

trained and working as scientists and engineers within the Navy research and acquisition system? 

Answer. The Navy is continually assessing the appropriate roles for military, civilian, and contractor personnel to determine the best approach to meeting our research and acquisition needs. If confirmed I look forward to exploring this issue 

more fully. 

Question. How would you ensure that directors of labs in your service have the 

tool they need to dynamically shape their S&T workforce? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the directors and the resource sponsors to 

ensure that we maintain a system that is responsive to the needs of the current 

S&T environment, including people, security, and instrumentation and tools. 

TEST AND EVALUATION ISSUES

Question. What do you see as the role of the developmental and operational test 

and evaluation communities with respect to rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition and 

other evolutionary acquisition processes? 

Answer. The operational test and evaluation communities play a critical role in 

ensuring the systems the Navy produces are ready for the stresses of extended operation at sea and ultimately for combat. This community ensures that our systems 

will perform to expectations and allow our sailors and commanders to have the capability and confidence in their gear that they need to win. 

Question. Are you satisfied with the Navy’s test and evaluation capabilities, including workforce and infrastructure? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. In which areas, if any, do you feel the Navy should be developing new 

test and evaluation capabilities? 

Answer. New technologies and rapid prototyping and fielding schemes will likely 

require us to develop new test and evaluation capabilities as well—capabilities that 

will evaluate new systems in ways that both provide the confidence in the system’s 

performance and also are responsive. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely 

with Defense Department leadership and the Congress to explore ways to achieve 

both of these aims. 

Question. What are your views on the appropriate roles of OSD developmental 

and operational testing organizations with respect to testing of Navy systems? 

Answer. The evaluation performed by OSD developmental and operational testing 

organizations is critical to delivering combat ready systems. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to partner with these organizations. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. What do you consider to be the key to the Navy’s success in recruiting 

the highest caliber American youth for service and retaining the best personnel for 

leadership responsibilities? 

Answer. Today our recruiting and retention numbers are at historic highs. Maintaining this quality as the economy improves will be critical to our ability to command the seas and provide options to national leadership. Key to recruiting and retaining high quality personnel will be to remain true to our values and beliefs. People with talent such as we see joining our ranks have many choices—and they chose 

to join our Navy team because we work together in high-preforming teams that 

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stand for something noble and true. We must always remain vigilant to ensure that 

our behaviors remain consistent with our values. As such, our ability to revise and 

renew outdated and cumbersome policies, practices, and technologies, to permit our 

current and future generations to fulfill their potential and their desire to serve, will 

be critical to keeping people on our team. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you feel should be taken to ensure that current 

operational requirements and tempo do not adversely impact the overall readiness, 

recruiting, retention, and morale of sailors? 

Answer. Central to recruiting and retaining high quality personnel and maintaining readiness and morale is our ability to provide sailors deployment predictability 

and the resources necessary to carry out their mission. Years of continuing resolutions, coupled with the long-lasting negative effects of sequestration in 2013 and the 

looming threat of sequester in the future have increased frustration and anxiety in 

our sailors. This ‘‘say-do mismatch’’ over time erodes trust, and factors heavily into 

a family’s decision to stay Navy or recommend a career in the naval service to others. Question. What impact, if any, do you believe the Department’s proposals aimed 

at slowing the growth of personnel and health care costs will have on recruiting and 

retention in the Navy? 

Answer. If communicated properly and put in the appropriate context by leadership, slowing growth, while still meeting expectations regarding those matters that 

sailors and their families value most, should allow the Navy to make appropriate 

adjustments in a controlled and sustainable manner. Our sailors want to be fairly 

compensated for their hard work and sacrifice, but they also join and stay in the 

Navy for the sense of purpose and teamwork that comes from operating around the 

world as part of high-performing units on advanced platforms. 

MILITARY COMPENSATION

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of military compensation? 

Answer. To win in the challenging future security environment, we must continue 

to recruit and retain high-quality people and their families. Our warfighting readiness and ability to win a future conflict depends on this. My general sense is that 

the basic structure of the compensation system is about right. There may be additional room to achieve greater efficiencies or provide even higher levels of satisfaction, but doing so will require developing deeper insight into the specific needs and 

desires of our sailors and civilians. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely 

with the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense on these types of initiatives. 

Question. What recommendations would you have for controlling the rising cost 

of personnel? 

Answer. I agree with the recent Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC) findings that our current system is generally 

sound, although we must continue to look for efficiencies where possible. I support 

proposals to modernize our retirement system so long as our sailors are given supporting education to make choices to best support their families. My inclination is 

that the MCRMC recommendation to combine some commissary and exchange functions make sense; I would like to study this more closely. If confirmed, I will work 

with my fellow Chiefs to continue to seek out opportunities to better align servicemember needs with support, both through compensation and through updates to 

how we manage our people. 

Question. Do you support the administration’s compensation and health care proposals? 

Answer. I support opportunities to find efficiencies in how we manage and pay 

for the healthcare of our sailors and families, but am mindful of the absolute need 

to keep our commitments to fairly reward them for their service. As we work 

through this process, our priority must be to ensure we continue to recruit and retain high quality people and their families. Our warfighting readiness and ability 

to win a future conflict depends on this. 

EDUCATION FOR SAILORS

Question. An important feature of the Post-9/11 GI Bill is the ability of careeroriented servicemembers to transfer their earned benefits to spouses and dependents. 

What is your assessment of the effect of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on recruiting and 

retention of sailors? 

Answer. According to quick polls and surveys, the Post 9–11 GI Bill has a positive 

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demic, technical, intellectual, personal, and professional development of our 

servicemembers and their families. This contributes to overall readiness, quality, 

and morale of our force. 

Question. In your view, what has been the effect of the transferability option on 

retention and career satisfaction of sailors? 

Answer. The Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits and the ability to transfer unused portions 

to dependents contribute significantly to both the retention and morale of our force 

and have the potential to strengthen our country’s educational base and technological leadership. 

Question. How important do you believe tuition assistance benefits are to young 

sailors, and what trends do you see in the Navy’s ability to pay for such programs 

at current levels over the FYDP? 

Answer. I share CNO Greenert’s commitment to tuition assistance. Sailor demand 

for tuition assistance remains strong and our plan is to maintain funding at the current level. Such assistance continues to be a key component of the Navy’s Learning 

Strategy and supports overall readiness by providing academic, technical, intellectual, and professional development for our sailors. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to current eligibility criteria for tuition assistance? 

Answer. I do not recommend any changes to the program at this time. Current 

law and policy provide the Services sufficient flexibility to tailor the Tuition Assistance Program to meet the requirements for our sailor’s personal and professional 

development while meeting the Navy’s warfighting requirements. 

Question. Do you believe that tuition assistance should be used to enhance a sailor’s career while he or she is in the Navy? 

Answer. Yes. Navy-funded education through tuition assistance or other means is 

a strategic investment in our people. Sailors develop critical thinking skills, broadening their intellectual base, and acquire the ability operate effectively in complex 

environments—regardless of the specific course of study. 

Question. Do you agree with the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission that tuition assistance should be limited to courses and education that contribute to a sailor’s professional growth? 

Answer. As long as we do not become too restrictive regarding our definition of 

what ‘‘contributes to a sailor’s professional growth,’’ I believe that Navy-funded education should both enhance the professional growth of our people and the effectiveness of our Navy. As with other personnel programs this will have to be closely 

studied and thoroughly communicated in order to achieve the desired positive effect. 

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. As you know, 2 years ago, the Department rescinded the policy restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission of 

engaging in direct ground combat operations, and has given the military services 

until January 1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request 

an exception to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that 

must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary 

of Defense. The services have opened a large number of positions to service by 

women and continue to work to develop gender-free physical and mental standards 

for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards. 

If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these standards? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure we follow Department guidance and meet our 

reporting obligations under the law. The Navy will provide a written report to the 

Secretary of Defense in September 2015 with validation of standards as gender neutral in accordance with Public Laws stating that occupational standards ‘‘accurately 

predict performance of actual, regular, and recurring duties of a military occupation; 

and are applied equitably to measure individual capabilities.’’ We are on track to 

certify that these validated standards are in use or will be in use by 30 Sep 2015 

at schools and in training. 

Question. Will you ensure that the standards will be realistic and will preserve, 

or enhance, military readiness and mission capability? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed I will ensure that all standards will be operationally 

relevant and accurately reflect the tasks required to accomplish the mission. 

Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on bona 

fide military requirements? 

Answer. Over 95 percent of Navy jobs are already open to both men and women. 

The Navy will continue to open positions to obtain the talent necessary to best meet 

military requirements. 

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Question. If so, what steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that such decisions are made on this basis? 

Answer. If confirmed I will continue our present course. Warren Buffet has been 

quoted as saying that as he grew up, he had the privilege of only having to compete 

against 50 percent of the population. The Navy’s goal is to ensure that we do not 

afford that advantage to any potential adversary. Our missions will be executed by 

the best qualified and most capable people, regardless of gender. In order to preserve unit readiness, cohesion, and morale, and to limit attrition, lessons learned 

from the surface, aviation, and submarine integration will be used to ensure future 

and continued success. 

Question. In 2011, the Navy opened service on submarines to women. 

What is the implementation status of this decision? 

Answer. I am pleased with progress being made; we are moving forward smoothly 

and deliberately. Women can now serve on all three types of submarines; SSBNs, 

SSGNs, and SSNs. To date, 56 women are currently serving onboard submarines, 

including 40 nuclear-trained officers and 16 supply officers. Sixteen submarine 

crews in Ohio- and Virginia-class submarines are integrated. In June 2015, the 

Navy announced the names of the first enlisted female submariners. These sailors 

will be assigned to the first two of eighteen submarine crews and will report to USS 

Michigan in 2016. The women and the men are performing superbly. 

Question. What challenges still exist and what proactive measures are submarine 

force leaders taking? 

Answer. The integration of women into the submarine community is progressing 

smoothly and deliberately. As the force moves toward integrating enlisted females 

in 2016, the Navy will continue to adhere to the principles and will benefit from 

the lessons learned that have led to success to date. The crews that will receive 

these females will have appropriate levels of training and certification to ensure 

they are prepared for these sailors. Additionally, the enlisted sailors are being assigned to crews that are already integrated with female officers. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Sailors and their families in both the Active and Reserve components 

have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational 

deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for 

servicemembers and their families? 

Answer. Each Navy family has unique needs driven by their own personal circumstances and geographic location. From pay and compensation, to deployment 

predictability, to healthcare, our families have unique concerns that unit leadership 

must address in a timely and compassionate manner. Our sailors tell us that predictability, combined with tailored communication before, during, and after deployments helps bring families together, building bonds that improve unit readiness and 

cohesion. 

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global 

rebasing, deployments, and potential future reductions in end strength? 

Answer. I believe that most family issues are best addressed and cared for at the 

local level by commanders and senior enlisted leaders whom sailors and their families know and trust. If confirmed, it would be my responsibility to ensure that commanders have access to the information and resources they need to respond to local 

concerns in a timely and compassionate manner. Additionally, it would be my responsibility to set a climate and environment that encourages candid and unsolicited family feedback, good or bad. This direct information, whether shared through 

our Ombudsmen network or electronically is an important look into command climate and readiness. 

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. The Committee is concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life 

programs for military families, such as family support, child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget challenges. 

If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of intense downward pressure on 

budgets? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to give the current family support programs 

high priority and to remain fully engaged in this area; monitoring it closely to ensure it remains responsive to families’ needs and receives the appropriate level of 

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support. In this endeavor, I hope to learn from our people and outside industry what 

additional initiatives we might introduce to better retain needed support while driving costs down. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues to concern the 

Committee. 

What is your assessment of the Navy’s suicide prevention program? 

Answer. There is no single proven solution to prevent suicide. Every suicide is a 

tragedy, and even one is too many. Our goal to eliminate suicides will be realized 

through continued efforts in communications, skills training, policy, and research. 

Progress may fluctuate from year to year, but our Navy’s commitment will be rock 

steady—we will spare no effort to reach those sailors who are suffering in this way. 

This is an area where we need to continue to improve, and if confirmed I am committed to leading that effort. 

Question. In your view, what role should the Chief of Naval Operations play in 

shaping policies to help prevent suicides both at home and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families? 

Answer. The CNO’s role is to ensure that our sailors first and foremost understand that suicide prevention is a priority mission. The CNO must also ensure that 

unit leaders have the information, training, tools, practices, and policies to be 

healthy, resilient, and mission ready day in and day out. I believe that suicide prevention extends beyond simple policy guidance and oversight, and that it must be 

a command-led effort to first connect with sailors who may be in distress, and then 

to guide them to the appropriate means to help them successfully arrive at a ‘‘safe 

harbor’’ where they will be more at peace. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental 

health resources are available to servicemembers in theater, and to the 

servicemembers and their families upon return to home station. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to make resources and direct care 

more accessible to sailors and their families. We will continue to embed mental 

health providers directly within operational units. I believe these deckplate resources are a crucial element in helping to detect stress injuries early before they 

lead to decreased mission capability and mental health problems. We are also embedding mental health providers in primary care settings to ensure these resources 

are available upon return to the home station. Finally, I will do all that I can to 

reduce the stigma associated with asking for help so that our sailors take full advantage of the available resources. 

PREVENTION OF AND RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULTS

Question. The fiscal year 2014 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual 

Assault in the Military reflects that substantiated reports of sexual assault in the 

Navy increased by 17 percent from 420 reports in fiscal year 2013 to 491 reports 

in fiscal year 2014. 

What is your assessment of this report? 

Answer. The report makes clear that while the Navy is making some progress to 

eliminate sexual assault, we still have much work to do. 

Question. What is your assessment of the problem of sexual assaults in the Navy? 

Answer. The Navy’s success is predicated on high-performing teams bonded 

through trust and respect. Sexual assault within our ranks has a poisonous effect 

on unit performance and cohesion, reflecting a breach of trust. While I believe that 

we recognize the seriousness of the crime, there is additional work to do both to 

eliminate this crime, and to provide the strongest possible support to survivors. To 

be successful, we must do more to break the continuum of harm that starts with 

harassment or a hostile climate, and far too often ends in sexual violence. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Navy sexual assault prevention and response program? 

Answer. I firmly support the Navy’s sexual assault prevention and response program. Having said that, eliminating sexual assault remains a challenging and complex problem. If confirmed, I will build upon current efforts and deepen my understanding of how to lead efforts to improve Navy responses, enhance accountability, 

and protect all of our sailors from this crime. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. In my view, having both these reporting options provides survivors a critical range of options., and both supports our goals of getting victims the care they 

need and holding offenders appropriately accountable. 

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Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. Commanders must lead the way in our efforts to eliminate sexual assault. Commanders support victims through participation in the Sexual Assault 

Case Management Group (SACMG) meetings held monthly, during which commanders address the needs and desires of survivors to ensure that they are receiving appropriate access to sexual assault response coordinators, sexual assault prevention and response victim advocates, healthcare, and counseling, as well as ensuring all of the proper arrangements for any requested expedited transfers are being 

made. When sexual assault does occur, commanders must lead decisive response efforts, including the responsibility for appropriate criminal or administrative actions 

against offenders. 

Most importantly, elimination of sexual assault and the behaviors that lead to 

sexual assault will be manifested by deckplate leadership—the chief petty officers 

and junior officers in the spaces. These leaders respond to their Commanding Officer (CO). That CO is accountable to remain fully engaged in establishing the proper 

climate and ensuring that his or her team is following through. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Navy resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help 

they need? 

Answer. I believe the Navy has sufficient resources and authorities to address the 

needs of victims. Needs and requirements are regularly assessed to ensure that sufficient resources are available. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Navy has taken to prevent additional 

sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

Answer. Sexual assault prevention requires multiple, layered efforts at several 

levels working in concert. Navy sexual assault prevention incorporates cultural improvement through engaged leadership, education and awareness, intervention, accountability, and partnerships across Navy organizations. Policy alone will not stop 

sexual assault; it requires action at the fleet level and involves all leaders. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the 

Navy to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. The Navy has increased the training and resources applied to the investigation and prosecution functions. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) 

has increased the number of investigators trained to investigate sexual assault offenses and enhanced its protocols to ensure these investigations are conducted or 

overseen by personnel qualified in this specialized field. The JAG Corps has similarly refined the training provided to judge advocates prosecuting or advising commanders in these cases, most notably requiring every attorney serving as lead trial 

counsel in a sexual assault case to be special victim qualified. As the law enforcement and legal components have individually improved, they have also endeavored 

to become more collaborative, both in training and execution. NCIS and the JAG 

Corps participate in an annual Special Victims Capabilities Course, attended by numerous members of the response community including trial and defense counsel, 

paralegals, Victims’ Legal Counsel, and Victim Advocates. NCIS also created the 

Adult Sexual Assault Program (ASAP) in the Navy’s largest fleet concentration 

areas to provide a distinct and recognizable group of personnel to investigate sexual 

assault related offenses. Upon receiving a report, ASAP personnel employ a surge 

team response. Members of the team collaborate with trial counsel and victim advocate personnel, resulting in the faster delivery of an investigative package to the 

convening authority. These types of functions are critical to responding to sexual assault, which in turn is essential to the commander’s ability to maintain good order 

and discipline. With the dynamic nature of this area and the fluidity of our force, 

we cannot afford to reduce the training and resources currently provided—we must 

continue to seek ways to improve. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. Engagement by the chain of command is essential as we create a culture 

at all levels that is intolerant of actions and behaviors that lead to sexual assault. 

Elimination of sexual assault and the behaviors that lead to sexual assault will 

be manifested by deckplate leadership—the chief petty officers and junior officers 

in the spaces. These leaders respond to their Commanding Officer. That CO is accountable to remain fully engaged in establishing the proper climate and ensuring 

that his or her team is following through. 

Question. Surveys report that up to 62 percent of victims who report a sexual assault perceive professional or social retaliation for reporting. If confirmed, what will 

you do to address the issue of retaliation for reporting a sexual assault? 

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Answer. Retaliation is unacceptable. If confirmed, I will continue our efforts to address and confront this issue. Everyone needs to be sensitive to the perception of 

retaliation, recognize its signs, and step in to eliminate it. Training to recognize and 

eliminate retaliation has been added to the training curriculum for first line supervisors, prospective command leadership and in the future sailor training for fiscal 

year 2016. In addition, each installation-based Sexual Assault Case Management 

Group (SACMG) specifically asks for any experiences of retaliation against any reporters of crime, or against first responders or witnesses during its monthly review 

of open cases of sexual assault. 

Question. Sexual assault is a significantly underreported crime in our society and 

in the military. If confirmed, what will you do to increase reporting of sexual assaults by military victims? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the progress being made by Navy leaders 

around the fleet. Increases in sexual assault reporting provide some hope that the 

Navy is making progress to elevate sailors’ trust and confidence in command leadership and in the SAPR process. Better understanding of the precursors, indicators 

and behaviors associated with this crime, awareness of the multiple avenues to report, trust that the command will take all reports seriously, and confidence that the 

command will support survivors throughout the process, have all contributed to the 

increase in reporting. We must keep sailors’ trust in the response process by ensuring the chain of command is central to this response. 

One area of concern is that the RAND report of 2014 indicated that male reporting rate is very low. We are incorporating male victim scenarios into our training 

and awareness, better understanding and removing barriers to male reporting, and 

continuing evaluation of support services to ensure they are gender-responsive. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command, instead of a military commander in the grade of O– 

6 or above as is currently the Department’s policy, to determine whether allegations 

of sexual assault should be prosecuted? 

Answer. I support the Department’s current policy. The Uniform Code of Military 

Justice operates as both a criminal justice system and a critical component of a commander’s authority to maintain good order and discipline. I believe our military 

members and national security will best be served by retaining the military commander’s key role in the military justice decision process. While the Navy cannot 

do without the legal analyses and recommendations provided by our highly proficient judge advocates, and I demand that all leaders in the Services to take advantage of this expertise, I firmly believe the military commander’s role is indispensable 

in the prosecutorial process. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Navy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to enhance our prevention efforts through 

responsive fleet-wide training based on what we’ve learned, addressing the spectrum 

of destructive and inappropriate behaviors to improve our ability to recognize and 

interrupt the continuum of harm as early as possible. I intend to continue command 

and leadership engagement and involvement at all levels. 

We have enhanced our response efforts by full implementation of Deployed Resiliency Counselors on large deck ships, enhanced NCIS investigative capability using 

specially trained Master-at-Arms, and continued legal assistance to victims through 

our Victims’ Legal Counsel program. I will continue to assess the extent to which 

these resources are effective and sufficient. We will incorporate male victim scenarios into our training and awareness, better understanding and removing barriers 

to male reporting, and continuing evaluation of support services to ensure they are 

gender-responsive. 

Question. What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of recent legislation concerning sexual assault on the capability of Navy commanders to prosecute sexual 

assault cases, including cases where prosecution is declined by civilian prosecutors? 

Answer. It is still too early to fully understand the impact of recent legislative 

changes. Initial surveys indicate that the changes, particularly those related to victims’ rights, have increased trust in the system. That trust has led to increased victim reporting and participation, which we believe is enhancing commanders’ ability 

to prosecute sexual assault cases, including those in which prosecution is declined 

by civilian authorities. 

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. American military personnel routinely deploy to locations around the 

world where they must engage and work effectively with allies and with host-country nationals whose faiths and beliefs may be different than their own. For many 

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other cultures, religious faith is not a purely personal and private matter; it is the 

foundation of their culture and society. 

Learning to respect the different faiths and beliefs of others, and to understand 

how accommodating different views can contribute to a diverse force is, some would 

argue, an essential skill to operational effectiveness. 

In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different beliefs, 

including no religious belief? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and good order and discipline? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and respects open 

and candid discussions about personal religious faith and beliefs in a home-port environment contribute in a positive way to preparing U.S. forces to be effective in 

overseas assignments? 

Answer. In my view, a military climate that welcomes and respects open and candid discussion about personal religious faith in garrison can positively prepare U.S. 

forces to be effective in overseas assignments. However, there must be clear guidance about the importance of mutual respect and trust. 

Question. Would a policy that discourages open discussions about personal faith 

and beliefs be more or less effective at preparing servicemembers to work and operate in a pluralistic environment? 

Answer. I believe that a military climate that welcomes and respects open and 

candid discussion about personal religious faith in garrison can positively prepare 

U.S. forces to be effective in overseas assignments. In a world that appears to be 

increasingly committed to expressing religious belief, possessing this skill is necessary to not only understand our adversaries, but also understand our partner nations (consistent with the National Strategy on Integrating Religious Leader and 

Faith Community Engagement into U.S. Foreign Policy). Any policy that discourages open discussion diminishes our ability to develop these skills. However, there 

must be clear guidance about the importance of mutual respect and trust. 

Question. In your view, when performing official military duties outside a worship 

service, should military chaplains be encouraged to express their personal religious 

beliefs and tenets of their faith freely, or must they avoid making statements based 

on their religious beliefs? 

Answer. I believe that current Navy instructions and Chief of Chaplains training 

notices provide adequate guidance to Chaplains regarding how to serve as a Chaplain in a pluralistic environment while maintaining the tenets of their faith. 

Question. Do you believe chaplains should be tasked with conducting non-religious 

training in front of mandatory formations, even if they may be uniquely qualified 

to speak on the particular topic, such as suicide prevention or substance abuse? If 

so, do you believe guidance provided to those chaplains on what they should and 

should not say with respect to their faith is adequate? 

Answer. Yes. Chaplains, like all naval officers should be prepared to provide 

training in subject matter areas they may have an expertise in or have specialized 

training that would be of benefit to members of the command. I believe that current 

Navy instructions and Chief of Chaplains training notices provide adequate guidance to Chaplains regarding how to serve as a Chaplain in a pluralistic environment 

while maintaining the tenets of their faith. 

ACTIVE DUTY END STRENGTH

Question. The Navy’s Active Duty end strength is projected to grow from 323,000 

in 2013 to 327,000 this year to 330,000 personnel in 2020. The Navy has made great 

strides in improving the ‘‘fit’’ and ‘‘fill’’ of sea-going billets in recent years. 

What are your greatest personnel management concerns? 

Answer. If confirmed, I want to ensure that the Navy has the necessary policies 

and statutes in place to adequately recruit and retain the next generation of sailors 

with the talent and skills to man our fleet. My efforts will be focused on obtaining 

sufficient and persistent insight into the needs and desires of current and prospective sailors and Navy civilians, with the goal of enhancing our ability to tailor our 

programs to continue to attract and retain the best talent. These trends can change 

quickly—if we wait too long, we may find ourselves unprepared and unable to effectively respond. 

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Question. What additional force management tools does the Navy need, and which 

of these require Congressional authorization? 

Answer. The current force management authorities and tools are very complex. 

If confirmed, I would be an active participant in Secretary of Defense Carter’s Force 

of the Future effort to pursue a broad range of initiatives aimed at attracting and 

retaining talent. I would seek to engage in a thorough review of existing tools and 

authorities, and would look forward to working with Defense Department leadership 

and the Congress to pursue necessary adjustments. 

JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nicholsrequired Joint Qualification System? 

Answer. Goldwater-Nichols was revolutionary in its time and has helped to transform the Department of Defense. However, much has changed in the past 30 years 

in both the Joint Force and the security environment. As such, while I do not see 

any urgent need for specific changes, I believe a review would be useful. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the 

Navy if such a review were undertaken. 

Question. Do you think additional changes in law or regulation are needed to respond to the unique career-progression needs of Navy officers? 

Answer. While I do not currently see any urgent need for change, I do believe that 

this is an area appropriate for renewed evaluation. If confirmed, I would welcome 

the chance to work closely with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the 

Navy if such a review were undertaken. 

Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with becoming a Joint 

Qualified Officer, including links to promotion to general and flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and professional demands of Navy line officers? 

Answer. I do not see any urgent need for immediate change. Having said that, 

I believe that a review would be useful and if confirmed, I look forward to exploring 

this issue in cooperation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs. 

Question. If not, what modifications, if any, to the requirements for joint officer 

qualifications are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to attain meaningful joint and Service-specific leadership experience and professional development? 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working on this issue with Defense Department leadership and the Congress. 

Question. In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification requirements on 

the ability of the services to select the best qualified officers for promotion and to 

enable officer assignments that will satisfy Service-specific officer professional development requirements? 

Answer. We operate and fight as a Joint team. While meeting all of the many demands for advancement is a challenge, I firmly believe that developing appropriate 

joint understanding is a critical element of higher-level leadership. If confirmed, I 

look forward to exploring whether there are more effective ways to achieve this objective, and if so, discussing them in greater depth with Defense Department leadership and the Congress. 

Question. Do you think a tour with a combatant command staff should count toward the Joint tour requirement? 

Answer. Yes. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY TALENT MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES

Question. On May 13, 2015, the Secretary of the Navy announced several talent 

management initiatives, including: changes to Navy fitness tests, a transition to the 

same uniform for males and females, increasing female enlisted accessions, opening 

all operational billets to women, tripling the length of maternity leave from 6 to 18 

weeks, expanding the Career Intermission Program, altering the promotion selection 

board process, revising year group management, ending General Military Training 

as it currently exists, and increasing graduate education opportunities. 

Do you support these changes? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Which of these changes, if any, do you believe should be modified, delayed, or eliminated? 

Answer. I support each of these new initiatives and if confirmed, look forward to 

implementing them in a thoughtful and responsible way. 

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NAVY RESERVE

Question. What is your vision for the roles and missions of the Navy Reserve, and, 

if confirmed, what objectives would you seek to achieve with respect to the Navy 

Reserve’s organization, end strength, and force structure? 

Answer. The Navy Reserve, over 58,000 strong, fully accomplishes its mission of 

delivering strategic depth and operational capability to the Navy, Marine Corps, and 

Joint Force. As part of the Navy’s Total Force of Active and Reserve sailors supported by Government civilians, Navy Reserve sailors bring value through scalable 

utilization options to meet Navy requirements. Approximately 25 percent of the 

Navy Reserve delivers operational support on any given day, increasing Total Force 

operational capacity. The manner in which the Navy employs its Reserve component 

provides responsive and flexible options to meet Navy mission requirements. If confirmed, I will support efforts to leverage our Navy Reserve capacity in new areas 

where our Reserve component could increase Total Force efficiency and effectiveness 

in executing the mission. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Navy Reserve as an 

operational Reserve, as opposed to its long standing traditional role as a strategic 

Reserve? 

Answer. The Navy Reserve is both operational and strategic. The Navy’s integrated approach to Total Force employment enables Reserve sailors and Reserve 

units to train for strategic requirements, while also supporting Navy’s day-to-day 

operations. Operationally, the Navy Reserve’s capability is routinely utilized to support mission requirements through scalable employment options. Strategically, the 

Navy Reserve’s capacity provides a surge force for the Navy. We should retain a 

Navy Reserve that is both operational and strategic, thereby providing maximum 

flexibility to meet unknown future requirements. Commanders have assured access 

to their Reserve component sailors, so we can confidently assign missions to the 

Navy Reserve where it makes operational and fiscal sense. 

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges to maintaining and enhancing the Navy Reserve as a relevant and capable operational Reserve? 

Answer. Our Navy Reserve is as relevant and capable today as it has been at any 

time in our history. We have invested in our people and our equipment, we have 

an integrated Total Force approach to filling operational and support missions, and 

we honor the service of our Reserve sailor’s families and employers. In the future, 

we need to continue investing in our Navy Reserve with an appropriate level of discretionary funding and equipment recapitalization to meet mission requirements. 

Moreover, as we continue to support the Secretary of the Navy’s Task Force Innovation and sailor 2025 initiatives, we will maintain a robust ability to recruit and retain the highest caliber sailors by delivering flexible career paths and opportunities 

that enable a lifetime of service. 

Question. What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve component 

forces in meeting combat missions? 

Answer. The optimal role for the Reserve component is as a partner in the Navy 

Total Force, where we view missions in terms of capabilities first, and then decide 

where the capability should reside. The value of the Navy Reserve is in both their 

strategic capacity to provide sailors and units for mobilizations in support of Global 

Force Management requirements, as well as their operational capacity to provide 

daily support to the fleet through flexible access options. 

Question. In your view, should the Department of Defense assign homeland defense or any other global or domestic civil support missions exclusively to the Reserves? 

Answer. The Navy’s approach to utilizing the Reserve component is to examine 

each mission from a Total Force perspective and decide what capabilities are needed, how often we need them, and what component is best suited to carry them out. 

In my opinion, this approach has worked well and could usefully be applied more 

broadly across the defense enterprise. 

NUCLEAR NAVAL PROPULSION PROGRAM

Question. Executive Order 12344 ‘‘Nuclear Naval Propulsion Program’’ of February 1, 1982, which was codified in section 2511 of title 50 United States Code, 

states ‘‘The director [of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program] shall be appointed 

to a serve a term of 8 years, except the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of 

the Navy may, with mutual concurrence, terminate or extend the term of the respective appointments.’’ 

Is it your understanding that both the Secretary of Energy and Secretary of the 

Navy have concurred on releasing you from your term as Director? 

Answer. Yes. 

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Question. In your view, is 8 years the appropriate length of tenure for the position 

of Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program? Please explain. 

Answer. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program currently has a superb record of 

safety and effectiveness that is founded on a culture defined by deep expertise, honest and detailed self-assessment, an unwavering focus on facing the facts, and doing 

the technically right thing. This approach serves as a model for the Navy and the 

Nation to discipline very complex technology operating in harsh environments. The 

Director must set the tone in each of these areas. Based on my 3 years as Director, 

I strongly support an 8 year tenure for the Director as the best way to keep this 

model intact. 

Question. What is your view of the role of the Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program in the preservation of the Program’s unique fail-safe culture of zero 

defects engineering, personnel excellence, and training? 

Answer. Since the beginning of the Program under Admiral Rickover, the Director 

has played a critical role, both inside and outside the Program, to preserve and sustain the culture. It is true to this day. 

Question. What is your view of the role of the Chief of Naval Operations in the 

preservation of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program’s unique fail-safe culture of 

zero defects engineering, personnel excellence, and training? 

Answer. The CNO plays a key role, working with the Director of Naval Reactors 

and Fleet Commanders, to ensure that the Program gets the resources needed to 

preserve the culture of excellence. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to support the NNPP as CNO. 

Question. How would you characterize the professional relationship between the 

Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program and the Chief of Naval Operations, including the responsibility to organize, train, and equip nuclear-powered 

vessels? 

Answer. In my experience both as Director and as a career nuclear operator, there 

is a strong professional relationship between the Director of Naval Reactors and the 

CNO. This relationship is founded on a common understanding of the importance 

of nuclear powered warships in our Nation’s defense, the importance of the Program’s record of safety and effectiveness in ensuring access around the world, and 

in the importance of the Naval Reactors organization as a model for achieving sustained excellence. If confirmed, I will continue to enhance this professional relationship. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Chief of 

Naval Operations? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

SIZE OF THE NAVY

1. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Richardson, from 2006 to 2012, the Navy’s requirement was around 313 ships. In Navy’s latest assessment earlier this year, the number was revised to 306 ships. Since 2012 and the 313-ship Navy, our national security challenges and the demands on our Navy have only grown, yet the size of the 

fleet the Navy says we need has decreased. How can you explain the decline in the 

fleet requirement in view of Russian aggression, the Chinese military buildup, the 

Islamic State conquests, and expanding Iranian state-sponsored terrorism and support to anti-American regimes? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. The current security environment is dynamic with an increasing array of diverse threats. The Navy has identified that sourcing all Global 

Combatant Commander requests would require about 450 combatant ships with requisite supporting structure and readiness. However, with an equally dynamic fiscal 

environment, our strategy must also consider the fiscal limitations and accept risk 

against known threats and reduced capacity to respond to unforeseen developments 

in order to meet the highest priority security missions. 

The Navy’s Force Structure Assessment produces the minimum requirement to 

meet the future steady state and warfighting requirements determined by the 

Navy’s analytical process, with an acceptable degree of risk (i.e., does not jeopardize 

joint force campaign success). The Navy’s 2014 update to the 2012 Force Structure 

Assessment calls for a force of 308 ships. This assessment is informed by operating 

concepts, including employment cycles, crewing constructs, and operating tempo limits. To meet the dynamic security environment, the Navy utilizes cost-effective approaches to increase our presence, such as forward basing, forward operating, and 

forward stationing ships. By increasing the number of ships forward stationed and 

forward based and improving our deployment preparation process through the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O–FRP), the Navy can deliver the same amount of presence with fewer ships. Provided sufficient readiness is restored and maintained 

across the Fleet, a fleet size of 308 ships should support the highest priority requirements for both presence and ‘‘surge’’ in the event of increased tensions or outright 

conflict. 

2. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Richardson, from 2006 to 2012, the Navy’s requirement was around 313 ships. In Navy’s latest assessment earlier this year, the number was revised to 306 ships. Since 2012 and the 313-ship Navy, our national security challenges and the demands on our Navy have only grown, yet the size of the 

fleet the Navy says we need has decreased. If confirmed, will you realistically revalidate the fleet requirement in light of the most diverse and complex array of global 

crises since the end of World War II? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes. The reality of a dynamic security and fiscal environment demands that both our strategy and structure be continually assessed and 

adapted, including our fleet requirements. The Navy conducts a Force Structure Assessment when there is a significant change in the global security environment. I 

will provide my best assessment of the requirements in light of the security environment, the fiscal constraints, and the resultant risk. 

GLENN DEFENSE MARINE ASIA

3. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Richardson, you were the consolidated disposition 

authority for cases in which Navy personnel were reviewed for their involvement 

with a Navy contractor, the owner and CEO of Glenn Defense Marine Asia, Leonard 

Francis. Last January, he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery, bribery, and 

conspiracy to commit fraud charges in Federal district court, admitting to what the 

Department of Justice described as a decade-long conspiracy involving ‘‘scores’’ of 

Navy officials, tens of millions of dollars in fraud, and millions of dollars in bribes 

and gifts, including: over $500,000 in cash; hundreds of thousands of dollars in prostitution services; travel expenses, including first class airfare, luxurious hotel stays 

and spa treatments; lavish meals, including Kobe beef, Spanish suckling pigs, topshelf alcohol and wine; and luxury gifts, including Cuban cigars, designer handbags, 

watches, fountain pens, designer furniture, electronics, ornamental swords and 

hand-made ship models. In exchange, Mr. Francis solicited and received classified 

and confidential U.S. Navy information, including ship schedules. Francis also 

sought and received preferential treatment for his company in the contracting process. Based on your experience as the consolidated disposition authority, why do you 

believe so many senior career officers and Navy civilians became involved with this 

criminal enterprise? 

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Admiral RICHARDSON. The events remain the subject of an ongoing federal investigation led by the Department of Justice. It would be inappropriate for me to discuss details of the cases or my personal opinions while the investigation is still in 

progress. Across our Navy the vast majority of our officers, enlisted and civilians 

conduct themselves with honor and integrity. As CNO, I intend to make character 

and integrity a hallmark of my tenure. 

4. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Richardson, you were the consolidated disposition 

authority for cases in which Navy personnel were reviewed for their involvement 

with a Navy contractor, the owner and CEO of Glenn Defense Marine Asia, Leonard 

Francis. Last January, he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery, bribery, and 

conspiracy to commit fraud charges in Federal district court, admitting to what the 

Department of Justice described as a decade-long conspiracy involving ‘‘scores’’ of 

Navy officials, tens of millions of dollars in fraud, and millions of dollars in bribes 

and gifts, including: over $500,000 in cash; hundreds of thousands of dollars in prostitution services; travel expenses, including first class airfare, luxurious hotel stays 

and spa treatments; lavish meals, including Kobe beef, Spanish suckling pigs, topshelf alcohol and wine; and luxury gifts, including Cuban cigars, designer handbags, 

watches, fountain pens, designer furniture, electronics, ornamental swords and 

hand-made ship models. In exchange, Mr. Francis solicited and received classified 

and confidential U.S. Navy information, including ship schedules. Francis also 

sought and received preferential treatment for his company in the contracting process. Do you believe senior Navy officials were aware of this problem? If so, why was 

nothing done to stop it? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. The events remain the subject of an on-going federal investigation led by the Department of Justice. It would be inappropriate for me to discuss the case while the investigation is still in progress. As CNO, I intend to make 

character and integrity a hallmark of my tenure. 

5. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Richardson, you were the consolidated disposition 

authority for cases in which Navy personnel were reviewed for their involvement 

with a Navy contractor, the owner and CEO of Glenn Defense Marine Asia, Leonard 

Francis. Last January, he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery, bribery, and 

conspiracy to commit fraud charges in Federal district court, admitting to what the 

Department of Justice described as a decade-long conspiracy involving ‘‘scores’’ of 

Navy officials, tens of millions of dollars in fraud, and millions of dollars in bribes 

and gifts, including: over $500,000 in cash; hundreds of thousands of dollars in prostitution services; travel expenses, including first class airfare, luxurious hotel stays 

and spa treatments; lavish meals, including Kobe beef, Spanish suckling pigs, topshelf alcohol and wine; and luxury gifts, including Cuban cigars, designer handbags, 

watches, fountain pens, designer furniture, electronics, ornamental swords and 

hand-made ship models. In exchange, Mr. Francis solicited and received classified 

and confidential U.S. Navy information, including ship schedules. Francis also 

sought and received preferential treatment for his company in the contracting process. If you are confirmed, what will you do to ensure this type of criminal corruption 

will not happen again? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I will continue the efforts to educate Navy personnel on the 

standards of ethical conduct required of all servicemembers and continue to evaluate the state of ethics culture and demand the highest commitment of integrity. Finally, I will review any assessments of the contracting and husbanding processes 

conducted in light of these events, and work with the Secretary of the Navy to ensure proper oversight measures are in place and enforced and efforts are taken to 

increase the transparency of the process. When necessary, I will ensure that individuals are held accountable when they fail to live up to their ethical responsibilities. 

UNSUBSTANTIATED LOBBYING ALLEGATIONS

6. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Richardson, Congress established specific prohibitions to limit indirect lobbying, including the Anti-Lobbying Act, which prohibits the 

use of taxpayer funds by federal agencies to conduct grassroots lobbying to pressure 

Congress to support ‘‘any legislation or appropriation by Congress’’. There are also 

prohibitions against using appropriated funds to support or defeat legislation pending before Congress. The DOD Inspector General recently completed a review of remarks you made to attendees of the 2014 Annual Symposium Naval Submarine 

League in which you suggested, in part, that attendees should contact their Members of Congress to support the Ohio-class replacement submarine and the National 

Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, as part of your ‘‘Commander’s Guidance.’’ The DOD Inspector General concluded that you did not spend taxpayer funds on publicity to enVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00728 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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gage in grass-roots lobbying and did not violate applicable standards. If you are confirmed, do you commit to working with the Secretary of the Navy, the General 

Counsel of the Navy, and the Judge Advocate General of the Navy to provide clear 

guidance to ensure that Navy officials understand the permissible role and the limitations under the law, in communications intended to influence Congress? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes. I have already begun this effort from my present position, and will continue to work to ensure Navy officials understand the limitations 

under the law in this important area. 

NUCLEAR NAVAL PROPULSION PROGRAM

7. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Richardson, in February 1982, Executive Order 

12344 entitled ‘‘Nuclear Naval Propulsion Program’’ was signed and later codified 

in title 50 United States Code. Among other direction, it states ‘‘The director [of the 

Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program] shall be appointed to a serve a term of 8 years, 

except the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of the Navy may, with mutual 

concurrence, terminate or extend the term of the respective appointments.’’ In your 

view, is 8 years the appropriate length of tenure for the position of Director of the 

Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program? Please explain. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Based on my 3 years as Director, I strongly support an 8 

year tenure for the Director as the appropriate model to ensure program continuity, 

technical expertise and rigorous self-assessment. 

8. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Richardson, in February 1982, Executive Order 

12344 entitled ‘‘Nuclear Naval Propulsion Program’’ was signed and later codified 

in title 50 United States Code. Among other direction, it states ‘‘The director [of the 

Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program] shall be appointed to a serve a term of 8 years, 

except the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of the Navy may, with mutual 

concurrence, terminate or extend the term of the respective appointments.’’If confirmed, are you confident the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program’s unique fail-safe 

culture of zero defects engineering, personnel excellence, and training will remain 

intact and your early transition will not adversely impact the program? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program’s unique culture of 

rigorous engineering, personal excellence, training and honest self-assessment is not 

based on a single individual but on an overall culture of knowledge and accountability throughout the Program. Although I am transitioning earlier than anticipated, the culture that is in place, including the systems, procedures, and other 

leadership, will ensure that the NNPP will retain its standards. Having said that, 

I strongly support the 8-year tenure for future Directors. 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS)

9. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Richardson, in December 2014, the Secretary of Defense announced his decision to upgrade the Littoral Combat Ships, designated 

LCS–33 through LCS–52, to provide a more capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate. Do you support the 

Secretary of Defense’s decision to continue production of LCS, including the upgrade 

to a so-called Frigate? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I support the Secretary of Defense’s decision to continue 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) production, and procure a Frigate (FF) based on the 

LCS Flight 0+ design. The 20 Frigates and 32 LCSs will fulfill the 52-ship Small 

Surface Combatant requirement in the Navy’s latest Force Structure Assessment. 

The Frigate modifications to the LCS design will add lethality and survivability 

features as well as organic SUW and ASW multi-mission capability. 

10. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Richardson, in December 2014, the Secretary of Defense announced his decision to upgrade the Littoral Combat Ships, designated 

LCS–33 through LCS–52, to provide a more capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate. In your view, what 

problem is the Frigate upgrade necessary to solve? In other words, why is the current LCS with its mission modules insufficient? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Flight 0+ and its associated 

mission packages are sufficient and meet JROC-validated requirements in surface 

warfare (SUW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and mine countermeasures (MCM). 

Following SECDEF direction in February 2014 to provide alternative proposals for 

a small surface combatant that is even more lethal, survivable, and mission capable 

than the LCS Flight 0+, Navy established the Small Surface Combatant Task Force 

(SSCTF). The SSCTF analyzed 600 modified-LCS designs, 50,000 new ship designs, 

and 18 existing designs and ultimately recommended a modified design of LCS 

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Flight 0+ to SECDEF. This recommendation incorporated the most cost-effective improvements to the lethality and survivability of the LCS. 

In December 2014, following a review by CAPE, DOT&E, and AT&L, SECDEF 

approved Navy’s recommendation to procure 20 modified-LCS. These ships, along 

with the 32 focused-mission LCS Flight 0/0+ will fulfill the 2014 re-validated Force 

Structure Assessment requirement for 52 small surface combatants. In January 

2015, SECNAV designated this multi-mission SUW/ASW ship as a Frigate. 

Frigates will execute the same SUW/ASW missions as LCS but will incorporate 

additional lethality and survivability upgrades, accepting less risk, thus increasing 

its utility to the combatant commander. 

GOLDWATER NICHOLS

11. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Richardson, in your response to our advance questions, you stated the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 

of 1986 ‘‘was revolutionary in its time and has helped to transform the Department 

of Defense. However, much has changed in the past 30 years in both the Joint Force 

and the security environment. As such, I believe a review would be useful.’’ In your 

view, what types of reforms should a review of Goldwater-Nichols address? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. At this point, I am not sufficiently informed to identify specific areas where I think Goldwater-Nichols should be modified. However, the Act 

was written over 30 years ago, in an environment that is significantly different than 

the one we face today. Given that reality, I believe that a comprehensive review 

should be done that examines each part of the Act, with the goal of determining 

what revisions can be made to advance the intent of the original Act. 

OTHER DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM

12. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Richardson, I am deeply concerned that the United 

States is beginning to lose its technological dominance. In this year’s defense bill 

the Senate has proposed giving the Department a number of new authorities and 

acquisition waivers to access non-traditional sources of technology in Silicon Valley 

and in other innovative places around the globe. I fear, however, that the Pentagon 

will not use these authorities—preferring to stick with business as usual. How can 

the Navy better access and integrate commercial and military technology to remain 

ahead of its potential adversaries? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I appreciate Congress’ proposals to give the Department 

some new authorities and acquisition waivers to access non-traditional sources of 

technology in Silicon Valley and other innovative areas. In my view, doing this effectively would include redefining the relationships and connections between our Navy 

Research and Development (R&D) centers and those centers in private industry and 

academia with the goal of lowering barriers between the Navy and non-Navy centers of innovation. As well, I will focus on making adjustments within the Navy to 

better streamline processes to take advantage of what we learn; to convert new 

ideas into effective programs. In this way I hope to mainstream innovation within 

the Navy. 

13. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Richardson, the naval nuclear propulsion program 

has had a longstanding tradition of innovation and the ability to attract top-notch 

talent going back to the 1950s. The development of the USS Nautilus launched in 

1954, the development of much of our strategic deterrent in the 1950s, and the 

launch of the first reconnaissance satellites from that era mark a time when the 

U.S. could successfully deploy operational capability rapidly and maintain its technological dominance. Are there any acquisition reform lessons that can be learned 

from the 1950s and early 1960s, such as with the development of the Nautilus program, as well as from the subsequent experience of the naval nuclear propulsion 

program? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Cornerstones of the Naval Reactors Program’s acquisition 

success have been based on the following: 

a. Not resting on past successes. NR continues to put in the hard work necessary 

to technically understand the actions to be accomplished, to garner support, 

and to pull together the best manufacturers and engineers to work the challenge. NR strives daily to hold the appropriately high standard, both from a 

technical and acquisition perspective. Per ADM Rickover, ‘‘another principle for 

managing a successful program is to resist the natural human inclination to 

hope things will work out, despite evidence or doubt to the contrary.’’ Fighting 

this tendency requires a government staff that is technically competent to be 

able to effectively oversee the industry contractors hired to deliver the needed 

products. First and foremost, identifying the key risks and challenges that we 

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confront and putting in place effective risk mitigation plans is critical. This requires involved, technically competent government managers. Finally, we continue to be self-critical, learning from past challenges and evaluating ways to 

improve the way we and our contractors do business. 

b. Recognizing the uncertain budget going-forward. From the very beginning, NR 

understood the challenge of balancing the need for robust technical plans with 

cost consciousness. During tight budget environments, this balance can be challenging to maintain and technical needs frequently, are at risk of becoming secondary to cost pressures. NR continually fights this pressure, requiring an indepth understanding of the technical risks and challenges inherent in each of 

its undertakings and ensures that Program budget requests align with technical plans. Additionally, NR personnel are trained to make the hard technical 

decisions required to ensure programs are delivered within budget and schedule. 

c. Ensuring personal responsibility. NR emphasizes the need for every engineer 

in the organization to feel personally responsible for their decisions, since mistakes can result in technical failures, inability to meet warfighting needs, and 

drive costs up. ADM Rickover was known to say, ‘‘Unless one person . . . can 

be identified when something goes wrong, then no one has really been responsible.’’ This mindset informs how we go about our daily business, designing and 

manufacturing propulsion plants for the long term and living with the consequences of our decisions. 

d. Continuity—NR insists that managers and engineers be experts in their areas 

and act though they will have their job forever. Otherwise, there would be inadequate knowledge, experience, and corporate memory and people can rotate 

out of jobs without having to face the consequences of their decisions. 

e. Bringing in the best talent. NR demands the sharpest talent, and today more 

than ever the competition is keen. Making decision that properly balance risk, 

effectiveness, and cost. that requires well-trained technical personnel that are 

empowered to make tough technical decisions. We work extremely hard to identify, recruit, and retain the cream of the crop. Today’s competitive environment 

more than ever is making retaining this top talent at NR exceptionally challenging. 

Overall, Naval Reactors success is not based on any revolutionary or magic acquisition strategies. Its foundation is based on talented individuals being vested in 

their decisions, continual self-assessment and improvement, and hard work. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

OHIO-CLASS REPLACEMENT PROGRAM (ORP)

14. Senator WICKER. Admiral, senior Navy leaders—including the current Chief 

of Naval Operations—have said that the Ohio-class replacement submarine program 

(ORP) is the Navy’s top priority program. Do you agree that the Ohio Replacement 

Program is the Navy’s top priority program? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, it is an absolutely critical, even existential, program 

for the Nation and our number one modernization priority. 

POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ORP COST OVERRUNS

15. Senator WICKER. As you’ve said in your responses to the Committee’s advance 

questions: ‘‘It is absolutely critical for the Nation to replace the Ohio-class submarines. The Navy is doing everything it can to limit requirements and control costs 

for this ship. Without increased shipbuilding funding in fiscal year 2021 and beyond, 

the Ohio Replacement Program will consume the majority of the Navy’s annual 

shipbuilding budget, costing the equivalent of 2–3 ships per year.’’ I am deeply concerned by the second part of your response that insufficient shipbuilding funds could 

cost the Navy the equivalent of two to three ships per year.Can you elaborate for 

us your personal assessment of: 

- The need for additional shipbuilding funding; 

- The potential impact of ORP on other shipbuilding programs; and 

- How much worse this impact could be if ORP experiences schedule delays or 

cost overruns? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. The Ohio replacement is an absolutely critical program for 

the country, and we are doing everything we can in the Navy to ensure that we 

deliver a submarine that meets the Nation’s security requirements at the most judicious cost possible. To this end, we are: 

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- ensuring that the performance requirements of the platform are adequate and 

stable before beginning design 

- ensuring that design is stable and mature before beginning construction 

- will build these platforms in a way that leverages all lessons from the successful 

Virginia-class program 

- meets all cost targets; in fact the Navy is considering cost targets as equivalent 

to every other performance parameter for the program. 

We are on a good track to achieve all these goals. 

Even when all of the above goals are met the Ohio Replacement Program represents a significant investment for the Nation, an investment that I believe is absolutely imperative. 

If the Navy is forced to ‘‘absorb’’ the entire cost of ORP within Navy accounts, 

it will of necessity come at the expense of other capabilities, to include construction 

of additional ships and/or aircraft. If funded at projected levels, the Ohio Replacement Program would equal about half of the shipbuilding funding each year starting 

in fiscal year 2026. 

I look forward to working with Defense Department leaders and Congress to formulate the necessary authorities and appropriations to fund ORP in a way that does 

not devastate the Navy budget, including the shipbuilding program. 

SEQUESTRATION

16. Senator WICKER. In fiscal year 2013, the Navy implemented numerous cuts 

in response to sequestration. This included cancellation of five ship deployments and 

the delayed deployment of a carrier strike group to the Middle East. Since 2013 

we’ve witnessed the rise of ISIS, Russia’s aggression in Eastern Europe, and a belligerent North Korea. Given sequestration’s impending return a little more than two 

months from now, we must acknowledge that the world is more dangerous today 

than it was in 2013. What is your view on how sequestration would threaten DOD’s 

ability to decisively project power abroad? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. If we return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016, the Navy 

would be unable to execute the defense strategy as currently written. The required 

cuts would force us to further delay critical warfighting capabilities for the future, 

and reduce readiness of today’s forces needed for contingency response, including 

further reduction in our stocks of weapons and munitions. As a last resort, we would 

cancel or stretch procurement of needed force structure. If funded at sequestration 

levels, the Navy would be unable to satisfy currently-expressed direction to provide 

power projection capacity, specifically in the areas of strike fighters, command and 

control platforms, and electronic warfare assets, advanced radar and missiles, and 

munitions. 

17. Senator WICKER. In fiscal year 2013, the Navy implemented numerous cuts 

in response to sequestration. This included cancellation of five ship deployments and 

the delayed deployment of a carrier strike group to the Middle East.Since 2013 

we’ve witnessed the rise of ISIS, Russia’s aggression in Eastern Europe, and a belligerent North Korea. Given sequestration’s impending return a little more than two 

months from now, we must acknowledge that the world is more dangerous today 

than it was in 2013. What is your assessment of the impact sequestration would 

have on our expeditionary forces? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. If we return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016, the Navy 

would be unable to execute the defense strategy as currently written. The required 

cuts would force us to further delay critical warfighting capabilities for the future, 

and reduce readiness of today’s forces needed for contingency response, including 

further reduction in our stocks of weapons and munitions. As a last resort, we would 

cancel or stretch procurement of needed force structure. If funded at sequestration 

levels, the Navy would only be able to provide a contingency response force of one 

Carrier Strike Group (CSG) and one Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), significantly 

less surge capacity than our operational plans (OPLANs) require. 

18. Senator WICKER. In fiscal year 2013, the Navy implemented numerous cuts 

in response to sequestration. This included cancellation of five ship deployments and 

the delayed deployment of a carrier strike group to the Middle East. Since 2013 

we’ve witnessed the rise of ISIS, Russia’s aggression in Eastern Europe, and a belligerent North Korea. Given sequestration’s impending return a little more than 2 

months from now, we must acknowledge that the world is more dangerous today 

than it was in 2013. Certain sectors of the defense industry—such as shipbuilding— 

are extremely capital intensive. Our fiscally constrained environment threatens to 

close production lines that would take years to restart. Given your prior experience 

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as the Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsions Program, what is your assessment of 

the risks to DOD industrial base given our current budget environment? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. The shipbuilding industrial base is a national strategic 

jewel—we must preserve it. To best sustain this base, and also get the best value 

for the Nation, program stability and predictability are critical. This is especially 

true in shipbuilding, where construction can span years. Disruptions in naval ship 

design and construction plans are significant because of the long lead time, specialized skills, and extent of integration required. Instability, unpredictability, and cancellations caused by sequestration will likely cause some suppliers and vendors to 

close their businesses, and experience shows that it would take years to recover 

from the loss of the skilled, experienced and innovative workforce—if it were even 

possible. To the maximum extent possible, the Navy is committed to protecting shipbuilding and the industrial base under funding. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL

JOINT REQUIREMENT FOR ELECTRONIC ATTACK

19. Senator MCCASKILL. Admiral Richardson, in testimony this year before the 

Senate Armed Services Committee, the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 

Greenert, stated that an additional 15 Growlers are needed to fulfill the Navy’s requirement for airborne electronic attack. While other platforms have electronic attack capability, it is my understanding that the Navy’s analysis showed that no 

platform could replace the full-spectrum capability of the Growler. Admiral Greenert 

then noted that an ongoing study is looking at the joint requirement for airborne 

electronic attack. Will this study inform the Navy’s decision on airborne electronic 

attack for fiscal year 2017 and across the FYDP? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. The current study will provide insight that will allow the 

Navy to optimize our EA–18G procurement plan and force structure to meet all joint 

EA–18 G requirements. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

CYBER

20. Senator GILLIBRAND. Admiral Richardson, I appreciate your interest in cyber. 

I believe this is a critical issue for our military. We need to start growing cyber warriors. How do you envision the career path for sailors who specialize in cyber? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I am committed to growing cyber warriors in the Navy. We 

have created the Cyber Warfare Engineer (CWE/1840) designator to attract and 

manage the best technical talent in this field. Our CWEs are officers that specialize 

in cyber operations for up to 10 years. After this period, they can transition to our 

Information Professional (IP/1820) or Information Warfare (IW/1810) communities 

or separate from the Navy and return to public or private sector careers. In addition 

to CWEs, we are establishing 44 teams of Sailors to support the Cyber Mission 

Force (CMF). The Navy teams include officers (designators: CWE/1840, IP/1820, and 

IW/1810) and enlisted personnel (ratings: cryptology (CT), information technology 

(IT), intelligence specialist (IS)). The Navy does not have a separate career path for 

CMF Sailors beyond that specified by their designator or rating. 

COMBAT INTEGRATION

21. Senator GILLIBRAND. Admiral Richardson, you said that the determination 

about whether to open remaining Navy positions to women would be dependent on 

ensuring mission effectiveness. Can you please describe the potential ways in which 

allowing women to compete for these positions might harm mission effectiveness? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I never meant to imply that allowing women to compete for 

any position might harm mission effectiveness. My comment was only to point out 

that, as with the introduction of any new capability to the force, the ultimate test 

is whether the effectiveness of the team is enhanced by that new addition. As I testified, over 96 percent of all Navy jobs are already open to women. Our experience 

to date in integrating women into previously closed occupations has been extremely 

successful, and women continue to serve with distinction and perform in a manner 

that enhances our mission effectiveness. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM KAINE

WORKLOAD AT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SHIPYARDS

22. Senator KAINE. Admiral Richardson, some of our public shipyards are experiencing a need for additional employees, while at the same time our private shipyards and repair facilities are preparing for a temporary decrease in workload. Is 

the Navy aware of this situation and what plans have been developed to mitigate 

disruptions in the workforce of our ship construction and repair industries? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I am very aware of these concerns. For new ship construction, the Navy has focused on stabilizing workload through the use of multi-year 

and block-buy procurements. 

For repair work, the Regional Maintenance Centers (RMC) work with both public 

and private shipyards to reach a shared understanding of projected workload. To 

execute this workload, the Naval Shipyards are focused on increasing workforce productivity by improving throughput and overall efficiency and performance. Where 

capacity exceeds that of the public yards, efforts are made to bring in the private 

shipyards to share the burden. The nature of ship repair work often results in a 

fluctuating workload, but by taking a shared approach to address the total challenge, the best balanced and stable workload is derived and allocated in a way that 

will keep both public and private shipyards optimally employed. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

ASIA PACIFIC REBALANCE

23. Senator HIRONO. In regards to the Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific I know we 

are on a path to base 60 percent of our ships in the Pacific. What do you envision 

in terms continuing or advancing our mil-to-mil engagements which could help enhance security and prosperity in the region? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. The Navy’s military-to-military engagement will continue 

to support the broader Department of Defense strategy in the region. The Navy is 

adapting our posture to be more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, 

and politically sustainable in the Pacific. At the same time, we are working with 

regional partners to improve their maritime security and maritime domain awareness in order to increase regional capability and deter further conflict. 

PACIFIC MISSILE RANGE FACILITY

24. Senator HIRONO. The Pacific Missile Range Facility continues to be an outstanding facility—it is the only range in the world capable of tracking objects in the 

surface, subsurface, air, and space realms simultaneously. My hope is that the Navy 

continues to treat this national asset as a priority. There appears to be a need to 

update underwater test range capabilities, which I believe the Navy is beginning to 

address. How valuable is PMRF to the Navy and organizations such as the Missile 

Defense Agency for testing, evaluation, and readiness? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. The Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) is a valuable 

and integral part of the Navy’s training range capability and hosts important Test 

and Evaluation (T&E) capabilities as well. PMRF’s unique and strategic mid-Pacific 

location, combined with range space, instrumentation, and logistics support, provides important capabilities to Ballistic Missile Defense testing and helps sustain 

Navy readiness. The PMRF underwater range capability is under consideration for 

improvements, along with other key readiness upgrades that compete for limited resources. 

25. Senator HIRONO. If confirmed, can I have your commitment that you will do 

what you can to ensure that PMRF maintains its status as a premier facility? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes. PMRF’s contribution to Navy readiness, as well as its 

role in test and evaluation of important future weapon systems, is widely recognized 

and understood. 

RED HILL

26. Senator HIRONO. I continue to be concerned about the fuel storage tanks at 

Red Hill on Oahu. I understand that the fuel held in these tanks is essential to 

many military operations in the Pacific. At the same time, the aquifer that residents 

depend on for their water supplies must be protected from contamination. If confirmed will you monitor this situation and step in where required? 

729 

Admiral RICHARDSON. The Navy is fully committed to operating and maintaining 

Red Hill to the highest standards of safety to ensure the protection of Hawaii’s 

drinking water. The Navy routinely evaluates and tests the water beneath and 

around the Red Hill complex, and I will continue the oversight of that process to 

monitor this strategic asset and ensure the safety of the drinking water. To ensure 

complete transparency with the local community, the Navy routinely works with 

local regulators in carrying out monitoring and testing in accordance with required 

standards. 

For example, the Navy has strict procedures in place to identify and quickly respond to any release of fuel. Additionally, the Navy has nine groundwater monitoring wells and an additional sampling point to routinely test ground water in and 

around the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility. This monitoring system is part of 

a 2008 State of Hawaii’s Department of Health approved groundwater protection 

plan. The Navy routinely submits its analytical test results and summary evaluations to the State of Hawaii’s Department of Health and the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency for review, assessment and approval. 

Currently, under Administrative Order of Consent (AOC) collaboration, the Navy, 

Defense Logistics Agency, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and State of Hawaii Department of Health are identifying best available, practicable technologies 

to upgrade the Red Hill tanks to further protect Hawaii’s drinking water, and retain 

the facility’s ability to support current military operations and maintain Pacific 

Command’s strategic fuel reserve. 

Since 2006, the Navy and Defense Logistics Agency invested $145 million to modernize Red Hill facilities and environmental testing capabilities. We plan to invest 

an additional $70 million in Red Hill over the next five years to further enhance 

the structural integrity of all tanks and the facility’s operational efficiency. These 

numbers do not include additional work that would be required through the AOC. 

27. Senator HIRONO. How would the Administrative Order on Consent (AOC) between EPA, Hawaii Department of Health, and the Navy affect naval operations in 

the PACOM AOR? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. The mission requirements for naval operations in the 

PACOM AOR will continue to be met by the Red Hill fuel facility on Oahu if the 

AOC is finalized in its current form. The current draft AOC, as approved by the 

Navy, includes timelines for facility modifications that allow anticipated Naval operations in the Pacific AOR to be executed as scheduled. 

NAVY ENERGY PROGRAM

28. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Mabus has set out a very forward-thinking approach to the Navy’s energy needs and has strongly made the case that focusing on 

diversifying fuel sources and improving energy efficiency will save money and improve the effectiveness of our forces. Are you committed to implementing Secretary 

Mabus’ strategy and, if so, what will your priorities be in this area? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, I am committed to implementing Secretary’s Mabus’ 

strategy for diversifying fuel sources and increasing the energy efficiency of our 

forces to enhance combat capability. In this way, the United States enhances its 

strategic position by becoming less dependent on imported fossil fuels. 

To achieve this end, I am committed to diversifying the Navy’s fuel supply and 

stressing the importance of the Navy’s testing and certification of advanced alternative fuels. Additionally, I will continue the emphasis on innovative technology in 

operational energy that improves the energy efficiency of the Fleet. 

29. Senator HIRONO. Also, is the Navy on track to sail its ‘‘Great Green Fleet’’ 

by 2016? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, Navy is on track to meet the Secretary of the Navy’s 

goal of sailing the Great Green Fleet in 2016. 

[The nomination reference of Admiral John M. Richardson, USN 

follows:] 

730 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

June 4, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment as Chief of Naval Operations and appointment in the United States Navy to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 5033: 

To Be Admiral

Admiral John M. Richardson, 1324. 

[The biographical sketch of Admiral John M. Richardson, USN, 

which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

731 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN 


15-68_Richardson_1.eps
732 


15-68_Richardson_2.eps
733 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Admiral John M. Richardson, USN in connection with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

John M. Richardson. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Chief of Naval Operations. 

3. Date of nomination: 

June 4, 2015. 


15-68_Richardson_3.eps
734 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

April 8, 1960; Petersburg, VA. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Dana Richardson (formerly Dana Silva). 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None. 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution. 

None. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

None. 

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

None. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from 

the Administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

JOHN M. RICHARDSON

This 22nd day of May, 2015 

[The nomination of Admiral John M. Richardson, USN was reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on August 4, 2015, with 

the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 5, 2015.] 

(735) 

NOMINATIONS OF MR. JOHN CONGER TO BE 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, COMPTROLLER; MR. STEPHEN P. 

WELBY TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING; MS. ALISSA M. STARZAK TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

THE ARMY; AND MR. FRANKLIN R. PARKER 

TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

NAVY FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE 

AFFAIRS 

Thursday, November 19, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in Room SDG50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain, (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Ayotte, 

Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed, Gillibrand, 

Donnelly, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services 

Committee meets this morning to consider the nominations of Ms. 

Alissa M. Starzak to be General Counsel of the Department of 

Army; Mr. Franklin R. Parker to be Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Mr. John Conger to be 

the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller; and 

Mr. Stephen P. Welby to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. 

We welcome all of you here this morning, as well as members of 

your families. As is our tradition, at the beginning of your testimony, we welcome you to introduce those members of your family 

joining you this morning. 

Ms. Starzak is currently the Deputy General Counsel at the Department of Defense. She has also served as counsel and a professional staff member on the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence and as Assistant General Counsel at 

the Central Intelligence Agency. I look forward to your testimony 

736 

on a number of pressing issues inside Army and the Department 

of Defense. 

Mr. Parker is currently Chief Counsel of the Maritime Administration in the Department of the Transportation. The Navy office 

of Manpower and Reserve Affairs has the great responsibility of 

taking care of our sailors, marines, and their families and the 

Navy’s civilian employees. I look forward to your testimony on how 

you plan to support the most important part of the Navy, its people. 

Mr. Conger is currently the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary 

for Installations and Environment. The Comptroller’s office, where 

he has been nominated to serve has a critical role to play at this 

time of budgetary challenges. The Department of Defense spends 

more than half a trillion dollars a year, but after years and years 

of effort, it still cannot pass an audit. The Department is alone 

among Federal agencies in being unable to provide the Congress or 

the American taxpayer assurances that their dollars are spent as 

appropriated. It is hardly surprising that according to the Government Accountability Office, the Department of Defense is at high 

risk for waste, fraud, and abuse due to decades of financial mismanagement. 

After 2 decades of empty promises, many of us are extremely 

skeptical that the Department will be able to audit its financial 

statements in 2017 as the law requires. While the organization of 

the Comptroller is also dual-hatted to serve as the Chief Financial 

Officer, those financial management duties are often dominated by 

the annual work of creating and defending the budget. Mr. Conger, 

this committee is interested in hearing what steps could be taken 

now to begin reversing this trend. 

Finally, Mr. Welby is currently the Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Systems Engineering at the Department of Defense. The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering has long been vacant. So we are eager to have the position 

filled on a permanent basis. As you know, defense research and innovation is essential to maintaining the cutting-edge technologies 

that provide superior capabilities and protection for our 

warfighters. 

I have concerns regarding the ability of the Defense Department 

to transition technologies from the laboratory to the warfighter in 

an effective, efficient, and timely manner. At the same time, the 

Department is chasing innovative companies in places like Silicon 

Valley, but it does not appear to be making the necessary changes 

to its research, contracting, and acquisition policies that would 

allow us to take advantage of commercial innovation. The challenges faced by the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, which 

Secretary Carter launched to better connect the Department with 

Silicon Valley, is one embodiment of these concerns. I look forward 

to your testimony on how you plan to lead the defense research enterprise and how you will accelerate defense innovation and technology transition. 

I thank the witnesses for their willingness to serve and I look 

forward to their testimony. 

Senator Reed? 

737 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, witnesses, for your willingness to serve and your 

service to date. Thank you very much. I join the chairman in welcoming you here to this hearing to fill these important vacancies 

in the Department of Defense. As we heard during the hearing we 

held earlier this week, managing an organization as large as the 

Department of Defense can be very challenging and requires strong 

leadership. If confirmed, I am confident that the nominees before 

us will have that strong leadership profile. 

Mr. Conger, who has been nominated to be the Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller, has extensive experience working on national security issues. As a congressional staff, 

Mr. Conger worked on budget and appropriations matters and has 

a deep appreciation for how the annual budget process works. In 

addition, Mr. Conger has overseen the Energy, Installations, and 

Environmental portfolio at the Department, providing oversight 

management of the Department’s $850 billion real property portfolio. Mr. Conger’s knowledge and experience will be critical in an 

era of constrained budget resources, as well as ensuring the Department finally achieves a clean audit of its financial statements, 

as the chairman has indicated. 

Mr. Welby, who has been nominated to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, serves as the Deputy for that position. Mr. Welby is well positioned for this job, 

given his strong technical background and experience both in government and industry. If confirmed, he will be responsible for ensuring that our research programs and institutions that perform 

cutting-edge R&D [Research and Development], like the defense 

labs and DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency], 

are as innovative and effective as possible. I want to hear his plans 

to advocate for and champion those labs, their people, and the important advanced technology products that they produce for our 

warfighters. 

Ms. Starzak, who has been nominated for the position of the 

Army General Counsel, has extensive legal experience in positions 

that have prepared her well for this position. After her private sector experience, Ms. Starzak has worked in the Office of the CIA 

[Central Intelligence Agency] General Counsel, she served as counsel on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and currently 

serves as the Deputy General Counsel in the DOD’s [Department 

of Defense’s] General Counsel’s Office. Ms. Starzak will be joining 

a new command team with a new Army Secretary and Chief of 

Staff where they will work together to address the many challenges 

that the Army faces. 

Mr. Parker, who has been nominated for the position of Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, appears 

well suited to lead Navy personnel programs. His experience in the 

Navy General Counsel’s Office and as Chief Counsel for the Maritime Administration, as well as his private sector experience, will 

give him a unique perspective to apply to the many important challenges he will face. 

Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. 

738 

Chairman MCCAIN. There are standard questions that are asked 

of all nominations, and I will go through these questions and you 

can respond by simply saying ‘‘I do’’ or responding in the negative. 

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, 

it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and 

other communications of information. Have you adhered to the applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. 

Mr. WELBY. Yes. 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. 

Mr. PARKER. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

Mr. CONGER. No. 

Mr. WELBY. No. 

Ms. STARZAK. No. 

Mr. PARKER. No. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record in hearings? 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. 

Mr. WELBY. Yes. 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. 

Mr. PARKER. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 

and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. 

Mr. WELBY. Yes. 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. 

Mr. PARKER. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. 

Mr. WELBY. Yes. 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. 

Mr. PARKER. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 

testify upon request before this committee? 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. 

Mr. WELBY. Yes. 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. 

Mr. PARKER. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner 

when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with 

the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. 

Mr. WELBY. Yes. 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. 

Mr. PARKER. Yes. 

739 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Conger, we will begin with you. Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN CONGER TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMPTROLLER 

Mr. CONGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members 

of the committee. It is a privilege to be here to answer your questions regarding my nomination to the position of Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller. I am humbled and 

honored by the support I have received from President Obama—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Would you like to mention a family member 

who is here? 

Mr. CONGER. Absolutely. I would like to introduce and offer my 

deepest appreciation for my wife, Kristine Minami. I could not set 

out on this demanding path without her love and strong support. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome. 

Mr. CONGER. I would also like to recognize my son, Conner 

Minami, who is only 4 and not here today. 

Chairman MCCAIN. He will miss it. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. 

I appreciate the support that I have received from the President, 

from Secretary Carter, who originally hired me into the Pentagon 

in 2009 when he was the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the support I received from Deputy Secretary 

Work and Under Secretary McCord. 

I would also like to recognize my dad who, along with my grandfather and my uncle, served in the U.S. Navy and set a strong example of public service. 

For more than 20 years, I have worked national security issues, 

both as a congressional staffer, most of that working appropriations 

and budget issue, and in senior Pentagon positions overseeing the 

Department’s Installations, Environment and Energy portfolio. 

Each has taught me important lessons that, if confirmed, I would 

bring to this new and challenging role. 

Mr. Chairman, the defense budget details a carefully balanced 

set of priorities and risk with clearly more risk than any of us desire. The Department has worked to balance readiness to meet today’s complex security challenges with the need to ensure that we 

are investing in future capabilities. As you have articulated well, 

the risk would be unacceptable if we were forced to adhere to the 

caps in the Budget Control Act. I am glad to see that we have 

achieved a reprieve from those limits for 2016 and 2017. 

The DOD [Department of Defense] Comptroller has a critical role 

in providing the justification to Congress why the funds we have 

requested are critical to meeting to our strategy. This office has the 

unique capability and responsibility to associate resource decisions 

with their real world impacts to better inform Congress as it deliberates. 

As you know, this case is made more difficult by the fact that the 

DOD has not passed a financial audit. Without a clean audit, it is 

harder to make the case that we are efficiently using all of the 

funds Congress has provided us, even as we request more. In this 

environment, I believe it is absolutely critical that we dedicate ourVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00745 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
740 

selves to passing this audit, both for the improvement to financial 

management that it promises and for the credibility that it will 

provide to our requests for more funding. 

If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to assist Under Secretary 

McCord and the Department’s leadership in meeting these challenges. I am grateful for your consideration, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conger follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. JOHN CONGER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Members of the Committee. It is a privilege to be here to answer your questions regarding my nomination to the position 

of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller. I am humbled and 

honored by the support I have received from President Obama, from Secretary Carter (who originally hired me into the Pentagon in 2009 when he was the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), from Deputy Secretary 

Work and from Under Secretary McCord. 

Before continuing, I would like to introduce and offer my deepest appreciation to 

my wife and partner, Kristine Minami. I could not set out on this demanding path 

without her love and strong support. I’d also like to recognize the joy of my life, my 

son Conner Minami, who is only 4 and is not here today. 

I would also like to thank my Dad who, along with my grandfather and my uncle, 

served in the U.S. Navy and set a strong example of public service. 

For more than 20 years, I’ve worked national security issues, both as a congressional staffer—most of that working appropriations and budget issues—and in senior Pentagon positions overseeing the Department’s Installations, Environment and 

Energy portfolio. Each has taught me important lessons that, if confirmed, I would 

bring to this new and challenging role. 

Mr. Chairman, the defense budget details a carefully balanced set of priorities 

and risk, with clearly more risk than any of us desire. The Department has worked 

to balance readiness to meet today’s complex security challenges with the need to 

ensure that we are investing in future capabilities. As you have articulated well, 

the risk would be unacceptable if we were forced to adhere to the caps in the Budget 

Control Act, and I am glad to see we have achieved some reprieve from those limits 

for FY 2016 and FY 2017. 

The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) has a key role in providing the justification to Congress why the funds we have requested are critical to meeting our 

strategy. This office has the unique capability and responsibility to associate resource decisions with their real world impacts to better inform Congress as it deliberates. 

As you know, that case is made more difficult by the fact that the DOD has not 

passed a financial audit. Without a clean audit, it is harder to make the case that 

we are efficiently using all of the funds Congress has provided us, even as we request more. In this environment, I believe it is absolutely critical that we dedicate 

ourselves to passing this audit—both for the improvement to financial management 

that it promises and for the credibility it will provide to our requests for more funding. 

If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to assist Under Secretary McCord and the Department’s leadership in meeting these challenges. I am grateful for your consideration, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Welby? 

STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN P. WELBY TO BE ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING 

Mr. WELBY. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you this morning as the 

nominee to serve as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. I wish to thank the President and Secretary Carter for their support of my nomination. 

741 

Chairman, I would like to also take a moment to thank my wife 

Kimberly, my son Bradan, and my daughter Claire, who are here 

today. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome. 

Mr. WELBY. I would also like to particularly acknowledge my father, Patrick Welby, who is behind me whose service in the Army 

and whose service as a New York City fire officer, until he was injured in the line of duty, really taught me the true meaning of public service. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome, sir. 

Mr. WELBY. Our military technology advantage is essential to 

supporting our Nation’s ability to deter aggression and to succeed 

in conflict. Today our technology edge is challenged by the 

globalization of technology the globalization of technical talent and 

the emergence of foreign military capabilities particularly intended 

to directly counter our own military strengths. This increasingly 

competitive global technology environment demands more agile approaches to technology delivery and development and faster adoption of new, innovative solutions that can offset the growing technical capabilities of potential threats. The Department needs to 

commit to continuously refreshing the core technologies that sustain our defense and that mitigate technological surprise and that 

support our modernization efforts. The Department also needs to 

focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of our research and engineering establishment to ensure that the delivery of advanced capabilities can be conducted in a fiscally constrained environment. 

If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that our defense research and engineering enterprise remains focused on sustaining 

the technological superiority of U.S. forces, both addressing the demands of our current conflicts and addressing the needs of the 

evolving security environment, by accelerating the delivery of advanced capabilities that can make a critical difference from laboratory to battlefield. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for 

your time and attention, and I look forward to answering your 

questions this morning. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Welby follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. STEPHEN P. WELBY

Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear 

before you this morning as the nominee to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Research and Engineering. I wish to thank the President and Secretary Carter 

for their support of my nomination. I would also like to thank my wife Kimberly, 

my son Bradan, and my daughter Claire, who are here today, for their support and 

encouragement and I’d like to particularly acknowledge my Father, Patrick Welby— 

whose service as a New York City Fire Officer, until he was injured in the line of 

duty, taught me the true meaning of a career in public service. 

Our military technology advantage is essential to our nation’s ability to deter aggression and prevail in conflict. Today, our technical edge is challenged by the 

globalization of technology and the emergence of foreign military capabilities intended to directly counter our own technical strengths. This increasingly competitive 

global environment demands more agile approaches to technology development and 

faster adoption of new, innovative solutions that can offset the growing technical capability of potential threats. The Department must continuously refresh the core 

technologies that sustain our defense advantage, that mitigate technological surprise, and that support our modernization efforts. The Department must also focus 

on the effectiveness and efficiency of the research and engineering enterprise, to 

742 

allow the delivery of advanced capabilities faster in a fiscally constrained environment. 

If confirmed, I am committed to focusing the defense research and engineering enterprise with a focus on sustaining the technological superiority of U.S. forces—addressing both the demands of our current conflict and the needs of the evolving strategic environment—by accelerating the delivery of the advanced capabilities that 

can make a critical difference, from laboratory to battlefield. 

I thank you Mr. Chairman and members of this committee for your time and attention, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Ms. Starzak? 

STATEMENT OF MS. ALISSA M. STARZAK TO BE GENERAL 

COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Ms. STARZAK. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Reed, and members of the committee. I am honored to appear before you today. I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to 

President Obama for my nomination, as well as to Secretary Carter 

for his support. 

I would not be here today if it were not for the family, friends, 

and coworkers who have supported me over the years. I especially 

want to thank my wonderful family, including my husband, Andrew Ferguson, who is here with me today, and my sister, Jocelyn 

Starzak, who is also here. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome. 

Ms. STARZAK. I also want to thank my parents and my two amazing children who are 3 and 6 and therefore not here today. 

Throughout my life, my family has taught me the value—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Next time it will be required attendance for 

all children. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. STARZAK. Throughout my life, my family has taught me the 

value of serving others. My goal has always been to live up to the 

expectations that they have set. 

I also want to thank those, both civilian and military, that I have 

had the privilege of working with during the 4 and a half years I 

have spent serving in the Department of Defense Office of General 

Counsel. Their commitment to protecting America and improving 

the lives of the dedicated men and women who serve all of us by 

putting themselves in harm’s way for our country inspires me 

every day. 

The role of the Army General Counsel is, first and foremost, to 

provide solid and timely legal advice to Army senior leadership. If 

confirmed, that would be my first priority. I believe my background 

and experience in the executive branch, the Congress, and the private sector have well prepared me to serve this function. 

If confirmed as the Army General Counsel, I am committed to 

working closely with the Army Judge Advocate leadership to address the legal challenges facing the Army. I strongly believe in the 

value of having civilian and military lawyers work together to offer 

the best possible legal advice to our clients. 

If confirmed, I will make every effort to live up to the confidence 

that has been placed in me. 

I am grateful for your consideration, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Starzak follows:] 

743 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MS. ALISSA M. STARZAK

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the Committee. I am honored to appear before you today. I would like to begin by expressing 

my gratitude to President Obama for my nomination, as well as to Secretary Carter 

and Acting Secretary Fanning for their support. 

I would not be here if were not for the family, friends and co-workers who have 

helped me over the years. I especially want to thank my wonderful family, including 

my husband Andrew Ferguson and my two amazing children. It is unfortunate they 

could not be here with me today. 

I also want to thank those—both civilian and military—that I’ve had the privilege 

of working with during the four and a half years I have spent serving in the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel. Their commitment to protecting America 

and improving the lives of the dedicated men and women who serve all of us by 

putting themselves in harm’s way for our country inspires me every day. 

The General Counsel of the Army advises Army leadership on the legal implications of the many challenges facing the Army. I believe my background and experience in the Department, the Congress and the private sector have well prepared me 

to serve in this role. 

I am committed to working closely with the Army Judge Advocate leadership, and 

strongly believe in the value of having 

civilian and military lawyers work together to offer the best possible legal advice 

to our clients. 

If confirmed, I will make every effort to live up to the confidence that has been 

placed in me. 

I am grateful for your consideration, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Parker? Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF MR. FRANKLIN R. PARKER TO BE ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE 

AFFAIRS 

Mr. PARKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, and members of the committee. It is an honor and a privilege to be here before you today. 

Joining me today, I am honored to have a wide swath of my family, my wife Ann, my son Franklin. His little sister Diana was not 

able to be here today, and it is probably a good thing for everyone. 

My mother Janice, my father Franklin, my sister Lisa, my uncle 

Glynn, my cousin Frank, my sister-in-law Luong, and my good 

friend, Steve Raden. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Is there anyone who could not make it? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. PARKER. There were a couple. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome to all of you. I know this is a proud 

moment for you. 

Mr. PARKER. I am honored and privileged to be here today regarding my nomination for the position of Assistant Secretary of 

the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

Before we begin, I would like to thank President Obama, Secretary Carter, and Secretary Mabus for their support of my nomination. I would also wish to express my sincere appreciation to my 

colleagues, both past and present, specifically those at the Departments of the Navy and Transportation and at the Maritime Administration, for whom I hold the greatest respect. 

I thanked my family previously, but in particular, I would like 

to recognize my father, Franklin Parker; my uncle, Glynn Parker; 

and my cousin, Frank Harris, whose service in the Air Force and 

Army and whose experiences as Vietnam veterans instilled in me 

744 

the deepest appreciation for our servicemembers and the sacrifices 

and contributions that they routinely make for our Nation. It is on 

the shoulders of these men and women that we all truly stand. 

Lastly, I wish to acknowledge with deepest gratitude my grandfather, Fred Curls, who passed away earlier this year at the age 

of 96. I thanked him not only for his service in the National Guard 

but also for serving as my inspiration to enter public service and 

for teaching me that anything is possible in our great Nation. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a privilege to 

be considered for this opportunity to serve our men and women in 

uniform, as well as our civilian personnel who share their mission 

and complement their efforts to uphold our defense. Their commitment to our Nation deserves not only our respect but a corresponding obligation to them and their families that we make 

every possible effort to honor and support their service. 

Over the course of my career, I have worked in the private sector, as well as in both defense and civilian agencies. I have performed legal and nonlegal roles. I have served as an action officer, 

a manager, a senior executive, and as a member of agency leadership. In every context, however, the one constant has been the primacy of people. Our people conceive, create, enable, and execute everything we do. People are our greatest and most powerful asset, 

and this is no truer than for those who serve in our Nation’s defense. 

In this realm, it is critical that our decisions always support 

readiness, that we bolster the morale of our force, that we seek to 

create an environment that is free from harassment and abuse, and 

that we ensure that our personnel have the tools they need to be 

successful in the field and healthy at home. These needs are even 

more pronounced as we continue to manage multiple conflicts and 

threats in a highly constrained fiscal environment. 

If confirmed, my highest priority will be to ensure that our manpower and Reserve policies and practices meet the standards that 

the men and women of our Navy and Marine Corps deserve. I view 

this not only as an honor but as an obligation. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and 

the Congress to provide the best for our servicemembers and civilian personnel. In so doing, I will make every effort to reward the 

faith you have placed in me and that our men and women who 

serve have placed in us. I am truly grateful for your consideration 

of our my nomination, and I look forward to your questions. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Parker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. FRANKLIN R. PARKER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the committee. I am honored to appear before you today regarding my nomination for the position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Before we begin, I 

would like to thank President Obama, Secretary Carter, and Secretary Mabus for 

their support of my nomination. I also wish to express my sincere appreciation to 

my colleagues past and present—specifically those at the Departments of the Navy 

and Transportation, and the Maritime Administration—for whom I hold the utmost 

admiration and respect. In addition, I wish to thank my family—my wife, my children, my parents and my sister—whose steadfast support enables everything I do. 

In particular, I would like to recognize my father Franklin Parker, my uncle Glynn 

Parker, and my cousin Frank Harris, whose service in the Air Force and Army inVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00750 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
745 

stilled in me the deepest appreciation for our servicemembers, and the sacrifices and 

contributions they routinely make on behalf of our Nation. It is on the shoulders 

of these women and men that we all truly stand. Lastly, I wish to acknowledge, 

with deepest gratitude, my grandfather Fred Curls who passed away earlier this 

year at the age of 96. I thank him not only for his service in the National Guard, 

but also for serving as my inspiration to enter public service and for teaching me 

that anything is possible in our great Nation. Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee, it is a privilege to be considered for this opportunity to serve our men 

and women in uniform as well as our civilian personnel who share their mission 

and complement their efforts to uphold our defense. Their commitment to our Nation deserves not only our respect, but a corresponding obligation to them and to 

their families that we will make every possible effort to honor and support their 

service. Over the course of my career, I have worked in the private sector as well 

as in both defense and civilian agencies. I have performed legal and non-legal roles, 

and have served as an action officer, a manager, a Senior Executive, and a member 

of Agency leadership. In every context, however, the one constant has been the primacy of people. Our people conceive, create, enable and execute everything we do. 

People are our greatest and most powerful asset, and this is no truer than for those 

who serve in our Nation’s defense. In this realm it is critical that our decisions always support readiness, that we bolster the morale of our force, that we seek to create an environment that is free from harassment and abuse, and that that we ensure that our personnel have the tools they need both to be successful in the field 

and healthy at home. These needs are even more pronounced as we continue to 

manage multiple conflicts and threats in a highly constrained fiscal environment. 

If confirmed, my highest priority will be to ensure that our manpower and Reserve 

policies and practices meet the standards that the men and women of our Navy and 

Marine Corps deserve. I view this not only as an honor but as an obligation. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and the Congress to provide 

the best for our servicemembers and civilian personnel. In so doing, I will make 

every effort to reward the faith you have placed in me, and that our women and 

men who serve have placed in us. I am truly grateful for your consideration of my 

nomination, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Conger, we talked about an audit. For 15 years, we have 

been talking about an audit. For 15 years, we have legislated the 

requirement for an audit. For 15 years, we have not gotten one. 

What do you think the chances are of getting one this time around? 

Mr. CONGER. So the progress that the Department has made and 

the new thing that has happened even this year is that the service 

budgets are under audit right now. They are not necessarily going 

to pass an audit this year, but they are under audit for the first 

time. The Marine Corps has been under audit for several years. So 

there has been a considerable amount of progress. 

Chairman MCCAIN. There was a recognition of failure of the Marine Corps audit as well. 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. So the Marine Corps audit that had originally 

received a clean audit but then later that was retracted was because of an anomaly that was discovered and appropriately retracted. But that actually helps the rest of the audit—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. So the answer to my question is do you think 

we will have an audit this year. 

Mr. CONGER. I think that the budgets of the services are under 

audit, but they are not necessarily going to pass. Experience shows 

that—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. When do you think we will have an audit, a 

complete audit just like every other branch of government has undergone? 

Mr. CONGER. It is hard to predict when we will pass an audit. 

Chairman MCCAIN. It certainly is. You really put your finger on 

it. It is hard to predict especially after 15 years of failure. 

746 

Mr. CONGER. But the difference now is that we are being audited, and that process will point out what needs to be fixed. Those 

corrective actions will improve our chances each year, each subsequent year—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Each year? 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I can tell you that is not exhilarating to me 

saying ‘‘each year,’’ after 15 years of failure, Mr. Conger. I am sorry 

that I sound so pessimistic. The taxpayers of America, after all 

these years, still cannot get an audit, and you are telling me that 

each year we will get better. 

Mr. CONGER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I want you to do better. Okay? That is what 

I want. That is what the Congress and the American people want. 

We want an audit that the American people and this committee 

and the Members of Congress can look at and then make the right 

decisions. Without us knowing those fundamental facts, it is very 

hard for us to legislate on behalf of the American people. 

Mr. CONGER. I agree, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Ms. Starzak, Congress, as you know, for 

years now and in the latest authorization bill, which we are told 

the President will be signing today or tomorrow or very soon, specifically prohibited the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to the 

United States in both the authorization bill and the defense appropriations bill. 

Does the Constitution in your view authorize the President to act 

contrary to the law, including laws he signed as President? I am 

specifically referring to the recurring rumor that is banging around 

out there that the President will act by executive order to close 

Guantanamo. Now, in your view, does the President have that constitutional authority? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I do not believe that issue would come before me as Army General Counsel, but I have no reason to question 

the constitutionality of those restrictions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I am not asking whether you question it. I 

am asking whether you believe that the President has the constitutional authority to act by executive order to close Guantanamo Bay. 

I just read you a list of the requirements when you come before 

this committee. 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, as I think the Attorney General testified 

earlier this week, I believe the statutory restrictions would prohibit 

transferring detainees to the United States. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Parker, same question. 

Mr. PARKER. Senator McCain, this is not an issue that I have 

worked on. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I understand that, Mr. Parker. It is the right 

of this committee to ask questions that we feel are important. 

Mr. PARKER. Absolutely, Senator McCain. I just am not in a position to provide an answer on this particular question. It is not one 

that I have looked into and really have—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Then we will await your written answer 

while you look into it. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

747 

This seems to be an issue beyond the scope of the position for which I am being 

considered. I would defer it to the appropriate offices with authority on this issue. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Welby? 

Mr. WELBY. Chairman, I am neither a lawyer nor have any particular experience in this matter. So I would have to go with the 

advice of others on this topic. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I understand. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

I am not a lawyer and I lack the personal background and training to provide 

an appropriate response to this question. It is my understanding that this issue 

would not fall under the purview of ASD(R&E). 

Mr. Conger? 

Mr. CONGER. Sir, I am not a lawyer, nor have I looked into this 

particular issue. I would have to get back to you, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Mr. Chairman, I agree that this is an important issue. However, I am not an attorney and know that such complex legal issues are best assessed by the appropriate legal experts. I would refer such a question to them to ensure you got an accurate and informed answer to your question. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Parker, the Marines recently released 

the results of their major research study on combat integration. Before reviewing the report, Secretary Mabus indicated he will not 

support any exceptions to policy to close any ground combat elements to women, and he also said that he would not even review 

the conclusions of the Marines study. 

Are you familiar with the Department of the Marine Corps? 

Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force report? 

Mr. PARKER. I am aware of the report, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Would you have made the same decision as 

Secretary Mabus before conducting a review of the report? 

Mr. PARKER. Senator McCain, I am aware of the report, but I 

have not had an opportunity to review the report and I have not 

spoken with Secretary Mabus. Without having reviewed the report 

and its analysis and its findings, without having spoken with the 

Secretary about his thought process, I cannot offer an opinion on 

whether or not I would have made the same decision as Secretary 

Mabus. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Would you agree that this will be in your 

area of responsibility? 

Mr. PARKER. Absolutely, Senator McCain. Once a decision is 

made by the Department of the Secretary of Defense—by the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, I will be closely involved in implementation of whatever decision is made. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, we would want to know your view on 

this issue, Mr. Parker. So I would hope that you would take a look 

at this task force report and get back to us as to your views on it. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

If I were developing the Department of the Navy’s position, I would avail myself 

of all information and facts related to the issue, as I understand Secretary Mabus 

did. Now that Secretary Carter has announced his decision to open all operational 

specialties to women, the only remaining issue is implementation. All qualified 

servicemembers will be able to serve in all occupational specialties based on their 

ability to meet operationally relevant, occupation-specific, individual standards, and 

it is my view that this policy will maximize the combat effectiveness of the Navy 

and Marine Corps. 

748 

Chairman MCCAIN. Finally, Mr. Conger, would you agree that we 

have a lot of work to do in accounting for both the number of personnel, as well as the expenses associated with our responsibilities? 

For example, we do not know how many civilian employees we 

have. We do not know how many contract employees we have. We 

are thinking about a mandate on end strength for both civilian personnel such as we have for uniformed personnel. What do you 

think about that? 

Mr. CONGER. I think that it is critically important to know how 

many people we have in the Department and that the personnel office should have that information in order for us to be able to budget appropriately. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank you. I thank the witnesses. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Conger, we have had a series of very thoughtful hearings at 

the direction of the chairman about revisions at the Department of 

Defense, Goldwater-Nichols. This week we had former GAO [Government Accountability Office] Director David Walker. We had 

General Punaro and others. 

I will quickly reveal my lack of accounting knowledge by asking—I got the impression that one way might be to get our arms 

around the audit is to not do it individually by service by service 

but start at the Department of Defense level because their materiality issues are much different than in the particular services. 

Again, this is a real question. 

Is there a different approach to the audit process that we could 

take that would be more effective than what we have been doing 

the last several years in terms of trying to get the services to do 

audits to then build on them to do a DOD audit? 

Mr. CONGER. So I appreciate the approach that you are suggesting or contemplating, and I understand the differences in materiality that evolve from looking at the larger enterprise. The Department has a strategy that has been moving the ball forward. We 

have been giving regular updates to this committee on the progress 

on that. I do not believe that the Department is planning on changing its strategy. 

Senator REED. Again, I am reflecting what the chairman has said 

and what we have all known. This is a strategy that is being pursued for 15 years resulting in the inability to produce the audit. I 

think it would be useful if at least you could sort of, as you push 

this along, think there might be an alternate way to do this. Again, 

these are really talented individuals who made the suggestions. 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. If confirmed, I would be happy to look at alternative strategies and try and figure out more effective ways to accomplish this. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Mr. Welby, thank you for your service and thank you for your father’s service. Thank you, sir. 

One of the aspects of your responsibilities are the government 

laboratories. They play a key role. At times, we get complaints or 

comments that they are antiquated in terms of equipment, management, in terms of their ability to function as they have in the 

past as real incubators for change and innovation. Can you give us 

749 

some thoughts about your particular approach to the laboratories 

and how we can engage them better? 

Mr. WELBY. Senator, thank you. 

I began my career as an intern in an Army research laboratory 

here in Maryland and spent a decade kind of working on cuttingedge problems that really made a difference, early GPS [Global Positioning System] activities, early work on unmanned air vehicles, 

some of the roots of some of the artificial intelligence briefings that 

are going on today. I think the energy and excitement that I see 

in the workforce in our laboratories is critical to ensuring that we 

are on the cutting edge of getting capabilities that matter to our 

warfighters. The laboratories have served as an incubator of technology and as a coupler to take advanced technology and drive it 

towards military needs. 

If confirmed, I do intend to very closely look at the state of our 

laboratories, the state of their capital equipment, but most importantly, I am concerned with the state of our people to ensure that 

we have the right mix of talent, the right mix of skills in our laboratories. I am particularly concerned with the graying of our laboratory workforce, and I want to make sure that we refresh the talent that will serve us in the future in the laboratories. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Welby. 

Ms. Starzak, one of the roles you will have to play is to work 

very closely with the Judge Advocate General of the Army, the uniformed individual that is your counterpart. You have had extensive 

experience at the CIA, Department of Defense, et cetera. Can you 

give us sort of a notion of how you intend to work and share responsibilities and emphasis? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, my understanding is that the Army TJAG 

General Darpino has a number of separate responsibilities, as well 

as our joint responsibilities. I think it is very important that she 

be able to provide independent advice to the Secretary on the 

issues that are in her jurisdiction. I think we would work together 

very well. I know General Darpino. She is terrific. 

Senator REED. She has been very helpful to this committee on a 

host of issues. Again, I think the combination of the two, you will 

be very effective for the Secretary of the Army. 

Just a final question, Mr. Parker, and that is, again, in the hearings that the chairman has, I think, very thoughtfully put together, 

the Goldwater-Nichols issues have come up again and again. One 

aspect—and he has alluded to it—is civilian personnel. Your responsibilities will include sort of the incentives for, the number of, 

looking at how they are integrated with Active Duty military personnel. Can you give us any ideas, as you begin, of what insights 

or what approaches you might take to deal more effectively with 

civilian personnel? 

Mr. PARKER. Senator Reed, that is an extremely important issue, 

and that is one that will be one of the top priorities, if confirmed, 

for me, really taking a look at the existing authorities and how best 

we can make sure that we modernize them in order to attract, recruit, and retain the highest quality workforce that we possibly 

can. I know there are a number of efforts ongoing as we speak, 

both in terms of looking at existing authorities, also in terms of talent management, and I would continue to work, if confirmed, in 

750 

those areas, and I would be open to and I would work with the 

committee as well in seeking the input of the committee and the 

Congress for ways to best implement solutions to some of these 

issues. 

I think one last aspect that is extremely important, however, is 

that whatever reforms are made, that we do not compromise readiness in the process. Maintaining that important balance is something else that I would make sure to prioritize, if confirmed. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cotton? 

Senator COTTON. Ms. Starzak, you were a lead investigator for 

the Senate Intelligence Committee majority staff study into the 

CIA’s rendition, detention, and interrogation practices. In your 

time as a lead investigator, did you access and review a set of documents known as the Panetta Review? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I had access to materials at the CIA facility that they provided. That includes what I believe to be the Panetta Review, although it was not called that when I was on the 

committee. I left for the Department in 2011. 

Senator COTTON. Did you access and review the Panetta Review 

more than once? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I believe I had access to it. I do not remember at this point, 4 and a half years later, how often I accessed 

it. 

Senator COTTON. Do you believe that computer forensic analysis 

would indicate how many times it was accessed? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I am sorry. I am not a computer expert. 

I do not know. 

Senator COTTON. Do you recall recording, making use of, or taking notes about the content of the Panetta Review? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I do not recall doing that. 

Senator COTTON. As you know, the CIA believes the Intelligence 

Committee staff should never have had access to the Panetta Review. Are you aware of how or why the CIA computer system set 

up for committee staff to review CIA documents included the Panetta Review? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I have no idea. My understanding is that 

the computer system was set up for the committee’s access, and the 

committee staff accessed all documents through the system that 

was set up. 

Senator COTTON. Did you ever speak to any current or former 

CIA official’s staff or contractors about making the Panetta Review 

accessible on this computer system? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I had no discussions about that particular 

document. 

Senator COTTON. None whatsoever. 

Ms. STARZAK. None with the CIA staff, no. 

Senator COTTON. Are you aware of other Intelligence Committee 

staffers who spoke to any current or former CIA official’s staff or 

contractors about making the Panetta Review accessible on that 

computer system? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I just do not know. 

751 

Senator COTTON. A committee staff member or members printed 

out a hard copy of the Panetta Review and removed it from the secure CIA document review facility and transported it to committee 

offices. Under the procedures agreed to by the committee and the 

CIA at the time, were committee investigators free to remove hard 

copies of any document they wished from the secure facility without consultation and authorization by the CIA? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, as I mentioned, I left the committee in 

2011. I believe, based on media reports, that that incident happened long after I had left the committee. I am not familiar with 

the circumstances of that arrangement. 

Senator COTTON. So you do not recall the agreement that the 

committee had with the CIA about all access to any document, not 

just the Panetta Review? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, my understanding is that issues were 

supposed to be worked out with the CIA, but again, I do not know 

the specifics of that particular document. 

Senator COTTON. Was there an agreed upon process by which the 

CIA could authorize the removal of certain hard copies of documents from that facility? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, the CIA did clear documents to be 

brought back to the committee SCIF [Sensitive Compartmental Information Facility]. That was certainly something that had happened. That was how the review was brought back. It was brought 

back through the CIA. 

Senator COTTON. Are you aware if the committee gained such authorization from the CIA to remove the hard copy of the Panetta 

Review? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, as I mentioned, I was not at the committee at the time that it was reviewed, or at least media reports 

suggest it was reviewed. So I just do not know. 

Senator COTTON. Media reports suggest that it was reviewed for 

the first time in 2010 when you were at the committee and a lead 

investigator there. 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, you asked when it was removed. Maybe 

I misspoke. I meant when it was removed from the CIA facility. 

Senator COTTON. When is it your understanding that it was removed from the CIA facility? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I do not know. I know it was not removed 

at the time I was at the committee. 

Senator COTTON. Are you aware of the identity of the committee 

staff members who took part in printing and removing the Panetta 

Review? 

Senator COTTON. Senator, as I mentioned, I was not at the committee at the time. All I have seen are the same media reports that 

everyone has seen. 

Senator COTTON. Okay. I want to call your attention to a poster. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

752 

Senator COTTON. The first page of each document in the Panetta 

Review contains a lengthy step as shown there. In relevant part, 

it reads, this classified document should not be distributed without 

express permission from DRG-RDI [Director’s Review Grasp for 

Rention, Detention, and Interrogation] or CIA’s Office of General 

Counsel. This document also contains material protected by the attorney-client and attorney-work product privileges. Furthermore, 

this document constitutes deliberative work product protected by 

the deliberative process privilege. It should not be relied upon by 

persons outside of DRG-RDI. 

Do you recall seeing this stamp on the Panetta Review? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, it is probably more than 5 years since I 

would have seen it. I do not remember it at this time. 

Senator COTTON. Do you recall speaking with anyone in the CIA 

or on the Intelligence Committee staff about seeing a stamp such 

as this on the Panetta Review? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I do not remember discussing it. 

Senator COTTON. You are a member of the DC Bar and the California Bar during the relevant times? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I am inactive in California, but I am a 

member of the DC Bar and inactive in California. 

Senator COTTON. At the time in 2010 and 2011? 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes, Senator. 

Senator COTTON. Were you aware that the DC and California 

professional responsibility rules regarding proper handling of privileged documents that may have been inadvertently disclosed by the 

CIA to committee staff? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I believe that the inadvertent disclosure 

applies to litigation issues. I think congressional oversight is significantly different. In fact, with respect to that statement, I would 

note that Congress actually does not recognize deliberative process 

privilege as being something that protects disclosure from Congress. So, for example, this committee has requested a number of 


15-88_1a.eps
753 

documents that are protected—that could arguably be protected by 

deliberative work product. The Department of Defense provides 

them—has provided documents as recently as this week that would 

be potentially subject to that privilege from outside disclosure. 

Senator COTTON. It will be your position, if confirmed as General 

Counsel of Army, that this committee is entitled to review any material that you or anyone in the Army inadvertently or unintentionally discloses to Congress? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I think the executive branch and the Congress do not always agree on the scope of privileges. I think that 

is actually an important thing. I think it is part of the separation 

of powers. We always expect tension between the executive branch 

and Congress on exactly what material can be disclosed. 

I think that the important part is comity between the two. So my 

understanding with respect to disclosure is often that the executive 

branch tries to accommodate Congress to the maximum extent possible. 

Certainly in the context of the review, the CIA review, the committee was provided access to more than 6 million pages. Many of 

them were deliberative in nature. Many of them were prepared by 

attorneys. There was no indication at the time that that was inadvertent. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you, Ms. Starzak. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thanks to the witnesses for your service. 

All of you have come up within the kind of Federal family, DOD 

certainly but also intel agencies or DARPA or the DOT [Department of Transportation]. 

We have just gotten a 2-year budget deal and an NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. The 2-year budget deal also lifts 

for the second 2-year budget deal in a row to a significant extent 

the BCA [Budget Control Act] caps imposed in August of 2011. 

In your current positions, talk about what difference it makes to 

getting the missions done that we have gotten a 2-year budget deal 

that lifts the pressure of the BCA caps. I will start with Mr. Conger. 

Mr. CONGER. So in my current responsibility set, with oversight 

over installations, energy, and environment issues, I think it is 

most starkly presented in the context of facility maintenance at our 

installations. When we are constrained by the budget and we have 

choices to make as far as where to take risk, we take that risk in 

facility maintenance over readiness of operational forces. That is 

the prudent thing to do. Facilities degrade slower than readiness 

does. 

However, when there is more flexibility provided, more budget 

available, we are able to perform that maintenance. Frankly, it is 

better in the long run to do the maintenance upfront. So I think 

that is probably the starkest place where the dynamics change. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Conger. 

Mr. Welby? 

Mr. WELBY. Senator, quickly just the ability for stability to allow 

us to plan I think is critical, and I appreciate the efforts here to 

ensure that we have the stability required to allow us to plan. 

754 

Science and technology advancements are made over time. It requires a continuity of effort and focus. I believe that the stability 

that the budget agreement offers allows us to have that focus at 

least over the next 2 years. 

Senator KAINE. Ms. Starzak? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I agree with those comments. I am not an 

expert in that particular area but I agree. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Parker? 

Mr. PARKER. Senator, I agree with those comments as well. In 

my current position with the Maritime Administration at the Department of Transportation, it does help provide stability especially 

for our defense sealift programs like our maritime security program. Being able to have that certainty for the next couple years 

definitely helps to ensure that those programs can continue to operate. 

Senator KAINE. The chair and ranking on this committee have 

really pushed the notion that we need to provide the certainty. I 

would just like to say to all my colleagues I think what the budget 

deal does is it starts to normalize two things: first, 2-year budgets 

instead of a 1-year budget, which gives all of you a better planning 

horizon and enables more stability for the reasons you have described; and second, the notion that the BCA caps are a discipline, 

a starting point, a default but not a straightjacket. For the second 

2-year budget deal in a row, we have treated BCA caps in that 

way, and I think that is very, very positive. I am interested in your 

testimony. 

Ms. Starzak, one of the issues that I am kind of interested in is 

when we do the NDAA, we put a lot of policy into it and a lot of 

it is legal policy. You have been in the General Counsel’s Office in 

the DOD and now going in the position with the Army, the largest 

of the service branches. Maybe the issue that we have talked 

about, just to use it as an example, the biggest in terms of policy 

is the set of reforms that we have made with respect to military 

sexual assault. Talk a little bit about the challenge of taking those 

reforms and then implementing them throughout the DOD or just 

within the Army. In the particular case of the legal reforms with 

respect to the way we are trying to treat the sexual assault problem, what is your assessment of the progress we are making in 

having those reforms percolate down through the entire organization? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, there have been significant reforms in recent years, particularly on the military justice side. I believe the 

Department is currently implementing more than 50 pieces of legislation addressing military justice and sexual assault. They have 

been challenges, honestly. I think the major reforms, the article 32, 

for example, major reforms to article 60, which relates to the back 

end of prosecutions have been significant. The Department has— 

they are doing their best to make changes to the manual for courts 

martial, for example, to ensure that there is common understanding of how those will be applied. But it is incremental. I think 

there has been a lot of change in a very short period of time. So 

the Department is struggling in some ways to keep up. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Conger, I was interested in your answer to 

Senator McCain’s questions about the audit because I hear more 

755 

recently—you know, coming in and there is not an audit, it seems 

like are you kidding me. But I do not have the background or the 

history of we are going to have an audit for year after year after 

year. Go into this issue of who is now under audit. Talk about the 

four branches, which branches are under audit, and how long have 

they been under audit. So did the Marines start before the others? 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. The first year that the Marine Corps budget 

was audited was in fiscal year 2012. 

Senator KAINE. Then tell me about the other service branches. 

Mr. CONGER. The other service branches will be under audit for 

their fiscal year 2015 budget, and that will be the first time. 

Senator KAINE. For the first time. 

So the Marines have been under audit since 2012 but have not 

yet gotten a clean audit. 

Mr. CONGER. That is right. 

Senator KAINE. You would expect, I guess, that if the other service branches go under for the first time in 2015, it is not likely that 

they are going to get a clean audit the first time around? 

Mr. CONGER. Absolutely. 

Senator KAINE. But the fact was before 2012, nobody was even 

under audit. I guess the process is you put them under audit and 

then you work with the service branches to get them to not only 

be under audit but to start to pass audits. 

Mr. CONGER. Yes, sir. It is not a trivial thing to be under audit. 

The auditors expect a certain responsiveness. When they ask for 

documentation for a particular transaction, you are supposed to be 

able to provide that in a reasonable amount of time. We just did 

not have the systems in place to be responsive at all. 

Senator KAINE. Is there also then a need for an audit not just 

of the service branches but kind of overall? Again, I am not an accountant, but the overall OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] 

enterprise. Are there additional audits that really need to be done 

in addition to the four service branches? 

Mr. CONGER. So in addition to the four service branches, the defense agencies will have their budgets under audit. In addition to 

the budget parts of the audit, there will need to be an audit of inventory, the existence and completeness. Essentially do you know 

everything that you have got whether it is real property, buildings—and I work on that piece of it right now—but also every piece 

of equipment, every tank, every aircraft carrier. Do you have that 

inventory comprehensive? Do you have a value associated with 

that? Do you know how much that book value is of that particular 

asset? Then documentation of all the liabilities of the Department. 

Senator KAINE. I have gone over time, but this is very, very critical to the committee. If Senator Manchin was here, he would not 

follow up and just pile on on this. It is so important that this be 

done, and if you can make a major advance on this audit issue, 

then we will put a statue of you up out here. 

Mr. CONGER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator REED [presiding]. Senator Tillis, on behalf of the chairman. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Ms. Starzak, you said something that made me kind of look back 

at the family. You were talking about the tension between the 

756 

branches, and I think that is what you are saying here. If you cannot follow the discussion, just understand we are kind of doing our 

fiduciary responsibility for our roles. For the youngsters here, we 

are not trying to be mean. 

But I do have to ask you some questions about Guantanamo Bay, 

and I am going to try to ask them in the context of the job that 

you would be moving into. If the President directed the transfer of 

detainees from Guantanamo Bay to the United States, in your professional judgment would the officers of the Department of Army 

be at legal risk of violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, it is unclear what role the Department of 

the Army would have in that, and so I think it very much depends 

on that question. 

Senator TILLIS. I am not an attorney, but I know attorneys move 

quickly into hypotheticals when you get a response like that. So hypothetically, if we had Army officers involved in the transfer of 

Gitmo detainees, do you think that they could potentially be in violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, my understanding is that there are appropriations restrictions that address the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to the United States. I do not have any reason to think the 

Army officers would necessarily be involved in that effort. 

Senator TILLIS. But it would seem to me in the hypothetical that 

in a way you could extend your legal judgment should the Army 

be involved to anyone else because it is going to be one branch of 

the services. So I think if, in the hypothetical, they were involved, 

do you believe that they would be in violation or potential violation 

of the Anti-Deficiency Act? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, Anti-Deficiency Act prohibitions—if there 

is a restriction in an appropriations bill, that potentially leads to 

an Anti-Deficiency Act violation. So if something is done inconsistent with a restriction in an appropriations act, yes, it would be 

a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act. 

Senator TILLIS. Ms. Starzak, thank you for that answer. 

The administration typically invokes article II, section 3 of the 

Constitution when they are arguing against the Anti-Deficiency 

Act. What is your legal opinion on whether the Faithful Execution 

Clause still applies in a situation where there is an affirmative prohibition against the use of funds under the law? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I think it is very circumstance-dependent. 

I think you have to look at exactly what the law is, potentially exactly what the constitutional infirmity might be. 

Senator TILLIS. What we will do is I would like maybe we can 

either get another hypothetical or get to the specific circumstance, 

and we will submit that for the record for follow-up questions. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Conger, it is amazing to me when you think about the Department of Defense and every single private sector company that 

they work with has to do an audit every year, and they have done 

it every year for a long, long time. In fact, it is probably a requirement for them to do business with the Department of Defense. 

As somebody who came from an audit firm, it is remarkable to 

me that we are having difficulty auditing an organization that has 

a half trillion dollar budget. As somebody—if you were thinking 

757 

about a board of directors and you came back to the board every 

year and said, well, we just cannot get the audit working, you 

know, what is the likelihood that they are going to make an investment in an enterprise that I would like to make more investments 

in? 

My question for you is if they fail to meet the audit-ready status, 

if any part of the organization fails to meet the audit-ready status 

by 2017, who specifically should be held accountable for that failure? 

Mr. CONGER. So it depends on which part of the organization is 

not meeting its responsibilities. People should be held accountable 

for those things that they are responsible for and have the authority to be able to execute. 

Senator TILLIS. We will submit for the record—I want to know 

the specific person who should lose their job if they fail again to 

produce an audit-ready status in 2017. But instead of putting you 

on the spot here, we will put you on the spot in the written questions. 

Senator TILLIS. This also relates to Guantanamo Bay. If you are 

confirmed as the Comptroller, would you support the use of appropriated funds to execute the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay to the United States? 

Mr. CONGER. So not having—the simple answer, Senator, is that 

we should be following the provisions in the law. So I would expect 

us to do that. I would rely on legal advice to decide exactly how 

we would apply those funds. 

Senator TILLIS. Because I know that we will have the opportunities to submit questions, that is another specific question that I 

would like to get your answer to. 

Senator TILLIS. I am sensitive to time. Mr. Parker, I just have 

a question for you. I will try and get in under the wire. The Marine 

Corps recently released the results of their major research study on 

combat integration. Are you familiar with that report? 

Mr. PARKER. I am aware of the report, Senator. 

Senator TILLIS. Are you familiar with the Department of the Marine Corps? recommendations? Specifically before I ask that question, given the time, do you support the decision of Secretary 

Mabus to not allow the Marine Corps? recommendation to go before 

the Secretary of Defense? 

Mr. PARKER. I am aware that the Secretary has provided a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, but I am not aware—— 

Senator TILLIS. Do you think it is wise to take the people who 

are on the ground that completed this extensive research to not 

have that be instructive to the Secretary’s decision-making process? 

Mr. PARKER. I am not aware of the Secretary’s decision-making 

process. 

Senator TILLIS. So do you or do you not agree with the decision 

of Secretary Mabus to not allow the Marine Corps? recommendation to go forward to the Secretary of Defense? 

Mr. PARKER. I am not aware of what Secretary Mabus forwarded 

to the Secretary of Defense. I am not aware of what was—— 

Senator TILLIS. It is my understanding that his recommendation 

is not to allow the Marine Corps? recommendations to go to the 

Secretary of Defense. Do you think that is a good or bad idea? 

758 

Mr. PARKER. I have not spoken to Secretary Mabus about his 

thought process and about his review of the report. 

Senator TILLIS. We will submit that for the record so you will 

have the opportunity to speak with the Secretary. 

Senator TILLIS. This is just another hypothetical question. If you 

extend the thought process that I think Secretary Mabus may 

have, do you believe that women should be required to register for 

the draft? 

Mr. PARKER. You know, that is a complex question that—— 

Senator TILLIS. It is actually a pretty simple question if you take 

a look at Secretary Mabus’ apparent policy trajectory. So that is 

another one we are—given that I guess it may be complex, that 

will be another one we will submit for the record. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Tillis. 

On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me recognize Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Ms. Starzak, I just want to clarify the record on this business of 

the Panetta Review. When did you leave the Intelligence Committee? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I left in May of 2011. 

Senator KING. When was the removal of the document and taken 

to the secure facility here in the Senate? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I do not know the exact date. I was not 

on the committee at the time. It was certainly after I left the committee. 

Senator KING. Late 2013. Does that sound correct? 

Ms. STARZAK. That is approximately my understanding from 

media reports. 

Senator KING. In other words, you had been gone from the committee for 2 years when this action took place. 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes, Senator. 

Senator KING. You had nothing to do with it whatsoever. 

Ms. STARZAK. No, Senator. 

Senator KING. Thank you. I just was confused by the prior line 

of questioning. I wanted to clarify that. 

Mr. Welby, one of the issues that we are continually talking 

about here is how to develop technology and how to get it into the 

hands of our military in a timely way. Talk to me about how we 

can accelerate the adoption of technology and handle the whole 

issue of R&D in the Defense Department. 

Mr. WELBY. Senator, in the commercial sector, time to market is 

what drives business success. I believe increasingly speed is going 

to be a critical measure for our research and development enterprise. I believe that we need to exercise the Department’s muscles 

in prototyping and demonstration, the tools that allow us to take 

capabilities that are developed in the laboratory, in industry, defense and non-defense, and put them into a military context, get 

operators exposed to those ideas to short circuit the long requirements process that we have today. 

Senator KING. Specifically, do you intend some kind of reorganization or restructuring in order to make that happen? Just saying it here in this committee is not going to make it happen. If Senator Inhofe was here, he would tell you that currently it takes 23 

759 

years to get a new airframe from conception to the tarmac and into 

flight. That is unacceptable. 

Mr. WELBY. Senator, I entirely agree. 

Two things that have happened recently that I have had a hand 

in that have been working to accelerate that process. We have 

shifted one of the four offices in ASDR&E [Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Research and Engineering] and renamed it to focus it 

on concept prototyping as a way to rapidly move technology forward, to accelerate that process of moving material from the lab 

into the field. 

But I think most importantly, we have begun structural changes 

to the way we buy. With this committee’s support, the Department 

has refocused its efforts on modular open system architectures, on 

ways that we can plug and play technologies, new emerging technologies, into existing systems so we do not have to go through that 

long lifecycle with a tightly integrated system. Today if you buy a 

computer, you can plug new cards into it to increase its capability 

over time. We want our military systems to have that same kind 

of plug and play upgradeability to allow us to insert technology 

faster over time. 

Senator KING. I would urge you to pursue that aggressively because it seems to me that is one of the serious problems. If we are 

going to build, for example, the new Ohio class, it is going to have 

a 40-year life. It has to be designed in such a way as to be 

upgradeable. Otherwise, it is obsolete the day it hits the water. 

Mr. WELBY. I agree entirely. 

Senator KING. The other issue with R&D—we had a very interesting hearing here a couple weeks ago about carriers, and it became apparent through the discussion that the overruns on the 

new carrier are largely attributable to the fact that we are doing 

R&D while we are building the ship. How do we separate R&D 

from construction of a new class of weapon system? 

Mr. WELBY. Senator, I believe that there is a series of questions 

that need to be asked at the start of any modernization program, 

any acquisition program focused on risk and particularly the technological risk, the risk associated with the technologies, with the 

manufacturing technology we plan to use, with the technology we 

would use to integrate those systems. 

In 2009, this committee established the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering position, the position I 

currently hold, to advise the Under Secretary and Secretary on 

technical risk on programs, and I have been doing my best over 

that period of time to kind of bring that conversation forward. I 

think we have done a much better job over the last 5 years in 

terms of not starting programs without a clear understanding of 

the maturity of the capabilities that go into them. That discipline 

is critical to ensuring that we can manage the cost and schedule 

and reliability of our programs. 

Senator KING. Well, you have some challenges with Ohio class 

coming, the new strike bomber coming. We are talking about some 

major weapon systems. I hope that you will focus very intensively 

on time and risk. I think those are the two factors. 

Mr. Conger, I am out of time, but I just want to join my colleagues in saying there is no more important mission from the fiVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00765 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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nancial point of view than getting this audit system in place. I tell 

people in Maine that we cannot audit the Department of Defense, 

and their jaws drop. We got to fix that. 

Mr. CONGER. I understand, Senator. 

Senator KING. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator King. 

On behalf of the chairman, Senator Sullivan, please. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Ms. Starzak, I just want to kind of follow up and give you a little 

more context on the—you have been getting a lot of questions on 

Gitmo [Guantanamo Bay]. I think what it does it reflects, obviously, an area of focus that this committee has been very interested 

in, the chairman, Senator Ayotte, all of us really. There are provisions in the NDAA. It looks like the President is going to sign that. 

But I think you see some of the frustration because it actually 

represents a broader frustration with an administration and a 

White House that sometimes seems to blatantly, in a lot of our 

views, ignore the law and do what they think they can do despite 

the fact that the law or the Constitution says otherwise. It has 

been kind of a theme, and it cross well beyond the military issues. 

So let me just ask a couple of questions and even a hypothetical 

or two that relate to this kind of—so the oath of office that the 

members of the military take, that actually all of you take—to 

whom or to what are you pledging an oath to? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, the oath is to the Constitution of the 

United States. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Correct. All the members of the military, 

when they take their oath—is it to the same entity? 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes, Senator. 

Senator SULLIVAN. So let us say kind of like what the AG [Attorney General] said recently in her testimony that it seems pretty 

clear that under the current law and the law that the President is 

getting ready to sign, the authority to close Gitmo resides with the 

Congress. I am not going to ask you if you agree with that or not. 

But let us say you do agree with that. Let us say you look and 

you are a smart lawyer, that you see that you think that is correct. 

It seems like the Attorney General of the United States was leaning that way in testimony. It would be good to know, for written 

testimony, if you can provide your answer on that, once you look 

at the NDAA provision. I am not going to ask you here right now. 

Senator SULLIVAN. But let us assume that you look at the NDAA 

provision, you get back to this committee, you say you think that 

the authority to close Gitmo firmly resides with the Congress of the 

United States. Then the White House, regardless of that, says they 

are going to do it anyway. As the chairman said, there are some 

rumblings along those lines. You are the General Counsel of the 

Army. What would you do? What would you do? If you came out 

with a written opinion, maybe it was not public, but maybe it was 

internal, saying you cannot do this, Mr. President, and then the 

White House overrules you and says we are doing it anyway, what 

would you do as the General Counsel of the United States Army? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I think, if confirmed as Army General 

Counsel, my role would be to mitigate against risk of legal implications for the Army. So I would specifically look at the legal implicaVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00766 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tions for the Army. I think that would be a significant challenge, 

obviously, if there was a disagreement. Ultimately, though, I would 

point out—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. If you thought the President was violating the 

law or the Constitution and you had in a written statement stated 

that either publicly or to the White House and they said, hey, forget it, we are doing it anyway, what would you do? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, like I said, I think that the importance 

would be from my written legal advice to apply to the Army. There 

are internal ways to ensure that your legal opinion is heard. Ultimately, though, the lawyer for the executive branch is the Department of Justice. So it is really up to the Attorney General to make 

a final determination on interpretation of legal provisions or on—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. So you would not resign if you thought that 

the White House was undertaking actions that were clearly contrary to the law or the Constitution? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I think you would have to look very carefully at the circumstances. It is very hard to talk about that as a 

hypothetical issue. It is hard to determine what would happen. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay. So just for the record, in terms of your 

written comments, if you could get back to us on—take a look at 

the NDAA provision, take a look at what the Attorney General is 

saying, and if you can directly answer the question, does the President of the United States, in light of the NDAA, have the authority 

to unilaterally without any congressional authorization shut down 

Gitmo. Can you get back to us on that? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I will look at that. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Can you get back to us? 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. Yes, Senator. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Parker, you know, one of the big issues 

that I know probably recognize—it is an issue that all of us are 

concerned about—are the high rates of suicide among military 

members, among our veterans. I know that you talked about in 

your testimony that you support efforts to encourage resilience 

among sailors and marines and their families. I appreciate that. Do 

you have any specific initiatives or ideas to help prevent suicide 

among Active Duty members or members of the Reserve? 

I am a reservist in the Marines. Like a lot of members in the 

military, I have seen the devastation that suicide can have with regard to units. Are you familiar with the Clay Hunt Suicide Prevention Act that the Congress passed at the beginning of this year? 

Mr. PARKER. Senator, every suicide is a tragedy. I understand 

that the Department is working very hard to try to do what it can 

to reduce the numbers of suicides. I know there are a number of 

programs in place that it is currently administering to really help 

individuals come forward and seek help, to help others to intervene 

when they see that there is a situation that might lead down that 

road. I know it is something that, if confirmed—it is something I 

will take extremely seriously. I will try to continue to implement 

and work through the programs that exist and also see if there are 

other ways to help address this terrible issue. I will be happy to 

work with the committee as well and seeking the committee’s ideas 

on how best to address it also. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Great. Thank you. 

762 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan. 

On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Donnelly, please. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To the entire group, to Mr. Parker and to everybody else, we 

have been working on this suicide issue for a long time now, for 

a number of years. Last year we were able to get in the NDAA that 

every servicemember can get a mental health assessment. This 

year’s NDAA—I worked together with Joni Ernst and Roger Wicker 

and John Boozman. We were able to get additional mental health 

assistance through what is called the care package. For private 

practitioners, mental health professionals, they can get special 

training to make them servicemember-friendly. Physician assistants we have been talking about as well. So if you will keep this 

on the front of the burner because we lost over 400 young men and 

women last year to suicide that were Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve combined. It is critically important for each one of them. That 

is a brother or a sister, mom or dad, son or daughter who is gone 

and lives have been turned completely upside down. 

So you all work in different areas. You are the Comptroller. You 

are Manpower and Reserve. But it will touch each and every one 

of you each and every day. We appreciate your efforts to stay on 

top of that. 

Mr. Welby, I wanted to ask you specifically in regards to your efforts, the importance of DOD’s R&D efforts to maintain our military’s technological edge. As we work to improve collaboration 

across government, academic, and private sector enterprises—and 

this is something that I know is critical to—well, to our whole 

country but also to Mr. Heinrich because of his home state. How 

do you view the role and the value of our military labs in the long 

term? To my State too because of the labs there. 

Mr. WELBY. Of course. Senator, I believe the DOD labs are a critical resource for the Department. I believe that they represent the 

key engine by which we map technology from the larger academic 

and private sector into those domains that are militarily critical. 

There are things in our laboratories that no one else will do, the 

key efforts we have in propulsion, in energetics, the military-specific IT [Information Technology] work that goes on, our biomedical 

teams. It is an amazing caliber of people and talent in our laboratories. I think it is critical that we preserve those. I think it is critical that we couple them to operational needs. It is critical to connect to them to a much larger community globally and in academia 

to ensure that we are getting talent and ideas flowing to our laboratories. 

Senator DONNELLY. One of the things we have seen recently is 

the sale of IBM’s [International Business Machines] semiconductor 

manufacturing business to a foreign-held company. It pretty much 

threw a wrench into our Trusted Foundry Program. What I am 

wondering is where we are with the strategy to manage supply 

chain risk for microelectronics going forward. 

Mr. WELBY. Senator, the Department reacted to the concern over 

the sale of the IBM Trusted Foundry to the GlobalFoundries group. 

We have built a series of mitigations to the loss of that capability, 

a near-term mitigation that ensures that the trusted facility reVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00768 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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mains available to the Department for a period of time, that allows 

us to make lifetime buys of critical parts that come off that line. 

It preserves the security context in which we ensure trust in that 

facility at least for the near term. 

In the long term, we need to recognize that the globalization of 

the microelectronics sector, microelectronics being so critical to our 

defense technology—it is going to require us to adapt the way we 

do business in microelectronics. We are going to need to be smarter 

about how we ensure the integrity of the devices we buy. 

Senator DONNELLY. One of the other areas we will probably have 

to continue to increase on is detection of counterfeit and similar 

things. Is it not? 

Mr. WELBY. I agree and that is part of our strategy, to ensure 

that the parts that we do buy are in fact trustworthy. Our efforts 

with the Joint Federated Analysis Center, the work going on at 

places like Crane or at Sandia National Labs that are supporting 

this nationwide network that allows us to look into electronics and 

ensure that they do only the things that we want them to do is 

going to be critical to that long-term strategy. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you. 

I am just about out of time, but I want to ask Mr. Conger. You 

know the issue of audits is critical to us. You have heard it. You 

have heard it from other members as well. Do you have an audit 

game plan, a list of metrics, that we can follow whether we are on 

target, whether you have the people you need to do the work you 

need to create this audit culture across the board that by this year, 

we expect to be at this point, by the following year, we expect to 

be at this point so we have a road map as opposed to just hoping 

that we can get somewhere on this? 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. The Department does have such a plan. It provided an update on that plan on Monday I believe to this committee, and we can certainly provide that—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Will you update that if you are in that position? 

Mr. CONGER. Absolutely. I would be intimately involved in updating that plan regularly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Senator Ayotte, on behalf of Chairman McCain. 

Senator AYOTTE. I thank the chair. 

I want to thank all of you for being here and your family as well. 

Mr. Conger, I wanted to ask you. You are currently performing 

the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment. In that capacity, you are responsible for 

oversight of DOD’s environmental cleanup programs. As you know, 

in 2014 chemicals used in Air Force fire fighting foam were discovered in the well water in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. This is a 

very concerning issue for my constituents in that area. The socalled PFCs [Perfluorinated Compound] have been associated with 

certain types of cancer. Together with Senator Shaheen, I have 

worked closely with the Air Force, the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 

764 

to ensure the Air Force cleans up the mess it made and the Federal 

Government provides full support to the local community. 

Mr. Conger, do you agree that it is important for the Air Force 

to clean up the mess that was created in the Portsmouth area in 

the well water and make every effort to notify personnel who may 

have been exposed to these PFCs and provide necessary support for 

the local community? 

Mr. CONGER. Senator, I absolutely agree that that is important. 

I have been in regular contact with Miranda Ballentine, my Air 

Force counterpart, who has been working very hard on this issue 

personally and has gone up and, I think, done town halls up in the 

community as well. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I appreciate that, and when you are confirmed for this new position, I would appreciate your continued 

focus and attention on making sure the people of Portsmouth are 

fully supported, people are notified that may have been exposed to 

PFCs, including military personnel, and that we do all we can to 

ensure that obviously the mess is cleaned up and that anyone who 

needs any assistance on the health end gets it. 

Mr. CONGER. Yes, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much. 

So, Ms. Starzak, I wanted to just clarify one thing. You have 

been Deputy General Counsel for legislation at the Department of 

Defense since May of 2011. Is that right? 

Ms. STARZAK. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. In that capacity since you have been in that position, the law has really been the same with regard to transfers 

from Guantanamo. The defense authorization, at least since I have 

been on this committee and since you have been Deputy General 

Counsel, has said that it does prohibit transfers from Guantanamo 

to the United States of America. Would you agree with that? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, yes. With respect to domestic transfers, 

the law has not significantly changed. 

Senator AYOTTE. Right. Obviously, there has been changes on the 

international transfers. Also on the military construction appropriation, the provision has essentially been the same, which is prohibiting resources going toward modification or construction in the 

United States of America? 

Ms. STARZAK. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. So I know that Senator Sullivan had asked 

you—we are going to give you some time to review the provisions, 

but you have already been Deputy General Counsel. The provisions 

are what the provisions have been. So I want to make sure I understand. Do you believe those provisions are constitutional? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, as I said to Senator McCain, I have no 

reason to doubt the constitutionality of those provisions. As you 

mentioned, the restrictions have been in place for some time. We 

have abided by them to date. 

Senator AYOTTE. I think that is what we all really want to be assured of. I know as the General Counsel for the Army—the reality 

is I was just in Guantanamo and most of the guards there are in 

the Army. So this is going to be a direct issue for you to face as 

Army General Counsel if the President makes the decision that he 

765 

is not going to follow this law. Would you recommend that the 

President follow the law? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, my understanding is that the Department 

is—certainly the Department but the administration at large is 

looking to work with Congress on those provisions. I think as the 

Attorney General stated, it is very important to follow the law. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I appreciate that. 

I do have a question. So on May 31st of 2014, there was the socalled Taliban Five transfer that occurred. You were Deputy General Counsel at that point for legislation. The law at that time provided—in clear violation of the law, Congress was not given 30 

days notification of the transfers of those five very dangerous individuals in exchange for one of the prisoners of war, Bowe Bergdahl. 

So I wanted to ask you were you aware of that transfer in advance, 

and did you advise both the Secretary of Defense and anyone in the 

White House of what the law was and what the law they were supposed to follow at the time in notifying us? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I was not involved in the legal determination about whether the 30-day notice would apply at that time. 

Senator AYOTTE. In any way? 

Ms. STARZAK. I was not involved in the legal analysis on that 

point. 

Senator AYOTTE. Were you aware of the transfer in advance? 

Ms. STARZAK. Very shortly in advance, not at the time—the day 

before basically. 

Senator AYOTTE. So you did not raise the issue of the law? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I think at that point, the Department of 

Justice had issued or had concluded that the 30-day notice did not 

apply in the very specific circumstances of that case because it was 

an attempt to save the life of Sergeant Bergdahl. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, it is not how I read the provision. But I 

do appreciate your answer on it. Thank you. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator Heinrich, please. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you. 

Mr. Welby, welcome. I have a couple of questions for you. First, 

I wanted to get your thoughts on the direction of directed energy 

in the coming years. I started my career in directed energy at Air 

Force Research Labs, then Philips Labs a couple of decades ago let 

us say. But a lot has changed and in some very positive ways in 

recent years. I think this is an area where we are once again really 

seeing a great focus and some real opportunities. So I just wanted 

to get your thoughts on where you see those opportunities and 

what specific programs within directed energy that you would be 

advocating for in this position. 

Mr. WELBY. Senator, I have also had a long engagement and 

very effective engagement with the folks out at Kirtland on directed energy of course. It has always been one of these technologies that is just another 10 years away, but I think it is here. 

I think we now are realizing the opportunities of those years of investment in this capability. 

I point to the Navy’s deployment on the Ponce of a directed energy system as a prototype for close-in defense. The Navy has been 

talking about that demonstration publicly. I think it is an example 

766 

of the near-term viability of directed energy as a real game changer 

for future military operations. 

I am very excited about the ability of solid state lasers today to 

scale in interesting ways, the ability for fiber laser technology to 

really now begin to see its fruition, and quite frankly also the technology of solid state bar lasers and what is happening in those 

areas. I think that we are only limited by imagination and how it 

might apply in these technologies. I think many of the power challenges, diode brightness challenges are now being resolved. So I am 

very excited about it. I think that we have teams that are thinking 

not only about the technology now but thinking about their application, and I think that is a very exciting time for directed energy. 

Senator HEINRICH. I could not agree more, and I look forward to 

working with you through this transition because, as you said, historically it has always been something that is a few years away, 

and now we are seeing real opportunities for application. I think 

it is important that we make that transition and start fielding 

these technologies in ways that can really support our warfighters. 

The MILCON [Military Construction] process has done, I think, 

an incredible job of making sure that we adequately modernize our 

bases around the country even at times when resources have been 

relatively limited. I want to ask you about the prioritization of the 

MILCON towards our DOD labs. Are we doing enough there to 

make sure that our labs are actually modernizing at the pace to 

support their missions? 

Mr. WELBY. Senator, I recognize the many competing demands 

for the pool of military construction dollars. Often, of course, operational requirements challenge the long-term investment in our research facilities. I do believe that the provisions that allow us to 

reallocate a certain fraction of RDT&E investment into near-term 

modernization and maintenance provides an excellent mechanism 

to allow laboratory directors to cover those most critical needs. But 

I expect that as we start to think about the future of our laboratories, we will be identifying opportunities where we will see challenges in terms of our facilities and the need to think about the 

new capabilities, new test facilities, new experimental facilities. We 

need to be thinking about how we balance that in the overall request. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you very much. 

I will yield back, Chairman. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Senator Heinrich. 

The situation is that Senator McCain will not be returning. I 

have to go to the floor for the beginning of the debate on the flood 

bill. So I am proposing unanimous consent that at the conclusion 

of Senator Gillibrand’s testimony—Senator King has already an opportunity—excuse me—her questioning that the hearing be adjourned. Is there any opposition? 

[No response.] 

Senator REED. Hearing no opposition, Senator Gillibrand. 

Senator KING. Is there not something mischievous we could do 

while McCain is not here? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator REED. I am trying to keep my title as the most 

767 

boring person in the United States Senate. There is no mischief 

allowed. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Yes, sir. 

Ms. Starzak, there was a report issued yesterday, I do not know 

if you saw it. It was published by the Associated Press, and it was 

criticizing the military justice system for concealing cases of child 

sexual abuse. This report found that just over half of sex offenders 

in military prisons were child sex offenders, and many of them are 

serving lesser prison terms as a result of lenient plea deals. More 

needs to be done to protect children from sexual predators. 

Additionally, this report highlights the lack of transparency in 

court martial proceedings. For example, transcripts and pretrial 

agreements are only available through FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] requests, which is obviously not the case for civilian 

courts. 

What can be done to improve our military justice system in trying to punish child sex offenders, and how can we increase transparency in the military justice system such as moving it to PACER 

[Public Access to Court Electronic Records] or a PACER-like system that we have in the civilian world? Why does a military judge 

have no knowledge of or no ability to impact plea deals? Would you 

support changing that? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I am aware of the article. I did read it. 

Obviously, any incidents of child sexual abuse is absolutely horrific. 

I think the Department needs to do all it can to ensure that we 

do not have that problem, that we prevent it in the first instance. 

I think the Department is certainly interested in pursuing changes, 

if necessary, to ensure that. 

With respect to your question on transparency, that is something 

the Department has been looking at very closely over the past few 

months. I anticipate that the Department is likely to have a recommendation on that front that will come to Congress hopefully in 

the near future. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. How do you think we can increase our confidence in the military justice system? In the context of military 

sexual assault, you have a 62 percent retaliation rate for people 

who do actually have the courage to come forward and report that 

they have been sexually assaulted. What do you think the best approach is to stop retaliation and change the climate? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I think, unfortunately, retaliation is a 

very difficult problem to tackle. I do not think it is entirely military 

justice-oriented. I think it is very important to change climate with 

respect to retaliation. I think one of the main issues that the Department has been looking at are ways to get at that problem, and 

I think 62 percent is, obviously, completely unacceptable. Victims 

have to have a voice in the process. They have to feel like they can 

come forward. That is critical just for the integrity of the military. 

So I certainly share your concerns with respect to that. I think 

the Department has been looking at the retaliation problem very 

closely and hopefully we will come up with some recommendations 

on that issue. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Some have used the argument that there 

are insufficient numbers of military lawyers to implement the MiliVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00773 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tary Justice Improvement Act. You appear to agree that more lawyers are needed in your advance policy questions where you said 

to address emerging requirements, including special victim capabilities and special victims counsel, the Army JAG [Judge Advocates General] Corps is planning to grow. 

How do you reconcile this plan to grow the JAG Corps to address 

what we all agree is a top concern for the military with claims that 

there are insufficient numbers of judge advocates to implement 

MJIA [Military Justice Improvement Act]? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, my understanding is that the Military 

Justice Improvement Act requires attorneys at the 2006 level, 

which is very high in the military justice world. So I think that 

there are not the numbers of 2006’s necessary. So I do not think 

those two are necessarily inconsistent. I think the growth that we 

are seeing is at the prosecutor level, the people who are actually 

in court level, not at the 2006 level. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. I think that the bill only says the decisionmaker has to be 06 or above, which is not dissimilar to the current 

decision-making for non-lawyers who are commanders, but the people involved in these cases can be more junior. 

But there seems to be a need to professionalize the lawyers within the military so that they actually get some specialized training. 

In the civilian world, for example, only very rare DAs’ [District Attorney] offices have successful records for prosecuting rape cases 

such as the Manhattan DA’s office where they have had a victims 

crime unit since the 1970s. Because they have specialized, because 

they have allowed seniority to develop amongst their prosecutors, 

they actually can take some of the hardest cases and actually get 

convictions. 

Have you considered a way to professionalize the prosecutor’s office within the military so that we can get better conviction rates 

and get better prosecution of these very tough cases? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, one of the changes that we have seen in 

recent years is the implementation of a special victims prosecutor 

program in the Army. So I understand that there is now a set of 

prosecutors in the Army who are more experienced who oversee the 

prosecution of sexual assault cases. They tend to be people with 

significantly more experience in military justice, and they also, during the course of their training, do a 2-week detail to a DA’s office 

to learn specifically how special victims units work. So I think that 

that is an important thing to look at. I think they certainly have 

been developing in that area. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. So I would like you, for the record, to give 

me some recommendations for how we can professionalize all of the 

services’ prosecution units so that we can really make the military 

the state of the art in terms of being able to prosecute effectively 

violent crimes in the military. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

I agree that it is critical to have a well-trained, professional Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps. I believe that the Army JAG Corps has made great strides in recent years in providing specialized training to prosecutors, particularly to special 

victim prosecutors, who handle sexual assault and domestic violence cases. Those 

prosecutors conduct training with major civilian special victims units and attend an 

array of courses and symposia annually at both the Army JAG Corps’ School and 

at various civilian locations, all focused on improving their prosecutorial skills. If 

769 

confirmed, I will work closely with The Judge Advocate General and the Provost 

Marshal General to identify areas where further improvement is possible in the 

areas of investigating and prosecuting crime. 

Chairman MCCAIN [presiding]. Senator King, did you have any 

additional—— 

Senator KING. No. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good. 

Ms. Starzak, I just had to leave to go to a hearing on a Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, of which I am a member, and 

the issue is child abuse and sexual exploitation. Thanks to technology, it has become a much more serious issue. So it is not part 

of the military, but it is an issue that, because we are an All-Volunteer Force, spills over into the military. So I hope you will have a 

look at that issue and ways that it may apply to the United States 

Army. It is a very unpleasant subject to discuss, and some of us 

shy away from it. But it is a growing problem in America and the 

world rather than one that is getting smaller. So I hope you will 

take the time to look at that and how it relates to the men and 

women who are in the military. 

By the way, on the issue of sexual assaults, I hope you will look 

at a number of the measures that we have already put in this 

year’s defense authorization bill, a number of measures over the 

last 2 years. If you think those measures are inadequate, we would 

be more than happy to listen to any recommendations that you 

have to improve. I am very happy with the work of particularly 

Senator Lindsey Graham, who was a JAG lawyer for some 33 

years, who I think struck the right balance in the legislation that 

we passed. Senator Gillibrand has been heavily involved in this 

issue as well. So we look forward to working with you. 

We thank all the witnesses. There may be some follow-up questions that hopefully we can get in before the end of the week when 

Congress takes a well deserved rest for a week. We will try to— 

our incompetent and insubordinate staff seems to be amused by 

that comment. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. We will try to get—when we get back, reporting—your nominations reported out of the committee and to the 

floor of the Senate as soon as we get back. Hopefully we can get 

that done and let you get to work. 

I thank the witnesses. I especially thank all the family members 

who have come here today. I know that it is a moment of great 

pride for them as you were nominated by the President of the 

United States to assume great positions of responsibility and authority, so I thank you for your willingness to serve and do not 

think you are going to enjoy coming before this committee. Thank 

you. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. John Conger by Chairman 

McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

770 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between the Principal 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and each of the following? 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is the principal assistant 

and advisor to the Secretary on fiscal and budgetary matters. If confirmed, as the 

Comptroller’s principal assistant, I will support the Secretary in the entire range 

of responsibilities of the Comptroller that the Secretary may require. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. My relationship with the Deputy Secretary of Defense will be based on 

the same role as described above. I have worked closely with the Deputy Secretary 

on installations and environmental issues and I would expect to have a similar relationship as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). If confirmed, I would support the Deputy Secretary in any matter within the purview of 

the Comptroller that the Deputy Secretary may prescribe. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 

Answer. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is the 

primary assistant and advisor to the Comptroller. If confirmed, I will do everything 

I can to help manage the Comptroller organization and represent the Comptroller 

when called upon to do so. 

Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Under Secretaries, 

to carry out the policies and guidance of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, both directly and more frequently through their Director for Force 

Structure, Resources, and Assessment on any matter pertaining to resourcing our 

forces and military operations and financial management. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on the entire range of resource allocation, budget execution, and other 

financial management issues. More frequently, I will work through the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management. I will ensure that they 

are aware of the President’s and the Secretary of Defense’s policies and priorities 

and assist them in implementing Departmental policies and programs as they may 

relate to their specific Services. 

Question. The heads of the defense agencies. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the heads of the defense 

agencies in any matter pertaining to resources and financial management. I will ensure that they are aware of the President’s and the Secretary of Defense’s policies 

and priorities and assist them in implementing Departmental policies and programs 

as they may relate to the specific agency. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The Department’s Comptroller and I will work very closely with the Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the military departments in the development and execution of budgetary matters, fiscal policy, and initiatives of the 

President and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with the 

Assistant Secretaries in contributing to the successful development and implementation of effective DOD policies and programs and management of the defense budget. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense. 

Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) works closely 

with the Department’s Office of the General Counsel on a daily basis. I will, if confirmed, consult and coordinate with the General Counsel on all legal matters, and 

specifically, matters related to fiscal and budgetary issues that may have legal implications. 

Question. The Director, Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. 

Answer. The Comptroller and Director of the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluations are partners in managing the annual Program/Budget Review 

process and developing the budget and accompanying Future Year Defense Program 

that supports the National Security Strategy. If confirmed, I will coordinate and 

work closely with the Director in meeting his or her duties and in providing advice, 

assessments, and options to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary. 

771 

Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work to improve the management of the 

Department’s complex operations and organization. In particular, I will work with 

the Deputy Chief Management Officer on developing and implementing the Secretary’s reform agenda as well as improving the systems that provide management 

information, particularly financial management information, and the development of 

appropriate metrics in those areas. 

Question. The Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment on the 

Joint Staff. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director for Force Structure, Resources, 

and Assessment on the Joint Staff in the management of the Program Budget Review process and all other matters relating to resourcing our forces and military operations. 

Question. The Director, Office of Management and Budget. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Comptroller in managing the near neardaily interaction with the Office of Management and Budget on the preparation and 

execution of the Department’s budgets, and the advancement of both the Administration’s and the Department’s management priorities. 

Question. The Comptroller General. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to review the recommendations of the Comptroller General and the Government Accountability Office regarding DOD financial 

matters and, as required, support actions to improve the Department’s processes. 

DUTIES OF THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER). 

Question. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) assists 

the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in the performance of his or her duties 

and acts for him when the Under Secretary is absent. The duties of the Comptroller 

of the Department of Defense are set forth in section 135 of title 10, United States 

Code, and in DOD Directive 5118.3. Among the duties prescribed in statute are advising and assisting the Secretary of Defense in supervising and directing the preparation of budget estimates of the Department of Defense, establishing and supervising Department of Defense accounting policies, and supervising the expenditure 

of Department of Defense funds. 

What background and experience do you possess that qualifies you to perform the 

duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)? 

Answer. I have more than 20 years of experience working on national security 

issues, both as a congressional staffer and in senior Pentagon positions. In each of 

these roles, I have worked to shape the defense budget, and each has provided valuable experience that I will leverage, if confirmed, to assist the USD (Comptroller) 

in developing and managing that budget. 

I spent most of my time as a congressional staffer working for a senior member 

of the House Appropriations and Budget Committees, where I not only developed 

a deep understanding of the congressional processes used to construct the annual 

budget and appropriations bills, but the underlying defense policies we were trying 

to affect, from military construction to quality of life to acquisition programs. 

As a senior leader in the Pentagon for most of the last 6 years, I have overseen 

the DOD’s $850 billion real property portfolio of more than 500 installations (encompassing 500,000 buildings and structures) and the roughly $40 billion annual budget 

for military construction, family housing, facilities sustainment, base operations, environment, and energy programs. In this role I have directly managed an organization of about 200 civilian, military and contractor employees, and an annual program budget of approximately $400 million. 

Moreover, in my role as Senior Real Property Official for DOD, I oversee the audit 

readiness efforts the Services and Agencies undertake to assert existence and completeness for real property and our work to achieve proper valuation of our real 

property assets and environmental liabilities. I participate in the DOD’s Financial 

Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) meetings chaired by the USD (Comptroller) and the Deputy Chief Management Officer, and I chair my own Functional 

Business Governance Board that I use to drive the use of standards and monitor 

progress toward auditability. 

Question. Describe how the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Comptroller 

should prioritize both its comptroller and financial management duties. 

Answer. The comptroller and the financial management duties are complementary 

priorities—two parts of a whole. I will assist the Comptroller in advising and assisting the Secretary in the preparation of the budget and will also assist the Comptroller in executing his fiduciary responsibility to supervise the execution of the 

funds enacted by Congress. 

772 

Question. Describe your knowledge of accounting and financial management principles and how you have applied this knowledge in previous positions. 

Answer. I am not an accountant by education and training but in my current capacity, I have worked closely with Comptroller personnel and have acquired a working knowledge in the practical application of accounting and auditing standards as 

they apply to my functional responsibilities for installations and environment. I am 

a firm believer that our financial stewardship responsibilities involve all of the functional business areas. If confirmed, I intend to continue my practical education and 

encourage my peers to do the same. 

In addition, in my experience as a congressional staffer and as a senior manager 

in the DOD, I have become intimately familiar with the account structure, processes, and rules associated with the DOD budget, its associated appropriations and 

individual line items. 

In my Pentagon role, I have been a resource manager for approximately $400 million in annual spending and provided oversight for $40 billion in accounts covering 

military construction, family housing, facilities sustainment, base operations, environment, and energy programs. 

In each of these roles, I had the responsibility to review investment priorities, 

identify offsets for higher priority actions, and make recommendations to my leadership based on financial and accounting information as well as other factors. 

Question. Do the indirect relationships between the DOD CFO and the service 

CFOs hinder the ability to effectively direct and coordinate efforts to improve financial management in the Department of Defense? 

Answer. I do not believe so. There are indirect relationships across multiple DOD 

portfolios between OSD principals and their Service counterparts—not just financial 

management. Ultimately, the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense and the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense gives the Department the appropriate ability to provide 

direction and policy guidance to the Services. This principle applies as much to improving financial management as to other aspects of managing the Department. 

Question. Do you believe the structure of the dual hatted Comptroller/CFO position allows for the appropriate level of attention to both functions? 

Answer. I do. Moreover, budget and execution are closely related, especially when 

resources—whether slated for the future or current—are limited. Knowledge of one 

supports the other, both prospectively and retrospectively. The synergistic relationship between the two enhances management and oversight by the Under Secretary 

over each of these two functions. 

DEFENSE BUDGET

Question. Given the growing strategic threats the United States faces with respect 

to a resurgent Russia, North Korean cyberattacks, and the rise of the Islamic State, 

how does the current level of defense spending adequately confront these challenges? 

Answer. The FY 2016 budget request provides for the necessary resources to execute the nation’s defense strategy with manageable risk and was developed with the 

identified challenges in mind, though as Secretary Carter testified earlier this year, 

it requires us to accept elevated risk in some areas. I have seen that in the installations portfolio as we accept lower funding in facilities sustainment, ultimately pushing larger repair bills into the future. 

Ultimately, this budget balances the need to maintain a ready force to confront 

today’s challenges with the need to ensure we can continue to meet challenges into 

the future. While readiness must take top priority, we must ensure the Department’s investment accounts are funded to sustain, recapitalize, and improve our capabilities, so we can meet future challenges. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Principal 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer? 

Answer. The USD (Comptroller)’s ongoing challenge—and therefore the PDUSD’s 

as well—is to develop credible, defensible defense budgets that balance multiple priorities and requirements, ensuring our ability to meet the challenges posed by current threats while investing in our future capabilities so we can continue to meet 

the Nation’s security needs into the future. These resource decisions directly impact 

the ability of our Armed Forces to continue to fulfill their missions. 

At the same time, the USD (Comptroller) has a critical role in providing the justification to Congress why these funds are critical to meeting our strategy, and why 

the Budget Control Act spending levels are insufficient. This office has the unique 

773 

capability and responsibility to associate resource decisions with their real world impacts to better inform Congress as it deliberates. 

The next 2 years will also be pivotal as the Department strives to achieve audit 

readiness by 2017. The Comptroller and his Principal Deputy have indispensable 

leadership roles in both helping the Department to meet this goal and driving them 

to prioritize it. I recognize the importance of this effort in achieving the credibility 

necessary to secure the increased resource levels referenced above. 

Lastly, we need to build the financial management workforce of the future. I am 

familiar with the substantial amount of effort that has gone into building a training 

program for the financial workforce, and I recognize continued momentum will take 

effort. This is particularly important as the Department strives toward auditability, 

recognizing that will need to be a sustained effort, not simply a dash toward 2017. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. This is a team effort. If confirmed, I will work closely with other senior 

officials in DOD, our Comptroller staff, the Military Departments and Defense agencies, the Office of Management and Budget, and Congress to develop policies to meet 

these challenges. 

I will also provide my commitment, leadership, and support to our staff in the immediate office of the Comptroller, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and 

the Defense Contract Audit Agency in meeting these priorities. 

I will ensure that we maintain our progress on the centerpiece of our financial 

management improvement efforts, which is achieving auditable financial statements. 

In building the workforce of the future, we need to maintain and enhance the 

quality of our financial management workforce. It is important to continue the commitment made in implementing the course-based certification program for Defense 

financial managers that was authorized by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012. 

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the efforts and progress 

that have been made in DOD since 1999 toward the goal of being able to produce 

a clean audit? 

Answer. DOD has made significant progress in the last 6 years towards achieving 

auditable financial statements. Since 2009, the Department has established a clear 

set of priorities that have translated this important initiative into an enterprisewide effort, involving all functional communities with strong senior leader support. 

However, the size, scope, and complexity of the Defense Enterprise continue to pose 

challenges. Now, there is an increased understanding of what is required and a commitment to succeed. 

I understand there is a substantial amount of work ongoing, including efforts to 

address some of the most challenging problems. Under the leadership of Mike 

McCord, the current Comptroller, the Department is already executing an updated 

strategy to achieve auditable statements on its Statement of Budgetary Resources 

through audits of successive Schedules of Budgetary Activity. 

As you know, audit requirements involve far more than budget information, and 

I have been watching efforts on real property more closely than others. Existence 

and completeness of our real property inventory is a requirement for audit, for example. In this area, inventories and controls are significantly stronger than they 

once were, but there is schedule risk. The Navy, for example, will only assert for 

existence and completeness in 2016, which leaves little margin for any schedule 

slips that may happen due to unforeseen circumstances. 

Question. In your view, what are the main impediments within the Department 

that prevent it from achieving the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act goal of 

ensuring the financial statements of the Department of Defense are validated as 

ready for audit by not later than September 30, 2017? 

Answer. In my view, the main impediments involve change management. We are 

trying to review and transform where necessary, long standing business processes 

that have been supporting our missions for many years, but are NOT always sufficient to meet financial audit requirements. In some cases, we have also implemented modern, more compliant systems to facilitate the necessary changes while 

also helping to sustain them. Changing a huge, global enterprise in a resource constrained, dynamic national security environment is a truly daunting task. But the 

Department is committed to making these changes and becoming ready for audit. 

If confirmed, I’m prepared to continue to be a part of leading this change. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the recent withdrawal 

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etary Resources? In your view, what are the implications of this withdrawal of the 

opinion for the Department of Defense? 

Answer. My understanding of the withdrawal of the Marine Corps 2012 Opinion 

is that it occurred because of an audit finding that occurred while the Marine Corps’ 

auditors were completing their work. Because they were working under contractual 

and time constraints and didn’t have time to determine the actual impact on their 

opinion, there was no practical way for them to investigate the issue before they 

had to close out their work. The OIG—who issued the opinion for FY 2012 and who 

administers the Marine Corps audit contract—were also concerned that the uncertainty that this situation created required them to withdraw their opinion. Until 

there is a more thorough review, we will not know the full implications. 

While I recognize this is discouraging for a Marine Corps team that has been such 

a leader in the Department on audit readiness, it represents great value for the Department if we apply the lessons we learn here to the larger audits in advance. 

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the Department’s efforts to achieve a clean audit opinion? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Under Secretary Mike McCord and other 

senior leaders in the Department to champion DOD’s efforts at becoming audit 

ready and eventually achieving a clean audit opinion. ‘‘Championing’’ can take many 

forms, including change management, attaining resources, and—most certainly— 

promoting and sustaining this as a high priority for the Department. 

Question. How will your efforts differ, if any, from previous initiatives that have 

been unsuccessful? 

Answer. My efforts will be in support of our current game plan that, as I mentioned before, is producing positive results. Previous efforts were not successful because they lacked senior leadership support and were limited to a narrow functional 

group. That has changed. If confirmed, I will be joining the Comptroller team at a 

good time as we are turning our attention to the balance sheet—assets and liabilities. My work on existence and completeness of real property and environmental 

liabilities should allow me to immediately contribute to this initiative. 

Question. What is your assessment of the resources and time that will be required 

by the Department of Defense to achieve independent audit readiness, to obtain a 

modified adverse or qualified opinion, and to obtain an unmodified ‘‘clean’’ opinion? 

Answer. My assessment is that achieving audit readiness by the currently required statutory date is a very ambitious goal that will likely require some amount 

of additional resources. The experience of non-defense, cabinet level agencies that 

have successfully followed this path indicates that it requires an incremental investment to get ready for, and actually support this new kind of audit. Despite the cost, 

this investment represents a necessary, positive change. 

Once we begin, this audit regimen will continue each year, and based on other 

agencies (e.g., Homeland Security), it will take a number of years to actually begin 

to achieve positive audit opinions. Getting into audit is critical though and we are 

just beginning that process in the largest parts of DOD. The budgetary, manpower, 

and systemic resources DOD commits toward audit must be appropriate and, most 

importantly, sustained, in order to sustain the positive progress needed to achieve 

and then maintain a clean opinion. 

Question. What incentives or authorities do you think would help the Services and 

Defense Agencies to prioritize activities that would accelerate the process of achieving a ‘‘clean’’ opinion? 

Answer. I believe the Military Departments and Defense Agencies currently have 

the needed incentives and authorities to achieve a clean audit opinion. However, 

managing audit preparations alongside other competing mission requirements has 

and always will be a challenge, given scarce resources. I also do not know that accelerating preparations or audits will yield better results. The Services already have 

audits underway and I understand that the Fourth Estate is accelerating its preparatory timelines. I think that providing budget stability and sustained, constructive oversight will help us maintain focus on this important goal. 

GAO HIGH RISK LIST

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) placement of Defense Financial Management on its 

‘‘High Risk List’’ since 1995? 

Answer. Given the Department’s size, complexity, and lack of auditable financial 

statements, the GAO’s consistent placement of DOD Financial Management on its 

High Risk List is fair. Without passing an audit, one cannot know for certain that 

Defense decisions are made based on timely and accurate data, and that appropriate 

controls are in place to prevent fraud, waste and abuse of resources. 

775 

The GAO’s most recent report indicates that while leadership commitment, capacity, and our action plan objectives are partially met, the DOD has yet to show demonstrated progress and an ability to monitor that progress. These things, among others, prevent the Department from getting off the High Risk List. These kinds of constructive criticism from the GAO have proven useful in setting FIAR strategy, seeking resources, and implementing audit enablers, such as enterprise resource planning systems. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you work to have DOD Financial Management 

removed from the High Risk List? 

Answer. The GAO has a prescribed process for removing a subject from the High 

Risk List that involves satisfying them on five criteria. Given GAO’s assessment on 

the Department’s Leadership Commitment, Capacity, and Action Plan, the way to 

convince GAO to remove DOD Financial Management from the High Risk List appears to be to Demonstrate Progress and an ability to Monitor that progress. We 

are certainly on the verge of demonstrating progress as part of our audit readiness 

efforts, and it would seem that removal from the High Risk List will happen naturally as the audit readiness effort proceeds. 

Question. In addition to Defense Financial Management, the GAO identifies Defense Contract Management, Supply Chain Management, and other areas where the 

obligation and tracking of taxpayer dollars is also ‘‘High Risk’’. Why do you believe 

the GAO consistently finds problems with DOD in these areas involving the spending of taxpayer dollars? 

Answer. In my judgment, each of these functional areas reflects a culture that is 

mission oriented and often focuses on results without adequately linking those results to costs and process controls. Our size, our de-centralized organizational construct and functionally stove-piped, non-standard way of doing business result in 

weaknesses in processes that result in problems that are often highlighted in audits. 

Frequent turnover of personnel only perpetuates these problems. I can point to 

changes in systems and processes, as well as initiatives such as FIAR that are beginning to address the root cause of some of these problems. I’m encouraged that 

GAO’s last report highlighted some of these changes and provided us credit for 

them, while also pointing out that we have much more work to do. 

CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Chief Management 

Officer and Deputy Chief Management Officer’s past efforts to improve the business 

operations of the Department of Defense? 

Answer. The Department formally established the DCMO on October 17, 2008 

with the responsibility to better synchronize, integrate, and coordinate the business 

operations of DOD. Additionally, the Department gave the DCMO specific duties in 

strategic planning, performance management, process improvement, and defense 

business systems oversight. Since that time, the DCMO’s responsibilities have continued to grow. 

Most recently, on December 4, 2013, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced an organizational review that directed the strengthening of the DCMO to 

better coordinate and integrate DOD’s business affairs by creating a leadership focused on management concerns and creating a single management, business oversight, and administrative organization within OSD and across DOD. This was done 

by realigning the Director of Administration and Management (DA&M) and its components under the DCMO, and realigning the oversight of business systems from 

DCMO to the DOD CIO. The new DCMO is focused on four activities: management, 

policy, and analysis; administration; planning, performance, and integration; and 

compliance and open government. The DCMO reorganization, with its refocused 

mission, was completed on October 1, 2014. 

I believe the current DCMO is properly organized, with the right authorities, to 

continue to improve the management and business operations of the DOD. 

Question. Are there responsibilities performed by the Comptroller that you believe 

should be reassigned to the Chief Management Officer or the Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense? 

Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I am not aware of any responsibilities that 

should be realigned from Comptroller to the Chief Management Officer or the Deputy Chief Management Officer. If confirmed, I will reassess the duties and responsibilities assigned to both offices and will offer my advice to the Comptroller. 

Question. Are there responsibilities performed by the Chief Management Officer 

that you believe should be performed by the Comptroller? 

Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I am not aware of any responsibilities that 

should be realigned from the Chief Management Officer to the Comptroller. If conVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00781 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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firmed, I will reassess the duties and responsibilities assigned to both offices and 

will offer my advice to the Comptroller. 

AUTHORIZATION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Question. Do you believe that an authorization pursuant to section 114 of title 10, 

U.S. Code, is necessary before funds for operation and maintenance, procurement, 

research and development, and military construction may be made available for obligation by the Department of Defense? 

Answer. I believe the Department has an obligation to follow the law, to include 

fiscal law that governs authority to spend funds. 

FUNDING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

Question. As long ago as 1995, the Department of Defense has paid for the cost 

of ongoing military operations through supplemental appropriations. Current law 

requires that DOD include in its annual budget submission a request for those incremental increased costs associated with ongoing military operations, now called 

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). 

What is your understanding and assessment of the history, current, and future 

use of OCO appropriations to fund the cost of ongoing military operations? 

Answer. The key is providing sufficient resources to support our deployed troops. 

The use of the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget has successfully 

funded operations since FY 2010. The amount requested in the OCO budget has decreased significantly. Given the uncertainty of the current world situation, it is important that we retain some budget flexibility to deal with emergent needs and that 

we be cautious about prematurely eliminating OCO funding. If confirmed, I would 

look forward to working with the oversight committees to review the use of a separate OCO budget or whether other funding mechanisms could be utilized. If confirmed, I will ensure that the leadership is aware of all statutory requirements to 

include the OCO funding levels for FY 2016 and FY 2017 included in the Bipartisan 

Budget Act of 2015 

Question. Uniformed leaders in DOD have testified to Congress that constraints 

and limitations on the execution of OCO appropriations make it difficult to exercise 

necessary flexibility when needed to meet a wider than operations range of military 

requirements. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the statutory and regulatory constraints or limitations on the execution of OCO appropriations? 

Answer. I am not aware of any unreasonable statutory or regulatory limitations 

on the use of OCO funds. If confirmed, I will make a point to work with the unformed leadership to identify major impediments and challenges in executing OCO 

funds and ensure that we have adequate funding tools to continue supporting our 

warfighters. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to law, policy, or 

regulation that govern the execution of OCO? 

Answer. I am not in an informed position to recommend changes. If confirmed, 

I will review the current body of law, policy and regulations governing the execution 

of OCO funds and seek improvement as necessary. 

TRACKING AND TIMELINESS OF DOD REPORTS

Question. The responsibility for tracking Congressionally-required reports largely 

is the responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 

Based on your experience in both the legislative and executive branches, how do 

you evaluate DOD’s current system for tracking and evaluating the sufficiency of 

reports required by Congress, and delivering required reports in a timely fashion? 

Answer. During my time in the Pentagon, I have worked closely with the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs to identify and track 

reporting requirements. The established system works well and in my experience, 

the requirements are accurately captured, assigned and tracked. Coordination on 

sufficiency always includes a review by the Office of General Counsel to ensure we 

are meeting the requirements in law. 

I believe the Department makes every effort to prepare congressional reports in 

a timely manner. Often reports request data that require unique data gathering 

processes that make it difficult to meet the established deadline. There is always 

room for improvement and if confirmed, I will work to ensure the reports assigned 

to the Comptroller’s office are timely and responsive. 

Question. If confirmed, would you support efforts on behalf of the Department to 

review current reporting requirements and, where appropriate, recommend elimination of reporting requirements? 

777 

Answer. Yes 

Question. If so, how would you intend to implement such a plan in order to 

achieve efficiencies? 

Answer. Secretary Carter has already challenged the Department to seek reform 

proposals and efficiencies in all our business processes. A review of current congressional reporting requirements falls within that direction. If confirmed, I would work 

with my colleagues across the Department, particularly the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Legislative Affairs, to identify reports that may no longer be needed and 

work with the oversight committees to eliminate those reports that no longer serve 

any purpose. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUDIT

1. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Conger, do you believe that the Department of Defense 

is on track to achieve full audit readiness by September 30, 2017? 

Mr. CONGER. I believe that we have established a credible plan that will position 

us to achieve full audit readiness by September 30, 2017. It is also an ambitious 

plan and will require significant leadership focus over the next 2 years. It will require change management and execution throughout all business areas—not just financial management. If confirmed, I will actively support our CFO and DCMO in 

monitoring execution of this plan. 

2. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Conger, what major tasks remain before reaching full 

audit readiness, and what is the primary obstacle to the September 30, 2017 deadline? 

Mr. CONGER. Three areas present particularly challenging obstacles. Feedback 

from our recent budgetary audits indicates ability to provide auditors complete 

transaction universes with adequate supporting documentation is one. The second 

and related area involves business systems controls and the sheer number of systems that need to be reconciled. Finally, the processes used to acquire assets will 

need to be changed to capture the information necessary to properly value these assets. Our current risk-based plans address each of these. If confirmed, I will actively 

participate in risk mitigation relating to these challenges. 

3. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Conger, do you agree that full audit readiness is not just 

a state to be achieved, but one that we must maintain perpetually? 

Mr. CONGER. I do agree that full audit readiness, along with ongoing annual audits will establish an improved state of business discipline that must be obtained. 

The only thing more important in earning positive audit opinions is keeping them 

so sustainment of our audit ready state is always an important consideration. 

778 

4. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Conger, what key metrics will you monitor as audits are 

carried out? 

Mr. CONGER. We will measure progress using a three-pronged approach: 

1) We have established interim milestones for each critical capability required for 

full financial statements auditability, such as policy decisions and process changes 

needed to value assets. I will closely monitor progress against each of these milestones on the critical path. 

2) We have established key metrics that focus on our critical capabilities relating 

to our audit plan. For example, we will track the number of successful system reconciliations and the reduction in unsupported journal vouchers as a way of monitoring our remediation efforts. 

3) We will also prioritize our SBA audit findings and begin to track status of remediation. 

5. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Conger, do you commit to making audit readiness a top 

priority if you are confirmed? 

Mr. CONGER. I do. It is clearly already a DOD-wide priority. If confirmed, I am 

committed to continuing to support it in this new role. 

6. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Conger, once confirmed, will you proactively keep my office informed regarding the Department of Defense audit? 

Mr. CONGER. I will definitely keep your office informed of our progress on the 

audit. With so many competing priorities, we particularly value the interest and 

support from members of our oversight committees. The Comptroller staff routinely 

provides updates to your staff, either as requested or pursuant to release of our 

semi-annual reports. If confirmed, I will ensure that you will continue to be kept 

informed of our progress on this initiative. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS

QUALIFICATIONS

7. Senator TILLIS. Mr. Conger, What are your qualifications to serve as the Deputy Chief Financial Officer of the world’s largest and most expensive bureaucracy 

at a time when it cannot account for how it spends hundreds of billions of taxpayer 

dollars? 

Mr. CONGER. I have more than twenty years of experience working on national 

security issues, both as a Congressional staffer and in senior Pentagon positions. In 

each of these roles I have worked to shape the defense budget, and each has provided valuable experience that I will leverage, if confirmed, to assist the USD 

(Comptroller) in developing and managing that budget. 

I spent most of my time as a Congressional staffer working for a senior member 

of the House Appropriations and Budget Committees, where I not only developed 

a deep understanding of the Congressional processes used to construct the annual 

budget and appropriations bills, but the underlying defense policies we were trying 

to affect, from military construction to quality of life to acquisition programs. 

As a senior leader in the Pentagon for most of the last 6 years, I have overseen 

the DOD’s $850 billion real property portfolio of more than 500 installations (encompassing 500,000 buildings and structures) and the roughly $40 billion annual budget 

for military construction, family housing, facilities sustainment, base operations, environment, and energy programs. In this role I have directly managed an organization of about 200 civilian, military and contractor employees, and an annual program budget of approximately $400 million. 

Moreover, in my role as Senior Real Property Official for DOD, I oversee the audit 

readiness efforts the Services and Agencies undertake to assert existence and completeness for real property and our work to achieve proper valuation of our real 

property assets and environmental liabilities. I participate in the DOD’s Financial 

Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) meetings chaired by the USD (Comptroller) and the Deputy Chief Management Officer, and I chair my own Functional 

Business Governance Board that I use to drive the use of standards and monitor 

progress toward auditability. 

If confirmed to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), I 

am committed to work with the USD (Comptroller) to ensure the Department meets 

its goal to be audit ready by 2017. 

779 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

WORKING TO ACHIEVE DOD AUDITABILITY

8. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Conger, DOD’s financial management has been on GAO’s 

High Risk List since 1995 because of pervasive deficiencies in its financial and related business management systems, processes, and controls. GAO has stated that, 

‘‘DOD’s risk management policies associated with preparing auditable financial 

statements are not in accordance with widely recognized guiding principles for effective risk management. And, DOD continues to experience impediments to deploying 

its planned modern business systems on schedule and with the intended capabilities.’’ If confirmed, what steps do you intend to take in order to ensure that each 

service effectively manages its risk, deploys capable business systems in a timely 

manner, and meets its auditability deadline? 

Mr. CONGER. I firmly believe we are on the right track and while we still have 

work ahead, we are making progress. The most recent GAO High Risk update acknowledges our progress and notes that the Department needs additional emphasis 

on monitoring progress in measurable way. In the Department’s most recent audit 

readiness status report, a risk-based approach is being employed to address deficiencies identified in ongoing budgetary audits, as well as in the new areas that relate to the full financial statements that will be audited beginning in FY 2018. If 

confirmed, I plan to actively participate in the governance and oversight process, ensuring that we are positioned to meet our auditability deadlines. This oversight also 

will provide specific emphasis on business systems controls that are critical to sustaining a state of audit readiness. 

[The nomination reference of Mr. John Conger follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

March 4, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

John Conger, of Maryland, to be a Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 

vice Michael J. McCord, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Mr. John Conger, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, 

follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MR. JOHN CONGER

Education: 

• Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

• 1987–1993 

• M.S. Aeronautics and Astronautics (1993) 

• B.S. Aeronautics and Astronautics (1991) 

• International Space University 

• Summer 1995 

• Certificate of Completion (1995) 

• George Washington University 

• 1994–1996 

• M.A. Science, Technology and Public Policy (1996) 

Employment Record: 

• Department of Defense 

• Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Energy, Installations & Environment) 

• December 2014–Present 

• Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment) 

• September 2012–December 2014 

• Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment) 

• June 2009–Present 

780 

• Office of Congressman Chet Edwards 

• Associate Appropriations Committee Staff • January 2007–June 2009 

• Legislative Director • January 2001–June 2009 

• House International Relations Committee 

• Professional Staff • August 2000–January 2001 

• Office of Congressman Sam Gejdenson 

• Legislative Assistant • January 1999–August 2000 

• Office of Congresswoman Jane Harman 

• Legislative Assistant • October 1997–January 1999 

• Adroit Systems Inc. 

• Legislative Affairs Analyst • October 1995–October 1997 

• Airborne Reconnaissance Systems Analyst 

• June 1993–October 1995 

Honors and Awards: 

• Military Order of the Purple Heart Special Recognition Award (2008) 

• National Association of State Approving Agencies Outstanding Support Award 

(2008) 

• Military Officers Association of America Paul W. Arcari Award (2007) 

• Military Coalition Freedom Award (2006) 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Mr. John Conger in connection with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

John Charles Conger. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 

3. Date of nomination: 

781 

March 4, 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

August 4, 1969, Los Angeles, CA. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Kristine Minami. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1987–1993). 

M.S. Aeronautics and Astronautics (1993). 

B.S. Aeronautics and Astronautics (1991). 

International Space University (Summer 1995). 

Certificate of Completion (1995). 

The George Washington University (1994–1996). 

M.A. Science, Technology and Public Policy (1996). 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Energy, Installations 

& Environment), 

Department of Defense, 

Washington, DC, 

December 2014–Present. 

Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), 

Department of Defense, 

Washington, DC, 

September 2012–December 2014. 

Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), 

Department of Defense, 

Washington, DC, 

June 2009–Present. 

Associate Appropriations Committee Staff, 

Rep. Chet Edwards, 

Washington, DC, 

January 2007–June 2009. 

Legislative Director, 

Rep. Chet Edwards, 

Washington, DC, 

January 2001–June 2009. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Professional Staff Member, 

House International Relations Committee, 

Washington, DC, 

August 2000–January 2001. 

Legislative Assistant, 

Rep. Sam Gejdenson, 

Washington, DC, 

January 1999–July 2000. 

Legislative Assistant, 

Rep. Jane Harman, 

October 1997–January 1999. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

N/A. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

Member, Japanese American Citizens League. 

782 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

Democratic Precinct Chair, MD District 20, 2005–2006. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

N/A. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. $500 to CHET EDWARDS FOR CONGRESS on 5/13/10. 

$250 to OBAMA FOR AMERICA on 6/18/11. 

$500 to OBAMA FOR AMERICA on 7/15/12. 

$250 to OBAMA FOR AMERICA on 10/16/12. 

$250 to FRIENDS OF HEATHER (MIZEUR) on 5/21/14. 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Awards/Recognitions: 

Military Order of the Purple Heart Special Recognition Award (2008). 

National Association of State Approving Agencies Outstanding Support Award 

(2008). 

Military Officers Association of America Paul W. Arcari Award (2007). 

Military Coalition Freedom Award (2006). 

Fellowships: 

NASA Space Grant Fellowship (full tuition at GWU, 1994–96). 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

Articles: 

‘‘DOD, Climate Change, and National Security,’’ The Environmental Forum 

(published by the Environmental Law Institute), March–April 2014. 

‘‘Space Visions of a New Generation,’’ co-authored with Lawrence Friedl, Space 

Policy Journal, May 1996. 

16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

I’ve made public comments on a number of occasions (panels, etc) but do not generally work from prepared texts. The exception is formal testimony, and I have submitted formal statements for the record on each of the following occasions. 

Testimony: 

Statement on FY16 Budget Request (used same statement for each): 

3/11/2015 SASC 

3/3/2015 HAC–Milcon 

3/3/2015 HASC 

Statement on FY15 Budget Request (used same statement for each): 

4/2/2014 SAC–Milcon 

4/2/2014 SASC 

3/12/2014 HAC–Milcon 

Statement on FY14 Budget Request (used same statement for each): 

5/9/2013 SAC–Milcon 

4/24/2013 SASC 

4/11/2013 HAC–Milcon 

Statement on Sikes Act Amendments 

3/21/2013 House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, 

Oceans and Insular Affairs 

Statement on Base Realignment and Closure 

3/14/2013 HASC 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

783 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

The witnesses will be protected from reprisal consistent with the law. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

JOHN CONGER

This 18th day of March, 2015 

[The nomination of Mr. John Conger was reported to the Senate 

by Chairman McCain on December 7, 2015, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 14, 2015.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Stephen P. Welby by 

Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering? 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 

(ASD(R&E)) is the principal staff advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and to the Secretary and Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, for research and engineering matters. The ASD(R&E) serves 

as the Chief Technology Officer for the Department of Defense. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties? 

Answer. I believe my strong, multidisciplinary background in technology and technical leadership has prepared me well to perform these duties. I have over 28 years 

of professional experience as an engineer and technologist, serving both in and out 

of government, working on cutting-edge technology development. I am currently 

serving as the Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research 

and Engineering and as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering (DASD(SE)). As the DASD(SE), I serve as the senior leader for the Department’s systems engineering workforce, support the Military Departments and 

Defense Agencies in the execution of engineering and development efforts, and advise the USD(AT&L) on the technical execution and risk of major defense acquisition programs. I began my technical career in a defense laboratory, and I have previously served in a number of leadership roles at DARPA. If confirmed, I believe 

my background and experience would enable me to discharge the responsibilities of 

784 

the ASD(R&E) to develop technology that enhances the operational capabilities required by our armed forces. 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 

Engineering? 

Answer. I believe that I have the necessary background, skills, and ability to perform the duties of the ASD(R&E). 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect 

that the Secretary of Defense will assign to you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary to assign me duties and functions 

commensurate with those of a Chief Technology Officer, and any other duties the 

Secretary may deem appropriate. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 138(b)(8) of title 10, United States Code, and DOD Directive 

5134.3 discuss the responsibilities and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Other sections of law and traditional practice 

also establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Research and Engineering with the following: 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Deputy Secretary to provide 

advice and assistance commensurate with the role of a Chief Technology Officer, including transitioning technology to the field, prioritizing science and technology investments, supporting a culture of institutional innovation, and leveraging technology to enhance current and future military capabilities. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Answer. The ASD(R&E) is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the 

USD(AT&L). If confirmed, I expect to support the USD(AT&L) with technology insight and technical leadership for the defense research and engineering community. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Intelligence to ensure our research and engineering needs are synchronized 

across the Department. I believe intelligence on emerging adversary capabilities is 

critical to informing and shaping our defense research and engineering programs. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer) to ensure that investments in research and engineering meet the overall priorities of the Department and are managed in accordance with DOD policy. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Personnel and Readiness to ensure that our current research and engineering 

workforce is ready to support the needs of the Department, and to ensure that the 

technical talent necessary for the future readiness of our forces would be available 

to the Department. 

Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Deputy Chief Management 

Officer of the Department of Defense on issues regarding the effective and efficient 

execution of the Department’s research and engineering practices. 

Question. The Service Secretaries. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to foster a close working relationship with the 

Military Departments to support their research and engineering priorities and technology investments and to ensure that the overall Department research and engineering portfolio is aligned and balanced. 

Question. The Service Acquisition Executives. 

Answer. Research and Engineering is critical to the overall acquisition process, so 

I view the Service Acquisition Executives as being among the primary customers of 

the knowledge and capabilities developed through the defense research and engineering enterprise. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretaries of the 

Military Departments and the Service Acquisition Executives on research and engineering matters that leverage technology for their missions. 

Question. The Service Science and Technology Executives. 

Answer. The Service S&T Executives are responsible for developing and executing 

the science and technology programs for their respective Service. If confirmed, I 

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vestment is coordinated and provides the best possible military capabilities and return on the taxpayer’s investment. 

Question. The Directors of Department of Defense Laboratories and Research Centers. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely, through the heads of the DOD components, with the Directors of Defense Laboratories and Research Centers to provide 

them with the guidance, resources, and support needed to deliver technology in support of DOD needs. I would also work to establish and maintain standards for laboratory and research center performance. 

Question. The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to ensure that DARPA continues to explore new technical fields, create technological surprise, and develop new technologies that have a profound impact on national security in accordance with DOD 

Directive 5134.10. 

Question. The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency on research and engineering matters, including those pertaining to 

weapons of mass destruction. 

Question. The Joint Staff. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Joint Staff to consider technology options and alternate procedures to enhance DOD systems and ensure our 

warfighters are affordably equipped with superior warfighting capabilities. 

Question. The Director, Defense Test Resource Management Center. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Director, Defense Test Resource 

Management Center to consider technology options and alternate procedures to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the test resources employed in the test and 

evaluation of DOD systems, including new and developing requirements such as cybersecurity testing. 

Question. The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, to include consideration of technology options and alternate procedures for 

enhancing the operational test and evaluation of DOD systems. 

Question. The Director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Office. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Director of the Joint ImprovisedThreat Defeat Agency, or any successor to it, to identify technology and system solutions for defeating current threats and countering future anticipated threats. 

Question. The Department of Defense Chief Information Officer. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Chief Information Officer to 

provide and align technology options to support the delivery and cyber protection 

of enhanced information management, information assurance, satellite communications, navigation and timing, spectrum utilization, and global military telecommunications capabilities. 

Question. The Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency to support the provision, operation, and surety of the Department’s globally accessible enterprise information infrastructure, command and 

control, and information-sharing capabilities. 

Question. The Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Director of the White House 

Office of Science and Technology Policy to ensure DOD research and engineering 

goals and priorities are aligned with the Administration’s goals and priorities. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering? 

Answer. The Department currently faces the most technically challenging future 

defense environment we have seen since the Cold War. I believe the critical task 

for the ASD(R&E) will be protecting the future technological edge of U.S. forces, by 

ensuring that the warfighter has access to technical capabilities that counter, defeat, and provide compelling overmatch against those that can be fielded by any potential adversary. U.S. military technological strength provides the critical underpinning to U.S. conventional deterrence. Today’s emerging competitive technology 

environment will require faster and smarter development and adoption of innovative, technologically enabled capacities that offset the growing technical capabilities 

of potential threats. 

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A second challenge involves ensuring that we can affordably deliver advanced capabilities in an efficient and effective manner, to permit modernization to continue 

at pace, even in a fiscally constrained environment. This challenge motivates the 

use of novel technologies and new system concepts and architectures that enable 

significant reductions in overall lifecycle cost. 

A third challenge is the need to refresh continually the core technologies that support our defense advantage—the disruptive breakthrough capabilities that allow the 

U.S. to ‘‘leap ahead’’ of potential adversaries. The discovery engine that underpins 

our warfighting technologies offers a critical hedge against uncertainty, mitigates 

against technological surprise, and supports our system development efforts. 

A fourth critical challenge is the need to ensure that the defense research and 

engineering enterprise is responsive to the demands of both the current conflict and 

the developing strategic environment—accelerating those advanced capabilities that 

can make a critical difference from laboratory to battlefield. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would develop research and engineering plans that address these and other challenges, leveraging the strengths of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to meet the defense science and technology needs of 

the warfighter. These plans would emphasize opportunities for increased effectiveness and efficiency across the Department’s research and engineering enterprise. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research 

and Engineering? 

Answer. A long-term challenge for the defense research and engineering enterprise is the ‘‘graying’’ of our workforce, within the office of the ASD(R&E), across 

the Military Departments and Defense Agencies, and within the defense industrial 

base. Our senior workforce possesses significant skill and experience, but over the 

near term the R&E enterprise will see an accelerated loss of experience as a significant fraction of its workforce retires. Attracting, developing, and retaining talent 

with critical twentyfirst century skills in domains such as advanced microelectronics, cybersecurity, embedded software development, and data analytics will be 

a significant challenge to the performance of the functions of the Office of the 

ASD(R&E) over the next decade. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with other OSD offices and the Military Departments to explore creative solutions to refresh the technical talent of the Department’s workforce. Solutions may include specific workforce development initiatives, 

opportunities to provide greater flexibility to those who wish to spend a ‘‘tour’’ with 

the Department as part of their career, and innovative projects to enhance the environment and culture of the Department’s research and engineering institutions to 

make them more attractive to key talent. 

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of 

issues that must be addressed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research 

and Engineering? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect my priorities for the Department’s research and engineering enterprise to be consistent with those established by the Secretary and 

the USD(AT&L). 

These priorities would include: 

1) Responsively addressing the technological needs of the warfighter in support 

of ongoing operations. 

2) Developing technologically enabled capabilities that establish and preserve 

U.S. military technological advantage against potential adversaries. 

3) Developing leap-ahead science and technology that offer a long-term disruptive 

advantage to U.S. forces. 

4) Maintaining the capacity of the Department to attract and retain the best and 

brightest scientists and engineers. 

5) Encouraging appropriate relationships with academia and industry to pursue 

cutting-edge science and technology. 

6) Enhancing warfighting capabilities by supporting acquisition programs with 

technologies that make weapon systems more effective and affordable. 

Question. What defense technologies do you consider the highest priorities for development to enhance DOD’s ability to pursue its designated missions? 

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Answer. I believe that an effective research and engineering program must focus 

on balance—balance between near- and long-term technology development and balance between pursuing technology that supports continuous improvement in military capability and technology with the potential for more revolutionary impact. 

There are many opportunities to leverage technology to provide capability advantage 

for U.S. forces. Today, near-term opportunities exist in areas such as autonomy, 

data analytics, communications, electronic warfare, propulsion, cyber-defense, undersea technologies, advanced manufacturing, and space technologies that can shape 

new systems concepts and operational architectures. Over the longer term, emerging 

ideas in areas such as quantum science, material science, biology, and new computational architectures will feed future capability opportunity. 

Question. What will be your strategy for developing these technologies in a manner to support needed defense capabilities in a timely and cost-effective way? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would look at all available development strategies and 

evaluate them against the constraints of being timely and cost-effective. I believe 

that the future competitive national security environment will drive the Department 

to place increasing value on the pace by which we move technologically enabled capabilities from concept to field. To accelerate our pursuit and exploration of innovative concepts, the Department must make best use of its own in-house capabilities, 

those of academia, and those of industry—large and small. We must also be open 

to new engagement with innovative non-traditional commercial entities and make 

better use of the global capabilities of our partners and allies. 

INVESTMENT IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. If confirmed, what metrics will you use to assess the size and portfolio 

of investments made under the defense science and technology (S&T) program? 

Answer. I believe the Department’s S&T program must forge ever-closer relationships with the requirements, intelligence, acquisition, sustainment, and logistics 

communities as it discovers, develops, and matures advanced technologies. Metrics 

and measures can help the S&T community assess its effectiveness in meeting the 

needs of these communities. The Department’s current S&T investments range from 

those addressing long-term, strategic objectives to those focused on narrower, nearer-term project goals, and appropriate metrics must be established that reflect the 

differences in nature, goals, and risk versus payoff of the work. If confirmed, I would 

leverage the ongoing efforts of the 17 communities of interest under the Reliance 

21 process to identify and characterize technology impact through performance 

measures. The Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative is also focused on improving performance of the S&T enterprise by developing metrics and measures that can help 

identify where we are having the most impact in creating options to help shape future military competition, moving technology into the hands of our warfighters, and 

creating opportunities for new and novel military capabilities. If confirmed, I would 

leverage these ongoing efforts. 

Question. What role should the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 

Engineering play in the detailed development and coordination of service and agency S&T investment strategies, programs, and budgets? 

Answer. I believe the ASD(R&E) should provide investment and management 

guidance that integrates Military Department and Defense Agency efforts to provide 

a full spectrum of DOD capabilities. Each of the Military Departments and Defense 

Agencies S&T programs should leverage and complement each other’s efforts. The 

ongoing Reliance 21 effort provides an overarching framework to support joint S&T 

planning and coordination, ensuring that the joint DOD S&T community provides 

solutions and advice to the Department’s senior-level decision makers, warfighters, 

Congress, and other stakeholders in the most effective and efficient manner possible. If confirmed, I anticipate leveraging the Reliance 21 process to support information sharing, alignment of effort, coordination of priorities, and support for scientists and engineers across the Department. 

Question. What, in your view, is the role and value of S&T programs in meeting 

the Department’s transformation goals and in countering irregular, catastrophic, 

traditional, and disruptive threats? 

Answer. The Department’s S&T portfolio plays a vital role in producing and maintaining operational advantages for our force, in meeting the Department’s goals for 

transformation, and in countering irregular, catastrophic, traditional, and disruptive 

threats. The DOD S&T program provides the foundation for all of the Department’s 

capability development. An investment in S&T that is balanced across near-term capabilities and long-term technological options ensures that critical warfighter challenges are met with effective, multi-domain solutions. With the warfighter and naVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00793 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tional security in mind, our scientists and engineers generate innovative solutions 

to address the vast array of current and future threats. 

Question. What S&T areas do you consider underfunded by the Department? 

Answer. The ASD(R&E) and the DOD Components balance S&T resources across 

the budget submission to ensure that resources are applied to the highest payoff 

areas and are focused on the most critical emerging technologies. The Department 

continually assesses which technology areas have the greatest opportunity to bring 

advantage to our warfighters and we develop new programs and focus research in 

those areas. Routine communication among the ASD(R&E) and DOD Component 

S&T executives is critical to ensure we remain closely aligned and focused on the 

most critical threats. While I believe the overall S&T budget is appropriate, given 

the many demands on national security resources, I believe there are a number of 

fastmoving areas where the Department should consider additional emphasis. Some 

potential examples include: Advanced robotics; autonomous, distributed and collaborative systems; new frontiers in quantum science; new computing architectures; new 

engineering, design and manufacturing capabilities; advanced cyber-security capabilities and increased emphasis on prototyping and experimentation. If confirmed, 

I would work with the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to ensure that 

our portfolio of investment is balanced and adequately focused on these and other 

potential high-payoff S&T areas. 

Question. In your judgment, will the funding levels in these areas affect the Department’s ability to meet the threats of the future? 

Answer. In a time of significant pressure on resources, the Department has continued to protect stable S&T funding, in order to preserve its capacity and prepare 

for an uncertain future. I believe, with appropriate balancing across technical opportunity, the Department’s S&T budget is sufficient to prepare adequately for the 

threats of the future. 

Question. Do you feel that the Department’s current science and technology investment strategy strikes the appropriate balance between funding innovative, disruptive technologies and addressing near-term operational needs and military requirements? 

Answer. Yes, I believe the current DOD S&T investment strategy strikes an appropriate balance between funding innovative, disruptive technologies (such as new 

capabilities for directed energy weapons) and addressing near-term operational 

needs and military requirements (such as software and systems capabilities to increase operator effectiveness). As technology evolves and the threat changes, DOD 

must constantly re-examine and adjust our S&T strategies to ensure that this balance is maintained. 

BASIC RESEARCH

Question. Given the continuing nature of basic research and the broad implications and applications of discovery-focused and innovation-focused sciences, what 

criteria would you use, if confirmed, to measure the success of these programs and 

investments? 

Answer. DOD’s investment in basic research has played and continues to play a 

central role in creating and preserving our military technological advantage. Today’s 

fielded technologies are rooted in and dependent upon the basic research discoveries 

of past decades. Basic research introduces disruptive change, born of new knowledge 

and physical insight, but this change typically emerges over time. 

If confirmed, I would continuously assess our investments in basic science and 

discovery by asking a series of questions about each effort: 

• Does this basic research investment lead to the creation of new fields of interest 

and/or help mitigate DOD capability challenges? 

• Do the investments lead to original approaches and novel technical strategies 

to meet DOD needs? 

• Does this investment lead to original, multidisciplinary approaches or support 

radically new perspectives? 

• Are the results of this research contributing to and being vetted by the broader 

community, including universities, industry, and through publication in peer reviewed journals? 

• Do the types of problems and approaches supported by this DOD investment 

selectively attract the finest scientists and engineers in the Nation to build a 

broader and smarter national security community? 

I believe these questions provide a test of the relevance and quality of DOD’s S&T 

investments. 

Question. What concerns do you have, if any, about current levels of funding for 

Department basic research? How would you plan to address those concerns? 

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Answer. I believe that, in the context of finite resources, the current level of funding for the Department’s basic research is reasonable, and represents a historically 

stable balance with overall S&T funding. Stability of research funding is necessary 

to provide continuity of research capabilities. If confirmed, this is an area I would 

watch closely. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you determine whether there is an adequate 

investment in basic research to develop the capabilities the Department will need 

in 2025? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would review existing studies of the Department’s basic 

research activities and budgets. Making this assessment is, in part, a subjective one, 

depending on the balance of research opportunities, near-term needs and long-term 

investments, and input from experienced S&T resources. This includes input from 

external sources, including the National Research Council and the Defense Science 

Board. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, will you take to increase efforts in unfettered exploration, which has historically been a critical enabler of the most important breakthroughs in military capabilities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would reemphasize to the DOD Components S&T executives, my belief that basic research is a critical component of our future military capability, and that the Department—from its senior officials to its bench scientists— 

should engage and be engaged with the Nation’s and the world’s leading scientists 

and engineers. If confirmed, I would also commit to the Department’s policy of minimizing restrictions on Department scientists to perform and interact with great research, and to reinforce our policy that sponsored fundamental research shall be 

performed without restriction, other than those restrictions imposed by law or national regulation. 

CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER

Question. If confirmed, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, you will be the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) of the Department of Defense. 

What do you see as the role of the CTO of the Department of Defense? 

Answer. The role of the Chief Technology Officer of the Department is defined in 

the ASD(R&E) charter. The charter defines the role of the ASD(R&E) as the Principal Staff Assistant to the USD(AT&L) and the Secretary on all technical matters. 

The ASD(R&E) should provide guidance to shape the DOD S&T program and should 

lead efforts to develop technology options for the Department. The CTO should also 

contribute significantly to ensuring that major acquisition programs are conducted 

with acceptable technological risk. 

Question. What experience do you have in your career that will enhance your ability to serve as CTO of DOD? 

Answer. My broad background in defense technology development provides the 

critical background and requisite knowledge to permit me to serve effectively as 

CTO of DOD. This experience includes time spent as a researcher in a defense laboratory, as a program manager and senior leader directing major research investments at DARPA, working critical technology programs with each of the Military 

Departments, and my experience over the past five years as the DASD(SE) within 

the Office of the ASD(R&E) 

Question. Do you believe the position for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering currently has adequate authorities to exercise the responsibilities of a CTO? 

Answer. Yes 

Question. How are the activities of the Advanced Manufacturing Institutes being 

incorporated into the Department’s science and technology activities? 

Answer. I am aware that each of the Advanced Manufacturing Institutes currently has an S&T lead to connect each Institute back to the Department’s broader 

science and technology activities. If confirmed, I would review the interaction of the 

planned work of the Advanced Manufacturing Institutes with the Department’s 

science and technology activities. 

Question. What is the status of the Department’s long-range research and development planning activities? What noteworthy results have been realized from that 

initiative so far? 

Answer. The Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program is a line 

of effort under the Defense Innovation Initiative which is focused on identifying 

emerging technology and materiel opportunities that could strengthen DOD capabilities in a competitive future national security environment. Since November 2014, 

I have been leading the 2015 LRRDPP study, which has included engaging technical 

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experts across the Department’s research and engineering enterprise, as well as academic, not-for-profit, and defense and non-defense commercial organizations, to 

identify emerging opportunities for future military innovation. The classified 

LRRDPP study continues to identify opportunities to accelerate and demonstrate 

new system concepts that can inform future materiel plans. 

It is also anticipated that this effort will identify key research and engineering 

areas for assessment and prioritization in future research and engineering planning. 

To date, among other input, the study has completed its review of over 400 submissions received from outside the Department in response to the 2014 Request for Information and have conducted site visits, meetings, and interviews with DOD and 

Department of Energy labs, small businesses, corporate research and development 

centers, academic institutions and intelligence community organizations. We are in 

the process of synthesizing the results of this study into a set of classified recommendations for the Deputy Secretary of Defense. We have synthesized the results 

of the first phase of the study into a set of classified recommendations for the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The second phase of the study is ongoing. 

We anticipate that these specific results will emphasize themes supporting the 

use of limited autonomy to enable deploying manned and unmanned systems together in new ways to enable new capabilities, themes that permit the execution 

of precision capabilities from long range, and themes that provide new ways to 

counter the complex threat environment we anticipate when operating against technologically advanced actors in the future. 

OFFSET TECHNOLOGIES

Question. During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key technologies to offset 

the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces: precision guided munitions, 

stealth technology, and satellite-based navigation. These three technologies have 

given U.S. forces unparalleled superiority until now. However, with advancements 

by our emerging adversaries, it seems like the military technological superiority is 

beginning to erode. As a result, it is critical that the United States once again focus 

on offsetting the technology advantages being gained by our adversaries. 

Which technology priorities do you believe the Department of Defense should be 

pursuing to maintain the military technological superiority of the United States? 

Answer. Since the Cold War, U.S. forces have had assured conventional military 

technology dominance over every adversary they have faced or might have faced. 

The combination of precision weapons, advanced intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance systems, stealth, digital command and control, and space-based capabilities including navigation and communications have provided clear technology overmatch against any potential adversary. Over the last 30 years, others have had significant opportunity to study the systems and technologies that advantage U.S. military capabilities. In recent years, other nations have begun to field systems that are 

closing the gap with U.S. capabilities and, in some cases, directly challenging the 

technical advantages we have used in the past to enable U.S. power projection. This 

is a result of specific investments made by potential future competitors, the 

globalization of advanced technology, supply chains, and technical talent, and the 

loss of technical data through cyber exfiltration. 

I believe that the Department of Defense should pursue innovative technologies 

that will minimize the effectiveness of these foreign investments and create the opportunity to impose extraordinary cost on future adversaries. These technological 

priorities should shift future national security competition from areas where U.S. 

advantages are narrowing to areas where U.S. strengths in agility, flexibility, and 

technical execution can flourish. Critical to executing these priorities will be identifying opportunities to drive cost out of future systems—through advanced design 

technologies; prototyping and demonstration; and advanced, flexible manufacturing 

capabilities to reduce risk. If confirmed, these areas would be a high priority for me. 

Question. What strategies would you recommend that Secretary Carter implement 

to develop these technology priorities? 

Answer. The Department is emphasizing the need to pursue innovative system 

concepts and technology solutions being developed within the Department itself, 

within the defense sector, and within the non-defense commercial sector, where the 

pace of technology adoption is often greater. We have increased our engagement 

with technology developers globally to ensure that we have awareness of and can 

leverage the best technical capabilities, regardless of source. Most importantly, the 

Department is reemphasizing the importance of prototyping, demonstration and experimentation as a means to mature rapidly emerging technical capabilities, gain 

insight into the operational capabilities they might offer, and to more rapidly inform 

modernization program development. These three approaches—(1) openness to innoVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00796 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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vation, (2) speed from idea to implementation, and (3) prototyping, demonstration, 

and experimentation to inform decision making—provide a means to explore new 

offsetting technological advantages, and if confirmed, these approaches would be a 

priority for me. 

Question. What role do the Services have to play in their development? 

Answer. I believe that the Military Departments play an essential role in developing, maturing, and fielding the future systems necessary to shape the future competitive strategy of the Department. 

TECHNOLOGY READINESS ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Question. Have you participated in or observed the development of Technology 

Readiness Assessments to support Milestone Decisions for defense acquisition programs? 

Answer. Yes, as the DASD(SE), I have observed and supported the Technology 

Readiness Assessment process and its employment in defense acquisition decisions. 

Question. What is your assessment of the value, strengths, and weaknesses of the 

current process? 

Answer. The Technology Readiness Assessment process provides a valuable measure of the maturity of critical technology elements in a defense acquisition program 

and can be useful in highlighting areas where relatively immature technologies may 

increase acquisition program risk. The existing process, however, reduces this very 

complex and somewhat subjective assessment to a single number, which offers limited insight into the actual risk that an acquisition system may bear. There are 

many technical risks that should be assessed in evaluating a defense acquisition 

program, including integration risk, supply chain risks, and reducibility risks. Technology Readiness Assessments can contribute, but they are only one part of a holistic assessment of overall program risk. If confirmed, I would be particularly attentive to ASD(R&E) efforts to assess the full range of technical risk as part of our 

efforts in support of defense acquisition programs. 

Question. Would you recommend any changes to the processes used for the assessment of technological maturity and integration risk of critical technology elements? 

Answer. In my current assignment as DASD(SE), I led an evaluation of our acquisition technical risk management process and have published guidance to the Department on more effective formal risk management, with a particular focus on improving our capacity for active risk mitigation. If confirmed, I would continue to investigate methodologies that would provide better insight into technology maturity 

and integration risks in the context of an overall acquisition program risk management framework. 

Question. Are you satisfied that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research 

and Engineering is properly staffed and resourced to support decision makers in 

complying with the technology certification and assessment requirements that are 

its responsibility? 

Answer. I believe the Office of the ASD(R&E) is currently adequately staffed to 

perform its various responsibilities with respect to technology certification and assessment. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you anticipate making, if confirmed, in this 

process? 

Answer. If confirmed, I do not anticipate proposing any changes to the current 

technology certification and assessment requirements, but I would seek to leverage 

better these assessments as part of an increased emphasis on technical risk management and mitigation as a critical engineering function. 

COORDINATION OF DEFENSE S&T INTERNALLY AND WITH OTHER AGENCIES

Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to integrate the S&T programs of the 

Services and Defense Agencies to reduce redundancy, leverage investments, and 

promote cooperation in order to achieve greater efficiency and technological advancement? Will you use existing structures such as Reliance 21? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to continue to employ the Reliance 21 process to integrate and coordinate Military Department and Defense Agency S&T programs. The Reliance 21 process has been successful in leveraging S&T efforts across 

the DOD Components to improve efficiency and effectiveness, spur collaboration, 

and reduce undesirable duplication of effort. 

Question. Do you believe the mechanisms of coordination between federal civilian 

agencies and the Department are adequate to ensure that the military can best leverage the advances of agencies such as: 

National Science Foundation on defense needs for basic science, especially in social sciences? 

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Answer. DOD funds basic research in targeted areas deemed most critical for defense but also relies heavily on complementary basic research insights funded by 

U.S. Government agencies such as the National Science Foundation. I believe that 

coordination between the DOD and NSF is critical and is currently adequate and 

effective. 

In the social sciences in particular, where defense efforts tend to be more narrowly scoped for particular regions and problems, DOD projects frequently build on 

NSF-funded basic research insights regarding the more universal drivers and mechanisms for conflict and cooperative behavior at individual and group levels. Without 

a robust NSF investment in social sciences, DOD would need to divert its social 

science research funds away from specific defense issues to fill in those foundational 

gaps. 

Question. National Aeronautics and Space Administration on hypersonics and 

other space research and the viability and availability of testing facilities? 

Answer. I believe the current level of coordination of DOD efforts with NASA is 

adequate and effective. NASA provides input for our biennial Space S&T Strategy 

report and the Department reviews draft NASA technology roadmaps to identify 

areas for cooperative activities. In addition, NASA and DOD participate in numerous forums where our staffs interact, at both the working and senior levels, to discuss and coordinate our efforts. 

Question. National Institutes of Health on areas in which military medical research and vaccine development overlap with civilian medical needs? 

Answer. I believe the current level of coordination of DOD efforts with NIH is 

adequate and effective. The focus of NIH investment (the broad health needs of the 

Nation) and the focus of DOD health care S&T investment (the specific and unique 

medical needs of the warfighter) differ, but in areas where military and civilian research needs overlap many programs are complementary and mutually supportive. 

The degree of collaboration in these areas is extensive. For example, programs for 

the development of Human Immunodeficiency Virus vaccines are collaborative efforts with the aim of meeting programmatic objectives of both the NIH and the military. These efforts have made use of the extensive laboratory and clinical trials 

managed and maintained by the military while taking advantage of the extensive 

fundamental and applied research effort of both the NIH and the military focused 

on developing new vaccine candidates. The synergy between these programs was 

critical to the development of the only vaccine candidate that provided some degree 

of protection against HIV and for improvements to the vaccine that will ultimately 

be used to protect both military and civilian populations. If confirmed, I will work 

with the ASD (Health Affairs) and the Surgeons General to foster collaborative research and development efforts with NIH in areas of mutual interest. 

Question. Intelligence Community in setting defense research priorities to prepare 

for future threat environments? 

Answer. I believe that the DOD effectively leverages the Intelligence Community 

to inform defense research prioritization and planning. In my current role as 

DASD(SE), I support the reinvigorated initiatives under Better Buying Power 3.0 

focused on integrating acquisition, intelligence, and requirements more closely. One 

additional initiative is the Science and Technology Intelligence Needs Plan that informs the intelligence community on the Department’s intelligence needs for S&T. 

If confirmed, I would ensure that dialogue between the Department and the Intelligence Community is open and transparent. 

Question. Department of Homeland Security on Homeland defense and national 

security-related science? 

Answer. I believe that the current level of coordination of DOD efforts with the 

Department of Homeland Security is adequate and effective and provides strategic 

leverage across the technology investments being made by the two Departments. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you work with other federal agencies and the 

Office of Science and Technology Policy to improve coordination? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with other federal agencies and with the 

OSTP to ensure that DOD research and engineering are well coordinated with other 

government efforts. 

TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY

Question. What weaknesses, if any, do you see in the current Defense S&T strategic planning process? 

Answer. I observe that the current Defense S&T strategic planning process is significantly labor intensive—which can create challenges in generating timely recommendations to support the Department’s annual budget submission. 

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Question. What do you believe are the key attributes for a good technology strategic plan that can be effectively utilized for programming and budgeting purposes? 

Answer. I believe an effective technology strategic plan should include (1) specific, 

time-phased, and actionable recommendations for technology development and demonstration; (2) a clear mapping between technology activities and potential outcomes, demonstrating clear relevance to the Department’s mission; and (3) specific 

quantified goals and targets to provide insight into progress. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that strategic plans are utilized during the budget planning and programming process? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to make Reliance 21 and the Communities 

of Interest more strategic in their planning and more efficient and effective in implementation through directly, explicitly, and transparently linking Reliance 21 recommendations to ASD(R&E) budget inputs and recommendations. 

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. The Department’s efforts to quickly transition technologies to the 

warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain, 

however, in successfully transitioning new technologies into existing programs of 

record, fielded systems, and major weapon systems and platforms. 

How would you assess the effectiveness of current transition systems? 

Answer. The current system is most effective when transitioning technological capabilities to support existing programs of record. The S&T laboratories are well connected and responsive to the needs of the program offices. Initiatives such as the 

Rapid Innovation Fund and Foreign Comparative Test provide program offices with 

access to non-traditional small businesses and international businesses—sources of 

new and novel solutions. 

The current system is less able to recognize and transition opportunistic capability—new and emerging technologies opportunities that emerge during development or which disrupt current acquisition plans. In these cases the Department 

needs to be more effective at assessing technical opportunity and creating opportunities to deploy more rapidly emerging capabilities to achieve maximum benefit with 

minimum impact. If confirmed, I would work to improve mechanisms for planned 

and opportunistic technology transition into DOD systems. 

Question. What challenges exist in technology transition within the Department? 

Answer. A key challenge in technology transition is the mismatch between the 

risk acceptance posture of technology developers and that of acquisition program 

managers. Technology developers are motivated to take risk and to explore the art 

of the possible, while acquisition managers are motivated to minimize risk and to 

pursue stable, well-understood capabilities to minimize overall acquisition program 

risk. I believe that aligning incentives so as to motivate program managers continually to review technology options to improve performance and reduce cost, and to 

motivate technologists to harden, demonstrate, and de-risk emerging technologies, 

would significantly aid technology transition. 

Question. What would you do, if confirmed, to address these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would vigorously support the Better Buying Power 3.0 direction to emphasize technology insertion and technology refresh in program planning. Initiatives under Better Buying Power that emphasize modular, open system 

architectures, initiatives that support rapid technology insertion, and initiatives 

that promote increased use of rapid prototyping and experimentation to mature and 

derisk technologies and demonstrate operational utility all help increase the Department’s ability to transition research and development more quickly and effectively 

to operational use. 

Question. What is the role of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 

Engineering in facilitating communication between technical communities, acquisition personnel, and end users to speed technology transition? 

Answer. I believe an effective ASD(R&E) must work closely with the requirements 

community, the acquisition community, the research and development community, 

and the operational communities to provide new technologies that sustain our technological superiority against potential future adversaries. The ASD(R&E) must coordinate across this broad set of communities: coupling technical opportunity to 

emerging requirements; informing technology development with operational feedback; and aiding transition of capabilities from research and development to acquisition. If confirmed, I would connect and coordinate these diverse communities to 

speed technology transition from concept to field. 

Question. Do you believe that we need to change the manner in which we fund 

technology transition in the Department of Defense? If so, what changes would you 

recommend? 

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Answer. Technology development is sometimes challenged by the availability of 

nonprogram-specific applied technology funding used to mature technologically driven capabilities, to prototype and experiment with emerging system concepts, and to 

support bridging technology development to support the transition of technology to 

programs of record and the warfighter. While the Department has protected S&T 

funding levels, Advanced Component Development and Prototypes funds are increasingly consumed by the demands of modernization programs and other uses directly tied to specific acquisition programs. If confirmed, I would explore ways to 

provide the flexibility needed to improve technology transition. 

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND PROTOTYPING

Question. Do you feel that the Department of Defense has sufficient systems engineering expertise in its current workforce or contractor base? 

Answer. Based on my engagement across this community and with acquisition 

leadership in each of the Components, I believe that the current systems engineering technical capacity and capability supporting the DOD is sufficient. I also believe 

that this workforce possesses and has demonstrated strong technical capabilities. It 

will be important to ensure that the workforce is technically refreshed as new challenges arise, and as technical disciplines mature. 

Question. What will be the impact of further reductions in personnel to the ability 

to execute the systems engineering missions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Research and Engineering? 

Answer. System Engineering oversight functions that are part of the Military Departments and OSD headquarters elements will likely be impacted by proposed 

across-the board headquarter staff reductions, and additional efficiencies will need 

to be identified to meet mission requirements 

Question. What changes, if any, do you believe should be made in the Department’s systems engineering organization and practices? 

Answer. I have worked with the Military Departments to optimize organic systems engineering practices. These are now reflected in policy, the foremost example 

being the recently updated DOD Instruction 5000.02 that revised DOD systems engineering policy, and reflects a stronger engineering participation and technical risk 

consideration across the acquisition activities. Our current systems engineering organizations and practices are adequate but should evolve as engineering tools and 

methods are developed and matured. 

Question. What is the value of competitive prototyping in increasing the success 

of DOD acquisition efforts? 

Answer. Competitive prototyping is most effective at increasing the likelihood of 

success of DOD acquisition efforts when it drives real risk reduction in the actual 

product that the Department will acquire and field. Under the right conditions, competitive prototyping can be expected to have several benefits to DOD programs, including: reduction of overall technical risk; validation of cost; validation of design; 

evaluation of the manufacturing process; and refinement of program requirements. 

Competitive prototyping imposes costs, since the Department must carry multiple 

offerors far enough through the design process to produce prototypes for evaluation. 

This cost penalty can sometimes reduce the advantage of competitive prototyping, 

making it most effective in cases where the cost/benefit ratio is clearly advantageous, where multiple design options merit further exploration, or where the competitive environment drives early return on lifecycle cost. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you work to increase the amount of systems engineering projects and competitive prototyping efforts that are undertaken by the Department of Defense and its contractor base? 

Answer. In my current role as DASD(SE), I have supported robust systems engineering and risk-appropriate, cost-effective prototyping. If confirmed, I would continue to emphasize a robust systems engineering process across the Department’s 

acquisition portfolio. 

VENTURE CAPITAL STRATEGIES

Question. In recent years, some components of the Department of Defense have 

attempted to follow the lead of the intelligence community by using venture capital 

firms to make investments in developing technologies. 

What role do you believe that venture capital firms should play in DOD’s investments in developing technologies, including in the Small Business Innovation Research program? 

Answer. I believe that small, early-stage companies are a significant driver of innovation in our Nation—leveraging U.S. strengths in entrepreneurship, acceptance 

of risk, and access to technical talent and smart capital to create businesses that 

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are shaping the commercial technology landscape. I believe the Department needs 

to be engaged with innovative early-stage firms throughout the country, to explore 

the relevance of applying cutting-edge commercial capabilities to meet the Department’s needs and to encourage small innovative companies to see the Department 

as a smart and engaged potential customer for their ideas. The Department’s Small 

Business Innovation Research program is a very effective means of engaging these 

companies. If confirmed, I would explore an alternative means to reach out to these 

companies, such as by using venture-capital-like approaches to engage companies 

early, with the objective that they consider the Department’s requirements among 

the targets for their product development priorities. 

Question. What advantages and disadvantages do you see in the use of venture 

capital strategies? 

Answer. Venture capital strategies could permit the Department to engage innovative companies in a natural way—by supporting their need for critical investment 

to support the development of innovative capabilities. This could provide the Department with access to innovation that we might not be able to reach through 

other approaches. Venture capital strategies, however, are inherently risky. Most 

early stage companies likely will not achieve breakthrough innovations, and a venture capital strategy must be patient enough to accept the risk profile associated 

with making a number of investments with the goal of seeing a fraction of them 

yield concrete benefit. 

Question. When DOD does decide to use venture capital strategies, what steps do 

you believe the Department should take to ensure that DOD funds are invested in 

technologies and companies that properly reflect national defense priorities, avoid 

the potential for conflicts of interest by industry partners, and ensure that the Department’s investments are not diluted? 

Answer. I believe it would be critical to evaluate carefully investments made 

through a venture capital strategies approach, and to assess whether leveraging a 

venture capital strategy is truly the most effective and appropriate model for investing in a particular technology or engaging a particular company. 

Question. What other strategies do you intend to employ, if confirmed, to ensure 

that the nation’s most innovative companies work on Department of Defense research and engineering programs? 

Answer. In April, Secretary Carter announced the Defense Innovation Unit-experimental, an activity in the San Francisco Bay Area to provide a mechanism to increase the Department’s presence in an area of significant entrepreneurial innovation. Communication and outreach efforts are effective ways to attract and engage 

innovative companies. If confirmed, I would explore methods to increase the Department’s engagement with and outreach to the most innovative companies across the 

Nation. 

INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH COOPERATION

Question. In your view, how should increased globalization of defense technology 

affect DOD’s research and technology development and investment strategy? 

Answer. The increased globalization of defense technologies provides both opportunities and challenges for the Department. To the extent DOD can leverage technology developments in allied and friendly nations, DOD will be able to redirect resources to address other critical needs. This would also provide opportunities for 

DOD to increase commonality with these nations, creating increased efficiencies for 

all. However, globalization of defense technology creates challenges to our technological superiority through proliferation of advanced military capabilities. 

Question. What is your assessment of the value of cooperative research and development programs with international partners? 

Answer. Our international cooperative research and development programs are 

based on equitable investment by all participants. In addition to reducing cost burdens, these cooperative programs enable us to interact with the best and brightest 

in many nations. Cooperative research and development programs deepen our defense relationships with our allies and other partner nations. 

Question. In your view, what are the obstacles to more effective international cooperation, and, if confirmed, how would you address those obstacles? 

Answer. Successful international cooperative research and development programs 

require trusted partnerships between the nations involved in them. These require 

commitment by all parties, which includes providing adequate levels of funding and 

involvement. If confirmed, I would attentive to ensuring our proposed international 

cooperative efforts address these commitments. 

Question. How will increased international technology cooperation affect our domestic defense industrial base? 

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Answer. International cooperative research and development programs can provide opportunities for the industrial base to work with and develop relationships in 

other nations. This can lead to increased business opportunities through creation of 

trusted partnerships. It can also provide the Department with increased access to 

world-class research and researchers. 

Question. How should DOD monitor and assess the research capabilities of our 

global partners and competitors, and of the global commercial sector? 

Answer. DOD maintains awareness of global S&T and commercial capabilities 

through our global technology watch efforts and through the Military Departments’ 

regional and global international S&T offices. If confirmed, I would support and 

strengthen these critical tools for providing situational awareness of the competitive 

global S&T landscape. 

TEST AND EVALUATION

Question. What are your views on the adequacy and effectiveness of the Department’s development and operational test and evaluation activities? 

Answer. I believe the Department’s developmental test and evaluation and operational test and evaluation activities are adequate and effective. Test activities play 

a critical role in informing acquisition decision making and in identifying programmatic opportunities for application of additional engineering and risk mitigation resources. 

Question. What will be the impact of further reductions in personnel on the ability 

to execute the test and evaluation missions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Research and Engineering? 

Answer. Further reductions in test and evaluation workforce capacity would require the Department to identify new efficiencies to effectively execute its T&E mission and will require careful planning and management attention. Developmental 

test and evaluation oversight functions that are part of the Military Departments 

and OSD headquarters elements will likely be impacted by proposed across-theboard headquarter staff reductions, and additional efficiencies will need to be identified to meet mission requirements 

Question. What changes do you anticipate will be made in the Department’s developmental testing organization and capabilities? 

Answer. I do not anticipate changes to the Department’s developmental testing organization and capabilities. The establishment of the position of the Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation, now the DASD(DT&E), significantly strengthened 

the Department’s test discipline and practice, and I have had the privilege of working closely with the DASD(DT&E) in my current capacity. 

Question. What modifications would you recommend to the test and evaluation 

processes in the Department of Defense to more efficiently and quickly develop and 

deliver operationally effective and suitable technologies to the warfighter? 

Answer. I believe that the test community needs to be engaged early and continuously with acquisition programs to ensure that opportunities for early, effective, and 

cost efficient test are designed into program plans and that test activities produce 

actionable information to inform programmatic decision making. I also believe that 

strong DT&E can be an effective way to minimize risk, and to avoid discovery of 

issues in OT&E by identifying and correcting issues early in the design and development process. If confirmed, I would support efforts to improve the test community’s 

early and continuous engagement. 

SMALL BUSINESS ISSUES

Question. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that the Small Business 

Innovation Research (SBIR) program serves a useful purpose in meeting the Department’s research goals? 

Answer. The policy oversight and responsibility for the SBIR/STTR falls within 

the Department’s Office of Small Business Programs. If confirmed, I would work 

closely with the Director of Small Business Programs to ensure that the program 

remains focused on innovation and technology advancement and aligned with the 

Department’s overall research goals. The SBIR /STTR program is a major contributor in meeting the Department’s research goals and fosters a broad and innovative 

small business industrial base to meet critical warfighter needs. 

Question. What recommendations would you suggest to the SBIR program to improve the transition of S&T capabilities into acquisition programs? 

Answer. The recent Better Buying Power 3.0 included efforts focused on improving the transition of SBIR-developed S&T capabilities into acquisition programs. 

Last year the Department included transition goals and incentives in DOD Instruction 5000.02. If confirmed, I would pursue reinforcing these initiatives to continue 

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to improve SBIR transition with guidance, education, and training across the Department. 

Question. What recommendations would you suggest to the SBIR program to improve its ability to attract non-traditional defense contractors, such as small startup 

companies, into the program? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would explore avenues to continue to improve the ability 

of DOD to attract non-traditional defense contractors through a comprehensive outreach and communication strategy. Annually the Department reviews over 10,000 

SBIR/STTR proposals, of which approximately one-third are from newly formed 

businesses engaging with the Department for the first time. The Department recently has significantly increased its outreach to minorities, HUB zone, and underserved states, and I believe these efforts should be fostered and expanded. 

Question. What guidance or direction do you consider necessary regarding transition of the research results of SBIR programs to major weapon systems and equipment? 

Answer. I believe the Department has adequate guidance and direction to support 

transition of SBIR results to major systems acquisition, but these efforts require 

continuous emphasis by Department advocates identifying and leveraging opportunities for transition. 

Question. What emphasis would you place, if confirmed, on participation by the 

acquisition community in setting research priorities for the SBIR and in accepting 

new solutions into existing programs of record? 

Answer. I believe the acquisition and S&T communities must be strongly engaged 

in setting research priorities for the SBIR program to ensure the relevance of these 

efforts to the Department’s research goals and to foster transition from SBIR to programs of record. If confirmed, I would emphasize these efforts. 

Question. In your judgment, are modifications needed to the Department’s SBIR 

program to ensure it meets the Department’s goals and is updated to support research costs of the small business community? 

Answer. I am currently unaware of the need for any modifications to the Department’s SBIR program. 

DEFENSE LABORATORIES

Question. What is your overall assessment as to the technical capabilities and 

quality of Defense laboratories relative to their Department of Energy, FFRDC, industry, academic and foreign peers? 

Answer. I believe that DOD laboratories are a critical and unique component of 

the Department’s research and engineering enterprise. They provide the science, 

technology, and engineering expertise to DOD that allows our Nation to maintain 

a technological edge over potential adversaries. DOD technical expertise also plays 

a prominent role in developing technologies that benefit the Nation as a whole. 

While Department of Energy, FFRDCs, industry, academic, and foreign laboratories 

make vital contributions, they cannot replace the unique capabilities and expertise 

of the in-house Defense laboratories and their unique focus on, and access to, U.S. 

warfighter needs. Furthermore, subject matter expertise developed in the DOD laboratories provides the knowledge necessary to evaluate and mold technologies developed by private industry and academia to meet DOD’s unique needs. The DOD laboratories’ complete focus on the warfighter and the mission make them unique, irreplaceable assets. 

Question. What are your views on the most effective management approach for 

personnel at these facilities? 

Answer. I believe that the most effective management approaches for the Defense 

laboratories are ones that provide laboratory leadership with the flexibility needed 

to shape their workforce to meet the rapidly changing needs of the warfighter. The 

authorities currently granted to defense laboratories as Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratories are appropriate for managing the personnel at DOD laboratories and, with the support of Congress, are continually being refined to meet the 

changing laboratory workforce management needs of the DOD. 

Question. A review of defense laboratories operations shows various deficits in 

personnel management, infrastructure renewal, physical plant recapitalization rate, 

support services adequacy, etc. Some analyses have indicated that these deficiencies 

result from excessive centralized control. 

Do you support significantly increased delegation of operating authority to the lab 

director? 

Answer. I believe empowering individual leaders at the lowest appropriate level 

is part of the necessary flexibility for effectively managing a laboratory. There is a 

complementary need for some centralized coordination in order to ensure that reVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00803 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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sources are expended both efficiently and effectively. I currently am unaware of a 

need significantly to increase delegation but, if confirmed, I would study this issue 

and recommend changes as appropriate. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, will you take to improve the quality, 

technical capabilities, and mission performance of the Defense laboratories? 

Answer. If confirmed, and building on the work of Better Buying Power 3.0 to look 

at laboratory return on investment, I would assess the current quality, technical capabilities, and mission performance of the Defense laboratories. I would then work 

in collaboration with the heads of the DOD components, and through them, the laboratories to implement any needed changes. 

Question. Would you support transitioning certain laboratory capabilities into 

FFRDCs or Government Owned-Contractor Operated facilities? 

Answer. I am currently unaware of any capabilities that should be transitioned 

to FFRDCs or Government Owned-Contractor Operated facilities. If confirmed, I 

would make any needed recommendations as part of the assessment of laboratory 

capabilities. 

LABORATORY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

The Department’s research and development laboratories perform unique functions in serving national security missions and do not readily fit into the general 

operational management structure. 

Question. Would you support increasing the flexibility of the laboratories on personnel matters? 

Answer. The quality of the Department’s research and development laboratories 

is completely dependent on the ability of the labs to attract, recruit, and retain topnotch technical talent with skill sets critical to military innovation. Increased flexibility in personnel matters is an important factor in recruiting and retaining the 

high-caliber workforce needed by the DOD’s laboratory enterprise. I support making 

maximum use of available direct and flexible hiring authorities for scientists and 

engineers, as well as allowing full use of all Science and Technology Reinvention 

Laboratory personnel authorities in order to compete to attract the best and brightest talent to the DOD laboratories. 

Question. What particular workforce challenges does the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Research and Engineering have? 

Answer. Recruiting and retaining a world-class technical workforce is a pressing 

challenge for the defense research and engineering enterprise. The DOD mission requires specialized scientific and engineering skills and the Department needs to 

compete effectively to identify and leverage this limited talent pool. I believe that 

attracting, developing, and retaining talent with critical twenty-first century skills 

in domains such as advanced microelectronics, cybersecurity, embedded software development, and data analytics will be a significant challenge to the Office of the 

ASD(R&E) over the next decade. 

An additional long-term challenge for the defense research and engineering enterprise is the ‘‘graying’’ of the workforce, within the Office of the ASD(R&E), across 

the Military Departments and Defense Agencies, and within the defense industrial 

base. The senior workforce possesses significant skill and experience, but over the 

near term the R&E enterprise will see an accelerated loss of experience as a significant portion of its workforce retires. If confirmed, I would be attentive to these challenges. 

Question. How do the personnel flexibilities of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering compare to those of DARPA or the 

Defense Laboratories? Should the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Research and Engineering be permitted to use the same hiring flexibilities as these 

organizations? 

Answer. I believe personnel flexibility is critical for recruiting and retaining the 

best and the brightest to our laboratory enterprise. DARPA and the Science and 

Technology Reinvention Laboratories (STRLs) have special authorities with regard 

to personnel flexibility, that do not apply to the Office of the ASD(R&E), I believe 

that these personnel procedures, including those applicable to OASD (R&E), have 

been adequate for the needs of the DOD, although I note that increased flexibility 

can prove useful for any part of the DOD. 

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CONFERENCES

Question. A recent GAO study indicated that the lengthy and burdensome approval processes for legitimate conference attendance requests at the Department of 

Defense have severely curtailed attendance at academic conferences. Has the work 

and mission of the laboratories and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

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for Research and Engineering been hindered by conference approval processes and 

travel limitations? 

Answer. Collaboration with scientific colleagues is key to the success of DOD laboratory and Office of the ASD(R&E) personnel, as is the ability to share technical 

findings with the broader research community. Scientific exchange is one of the primary vehicles for the exchange of new ideas and is a vehicle through which new 

concepts and technological innovation bloom. Academic and technical conference 

participation for the DOD professional workforce, including scientists and engineers, 

is an essential element of the S&T mission and a critical means of achieving and 

maintaining global technological superiority. 

While the Defense Laboratories and the Office of the ASD(R&E) continue to meet 

their mission, the conference approval processes and travel limitations have hindered this type of important collaboration. If confirmed, I would work with the 

USD(AT&L), the Deputy Chief Management Officer, and the Components to explore 

means to reduce unnecessary impediments to technical collaboration. 

Question. Has the application of the new conference approval processes since the 

issuance of OMB Memorandum M–12–12 ‘‘Promoting Efficient Spending to Support 

Agency Operations’’ improved the effectiveness of the DOD research and engineering community in executing its designated missions? 

Answer. The September 23, 2015 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the associated DOD Conference Guidance Version 3.0 issued simultaneously by the Deputy Chief Management Officer recognize the importance of participation in technical meetings, symposia and conferences to the DOD Science and 

Engineering community. These revised policies have significantly streamlined approval authorities for technical conference attendance and are intended to remove 

unintended barriers to technical collaboration, while maintaining appropriate management visibility and management to control travel costs. I expect that implementation of this revised policy will address previous concerns over burdensome local 

implementation of M–12–12 policy. 

Question. Does the application of the conference approval process in DOD align 

with best practices of the commercial sector or leading public and private academic 

institutions? 

Answer. Recent revisions to conference approval policy are intended to align DOD 

practice more closely with best practice of leading public and private institutions. 

If confirmed, I will monitor and assess impacts of this recent policy change on the 

research and engineering workforce. 

TECHNICAL AND ACQUISITION WORKFORCE ISSUES

Question. In your view, does the Department have adequate technical expertise 

within the government workforce to execute its designated acquisition and technical 

development missions? 

Answer. I believe the current scientific and engineering workforce numbers and 

skill mix are sufficient to meet DOD’s current acquisition and technical development 

needs, but several trends raise future concerns. The first trend is the large number 

of employees in the technical workforce nearing or at retirement age. We expect that 

approximately half of the technical workforce will be eligible to retire in the next 

10 years. The second challenge is with the most recent hires: those with 0–5 years 

of experience. Studies indicate that the individuals in this age group may expect to 

change jobs every 3–5 years. Consequently DOD will need to compete with industry 

to retain the newest employees. Finally, in fast moving technical areas, the Department will need to refresh, retrain, and upgrade the skills of its acquisition and technical development workforce. If confirmed, I would carefully monitor workforce data 

for early indications of excessive turnover and/or accelerated loss of key skills. 

Question. What efforts will you undertake, if confirmed, to improve the technical 

capabilities of DOD in critical areas, such as systems engineering, information assurance, social and cultural sciences, and software engineering? 

Answer. The DOD Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics workforce 

represents a diverse set of very specific technical skills. Critical, high demand skills 

such as systems engineering, cyber security and information assurance, large data 

analytics, social and cultural modeling, and software engineering are areas that require particular and continued attention. Other domains, such as nuclear engineering, aerospace engineering, naval architecture, and energetics, in which DOD— 

unique skill sets are required, also merit specific attention. As DASD(SE), I have 

worked closely with leaders across the engineering community to address critical 

technical capabilities needed by the DOD workforce. Mitigation actions have included improved training and education, development of guidance and best practices, and investment in the development of new methodologies to address DOD 

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challenges. If confirmed, I would continue to work with the engineering and scientific communities to address these needs to ensure we have a workforce that can 

meet current and future DOD challenges. 

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

Question. What is your view of the appropriate relationship between the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering and the Director of DARPA? 

Answer. The Director of DARPA reports to the USD(AT&L) through the 

ASD(R&E), I believe this the appropriate relationship. In my current position, I 

have an excellent, strong, and ongoing relationship with DARPA. 

Question. What do you believe is the proper research mission for DARPA? 

Answer. Since its founding, DARPA has a long history of being an effective engine 

of transformative innovation. DARPA’s ability to apply innovative solutions to address some of the most difficult problems that face the DOD, now and in the future, 

has been the cornerstone of its success. The agile, flexible, and inventive nature of 

the agency’s organizational culture has been successful in driving the pace of technology development for the National Security enterprise. I believe the proper role 

for DARPA is to conduct high-risk, high-payoff research for the Department, and to 

share that work with the Military Departments and others within the government. 

Question. What adjustments do you expect to make, if confirmed, to the current 

style of DARPA research program management and investment strategy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with DARPA, as well as the Military 

Departments and other DOD Components, to provide a balanced technology portfolio 

across the Department. Based on my current awareness of the DARPA research program and investment strategy, I do not see a need to make significant adjustments 

to the agency’s current strategy. 

Question. What do you believe are the key characteristics of an effective DARPA 

director? 

Answer. I believe an effective DARPA Director should have the ability to develop 

and communicate a vision of the DARPA research program, have the ability to attract exceptional technical talent to the agency, have the ability to motivate teams 

internal and outside the agency to take on challenges of national importance, be 

able to connect and bridge DARPA research to the operational and acquisition community, and be prepared to take on the most critical technical challenges that face 

the Department. 

Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relationship between DARPA and 

the Service S&T programs? 

Answer. I believe that the DARPA and the Military Department S&T programs 

should be coordinated, supportive, and complementary. DARPA is particularly focused on pushing the envelope to develop high-risk, high-payoff, leap-ahead advances, while the Military Department S&T programs draw upon and further develop these and other technological advancements to maintain the broad and deep 

technology base required to develop innovative capabilities for the warfighter. 

DARPA’s strategy allows the agency to pursue opportunistic thrusts to dramatically 

advance particular technical capabilities, while the Military Department S&T programs seek a more balanced risk portfolio. 

Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relationship between DARPA and 

the Service laboratories? 

Answer. I believe that the programs relationship between the Military Department laboratories and DARPA is one of being partners in developing technology solutions for the warfighter. 

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING AND MATHEMATICS (STEM) EDUCATION

Question. Do you believe that DOD specifically and the Nation as a whole is facing a crisis in STEM education? 

Answer. As the government’s largest employer of federal scientists and engineers, 

the Department has a large stake in identifying and attracting necessary STEM talent. This, in turn, means the Department depends on the Nation’s success in producing a capable, competitive talent pool in STEM fields. 

STEM education and maintenance of a vibrant STEM workforce are national security imperatives. Today’s military capabilities reflect the great reach and impact 

that scientists, engineers, and technologists have made on our national security and 

economy. DOD’s future STEM capacity, however, is at risk. In 2008, the percentage 

of engineering graduates among all university graduates in the United States remained among the lowest in the world, at 4.4 percent (by comparison, China was 

among the highest at 31 percent). The Department of Labor predicts that in the 

next decade, 80 percent of jobs will require STEM skills, yet according to the DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00806 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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partment of Education, less than 25 percent of college students pursuing bachelor’s 

degrees will be specializing in STEM fields. Excellence in is imperative to national 

security and the Nation’s economic well-being; however, as much of DOD’s workforce 

approaches retirement, DOD and industry will face a significant challenge in attracting superior STEM talent. 

Question. In your view, how will this affect DOD’s ability to pursue its missions? 

Answer. I believe that the health of the STEM talent pool directly affects DOD’s 

ability to pursue its mission and goals. The Department seeks to ensure continued 

success at recruiting STEM talent, enhancing STEM education, and providing opportunity to the children of military families, and assuring a STEM-capable workforce through strategic outreach 

Question. What role do you think DOD should play in supporting STEM education? 

Answer. I believe the Department should be actively engaged at all levels across 

the Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics education continuum—precollege through graduate—and, more importantly, work with the Office of Science 

and Technology Policy, the National Science Foundation, the Department of Education, and other Federal components involved in national security, to generate a 

‘‘whole of government’’ approach to address national security STEM workforce development. 

Question. How do DOD’s efforts fit in with the larger STEM education program 

consolidation initiative announced by the President? 

Answer. DOD efforts span a broad educational continuum, from elementary 

through graduate school and into workforce development. The Department’s STEM 

efforts align with the Administration’s larger STEM education program consolidation initiative in numerous ways. DOD collaborates with the lead Federal agencies— 

the Department of Education (pre-kindergarten through 12th grade STEM education), and the National Science Foundation (undergraduate through graduate 

STEM education). It also works with the Smithsonian Institution (informal STEM 

education) as well as with other Federal agencies on a regular basis through the 

Federal Interagency Working Groups (IWGs). For example, DOD contributed to the 

development of the Federal STEM Education 5–Year Strategic Plan and IWG charters, and it continues to provide significant input about its programs to joint agency 

efforts in support of enhancing evaluation and increasing the impact of the Federal 

investments in STEM education. DOD actively advises and assists with implementation of the Federal STEM Education 5–Year Strategic Plan. 

HEALTH OF R&D ENTERPRISE

Question. What is your assessment of the current health of the DOD’s R&D enterprise as a whole? 

In general, I believe the health of the DOD’s R&D enterprise is good, but there 

are signs of stress as a result of reduced DOD manpower and budget. DOD is seeing 

some indications that retention of younger employees is a potential concern. Another 

trend is a growing number of employees in the technical workforce nearing or at 

retirement age. Approximately half of the technical workforce will be eligible to retire in the next 10 years. The cumulative effect of downsizing, reduced opportunities 

for technical collaboration, and uncertainty about future funding stability may be 

having a negative impact on the overall health of the R&D enterprise by decreasing 

the Department’s reputation as an employer of choice. 

Question. Are rules currently in place to govern DOD R&D conducive to a healthy 

enterprise? 

Answer. I believe current statutory authorities, rules, and regulations have been 

sufficient for a healthy R&D enterprise, but the Department finds itself in competition for critical technical talent and is challenged by the flexibility of the current 

processes. 

Question. DOD has recently taken criticism for not devoting enough funding to 

constructing and upgrading facilities for R&D. If confirmed, how would you address 

that issue? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the effectiveness of existing authorities in addressing concerns over constructing and upgrading facilities for R&D. 

Question. How would you work to reduce the overall costs of the R&D enterprise, 

while still maintaining the integrity and quality of the Department’s R&D work? In 

which areas would you strive to build efficiency? 

Answer. I have not assessed the efficiency of the current R&D enterprise. Under 

the Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative, the Department is taking a holistic look at 

costs and overhead across the R&D enterprise, with the goal of improving performance and efficiency. If confirmed, I would strongly support this effort. 

802 

Question. How do you think continued budgets under sequestration will affect 

DOD science and technology funding? 

Answer. I believe the threat of sequestration significantly affects the Department’s ability to perform effective long-range S&T planning. To date, the Department has made a concerted effort to prioritize and protect S&T funding in its budget 

requests. If, however, the full effect of sequester were triggered in any year, I believe that there would be an immediate reduction to S&T budgets. 

DEFENSE INNOVATION INITIATIVE

Question. Former Secretary Hagel recently established a broad, Department-wide 

initiative to pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance the country’s military 

superiority and improve business operations. How has the Department integrated 

that initiative with Research and Engineering? 

Answer. One of the lines of effort under the Defense Innovation Initiative is focused on identifying emerging technology and material opportunities that offer opportunity to strengthen DOD capabilities in a competitive future national security 

environment. The effort, called the Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program (LRRDPP), was named in reference to the seminal 1973 study that 

identified many of the key military thrusts of the last 30 years. Since November 

2014, I have been leading the 2015 LRRDPP study, which has engaged technical 

experts across the Department’s research and engineering enterprise, as well as 

seeking separate input from academic, not-for-profit, and other private sector 

sources to identify emerging opportunities for future military innovation. The classified LRRDPP study, when fully completed early next year, should identify opportunities to accelerate and demonstrate new system concepts that can inform future 

materiel plans. This effort will also identify key research and engineering areas for 

assessment and prioritization in future research and engineering planning. 

Question. How would you further those efforts? 

Answer. While the current LRRDPP effort has been a valuable assessment of 

emerging technology and system opportunities, I believe the Department needs to 

establish a stronger capacity to conduct regular, periodic, independent assessments 

of broad emerging defense and non-defense technology opportunities, both to inform 

our DOD’s science and technology investment priorities and to ensure that the Department is continuously experimenting with new and emerging technologies that 

can inform and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of critical military capabilities. 

Question. How would you increase the effectiveness of the Long-Range Research 

and Development Program Plan (LRRDPP)? 

Answer. The initial LRRDPP effort focused largely on future weapon, air combat, 

maritime, and space capabilities to counter emerging peer and near-peer state actors. It did not include an assessment of technology-enabled future land combat. 

Earlier this year, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested an LRRDPP follow-on 

study, with the participation of key technology and operational experts from the 

U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Force communities, of 

emerging technical opportunities for future land combat. This effort is currently 

under way. 

TRUSTED FOUNDRY PROGRAM

Question. What is the status of the ‘‘Trusted Foundry’’ program for providing a 

secure source of microchips for sensitive defense systems? 

Answer. The Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) manages the DOD Trusted Foundry Program. This program provides the Department and other government 

agencies with access to trusted microelectronics design and manufacturing capabilities necessary to meet the confidentiality, integrity, availability, performance, and 

delivery needs of U.S. Government customers. DMEA accredits suppliers as ‘‘trusted’’ in the areas of integrated circuit design, aggregation, brokerage, mask manufacturing, foundry, post processing, packaging/assembly, and test services. These services cover a broad range of technologies and are intended to support both new and 

legacy applications; both classified and unclassified. There are currently 72 DMEAaccredited suppliers covering 153 services, including 22 suppliers that can provide 

full-service trusted foundry capabilities. 

Question. What is being done to respond to the recent announcement that IBM 

plans to sell its Foundry capabilities to a foreign controlled company based in the 

United Arab Emirates? 

Answer. In July 2015, Global Foundries purchased IBM’s U.S.-based Trusted. 

DOD, the IC, and the Department of Energy assessed how the loss of access to the 

Trusted Foundry’s specialized IBM technology, IP, and R&D knowledge would disVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00808 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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rupt their current and future national security programs. Based on this assessment, 

the DOD determined that continuity of supply of unique trusted products over the 

short- and mid-term is critical, and that a revised strategy is needed to ensure long 

term access to trusted state of the art microelectronics. 

For the short- and mid-term, DOD continues to work directly with GF to ensure 

appropriate accreditations can be in place for the successor company to serve as a 

DOD Trusted Supplier. For the long term, the DOD is taking a broad look toward 

future, state-of-the-art needs, projections for the commercial microelectronics marketplace, and technology solutions that may enable access to commercial fabrication 

facilities, to inform alternative approaches to ensuring access to trusted, state of the 

art microelectronics. 

Question. How might the Department mitigate the risks of losing that capability 

to a company with foreign ownership? 

Answer. The Department is studying long-term options and alternatives to the 

current Trusted Foundry approach. The DOD is taking a broad look toward future, 

state-of-the-art needs, projections for the commercial microelectronics marketplace, 

and technology solutions that may enable access to commercial fabrication facilities, 

to inform alternative approaches to ensuring access to trusted, state of the art 

microelectronics. The vision for these new approaches involves shifting the burden 

of hardware assurance from policies that restrict access to the commercial sector, 

to technologies and processes that enable cooperation. Options include improved 

hardware and software assurance tools for analyzing provenance and functionality, 

new technology capabilities to enable trust from untrusted sources, and continued 

maturation of the broader trusted supplier network that DMEA certifies. DOD and 

other federal agencies are contributing to these analyses, to identify sustainable approaches to securing the microelectronics supply chain of the future. 

Question. How does the Trusted Foundry program support a secure supply chain 

for field-programmable gate array (FPGA) chips? 

Answer. The current Trusted Foundry program does not address FPGA chips; it 

provides access to custom-manufactured application specific integrated circuits 

(ASICs). FPGAs are frequently a more affordable alternative to ASICs, but unlike 

ASICs, they are commercial-off-the-shelf items produced for a broad market of 

users. FPGAs have unique trust issues. They are globally designed and manufactured, and unlike ASICs there are currently no U.S.-based foundries supplying 

FPGAs for DOD use. 

It is DOD policy to employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain for 

components or subcomponent products such as FPGAs. The Department has issued 

guidance on supply chain risk management practices to address components such 

as FPGAs. If confirmed, I would support efforts to continue to mature these practices as we learn more about their effectiveness. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do 

you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and 

other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

804 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

OUR OWN ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL STRATEGY

1. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Welby, there is much concern about China’s ability to deploy cost-effective ‘‘anti-access/area denial’’ capabilities in the Pacific that could frustrate our ability to project power into that theater in the event of conflict. However, 

China must also ‘‘project power’’ across the South China Sea to secure the series 

of island chains that ring their mainland. This geography offers the United States 

and its allies in the region the ability to present China with an effective and affordable anti-access/area denial challenge. In other words, the very technology trends 

that we are expressing concern about could be harnessed to check China’s power 

projection capability. Could our own anti-access/area denial strategy help the U.S. 

and our allies help to contain China’s military in a conflict? 

Mr. WELBY. The combatant commander, U.S. Pacific Command, is responsible for 

developing the plans and strategies to conduct operations in the South China Sea 

and other areas of the Western Pacific. We work closely with the commander and 

his staff to identify the current and future capabilities PACOM will need, in order 

to guide our research and development efforts. ASD(R&E) is actively pursuing technologies that will improve existing PACOM capabilities and developing new technical capabilities that will allow U.S. and allied forces under U.S. PACOM command 

to maintain a credible deterrent and successfully execute PACOM plans. These efforts include technical efforts focused on addressing ‘‘anti-access/area denial’’ capabilities as well as efforts focused on creating asymmetric advantages for U.S. Forces. 

If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize these efforts. 

2. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Welby, have you considered this concept in the context 

of your ‘‘Third Offset Strategy’’? 

Mr. WELBY. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary are exploring the concept of a 

‘‘Third Offset Strategy’’ to address specific challenges we see in future conflicts due 

to the rapidly evolving global national security environment and the proliferation 

of advanced technical capabilities. Technology is one aspect of this discussion. In 

support of these efforts, ASD(R&E) has been evaluating technical approaches that 

can mitigate against the growing anti-access/area denial challenge and that can create asymmetric advantages for U.S. Forces in a future competitive environment. I 

consider these efforts critical to maintaining our warfighters technical edge in a future competitive technology environment. 

3. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Welby, what technologies would you want to develop to 

support this idea? 

Mr. WELBY. Working with the Services, the combatant commanders, and others, 

ASD(R&E) has identified and is pursuing a number of technologies that have the 

potential to deliver significant new or improved capabilities to the Joint Force in a 

range of militarily relevant domains including, but not limited to: Missile Defense, 

Air Warfare and strike, Maritime warfare, Land Warfare, Communications, and 

Surveillance. Many of these areas may also be able to take advantage of emerging 

concepts in electronic warfare, advanced computing (including applications of large 

data and deep learning), and advances in manned-unmanned teaming and systems. 

If confirmed, I would prioritize these efforts. 

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY TO SUPPORT COMBATANT COMMANDERS

4. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Welby, although the combatant commanders (such as 

PACOM) are the ones who actually execute military operations, it seems like many 

times their needs and requirements are subordinate to the needs and priorities of 

the Military Service bureaucracies. As a result research programs are not established that connect with their priorities and these needs go unmet. How will you 

work to ensure that the needs of PACOM and the other combatant commanders are 

adequately prioritized by the Services as they build their science and technology and 

research budgets and programs? 

Mr. WELBY. ASD(R&E) works to insure that the long term needs of combatant 

commanders shape the science and technology investments of the Department. 

ASD(R&E) maintains liaisons with all of the Combatant Commands. These liaisons 

also perform outreach to the Service Component Commanders in each command. If 

confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department’s research and engineering enterprise deepens its connections to the combatant commanders, including PACOM. 

5. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Welby, what programs would you strengthen to better 

connect research activities to the combatant commanders? 

805 

Mr. WELBY. If confirmed, I will work to promote active dialog and interaction between the combatant commanders and their subordinate Service Component Commanders with the R&D activities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

those in the Service Research & Development organizations. I particularly believe 

that our programs focused on Experimentation and Concept Prototyping offer an excellent opportunity for engagement—as these efforts provide an excellent opportunity to jointly explore the operational impacts of emerging technology and to accelerate emerging capabilities to the force. 

[The nomination reference of Mr. Stephen P. Welby follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

March 19, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Stephen P. Welby, of Maryland, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice 

Zachary J. Lemnios, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Stephen P. Welby, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF STEPHEN P. WELBY

Education: 

MS Computer Science, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, 1996 

MS Applied Mathematics, The Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD, 1991 

MS Business Administration, Texas A&M University, Texarkana, TX, 1988 

BS Chemical Engineering, The Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and 

Art, Manhattan NY, 1987 

Employment Record: 

• United States Department of Defense—Washington, DC 

• Deputy Assistant Secretary for Systems Engineering 

• September 2009–Present 

• Raytheon Missile Systems—Tucson, Arizona 

• Deputy Vice President, Advanced Missiles and Unmanned Systems 

• February 2009–September 2009 

• Self Employed, Independent Aerospace and Defense Consultant—Bethesda, 

Maryland 

• August 2008–February 2009 

• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency—Arlington, Virginia 

• Director and Deputy Director, Tactical Technology Office (2004-2008) 

• Acting Director and Deputy Director, Information Exploitation Office (2001- 

2004) 

• Program Manager, Information Systems and Special Projects Offices (1997- 

2001) 

• October 1997–August 2008 

• US Army Research Laboratory—Adelphi, MD 

• Project Engineer and Team Leader 

• 1988–1997 

• US Army School of Engineering and Logistics, Red River Army Depot—Texarkana, TX 

• Engineering Intern 

• 1987–1988 

Honors and Awards: 

• Full Undergraduate Academic Scholarship, The Cooper Union for Advancement 

of Science and Art 

• Secretary of Defense Award for Exceptional Public Service 

806 

• Secretary of Defense Exceptional Civilian Service Award 

• Department of the Army Achievement Medal for Civilian Service 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Mr. Stephen P. Welby in connection with his 

nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Stephen Patrick Welby 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 

3. Date of nomination: 

March 19, 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

3 February 1965, Manhattan, NY. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married, Spouse: Kimberly Jean Villa. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. 

MS Computer Science, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, 1996 

MS Applied Mathematics, The Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD, 1991 

MS Business Administration, Texas A&M University, Texarkana, TX, 1988 

BS Chemical Engineering, The Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and 

Art, Manhattan NY, 1987 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

2009–Present, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Systems Engineering, United States 

Department of Defense, Washington, DC 

807 

2009–2009, Deputy Vice President, Advanced Missiles and Unmanned Systems, 

Raytheon Missile Systems Tucson, Arizona 

2008–2009, Self Employed, Independent Aerospace and Defense Consultant, Bethesda, Maryland 

2004–2008 Director and Deputy Director, Tactical Technology Office Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Arlington, Virginia 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

2001–2004 Acting Director and Deputy Director, Information Exploitation Office 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Arlington, Virginia 

1997–2001 Program Manager, Information Systems and Special Projects offices 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Arlington, Virginia 

1988–1997 Project Engineer and Team Leader U.S. Army Research Laboratory, 

Adelphi, Maryland 

1987–1988 Engineering Intern U.S. Army School of Engineering and Logistics, 

Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

None 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

Senior Member, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 

Member, International Council on Systems Engineering 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Full Undergraduate Academic Scholarship, The Cooper Union for Advancement of 

Science and Art 

Secretary of Defense Award for Exceptional Public Service 

Secretary of Defense Exceptional Civilian Service Award 

Department of the Army Achievement Medal for Civilian Service 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

None 

16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

See attached for a copy of the latest three speeches given. 

Below table summarizes speeches or presentations done over the past five years. 

Speeches are highlighted in yellow. 

808 


15-88_Welby_14.eps 15-88_Welby_10.eps
809 


15-88_Welby_11.eps 15-88_Welby_12.eps
810 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

STEPHEN P. WELBY

This 7th day of April, 2015 

[The nomination of the Mr. Stephen P. Welby was reported to the 

Senate by Chairman McCain on December 7, 2015, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on December 14, 2015.] 


15-88_Welby_13.eps
811 

[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Alissa M. Starzak by 

Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. I believe that Goldwater-Nichols and other reforms significantly improved interservice and joint relationships within the Department of Defense. The 

principles that animated Goldwater-Nichols—including enhancing civilian control of 

the military, improving military advice to civilian leaders, strengthening the role of 

combatant commanders to allow them to accomplish the missions assigned to them, 

and encouraging joint officer management—continue to apply today. I understand 

that there is currently a desire to take a careful look at Goldwater-Nichols to assess 

whether any changes are necessary. Although at this time, I am unaware of any 

need to amend Goldwater-Nichols, I look forward to being involved in those discussions, if confirmed, and to recommend any changes I believe to be warranted 

through the established process. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. As noted above, I am not aware of any need to amend Goldwater-Nichols. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the General 

Counsel of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. The duties and functions of the General Counsel of the Army are determined and assigned by the Secretary of the Army. The General Counsel provides 

legal advice to the Secretary of the Army, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, and other offices within the Army Secretariat and serves as the chief legal 

officer of the Department of the Army responsible for determining the controlling 

legal positions of the Department. I understand that the General Counsel’s responsibilities extend to any matter of law and to other matters as directed by the Secretary, to include overseeing matters in which the Army is involved in litigation, 

taking final action on certain claims filed against the Army, providing professional 

guidance to the Army’s legal community, and establishing and administering the 

Army’s policies concerning legal services. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. Because of the broad nature of the duties and responsibilities of the office, the Army General Counsel must not only have good judgment and legal skills, 

but also the ability to build strong relationships and work collaboratively with individuals in the Army, across the Executive branch, and in the Congress. I believe 

my experience, both inside and outside the Department of Defense, has prepared me 

for this role. 

After receiving a Bachelor of Arts degree, magna cum laude, from Amherst College, I attended the University of Chicago Law School, where I was an editor on 

the Law Review and graduated with honors. After graduation, I served as a law 

clerk to the Honorable E. Grady Jolly, on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit in Jackson, Mississippi. I subsequently moved to Washington, DC, to practice law at the law firm of O’Melveny and Myers, where I focused on compliance, 

corporate investigations and white collar defense. In 2005, I joined the Office of 

General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency, before becoming a counsel on 

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2007. I currently serve as a Deputy 

General Counsel in the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel, working 

on a variety of legal issues related to Congress, including issues directly related to 

the Army. I believe that this legal and practical experience—in three branches of 

812 

government—will serve me well in addressing the wide range of issues that will face 

the Department of the Army. 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. I am confident that I have the necessary legal and professional experience, analytic skills, and leadership abilities to be the General Counsel of the Department of the Army. If I am confirmed, I will establish and maintain close and 

professionally cooperative relationships with the talented and dedicated attorneys in 

the Office of the General Counsel, with The Office of The Judge Advocate General 

of the Army, and with other offices dealing with matters of mutual interest in order 

to provide the best possible legal services to all members of the Department of the 

Army. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect 

that the Secretary of the Army would prescribe for you? 

Answer. If I am confirmed, I will be ready to execute the responsibilities of the 

General Counsel set forth in the General Order prescribing the duties of each principal officer of Headquarters, Department of the Army. In addition to these duties, 

I anticipate that the Secretary of the Army will expect me to manage the Office of 

General Counsel efficiently and effectively, ensuring that it provides accurate and 

timely legal advice. I also anticipate that the Secretary will expect me to work collaboratively with The Judge Advocate General, the General Counsels of the Department of Defense, the other Military Departments, and the Defense Agencies, and 

the legal staff of other federal agencies. 

Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense? 

Answer. While the General Counsels of the Army, Navy and Air Force serve as 

the chief legal officers of their respective departments, the General Counsel of the 

Department of Defense is the chief legal officer and final legal authority for the entire Department of Defense. If confirmed, I intend to continue the close professional 

relationship I have with Mr. Robert Taylor, the Acting General Counsel of the Department of Defense, by meeting regularly and collaboratively working in furtherance of the best interests of the Department of Defense. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the General Counsel of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. The General Counsel of the Department of the Army must provide accurate and timely legal advice on the full spectrum of matters that arise in the Army. 

In a time of shrinking budgets, the General Counsel will be confronted with significant legal matters related to balancing and transitioning the Army. In addition, I 

expect that the General Counsel will confront significant challenges related to the 

prevention of, and response to, sexual assault, military and civilian personnel policies, acquisition, and compliance with environmental law. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to prioritize legal issues consistent with the Secretary of the Army’s priorities, and to work closely with the Secretary, the Chief of 

Staff, The Judge Advocate General, and the attorneys in the Office of the General 

Counsel to provide timely, accurate, and candid legal advice. If confirmed, I will also 

ensure that the Office of the General Counsel is appropriately resourced and staffed 

to address those priorities. 

Question. What do you see as the most significant legal issues the Army will face 

in the coming year? 

Answer. In an environment of declining resources, the Army is facing difficult policy choices and a period of significant transition. Those efforts to rebalance and reform the Army will invariably involve significant legal questions. Although it is difficult to predict exactly what other significant legal issues will arise in the coming 

year, if confirmed, I will work closely with the talented team of attorneys and judge 

advocates in the Office of the General Counsel to address those issues. 

Question. Does the Army Office of the General Counsel have the resources to deal 

with these problems? 

Answer. At this time, I believe the Office of the General Counsel has the resources needed to address the many difficult legal issues confronting the Army 

today. If I am confirmed, I will be in a better position to evaluate this important 

management and leadership issue. 

Question. What broad priorities will you establish in terms of issues which must 

be addressed by the Office of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army? 

813 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to carefully examine the structure and functioning 

of the Office of General Counsel to ensure that it continues to appropriately address 

the needs of the Army as changes are made to the Army’s operating framework. To 

provide high-quality, timely legal advice, the Army legal community must be integrated into the broader Army community and involved at all stages of the decisionmaking process. If confirmed, I also intend to carefully review programs for attorney 

recruitment and retention to ensure that the Office has the skills and capacity to 

address the challenges of the future. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What is your understanding of the formal and informal relationship between the General Counsel of the Army and the following offices? 

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense. 

Answer. I understand that the Acting General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Mr. Robert Taylor, has worked closely with the General Counsels of the Military Departments. If confirmed, I intend to continue the professional relationship 

I have with Mr. Taylor, which will include routine consultation, communication, and 

cooperation on matters of mutual interest, furthering the best interests of the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense. 

Question. The Secretary of the Army. 

Answer. As the head of the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the Army 

is responsible for all affairs of the Department. If confirmed, my primary responsibility will be to provide the Secretary with clear, concise, and correct legal advice 

and counsel, and to perform the duties and functions he has assigned. In order to 

execute these responsibilities to the highest standard, I intend to establish a strong 

relationship with the Secretary of the Army that will enhance my ability to communicate with him directly and candidly on all matters. 

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army is the senior military officer of the Department of the Army and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of Staff is 

directly responsible to the Secretary of the Army on all matters except those related 

to his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely 

with The Judge Advocate General to continue the excellent relationship between the 

Army General Counsel, the Chief of Staff, and the Army Staff. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army. 

Answer. I understand that the five Assistant Secretaries of the Army perform the 

duties and responsibilities assigned to them in statute and prescribed by the Secretary of the Army. In broad terms, the Assistant Secretaries formulate and oversee 

policies and programs within their functional areas. As the chief legal officer of the 

Department of the Army, the General Counsel is responsible for providing legal advice, counsel, and guidance to the Assistant Secretaries and their staffs. If confirmed, I will seek to establish strong, productive relationships with each of the Assistant Secretaries and ensure that the Office of the General Counsel continues to 

provide timely and correct legal advice to their respective staffs. 

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army. 

Answer. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, I understand The Judge 

Advocate General serves as military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and 

the primary legal advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army, members of the Army 

Staff, and members of the Army generally. Additionally, I recognize that The Judge 

Advocate General has the primary responsibility for providing legal advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the administration 

of military discipline. A close, professional relationship between the civilian and uniformed members of the Army’s legal community is critical. If confirmed, I will work 

collaboratively with The Judge Advocate General to provide the best possible legal 

support to the Army. 

Question. The Inspector General of the Department of Defense. 

Answer. The Inspector General of the Department of Defense is responsible for 

advising the Secretary of Defense on criminal investigative matters and all other 

matters relating to the prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse within 

the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will work with the Inspector General of 

the Department of Defense on matters related to the Department of the Army to 

ensure that Army interests are fully and fairly represented and to ensure Army actions taken as a result of Department of Defense Inspector General recommendations are executed in compliance with applicable law, directives, and regulations. 

Question. The Inspector General of the Army. 

Answer. The Inspector General of the Army reports directly to the Secretary of 

the Army regarding the discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army, and on 

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other matters specifically assigned by the Secretary. If confirmed, I anticipate maintaining a close and professional relationship with The Inspector General to ensure 

that he and his staff have the legal advice and support they require for mission success. 

Question. The General Counsels of the other military departments. 

Answer. Like the General Counsel of the Army, the General Counsels of the other 

Military Departments serve and act under the authority, direction, and control of 

the Secretaries of their respective Departments. If confirmed, I would expect to work 

closely with them on matters of mutual interest. I know that the Acting General 

Counsel of the Department of Defense, Mr. Taylor, facilitates this effort in order to 

best use the legal services across the Department of Defense. I look forward to participating in this effort. 

Question. The Attorney General and the Department of Justice. 

Answer. The Attorney General is the chief legal officer of the Executive Branch 

and may issue controlling guidance on certain legal issues. I also know the Attorney 

General and the Department of Justice represent the Department of the Army in 

litigation before Federal district courts and State courts. I view a strong relationship 

between the Army and the Department of Justice to be critical to success, and if 

confirmed, I will work in conjunction with The Judge Advocate General and the 

General Counsel of the Department of Defense to ensure the continuation of the 

Army’s current cooperative relationship with the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. 

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL. 

Question. In carrying out your duties if you are confirmed, how will you work with 

the Judge Advocate General of the Army? 

Answer. It is essential that the Army General Counsel maintain a close and cooperative relationship with The Judge Advocate General. A productive and positive relationship sets the tone and the direction for the effective delivery of legal services 

to the Army at all echelons. I know The Judge Advocate General shares this view, 

and if confirmed, we will work together to ensure the Offices of the General Counsel 

and The Judge Advocate General work closely together in the spirit of teamwork 

to deliver the best possible legal services to the members of the Army. 

Question. How are the legal responsibilities of the Department of the Army allocated between the General Counsel and the Judge Advocate General? 

Answer. The Army General Counsel serves as the chief legal officer for the Department of the Army. As a component of the Army Secretariat, the Office of the 

Army General Counsel is charged to provide advice to the Secretary of the Army 

and other Secretariat officials on any subject of law and on other matters as directed by the Secretary of the Army. The Army General Counsel is authorized to 

provide the controlling legal opinion in any matter for the Army. The Judge Advocate General is the chief legal advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army, members 

of the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In coordination with the 

Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as the military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army. The law prohibits interference with the ability 

of The Judge Advocate General to provide independent legal advice to the Secretary 

of the Army, which I fully support. The Judge Advocate General provides supervision over the delivery of a wide-range of legal services across the Army. The Judge 

Advocate General also has primary responsibility for providing legal advice and 

services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the administration of 

military discipline. The Offices of the Army General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General have a well-developed and supportive working relationship in their respective responsibilities. If confirmed, I will work to continue this productive partnership for the benefit of the Army. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that legal opinions of your office 

will be available to Army attorneys, including judge advocates? 

Answer. I understand the respective offices of the General Counsel and The Office 

of The Judge Advocate General have a longstanding routine and cooperative working arrangement. Open lines of communication and collaboration are essential to ensure legal views and opinions issued by the Office of the Army General Counsel and 

the Office of The Judge Advocate General are readily available to all Army attorneys, both civilian attorneys and judge advocates. If confirmed, I will support this 

relationship in a positive manner. 

Question. In response to attempts within the Department of Defense to subordinate legal functions and authorities of the Judge Advocates General to the General 

Counsels of the Department of Defense and the military services, Congress enacted 

legislation prohibiting any officer or employee of the Department of Defense from 

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interfering with the ability of the Judge Advocates General of the military services 

and the legal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide independent legal advice to the Chairman, service secretaries, and Service Chiefs. 

What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocate General of the Army to 

have the authority to provide independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Army 

and the Chief of Staff of the Army? 

Answer. I believe it is essential that the expertise of The Judge Advocate General 

be available to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army. I fully 

support the law, in both principle and in spirit, empowering The Judge Advocate 

General of the Army to provide independent legal advice honed by years of experience and informed judgment on military affairs to the Secretary of the Army and 

the Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Question. What is your view of the responsibility of Army judge advocates to provide independent legal advice to military commanders? 

Answer. Army commanders are charged with the responsibility to maintain discipline and to ensure the lawful conduct of the forces under their control, in addition 

to the proper functioning of their unit or organization. Army Judge Advocates at all 

levels provide valuable aid to commanders and leaders to maintain discipline and 

to help avoid a myriad of legal pitfalls in the day-to-day business of command. A 

Judge Advocate’s ability to provide candid legal advice to a commander and staff, 

both openly and in confidence as needed, is absolutely critical. Army commanders 

need and deserve the best legal advice and judgment available. This is best achieved 

when Judge Advocates are empowered to provide commanders with independent 

legal advice, supported by appropriate guidance from supervising attorneys. 

Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to the current relationships between the uniformed judge advocates and the Army General Counsel? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will always look for opportunities to improve and to 

strengthen the relationships between the uniformed judge advocates and the staff 

of the Office of the General Counsel. At this time, I am not aware of any need for 

change, and my understanding is that the current relationship works well. 

Question. Are legal opinions of the Office of the Army General Counsel binding 

on all Army lawyers? 

Answer. Because the Army General Counsel is the chief legal officer for the Department of the Army as directed by the Secretary of the Army, legal opinions 

issued by the Office of the Army General Counsel are controlling throughout the Department of the Army. As a general matter, however, I understand that opinions 

are typically drafted in collaboration with The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I would ensure that significant legal opinions are informed by the expertise 

of both civilian attorneys and judge advocates. 

Question. How will you ensure that such legal opinions are available to Army lawyers? 

Answer. Written opinions of the Office of the General Counsel for the Department 

of the Army are distributed in the ordinary course of business, using normal departmental distribution processes. If confirmed, I expect to continue this practice. 

Question. If confirmed, are there specific categories of Army Counsel legal opinions that you expect to reconsider and possibly revise? If so, what categories? 

Answer. I am not aware of any specific categories of Army General Counsel legal 

opinions in need of reconsideration or revision. If confirmed, however, as the need 

arises, I would review opinions warranting revision consistent with contemporary 

law in consultation with the appropriate attorneys and subject matter experts within the Army and elsewhere as appropriate. 

Question. Article 6 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice gives primary jurisdiction over military justice to the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and 

Air Force. 

How do you view the responsibilities of the Army General Counsel in the performance of military justice matters with regard to the Judge Advocate General of the 

Army? 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General’s responsibilities to ensure the proper administration of the military justice system require direct and independent advice to 

the Secretary of the Army. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting The Judge Advocate General on military justice matters with consultation, advice, and assistance, 

as needed. 

ATTORNEY RECRUITING AND RETENTION ISSUES

Question. If confirmed, how do you assess your ability to hire and retain top quality attorneys and provide sufficient opportunity for advancement? 

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Answer. I believe my background and experience have prepared me to meet the 

challenges of recruiting and retaining top quality attorneys and providing meaningful and rewarding opportunities for those attorneys to advance. Nevertheless, I believe the Army will face significant challenges in the coming years as we compete 

with the private sector and other federal employers for quality attorneys, while 

shrinking resources will force us to demand more from the highly qualified attorneys we already have. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Army allocates sufficient resources to attract and select only the best qualified candidates for military 

and civilian attorney positions. In doing so, I will work closely with the Office of 

The Judge Advocate General to retain the best attorneys to provide first-rate legal 

services to the Army, its commanders, soldiers, and family members. 

Question. In your view, does the Department of the Army have a sufficient number of civilian and military attorneys to perform its missions? 

Answer. My understanding is the Army General Counsel has a sufficient number 

of civilian attorneys to perform its mission, and the Judge Advocate General’s Corps 

(JAG) has enough military and civilian attorneys to meet its current requirements. 

To address emerging requirements, however, including special victim capabilities 

(required by the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act) and special victim 

counsel (required by the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act), the Army 

JAG Corps is planning to grow. Recognizing that as the Army draws down, legal 

support requirements may increase, I will closely monitor these emerging requirements and ensure they are resourced appropriately. 

Question. In your view, what incentives to successful recruiting and retention of 

attorneys, if any, need to be implemented or established? 

Answer. I understand the legal market is projected to become increasingly competitive over the next several years, with fewer students graduating from law school 

and a likely increase in hiring by private sector law firms. In my view, it is crucial 

that the Army renew our commitment to funding current incentive programs, like 

student loan repayment and career retention bonuses, notwithstanding the current 

fiscal challenges. These programs are needed to attract and retain the highest quality attorneys. 

DETAINEE ISSUES

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in addressing legal issues 

regarding detainees? 

Answer. Although issues relating to the treatment of detainees most often arise 

in combatant commands, there are many Army judge advocates serving in those 

combatant commands, and the General Counsel of the Army may in some circumstances have an appropriate role in assisting those judge advocates with legal 

issues regarding detainees. 

Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the 

United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be 

subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 

In your view, is the section 1403 prohibition in the best interest of the United 

States? Why or why not? 

Answer. Yes, I believe this prohibition is in the best interest of the United States 

and is fully consistent with protecting our national security. 

Question. Do you believe that the phrase ‘‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 

or punishment’’ has been adequately and appropriately defined for the purpose of 

this provision? 

Answer. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act 

of 2009 define ‘‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment’’ as the cruel, 

unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. I think this definition provides a clear standard for ensuring that detainees in the custody of the U.S. Government are treated in a humane manner. 

Question. What role do you believe the General Counsel of the Army should play 

in the interpretation of this standard? 

Answer. The General Counsel should play an independent role in advising the 

Secretary of the Army and those who fall under his command on the standards governing the treatment of persons detained by the U.S. Army, including any interpretation of this legal standard. 

Question. What role do you believe the Judge Advocate General of the Army 

should play in the interpretation of this standard? 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Army should be intimately involved 

in the interpretation of legal standards governing the treatment of detainees and 

817 

should provide independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Army. The Judge 

Advocate General and the lawyers she leads—many of whom have served multiple 

deployments—bring experience and an important perspective to these and many 

other operational matters. If confirmed, and if called on to offer any guidance on 

this standard, I would expect to work collaboratively with The Judge Advocate General to provide clear advice to the field. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, 

dated September 5, 2006? 

Answer. Yes, I support the requirements in revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and DOD Directive 2310.01E, reissued on August 14, 2014, that all detainees and detained personnel be treated humanely and with respect for their dignity. 

Question. Section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by the Military 

Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of common article 3 of the Geneva 

Conventions, including torture and cruel and inhuman treatment. 

In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a manner that provides appropriate protection from abusive treatment to U.S. detainees in foreign custody and 

to foreign detainees in U.S. custody? 

Answer. I believe section 2441 provides an appropriate standard for protecting 

both U.S. detainees in foreign custody and foreign detainees held in our custody. 

Question. Section 812 of title 10, United States Code states: ‘‘No member of the 

armed forces may be placed in confinement in immediate association with enemy 

prisoners or foreign nationals not members of the armed forces.’’ 

Consistent with the statute, what recommendations would you provide the Secretary of the Army, if confirmed regarding the possible holding of foreign detainees 

at DOD Regional Corrections Facilities and Disciplinary Barracks? 

Answer. In the event that the Secretary of the Army sought my advice on such 

a matter, I would ensure that my advice was consistent with applicable law, including section 812. 

Question. What types of modifications would be needed at military detention facilities to ensure they are compliant with domestic and international law as well as 

meeting the special security considerations necessary for the safe detention of foreign law of war detainees? 

Answer. At this time, I am not familiar with what modifications, if any, would 

be needed to ensure that a military detention facility complies with domestic and 

international law. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you have for addressing the 

safety and security of the general public living near these facilities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would defer to law enforcement experts about what measures would be necessary to ensure the safety and security of the general public living near these facilities, and would work closely with them to ensure that safety 

issues are appropriately and lawfully addressed. 

Question. In November 2012, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

published a report titled: Guantanamo Bay Detainees: Facilities and Factors for 

Consideration if Detainees Were Brought to the United States. That reported noted 

that only one DOD facility, the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, currently holds ‘‘inmates with sentences exceeding 5 years as well as inmates sentenced to death.’’ The report also stated: ‘‘in order to conform with international law and DOD policies . . . ’’ detainees are to be ‘‘protected from public curiosity (for example, pictures of detainees’ faces are not disseminated publicly).’’ 

In your view, what steps would need to be taken in the handling of law of war 

detainees in order to comply with international law and DOD regulations, including 

the ‘‘public view’’ prohibition raised by GAO? 

Answer. The Department of Defense takes seriously its obligation to comply with 

the Geneva Conventions and other legal requirements relating to the treatment of 

detainees, including the requirement not to hold detainees out for public curiosity. 

If confirmed, I would ensure any advice I provide regarding law of war detention 

is consistent with those requirements. 

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Question. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was enacted in 

2000 to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. courts to persons employed by 

or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States. 

818 

In your view, does MEJA provide appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas of combat operations? 

Answer. I believe that the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 

(MEJA) does provide appropriate criminal jurisdiction over contractor employees in 

areas of combat operations. Although these types of prosecutions are rare, MEJA 

is an effective tool to hold contractors and Department of Defense civilian employees 

accountable for serious criminal acts. All people supporting our Armed Forces, regardless of their location, should be held accountable for their actions, and MEJA 

can be an effective means of achieving that end. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to MEJA? 

Answer. My understanding is that MEJA is sufficient in its current form. 

Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in developing Administration recommendations for changes to MEJA? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to be actively involved in any effort to develop Administration recommendations for changes to MEJA. Because MEJA applies to civilian personnel working across the Department of Defense and its contractors, I 

would certainly work with officials in other agencies and military departments on 

any recommended changes to MEJA. 

Question. Section 552 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2007 extended criminal jurisdiction of the military courts under the Uniform Code 

of Military Justice to persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the 

field during time of declared war or a contingency operation, such as our current 

operations in Afghanistan. 

In your view, does the UCMJ provide appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal 

actions of contractor employees in Afghanistan and other areas of combat operations? 

Answer. Yes. The UCMJ provides appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Afghanistan and other areas of combat operations. 

Civilians serving with or accompanying our Armed Forces overseas who commit 

crimes should be held appropriately accountable. While it is difficult to prepare for 

every scenario that may arise in a deployed environment, article 2 of the UCMJ provides a means to address the misconduct of civilians accompanying the force in 

areas of combat operations. 

Question. What is your view of the procedures agreed upon by the Department 

of Defense and the Department of Justice to reconcile jurisdictional responsibilities 

under MEJA and the UCMJ? 

Answer. If confirmed, I am prepared to examine, from an Army perspective, the 

relationship between the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense and 

to give thought to whether it reflects the appropriate balance. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the UCMJ to ensure appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of contractor employees? 

Answer. I have no recommendations for any such changes to the UCMJ at this 

time. If confirmed, and if after further review I perceive a need, I will recommend 

any changes I believe to be warranted. 

IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL EXTREMIST VIEWS

Question. In your view, do current Army policies limit the ability to include information about extremist views in official records that may assist in the identification 

of potential threats? 

Answer. No. To my knowledge, current Army policy does not limit the ability to 

include this type of information in official records. The Army maintains several 

types of records that may help identify individuals whose extremist views could pose 

a threat. These official records include, but are not limited to, records managed by 

several U.S. Army commands, such as the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, 

the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, and the U.S. Army Intelligence 

and Security Command. 

Question. Do current Army procedures hinder the ability to share this type of information with other official agencies charged with identifying and monitoring potential extremist or terrorist activities? 

Answer. My understanding is that Army procedures do not prohibit sharing this 

type of information with other official agencies where appropriate. Documents collected in official records are available to individuals or organizations that have a 

‘‘need to know,’’ which includes appropriate law enforcement agencies. 

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dividual privacy and respect for the right of soldiers to hold and express personal 

beliefs? 

Answer. Commanders are responsible for building healthy and positive social climates based on dignity and respect for treatment of one another, and maintaining 

good order and discipline. As such, the Army emphasizes the exercise of calm and 

prudent judgment to achieve the proper balance between security and the need to 

preserve a soldier’s right of expression. I understand that the Army gives commanders discretion and latitude to balance the mission of safeguarding the security 

of the United States while preserving the constitutional right of expression. 

Question. Do you see a need for a change in this balance? 

Answer. I do not currently see a need for change, but I am prepared to examine 

this issue if confirmed. 

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. In your view, do Department of Defense policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion 

and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on 

those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief? 

Answer. I believe the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense’s 

policies support the goals of religious tolerance and mutual respect. If confirmed, in 

this area as well as other areas, I would ensure all Army policies uphold the Constitutional tenets of the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of the First 

Amendment. 

Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers 

offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the 

proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her 

religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs? 

Answer. I have been advised that under current Army policy, when participating 

in mandatory official events, chaplains are not compelled to offer prayers that are 

inconsistent with their personal beliefs or faith, but they are expected to remain 

sensitive to the pluralistic Army and society they serve. Given the diversity of religious views in the Army, this policy appears to strike the proper balance. 

Question. Section 533 of the FY13 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112– 

239), as amended by section 532 of the FY14 National Defense Authorization Act 

(P.L. 113–66) protects rights of conscience of members of the armed forces and chaplains and prohibits, so far as possible, use of such beliefs as the basis of any adverse 

personnel action, discrimination, or denial of promotion, schooling, training, or assignment. Members of some religious denominations have sincerely held beliefs in 

opposition to same-sex marriage. 

In your view, may a member of the armed forces who has a sincerely held belief 

in opposition to same-sex marriage be subject to adverse personnel action or similar 

other adverse action, if he or she shares those personal views on the subject in a 

personal capacity? 

Answer. If soldiers wish to express their personal views about this issue in an 

open forum and caveat those as such, it is within their right to do so, and they will 

not be subject to adverse personnel action or similar other adverse action for expressing those views. This is a fundamental right, and if confirmed, I will ensure 

that all Army policies protect this and similar rights. 

ROLE IN THE OFFICER PROMOTION AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General Counsel of the 

Department of the Army in ensuring the integrity and proper functioning of the officer promotion process? 

Answer. I understand the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the proper 

functioning of the Department of the Army’s promotion selection process. The Army 

General Counsel is responsible for ensuring that the conduct of the board process 

conforms to all legal requirements; this includes reviewing all Memoranda of Instruction and selection board reports to ensure they comport with statutory standards. The Office of the Army General Counsel works closely with the Office of The 

Judge Advocate General to advise the Secretary of the Army of any case in which 

a selection board report or selection board process fails to adhere to the statutory 

standards and to provide counsel on appropriate corrective action. 

Question. Do you see a need for change in this role? 

Answer. I have been advised that the current process is working well; however, 

if I am confirmed and determine that a change is necessary and proper, I would 

work closely with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve AfVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00825 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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fairs), The Judge Advocate General, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1, to effect 

such change. Proper execution of this process is essential to maintaining the trust 

of the Army Officer Corps, the Congress, and the American people. 

GENERAL OFFICER NOMINATIONS

Question. Under DOD Instruction 1320.4, adverse and alleged adverse information pertaining to general and flag officers must be evaluated by senior leaders in 

the Services and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense prior to nomination for 

promotion and certain assignments. 

If confirmed, what role, if any, would you play in the officer promotion system, 

particularly in reviewing general officer nominations? 

Answer. I have been informed that for all Army officer promotions, including general officer promotions, the Office of the Army General Counsel, in coordination with 

The Office of The Judge Advocate General, plays an active role in the officer promotion system, to include reviewing Memoranda of Instruction that govern the conduct of promotion selection boards and subsequent promotion selection board reports. 

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General Counsel of the 

Department of the Army in ensuring the legal sufficiency of statutory selection 

board processes? 

Answer. I understand the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the proper 

functioning of the Department of the Army’s promotion selection process. Prior to 

approval by the Secretary of the Army, all Memoranda of Instruction for officer promotion selection boards are reviewed by the Office of the Army General Counsel, 

in coordination with the Office of The Judge Advocate General, to ensure the Secretary’s instructions conform to statutes and accurately reflect his guidance regarding attributes necessary for service in the next grade. All reports of promotion selection boards are processed through the Office of the Army General Counsel prior to 

final action on the report by the Secretary. The Army General Counsel must be satisfied that the Army has met applicable statutory standards and that individual selection board reports conform to the law. The Army General Counsel must advise 

the Secretary of the Army of any case in which a selection board report fails to adhere to the statutory standards, either generally or with regard to a particular officer being considered for promotion. In advising the Secretary of the Army and the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), the 

Army General Counsel helps to ensure that Army promotion policies properly implement applicable laws and regulations and are fairly applied. 

Question. What is the role, if any, of the General Counsel of the Department of 

the Army in reviewing and providing potentially adverse information pertaining to 

a nomination to the Senate Armed Services Committee? 

Answer. It is my understanding that under current Department of the Army practice, regarding General Officer nominations, the Office of the Army General Counsel 

reviews each selection board report, as well as departmental communications to the 

Committee, the President, and the Secretary of Defense, to ensure that the reports 

and communications comply in form and substance with law and applicable directives and regulation. The Office of the Army General Counsel gives special attention 

to cases of nominees with substantiated or potentially adverse information and 

cases with reportable information in order to ensure that such information is reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee in a timely, accurate, and comprehensible manner. 

MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY AND CASES

Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the General Counsel and civilian 

attorneys assigned to the Office of General Counsel play in military personnel policy 

and individual cases, including cases before the Board for Correction of Military 

Records? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army, the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and other senior leaders to 

ensure that the Army properly develops and fairly applies military personnel policies. If I am confirmed and become aware that the Department did not fairly and 

lawfully apply military personnel policies, I will take appropriate action to ensure 

that the Army properly resolves the issue. I understand and fully respect the independent role that the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) 

plays in the correction of military records, and if confirmed, I will coordinate with 

the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), who exercises 

overall responsibility for the Army Review Boards Agency regarding the legal sufficiency of ABCMR recommendations to the Secretary of the Army. 

821 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Fiscal Year 2013 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual 

Assault in the Military reflects that reports of sexual assaults in the Army increased 

by 51% from fiscal year 2012 to 2,149 reports of sexual assault in fiscal year 2013. 

What is your assessment of this report? 

Answer. Although the Department of Defense did not conduct a study of the prevalence of sexual assault in fiscal year 2013, I understand there are indications that 

the increase in reporting in fiscal year 2013 reflects an increased willingness of victims to come forward rather than an increase in the number of sexual assaults. 

Nevertheless, there is still more to do to prevent and punish the crime of sexual 

assault. If confirmed, I intend to provide my full support in helping the Army 

achieve this goal. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s sexual assault prevention and 

response program? 

Answer. I understand that the Army has taken substantial steps to addressing 

the issue of sexual assault. Through the combined efforts of military and civilian 

leaders at all echelons, I am informed that the Army has implemented an unprecedented number of program and policy initiatives to address this insider threat. 

I support the Army’s commitment to a holistic approach to change culture, prevent sexual assault and harassment in the ranks, support and advocate for victims, 

and hold offenders appropriately accountable. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. I am informed that since implementing the restricted reporting option 

(which does not initiate a law enforcement investigation) in 2005, the number of 

total reports has continued to increase. The restricted reporting option gives victims 

time to understand the process, seek the counseling and care they need, and to consult with an attorney if they wish. I understand the conversion of restricted reports 

to unrestricted continues to increase, which I believe is an indication that victims 

are gaining more trust in the system. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to work to improve upon its response system and to enhance victim support. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to the victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. I believe the chain of command has an important role to play in providing compassionate care and necessary support to victims of sexual assault. As a 

general matter, the commander—as well as the commander’s subordinate commanders and staff members—has a responsibility to care for soldiers in the commander’s charge. I understand that the Army is working hard to foster a climate 

in which victims trust their chain of command to support them if and when sexual 

offenses occur. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Army resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help 

they need? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Army is dedicated to providing soldiers, civilians and eligible family members who are the victims of sexual assault with extensive medical, psychological, and legal support services. I am aware that sexual 

assault victims are offered the services of a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator 

(SARC) and a Victim Advocate (VA). When a victim of sexual assault comes to any 

Military Treatment Facility in the Army, his or her medical needs are managed by 

a Sexual Assault Clinical Provider and his or her behavioral health care is provided 

by the Sexual Assault Behavioral Health Provider. Victims of sexual assault are 

also entitled to the services of a Special Victim Counsel. The Army Special Victim 

Counsel program is staffed, resourced, and supported by the Department of the 

Army; the Army JAG Corps is currently growing to meet emerging requirements. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to prevent additional 

sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

Answer. I understand that both the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff 

of the Army have made the prevention of sexual assault a top priority and are providing resources consistent with that prioritization. As a result, leaders at every 

echelon and in every location must be committed to preventing sexual assaults and 

caring for victims, and the Army is working diligently to ensure that all soldiers 

share these commitments. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the 

Army has in place to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. I understand that the Army has invested substantial resources and training toward the investigation and response to allegations of sexual assault. As stated 

above, the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff have made the prevention of 

822 

sexual assault a top priority and are providing resources consistent with that 

prioritization. 

Question. What is your view on the value of the Army’s Special Victims Counsel 

Program? Has this program had an impact on the reporting and prosecution of allegations of sexual assault in the Army? If so, what is that impact? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Special Victim Counsel Program has been 

successful for both victims and commanders. The feedback from victims is that this 

program is an invaluable resource as they navigate the administrative, medical and 

justice systems within the Army. Commanders indicate that they can now act with 

confidence that they understand the victim’s position and preferences. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. I believe that commanders can drive change in culture. Commanders are 

responsible for everything their command does or fails to do, which includes training 

soldiers on how to prevent sexual assault and holding all leaders accountable for 

creating a culture that does not tolerate sexual assault. As part of these responsibilities, commanders are responsible for fostering respect within their units, creating 

a climate in which sexual assaults and sexual harassment are not tolerated, holding 

offenders accountable, and cultivating an environment in which victims feel comfortable reporting all forms of misconduct. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. I think it is difficult to fully assess the potential impact of such a significant change to the military justice system. Requiring a judge advocate outside the 

chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be 

prosecuted would, in effect, create a separate justice system for sexual assault cases, 

with uncertain consequences. The Army must encourage a climate in which victims 

feel comfortable in reporting misconduct, perpetrators of sexual assault are held accountable for the crimes they commit, and all soldiers believe the system to be fair 

and transparent. I believe that both commanders and judge advocates have important roles to play in all components of that effort. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will be an ardent supporter of the Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program and will work with the Secretary 

of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Manpower & Reserve Affairs), and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1 to ensure that 

eliminating sexual assault remains a top priority throughout the Army. 

ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. In January 2013, Secretary of Defense Panetta rescinded the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, excluding women from assignment to units and positions whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat 

on the ground. The Military Departments are required to develop detailed plans for 

implementation of this directive and to complete integration of women into newly 

opened positions and units as expeditiously as possible, considering good order and 

judicious use of fiscal resources, but no later than January 1, 2016. Any recommendation to keep an occupational specialty or unit closed to women must be 

personally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Secretary of Defense. 

If confirmed, what role, if any, would you expect to play in the evaluation of the 

plans of the Department of the Army to integrate women into occupational specialties or recommendations to keep specific occupations or units closed to women? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to provide legal advice regarding plans to 

integrate women into those occupational specialties. 

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RESPONSE SYSTEMS TO ADULT SEXUAL ASSAULT CRIMES

PANEL

Question. On June 27, 2014, the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault 

Crimes Panel (RSP) released its report fulfilling the requirements of section 576 of 

the Fiscal Year National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112–239). This report contained 132 recommendations in the areas of victim services, victim rights, the role 

of the commander in the military justice process, and the investigation, prosecution 

and adjudication of sexual assault. 

823 

If confirmed, what role, if any, would you expect to play in the evaluation of the 

recommendations of the RSP for possible implementation in the Department of the 

Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to work closely with The Judge Advocate 

General to advise the Secretary of the Army about the RSP’s recommendations and, 

where appropriate, how they should be implemented. 

WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION

Question. Section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, prohibits taking retaliatory 

personnel action against a member of the armed forces as reprisal for making a protected communication. By definition, protected communications include communications to certain individuals and organizations outside of the chain of command. 

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that senior military leaders understand the need to protect servicemembers who report misconduct to appropriate 

authorities within or outside the chain of command? 

Answer. The General Counsel has the primary role of advising the Secretary of 

the Army and those who fall under his authority on the standards governing treatment of servicemembers reporting misconduct to any appropriate authority. I am 

fully committed to protecting those who report misconduct to appropriate authorities. Army policy provides for reporting and investigation of retaliatory actions, and 

for appropriate corrective and disciplinary action. Additionally, the Secretary of the 

Army, pursuant to the requirements of section 1034 of title 10, has a special obligation to ensure appropriate action is taken to correct the record of those who have 

been subjected to reprisal and to ensure appropriate disciplinary action is taken 

against those who engage in prohibited personnel actions against servicemembers 

reporting misconduct. It is critical for senior Army leaders to be aware of legal requirements so as to avoid improper retaliatory actions against those who bring matters of interest to our attention. My staff and I will work to ensure statutory and 

policy requirements are understood and appropriately executed. 

SUPPORT TO ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL

Question. What role, if any, do you think the General Counsel of the Army should 

have in reviewing the investigations and recommendations of the Army Inspector 

General? 

Answer. The Inspector General is a key member of the Secretariat, and if confirmed, as counsel to all Secretariat officials, I will ensure the Office of the General 

Counsel of the Army continues its current professional relationship with The Inspector General. I personally intend this to include routine, direct, and candid communications. I have been advised that Army General Counsel’s office routinely provide 

independent and objective legal advice to the Office of The Inspector General in regard to all matters that relate to Inspector General programs, duties, functions, and 

responsibilities. In coordination with The Judge Advocate General, I will oversee the 

provision of effective legal guidance to the Office of The Inspector General in conducting investigations and making recommendations. Additionally, based on the 

Army General Counsel’s responsibility to review legal and policy issues arising from 

the Army’s intelligence and counterintelligence activities, I will work closely with 

The Inspector General concerning proper reporting of the Army’s intelligence oversight activities. 

CIVILIAN ATTORNEYS

Question. Judge advocates in the armed forces benefit from an established career 

progression, substantial mentoring and training opportunities, and exposure to a 

broad spectrum of legal areas and leadership responsibilities. By contrast, civilian 

attorneys in the military departments normally do not have established career programs and may do the same work for many years, with promotion based solely upon 

longevity and vacancies. 

What is your understanding of the personnel management and career development system for civilian attorneys in the Army? 

Answer. Civilian career development is important to me, and it is my understanding that all civilian attorneys and paraprofessionals supporting Army legal 

services are now covered by a comprehensive career program that promotes and facilitates their recruitment, training, education, development, advancement and retention. To achieve these goals, a career program office was established. I have been 

informed that the career program office publishes two governing documents, which 

the Army terms ‘‘Army Civilian Education, Training, and Education Development 

System’’ plans. There are separate guides for civilian attorneys and paraprofesVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00829 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
824 

sionals, but both are functionally tailored to the legal career field and combine formal training with developmental assignments. 

Question. In your view does that system need revision? If so, what do you see as 

the major problems and what changes would you suggest? 

Answer. From what I have been told, the career program is still in its early stages 

of operation, and program evaluation is ongoing. If confirmed, I will serve as the 

career program’s functional chief, and will advocate for, or direct, revisions when appropriate. 

CLIENT

Question. In your opinion, who is the client of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. The client of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army is the 

Department of the Army, acting through its authorized officials. 

ACQUISITION ISSUES

Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that Army procurement programs are executed in accordance with the law and DOD acquisition 

policy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army, the 

Under Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics and Technology, the Chief Information Officer, the Director of Small Business Programs, and other senior Army officials to ensure that Army acquisition programs comply with applicable laws, regulations, and policies. The Army’s acquisition 

leadership must accomplish its primary mission of acquiring equipment and services 

for the Department while complying with an extensive framework of legal and policy 

requirements. Army lawyers best support this mission through early involvement in 

acquisition program and procurements and through proactive assistance in identifying potential issues and shaping effective, legally-supportable business strategies 

throughout the acquisition life-cycle. 

Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that Army acquisition officials understand flexibilities provided by Congress in the acquisition 

and financial statutes and can take advantage of those flexibilities to act in the best 

interests of the Army? 

Answer. I believe the legal community is uniquely suited to assist Army officials 

in this area. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department’s senior leadership to ensure that Army acquisition programs and financial operations comply with 

their governing legal and policy framework but also to question and modify program 

strategies that reflect an inaccurate or unduly restrictive interpretation of applicable authorities. 

Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that ethics provisions on conflict of interest are followed both by Army personnel and by Army contractors? 

Answer. It is essential that the Department have well-understood business rules 

designed to avoid or mitigate organizational and personal conflicts of interest. Army 

lawyers play an important role in this area through robust programs for acquisition 

ethics training and proactive involvement in the Army’s acquisition, logistics and 

technology programs and contracting operations. If confirmed, I will work closely 

with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology 

and other Army senior leaders to foster an organizational climate that is sensitive 

to the importance of avoiding conflicts of interest and that appropriately addresses 

specific situations that arise. 

Question. Allegations of fraud and abuse during contingency contracting in Iraq 

and Afghanistan have been wide-spread. 

What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that Army personnel are 

properly trained in contingency contracting and are supervised in the performance 

of their duties? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army, the 

Under Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics and Technology, and other senior officials to ensure that the Army legal 

community continues to support the contingency contracting initiatives adopted in 

response to the 2007 Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 

Management in Expeditionary Operations, also known as the ‘‘Gansler Commission 

Report.’’ I would also work closely with The Judge Advocate General of the Army 

and other senior leaders in the Army legal community to ensure that an appropriate 

level of legal resources are allocated in support of contingency contracting. 

825 

DETECTING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Question. Personal and organizational conflicts of interest have become a major 

concern. DOD’s expanded use of private contractors being tasked to perform key 

functions that the services had formerly performed in-house and the new requirement to fill thousands of DOD civilian positions with experienced, qualified individuals present challenges in preventing conflicts of interest and the appearance of conflicts of interest. 

What do you think the Army should do, and what should the General Counsel’s 

role be, in ensuring that the Army identifies personal and organizational conflicts 

of interests and takes the appropriate steps to avoid or mitigate them? 

Answer. Because of their potential not only to result in an unfair competitive advantage, but also to damage the credibility of the institution, conflicts of interest 

are unacceptable in any organization. As the Army’s Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO), the General Counsel is responsible for management and oversight of 

the Army Ethics Program. These duties include ensuring that Army personnel who 

are required to file financial disclosure reports do so at the appropriate time and 

that ethics counselors timely review these reports to prevent or mitigate conflicts 

of interest. In addition, if confirmed, I will help ensure that other circumstances of 

potential conflict of interest are addressed promptly, consistent with legal requirements. 

Question. What is your understanding of the steps the Army takes to identify and 

address potential conflicts of interest during the hiring process? 

Answer. At this time, I am not aware of the steps the Army takes to identify and 

address conflicts of interest during the hiring process. If confirmed, I will look into 

that issue and ensure that appropriate safeguards exist. 

LEGAL ETHICS

Question. What is your understanding of the action a Department of the Army attorney or an Army judge advocate should take if the attorney becomes aware of improper activities by a Department of the Army official who has sought the attorney’s 

legal advice and the official is unwilling to follow the attorney’s advice? 

Answer. If an Army attorney suspects that the Army official, either in exercising 

functions or in failing to do so, violates a law or standard of conduct, the attorney 

should immediately bring the matter to the attention of the attorney’s supervisor. 

If not satisfactorily resolved at that level, the matter should be brought to higher 

level supervisory lawyers or authorities in the chain of supervision or command. 

Question. Do you believe that the present limits on pro bono activities of government attorneys are generally correct as a matter of policy or does the policy need 

to be reviewed and revised? 

Answer. I understand the former Army General Counsel established a supportive 

and permissive pro bono legal practice policy for the Office of the Army General 

Counsel, consistent with statutory restrictions prohibiting federal employees from 

representing clients before the federal government, including the federal courts. 

Many rewarding pro bono activities are available to government attorneys in their 

private, non-official capacity in areas such as family law, consumer law, landlordtenant disputes, and other civil and criminal law matters. If confirmed, I would review pro bono policies to determine whether any change would be appropriate. 

Question. In your view, do the laws, regulations, and guidelines that establish the 

rules of professional responsibility for attorneys in the Department of the Army provide adequate guidance? 

Answer. Much of the value and respect for the law depends on the proper ethical 

conduct of lawyers. I believe that the laws, regulations, and guidelines establishing 

rules for attorney professional responsibility for the Department of the Army are 

well developed and adequate. The Army’s ethical rules are based on the American 

Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Both uniform and civilian 

Army attorneys are subject to state licensing authority ethical codes. By regulation, 

Army attorneys must remain, at all times, in good standing with a at least one licensing authority in the United States, including those of U.S. states, U.S. territories, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. This complimentary system of ethical oversight is implemented on a day-to-day basis by the 

exercise of competent and conscientious supervision by experienced Army attorneys 

at all levels. If confirmed, I would consult and review the current professional responsibility policy and systems with The Judge Advocate General and, as appropriate, seek revisions and improvements. 

826 

LITIGATION INVOLVING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between the Department 

of the Army and the Department of Justice with respect to litigation involving the 

Department of Defense? 

Answer. Under section 516 of title 28 of the U.S. code, the authority to represent 

the military departments in litigation is reserved to the Department of Justice, 

under the direction of the Attorney General. It is my understanding the Department 

of Defense and the Department of the Army, along with the other military departments, have a positive and mutually supportive relationship with the Department 

of Justice. I understand coordination between the Department of Justice and the 

military departments is timely and consistent on every level. If confirmed, I will 

work collaboratively with The Judge Advocate General and the General Counsel of 

the Department of Defense to ensure the interests of the Army are fully understood 

and appropriately pursued with the Department of Justice in litigation. 

Question. In your view, does the Department need more independence and resources to conduct its own litigation or to improve upon its current supporting role? 

Answer. In general, because of established close working relationships, I think the 

Department of Justice is effective in defending the interests of the Department of 

the Army. If confirmed, I will routinely consult with The Judge Advocate General 

and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense to determine whether adequate authority and resources are available to protect the full measure of the 

Army’s interests in litigation. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the General Counsel of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOM COTTON

PANETTA REVIEW

1. Senator COTTON. Ms. Starzak, during your hearing, you responded to a number 

of my questions by stating that your employment with the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence ended years ago and that you do not recall details of the events I 

inquired about. Please make every effort to refresh your memory of these events. 

Also, please describe what efforts you have taken to refresh your memory, including 

any conversations with colleagues and any review of news articles, notes, files, emails, and other records that you possess or to which you can gain access. 

Ms. STARZAK. Consistent with the rules established by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for discussion or review of Committee-sensitive material, I 

have no access to non-public Committee material related to the Committee’s study 

for review. I do not possess any notes, files or emails related to the review to refresh 

my memory. 

During the hearing, questions were asked about events that occurred after I left 

the Committee in 2011. As I was not personally involved in those events, I have 

no additional information about them. 

827 

2. Senator COTTON. Ms. Starzak, the first page of each document in the Panetta 

Review contains the following lengthy stamp: ‘‘This classified document was prepared by the CIA Director’s Review Group for Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation (DRGRDI) for DRG–RDI’s internal discussion purposes and should not be used 

for any other purpose, nor may it be distributed without express permission from 

DRG–RDI or CIA’s Office of General Counsel. This document contains [certain classified information]. This document also contains material protected by the attorneyclient and attorney work-product privileges. Furthermore, this document constitutes 

deliberative work product, protected by the deliberative-process privilege, and is not 

a final, conclusive, complete, or comprehensive analysis of DRG–RDI or CIA. Rather, it was created to suit the needs of DRG–RDI, in support of informing senior 

Agency officials about broad policy issues. While every effort was made to ensure 

this document’s accuracy, it may contain inadvertent errors. For this reason, and 

because this document selectively summarizes, draws inferences from, or omits information from the sources it cites, it should not be relied upon by persons outside 

DRG–RDI.’’ 

As a trained attorney I would hope that one would read this caveat and feel it 

best to consult with interested parties to best preserve governmental prerogatives, 

exercise proper congressional oversight, and meet ethical and legal obligations. 

a. When you saw this stamp, did you notify and seek guidance from any CIA officials? 

i. Who specifically did you seek guidance from? 

ii. Did these CIA officials provide you with any instructions? 

b. Did you notify or seek guidance from any SSCI officials? 

i. Who specifically did you seek guidance from? 

ii. Did these SSCI officials instruct you to continue your review without notifying 

the CIA? 

Ms. STARZAK. I participated in many conversations with CIA officers related to 

the study and the provision of documents to the Committee. Although the terms of 

reference for the study provided to the CIA by the Committee suggested that the 

Committee intended the study to examine issues that could arguably be subject to 

privilege, I do not remember having any conversations in which CIA officers or attorneys indicated that CIA was seeking to withhold documents from the Committee 

pursuant to deliberative-process, attorney-client or attorney work-product privileges. 

Indeed, many of the documents I reviewed in connection with the study—including 

some documents the CIA delivered to the Committee’s space in the Hart Senate Office building—were marked as deliberative or predecisional or had been prepared by 

CIA attorneys. I am not aware of any claims that these documents were provided 

to the Committee inadvertently, notwithstanding their markings or the fact that 

they were prepared by or for attorneys. As such, the caveat referenced above would 

not have provided the document a different legal status than many of the other documents that the CIA provided to the Committee for the purpose of congressional 

oversight. 

I have no memory of seeking guidance from either CIA or SSCI officials about the 

particular document referenced, which was one of the more than six million pages 

of CIA records to which SSCI staff had access at the CIA facility. 

c. Did you notify or seek guidance from any other officials, advisors, attorneys, 

or persons apart from those you may have consulted at the CIA or with SSCI? 

Ms. STARZAK. No. 

d. Have you ever been asked to speak to an investigator regarding an individual 

who may have accessed, removed, or had knowledge of the removal of a hard copy 

of the Panetta Review Document to SSCI offices? 

Ms. STARZAK. No. 

e. Did you ever speak with the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms or the CIA Inspector 

General during their investigations relating to the discovery and removal of these 

documents? 

Ms. STARZAK. No. 

RDI INVESTIGATION

3. Senator COTTON. Ms. Starzak, the SSCI rules of procedure 10.4 states that the 

‘‘Committee staff shall assist the minority as fully as the majority in the expression 

of minority views, including assistance in the preparation and filing of additional, 

separate, and minority views, to the end that all points of view may be fully considered by the Committee and the Senate.’’ 

828 

a. Do you believe you fully complied with this rule during your time with the committee? 

Ms. STARZAK. I am not aware of any minority views being prepared related to the 

RDI investigation during my time on the Committee. 

b. Senator COTTON. During your time with the SSCI, did you ever request that 

access to CIA documents during the RDI investigation be denied or turned off for 

any Republican committee staff member? 

i. Senator COTTON. If so, was your request denied, overridden, or reversed? 

Ms. STARZAK. Republican Committee staff was provided access to CIA documents 

at the CIA facility throughout the two and half years I worked on the study. I never 

requested that access to CIA documents be denied for any Republican Committee 

staff member. 

I do recall an isolated incident in which the CIA temporarily suspended a minority committee staff member’s access to documents after majority staff requested to 

reconfigure the computer system. The reconfiguration of the system mistakenly resulted in the temporary suspension of the minority staff member’s access to certain 

CIA documents, an outcome that was never intended. Once the error was identified, 

the CIA restored the minority staff member’s access to CIA records as quickly as 

possible. 

BERGDAHL CASE

4. Senator COTTON. Ms. Starzak, President Obama traded five hardened Taliban 

commanders for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, who served in the military branch you would 

like to advise. The GAO found that President Obama broke two laws with this 

trade—a 30-day congressional notification requirement and the Anti-Deficiency Act. 

a. Do you agree with the GAO that President Obama broke the law twice with 

this transfer? 

Ms. STARZAK. The Department of Defense prepared a notification to Congress on 

the conclusions of the report, stating that it disagreed with GAO’s conclusions. That 

notification is attached. 

b. Susan Rice has stated that Sgt. Bergdahl served honorably. Is it your position 

as well that Sgt. Bergdahl served honorably? Should the Army encourage other soldiers to serve as honorably as Sgt. Bergdahl? 

Ms. STARZAK. I understand that there are preferred charges pending against SGT 

Bergdahl alleging desertion and misbehavior before the enemy, both of which are 

offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Given the possibility that these 

charges may go to trial, I believe it would be inappropriate for me to characterize 

SGT Bergdahl’s service or to comment on his guilt or innocence. 

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834 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS

GUANTANAMO BAY

5. Senator TILLIS. Ms. Starzak, In the event that the President directed the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo to the United States, in your professional legal 

judgment, would officers of the Department of the Army be at legal risk for a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act if they were to execute a transfer of detainees from 

Guantanamo to the United States, contrary to the prohibition against use of appropriated funds for that exact purpose? 

Ms. STARZAK. The Department of the Army’s operations are currently funded by 

a continuing resolution that incorporates funding restrictions from the Department 

of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015. Sections 8112 and 8113 of the DOD Appropriations Act, 2015 prohibit the use of funds to, respectively, ‘‘transfer, release, or assist 

in the transfer or release to or within the United States, its territories, or possessions’’ Guantanamo detainees and ‘‘construct, acquire, or modify any facility in the 

United States, its territories, or possessions to house’’ Guantanamo detainees. If the 

Department of the Army were to act in a manner inconsistent with those funding 

restrictions, it could potentially be a violation of the Antideficiency Act. 

6. Senator TILLIS. Ms. Starzak, what do you believe is the proper authority under 

which the President could decide to unilaterally close Guantanamo and move inmates to the U.S. by executive action? 

Ms. STARZAK. There are currently statutory prohibitions on the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay to the United States. As such, I believe it is appropriate 

for the Administration to engage with Congress to address those statutory restrictions on the transfer of detainees. 

7. Senator TILLIS. Ms. Starzak, the administration typically evokes article II, section III of the Constitution when arguing against an anti-deficiency act violation. 

What is your legal opinion on whether the faithful execution clause still applies in 

a situation where there is an affirmative prohibition on use of funds in the law? 

Ms. STARZAK. The Constitution requires the President to take care that the laws 

are faithfully executed. To the extent that Congress lawfully imposes restrictions on 

the use of appropriated funds, the Take Care Clause would require the President 

to comply with those funding restrictions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

GUANTANAMO BAY

8. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Starzak, after reviewing at the NDAA provision and the 

Attorney General’s recent statements regarding Guantanamo Bay, does the authority to close Guantanamo Bay reside in the Congress of the United States? 

Ms. STARZAK. I believe this is a reference to the comments of the Attorney General to the House Judiciary Committee in which she indicated that the law currently does not allow for the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo to the United 

States. My understanding is that the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 

2016 and restrictions from the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015 incorporated into the continuing resolution currently funding DOD’s operations prohibit the transfer or release of Guantanamo detainees to or within the United States 

through December 31, 2016. Thus, I agree with the Attorney General that, to the 

extent that closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility requires the transfer 

of a number of detainees to the United States for continued detention, the law does 

not currently allow for that. 

9. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Starzak, does the President, in light of the FY 2016 

NDAA, have the authority to unilaterally shut down Guantanamo Bay without Congressional authorization? 

Ms. STARZAK. As noted above, in light of the FY 2016 NDAA and restrictions from 

the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015 incorporated into the continuing resolution currently funding DOD’s operations, to the extent that closure of 

the Guantanamo Bay detention facility requires the transfer of a number of detainees to the United States for continued detention, the law does not currently allow 

for that. 

[The nomination reference of Ms. Alissa M. Starzak follows:] 

835 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 13, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Alissa M. Starzak, of New York, to be General Counsel of the Department of the 

Army, vice Brad Carson, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Ms. Alissa M. Starzak, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ALISSA MICHELLE STARZAK

Education: 

• Amherst College 

• 1991–1995 

• AB 

• University of Chicago 

• 1997–2000 

• JD 

Employment Record: 

• Department of Defense (Washington, DC) 

• Deputy General Counsel (Legislation) 

• May 2011—Present 

• U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Washington, DC) 

• Counsel 

• January 2007–May 2011 

• Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC) 

• Assistant General Counsel 

• August 2005–January 2007 

• O’Melveny & Myers (Washington, DC) 

• Attorney 

• November 2001—August 2005 

• U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (New Orleans, LA) 

• Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable E. Grady Jolly 

• 2000–2001 

Honors and Awards: 

None 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Ms. Alissa M. Starzak in connection with her 

nomination follows:] 

836 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Alissa Michelle Starzak. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

General Counsel, Department of the Army. 

3. Date of nomination: 

January 13, 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

August 3, 1973, Binghamton, NY. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Andrew G. Gerguson. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. 

Amherst College, 1991–1995, AB, May 1995. 

University of Chicago, 1997–2000, JD, June 2000. 

9.Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

May 2011–Present: Deputy General Counsel (Legislation), Department of Defense, 

Pentagon, Washington, DC. 

January 2007–May 2011 : Counsel, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. 

Senate, Washington, DC. 

August 2005–January 2007: Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence 

Agency, Washington DC. 

November 2001–August 2005: Associate, O’Melveny & Myers, Washington, DC. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable E. Grady Jolly, U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Fifth Circuit, 2000–2001. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

None. 

837 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

None. 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. Obama for America, 2012, $200. 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

N/A. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

None. 

16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

None. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

ALISSA M. STARZAK

This 7th day of April, 2015 

[The nomination of Ms. Alissa M. Starzak was reported to the 

Senate by Chairman McCain on December 7, 2015, with the recVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00843 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
838 

ommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on December 14, 2015.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Franklin R. Parker by 

Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

What modifications to Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions, if any, do you believe are 

necessary for the readiness of the armed forces? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess whether there is a need for changes to the 

Goldwater-Nichols provisions. Given that changes would likely have implications 

across all Services and the potential to alter the basic command and control and 

operational readiness of our forces, any proposed changes would have to be carefully 

considered by senior leadership across the Department of Defense (DOD). In the 

area of personnel policy, I understand the Goldwater-Nichols provisions that govern 

promotion policies are nearly thirty years old and, if confirmed, I will review those 

in detail to see if they continue to meet the needs of our current force. 

DUTIES

Question. Section 5016 of title 10, United States Code, provides that the Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs shall have ‘‘as his principal 

duty the overall supervision of manpower and Reserve component affairs of the Department of the Navy.’’ 

If confirmed, what duties do you expect that the Secretary of the Navy will prescribe for you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I believe the Secretary of the Navy will require me to provide overall supervision and oversight of manpower and Reserve component affairs 

for the Navy and Marine Corps. I would be responsible for developing integrated 

policies and programs related to military personnel (Active and Reserve components) and the civilian workforce. Additionally, I would provide the necessary oversight of our total force—military, civilians and contractors—to ensure the most efficient workforce balance. 

Question. What actions will you take to enhance your ability to perform the duties 

of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will apply my experience in government service to further 

my understanding and knowledge of the Department of the Navy, its people and organizations. I will diligently evaluate the challenges it faces and the resources necessary to sustain and transform it. I will seek advice and counsel from the military 

and civilian personnel of the Department and from Members of Congress and their 

staffs. 

Question. In carrying out these duties, what would be your relationship with the 

following officials: 

The Secretary of the Navy. 

Answer. The Secretary of the Navy is responsible for conducting all the affairs of 

the Department of the Navy and for formulating and implementing policies and programs consistent with the policies and objectives established by the President and 

the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy 

to help him achieve his goals, particularly those involving manpower issues. My role 

will be defined in part by powers he may choose to delegate to me. 

Question. The Under Secretary of the Navy. 

Answer. The position of Under Secretary of the Navy is currently vacant. As the 

Chief Operating Officer of the Department of the Navy, the Under Secretary plays 

a significant role in prioritizing and synchronizing the efforts of the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy. If confirmed, I would establish a close, direct, and supportive 

839 

relationship with the new Under Secretary of the Navy, or the person acting in that 

capacity. 

Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Navy. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate with them on our combined interests and 

work together to support the Secretary’s goals. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Navy. 

Answer. The General Counsel is the senior civilian legal advisor to the Secretary, 

the Under Secretary, and the Assistant Secretaries and their staffs. If confirmed, 

I expect to consult and rely upon the General Counsel on a variety of legal issues 

in discharging my responsibilities. 

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy. 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General is the senior uniformed legal advisor to the 

Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations and serves as the Department 

of Defense Representative for Ocean Policy Affairs. If confirmed, I expect to consult 

and rely upon the Judge Advocate General on a variety of legal issues in discharging my responsibilities. 

Question. The Inspector General of the Navy. 

Answer. The Naval Inspector General is the senior investigating official in the Department of the Navy and the principal advisor to the Secretary of the Navy, Chief 

of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps on all matters concerning inspection, investigations, and audit follow-up. If confirmed, I will establish 

and maintain a close and professional relationship with the Naval Inspector General. 

Question. The Chief of Legislative Affairs of the Navy. 

Answer. The Chief of Legislative Affairs is responsible for developing legislative 

strategies for the Navy. If confirmed I will work closely with him as it relates to 

the Department’s legislative requirements for manpower and personnel and to ensure an open and candid dialogue with the oversight committees and individual 

Members of Congress and their respective staffs. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense 

for Total Force Management as it relates to readiness, Active and Reserve component affairs, health affairs, training, and personnel requirements and management. 

These responsibilities include the issuance of guidance to the Military Departments. 

If confirmed, I will develop a close and professional relationship with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. I will continuously communicate and 

coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on 

matters of mutual interest, articulating the views of the Department of the Navy. 

I will ensure that the Department of the Navy is administered in accordance with 

guidance and direction from the Department of Defense. 

Question. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness. 

Answer. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness advises the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and, 

from time to time, performs responsibilities that require the issuance of guidance 

to the Military Departments. If confirmed, I will continuously communicate and coordinate with the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness on matters of mutual interest and in furtherance of the best interests of 

the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

Answer. This is a new position and currently not filled. The Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is responsible for the overall supervision of manpower and Reserve affairs of the Department of Defense. If confirmed, 

I will communicate and coordinate with the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs, or the person acting in that capacity, in the development of programs and policy related to military and civilian personnel in furtherance of the best interests of the Department of the Navy and the Department of 

Defense. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness. 

Answer. This is a new position and currently not filled. The Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Readiness is responsible for advising the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on key readiness and training issues. 

If confirmed, I will communicate and coordinate with the new Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Readiness, or the person acting in that capacity, on matters of mutual 

interest and in furtherance of the best interests of the Department of the Navy and 

the Department of Defense. 

Question. The Chief of Naval Operations. 

840 

Answer. The Chief of Naval Operations is the senior military officer of the Department of the Navy and has a direct reporting relationship to the Secretary of the 

Navy. If confirmed, I would work with the CNO to support the Secretary in areas 

of manpower policy as well as program execution. 

Question. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations. 

Answer. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations is the second highest-ranking commissioned officer in the United States Navy, and serves as the second-in-command 

for the Chief of Naval Operations. If confirmed, I will work very closely with the 

Vice Chief of Naval Operations, as required, on manpower issues. 

Question. The Chief of Naval Personnel. 

Answer. The Chief of Naval Personnel is responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for Navy’s manpower readiness. If confirmed, I would maintain a close relationship with the Chief of Naval Personnel, ensure that the manpower, personnel, 

training, and education needs of the Navy are met, and to provide the best possible 

support for sailors and their families. 

Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Answer. The Commandant is the highest-ranking officer in the United States Marine Corps and has a direct reporting relationship to the Secretary of the Navy. If 

confirmed, I would work with the Commandant to support the Secretary in areas 

of manpower policy as well as program execution. 

Question. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Answer. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps is the second highest 

ranking officer in the United States Marine Corps and serves as the second-in-command for the Commandant of the Marine Corps. If confirmed, I will work very closely with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, as required, on manpower 

issues. 

Question. The Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

Answer. The Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs assists the Commandant by planning, directing, coordinating, and supervising both Active and Reserve forces. If confirmed, I would maintain a close relationship with the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and 

Reserve Affairs, ensure that the manpower, personnel, training, and education 

needs of the Marine Corps are met, and to provide the best possible support for Marines and their families. 

Question. The Surgeon General of the Navy. 

Answer. The Surgeon General of the Navy is the Chief of the Bureau of Medicine 

and Surgery. If confirmed, I would look to the Surgeon General for advice and insights on the spectrum of medical affairs affecting our Navy and Marine Corps personnel. 

Question. The Chief of Navy Reserve. 

Answer. The Chief of Navy Reserve is the principal advisor on Navy Reserve matters to the Chief of Naval Operations and the commander of the Navy Reserve 

Force. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Chief of Navy Reserve on the numerous operational and policy matters affecting the Reserve component of the Navy. 

Question. The Commander, Marine Forces Reserve. 

Answer. The Commander, Marine Forces Reserve, is the principal advisor to the 

Commandant on Marine Forces Reserve matters. If confirmed, I would work closely 

with Commander, Marine Forces Reserve on the numerous operational and policy 

matters affecting the Marine Forces Reserve. 

Question. Marines, sailors and their families. 

Answer. Those men and women who answer the call to duty and service are our 

Nation’s most valuable national security assets. If confirmed, I will work to ensure 

sailors and marines are fully trained, integrated and ready when called upon. I will 

also work diligently to care for sailors, marines and their families across the Department of the Navy to ensure they enjoy a comfortable quality of life that meets their 

individual and collective needs as they serve and sacrifice on behalf of our Nation. 

Additionally, I would meet with sailors and marines wherever they are stationed, 

when practicable, to gain their insights and to remain informed of the issues and 

concerns most important to them. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. If confirmed, I believe my personal background, my educational and my 

professional experiences qualify me for this position. 

841 

The son and nephew of Vietnam veterans—my father an Air Force Captain, my 

uncle an Army Lieutenant Colonel—I was raised with a deep appreciation for what 

it means to be called to serve our Nation. It was instilled in me at an early age 

that we must always respect our servicemembers and their service, and that we 

must always care for them as they have for us. Following 9/11, I left the practice 

of law to pursue a life of public service. After earning an advanced Public Policy 

degree in Political Advocacy and Leadership from Harvard University’s John F. 

Kennedy School of Government, I returned to private legal practice specializing, in 

part, in legislative and regulatory affairs, where I gained valuable experience working with Congressional offices on public policy issues. 

In 2009, I was honored to receive an appointment as Special Assistant (attorneyadvisor) to the General Counsel of the Department of the Navy. During this extraordinary opportunity, I worked on a range of matters that provided me with critical 

insight into issues impacting the Department, its servicemen and women, and its 

civilian personnel. I was afforded the unique opportunity to participate in DOD’s 

Comprehensive Review Working Group, which examined the impacts of a repeal of 

the ‘‘Don’t Ask Don’t Tell’’ policy; exploring the potential effects of one of the most 

significant military personnel policy changes of our time. For my service, I was honored to receive the Department of the Navy’s Meritorious Public Service Award in 

2011 and the Distinguished Public Service Award in 2012. 

In 2012, I was appointed as Chief Counsel for the Maritime Administration 

(MARAD) at the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), where I serve not only 

as MARAD’s chief legal officer, but also as its third-ranking official. In this capacity, 

my responsibilities include not only legal matters, but also impact broader personnel, management, and policy concerns in support of MARAD’s mission. Core to 

this mission is the training, employment, and retention of the U.S. merchant mariners and maritime professionals who support our Nation’s commercial and military 

sealift requirements. In addition to my core duties as Chief Counsel, I have been 

closely involved in other personnel-related initiatives such as serving on DOT’s Senior Executive Service (SES) Performance Review Board, participating in Office of 

Personnel Management-led interagency efforts to improve SES onboarding practices, 

and playing various roles in hiring, diversity, mentoring, quality of life, professional 

development, outreach and other efforts. 

I believe the sum of my experiences in private practice and government; my efforts on both military and civilian personnel matters; my legal familiarity with governmental authorities and limitations; my perspective having served in both defense 

and civilian agencies; my understanding of government processes, organizations, 

and dynamics; my roles as an action officer, a Senior Executive and as a member 

of senior Agency leadership; my work with Congressional offices and staff, and the 

deep respect and appreciation I hold for the women and men who serve our Nation, 

equip me with the skills I need to effectively perform the duties of this position. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs? 

Answer. In my view, the fundamental challenge facing the Assistant Secretary of 

the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is effectively manning the entire force, 

which equates to balancing military readiness with future requirements. Manning 

the force with the right manpower mix of qualified military, civilian, and contractor 

personnel in the current and foreseeable fiscal environment will be a critical challenge. The Department of the Navy must continue to recruit, train and retain the 

very best, maintain the superior pay and benefits package our sailors and marines 

deserve, and ensure the best care for our wounded warriors and their families. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

If confirmed, I will work within the Department of the Navy-Department of Defense framework to address manpower requirements while supporting our servicemen and women and their families. I will work to ensure that major headquarters 

are properly adjusted per congressional and SECDEF guidance. I will support 

SECDEF and SECNAV initiatives such as Force of the Future, Task Force Innovation, and Talent Management initiatives to enhance flexibility in career and workforce management and help develop and retain the Department of the Navy’s highly 

trained personnel. I will address requirements by garnering the expertise of the civilian and military leadership within the Department of the Navy, the Office of the 

Secretary of the Navy, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and will be open 

to input from Members of Congress and the Department’s oversight committees. 

842 

SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from the Navy and the Federal Government for support 

services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from Active Duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis 

over the past several years, many challenges remain. 

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by the Navy to improve 

the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured marines and sailors, and their families? 

Answer. I am aware that the Navy and Marine Corps take seriously the importance of caring for the medical needs of their personnel and their families. I understand the Navy Safe Harbor program and Marine Corps Wounded Warrior Regiment programs were established to improve and integrate support services, and 

speed delivery of coordinated care. In addition to these programs, I am aware the 

Navy 21st Century sailor and marine initiative has been established to address 

other areas to provide the full spectrum of whole life support. If confirmed, I will 

continue to support and optimize these and other vital programs for Wounded Warriors and their families. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase the Navy’s support for wounded marines and sailors, and 

to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Secretary of the 

Navy, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), Surgeon General of the Navy, the 

Department of Veterans Affairs leadership, and the veteran service and non-profit 

organizations in local communities to continually evaluate and improve existing programs and initiatives provided to our wounded and their families. In addition I will 

look to continue the Department’s Annual Wounded Warrior Hiring conference. I 

will continue to champion the best practices of training, hiring and retaining our 

wounded, ill and injured servicemembers into both government and private career 

opportunities. I thank Congress for its continued support, as I believe our Nation 

and our Department owe these wounded sailors and marines a debt that can never 

fully be paid. 

OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. As the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs you would have significant responsibilities with regard to officer management 

policies, the promotion system, and recommending officers for nomination to positions of authority and responsibility. 

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you make to the officer management 

system? 

Answer. I understand the officer management systems, and in particular the promotion system, are constantly being evaluated and efforts made to improve them. 

I am not yet familiar with the specifics of the program, or the results of the latest 

evaluations. However, if confirmed, I will fully consider and evaluate any recommendations from Navy and Marine Corps leadership for system improvement. 

Question. Do you believe the current Navy procedures and practices for reviewing 

the records of officers pending nomination by the President are sufficient to ensure 

the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense, and the President can make 

informed decisions? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Navy’s processes and policies to identify 

eligibility and suitability for appointment or re-appointment as officers provide sufficient information for these decisions. If confirmed, I will fully support efforts to enhance personnel suitability screening associated with nominations for appointments 

to higher positions of leadership, trust and responsibility. 

Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair and reasonable for 

the officers involved? 

Answer. To the best of my knowledge, current procedures for vetting personal and 

professional information seek to protect the rights of individual officers and the interests of the Navy in advancing only those who have clearly demonstrated exceptional character, competence, and commitment to the Nation’s values. If confirmed, 

I will support these vetting processes and, for any changes proposed, I will ensure 

the due process rights of individual officers are protected. 

843 

TECHNICAL TRAINING AND ASSIGNMENT OF GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS

Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of general and flag officers have 

advanced training and degrees in scientific and technical disciplines? 

Answer. Anecdotally, it has been my personal experience that the general and flag 

officers I have worked with predominantly have sufficient training and degrees to 

fulfill their responsibilities. In my previous position as an attorney in the Office of 

the General Counsel of the Navy, it was apparent to me that many of the general 

and flag officers with whom I interacted had scientific and technical backgrounds 

likely obtained through a scientific or technical undergraduate and/or graduate degree. 

If confirmed, I will closely monitor the inventory of senior officer personnel to ensure our Navy and Marine Corps has officers with the technical and scientific training necessary to perform their duties. 

Question. Are the career paths for officers with technical skills appropriate to ensure that the services can execute complex acquisition programs, adapt to a rapidly 

changing technological threat environment, and make informed investment decisions on DOD and Army resources? If not, what will you do to address this deficiency? 

Answer. It is my understanding that there are multiple factors that affect a general/flag officer’s ability to ensure the effective execution of complex acquisition programs. I understand that the Department of the Navy policy for the Acquisition 

Workforce requires that those general/flag officers serving in positions with oversight responsibility for major acquisition programs have at least 10 years of experience, prior experience in a Critical Acquisition Position, as well as prior experience 

as an acquisition Program Manager or Deputy Program Manager. 

Additionally, I understand that the Department of the Navy (DON) attempts to 

provide a robust development program for its acquisition program leaders. For example, I understand the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development 

and Acquisition has Acquisition War Rooms that provide well-researched lessons 

learned on what has been successful in Shipbuilding/Combat Systems Acquisition as 

they relate to current programs. Newly selected leaders are required to go through 

the War Rooms. Further, DON offers an ‘‘Understanding Industry’’ course that arms 

participants with an understanding of the mindset of Industry leaders, better equipping participants to more effectively negotiate business arrangements. Additionally, 

I understand DON allows selected acquisition leaders to participate in the Secretary 

of Defense Corporate Fellowship Program, a year-long training opportunity with Industry to gain first-hand experience with corporate operations. Combined with existing acquisition experience, Defense Acquisition University training, and graduate 

education, these initiatives are intended to collectively develop well-rounded Program Managers. 

Question. In your view do current general and flag officer assignment policies provide and incentivize qualified officers to serve in acquisition programs? Do tour 

lengths for those assignments enable and empower such officers to effectively manage acquisition programs? If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to improve the effectiveness of senior officers assigned those duties? 

Answer. I am aware the DON has policy to ensure that acquisition officers promote at the same rate as those in non-acquisition positions. In addition, I understand the department has made efforts to incentivize those leading and executing 

acquisition programs. There are more than ten different awards recognized in the 

annual DON Acquisition Excellence Awards Ceremony, with multiple others submitted for recognition at the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) level. The department also recognizes leaders of acquisition programs in the USD (AT&L) magazine. DON policy requires tour lengths 

that are consistent with OSD policy, i.e., four years (or closest major milestone) for 

those leading major programs and three years for those serving as Program Executive Officers. Beyond that, DON’s Program Review process attempts to ensure program leaders are empowered to make decisions to effectively manage their programs. 

If confirmed, I will evaluate whether there is a relevant and sufficient match between acquisition education requirements and senior officer training and education. 

GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER NOMINATIONS

Question. Under DOD Instruction 1320.4, adverse and alleged adverse information pertaining to general and flag officers must be evaluated by senior leaders in 

the Services and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense prior to nomination. 

Answer. [Noting that the guidance has been updated as DOD Instruction 1320.04 

in January 2014] 

844 

Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in the officer promotion system, 

particularly in reviewing general and flag officer nominations? 

Answer. The officer promotion system is governed by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act and the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act. If confirmed, I will review all flag and general officer nominations prior to approval by 

the Secretary of the Navy. If there are any concerns, I would consult with the Chief 

of Naval Personnel or the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower 

and Reserve Affairs to discuss the issues prior to routing the nomination to the Secretary. 

I understand that current regulations and procedures provide senior civilian oversight to ensure information relevant to prospective nominees is appropriately considered by promotion boards and officials within the recommending hierarchical 

chain. If confirmed, I will engage with and monitor these processes to preserve the 

integrity of the promotion system to ensure that the officers promoted are physically, mentally and morally qualified to serve at the highest levels. 

Question. What is your assessment of the ability of the Services to timely document credible information of an adverse nature for evaluation by promotion selection boards and military and civilian leaders? 

Answer. I believe that consideration of all information is critical to ensuring the 

reliability of selection board results. I consider this to be a vitally important responsibility. If confirmed, I would carefully review the selection process for military and 

civilian leaders to ensure information of an adverse nature is properly evaluated. 

It is my understanding that the Navy’s process to identify credible information of 

an adverse nature for evaluation by promotion selection boards and military and civilian leaders provides sufficient information for these decisions. If confirmed, I will 

review and monitor these processes to determine if there are areas for improvement. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that only the best qualified officers are nominated for promotion to general and flag officer rank? 

Answer. I understand that a thorough screening process and review is conducted 

on convening orders for flag and general officer selection boards to ensure clear 

guidance is provided to all flag and general officer selection board members. While 

I am not fully aware of the existing process within the Department of the Navy for 

developing and promulgating selection criteria for general and flag officers, if confirmed I would examine this process closely. If confirmed, I will provide the Secretary my frank assessment of the existing processes and will make recommendations regarding any changes necessary to ensure the best qualified officers are nominated. 

END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS

Question. In this year’s budget request and Future Years Defense Program, the 

Department proposes making additional cuts to the Marine Corps active and Reserve component end strengths. The Department proposes reducing the marine Active component to 182,000 by 2020, and plans to keep the Marine Corps forces at 

182,000 if sequestration continues. 

In your view, can the Marine Corps meet national defense objectives at the 

strength levels proposed without sequestration? What about at the strength levels 

proposed with sequestration? 

Answer. I understand the Commandant of the Marine Corps has testified that the 

Marine Corps can meet the requirements of the Defense Strategic Guidance today 

at the President’s Budget levels, but there is no margin. Lowering end strength due 

to sequestration or enforcement of the Budget Control Act funding caps would not 

allow the Marine Corps to execute the current Defense Strategic Guidance. I understand a new strategy would need to be developed that would take into account fewer 

warfighting units available to deploy in defense of the Nation. 

Question. If the Marine Corps must reduce its active component end strength to 

182,000, where does the Marine Corps take risk with respect to the national defense 

strategy? 

Answer. I understand the Commandant of the Marine Corps has testified that the 

Marine Corps has been forced to prioritize near-term readiness for forward deployed 

marines and assume risk in home station readiness, modernization, infrastructure 

sustainment, and quality of life programs. 

If confirmed, I will work with Marine Corps leadership to minimize the risk to 

overall Service readiness. 

Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional force shaping 

tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has provided the past three years? 

Answer. I understand Congress has given the Marine Corps the authorities necessary to accomplish its present drawdown. If confirmed, I will assess Departmental 

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processes and results to ensure the Marine Corps reduces end strength in a smart, 

measured way and identifies any additional legislative changes needed in a timely 

manner. 

Question. In your view, should the number of general and flag officers in the Marine Corps and Navy be reduced commensurate with the drawdown of total Marine 

and Navy end strength? 

Answer. I am aware that the Services recently conducted a Congressionally-directed review of active component general and flag officer billets. A similar review 

is underway now for the Reserve component. If confirmed, I will ensure that any 

recommendations regarding changes in the number of authorized flag and general 

officers are based on the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps, considering the nature of responsibilities associated with any specific position. 

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What do you believe are the major personnel lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) which you 

would seek to address if confirmed as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower 

and Reserve Affairs? 

Answer. I am confident that there are valuable personnel lessons learned from 

OEF and OIF. The sacrifices of our sailors and marines, and their families in support of these operations, were made at great cost. It is impressive that all the Services have been able to maintain a high-quality all-volunteer force through more than 

a decade of combat operations. The continuous integration of Active Duty and Reserve forces throughout and since these Operations has been remarkable as well. 

I am aware that there have been many lessons from OEF and OIF about the impacts of stress on the force, and there is still more to learn and to do in support 

of the physical and mental resiliency of our sailors and marines, and for veterans 

seeking to reintegrate with their families and communities, to include transitioning 

from the uniform. If confirmed, I will seek out and review the hard-earned lessons 

learned with senior leaders within the Department of the Navy. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services continue to be of great 

concern to the Committee. 

If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide prevention programs 

and policies for the Department of the Navy to prevent suicides and increase the 

resiliency of marines, sailors and their families? 

Answer. I share the Department of the Navy view that every suicide is a tragedy, 

and that suicide is also a leadership issue. I understand that the Services have 

taken significant steps to improve suicide prevention efforts. If confirmed, I will support efforts to encourage strength and resilience among sailors, marines and their 

families, and to foster command climates supportive of psychological health and 

help-seeking behavior. It is critical that the Department continues to emphasize the 

importance of personal responsibility, peer-support and bystander intervention, and 

that it continues to emphasize that seeking help is a sign of strength. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Marines, sailors and their families in both the active and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go 

with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for marines, sailors and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced, especially in light of 

current fiscal constraints? 

Answer. Sailors, marines and their families are the Department of the Navy’s 

greatest assets. Addressing their needs can be more challenging in times of war or 

contingency operations, particularly in a fiscally constrained environment. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, 

the Department remains agile and responsive to the needs of servicemembers and 

their families, within fiscal realities. Whether assisting them in transitioning to civilian life, or providing financial education throughout their service, addressing 

their needs and desires will be essential to success. 

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MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for marines, sailors and their families, especially in light 

of deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible 

users, including active-duty and Reserve personnel, retirees, and families. 

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Navy MWR programs, particularly 

in view of the current fiscal environment and, if confirmed, are there any improvements you would seek to achieve? 

Answer. It is vitally important not to marginalize MWR program contribution to 

readiness and retention. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to ensure program relevance and sustainability. I am aware that in a fiscally constrained environment, it is critical to optimize MWR’s revenue generating capability and to protect the profitability of the military exchanges that help fund MWR programs. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. What is your assessment of the Navy’s sexual assault prevention and 

response program? 

Answer. In recent years, I understand over 150 program and policy initiatives 

have been implemented in an effort to provide a comprehensive approach to sexual 

assault prevention and response (SAPR). 

I am aware that in Fiscal Year 2014 (FY14), reports of sexual assault in the Department continued to increase over previous years, though I understand that an 

increase in sexual assault reports may not necessarily represent increased incidents 

of sexual assault. For a crime that is universally underreported, the Department believes this trend may represent in part an improved command climate since when 

a sailor or marine trusts the command to respond appropriately, he or she is more 

likely to make a report. I understand that the DON is also committed to further 

efforts to address sexual assault through new training initiatives, such as bystander 

intervention training. Despite these efforts, however, I concur with the Department’s view that there is more work to be done and that this issue requires continued focus at the highest levels. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. I understand that the system allowing both restricted and unrestricted 

reporting is valuable to ensure that all persons have access to support services. 

If confirmed, I would be committed to ensuring that victims have the option 

whether to report and, if they decide to do so, they can report in a manner that 

respects their privacy, their rights, and their desire to participate in the military 

justice system. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to the victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. Through their words and deeds, commanding officers set the tone for, 

and are ultimately responsible for, command climate. As a result, they are the 

lynchpin for establishing and maintaining a positive command climate. 

Every commander must be held accountable for ensuring the well-being of each 

individual within the command. The chain of command is integral to providing compassionate care and support to victims. It is also fundamental to implementing command-wide training on how to support survivors and ensuring implementation of 

military policies regarding sexual assault prevention and response. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Navy resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help 

they need? 

Answer. I am aware that the Department has placed a significant focus on providing support to victims. I have been informed that victims are offered a range of 

resources to provide them with the proper physical, emotional and legal support. I 

understand that newly established programs and positions such as Sexual Assault 

Response Coordinators (SARC), deployed resiliency counselors, and Victims’ Legal 

Counsel (VLC) have afforded important guidance, support, and advocacy for victims. 

Meanwhile, I understand the medical community strives to provide individuals with 

compassionate, competent, and victim-centered care. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Navy has taken to prevent additional 

sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

Answer. I understand that the Department is aggressively attempting to address 

the problem of sexual assault no matter where an offense is committed. Specifically, 

I understand that SARCs, deployed resiliency counselors, and VLCs are available 

worldwide. The Department has also established peer-to-peer training for every sailor and marine. Given the connection between alcohol use and sexual assault, the 

847 

Department has established alcohol sales policies on every Navy installation. In addition, I understand the Department has established new base security measures 

in resident housing. If confirmed, I will support continued efforts to eliminate all 

forms of sexual assault, in all locations, and will advocate for the continuous development of effective new approaches to combat the crime and to support victims. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources Navy 

has in place to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. I understand there has been significant focus on ensuring sufficient resources and training for NCIS and Navy and Marine Corps judge advocates. I am 

aware that NCIS is required to investigate every allegation of sexual assault and 

I understand that changes have put into place specialists who handle investigations, 

courtroom litigation and provide victim support. 

Adequacy of training and resources for investigation, prosecution, and defense of 

allegations of sexual assault is critical to ensuring a thorough investigation and fair 

trial of sexual assault cases while protecting both the victim’s privacy interests and 

the constitutional rights of the alleged offenders. If confirmed, I will monitor the Department’s training and resources closely to ensure that they sufficiently prepare 

and equip those who investigate and prosecute sexual assault allegations. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. I believe that preventing and responding to sexual assault is not just a 

legal issue—it is a leadership issue. The chain of command is responsible for the 

health and well-being of the servicemembers they have been entrusted to lead and 

plays a fundamental role in the Department of the Navy’s (DON’s) prevention and 

response efforts. As a result, the chain of command must practice, promote and reinforce these efforts at every level in order to create an environment and culture in 

which sexual assault is not tolerated. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. I believe that, in the military environment, the chain of command has 

a central role in ensuring the well-being of servicemembers, but I also understand 

concerns that have been expressed regarding the role of the chain of command in 

sexual assault prosecutions. If confirmed, I will closely examine this important question, and will keep an open mind regarding options for improving the system for 

prosecutions of sexual assault. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Navy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue ongoing work to implement statutory mandates, Secretary of Defense initiatives, and Service initiatives, and would monitor 

these new initiatives for effectiveness as they are implemented. I would consider 

any independent recommendations and would also continue collaboration with Congressional oversight committees; keeping an open mind regarding their concerns and 

suggestions for addressing this important issue. In addition, I would stress the importance of training as well as the significance of a commitment from leadership at 

all levels to create and sustain a climate that refuses to tolerate sexual assault or 

retaliation against survivors. 

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. In your view, do Department of Defense policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion 

and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on 

those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief? 

Answer. I understand the Department of the Navy (DON) and the Department 

of Defense (DOD) take very seriously the Constitutional freedom expressed in the 

First Amendment for the free exercise of religion on the part of all citizens, including members in military service, and respects those who observe no religion. I am 

aware that commanders, leaders, and chaplains are responsible for ensuring those 

rights are afforded to all of our sailors, marines, their families, and DON civilians, 

and for striving to protect their civil liberties to the greatest extent possible, consistent with military requirements. 

Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers 

offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the 

proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her 

religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs? 

848 

Answer. The Navy’s Chaplain Corps provides religious support to the Navy, Marine Corps and the Coast Guard on the basis of the servicemembers’ respective free 

exercise rights. Chaplains provide prayers on many occasions in both private and 

public settings, and I understand chaplains are never required to pray outside of 

their individual convictions, beliefs, religious traditions, or the tenets of the religious 

organization that provides their endorsement to DOD and DON. I understand that 

there are no Department policies that restrict prayers, either in manner or content, 

though chaplains are encouraged to be respectful of other faiths when praying during official ceremonies where attendance is mandatory. 

Question. Section 533 of the FY13 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112– 

239), as amended by section 532 of the FY14 National Defense Authorization Act 

(P.L. 113–66) protects rights of conscience of members of the armed forces and chaplains of such members, and prohibits, so far as possible, use of such beliefs as the 

basis of any adverse personnel action, discrimination, or denial of promotion, schooling, training, or assignment. Members of some religious denominations have sincerely held beliefs in opposition to same-sex marriage. 

In your view, may a member of the armed forces who has a sincerely held belief 

in opposition to same-sex marriage be subject to adverse personnel action or similar 

other adverse action, if he or she shares those personal views on the subject in a 

personal capacity? 

Answer. I understand that sailors and marines may express sincerely-held moral 

or religious views about same-sex marriage when speaking in a personal capacity, 

but must avoid any appearance that they are expressing an official position. DOD’s 

Equal Opportunity policy (DODD 1020.02E) guarantees all servicemembers an environment free from harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, color, national 

origin, religion, sex, or sexual orientation. Having an environment free from discrimination helps ensure that sailors and marines reach their potential and contribute as much as possible to the mission. So while I understand the Department 

recognizes that some servicemembers may hold very sincere religious convictions in 

good-faith opposition to same-sex marriage, it nevertheless requires all sailors and 

marines to abide by DOD’s Equal Opportunity policy in their official capacities. 

OFFICER ACCESSIONS

Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relative distribution from the 

sources of commission to meet the Navy’s officer accessions requirements and sustain the viability of the Naval Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and the 

Officer Candidate School? 

Answer. My understanding is that each commissioning source brings different 

strengths in terms of prior military experience, academic background, diversity, and 

indoctrination into military culture. The existence of different commissioning 

sources likely makes naval service appealing to a wider range of young men and 

women than would be attracted by any single program. If confirmed, I would need 

to look at the reasons each Service relies on a particular source for a specific number of officer commissions each year, to determine whether the relative distribution 

is appropriately aligned with the skills and experiences necessary to meet the requirements of the force. 

UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

Question. What is your assessment of the policies and procedures at the United 

States Naval Academy to prevent and respond appropriately to sexual assaults and 

sexual harassment and to ensure essential oversight? 

Answer. My understanding is that the United States Naval Academy (USNA) possesses policies and procedures designed to prevent and respond appropriately to sexual harassment and sexual assaults and to ensure essential oversight. I believe it 

is critical at every level to promote a positive command climate that does not tolerate any form of sexual assault,or sexual harassment. I understand that the USNA 

recognizes this and that the highest levels of school leadership are engaged on this 

issue. Recently, the USNA has played an integral part in the launch of the ‘‘It’s On 

Us’’ campaign that addresses prevention of sexual assault on college campuses and 

has participated in a number of civilian institutional forums designed to share best 

practices. If confirmed, one of my highest priorities will be to support the ongoing 

efforts to strengthen the USNA programs and policies that attempt to eliminate sexual assault and sexual harassment. 

Question. What is your assessment of the policies and procedures at the United 

States Naval Academy to ensure religious tolerance and respect? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the USNA follows Department of Defense 

and Department of the Navy policies on religious accommodation and has proceVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00854 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
849 

dures in place aimed at ensuring religious tolerance, respect, and support for midshipmen, faculty, and staff in their personal faith choices. I fully support this Constitutional right and recognize its importance to our Nation and the Department of 

the Navy. If confirmed, I will take all the necessary steps to ensure that the Department of the Navy’s policies reflect religious tolerance for all faiths. 

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. The Department of Defense, in January, 2013, rescinded the policy restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission 

of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and gave the military services until 

January 1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request an 

exception to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that 

must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary 

of Defense. The services were tasked to develop gender-free physical and mental 

standards for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards and have submitted their reports and recommendations to the Military Departments who in turn provided their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense no 

later than 30 September 2015 for review and final decision. 

If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these standards? 

Answer. If confirmed, I believe my role would be oversight and advice to the Secretary of the Navy regarding these standards. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the standards are realistic and preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will work closely with both the Navy and Marine 

Corps and seriously consider their respective input in development or implementation of the standards. 

Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on bona 

fide military requirements? If so, what steps would you take to ensure that such 

decisions are made on this basis? 

Answer. I understand the Department of the Navy is committed to evaluating the 

requirements of each position in order to select and train sailors and marines, who 

can meet the requirements of their military occupational specialties, regardless of 

the gender of the individual. My understanding is that decisions will not be based 

on which positions to open, but rather on what positions require an exception to remain closed. I understand that exceptions to policy (if any) would be subject to a 

very high bar and that military requirements would be the primary consideration 

for any such exceptions. 

Question. If an exception to policy is requested, what criteria should be used to 

determine whether to grant or deny that exception? 

Answer. It is premature for me at this time to offer my opinion on the appropriate 

criteria for granting exceptions to policy. However, I understand that criteria related 

to military requirements would play a central role if any exceptions are requested. 

I share the Navy and Marine Corps view that it is imperative to always maintain 

the high military standards that are necessary in defense of our Nation. 

LEGISLATIVE FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

Question. Each year, the Services assign mid-career officers to the offices of Members of Congress under the Legislative Fellows Program. Upon completion of their 

legislative fellowships, officers are required to be assigned to follow-on positions in 

their services in which they effectively use the experience and knowledge they 

gained during their fellowships. 

What is your assessment of the process for the recruitment, selection, preparation, 

and assignment to Members of Navy officers in the Legislative Fellows program? 

Answer. I understand that the Navy and Marine Corps Legislative Fellows programs are open to a wide variety of Line and Staff Corps officers permanent grades 

of O2 to O5 and some E–6 to E–9. Competition is keen, and the selection process 

focuses primarily on individual performance, promotion potential, career, timing, 

breadth of experience, academic and subspecialty qualifications, needs of the Navy 

and Marine Corps, and availability for follow-on assignment, as well as communication skills, aptitude, personality, and the general ability to adapt to a Capitol Hill 

work environment. I understand that Fellow selectees are provided with training 

within the Office of Legislative Affairs and in a Capitol Hill workshop, and that 

they are offered the opportunity to earn a Legislative Additional Qualification Designator (AQD). 

850 

Question. What is your assessment of the value of the Legislative Fellows program to the Navy and the utilization of officers who have served as legislative fellows? 

Answer. I understand the Fellows program educates Navy personnel on the workings of the legislative branch of government, while enhancing Navy/Marine Corps’ 

ability to fulfill its role in the national policy development process. I understand 

that the Navy/Marine Corps benefit from assignment of personnel to Congress by 

bringing a unique perspective to the process of drafting and passing legislation, and 

by affording the incumbent an opportunity to learn about the legislative process. 

Specifically, Fellows receive instruction and hands-on experience in a Congressional 

office through dedicated training and developmental activities; a full-time, one-year 

assignment to the staff of a Member of Congress who serves on a Defense-related 

subcommittee; and liaison with the Navy/Marine Corps Office of Legislative Affairs 

(OLA). 

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of 

senior executives. 

What is your vision for the management and development of the Navy senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields? 

Answer. I am very interested in supporting the development and management of 

the senior executive workforce for the Department of the Navy. The quality and capabilities of the civilian executive leadership is vital to the functioning of the Department. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that senior executives have a diverse 

portfolio of experiences and strong leadership skills that support the Department’s 

mission and organizational goals. I understand that the Department has an enterprise approach to senior executive management through an Executive Management 

Advisory Panel and an annual Talent and Succession Management process. My understanding is that these processes were designed to ensure the Department has the 

leadership and technical talent for the mission including acquisition, financial, scientific and technical capabilities. If confirmed, I will review the executive management process and ensure that the policies are in place to attract, retain, and develop 

the best senior executives for all positions. 

BALANCE BETWEEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES

Question. The Navy employs many civilian employees and contractors. In many 

cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and 

task forces, and perform many of the same functions as federal employees. Both contractors and civilians make up an integral part of the Department’s total workforce. 

Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees and contractor 

employees is in the best interests of the Navy? 

Answer. I believe the Department of the Navy’s best interests are served by 

achieving and maintaining the right balance of military, federal civil servants and 

contractor employees in each organization and set of functions. I am aware that for 

each function, the Department of the Navy must consider the most appropriate, effective, and cost-efficient source of labor to meet mission requirements. If confirmed, 

I would be committed to identifying and maintaining the optimal mix of military, 

federal civil servants, and contractor personnel and to practices that ensure the best 

stewardship of taxpayer resources. 

Question. In your view, has the Department utilized contractors to perform basic 

functions in an appropriate manner? 

Answer. For every function, the Department should consider the most appropriate 

and effective sources of labor, and apply scrutiny to processes at all levels to ensure 

that no inherently governmental functions are outsourced. It is also critical for the 

Department to examine mission requirements and best stewardship practices of existing resources when determining the most effective use of contractors. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary, and other leaders to assess the extent of the Department’s reliance on contractors and to ensure compliance with law and policy. 

Question. Do you believe that the Navy should undertake a comprehensive reappraisal of ‘‘inherently governmental functions’’ and other critical government functions, and how they are performed? 

Answer. I understand that the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act, 

the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the Total Force Management statutes of title 10 govern the proper sourcing of labor. It is always in our best interest 

851 

to carefully review the direct, indirect, and potentially unintended consequences of 

a decision to contract out functions, and to take precautions to ensure that inherently governmental functions are not outsourced. If confirmed, I am committed to 

enforcing the processes necessary to perform this analysis, and to ensuring Departmental compliance with the FAIR Act and the FAR. 

Question. Are there non-monetary reasons why the Navy would need or desire one 

type of manpower over the other? If so, provide relevant examples where of those 

reasons? Under what circumstances should cost be used as the primary factor? 

Answer. I understand there are multiple factors that contribute to workforce mix 

decisions, many of which are non-monetary. If the duties are deemed inherently governmental, (for example work that involves key fiduciary responsibilities) then the 

work must be sourced by military or federal civilian employees, without consideration for cost. Similarly, cost might not be the driving factor when sourcing a shortterm project that requires highly specialized expertise not readily found in the federal workforce. However, cost would likely be used as a primary factor when filling 

requirements that are neither inherently governmental nor core business processes 

of the Department of the Navy. Additionally, in some cases, it may be desirable for 

certain positions to be used as shore rotation billets even if, narrowly considered, 

the positions might be filled by civilians at lower cost (since it is not reasonable to 

expect sailors and marines to spend their entire careers assigned to ships and other 

operational units). For every function, the Department should consider the most appropriate, effective, and cost-efficient source of labor to meet the mission requirement. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work with other appropriate officials in the Navy 

to review the contractor and civilian force mix for cost and mission effectiveness? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with other appropriate officials in the Department to review the contractor and civilian force mix. As required by statute, if 

confirmed, I will also work closely with the Under Secretaries of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Comptroller, and Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, to 

ensure that the Department of the Navy continues to operate in a manner consistent with the Department of Defense guidance. 

Question. Would you agree that the balance between civilian employees and contractor employees in performing Navy functions should be determined by the best 

interests of the Navy and its mission requirements? 

Answer. Absolutely, and the Department of the Navy’s continuous success in mission accomplishment hinges upon continuing to employ the most effective and appropriate workforce mix of available labor sources. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work to remove any artificial constraints placed 

on the size of the Navy’s civilian and contractor workforce, so that the Navy can 

hire the number and type of employees most appropriate to accomplish its mission? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will support efforts to ensure that the Department of the 

Navy has the most appropriate, effective, and cost-efficient workforce to accomplish 

its many missions, within available resources. I will also support efforts to remove 

any inappropriate constraints on the size of the civilian or contractor workforce. 

ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY WORKFORCE

Question. The Department of Defense is in a global competition for the highest 

quality STEM professionals at the entry-level, mid-career, and senior levels. These 

individuals are charged with managing billions of dollars’ worth of taxpayer resources in complex acquisition programs, directly providing technical support to 

military operations, supporting the development of technically informed policies and 

regulations in areas ranging from cybersecurity to use of drones; and performing 

world class research and engineering functions in in house labs and centers. 

Do you feel that the Navy can currently compete with the private sector for the 

highest quality technical performers at the early career, mid-career, and senior levels? 

Answer. I understand that the Department of the Navy is experiencing some success in regard to hiring the highest quality technical performers across the full career spectrum and, for the most part, is competitive with the private sector for the 

Nation’s best and brightest talent. Our country’s technical workforce is driven by 

the opportunity to practice hands-on science and engineering within one’s chosen 

discipline. The Department continues to provide such opportunities for prospective 

candidates at generally competitive salary rates. However, I understand Departmental hiring managers face significant hurdles in the hiring process that are not 

shared by private sector employers. Streamlining the hiring process to overcome 

these hurdles would allow the Department of the Navy to increase its hiring success 

rate across early career, mid-career, and senior levels. I understand several current 

852 

Departmental proposals are aimed at broadening workforce talent recruitment (including STEM occupations) and retaining personnel by expanding career opportunities and developing talent management processes. 

Question. How will you work to enhance policies and flexibilities necessary to 

allow the Navy to compete with the private sector for this talent? 

Answer. I understand the Department of the Navy’s ability to compete for and retain talented technical performers at all career levels is dependent upon streamlining the hiring process and ensuring that the technical workforce is engaged in 

hands-on research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) initiatives. Specifically, I understand that direct hiring authority at the Navy Warfare Center and 

Laboratory levels would facilitate the Department’s ability to compete for talent, as 

would providing technical hiring managers with the flexibility to identify and hire 

appropriate talent within a timeframe that is consistent with that of the private sector. In addition, I understand that the Department of the Navy’s Task Force Innovation provides its workforce the opportunity to improve the DON through new and 

innovative ideas, to assist not only with mission execution, but also with workforce 

attraction and retention. 

If confirmed, I will work very closely with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

(Research, Development & Acquisition), the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and other Departmental leaders to ensure that policies, practices, and new initiatives fully leverage the flexibility authorized by Congress to enable the Department of the Navy to remain competitive with the private 

sector in attracting talent. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided in a timely manner to this Committee and its staff 

and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THOM TILLIS

WOMEN IN COMBAT INTEGRATION

1. Senator TILLIS. Mr. Parker, the Marines recently released the results of their 

major research study on combat integration. Before reviewing the report, Secretary 

Mabus indicated that he will not support any exceptions to policy to close any 

ground combat elements to women. Are you familiar with the Department of the 

Marine Corps’ Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force report? 

Mr. PARKER. I am aware that the Marine Corps submitted a report internal to 

the Department of Defense on the Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force, 

but I am not aware of any official release of that report. 

2. Senator TILLIS. Would you have made the same decision as Secretary Mabus 

before conducting a thorough review of the report and understanding the rigorous 

research efforts done to prepare the report? 

Mr. PARKER. My understanding is that Secretary Mabus thoroughly reviewed the 

Marine Corps report and submitted a consolidated Department of the Navy (DON) 

recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, as directed by Secretary Panetta and 

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Chairman Dempsey in their guidance on this policy. The official decision in this 

matter is currently with the Secretary of Defense. 

3. Senator TILLIS. The Marine Corps’ research demonstrated that women suffered 

higher injury rates among women than men when engaged in field combat exercises 

and training. Does that concern you? 

Mr. PARKER. Injured sailors and marines always concern me regardless of the circumstances leading to the injury. 

4. Senator TILLIS. Mr. Parker, Do you support the decision of Secretary Mabus 

not to allow the Marine Corps recommendation to go forward to the Secretary of 

Defense? 

Mr. PARKER. I am aware that Secretary Mabus has submitted his recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and included in his submission all recommendations 

and supplemental materials provided by the Commandant of the Marine Corps and 

the Chief of Naval Operations. 

5. Senator TILLIS. If yes, wouldn’t it be best to allow the Secretary of Defense to 

review all recommendations and research materials and then make a decision? 

Mr. PARKER. It is my understanding that Secretary Mabus thoroughly reviewed 

all provided materials before making his final recommendation to the Secretary of 

Defense and that Secretary Carter intends to carefully review all data and recommendations before making a final decision. 

6. Senator TILLIS. Mr. Parker, Do you believe women should be required to register for the draft? 

Mr. PARKER. I understand that the decision to rescind the 1994 Direct Combat 

Definition and Assignment Rule may require an analysis of the Military Selective 

Service Act. If confirmed, I will further review the Military Selective Service Act 

and work with Congress, if requested, on this issue. 

GUANTANAMO BAY

7. Senator TILLIS. Mr. Parker, In the event that the President directed the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo to the United States, in your professional legal 

judgment, would officers of the Department of the Navy be at legal risk for a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act if they were to execute a transfer of detainees from 

Guantanamo to the United States, contrary to the prohibition against use of appropriated funds for that exact purpose? 

Mr. PARKER. If confirmed, this is an issue for which I would have to seek legal 

counsel. Generally, I understand that if an agency incurs an obligation in excess or 

in advance of amounts that are legally available, the agency has violated the AntiDeficiency Act. 

COMMAND CLIMATES

8. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Parker, how will you encourage strength and resilience 

and foster supportive command climates? 

Mr. PARKER. Developing and maintaining resilient sailors, marines and families 

with effective fitness, readiness and transition programs while decreasing and deterring destructive behaviors through awareness, training, and accountability has been 

a priority in the Department of the Navy. If confirmed, I will continue the emphasis 

on core programs including physical readiness, substance abuse prevention, family 

readiness, suicide prevention, sexual assault prevention and response, sexual harassment prevention, equal opportunity, transition assistance and hazing prevention. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION EFFORTS

9. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Parker, do you have any specific ideas for initiatives to 

prevent suicide in our military? 

Mr. PARKER. Every death by suicide is a tragedy and an unacceptable loss to the 

Department of the Navy. Suicide is a difficult problem and despite diligent efforts 

by the Department of the Navy, DOD and the nation, we still do not know how to 

prevent all suicides. However, there are evidence-based practices that are known to 

reduce risk by improving protective factors, reducing risk factors, and reaching out 

and providing help and resources to those at risk. If confirmed, continuing robust 

suicide prevention programs in the Navy and Marine Corps will be a priority for 

me. I will ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps suicide prevention programs 

monitor the latest research on suicide prevention and implement procedures that 

show potential to reduce suicides. 

854 

10. Senator SULLIVAN. If so, what are your specific ideas? 

Mr. PARKER. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps suicide 

prevention programs monitor the latest research on suicide prevention and implement procedures that show potential to reduce suicides. 

[The nomination reference of Mr. Franklin R. Parker follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

March 26, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Franklin R. Parker, of Illinois, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, vice Juan 

M. Garcia III. 

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Franklin R. Parker, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF FRANKLIN R. PARKER

Education: 

• Yale University 

• 1992–1996 • Bachelor of Arts, Sociology • Stanford Law School 

• 1996–1999 • Juris Doctor • Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government 

• 2002–2004 • Master in Public Policy, Political Advocacy and Leadership 

Employment Record: 

• U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration (Washington, 

DC) 

• Chief Counsel • February 2012–Present • U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the General Counsel (Washington, DC) 

• Special Assistant (Attorney-Advisor) to the General Counsel • August 2009–February 2012 • Winston & Strawn LLP (Washington, DC) 

• Associate • January 2005–August 2009 • Catholic Charities, Archdiocesan Legal Network (Washington, DC) 

• Pro Bono Legal Clinic Volunteer • January–August 2009 • National Conference of State Societies (Washington, DC) 

• General Counsel (Volunteer) • March 2008–August 2009 • Taylor Business Institute (Washington, DC/Chicago, IL) 

• Member of the Board of Governors (Volunteer) • June 2005–August 2009 • Illinois State Society (Washington, DC) 

• Member of the Board of Directors (Volunteer) • June 2005–August 2009 • Obama for America (Washington, DC/Various States) 

• Volunteer • March 2007–December 2008 • Obama for Illinois (Chicago, IL) 

• Member of the Policy and Research Staff • July–December 2004 

• AmericaSpeaks (Cambridge, MA/Washington, DC) 

• Volunteer 

• October 2003–April 2004 

855 

• Trust for Public Land (Boston, MA) 

• Summer Analyst/Summer Associate 

• June–August 2003 

• Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group (Boston, MA) 

• Volunteer 

• February–May 2003 

• Taylor Business Institute (Cambridge, MA/Chicago, IL/Washington, DC) 

• Ad hoc consulting assistance 

• August 2002–June 2005 

• In-Common (Cambridge, MA) 

• Student Peer Counselor (Volunteer) 

• Approx. September 2002–January 2003 

• Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP (Palo Alto, CA) 

• Associate 

• August 2000–November 2001 

• Big Brothers, Big Sisters of San Francisco and the Peninsula (East Palo Alto, 

CA) 

• Tutor and Mentor (Volunteer) 

• Approx. October 2000–May 2002 

• San Francisco 49ers Academy (East Palo Alto, CA) 

• Tutor and Mentor (Volunteer) 

• Approx. October 2000–May 2002 

• East Palo Alto Community Law Project (East Palo Alto, CA) 

• Pro Bono Legal Clinic Volunteer 

• Approx. August 2000–November 2001 

• Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro LLP (San Francisco, CA) 

• Associate 

• October 1999–July 2000 

• San Francisco Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights (San Francisco, CA) 

• Pro Bono Legal Clinic Volunteer 

• Approx. October 1999–July 2000 

• Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro LLP (San Francisco, CA) 

• Summer Associate 

• July–August 1998 

• Mayer, Brown & Platt LLP (Chicago, IL) 

• Summer Associate 

• June–July 1998 

• Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro LLP (San Francisco, CA) 

• Summer Associate 

• June–August 1997 

• Street Law (Palo Alto/San Jose, CA) 

• Volunteer Instructor 

• Approx. October 1997–May 1998 

• United States Senator Paul Simon (Washington, DC) 

• Judiciary Committee Intern 

• Approx. June–August 1996 

Honors and Awards: 

• Department of the Navy, Distinguished Public Service Award (2012) 

• Department of the Navy, Meritorious Public Service Award (2011) 

• Winston & Strawn LLP, Pro Bono Commitment to Service Award (2009) 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Mr. Franklin R. Parker in connection with 

his nomination follows:] 

856 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Franklin R. Parker. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

3. Date of nomination: 

March 26, 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

May 12, 1974 in Joliet, Illinois. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Anne Hong Nguyen. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. 

Providence Catholic Hiqh School (1988–1992): High School Diploma (June 4, 

1992). 

Yale University (1992–1996): Bachelor of Arts (May 27, 1996). 

Stanford Law School (1996–1999): Juris Doctor (June 13, 1999). 

Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government (2002–2004); Master 

in Public Policy (June 10, 2004). 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration (Washington, DC)— 

Chief Counsel (February 2012–Present). 

U.S. Department of the Navy (Washington, DC)—Special Assistant (Attorney-Advisor) to the General Counsel (August 2009–February 2012). 

Winston & Strawn LLP (Washington, DC)—Associate (January 2005–August 

2009). 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

U.S. Senator Paul Simon (Washington, DC)—Judiciary Committee Intern 

(Approx. June–August 1996). 

U.S. Congressman Mel Reynolds (Washington, DC)—Legislative Intern (Approx. 

June–August 1994). 

857 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

• State Bar of California (admitted 1999). 

• District of Columbia Bar (admitted 2004). 

• United States District Court for the District of Columbia (admitted December 

2006: not active). 

• United States Supreme Court Bar (admitted 2011). 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

05/19/2010—$200.00 (Newell, Felton via Newell for Congress). 

08/05/2012—$1,000.00 (Obama, Barack via Obama for America). 

09/03/2012—$1,500.00 (Obama, Barack via Obama for America). 

09/19/2012—$1,000.00 (Obama Victory Fund 2012). 

09/29/2012—$1,500.00 (Obama Victory Fund 2012). 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Distinguished Public Service Award, U.S. Department of the Navy (2012). 

Meritorious Public Service Award, U.S. Department of the Navy (2011). 

Pro Bono Commitment to Service Award, Winston & Strawn LLP (2009). 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

None. 

16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

Copies of representative speeches are provided with this questionnaire. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

858 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

FRANKLIN R. PARKER

This 6th day of April, 2015 

[The nomination of Mr. Franklin R. Parker was reported to the 

Senate by Chairman McCain on December 7, 2015, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on December 14, 2015.] 

(859) 

NOMINATIONS OF HONORABLE MARCEL J. 

LETTRE II TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; MR. GABRIEL O. CAMARILLO TO BE ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS; MR. JOHN 

E. SPARKS TO BE A JUDGE ON THE COURT 

OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES; 

AND VICE ADMIRAL KURT W. TIDD, USN TO 

BE ADMIRAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED 

STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:14 p.m. in Room 

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Fischer, Ernst, 

Reed, Gillibrand, Donnelly, and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. We welcome all of our nominees here this afternoon, as well as members of your families. As 

is our tradition, at the beginning of your testimony, we welcome 

you to introduce any members of your family that are joining us 

today. 

Admiral Tidd, you have been nominated to serve as the next 

Commander of U.S. Southern Command [SOUTHCOM]. If confirmed, you will be responsible for overseeing a region facing a 

daunting array of security and governance challenges. At the same 

time, however, you will be forced to confront those challenges without the support you require due to persistent resource shortfalls 

that plague our efforts in the region. 

In testimony before this committee in March, General John 

Kelly, USMC, the outgoing SOUTHCOM Commander, framed the 

impact of these longstanding resource shortfalls in stark terms by 

stating: ‘‘This presents more than just risks to our national interests; U.S. Southern Command has accepted risk for so long in this 

region that we now face a near-total lack of awareness of threats 

860 

and the readiness to respond, should those threats reach crisis 

levels.’’ 

Of particular concern is the deteriorating situation in Central 

America, where feeble governance, endemic corruption, and weak 

security institutions are allowing transnational criminal organizations to operate with impunity. Despite our efforts to counter these 

ruthless groups and the drugs they traffic into our country, it is 

clear we are not winning the war. 

Demand for the drugs, heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine, is 

too high and the profits too great to dissuade these criminals from 

their illicit actions. We, of course, must improve and adequately resource our drug interdiction strategy, but we must also reduce demand here at home. To be clear, the threat posed by these groups 

extends beyond the drugs they smuggle into our communities. The 

smuggling routes they control are also used to traffic weapons, bulk 

cash, and even humans and pose a direct threat to our national security. 

While the challenges within the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility [AOR] are significant, there are also opportunities. Colombia, 

once on the cusp of becoming a failed state, has emerged from decades of conflict as a remarkable example of what sustained U.S. 

support and engagement can achieve. Admiral, I look forward to 

your thoughts today on how you intend to approach both the enormous challenges and opportunities within the SOUTHCOM area of 

responsibility. 

Mr. Lettre, if confirmed to be the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence, you would serve as the principal intelligence advisor 

to the Secretary of Defense. The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence was created in 2002 in the wake of the 9/11 

attacks to better integrate, oversee, and prioritize intelligence resources and capabilities throughout the Department. This mission 

has never been more important. 

Currently, the United States faces an increasingly complex global 

threat environment where terrorist organizations are metastasizing 

and now exercise state-like capabilities, and nation-state adversaries are increasingly asserting power, even through irregular and 

asymmetric means. Every component of our Defense Department 

must have timely intelligence to understand the varied threats we 

face, to prepare for potential conflict, and to respond swiftly, accurately, and decisively when necessary. In an age of decreasing 

budgets, accurate and timely intelligence becomes all the more 

vital. We look forward to discussing how Mr. Lettre plans to address his important mission. 

Mr. Camarillo, you are nominated to serve as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. You currently serve as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Acquisitions Logistics and Technology. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, you would be responsible for the 

overall supervision of manpower and reserve component affairs of 

the Department of the Air Force. 

The Air Force is challenged with implementation of congressionally mandated reductions in headquarters personnel to transform 

what is currently a bloated infrastructure into a lean and responsive organization. I hope your recent experience in the Army headVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00866 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
861 

quarters will also bring a new, fresh perspective to the Air Force’s 

remotely piloted aircraft [RPA] personnel community. The Air 

Force must move away from legacy organizational structure in this 

vital area. The Air Force must also embrace the use of enlisted and 

warrant officer RPA pilots as it builds a viable career force. I look 

forward to hearing your views on this subject. 

Mr. Sparks, you have faithfully served as Commissioner to the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces for 14 years. 

You are a graduate of one of the finest educational institutions in 

the world, the United States Naval Academy, and you served with 

distinction as an officer in the United States Marine Corps. I cannot imagine a more able and qualified individual than you to serve 

as judge on the highest court in our military justice system. 

Our committee has been at the vanguard of recent significant 

changes to the military justice system, establishing new protections 

for victims of sexual assault while preserving the rights of those 

military members accused of criminal activity and while empowering the vital and necessary ownership of good order and discipline by military commanders. As an individual nominated to 

serve as a judge, neither I nor any of my colleagues would expect 

you to comment on a matter that might cause you to be disqualified on any future case that may come before the court. However, 

I look forward to hearing your views on the state of military justice 

as they are informed by your wealth of experience. 

We will begin with you, Secretary Lettre, and move down the 

list. As I said, please feel free to introduce your family members 

after Senator Reed predicts what will happen on Saturday. 

Senator REED. I have only one question. Mr. Sparks, did you play 

football at Navy? 

Mr. SPARKS. I did not, Senator. 

Senator REED. Then you have the potential to be nominated to 

the position—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator REED. With that, Mr. Chairman, I have a statement that 

simply describes the expertise and the increasing level of responsibilities and service of these gentlemen, which makes them all in 

my view well qualified for the jobs. I would ask unanimous consent 

my statement be made part of the record and then allow you to 

continue. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Reed follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JACK REED

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our nominees, and 

I thank you for holding this hearing to fill important military and civilian vacancies 

in the Department of Defense. The positions for which these individuals have been 

nominated involve significant and challenging duties. If confirmed, I am confident 

that these nominees are up to the challenge. 

Mr. Lettre, who has been nominated for the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, is well suited to serve as the principal staff advisor for the 

Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters. In addition to serving as the Principal 

Deputy to the previous Under Secretary for Intelligence or the last 2 years and Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence for the last 7 months, Mr. Lettre 

served as a Special Assistant to Secretaries of Defense Chuck Hagel, Leon Panetta, 

and Bob Gates, including serving as Deputy Chief of Staff to Secretary Panetta. He 

also served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. Prior to his executive branch service, Mr. Lettre was the Senior Defense and 

Intelligence Advisor and then Senior National Security Advisor to the Senate MajorVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00867 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
862 

ity Leader. He also served on the staff of the House Permanent Select Committee 

on Intelligence from 2002 to 2005. As intelligence is a key factor in all of our critical 

operational challenges, I look forward to hearing Mr. Lettre’s ideas for improvement 

and reform. 

Mr. Camarillo, nominated for the position of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, will face many challenges managing Air Force 

military and civilian personnel. Mr. Camarillo comes from the Army where he currently serves as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics & Technology. Prior to his Army experience, he practiced law in the private sector. We hope that Mr. Camarillo’s broad and varied experience will bring 

fresh ideas and solutions to the challenges he will face. 

Mr. Sparks has an extensive military and military justice background that makes 

him well-qualified to serve as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Armed Forces. He began his military career as a Marine infantry officer, so he has 

experienced first-hand the need for good order and discipline in a combat unit. He 

also has extensive experience as a Marine judge advocate, and most recently has 

served as a Commissioner to the Court to which he has been nominated as a judge. 

With this extensive relevant experience, Mr. Sparks will bring a very valuable perspective to this court, which is sometimes referred to as the ‘‘Supreme Court for the 

military,’’ a court consisting of civilian judges that is, in most cases, the final arbiter 

of the fairness and correct application of the UCMJ. 

Vice Admiral Tidd, nominated for promotion to admiral and assignment as Commander, United States Southern Command, holds the title of the Navy’s ‘‘Old Salt,’’ 

the longest serving surface warfare trained officer on Active Duty. Vice Admiral 

Tidd has served in positions of distinction throughout his career, positions including 

the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director for Operations for the Joint Staff, and the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command and U.S. 4th Fleet. Particularly in this era of constrained resources, the next 

commander will need to leverage the capabilities of the interagency and of the international community in order to faithfully carry out SOUTHCOM’s mission. Vice Admiral Tidd’s knowledge and experience have equipped him well for this undertaking. 

Again, I thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing, and I look forward to 

hearing from our witnesses. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Before we begin with the witnesses, we have standard questions 

for our civilian nominations, and that is Mr. Lettre and Mr. 

Camarillo and Mr. Sparks. If you will just respond to the questions. 

Admiral Tidd as well. All right. Admiral Tidd, you will have one 

last question. 

For all four of you then, in order to exercise its legislative and 

oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and 

other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive 

testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Have you adhered to the applicable laws and regulations governing 

conflicts of interest? Just say yes or no. 

Mr. LETTRE. Yes. 

Mr. CAMARILLO. Yes. 

Mr. SPARKS. Yes, I have. 

Admiral TIDD. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

Mr. LETTRE. No. 

Mr. CAMARILLO. No. 

Mr. SPARKS. No. 

Admiral TIDD. No. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record in hearings? 

Mr. LETTRE. Yes. 

863 

Mr. CAMARILLO. Yes. 

Mr. SPARKS. Yes. 

Admiral TIDD. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 

and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Mr. LETTRE. Yes. 

Mr. CAMARILLO. Yes. 

Mr. SPARKS. Yes. 

Admiral TIDD. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Mr. LETTRE. Yes. 

Mr. CAMARILLO. Yes. 

Mr. SPARKS. Yes. 

Admiral TIDD. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 

testify upon request before this committee? 

Mr. LETTRE. Yes. 

Mr. CAMARILLO. Yes. 

Mr. SPARKS. Yes. 

Admiral TIDD. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner 

when requested by a dually constituted committee or to consult 

with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or 

denial in providing such documents? 

Mr. LETTRE. Yes. 

Mr. CAMARILLO. Yes. 

Mr. SPARKS. Yes. 

Admiral TIDD. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Admiral Tidd, do you agree, when asked, to 

give your personal views even if those views differ from the administration in power? 

Admiral TIDD. Yes, I do. 

Chairman MCCAIN. All right. 

Mr. Secretary, please begin. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MARCEL J. LETTRE II, TO BE 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. LETTRE. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of the 

committee, I am honored—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. By the way, could I just interrupt? Your complete statements will be made part of the record. 

Go ahead, please. 

Mr. LETTRE. I am honored to be here with you this afternoon as 

you consider my nomination as Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

I would like to begin by introducing my family and guests in attendance today. I am privileged to introduce my wife Simmons; my 

daughters, McKinley, age 13, and Amelia, age 11; my brother, 

Peter Lettre, who has come down from Brooklyn, New York; my 

mother-in-law, Millie Ravenel, who has come up from Raleigh, 

North Carolina; my mother from Fredericksburg, Virginia, Mary 

864 

Lettre, a proud Army wife and former teacher; and my father, 

Marcel Lettre, Sr., a retired Army colonel, Airborne Ranger and 

Vietnam combat veteran, who I might add successfully avoided a 

Pentagon tour during his 27 years of service. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Miraculous. Congratulations to all the family 

members, and we are very pleased that you would take the time 

to be here. I know this is a proud time for you. 

Mr. LETTRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am also pleased that a number of other friends and colleagues 

are here, including two college friends and former colleagues, Jason 

Forester and Andrew Williams. Thanks, guys. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. LETTRE. Finally, I would like to thank the defense leaders 

I have had the privilege to work with over the last 7 years, including Secretary Carter, Deputy Secretary Bob Work, former Secretaries Bob Gates, Leon Panetta, and Chuck Hagel, and former 

Under Secretaries Mike Vickers, Michele Flournoy, and Jim Miller. 

I am honored that President Obama has nominated me as Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

If confirmed, I will be proud to serve the men and women of the 

U.S. military and the defense intelligence enterprise. Our people, 

their dedication to mission, their skills, their integrity, and innovative spirit are our true strategic advantage. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe we are facing one of the most complex 

geostrategic landscapes we have seen in several decades, and the 

need for integrated, informed, cutting-edge intelligence has never 

been greater. If confirmed, I intend to focus on three priorities. 

First, fostering jointness and integration across defense intelligence, a critical source of our strategic advantage. In this regard, 

I look forward to a continued partnership with Director of National 

Intelligence Jim Clapper and the leaders of the 17 organizations 

that make up the Intelligence Community. I also applaud this committee’s efforts to review the record of defense and intelligence reforms spurred by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and other subsequent reform initiatives. I welcome a dialogue on further initiatives 

that we can undertake to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, and 

agility of defense intelligence. 

Second, providing intelligence support to current operations. We 

must bring the powerful capabilities of defense intelligence to bear 

on a range of pressing current operational challenges, most notably, countering ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], 

countering Russian aggression, operationalizing the Asia-Pacific rebalance, providing intelligence support to cyber defense, countering 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and ensuring stability 

in Afghanistan. 

Third, investing in innovative future capabilities. As the Department pursues technologies and operational concepts that will ensure a strong advantage over adversaries for decades to come, what 

Bob Work has called the ‘‘third offset,’’ five investment areas are 

particularly important for ensuring an enduring and innovative defense intelligence advantage: capabilities that ensure global coverage; operating in anti-access, area-denial environments; counterterrorism and counterproliferation; cyber defense; and countering 

865 

insider threat. Even as resources remain constrained, we must 

sharpen the impressive capabilities that keep America’s superior 

technological edge. 

This committee’s oversight and guidance steer these efforts. I 

look forward to contributing to a close partnership shaped by 

strong and regular dialogue between defense intelligence leaders 

and this committee in order to further the committee’s oversight responsibilities. 

We must implement our priorities in defense intelligence while 

being ever vigilant about the need for vigorous protection of the 

principles, rights, and freedoms from which America gains its 

strength. 

Our intelligence analysts must always hear from our leaders that 

we expect them to speak truth to power, to call it as they see it. 

Above all, those of us privileged to serve in these positions of responsibility recognize that we owe our citizens and our families our 

full focus and our full energy on keeping the Nation safe and secure. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lettre follows:] 

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE MARCEL J. LETTRE II 

Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, Members of the Committee, I am honored to be 

before you here this afternoon as you consider my nomination as Under Secretary 

of Defense for Intelligence. 

To begin, I’d like to introduce my family and guests in attendance today and recognize several individuals who shaped my life toward a role in public service. 

I’m privileged to introduce: 

• My wife Simmons; 

• My daughters McKinley, age 13, and Amelia, age 11; 

• My brother, Peter Lettre; 

• My mother-in-law, Millie Ravenel, who drove up from Raleigh, North Carolina; 

• My mother, Mary Lettre, a proud Army wife and teacher; 

• And my father, Marcel Lettre, Sr., a retired Army Colonel, Airborne Ranger and 

Vietnam combat veteran—who, I might add, successfully avoided a Pentagon 

tour during his 27 years of service. 

I am also pleased that a number of other friends and colleagues are in attendance 

today—thank you for being here. 

And, finally, I would like to thank the defense leaders I have had the privilege 

to work for over the last seven years—including Secretary Ash Carter, Deputy Secretary Bob Work, former Secretaries Bob Gates, Leon Panetta, and Chuck Hagel, 

and former Under Secretaries Mike Vickers, Michele Flournoy, and Jim Miller. 

I am honored that President Obama has nominated me as Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

If confirmed, I will be proud to serve the men and women of the U.S. military 

and the defense intelligence enterprise. Our people—their dedication to mission, 

their skills, their agility and innovative spirit—are our true strategic advantage. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe we are facing one of the most complex geostrategic landscapes we have seen in several decades, and the need for integrated, informed, cutting edge intelligence has never been greater. If confirmed, I intend to focus on 

three priorities. 

First, fostering jointness and integration across defense intelligence—a critical 

source of our strategic advantage. In this regard, I look forward to a continued partnership with Director of National Intelligence Jim Clapper and the leaders of the 

17 organizations that make up the Intelligence Community. I also applaud this committee’s efforts to review the record of defense and intelligence reform spurred by 

the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and other subsequent reform initiatives. I welcome 

a dialogue on further initiatives that we can undertake to enhance the efficiency, 

effectiveness, and agility of defense intelligence. 

Second, providing intelligence support to current operations. We must bring the 

powerful capabilities of defense intelligence to bear on a range of pressing current 

866 

operational challenges—most notably, countering ISIL, countering Russian aggression, operationalizing the Asia-Pacific rebalance, providing intelligence support to 

cyberdefense, countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and ensuring 

stability in Afghanistan. 

Third, investing in innovative future capabilities. As the Department pursues 

technologies and operational concepts that will ensure a strong advantage over adversaries for decades to come—what Bob Work has called the ‘‘Third Offset’’—five 

investment areas are particularly important for ensuring an enduring and innovative defense intelligence advantage—capabilities that ensure: global coverage; operating in anti-access, area-denial environments; counterterrorism and counterproliferation; cyberdefense; and countering insider threat. Even as resources remain 

constrained, we must sharpen the impressive capabilities that keep America’s superior technological edge and protect its advantages over its adversaries. 

This committee’s oversight and guidance steers these efforts. I look forward to 

contributing to a close partnership shaped by strong and regular dialogue between 

defense intelligence leaders and this committee in order to further this committee’s 

oversight responsibilities. 

We must implement our priorities in defense intelligence while being ever vigilant 

about the need for vigorous protection of the principles, rights and freedoms from 

which America gains its strength. 

Our intelligence analysts must also always hear from our leaders that we expect 

them to speak truth to power, to call it as they see it. 

And, above all, those of us privileged to serve in these positions of responsibility 

recognize that we owe our citizens and our families our full focus and our full energy on keeping the Nation safe and secure. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Camarillo? 

STATEMENT OF MR. GABRIEL O. CAMARILLO, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR MANPOWER AND 

RESERVE AFFAIRS 

Mr. CAMARILLO. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the 

committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before the 

committee today, and I also appreciate the confidence that President Obama, Secretary Carter, and Secretary James have placed in 

me by supporting my nomination as Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

I begin by thanking my family for their love and support. I am 

joined today by my wife Nicole and my two children, which include 

my 12-year-old son Ethan and my 7-year-old daughter Natalie. 

They are equally grateful to this committee for providing them 

with the basis for an excused absence from school. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Is it the one with the bow in her hair? 

Mr. CAMARILLO. Yes, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. You certainly look beautiful today. Thank 

you. 

Mr. CAMARILLO. I would be remiss if I did not thank my parents, 

my siblings, and countless colleagues and mentors who have enabled me to succeed. Working with the dedicated airmen, soldiers, 

sailors, marines, and Department civilians that I have encountered 

remains the highest honor of my career. Their talent and dedication sets an example for our Nation, and their enduring contributions remain our greatest asset. 

Over the past 5 years, I have been extremely privileged to serve 

with Army soldiers and civilians in support of the Army’s acquisition efforts. This experience has underscored the vital importance 

of our people, the talent they contribute, and the expertise that 

they provide. As Secretary James has stated, the Air Force’s greatVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00872 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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est strength is its people. If confirmed, I will dedicate my efforts 

to ensuring that Active Duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilian 

airmen receive the support that they need as they work selflessly 

to defend our country. 

Thank you again for considering my nomination, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Camarillo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. GABRIEL CAMARILLO

Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Members of the Committee, 

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today. I also 

appreciate the confidence that President Obama, Secretary Carter and Secretary 

James have placed in me by supporting my nomination as Assistant Secretary of 

the Air Force. 

I begin by thanking my family for their love and support. I am joined by my wife, 

Nicole, and my two children, which include my 12 year-old son Ethan and my 7- 

year old daughter Natalie. They are equally grateful to this Committee for providing 

them with the basis for an excused absence from school. 

I would be remiss if I did not thank my parents, siblings and countless colleagues 

and mentors who have enabled me to succeed. Working with the dedicated airmen, 

soldiers, sailors, marines and department civilians I have encountered remains the 

highest honor of my career. Their talent and dedication sets an example for our Nation, and their enduring contributions remain our greatest asset. 

Over the past five years, I have been extremely privileged to serve with Army soldiers, civilians and contractors in support of the Army’s acquisition efforts. This experience has underscored the vital importance of our people, the talent they contribute, and the expertise they develop. As Secretary James has stated, the Air 

Force’s greatest strength is its people. If confirmed, I will dedicate my efforts to ensuring that our Active Duty, National Guard, Reserve and civilian airmen receive 

the support they need as they work selflessly to defend our country. 

Thank you again for considering my nomination, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Sparks? 

STATEMENT OF JOHN E. SPARKS, TO BE A JUDGE ON THE 

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES 

Mr. SPARKS. Chairman McCain and Senator Reed, members of 

the committee, thank you all for having me here today. I would like 

to thank as well the President for his expression of confidence in 

me today. 

I am joined here by my wife of 40 years Wendy, my daughter 

Adrianne, my son Casey, and my sister, Mrs. Constance Williams 

from Philadelphia. And a number of colleagues in the back I 

believe. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome. 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, I have been involved with military justice 

in one aspect or another for over 30 years now. This is an area of 

the law that I often refer to as my second great love. My first great 

love, of course, is seated behind me. I have been passionate about 

public service, and of the 44 years of public service I have behind 

me, I would not trade a single day of it for anything. 

For the 14 years prior to my recent retirement from Federal civilian service, I had the privilege of working at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. It was truly a pleasant and professionally rewarding experience and one that I will forever treasure. 

Although many members of the public may not be familiar with 

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tary justice system. Established in 1950, it has more than fulfilled 

Congress? intent to establish a specialized, independent civilian appellate court for the review of courts martial. If confirmed for a 

seat on the court, I pledge to uphold its reputation for integrity, intellectual honesty, and independence. I hope to join a long line of 

respected jurists who have, indeed, made this an honorable court. 

Thank you, and I am prepared, as well as the others, for questions from the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sparks follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. JOHN E. SPARKS

Good afternoon Senator McCain and members of the committee. I thank you for 

having me here today and I would like to take this opportunity, as well, to thank 

the President for his expression of confidence in me. I am joined by my wife Wendy 

and several other members of my family. 

I have been involved with military justice in one aspect or another for over 30 

years now. So, this is an area of the law that has always been my great passion. 

I am passionate about public service as well, and of the 44 years of public service 

I have behind me, I would not trade a day of it for anything. 

For the 14 years prior to my recent retirement from federal civilian service, I had 

the privilege of working at the U.S Court of Appeals for the Armed forces. It was 

truly a pleasant and professionally rewarding experience, and one that I will forever 

cherish. 

Although many members of the public may not be familiar with this particular 

court, in my view, it is the centerpiece of the military justice system. Established 

in 1950, it has more than fulfilled Congress’s intent to establish a specialized, independent civilian appellate court for the review of courts-martial. If confirmed for a 

seat on the court, I pledge to uphold its reputation for integrity and intellectual honesty, and I hope to join a long list of respected jurists who have indeed made it an 

honorable court. 

Thank you, and I am prepared for any questions the committee may have for me. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Admiral? 

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL KURT W. TIDD, USN, TO BE 

ADMIRAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN 

COMMAND 

Admiral TIDD. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Senators, I am honored to meet with you today as the President’s 

nominee to command U.S. Southern Command. I am excited by the 

opportunities and the challenges accompanying this position, and I 

am humbled by the enormous shoes that I will fill if you confirm 

this nomination. 

I know General John Kelly is held in high regard by this body 

as an absolutely candid combatant commander and as a leader of 

unquestioned integrity, enjoying your full trust and confidence. If 

confirmed, I am committed to being as candid and forthright as 

General Kelly and will work closely with this committee to build 

the same bonds of trust and confidence. 

Before introducing two family members with me today, I would 

like to mention several who were unable to be here. My dad served 

34 years in the Navy. He is a combat veteran of World War II, 

Korea, and Vietnam. He is my mentor and role model, the single 

most influential person I look to for advice on how to lead and 

guidance on how to serve. 

869 

That said, like most service families, my mother was the real unsung hero, raising two sons and moving households over a score of 

times while Dad was at sea. 

Dad’s health prevents him from being here today, but he is 

watching on C–SPAN. 

We lost Mom this time last year, but her impact lives on in our 

extended family and in all the families whose lives she touched. 

My parents inspired my brother, Mark, and me to serve in the 

Navy. Mark took a slightly different path. Spending over 3 decades 

as a Navy chaplain, including multiple combat tours, he recently 

retired as the Navy’s 25th Chief of Chaplains. As I like to tell people, my big brother Mark is the good Admiral Tidd. 

My wife and partner of 24 years, Eileen, is here today, along 

with our youngest daughter Jacqueline, a high school senior. Our 

oldest daughter Katherine is a college freshman and hopefully is 

studying for exams right now. 

Like all of my family, Eileen has spent a lifetime in service of 

our Nation. She is a retired military physician with 7 years in the 

Army where she earned a 1st Armored Division combat patch and 

a bronze star during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, followed by 

13 years as a Navy physician. As a retiree, she continues to serve 

as a volunteer physician at Walter Reed National Military Medical 

Center. 

Eileen is the guiding force in our family. She holds everything together at home and allows me to pursue this Navy adventure. Her 

continued dedication and personal sacrifice are the real reason that 

I sit here today. 

U.S. Southern Command contrasts real security challenges with 

plentiful opportunities. Within our shared Americas, we have partners who welcome our presence, who are eager to work together to 

confront the challenges posed by unequal prosperity, imperfect governance, and pervasive insecurity. Unlike other geographic regions, 

in the Americas we have no nation able or interested in posing a 

credible threat to our way of life. But we do have transnational 

criminal organizations that prey upon this region and we have external nations and non-state actors who are competing for influence 

and threatening our shared interests. 

If confirmed, I will work with this committee to ensure that 

SOUTHCOM’s requirements continue to be relentlessly articulated 

and that innovative means are identified to deal with them. 

In closing, I would like to thank the members of this committee 

for the support you provide the men and women who protect our 

Nation. In an era characterized by self-promotion and instant fame, 

they remain motivated by notions of duty, honor, courage, and selflessness. They calmly confront fear and terror because they value 

the love and the trust of their teammates. Thank you for supporting them and for recognizing the irreplaceable role that they 

play safeguarding our uniquely blessed Nation. 

If confirmed, I look forward to serving alongside these men and 

women in U.S. Southern Command, to partnering with our interagency teammates safeguarding the defense of the United States. 

I look forward to continuing the dedicated work of previous 

SOUTHCOM commanders who built a solid team with partner nations who shoulder the responsibility of safeguarding our shared 

870 

Americas. I am honored and humbled to have been nominated for 

this position, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. Sparks, I will have no questions for you except to say thank 

you for your many years of outstanding service, and we are glad 

you are going to be able to continue it as a member of the Court 

of Appeals. Thank you. 

Mr. SPARKS. You are welcome, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Lettre, let me give you a quote from Secretary Gates, the one favorite of many of us on both sides, Republican and Democrat. ‘‘In the 40 years since Vietnam, we have a perfect record in predicting where we will use military force next. We 

have never once gotten it right.’’ Does that have something to do 

with intelligence? 

Mr. LETTRE. Mr. Chairman, it absolutely has everything to do 

with intelligence. I am familiar with the quote. I know that even 

in the recent hearings that you chaired here at the committee, 

former Secretary Gates mentioned that as a way of pointing out 

that we need to be agile and innovative. That is certainly true in 

intelligence where we can expect to be surprised all the time. In 

that regard, we also need to recognize that that surprise can come 

from places where we do not expect it. It can also come from adversaries who are trying to move faster than we are. 

As we look at the responsibilities that we all have to invest in 

defense intelligence capabilities, if confirmed, my focus would really be on building the kind of capabilities for the future that allow 

for global coverage, that allow us to be able to adapt when surprise 

has occurred and react rapidly and outpace our adversaries with 

the strategic advantages that we bring to bear with the broader 

military capability. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Secretary, I just want to point out to 

you—and I am sure you are aware—that there have been significant allegations about distortion of intelligence information as it 

comes up through Central Command [CENTCOM] to the President 

of the United States. This committee has been looking at it and we 

will continue looking at it. There have been whistleblowers and 

others. We have reached no conclusion on this situation, but we 

will be continuing to look at it. I suggest that you also make yourself aware of these allegations and can help us resolve them one 

way or the other. It is very disturbing—these kinds of allegations, 

as I am sure you understand. 

Mr. LETTRE. Senator, I take those allegations and I view them 

very seriously. As I said in my opening statement, analysts need 

to be able to know they can speak truth to power and to call it like 

they see it. As you know, one of the most rigorous investigative capacities that we have is the Department’s IG [Inspector General], 

and it is currently investigating that. We are, as you are, awaiting 

the IG’s results and look forward to taking swift actions as appropriate once the IG is done with its work. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Camarillo, you are stepping into a situation where we have 

just fundamentally in the 2016 defense authorization bill changed 

the retirement system. We have mandated a 7 and a half percent 

reduction in staffs over 4 years to 30 percent. One of the major 

871 

areas that we are working on is the unfortunate tooth-to-tail trend 

that has continued to cause us to have bloated staffs, too many 

senior officers. It is going to be one of the major areas of our hearings and investigation in the coming year. It is a consensus on this 

committee, as well as from the witnesses we have had in our series 

of hearings of outside individuals with many years of experience, 

both in and out of the Pentagon, that we need to do something 

about it. I hope you understand and appreciate that. 

Mr. CAMARILLO. Senator, I do. Certainly the Department, as I 

understand it, is working right now to come into compliance with 

those requirements established under the Defense Authorization 

Act. Secretary Carter I think announced today he looks forward to 

working with the committee on a broad review of the headquarters 

and Goldwater-Nichols issues that you have identified. Certainly if 

I am confirmed, I look forward to doing the same as part of that 

effort in collaboration with this committee. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Finally, Admiral Tidd, you mentioned General Kelly in your testimony, and we agree. He did an outstanding job and did speak 

truth to power. 

But more disturbing is what he noted in his testimony that 

frankly because of sequestration, which has nothing to do with you 

or him—it was an action taken by Congress—that in the maritime 

domain, he said he has been forced to sit and watch nearly 75 percent of illicit trafficking pass through his AOR into the United 

States. Have you had a chance to authenticate or look at that? It 

is a pretty alarming fact that he has cited in is testimony before 

this committee. Do you have a view on that? 

Admiral TIDD. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do. I have seen the figures 

that he cited, and I think, if anything, they may understate the 

gravity of the challenge. That said, I think what he has done is 

taken advantage of opportunities to work with partners to try to 

mitigate some of those shortfalls. 

But with regard specifically to sequestration, I would have to 

agree with the words that he used, which is that it would be catastrophic, that the effects of sequestration specifically with regard to 

the U.S. Southern Command would be catastrophic. That is simply 

because of the difficulty that it poses in terms of being able to plan 

effectively, the inability to take advantage of long-term planning to 

have the right forces in place, and recognition that as the theater 

that probably is the last in terms of priority of resources because 

of very valid considerations in other parts of the world, if there are 

fewer forces available to be able to meet the challenges, that will 

affect SOUTHCOM most. I think it is a very serious consideration. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I will follow the chairman’s lead by saying, Mr. Sparks, thank 

you very much for your service in so many different capacities and 

I look forward to your continued service. 

Let me ask Secretary Lettre. One of the areas which is increasingly disturbing I think not only to myself but to the committee is 

our inability to counter the information campaign of ISIL, which 

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plicated interagency process. The State Department probably has 

as big a lead as you might. 

Can you talk about in your prospective role what you would be 

doing to help this effort not only to get information from their social contacts, et cetera, but also to disrupt their ability to communicate and attract adherents? 

Mr. LETTRE. Senator, there really are two areas where I would 

be most interested in seeing, if confirmed, how I could contribute 

by catalyzing effort in the defense intelligence enterprise. 

One is in support of the interagency efforts. Clearly, there are 

parts of our government who have the lead responsibility for either 

in diplomatic channels or here in the homeland with respect to the 

responsibilities of DHS [the Department of Homeland Security] and 

FBI [the Federal Bureau of Investigation] to look at effective ways 

to counter the violent extremist message, and the extent to which 

we can contribute to that appropriately with defense intelligence 

capability, I would like to do so. 

The second area gets back to the point made earlier about innovation. This is an area where our adversaries are able to leverage—I think it was mentioned in the hearing earlier this morning 

that sometimes you see as many as 90,000 Twitter comments or individuals on Twitter echoing the comments of violent extremists 

and the savages associated with ISIL. This is something that they 

are capable of doing on a very rapid and immediate timescale, and 

as a government, we have not found the right formula for being 

able to respond to that. 

This really does require focused innovation within government. 

Within the defense intelligence enterprise, it requires us to look at 

how to better leverage our understanding of open source information and how to better understand social media and its role. 

The final piece is this is a very good example of where the best 

and brightest minds of the U.S. industry can be brought to bear to 

help us with solutions here, whether it is in Silicon Valley or other 

parts of the region where creativity and innovation is occurring. 

Outreach to those communities is essential on this score. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary Camarillo, the chairman made this comment in his 

opening remarks, and I second it, which is that there is an acute 

shortage of Air Force personnel that are flying UAVs [unmanned 

aerial vehicles]. In situations in the past, particularly in Vietnam 

with the Army, when we needed a huge increase in helicopter pilots, we went to warrant officers. Are you going to embrace that notion, I hope? 

Mr. CAMARILLO. Senator, there is no question that 15 years of 

sustained high demand for ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities has created some significant challenges 

for the Air Force. I know for a fact that Secretary James and General Welsh and others are looking right now at a variety of courses 

of action to address this ongoing demand, one of which includes increasing the throughput of training programs for pilots. I think 

some of the statistics were 190 pilots a year to about 300 pilots a 

year. These and other efforts—I certainly know that they are looking at all of those. If confirmed, I certainly would want to examine 

873 

those options and work with Secretary James and General Welsh 

to get a result that addresses the shortfall. 

Senator REED. I think the chairman and I share the same view, 

which is this is a highly specialized occupation, which you do not 

really have to put someone through the process of flying and then 

commanding and then doing a staff job, et cetera. Again, my best 

analogy would be the numerous and incredibly effective warrant officers that flew in Vietnam, in fact, were the backbone of the Army 

aviation elements in Vietnam. 

Admiral Tidd—and this alluded also to I think comments you responded to with the chairman. You have an AOR that is always 

under-resourced, but also one that requires, more than any other 

perhaps or as much, interagency cooperation. You need DEA [the 

Drug Enforcement Administration] because a lot of that illicit traffic is drugs. It is not anything else. You need FBI to help you. You 

need CDC [the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention], for example, to be able to partner with you in terms of health in the region, which is an important part. It goes back to the point also the 

chairman made about sequestration, how it hampers your ability to 

respond. 

But more broadly, just a sense of how you want to work on this 

interagency process, bring all these entities together in a more effective way. 

Admiral TIDD. Senator Reed, the interagency is absolutely critical to the activities and the operations of U.S. Southern Command. 

I think as you know, they are very well represented down there 

within the headquarters with senior capable members who are able 

to draw directly upon their organizations. The role of the military 

commander, frankly, is to act as the enabling platform to be able 

to pull together and help support and coordinate the activities. In 

most cases, as you have recognized, it will not necessarily be a 

military end game to deal with the kinds of security threats that 

we will be working with down there. Oftentimes it may be a partner nation, a law enforcement agency, a partner nation military or 

a U.S. law enforcement activity, and probably in the last instance 

does it end up being a U.S. military. But the role of the combatant 

commander to be able to pull together, synchronize all of those activities and focus some of the efforts, particularly taking advantage 

of the experience that we have in understanding networks and 

being able to orchestrate an effective strategy to detect, illuminate, 

and ultimately to take apart networks. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst? 

Senator Ernst: Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing in front of us today, and I 

want to thank your beautiful families for being here as well. I 

know they are very proud of you. 

Secretary Lettre, I would like to start with you. I am concerned 

about military intelligence support to our warfighters and our current military intelligence force structure. 

As we are facing complex and growing threats at home and 

abroad, the work of our intelligence professionals in answering tactical, operational, and strategic level intelligence requirements in 

874 

support of the warfighter and national decision-makers remains 

vital to defending our country. 

I was informed that you did have a very good discussion with my 

staff yesterday. Thank you for taking time to do that. I do look forward to working with you on ways that we can enhance our Nation’s military intelligence capabilities. 

Now, in your statement, you list as one of your top priorities to 

ensure that current operations receive necessary intelligence support. I do believe there is a need to enhance our efforts against 

ISIL and other terrorist groups not only in the CENTCOM areas 

of responsibility but also in Africa where they are making headway 

in expanding the so-called caliphate. 

In Europe, both General Philip Breedlove, USAF and General 

Benjamin Hodges, USA have told me they need more military intelligence capacity to counter Russian and transnational terrorist 

groups. Considering the past intelligence failures that we have had 

on anticipating Russian actions since 2008, we really cannot afford 

to be surprised by our adversaries again. 

Will you commit to me that if you are confirmed, you will examine DOD military intelligence capabilities, their force structure and 

command relationships as INSCOM [U.S. Army Intelligence and 

Security Command] plays a role in that as well and seriously consider those reforms which could enhance our intelligence support to 

the warfighter? 

Mr. LETTRE. I will, Senator. As the committee considers its review of Goldwater-Nichols and defense reform, I think there are a 

number of areas within defense intelligence that would make sense 

to look at. One of the questions is the roles of Service intelligence 

and how it can be best postured and optimized across each of the 

Services, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, 

in support of the warfighter, and I think that is a reasonable area 

to be looking at over time as the committee considers these reform 

efforts. 

Senator Ernst: Thank you, Secretary. 

Are there any specific examples that you would give or any specific intelligence capabilities that you believe we should be doing 

better, investments that should be made which could enhance those 

capabilities? Any specific examples? 

Mr. LETTRE. A couple that immediately come to mind, Senator, 

reference the previous question about open source information in 

social media. We are in a world where vast amounts of information 

are available in an unprecedented way, and being able to ensure 

that our warfighters and our analysts who are supporting the 

warfighters are able to leverage that to maximum extent is one. 

A second area is around the theme of integrated effort, jointness 

essentially for defense intelligence. We have a tremendous opportunity to use different intelligence disciplines to tip and cue each 

other. A human intelligence report tipping from the Army perhaps, 

tipping a signals intelligence capability that then provides us imagery in a very rapid way to get at an operational mission in support of an operational mission. There is much more opportunity to 

leverage that than we have been able to in past. With technology 

and big data analytics heading where it is, if we can marshal those 

875 

capabilities and harness them, that can bring powerful strategic effect to the United States military. 

Senator Ernst: Fantastic. I look forward to working with you on 

that. 

Mr. Chair, that is all I have. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King? 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before beginning my questions, I think one of the most important 

things that should be brought before this committee is that Mr. 

Lettre and his dad and brother through-hiked the Appalachian 

Trail from Maine to Georgia, which to me indicates a high level of 

perseverance, stamina, and I do not know about the intelligence 

parts. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. And insanity. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KING. Yes, well, okay. It is quite an achievement, and 

my hat is off to you. Starting in Maine, of course, was a good decision. 

You mentioned 17 agencies, and we are talking about a total intelligence budget of $70 billion a year. I just plead with you to be 

aware and try to find areas of overlap and duplication where we 

can save the taxpayers some money and yet still be effective in 

terms of what you are doing is critically important. We heard this 

morning from Secretary Carter and General Selva about the importance of intelligence in this war with ISIL. But to the extent that 

you see areas of overlap, I hope that is something you will bring 

to us, bring to the Intelligence Committee, and bring to Jim Clapper so that we can try to do this as effectively as we can. 

Mr. LETTRE. It will remain a focus for me, if confirmed, Senator, 

based on directions so far from this committee and from the Secretary of Defense, to look for areas to reduce headquarters, for example, across the Department of Defense at the 25 to 30 percent 

level. The same thing is being looked at across defense intelligence 

in order to lean out headquarters where we can. 

But I would say that one of the main purposes of my office, in 

parallel with Director Clapper and his team, is to look for both efficiencies and effectiveness so that those 17 organizations increasingly are working in a joint way so that the whole is greater than 

the sum of its parts operationally but also from a good stewardship 

of the taxpayer dollar perspective as well. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

One of the great challenges and very recent challenge in terms 

of intelligence is the going dark phenomenon, worldwide 

encryption, which means that unless some solution is found which 

is very difficult, as you know, signals intelligence is not going to 

be as important as it once was. Do you see or do you believe it 

should be a priority to rebalance toward human intelligence in 

order to compensate for this loss of capacity? 

Mr. LETTRE. That is one piece of the response that is necessary, 

Senator. We need to pursue excellence in all of our intelligence disciplines, human intelligence, signals intelligence, geospatial intelligence, and so forth. 

876 

But within the confines of the going dark problem, I think it is 

important to underscore it is, unfortunately, the case that adversaries are learning from the amazing operations that our military 

and our intelligence and law enforcement community are able to 

conduct and learning how to avoid the watchful eye. That is a troublesome dynamic. It certainly puts at risk our ability to successfully interdict terrorist plots. 

Senator KING. I just want to be sure we are reacting to this 

changed intelligence battlefield in an agile manner and in a quick 

manner, not saying, well, we have always done it this way for the 

last 15 or 20 years. I think the landscape is changing significantly 

just in the past 6 months, and we have to really react to that. 

One final, not really a question, but the issue of analytic integrity. The chairman mentioned this. This is something that is of the 

gravest concern because if our leaders, if the President is not getting good intelligence, good, straight information, it can have disastrous results and I mean disastrous results. Not only do we look 

forward to the Inspector General’s report, but I think as a leader 

of an intelligence agency, you have to continually—continually— 

work on the issue of analytic integrity. There is always a human 

tendency to tell the boss what they want to hear, and I hope that 

that will be a priority for you. 

Mr. LETTRE. It will remain a priority, Senator. This is also an 

area where the Secretary of Defense and other defense leaders 

have made a point of repeating how important it is that their expectations are met, that analysts know they can and should speak 

truth to power. 

Senator KING. There are expectations for good data. That is the 

expectation that we want to meet. 

Mr. Camarillo, I have used up my time. I would like for the 

record if you could give us your thoughts. We did a piece on retirement in the Defense Authorization Act, as you know. What other 

areas of attention should we be making in terms of personnel focusing on efficiency but also retention and recruitment? I would like 

very much to have your thoughts on that. 

Mr. Sparks, I think the issue that is of grave concern to all of 

us on sexual assault is the issue of how do we deal with retaliation. 

That seems to be one of the major stumbling blocks to a successful 

culture change in this area. Again, for the record, if you could—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. If I could ask—we have sufficient time if you 

would rather just get verbal responses. 

Senator KING. Okay. That would be fine. 

Mr. Camarillo, do you have any thoughts on this issue of what 

else should we do other than what we have done on retirement in 

order to ensure that we have sufficient recruitment and retention 

to maintain the high level of professionalism that the Air Force has 

now achieved? 

Mr. CAMARILLO. Senator, I would want to first have the opportunity to examine the current tools and incentives that the Air 

Force employs and how effective they are in retaining the talent 

they need for their airmen moving forward before I would give you 

that assessment. 

However, I will say that I think the Department is conducting— 

and the Air Force is part of it—a comprehensive review right now 

877 

of what those incentives need to be, whether we are looking at military compensation, retirement, in conjunction with the efforts 

taken by this committee, as well as some of the incentives that 

were provided in the recent Defense Authorization Act in the area, 

for example, going back earlier to the RPA [remotely piloted aircraft] pilots. 

I think we would have to look systematically at all of these options in conjunction with the other areas explored by this committee in defense reform to give you a complete answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you on that. 

Senator KING. I certainly hope so because I think as we move out 

of the recession and the economy improves, the retention and recruitment could prove more difficult. I think it is something we 

need to attend to before it becomes a serious problem. 

Mr. Sparks, your thoughts on retaliation and how we criminalize 

it or punish it or discourage it. It seems to me that is at the core 

of part of the problem of not reporting sexual assaults in the 

military. 

Mr. SPARKS. Thank you, Senator, and I agree. 

I will say this about sexual assault and specifically sexual assault victims, that the good work that has been done up to this 

point by Congress, the media, and others, the attention they have 

focused on this issue is welcomed and, quite frankly, long awaited. 

I was heartened by the provisions in the most recent authorization act dealing with sexual assault victims and their ability to report and the provisions that actually prevent or are designed to 

prevent retaliation against those who support sexual assault victims or report on their behalf. I believe that time will tell whether 

or not this is enough. But I would only hope that the good work 

done in Congress and elsewhere will continue. 

Senator KING. I appreciate that, and I am not entirely sure of 

what the proprieties are in terms of your interaction with Congress, if and when you are confirmed, but to the extent you can 

provide us with some of your accumulated wisdom as we continue 

to work on this problem, I think that would be very helpful to the 

committee. I appreciate that. 

Mr. SPARKS. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. Admiral, we have talked about this, the idea that 

we are, at this moment in time when we are suffering from literally a heroin epidemic all over the country, including tragically 

in my State of Maine. What is it you need in order to interdict 

more of those ships? Is it intelligence? Is it ships? Is it manpower? 

What is the shortfall? I mean, we are spending a lot of time here 

talking about the threat of ISIL, and in the meantime, we have 

this other threat that is killing in my State 200 or 300 people a 

year. 

Admiral TIDD. Senator, I think all of the elements that you have 

identified are critical. It takes the putting together of a comprehensive network to be able to understand the network that is currently 

moving drugs. But as we have seen, these transnational criminal 

networks are also capable of moving weapons, bulk cash. They are 

engaged in human trafficking. It is an entity that is a network out 

there, and we have to understand that network. We have to be able 

to illuminate it and dismantle it. That is going to take the efforts 

878 

of the elements of our intelligence community, our law enforcement 

community, ultimately pieces of our military, not the high-end 

pieces of the military frankly, but enough to be able to support that 

end game of interdiction. 

Senator KING. Because you are where you are, assuming you are 

approved at SOUTHCOM, you are going to be in the point of this. 

To the extent you can tell us what you need, not necessarily in 

terms of military assets, but comprehensively, because this is a 

true crisis in this country today, and supply is part of the problem. 

Obviously, we need to talk about treatment, prevention, and all of 

those issues. But supply is part of it. My understanding is a great 

deal of this heroin particularly is coming up from south of our borders. 

Admiral TIDD. That is correct. My understanding is that all of 

the heroin that comes into the United States is coming from countries just to the south of our border. 

It is for that reason that, if confirmed, I would absolutely look 

forward to working with you to try to describe in a compelling 

manner just exactly what the force elements might be. But I would 

caution that there will be no single-source, single-point solution to 

this problem. If there was, it would have been discovered and implemented a long time ago. 

As you have pointed out and as we have discussed, the supply 

reduction is only a piece of the problem. The demand reduction is 

the part that an equal degree of effort will, obviously, have to be 

devoted to. If we cannot really make a dent in that demand side, 

it is akin to having the best bilge pump in the world in your boat, 

but if you cannot repair that hole in the hull by solving the demand side, then the boat is going to sink. 

Senator KING. I agree. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I think you will see, Admiral, that a great 

deal of that, an overwhelming majority of that heroin is coming 

across the Sonora-Arizona border, which is obviously very disturbing to all of us who live in the State. It has reached—‘‘epidemic’’ is not the word, but there has been a dramatic increase in 

drug overdose deaths in both the Midwest and Northeast as a result of this, including Maine when it gets really cold. 

Senator Ayotte is on her way here. I would just like to say that 

we will move your nominations as quickly as possible. If, unfortunately, we are in next week, I will see if we cannot get it to the 

floor of the Senate. If you receive written questions from any of the 

members, please return the answers as rapidly as you can. 

You are coming to these positions in what most experts believe 

are the most challenging times in our history since the end of 

World War II. I do not think there is much argument about that. 

It will probably require long hours and time away from your families, and we regret that. We are very honored that your family is 

here today in support of you. 

If Senator Ayotte does not show up, I am going to have to let her 

ask another day, do you think, Jack? 

Senator REED. That is why they pay you to be chairman, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[Laughter.] 

879 

Chairman MCCAIN. The only other request I would have of you, 

Mr. Sparks and Vice Admiral Tidd, you might work up a condolence note to be delivered to Senator Reed sometime late Saturday 

afternoon. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. This hearing is adjourned. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Go Army. 

[Whereupon, at 3:09 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to the Honorable Marcel J. Lettre 

II by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied 

follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the role, duties, and functions of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

(USD(I)) is responsible for supporting the Secretary of Defense in discharging his 

intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities under title 10 and title 50 of the 

United States Code (U.S.C.). 

This includes: serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense; exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over all intelligence organizations within the Department of Defense; ensuring 

that intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense are manned, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of the Department; ensuring 

that the DOD Components, which are also elements of the Intelligence Community, 

are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of the 

DNI’s authorities; ensuring that the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided with appropriate 

intelligence support; ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department 

are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that other sensitive 

activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and managed 

efficiently and effectively; overseeing Defense Department personnel, facility, and 

industrial security to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; serving as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program, and ensuring that the DOD Components funded by the National Intelligence Program are robust, balanced, and in 

compliance with the guidance and direction of the DNI; and ensuring that the Department provides the U.S. Congress with intelligence-related information sufficient 

to execute its oversight responsibilities. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. If confirmed, I believe I have the proper background and experience to 

effectively perform the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I 

have had the privilege of serving as the Acting Under Secretary since May of this 

year, performing all of the functions of the office. Prior to that, I served as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence under Michael G. Vickers. 

In both positions, I have had the opportunity to develop strong working relationships with other senior leaders across the Intelligence Community along with pursuing key initiatives in operational support to policy makers and warfighters, intelligence capabilities development, and integration for the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. 

Additionally, I have been honored to serve as Special Assistant under three Secretaries of Defense. In that capacity, I advised the Secretary of Defense on a range 

of matters pertaining to U.S. national security, including intelligence-related matters. With functional responsibilities as the civilian deputy chief of staff to Secretary 

Panetta, I supported the Secretary of Defense on defense strategy, budget development, acquisition oversight, national security policy initiatives, and crisis management. I also led two Secretary of Defense transition teams. For my work in support 

of Secretary of Defense priorities, I am honored that Secretary Panetta presented 

me the Defense Distinguished Public Service Award. 

880 

As Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, I had 

responsibilities on a team executing legislative programs on Departmental priorities 

including the defense budget and policy; Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan; strategic 

nuclear arms control matters, including the ratification of the New START Treaty; 

acquisition and export control reforms; information operations, and Secretary Gates’ 

efficiencies initiative. For my work on strategic nuclear arms control matters, Secretary Gates awarded me the Exceptional Public Service Award. 

As Senior Defense and Intelligence Advisor and then as Senior National Security 

Advisor to the U.S. Senate Minority and then Majority Leader, I handled all ‘‘Gang 

of Eight’’ intelligence matters for the Leader, and shaped legislation and policy initiatives in areas including: Iraq and Afghanistan strategy; counterterrorism; enhancing foreign intelligence collection and sensitive intelligence operations; countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in securing passage of defense and intelligence authorization bills, appropriations bills, and war 

supplementals. 

As a Professional Staff Member on the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence, I supported the intelligence after-action reviews 

on the 9/11 terrorist attacks and on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and advised 

on the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act which created the 

Director of National Intelligence. 

Prior to these positions, I served in the private sector, the foreign policy research 

sector, and on a congressional commission examining the organization and efficiency 

of the U.S. Government regarding intelligence and programs to counter Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (WMD). 

Serving in both the Legislative and Executive Branches of the government has 

given me a multi-faceted appreciation for the role of intelligence. I have served as 

an intelligence consumer, ensuring the nation’s senior decision makers are supported with intelligence products on important decisions. I have gained an appreciation of the statutory roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and other senior leaders in ensuring effective intelligence capabilities. I 

have familiarity with a range of intelligence operations and capabilities. I have experience working intelligence resourcing issues through the National Intelligence 

Program and Military Intelligence Program, knowledge of key trajectories for our acquisition and investment programs, and awareness of key counterintelligence and 

security priorities. I am personally committed to supporting the Secretary of Defense in focusing on the needs of the warfighter, particularly in intelligence support. 

Finally, my experience has given me a deep appreciation for the important role 

of oversight, from within the executive branch as well as by the legislative and judicial branches of government. 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the USD(I)? 

Answer. If confirmed, I believe the most significant action that I would need to 

take would be to assist the Secretary of Defense in executing his priorities by ensuring that he receives timely and accurate intelligence to support Presidential decision-making. Additionally, in accordance with the Secretary’s priorities, I would ensure that our Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to both adequately support 

our warfighting combatant commanders with current operations and to tackle the 

challenges of the future. That said, I believe that I need to more deeply understand 

the challenges posed by the new fiscal environment, the resource constraints that 

will be faced ahead, and the opportunities for further efficiencies across the Defense 

Intelligence Enterprise, as we sustain and strengthen OUSD(I)’s budgetary oversight. 

Question. What major challenges do you foresee in fulfilling these duties and functions? 

Answer. If confirmed as the USD(I), the major challenges that are likely to confront me are the continued unprecedented scope and pace of global operations and 

unmet demand for intelligence in an era of intelligence-driven operations; the need 

to adapt to a rapidly changing intelligence environment; the need to address longerterm challenges to prevent strategic surprise while fully supporting ongoing operations; and the need to do all this in a more constrained fiscal environment. Additionally, we must improve on protecting intelligence sources and methods and preventing unauthorized disclosure of information. The next USD(I) will need to overcome these challenges while ensuring Defense Intelligence is postured with the IC 

to continue to provide world-class intelligence. 

881 

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

However, the global environment has changed a great deal since Goldwater-Nichols was enacted, while the relationships and responsibilities of DOD’s various components have not. This Committee has begun a comprehensive review of the United 

States’ defense organization to identify challenges and potential reforms to the Department of Defense and the armed forces. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. My present duties have not yet afforded me an opportunity to systematically review and address any potential modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act 

provisions that would improve the Department’s defense intelligence enterprise performance, but I am prepared to work with this committee and other stakeholders 

to pursue any initiatives that will improve the effectiveness of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. I look forward to contributing to the dialogue ahead on whether potential 

modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions might further advance the 

performance of defense intelligence. Reform efforts of the last thirty years under 

Goldwater-Nichols, and intelligence reform efforts since 9/11, have achieved tremendous gains in ensuring jointness and integrated effort across intelligence organizations, pursuing operational speed and agility, and spurring innovation and adaptation in the face of major strategic and technological change. I look forward to continuing to work with the committee to pursue initiatives that would continue to advance this integration, agility, and innovation in defense intelligence. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. Pursuant to statute, departmental directives, and direct guidance from 

the Secretary of Defense, if confirmed as USD(I) I will serve as the Principal Staff 

Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, and security, and exercise SecDef authority, direction 

and control over the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will provide support to the Deputy Secretary 

consistent with that which I would provide to the Secretary, as described above, in 

support of the Deputy Secretary’s responsibilities and priorities. 

Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will work closely with each of the Under Secretaries, their Principal Deputies, and senior teams, as I have while serving as the 

Acting USD(I). A close relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the USD(I), and their Principal Deputies, is particularly important, so I intend to fully support those relationships. In my former positions within the Department, as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, and Principal Deputy USD(I), I had 

positive relationships with the Under Secretaries, which I would continue to develop 

if confirmed as USD(I). 

Question. The Chief Information Officer. 

Answer. The Chief Information Officer (CIO), like its predecessor the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, has had oversight 

of enabling capabilities which are central to the conduct of intelligence and securityrelated activities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the CIO to ensure that this 

support remains robust. 

Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Policy. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DASD for Detainee Policy on 

the intelligence aspects of detainee policy and operations. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity 

Conflict (ASD SOLIC). 

882 

Answer. USD(I) and the ASD SO/LIC work closely together in several areas, and 

this close partnership has grown substantially in recent years. If confirmed as the 

USD(I), I will contribute to ensuring that this close partnership continues. 

Question. The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence Directors. 

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will serve as the Program Executive for the 

Military Intelligence Program. As appropriate, I will work with the Secretaries of 

the Military Departments and the Service Intelligence Directors to ensure their intelligence requirements are met, that the Military Departments and Services develop intelligence capabilities appropriate for the current and future security environment, and that the intelligence organizations contribute to meeting the intelligence needs of their respective Military Department/Service, the Joint Force, the 

Department, and the Nation. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense (DOD). 

Answer. In my previous positions in DOD, I have worked closely with the General 

Counsel and his staff. If confirmed as USD(I), I will continue to closely collaborate 

with the General Counsel and seek his advice on the legal issues that impact 

USD(I)’s duties and functions. 

Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. In my previous positions in DOD, I have worked closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior leaders on 

the Joint Staff, on a range of issues. If confirmed as USD(I), I will seek to continue 

this close relationship to ensure that Defense Intelligence and the Intelligence Community meet the requirements of the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands. 

Question. The commanders of the Combatant Commands, including U.S. Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM) and U.S. Cyber Command. 

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will seek to ensure that the intelligence needs 

of the commanders of the Combatant Commands, including the commanders of U.S. 

Special Operations Command and U.S. Cyber Command, are met. 

Question. The Directors of the Defense intelligence agencies. 

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will exercise the Secretary of Defense’s authority, direction, and control over NSA, NGA, NRO, and DIA. I will also help sustain 

the deep relationship shared with the DNI by working with the Office of the DNI 

to ensure clear and consistent guidance is provided to the Defense intelligence agencies. 

Question. The Director of National Intelligence. 

Answer. Since serving as the Acting USD(I), I have sought to maintain a strong 

relationship with the DNI. If confirmed as USD(I), I intend to continue my full support of our mutual goal of greater Intelligence Community integration. Because the 

USD(I) is dual-hatted as the DNI’s Director of Defense Intelligence, if confirmed, I 

will advise the DNI on Defense Intelligence capabilities. 

Question. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will work to sustain the relationship I have developed as the Acting USD(I) with the Director and Deputy Director of the Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) and their senior team. 

Question. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. 

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will work to bolster the already close relationship I have developed as the Acting USD(I) with the Director of the NCTC. 

Question. The Director of the National Counterproliferation Center. 

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will work to maintain the relationship I have 

developed as the Acting USD(I) with the Director of the NCPC. 

Question. The Deputy and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence. 

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will fully support and cooperate with the Principal Deputy, Deputy and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence to ensure integration and unity of effort in the direction and oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. 

Question. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with intelligence responsibilities. 

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will serve as the Secretary of Defense’s focal 

point for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security matters for senior officials 

from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and will seek to ensure a strong 

working relationship with the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis. 

PRIORITIES

Question. How would you anticipate developing priorities for allocating your time 

and resources as the USD(I)? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would develop priorities for allocating my time consistent 

with priorities set by the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence. 

883 

In general, I would anticipate dividing my time broadly between oversight of current 

intelligence operations, the development of future intelligence capabilities, and the 

integration of intelligence across the Department of Defense and with the full range 

of national security partners, as well as internal management of OUSD(I) operations 

and other duties the Secretary may assign. In what will continue to be a resourceconstrained environment, I will seek to ensure that resources are strategically allocated to, and across, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. 

Question. If confirmed, what would be your priority issues to be addressed by the 

OUSD(I)? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to execute the priorities of our organization during my tenure as the Acting USD(I), including: (1) ensuring that the full 

weight of Defense intelligence capabilities are brought to bear to disrupt, dismantle, 

and defeat al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, creating and sustaining stability in Afghanistan and Iraq, countering Russian aggression, bolstering 

our national cyber defense, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, operationalizing the Asia-Pacific Rebalance, and supporting other ongoing operations in which the Department is engaged or may be engaged; (2) ensuring that 

intelligence operations conducted by the Department of Defense are effective and in 

compliance with all relevant statutes, authorities, directives, and policies; (3) ensuring that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to prevent strategic surprise, fully exploit emerging opportunities, and pursuing innovative future capabilities; and (4) ensuring that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient as possible. I would expect to pay particular attention to ensuring that: we have the right 

collection and analytical priorities; that we have a robust ISR architecture (both 

space and airborne), today and in the future; that the Department’s clandestine operations are fully integrated with those of the CIA and National Clandestine Service; that the President’s highest priority intelligence programs are fully resourced; 

that analysis addresses the needs of policy makers and operational commanders; 

that intelligence is timely, accessible, and independent; and, where appropriate, that 

we aggressively exploit advances in technology to improve our intelligence capabilities. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you balance the need to provide intelligence 

support to the war-fighter with the need to provide intelligence support to policy 

makers? 

Answer. In support of the Secretary’s own commitments to both ensure the 

strength of today’s fighting force and provide the President with his best national 

security advice, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the Defense Intelligence Enterprise continues to satisfy intelligence requirements foremost in support of current 

military operations and planning but also in collaboration with Interagency partners 

to inform political-military decision-making by our national leaders. In the USD(I)’s 

dual-hatted capacity as both a Defense and National Intelligence official, if confirmed I would seek to consistently identify and communicate the critical intelligence needs of the war-fighter. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Geographic Combatant Commands are adequately assessing and prioritizing their intelligence needs? 

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I would seek to strengthen integration and collaboration between the Geographic Combatant Commands and components of the 

Defense Intelligence Enterprise to inform the allocation of tools and expertise to efficiently assess and prioritize intelligence needs suited to their respective missions. 

These intelligence needs should be continually assessed and prioritized in consideration of those of each other Combatant Command and the fluidity of the threat environment in some areas of operations, given current resource constraints. If confirmed as USD(I), I also would work to ensure fruitful communication with the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and between the Combatant Commands to support intelligence integration in functional and topical areas where their needs cross the geographic boundaries from one command to another. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by 

special operations forces are adequately coordinated and deconflicted with other activities carried out by the intelligence community? 

Answer. Special Operations Forces coordinate their intelligence activities with the 

Intelligence Community as required by applicable law, policy, and agreements. My 

understanding is that USSOCOM liaises with members of the Intelligence Community in the Washington, D.C. area, at the Headquarters in Tampa, Florida, and on 

the battlefield. If confirmed as USD(I), I would work to ensure the demonstrable 

gains achieved in intelligence coordination with the interagency and international 

partners during the past several years are not only sustained but continue to improve. If confirmed, I also would welcome a continued dialogue with the committee 

to ensure clear, coherent and regular reporting to the congressional oversight comVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00889 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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mittees of these activities, consistent with critically important committee oversight 

responsibilities. 

CYBER AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Question. In the Advance Policy Questions for your recent confirmation as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the committee noted that 

‘‘Information operations, as currently defined by DOD, include electronic warfare, 

operational security, computer network operations, psychological operations, and 

military deception. Each of these lines of operations is unique and complex, and, in 

some cases, they are interwoven. The establishment of U.S. Cyber Command organizationally separated cyber operations from the other elements making up ‘information operations.’’’ 

The committee asked you how this separation complicates integration across these 

elements, and what is your understanding of the Department’s efforts to mitigate 

its impact? 

You responded at that time as follows: ‘‘If confirmed, I look forward to studying 

this question further. My current understanding is that Information Operations as 

currently defined refers to the integration of various information activities to 

achieve effects across the information environment, which includes the cyber domain. The establishment of U.S. Cyber Command does not change the relationship 

of cyberspace operations to the other capabilities necessary for DOD to conduct information and cyber-related operations. It will, however, enhance our ability to conduct information operations in the cyber domain.’’ 

Have you studied this question further? What is your current view of how well 

the Department is integrating across the elements of ‘‘information operations,’’ and 

especially across electronic warfare and cyber? 

Answer. As PDUSD(I) and Acting USD(I), I have continued to engage in this set 

of issues, working in collaboration with and in support of the broader Defense Department team of stakeholders, under guidance from the Secretary and the Principal Cyber Advisor. 

The April 2015 DOD Cyber Strategy has set a framework for guiding planning, 

programming, and budgeting, as well as strategy, capability development, and operations, regarding the cyber domain. We are using this strategy to support DOD’s 

ability to build and maintain ready Cyber Mission Forces and their capability to 

conduct cyberspace operations. In implementing this strategy, particular emphasis 

is being placed on integrating cyberspace operations to enable information operations and electronic warfare. Implementation efforts to date have revealed the requirement for further study on how best to integrate electronic warfare effectively 

within all DOD capabilities. 

I view the establishment and continued buildout and adaptation of U.S. Cyber 

Command as a positive development to meeting the challenges of effectively operating within the cyber domain. If confirmed as USD(I), I look forward to continuing 

to participate in refining organizational relationships and authorities within the Department to improve integration of cyber efforts without compromising the agility 

necessary for success in this domain. 

EFFICIENCIES IN HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Question. In signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and 

space reconnaissance, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Intelligence Community (IC) decades ago consolidated national-level activities into single agencies— 

the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and the 

National Reconnaissance Office, respectively. However, in the sole area of human 

intelligence (HUMINT) collection, DOD and the IC maintain separate, stand-alone 

programs in the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 

Twenty years ago, the Aspin-Brown Commission, led successively by two former 

Secretaries of Defense, catalogued the historical problems that limited the effectiveness of clandestine HUMINT operations conducted by DOD, and recommended that 

HUMINT operations be consolidated in the CIA, with DOD maintaining a cadre of 

military case officers for assignment to CIA. 

The problems that the Aspin-Brown Commission described 20 years ago persist 

to the present day. 

In the Advance Policy Questions for your recent confirmation as Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the committee asked you what the justification is for maintaining two organizations in this mission area in a time of severe budget austerity? 

You responded that ‘‘the Department of Defense maintains organic human intelligence (HUMINT) collection capabilities because it operates under different authoriVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00890 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ties than the CIA and also responds to different customers, priorities, requirements, 

and targets.’’ 

To clarify, the committee’s question was aimed at the Department’s national-level 

HUMINT program conducted under title 50, U.S.C., and funded by the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and not the Department’s tactical HUMINT activities. 

The National Clandestine Service administered by the CIA also operates under title 

50, U.S.C. and NIP budget, and is charged with providing HUMINT support to the 

Defense Department. 

Question. In this era of reduced budgets, manpower pressures, and interest in reducing duplication and overhead in DOD, do you think the Aspin-Brown Commission’s recommendation should be reconsidered today? 

Answer. I have an open mind to exploring any ideas the Committee believes 

should be explored that may improve the effectiveness of defense HUMINT capabilities. DOD has unique customers, priorities, requirements and targets that need to 

be met. At the same time, it is important not to have unnecessary redundancy and 

wasteful duplication in any mission area. In my experience to date, the recent evolution of defense HUMINT capabilities, including those in the Defense Clandestine 

Service, has been a sound, efficient, and effective approach to meeting defense intelligence requirements and has strengthened capabilities. In order to ensure successful efforts in this regard, strong leadership, clear guidance, rigorous standards and 

effective operational concepts are needed. Under any model, close CIA and DOD relationships and collaboration are critical. Recent modernization efforts launched at 

CIA also require us to continue to review how to optimize our close partnership and 

collaboration. I welcome a continued dialogue with the committee on this important 

capability area. 

RESPONSIVENESS OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO COMBATANT COMMAND

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Question. This committee and some current and former senior officers and officials 

in DOD are concerned that DOD intelligence Agencies are not sufficiently responsive to DOD operational, wartime requirements. 

Are you aware of these concerns and do you think they have a valid basis? 

Answer. I am aware of these views. The need for continuous improvement of our 

support to the warfighter is not only valid, it is essential. If confirmed, meeting the 

requirements of the warfighter will be central to my decisionmaking. 

The support that DOD Intelligence Agencies provide to the warfighter during 

times of war or threat to national security have been a longstanding oversight concern to Congress, the Chairman, and the Secretary of Defense. As one manifestation 

of this concern, in the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, Congress 

directed the Chairman to conduct biennial assessments of the Combat Support 

Agencies (CSA)– including DIA, NGA and NSA—to assess this crucial facet of their 

operations. These, and other reviews, have yielded regular reports on how best to 

posture, and adapt, the support of DOD intelligence agencies for responsiveness to 

DOD operational, wartime requirements. If confirmed, I look forward to working 

with the committee to seek to implement any adjustments and refinements that can 

be identified that will strengthen agency responsiveness to operational, wartime requirements. 

Question. How would you address these concerns? 

Answer. When the biennial assessments and CSA review teams identify systemic 

areas of concern that may impact optimizing support to the warfighter—such as 

communications, information technology, foreign disclosure, and foundational intelligence—these insights need to drive additional emphasis on resolving them through 

the operational oversight and resource allocation systems. Doing so will require innovative solutions and collaboration across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. If 

confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the CSAs continue to address these shortcomings to the satisfaction of the warfighter they support. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) TASK FORCE

Question. In 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates established the ISR Task 

at the most senior levels of the Department to address acute shortfalls in intelligence support to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The establishment 

of this Task Force reflected the failure of the existing ISR planning and programming process in the military departments and across the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD). 

The ISR Task Force was an effective expedient solution to an immediate problem, 

but since it by-passed established processes and organizations, it responded only to 

symptoms and did not fix the underlying causes of the problems. 

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What is your perception of the underlying causes of the failure of the Services and 

OSD to recognize and respond to the demand signal from battlefield commanders, 

and how would you propose to correct them? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will remain committed to ensuring the Nation does its 

best to meet warfighter requirements, particularly in terms of ISR support. Many 

of the underlying issues associated with the challenge of providing timely and effective ISR support to the warfighters highlighted in 2008 still exist today. USDI, in 

coordination with other elements of the Department, CCMDs, and Services, are actively seeking methods to improve this situation. The successor to the ISR Task 

Force, the ISR Operations Directorate, has now been successfully integrated into the 

OUSDI. Its charter includes developing solutions to warfighter ISR requirements 

ahead of the Future Years Defense Program, within 18–24 months of the identification of the warfighters’ requirements. These rapid acquisition efforts streamline the 

acquisition process. While accepting risk, this approach maximizes innovation to 

match emergent ISR requirements with capability residing in industry. These activities, conducted under close oversight of USDI and the USD AT&L, are a necessary 

complement to the traditional program of record acquisition process. 

ALLOCATION OF INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) ASSETS

THROUGH THE GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT PROCESS (GFMAP)

Question. In the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015, and the accompanying report (S. Rept. 113–176), the 

Committee voiced strong concerns about the process and underlying analysis supporting the allocation of ISR assets to the combatant commands under the Global 

Force Management Process (GFMAP). While these GFMAP problems are numerous, 

the Committee noted in particular that, since the events of September 11th, U.S. 

Central Command (CENTCOM) has received the overwhelming share of ISR assets, 

to the point where the Committee expressed doubt that ‘‘a rigorous analysis would 

consistently rank the lowest priorities of one combatant command higher than the 

highest priorities of other combatant commands.’’ While CENTCOM’s ISR needs remain extremely high, there are serious and growing requirements in Africa, Europe, 

and the Pacific. 

What actions, if any, have been taken by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to respond to these concerns and the direction in section 1058 

of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2015? 

Answer. Balancing ISR requirements across the combatant commands remains a 

challenge, and I share the committee’s concern about the shortfalls that exist for 

ISR in regions like Africa, Europe and the Pacific. With the ongoing operations to 

counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria, urgent operational needs continue to drive high demand in USCENTCOM for ISR, while serious and growing requirements exist in Africa, Europe and the Pacific. In my tenure, OUSDI has focused its efforts to provide 

the warfighter with ISR in three core areas: ensuring a rigorous review of requirements in order to allocate available ISR as optimally as possible across CCMDs; 

seeking to gain more efficiency out of available ISR through efforts such as dynamic 

reallocation of platforms; and seeking to grow the number of ISR platforms and associated capabilities. 

Question. What further actions would you recommend? 

Answer. I remain open to the possibility that automated and operational research 

and systems analysis tools can help improve the acquisition and GFM processes. I 

am also open to continuing to explore the option of supporting unfulfilled ISR requirements with contract capability when and where it makes sense. Lastly, improving coordination and cooperation with key allies who may possess identical or complementary ISR resources can augment our capabilities. 

IMPROVING THE INTEGRATION OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND OF INTELLIGENCE

SYSTEMS AND STRIKE ASSETS

Question. Success in modern warfare will depend on synchronizing the operations 

of different types of satellites and diverse airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, and the rapid sharing of data with and among strike 

assets. Today, however, imagery systems are tasked separately from signals intelligence systems, and satellites are controlled separately from airborne systems. The 

ability to share information from intelligence systems directly with strike assets, 

and even between the strike platforms themselves, is poor. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the one official in the executive 

branch with strong direct oversight authority over both National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program budgets and programs. 

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What changes do you think are necessary in operational tasking processes and 

program planning to achieve synchronized support to strike operations? 

Answer. Synchronizing the diverse satellite and airborne ISR collectors and 

shrinking the timeline to targeting is a difficult challenge but is increasingly important in the threat environments we face now and projected in the future, including 

in high-end anti-access area-denial warfighting scenarios. This is a challenge with 

no single solution and thus requires constant advancements in standardizing data, 

developing advanced ISR analytics, improving interoperability, and refining processes to receive, analyze, and push data from our ISR processing, exploitation and 

dissemination (PED) nodes to strike assets. At the same time, many of our latest 

generation assets such as the F–35 are ISR nodes themselves, allowing us to expand 

our collection network. While a positive development, this adds to the complexity 

of synchronizing ISR and combat operations. 

In order to address this challenge, USDI has been working across the Department 

to mature the Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise (DI2E) to improve intelligence data standards, sharing, and interoperability. Likewise, we are taking steps 

to factor in intelligence support considerations much earlier in the acquisition process. I believe we can improve the common operating picture capability for our future 

weapons systems by identifying upfront in the acquisition process requirements associated with linking the entire ISR constellation of programs to the tactical user. 

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO CYBER MISSION FORCES

Question. The Department of Defense (DOD) is establishing Cyber Mission Teams 

(CMTs) to support the war plans of the combatant commands. Among these units’ 

missions is to create effects on the battlefield in integrated operations with electronic warfare and traditional weapons systems engaged in kinetic operations. Having the ability to affect adversary weapons systems and battlefield command and 

control will require special and focused intelligence collection. 

What guidance and direction have been given to the national intelligence agencies 

to support the Department’s needs for intelligence support to offensive cyber operations? 

Answer. Planning for cyber operations and capability development is generally informed by the DOD Cyber Strategy released in April 2015. The development of options for DOD offensive cyber operations, like military operations within other domains, receives intelligence support from the national intelligence and combat support agencies consistent with the relative prioritization of the specific combatant 

commander requirements and guidance and direction from the Secretary of Defense 

and the Director of National Intelligence. 

Question. Are the intelligence community and DOD’s foreign material acquisition 

and exploitation (FMA/E) programs today properly prioritizing the collection of intelligence needed to support the CMTs? 

Answer. I believe CMT needs are appropriately prioritized but that this requires 

regular attention, review, and refinement. The Department annually incorporates 

national and defense foreign materiel priorities in providing strategic guidance to 

the Military Departments, Combatant Commands, and the Test and Evaluation 

community through the DOD Foreign Materiel Annual Plan. Since at least 2013, 

strategic guidance has included advancing U.S. understanding of foreign military 

capabilities in several priority areas, including cyber capabilities. This past year, 

DIA and USCYBERCOM supported ranking DOD cyber requirements, resulting in 

more than two dozen prioritized cyber-specific requirements. For next year, 

USCYBERCOM is expected to not only provide unique cyber requirements but to 

also support ranking the overall DOD top priorities list for foreign materiel. 

Question. Does the National Security Agency (NSA) provide adequate insight into 

the data it collects that could be useful for the Cyber Mission Teams and FMA/E 

programs? 

Answer. Based on analysis I have been provided so far, it appears that NSA provides relevant insight and the Department has improved the coordination process 

across key stakeholders to ensure the exchange of intelligence information and provision of support to cyber mission forces and FMA/E programs. 

Question. Is there an effective process in place to task NSA collection? 

Answer. The Department continues to use the established collection requirements 

process to drive collection supporting the CMF and cyber requirements, and based 

on analysis that I have been provided so far, it appears effective. 

Question. What priority would you assign to providing such support, and how 

would you propose to shift resources to this task? 

Answer. The previous USD(I) established development of intelligence support to 

cyber operations as one of his five long-term capability development priorities for 

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the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. If confirmed, I intend to continue these 

prioritized efforts in alignment with the Department’s overall Cyber Strategy. Given 

the current state of the CMF build out, the Department continues to study the high 

priority need for intelligence support to the CMF and cyberspace operations. Studies 

identify a continued strong demand signal for intelligence analysis. If confirmed, I 

will continue to refine cyber intelligence priorities as more of the CMF becomes fully 

operational. 

RELATIONSHIP WITH RESPECT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL

OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (ASD SOLIC)

Question. How are responsibilities for the oversight of the activities and programs 

of special operations forces delineated between the USDI and ASD SOLIC? 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense has assigned oversight responsibility for intelligence and intelligence-related activities to various officials in DOD, consistent with 

law and executive order. Primarily, the Secretary of Defense has assigned oversight 

of intelligence and intelligence related activities to the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Intelligence (USD(I)), and oversight of special operations and low intensity conflict policy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) in their respective charter directives. 

The Department oversees SOF intelligence and intelligence-related activities during: (1) the conduct of the activity, (2) the capability development and approval process, (3) the funding and budgeting processes for both capabilities and activities, and 

(4) the reporting of clandestine activities to Congress. This oversight requires collaboration and partnership between USDI and ASD/SOLIC across a range of mission areas. 

The USD(I) is responsible for oversight of all intelligence and intelligence related 

activities, development and execution of the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) 

and oversight of MIP-funded intelligence-related capabilities, programs, and production of the clandestine quarterly activity reports to Congress. The OUSD(I) staff conducts these functions in concert with the ASD (SO/LIC) staff. 

As the acting USD(I), one of my priorities has been to increase integration between OUSDI and DOD components and staff. We work daily and closely with ASD 

(SO/LIC) to identify shortfalls in intelligence support to SOF as we develop plans, 

programs, or activities that support SOF capability to conduct their assigned missions. I will continue to foster this collaboration. 

Question. Are there any programs that are currently overseen by the USDI that 

would be more appropriately overseen by ASD SOLIC? 

Answer. In response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2015, OUSDI and ASD (SO/LIC) staff are reviewing USSOCOM intelligence and intelligence-related programs. The review is still being conducted. Should the review 

identify potential programs whose oversight could properly change from current arrangements, we will work together with ASD (SO/LIC) to develop appropriate proposals and would consult with the Armed Services committees. 

PERSONNEL SECURITY AND INSIDER THREATS

Question. The Committee has enacted significant legislation in recent National 

Defense Authorization Acts mandating and guiding urgent reforms in personnel security processes and insider threat detection and prevention. The recent severe 

breach in personnel security records held by the Office of Personnel Management 

has now also driven a re-evaluation of which element or elements of the government 

should conduct background investigations (BIs) and be responsible for protecting the 

information that such investigations produce. 

What are your views about the pace of this reform effort? 

Answer. I support the need for personnel security process reform. With regard to 

the pace of these efforts, a sense of urgency is needed—recognizing the complexity 

of the system architecture and the amount of interagency coordination which must 

be accomplished to achieve the desired reforms. Recent National Defense Authorization Act provisions increase and improve the Department’s ability to prevent, deter, 

detect, and mitigate actions by any DOD personnel who represent a threat to DOD 

personnel, facilities, operations, or resources. 

Question. What are your views about whether the Department of Defense should 

be responsible for conducting BIs and protecting that sensitive data? 

Answer. As a member of the Suitability and Security Performance Accountability 

Council (PAC), the Department has been participating in the on-going Office of 

Management & Budget (OMB)-led review of the background investigation process 

that began in July 2015. A key focus area of this review is to prioritize the security 

of sensitive personnel data. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the PAC and 

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our interagency partners to implement the OMB review recommendations, to include ensuring that any entity conducting investigations has sufficient cybersecurity 

protections. 

DUPLICATIVE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

Question. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) 

oversees all aspects of the large Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence agencies, 

the service components of the National Intelligence Program, and the Military Intelligence Program-funded activities and programs of the military services and U.S. 

Special Operations Command. This oversight covers policy, budgets, acquisition programs, personnel, information technology (IT), and operations. OUSDI maintains 

staff to oversee all these activities even though functional expertise for policy, acquisitions, personnel, and IT resides in the Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense 

for Policy; Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and Manpower and Readiness; and 

the Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO), respectively. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 

ASD(SOLIC) oversees all aspects of U.S. Special Operations Command, including its 

intelligence activities and programs. 

In the Advance Policy Questions for your recent confirmation as Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the committee asked you whether the 

OUSD(I) staff should continue to duplicate the functions and resources of these 

other Under Secretaries, the CIO, and ASD(SOLIC), and if so, why? 

You responded as follows: ‘‘In support of the USD(I), I look forward to assessing 

this in more detail, if confirmed, as the current fiscal environment does require a 

careful look to ensure inefficiencies and unnecessary duplication are eliminated 

across headquarters elements.’’ 

Have you assessed this matter since you began serving as Principal Deputy? 

Could efficiencies and more effective oversight be achieved by jointly leveraging 

these existing pillars of functional expertise for oversight of intelligence programs, 

personnel, policy, and IT issues? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to place a priority on eliminating inefficiencies and unnecessary duplication across headquarter elements. I have an open mind 

to ideas the Committee might wish to explore for continuing to refine effectiveness 

and efficiency of intelligence programs, personnel, policy and IT issues. 

In my experiences to date, each of the Under Secretaries, the CIO, and 

ASD(SOLIC) bring unique capabilities and expertise to bear. Joint, integrated approaches to oversight and management across these key functions and organizations 

are effective in ensuring complex strategic challenges are comprehensively addressed. This approach takes best advantage of the complementary nature of the expertise arrayed across OSD, including the unique intelligence, counter-intelligence 

and security expertise resident in the OUSDI staff. For example, USD(I)’s close 

partnership with the DOD CIO in responding to the Office of Personnel Management breach leverages both organizations’ unique areas of expertise while ensuring 

that defense intelligence and defense information responses to the breach are fully 

coordinated and not duplicative. 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations personnel different from those carried out by others in the intelligence community? 

Answer. In my view, Special Operations Forces (SOF) intelligence activities and 

capabilities are consistent with how other DOD service components execute and develop intelligence activities. SOF organic intelligence capabilities focus on the SOF 

Commander’s mission critical information needs, which enable SOF to accomplish 

missions assigned by the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC). Intelligence 

Community components do not typically focus on these tactical intelligence requirements due to capacity limitations or the short timelines associated with supporting 

ongoing GCC operations. 

In my view, the unique set of SOF missions range from enduring, current, to 

emergent, all of which require very precise and detailed intelligence to ensure their 

operations achieve national security objectives. The range of missions unique to SOF 

also requires agile and flexible intelligence capabilities in order to meet operational 

timeline requirements. This allows our most sensitive operations, such as hostage 

rescue operations, to take advantage of opportunities as they arise and/or respond 

sufficiently to emergent needs or crises. 

Lastly, SOF intelligence activities are expected to be coordinated fully with the 

IC partners to ensure the necessary de-confliction and to avoid redundancy. Also, 

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any intelligence discipline specific activities must follow the relevant intelligence coordination processes, for instance the Intelligence Community Directive 304 coordination process for any human intelligence activities. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by 

special operations forces are adequately coordinated with other activities carried out 

by those in the intelligence community? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to work to advance efforts to integrate 

SOF intelligence capabilities with those of the Intelligence Community. These efforts have strengthened coordination among and between SOF and the Intelligence 

Community. In my intelligence oversight role, I would ensure SOF intelligence activities adhere to the appropriate coordination process and provide visibility of these 

activities to Congress through the clandestine quarterly reporting process. 

NEED FOR INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Question. Intelligence analysis should be independent and free of command chain 

and political pressure that it reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that 

fits a particular policy preference. 

If confirmed, how would you ensure that all intelligence analysts within the DOD, 

including those who may be seconded to offices that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are free from such pressure? 

Answer. It is imperative that DOD intelligence analysis be objective and free from 

pressure of any kind. Analysts are expected to ‘‘speak truth to power’’ and to call 

it as they see it. If confirmed, I will make the necessity of protecting the analytic 

integrity within their organizations a point of emphasis in my interactions with the 

senior leadership of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, as I have done in the past. 

I will also seek to ensure that DOD intelligence training emphasizes analytic integrity requirements as established in Intelligence Community Directive 203 (Analytic 

Standards) and Joint Publication 2–0 (Joint Intelligence)—safeguarding analytic objectivity, integrity, and independent of political consideration. 

Finally, I will look for opportunities to support analytic ombudsman programs 

across the enterprise. My intent is to make sure that our analytic leadership and 

workforce are fully knowledgeable of the required integrity standards and that analysts have effective recourse available to them if they believe that the independence 

of their analysis is being hindered in any way. 

Question. Has your office investigated the charges that intelligence assessments 

in U.S. Central Command of the emergence of the Islamic State terrorist group and 

the failure of the Iraqi Army were altered inappropriately? If so, what was the result of the investigation? 

Answer. The allegations involving the U.S. Central Command are being thoroughly and impartially investigated by the DOD Inspector General. As such, it is 

neither necessary nor appropriate for my office to conduct a separate, parallel investigation. If confirmed, I will review and implement as appropriate recommendations 

developed by the IG that protect and strengthen the integrity of our analytic processes. 

ANALYTIC CAPABILITIES AND CAPACITY

Question. In the Advance Policy Questions for your recent confirmation as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the committee noted that 

the DOD Inspector General (IG) had recently issued an assessment of DOD longterm intelligence analysis, which concluded that the Department has significant 

problems in three areas. One is broadly termed ‘‘non-traditional support’’ to the combatant commands in such areas as shaping the environment and deterring potential 

adversaries, partner engagements, long-term analysis for campaign planning, and 

evaluation of cyber threats. A second is scientific and technical intelligence support 

to the acquisition process. A third problem area is lack of in-depth expertise in the 

analytic workforce. 

The committee asked you whether you agreed with the IG’s assessment, and, if 

so, how do you believe the Department can address these problems despite declining 

budgets and personnel levels, while sustaining support for counterterrorism and 

other transnational requirements, and the pivot to the Pacific? 

You stated that ‘‘I am not familiar with this assessment, but if confirmed, I will 

review it and discuss the IG’s observations with Dr. Vickers to ascertain the best 

way to address the issues raised.’’ 

What have you done to follow up on this issue since your confirmation? 

Answer. I have reviewed the referenced IG report and believe that fully addressing its findings are challenged in that, as the Committee notes, the Department is 

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in an era of budgetary constraints. Nevertheless, a number of initiatives are underway to mitigate the concerns raised. 

In the current global environment, the Department’s intelligence requirements 

(traditional, non-traditional, acquisition support, cyber, and others) are expanding, 

while our analytic budgets are constrained. This limits the ability to fully satisfy 

our intelligence requirements. The enterprise must instead maximize efficiencies, 

and effectively prioritize our Defense Intelligence Enterprise operations to ensure 

that we are applying our available resources against the Department’s highest 

needs. As Acting USD(I), and at the direction of Congress, I have directed my staff 

to develop the Integrated Defense Intelligence Priorities (IDIP) framework as a 

means to appropriately integrate the full range of Department customer intelligence 

requirements into one tool. If confirmed, I will continue to make the IDIP development a high-emphasis effort to effectively allocate and manage our analytic efforts 

against our highest priority requirements. 

I believe that one way to significantly bolster our analytic capacity is to leverage 

and integrate the intelligence capabilities of our foreign partners to the maximum 

extent possible. Accordingly, as PDUSD(I) and Acting USD(I) I have made the 

strengthening and proactive expansion of our defense intelligence partner engagement program a priority effort. I believe these engagement initiatives, along with 

continued advances in information technology and intelligence sharing via capabilities such as Battlefield Intelligence Collection & Exploitation System (BICES) can 

achieve significant benefits in enhancing our collective intelligence capacity and detecting and preventing threats. If confirmed, I will continue to place significant emphasis in this area. 

Regarding analytic workforce expertise, the Department is beginning implementation of a skills certification program for all-source analysts that will better enable 

it to assess analyst capabilities and to guide future hiring and development of the 

analyst cadre. If confirmed, I will work with the Service and agency leadership to 

look for resource-neutral opportunities to increase our analysts’ expertise. 

The demand for Intelligence Mission Data (IMD) is outstripping the Department’s 

ability to meet the operational requirements of advanced weapons systems, both 

those fielded and still being acquired. IMD, providing the foundation for operational 

mission data, is the result of scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) analysis, 

and is used to define the capabilities of these advanced weapon systems. There are 

many simultaneous National and DOD efforts underway to better support integration of intelligence into the capability development and acquisition process to address S&TI support to the acquisition process. From policy changes to significant 

resource reallocation, the enterprise has established and is refining a governance 

structure to identify, prioritize, and address resourcing and prioritization of cradleto-grave IMD requirements. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

GAO SATELLITE OVERSIGHT

1. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Lettre, I understand the Director of National Intelligence 

(DNI) has been aggressively opposed to allowing the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review satellite acquisition programs at the National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO). As you know, the GAO serves an important oversight role and provides critical insight into Department of Defense’s (DOD) unclassified space programs. Do you believe NRO programs should be exempted from the same level of 

waste, fraud, and abuse scrutiny? 

Mr. LETTRE. If confirmed, I will fully support congressional oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and continuously improve the responsiveness of the 

Defense Intelligence Enterprise to congressional oversight. 

Intelligence Community Directive 114, effective June 30, 2011, establishes the Intelligence Community (IC) policy to cooperate ‘‘to the fullest extent possible’’ with 

the GAO. DOD Instruction 7650.01, of January 27, 2009 sets out the DOD policy 

to cooperate with the GAO and to ‘‘allow the GAO full access to all records that are 

not exempt from disclosure to the GAO.’’ I fully support these policies, and their appropriate application to the DIE as a whole, including the NRO. Since the Defense 

Intelligence Enterprise is charged to protect some of the nation’s most sensitive national security information, we must take into account established protections for 

this information in the context of the full breadth and scope of GAO reviews. 

INTELLIGENCE AGAINST ISIL

2. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Lettre, in your opening statement, you list as one of your 

top priorities ‘‘ensuring that current operations receive necessary intelligence support’’. We have been surprised to hear, during our recent trips to the bases conducting operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), that 

there remains a strong demand for more intelligence support, particularly from defense support agencies and interagency partners. What steps will you take in your 

position, if confirmed, to review whether operations against ISIL are getting sufficient intelligence support and how can you help reallocate resources if needed? 

Mr. LETTRE. While serving as Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, 

I have sought to ensure that current operations receive necessary intelligence support, which I would continue to pursue, if confirmed. I have traveled in the United 

States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of operations to seek the perspectives and insights from our front line forces and commanders, particularly from our 

special operations forces. Within the Department, my staff has supported deep-dive 

intelligence and operations studies to better scope the threat posed by ISIL. I have 

asked all Defense Intelligence Enterprise components to participate in these assessments in order to look for any disconnects between headquarters-level views and the 

warfighter, and to better focus the Defense Intelligence Enterprise against the global and expanding ISIL threat. A particular area of focus has been the need to continuously improve support to targeting, enhancing both the capacity and timeliness 

of reach-back and forward-based support. While USCENTCOM is leading the Department’s response against ISIL in Syria and Iraq, the Department recognizes that 

ISIL is a global threat which requires a global, federated response. At Secretary 

Carter’s direction, we are reviewing the level of intelligence support to counter-ISIL 

operations and will be ready to adjust resource allocation as circumstances dictate. 

3. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Lettre, why do you think it took so long for the Intelligence Community and the military to view ISIL as a terrorist entity with statelike capabilities? 

Mr. LETTRE. ISIL is a threat to the United States, and it is a multi-dimensional 

one, continuing to undermine security and stability in Iraq and Syria, posing a 

growing challenge transregionally as it seeks to solidify a presence in as many as 

eight other areas in Africa and other regions, and posing a serious threat of conducting external attacks in Europe and against U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland, including through inspiring lone actors. 

The Intelligence Community has been monitoring ISIL, its predecessor organizations, and its evolution for some time, but remains very challenged by the difficulty 

of collection against the ISIL network. ISIL remains an adaptive and rapidly moving 

organization, with leaders who appear to aspire to govern territory and establish a 

caliphate while also conducting terrorist activities. 

I am not satisfied with our knowledge of this enemy. The Intelligence Community 

has done impressive work to continue to improve our collection and build our analytic expertise in understanding ISIL, its centers of gravity, and its vulnerabilities, 

893 

but we need to continue to focus efforts on further improving our intelligence posture, and providing support to all of the lines of effort focused on degrading and defeating ISIL. If confirmed, I intend to continue to seek to catalyze these intelligence 

efforts within the defense intelligence enterprise. 

4. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Lettre, what steps will you take to ensure that the defense intelligence enterprise is more nimble and capable of supporting operations 

from the moment those operations begin? 

Mr. LETTRE. In today’s environment, it is more important than ever for the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to adapt rapidly to changing conditions. An important 

part of our responsibilities is ensuring the best possible support to warfighters. This 

means being prepared to adjust the level and the type of support as quickly as circumstances demand. For established contingency plans (CONPLANs), the Department has a process that identifies Combatant Command (CCMD) priorities for intelligence support, evaluates current capabilities, and identifies shortfalls and knowledge gaps. Each CONPLAN has a National Intelligence Support Plan (NISP) in 

which Combat Support Agencies (CSA) provide a detailed concept of support. My 

staff reviews the NISPs and works with the CSAs to ensure the CONPLAN is realistic, executable, and nimble in delivering capabilities to support CCMD operations. 

For unanticipated contingencies, an abbreviated version of this process can be applied to ensure optimized intelligence support to CCMD priorities. 

Through this process, we strive to ensure that the combatant commanders have 

the right mix of intelligence assets they require, including support from National 

Technical Means. 

For high priority operations, senior leader involvement is essential to provide 

oversight at all levels in order to expedite allocation of assets to address identified 

shortfalls. Intelligence support is a limited commodity, and difficult allocation decisions are necessary to mitigate risk as much as possible. If confirmed, I will seek 

to drive the kind of constant dialogue essential to ensuring that urgency of support 

is well understood, and to focus all members of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise 

toward consistent and strategic priorities. 

5. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Lettre, if you believe a combatant commander is not properly allocating resources within the command, and perhaps not providing the right 

support to the warfighter, how can your office address or influence that 

misallocation of resources? 

Mr. LETTRE. The Department has established approaches and management systems by which we constantly reassess and readjust resource allocation based on our 

priorities and changing world circumstances. My office is directly involved in the 

process run by the Joint Staff that results in the Secretary’s orders allocating resources to combatant commanders. There are multiple points throughout the process 

where USD(I) provides input on appropriate resource allocation. We also partner 

with the combatant commanders, multiple agencies within and outside the Department of Defense, and many foreign counterparts to help develop and improve methods to share information between the United States and its friends and allies. Our 

efforts to assist the combatant commanders also include seeking innovative methods 

to develop and field new capabilities where and when it makes good sense to do so 

to support the force of the future. If analysis indicates that senior-level attention 

is warranted to address significant reallocation needs, I can, and if confirmed, will 

engage at my level with combatant commanders, defense intelligence leaders, and 

other key stakeholders to assess the needs and bring senior-level attention to critical resource allocation matters. 

6. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Lettre, how can your office encourage more timely and 

robust interagency support to the warfighter during the beginning phases of a conflict? 

Mr. LETTRE. If confirmed, a priority will be to extend integration and by extension, foster agility, across National and Defense Intelligence programs. The OUSD(I) 

has established relationships throughout the DOD, particularly with the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, as well as our interagency partners. In the beginning of a crisis or conflict, we leverage these relationships to respond to the emergent needs. In 

my experience, the beginning phases of a conflict surface two kinds of needs: surge 

support of existing resources—collection and analysis—for new operational activity 

and senior decision-making; and new resource and capacity needs, based on new 

strategic, operational, and tactical challenges. We therefore need to continue 

leveraging mechanisms for rapidly reallocating intelligence resources and fulfilling 

new urgent operational needs. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the 

894 

entire intelligence enterprise to ensure the warfighter receives the appropriate level 

of timely support. 

DETENTION POLICY

7. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Lettre, Operation Inherent Resolve spokesman, Colonel 

Steve Warren, recently said that ‘‘certainly it’s our preference to capture in all 

cases. It allow[s] us to collect intelligence.’’ If we were to capture Ayman al-Zawahiri 

or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi tonight, where would we detain them for long-term law 

of war detention and interrogation? 

Mr. LETTRE. The appropriate disposition for a detainee, consistent with U.S. domestic law and international law, is determined on the basis of all the facts and 

circumstances, including the national security interests of the United States and its 

allies and partners, and the actions that the detainee has engaged in. Depending 

on the circumstances, detainees may be prosecuted in the United States, detained 

in their home countries, or detained in a third country. The U.S. Government makes 

assessments regarding the appropriate disposition of detainees on a case-by-case 

basis. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

8. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Lettre, earlier this year, I asked Assistant Secretary 

of Defense Michael D. Lumpkin about our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and he said we have an ISR shortage for all of our operations. Do we currently have the appropriate amount of ISR for each combatant 

command? 

Mr. LETTRE. No. One of the greatest challenges the Department faces in the ISR 

domain is meeting the warfighter demand for ISR. The Department addresses this 

challenge through a continuous process of ISR asset allocation where we carefully 

balance defense priorities against risk. We also seek opportunities to cultivate and 

enhance information sharing agreements with our allies which can help bring partner capabilities to bear. Lastly, we explore innovative ways of fielding ISR capabilities to support the force of the future. To give one example, the Department is actively pursuing an effort to increase its unmanned MQ–1/9 ISR combat air over the 

next four years. 

9. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Lettre, in a situation where transnational terrorism 

and non-state actors can pose as much of a threat as hostile nations, how do we 

prioritize ISR resources? 

Mr. LETTRE. The Department has established processes by which we constantly 

reassess and readjust resource allocation based on our priorities and changing world 

circumstances. This process addresses threats to the Nation and its interests posed 

by state and non-state actors alike. If I am confirmed, one of my highest priorities 

will be to drive intelligence operations and activities to satisfy national security requirements and shape intelligence efforts to best support current operations and political-military decision making. The United States must remain vigilant against the 

threat posed by adversaries while aggressively pursuing ISR capabilities to achieve 

success in counter-terrorism and related operations. 

10. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Lettre, I was dismayed to hear allegations that senior officials at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) were altering the analysts’ reports on ISIL to make these reports appear more favorable. Not only is this unethical, but our leaders cannot make smart decisions if those decisions are not based 

on fact. What can be done to ensure that unethical practices such as these are prevented and that those who do so are held accountable? 

Mr. LETTRE. The Department shares your concerns about the allegations involving 

the U.S. Central Command. The Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DOD IG) is currently conducting an investigation of the allegations to determine whether there was any falsification, distortion, delay, suppression or improper 

modification of intelligence information; any deviations from appropriate intelligence 

analysis processes, or internal controls regarding the intelligence analysis; and any 

misconduct or failure to follow established processes. Pending the outcome of the 

DOD IG investigation into the matter, it still remains unknown whether the allegations regarding senior officials at CENTCOM are valid or not. 

The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence recognize the 

need to ensure the analytic integrity of defense intelligence. They have made a point 

895 

of restating how important it is that analysts know they can and should provide 

their honest analysis and are truly expected to call it as they see it. The Defense 

Intelligence Enterprise adheres to a distinct set of standards and processes concerning analytic integrity. I am committed to emphasizing the importance of analytic integrity in defense analysis; and if confirmed, I will seek to ensure these 

standards are clearly understood at all levels across the enterprise. 

[The nomination reference of the Honorable Marcel J. Lettre II 

follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

August 5, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Honorable Marcel John Lettre II, of Maryland to be the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, vice Michael Vickers, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Honorable Marcel John Lettre II, 

which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF HONORABLE MARCEL JOHN LETTRE II 

Education: 

• Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, Massachusetts 

o 1998–2000 

o Masters in Public Policy Degree awarded June 2000 

• University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee 

o 1990–1994 

o Bachelor of Arts Degree awarded June 1994 

Employment Record: 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense 

o Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) 

o As of 1 May 2015, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) 

o 2013–2015 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense 

o Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

o 2011–2013 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense 

o Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs) 

o 2009–2011 

• Office of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (Minority Leader 2005–2006) 

o Senior National Security Advisor 

o 2007–2009 

o Senior Defense and Intelligence Advisor 

o 2005–2007 

• U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

o Professional Staff Member 

o 2002–2005 

• Booz Allen Hamilton 

o Associate 

o 2000–2001 

• Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat 

the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

o Senior Policy Analyst 

o 1998-1999 

• Office of the President, American University 

o Senior Staff Assistant 

896 

o 1995-1997 

• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

o Junior Fellow/ Program Associate, Nuclear Non Proliferation Project 

o 1994-1995 

Honors and Awards: 

Department of Defense Recognitions 

• Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service (2013) 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service (2011) 

Academic Recognitions 

• Award for Excellence in Student Teaching (2000) 

• Nominee for Best Policy Analysis Exercise (2000) 

• Phi Beta Kappa (1994) 

• Bachelors Degree awarded Magna Cum Laude, with Honors (1994) 

• Pi Sigma Alpha Political Science Honor Society (1994) 

• Order of the Gown Academic Honor Society (1991-1994) 

• Wilkins Scholarship (1990-1994) 

• Eagle Scout (1989) 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by the Honorable Marcel J. Lettre II in connection with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Marcel John Lettre II. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

3. Date of nomination: 

August 5, 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

August 9, 1972. 

Gainesville, Georgia. 

897 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Simmons Covington Lettre (‘‘Simmons’’). 

(Maiden name: Renee Fitzsimmons Covington). 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. 

Terry Sanford Senior High School 

Fayetteville, North Carolina 

1987–1990 

High School Diploma (June 1990) 

University of the South 

Sewanee, Tennessee 

1990–1994 

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science (June 1994) 

American University 

Washington, DC 

1995–1996 

Non-Degree Coursework (2 classes in economics) 

Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government 

Cambridge, Massachusetts 

1998–2000 

Masters in Public Policy (June 2000) 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

November 2013–Present. 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, 

(Acting Under Secretary, May 2015–Present), 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Department of Defense, 

The Pentagon, Washington, DC. 

April 2011–November 2013. 

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Department of Defense, 

The Pentagon, Washington, DC. 

April 2009–April 2011. 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Department of Defense, 

The Pentagon, Washington, DC. 

October 2007–April 2009. 

Senior National Security Advisor, 

Office of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, 

U.S. Senate, 

The Capitol, Washington, DC. 

April 2005–October 2007. 

Senior Defense and Intelligence Advisor, 

Office of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (2007), 

Office of Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (2005-2006), 

U.S. Senate, 

The Capitol, Washington DC. 

March 2002–April 2005. 

Professional Staff Member, 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

The Capitol, Washington, DC. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

None. 

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11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

Member, Council on Foreign Relations 

Member, Appalachian Trial Conservancy 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

Contribution to Obama Victory Fund, October 2012, $2,500. 

Contributions to Friends for Harry Reid, October 2010, $500. 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

University and Earlier 

Eagle Scout 

Phi Beta Kappa 

Bachelors Degree awarded Magna Cum Laude, with Honors 

Wilkins Scholarship 

Pi Sigma Alpha Political Science Honor Society 

Order of the Gown Academic Honor Society 

Graduate School 

Award for Excellence in Student Teaching 

Nominee for Best Policy Analysis Exercise 

Department of Defense Recognitions 

Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service 

Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, Bronze Palm 

Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

Interview with Marcel Lettre, ‘‘Transformation Manager: Making Defense Intel 

More Responsive to Today’s Threats,’’ KMI Media Group, May 5, 2015, http:// 

www.kmimediaaroup.com/topics/424-articles-qif/q-a-marcel-lettre/6678-q-amarcellettre 

Ashton B. Carter, with Marcel Lettre and Shane Smith, ‘‘Keeping the Technological Edge,’’ Chapter 6 in Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future. 

Cambridge, MA: Preventive Defense Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2001. 

Marcel Lettre, ‘‘Observations During the Early Response to the World Trade Center Incident, September 11th, 2001,’’ Personal narrative available on the internet, 

September 2001. 

Marcel Lettre and James Anderson, eds. Passing the Torch: Recommendations to 

the Next President on Emerging National Security Issues, New York, NY: Council 

for Emerging National Security Affairs, November 2000. 

Marcel Lettre, ed. Former-Soviet Nuclear Weapon and Sensitive Export Status 

Report, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Monterey Institute, July 1995. 

16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

‘‘Persistence, Resilience and Innovation: Driving Defense Intelligence Transformation in GEOINT.’’ U.S. Geospatial Intelligence Foundation, Washington DC, 

June 25, 2015. 

899 

‘‘Succeeding in the Open—The Military Dimension.’’ George T. Kalaris Intelligence Conference, Washington DC, September 24, 2015. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No (Currently serving as the Acting Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence). 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

MARCEL J. LETTRE II

This 13th day of November, 2015 

[The nomination of the Honorable Marcel J. Lettre II was reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on December 15, 2015, 

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The 

nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 16, 2015.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Gabriel O. Camarillo by 

Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

900 

What modifications to Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions, if any, do you believe are 

necessary for the readiness of the Armed Forces? 

Answer. Goldwater-Nichols constituted a historic and important effort to modernize the military for the late 20th century comprised of an all-volunteer force. It 

is also an excellent example of Congress’ important role in overseeing the Department of Defense and promoting reform as means to ensure our national security. 

As the threats the Nation faces continue to evolve, however, it is important to continually reassess our organizational structure and processes to ensure we are best 

prepared to defend the country from these threats. Accordingly, if confirmed, I am 

fully committed to working with Air Force leadership, my counterparts throughout 

the Department of Defense and Congress to evaluate the success of Goldwater Nichols and whether any modifications are prudent. 

DUTIES

Question. Section 8016 of title 10, United States Code, provides that the Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs shall have ‘‘as his principal duty the overall supervision of manpower and reserve component affairs of the 

Department of the Air Force.’’ 

If confirmed, what duties do you expect that the Secretary of the Air Force will 

prescribe for you? 

Answer. As you have indicated, the principal duties of the Assistant Secretary of 

the Air Force are to support and execute the tasks assigned by the Secretary of the 

Air Force. It is my understanding that these duties include providing guidance, direction, and oversight for Air Force military and civilian manpower/personnel programs; medical readiness and health care; and Reserve Component affairs. The Assistant Secretary is also responsible for oversight of the operation of the Air Force 

Review Boards Agency and its component boards. If confirmed, I will work hard to 

execute these duties to the best of my abilities, as well as any other duties or tasks 

assigned to me by the Secretary. 

Question. What actions will you take to enhance your ability to perform the duties 

of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a thorough review of current Air Force organizations, programs and personnel dedicated to the support of airmen and their 

families to better understand the specific challenges, resources and efforts needed 

to support the Total Force. If confirmed, I will seek input from a broad array of internal and external stakeholders committed to the well-being of our airmen, to include Congress, and work to maintain open and continuous engagement regarding 

matters affected by my performance of the duties associated with this office. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. In carrying out these duties, what would be your relationship with the 

following officials: 

The Secretary of the Air Force. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain regular communication and engagement 

with the Secretary of the Air Force. I will provide the Secretary with my honest assessment and advice and support the Secretary in the implementation of her decisions and policy. 

Question. The Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary, including communication on a regular basis. 

Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain close and professional relationships with each of the Assistant Secretaries and seek to foster collaboration, 

working together to support airmen and their families in the day-to-day management and long-range planning efforts of the Air Force. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Air Force General Counsel has a significant role to play in virtually 

all policy decisions in the Air Force. If confirmed, I expect to have a strong relationship with the General Counsel to obtain consistent and sound legal advice in the 

execution of my duties as an Assistant Secretary. 

Question. The Inspector General of the Air Force. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a constructive relationship 

with the Inspector General as this office has an important role in inquiring into and 

reporting on matters that directly affect Air Force readiness (such as efficiency, 

training, discipline, and morale). 

Question. The Chief of Legislative Liaison of the Department of the Air Force. 

901 

Answer. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the Director of Legislative Liaison who to help the Director ensure 

that the Air Force maintains positive relations with Congress while coordinating the 

Air Force’s legislative strategy. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to maintain a productive and effective working relationship with the civilian leadership in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. I will communicate openly and directly with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness to articulate the views of the Department of the Air Force, the needs of 

airmen and their families, and their impact on readiness. 

Question. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would maintain the same productive and effective relationship with the Principal Deputy that I intend to establish with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to establish the same productive and effective relationship with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs that I intend to establish with all civilian leadership in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to establish the same type of harmonious 

relationship with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness that I intend to 

establish with all civilian leadership in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, except as otherwise prescribed by law, 

performs his duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of 

the Air Force and is directly responsible to the Secretary. If confirmed as the senior 

civilian charged with supervision and direction of policy for manpower and reserve 

affairs, I would work closely with the Chief of Staff to carry out the duties prescribed by the Secretary of the Air Force. 

Question. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs. 

Answer. I understand that many of the functions and operations relating to Air 

Force personnel are executed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel, 

and Services. If confirmed, I would work in concert with the Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to ensure that such execution is consistent with 

policies approved by the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. 

Question. The Surgeon General of the Air Force. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Surgeon General of the Air 

Force to ensure the Air Force medical system supports a medically ready force and 

strives to maintain quality medical support to airmen. 

Question. The Chief, National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to maintain a close working relationship with the 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau on matters relating to the National Guard and 

the Air National Guard. Among my priorities, if confirmed, will be ensuring that 

our National Guard is capable of meeting mission requirements. 

Question. The Director of the Air National Guard. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would maintain close collaboration and clear communication with the Air National Guard. The Reserve Components are a critical part of 

the Total Force and contribute significantly to Air Force mission success. If confirmed, one of my priorities will be to work hard to understand and address Air National Guard issues and challenges. 

Question. The Chief of Air Force Reserve. 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to also maintain close collaboration and clear communication with the Chief of Air Force Reserve. I recognize, however, that due to 

the title 10 mission associated with the Air Force Reserve, the specific issues and 

concerns would be distinct. 

Question. Airmen and their families. 

Answer. Airmen and their families form the backbone of Air Force readiness and 

are therefore essential to the success of its missions. If confirmed, my top priority 

will be to promote the interests and well-being of airmen and their families in the 

development of policies, programs and procedures under the purview of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

902 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. I believe that my combined policy, business and management experience, 

including the past five and half years in the Department of Defense, has prepared 

me to contribute directly to the success of the Air Force through the development 

of policies, programs and processes to address the needs of airmen and their families. 

In my current position as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology), I help oversee the acquisition functions of the 

Army, including research and development, procurement, logistics and sustainment 

across a significant investment portfolio that spans over 600 programs and $72 billion in contracting actions for goods and services in fiscal year 2015. This position 

has provided me keen expertise regarding the Department’s programming, budgeting and execution processes, the impacts of equipment training and readiness on 

title 10 missions, the significant challenges associated with talent management and 

retention as it relates to the Army acquisition workforce, and the equipping needs 

of the Army National Guard. 

I have also proudly committed much of the rest of my career to public service, 

having previously served as legislative staff in the House of Representatives, as a 

civil servant in local government, and for five and a half years as a civilian appointee in the Department of Defense. The needs of our Service men and women 

have shaped virtually every position I held in public service, to include support for 

quality of life programs and base housing at Lemoore Naval Air Station while I 

worked for Rep. Calvin Dooley, the impact of Fort Bliss and Army soldiers on the 

local economy of El Paso, TX, and the equipping needs of soldiers for nearly six 

years in the Department of the Army. During my career, I’ve gained a deeper appreciation for the needs of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines and the vital mission 

they fulfill in defense of our Nation. 

Moreover, as a lawyer in the private sector, I have been involved in the development and management of personnel policies and have been active in the recruiting, 

mentoring and talent management efforts. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of the 

Air Force, I look forward to applying this experience in support of the Air Force, 

airmen and their families, and Total Force readiness. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs? 

Answer. In my view, the most significant challenge facing the Assistant Secretary 

of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is ensuring that the Air Force 

continues to recruit, train, develop and retain talented professionals. In a rapidly 

changing world that presents unique challenges to the Department of Defense and 

our Armed Forces, the foundation of success for the Air Force is and will continue 

to be the airmen—Active Duty, guard, reserve, civilians and civil air patrol—that 

carry out the Air Force’s many missions. Making sure the Air Force continues to 

recruit, develop, and retain the best of our Nation’s diverse talent is critical for the 

future and a major focus for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would look to build on the Air Force’s Total Force construct to explore innovative approaches to attracting and developing talented professionals in the Air Force. 

Similarly, if confirmed, I would consider new approaches to recruit, attract and 

retain an All-Volunteer Force of agile and inclusive airmen. Today’s labor market 

dynamics require flexible, modern approaches to make sure the Air Force of the future has the numbers, talents, and diversity to needed to remain the best Air Force 

in the world. 

Also, if confirmed, I would carefully review the many current and proposed authorities the Services have for managing and developing the tremendous talent 

across the force to make sure they provide maximum capability for the Air Force 

to continue developing and retaining the airmen needed for the future. 

SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

Question. What is your assessment of the progress made by the Air Force to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured airmen? 

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Answer. It is my understanding there has been steady progress improving the 

care of Wounded, Ill and Injured (WII) Airmen as result of combined efforts across 

the Air Force. My understanding is that the Air Force has established Care Management Teams to guide WII Airmen through their recovery and transition and to 

ensure they have appropriate primary, specialty and mental health care by monitoring their access and utilizing clinical case managers. I understand that the Air 

Force currently evaluates WII Airmen through the Disability Evaluation System 

(DES) to ensure those unable to continue serving receive their full benefits. 

If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue 

to increase the Air Force’s support for wounded airmen, and to monitor their 

progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

If confirmed, I will assess the effectiveness of these programs and their resources 

to determine which adjustments or strategies are needed to ensure that wounded 

airmen receive the best support and care possible. 

OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. As the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs you would have significant responsibilities with regard to officer management policies, the promotion system, and recommending officers for nomination to 

positions of authority and responsibility. 

If confirmed, what modifications would you make to provide the Air Force the 

force management tools necessary to meet the needs of the 21st century joint, allvolunteer force? 

Answer. A strong emphasis on force management is critically important to the 

long-term development of a Total Force capable of meeting current and future Air 

Force missions and requirements. If confirmed, I would review the set of management tools applied toward this critical function and develop strategies to address 

any needed changes, as appropriate. 

Question. Do you believe the current Air Force procedures and practices for reviewing the records of officers pending nomination by the President are sufficient 

to ensure the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of Defense, and the President 

can make informed decisions? 

Answer. I have not had the opportunity to conduct a detailed review of the processes and procedures used in the Air Force to review officer records prior to nomination. If confirmed, I would conduct a review of these procedures to ensure that they 

facilitate informed decisions regarding the best qualified officers selected for promotion. 

Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair and reasonable for 

the officers involved? 

Answer. If I am confirmed, it is my understanding that one of my responsibilities, 

delegated by the Secretary of the Air Force, would be to interview Board Presidents, 

members and recorders to ensure boards follow all applicable laws, instructions and 

administrative directives. If confirmed, this will provide me a great opportunity to 

interact with individuals directly involved with these procedures and practices and 

directly assess their effectiveness and impacts. 

Question. What modifications, if any, to the requirements for joint officer qualifications are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to attain meaningful 

joint and service-specific leadership experience and professional development? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the requirements for joint officer qualifications are currently under review. If confirmed, I will carefully evaluate the results 

to determine their effect on the Air Force. 

Question. In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification requirements on 

the ability of the services to select the best qualified officers for promotion and to 

enable officer assignments that will satisfy service-specific officer professional development requirements? 

Answer. I believe there are benefits to joint qualifications and assignments as officers develop experience that is useful for broad professional development and future 

service assignments. I have not had a chance to make an assessment of any impacts 

associated with joint assignments on Air Force officer professional development. It 

is my understanding that the Air Force is currently undertaking a review of joint 

officer qualifications and if confirmed, I will study this review when completed and 

engage with the Secretary of the Air Force on any changes or modifications deemed 

appropriate in the area of professional development. 

Question. Do you recommend changes to the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) to recruit and retain the best and brightest Air Force officers? 

Answer. My understanding is our talent management systems may need to be 

more permeable to attract and retain the Force of the Future. I look forward to SecVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00909 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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retary Carter’s announcement on the Force of the Future initiatives. If confirmed, 

I will assess these initiatives and recommendations before engaging with Secretary 

James on any potential changes for the Air Force. 

Question. Do you agree with recent testimony before the Committee that the military services should significantly reduce the size and number of the officer corps? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Air Force senior leadership to review and 

ensure that our force (Active and Reserve Components), our military (officer and enlisted) and civilians, as well as contracted support, are sized both effectively and efficiently to meet Air Force requirements and missions. Technical Training and Assignment of General Officers 

Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of general officers have advanced 

training and degrees in scientific and technical disciplines? 

Answer. Although I cannot answer this question definitively at this time, if confirmed, I will be in a better position to assess the Air Force’s needs regarding advanced training and degrees in scientific and technical disciplines for general officers. 

Question. Are the career paths for officers with technical skills appropriate to ensure that the services can execute complex acquisition programs, adapt to a rapidly 

changing technological threat environment, and make informed investment decisions on DOD and Air Force resources? If not, what will you do to address this deficiency? 

Answer. I understand that the Air Force goes to great lengths to manage its officer corps to ensure it develops a talented, professional acquisition workforce to manage investment in critical warfighting capabilities for the Air Force. One of my priorities as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army has been to ensure that 

talent management and training in the Army acquisition workforce enables us to 

respond to a rapidly evolving threat environment calling for expertise in key technical areas. If confirmed, I will work with Air Force leadership to assess the needs 

of the Air Force acquisition workforce and work collaboratively to address any needed changes in policies or programs. 

Question. In your view do current general officer assignment policies provide and 

incentivize qualified officers to serve in acquisition programs? Do tour lengths for 

those assignments enable and empower such officers to effectively manage acquisition programs? If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to improve the 

effectiveness of senior officers assigned those duties? 

Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the effect of current Air Force 

officer assignment policies on the management of Air Force acquisition programs. 

If confirmed, this is certainly an area I will review in collaboration with Air Force 

leadership. 

GENERAL OFFICER NOMINATIONS

Question. Under DOD Instruction 1320.4, adverse and alleged adverse information pertaining to general officers must be evaluated by senior leaders in the Services and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense prior to nomination. 

If confirmed, what role would you play in the officer promotion system, particularly in reviewing general officer nominations? 

Answer. I have been informed that both the Secretary of the Air Force and the 

Chief of Staff are directly involved in the General Officer nomination process. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting them through the duties assigned to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

Question. What is your assessment of the ability of the Services to timely document credible information of an adverse nature for evaluation by promotion selection boards and military and civilian leaders? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Department of the Air Force gathers information from multiple organizations to document and present adverse information to 

promotion selection boards. If confirmed, I will be in a better position to assess the 

timeliness of this process and its effect on promotion selection boards. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that only the best qualified officers are nominated for promotion to general officer rank? 

Answer. As previously stated, both the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief 

of Staff are involved in this matter. If confirmed, I will provide my best advice and 

counsel to the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure the Air Force continues to nominate the best and most qualified officers for promotion to the rank of General Officer. 

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CREWING FOR REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS

Question. The Air Force has been experiencing problems with manning its fleet 

of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), specifically Predators and Reapers. A recent internal Air Force email from the head of Air Combat Command to the Air Force 

Chief of Staff said these fleets are being strained to the breaking point because of 

overstressing air crews in trying to maintain 65 RPA orbits. This has been continuing issue since demand for UAV services has outstripped capacity to produce 

aircrews from the beginning of UAV deployments. 

Air Force budget documents indicate that the Air Force is planning to add 434 

personnel authorizations to the MQ–9 force structure in fiscal year 2016. Increased 

authorizations, however, do not equate to additional personnel in the squadrons. 

The Air Force has proposed increases to the RPA community in the past that did 

not result in the similar increases in air crews. 

We understand that the fiscal year 2017 Department of Defense (DOD) budget request will increase the demand for RPA orbits well beyond 65 orbits, although the 

Air Force will not be asked to shoulder the responsibility for the additional orbits. 

What steps do you believe the Air Force and DOD should take to improve the Air 

Force’s ability to sustain the current force? 

Answer. I have been informed that in response to the current shortage of remotely 

piloted aircraft pilots, the United States Air Force has launched several initiatives 

to improve total manning to 100 percent within the existing organizational construct. I understand that these initiatives will require some time to accomplish and 

utilize Active Duty, Reserve, Guard, Department of the Air Force Civilians, and 

where appropriate, contracted support, operational, training, and mission support 

functions throughout the Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Enterprise. 

The RPA Enterprise has grown exponentially, while conducting surge operations, 

over the past 15 years of conflict to support warfighter demands. The resourcing for 

this critical enterprise has occurred within the existing personnel and programming 

constraints of the AF which has limited the ability to develop a fully sustainable 

weapon system. If confirmed, I will conduct a review of current and planned efforts 

to address the manning requirements for RPA aircrews and work with the Secretary 

of the Air Force to address any additional steps required to meet this demand. 

Question. How would the Air Force deal with additional demand if it had to provide aircrews for the additional orbits? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Air Force will continue to provide combatant commanders with ISR, situational awareness and strike capability. I have been 

informed that the Air Force would prioritize warfighter requirements and explore 

a range of options to meet the additional demand with a mix of Total Force resources, to include potential Reserve and Guard mobilization. If confirmed, I would 

review and assess the effect of these strategies before determining whether any additional or modified approaches are necessary or appropriate. 

Question. Do you see a need for any changes in legislation to enable the Department to solve these RPA crew problems? 

Answer. It is my understanding the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2016, Congress included flight, bonus and incentive pay provisions for RPA aircrew personnel. If confirmed, I would assess the effect of these statutory authorities 

before making any recommendations for additional legislative action. 

AIR FORCE END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS

Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Congress authorized an Active Duty end strength for the Air Force of 320,715. 

In your view, can the Air Force meet national defense objectives at this strength 

level? 

Answer. Based on information I have received, it is my understanding that an Active-Duty workforce of approximately 321,000 would likely be sufficient to meet today’s national defense objectives and operational requirements. If confirmed, however, I look forward to conducting a review and assessment of the Air Force’s end 

strength requirements in coordination with the Air Force leadership. 

Question. If budget caps effective in current law remain in place, how will the Air 

Force’s active- and reserve component end strengths be impacted? 

Answer. My understanding is that budget caps will drive the Air Force to evaluate/re-prioritize its various programs and missions and those choices will directly influence Air Force end-strength requirements. It is likely that the Air Force would 

be required to divest or trim back missions and explore a corresponding reduction 

in our Total Force workforce. That said, if confirmed, I will have an opportunity to 

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further assess the Air Force Total Force requirements and will advocate for an active-reserve force mix of the future the remains both effective and efficient. 

Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional force shaping 

tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has provided the past three years? 

Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to review the effects of current force 

shaping tools available to the Air Force. If confirmed, I would conduct an assessment of all force shaping tools available to the Air Force, including recent authorities provided by the Congress, and make recommendations for additional force shaping tools as necessary. 

Question. In your view, should the number of general officers in the Air Force be 

reduced commensurate with the drawdown of total Air Force end strength? 

Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review the processes and analysis used 

by the Air Force to right-size the General Officer corps. I am aware that the Air 

Force has implemented reductions required across the Department of Defense consistent with the Air Force drawdown. If confirmed, I would review these efforts and 

work with the Secretary of the Air Force to determine whether further efforts are 

required. 

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What do you believe are the major personnel lessons learned from the 

last fifteen years of sustained combat operations which you would seek to address 

if confirmed as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs? 

Answer. Prolonged combat operations have taken a significant toll on airmen, who 

continue to meet unplanned mission requirements creating a normalized surge environment while resources continue to decrease. Having the resources to maintain a 

deliberate and steady force structure and end-strength that can adapt to emerging 

threats is imperative to success. The unique skills grown through military service 

need a steady and consistent budgeting process to maintain readiness as well as the 

modernization of weapon systems to carry out the mission. A stable and predictable 

balance of investment between readiness, modernization and manpower is required 

to allow the Air Force to adequately train, develop, and equip airmen to meet the 

demands of a complex security environment. 

NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, AND READINESS

Question. Legislative proposals introduced in recent years and recommendations 

of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves have proposed numerous 

changes to the roles and responsibilities of the National Guard and Reserves. Several of the proposed changes have been implemented, and numerous others are 

under consideration. 

How do you assess the changes in the role and authorities of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau? 

Answer. From my perspective, the changes to the roles, mission and authorities 

of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau elevated the National Guard to a level 

of visibility needed to ensure it is properly equipped and resourced to carry out its 

dual-role mission. 

Question. How do you assess the changes in the roles and mission of the Air National Guard? 

Answer. The Air National Guard is engaged across all Air Force mission sets. 

Like the Regular Air Force, they have undergone significant transformation to increase their roles in cyber, space, remotely piloted aircraft and other emerging missions our combatant commanders need for today’s operating environment. While I 

have not been involved in the recent analysis efforts the Air Force has undertaken 

regarding the mission mix between components, I look forward to participating and 

engaging in that effort. 

Question. In your view, do the current Air Force processes for planning, programming, and budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the Air National 

Guard? What is the appropriate role of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and 

the Director of the Air National Guard in this regard? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Air Force planning, programming and 

budgeting process is managed as a Total Force activity with full participation from 

the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. The Director of the Air National 

Guard, as a full member of the CNGB staff plays a dual role of participating in the 

overall Air Staff budgeting process while concurrently keeping the CNGB apprised 

of relevant issues. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging with the Air National 

Guard and Air Force Reserve to ensure that a Total Force approach is maintained. 

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Question. In your view, what should be the Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s 

role, if any, in the assignment of Directors and Deputy Directors of the Air National 

Guard? 

Answer. It is my understanding the Directors and Deputy Directors of the ANG 

are appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force in consultation with the Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. I believe this 

consultative role played by the CNGB is appropriate. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services continue to be of great 

concern to the Committee. 

If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide prevention programs 

and policies for the Department of the Air Force to prevent suicides and increase 

the resiliency of airmen and their families? 

Answer. Even one suicide in the Air Force is too many, and I understand that 

the Air Force has responded to this problem through a comprehensive approach focusing on airmen fitness, resiliency, care and support. It is my understanding that 

the Air Force Suicide Prevention Program employs evidence-based methods and consists of a leadership-driven, Coordinated Community Approach. I fully support this 

strategy as consistent with a Comprehensive Airman Fitness and Wingman Culture. 

Airmen are impressively resilient but are also subject to many challenges. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Air Force continues to provide a wide range 

of quality services to support airmen and families while firmly establishing a culture of positive support where airmen seeking assistance is seen as a sign of 

strength. If confirmed, I will also work with the Secretary of the Air Force to implement efforts to reduce suicides by providing oversight and assuring that this issue 

is appropriately prioritized and addressed. I will work collaboratively with our sister 

Services, DOD, VA and other stakeholders to optimize our effectiveness, promote resilience and ensure that our Airman and families receive the best medical and support services. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Airmen and their families in both the active and reserve components 

have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational 

deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for airmen 

and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness 

needs are addressed and adequately resourced, especially in light of current fiscal 

constraints? 

Answer. Taking care of people is the Air Force’s number one priority. The most 

important family readiness issues for airmen and their families is investment in airmen and family programs and the MWR Portfolio. MWR and family programs have 

a direct impact to retention, resiliency, and readiness. These programs contribute 

directly to building a ‘‘community’’ of airmen and families. Support for airmen family readiness is one of my priorities, as it is vital to the long-term success of the 

Air Force. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing and identifying any needs in 

this area. 

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. If confirmed, what challenges do you foresee in sustaining Air Force 

MWR programs in the future fiscal environment of the Air Force? 

Answer. Robust and successful MWR programs contribute significantly to mission 

success while reinforcing the sense of community among airmen and their families. 

Constrained resources present tough challenges to the Air Force’s efforts to sustain 

MWR programs. I understand that the Air Force leadership recognized the importance of MWR programs and recommended funding in the fiscal year 2016 budget 

and out-years consistent with this priority. In the coming years, retaining adequate 

resources for these programs in an uncertain fiscal environment presents the greatest challenge. MWR Programs are the right investment for airmen and their families; even in times of scarce resources as they are directly tied to resilience, morale 

and ultimately readiness/mission performance. 

MILITARY HEALTH CARE

Question. In your view, what should the Air Force Medical Service do to improve 

access to care in its medical facilities? 

908 

Answer. In my view, to improve access for our airmen and their families, the Air 

Force Medical Service must identify, validate, standardize and implement the best 

access-related practices from across the Air Force, the military health system, as 

well as civilian medicine. Additionally, the enhanced care delivery venues the Air 

Force Medical Service already employs should continue to be developed and leveraged to ensure that patients receive the right care from the right provider, at the 

right time and in the right setting. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Surgeon General of the Air 

Force to improve the healthcare experience for airmen and their families? 

Answer. Providing excellent healthcare to airmen and their families is a paramount objective and if confirmed, I will work with the Surgeon General to review 

current and planned efforts to maintain and improve the highest quality and safest 

care possible. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. In 2014, there was what the Department described as an ‘‘unprecedented 53 percent increase in victim reports of sexual assault. In fiscal year 2014, 

victims made 4,660 Unrestricted Reports and 1,840 initial Restricted Reports of sexual assault. Also in fiscal year 2014, the Department saw the number of victims who 

converted Restricted Reports to Unrestricted Reports increase from an average of 

15 percent to 20 percent. According to the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study 

approximately 72 percent of servicemember victims who indicated they made a sexual assault report said they would make the same decision to make a report if they 

had to do it over again. The Rand Study also indicated the percentages of Active 

Duty personnel who experienced unwanted sexual assault declined in 2014, from 6.1 

percent to 4.3 percent for women and from 1.2 percent to 0.9 percent for men. The 

Department also concluded the estimated gap between reporting and prevalence of 

sexual assaults was at the narrowest point since the Department began tracking 

this data. 

What is your assessment of the Air Force’s sexual assault prevention and response program? 

Answer. It is my understanding the Air Force is making progress in preventing 

and responding to this crime with support and funding from Congress. Since fiscal 

year 2012, reports of sexual assault in the Air Force have risen, while estimated 

prevalence trends have fallen, indicating the program’s progress in both preventing 

sexual assault and increasing airmen’s confidence in the program. Another indication of airmen’s confidence is the increase in the percentage of unrestricted reports, 

However, the emphasis on these and other Air Force-wide efforts must continue 

and there is still much work to be done. For example, I’ve been informed the Air 

Force will introduce newly enhanced service-wide prevention training in January 

2016 to continue to further combat the problem of sexual assault in our service. If 

confirmed, improving the Air Force’s prevention and response efforts will be one of 

my top priorities and I eagerly look forward to the opportunity to work with Air 

Force leadership to further address this crime. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. I believe giving victims the ability to choose between filing a restricted 

or unrestricted report allows access to services that are unmatched in the civilian 

community. In addition, this allows victims to seek care confidentially, if they prefer, and to mitigate concerns regarding career impact or retaliation. A victim may 

need care, but be reluctant to report an assault because they do not want a formal 

investigation. Until the Air Force instituted restricted reporting, these victims were 

unable to see a SARC and obtain the services they so desperately needed to heal. 

Now victims are able to start the healing process and engage in all the support 

SARC and the Air Force provide without being required to participate in a formal 

investigation. This also allows the Air Force to preserve evidence from victims who 

come forward to support future investigations, should they later decide to change 

their report to unrestricted. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to the victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. Commanders actively support sexual assault prevention and response 

programs and are responsible for supporting victims, as well as for conducting the 

criminal justice procedures that enable the accused to be held appropriately accountable. Commanders notified of a sexual assault must take immediate steps to 

ensure the physical safety, emotional security and medical treatment needs of a victim are met, and that the appropriate investigative agency and sexual assault response coordinator is notified. Furthermore, the commander’s role is to protect sexVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00914 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ual assault victims, witnesses, bystanders, first responders and other parties to the 

incident from coercion, ostracism, maltreatment, discrimination, reprisal and retaliation. 

It is my understanding that every commander in the Air Force is provided training prior to taking command to ensure that he or she is fully informed of all the 

available resources to support a victim of sexual assault. Through their training and 

support from their sexual assault response coordinator, a commander is made aware 

of the array of personnel actions, to include expedited transfers, which are available 

and may be appropriate. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Air Force resources and 

programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal 

help they need? 

Answer. I understand that the Air Force provides a multitude of resources to assist victims of sexual assault. Regarding legal support, the Special Victims’ Counsel 

(SCS) program provides holistic legal representation to victims, ranging from advising victims on all aspects of the military justice process to traditional legal assistance. Victims who do not desire SVC representation can still seek traditional legal 

assistance at the legal office for issues that may stem from a sexual assault, such 

as breaking a lease, divorce or other personal legal matters. Further, Victim Witness Assistance Program personnel in the legal office assist victims and witnesses 

through the military justice process and assist Sexual Assault Prevention and Response personnel and SVCs in providing care to victims. 

My understanding is that victims also have a variety of medical and psychological 

resources available to them. The Air Force Medical Service has trained Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners available to every Military Treatment Facility to serve as 

the medical point of contact post-assault when medical care for the purposes of collecting forensic evidence or assessing and treating medically-related injuries is necessary. Victims are offered mental health support by providers who are expertly 

trained to deliver both crisis-counseling services and ongoing care often needed 

when overcoming trauma events. 

If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to closely review these programs 

and resources to determine whether any modifications or augmentations are needed 

or appropriate. 

Question. What is your view of the Air Force’s Special Victim Counsel Program? 

Answer. I’ve been informed that since the Program’s groundbreaking establishment in 2013, the Air Force’s Special Victims’ Counsel Program has served 2005 clients, including 58 child clients. In my view, the Program has been successful assisting victims of sexual assault navigate the military justice process and resolve legal 

issues associated with their sexual assault, to include retaliation and privacy concerns. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Special Victim Counsel program 

as part of the Air Force’s comprehensive efforts to address and prevent sexual assault. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Air Force has taken to prevent additional sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

Answer. In my view, the decrease in prevalence and the increase in reporting are 

strong indicators that the Air Force‘s efforts are making progress. I understand that 

the Air Force has built a robust response system that’s unmatched in the civilian 

community and will continue expanding its prevention strategy designed to eliminate sexual assault from its ranks. If confirmed, I am committed to supporting these 

efforts. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources Air 

Force has in place to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to assess the adequacy of training and 

resources employed by the Air Force for investigation and prosecution of cases. I am 

aware that the Air Force established a worldwide special victim’s investigation and 

prosecution capability. These prosecutors and investigators received specialized 

training in investigating and prosecuting sexual assault cases and currently assist 

other agents and judge advocates across the Air Force in the investigation and prosecution of sexual assault cases. If confirmed, I will assess the adequacy of these programs and their required resources to determine whether any recommended 

changes are needed. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. I believe that the chain of command is vital in creating and maintaining 

a professional and respectful climate in every military unit. The ability to set standards and enforce them through judicial and non-judicial punishment is critical to ensuring that all airmen reflect Air Force values and standards of conduct. 

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Question. Surveys report that up to 62 percent of victims who report a sexual assault perceive professional or social retaliation for reporting. If confirmed, what will 

you do to address the issue of retaliation for reporting a sexual assault? 

Answer. Addressing fears of retaliation is critical to any efforts to encourage 

greater reporting of sexual assault and providing care for victims. Climate surveys 

and other research indicate, airmen have a high level of trust and confidence in 

their commanders. What is becoming more apparent is that the ‘‘retaliation’’ that 

is often discussed is in the form of negative responses or a perceived stigma from 

their fellow airmen. 

Retaliation not only harms the lives and careers of victims, bystanders, witnesses 

and first responders, but it also undermines military readiness and weakens the culture of dignity and respect. Without question, retaliation has no place in the Air 

Force. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the prevention and response professionals to institute education for commanders and airmen at all levels about the 

impact of sexual assault on an individual and proper ways to care for one another. 

As part of these efforts, commanders must be prepared and trained to understand 

the immense trauma that accompanies any sexual assault, to include the behavioral 

and mental health issues that may arise in connection with these crimes. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that in-depth training and guidance on sexual assault 

trauma is assists commanders in their efforts to support victims in recovery. 

Additionally, I understand that a recent change to Air Force policy requires airmen be advised of their right to request review by a general officer if they believe 

the Commander’s recommendation for involuntary (administrative) discharge was 

initiated in retaliation for having made an unrestricted report of sexual assault 

within the previous twelve months. I look forward to further reviewing the effects 

of these and other policies and programs if confirmed. 

Question. Sexual assault is a significantly underreported crime in our society and 

in the military. If confirmed, what will you do to increase reporting of sexual assaults by military victims? 

Answer. I believe the key to increased reporting is a two part message: First we 

must to continue emphasize that sexual assault and sexual harassment have no 

place in the Air Force. However, should a sexual assault occur, we should encourage 

victims to select a reporting option and get the care they need. To sustain these efforts, we must properly resource efforts across the spectrum of reporting, response 

and prevention. 

The most under-reporting group in the Air Force is male victims. In the last year, 

the Air Force specifically focused on the subject of ‘‘male victimization’’ during annual Sexual Assault Prevention and Response training. In a further effort to increase reporting, the Air Force led the DOD by offering Sexual Assault Prevention 

and Response services to civilian employees. This important effort has opened the 

door for ALL airmen to be treated with dignity and respect, and to be empowered 

to start down the path of healing as valued members of the service. If confirmed, 

I will continue to look for ways to better serve victims of this crime. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command, instead of a military commander in the grade of O– 

6 or above as is currently the Department’s policy, to determine whether allegations 

of sexual assault should be prosecuted? 

Answer. The commander and the judge advocate must continue to play a significant role in the effective prosecution of this crime. Continuing the strong partnership between commanders and their legal advisors is critical to address the needs 

of victims and to hold alleged offenders appropriately accountable. If confirmed, I 

would closely review the current policies and procedures in place to ensure that we 

foster an environment in which victims feel safe and comfortable in reporting such 

crimes, as we continue to work toward eradication of sexual assault from the Air 

Force. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Air Force? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Air Force continues to apply 

the necessary leadership, resources and manpower toward the goal of eliminating 

sexual assault from the Air Force. I believe the Air Force is making progress in 

these efforts, and the new five-year prevention and response strategy General Welsh 

recently signed will help to build on this success. A continued emphasis on a comprehensive approach with an emphasis on prevention will help the Air Force achieve 

this goal. 

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RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. American military personnel routinely deploy to locations around the 

world where they must engage and work effectively with allies and with host-country nationals whose faiths and beliefs may be different than their own. For many 

other cultures, religious faith is not a purely personal and private matter; it is the 

foundation of their culture and society. Learning to respect the different faiths and 

beliefs of others, and to understand how accommodating different views can contribute to a diverse force is, some would argue, an essential skill to operational effectiveness. 

In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different beliefs, 

including no religious belief? 

Answer. I fully support the Constitutional principles protecting the free exercise 

of an individual’s religious views and the freedom from established religious practices within the workplace. It is my understanding that Air Force policy supports 

the rights of every Airman to practice the religion of their choice or subscribe to no 

religious belief at all. I have not, however, had the opportunity to observe the implementation of these policies throughout the Air Force. If confirmed, I would continue 

the Air Force’s commitment to upholding the Constitutional tenets of the ‘‘free exercise’’ and ‘‘establishment’’ clauses, and review policies as necessary to assure continued compliance with the First Amendment. 

Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and good order and discipline? 

Answer. I understand that Air Force policy is aligned with the law and OSD policy supporting an individual’s right to express and request accommodation for their 

sincerely held beliefs unless their expressions of belief impacts military readiness, 

unit cohesion, good order, discipline, health and safety or mission accomplishment. 

If confirmed, I will review these policies as required. 

Question. In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and respects open 

and candid discussions about personal religious faith and beliefs in a garrison environment contribute in a positive way to preparing U.S. forces to be effective in overseas assignments? 

Answer. I believe that airmen should confidently express their own beliefs while 

respecting and being sensitive to the viewpoints of others who differ from their own. 

Open, respectful and candid discussions will help prepare our airmen to respect the 

different faiths and beliefs of others throughout the world. 

Question. Would a policy that discourages open discussions about personal faith 

and beliefs be more or less effective at preparing servicemembers to work and operate in a pluralistic environment? 

Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the impact such discussions have 

on preparing airmen for missions, but I believe that any policy discouraging airmen 

from exercising their Constitutional rights would be less effective at preparing 

servicemembers to work in a pluralistic environment. 

Question. In your view, when performing official military duties outside a worship 

service, should military chaplains be encouraged to express their personal religious 

beliefs and tenets of their faith freely, or must they avoid making statements based 

on their religious beliefs? 

Answer. Chaplains should be provided the same opportunities as all airmen to respectfully express their personal religious beliefs without fear of any adverse personnel action. I understand that chaplains are trusted to serve Airman and to understand when it is appropriate to engage in discussions of faith, religion, or spirituality to encourage personal and family health and to enhance Airman resiliency. I 

also understand that Chaplains are trained and expected to be sensitive to the 

needs and beliefs of a pluralistic Air Force reflecting a diversity of beliefs. 

Question. Do you believe chaplains should be tasked with conducting non-religious 

training in front of mandatory formations, even if they may be uniquely qualified 

to speak on the particular topic, such as suicide prevention or substance abuse? If 

so, do you believe guidance provided to those chaplains on what they should and 

should not say with respect to their faith is adequate? 

Answer. I understand that Chaplains are professionals trained to provide their expertise at these events in an appropriate manner. I have not had an opportunity 

to review in depth the Air Force’s policy concerning the use of Chaplains in nonreligious training. If confirmed, I will study this issue to determine if changes in 

policy are necessary. 

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OFFICER ACCESSIONS

Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relative distribution from the 

sources of commission to meet the Air Force’s officer accessions requirements and 

sustain the viability of the Air Force Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and 

the Officer Candidate School? 

Answer. I understand that the Air Force employs a balance among three officer 

accession sources to develop high quality officers reflecting a diversity of education, 

thought, and background. I understand that the Air Force projects approximately 

4,447 officer accessions in fiscal year 2018 to meet required end strength, which will 

require a balanced mix of officers from these sources. If confirmed, I will review the 

processes and analysis employed to determine the relative distribution of accessions 

and work to ensure that a balanced approach is maintained to achieve a talented 

and diverse group of officers. 

Question. As force levels for all the services continue to be impacted by both the 

rising cost of personnel and budget caps, how would you, if confirmed, evaluate and 

make adjustments, if any, to the relative distribution among sources of commissioning to meet potentially lower officer accession requirements? 

Answer. My understanding is that current approach employed by the Air Force 

affords flexibility to meet changing end strength requirements. 

Question. What is your assessment of the ability of the Department to restore end 

strength if required in response to an emerging national security threat? 

Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to assess the efficacy of current tools 

and processes to restore Air Force end strength in response to urgent threats and 

operational needs. I understand that the Air Force utilizes accession capacity to 

maintain the ability and flexibility to help surge the Air Force in response to any 

emerging national security threat. If confirmed, I would review these processes to 

determine whether any changes or adjustments are required. 

Question. In your view, does the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act need 

to be updated to support Air Force Officer accessions? 

Answer. I have not had sufficient time to review the process for conducting Air 

Force Officer accessions to determine whether DOPMA reforms are needed. I am 

aware that as part of the Department of Defense current Force of the Future study, 

several DOPMA reforms are being considered. Several modified approaches to 

DOPMA could help in retaining individual airmen in specific cases and support the 

management of niche or technical career fields where current up-or-out models restrict progression, prohibit permeability, and limit retention of some key talent. 

Given the wide reaching effects of such changes, I would first undertake a thorough 

review of the impacts on the Air Force and the grounds for legislative reform. . 

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY

Question. What is your assessment of the policies and procedures at the United 

States Air Force Academy to prevent and respond appropriately to sexual assaults 

and sexual harassment and to ensure essential oversight? 

Answer. I have not yet had a chance to review the specific policies and procedures 

in place at the Air Force Academy. If confirmed, I would expect the Air Force Academy to be in full compliance with OSD and AF-wide policy. 

Question. What is your assessment of the policies and procedures at the United 

States Air Force Academy to ensure religious tolerance and respect? 

Answer. I have not yet had a chance to review the policies and procedures in effect at the Air Force Academy. I believe that common standards and policies 

throughout the Air Force, including the Air Force Academy, contribute to a culture 

of religious tolerance and respect for diversity. If confirmed, I would expect the Air 

Force Academy to remain in full compliance with OSD and Air Force-wide policy. 

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. The Department of Defense, in January, 2013, rescinded the policy restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission 

of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and gave the military services until 

January 1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request an 

exception to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that 

must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary 

of Defense. The services are working now to develop gender-free physical and mental standards for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those 

standards. 

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If confirmed, what role will you play in the development and implementation of 

these standards? 

Answer. It is my understanding the Air Force has already developed and validated their mental and physical standards as being gender neutral and in-compliance with public law. As Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, my role would be to ensure the Air Force implements and maintains 

these physical and mental standards in compliance with these laws. If confirmed, 

I will help ensure the Air Force Inspector General is also engaged to validate the 

physical and mental occupational standards and to ensure that our implementing 

methodologies are in compliance with applicable statutes. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the standards are realistic and preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability? 

Answer. Yes. My understanding is that current Air Force policy supports the view 

that operational effectiveness and success results from having airmen who are well 

trained and well led, with the key component being airmen who meet the individual 

physical and mental standards regardless of gender. 

Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on bona 

fide military requirements? If so, what steps would you take to ensure that such 

decisions are made on this basis? 

Answer. I believe decisions to open positions should be based not solely on bona 

fide military requirements, but should take into account unit readiness, cohesion, 

morale, maintaining the best quality and most qualified people, and having a viable 

career path. 

My understanding is that the Air Force has undertaken several studies related 

to the review of open positions that included 1) validation of the physical occupational standards associated with the six closed career fields; 2) a re-validation of the 

physical entry standards currently in use for all of our currently open career fields; 

and 3) a re-validation of the mental entry standards for all our career fields. If confirmed, I would review these assessments and associated criteria before determining 

whether any adjustments are needed. 

Question. If an exception to policy is requested, what criteria should be used to 

determine whether to grant or deny that exception? 

Answer. I have not had a sufficient opportunity to review cases where exceptions 

to policy would be required. I believe criteria used to evaluate such requests would 

likely take into account impacts on unit readiness and talent management among 

others. If confirmed, I will review Air Force career fields to confirm whether such 

cases exist and the factors used in determining whether an exception is warranted. 

. 

LEGISLATIVE FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

Question. Each year, the Services assign mid-career officers to the offices of Members of Congress under the Legislative Fellows Program. Upon completion of their 

legislative fellowships, officers are required to be assigned to follow-on positions in 

their services in which they effectively use the experience and knowledge they 

gained during their fellowships. 

What is your assessment of the process for the recruitment, selection, preparation, 

and assignment to Members of Air Force officers in the Legislative Fellows program? 

Answer. My understanding is the Air Force has a robust vetting, placement and 

follow on process for officers in the Legislative Fellows program. I look forward to 

learning more about it if confirmed. 

Question. What is your assessment of the value of the Legislative Fellows program to the Air Force and the utilization of officers who have served as legislative 

fellows? 

Answer. My understanding is the Legislative Fellows Program is part of the Professional Military Education portfolio and is very competitive. Again, I look forward 

to learning more about it if confirmed. 

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

Question. What is your vision for the management and development of the Air 

Force senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields? 

Answer. Having served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, I have significant experience in senior executive talent management in the acquisition workforce and the need for expertise in 

scientific, engineering and technical career fields. I believe that a successful talent 

management strategy across all career fields requires several key elements. First, 

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success in developing executive talent begins at the earliest stages of an individual’s 

career, where mentorship, leader development, retention efforts and career broadening experience are all critical in identifying the pool of future senior executives. 

Second, efforts must be made to cultivate diversity within the population of senior 

executives, with a range of experience and skills that contribute to mission success. 

Finally, I believe that current executives often benefit from continued leadership 

training and broadening assignments to further develop their individual careers. 

In acquisition, engineering and scientific career fields, career civilian employees 

should receive career path counseling early and often in their careers. Civilian career opportunities that provide growth and responsibility over time are critical to 

Department-wide goals to retain talented professionals in these career fields. 

In all these areas, we must recognize, attract and retain talent to meet the needs 

of a 21st century security environment. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting 

the Secretary of the Air Force in these efforts. 

MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL SUFFICIENCY

Question. The Air Force has faced challenges to its manpower and personnel sufficiency to successfully navigate looming major force structure efficiencies in a budget 

constrained environment, particularly with its ISR combat air patrol crew ratios, F– 

35 Joint Strike Fighter program, and RAP community. 

If confirmed, will you commit to monitoring the Air Force’s progress towards developing a sufficient manpower and personnel program to address these challenges? 

Answer. Yes, I will. 

Question. How do you plan on addressing the manpower shortage in the RAP community and making the RAP career path a more attractive option for future airmen? 

Answer. The innovation that the Air Force has delivered since the early 2000’s 

in the realm of remotely piloted vehicles and ISR is truly amazing. Continuing to 

ensure our Air Force can innovate and deliver in this career field will be one of my 

top priorities. I look forward to working with others in the Department as well as 

the Congress to ensure that the Air Force meets these critical requirements. 

BALANCE BETWEEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES

Question. The Air Force employs many contractors and civilian employees. In 

many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same 

projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions as federal employees. Both contractors and civilians make up an integral part of the Department’s 

total workforce. 

Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees and contractor 

employees is in the best interests of the Air Force? 

Answer. As noted above, the Department of Defense, including the Air Force, currently relies on a total workforce comprised of military, civilian employees and contracted support to meet missions and requirements. If confirmed, I would work with 

the Secretary of the Air Force, and leaders across the Air Force to assess the current mix of military civilians and contracted support against current and projected 

resources and missions while ensuring that the Air Force remains compliant with 

all applicable statutes and policies across the Department. 

Question. In your view, has the Air Force utilized contractors to perform basic 

functions in an appropriate manner? 

Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to review the roles and functions assigned to contractors across the Air Force. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of the Air Force, and leaders across the Air Force to assess this matter so 

as to ensure compliance with the law and with OSD policy. 

Question. Do you believe that the Air Force should continuously assess ‘‘inherently 

governmental functions’’ and other critical government functions, and how they are 

performed? 

Answer. Yes, I do. 

Question. What should be the primary factor in determining the allocation of work 

between the civilian and contractor workforces? 

Answer. The primary factor should be compliance with rules regarding inherently 

governmental functions. Consideration of the duties and functions that should reside within the government must be a primary consideration in allocating any work 

between a civilian workforce and contracted support. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work with other appropriate officials in the Air 

Force to review the contractor and civilian force mix for cost and mission effectiveness? 

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Answer. If confirmed, I would support all efforts to ensure compliance with the 

law, and if modifications are determined to be necessary, to work with Congress as 

necessary. 

Question. Would you agree that the balance between civilian employees and contractor employees in performing Air Force functions should be determined by the 

best interests of the Air Force and its mission requirements? 

Answer. Yes, I agree. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work to remove any artificial constraints placed 

on the size of the Air Force’s civilian and contractor workforce, so that the Air Force 

can hire the number and type of employees most appropriate to accomplish its mission? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Air Force leaders to ensure compliance 

with all applicable statutes regarding the civilian-contractor force mix. I would also 

review the current and projected force mix against mission requirements and recommend adjustments as appropriate. 

Question. The Air Force submitted a reprogramming request to the congressional 

defense committees this summer to address civilian personnel cost underestimations 

resulting from a budgeting error and indicated that the same issue exists for the 

fiscal year 2016 budget. The Air Force further indicated that had Congress not supported the reprogramming request, some civilian employees would have been furloughed. 

What steps has the Air Force taken to remedy the budget shortfall for fiscal year 

2016? 

Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to review the circumstances that gave 

rise to the reprogramming request in question. I understand that the Air Force is 

currently working to identify resources to meet these requirements from other programs and sources. If confirmed I will work closely with the Secretary of the Air 

Force and leaders across the Air Force to fully source civilian pay requirements for 

fiscal year 2016 and to prevent similar issues in the future, provided that such 

shortfalls can be identified and addressed earlier. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure this personnel management problem is corrected and does not reoccur? 

Answer. If confirmed I will ensure that the Air Force remains committed to 

sourcing the civilian pay funds needed to sustain our workforce and that our future 

budget submissions accurately depict civilian workforce resource requirements. 

HEADQUARTERS REDUCTIONS

Question. The Department of Defense is currently under a mandate to reduce its 

headquarters staff by 20 percent. This mandate included guidance from Secretary 

Carter, who was Deputy Secretary of Defense at the time, to strive for a goal of a 

20-percent reduction in government civilian staff by eliminating activities and to not 

grow subordinate headquarters. 

To this date, how many Air Force civilians have been divested as a result of this 

20 percent reduction? 

Answer. My understanding is the Air Force fiscal year 2016 budget submission 

included a reduction of 790 management headquarters and ∼600 non-management 

headquarters civilian positions. 

Question. What financial options were offered to those employees who were divested? Was ERA/VSIP used? 

Answer. My understanding is that VERA/VSIP was offered in fiscal year 2015. 

Question. How many have been retrained and moved into other jobs within the 

Air Force? 

Answer. It’s been explained to me that all remaining reductions or outplacements 

will be made by the end of fiscal year 2016. 

Question. How many of the positions ‘‘reduced’’ were cuts to unencumbered 

billeted positions? 

Answer. Of the these 1,400 positions reduced from headquarters, administrative, 

and support activities, about 500 were unencumbered as a result of prior sequestration driven hiring controls. 

Question. How many military billets were cut as a result of the 20 percent reduction? 

Answer. The Air Force fiscal year 2016 budget submission included a reduction 

of 2,200 military positions. 

Question. Provide examples of functions and activities that were eliminated as a 

result of the Air Force’s 20 percent headquarters reduction. 

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Answer. One of the ways the Air Force met this reduction was to consolidate installation management support at multiple headquarters locations into a single 

staff. 

Question. Was the reduction met through a 20 percent reduction in government 

civilian staff as directed by Secretary Carter, or was it met through a combination 

of civilian and military billets? Provide the percentages for each type of manpower 

reduced. 

Answer. I haven’t been briefed in detail on this topic, but I will explore it deeper 

if confirmed. 

Question. How many billets, military and civilian, were moved from management 

headquarters to subordinate commands and detachments, specifically the Twenty 

Fifth Air Force and the Installation Mission Support Center? 

Answer. Again, I haven’t been briefed in detail on this topic, but am committed 

to understanding how and why the Air Force took this course of action to meet the 

20 percent reduction target. 

ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY WORKFORCE

Question. The Department of Defense is in a global competition for the highest 

quality STEM professionals at the entry-level, mid-career, and senior levels. These 

individuals are charged with managing billions of dollars’ worth of taxpayer resources in complex acquisition programs, directly providing technical support to 

military operations, supporting the development of technically informed policies and 

regulations in areas ranging from cybersecurity to use of drones; and performing 

world class research and engineering functions in in house labs and centers. 

Do you feel that the Air Force can currently compete with the private sector for 

the highest quality technical performers at the early career, mid-career, and senior 

levels? 

Answer. Despite the intensifying domestic and international demand for STEM 

professionals, I believe the Air Force competes well with the private sector in attracting, recruiting and retaining our Nation’s best and brightest. As Secretary Carter recently stated, our airmen have the opportunity to work with the most cuttingedge technologies spanning everything from robotics to biomedical engineering. I believe that the Air Force mission affords opportunities to STEM professionals unlike 

any other outside of the Department of Defense. My experience in Army acquisition 

is consistent. However, the combination of emerging threats and the rapid pace of 

technological change call for further efforts to attract, train and develop talented 

professionals in the acquisition workforce. If confirmed, I will work with Air Force 

leadership continue and build upon efforts to ensure we can attract, recruit and retain the highest quality technical workforce necessary to keep our technological 

edge. 

Question. How will you work to enhance policies and flexibilities necessary to 

allow the Air Force to compete with the private sector for this talent? 

Answer. Over the last several years, the Congress has provided the Department 

of Defense with expanded personnel authorities for our technical workforce. Other 

authorities, such as broadended and expedited civilian hiring and compensation authorities, will help the Air Force continue to compete with the private sector for the 

best talent. If confirmed, I will review the Air Force’s implementation of these authorities and tools and ensure that the Air Force adopts the necessary policies to 

fully implement the provided authorities. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided in a timely manner to this Committee and its staff 

and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

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Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

1. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Camarillo, as you are aware, the U.S. Army operates 

some of the same medium altitude ISR platforms as the Air Force, using warrant 

officers and enlisted personnel to supervise and conduct ISR and strike operations, 

and their units are led by few officers. What is your assessment of the Air Force 

reintroducing a warrant officer program or using enlisted personnel to operate its 

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) fleets to increase manning and reduce costs, as well 

as relieve manning level stress on other rated career fields? 

Mr. LETTRE. Given the ongoing high demand for ISR capabilities, is my understanding that the Air Force is actively exploring a range of options to address the 

shortfall of RPA operators. My understanding is that the Air Force is seriously considering several approaches to meet requirements for RPA operators, to include enlisted personnel. As demand for critical Air Force assets increases, I believe that the 

Air Force must continue to assess and maximize the full capability of its talented 

officer and enlisted airmen. 

AIR FORCE WARRANT OFFICER PROGRAM

2. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Camarillo, in the Air Force’s response to the National 

Commission on the Structure of the Air Force’s (NCSAF) recommendation (#42) on 

Up or Out policy, the Commission recommends, ‘‘Congress should amend restrictive 

aspects of current statutes that mandate ‘up-or-out’ career management policies to 

enable the Air Force to retain airmen of all components actively working in career 

fields where substantial investment in training and career development has been 

made and where it serves the needs of the Air Force.’’ In your opinion, would reinstituting a warrant officer program in the Air Force attract and keep certain 

skilled people who are more interested in remaining in a particular career field 

rather than worrying about additional institutional requirements they must accomplish for promotion in the officer ranks? 

Mr. CAMARILLO. My understanding is that the Air Force has taken deliberate 

steps to grow and retain manpower in critical areas using several approaches. These 

include increased accessions, retention incentives, retraining efforts and reserve 

component utilization. If confirmed, I would first assess the effectiveness of these 

combined efforts to help determine whether alternative strategies are required. 

3. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Camarillo, do you believe certain career fields could receive benefit from a warrant officer program in operational or technical positions 

such pilot training instructor pilots, remotely piloted aircraft pilots, and cyber warfare specialties? 

Mr. CAMARILLO. I believe that it is a priority for the Air Force to consider a range 

of options to meet the high demand for skilled positions in order to maintain readiness and mission effectiveness. If confirmed, I would closely review this proposal as 

part of a comprehensive effort to address requirements for technical expertise. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

4. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Camarillo, you are nominated to be the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Have you reviewed the 

January 2014 National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force report? 

Mr. CAMARILLO. Yes. 

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5. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Camarillo, the Commission concluded that the Air Force 

has committed the resources necessary to allow the Reserve component to ‘‘maintain 

the same standards of skill and operational readiness as the Active component.’’ 

That has certainly been my experience, and we could not have carried out the wars 

in Iraq and Afghanistan without the Reserve component. The commission also concluded that the ‘‘capability delivered by traditional Reservists and Guardsmen who 

do not serve continuously on Active Duty—costs less than the force structure provided by ‘full time’ personnel.’’ If confirmed, in this environment of growing threats 

and constrained defense budgets, will you work with your colleagues to look for opportunities where we can maximize the use of Reserve component personnel to accomplish missions and provide capabilities at a lower cost to the taxpayer? 

Mr. CAMARILLO. Yes. The Reserve component has provided critical support to Air 

Force missions throughout the course of sustained combat operations. If confirmed, 

I intend to work with Air Force leadership to continue to seek opportunities where 

we can maximize the use of Reserve component personnel to lower costs while still 

effectively employing the AF’s capabilities to fulfill our assigned missions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

AIR FORCE ASSOCIATE UNITS

6. Senator DONNELLY. Mr. Camarillo, in its 2014 report, the National Commission 

on the Structure of the Air Force recommended creating more Associate Units. The 

Commission noted that hosting these units on Reserve component bases ‘‘is inherently less expensive because those bases tend to have fewer non-operational facilities than Active component installations do.’’ If confirmed, will you work to expand 

the number of Reserve-led Associate Units in the Air Force? Please explain. 

Mr. CAMARILLO. If confirmed, I will work with Air Force leadership to explore potential benefits of economically feasible basing options, including looking closely at 

the potential benefit of further hosting of associated units on Reserve component 

bases. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

CYBER SECURITY

7. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Camarillo, DOD is continuing to expand its Cyber 

Mission Force, which serves to defend against cyberattacks and offer cyber support 

to military operations. Funding is expected to end next year, and it is not clear how 

we will train future cyber warriors after then. What do you think should be the role 

of the different Services and the Air Force specifically in training our cyber operators? 

Mr. CAMARILLO. The development and training of a cyber mission workforce remains a critical priority across the Department in response to rapidly evolving 

threats. I recognize that the military services, including the Air Force, will play a 

significant role in recruiting, training, and managing talent to meet cyber defense 

requirements. If confirmed, I will work with stakeholders to address these requirements currently met by NSA and CYBERCOM. 

8. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Camarillo, if each Service trains these cyber warriors 

separately, how can we ensure each service meets a high standard of training? 

Mr. CAMARILLO. If confirmed, I would work with CYBERCOM, the military services and other organizations across the Department to ensure that training standards and best practices are consistently applied in the development of our cyber 

workforce. 

9. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Camarillo, the Air Force will have cyber protection 

teams in the Reserve component that will serve as part of its contribution to the 

Cyber Mission Forces. What do you see as the role of the Reserve components in 

serving the cyber mission? 

Mr. CAMARILLO. I see the Reserve components as having a critical role as a member of the Total Force Cyber Protection Team, operating side-by-side with Active 

Duty airmen. 

919 

WOMEN IN COMBAT

10. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Camarillo, as I’m sure you are well aware, just last 

week Secretary of Defense Ash Carter announced that all combat roles would be 

open to women, and that he would not grant any exceptions to the Services. The 

Air Force has embraced the integration of women, having already opened the preponderance of billets to women. What steps are needed to ensure integration is completed effectively? 

Mr. CAMARILLO. As Secretary Carter has stated, integration will follow a deliberate process that focuses on readiness and combat effectiveness while ensuring that 

all positions are filled according to ability, not gender. My understanding is the Air 

Force is currently working to finalize and submit an integration plan to Secretary 

Carter by January 1, 2016. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Air Force 

leadership in the implementation of this policy. 

11. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Camarillo, how do we ensure that women continue 

to be successful in the Air Force? 

Mr. CAMARILLO. My understanding is that the Air Force is committed to ensuring 

all of our airmen, regardless of gender, have the opportunity to succeed and carry 

out rewarding careers in service to our nation. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting ongoing Air Force efforts to promote diversity and unlock talent in the workforce. This includes several retention initiatives, such as the Career Intermission 

Program and the Air Force’s recent establishment of a mentoring program. If confirmed, I would review these and other initiatives and work with Secretary James 

to ensure that all servicemembers have an equal opportunity to succeed in their careers. 

[The nomination reference of Mr. Gabriel O. Camarillo follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

April 13, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Gabriel Camarillo of Texas, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, vice 

Daniel Ginsberg. 

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Gabriel O. Camarillo, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MR. GABRIEL O. CAMARILLO

Education: 

• Stanford University Law School 

o 1999-2002 

o Juris Doctor 

• Georgetown University 

o 1995-1998 

o Bachelor of Arts 

Employment Record: 

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), Department of the Army, Pentagon, Arlington, VA 

o Position: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) 

o December 2012-present 

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), Department of the Army, Pentagon, Arlington, VA 

o Position: Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) 

o May 2010–December 2012 

• Kaufman Legal Group, Los Angeles, CA 

920 

o Position: Associate 

o May 2009–May 2010 

• Sutton Law Firm, San Francisco, CA 

o Position: Of Counsel 

o August 2008–April 2009 

• Obama Campaign for Change, Albuquerque, NM 

o Position: Deputy Voter Protection Coordinator 

o September 2008–November 2008 

• Sutton Law Firm, San Francisco, CA 

o Position: Associate 

o August 2004–August 2008 

• Office of Representative Calvin Dooley, Fresno, CA 

o Position: Field Representative 

o March 2004–August 2004 

• Lisa Quigley for Congress, Fresno, CA 

o Position: Campaign Manager 

o September 2003–March 2004 

• Akin Gump, LLP, Austin, TX 

o Position: Associate 

o September 2002–September 2003 

• Akin Gump, LLP, Austin, TX 

o Position: Summer Associate 

o July 2001–August 2001 

• Jenkens and Gilchrist PC, Austin, TX 

o Position: Summer Associate 

o June 2001–July 2000 

• Adam Schiff for Congress, Pasadena, CA 

o Position: Finance Consultant 

o July 2000–August 2000 

• Jenkens and Gilchrist PC, Austin, TX 

o Position: Summer Associate 

o June 2000–July 2000 

• City of El Paso, Texas, Office of Economic Development, El Paso, TX 

o Position: Intern/Research Associate 

o June 1999–August 1999 

• Office of Representative Calvin Dooley, Washington, DC 

o Position: Legislative Assistant/Deputy Press Secretary 

o May 1998–May 1999 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Mr. Gabriel O. Camarillo in connection with 

his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

921 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Gabriel Omar Camarillo 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) 

3. Date of nomination: 

April 13, 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

August 25, 1976. 

El Paso, Texas, USA. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Pilar Nicole Tidball. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. • Stanford University Law School, Stanford, CA, 1999–2002, Juris Doctor (2002). • Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 1995–1998, Bachelor of Arts (1998). • St. Mary’s University, San Antonio, TX, 1994–1995, (Transfer to Georgetown 

University). • J.M. Hanks High School, El Paso, TX, 1990–1994, High School Diploma. 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

• Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & 

Technology), Department of the Army, Pentagon, Arlington, VA, December 

2012–present. 

• Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition Logistics 

& Technology), Department of the Army, Pentagon, Arlington, VA, May 2010– 

December 2012. 

• Associate, Kaufman Legal Group, Los Angeles, CA, May 2009–May 2010 (On 

extended leave of absence from 2010–2014). 

• Of Counsel, Sutton Law Firm, San Francisco, CA, August 2008–April 2009. 

• Deputy Voter Protection Coordinator, Obama Campaign for Change, Albuquerque, NM, September 2008–November 2008. 

• Associate, Sutton Law Firm, San Francisco, CA, August 2004–August 2008. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

• Field Representative, Office of Representative Calvin Dooley, Fresno, CA, 

March 2004–August 2004. 

• Intern/Research Associate, City of El Paso, Texas, Office of Economic Development, June–August 1999. 

• Legislative Assistant/Deputy Press Secretary, Office of Representative Calvin 

Dooley, Washington, DC, May 1998–May 1999. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

California Bar Association 

Texas Bar Association 

Association of the United States Army 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

922 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

While practicing law in 2010, I represented the following political committees: 

• Alfredo Amezcua for Mayor 2010. • Blue America PAC. • Bass for Assembly 2008. • Strengthening California Through Leadership. • Karen Bass for Congress. • Adeena Bleich 2009. • Brave New PAC. • Friends of Barbara Boxer. • PAC for a Change. • Boxer/Franken 2009 • Boxer/Oberstar 2010. • Reid/Boxer 2010. • Bradford for Assembly 2009. • Bradford for Assembly 2010. • Friends of Betsy Butler for Assembly 2010. • Courage Campaign Civic Action Fund. • Courage Campaign Issues Committee. • Californians for a Democratic Majority. • Californians for Fair Elections. • Californians for a Fresh Start. • John Chiang for Controller 2010. • Judy Chu for Congress 2010. • Judy Chu for Congress. • Coto for Assembly 2008. • Coto for Assembly 2012. • California United Homecare Workers PAC. • California Voters First. • California Working Families. • For Our Children’s Future. • Rocky J. Delgadillo for Attorney General. • California Progress. • Mitchell Englander for City Council 2011. • Bob Foster for Mayor 2010. • Election Watchdog, Sponsored by: Consumer Watchdog Campaign. • Californians for Real Insurance Reform, Sponsored by: Consumer Watchdog 

Campaign. 

• Fuentes for Assembly 2010. 

• Fuentes Reform CA Ballot Measure Cmte. 

• Tamar Galatzan for School Board. 

• Tamar Galatzan for City Council 2009. 

• Monica Garcia for State Assembly 2010. 

• Chris Garland for Assembly 2010. 

• Wendy Greuel for Controller 2009. 

• Mothers Against Gang Violence. 

• Janice Hahn for Lieutenant Governor 2010. 

• Friends of Hannah Beth Jackson 2008. 

• Hollywood Chamber of Commerce PAC. 

• Homes for LA Families. 

• Human Rights Campaign: California Marriage PAC—No on 8. 

• IBEW, Local No. 11 PAC. 

• IBEW, Local 18, AFL–CIO: Water & Power Defense League. 

• Believing in a Better California. 

• Kevin de Leon 2010. 

• Kevin de Leon for Senate 2010. 

• Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce PAC. 

• Committee to Reform LA—Yes on Measure R. 

• Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce Issues Committee. 

• Level the Playing Field 2010. 

• Manuel Perez for Assembly. 

• Committee to Re-Elect Assemblymember Manuel Perez. 

• Padilla for Senate 2010. 

• California 2020. 

923 

• Dr. Richard Pan for Assembly 2010. • Taxpayers for Chris Parker for BOE 2010. • Los Angeles Court Reporters Political Action Committee aka PARLAC. • John A. Perez for Assembly 2010. • Building California’s Future: John A. Perez Ballot Measure Committee. • IJA Plumbers Local 78 PAC. • Bill Rosendahl for City Council. • Schiff for Congress. • USA PAC. • Local 6434 State PAC. • Local 6434 Issues Committee. • SEIU Local 721 State and Local PAC. • SEIU Local 721 State Issues & Initiatives Committee. • SEIU Local 721 CLC Workers’ Strength Committee. • Coalition for a Responsible Government. • Save South Pasadena Schools. • Torres for Assembly 2010. • Californians for Trust, Responsibility, Unity & Empowerment PAC. • United Firefighters of Los Angeles City State PAC. • United Firefighters of Los Angeles City Issues Committee. • Mayor’s Committee on Governmental Ethics and Accountability. 

• Antonio R. Villaraigosa for Mayor 2009. 

• Vote Strong CA State PAC. 

• Citizens for Waters. 

• Working Californians. 

• Working Californians Issues Committee. 

• Das Williams for Assembly 2010. 

• Women’s Political Committee—State. 

• Women’s Political Committee—Federal. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None. 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

None. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

None. 

16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

• March 2015: Army Industry Day, hosted by Aerospace Industries Association. 

• March 2015: General Officer/Senior Executive Service Force Integration Course. 

• March 2015: National Defense Industrial Association Procurement Division 

Luncheon. 

• November 2014: Gilbert A. Cuneo Lecture, Contract and Fiscal Law New Developments Course, Judge Advocate General School. 

• October 2014: Association of the United States Army Small Business Forum. 

• September 2014: Army Acquisition Center of Excellence Course. 

• June 2014: General Officer/Senior Executive Service Force Integration Course. 

• February 2014: Munitions Executive Summit. 

• January 2014: Fort Bliss Small Business Conference. 

• October 2013: Association of the United States Army Small Business Forum. 

• September 2013: 10th National Small Business Conference, National Defense 

Industrial Association. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

924 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

GABRIEL O. CAMARILLO

This 14th day of April, 2015 

[The nomination of the Mr. Gabriel O. Camarillo was reported to 

the Senate by Chairman McCain on December 15, 2015, with the 

recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on December 16, 2015.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. John E. Sparks by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES

Question. Subchapter XII chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code, establishes 

the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (USCAAF) and provides 

for its organization and administrative procedures. 

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the USCAAF and its 

judges? 

Answer. Congress established the court in 1950 to provide specialized independent 

civilian review of courts-martial with the goal of promoting good order and discipline 

in the Armed Forces while also ensuring just treatment of the accused. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. I spent 7 years as an infantry officer, 15 years as an Active Duty judge 

advocate, and almost 15 years as the senior adviser to a judge on the USCAAF. My 

duties as an infantry officer included time spent as an executive officer and a commanding officer of a rifle company. My years as a judge advocate included extensive 

trial experience as a military prosecutor, defense counsel and military judge. As adviser to a sitting USCAAF judge, I was intimately involved in the research and 

drafting of appellate opinions for that judge. 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of a judge on the USCAAF? 

Answer. I continue to stay abreast of developments in military justice and the 

criminal law generally, and I do not believe there are other actions I need to take 

at this point. 

925 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What are the respective roles of each of the following with respect to 

the military justice system, and if confirmed, what would your relationship be with: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. Under 10 U.S.C. 113, the Secretary of Defense exercises ‘‘authority, direction, and control’’ over the Department of Defense. Although the Secretary is not 

involved in day-to-day military justice matters, he is ultimately responsible for setting policy with regard to all matters affecting the Department including the area 

of military justice. Article 141 of the UCMJ provides that USCAAF ‘‘is located for 

administrative purposes only in the Department of Defense.’’ This is consistent with 

the congressional drafters’ intent that the court be established as an independent 

entity outside of the purview of the Secretary while also recognizing, at the time, 

that the court would need some level of support. As far as I could tell from my years 

working at the court, this arrangement has worked well and the relationship between the Department and the court is a good one. If confirmed I would strive to 

maintain the quality of this important relationship. 

Question. The Chief Judge of the USCAAF. 

Answer. Under Article 143, the Chief Judge is determined by seniority of commission. The Chief Judge is for all practical purposes the ‘‘agency head,’’ so to speak. 

As such, he has a variety of administrative duties that the associate judges do not 

have. I have known the current Chief Judge for about 13 years and our relationship 

is one of mutual respect. If confirmed, I expect this relationship of mutual respect 

and collegiality to continue. 

Question. Judges of the CAAF. 

Answer. Except for the administrative duties lodged in the Chief Judge, the 

judges of the USCAAF are equal, differing only in seniority. I have known all of 

the current judges on the court for a number of years. As with the current Chief 

Judge, my relationship with the associate judges has been one of mutual respect 

and I do not expect this to change if I am confirmed. 

Question. The military courts of criminal appeals. 

Answer. The courts of criminal appeals are established under Article 66 of the 

UCMJ to conduct mandatory appellate review of cases ‘‘in which the sentence, as 

approved, extends to death, dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet or midshipman, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one year or 

more.’’ I have always been impressed with the competence of the judges sitting on 

these courts and the quality of their work. It has been my experience that they have 

a healthy respect for the USCAAF judges and that the relationship between the 

lower courts and the USCAAF is a good one. If confirmed, I would not expect this 

to change. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense. 

Answer. Under 10 U.S.C. 140(b), the General Counsel of the Department of Defense is the chief legal officer of the Department, and performs such duties as the 

Secretary may prescribe. Though not normally involved in the day-to-day operation 

of the military justice system, the General Counsel is substantially involved in the 

formulation of the Department’s legal policy and its legislative recommendations to 

Congress. Although I expect my relationship with the General Counsel would be one 

of mutual respect if I am confirmed, I do not expect that it will be marked by frequent interaction. 

Question. The Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and 

the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Answer. Under Article 6 of the UCMJ, the Judge Advocates General are statutorily responsible for the administration of military justice within their respective 

services. The relationship of the judges of the USCAAF to the Judge Advocates General must therefore, while remaining mutually respectful, always maintain the distance essential to the appearance, and indeed the actuality, of judicial neutrality 

and independence. 

LEGAL ISSUES

Question. What do you anticipate would be the most significant legal issues you 

will be called upon to address if confirmed as a judge of the USCAAF? 

Answer. As far as I know, cases involving sex offenses such as child pornography, 

child sex abuse and sexual assault continue to occupy a significant portion of the 

court’s docket. Regarding sexual assault cases in particular, I anticipate that a number of new issues will likely confront the court given the changes to the statutory 

offenses in recent years, including issues likely to arise concerning the very important role of the special victims counsel. Secondly, I anticipate that the issue of the 

continued viability of the military death penalty may eventually find its way to the 

926 

court, depending what, if anything, the Supreme Court ends up saying about the 

death penalty generally. 

JURISDICTION OF THE USCAAF

Question. In your view, has the USCAAF fulfilled the expectations of Congress 

when the Court was established in 1951? 

Answer. Yes. The court continues to provide effective and necessary civilian review of military cases and remains an independent bulwark against unlawful influence. 

Question. In your view, are there any legislative changes needed regarding the 

role and responsibilities or the jurisdiction of the USCAAF? 

Answer. None that come to mind at this time. 

DECISIONS OF THE USCAAF

Question. Please describe the three decisions of the USCAAF since 2005 which 

you believe to have been the most significant. 

Answer. United States v. Denedo, 66 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F. 2008). The accused in this 

case pleaded guilty in 1999 to certain offenses. Seven years later he discovered that 

his court-martial conviction rendered him eligible for deportation. He petitioned the 

Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of error coram nobis alleging that his defense 

counsel had not informed him of this potential consequence. The lower court denied 

his petition and he appealed to the USCAAF. The USCAAF held that Denedo had 

met the requirements for such a writ. 

United States v. Miller, 67 M.J. 385 (C.A.A.F. 2009). This case overruled longstanding case law that suggested an accused was on notice of a lesser included offense under Article 134 because every enumerated offense under the UCMJ was per 

se prejudicial to good order and discipline. Thus, Miller rejected the notion of implied elements. 

United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2011). This case held that a specification charged under Article 134 must allege either expressly or by necessary implication one of the terminal elements of Article 134 or else it fails to state an offense. Previously, the express allegation of the terminal elements of Article 134 had 

not been viewed as necessary. 

Question. What is your view of the role of stare decisis in terms of prior decisions 

of the USCAAF? 

Answer. The doctrine of stare decisis is an essential guiding principle for any appellate court since it provides consistency and stability in the law. There may be 

instances where a precedent has become unworkable or other developments in the 

law have reduced the precedent to nothing more than a less than useful relic of a 

prior era. In such cases the continued vitality of the precedent should be examined. 

Otherwise, courts should adhere to the doctrine for the reason stated. 

Question. In view of Article 36 of the UCMJ, what is your view as to the hierarchy 

of sources of law that must be applied by the USCAAF in addressing rules of evidence and procedure in the administration of the military justice system? 

Answer. Generally, the courts have considered the following hierarchy of sources: 

the Constitution as applied to members of the armed forces; the UCMJ and other 

applicable statutes; the Manual for Courts-Martial and other applicable Executive 

Orders and presidential issuances; other rules incorporated into military practice 

under authority recognized by the Manual for Courts-Martial; and other executive 

branch issuances. As a general matter, the courts under Article 36 have applied the 

provisions of the Manual for Courts-Martial unless a Manual provision is contrary 

to or inconsistent with the UCMJ or the Constitution. 

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate standard for determining when 

the USCAAF should apply a Rule for Courts-Martial or Military Rule of Evidence 

that is different from the rule generally applied in the trial of criminal cases in the 

Federal district courts? 

Answer. Under Article 36, if the matter is governed by the Manual for CourtsMartial, and the provision is ‘‘not contrary to or inconsistent with’’ the UCMJ or 

the Constitution, the courts generally have determined that the Manual provision 

is applicable. If there is no rule in the Manual, the courts have looked to the rules 

generally applicable to the trial of criminal cases in the federal district courts to the 

extent not inconsistent with the UCMJ. Further, if a properly issued executive 

branch rule is more protective of the accused than the rule generally applied in federal courts or at common law, the courts generally have viewed the executive branch 

issuance as applicable. 

927 

MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM

Question. In your view, what are the major strengths and weaknesses of the military justice system? 

Answer. In my view the following are strengths of the system, 1) qualified defense 

counsel provided free of charge to the accused at both the trial and appellate level; 

2) Article 31 of the UCMJ which affords the accused greater protections against selfincrimination than most civilian criminal justice systems; 3) a system of appellate 

review within each service and by the USCAAF with certiorari to the U.S. Supreme 

Court; and 4) sufficient resources devoted to the trial of criminal cases so that each 

case receives the necessary and appropriate amount of attention. 

I consider the following to be weaknesses remaining in the system, 1) because of 

the very nature of a military organization there remains the constant potential for 

unlawful influence to affect the disposition of cases before and after trial; and 2) the 

military’s inability to overcome a flawed perception among some members of the 

public and the media that the military justice system is not at all protective of an 

accused person’s rights and is therefore, anything but a credible criminal justice system. 

Question. In your opinion, does the military justice system afford a fair and just 

system for military personnel accused of violations of the UCMJ? 

Answer. In the context of the need to maintain good order and discipline, I believe 

the military justice system is both fair and just. However, that is not to say that 

there isn’t well founded criticism of the system, or that there are not problems with 

the system upon which reasonable minds might debate. Because the system rests 

upon the delicate balance between maintaining good order and protecting the rights 

of the accused, the military courts, the USCAAF and Congress must remain vigilant 

to ensure that the system is, and is perceived to be, a credible criminal justice system. 

Question. In your view, does the military justice system appropriately address the 

rights of victims of offenses prosecuted in courts-martial? 

Answer. Prior to the recent, and welcomed, attention to sexual assault victims, 

I would have disagreed with the statement that the system appropriately addresses 

the rights of victims. However, the recent emphasis on victims (including provisions 

in the most recent Authorization Act) has resulted in changes that I believe in time 

will sensitize the system to the interests and welfare of all crime victims. 

Question. What is your view of the relationship between the rights of service personnel and the disciplinary role of commanders? 

Answer. With the advent of the UCMJ in 1950, I believe the Congress struck an 

appropriate, albeit delicate, balance. Commanders must have the authority to enforce good order and discipline in order to maintain morale and to ensure the readiness of the fighting force. Thus, the UCMJ retains the commander’s role as the convening authority with respect to referring charges, selecting court members, and 

post-trial review. On the other hand, it provides an accused statutory protection 

against unlawful influence and a robust appellate review process to a civilian court 

completely insulated from any command structure. Although there are some very 

obvious differences between the military system and most civilian systems, Congress 

recognized that there are a wide variety of situations arising in the military environment that simply have no analog in civilian society. 

Question. Do you think that changes to the military justice system are called for 

in light of the experiences of the Armed Services in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. My perception from afar is that the military justice system appears to 

have adapted to the frenzied pace of a decade or more of combat operations. However, Congress may wish to elicit experiences of those on the ground to determine 

whether any changes are warranted. 

Question. In your view, are changes to the military justice system called for in 

light of changes in American criminal jurisprudence? 

Answer. At the moment, I believe the USCAAF has done an admirable job of 

blending elements of federal civilian criminal jurisprudence into the military system 

when it has deemed it appropriate. 

CAPITAL CASES IN THE ARMED FORCES

Question. The ability of the military justice system to provide qualified personnel 

and resources necessary to capably defend and prosecute death penalty cases and 

respond to the constitutional requirements associated with such cases has come 

under scrutiny. 

What is your understanding of the requirements under constitutional precedent 

for the defense of a capital case? 

928 

Answer. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), is the seminal case for 

examining the performance of defense counsel in capital cases. Strickland requires 

the defendant to prove both that the counsel’s representation was deficient, and that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s deficiency, the outcome 

of the trial would have been different. In more recent cases, the Supreme Court has 

held that failure to conduct a thorough investigation of potential mitigating factors 

may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S.Ct. 

2527 (2003); Porter v. McCollum, 130 S.Ct. 447 (2009). 

Question. Based on your review of military jurisprudence regarding death penalty 

cases since the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Furman v. Georgia, what are the 

issues or errors that have most frequently resulted in overturning of death sentences on appeal? 

Answer. My experience is that ineffective assistance of counsel is the leading reason that military death sentences are overturned. 

Question. What do you consider to be the essential elements in preparing courtmartial practitioners for the prosecution and defense in capital cases? 

Answer. First and foremost, I believe each side of the case should employ at least 

one experienced criminal trial litigator. The defense should have at least one lawyer 

who is specially trained and qualified in the trial of capital cases. All counsel should 

be well trained in the use and examination of expert witnesses—particularly, mental health experts and mitigation specialists. Although I am far from possessing any 

expertise in capital litigation, my experience in reading the records in these types 

of cases over the years reveals to me that these may be areas of concern. 

COMMAND INFLUENCE

Question. The problem of command influence, including instances involving judge 

advocates as well as commanders, is a constant threat to the military justice system. 

What is your view as to the role of the USCAAF in addressing this problem? 

Answer. Because of its unique status as an independent entity, separate and 

apart from the uniformed military establishment, the USCAAF remains the bulwark against unlawful influence. I believe the court has embraced its responsibility 

in this area over the years and continues to abide by its own view that unlawful 

command influence is the mortal enemy of military justice, and where it is found 

to exist, judicial authorities must take those steps necessary to preserve both the 

actual and apparent fairness of court-martial proceedings. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

MILITARY JUSTICE CREDIBILITY

1. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Sparks, in your response to advance policy questions you 

stated you consider one of the weaknesses of the military justice system to be ‘‘the 

military’s inability to overcome a flawed perception among some members of the 

public and the media that the military justice system is not at all protective of an 

accused person’s rights and is therefore, anything but a credible criminal justice system.’’ If confirmed, what would be your role in assuring that our military justice system is a credible criminal justice system? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, I believe this is an issue of lack of education on the part 

of some in the media and some in the public generally. In recent years a few civilian 

lawyers, have given the public some insight into the military justice system. However, the perspective is generally a relatively narrow one—and this is not a criticism. Also, in recent years a few USCAAF judges have participated as adjunct professors at some of the local law schools. Certainly, all of these efforts have helped 

to educate the public. However, those of us in the military justice community can 

advance the cause though efforts to reach an even broader audience. Therefore, if 

confirmed, I hope to participate in legal education conferences and to speak at undergraduate institutions as well as law schools if invited. 

929 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

MILITARY COURTS

2. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Sparks, given the greater protections now available to 

military defendants, and considering appellate judges’ inability to observe the tone 

and demeanor of a witness, among other things, do military courts of appeal still 

need fact-finding authority? Why or why not? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, the issue of the adequacy of the lower courts’ exercise of 

their factual sufficiency review is often raised at the USCAAF, therefore, it would 

not be appropriate for me to opine on the necessity of such authority. I am, however 

aware of some of the views on both sides of the issue. One view is that this authority is virtually unreviewable by the USCAAF, and is simply a relic of a bygone era 

before the UCMJ required military trial judges. Another view is that this authority 

is still necessary to protect an accused from overzealous court members who, however imperceptibly, might still be vulnerable to the effects of command influence. 

However, I believe the Judge Advocates General are better suited to answer this significant policy question. 

3. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Sparks, the requirement for a Care inquiry and the often 

lengthy presentencing hearing prevent servicemembers from simply pleading guilty 

and accepting a negotiated punishment as in a civilian court. Since military defendants have greater protections against self-incrimination than civilians and have 

independent counsel provided free of charge, is the Care inquiry still necessary, or 

could the military justice system be streamlined with respect to guilty pleas? Please 

explain. 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, it is true that the inquiry required under United States v. 

Care is a more searching inquiry than that used in most jurisdictions including the 

federal district courts. However, in my view the inquiry has two advantages. First, 

notwithstanding the talented defense counsel in the system, there are areas of the 

law that remain unsettled. The inquiry allows the military judge to assure herself 

that the accused is admitting guilt to the right offense(s) and/or accepting the proper scope of criminal liability. Second, it allows the accused to put forth on the record 

the factual basis for his plea which, in turn, gives appellate authorities the ability 

to more effectively exercise their review of the case. So, yes, I believe the Care inquiry is still necessary. 

4. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Sparks, Article III judges are ultimately responsible for 

civilian sentences. In the military system, that determination is made by the finder 

of fact; often by juries made up of military members with no point of reference for 

determining a just punishment, save the disparate recommendations of opposing 

lawyers. Do you think that military juries should determine sentences? Why or why 

not? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, both the current system where the accused can choose 

court-martial members for sentencing or a judge and a system that would involve 

only judge-alone sentencing have their advantages. The current system is an historical feature of the court-martial system as it existed in 1950 when the UCMJ was 

enacted. Since there were no military judges then, the members were the sole sentencing authority. Many still think that the traditional model remains well suited 

for the military. Part of the rationale, even today, is that the members from the 

command are better situated than any lawyer to determine what sentence best promotes good order and discipline in their commands. Further, in 1983 Congress directed the Secretary to establish an advisory commission to study a variety of military justice issues. One of the issues was whether the sentencing authority should 

be exercised by the military judge alone. That commission concluded that participation of military members in court-martial punishment decisions fosters understanding of military justice by all servicemembers and belief in the fairness of the 

system. See Report of the Military Justice Act of 1983 Advisory Commission (1984). 

Under the judge-alone alternative, it is thought that sentence disparity could be 

greatly reduced and that a wider range of evidence could be presented to a judge 

without fear of its misuse. Although I tend to favor the traditional model, I believe 

the judge-alone model has a number of beneficial aspects. Should this issue arise 

in the committee, I hope it will receive thorough consideration. 

5. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Sparks, some military justice practitioners complain that 

it is difficult for military juries—often made up of members who have no experience 

with courts-martial—to choose an appropriate sentence from a range that often 

930 

spans from no punishment at all to years in prison. Would it be helpful to provide 

guidelines for sentencing similar to those in the Federal system? Why or why not? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, I am generally against sentencing guidelines for member 

sentencing since crafting instructions for the lay members is likely to cause considerable confusion and to result in unnecessary appellate litigation. However, if a 

judge-alone model is ever adopted, some guidance might be useful. Even then, the 

intricate guidelines used in the Article III courts are not likely to work well in the 

military adversarial sentencing setting. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

MILITARY JUSTICE

6. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Sparks, there have been a number of reports and appeals concerning the lack of transparency of the court-martial process both at the 

trial and appellate level. Do you believe transparency is important and what role 

do you see Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) having on this issue? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, I believe that transparency is important in the court-martial 

process. It is my view that access to pleadings and other filings, with some limited 

exceptions (like classified filings), can actually enhance the public’s understanding 

of the military justice system. 

7. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Sparks, do you think the military justice system 

should adopt something like PACER [Public Access to Court Electronic Records]? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, I am not familiar enough with the PACER system to offer 

a comparative model. I would simply say that use of FOIA seems an overly burdensome and inefficient means for providing access to court-martial documents. I believe the USCAAF currently provides online access to all briefs in granted cases. Additionally, oral argument audio files are available on the court’s website. Pleadings 

and other filings are provided free upon request to the Clerk of Court unless the 

filings are sealed or classified. Although the USCAAF can continue to serve as a 

model for access, the issue of uniform access to court documents among the services 

is one that would appear to be within the purview of the Secretary. 

8. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Sparks, Federal civilian prosecutors have a uniform 

standard for indicting a citizen (i.e., reasonable likelihood of a conviction). The military has a probable cause standard. Do you see that as a problem as it regards 

crime victim expectation of results of trial? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, I have read no reports nor have I seen any data on the probable cause standard as it relates to victim expectations. Thus, I am unable to conclude one way or the other whether this is a problem. 

9. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Sparks, what is your position on the Service courts 

overturning sexual assault trial convictions for ‘‘factual insufficiency′′—when those 

appellate judges were not even at the trial, never saw the victim or the demeanor 

of witnesses, and simply read a transcript and decided their judgement outweighs 

the first-hand experience and judgement of the panel that actually heard the case 

and convicted the accused? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, to a similar question asked by Senator Ayotte, I responded 

as follows: 

‘‘Senator, the issue of the adequacy of the lower courts’ exercise of their factual 

sufficiency review is often raised at the USCAAF, therefore, it would not be appropriate for me to opine on the necessity of such authority. I am, however aware of 

some of the views on both sides of the issue. One view is that this authority is virtually unreviewable by the USCAAF, and is simply a relic of a bygone era before 

the UCMJ required military trial judges. Another view is that this authority is still 

necessary to protect an accused from overzealous court members who, however imperceptibly, might still be vulnerable to the effects of command influence. However, 

I believe the Judge Advocates General are better suited to answer this significant 

policy question.’’ 

10. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Sparks, in your advance policy questions, you talk 

about the perception that the military justice system is balanced against the accused, the challenge of undue command influence, and the balance that the military 

justice system strikes. You said ‘‘because of the very nature of a military organization there remains the constant potential for unlawful influence to affect the disposition of cases before and after trial.’’ That ‘‘Prior to the recent, and welcomed, attenVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00936 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
931 

tion to sexual assault victims, I would have disagreed with the statement that the 

system appropriately addresses the rights of victims. However, the recent emphasis 

on victims (including provisions in the most recent Authorization Act) has resulted 

in changes that I believe in time will sensitize the system to the interests and welfare of all crime victims.’’ And in your response to whether the military justice system affords servicemembers a fair and just system you said that in the context of 

good order and discipline it does. Do you view good order and discipline as a separate, although parallel element to administration of justice? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, no doubt all would agree that the maintenance of good order 

and discipline is a requirement for an effective fighting force. My experiences have 

shown me that the fair and proper administration of justice through use of the military justice system is but one means of promoting order and discipline. Another 

means might be the establishment of training programs that inspire confidence and 

foster loyalty and respect not only up and down the chain but also among the members of the command. Still another may be the institution of programs that keep 

morale high. I certainly do not profess to be a military leadership scholar, but I hope 

this is a fair response to your question as I understand it. 

11. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Sparks, do you believe that separating commanders 

from the judicial aspect and empowering trained prosecutors would lead to a more 

credible and just system? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, I am not a policymaker, but during my time as an infantry 

officer and later as a judge advocate, it seemed to me that Congress had given the 

commander an appropriate role in the military justice system. I do believe this is 

an important policy issue worthy of debate with valid concerns on both sides of the 

question. From a judicial perspective, this issue does not significantly impact how 

the USCAAF reviews the cases that come before it. 

12. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Sparks, are you concerned that the rhetoric about 

cracking down on offenders—especially sexual assault offenders—regardless of evidence, plays into the narrative that the military justice system is not balanced? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, I am not aware of specific statements you may be referencing or by whom such statements may have been made. I can only say that the 

best way to counter inaccurate perceptions of the military justice system is to educate the uninformed, whether they are members of the media or the public generally. However, in doing so, we should be open to hearing ideas from those outside 

the military justice community on improving the system. 

13. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Sparks, what role does the CAAF have in addressing 

these issues? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, the issues of the probable cause standard’s effect on victims’ 

expectations, the factual sufficiency authority of the service courts and the commander’s role in the military justice system are, in my view, policy determinations 

beyond the purview of the CAAF. The main responsibility of the CAAF is 1) to ensure the court-martial has proceeded in accordance with the procedures and principles set forth in the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-martial and 2) to ensure 

the accused has received a constitutionally fair trial. As for addressing how the public perceives the system, I believe CAAF judges, as well as others in the field, can 

and should take the opportunity when presented to speak publicly about the military justice system. 

14. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Sparks, Congress and the CAAF have recently 

strengthened the role of a special victim’s counsel at the pretrial, trial and appellate 

stage. Do you agree that victims have certain rights both before and during trial 

that can only be protected if the victim has access to both the service appellate 

courts and CAAF? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, the USCAAF has held that under certain circumstances a 

sexual assault victim has standing to seek relief in the appellate courts including 

the USCAAF. See LRM v Kastenberg, 72 M.J. 364 (C.A.A.F. 2013). 

15. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Sparks, you have served in your current position as 

Commissioner to the Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the past 15 years. 

Do you anticipate any difficulty moving from staff to the bench? 

Mr. SPARKS. I do not. I have known all of the current judges on the court for 

many years. I served on Active Duty with one judge. I believe all of the judges respect my background and experience and our relationship has always been one of 

mutual respect. Since learning of my nomination, the judges have been, without exVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00937 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
932 

ception, very supportive as I have moved through the nomination process and each 

has expressed their hope that I will be confirmed. 

16. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Sparks, having worked closely under current and 

previous judges, how will you be able to bring independent judgment to bear on any 

precedents these judges might have set? 

Mr. SPARKS. Senator, in one of my advance policy questions I stated my belief that 

the doctrine of stare decisis is an essential guiding principle for maintaining consistency and stability in the law. I believe this principle is more important than the 

view of any particular individual. Therefore, the author of any particular opinion 

would be irrelevant to me in determining whether the precedent should be followed 

or overruled. 

[The nomination reference of the Mr. John E. Sparks follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

July 30, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

John E. Sparks, of Virginia to be a Judge of the United States Court of appeals 

for the Armed Forces for the term of fifteen years to expire on the date prescribed 

by law, vice James Edgar Baker, term expiring. 

[The biographical sketch of Mr. John E. Sparks, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, 

follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MR. JOHN E. SPARKS

Education: 

• University of Connecticut School of Law 

o Sept 1983–May 1986. 

o Juris Doctorate. 

• U.S. Naval Academy 

o Jul 1972–Jun 1976 

o Bachelor of Science 

Employment Record: 

• Officer, U.S. Marine Corps, Jun 1972–Jan 1998. 

• Special Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture, Feb 1998–Jan 1999. 

• Principal Deputy General Counsel, Dept of the Navy, Jan 1999–Dec 2000. 

• Commissioner U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, Dec 2000–Jul 2015. 

Honors and Awards: 

• Military Awards 

o Defense Superior Service Medal 

o Meritorious Service Medal (2 awards) 

o Navy Commendation Medal (2 awards) 

o National Defense Medal 

• Federal Civilian Awards 

o Secretary of the Navy Distinguished Public Service Award 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Mr. John E. Sparks in connection with his 

nomination follows:] 

933 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

John Edward Sparks. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Associate Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals Armed Forces. 

3. Date of nomination: 

July 30, 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

August 15, 1953. 

La Rochelle, France. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Ruth Annette (Cummings) Sparks. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. 

Undergraduate: 

Attended: U.S. Naval Academy 

Degree Granted: BS 

Degree Received: 2 Jun 1976 

Graduate: 

Attended: Univ of Connecticut School of Law 

Degree Granted: JD 

Degree Received: 17 May 1986 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

I was employed as commissioner to the Honorable James E. Baker, U.S. Court 

of Appeals for the Armed Forces, from Dec 2000 to Jul 2015. I am currently retired 

from federal service. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Until recently, I served as an adviser to the Military Justice Review Group, a 

working group directed by the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive review of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual for Courts-Martial. 

My prior government service includes duties as a commissioned officer in the U.S. 

Marine Corps from June 1976 to January 1998. I spent my last tour of Active Duty 

934 

as a deputy legal advisor on the National Security Council staff (1996–1998). Upon 

my retirement from Active Duty, I served as the Special Assistant to the Secretary 

of Agriculture from February 1998 to January 1999. I left that position to assume 

the duties as Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Navy and served until December 2000. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

I have no such relationships. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

I am not a member of nor do I hold office in any of the aforementioned types of 

organizations. 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None. 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Military Awards: 

Defense Superior Service Medal. 

Meritorious Service Medal (2 awards). 

Navy Commendation Medal (2 awards). 

National Defense Medal (2 awards). 

Civilian awards: 

Secretary of the Navy Distinguished Public Service Award. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

None. 

16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

None. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes, to the extent such requests and questions do not include judicial deliberative 

matters. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes, to the extent such requests and questions do not include judicial deliberative 

matters. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes, but see (c) and (d) above. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes, but see (c) and (d) above. 

935 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

JOHN E. SPARKS

This 4th day of September, 2015 

[The nomination of Mr. John E. Sparks was reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on December 15, 2015, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on April 5, 2016.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Vice Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, 

USN by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization 

Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting 

readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities 

of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications? 

Answer. As an officer whose career was directly transformed by this legislation, 

I believe the Goldwater-Nichols Act revolutionized the U.S. military and significantly improved the conduct of joint operations. However after almost three decades 

and multiple changes to the strategic environment, we should welcome a comprehensive review. At this time I do not have any specific recommendations for 

modifications to the Act, though I believe we must give serious consideration to 

incentivizing our national security interagency partners to achieve the same kinds 

of improvements that the Goldwater-Nichols Act brought to the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to providing this Committee appropriate recommendations on this or other issues. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U. S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)? 

Answer. The 2011 Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes USSOUTHCOM’s 

missions, responsibilities, and geographic area of responsibility (AOR). The latter 

encompasses 31 countries and 16 dependencies and areas of special sovereignty in 

Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. Per the UCP, the Commander 

of U.S. Southern Command is responsible for: 

• Detecting, deterring, and preventing attacks against the United States. 

• Planning for and executing military operations, including detection and monitoring of the aerial and maritime transit of illicit drugs, and detention operations at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay. 

• Ensuring unified actions among subordinate commands. 

936 

• Maintaining security of and carrying out force protection measures. 

• Exercising force protection responsibilities for the command. 

• Designating and establishing readiness requirements. 

• Providing trained and ready joint forces to other combatant commands. 

• Planning, conducting, and assessing security cooperation activities. 

• Planning and conducing the evacuation and protection of U.S. citizens. 

• Providing U.S. military representation to international and national agencies. 

• Providing advice and assistance to chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions in negotiations of rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements required in support of 

military missions. 

• Providing the single point of contact on military matters within the AOR. 

• Assuming combatant command of security assistance organizations in the event 

of war or an emergency that prevents control through normal channels, or as 

directed. 

• Commanding U.S. forces conducting peace or humanitarian relief operations. 

• Planning for and conducting military support to stability operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. 

• Planning for, supporting, and conducting the recovery of astronauts, space vehicles, space payloads, and objects. 

• Defense of the Panama Canal and Panama Canal area. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. I am honored the President nominated me to be the Commander of U.S. 

Southern Command. I have served in a variety of U.S. Navy, joint, and interagency 

assignments, including operational and staff positions in the Pentagon and National 

Security Council Staff, as well as tours commanding and supporting coalition forces 

in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. In particular, my experience 

commanding U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command and U.S. 4th Fleet significantly 

contributed to my understanding of USSOUTHCOM’s AOR. Naval forces under my 

command directly supported Joint Interagency Task Force South’s detection and 

monitoring mission. Additionally, a number of assignments associated with counterterrorism policy and operations introduced me to the value of building cooperative 

networks to understand and target adversary networks—an approach well-suited to 

a number of regional security challenges in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. As the former 

director for Operations (J3), Joint Staff, I gained the experience and insight to direct 

the operations of a geographic combatant command, as well as a clear understanding of the challenges of joint force allocation and management. My current assignment as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has given me 

strategic experience to understand the complexities and interdependencies of the 

global security environment. I have also gained a deep appreciation for the importance of cooperating with partner nations and forging international alliances. In this 

role I serve as the Chairman’s direct liaison with the Secretary of State, and work 

to enhance military support to foreign policy objectives. Over the past 2 years I traveled extensively, building relationships with senior diplomats and Chiefs of Missions, and observing the effective execution of the diplomatic arm of national security policy. If confirmed, these collective experiences have prepared me to embrace 

the opportunities and meet the challenges of commanding U.S. Southern Command. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the SOUTHCOM Commander? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will seek insight from key leaders and experts within the 

Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. Government to enhance my knowledge of U.S. foreign policy objectivities in USSOUTHCOM’s AOR. I will also engage 

with military, defense, and governmental leaders of nations throughout the region 

to strengthen existing relationships and identify new avenues for cooperation. I will 

reach out to experts in academia and think tanks to better understand the evolving 

internal issues affecting Latin American and Caribbean security. Engagement and 

collaboration with law enforcement agencies will also be a focus, as will seeking new 

opportunities where USSOUTHCOM can amplify law enforcement activities in the 

region. Global security challenges are evolving rapidly and I intend to focus on how 

extra-hemispheric actors, as well as illegally armed non-state actors, may appear or 

attempt to gain influence in our hemisphere. Finally, if confirmed, I hope to build 

on my modest appreciation of Spanish and begin to familiarize myself with Portuguese. I firmly believe effective communication and cultural understanding are 

critical to successful engagements with partner nations, especially in this critical region. 

937 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain 

of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, 

U.S. Southern Command, to the following: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Commander performs his duties under the authority, direction, and 

control of the Secretary of Defense, and is responsible for accomplishing the military 

missions directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense and for exercising 

command authority over the forces assigned by the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs duties delegated by the Secretary and performs the Secretary’s duties in his absence. The Commander communicates regularly with the Deputy Secretary and provides information and support 

necessary for the Deputy Secretary to perform these duties. 

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. The Commander does not have a direct command relationship with the 

Under Secretaries of Defense. The Commander does regularly communicate with the 

Under Secretaries on strategic and regional security issues as appropriate. 

Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense and serves as the key communication link between the combatant 

commanders and the President. The Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed 

by the Chairman, and performs the Chairman’s duties in his absence or disability. 

To enable the Chairman and Vice Chairman to perform their respective roles and 

duties, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command routinely provides information 

to the Chairman and Vice Chairman on significant events and issues in the Command’s AOR. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs. 

Answer. The Commander does not have a direct command relationship with the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, but regularly coordinates with the Assistant Secretary on issues related to Western Hemisphere security. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. 

Answer. The Commander does not have a direct command relationship with the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 

but regularly exchanges information and coordinates with the Assistant Secretary 

on issues of mutual concern and interest. The Assistant Secretary is responsible for 

many of the activities conducted every day within the U.S. Southern Command 

AOR, including counterterrorism, information operations, the Department of Defense counternarcotics program, building partnership capacity initiatives, and humanitarian and disaster relief efforts. 

Question. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs. 

Answer. The Service Secretaries are responsible for administration and support 

to the forces assigned to the combatant commands. The Service Chiefs are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces in their respective departments 

for assignment to the Combatant Commands. The Commander does not have a direct command relationship with the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs, but regularly communicates with and coordinates on issues of mutual concern and interest, 

working closely with them to understand service capabilities, convey combatant 

command requirements, and effectively employ service capabilities to successfully 

conduct U.S. Southern Command’s mission. 

Question. The other combatant commanders, particularly U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). 

Answer. The Commander, U.S. Southern Command, maintains an exceptionally 

close relationship with other combatant commanders, especially with the Commander of U.S. Northern Command. The combatant commanders are in frequent 

communication, maintaining a shared perspective on trans-regional threats, coordinating on issues of mutual concern, sharing information, and preventing or removing any gaps or seams along regional boundaries. When directed or specified by the 

Secretary of Defense, the relationship between combatant commanders becomes formalized in order to plan and execute specific operational plans. 

938 

Question. U. S. Chiefs of Mission within the U. S. Southern Command area of responsibility (AOR). 

Answer. The Commander does not have a formal relationship with the Chiefs of 

Mission. The U.S. Ambassador is responsible for directing and supervising all U.S. 

Government activity in the host nation, with the exception of U.S. military activities 

under the direction and coordination of the Combatant Commander. However, Geographic Combatant Commanders routinely discuss issues of mutual interest and 

concern with the Chiefs of Mission in the Command’s AOR and coordinate security 

cooperation activities with the Chief of Mission and country team. The combatant 

commanders negotiate force protection arrangements with the Chiefs of Mission as 

appropriate. If confirmed, I intend to maintain close coordination and contact with 

the Chiefs of Mission throughout the U.S. Southern Command AOR, working together to execute our mutual responsibilities to achieve our shared national security 

objectives. I will continue to host annual sub-regional conferences with the Chiefs 

of Mission to exchange perspectives and gain regional insight. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. If confirmed as the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, you 

will be responsible for all military operations in that region. These include operations supporting homeland defense and security, counter-narcotics efforts in source 

and transit countries, responses to natural disasters, detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay, and the development of democratic values within the militaries of the 

region, among others. 

In your view, what are the major challenges and problems you would confront if 

confirmed as the next Commander of SOUTHCOM? 

Answer. Today, no nation in the region poses a direct, credible conventional military threat to the United States. Although there are many longstanding border disputes, there is minimal risk of inter-state armed conflict between neighboring countries. As I understand it, Latin America and the Caribbean has witnessed significant progress—especially in terms of democratic consolidation; the growth of market-based economies; and the protection of human rights—however the region still 

faces numerous persistent unresolved challenges. 

Many countries face economic and social challenges, institutional problems, and 

malicious activities by non-state actors. These challenges are inter-related. Pervasive inequality, chronic unemployment, lack of economic opportunities, and deteriorating citizen security drive migration and propel young men and women to join violent criminal gangs, as well as set the conditions for radicalization within the region’s small Muslim communities. Lack of state presence, ineffective governance, 

and weak rule of law provide fertile ground for the drug trade and spread of powerful criminal networks; these networks, coupled with criminal violence, threaten political, financial, and security institutions and jeopardize the stability of some partner nations. In certain countries there is a troubling trend toward authoritarianism: 

elected leaders that shun democratic standards, abuse human rights, muzzle the 

press, and suppress opposition. Public frustration with endemic corruption feeds social protests and, in the case of Guatemala, can even bring down a sitting president. 

Environmental disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanoes, floods, and 

drought loom as ever-present dangers. 

Finally, in recent years, growing competition for regional influence by nations like 

China, Russia, and Iran present challenges to our aim to broaden security cooperation within and across the region. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges 

and problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will defend the southern approaches to the United States 

and work with partners in the U.S. Government and the region to advance security, 

prosperity, and stability in the Western Hemisphere. Given U.S. Southern Command’s minimal force allocation, I will maximize the use of all available resources, 

explore innovative opportunities, and leverage the full spectrum of relationships and 

partnerships to best mitigate risks. 

I will prioritize the development of creative and non-traditional approaches—including the use of alternative platforms to support DOD’s detection and monitoring 

mission—and facilitate improved information sharing with partner nations. As appropriate, I will encourage bilateral and multilateral training, security cooperation 

activities, and exercises to strengthen defense cooperation; build partner nation capacity; encourage increased responsibility and global leadership; and advance common interests and values. I will emphasize the ability to rapidly and effectively respond to contingencies in concert with partner nations, the interagency, and private 

organizations. I will ensure U.S. Southern Command remains vigilant against the 

939 

threat of terrorism and violent extremism by working closely with our partners to 

monitor and if necessary deter terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland or our partner 

nations. Finally, I will continue to ensure the safe, humane, and legal treatment of 

detainees at Joint Task Force Guantanamo. 

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number of temporary and permanent authorities to build the capacity of partner nations’ security 

forces and institutions. 

In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in building the capacities 

of partner nations in the SOUTHCOM AOR? 

Answer. In my view, the strategic objectives of building partner capacity (BPC) 

are to increase the capability of partner militaries to address threats within their 

own territories; to foster regional cooperation among and between partner nations; 

and to promote a peaceful, cooperative international order. Probably to a greater degree than other Geographic Combatant Commands, U.S. Southern Command relies 

heavily on BPC activities to help generate a layered defense of the U.S. homeland. 

These activities cultivate capable partners who are willing and able to work cooperatively to confront shared security challenges. Appropriate BPC efforts in the 

USSOUTHCOM AOR should focus on improving regional domain awareness and information sharing; the ability of partner nations to support ‘end game’ interdiction 

operations; and the continued professionalization of regional defense forces. 

Question. In your view, are existing authorities and resourcing sufficient to meet 

these strategic objectives? 

Answer. In my view, maintaining current authorities to conduct BPC and DOD 

security cooperation activities will be critical to meeting these strategic objectives. 

The role of the Congress in supporting DOD by granting the flexibility to address 

emerging threats will also be key to the continued success of our efforts. 

USSOUTHCOM has long operated as an economy-of-force command, receiving minimal force allocation and resources. This has forced the Command to accept risk in 

many of its missions. If confirmed, I will assess strategic and readiness risks across 

the spectrum of USSOUTHCOM missions and work to mitigate them to the extent 

possible. 

Question. Are there ways in which existing authorities could be reformed to more 

effectively and efficiently respond to requirements in the SOUTHCOM AOR? 

Answer. I know that the Congress recently recognized transnational organized 

crime as an increasing threat to national security and granted the Department 

greater flexibility to address this challenge. This type of support—which helps DOD 

address an adaptive adversary—is critical to defending the homeland. If confirmed, 

I will assess the threat environment to ensure I have the flexibility I need to address evolving challenges, especially when it comes to missions like countering 

transnational organized crime and counterterrorism, and will keep the Congress informed of any necessary or recommended authority changes. 

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate balance between efforts to build 

partnership capacity at the tactical and operational level and at the institutional 

and ministerial-level? 

Answer. I believe these efforts should be executed in tandem. As I understand it, 

U.S. Southern Command focuses on building the tactical and operational capacity 

of regional defense and security forces. USSOUTHCOM also works closely with organizations and programs like the William J. Perry Center and the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) to promote good governance and accountability, and 

strengthen strategic planning and budgeting processes at the ministerial level. 

Question. Do you believe the ability of a partner nation to sustain U.S.-provided 

equipment and capabilities should be a key factor in determining the level and type 

of assistance to be provided? 

Answer. Absolutely. As I understand it, U.S. Southern Command works closely 

with partner nations to provide appropriate equipment and sustainment training 

tailored to each individual nation’s needs and abilities. The United States strives 

to be the partner of choice to countries around the world, and to do so we must be 

responsive partners. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States remains 

the region’s security partner of choice. 

USE OF MILITARY FORCES FOR CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Question. Throughout the Western Hemisphere there is increased use of militaries 

to conduct policing and public security roles. 

What is your assessment of this trend? In your view, are these permanent shifts 

or temporary measures taken while the capabilities of police forces are improved? 

940 

Answer. As I understand it, in the face of rising crime and violent insecurity and 

within the constraints of their own national laws, some democratic governments in 

the region have resorted to deploying their militaries to support overwhelmed, 

outgunned, and at times corrupt police forces. In many countries, the military is 

among the most trusted institutions, and public opinion polls show that many of the 

region’s citizens support the use of the military in domestic security functions. I believe these are and should be temporary measures that are taken while civilian police forces are improved and the judicial sector is strengthened. This will not happen 

overnight, however—and until then, we should remain supportive as regional militaries fill this critical capability gap. 

Question. In your view, what are the benefits and risks of militaries taking on 

more public-security tasks? 

Answer. Civilian leaders in the region are doing their best to improve citizen security. However, as militaries take on more public security tasks, there is potential 

risk for human rights violations or increased corruption in the military ranks. I understand that U.S. Southern Command has a robust Human Rights Initiative. This 

program promotes respect for human rights and subordination to civilian authority 

among the region’s military and defense forces. If confirmed, I will emphasize the 

importance of human rights. I will also support and encourage partner nations as 

they transition domestic security missions back to civilian police forces. 

DOD COUNTER-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

Question. DOD serves as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring 

of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing toward the U.S. On an 

annual basis, DOD’s counter-narcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.0 

billion to support the Department’s CN operations, including to build the capacity 

of U.S. Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and certain foreign governments, and provide intelligence support on CN-related matters and a variety of 

other unique enabling capabilities. Much of this funding is directed towards the 

SOUTHCOM AOR. 

In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD—and by extension 

SOUTHCOM—in U.S. counterdrug efforts? 

Answer. I believe the Department’s current role is appropriate and a good use of 

DOD’s unique capabilities. By law, the Department of Defense is the lead federal 

agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illicit drugs 

into the United States. In this role, the Department supports the U.S. Coast Guard 

and other U.S. law enforcement agencies that are engaged in interdiction and apprehension activities. U.S. Southern Command accomplishes this mission through its 

component Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South). U.S. Southern Command also works to build the capacities of partner nation militaries to conduct successful detection, monitoring, and interdiction operations in support of U.S. and 

partner nation law enforcement efforts. These efforts complement other U.S. 

counterdrug programs, such as the Department of State’s eradication and alternative economic development programs and the Drug Enforcement Agency’s arrest, 

extradition, and prosecution of illicit traffickers. In its supporting role, DOD must 

consider a much broader perspective than simply supporting the disruption of illicit 

drugs. We must take a network perspective—understanding the entire value chain 

and its facilitation of other transnational threats. It is not enough to see and stop 

the drug flow; we must understand the adaptive networks that direct and support 

this flow if we hope to have more of an impact. 

Question. How would you measure the effectiveness of U.S. and DOD counter-narcotics programs? 

Answer. Rather than saying effective, I believe Department of Defense counternarcotics programs get positive results from very limited resources. As I understand 

it, in fiscal year 2015 JIATF South’s Operation MARTILLO resulted in the disruption of 192 metric tons of cocaine destined for the United States. This success would 

not have been possible without significant contributions by partner nations and Allies, who helped disrupt 108 metric tons of cocaine. Every year, JIATF South and 

its international partners disrupt approximately three times the amount of cocaine 

seized at or within U.S. borders—while receiving only 1.7 percent of the total U.S. 

counterdrug budget. Apart from measuring cocaine seizures, I also believe it is important to look at the impact of U.S. counternarcotics programs on partner nations, 

especially in terms of stability, citizen security, and the capability of military and 

security forces to successfully support and conduct counterdrug operations. I am 

aware of the significant and growing number of drug related deaths in the United 

States. Our national strategy places great emphasis on the demand side of the equaVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00946 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tion, while DOD counternarcotics programs contribute primarily to the supply side. 

We will explore how we might do more, in creative and innovative combinations. 

Question. In your view, what should be the role of the U.S. in countering the flow 

of narcotics to nations other than the U.S.? 

Answer. Regardless of destination, the flow of narcotics leaves a trail of corruption, violence, death, and large sums of money that fund nefarious activities and destabilizes entire regions. As the world’s principal consumer of cocaine, the United 

States has a responsibility to help our partners address this challenge. In my view, 

the U.S. should work to build the capacity of partner nations to counter illicit trafficking, both individually and collectively, in the maritime, air, and land domains. 

Given that the globalized illicit economy supports a diverse network of organized 

crime groups, extremist organizations, and terrorists, we have a responsibility to aggressively share information with other nations, especially as it relates to international security. If confirmed, I will seek ways to increase JIATF South’s current 

information sharing authorities, and enhance U.S. Southern Command’s efforts to 

build partner nation capacity. 

HEROIN

Question. General John Kelly, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, testified 

before the Armed Services Committee on March 12, 2015 that ‘‘we are in the middle 

of a serious epidemic, in—particularly when it comes to heroin.’’ General Kelly went 

on to note that ‘‘100 percent of it is produced . . . in the Latin America. About half 

of it is produced in Mexico, and the rest of it is produced further south in various 

parts of the Central American isthmus and South America.’’ 

What is your assessment of the threat posed by the trafficking of heroin into the 

United States from Mexico, Central and South America? 

Answer. The threat posed by heroin in the United States is serious. While U.S. 

demand for cocaine has been decreasing over the past few years, demand for heroin 

has more than doubled since 2007. In response, criminal organizations have ramped 

up heroin production in Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala. Heroin is available in 

larger quantities, used by a larger number of people, and is causing an increasing 

number of overdose deaths. I have been told that Mexican transnational criminal 

organizations control drug trafficking across the Southwest Border and are moving 

to expand their share of U.S. illicit drug markets, particularly heroin markets. 

Question. What more should be done to combat what General Kelly has deemed 

a ‘‘serious epidemic?’’ 

Answer. Given the nature of how heroin is produced and smuggled in the 

USSOUTHCOM AOR, I believe the most effective way to address this threat is to 

focus on building the capacity of regional partners to detect and illuminate the 

criminal networks engaged in this activity, and to interdict the flow of dangerous 

drugs like heroin and methamphetamine as close to the point of origin as possible. 

Because heroin is often smuggled in small quantities via established smuggling 

routes, it is extremely difficult to intercept it once it is en route. We have significant 

experience leading coalition efforts that build networks to defeat networks; in this 

case we can work with our interagency and regional partners to dismantle 

transnational criminal organizations. 

COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are 

also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats 

that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. 

What is your assessment of the threat to the United States posed by transnational 

organized crime? 

Answer. In my opinion, transnational organized crime (TOC) poses a significant 

and growing threat to U.S. national security. TOC networks operate with blatant 

disregard for national sovereignty, the rule of law, and citizen security. These sophisticated and dangerous criminal networks generate enormous revenue, particularly from the trafficking of illegal drugs, and cause significant damage to the environments in which they operate. Exploiting technological developments, TOC networks have expanded and their illicit operations threaten the security of citizens 

and the stability of some political and economic institutions. In the Western Hemisphere TOC networks fuel corruption and exploit insufficient state presence and 

weak rule of law. We have no indications of this in the USSOUTHCOM AOR, 

though the potential exists for terrorist organizations to work with TOC networks 

to transport special interest aliens, terrorists, or weapons of mass destruction into 

the United States. 

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Question. What is your understanding of the President’s July 2011 strategy to 

combat transnational criminal organizations? 

Answer. As I understand it, the President’s strategy aims to build, balance, and 

integrate all the tools of American power to combat transnational organized crime 

and related threats to U.S. national security to ensure the threat is degraded to a 

public safety problem manageable by partner nation law enforcement organizations. 

Question. What kind of additional support, if any, would you envision DOD—and 

SOUTHCOM in particular—providing to U.S. law enforcement to combat 

transnational organized crime? 

Answer. The primary ways TOC will be addressed are through law enforcement 

capacity building efforts, adroit diplomacy with partner nations, and the use of innovative policy tools such as counter threat finance capabilities to break the financial 

back of criminal networks. DOD will rarely be the lead agency in efforts to combat 

TOC, except where activities fall into unique DOD capability areas (i.e. detection 

and monitoring and supporting interdiction operations). USSOUTHCOM supports 

the broader U.S. Government effort through detection and monitoring operations; 

support to U.S. and partner nation law enforcement operations; and by building the 

security capabilities of vetted partner military units through counternarcotics training, equipping, and infrastructure support. DOD can also assist law enforcement efforts through the development of comprehensive intelligence. Our unique DOD capabilities and experience working across the interagency can and should be applied 

to TOC. DOD can support law enforcement organizations by working in close collaboration to illuminate, characterize, and understand the organization, function, 

and vulnerabilities of criminal networks. I envision a more comprehensive effort to 

gather and integrate disparate knowledge from across the U.S. Government-law enforcement organizations, DOD, the intelligence community, and open source information—to paint a broader picture of this agile adversary and how they respond to 

our efforts. Working directly with Chiefs of Mission and country teams, we can also 

help our partners more effectively enforce the rule of law. 

CENTRAL AMERICAN SECURITY STRATEGY

Question. The President announced on January 29, 2015 a strategy entitled Promoting Prosperity, Security and Good Governance in Central America, principally 

focused on promoting enhanced trade, security, and governance in Guatemala, El 

Salvador, and Honduras—the so-called Northern Triangle. 

What is your understanding of the President’s Central America strategy? 

Answer. As I understand it, the Strategy for U.S. Engagement in Central America 

broadens the vision for how we achieve security in the sub-region. The Strategy 

prioritizes three interconnected objectives: prosperity, governance, and security. It 

outlines how the United States will work with international organizations and regional governments to put the region on a course to sustained, broad-based economic 

growth, better government performance, and improved security conditions 

Question. How do you envision SOUTHCOM’s activities in the region complementing the President’s strategy? 

Answer. Although DOD is not the focus of the strategy nor the recipient of the 

additional funding requested by the President, Congress recognized the important 

role security plays in addressing the region’s long-standing challenges and provided 

additional funding towards that end, increasing USSOUTHCOM’s capacity to complement the President’s strategy. 

U.S. Southern Command’s efforts to build the capacity of the Central American 

security forces—as well as its title X responsibility to detect and monitor the aerial 

and maritime transit of illicit drugs—directly support the President’s vision of a 

more secure and stable Central America. If confirmed, I will ensure USSOUTHCOM 

activities focus on helping partner nations secure their borders; gain domain awareness; disrupt illicit trafficking and transnational criminal networks; maintain professional security forces that respect human rights and uphold the rule of law; and 

build stronger defense institutions. 

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

Question. What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance activities? 

Answer. In accordance with the Department of Defense Directive 5205.14 on 

counter threat finance policy, the Department of Defense should use its unique capabilities, such as network analysis, to support the interagency and work with partner nations to deny, disrupt, and degrade the ability of adversaries to use global 

and illicit financial networks to negatively affect U.S. interests. 

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Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of SOUTHCOM in 

supporting counter threat finance activities? 

Answer. I do believe that USSOUTHCOM has an appropriate role supporting 

counter threat finance activities with its unique capabilities. Finance is an important layer of network activity. If we are to understand criminal networks and more 

effectively counter them—we must integrate our understanding of finance, logistics, 

leadership, and other layers of the network into a more holistic understanding. For 

example, in support of the Department of the Treasury, U.S. Southern Command 

recently stood up a Counter Threat Finance Branch that helps map illicit networks, 

conducts all-source intelligence analysis and production, and works with U.S. and 

regional partners to support targeted financial measures and U.S. law enforcement 

efforts. These efforts enhance the U.S. and partner nation efforts to disrupt the 

global illicit economy and combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 

MEXICO

Question. Much of the illegal narcotics supply comes into Mexico from the 

SOUTHCOM AOR. While Mexico is in the U.S. Northern Command AOR, the rest 

of Latin America is in the SOUTHCOM AOR. 

What is your vision of how SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM should work together 

in a fully coordinated effort with respect to Mexico and other security challenges? 

Answer. I am told that the staffs of U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern 

Command regularly collaborate on issues related to the Mexico-Guatemala-Belize 

border to eliminate any seam that might pose a weakness in the forward defense 

of the Homeland. Also, the Joint Operating Area for JIATF South was purposefully 

designed to overlap both commands’ areas of responsibility to remove any boundaries in the air and maritime arenas. I understand that there is a Mexican liaison 

officer at JIATF South, and that the staffs of both commands are in constant communication, participate in exercises, and attend regional conferences, which often 

includes attendance by Mexican officials. 

If confirmed, I will aggressively support this coordination and seek additional 

ways to foster collaboration between the Mexican and Central American militaries 

to encourage cooperation on shared security challenges, including illicit trafficking, 

transnational organized crime, and illegal migration. 

TERRORISM THREAT

Question. General John Kelly, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee 

on March 12, 2015, noted concern that the ‘‘relative ease with which human smugglers moved tens of thousands of people to our nation’s doorstep also serves as another warning sign: these smuggling routes are a potential vulnerability to our 

homeland. As I stated last year, terrorist organizations could seek to leverage those 

same smuggling routes to move operatives with intent to cause grave harm to our 

citizens or even bring weapons of mass destruction into the United States.’’ 

Do you share General Kelly’s concern about the potential for terrorist organizations to exploit smuggling routes into the United States for nefarious purposes? 

Answer. Yes, I do share General Kelly’s concern. Drugs are but one manifestation 

of the overall problem of illicit trafficking. The overarching threat to our national 

security—of which drugs are one part—is the range of illicit commodities and traffickers, including those that facilitate the movement of ‘special interest aliens’ 

(SIAs) from countries such as Syria, Pakistan, and Iran. There is a risk that terrorist organizations could exploit SIA networks, established smuggling routes, or 

other regional vulnerabilities—including lax immigration and border security, corrupt government officials, or the capabilities of criminal organizations—to move terrorists into the United States or into the region. 

I am also deeply concerned by the proven threat posed by foreign fighters. I understand there has been a small but steady stream of individuals and their families 

leaving the region to join ISIL in Syria or Iraq. This is especially concerning considering that many partner nations are unable to monitor the potential return of foreign fighters and often lack robust counterterrorism legislation to address this 

threat. 

Question. What should SOUTHCOM do in order to counter this threat? 

Answer. I believe USSOUTHCOM must continue collaborating closely and aggressively with its interagency, regional, and international partners—as well as providing intelligence support to regional U.S. Country Teams and interagency operations—to ensure our nation and those of our friends remain secure. If confirmed, 

I will also work tirelessly to ensure U.S. Southern Command develops, maintains, 

and aggressively employs the required intelligence capabilities to identify, monitor, 

and deter threats to the U.S. homeland or partner nations. 

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INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Question. What is your assessment of the current level of coordination between 

DOD and civilian agencies in SOUTHCOM’s AOR? 

Answer. USSOUTHCOM plays an enormously important role as an enabling platform for interagency operations and activities across the region. There are more 

than 30 interagency representatives integrated into the headquarters staff, allowing 

U.S. Southern Command to marshal in-house expertise to align military engagement activities within interagency frameworks, programs, and activities. 

USSOUTHCOM’s Security Cooperation Organizations—mostly co-located in U.S. 

Embassies across the region—work side-by-side with civilian U.S. agencies to ensure 

seamless execution of U.S. security policies within each host nation. I understand 

there is also routine discussion and coordination between senior leaders from U.S. 

Southern Command, the United States Agency for International Development, and 

the Department of State Bureaus of Western Hemisphere Affairs and International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that DOD efforts in your 

AOR complement the efforts of civilian agencies? 

Answer. I firmly believe that seamless interagency coordination and execution is 

critical to effective and efficient U.S. security and foreign policy. If confirmed, I will 

continue to strengthen this coordination. I will also conduct periodic assessments of 

U.S. Southern Command’s activities to identify areas for improving synchronization 

of efforts between U.S. Southern Command and civilian agencies, while also engaging with counterparts at the Department of State and other interagency entities to 

identify new opportunities for collaboration. 

CUBA

Question. In light of the Administration’s rapprochement with the government of 

Cuba, what is your view of the need to review and, potentially, revise U. S. policies 

regarding security cooperation with Cuba? 

Answer. As I understand it, the United States and Cuba have cooperated on antidrug efforts for over a decade, with a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist 

stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. Coast Guard officials have also engaged 

with Cuban officials regarding oil spill prevention, planning, and response issues 

under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 

U.S. military engagement with the Cuban military is currently restricted under 

U.S. policy. In compliance with all applicable U.S. polices and laws, I understand 

DOD is exploring avenues for cooperation with Cuba on shared interests like humanitarian and medical issues, disaster relief, and limited exercise and conference 

attendance. Currently, the monthly fence line meeting with the Cuban Army Frontier Brigade is one of the few direct channels to Cuba’s military. 

Question. What is your opinion about the pros and cons of military-to-military 

contact with Cuba? 

Answer. Given that Cuba’s military and security forces have long regarded the 

United States as its greatest threat to national security and are antagonistic to the 

presence of the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, the Cuban government will 

likely be hesitant to engage in high-profile military-to-military engagements, preferring low-level interaction on medical and humanitarian issues. An example of such 

engagement is when Cuban medics joined U.S. personnel from the USNS Comfort 

to provide medical care at a hospital in Haiti earlier this year. 

Any military-to-military engagement plan must be developed within a larger, comprehensive U.S. Government engagement strategy that leverages all efforts to 

achieve U.S. national objectives; namely a stable, prosperous, and democratic Cuba. 

In general, based on our proven track record improving partner nations’ military 

professionalism and respect for human rights, I believe engagement by our U.S. 

military could positively influence democratic governance, nurture and develop professional defense forces, and encourage greater regional cooperation. While normalization of relations opens up new avenues of cooperation, the U.S. military will not 

work with anyone who is not vetted or does not respect human rights. So if a decision is taken to change U.S. policy toward Cuba, mil-to-mil engagement may provide 

opportunities to improve conditions for the Cuban people. 

VENEZUELA

Question. U. S. -Venezuelan relations have continued to be strained as President 

Maduro continues to propagate anti-American rhetoric, import increasing amounts 

of military armament, politicize the Venezuelan military forces, traffic illegal narcotics throughout the region, and export his brand of populism to the region. 

945 

What is your view of President Maduro’s intentions in the region? 

Answer. President Maduro publicly expresses his opposition to the United States, 

regularly criticizing the U.S. Government, its policies, and its relations with Latin 

America. 

Question. What is your understanding of the current state of military-to-military 

relations between the U. S. and Venezuela? 

Answer. My understanding is that military-to-military relations with Venezuela 

are minimal, despite U.S. Southern Command’s efforts to maintain interaction and 

dialogue with the Venezuelan military. U.S. Southern Command invites Venezuelan 

military personnel to international and regional military forums, but they simply do 

not show up. JIATF South maintains an open position for a Venezuelan liaison officer; however, for several years, Venezuela has chosen to leave the position unfilled. 

If confirmed, I will continue to seek engagement opportunities with the Venezuelan 

military, in accordance with U.S. policy. 

Question. How would you assess Venezuelan relations with China, Cuba, Iran, 

and Russia vis-a-vis the national interests of the United States? 

Answer. Venezuela has strengthened its bilateral ties with Cuba, China, Iran, and 

Russia over the past few years, although it appears President Maduro does not have 

the strong personal ties his predecessor had with the leaders of those countries. If 

confirmed, I will monitor developments in Venezuelan foreign relations closely, particularly as they relate to U.S. national security interests. 

Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which Venezuelan government or military forces are involved in the drug trade? 

Answer. My understanding is that there are widespread allegations of Venezuelan 

government and military involvement in the drug trade, and that various government officials have been sanctioned under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Act. 

Question. What is your assessment of the impact of Venezuela’s deteriorating economic situation on the stability of the government and its relationship with the 

broader region? 

Answer. As I understand it, Venezuela faces domestic economic challenges. Regionally, Venezuela’s long-running border and maritime territorial disputes with its 

neighbors Guyana and Colombia continue. It is also a major drug transshipment 

point that fails to engage in consistent, strategic, and broad cooperation with international counter narcotics efforts. 

BRAZIL

Question. What is your understanding of Brazil’s security role in South America 

and the broader region? 

Answer. As I understand it, Brazil seeks to take a greater global leadership role, 

particularly on issues related to maritime security and peacekeeping operations. 

Brazil has deployed security forces to its borders to address illicit trafficking and 

criminal activity. It is also an active contributor to regional and international peacekeeping and stability efforts, including leading the United Nations Stabilization 

Mission in Haiti. 

Question. How would you assess U.S.-Brazil security cooperation? 

Answer. As I understand it, the U.S. and Brazilian militaries cooperate on a number of issues, including counternarcotics, counterterrorism, disaster preparedness, 

humanitarian assistance, and aviation and port security. As the two largest democracies and economies in the Western Hemisphere, the United States and Brazil are 

natural partners, and both countries have committed to deepening security cooperation efforts. 

Question. If confirmed, how might bilateral security coordination be improved? 

Answer. As I understand it, the United States-Brazil Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) 

will strengthen bilateral defense relations and enable greater cooperation between 

the United States and Brazil in defense-related matters, especially research and development, commercial initiatives, logistics support, technology security, and the acquisition and development of defense products and services. If confirmed, I will look 

to advance cooperation in these areas, focusing on joint exercises and the exchange 

of information and equipment, especially to improve the conduct of international 

peacekeeping operations. 

PANAMA

Question. What is your assessment of U.S.-Panamanian security cooperation, particularly in the area of counter-narcotics efforts? 

Answer. My understanding is that U.S.-Panama security cooperation is extremely 

close. The United States enjoys a strong partnership with all Panamanian security 

946 

services and Panama actively cooperates with the U.S. on counternarcotics efforts, 

to include supporting U.S. Coast Guard maritime operations; responding to interdiction cues from JIATF South; and collaborating with the Drug Enforcement Administration. Panama is a strong supporter of Operation MARTILLO, a multinational 

counter illicit trafficking operation to disrupt organized crime groups by limiting 

their ability to use Central America as a transit zone. Additionally, Panama’s commitment to the security of the Canal has been exemplary, as shown by Panama’s 

2013 interdiction of the Motor Vessel Chong Chon Gang and its cooperation with 

the United Nations to determine if sanctions violations occurred. 

ECUADOR

Question. How would you characterize the current status of counter-narcotics cooperation between the United States and the government of Ecuador? 

Answer. As I understand it, the Ecuadorian government’s closure of the U.S. Embassy’s Office of Security Cooperation in April 2014 greatly reduced bilateral counternarcotics collaboration. Despite this setback, the United States continues to support Ecuador’s security forces in limited ways. Ecuador participates in the annual 

U.S. Coast Guard-sponsored Multilateral Counterdrug Summit, which enhances bilateral cooperation in combating maritime drug trafficking and improving prosecution of maritime trafficking cases. While the closure of the Office of Security Cooperation certainly complicates military-to-military engagement and security cooperation between our two countries, the United States remains open to mutually 

beneficial engagement opportunities in the future. 

SOUTHCOM’S MILITARY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS

Question. Like all of the Combatant Commands, SOUTHCOM has military service 

component commands that implement the plans and policies of the Combatant Commander. Each of the component commands also have responsibility to the Services 

they represent. It seems SOUTHCOM, however, exercises limited command and 

control in directing specific activities and limited oversight of the activities of the 

component commands. 

If confirmed, will you review the command and control relationship and share 

your findings with the committee? 

Answer. Yes, I will. 

Question. SOUTHCOM does not have any assigned forces and—as a result—is required to compete for forces within the global request for forces process. Given the 

Department’s focus on the greater Middle East and Asia-Pacific, do you believe the 

SOUTHCOM Commander will be able to secure the necessary personnel to accomplish its partnering and engagement mission within its AOR? If not, how would you 

assess the risk to U.S. strategic interests in the region? 

Answer. U.S. Southern Command has long operated as an economy-of-force command. Persistent ISR shortfalls negatively impact the Command’s ability to monitor 

threat networks in the region and to identify indicators and warnings for potential 

crises. With regard to forces, even a small change in force allocation makes an enormous difference in the Command’s ability to engage with partner nations and ensure a defense in depth of the homeland. If confirmed, I will advocate aggressively 

to ensure that USSOUTHCOM’s requirements are adequately sourced. I will also 

seek innovative alternatives to traditional force sourcing solutions. 

ACQUISITION

Question. Do you feel that the military services are responsive to SOUTHCOM requirements when prioritizing resources for acquisition programs, for example, with 

respect to drug interdiction platforms? 

Answer. Given global defense priorities, the Services do their best to be responsive 

and source USSOUTHCOM requirements. While the U.S. Navy has competing requirements, the U.S. Coast Guard has committed a 50 percent increase in cutters 

equipped with a helicopter flight deck, plus a commensurate plus-up in maritime 

patrol aircraft hours to support JIATF South’s detection and monitoring mission. To 

help mitigate shortfalls, I understand that USSOUTHCOM also makes good use of 

a variety of innovative approaches, like adapting anti-IED technology for use in 

counterdrug operations in dense jungle and mountainous terrain. 

Question. Would SOUTHCOM missions benefit from its own dedicated acquisition 

budget and authority, especially for rapid acquisition and deployment of new capabilities? 

Answer. From my understanding of USSOUTHCOM’s current organizational construct, changes of this nature would require the creation of a new acquisition branch 

and the hiring of additional personnel. Currently, I do not believe that 

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USSOUTHCOM would be able to manage changes of this nature. However, if confirmed, I can examine that possibility and report back to the Committee if I believe 

such a change would be beneficial. 

COLOMBIA

Question. Plan Colombia has demonstrated that a multi-year, sustained partnership can achieve significant and lasting results in the area of security cooperation. 

Plan Colombia has enabled the Colombian government to make significant gains 

against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and other paramilitary 

forces in Colombia, as well as enabled the government to secure many previously 

ungoverned areas. 

What is your assessment of the current security situation in Colombia? 

Answer. Thanks to our sustained assistance and their political will, Colombia has 

been transformed from a near failed state into a major regional player exercising 

significant political influence, including South America’s most professional security 

forces, and a dynamic economy. In a little over a decade, homicide and kidnapping 

rates have plummeted and terrorist attacks are down 50 percent. The number of 

FARC combatants has been reduced from ∼22,000 in 2002 to fewer than 8,000 

today. The FARC is profoundly unpopular, routinely polling at about 3 percent domestic popular support. Colombia now sets the standard for hemispheric law enforcement and counternarcotics efforts, and now exports its security expertise to 

other countries in the region. 

Although Colombia’s transformation is remarkable, they will still face a violent 

period with many challenges even if a peace deal is reached. For Colombia to successfully consolidate the promise of this decades long struggle, the United States 

must remain a fully engaged post-peace accord partner. 

Question. What lessons should be drawn from Plan Colombia to inform building 

partner capacity efforts elsewhere in the SOUTHCOM AOR and beyond? 

Answer. We can learn a lot from the Colombian experience. We should look to Colombia, not just for examples of where we got it right, but where they did, and why. 

Colombia had effective core institutions, a strong sense of national identity, and a 

commitment to a market economy, institutional democracy, and fundamental freedoms. Most importantly, after the struggles of the 1990s, Colombia’s leaders possessed one thing that is indispensable to the success of security assistance: tenacious political will. They came up with their own plan (Plan Colombia)—what they 

called a ‘Colombian solution to a Colombian problem’—that involved modernization 

and professionalization of their Armed Forces, respect for human rights, and welcoming U.S. training and intelligence support with open arms. Policy continuity over 

successive Colombian administrations was also a key factor and, again, a reflection 

of their enduring commitment to a goal we shared. This goal was not just shared 

by the Colombians; bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress and a ‘whole of U.S. 

Government’ approach was also instrumental to Plan Colombia’s success. While the 

U.S. has spent approximately $10 billion to train the Colombian military and support the Colombian government, the Colombians outspent us by a significant margin. 

Question. How should U.S. security cooperation programs and activities evolve as 

the security situation in Colombia continues to improve? 

Answer. Although Colombia’s economic and security transformation is remarkable, the proliferation of weapons and criminal organizations and the potential for 

violent competition after the FARC demobilizes will continue to pose significant 

challenges. Colombia’s topography, jungles, and difficult terrain will complicate efforts to consolidate state institutions and extend government presence into remote 

areas once run by the FARC. 

Continued U.S. engagement will be critical to ensure Colombia can consolidate the 

success it has achieved over the past 15 years. In addition to continued counterdrug 

cooperation, I understand that U.S. Southern Command is supporting the Colombian military’s modernization and transformation efforts as they prepare for a new, 

post-peace accord role that is more outwardly focused on international missions such 

as peacekeeping. 

Question. What programs should continue in order to ensure that the progress 

that has been made is sustained? 

Answer. Current programs such as Civil Military Support Elements and Information Operations will be critical to supporting the Government of Colombia’s efforts 

to extend state influence and security throughout all parts of the country. Military 

cooperation will remain essential to maintain and expand on hard-fought security 

gains and manage emergent security concerns. Given the government’s focus on implementing its new counternarcotics strategy, SOUTHCOM will need to remain foVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00953 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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cused in this area, while also expanding training for international peacekeeping operations. 

Question. How do you envision the U.S. security cooperation programs and activities evolving in the event of a successful outcome of the Colombian—FARC peace 

negotiations? 

Answer. As Colombia nears the end of a 51-year conflict, now is the time to position the United States, Colombia’s leading ally, to support successful implementation of a peace agreement. Consolidation of the gains achieved to date and establishment of state authority throughout its sovereign territory will require sustained effort for years to come. Continued targeted assistance will be essential to the Colombian government as it begins peace implementation, helping reassure the Colombian 

public of the benefits of a peace agreement and the strength of our bilateral partnership. Such assistance will also help build the conditions for a just and durable 

peace. 

The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process will likely be 

a long-term endeavor that will require U.S. assistance on a range of issues. Immediate support to this process would likely include planning and logistical assistance, 

as well as support in constructing zones for demobilized guerillas and demining efforts. The movement of the FARC to DDR zones will likely create vacuums that 

need to be filled by the effective presence of the state—and there will no doubt be 

an important security component to this. I also believe the U.S. military should continue its core support to Colombia as it combats cocaine cultivation, production, and 

trafficking and fights transnational organized crime. 

Question. How would you approach the issue of respect for human rights in the 

Colombian military? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain the U.S. Southern Command’s Human 

Rights Initiative and ensure that respect for human rights continues to be a key 

element of the U.S. military’s engagement with Colombia. 

Question. Colombia has demonstrated a willingness to become more involved 

internationally, to include increased engagements with regional partners, signing a 

Cooperation and Security of Information Agreement with NATO in 2013, and President Santos’ announcement at the United Nations General Assembly meeting in 

September 2015 that his country would contribute 5,000 personnel to U.N. international peacekeeping missions over the next three years. 

What are your views on these developments? 

Answer. This demonstrates a significant return on our investment. A prospering 

Colombia at peace has the potential to be a global partner on security, democracy, 

and trade issues. In the security realm, Colombia has one of the most capable militaries in the region and is the region’s premiere ‘security exporter,’ sharing counterterrorism and counternarcotics expertise with Central America, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. They are also contributing to international security efforts; the 

Colombian Navy currently has a ship off the coast of Somalia protecting World Food 

Programme shipments (in support of NATO’s anti-piracy operation OCEAN 

SHIELD). 

Question. In what ways should SOUTHCOM assist Colombia in its efforts to assume a greater role internationally? 

Answer. As the Colombian military carefully plans its transition to a post-peace 

accord role, USSOUTHCOM can assist with planning and other efforts, as well as 

expanding activities that support the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation. I think USSOUTHCOM can also contribute to Colombia’s plan to 

transform its military force by providing training in missions such as peacekeeping 

operations, as well as support the Colombian military’s long-term modernization 

and self-sufficiency. 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY COOPERATION

Question. The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation 

(WHINSEC), which replaced the School of the Americas in 2001, has the mission 

of contributing to theater cooperation activities through the education and training 

of students in the Western Hemisphere from Canada to Chile. 

What is the relationship between SOUTHCOM and WHINSEC? 

Answer. WHINSEC does not fall under U.S. Southern Command’s command authority, but it is one of many valuable tools available to strengthen military-to-military relations in the region. I also understand the Commander of U.S. Southern 

Command is a member of WHINSEC’s Board of Visitors. If confirmed, I look forward to joining this distinguished group. 

Question. In your view, does WHINSEC promote the national security interests 

of the United States in the Western Hemisphere? 

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Answer. DOD educational institutions like WHINSEC provide professional education, and training opportunities to eligible personnel within the context of the 

democratic principles set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American 

States (OAS), while fostering confidence and cooperation among the participating 

nations, and promoting democratic values and respect for human rights. Instilling 

these principles in partner nation militaries absolutely enhances the national security of the United States. 

Question. In your view, what more—if anything—does WHINSEC need to do to 

emphasize human rights in its curriculum? 

Answer. From what I understand, WHINSEC has a very comprehensive human 

rights curriculum in place. USSOUTHCOM’s Human Rights Office does not have 

the capacity to directly plan and execute human rights training to partner nation 

militaries. Instead the office depends upon third parties like WHINSEC to plan and 

conduct the training. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor and assess the human 

rights curriculum and will stress the value of WHINSEC attendance for personnel 

from regional militaries and security forces. 

Question. Will you attend the regularly scheduled WHINSEC Board of Visitors 

meetings? 

Answer. Yes, I will, if confirmed. 

IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

Question. There has been increased concern in recent years about Iran’s growing 

interest in Latin America, particularly its relations with Venezuela, which in turn 

has played a key role in Iran’s expanding relations with Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. There has been disagreement, however, over the extent and significance of 

Iran’s relations with the region. 

What is your assessment of Iran’s military presence and objectives in the region? 

Answer. I believe Iran’s efforts in the region have primarily been undertaken to 

circumvent international sanctions which have resulted in Iranian diplomatic and 

political isolation. I believe Iran also intends to undermine U.S. influence in the 

USSOUTHCOM region. While Iranian engagement and influence had waned in recent years, President Ruhani has indicated Tehran intends to increase economic, scientific, and cultural ties with Latin America. I am not aware of any increase in uniformed Iranian military presence in the region. 

Question. What is the extent of Iran’s military-to-military engagement with Latin 

American countries? 

Answer. As the foremost state sponsor of terrorism, Iran’s involvement in the region remains a matter for concern. Iranian overt engagement has focused mainly 

on enhancing its economic and diplomatic ties to the region, and it has not made 

significant progress in increasing its arms sales to the region. 

Question. What is your understanding of Hezbollah’s activities in the hemisphere? 

Answer. As I understand it, Lebanese Hezbollah maintains an extensive regional 

network of supporters and sympathizers in the region, some of whom are involved 

in trade-based money laundering and other illicit activities to generate revenue, a 

portion of which goes to support the parent organization in the Middle East. Despite 

this focus on financial gain, Lebanese Hezbollah maintains an operational infrastructure in the region with the capability to conduct or support Iranian or 

Hizballah terrorist attacks with little to no warning. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL IN EMBASSIES

Question. U.S. Special Operations Command deploys personnel to work with country teams in a number of priority countries where the United States is not engaged 

in direct action operations, but rather trying to stop the spread of violent extremism. Their mission is to support the priorities of the Ambassador and the Geographic Combatant Commander’s theater campaign plan against terrorist networks. 

If confirmed, what do you intend to do to make sure the goals of special operations 

personnel deployed to these countries are aligned closely with those of the Ambassadors they are working with? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would personally reach out to Ambassadors in the region 

to ensure our activities remain aligned with their objectives. Prior to deploying any 

forces, we would provide planning direction through USSOUTHCOM’s Theater 

Campaign Plan. Military personnel embedded within U.S. Country Teams use this 

direction to develop Country Cooperation Plans, which directly support and are 

aligned with their respective Ambassadors’ Mission Strategic Resource Plans. Prior 

to and during execution of activities, my staff would review all deployments, including that of Special Operation Forces, to ensure they meet requirements that have 

been vetted by the Ambassador and the U.S. Country Teams. 

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SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE IN U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

Question. What is your assessment of the challenges in implementing an effective 

sexual assault prevention and response program in U.S. Southern Command and 

the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility? 

Answer. Sexual assault has no place in the U.S. military. It has a devastating and 

life-long impact on the victims and is detrimental to unit morale, cohesiveness, and 

readiness. Ensuring an unambiguous zero tolerance policy across any large organization is a critical priority. Further, there should be no doubt or ambiguity that sexual assault is a violation of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice and will be investigated and prosecuted accordingly under all applicable regulations and policies. 

If confirmed, I will communicate and enforce a culture in which all personnel uphold 

the highest standards of respect for their fellow servicemembers. 

Question. What steps would you take to create an environment that encourages 

reporting and investigation of sexual assault, and that provides appropriate accountability for substantiated allegations of sexual assaults within deployed forces in a 

joint environment, and how would you, if confirmed, ensure such accountability? 

Answer. Deployed joint forces confront command and control issues inherent to 

the differences among Services and missions across sometimes very long distances. 

If confirmed, I would ensure that all sexual assault allegations are fully investigated, that perpetrators are held accountable by their appropriate chains of command, and that all victims are cared for and shielded from retribution. The Department of the Army, which is the executive agency for U.S. Southern Command, has 

instituted a comprehensive Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention 

(SHARP) program training support package to provide training to all military personnel. This includes a zero tolerance policy that ensures all incidents are handled 

using the exact procedures outlined in Department of Defense directives and policy, 

which promote sensitive care, confidential reporting for victims of sexual assault, 

and 100 percent accountability for those who commit these crimes. U.S. Southern 

Command recently appointed a second Sexual Assault Response Coordinator to the 

Headquarters, which is an excellent step towards ensuring a culture of accountability and support. If confirmed, I would continue to communicate and enforce this 

zero tolerance policy while creating and fostering a culture of support and protection 

for victims. 

Question. Recently, this Committee received testimony about troubling allegations 

concerning sexual assault by senior officials for coalition partners in Afghanistan. 

In your view, what is the appropriate role for a U.S. military commander who is 

working with senior foreign officials of partner nations, if that U.S. officer becomes 

aware of allegations of sexual misconduct by the foreign officer or by officials of the 

foreign nation? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would direct all U.S. personnel serving under my command to immediately report any such allegation through their chain of command. 

In the case that coordination is required with the foreign military or government, 

I would work closely with the U.S. Ambassador in the foreign nation with the foreign military or government, I would work closely with the U.S. Ambassador in the 

foreign nation. 

Question. If confirmed, what direction would you give to U.S. personnel assigned 

in the SOUTHCOM AOR who become aware of such allegations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would direct all U.S. personnel serving under my command to immediately report any such allegation through their chain of command. 

I will also emphasize discipline in the ranks and a strong culture of accountability 

and personal responsibility. 

Question. Under what circumstances would you expect U.S. personnel under your 

command to intervene to stop such misconduct if they suspect it or observe it? 

Answer. U.S. personnel should immediately report any such misconduct through 

their chain of Command. Direct intervention should only occur in the case of a life 

or death situation. 

MENTAL HEALTH OF SERVICEMEMBERS AND STRESS ON THE FORCE

Question. The Committee is concerned about the stress on military personnel and 

their families resulting from repeated deployments and their access to mental 

health care to deal with this increased stress. 

In your view, are there sufficient mental health assets embedded within U.S. 

Southern Command to address the mental health needs of the military personnel, 

particularly for those who have experienced multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as military families? 

Answer. As I understand it, the majority of forces that deploy within the 

USSOUTHCOM AOR rely on their parent service for medical care during post-deVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00956 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ployment, including the very important post-deployment monitoring of mental 

health. During deployment, I am told USSOUTHCOM’s Command Surgeon closely 

monitors all command mental health issues and ensures that the command provides 

immediate support, if necessary. Personnel assigned to the U.S. Southern Command 

Headquarters have their medical needs met through a small U.S. Army Health Clinic located at the Headquarters. I have been told that a mental health professional 

is assigned to this clinic and that patients may also be referred to the local VA hospital, clinics, and civilian providers to address their mental health needs. I understand that family members and retirees are also supported by the Garrison Employee Assistance Program as well as TRICARE. 

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

Question. What should be the role for the U.S. military in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the SOUTHCOM AOR? 

Answer. As outlined in the Unified Command Plan, the U.S. military is responsible for conducting foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations 

in support of the lead federal agency (USAID/OFDA), at the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense in response to a request from the affected host nation. 

Question. Are the resources necessary to fulfill this role currently available to the 

SOUTHCOM Commander? If not, what additional resources are necessary? 

Answer. As I understand it, mandated budget and workforce reductions have impacted U.S. Southern Command’s ability to rapidly respond to a significant contingency without substantial headquarters augmentation. If confirmed, I would examine USSOUTHCOM’s current capabilities to respond to a natural disaster or humanitarian crisis and work through the Joint Staff and Services to source requirements. 

LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

Question. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is pending consideration in the United States Senate. 

What is your view on whether or not the United States should join the Law of 

the Sea Convention? 

Answer. As an official policy matter, I defer questions associated with the U.N. 

Law of the Sea Convention to the Secretary of the Navy. However, as a senior joint 

officer with relevant maritime experience, I fully support the U.S. accession to the 

Convention. 

Question. How would being a party to the Law of the Sea Convention help or 

hinder the United States’ security posture? 

Answer. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) codifies navigation and overflight rights on the high seas and ensures rights of transit 

through international straits, both of which are essential for the mobility of U.S. 

armed forces. UNCLOS supports our National Security Strategy and helps advance 

our economic and security objectives. As a senior Naval officer I know that as a matter of customary law, the U.S. is already in compliance. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. As with other Combatant Commands, a Science and Technology (S&T) 

advisor is assigned to support SOUTHCOM. 

If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the SOUTHCOM Science and 

Technology advisor? 

Answer. My priorities for the Science and Technology Advisor would focus on applying innovative and sustainable technologies that support Command priority missions and maintain security and stability in the AOR. That would include technologies like surveillance, non-lethal weapons, communications, logistics, information sharing, foliage penetration, cyber security, and maritime security. Science and 

technology is an excellent tool to foster enduring partnerships and coalition collaboration. I would also direct the Science and Technology Advisor to continue working 

with established and new partners, both domestically and internationally, to mitigate any technology surprises that would challenge theater security. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

952 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes, I do. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes, I do. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. Southern Command? 

Answer. Yes, I do. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes, I do. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes, I do. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

Guantanamo 

1. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Tidd, General Kelly has been a strong and consistent 

advocate of the men and women of Joint Task Force Guantanamo, who conduct safe, 

legal, humane, and transparent detention operations that keep dangerous terrorists 

off the battlefield and increase the safety of Americans. Admiral Tidd, if confirmed, 

will you follow General Kelly’s example and serve as a strong and consistent advocate for the men and women of Joint Task Force Guantanamo, and ensure that they 

have the necessary resources and facilities to complete their task? 

Admiral TIDD. If confirmed, just as Gen Kelly has been, as their commander I will 

be the most aggressive advocate for the men and women under my command. The 

men and women of our armed forces are by far our most valuable resource. They 

volunteer to serve their country out of a strong sense of honor, duty, and courage. 

The personnel serving at the Joint Task Force Guantanamo exemplify these traits 

every day as they perform the demanding, and often thankless mission of conducting humane and principled detention operations. 

2. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Tidd, will you look for opportunities to highlight the 

professionalism and performance of the guard force that performs such a difficult 

job so well? 

Admiral TIDD. If confirmed, I will always prioritize the well-being and morale of 

those serving our nation. The men and women conducting detention operations at 

the Joint Task Force Guantanamo execute their duties in a stressful environment, 

in which they face near-constant verbal and physical assault by detainees. In the 

face of those challenges, the guard force and medical personnel maintain the highest 

professional standards and I will always recognize their outstanding work. 

HEROIN

3. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Tidd, addressing the devastating heroin epidemic in 

New Hampshire has been a major priority of mine. We’ve seen a dramatic increase 

in the number of drug deaths, and I know many other States are also struggling 

with this epidemic too. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 

heroin and fentanyl are most commonly brought into the United States through the 

Southwest border. I have discussed this at length with General Kelly and worked 

to include funding to reduce the flow of drugs through the Southern Command 

(SOUTHCOM) area of operations and into the United States. A consistent problem 

has been the lack of interdiction assets, such as vessels and helicopters. If confirmed, will you come back within a few weeks and tell me what specific additional 

resources you need to more effectively fight the flow of drugs through SOUTHCOM’s 

area of operations? 

953 

Admiral TIDD. If confirmed, I am committed to being candid and forthright about 

SOUTHCOM’s requirements for its mission to detect and monitor illicit narcotics 

bound for the United States. There is no easy solution to stop the flow of drugs into 

our nation. It will require the concerted efforts of the military, intelligence community, law enforcement, and partner nations to detect, illuminate, and ultimately dismantle these criminal networks that have proven they can move drugs, weapons, 

bulk cash, and people into our country. I will work closely with you and the committee to maximize available resources, explore innovative solutions, and leverage 

partnerships to mitigate risks. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA

4. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Tidd, in March, General Kelly testified that Russia

has continued to boost its military presence in Central and South America. He cited 

examples of increased Russian activity and influence in the region, from Russia’s 

naval deployments to the Caribbean to various stops in countries like Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Given the international sanctions against Russia, could you 

characterize Russia’s actions in Central and South America as the beginning of Russia’s strategic ‘‘rebalance’’ to Central and South America? 

Admiral TIDD. Russia’s presence in Central and South America is less than it was 

during the Cold War period. I do not believe that Russia is a direct military threat 

in the hemisphere; however, Russia is expanding their presence in the region, competing directly with the U.S. for influence in our hemisphere. Russia will likely continue to engage in this hemisphere, in an attempt to escape the diplomatic isolation 

imposed as a result of its illegal invasion/annexation in Crimea/Ukraine. 

5. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Tidd, since General Kelly’s testimony in March,

have Russian activities in Central and South America increased, decreased, or stabilized? 

Admiral TIDD. Russian activities in Central and South America are above traditional norms established a decade ago, but the only appreciable growth has been its 

engagement with Nicaragua. 

6. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Tidd, what specific examples can you give of Russia’s recent actions in the region that have occurred since General Kelly’s testimony 

in March? 

Admiral TIDD. Since March 2015, Russia maintained a small military presence, 

collected information about the region and the U.S., and projected naval power. I 

am aware of Russia conducting four naval deployments to the SOUTHCOM region 

in the last year—an oceanographic and hydrographic research ship to Nicaragua; an 

intelligence collection ship to the U.S. east coast and Caribbean; and another oceanographic research ship to the Caribbean. Notably, all of the naval deployments involved data or intelligence collection. 

7. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Tidd, what are the ramifications of Russia’s actions

in Central and South America on U.S. interests—like Russia’s recent moves to deepen its economic and military relationship with Argentina and other countries in the 

region? 

Admiral TIDD. I believe Russia’s actions in the region are aimed at competing 

with the U.S. for regional influence. As a result of resource constraints, causing 

SOUTHCOM to reduce engagement, I believe Russia may be able to gain some increased influence. I am not aware of any Russian overtures to the recently elected 

Argentine government, which I understand may be far more open to engagement 

than the previous government with other regional nations, including the United 

States. Russia has three partners of choice throughout the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility—Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. 

8. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Tidd, do you agree with current SOUTHCOM Commander General Kelly that Russia’s power-projection in Central and South America 

constitutes a ‘‘clear return to Cold War tactics’’? Why or why not? 

Admiral TIDD. Russia’s actions world-wide are concerning on many levels. Russia’s 

tactics in Latin America do not appear militarily challenging, but do pose direct 

competition for regional influence. Russia’s engagement in the SOUTHCOM area of 

responsibility in some ways resembles tactics that it employed during the Cold War. 

However, I suspect that their tactics are more than ‘‘back to the future’’ Cold War 

954 

business. I am mindful of their hybrid warfare strategy in the Ukraine that uses 

sophisticated disinformation and leverages organized crime and proxies. Pursuing a 

gradualist approach designed to stay below a threshold that would provoke intervention is part of the Russia hybrid warfare playbook; actions that do not seem directly challenging may still be meaningful steps toward Russian objectives that are 

counter to United States interests. I will keep a weather eye on this. I will stay 

closely linked with EUCOM—to better understand Russian strategy and activities, 

to learn best practices of NATO and our European allies that can be transferred to 

SOUTHCOM, and to be able to provide support to EUCOM and the United States 

grand strategy as it relates to Russia. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

DRUG INTERDICTION IN PUERTO RICO

9. Senator GILLIBRAND. Admiral Tidd, interdiction of drugs in Puerto Rico is a

challenging but necessary task. A GAO report from June 2014 found that, however, 

during fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the Coast Guard met the target of their primary performance measure—the removal rate of cocaine from noncommercial vessels in the transit zone—only once. What is your understanding of the status of 

interdiction in Puerto Rico? 

Admiral TIDD. I will have to consult with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

and the U.S. Coast Guard with regard to interdictions in and around Puerto Rico. 

The Department of Defense has the statutory responsibility to detect and monitor 

aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs bound for the United States. The law 

enforcement agencies have the authority for interdiction and apprehension. 

10. Senator GILLIBRAND. Admiral Tidd, to what extent does SOUTHCOM support

interdiction efforts in Puerto Rico? 

Admiral TIDD. The Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South), an interagency joint task force subordinate to SOUTHCOM, operates in the transit zone to 

support interdiction of all known northbound illicit targets of interest, to include 

those that might end up in Puerto Rico. JIATF South fuses intelligence and shares 

that information with NORTHCOM and the U.S. Coast Guard, which generally conducts interdiction around Puerto Rico. 

11. Senator GILLIBRAND. Admiral Tidd, to the extent that SOUTHCOM is involved, do you feel there are enough resources to successfully execute its mission 

and what else might be needed? 

Admiral TIDD. Understanding global priorities and the limited resources available 

to address those priorities, I do believe that SOUTHCOM lacks sufficient maritime 

and air assets to effectively conduct its detection and monitoring mission in support 

of law enforcement interdiction efforts. As multiple SOUTHCOM Commanders have 

previously testified, stemming the flow of illicit drugs is extremely complex. It requires the development of actionable intelligence and a range of air and maritime 

assets to ultimately support interdiction and apprehension of traffickers. If confirmed, I will seek to mitigate this shortfall of forces by developing creative and nontraditional solutions, and I will continue to foster the partnerships with our law enforcement and partner nations who have been critical in this mission. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT INTERNATIONALLY

12. Senator GILLIBRAND. Admiral Tidd, in your advance policy questions, you

talked about the importance of reporting up the chain of command any incidence 

of sexual assault by a partner foreign nation force. Since these incidents do not fall 

under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), but do impact our ability to 

operate and potentially how we are viewed by the local population, what more can 

we do to ensure that this kind of behavior is addressed? 

Admiral TIDD. U.S. Military Servicemembers are expected to uphold the highest 

standards of personal conduct and respect for good governance; they should respect 

others and actively demonstrate that respect to our partner nation (PN) personnel 

in a way that the PN leadership and forces would want to emulate. If our forces 

detect or suspect instances of sexual assault by PN military forces, our forces must 

report that immediately to their chain of command and PN leadership. Should PN 

leadership indicate an unwillingness to act, then I would expect our most senior 

U.S. representatives (diplomatic and military) to meet with senior officials of the PN 

to impress upon them the need to take action. 

955 

13. Senator GILLIBRAND. Admiral Tidd, what can we do in situations in which the

local authorities do not act on the information we provide? 

Admiral TIDD. Should PN leadership indicate an unwillingness to act, then I 

would expect our most senior U.S. representatives (diplomatic and military) to meet 

with senior officials of the PN to impress upon them the need to take action. If local 

authorities do not act on the information the U.S. provides, the senior U.S. Military 

Commander and the Country Team, in coordination with the Departments of Defense and State, could reassess ongoing operations and engagements with the partner nation. Partnering activities could be scaled back, as necessary or appropriate, 

to stress the unacceptability of this inaction. 

14. Senator GILLIBRAND. Admiral Tidd, how can DOD and the military work with

other parts of the U.S. Government—like the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—to help the victim of these assaults? 

Admiral TIDD. I am aware of the services available to assist our servicemembers 

who have been victims of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will engage senior interagency representatives to better understand their capabilities and services available 

for non-U.S. military victims of sexual assault and how we could partner if this were 

to be observed by U.S. forces in the region. 

[The nomination reference of the Vice Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, 

USN follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

October 28, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Navy to the 

grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under 

title 10, U.S.C., section 601: 

To Be Admiral

Vice Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, 0000

[The biographical sketch of Vice Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, USN, 

which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF VICE ADMIRAL KURT W. TIDD, USN 

Promotions: 

Dates of appointment Promotions 

07 JUN 1978 ........ Ensign 

07 JUN 1980 ........ Lieutenant (junior grade) 

01 JUL 1982 ......... Lieutenant 

01 SEP 1988 ........ Lieutenant Commander 

01 JUN 1993 ........ Commander 

01 JUL 1999 ......... Captain 

14 JUL 2006 ......... Designated Rear Admiral (lower half) while serving in billets commensurate with that grade 

01 SEP 2006 ........ Rear Admiral (lower half) 

01 DEC 2009 ....... Rear Admiral 

26 JUL 2012 ......... Vice Admiral, Service continuous to date 

956 

Assignments and Duties: 

Assignments and Duties From To 

U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD (Instructor for Naval Science) ................................................... JUN 1978 AUG 1978 

Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Newport, RI (DUINS) ...................................................... AUG 1978 APR 1979 

USS SEMMES (DDG 78) (Main Propulsion Assistant) .......................................................................... APR 1979 FEB 1981 

Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Newport, RI (DUINS) ...................................................... FEB 1981 FEB 1981 

USS AMERICA (CV 66) (Boilers Officer) ............................................................................................... MAR 1981 JAN 1983 

Fleet Combat Training Center, Atlantic, Dam Neck, VA (DUINS) ........................................................ JAN 1983 APR 1983 

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group EIGHT (Flag Lieutenant/Aide) .................................................. MAY 1983 MAY 1984 

Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA (DUINS) ............................................................................ MAY 1984 AUG 1984 

University of Bordeaux, France (Student) Olmsted Scholar ................................................................. SEP 1984 SEP 1986 

Surface Warfare Officers School Command Newport, RI (DUINS) ....................................................... OCT 1986 MAY 1987 

USS DEYO (DD 989) (Operations Officer) ............................................................................................ MAY 1987 JAN 1989 

Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA (Student) .............................................................................. JAN 1989 JUL 1989 

U.S. Military Representative to NATO Military Committee, Brussels, Belgium (Aide) ......................... AUG 1989 AUG 1991 

XO, USS LEFTWICH (DD 984) ................................................................................................................ AUG 1991 DEC 1992 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Action Officer) (N51) .......................................................... JAN 1993 AUG 1993 

The Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C. (Federal Executive Fellow) .................................................... AUG 1993 JUN 1994 

Office of Program Appraisal (Political Military and Special Projects)—SECNAV ............................... JUN 1994 AUG 1995 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Assistant for Long Range Planning) (NOOK) ..................... SEP 1995 AUG 1996 

CO, USS ARTHUR W RADFORD (DD 968) ............................................................................................. SEP 1996 OCT 1998 

Commander, FIFTH Fleet (Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations) (N3 A) ............................ OCT 1998 APR 2001 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Branch Head, Warfare Policy and Doctrine Branch) (N51) APR 2001 JUL 2001 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Deputy for Operations and Strategy) (N3) ......................... AUG 2001 DEC 2003 

Commodore, Destroyer Squadron FIVE ZERO ....................................................................................... DEC 2003 MAR 2005 

National Security Council, Washington, DC (Director of Combating Terrorism) ................................. MAR 2005 JUL 2006 

National Security Council (Director, Strategic Capabilities Policy) ..................................................... JUL 2006 AUG 2008 

Commander, Carrier Strike Group EIGHT ............................................................................................. AUG 2008 AUG 2009 

Joint Staff (Vice Director for Operations) (J3) ..................................................................................... AUG 2009 AUG 2011 

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, U.S. Southern Command/ ................................................................. AUG 2011 JUL 2012 

Commander, United States FOURTH Fleet/Joint Staff (Director for Operations) (J3) .......................... JUL 2012 OCT 2013 

Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ...................................................................... OCT 2013 To Date 

Medals and Awards 

Defense Superior Service Medal 

Legion of Merit with two Gold Stars 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal with two Gold Stars 

Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with three Gold Stars 

Navy Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star 

Navy ‘‘E’’ Ribbon with two ‘‘Es’’ 

Navy Expeditionary Medal with two Bronze Stars 

National Defense Service Medal with two Bronze Stars 

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two Bronze Stars 

Iraq Campaign Medal 

Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal 

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal 

Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with three Bronze Stars 

Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service 

Ribbon with one Bronze Star 

Expert Pistol Shot Medal 

Expert Rifle Marksmanship Medal 

Special Qualifications 

BS (Foreign Affairs) U.S. Naval Academy, 1978 

MA (Political Science) University of Bordeaux, 1986 

Olmsted Scholar, 1986 

Designated Surface Warfare Officer, 1980 

Designated Joint Qualified Officer, 1989 

Capstone, 2007–4 

Designated Level IV Joint Qualified Officer, 2009 

Foreign Language 

French. 

957 

Summary of Joint Duty Assignments 

Assignment Dates Rank 

U.S. Military Representative to NATO Military Committee, Brussels, Belgium (Aide) ............... AUG 89–JUL 91 LCDR 

National Security Council, Washington, DC (Director of Combating Terrorism) ....................... MAR 05–JUL 06 CAPT 

National Security Council, Washington, DC (Director, Strategic Capabilities Policy) ............... JUL 06–AUG 08 CAPT 

Joint Staff (Vice Director for Operations) (J3) ........................................................................... AUG 09–AUG 11 RDML 

Joint Staff (Director for Operations) (J3) ................................................................................... JUL 12–OCT 13 VADM 

Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ............................................................ OCT 13–TO DATE VADM 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Vice Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, USN in connection with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Kurt W. Tidd. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commander, U.S. Southern Command. 

3. Date of nomination: 

October 28, 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

March 26, 1956. 

Honolulu, Hawaii. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Eileen Scanlan Tidd, MD, MPH. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None. 

958 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

None. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

None. 

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

None. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from 

the Administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

KIRT W. TIDD

This 30th day of September, 2015 

[The nomination of the Vice Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, USN was reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on December 15, 2015, 

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The 

nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 16, 2015.] 

(959) 

NOMINATIONS OF HONORABLE PATRICK J. 

MURPHY TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE 

ARMY; DR. JANINE ANNE DAVIDSON TO BE 

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY; AND 

HONORABLE LISA S. DISBROW TO BE 

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 15, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in Room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker, Ayotte, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, 

Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, 

King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. We welcome all our nominees 

here this morning as well as members of your families. As is our 

tradition at the beginning of your testimony, we welcome you to introduce any members of your family joining you today. 

Mr. Murphy, you served as congressman for the 8th District of 

Pennsylvania from 2008 to 2011. You served in the United States 

Army as a judge advocate. While on Active Duty, you served as a 

military instructor at West Point. By the way, that was an excellent game on Saturday. 

Senator REED. I do not know. 

Chairman MCCAIN. It was actually very competitive, and I think 

the Black Knights can be proud of their performance. I really do. 

Mr. MURPHY. I agree. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Against arguably one of the best quarterbacks in the country. So I think they can be proud. 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. It was amazing. If confirmed, you would 

serve as Under Secretary of the Army. 

Dr. Davidson, you also served in the military as an Air Force officer and pilot. You previously served in assignments in the Department of Defense [DOD] as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Plans, and as Director for Stability Operations, Capabilities. If 

confirmed, you would serve as Under Secretary of the Navy. 

960 

Ms. Disbrow—— 

Ms. DISBROW. Disbrow, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. I apologize for the mispronunciation. Ms. Disbrow, you currently serve as Acting Under Secretary 

of the Air Force having served as Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force for Financial Management and Comptroller since July 2014. 

Ms. Disbrow, you also served our Nation in uniform as a colonel 

in the Air Force. You were also beaten by Navy. If confirmed, you 

would serve as Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

This committee honors your military service of all three witnesses and your continued willingness to serve our Nation. Each of 

you, if confirmed, will begin your service as Under Secretaries of 

the military departments with less than a year remaining in this 

Administration. Some might ask what positive impact you could 

possibly have in those positions during an abbreviated term. 

If confirmed, I encourage you to defy those who believe they can 

simply wait you out. I challenge each of you to be impatient, yet 

prudent, as you undertake your important responsibilities. The 

next year will be a sprint, not a marathon. There is much work to 

be done and not a minute to be wasted. 

Among the most critical of your duties, if confirmed, is to serve 

as the chief management officer of a military department. You will 

have the leading role within your respective Services to develop a 

comprehensive business enterprise architecture and transition plan 

to guide the development of its business systems and processes 

during a time of severe fiscal restraint in one of the most dangerous national security climates that this Nation has ever seen. 

I look forward to hearing your views on how you would undertake this challenge and how your experience and leadership will 

enable our military departments to be ready to fight and win for 

our national security. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

join you in welcoming the witnesses. I also want to thank you for 

holding this hearing so that we can begin to fill these important 

positions of Under Secretary of the Services. 

I welcome all the nominees and their families. I want to recognize Congressman Patrick Murphy who has been nominated to be 

Under Secretary of the Army, and thank him for his willingness to 

serve. Mr. Murphy was elected to the United States House of Representatives in 2006, and in so doing, he became the first veteran 

of Operation Iraqi Freedom to serve in Congress. 

During his tenure, he served on the House Armed Services Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 

He was an extraordinarily capable member. As the chairman 

noted, in his military career he was an assistant professor of the 

Department of Law at the United States Military Academy under 

our mutual friend, General Pat Finnegan. He distinguished himself 

there and continues to do so, serving on the board on the visitors. 

Thank you, Congressman, for your service. 

Dr. Davidson has been nominated to be Under Secretary of the 

Navy. Dr. Davidson served on Active Duty with the Air Force folVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00966 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
961 

lowed by serving in the private sector and academia, think tanks, 

and for the Government, and most recently with the Council on 

Foreign Relations. Dr. Davidson has also served as the commissioner on the National Commission on the Structure of the Air 

Force, and currently serves as a member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. She has long experience in dealing with public policy 

issues in all of these positions, and she is imminently qualified. 

Ms. Disbrow has been nominated to be Under Secretary of the 

Air Force. Ms. Disbrow served on Active Duty with the Air Force, 

and has since served as a civilian in several Federal agencies, including the National Security Council, the Joint Staff, and most recently as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller. Once again, she also brings great talent, 

integrity, and diligence to her task. 

Let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and 

I look forward to going forward with you on these nominations. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. Could I just add that it is not in 

any way imperative for an individual to serve as one of our civilian 

leaders in our Department of Defense. But I think it is very helpful 

because all three of you have had the experience of serving with 

the men and women who are performing so admirably throughout 

the world. You bring an understanding and perhaps sensitivity to 

the challenges that they face in these very challenging times. I 

view it as not a requirement, but I think it is certainly a definite 

advantage that the men and women who are serving will have 

under your duties as civilian authorities over them. 

I have to ask the standard questions, and if you would please respond by saying yes or no to answer to these questions. These are 

the standard questions for all nominees. 

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, 

it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress be able to receive testimony, briefings, and other 

communications of information. Have you adhered to applicable 

laws and regulations governing conflicts of interests? You say ‘‘I 

have’’ if you have. If you have not, we would be interested. 

[Laughter.] 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

[A chorus of nays.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record and hearings? 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you be cooperative in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree if confirmed to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

962 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication in a timely manner 

when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with 

the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Why do we not begin with you, Secretary 

Disbrow? 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE LISA S. DISBROW, NOMINEE, 

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 

Ms. DISBROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, and 

members of the Armed Services Committee. It is an honor to appear before you today. I want to thank President Obama for nominating me, and I appreciate the confidence and support Secretary 

Carter and Secretary James have for my nomination as Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

The privilege of appearing before you today is only possible because of the love and support from my remarkable family. Joining 

me today is my husband, Harry, my daughter, Stephanie, her husband, T.J., and my grandson, Parker, my son, Derrick, and my 

brother, David from Boston. Unfortunately my two stepdaughters 

and their families who live in Phoenix could not join us today, and 

my parents who reside in Fredericksburg were unable to join us. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome, and, Parker, we will give you a debrief on the hearing. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Glad he is here. 

Ms. DISBROW. I want to mention the importance of numerous colleagues and mentors who have supported me from the very beginning when I graduated from Officer Training School 30 years ago 

in 1985 until today. Thank you all. Representing them today is my 

friend and colleague, Lynda Mallow from Alexandria, Virginia. 

During my time on Active Duty in the Air Force, the National 

Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Council, the Joint 

Staff, and now Headquarters Air Force, it has been my privilege to 

serve with men and women from all Services, who have dedicated 

their lives to defending this great Nation. If confirmed, I will do my 

utmost in ensuring those who put their lives on the line for this 

country are supported in every way possible. 

The Under Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for the efficient and effective management of the Air Force, and for providing 

for the welfare of more than 674,000 Active Duty, Reserve, Guard, 

and civilian airmen and their families. I work hard every day to 

ensure that they receive the resources and the support they need 

to keep this Nation safe. Additionally, if I am confirmed, I am committed to working closely with Congress to make certain our Air 

Force needs are clearly articulated, and that you have all the information you need to perform your duties as authorizers and appropriators. 

Thank you again for considering my nomination. Thank you for 

your service, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Disbrow follows:] 

963 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HONORABLE LISA DISBROW

Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Members of the Armed Services Committee. It’s an 

honor to appear before the committee today. 

I would like to thank President Obama for nominating me, and I appreciate the 

confidence and support of Secretary Carter and Secretary James for my nomination 

as Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

The privilege of appearing before the committee today is only possible because of 

the love and support from my remarkable family. Joining me today is my husband 

Harry, who himself served 26 years in the United States Air Force as an F–15 pilot; 

our daughter Stefanie and son, who is also known as our beautiful grandson Parker; 

our son Derek; and my brother David, from Boston. Unfortunately, some family 

members couldn’t make it—my step-daughters and their families in Phoenix, and 

my parents, who live in Fredericksburg. 

I also want to mention the importance of many colleagues and mentors who have 

supported me from the very beginning when I graduated from Officer Training 

School, 30 years ago on July 4th, 1985 up to now. Thank you. Representing them 

today is our friend, Lynda Mallow, from Alexandria VA. 

During my time, on Active Duty in the Air Force; the National Reconnaissance 

Office; the National Security Council; the Joint Staff and now Headquarters Air 

Force, it has been my privilege to serve with the men and women from all Services 

who have dedicated their lives to defending this great nation. 

If confirmed, I will do my utmost in ensuring those who put their lives on the 

line for this country are supported in every way possible. 

The Under Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for the efficient and effective 

management of the Air Force and for providing for the welfare of more than 674,000 

Active Duty, Guard, Reserve and civilian airmen and their families. 

I work very hard every day to ensure they receive the resources and the support 

they need to keep this country safe. 

Additionally, if I am confirmed I am committed to working closely with Congress 

to make certain our Air Force needs are clearly articulated and that you have all 

the information you need to exercise your roles as authorizers and appropriators. 

Thank you again for considering my nomination, thank you for your service; and 

I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Davidson? 

STATEMENT OF DR. JANINE ANNE DAVIDSON, NOMINEE, 

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Good morning. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee, I am truly honored to be here today as the nominee for Under Secretary of the 

United States Navy. I am grateful to President Obama, Secretary 

Carter, and Secretary Mabus for giving me the opportunity, if confirmed, to help lead the finest Navy and Marine Corps in the 

world. 

I would like to begin by thanking my family for joining me here 

today and supporting me, starting with my husband, David 

Kilcullen, and my stepson, Harry. Their love and good humor keep 

me grounded every day. My sister, Jennifer Parker, is also here, 

along with her kids, Colin, Alyssa, and Sarah, and my brother, Jim 

Davidson and his wife, Melanie. My mother, Joanne, a Navy wife, 

who expertly orchestrated 18 family moves in 35 years as so many 

Navy families have done, is no longer with us, but I know that she 

would be delighted at the prospect of my rejoining the Navy family. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome to all. Thank you. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Finally, I want to thank my father, Retired Rear 

Admiral Jim Davidson, for coming all the way from California to 

be here today. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Of course, it did help that he was already in town 

for the Army-Navy game. 

964 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Throughout my career, I have counted on my family’s love and support, and in the case of my father, who proudly 

served for 35 years as a Navy supply corps officer, I learned to appreciate how much military power truly does depend on getting the 

right gear to the right places at the right time, something our globally deployed force does better than any military in the history of 

the world, thanks to professionals like my dad and his many, many 

shipmates. 

If confirmed, I will work tirelessly with the members of this committee and your staffs to ensure that we have the most competitive, 

creative, and, above all, combat ready Navy and Marine Corps in 

the world. This vision would drive my work every day in the service of our proud civilians, sailors, and marines. 

The United States Navy and Marine Corps play a central role in 

the U.S. defense strategy. They provide forward presence to reassure our friends and deter our adversaries. They are our force in 

readiness, prepared to go wherever required anywhere in the 

world, and they are ready to fight America’s enemies to keep us 

safe. 

After years of high op tempo [operational tempo], combat operations, and growing fiscal constraints, the Navy and Marine Corps 

face great challenges in resetting and modernizing their forces to 

meet current threats, while also preparing for a complex future. 

They also face a renewed opportunity as a critical instrument of 

national power for a new century and a new global environment. 

As Under Secretary of the Navy, if confirmed, I will work with 

the Navy and Marine Corps leader to ensure that we restore readiness across the fleet, manage a complex investment portfolio to acquire the right capabilities, and that we innovate and experiment 

to ensure we have the right concepts that can sustain our military 

edge in the face of growing threats. 

I am a proud member of the Navy family, having grown up surrounded by the ships, the people, and the bases that constitute our 

maritime power. I am a proud veteran, having served as an Air 

Force officer for 10 years, flying C–130 and C–17 transport planes. 

I am a proud former Pentagon civil servant and former deputy assistant secretary of defense, where I helped oversee the Pentagon’s 

contingency planning processes and the global basing strategies. 

I have spent my entire life surrounded by America’s best and 

brightest, those uniformed men and women who sacrifice so much 

to keep us safe. If confirmed, I will do my very best to ensure that 

our sailors and marines remain unmatched in their training, their 

equipment, and their readiness. It is a solemn obligation, and I 

would be immensely proud to serve with them. 

I am honored to be here today. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Davidson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. JANINE DAVIDSON

Good Morning 

Chairman McCain and Senator Reed, distinguished members of the committee, I 

am truly honored to be here today as the nominee for Under Secretary of the United 

States Navy. I am grateful to President Obama, Secretary Carter, and Secretary 

Mabus for giving me the opportunity, if confirmed, to help lead the finest Navy and 

Marine Corps in the world. 

965 

I’d like to begin by thanking my family for joining me here and supporting me: 

Starting with my husband, David Kilcullen and my stepson, Harry. Their good 

humor and wit keep me grounded every day. My sister, Jennifer Parker, is also 

here, along with my nephew Colin, my brother Jim Davidson, and his wife Melanie. 

My mother Joanne, a Navy wife who expertly orchestrated 18 family moves in 35 

years, as so many Navy families have done, is no longer with us, but I know she 

would be delighted at the prospect of my re-joining the Navy family. Finally, I want 

to thank my stepmom, Sarajane Wallace and my father, retired Rear Admiral, Jim 

Davidson, for coming all the way from California to be here today. Of course it did 

help that they were already in town for the Army-Navy game. So special thanks 

goes to the committee staff for working out that timing for us all. Throughout my 

career, I have counted on my family’s love and support; and in the case of my father, 

who served proudly for 35 years as a Navy Supply Corps officer, I learned to appreciate how much military power truly does depend on getting the right gear to the 

right place at the right time, something our globally deployed force does better than 

any military in the history of the world thanks to professionals like my Dad and 

his many many shipmates. 

If confirmed I will work tirelessly with the members of this committee and your 

staffs to ensure that we have the most competitive, creative, and above all, 

combat-ready Navy and Marine Corps in the world. This vision would drive my 

work every day in the service of our proud civilians, sailors and marines. 

The United States Navy and Marine Corps play a central role in U.S. defense 

strategy—they provide forward presence to reassure our friends and deter our adversaries, they are our force in readiness—prepared to go wherever required anywhere in the world, and they are ready to fight America’s enemies to keep us safe. 

After years of high-tempo combat operations and growing fiscal constraints, the 

Navy and Marine Corps face great challenges in resetting and modernizing their 

forces to meet current threats while also preparing for a complex future. They also 

face a renewed opportunity as a critical instrument of national power for a new century and a new global environment. As Under Secretary of the Navy, if confirmed, 

I will work with Navy and Marine Corps leaders to ensure we restore readiness 

across the fleet, manage a complex investment portfolio to acquire the right capabilities, and that we innovate and experiment to ensure we have the right concepts that 

can sustain our military edge in the face of growing threats. 

I am a proud member of the Navy family, having grown up surrounded by the 

ships, the people, and the bases that constitute our maritime power. I am a proud 

veteran, having served as an Air Force officer for 10 years, flying C–130 and C– 

17 transport planes. I am a proud former Pentagon civil servant, and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, where I served with America’s finest defense 

leadership and helped oversee the Pentagon’s contingency planning process and 

global basing strategies. I’ve spent my entire life surrounded by America’s best and 

brightest—those uniformed men and women who sacrifice so much to keep us safe. 

If confirmed, I will do my very best to ensure that our sailors and marines remain 

unmatched in their training, their equipment, and their readiness. It is a solemn 

obligation and I would be immensely proud to serve with them. 

I am honored to be here today. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Congressman Murphy, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE PATRICK J. MURPHY, NOMINEE, 

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, 

and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. It is a privilege to appear in front of you here today. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce my family. Right behind 

me I have my wife, Jenny Murphy, my daughter, Maggie Murphy, 

age 9, my son Jack, age 6, my mom and dad, Jack Murphy and 

Marge Murphy. My father was a Navy enlisted man during Vietnam. My two uncles, though, were Army, both Vietnam veterans. 

My grandfather and Jenny’s grandfather both served the Navy in 

the Pacific in World War II. Jenny’s grandfather served in the USS 

Hornet in a Doolittle Raid. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome. Thank you all. Welcome. 

966 

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I am a third generation veteran, 

and I am eternally grateful for my family teaching me the ethos 

of duty, honor, country. 

I would like to thank President Obama, Secretary Carter, and 

Acting Secretary Fanning for placing their trust and confidence in 

me with this nomination. Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, I hope to earn your support and confirmation as Under Secretary of the Army. My experiences as an Iraq war veteran and 

congressman give me the unique perspective to be successful in 

this position. 

I will make sure that the Army is manned, trained, and equipped 

to accomplish what General Milley recently articulated as his fundamental task: to win in the unforgiving crucible of ground combat. 

I will make sure that our troops do not have a fair fight, that they 

have a tactical and technical advantage against our enemies. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with this committee to ensure 

that we continue to have the best possible Army to defend our Nation. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. PATRICK MURPHY

Thank you Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee for the privilege of appearing before 

you today. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m a third generation veteran and I’m eternally grateful for my 

family teaching me the ethos of Duty, Honor, Country. 

I’d like to thank President Obama, Secretary Carter, and Acting Secretary Fanning for placing their trust and confidence in me with this nomination. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I hope to earn your support and 

confirmation as Under Secretary of the Army. My experience as an Iraq War Veteran and Congressman give me the unique perspective to be successful in this position. 

I will make sure our Army is manned, trained, and equipped to accomplish what 

General Milley recently articulated as its fundamental task: to win in the unforgiving crucible of ground combat. 

I will make sure our troops do not have a fair fight. I will make sure they have 

the tactical and technical advantage over our enemies. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with this Committee to ensure we continue to 

have the best Army possible to defend our Nation. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you all. Congressman Murphy, is ISIS 

[the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] contained? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, I am not currently, as you know in government, but let me tell you what I know from my personal perspective, Mr. Chairman. When you look at things like the Russia—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Why do you not start out by saying yes or 

no? 

Mr. MURPHY. I would say no because, Mr. Chairman, when you 

look at things like the Russian airliner, when you look at things 

like the Paris attack, which killed civilians, when you look at 

things like the ISIS inspired attack in California, when you look 

at ISIS operations currently in Ramadi and Mosul, I am concerned, 

as we all are concerned. I think Secretary Carter and General 

Milley have said that we must accelerate our prosecution in the 

war against ISIS immediately. If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will 

do just that to make sure we take the fight to them. 

967 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. Dr. Davidson, one of the sources 

of great personal concern, as well as my regular duties in the 

United States Senate, is the cost overruns of the aircraft carriers. 

We need aircraft carriers. In fact, I am of the view that we need 

more. But I have great difficulty going back to Arizona and talk 

about a $2 billion cost overrun of one ship, and frankly, we are now 

seeing that with the next aircraft carrier, the Kennedy, the Ford. 

It is $2 billion, and another $2 billion cost overrun. We cannot justify that to the taxpayers. So far, to be honest with you, we have 

not seen any progress. 

Now, in the defense bill that we passed, we called for a study on 

alternative aircraft carriers or platforms instead of the only game 

in town, which seems to be able to name its own price. I want you 

to get on that issue, and I hope you understand how difficult it 

makes life for every member of this committee who supports the 

defense authorization bill, all of whom think that sequestration is 

doing great damage to our ability to defend the Nation. I do not 

know if you have looked into that issue, but I strongly suggest you 

do so. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, Senator. I am aware of the cost overruns and 

the delays in the Ford Carrier Acquisition Program, and it is deeply troubling. I absolutely share your concern. The Carrier Strike 

Group is a strategic asset. We absolutely need that for our power 

projection, for our global responsibilities. If confirmed, I absolutely 

will look into what lessons can be learned going forward and to see 

what we can do to drive some costs down. I am open to all options 

to ensure that we can continue to project power. 

Chairman MCCAIN. We have mandated a study, and I want that 

mandate to be taken seriously. We cannot justify these kinds of 

multibillion-overruns. The American taxpayer will not stand for it. 

Ms. Disbrow, the Air Force 2 years in a row came before this 

committee and argued strenuously to take the A–10 aircraft out of 

commission. Because of actions of this committee and legislation 

signed by the President, that was not allowed. 

We now read that when we finally, after 16 months, decided to 

take out the fuel trucks which were providing millions and millions 

of dollars to fund ISIS’ terrorist activities, that guess what airplane 

is employed to take out those fuel trucks? The A–10. 

Have you looked into the issue of the A–10 and whether the Air 

Force should continue to take the position that the A–10 should be 

phased out? If you do support that position, could you tell us what 

you view as an adequate replacement for what arguably is the most 

capable close air support aircraft in our inventory? 

Ms. DISBROW. Mr. Chairman, this is an incredible asset for the 

United States Air Force and for the Nation. The demand has just 

increased, as you referenced. We are taking a hard look at it, and 

if confirmed, I will look forward to working towards an acceptable 

plan for recapitalizing this incredibly important mission area. 

All options are on the table. We are looking at the multi-mission 

aircraft that we have currently planned as well as other options. 

The Chief of Staff, the Secretary, and I, if confirmed, take this very 

seriously and look forward to working with this committee on an 

acceptable phased plan. 

968 

Chairman MCCAIN. I hope beginning next year you will not come 

before this committee with a request to phase out the A–10 aircraft 

when at least during this period of time when according to the 

President of the United States yesterday, we will be stepping up 

our air attacks in both Iraq and Syria. It is pretty obvious that the 

A–10 aircraft is one of the major tools to be used to try to destroy 

ISIS from the air, which happens to be impossible, but at least the 

intensification is a small step forward. 

Finally, Congressman Murphy, real quick. We have in this legislation of the 2016 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] 

mandated a reduction of headquarters staff by 25 percent, and cost 

savings from overall administrative support by about $10 billion 

over a 5-year period. One thing I think we have gained from testimony before this committee by many outside experts that have had 

years and years of experience, that the staffs are too large and they 

are redundant, and with some going so far as to say that the Secretarial staff and the military staff should be consolidated into a single Service staff. Now, that has not been the view of this committee 

yet. We are examining it, but some have gone so far as to suggest 

that. 

Do you have a view on that issue? First of all, do you agree with 

what we did in the 2016 act requiring the headquarters staff reductions, and what is your view of the staff situation? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, yes, I agree with what was put into place. 

Two, I believe in the principle that you must lead by example. It 

is about the warfighter. It is about tooth-to-tail. Mr. Chairman, 

members of this committee, I think what the Army has tried to do 

by leading by example, in the past year they have cut—again, was 

given 20 percent reductions. The Army has met that and exceeded 

that. They have had 25 percent reductions. That has resulted in 

3,600 personnel that have been moved out. And when you look at 

that—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. When you say ‘‘moved out,’’ has the size of 

the force been reduced by that number? 

Mr. MURPHY. That is correct. Not the size—it is pushing them 

down to—it is the middle management, so it is about spans of control. When you used to have four spans of control, now it is to 

eight, which is positive because it is the middle management. I 

should say we are getting rid of the cheapest labor. It is making 

sure that we effectuate positive change. When you look at positive 

change—so when you look at—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. We want to reduce numbers also, Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. MURPHY. I understand, Mr. Chairman. When we look at our 

brigade combat teams and other things, when we are saying we 

want to make sure we have the most capable Army during this 

time, we are looking at that. But I agree with the 12 hearings that 

you have had on Goldwater-Nichols. We need to get after it and 

lead by example in this role. I will give you that commitment, absolutely. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. I congratulate the witnesses and 

their willingness to serve. Now that we have a quorum, I would 

like to ask the committee to consider three civilian nominations 

and one flag officer nomination. 

969 

First, I ask the committee to consider the nominations of the 

Honorable Marcel J. Lettre to be Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence, Mr. Gabriel Camarillo to be Assistant Secretary of the 

Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Mr. John Sparks 

to be a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. 

Is there a motion to favorably report these nominations? 

Senator REED. So moved. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Is there a second? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Second. 

Chairman MCCAIN. All in favor, say aye. 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Finally, I ask the committee to consider the 

nomination of Vice Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, USN, to be admiral and 

Commander, United States Southern Command. Is there a motion 

to favorably report Admiral Tidd’s nomination to the Senate? 

Senator REED. So moved. 

Senator HIRONO. Second. 

Chairman MCCAIN. All those in favor, say aye. 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, Congressman Murphy, Dr. Davidson, Secretary Disbrow. Let 

me follow up with the line of questioning that the chairman started. In fact, the chairman’s efforts throughout the many months we 

have been here to focus on reorganization and streamlining the Department of Defense. 

You have responded, Congressman. Dr. Davidson, in your new 

capacity, what do you identify as the best initial approaches to 

streamlining headquarters and eliminating headquarters personnel? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, Senator. I support the efforts in streamlining 

headquarters. I am not familiar with all the details about how the 

Navy and Marine Corps are doing it, but I think it is important 

that we take a data-driven approach and make sure that we do so 

in a way that sustains our combat effectiveness and also the morale of the workforce. But I absolutely support any efforts that will 

improve efficiency. We absolutely cannot afford in these times of 

fiscal constraints to be having bloated staffs. 

Senator REED. Secretary Disbrow? 

Ms. DISBROW. The Air Force under Secretary Gates and Secretary Hagel have taken many efforts to streamline our staff, but 

it is not enough. We are looking now, in alignment with the NDAA 

that was just approved, to continue to look at the layers, to look 

at areas where we can consolidate, and while we consolidate in 

those areas, reduce staff. 

We have had some success in our facility support area, as well 

as our intelligence area for reducing overhead as we consolidate 

and centralize. We continue to look de-layering, and we have an 

independent study right now under way with two phases: first, to 

identify the scope of our problem, and then to offer areas where we 

can put the right skill set in the right places, which is critical as 

we downsize. Not enough work done. A lot of work to do. I will look 

forward to working with this committee, if confirmed. 

970 

Senator REED. Just a follow-up question, and you all might respond, is that one of the points that has been made over and over 

again is that in the civilian sector, most major companies have 

combined their logistics transportations systems into one entity, 

and DOD has TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command] and a 

logistical operation separate. From a Service perspective, how 

would you try to sort of combine those activities into one more efficient, or would that be something that we would have to wait on 

DOD sort of action? 

Ms. DISBROW. Senator, this is an important area to look at. I 

think all options have to be on the table. We have not as a Department had a chance to look at synergies between agencies and combatant commands. In this specific area, I know there are some duplicative IT [information technology] systems, so I think some 

streamlining can be done there with parts, and supply, and 

warehousing. I know there are some efficiencies we can find there. 

This is an area that, again, I think we need to have all options 

on the table and take a hard look at. 

Senator REED. Dr. Davidson, your comments. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, Senator, I would agree with my colleague. 

This is not just an issue that affects one Service or each Service, 

I mean, from TRANSCOM to DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] and 

other things. My sense is that we need to actually take a look at 

it, see if we can find efficiencies, while also maintaining our ability 

to get the items that need to get to the fleets, and the soldiers, and 

the airmen as well, without sort of undermining the Service-level 

supply chain. But I absolutely think that it needs to be looked at 

fresh, and I am open to absolutely all options. 

Senator REED. Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator Reed, if confirmed, as the chief management officer of the United States Army, I will look at top to bottom 

review, and make sure that we have the efficiencies within the organization so we can refocus on those warfighters that are keeping 

our families safe. 

Senator REED. I presume in that capacity, all of you will be making recommendations or receiving recommendations, but certainly 

making good recommendations to the Department of Defense, because some of these functions are at a defense level, and you will 

be actively engaged in giving your best advice to the Secretary. 

Mr. MURPHY. Absolutely. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have had an opportunity to work with Secretary Disbrow. I have not had a chance to 

really meet the two of you, so I spent a lot of time researching, and 

quite frankly I do not think I have ever said this before. I think 

we have three people here that are going to do great jobs, and I 

appreciate your background, what you bring to the table, and your 

opening statements. 

Before this committee, Secretary Gates testified and this is a 

quote, ‘‘Without proper and predictable funding, no amount of reform or clever reorganization will provide America with the military capable of accomplishing the missions assigned it.’’ 

971 

Now, I raise that question because I agree with that statement. 

I look at the threat that we are facing in this country now, and I 

think we are in the most threatened position we have ever been in. 

We have countries, like North Korea, and Iraq, Iran, and Syria, 

Yemen, that are run by questionable people who are gaining a capability of a weapon and a delivery system, and it is really dangerous, you know. 

I look at that, and I would ask you, do you all agree with Secretary Gates’ statement that I just quoted? 

Mr. MURPHY. I would agree, Senator, often that—I would agree, 

yes. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Senator, I would definitely agree with Secretary 

Gates. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes? 

Ms. DISBROW. Yes, Senator. This is an area where there is not 

enough resource right now, and it is that fine art of balance between today’s readiness needs and modernizing our force that is 

important. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. I cannot remember who it was that testified, but he was reminding us that back in 1961, 51 percent of our 

budget was spent on defending America. It is down to 15 percent 

now. This is the mismatch that I see out there in a time that we 

have such great threats. You are inheriting this mess. You are not 

at fault in this thing, but do you think that this is just inadequate 

defense funding? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Senator, it is something that absolutely concerns 

me. We cannot shortchange national defense, especially now in a 

time of such uncertainty. I think that what it is important to do, 

and if confirmed I will work very hard with the Navy and Marine 

Corps leadership to do, is to try to determine exactly what we 

mean when we say we are accepting more risk. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Yes. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. I think that is really important, and I look forward to working with the committee to make sure that you have 

all the information that you need to understand whether or not we 

are going too far on those cuts. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Do you agree with that? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Secretary Disbrow, in one of the prehearing 

questions asked of you, it says, ‘‘What is your assessment of the 

current readiness of our Air Force to meet national security requirements across the full spectrum of military operations?’’ Your 

response was, ‘‘Our combat coded unit’s readiness is assessed 

against a full spectrum of military operations. Less than one-half 

of those units are rated as ready.’’ I know you are concerned about 

it. How concerned are you, and what do you see as the remedy for 

that? 

Ms. DISBROW. This is a critical priority, Senator. Our combat 

coded readiness varies across major weapons systems, but are critical in fighters. On average, about 50 percent of our inventory on 

any day is not ready. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, and that is very disturbing, and right now 

I am not sure what can be done about that. I think that I say to 

Mr. Murphy, the question was asked of you, ‘‘What is your assessVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00977 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ment of the current readiness of the Army to meet the national security,’’ and you talked about, ‘‘However, given the decreasing resources and the shrinking capacity of the Army, the Army is mortgaging future readiness and response capabilities.’’ 

Now, I have always felt that it is true, and I think that is obvious that when you are strapped the way we are strapped right now 

with the expectations of a policy that we are supposed to be following with the resources that we have, you have to give up something. You give up modernization. You give up readiness. You give 

up maintenance. Which of those things concerns you the most right 

now, because you’re going to have to give up some of those. 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, it is all about readiness for warfighters, 

and I think when you give up modernization—when I said in my 

opening statement we need to give our warfighters the tactical and 

technical advantage because we do not want a fair fight with our 

enemies, that that that is what you are mortgaging when you do 

not invest in weapons systems, et cetera, or as much as you would 

like to. 

But I would say to you, sir, the numbers itself—when I left Congress 5 years ago, we were at 45 brigade combat teams on Active 

Duty. We are now down to 31 brigade combat teams. That is what 

I shared with you earlier, my concern. We have to make sure that 

it is about readiness. 

Senator INHOFE. Also, I look at this, we are giving up superiority, 

and we have always been superior. I am out of time here, but I will 

read this statement of Secretary Hagel. He said, ‘‘American dominance on the seas, in the skies, and in space can no longer be taken 

for granted.’’ I think that is true. Do you think it is true? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Senator, I think that it risks being true if we do 

not take care right now on readiness, and balancing current readiness with modernization. If confirmed, readiness will be one of my 

absolute top priorities. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Thank you. 

Ms. DISBROW. Senator, I am very concerned about our adversaries and their growing capabilities across the board, the speed at 

which they are modernizing their own forces. It is a critical concern. The Air Force is the smallest it has been since its inception, 

and with demand only increasing, those two things do not match. 

We have a threat that we need to keep pace with and go beyond. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. I think that is also true with the 

Army. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I thank each of 

you for your service to our country and your willingness to serve 

in the very important capacities for which you have been nominated, and your families as well. 

Talking about readiness, Dr. Davidson, I am assuming that you 

would agree that the Ohio replacement program is critical to our 

sea power superiority. I would like your commitment that you 

would anticipate that the Ohio replacement program will continue 

to be one of the number one priorities of the Navy. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, Senator. The Ohio replacement is the number one priority for the Navy, and I support that. If confirmed, I 

973 

look forward to working with this committee to find a way to properly fund it. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. As you also know, the Navy estimates 

that it needs 48 attack submarines, junior class submarines. Yet it 

projects the number of attack submarines will actually fall as low 

as 41, and remain below the required 48 for the next 16 years. This 

struck four calls into question the Navy’s ability to meet the requirements of combatant commanders around the world and other 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] needs. 

The sub is an extraordinary versatile and important platform for 

our armed services, not only in offense, but also in surveillance, intelligence, and launching special operations, as you well know. Are 

you committed to the present policy of continuing to procure two 

Virginia-class submarines every year? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, Senator, I am. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. Shifting to another area that 

I think is critically important. Congressman Murphy, you alluded 

to it in the reference to downsizing the transition of our military 

men and women out of the armed services. We are going to be seeing more and more downsizing of our military, and many very 

qualified and dedicated men and women who have served our Nation transitioning. 

I would like your commitment that enabling better transition 

will be a commitment of yours. We are going to actually have a 

hearing this afternoon in the Veterans Affairs Committee where I 

am the ranking member on this very issue. It has been an extraordinary time for our Nation in keeping faith with our veterans to 

provide the education, and skill training, and housing, and 

healthcare, including mental healthcare, that many of our veterans 

need to meet the invisible wounds of war—post-traumatic stress 

[PTS] and traumatic brain injury. I would like a commitment from 

each of you that it will be a priority. 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, Senator. 

Ms. DISBROW. Yes. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me just finish on an issue that has 

been of great concern to me and, I believe, the chairman and ranking member. Hundreds of thousands of veterans have less than 

honorable discharges because they were transitioned out of the 

military and were suffering at the time from undiagnosed PTS. I 

worked with Secretary of Defense Hagel to revise the rules and 

allow these veterans to petition to correct their records. 

On September 3, 2014, Secretary Hagel issued policy guidance 

that the Boards for Correction of Military Naval Records would 

give ‘‘liberal consideration of PTS-related discharge upgrade requests.’’ He directed a public messaging campaign and outreach effort. But unfortunately, despite his commendable change in policy 

and the commitment of Secretary Carter in his nomination hearing 

sitting where you are now, there really has been too little done. 

In fact, at the end of August, the Department of Defense reported 

to this committee that only 201 veterans across all Services have 

applied for these upgrades. There are about 260,000 veterans from 

the Vietnam war alone who are prohibited this day from accessing 

VA [Department of Veterans Affairs] healthcare and support beVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00979 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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cause of less than honorable discharges, and many of them suffer 

from PTS. They need to be reached, and the public messaging campaign really needs to be undertaken in earnest. I would urge you 

to pursue those steps, each of you within your respective Services, 

and I would welcome your comments. 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, you have my commitment to do just that. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Senator, I think this is an incredibly important 

issue, and I look forward, if confirmed, to working with the VA, 

Navy, and Marine Corps leadership to ensure that we are doing it 

right. 

Ms. DISBROW. Senator, I am passionate in this area. We have 

done some effort, but not enough. But the Vice Chief and I in my 

current capacity have commissioned an independent study to see 

the scope of the problem in the Air Force. We are concerned about 

all airmen who separate, particularly those with less than honorable, who may have fallen through the cracks for benefit relief. 

We have the Surgeon General and our JAG [Judge Advocate 

General] involved, and we are coming up with an action plan, and 

we are working this hard. More work to be done. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I thank each of you for those answers and 

your commitment. Again, thank you for your service. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 

each of you for being here, for your willingness to serve and for the 

service that you have given our country so far. I think you are all 

tremendously qualified. 

I wanted to ask you, Dr. Davidson, so part of the challenge that 

we often face when we think about readiness, we cannot forget 

about recruiting and retaining quality people and making sure that 

we treat those who serve well. Part of that is their living conditions. I wanted to ask you, you are nominated to serve as the 

Under Secretary of the Navy, and I want to highlight an issue for 

you at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, which is the Navy center 

of excellence for fast attack nuclear-powered submarine maintenance, modernization, and repair. 

When a submarine arrives for long-term maintenance, the junior 

enlisted sailors assigned to that submarine, they stay in the barracks at the shipyard. Earlier this year, I was very disappointed 

when I saw the conditions at Building 191 Barracks, which was the 

junior enlisted barracks. The barracks violate current building and 

fire codes. They do not have an operational fire suppression system. 

They do not have code compliant ventilation, and you can tell it 

when you are in it. They frequently suffer from sewage failures, rat 

infestation, mold, hot water failures. I believe our junior enlisted 

sailors deserve a lot better than that. 

The shipyard itself has been highlighting this issue for quite 

some time, but the Navy hadn’t prioritized the funding. After I visited the barracks, both Senator Shaheen and Senator King joined 

me, when we did the defense authorization in 2016, including language to note the unacceptable conditions on Building 191. This 

language emphasized the committee’s expectations that for Fiscal 

Year 2017 the Navy will request funding and address this issue for 

the replacement barracks. 

975 

I have to say I am very pleased that the Navy post the defense 

authorization did move the sailors into better living conditions, but 

they are temporary. There still needs to be a permanent solution 

for this barracks issues and the living conditions to make sure that 

they are appropriate. I wanted to ask for your commitment, Dr. 

Davidson, if you are confirmed, will you examine this issue and 

work to ensure the Navy in its Fiscal Year 2017 budget looks at 

this issue, honors its commitments, and really complies with the direction of the Senate Armed Services 

Committee on this issue? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, Senator. Thank you for highlighting that and 

for your leadership. If confirmed, I will take a look at the progress 

being made and ensure that we are working to ameliorate the situation. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. Thank you very much. I also wanted to ask each of you, on the issue of auditing, auditing being services. It has been a great frustration in this committee, as you 

know, over the years on the auditing of the Pentagon. I wanted to 

ask each of you what your commitment will be—we have repeatedly seen the deadline slip, and we know that if we look across the 

rest of government, that being able to make a valid financial audit 

does not happen in the Pentagon, but happens in so many other 

areas of government. 

I would like each of your commitment that you are going to 

prioritize this because this has been a frustration for this committee for years. 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, you have my commitment, if confirmed, 

that this is a top priority. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Senator, you have my commitment as well. Thank 

you. 

Ms. DISBROW. You have my full commitment. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, because as we look at the resource 

challenges, we want to be able to make sure that we can tell the 

taxpayers of this country that we are accounting for all of the dollars, and that we are ensuring that we do the best to make sure 

that those dollars are spent wisely. 

That said, we have had recently so much testimony before this 

committee about the problems with issues within the Pentagon, 

issues with how we get the best for our warfighter. Something that 

General Flynn said recently before our committee very much struck 

me. Essentially what he said was that it was the Pentagon that he 

felt most often—′′I found myself fighting the Pentagon as much or 

more than our enemies.’’ 

We have seen time and time and again where our warfighters do 

not get what they need, or the process upon which they have to go 

through or, you know, the examples that are given in Secretary 

Gates’ books and other examples just are absolutely wrong. I want 

to hear from each of you what are we going to do to make sure this 

changes so that when our warfighters need something in theater, 

that there is a way that we get it to them as soon as possible so 

that they can continue to defend our Nation and defeat our enemies? 

Ms. DISBROW. Senator, every day my focus is combat power, and 

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row’s fight. We continue to look at processes to include the 

warfighting requirements process to make sure that it is well—reviewing with combatant commanders what those needs are, where 

the capability gaps are, and how to best and quickly solve those 

gaps. 

We are working with the acquisition community to change the 

way we acquire systems and to ensure we are getting innovative 

solutions into our processes for decision quickly, and that we are 

pushing that capability to the warfighter as quickly as possible. 

You have my commitment, if confirmed. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Senator, you have my commitment that I will 

work with the Navy leadership and the Marine Corps leadership 

to ensure that we put the focus on the combatant commanders and 

on the warfighter. All of our processes should be looked at with 

that lens in mind. If I am confirmed, you have my commitment 

that I will absolutely do that. 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, absolutely. What we will bring to this job 

as chief management officers of our respective branches, we need 

to be thinking about how this affects the warfighter, and empowering them to do what is necessary to keep our families safe. You 

absolutely have my commitment. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Davidson, I hope you will look at that 

issue there of the living conditions. It is not acceptable, and it is 

not very helpful to the All-Volunteer Force. I hope you will give 

that some priority. 

Senator King because of his advanced age would like to go ahead 

of Senator Donnelly. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KING. I have so many thoughts now. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KING. I appreciate it. I do have to be at an Intelligence 

Committee meeting. 

Ms. Disbrow and Dr. Davidson, you all will each be facing decisions involving long-term major investments in new or rebuilt 

weapons systems. The Ohio-class submarine has already been mentioned, and the long-range strike bomber. Experience has taught us 

that this is where the problems of overruns come most dramatically 

in a new or a major upgrade. 

The other challenge is that both of those systems will be 40-year 

assets. With technology changing at the rate that it does, we have 

had an extraordinary series of hearings here on procurement and 

on technology and integration. I hope that you will pay particular 

attention to, A, the potential for catastrophic overruns in new programs, and B, the challenge of building a new platform that is 

modular, if you will, or modifiable so that we do not face technological obsolescence 10 years into a 40-year platform. 

Dr. Davidson, I know you have given some thought to this subject. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, Senator. I think it is really important that 

we take a hard look at our acquisition processes, and also the private sector in how they innovate quickly because I think you are 

absolutely right that we have to worry about long lead time programs that could potentially not keep pace with the threat. That 

977 

is something that I am very concerned about, and I think we need 

to take a look at it. 

I think that there have been a lot of lessons learned from some 

of the acquisition problems that we have had in the past, and if 

confirmed, I will work with the Navy leadership, Sean Stackley, in 

particular, our acquisition assistant secretary, to make sure that 

we apply those lessons going forward, especially given the challenge of things like the Ohio replacement, which definitely will—— 

Senator KING. There have been many lessons. I want to be sure 

they have been learned. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. I agree. 

Senator KING. Ms. Disbrow? 

Ms. DISBROW. Yes, Senator. The focus specific to our long-range 

strike bomber, which is a critical capability, we were focused on life 

cycle costs to keep costs down by stabilizing requirements. We are 

very focused on what you described as this open system approach 

to acquiring this capability area so we can rapidly keep up with 

changing technology and bring it in without as much concern for 

integration, and without the length of time that many of our past 

programs have taken. That is the focus of this important program. 

Senator KING. Mr. Murphy, it seems to me one of the crucial requirements of our Army in these days is training other people. We 

have been through a long series of training in Iraq. It does not appear to have been all that effective. I would hope that this might 

be a focus. How can we train other fighters effectively so that when 

the time comes we do not have to send in our own troops to take 

care of a situation in Mosul or Raqqa? 

I commend to you some serious thought and research on what 

works, what has not worked, again, lessons learned, because I 

think this is becoming a more and more important mission. 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator King, I think you saw the Chief of the 

Staff of the Army, General Milley, just yesterday at the Center for 

National Security come out and talk about those advise and assist 

battalion brigades that are necessary, experts like John Nagel, who 

is now headmaster at Haverford School, has talked about that. He 

served under General Petraeus like I have. Those type of systems 

in place I think are critical when you project in the future what 

it will be over the next 50 years, what we need to be doing. 

I will say to you, Senator, it is not just about training them to 

fight so we can come home, but it is also that political solution that 

is desperately needed so they have the will to fight, so they believe 

in their government. When you look at the Sunni population from 

Damascus to Baghdad, you know, we need to encourage them that 

they have a government that they can believe in. Or whatever it 

is, that political solution needs to be found just as well. 

Senator KING. I completely agree. If the government in Baghdad 

had been more inclusive starting 10 years ago, we might not have 

had the rise of ISIS, or at least the ease with which they took that 

territory. 

One final, and this falls into the category of a suggestion. We 

have been talking about headquarters staff and how to reduce it. 

There are two different approaches. One is a big reorganization 

and re-looking. Another that often can work without the disruption 

of a total reorganization is a combination of what amounts to a hirVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00983 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ing freeze and attrition because in any workforce, there is 5 or 10 

percent attrition in any year. 

If you have somebody who is in charge of saying do we really 

need to refill this position, you avoid a lot of the disruption, and 

yet you will get where you want to get in a systematic way. In my 

experience, one person in your organization has to be in charge of 

saying, okay, we need to fill this positon or we do not, combine that 

with reorganization. It is an effective way to get there, sometimes 

more effective than waiting for the big reorganization that never 

seems to come. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Rounds? 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Disbrow, the 

U.S. Army operates some of the same medium-altitude ISR platforms as the Air Force does. But they use warrant officers and enlisted personnel to supervise and to conduct some ISR end strike 

operations, and their units are led by a few officers. Compare that 

with the Air Force where we are using officers throughout that 

same operation. 

What is your assessment of the Air Force reintroducing a warrant officer program or using enlisted personnel to operate its remotely-piloted aircraft [RPA] fleets to increase the manning and reduce costs as well as really manning level stress, which right now 

I understand is occurring. Could you share that with us? 

Ms. DISBROW. Senator, it has been my experience that our airmen can do anything we ask and train them to do. They are a 

highly capable force. Our Secretary and Chief are taking a hard 

look at enlisted and how to integrate enlisted skills to include our 

RPA stressed force. 

Right now, the main focus is on increasing the training pipeline, 

which is really the root cause for the shortfall we have. But the 

Secretary and Chief are finalizing their findings, and I expect them 

to share those findings shortly on how to integrate the enlisted 

force in the RPA career field area. We have experience in space as 

well as other intelligence areas of integrating well our enlisted 

force. 

Senator ROUNDS. You would be open to such a proposal? 

Ms. DISBROW. Senator, I remain open to all proposals. 

Senator ROUNDS. Very good. Senator King started with a line of 

questioning right after the chairman had earlier begun this. But I 

would like to begin with Dr. Davidson and then follow up with Ms. 

Disbrow. In addition to the more than $2 billion in cost growth on 

each of the Ford-class aircraft carrier, key systems on the USS 

General R. Ford continue to demonstrate technology immaturity 

and be concurrently designed and built, most notably, the advanced 

arresting gear, which has incurred a development cost that has 

quadrupled, and development time that has nearly tripled. 

If confirmed, what role would you envision playing in controlling 

the cost of aircraft carriers and ensuring individual accountability? 

But even more, the suggestion is that we have the NDAA directed 

study of future aircraft carrier alternatives that would replace or 

supplement Ford-class aircraft carriers. 

Specifically my question is this. Do we start over again, or do we 

look at duplicating what is a system which has now gone through 

979 

the development phase? How do you reconcile starting over, looking 

at other alternatives as directed by the NDAA study, or simply 

copying or duplicating what we have found successful? How do you 

look at the two? I am going to ask this of both of you two. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, Senator, I think that is exactly the challenge 

that we face. Number one, in taking the lessons that we have 

learned from the problems with the Ford to include making sure 

that you have advanced technology that is already ready to go, that 

you have defined requirements, and that you have a stable program, and a trained acquisition workforce that knows how to oversee these programs and that knows how to balance it overall. Those 

are important lessons taking forward no matter which route we 

choose. 

That said, I look forward to reviewing the report on alternatives 

and to see if there are affordable ways to ensure that we continue 

to have a carrier fleet that will be able to project the power that 

we need to do. 

Senator ROUNDS. Would it not be fair to assume that if we are 

going to duplicate what we are already doing, the cost per copy 

should go down and not up? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, Senator, I think that that is their desire. If 

I am confirmed, I will take a look at that to make sure that that 

is the direction that we are headed. 

Senator ROUNDS. Specifically with the LRSB [long-range strike 

bomber] that we are looking at, if we start out suggesting a certain 

number be built and then we average the cost of the design development over that number, if we do not produce that number of 

LRSBs, then the cost per unit would go up. Would you be committed that if we identify an appropriate number which should be 

built, that we follow through with the number of LRSBs that we 

originally started out with? Would you support that that is an appropriate directive long term for the Air Force? 

Ms. DISBROW. These kinds of cost overruns are unacceptable, and 

I do support and I do commit to this acquisition strategy that we 

are developing for this very important capability area. You have 

my commitment, Senator. 

Senator ROUNDS. Did we learn anything with the F–22? 

Ms. DISBROW. We have learned lessons from all our major acquisitions. It is about matching the acquisition strategy to the technology maturity, and to do that and lay that schedule in in a realistic way—— 

Senator ROUNDS. Specifically, though, with the F–22, we did not 

plan on just building 200 units, and yet that is what we ended up 

with. Was that a mistake to shut it down early? 

Ms. DISBROW. The F–22 is an incredibly capable aircraft. We 

would love to have more of that aircraft. We need to watch as we 

go forward with these aircraft programs that we are—— 

Senator ROUNDS. Is it not fair to say, though, that the cost per 

unit would have gone down if we would have been building more 

than the number than we had originally intended? 

Ms. DISBROW. Senator, I agree with that type of math, yes. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly. 

980 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary 

Disbrow, I want to thank you and your family. Dr. Davidson, I 

want to thank you and your family. Congressman Murphy, I was 

privileged to serve with you in the House for a number of years. 

You, and Jenny, and your family are close friends, and we are honored by all of you stepping up to serve our country. 

One of the areas that we have continued to focus on here, and 

I know that your various forces have as well, is ending suicide, 

ending suicide among our men and women. You are responsible for 

readiness. You are responsible for training. You are the chief management officers. 

I want to make sure that one of your main focuses is getting that 

number to zero. It is over 400 again last year. It looks like we will 

be over 400 again this year. Every one of those young men and 

women is somebody’s husband or wife, mom or dad, brother or sister. 

One of the areas that has been challenging is stigma. I want to 

make sure that you are willing to work on eliminating that stigma, 

and making it a sign of strength that people go to try to have somebody to talk to. 

Mr. MURPHY. Absolutely, Senator. As you know, the signature injuries of the Iraq-Afghanistan War are TBI, traumatic brain injury, 

and PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder. Of the 2.7 million IraqAfghanistan veterans, over a half million have PTSD. 

We need to make sure that our soldiers, our warfighters when 

they come home have the resources necessary. Now, part of that is 

the stigma, is to make sure that they understand that just like 

physical health is very important when we have a PT [physical 

training] test, that that mental health is just as important. That 

is why the Army has begun an initiative, really embedded help 

teams in the brigade—at the brigade level where they are to make 

sure that those soldiers know when they are showing up at PT that 

they know where those mental health professionals are. 

I will say nationwide, there is a mental health professional shortage. We are doing our best to get after it, to get the best and 

brightest to come in there both on the civilian and the uniform 

side. But this needs to be a national effort. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you. Dr. Davidson? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, Senator. This is an issue that I think is an 

absolute tragedy, and if confirmed it will be an enormous priority 

for me as I know it already is for the Navy leadership. They are 

seized with this issue. 

The issue of stigma, I think, is really important, and what we 

need to do is focus on education for the commanders, peers, and 

chaplains, and that is what the Navy has been focusing on. They 

have some programs I think that should help, but it is an enormous, enormous tragedy and an enormous problem, and I look forward to working on it. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you. I think, Secretary Disbrow, you 

and everyone else will find that the more you push it down to the 

lowest possible level in terms of responsibility. They are the ones 

who see it first, who see one of their servicemembers going a little 

bit sideways. Any efforts you can put into that would appreciated. 

981 

Ms. DISBROW. Yes, Senator. Every life is precious, and you have 

my commitment to do everything to do to change the culture, to 

look for symptoms, and be there for our people. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you. Two other things. Each of your 

organizations has different best practices on how to end suicide. By 

law, we require you to work together to focus on best practices. If 

the three of you would continue to talk outside of this room today 

and over the next year and into the future, the more you talk with 

each other, you will find that one has something that is working, 

one has something else that is working. Joint effort helps to move 

the entire ball along. 

Additionally, General Chiarelli has worked very hard on the 

handoff from the Department of Defense to the VA. We have had 

a real challenge of what is called the formulary where some of our 

men and women are receiving certain prescriptions while in DOD 

to try to work with their mental health challenges, and when they 

go over to the VA, they are put onto something completely different. We really need you to work with the VA in making this a 

seamless handoff so that one day they are not in one place, and the 

next day they are not in another place. 

I apologize. I am a little short on time. I just wanted to get into 

two other things. Congressman Murphy, one of the things we are 

going to see in the future is we are going to be bringing JLTV [the 

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle] on line. I want to make sure that as 

you do that that you look at how you integrate bringing the 

Humvees that are out there to continue to modernize and upgrade 

them, as well as bringing JLTV online so you have a whole program of all of those vehicles moving forward. Will you commit to 

that, sir? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, Senator. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. Finally, there are real challenges in 

what strategy to move forward in Syria and in Iraq. There are a 

number of different opinions here and elsewhere on no fly zones, 

on safe zones, on how to best coordinate with the Sunni tribal leaders, how to work best with the Kurds. 

We really need you to provide your unvarnished opinion. Going 

along to get along in this area only causes heartache and trouble. 

I want to make sure that, all of you have a phenomenal amount 

of experience, of service to our country. It does not do any of us any 

good if you put that in a closet. Will you continue here and in your 

new positions to provide your unvarnished opinion as to what you 

think is the best way to move forward in strategy and elsewhere? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, Senator. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, Senator. 

Ms. DISBROW. Yes, I will. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you so very, very much. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to all of you 

for being here. Congratulations on your nominations and to your 

families as well. We are so glad that you are able to join us today. 

We will start with Congressman Murphy and Dr. Davidson, 

please. As you know, Secretary Carter just recently announced that 

all occupational specialties will be open not only for men, but now 

982 

also for women. I do support providing women every opportunity to 

serve in any sort of capacity. However, I do want to make sure that 

standards are not lowered, and that this move is enhancing our 

military combat effectiveness. 

I am a bit disturbed at how it appears the Secretary has somewhat muzzled our agencies and the Services to a point where the 

Services have not been able to provide us with the data and the 

input either before the decision was made, and even now after the 

decision was made, on gender integration within the different Services. I would like some follow up on that. 

But for both of you, please, if there are only a small number of 

women that are able to qualify for combat military occupational 

specialties [MOS], would you support them lowering the standards 

to enable a larger number of women to participate in these types 

of activities? Congressman Murphy? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, no, I would not. The Army is a standard 

space organization. We have PT tests, and we have MOSs, military 

occupational specialties, that are elite units, like our Rangers, our 

Delta Force, et cetera. They have to go through immense training 

to go through those schools and capabilities. 

There are women in our ranks and in our future ranks that will 

be able to meet those standards and wanting to do those. They now 

have access to that. Ranger School is open forever now to women. 

But we will not lower our standards because it is clear that we 

have an MOS that has laid out what those capabilities are to accomplish the mission. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. Thank you. 

Mr. MURPHY. You have my commitment. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. And, Dr. Davidson? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Senator, now that the decision has been made, I 

assume that if I am confirmed, implementation will be my priority. 

My guiding principle on this issue is absolutely not to lower the 

standards and to ensure combat readiness. I was the first woman 

to fly the C–130 tactical aircraft in the Air Force, and if they had 

lowered the standards just to let people like me do it, that would 

have been a tragedy for combat readiness. I am committed to make 

sure that does not happen. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. I appreciate that very much. I hear 

the same thing from a number of women that I have served with 

also that we do not want to see those standards lowered. The second question along that same line of effort, since we have now 

opened up all of our MOSs to women, let us talk a little bit about 

Selective Service then. If all of you would participate in the discussion, please. Do you think that Selective Service should now include females, Congressman? 

Mr. MURPHY. Ma’am, if confirmed, I am absolutely willing to look 

into that. I do believe, though, it is a broader national question 

that needs to be had, and I look forward to working with you and 

the committee to address it. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Senator, I understand that there is a high-level 

interagency discussion on this issue, and I agree with my colleague 

that it is an issue for the American people. If I am confirmed, I will 

look forward to engaging with you in that discussion. 

983 

Senator ERNST. Okay. Secretary? 

Ms. DISBROW. I do see a need to review the Selective Service 

processes, and I look forward to working with you. There are many 

perspectives on this, and I look forward to working with this committee on those. 

Senator ERNST. Certainly, and I look forward to that discussion 

as well. 

Chairman MCCAIN. You have all three successfully ducked the 

question. 

Senator ERNST. Exactly, yes. But I do understand there needs to 

be a very broad discussion about this, but I think that the President has opened that door. I think the Secretary has opened that 

door now by opening all MOSs to women. I would be proud to have 

my daughter register for the Selective Service, so I think it is 

something that we do need to have a serious discussion on. If there 

is a way that you can influence that, certainly would look forward 

to your comments as we move forward with this. 

Just very briefly, Congressman, I know you are a former company grade officer, and I appreciate your service so very much. We 

have had a lot of problems. We need some common sense when it 

comes to acquisition within the Pentagon, and we can talk further 

about this, but small arms upgrades in the Army. We have seen 

the request for proposals that have been put out on just a simple 

handgun. I would like to have your commitment that we will take 

a look at this and make sure that we are moving forward in a 

smart manner. 

Mr. MURPHY. Absolutely, ma’am. Yes. 

Senator ERNST. Okay. I know my time is up. Thank you, Mr. 

Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Davidson, you had no role in causing the 

C–130 to be the most uncomfortable aircraft in the inventory to 

ride in. Do you bear any responsibility for that? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. I feel your pain, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin? 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to 

thank all of three of you and your families for the support they give 

you, for willing to be confirmed for this job. 

My question to all three of you is going to be why do you want 

the job and what is your first reason or your first priority when you 

are confirmed? Ms. Disbrow, we will start with you. Why do you 

want the job? 

Ms. DISBROW. I feel I can make a difference, Senator. My focus 

for my entire career has been all about combat power, and I see 

shortfall areas. I see readiness problems. I see processes that need 

reform. I think I can make a difference. 

Senator MANCHIN. What have you identified as the number one 

problem, and what do you want to change? 

Ms. DISBROW. Readiness and—— 

Senator MANCHIN. That is the biggest. 

Ms. DISBROW.—and meeting demands while we are modernizing. 

Senator MANCHIN. Doctor? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Senator, I would like this job because I think we 

are at an incredibly important inflection point in the United States. 

We have to reset and also think about modernizing for the future. 

984 

My priority is also readiness. The Navy has some serious shortfalls 

when it comes to aviation readiness and ship maintenance. If confirmed, those will be my first priorities. 

Senator MANCHIN. Pat? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, I joined the Army when I was 19 years 

of age, and I joined because I love my country. When the President 

asked me to serve in this capacity, I had to check with my boss 

first, but once I got the green light I said yes. It is because we are 

at a defining moment in the Nation’s history, and we need the best 

and the brightest to be in these roles to make sure we get after it 

against ISIS and against other folks that are trying to do our families harm. 

My top priority, sir, and what I am most excited about is that 

chief management officer role. We have to get after it when we talk 

about redundancies, when we talk about spending, when we talk 

about auditability, and these issues. We cannot come back to Congress year after year after year and say we are working on it, we 

are working on it. We need to execute. 

Senator MANCHIN. I will ask all three of you another question. 

What is the greatest threat the United States of America faces? We 

will start with you, Congressman. 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, I would concur with General Milley, the 

Chief of Staff of the Army, who says that Russia is our number one 

strategic threat. But the immediate threat to our families right 

now I would say would be ISIS. If confirmed, I will do everything 

I can to let my voice be heard as a former warfighter to make sure 

that we are getting after it strategically and tactically. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Senator, I also agree with the chairman, the vice 

chairman, and other defense leaders that Russia is the greatest 

strategic threat, but that we also have to remain focused on the 

ISIS threat currently. 

Ms. DISBROW. Senator, I think the greatest threat is that we 

need to keep ahead of our adversaries and how quickly they are 

changing. There are adversaries we are not even aware of. I think 

our biggest threat is continuing to keep a laser focus on keeping 

ahead of our adversaries. 

Senator MANCHIN. Admiral Mullen about 5 years ago when I 

first came to the Senate testified before us, and the question was 

asked of him what the greatest threat the United States faces. I 

thought I would hear the same as I heard from you all. He said 

without blinking an eye the debt of this Nation is the greatest 

threat that we face because we will not be able to maintain everything that you all are concerned about. 

How concerned are all three of you about the debt this Nation 

faces, and also the Department of Defense not even being able to 

stay on track to get an audit done by 2017? The only agency in the 

Federal Government that is not audited. What is your commitment 

to getting this place audited? Doctor, we will start with you and go 

right to down the line. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Senator, I agree that we should not exacerbate 

the problems that we already face by complicating our own processes here at home and our own budgeting processes. If confirmed, 

I will make it a priority to focus on the audit problem. I know that 

985 

the Navy and Marine Corps are making some progress there, but 

that there is a long way to go. 

Senator MANCHIN. Congressman Murphy? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, to me it is a great threat. We need to get 

after it. I was a Blue Dog for a reason. I put forth and passed legislation like the Improper Payments Recovery Act, which identified 

tens of billions of dollars that we were improperly paying. I look 

forward to using that legislation and other legislation to get after 

it within the Department of Army, and it is long overdue. 

Ms. DISBROW. You have my full commitment to audit. This is 

something that needs to continue to progress. We have found many 

weaknesses, and we are working those hard. We are on track to 

meet the Congress’ requirements for full audit. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me just say as I finish here, is that the 

military is the thing that keeps us united as a Nation, if you will, 

but also it is the one that keeps us in a bipartisan effort. This committee works in a bipartisan effort. I think the support we receive 

back home is bipartisan for our military. But they want to make 

sure that we are being efficient in how we do things and the 

amount of money that we are spending, and not just keeping that 

we are short on funds, but we spend the money wisely. 

There are redundancies throughout the entire Department. If 

you listen to GAO [Government Accountability Office] reports and 

everybody else’s reports on this, but it just will not change from 

within. For some reason, it inherently will not change. That is why 

I was asking you what is your passion because you have to have 

a passion to go in there and want to make change. You are going 

to ruffle some feathers, so I would hope that you all would take 

that passion with you and make change. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to 

thank the nominees for their service to our country and willingness 

to serve, and I also want to thank the families. I know how much 

the families also serve even though they might not have the title, 

so it is great to see so many families here. 

Congressman Murphy, I want to dig into a couple of issues relating to the Army. First, the whole issue of the tooth-to-tail ratio. I 

know General Milley has been very focused on this. As a matter 

of fact, I saw Acting Secretary Fanning at the Army-Navy game. 

Sorry, Jack, about the result there. 

Senator REED. Thank you, sir. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay. But I think it is a really important 

issue, and we are hearing about it all the time. One example recently just in testimony a couple of weeks ago, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense has 77 flag officers. Is our U.S. Army toothto-tail ratio too strongly focused on the tail? If so, what do we do 

to fix it? I know it is a big concern of the Chief of Staff of the Army 

as well as Acting Secretary Fanning. 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, it is an absolute concern. I do believe the 

Army’s focus is on the tooth, but that does not mean that we do 

not need to make improvements in the tail. Part of that effort—— 

986 

Senator SULLIVAN. You think we are too heavily weighted. If you 

look at the U.S. military compared to almost any other military in 

the world, we are very, very heavy on the tail. 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, I look forward to work with you on this. 

I would say to you that—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. What is your opinion? 

Mr. MURPHY. I am concerned, and I think that we need to increase the tooth and less in the tail. I think, Senator, you do that 

first by saying what is the tooth. I look at studies like McKenzie 

and others—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Is a brigade combat team—an airborne brigade team, a tooth? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yes. I think General Milley would agree that 

we are too heavy in the tail, and I want to get your commitment 

certainly to work with this committee to actually focus more on the 

warfighter. 

Mr. MURPHY. You have that commitment, Senator. 

Senator SULLIVAN. There is a lot of talk about Russia, and a lot 

of the members of the Joint Chiefs in the past year when they 

came up for their confirmation hearing talked about Russia as the 

number one threat. 

One area that has been a focus of the committee is in the Arctic, 

and the Russians have dramatically, dramatically built up their 

forces in the Arctic: four new BCTs, just this year a new Arctic 

military command, 11 new airfields. Just last week they announced 

deploying cutting-edge S–400 missile defense systems in the Arctic. 

Do you know what the U.S. Army is planning on doing in the Arctic right now? 

Mr. MURPHY. Are you asking me, Senator? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. MURPHY. Sorry, I just want to make sure. I am aware of 

what the Army plan is that they are looking at, that they have not 

made a commitment to yet. 

Senator SULLIVAN. What is that just so people understand—— 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, as you know, Chief of Staff of the Army 

Milley is reviewing that decision, but it is that are we going to 

make a brigade combat team to make it a battalion level and not 

a brigade level. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Again, that is the ultimate tooth, right, for 

the U.S. military, a brigade combat team, an airborne brigade combat team, the ultimate kick in the door capability. What do you 

think Vladimir Putin would think of that if we are removing the 

only airborne BCT in the Arctic, the only airborne BCT in the entire Asia-Pacific while the Russians dramatically build up their 

forces? How do you think Vladimir Putin would react to that? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, I think that is a hypothetical. I am 

not—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. It is not a hypothetical. I guarantee you he 

is looking at the issue right now. 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, I think the Russian president looks at 

that we have 80,000 troops in the Pacific, and I think he looks at 

the fact that we have done this—— 

987 

Senator SULLIVAN. Taking our only airborne BCT, one of the 

most strategic assets in the U.S. military in the entire Asia-Pacific, 

in the entire Arctic, and we are getting rid of it. What do you think 

Vladimir Putin would think of that when he is building up in the 

region? Huge. 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, I think that is why the new leadership in 

the Army, which I am not part of yet, but if confirmed I will be, 

is reviewing that decision. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me ask another question. Because this 

committee and the Congress are concerned about the Arctic, we 

had a commitment in the NDAA for an OPLAN [operational plan] 

plan for the Arctic, first time ever. The Secretary and General 

Dunford both committed to make that a robust OPLAN for the Arctic. 

If confirmed, I would like your commitment to make sure we 

have an OPLAN first with the Secretary and the chief of staff or 

the chief of the armed services committed to saying it would be a 

robust OPLAN. I would like your commitment if confirmed to make 

sure we are not moving a single soldier out of the Arctic until that 

OPLAN is completed. I believe I have gotten this commitment from 

General Milley. 

A frustration of mine, though, has been when I go home, I hear 

that our troops are continuing to move forward with disbanding the 

425, which is not the commitment that I received from the Army 

senior leadership. I need right now here, if confirmed, you would 

confirm to make sure we first complete this robust Arctic OPLAN 

before we move a single soldier out of the Arctic. Can I get that 

confirmation? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, you have my commitment that I will review it and that I will do that as you—whether it was you in the 

Marine Corps or me as a paratrooper in the 82nd Airborne Division, when we are at the rough ranges, it is ready, aim, fire, not 

fire, aim, ready. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Exactly. Will you make sure we get after it? 

Mr. MURPHY. I know General Milley is after this. He is going to 

the Arctic. I am not trying breaking any news, but he is going to 

Alaska to visit, and he is, I believe, planning to go to the JRTC 

[Joint Readiness Training Center] down in Louisiana. You have my 

commitment, Senator, that I will review it when I get in there and 

brief you and the whole SASC to make sure that we are doing the 

right thing. 

Senator SULLIVAN. But not moving a single soldier out of the 

Arctic until that OPLAN is completed. That is the commitment—— 

Mr. MURPHY. That is my understanding that is what—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. That is the commitment I need from you right 

now. 

Mr. MURPHY. That is the commitment that I believe that the 

Army, that General Milley has made to you currently, Senator. I 

concur with General Milley, yes. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator, I think you made your point. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen. 

988 

Senator SHAHEEN. First of all, congratulations to each of you, 

and thank you very much to your families and to each of you for 

your willingness to continue to serve the country because each of 

you have actually been serving. 

I want to begin, Assistant Secretary Disbrow, with you. As you 

may be aware, the Pease International Tradeport in Portsmouth, 

New Hampshire, because of previous activity of the Air Force being 

there, the three wells that are used by the community have been 

contaminated. The Air Force has been very good at coming up and 

listening to people in the community, hearing the concerns that 

they have, and taking responsibility to address the situation. 

But I just want to make sure that if confirmed that you will commit to ensuring that the Air Force continues to provide the resources that are necessary to complete the well treatment systems 

and to continue the work with the local community. 

Ms. DISBROW. Senator, you have my commitment. We are working hard with you and your team to ensure we are identifying 

those who may have been exposed. We are working the cleanup effort, and we continue to work with you on the blood level testing 

issue. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. Dr. Davidson, I am not 

going to reiterate what Senator Ayotte said about the base housing 

at the shipyard, but it is something obviously that Senator King 

and I will also continue to watch very closely, and appreciate your 

willingness to ensure that action is taken to address that. 

In one of the hearings we have had in the last few weeks about 

military reform, one of the issues that we heard from people testifying was concern about cutbacks to research and development that 

would affect the capacity of our military to have the innovation 

that it needs to stay ahead of the competition, to stay ahead of the 

national security challenges to the country. 

A number of people testifying talked about the Small Business 

Innovation Research [SBIR] Program and how important that is in 

developing new technologies. They also talked about the role of 

small businesses because so much of our innovation comes from 

small business. I know that it has been a challenge getting DOD 

up to the commitment that it has to ensure that a certain percent 

of contracts, 5 percent of its business, go to small businesses. 

Can each of you talk about the challenges you see to ensuring 

that we continue to work with small businesses, which are so critical to our defense industrial base in this country, and about what 

you think we can do to remove some of those obstacles to ensuring 

that our small businesses are working closely with DOD. Congressman Murphy, I will ask you to begin. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Senator. It is critical. I mean, 98 percent of the business of the workers in America are small business. 

I am in the private sector now. I work for an actual law firm. We 

cater to small businesses. These are small businesses, 16,000 of 

them that are mostly privately held. 

It is critical, and we need to make sure that when we partner, 

that they understand what we are trying to do, and they understand that they need to be on time and on budget. A lot of times 

because they are so agile, they are performing, in many cases, over 

performing. You have my commitment that we continue that focus. 

989 

Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Davidson, are there any specific actions 

that you think can be taken to ensure that we continue this effort 

in a robust way? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, Senator. I share your enthusiasm for this 

issue, and I appreciate your leadership. I know that the Navy has 

programs to reach out to small businesses, and that they actually 

have been doing fairly well at that. I think that the challenge that 

we need to work on going forward is the barriers that we have of 

small businesses actually trying to work with the government. 

Sometimes it is so overwhelming for them. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Dr. DAVIDSON. I look forward, if confirmed, to working with the 

committee to the extent that some of those are legislative, but 

many of the ones that are policy oriented, the Navy can get on 

right away. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I would agree the Navy has been very effective, particularly with the SBIR Program. Secretary Disbrow. 

Ms. DISBROW. Senator, the Air Force also has this as a concern 

area. We actually exceeded our goal for 2015 for the percentage of 

obligations that went to small businesses. We exceeded by 4 percent our target for a total of 18 percent. 

We also have a small team that works on the headquarters Air 

Force staff that does this every day. They work for the Under Secretary position. If confirmed, I will help guide and focus them on 

this critical area. They have developed a great website that gets to 

what my colleague raised as an issue, which is how do small businesses bring their innovative ideas in. They are able to actually expose what they are doing to our team so that we can match them 

to the right places where we are looking for proposals. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Great. Thank you all very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All of you are exceptionally qualified for these positions, and I congratulate you. 

Dr. Davidson, you were an Air Force officer. Is that going to put 

you in an uncomfortable role being in the Navy? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Senator, actually I think my having been an Air 

Force officer helps me bring a joint focus to my leadership in the 

Navy. 

Senator NELSON. This will sound parochial, and in part it is, but 

one of the lessons of Pearl Harbor was that you do not put all your 

eggs in one basket. You disperse your assets. Presently, well, shall 

I say formerly, we always have with our aircraft carriers in the Atlantic Fleet, presently they have not been dispersed. They are all 

in one home port, and I have pictures where all five aircraft carriers were tied up at the same time. Do you have any thoughts 

about dispersing? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Senator, I appreciate the issue of dispersing from 

a geopolitical and a national security perspective. If confirmed, I 

am open to any ideas to look at that issue. 

Senator NELSON. The policy of the United States Navy, just so 

you know since you said you are open to looking at all issues. The 

policy of the United States Navy from every CNO [Chief of Naval 

Operations] for the last 15 years that I have been here, and previous to that for every CNO, is you disperse your assets, just like 

990 

we have in the Pacific Fleet. We have the six aircraft carriers 

homeported in three ports for the obvious reason. 

Because of the budget crunch, the work on dispersing the Atlantic fleet five carriers was stopped or, shall I say, delayed. It will 

be an issue in front of you. Secretary Mabus knows this issue inside and out, the CNO, the previous CNO, and every CNO going 

way back. 

At some point we are going to have to just face the music so that 

you do what we have always done, not only in the Pacific, but also 

the Atlantic. It just does not make sense from a national security 

standpoint to put all of them in one place. 

That second place, and I said it is going to sound parochial, and 

it is. That second place has always been Mayport, Florida and 

Mayport is ready. The channel was dug. It is down below 50 feet. 

It is ready. They bring the carriers in there from time to time. But 

the long and short of it is that you have to then go in and put in 

the nuclear facilities for homeporting, and that is an expenditure. 

But at the end of the day, that is an expenditure that we have to 

make. 

Secretary Disbrow, we are going to have some major expenditures in the Air Force. Of course, the cost overruns have been really something on the F–35, but now as we look to the future, B–52s 

that are a lot older than you have to be replaced, and the longrange strike bomber would eventually replace them as well as the 

B–1s. We would still keep the B–2s. What do you think about that? 

Ms. DISBROW. Senator, we have to begin that planning of the 

heel-to-toe tradeoff so that we do not have gaps in this critical 

bomber area. 

Senator NELSON. Okay, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much. Thank you. We will, 

depending on how long the smooth running operation, well-oiled 

machine runs here in the Senate, we will see if we can get your 

nominations through before we leave on a well-deserved Christmas 

vacation. Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Again, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 

scheduling these hearings and moving so expeditiously to get these 

confirmations completed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. Thanks to the witnesses and 

their families. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to the Honorable Patrick J. 

Murphy by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers 

supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Committee has recently held a series of hearings on defense reform. 

What modifications of Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 

Act of 1986 provisions, if any, do you believe would be appropriate? 

991 

Answer. The ongoing hearings focused on the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization 

Act of 1986 are both timely and necessary. The Goldwater-Nichols framework for 

National Security has served the Nation well, but our current global environment 

is dramatically different from the Cold War environment of the 1980s. If confirmed, 

I will fully support the hearings as required. If significant amendments are passed, 

I will ensure the Army fully coordinates and executes implementation of those 

amendments. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. As a third generation veteran, strong family values and accountability 

were instilled by my mother and father. My father’s time in the Navy, and as a 

Philadelphia police officer, as well as my mother’s service to the Catholic Church 

and legal profession, taught by example what leadership looks like. My public service and private sector experience make me uniquely qualified to serve in this position. I have dutifully served our Nation in some capacity for over twenty-three 

years, highlighted by two operational deployments (Iraq and Bosnia) as an Army officer, as an assistant professor at the United States Military Academy, serving on 

the national security committees as a member of the House of Representatives in 

the Armed Services, Appropriations, and the Select Intelligence Committees, and 

even today as a member of the United States Military Academy Board of Visitors. 

As a small business owner, law firm partner serving as outside general counsel to 

small businesses, and as an academic, I possess the unique public and private sector 

background to perform the duties of Chief Management Officer. If confirmed, I look 

forward to serving as the Army’s Under Secretary. 

DUTIES

Question. Section 3015 of title 10, United States Code, states the Under Secretary 

of the Army shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary 

of the Army may prescribe. 

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary 

of the Army? 

Answer. By statute, the Under Secretary of the Army performs such duties and 

exercises such powers as the Secretary of the Army prescribes. By regulation, the 

Under Secretary is the Secretary’s principal civilian assistant and principal advisor 

on matters related to the management and operation of the Army. To that end, the 

Under Secretary is charged with communicating and advocating Army policies, 

plans, and programs to external audiences, including Congress, interagency partners, foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the American public. The Under Secretary also advises the Secretary on the development and integration of Army programs and the Army budget. Finally, pursuant to section 904 of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, the Under Secretary 

is the Chief Management Officer of the Department of the Army. 

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties 

and functions of the Under Secretary of the Army, as set forth in section 3015 of 

title 10, United States Code, or in Department of Defense regulations pertaining to 

functions of the Under Secretary of the Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review and assess the duties and functions currently 

assigned to, and performed by, the Under Secretary, and I will discuss with the Secretary of the Army any changes I believe may be necessary to enhance the Under 

Secretary’s ability to support the Secretary of the Army’s efforts to ensure that the 

Department of the Army is effectively and efficiently administered. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties, if any, do you expect will be prescribed for you? 

Answer. I am confident that the Acting Secretary will assign me duties that most 

appropriately support his efforts to ensure that the Department of the Army is effectively and efficiently administered, taking into consideration my background and experience. 

Question. Section 904(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008, directs the Secretary of a military department to designate the Under Secretary of such military department to assume the primary management responsibility for business operations. 

What is your understanding of the business operations responsibilities of the 

Under Secretary of the Army? 

Answer. By statute and regulation, the Under Secretary is assigned the position 

of Chief Management Officer of the Army. In that position, the Under Secretary is 

992 

the principal adviser to the Secretary of the Army on the effective and efficient organization and management of the Army’s business operations, and is responsible for 

carrying out initiatives the Secretary of the Army approves for the business transformation of the Army. 

Question. How do you perceive your role in setting the agenda for the Army Chief 

Management Officer? 

Answer. I perceive my role as the Chief Management Officer would include recommending to the Secretary of the Army methodologies and measurement criteria to 

better synchronize, integrate and coordinate the business operations of the Department of the Army. In addition, I perceive that my role as the Chief Management 

Officer would include developing and submitting to the Secretary of the Army for 

approval a comprehensive business transformation plan and a well-defined enterprise-wide business system architecture and transition plan. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship with: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as head of the Department of Defense, possesses full authority, direction, and control over all of its elements. If confirmed, and 

subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army, I would 

communicate with the Secretary of Defense on matters involving the Department 

of the Army. I would cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense to ensure that 

the Department of the Army fulfills the Administration’s national defense priorities 

and, mindful of my role as the Army’s Chief Management Officer, I would make certain that the business operations of the Army are effectively and efficiently organized and managed to ensure their optimal alignment in support of Department of 

Defense and Department of the Army missions. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and exercises such 

powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The Deputy Secretary is also the 

Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense. If confirmed, and subject 

to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army, I would be responsible to the Secretary of Defense—and to his Deputy—for the operation of the 

Army. I would also be responsible for providing information to the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense regarding the Army’s business operations to assist him in the performance of his duties as the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense. 

Question. The Chief Management Officer and Deputy Chief Management Officer 

of the Department of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense assists the Deputy Secretary of Defense in synchronizing, integrating, and coordinating business operations within the Department of Defense. If confirmed as Under 

Secretary, I will provide information to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the 

Deputy Chief Management Officer regarding the Army’s business operations to assist them in the performance of their Chief Management Officer duties, and I will 

work closely with the Deputy Chief Management Officer on the full range of matters 

involving the management of the Department of Defense. 

Question. The Secretary of the Army. 

Answer. The Secretary of the Army is the head of the Department of the Army 

and is responsible for, and has authority to conduct, all of its affairs. If confirmed, 

my relationship with the Secretary of the Army will be close, direct, and supportive. 

As Chief Management Officer, I would be accountable to the Secretary for the effective and efficient organization and management of the Army’s business operations 

and for carrying out initiatives he approves for the business transformation of the 

Army. I understand that all of my actions would be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army. 

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army is the senior military advisor to the Secretary of the Army, is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Army, and performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the 

Army. The Chief of Staff also performs the duties prescribed for him by law as a 

member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is vital that all leaders of the Department 

of the Army, both civilian and military, work closely together as one team to face 

the many challenges confronting our Nation. If confirmed, I will coordinate with the 

Chief of Staff of the Army in the performance of my duties. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works has, as a principal 

duty, the overall supervision of missions associated with the development and manVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00998 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
993 

agement of the Nation’s water resources, support for commercial navigation, restoration, protection and management of aquatic ecosystems, flood risk management, and 

engineering and technical support services. If confirmed, I will build a strong professional relationship with the Assistant Secretary, and I would cooperate fully with 

the Assistant Secretary in advancing and defending the Army’s Civil Works Program. 

Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Army. 

Answer. The four other Assistant Secretaries of the Army set the Army’s strategic 

direction by developing and overseeing policies and programs within their respective 

functional areas. If confirmed, I will work to establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each of the Assistant Secretaries, and I will foster an environment of cooperative teamwork to ensure that we work together effectively on 

both the day-to-day management and long-range planning needs of the Army. In 

particular, in my role as the Chief Management Officer of the Army, I will coordinate with the Assistant Secretaries in addressing any matter related to business operations or business transformation that may impact their respective domains. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Army. 

Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal and ethics officer of the Department of Army and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other Secretariat officials. 

The General Counsel’s duties include providing legal and policy advice to officials 

of the Department of the Army, as well as determining the position of the Army 

on all legal questions and procedures. If confirmed, and particularly given my experience as an Army Judge Advocate, I will work to establish and maintain a close, 

professional relationship with the General Counsel of the Army, and I will actively 

seek his or her guidance to ensure that Army policies and practices are in strict accord with the law and the highest principles of ethical conduct. 

Question. The Inspector General of the Army. 

Answer. The Inspector General of the Army is charged with inquiring into, and 

reporting on, the discipline, efficiency, readiness, morale, training, ethical conduct 

and economy of the Army, as directed by the Secretary of the Army or the Chief 

of Staff of the Army. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I will work to establish and 

maintain a close, professional relationship with The Inspector General of the Army 

to ensure the effective accomplishment of these important duties. 

Question. The Surgeon General of the Army. 

Answer. The Surgeon General is the principal advisor to the Secretary of the 

Army and to the Chief of Staff of the Army on the military health service system. 

In that role, The Surgeon General is charged with maintaining a medically ready 

military force, as well as a trained and ready medical force. If confirmed, I will work 

to establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with The Surgeon General to ensure that the Army’s health care systems and medical policies effectively 

and uniformly support the Army’s objectives, responsibilities, and commitments 

across the total force. 

Question. The Army Business Transformation Office. 

Answer. In accordance with section 908 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2009, the Secretary of the Army established the Office of Business 

Transformation to assist the Army Chief Management Officer in carrying out business transformation initiatives. The Office of Business Transformation is headed by 

the Director of Business Transformation, who is appointed by and reports to the 

Army Chief Management Officer. If confirmed, I will work closely and directly with 

the Army Business Transformation Office in carrying out initiatives the Secretary 

of the Army approves for the business transformation of the Army. 

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army. 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Army is the legal advisor to the Chief 

of Staff of the Army, the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as the 

military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General 

also directs the members of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps in the performance 

of their duties and, by law, is primarily responsible for providing legal advice and 

services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the administration of 

military discipline. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I look forward to establishing 

a close, professional and inclusive relationship with The Judge Advocate General, 

and I will always welcome her views regarding any legal matter under consideration. 

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces and on other matters as determined 

by the Secretary of Defense. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is also the 

994 

principal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army 

on matters relating to the Army National Guard. If confirmed, and subject to the 

authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army, I will establish a professional relationship with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and I will work 

closely with him to utilize the talents available within the Army National Guard 

to strengthen the Total Army. 

Question. The Director of the Army National Guard. 

Answer. The Director, Army National Guard is responsible for assisting the Chief, 

National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the National Guard Bureau, 

as they relate to the Army National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Director, Army National Guard to 

foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Department of the 

Army and the National Guard Bureau. I will also seek the input of the Director of 

the Army National Guard on all matters of policy and procedure that may impact 

Army National Guard soldiers and their families. 

Question. The Army Chief of Chaplains. 

Answer. From the earliest days of the Army, chaplains have been an integral part 

of the total force. Chaplains are often the first to respond to incidents of death, combat casualty, suicide, and sexual assault. The programs that the Chaplains lead 

serve to bolster soldier and family resiliency in these difficult times. The Army Chief 

of Chaplains leads the Army Chaplains Corps in its primary mission of providing 

religious support to the Army, and advises the Secretary of the Army and Chief of 

Staff of the Army on all matters of chaplaincy. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I 

will work to establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief 

of Chaplains because I understand the importance of, and value in, consulting with 

him in the exercise of my responsibilities. 

Question. The Under Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to establish and maintain a close, professional 

relationship with the Under Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force, and I look 

forward to engaging in frank exchanges of advice and opinions with them regarding 

issues that impact all the military departments. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges, if any, that you would confront if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army? 

Answer. I believe that the Army’s primary challenge will be to meet the Nation’s 

security needs with reduced and uncertain budgets. With the spread of ISIL, the 

resurgence of Russia and the growth of China, the world is increasingly complex, 

and combatant commanders’ demand for forces is not diminishing. Yet, the Army 

has been downsizing, and I have been advised that the fiscal uncertainty caused by 

sequestration hinders planning and the efficient execution of the Army’s mission. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you prioritize and what plans would you have, 

if any, for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. Given our complex geopolitical situation and uncertain funding, one of 

my priorities, if confirmed, will be to assist the Secretary of the Army provide ready 

forces to combatant commanders as efficiently and effectively as possible. I have 

been advised that several important initiatives are underway that will assist the 

Army in accomplishing this goal. For example, the Department of Defense is reviewing personnel policies and compensation reforms as part of its Force of the Future 

initiative, and the Army is supporting ongoing efforts to reexamine Goldwater-Nichols. I have also been advised that the Army is making progress in auditability and 

the processes for maintaining readiness. If confirmed, I look forward to leading and 

supporting these efforts. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Under Secretary of the Army? 

Answer. It is my understanding that one of the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Under Secretary is that the bureaucratic processes 

required to manage a large, diverse organization like the Army can also stifle innovation and limit agility. Organizational innovation and agility are critical in ensuring the United States Army meets the needs of the Nation and takes care of its soldiers during a period of constrained resources and personnel reductions. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. I will work closely with the Army’s principal officials to ensure that our 

management processes are agile, efficient, innovative, and accountable. These processes must ensure Army readiness to meet the needs of the Nation and takes care 

995 

of soldiers and their families in the most resource effective manner. Aggressive but 

reasonable timelines are critical in tackling these problems. 

Question. How will you manage the recommendations of the National Commission 

on the Future of the United States Army? Its report is expected in February 2016. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will thoroughly review the Commission’s recommendations 

and assist the Secretary of the Army in taking appropriate action on those recommendations. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative? Are its objectives reasonable? Do you think its cost avoidance goals are achievable? Are the equities of the National Guard and Reserves being adequately addressed? Is it the best plan for the Total Army? 

Answer. I have been briefed that ARI provides greater combat capability at lower 

cost than proposed alternatives, achieved by divesting the Army’s oldest aircraft 

fleets and rationally distributing its modernized aircraft between the components. 

I have also been briefed that it promotes a modernized aircraft fleet in the Army 

National Guard and Army Reserve. I am told that ARI underwent numerous external reviews, to include those by GAO and OSD’s CAPE office, which validated its 

cost savings and operational capability estimates. Based on what I have learned 

thus far, ARI appears to be a sound and achievable response to the significant fiscal 

constraints the Army faces as a result of the Budget Control Act. If confirmed, however, I look forward to the report of the National Commission on the Future of the 

Army and the insights on Army’s aviation structure that they will provide. 

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish? 

Answer. One of my broad priorities will be to assist the Secretary and Chief of 

Staff of the Army to rebuild readiness across the Army. After a decade of counterinsurgency operations followed by downsizing and new emergent demands, readiness is difficult to rebuild. The Army needs to institutionally adapt to the new environment—to train and ready forces for the wide range of warfighting missions required to meet the security needs of a complex world. This touches not just our combat units, but institutionally how we can become more efficient across ‘‘Man, Train, 

Equip’’ to produce and sustain readiness. Additionally, the Army needs to prepare 

for the future in developing and investing our soldiers and future leaders, in pursuing sound modernizations strategies, and in adopting effective doctrine. Another 

one of my top priorities will be to take care of soldiers, civilians and families, in 

particular those who have seen so many combat tours. The Army has adapted before 

and can adapt to these challenges. 

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

Question. Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008 designates the Under Secretary of the Army as the Army’s Chief Management 

Officer (CMO). Section 908 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2009 requires the CMO of each of the military departments to carry out a comprehensive business transformation initiative, with the support of a new Business 

Transformation Office. 

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Under Secretary in his capacity as CMO of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. By statute and regulation, the Under Secretary is assigned the position 

of Chief Management Officer of the Army. In that position, the Under Secretary is 

the principal adviser to the Secretary of the Army on the effective and efficient organization and management of the Army’s business operations, and is responsible for 

carrying out initiatives the Secretary of the Army approves for the business transformation of the Army. In addition, as the Chief Management Officer, the Under 

Secretary is responsible for developing and submitting to the Secretary of the Army 

for approval a comprehensive business transformation plan and a well-defined enterprise-wide business system architecture and transition plan. 

Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify 

you to perform these duties and responsibilities? 

Answer. My public service and private sector experience make me uniquely qualified to serve in this position. My Active Duty Army service (including two deployments) and my service as a lawmaker on the House Armed Services, Appropriations, 

and Intelligence committees, informed by being a small business owner, allow for 

a unique perspective to lead change in the Army as the Chief Management Officer. 

If confirmed, I look forward to serving as the Army’s Under Secretary. 

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Question. Do you believe that the CMO and the Business Transformation Office 

have the resources and authority needed to carry out the business transformation 

of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. As I understand the authorities prescribed in law and by the Secretary 

of the Army, and the resources currently available to the Department, I believe the 

position and office are properly resourced and able to accomplish the necessary business transformation efforts of the Army. If confirmed, I will consult with the Secretary of the Army; the Army Chief of Staff; the Director of the Office of Business 

Transformation; and the Department of Defense’s Deputy Chief Management Officer 

for their perspectives and assess the current situation as to whether any additional 

authorities or resources are needed to continue to achieve meaningful transformation. 

Question. What role do you believe the CMO and the Business Transformation Office should play in the planning, development, and implementation of specific business systems by the military departments? 

Answer. The Chief Management Officer and the Business Transformation Office 

play leading roles in successful implementation of business systems for the Army. 

The Army Chief Management Officer and the Office of Business Transformation 

achieve the integration of its business management decisions through effective governance, utilizing the Army Business Council in particular, which provides overall 

synchronization of the department’s business activities and ensures vertical integration from the Office of the Secretary of Defense down through all business activities 

of the Army. If confirmed, I will work with the Office of Business Transformation 

and the other leaders of the Department of Defense in continuing the momentum 

to drive the evolution of the maturing enterprise architecture and supporting business systems within the Army’s business operations, leading to increased readiness 

and efficiency. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the statutory provisions 

establishing the position of CMO and creating the Business Transformation Office? 

Answer. The legislation that originally established the Service Under Secretaries 

as Chief Management Officer s, and created the business transformation offices, has 

driven tremendous change and positive improvements for the Department of the 

Army. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army, the DOD 

Deputy Chief Management Officer and the Deputy Secretary of Defense to determine the need for statutory changes in order to further increase the effectiveness 

of our critical business transformation efforts. 

Question. Section 2222 of title 10, United States Code, requires that the Secretary 

of Defense develop a comprehensive business enterprise architecture and transition 

plan to guide the development of its business systems and processes. The Department has chosen to implement the requirement for an enterprise architecture and 

transition plan through a ‘‘federated’’ approach in which the Business Transformation Agency has developed the top level architecture while leaving it to the 

military departments to fill in most of the detail. The Army’s business systems, like 

those of the other military departments, remain incapable of providing timely, reliable financial data to support management decisions. 

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure that the Army develops 

the business systems and processes it needs to appropriately manage funds in the 

best interest of the taxpayer and national defense? 

Answer. Well defined, understood, and applied enterprise business processes reflecting best business practices and supported by modern system technology are central to funds management and the Army’s ability to provide trained and ready forces 

at best value to the Nation. If confirmed, and in the capacity of Chief Management 

Officer, I will ensure the Army optimizes business systems and processes to meet 

the needs of national defense while maintaining dedicated stewardship of the funds 

entrusted to it. In this regard, I will seek the advice of subject matter experts, both 

inside and outside the Department of Defense to ensure we are following best business practices and employing state-of-the-art financial systems, as well as capitalizing on the results of our ongoing schedule of financial audits to improve processes 

and systems. 

Question. Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the successful transformation of the 

Army’s business systems? 

Answer. Absolutely. A well elaborated integrated enterprise business architecture 

details how the Army conducts its core title 10 U.S. Code functions and how supporting business information technology systems support process execution. Comprehensive and enterprise-wide architecture is the starting point to implement transition plans from Army legacy business systems to its modern systems and to identify opportunities for greater effectiveness. 

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Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Army’s enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the requirements of section 2222? 

Answer. Section 2222 is a powerful tool that ensures the Army continues to employ best practices in its business processes. If confirmed, I will ensure that the 

Army’s enterprise architecture and transition plan meets the requirements contained in section 2222. I will ensure a continuous review and, where appropriate, 

revision, of our defense business processes in order to implement the most streamlined and efficient business processes practicable, and to minimize customization of 

commercial business systems. 

Question. What are your views on the importance and role of timely and accurate 

financial and business information in managing operations and holding managers 

accountable? 

Answer. Timely and accurate financial and business information are critical 

enablers for Army senior leaders to make the best resource-informed decisions that 

guide and direct the Army in providing trained and ready forces wherever and 

whenever needed. If confirmed, as the Under Secretary and Chief Management Officer of the Army, I will be a strong advocate for ‘‘management by fact’’ as accurate 

data is the key to making the optimal decisions to ensure the long term defense of 

our Nation. I will hold leaders and managers throughout the Army accountable for 

the focused application of resources to generate readiness and to provide best-inclass support to soldiers in the performance of their important missions. 

Question. How would you address a situation in which you found that reliable, 

useful, and timely financial and business information was not routinely available for 

these purposes? 

Answer. I would find that to be unacceptable. If confirmed, I would take steps to 

discover the root causes of why financial and business information was inaccurate 

or unavailable. I would address deficiencies by implementing systemic changes in 

processes and hold leaders and managers directly responsible for implementing and 

sustaining those changes. 

Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial and business information 

available to Army managers? 

Answer. I will play the central role in leading and managing Army business operations. I will execute this by ensuring that the right policies and directives are in 

place to guide Army business operations and that governance structures are effectively functioning to enable Army senior leader performance assessment, and identification of and direction for improvement opportunities. I will also empower and 

hold Army leaders and managers accountable for ensuring the availability and accuracy of data and information for improvement of business processes. 

HEADQUARTERS STREAMLINING

Question. The Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters functions of the Department of Defense and 

the military departments. 

If confirmed, what would be your role in streamlining functions, as well as identifying and implementing reductions in the Department of the Army headquarters? 

Answer. I anticipate playing a key and leading role in the analysis and streamlining of processes and functions in the Army. We must lead by example. Every dollar we can save in such a review can directly contribute to increased readiness of 

our operational force, and I am therefore committed to a relentless pursuit of such 

efficiencies. I am also aware that the Army implemented a plan to reduce all of its 

two-star headquarters and above by 25 percent over the period 2015–2019, and implemented a comprehensive delayering of the Department Headquarters which increased supervisors’ spans of control from 4 to 8 and reduced 2 layers of bureaucracy. If confirmed, I would anticipate overseeing the continued implementation of 

those plans as well as identifying additional opportunities to streamline our headquarters. 

Question. What areas and functions, specifically and if any, do you consider to be 

the priorities for possible consolidation or reductions within the Department of the 

Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, as the Army’s Chief Management Officer, I intend to make 

the identification of opportunities for consolidation or reduction a major priority. We 

must lead by example. While I have not yet had the opportunity to begin that process, if confirmed, I will initially focus on two methods to prioritize my efforts. First, 

I will focus on those areas which if consolidated or reduced would provide the most 

savings. Secondly, I will focus on those areas and functions where the Department 

of the Army most significantly deviates from best practices in the private sector, not 

998 

because the Army should necessarily resemble a business, but because those areas 

might be the most likely in need of significant transformation. 

Question. To the extent that the Department of the Army has functions that overlap with the Department of Defense, Joint Staff, or military departments, what 

would be your approach to consolidating and reducing redundancy? 

Answer. I will follow a disciplined and deliberate approach in analyzing potential 

redundancies between the headquarters of the Army and the other major headquarters of the Department of Defense. Redundancies and overlap among headquarters potentially represent major resource savings which could be re-applied to 

generating increased levels of Army readiness, a commodity in great demand. First, 

we must assess the necessity of a redundant function. Once we verify the need for 

the function, in conjunction with the other leaders of the Department of Defense, 

an unbiased determination where the function is most appropriately performed will 

be made, whether it is at the Department of the Army, another Military Service, 

a Defense Agency or in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We must carefully 

balance the need for efficiency by centralizing functions with the effectiveness of decentralizing those very same tasks. If confirmed, I will bring a fresh and impartial 

view to those tough questions and make those recommendations to the Army, which 

I believe will best contribute to the long term defense of this Nation. 

END STRENGTH

Question. In this year’s budget request and Future Years Defense Program, the 

Department proposes making additional cuts to the Army’s Active and Reserve component end strengths. 

In your view, can the Army meet national defense objectives at the end strength 

levels proposed under the current budget agreement? What about at the end 

strength levels that would be necessary after fiscal year 2018 after this budget 

agreement expires? 

Answer. With the Bipartisan Budget Act levels of funding, the Army will be able 

to support a total Army end strength of 980,00 (450,000 Active component (AC); 

335,000 Army National Guard (ARNG); 195,000 United States Army Reserve 

(USAR)) through Fiscal Year 2017. The Army leadership has said that this is the 

lowest acceptable level to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance with significant risk. 

I have been advised that the Army is also reducing civilian manpower commensurate with military end strength reductions. In the event of full sequestration, the 

Army would be forced to reduce to make significant reductions. These end strength 

levels would severely compromise the Army’s ability to meet current combatant 

commander’s demand, and the requirements of the Defense Strategic Guidance to 

defeat an adversary in one major combat operation while simultaneously denying 

the objectives of an adversary in a second theater. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Army’s ability to meet these goals 

without forcing out soldiers who have served in combat over the past 10 years with 

the implicit promise that they could compete for career service and retirement? 

Answer. The Army has worked to minimize involuntary separations by reducing 

new accessions and utilizing greater promotion selectivity. Of the approximate 

76,000 reductions since 2012, only about 4,400 (5.8 percent) were involuntary. Unfortunately, it is my understanding that the Army may not be able to continue to 

meet the end strength goals without additional involuntary separations. 

Question. To what extent will the Army have to rely on involuntary separations 

through 2018? How will the budget agreement affect this? 

Answer. I am aware that in order to achieve an Active Component end strength 

of 450,000 by 2018, a reduction of 40,000 soldiers, where approximately 14,000 (35 

percent) involuntary separations will be required. Without the budget agreement, 

we would potentially have had to lower end strength even further which would require more involuntary separations. 

Question. What programs are in place to ensure that separating and retiring 

servicemembers are as prepared as they can be as they enter civilian workforce? 

Answer. In my experience and through briefings, I have witnessed the coordination with the Department of Veterans Affairs, as the Department of Labor, as the 

Small Business Administration, and the Department of Defense, the Army has developed an enhanced version of its transition assistance program. Called the soldier 

for Life—Transition Assistance Program (SFL–TAP), this commander’s program features soldier counseling and training sessions, employment and career workshops, 

and education opportunities, all while maintaining leadership focus on, and involvement in, each soldier’s transition process. SFL–TAP affords soldiers the opportunity 

to prepare for successful post-Service careers 

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Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional force shaping 

tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has provided the past few years? 

Answer. The Army has provided proposals to obtain additional authorities to responsibly shape the force. If confirmed, I will assess the need for additional authorities, and if necessary, work with the Congress to garner support. 

Question. In your view, should the number of general and flag officers in the 

Army be reduced commensurate with the drawdown of total Army end strength? 

Answer. I have not had the opportunity review the linkage between the number 

of General Officers in the Army, current force structure, and overall end strength. 

If confirmed, I commit to reviewing any such analysis conducted to date, and, if appropriate, make recommendations to the Secretary. If no such analysis has been 

conducted, I will recommend the Secretary direct it. 

Question. What are your views on the appropriate size and mix of the Active Duty 

Army, and the Reserve components? 

Answer. The Army remains committed to the Total Force Policy. The Active component (AC), Army National Guard (ARNG), and the United States Army Reserve 

(USAR) all have important roles as part of the Total Force. The AC provides responsiveness and flexibility; the ARNG and USAR provides depth, staying power, and 

unique skills. The Army needs all three in the right combination to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance in the most effective and efficient manner. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review establishes Army end strength at 980k (450k AC; 335k 

ARNG; 195k USAR). If confirmed, I will ensure the Army utilizes the Total Army 

Analysis process for determining the forces required to meet Defense Strategic Guidance and component mix given authorized end strength. 

ARMY RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The retention of quality soldiers, officer and enlisted, Active Duty and 

reserve, is vital to the Department of the Army. 

How would you evaluate the status of the Army in successfully recruiting and retaining high caliber personnel during a period of sustained overall decrease in end 

strength? 

Answer. I have seen firsthand that even in a challenging recruiting and retention 

market, the Army continues to attract the Nation’s most talented young men and 

women. As I have been briefed, currently only about 29 percent of today’s youths 

age 17–24 are eligible for military service. The Army continues to recruit high quality personnel averaging 97 percent high school graduates, 0.4 percent CAT IVs (soldiers who scored in the 10–30 percent of the Armed Forces Qualification Test). Additionally, the Army continues to use enlistment waivers judiciously, only granting 

them for 11.2 percent of new recruits for fiscal years 2012–2015. The Army has also 

exceeded retention objectives during this period, retaining only the most highly 

qualified soldiers. Many soldiers will ultimately leave the Army during the drawdown, but the Army must continue to retain and recruit soldiers with high potential 

for future Service, balance the force with critical skills, experience, and fill missionessential units. It is clear that costs for recruiting and retention incentives and for 

advertising are rising. If confirmed, I will work with Army leaders to ensure sustaining the All Volunteer Force remains a strategic imperative for the Army and 

evaluate the progress of our efforts. 

Question. What initiatives would you take, if confirmed, to further improve Army 

recruiting and retention, in both the Active and Reserve components? 

Answer. I will ensure that both our Recruiting and Retention programs are focused on recruiting and retaining only the highest quality soldiers during the drawdown. I also will take steps to ensure that the Army can continue to develop indicators that help identify applicants that are more likely to succeed in service and lessen the chances that new soldiers leave the Army before the end of their terms of 

enlistment. These measures offer the potential to reduce recruiting and training 

funds. If confirmed, I will ensure that leaders charged with the success of these programs have the tools needed to successfully recruit and retain the highest quality 

personnel. 

READINESS

Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of the Army to meet 

national security requirements across the full spectrum of military operations? 

Answer. I am aware that as part of the Joint Force, the Army delivers decisive, 

expeditionary, and adaptive strategic land power for the Nation. In fact, the Army 

has more than 190,000 soldiers in over 140 worldwide locations accomplishing a variety of combatant command military operations. However, given decreasing resources and shrinking capacity, the Army is mortgaging future readiness and reVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01005 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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sponse capabilities. As a result, the Army may be challenged to defeat a regional 

adversary without having to utilize resources and units needed to simultaneously 

deter aggression, assure allies, and conduct foundational activities elsewhere in the 

world. 

ACQUISITION ISSUES

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 emplaced 

myriad changes to defense acquisition processes, including reinserting service chief 

influence and accountability into acquisition processes. 

Do you support the acquisition reform provisions in the Fiscal Year 2016 National 

Defense Authorization Act? 

Answer. Yes. I support efforts between the Department and the Congress to improve the acquisition system by streamlining processes, improving access to technological innovation, and professionalizing the acquisition workforce. If confirmed, I 

will review the impact of the legislative changes in processes and requirements in 

order to fully assess the effects on Army acquisition. 

Question. What additional acquisition-related reforms do you believe the Committee should consider? 

Answer. I am aware the Department is currently working to implement changes 

established under the Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. I would 

want to first assess the impact and effects of these reforms before determining 

whether additional changes are needed. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to closely review the legislation, and to work with the Department and the 

Congress in determining the appropriateness of any additional changes. 

Question. How can the Department and the Army better access and integrate 

commercial and military technology to remain ahead of its potential adversaries? 

Answer. Our warfighters must have the technical and tactical advantage over our 

enemy. This technological advantage over our adversaries is critical to our Nation’s 

success. If confirmed, I would first assess the efficacy of existing authorities, processes, and procedures to access commercial technology and their utility in developing Army capabilities, and make recommendations, as appropriate. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you synchronize your acquisition responsibilities 

with the Army Chief of Staff? 

Answer. The Army Chief of Staff plays a critical role in the development of requirements and ensuring the resources necessary to successfully develop and field 

programs. In this role, the Chief of Staff brings a unique perspective with a wealth 

of operational experience that is invaluable when generating and prioritizing military equipment requirements. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Army 

Chief of Staff to ensure that we make the appropriate tradeoff requirements in pursuit of warfighting capabilities while ensuring responsible use of our taxpayers’ dollars. 

Question. What is your assessment of the size and capability of the Army acquisition workforce? 

Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to assess firsthand the size and capabilities of the Army acquisition workforce against the Army’s acquisition needs. If 

confirmed, I will work with Army leaders to review and ensure that our workforce 

is properly sized and trained for effective and efficient delivery of warfighting capabilities to our soldiers. We must ensure our warfighters have the technical and tactical advantage over our enemy. 

Question. If confirmed what steps would you take to ensure that the Department 

of the Army has an acquisition workforce with the size and capability needed to 

manage and reverse the acquisition problem? 

Answer. The Army acquisition workforce requires critical skills in a diverse range 

of disciplines, to include contracting, program management, systems engineering, 

cost estimating, and risk management. If confirmed, I will first assess the current 

size and capability mix of the workforce before determining what, if any, steps are 

necessary to ensure the workforce is positioned to effectively and efficiently deliver 

critical capabilities to our warfighters. 

AUDIT READINESS

Question. The Department of Defense remains unable to achieve a clean financial 

statement audit. The Department also remains on the Government Accountability 

Office’s list of high risk agencies and management systems for financial management and weapon system acquisition. Although audit-readiness has been a goal of 

the Department for decades, DOD has repeatedly failed to meet numerous congressionally directed audit-readiness deadlines. 

1001 

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s efforts to achieve a 

clean financial statement audit by 2017? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Army has developed a plan to achieve a 

clean financial audit statement by 2017. I am aware of the DOD published Financial 

Improvement Audit Readiness plan to achieve audit readiness. If confirmed, I will 

examine the Army’s and DOD’s plans and work to identify any potential improvements to help the Army achieve financial auditability by Congressionally mandated 

deadlines. If confirmed, I will ensure a clean financial statement audit will be a top 

priority. 

Question. In your opinion, is the Department of the Army on track to achieve 

these objectives, particularly with regard to data quality, internal controls and business process re-engineering? 

Answer. The Army is on track to achieve these objectives, but, if confirmed, I will 

review current Army processes and ensure the Army executes a fully coordinated 

plan. 

Question. If not, what impediments may hinder the Army’s ability to achieve this 

goal and how would you address them? 

Answer. The Army has identified a series of risks to achieving these objectives 

that include system shortcomings. If confirmed, I will review those potential system 

shortcomings, will provide my assessment to the Committee, and will do everything 

in my power to execute on this critical goal. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Army moves 

to achieve these objectives without an unaffordable or unsustainable level of onetime fixes and manual work-arounds? 

Answer. Budgets are moral documents and proper analysis and execution is critical to our warfighters. In addition to personally assessing progress on a regular and 

consistent basis, if confirmed, I will reinforce the governance structure that the 

Army has put in place so that the Army is focused on developing and achieving 

Army-wide, cost-effective, and sustainable solutions. Additionally, if confirmed I will 

work closely with senior leaders to establish a ‘tone from the top’ that reinforces 

that audit activities are not simply checklists. It is about transforming the way the 

Army conducts its business enabling us to create a long-lasting infrastructure fully 

compliant with accounting standards and sustainable despite potential fiscal uncertainty. 

ARMY MODERNIZATION

Question. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not been successful 

over the past decade or more. Since the mid-1990’s, Army modernization strategies, 

plans, and investment priorities have evolved under a variety of names from 

Digitization, to Force XXI, to Army After Next, to Interim Force, to Objective Force, 

to Future Combat System and Modularity. Instability in funding, either as provided 

by DOD or Congress, has been cited by the Army and others as a principal cause 

of program instability. For the most part, however, the Army has benefited from 

broad DOD and Congressional support for its modernization and readiness programs even when problems with the technical progress and quality of management 

of those programs have been apparent—the Future Combat System is a recent example. 

What is your assessment, if any, of the Army’s modernization record? 

Answer. I think overall the Army has had too many failed modernization programs over the last ten years; some of them major programs. The cause of some 

of these failures appears to be overly ambitious requirements, funding instability or 

a slow, bureaucratic acquisition process. The Army modernization effort has worked 

well in addressing important needs for current operations remaining focused on requirements that could be rapidly delivered to meet the needs of our warfighters. If 

confirmed, I will do my best to ensure major Army modernization programs are 

managed properly, with reasonably achievable requirements, and in a fiscally responsible manner. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy? 

Answer. I believe the Army has a solid Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy. The 

strategy was approved in December 2014. The Army has made significant investments over the recent conflicts to modernize and increase protection of its tactical 

wheeled vehicles. The strategic objectives are: increased soldier protection; fleet operations to provide broad warfighting capabilities to combatant commanders such as 

sustainment, medical evacuation, and recovery; enabling mission command functions; providing mobility in various operational environments; and maintaining a 

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healthy industrial base. The centerpiece of the tactical wheeled vehicle strategy is 

fielding the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle in the near term. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s Combat Vehicle Modernization 

Strategy? 

Answer. It is my initial assessment that the Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy (CVMS) provides an effective framework for enabling brigade combat teams the 

appropriate combination of lethality, mobility, and protection to achieve overmatch 

against threats. The strategy addresses near-to-mid-term capability gaps for Infantry Brigade Combat Teams and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The Army will also 

invest in incremental improvements (Engineering Change Proposals) of our current 

platforms in order to improve the Armored Brigade Combat Team’s ability to fight 

and win in a complex world. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to take to achieve 

a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program for the Army? 

Answer. I will work to ensure the Army’s modernization strategy focuses on providing necessary capabilities that satisfy the needs of both the combatant commanders and our nation’s leadership. It is important that the Army’s modernization 

programs have reasonably achievable requirements that prioritized to allow for 

trade space and that the highest priority capabilities receive should consistent and 

unwavering oversight and advocacy from Army Senior Leaders. If confirmed, I will 

also work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress to secure stable 

and predictable support to allow the Army to manage programs as efficiently as possible. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s modernization investment strategy? 

Answer. My initial impression is that more investment is needed, however, I understand that the strategy is designed to modernize the highest priorities within fiscal limitations. I understand that the Army strategy is to adapt its current equipment to gain or regain lost capability as our potential adversaries increase theirs, 

to evolve current equipment to avoid obsolescence and meet emerging gaps, and to 

innovate to develop new tools and methods that permit Army forces to address future demands, and stay ahead of determined enemies. If confirmed, I will undertake 

a comprehensive assessment of the strategy to ensure that it is appropriate given 

the fiscal and operational environment facing the Army. 

Question. In your view does the Army’s modernization investment strategy appropriately or adequately address current and future capabilities that meet requirements across the spectrum of conflict? 

Answer. I think the modernization strategy is appropriate given current fiscal 

constraints. In our rapidly changing national security environment, if confirmed, I 

will work to ensure the Army’s strategy is appropriate to meet emerging threats 

across the spectrum. 

Question. If confirmed, what other investment initiatives, if any, would you pursue in this regard? 

Answer. I will ensure the Army is investing in cross-cutting capabilities that can 

enhance multiple equipment portfolios, such as the active protection system that 

can be used on multiple combat platforms and other vehicles, directed energy or autonomous systems, and cyber security. The Army should invest in areas identified 

as potential vulnerabilities and in any areas that may have been bypassed over the 

past decade while it was investing in capabilities required by the conflicts in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Syria. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to ensure that all 

these initiatives are affordable within the current and projected Army budgets? 

Answer. I will evaluate the affordability issues of these initiatives and seek to 

align the Army’s investment strategy with its highest priority warfighting challenges, and ensure that the Army’s major programs receive the requisite oversight, 

advocacy and funding stability. 

Question. In your view, what trade-offs, if any, would most likely have to be taken 

should budgets fall below or costs grow above what is planned to fund the Army’s 

modernization efforts? 

Answer. Reduction in budgets or growth in costs above what is planned will require the Army to make some tough choices, to include deferring on and potentially 

terminating programs to fill more important capability gaps. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the stakeholders to fully understand the costs and risks associated with the budget reductions. 

Question. In your view, should the Army trade-off requirements within a program 

in order to make that program affordable? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would seek to prioritize must-have capabilities within 

the program while trading-off less critical capabilities, or ones at higher risk of 

1003 

being achieved due to technology immaturity, to ensure the program remains affordable. The Army may also have to consider reducing planned procurement quantities 

to keep programs affordable. 

ARMY WEAPON SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the following research, 

development, and acquisition programs? Are all programs delivering or sustaining 

capabilities that are suitable, reliable and survivable? Are all programs within cost, 

timeline and performance? 

Warfighter Information Network Tactical. 

Answer. My understanding is that the Warfighter Information Network Tactical 

program provides the Army a secure, high-speed, high-capacity networking backbone for mobile, ad-hoc networks in tactical environments, and underpins the 

Army’s Tactical Network modernization efforts. The program is focused on the development of key networking capabilities that have been tested and are currently 

deployed and utilized by warfighters in Afghanistan. I have been briefed that the 

Warfighter Information Network Tactical program is within cost, timeline, and performance against current requirements. 

Question. Distributed Common Ground System—Army. 

Answer. I understand that the Distributed Common Ground System—Army is the 

Army’s weapon system for Intelligence Analysts supporting current operations 

worldwide in Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Korea. It provides ground stations to 

receive, process, and disseminate sensor data and information; workstations for intelligence, weather, geospatial, and space operations analysts; tactical, operational, 

and theater strategic server capabilities; and a worldwide enterprise that provides 

access to over 700 data sources and intelligence reach back and tactical over watch 

capabilities. I have been briefed that the Distributed Common Ground System— 

Army system is within cost, timeline, and performance. I am aware that this system 

has drawn criticism, and, if confirmed, I am committed to an objective evaluation 

of the system’s performance. 

Question. Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). 

Answer. The Ground Combat Vehicle program, which was concluded in 2014 due 

to budget limitations, was developed as a new Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) to 

replace the Bradley IFV. I have been briefed that the Ground Combat Vehicle program is no longer active, but when it was, it was within cost, timeline, and performance. 

Question. Stryker Combat Vehicle, including the Stryker Lethality Upgrades. 

Answer. The Stryker Combat Vehicle is an acquisition program that has proven 

to be highly successful in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will remain a significant part 

of the Army’s force structure for the foreseeable future. The Army is pursuing upgrades to the Stryker Combat Vehicles to increase both the survivability and 

lethality of the fleet in response to urgent operational needs. 

In response to poor performance against improvised explosive devices, the Army 

retrofitted Stryker vehicles with a more survivable Double V–Hull designed underside. My understanding is that the blast-deflecting Double V-hull improvements 

have saved numerous lives in Afghanistan. 

In an effort to increase the lethality of the Stryker vehicles against emerging 

threats abroad, the Army will integrate 30mm cannons with an unmanned remote 

turret into a number of the vehicles. Providing an improved direct fire weapon system to support infantry at a greater range will improve the lethality of the Stryker 

fleet against a wide array of targets. 

I have been briefed that the Stryker Combat Vehicle program is within cost, 

timeline, and performance. 

Question. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). 

Answer. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is a Joint Army and Marine 

Corps development program, which consists of a Family of Vehicles that are capable 

of performing multiple mission roles. The JLTV will be designed to provide protected, sustained, and networked mobility for personnel and payloads across the full 

spectrum of military operations. JLTV addresses force protection performance and 

payload limitations in current High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, while 

providing more off-road mobility, fuel efficiency, and reliability than Mine-Resistant 

Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicles. I have been briefed that the JLTV program 

is within cost, timeline, and performance. 

Question. M1 Abrams tank modernization. 

Answer. The Abrams tank is anticipated to be the Army’s primary ground combat 

system through at least 2045. The age of the current Abrams tank fleet is low— 

6 to 7 years, on average. As a result of lessons learned in Iraq, the Army is pursuing 

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incremental improvements to the Abrams tank designed to buy back power deficiencies, improve protection and lethality, and provide the ability to accept future 

network and protection upgrades. These improvements will enable the Abrams Tank 

to maintain its leading edge in measures of survivability, lethality, and maintainability. I have been briefed that the Abrams Tank modernization program is within 

cost, timeline, and performance. 

Question. M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization. 

Answer. The Bradley Family of Vehicles has been an integral part of the Army’s 

force structure for decades, and will be continue to be so for the foreseeable future. 

As such, modernization of the fleet is critical. Over the past years, the Army has 

made incremental improvements to the Bradley variants that will buyback power 

deficiencies, improve protection and provide the ability to accept future network and 

protection upgrades. The Bradley fleet is now undergoing two additional improvements initiatives to upgrade the mobility, power generation and cooling capabilities 

lost by increasing the survivability and upgrading the network. I have been briefed 

that the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization program is within cost, 

timeline, and performance. 

Question. Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) self-propelled howitzer modernization. 

Answer. The Army is fully committed to the Paladin M109A7 Family of Vehicles, 

formerly known as PIM. The M109A7 will replace the current Paladin M109A6 Self 

Propelled Howitzer and Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicle starting in Fiscal Year 2017. The M109A7 will deliver responsive, all-weather, operationally adaptable, and offensive and defensive fires in support of the Armored Brigade Combat 

Team maneuver force, while keeping pace with the Abrams and Bradley. I have 

been briefed that the PIM modernization program is within cost, timeline, and performance. 

Question. Armored Multipurpose Vehicle (AMPV). 

Answer. The AMPV will replace the M113 Family of Vehicles (FoV) within the 

Armored Brigade Combat Team, which have become operationally irrelevant due to 

inadequate mobility, survivability, and force protection, as well as the lack of size, 

weight, power, and cooling necessary to incorporate future technologies. The AMPV 

will replace five M113 FoV mission roles with the following variants: Mission Command, Medical Treatment, Medical Evacuation, General Purpose, and Mortar Carrier. The first prototypes are scheduled to be delivered in December 2016. I have 

been briefed that the AMPV program is within cost, timeline, and performance. 

Question. AH–64E Apache modernization and Manned-Unmanned Reconnais- sance. Answer. The Apache is the Army’s only heavy attack helicopter, and is an invaluable asset on the modern battlefield, providing an immeasurable contribution to 

combat power. The Apache’s history dates back to the 1980’s, and the latest version, 

the AH–64E, is the second remanufacture of that proven system. 

Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM–T) is a force-multiplying capability in which 

the AH–64E Apache receives video feeds and target coordinates from Army’s Gray 

Eagle and Shadow Unmanned Aircraft. This greatly increases the Apache’s combat 

lethality and survivability by providing the pilot increased situational awareness 

prior to engaging the threat. 

Both the Apache modernization efforts and the MUM–T capability are delivering 

and sustaining capabilities that are suitable, reliable, and greatly enhance survivability for our soldiers. 

I have been briefed that the AH–64E Apache modernization and Manned-Unmanned Reconnaissance program is within cost, timeline, and performance. 

Question. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). 

Answer. The radios in the former JTRS program comprise a critical aspect of the 

Army’s and the Department’s network modernization effort, and are the foundation 

of the Army’s tactical network and communications. The radios provide man-portable, vehicle-mounted, and aerial communication and data transport services for the 

Army’s tactical network. It is my understanding that the Army’s strategy for the 

acquisition of these systems is to conduct full and open competition designed to leverage industry innovation and capability, reducing the long developmental lead 

times of the original JTRS program. I have been briefed that the JTRS program is 

within cost, timeline, and performance. 

Question. Joint Multi-Role rotorcraft program 

Answer. The Joint Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator is a Science and Technology effort to help inform capabilities and requirements for the planned Future 

Vertical Lift Program. I have been briefed that the Future Vertical Lift program is 

not yet an acquisition program, so it does not have a cost and schedule baseline yet. 

Question. Small arms modernization. 

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Answer. The Army’s small arms modernization efforts provide for the maturation, 

demonstration, testing and evaluation for emerging technologies in small arms. The 

ultimate goal is to provide soldiers with world-class weapons systems that achieve 

overmatch, and which are suitable, reliable, and survivable on current and future 

battlefields. Currently, it is my understanding that the Army is focused on developing weapons system improvements that will enhance the lethality, target acquisition and tracking, fire control, training effectiveness, and reliability of weapons. 

I am aware the Army’s portfolio of small arms modernization programs includes 

the XM17 Modular Handgun System, designed to replace the M9 pistols currently 

in use by the Army; the M2A1 Machine Gun; and the M4A1 Carbine. 

I have been briefed that the small arms modernization program is within cost, 

timeline, and performance. 

Question. Personal protective equipment modernization. 

Answer. The Army provides soldiers with the best protective equipment in the 

world. Over the past ten years the Army has fielded, and continuously improved, 

protective equipment that saves soldiers’ lives. It is my understanding that soldiers 

are equipped with a complementary suite of protective capabilities (body armor/combat helmets) that guard against multiple threats associated with ballistic, blast, and 

blunt force events, including ballistic projectiles and fragmentation from Improvised 

Explosive Devices. These improvements are drastic compared to what I personally 

experienced in Iraq in 2003–2004. 

My understanding is that the Army’s next generation PPE system is the soldier 

Protection System (SPS). The objective of the SPS program is to develop a modular, 

scalable, and tailorable system that is designed to defeat current threats at a reduced weight in comparison to our existing PPE. 

I have been briefed that the personal protective equipment modernization program is within cost, timeline, and performance. 

Question. AN/TPQ–53 Counter Fire Radar. 

Answer. The AN/TPQ–53 (Q–53) Counter Fire Radar is a new generation of 

counter fire sensor with the flexibility to adapt to uncooperative adversaries and 

changing missions, a vital capability on today’s battlefield. The Q–53 detects, classifies, tracks and determines the location of enemy indirect fire. The Q–53, replacing 

the current Q–36/37 Counter Fire Radars, provides enhanced performance including 

greater mobility, increased reliability and supportability, and the increased capability to determine the location of enemy fire in either 360-degree rotating or 90- 

degree stationary modes. The AN–TPQ 53 radar is on track from a cost, schedule 

perspective. The radar experienced performance issues during tests but we are back 

on track and the program is moving forward to production. 

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s long term 

strategy for the retention, disposal, utilization, and sustainment of its large MRAP 

vehicle fleet?’’ 

Answer. The Army is retaining the best, most modern MRAPs necessary for its 

requirements, and where appropriate, excess equipment is made available to other 

agencies, activities, and nations. If confirmed, I will review the Army’s MRAP strategy and make recommendations as necessary. 

ARMY-RELATED DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the systems and processes for identifying, evaluating, and managing risk in the Army’s organic and commercial defense industrial base? 

Answer. The Army continually assesses the industrial base and makes adjustments as necessary, while maintaining compliance with legal and policy requirements, to appropriately manage and maintain a viable, ready industrial base. If confirmed, I will review the Army’s industrial base strategy and make recommendations as necessary. 

Question. Should Army acquisition leaders consider impacts on the industrial base 

when addressing requirements for recapitalization or modernization of major end 

items such as tanks, tactical wheeled vehicles or key repair parts? 

Answer. It is my belief that Army acquisition leaders should consider impacts to 

the industrial base when addressing recapitalization or modernization requirements 

in order to make the best decisions for the total force. Army materiel must be available, reliable, sustainable, and affordable. Army acquisition leaders must consider 

all aspects of acquisition, including impacts to the industrial base, to be responsive 

to the needs of the warfighter. 

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Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue in systems and 

processes to improve identification, monitoring, assessment, and timely actions to 

ensure that risk in the Army-relevant sectors of the defense industrial base is adequately managed in order to develop, produce, and sustain technically superior, reliable, and affordable weapons systems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review and assess the existing systems and processes 

the Army uses to identify potential risk to the industrial base, and monitor its overall health. I will work with Army leadership to implement required improvements 

to ensure that the defense industrial base remains reliable, cost-effective, and prepared to meet the Army’s current and future strategic objectives. 

ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the role that Army 

science and technology programs have played and will play in developing capabilities for current and future Army systems? 

Answer. Over more than a decade of war, our warfighters have had the technical 

and tactical advantage over our enemies. The world has witnessed the value and 

impact that technologically enabled capabilities are critical to our warfighters. I 

have been briefed that the Army’s Science and Technology (S&T) mission is to enable soldiers to dominate the battlefield, both today and tomorrow. The Army’s S&T 

Enterprise includes more than 11,000 scientists and engineers, has been essential 

to developing near-term fixes for warfighter’s urgent needs. The strong technical expertise they provide has led to many fielded capabilities in response to both Operational Needs Statements (ONS) and Joint Urgent ONS. From what I have learned, 

the Army S&T Enterprise is aligned with and meeting the needs of the current and 

future warfighter. 

Question. Given the budget, how will you ensure that Army science and technology programs will successfully transition to operational warfighting capabilities? 

Answer. The Army has established a thirty-year modernization plan to guide 

Science and Technology investments and provide a more deliberate and systematic 

planning of technology insertion into programs of record. I believe that to prevent, 

shape, and win future conflicts in an ever-changing world, Army Science and Technology must deliver timely technological solutions that address top priority capability gaps. Science and Technology remains a critical investment to ensure our soldiers maintain a technological edge over potential adversaries. These investments 

are required to develop and mature enabling technologies. If confirmed, I would support continued investment in this area and ensure that it successfully transitions 

to the Army’s current and future acquisition programs. Given the great uncertainty 

about, and increasing complexity of, future national security threats, I believe it is 

especially important that the Army also continues investing in basic research and 

development. 

Question. If confirmed, what metrics would you use to judge the value and the 

investment level in Army science and technology programs? 

Answer. Historically, developing metrics associated with S&T has been exceedingly difficult. I have been advised that continuity of both funding and focus areas 

are keys to success within S&T, both from a technology development perspective as 

well as to maintain core competencies. I am told that the Army does measure how 

well S&T is aligned to warfighter needs and how well S&T transitions. If confirmed, 

I will challenge the S&T community to continue to develop additional metrics that 

will aid in assessing whether the Army is adequately invested. 

ARMY LABORATORIES AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ENGINEERING CENTERS

(RDEC)

Question. What role should Army laboratories play in supporting current operations and in developing new capabilities to support Army missions? 

Answer. Army laboratories should deliver technology-enabled solutions for current 

conflicts and develop technologies that enhance the Army’s ability to prevent, shape, 

and win future conflicts. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that Army laboratories 

fulfill these important roles. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army laboratories and research and development centers have a high quality workforce, laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so that they can continue to support deployed forces and develop next generation capabilities? 

Answer. I fully recognize the important role that the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics workforce and laboratory facilities have in facilitating the 

Army of the future. If confirmed, I will learn more about the specific issues and 

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challenges facing Army laboratories and centers and ensure they have the necessary 

tools and personnel to effectively perform their missions. 

Question. Do you support the full utilization of authorities established by Congress under the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration program that is currently 

being run in many Army RDECs? 

Answer. Yes, I have been informed that the authorities established by Congress 

under the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration Program have given the laboratories 

and engineering centers the flexibility and tools necessary to manage and 

incentivize Army personnel performing this critical function. If confirmed, I will 

seek to ensure that the Army is taking full advantage of the authorities provided 

by Congress under this program. 

Question. Do you believe that all RDECs in the Army’s Research, Development 

and Engineering Command (RDECOM) need enhanced personnel authorities in 

order to attract and retain the finest technical workforce? Would you support expansion of the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration authorities to all of RDECOM’s laboratories and engineering centers? 

Answer. All the RDECOM laboratories and centers are currently part of the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration, and that this provides important management 

flexibility for the laboratory directors allowing them to shape their workforce and 

remain competitive with the private sector. If confirmed, I will assess the effectiveness of these existing authorities, recommend changes, and execute as needed and 

appropriate. 

Question. Do you believe that the Army’s laboratories and engineering centers 

should have a separate, dynamic personnel system, uniquely tailored to support laboratory directors’ requirements to attract and retain the highest quality scientific 

and engineering talent? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would fully examine this issue to better understand the 

potential benefits and costs of such a system. With the exception of a few organizations, it is my understanding that the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration program 

provides the laboratory directors with the ability to attract and retain the highest 

quality scientific and engineering personnel. 

Question. How will you assess the quality of Army laboratory infrastructure and 

the adequacy of investments being made in new military construction and 

sustainment of that infrastructure? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage the appropriate Army organizations and 

stakeholders to better understand the challenges facing our Science and Technology 

infrastructure and develop solutions to ensure we are making the necessary investments in this important area. 

Question. Are you concerned about the current or future supply of experts in defense critical disciplines, particularly personnel with appropriate security clearances, to hold positions in defense laboratories? 

Answer. The Army must and will compete with the private sector to attract and 

retain the highest quality personnel in critical, emerging areas such as materials 

science, biotechnology, and cyber. It is my understanding that Army laboratories 

have benefited from a number of congressionally authorized personnel flexibilities 

allowing them to mitigate many of the concerns related to hiring clearable experts. 

In addition, these same authorities provided the directors of each of the Army laboratories management flexibility to ensure that their laboratories possess the research programs and facilities to entice the highest quality personnel. I also understand that the Army has been investing in Science, Technology, Engineering, and 

Mathematics education to ensure a future workforce that includes well-trained scientists and engineers. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Army continues to 

have the authorities necessary to access a high quality workforce both current and 

future. 

ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION (T&E) EFFORTS

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army’s test and evaluation 

infrastructure is robust enough to ensure that new systems and technologies are 

tested to verify their combat effectiveness and suitability? 

Answer. I will ensure the acquisition and the test and evaluation enterprise continually assesses the adequacy of the Army’s test and evaluation infrastructure to 

support current and planned future test events. I will also take into consideration 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s annual reports to Congress on developmental 

and operational test and evaluation as well as the Test Resource Management Center’s annual budget certification focused on test and evaluation infrastructure in accordance with 10 USC 196(e)(2). If confirmed, I will take steps to protect the funding necessary to maintain a robust Army test and evaluation infrastructure. 

1008 

Question. What metrics will you use to assess the quality of the Army’s T&E infrastructure? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the adequacy of the Army’s Test & Evaluation 

infrastructure and the metrics used to support the testing requirements of Army 

and Department of Defense acquisition, test, and evaluation professionals. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that weapon systems and other 

technologies that are fielded by the Army are adequately operationally tested? 

Answer. I will ensure that the operational test community has adequate resources 

to independently verify that acquisition systems and technologies employed by soldiers under operationally realistic conditions and are operationally effective, operationally suitable and survivable prior to deployment of the systems and technology. 

ARMY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

Question. What major improvements would you like to see made in the Army’s 

development and deployment of major information technology systems? 

Answer. The Army has a number of efforts to modernize the network; however, 

the current budget extends our modernization efforts out to 2022. My goal, if confirmed, would be to accelerate the modernization to the left to meet increasing cybersecurity threats and ensure we derive maximum benefit from increased capacity, 

efficient network operations and improved cybersecurity posture. 

The Army must continue to streamline the IT and Cyber acquisition process so 

that we may procure and quickly transition the necessary information technologies 

to stay ahead of the threat, which requires current and cutting edge technologies. 

Question. How will you encourage process and cultural change in organizations 

so that they maximize the benefits that new enterprise information technology systems can offer in terms of cost savings and efficiency? 

Answer. A key aspect of culture change is to continue to ensure that cybersecurity, threat awareness and sound cyber practices are instilled throughout the Army 

as an institution. The Army is working closely with DOD, the other Services and 

across the interagency community to ensure we improve our cyber hygiene and 

heighten our cybersecurity posture. 

If confirmed, I will encourage the Army to continue to implement its IT management reforms initiated in 2012, and continue supporting Secretary Carter’s initiative to reinvigorate DOD’s relationship with our IT & Cyber industry partners. This 

is key to tapping the innovation present in the private sector and for enhancing our 

ability to rapidly identify and take advantage of changes in the technology environment. 

Question. What is the relationship between Army efforts at implementing enterprise information technology programs and supporting computing services and infrastructure to support Army missions and efforts being undertaken by the Defense Information Systems Agency? 

Answer. I have been briefed that the Army looks to DISA as a service provider 

for enterprise services such as email, communication transport, and application 

hosting. DISA sees the Army’s efforts as setting the stage for the other Services to 

take advantage of DISA’s enterprise services and is using the Army as a catalyst 

to pave the way for a better Joint Information Environment across the Department 

of Defense. 

The Army is working closely with DISA on a number of efforts to include: Enterprise Resource Programs, mobile pilots, Joint Regional Security Stacks and MultiProtocol Layered Switching which is a huge effort for DISA and currently the biggest Army effort to build the capacity necessary to support enterprise capabilities. 

INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE: 

Question. Witnesses appearing before the Committee in the past have testified 

that the military services under-invest in both the maintenance and recapitalization 

of facilities and infrastructure compared to private industry standards. Decades of 

under-investment in DOD installations has led to substantial backlogs of facility 

maintenance activities, created substandard living and working conditions, and 

made it harder to take advantage of new technologies that could increase productivity. These challenges have been exacerbated by current budget pressures. 

What is your assessment of the Army’s infrastructure? 

Answer. I am aware there is a substantial backlog of facility maintenance. The 

Army has one of the largest real property inventory portfolios in the federal government, spread over a broad geographic footprint—both domestic and overseas. The 

Department is now in its fourth year of budget caps under the Budget Control Act, 

which have resulted in sizable underinvestment in facilities, impacting the Army’s 

ability to sustain its current infrastructure. This continued underfunding ultimately 

1009 

results in greater costs down the line, as small repairs turn into much larger problems. To that end, if confirmed, I will prioritize resources on facilities that build 

readiness to maintain life, health, and safety standards. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions if any would you propose to increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities? 

Answer. The Army should address critical maintenance problems before they develop into bigger and more expensive projects. I also believe more predictable funding is essential to facility investment planning and strategic decision making. As the 

Army downsizes, it has excess and poor quality facilities, which are unsustainable 

at the current funding levels. Budget predictability and modification of the Budget 

Control Act would help the Army provide adequate funding for the sustainment, restoration, modernization, and military construction accounts to meet infrastructure 

needs. If confirmed, I will focus on reducing the Army’s footprint, while adding precision to its facility investments. 

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENTS

Question. The Department of Defense has repeatedly requested a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. 

Do you believe another BRAC round is necessary? If so, why? 

Answer. Senior Leaders within the Defense Department and the Department of 

the Army have repeatedly stated the need for another round of BRAC to reduce excess infrastructure. Declining budgets and force reductions underscore the need to 

avoid spending resources on excess infrastructure. With the Army’s announced force 

structure reductions to an Active end strength of ∼450,000, I believe the Army must 

be provided the authority to analyze and where necessary reduce excess infrastructure. BRAC is a proven process that saves significant sums of money. 

Question. If confirmed and if Congress were to authorize another BRAC round, 

how would you go about setting priorities for infrastructure reduction and consolidation within the Department of the Army? 

Answer. BRAC is a strict statutory process by which DOD can close or realign 

military installations. It requires a meticulous, objective, and well documented analysis, with a focus on reducing capacity, not capabilities. If confirmed, I will ensure 

the Army uses military value as the primary consideration and treats all bases 

equally using the approved 20 year force structure plan and statutory selection criteria to develop recommendations to the Commission and Congress. 

Question. If confirmed and if Congress were to authorize another BRAC round, 

what is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Army in working with local 

communities with respect to property disposal? 

Answer. Specific Army responsibilities for property disposal can only be determined after the recommendations are approved. If confirmed I will ensure DOD resources are made available to assist affected local communities in planning the redevelopment of surplus Army properties. 

Question. It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round resulted in 

major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far less money than originally estimated. 

What is your understanding of why such cost growth and lower realized savings 

have occurred? 

Answer. BRAC 2005 primarily supported Army Transformation while the Army 

force structure was increasing and tens of thousands of soldiers returned to the U.S. 

from overseas requiring the construction of new facilities. Nearly half of the BRAC 

2005 recommendations focused on opportunities to enhance military value available 

under BRAC authority to move forces and functions. I understand that BRAC 2005 

is still saving the Army $1 billion per year on a net $13 billion investment (7.7 percent annual investment yield). It was also produced a significant improvement in 

military value (which was the goal). 

Question. How do you believe such issues could be addressed in a future BRAC 

round? 

Answer. A future BRAC round could be structured differently than BRAC 2005 

so as to focus on infrastructure consolidation and cost savings in response to a reducing force structure. This future BRAC would look more like 1990s-era BRAC 

rounds with relatively short payback periods. The payback for Army BRAC recommendations during these rounds averaged 2 years. The Army had about 30 ‘‘efficiency’’ recommendations in BRAC 2005. Those ‘‘efficiency’’ recommendations have 

an average payback period of 3.4 years and produce over half a billion dollars in 

annual savings. 

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RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. In your view, do Department of the Army policies concerning religious 

accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging 

on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief? 

Answer. Yes. I am aware that the Army and DOD policies ensure that every request for religious accommodation is evaluated equally on a case-by-case basis, 

given the unique facts of each case, for all soldiers, regardless of their faith background or belief or non-belief system. 

Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact good order and discipline? 

Answer. Yes, I am aware that current law and policy protect and accommodate 

individual expressions of belief, or non-belief that do not impact good order and discipline. 

Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers 

offered by Army chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the 

proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her 

religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs? 

Answer. The Army does not have a policy regarding public prayer by Army chaplains. As a matter of practice, however, chaplains are encouraged to be considerate 

of the audience as they pray in accordance with their own religious tradition. The 

Chaplain Corps trains Army Chaplains to perform or provide religious support to 

soldiers in a diverse and pluralistic environment. Training and the leadership of supervisory Chaplains ensures that religious beliefs and expression are protected in 

practice. While it appears Army’s training programs and practices strike an appropriate balance, if confirmed, I will assess this matter to ensure that the approach 

is effective and appropriate. 

Question. What is your assessment of measures taken at the Military Academy 

to ensure religious tolerance and respect? 

Answer. As a member of the United States Military Academy (USMA) Board of 

Visitors, I am familiar with the measures taken at the Military Academy to ensure 

religious tolerance and respect. The Superintendent and Commandant take this 

issue very seriously and hold frequent sensing sessions to review religious tolerance. 

The USMA Chaplain’s office has developed rules for religious discussions among cadets, faculty, and staff and has issued guidance for attending religious events. If 

confirmed, I will assess the effectiveness of these efforts at USMA and will monitor 

this area carefully across the entire force. 

DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES

Question. What is your understanding of the respective roles of the General Counsel and Judge Advocate General of the Army in providing the Secretary of the Army 

with legal advice? 

Answer. The General Counsel is the legal counsel to the Secretary of the Army 

and the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army. The duties of the General 

Counsel include coordinating legal and policy advice to all members of the Department regarding matters of interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the 

position of the Army on any legal question or procedure. 

The Judge Advocate General of the Army is the legal advisor of the Secretary of 

the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Army Staff, and members of the Army 

generally. The Judge Advocate General also directs the members of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps in the performance of their duties and, by law, is primarily 

responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice and the administration of military discipline. 

Question. What are your views about the responsibility of the Judge Advocate 

General of the Army to provide independent legal advice to the Chief of Staff of the 

Army? 

Answer. I fully support the statutory provision that prohibits any officer or Department of Defense employee from interfering with the ability of The Judge Advocate General to give independent legal advice to the Chief of Staff of the Army. The 

Chief of Staff does not appoint The Judge Advocate General, and does not have the 

personal authority to remove her. This enables The Judge Advocate General to provide independent legal advice. 

Question. What are your views about the responsibility of staff judge advocates 

within the Army to provide independent legal advice to military commanders 

throughout the Army establishment? 

1011 

Answer. I fully support the statutory provision that prohibits any officer or Department of Defense employee from interfering with the ability of judge advocates 

to give independent legal advice to their commanders. Staff Judge Advocates understand that the Army is the client and they are trained and instructed at The Judge 

Advocate General’s Center and School on the importance of providing independent 

legal advice to commanders. 

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL CORPS RESOURCING

Question. What is your understanding of the current and projected manpower requirements in the Army JAG Corps? 

Answer. As a former Army Judge Advocate, I am very interested in this topic. 

Based on my experience, I understand the important role that Judge Advocates play 

in providing legal advice to soldiers, their families, and commanders at all levels. 

I have not had the opportunity to thoroughly review the Army JAG Corps’ current 

manning levels or future requirements but assure you that, if confirmed, I will undertake such a review to ensure that the Army JAG Corps is properly manned to 

support commanders in all aspects of their mission. 

Question. If confirmed, will you review the judge advocate manning within the 

Army and determine whether current Active Duty strengths are adequate? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed I will review judge advocate manning and work with 

The Judge Advocate General to ensure current Active Duty strengths are adequate. 

As the Army continues to have emerging legal support missions in areas such as 

cyber, military justice, and legal assistance, I will continue to consult The Judge Advocate General and the G–1 to ensure there are also adequate levels of manning 

for the legal support missions for soldiers, family members, retirees and the Army. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s sexual assault prevention and 

response program? 

Answer. From my initial review of the data, I see positive progress and indicators 

that the Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) is 

going in the right direction. However, I also believe that there is still much work 

to be done. The Army must continue to increase reporting and decrease prevalence. 

The Army must also focus on the issue of retaliation to ensure that victims feel safe 

in reporting and that we have established a command climate that demands dignity 

and respect for all soldiers, civilians and family members. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s programs to address and prevent retaliation or reprisal against individuals who report sexual harassment or sexual assault? 

Answer. Sexual harassment and sexual assault are a cancer to our Army. The 

Army has been working proactively to address retaliation and reprisal against individuals who report sexual harassment or sexual assault. Past efforts have included 

the expedited transfer program and the implementation of the Special Victim Counsel. Most recently, the Army has spoken with and surveyed victims, implemented 

policy to prohibit retaliation, developed training to assist soldiers in identifying and 

preventing retaliation, and implemented policy to investigate and monitor all allegations of retaliation. While I believe these programs and efforts are good steps, if confirmed, I will assess their effectiveness and recommend additional measures if necessary. 

Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges to the success of those programs? If confirmed what changes if any would you make to improve those programs? 

Answer. The greatest challenge is eliminating sexual harassment and assault 

while simultaneously maintaining an environment that encourages and facilitates 

victim reporting. Achieving a balance between these complementary goals contributes directly to individual soldier and unit readiness. A matter of critical importance, if confirmed I will assess and monitor closely to ensure that the Army continues to make progress toward achieving this end state. 

Question. What is your assessment of Army programs and policies to hold individuals accountable for retaliation or reprisal against individuals who report sexual assault or sexual harassment? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct an assessment to ensure policies are sufficient to hold individuals accountable for their actions. Army Directive 2014–20 prohibits any soldier from retaliating against a victim, an alleged victim or another 

member of the Armed Forces based on that individual’s report of a criminal offence. 

As a former judge advocate, I know soldiers may be punished for acts of retaliation 

under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I have been advised that 

1012 

when Army CID initiates a sexual assault investigation, it will also now initiate and 

conduct subsequent investigations relating to suspected threats against the sexual 

assault victim, including minor physical assaults and damage to property. If confirmed, I’ll ensure these policies are working to hold people accountable to rid our 

Army of this cancer. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. As a former military prosecutor and leader, I believe protecting the victim of sexual assault is imperative. Army policy favors unrestricted reporting as a 

bridge to offender accountability. Some victims do not want an investigation for a 

variety of personal reasons. Restricted reporting is a vital avenue to allow these soldiers to obtain advocacy, medical, mental health, and legal services. I have been advised that the services and support provided to victims who initially make a restricted report sometimes provide victims with the confidence to convert to an unrestricted report. I believe we should continue to allow victims options and multiple 

avenues for reporting sexual assault at this time. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to the victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. I firmly believe that commanders, and all Army personnel occupying 

leadership positions, should be held accountable for setting, training and enforcing 

the highest standards for supporting victims of sexual assault. 

Specifically, committed and engaged leadership and robust prevention campaigns 

at the squad leader level are critical to providing the necessary support to victims 

of sexual assault. Commanding officers are also responsible for setting positive command climates that not only help prevent the crime of sexual assault but also provide a safe environment where victims feel confident coming forward to report. The 

entire chain of command is responsible for creating a climate that prevents sexual 

assault, protects the victims from retaliation or reprisal, and holds the perpetrators 

fully accountable in accordance with appropriate legal processes. We must not rest 

until we rid the Army of the cancer of sexual assault. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Department of the Army’s implementation of the requirements to establish special victim’s counsel? 

Answer. From what I have observed, after legislative efforts, the Army’s rapid implementation of this program, which provides independent legal representation for 

victims of sexual assault, has been very successful in providing essential legal assistance to victims throughout the Army. Comprising approximately 75 Special Victims’ Counsel at 34 installations, positive feedback from clients supports the Army’s 

decision to place these counsel at local installations to maximize face-to-face interaction, the most effective means of delivering these critical services. These counsel 

have been aggressively protecting victims’ rights and allowing them to make informed decisions during the military justice process. Victims are also able to swiftly 

address retaliation concerns with the assistance of these Special Victims’ Counsel. 

These efforts have gone a long way, but we cannot stop until we rid the Army of 

the cancer of sexual assault. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Army resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help 

they need? 

Answer. After legislative efforts, the Army has dramatically transformed victim 

response services in recent years, to include professionalizing Sexual Assault Response Coordinator and Victim Advocate education, implementing a Special Victim’s 

Counsel Program, and establishing one-stop shops for victims in Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Resource Centers. However, we must continue to do all we can to prevent the scourge of sexual assault on our forces, and 

provide the victims of this intolerable crime the medical, psychological, and legal assistance they need. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring that adequate 

Army resources and programs exist so we can rid the Army of the cancer of sexual 

assault. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to prevent additional 

sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

Answer. I believe the Army has made significant, measurable progress to prevent 

sexual assaults both at home and in deployed locations. There is, however, much 

more work to be done. I am committed to combating this crime and cancer to our 

troops. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources Army 

has in place to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. The Army has one of the best training programs for sexual assault investigators in the Nation and, as a result, the Army’s investigators bring exceptional 

investigative capabilities to each installations’ special victim teams. I am also aware 

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of the Army’s development of a special victims’ prosecution capability, which consists of uniquely-trained counsel focused solely on the prosecution of sexual assault 

and family violence crimes. These Special Victims’ Prosecutors respond to every allegation of sexual assault that arises in their geographic areas and work closely with 

local Staff Judge Advocates and trial counsel to ensure the best advice is given to 

investigators and commanders, and to ensure the appropriate disposition in each 

case. While the training and resourcing of specially-selected and trained investigators and prosecutors has been a focus of the Army’s efforts, if confirmed, I will closely and continually monitor this critical work. We cannot rest until the cancer of sexual assault is gone from our Army. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. As a former military prosecutor and with the changes—driven by statute 

and policy—the Army has made, over the last few years, I believe the commander 

is central to sexual assault prevention within the Army. The commanding officer of 

every unit is the centerpiece of an effective and professional warfighting organization. They are charged with building and leading their team to withstand the rigors 

of combat by establishing a climate of dignity, respect, and trust in their unit. Leaders at every level must be held accountable to rid our troops of this cancer. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. The issue of sexual assault in the Army will be one of my primary areas 

of focus. Ridding our Army of this cancer is a top priority and readiness issue. Significant changes to law and policy have occurred in this area over the last few years, 

including requirements for additional legal training for commanders at all levels, 

and reducing the Commander’s authority in the clemency phase of sexual assault 

cases, to name only a few. The military justice system has recently undergone the 

most comprehensive revision since its implementation more than 50 years ago. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense directed the establishment of the Military Justice Review Group to conduct a comprehensive review of the military justice system. 

If confirmed, I would want to review all of these changes and to determine their 

effect on the current military justice process in sexual assault cases prior to making 

an assessment on further changes, including the use of judge advocates outside the 

chain of command making such determinations. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Army? 

Answer. I believe that the Army has made progress but there is additional work 

still to be done. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring continued progress. The 

Army focused significant efforts on senior leadership engagement to address this 

cultural issue. To achieve continued progress, the Army is placing additional emphasis on junior leader/first line leaders with programs like ‘‘NOT IN MY SQUAD’’ encouraging first line leaders to achieve the culture of dignity and respect necessary 

to eradicate sexual assault in our Army. 

BALANCE BETWEEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES

Question. The Army employs many contractors and civilian employees. In many 

cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and 

task forces, and perform many of the same functions as federal employees. Both contractors and civilians make up an integral part of the Department’s total workforce. 

Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees and contractor 

employees best serves the Army? 

Answer. Although I have worked with both Department of the Army civilians and 

contractors, I do not have current knowledge of any issues indicating these two components of the force are out of balance. The most effective make up for one element 

of the Army will not necessarily be the same for another, so determining optimal 

efficiency and effectiveness across the force requires detailed analysis. If confirmed, 

I will review and should I become aware of an imbalance or an inefficient use of 

taxpayer dollars, I am committed to providing the Secretary my best advice, within 

current statutory limitations, to remedy the situation. 

Question. In your view, has the Department utilized contractors to perform basic 

functions in an appropriate manner? 

Answer. Again, although I have worked with both Department of the Army civilians and contractors, I do not have sufficient current knowledge to assess whether 

or not the Department is utilizing contractors in an appropriate manner when performing basic functions. If confirmed, I will review and should I become aware of 

1014 

an inappropriate use of contractors, I am committed to providing the Secretary my 

best advice to remedy the situation. 

Question. Do you believe that the Army should undertake a comprehensive reappraisal of ‘‘inherently governmental functions’’ and other critical government functions, and how they are performed? 

Answer. The Army Staff has briefed me that current law requires the Army to 

do so through the Inventory for Contractor Services review process. If confirmed, I 

will review and should I discover the Army is not in compliance with this statutory 

requirement, I will immediately recommend to the Secretary a plan for coming into 

statutory compliance. 

Question. Are there non-monetary reasons why the Army would need or desire 

one type of manpower over the other? If so, provide relevant examples where of 

those reasons? Under what circumstances should cost be used as the primary factor? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess under what circumstances, within existing 

statutory and policy constraints, cost should be used the primary factor in the Army 

using one type of manpower over another. As a general rule, military personnel 

should perform military duties, maximizing combat power and bolstering readiness. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work to remove any artificial constraints placed 

on the size of the Army’s civilian and contractor workforce, so that the Army can 

hire the number and type of employees most appropriate to accomplish its mission? 

Answer. By law, the Army does not manage its civilian workforce based on caps, 

End Strength levels or Full Time Equivalent levels. Instead the Army manages its 

civilian workforce based on workload, available funding, and Total Force Management statutory and policy requirements governing the mix between military, civilian 

employees and contractors. The Federal Acquisition Regulations require most contracts to be ‘‘performance based’’ rather than ‘‘personal services’’ arrangements unless personal services are specifically authorized by statute. By law, the Army provides input to Department of Defense plans for reducing civilian and contract funding as a percent of military funding reductions. This requires managing both civilian 

employees and contractors based on cost savings, rather than manpower levels, and 

strategically programming for both civilian and contract funding when developing 

Agency budgets. If confirmed, I will work to remove artificial constraints placed on 

the size of the Army’s civilian and contractor workforce and ensure the Army is 

compliant with statutory requirements. 

WOMEN IN COMBAT INTEGRATION

Question. Army recently completed its review of military occupations closed to 

service by women, prior to the Secretary and Chief of Staff essentially recommending that all positions be opened. 

What is the military necessity to allow women to serve in the combat arms? Is 

there a shortage of qualified men? Does the Army assess women are as suitable, 

reliable and survivable as men in close combat? 

Answer. Access to a greater pool of qualified individuals who meet Army standards will improve our readiness. Women have already shown their capability in 

combat, most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Army will continue to be 

a standards-based organization. 

Question. The Marine Corps’ research demonstrated that women suffered higher 

injury rates among women than men when engaged in field combat exercises and 

training. Did Army research show the same? If so, does that concern you with respect to potential impact to female soldiers? 

Answer. The Army reviewed an extensive amount of published research and injury data provided by the Public Health Center. The published research demonstrates that overall injury rates are higher for women, but higher levels of physical fitness in women reduce injury rates. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the 

implementation of gender neutral occupational standards and optimal physical fitness programs to place the right soldier in the right job regardless of gender. 

Question. Has the Army done a cost benefit analysis of decision to send women 

to Ranger School? What was the ratio of female volunteers beginning the course to 

graduates? How does this ratio compare to male volunteers? What is the comparative cost in dollars and man hours for a female Ranger School graduate and compared to that of a male? 

Has the Army done a cost benefit analysis of decision to send women to Ranger 

School? 

Answer. The Army began assessing the participation of women in the Ranger 

Course in May 2014, and gained the Secretary of the Army’s approval in January 

2015 to proceed with an initial assessment in April 2015. Resource costs associated 

with that gender integration assessment included necessary facilities changes to esVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01020 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tablish designated female living areas and to implement safe and secure measures 

such as security cameras and reinforced doors. Costs associated with the Ranger 

Course Assessment also included the Temporary Duty costs of female Observer/ Advisors, which was approximately $866K. This cost was driven by the fact that there 

were no permanently assigned female cadre in the Airborne Ranger Training Brigade at the time of the assessment and this would not be an enduring/continuing 

cost. 

Question. What was the ratio of female volunteers beginning the course to graduates? 

Answer. Nineteen women started the April 2015 Ranger Course Assessment, with 

three graduating and earning the Ranger Tab (16 percent). 

Question. How does this ratio compare to male volunteers? 

Answer. The graduation rate for males completing the same April Ranger Course 

was 33 percent. 

Question. What is the comparative cost in dollars and man-hours for a female 

Ranger School graduate and compared to that of a male? 

Answer. The costs are similar for men and women attending the Ranger Course 

with the exception of female Observer/Advisors, which will not be an enduring cost. 

The Army is currently determining costs associated with permanently integrating 

female students into the course (e.g., billeting, latrines, and showers at Ranger 

training sites). 

Question. Do you believe Congress should amend the Selective Service Act to require the registration of women? 

Answer. The decision to fully integrate women into our military is an historic decision, and full implementation of this decision requires cooperative efforts across 

the Department of Defense and Congress, which must decide how this impacts the 

Selective Service Act. If confirmed, recognizing the significance of this decision, my 

goal is to ensure the Army implements this change consistent with controlling law 

and policy, while ensuring continued successful mission accomplishment of individual soldiers and Army units. 

Question. If women become subject to the draft, should they also be prepared for 

involuntary assignment based upon the needs of the Army? 

Answer. Over the past 15 years, our volunteer force has proven its ability to succeed against challenging adversaries in rapidly changing environments. If the draft 

is reinstated, meeting the requirements of the combatant commanders will be the 

Army’s top priority. The primary considerations in assigning a soldier are, and will 

continue to be, the soldier’s current qualifications and ability to fill a valid requirement. The goal is always to place the right soldier in the right job at the right time. 

Question. What is your opinion on whether men and women in combat and special 

forces MOSs should be subject to the same physical requirements for participation 

in those MOSs? 

Answer. The use of gender neutral validated occupational standards and physical 

requirements ensures readiness across the force. My opinion is that if an individual 

meets the occupational standards of a specific MOS then they should be allowed to 

serve. If confirmed, the Army will continue to be a standards-based organization. 

Question. In light of Secretary Carter’s decision to open all military positions to 

women, what do you believe are the primary challenges to implementing full integration in the Department of the Army and how do you plan to address them? 

Answer. I have been briefed that the Army is taking a deliberate, methodical, 

standards-based approach to integrating women into previously closed occupations 

and positions. This analysis will identify the primary challenges to implement full 

integration. 

Question. Tank crews, howitzer sections, infantry squads, engineer squads, mortar 

squads and scout sections readiness require small unit stability after weapons qualification. These are the building blocks that affect Battalion and Brigade over all 

readiness. Given available data, women have higher rates of injury. Maternity leave 

can remove a female soldier from her assigned crew or squad for months. Given 

these challenges, what is your view on the impact this decision will have on unit 

readiness? 

Answer. I have been advised that the Army is taking a deliberate, methodical, 

standards based approach to integrating women and we do not anticipate a decrease 

in readiness when women enter previously closed occupations and positions under 

current Army policies. The Army is instituting a longitudinal study on physiological 

injuries on all soldiers to improve the physical readiness of all soldiers. 

1016 

MATERNITY LEAVE

Question. Navy Secretary Mabus recently announced a change in Department of 

Navy policy that would provide 18 weeks of maternity leave for sailors. 

Would you support extending maternity leave to 18 weeks for soldiers? 

Answer. Army soldiers and their families are our greatest asset. I fully support 

Army maternity leave, but I need to better understand the impact that extending 

maternity 6-week leave and/or parental leave would have on the readiness of the 

force during a drawdown before providing an opinion on this issue. If confirmed, I 

will review the impact extending maternity leave would have on readiness, coupled 

with the impact an extension of our 6-week policy may have on recruitment and 

family resiliency. 

Question. If so, what would be your plan to augment or back-fill those positions 

occupied by female soldiers on extended maternity leave? Would you consider utilizing reservists to back-fill those positions? 

Answer. Army soldiers, their families, and readiness are our top priority. I need 

to better understand how extending maternity leave would impact the force. If confirmed, I will review the impact on readiness, and the associated fiscal costs and 

its effect on recruitment and family resiliency, and I will make a recommendation 

on how best to mitigate any impacts. 

Question. In your view, how would the soldiers account and pay for the cost of 

additional personnel to fill positions left vacant by soldiers on extended maternity 

leave? 

Answer. I need to better understand how extending maternity leave will impact 

the force. If confirmed, I will review the impact that an extended maternity leave 

policy will have on the readiness of the force, to include potential recruitment benefits and family resiliency. 

Question. Would the Army require an increase to their authorized end strength 

to accommodate additional manning requirements? 

Answer. I need to better understand how extending maternity leave will impact 

the force. If confirmed, I will review the readiness impact and costs associated with 

providing extended maternity leave, to include potential recruitment and family resilience. 

Question. Do you support paid uncharged paternity leave for male soldiers in excess of the 10 days afforded by statute? If so, how many weeks do you believe is 

an appropriate amount of time? 

Answer. I need to better understand the impacts of changing the current law regarding paternity leave. If confirmed, I will review the data and any readiness impacts and associated costs that a change in paternity leave would have on Army 

readiness, cost, and potential recruitment and family resiliency. 

Question. Do you believe the Army fully understands the cost of this reform? If 

so, describe those costs. 

Answer. I’ve been advised that the Army is currently assessing the impact that 

this reform would have on cost and readiness. If confirmed, I will review the cost 

and readiness impacts, to include potential recruitment and family resilience benefits, and provide a recommendation. 

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. If confirmed, what challenges do you foresee in sustaining Army MWR 

programs in the future fiscal environment? 

Answer. soldier and family quality of life is an essential component to our Army. 

Moreover, family is one of the most important components of retention. We have tremendous programs now. The challenge is to re-shape MWR to address the needs of 

the families while adapting the programs to be less dependent on appropriated dollars. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Army’s highest priority MWR programs 

are fiscally sustainable and continue to provide soldiers and families a quality of 

life they so deserve. 

MILITARY HEALTH CARE

Question. In your view, what should the Army Medical Command do to improve 

access to care in its medical treatment facilities? 

Answer. As a former Army judge advocate, I recognize the importance of providing 

timely and high quality care to our Army family. If confirmed, I will work with the 

Army Surgeon General to ensure we continue to make focused improvements in access to care and that we are diligent in the governance and oversight of our 

healthcare responsibilities. 

1017 

Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Surgeon General of the 

Army to improve the healthcare experience for soldiers and their families? 

Answer. I am committed to working with The Surgeon General to ensure that soldiers, family members and retirees have access to quality and safe health care 

where and when it is needed. My focus will be on improving access by expanding 

the number of portals available to obtain an appointment, and by studying the possibility of leveraging such tools as expanding the use of Telehealth beyond the fixed 

facility and into the patient’s home. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. soldiers and their families in both the active and reserve components 

have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational 

deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for soldiers, and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced, especially in light of current fiscal constraints? 

Answer. Our soldiers and their families are our greatest asset. I am aware and 

believe that continued deployments, rotations, separations and permanent changes 

of station are very stressful to soldiers and families and that effective programs to 

reduce that stress are critical to the Army’s readiness. If confirmed, one of my top 

priorities will be adequately resourcing programs that address and prevent negative 

behaviors such as domestic violence and substance abuse. Another area of great importance to me is soldier and family financial readiness. These programs build resiliency, self-reliance, and confidence to enable soldiers and families to remain Total 

Army Strong. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the fiscal viability of family programs such as those that provide child care and family advocacy services, as well 

as effective financial readiness training to soldiers throughout their careers. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continue to be of great 

concern to the Committee. 

If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide prevention programs 

and policies for the Department of the Army to prevent suicides and increase the 

resiliency of soldiers and their families? 

Answer. Suicide prevention must be a priority and I will personally oversee the 

Army’s Suicide Prevention efforts. The Army’s ready and resilient campaign along 

with targeted and integrated training efforts are working to build protective factors, 

instill deterrence, prevention and intervention strategies with an aim to identify behaviors, which are associated with suicide. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army 

continues to collaborate with our sister services and the Defense Suicide Prevention 

Office to address common challenges and share best practices and results of Armyspecific initiatives. 

SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED, ILL, AND INJURED SOLDIERS

Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from the Army and the Federal Government for support 

services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from Active Duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. 

What is your assessment of the progress made by the Army to improve the care, 

management, and transition of seriously ill and injured soldiers? 

Answer. I am confident in the progress the Army has made to improve the care 

for our wounded, ill and injured soldiers, but we must continue to maintain and improve upon the great work we have already done for seriously ill and injured soldiers. If confirmed, I will continue to leverage the Medical Command’s rigorous organizational inspection program, Army and Department of Defense Inspectors General, the Army Audit Agency, and external audit organizations, such as by the Government Accountability Office, to drive improvements in the care and management 

of our seriously ill and injured soldiers. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase the Army’s support for wounded soldiers, and to monitor 

their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. Warrior care should remain an Army priority; it is an enduring mission 

and our sacred obligation. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army remains committed to ensuring our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers have the best health care 

1018 

possible to either successfully remain on Active Duty or transition from military 

service into communities as productive veterans. If confirmed, I would work on 

these important priorities and continue collaborative efforts with the Department of 

Veterans Affairs to facilitate the seamless transition for our wounded warriors. 

SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ACCOUNTABILITY

Question. While representative of a small number of individuals in DOD, reports 

of abuses of rank and authority by senior military and civilian leaders and failures 

to perform up to accepted standards are frequently received. Whistleblowers and 

victims of such abuses often report that they felt that no one would pay attention 

to or believe their complaints. Accusations of unduly lenient treatment of senior officers and senior officials against whom accusations have been substantiated are also 

frequently heard. 

What are your views regarding the appropriate standard of accountability for senior civilian and military leaders of the Department? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will demand accountability from all of our leaders. My 

view is that the Army should demand that all soldiers and Army civilians abide by 

the Army values. We will hold leaders accountable for ensuring professionalism, 

trustworthiness, expertise, and honorable service, while also ensuring that all members receive appropriate due process when they fail to meet Army standards. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that senior leaders 

of the Army are held accountable for their actions and performance? 

Answer. I will ensure that all allegations of misconduct or performance against 

general officers and senior executive service civilians, of which I am aware, are 

properly referred to the Inspector General of either the Army or the Department of 

Defense for a thorough, impartial investigation, regardless of the perceived credibility or magnitude of the allegation. If asked, I would also provide my best professional advice to the Secretary of the Army regarding the appropriate disposition of 

any substantiated allegation of misconduct or performance by a senior leader. 

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE (SES)

Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of 

senior executives. 

What is your vision for the management and development of the Army senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields? 

Answer. I will work closely with the Army staff to ensure the availability of talented individuals prepared to fill key leadership positions throughout the Department of the Army and the Army-serviced organizations, such as European Command, Africa Command, Southern Command and the majority of the executives assigned to the U.S. Mission to NATO. I have been advised, that in order to meet this 

goal, the Army will need to continue to leverage talent and performance management programs and that those programs will need to be extended below the executive level to ensure the availability of a strong bench of candidates. I understand 

the Army has implemented new initiatives for the mid- and senior-graded GS (and 

equivalent) workforces, and, if confirmed, I intend to continue to promote these to 

build a diverse bench of leader candidates. 

Question. Do you believe that the Army has the number of senior executives it 

needs, with the proper skills to manage the Department into the future? 

Answer. The Army manages senior executives to best meet leadership needs for 

Army and DOD. I understand that the Army continuously reviews the alignment 

of senior leader allocations to leadership needs and identifies changes in requirements. If confirmed, I will review this process and make recommendations to ensure 

the Army has the proper skills for the future. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

1019 

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of the Army? 

Answer. Yes. 

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important 

that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to 

receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or 

to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial 

in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

END-STRENGTH REDUCTIONS

1. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Murphy, when you look at the current threats to our national security, do you see a strategic justification for the reduction of Army endstrength by 40,000 soldiers? 

Mr. MURPHY. No, I do not see a strategic justification. Based on what I know of 

current threats, the reduction from 490,000 to 450,000 soldiers incurs significant 

risk with implementing the Defense Strategy. 

2. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Murphy, according to your responses to the advance policy 

questions, if the Army is required to reduce its size to 450,000 Active Duty soldiers 

by 2018, this will require that approximately 14,000 soldiers, or 35 percent of reductions, be involuntarily separated. As a veteran of the Iraq War and in your capacity 

as the nominee to be the Under Secretary of the Army, do you believe that we 

should avoid as much as possible the involuntary separation of well-performing soldiers, particularly mid-career soldiers who have not earned a retirement? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, I believe we should avoid as much as possible the involuntary 

separation of well-performing soldiers. The Army has worked to minimize involuntary separations by reducing new accessions and utilizing greater promotion selectivity. Of the approximately 76K reductions since 2012, only about 4.4K (5.8 percent) were involuntary. Unfortunately, it is my understanding that the Army will 

not be able to continue to meet reduced end strength levels without additional involuntary separations. 

3. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Murphy, I worked to include section 525 in the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (NDAA), which requires the Services 

to report to Congress on their use of involuntary separation. I worked to renew this 

requirement again in this year’s NDAA. If confirmed, do you commit to following 

this law, keeping Congress informed on the Army’s use of involuntary separation, 

and working where possible to avoid the involuntary separation of well-performing 

soldiers to meet budget-driven end-strength reductions? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, I commit to following the law. And yes, I will work, where possible, to avoid involuntarily separating well-performing soldiers. 

4. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Murphy, if confirmed, will you let me know if there is 

anything that I can do to help the Army minimize the need to utilize involuntary 

separations? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. To maintain the necessary force structure, the Army requires 

adequate, sustained funding. 

1020 

BEST VALUE CONTRACTING

5. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Murphy, there has been a recent trend in some of the 

Services to buy more products through Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) 

and reverse auction acquisition methods. I have become aware of cases where these 

methods have even been used for the procurement of personal protective equipment 

where safety and quality are critical and the failure of the item could result in combat casualties. Our troops, who put their lives on the line for our freedom and security, should not be sent into harm’s way with the cheapest equipment, but rather 

the best. In combat, as well as in training, quality personal protective equipment 

can prevent serious injuries and can even be the difference between life and death 

for our servicemembers. That is why I worked to include section 884 in this year’s 

NDAA, which was recently signed into law. This provision requires the Secretary 

of Defense to ensure that the Services, in procuring an item of personal protective 

equipment or a critical safety item, use source selection criteria that is predominately based on technical qualifications of the item, if the level of quality or failure 

of the item could result in death or severe bodily harm to the servicemember. If confirmed, will you review this provision in the NDAA and ensure that your Service 

complies with this law? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with Army acquisition officials to ensure that our acquisition process comports with law regulation and policy, to include 

section 844 of this fiscal year’s National Defense Authorization Act. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

REBALANCE TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC

6. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Murphy, I am very concerned with ensuring that our Rebalance to Asia-Pacific is more than just rhetoric. What are your views on advancing 

a tangible rebalance? 

Mr. MURPHY. The United States Army in the Pacific (USARPAC) is a robust component of the Nation’s Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. With over 100,000 soldiers and Army civilians assigned, it is the largest overseas command in the Army, 

and represents 30 percent of the Defense Department’s presence in the Pacific region. Even during the height of combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, 

the number of soldiers assigned to USARPAC remained relatively constant. Today, 

the Army is increasing its forward presence west of the international dateline 

through enduring security cooperation exercises and rotating additional trained and 

ready forces to the Republic of Korea, despite the Army’s ongoing reductions in endstrength (450,000 Active component soldiers by the end of Fiscal Year 2017). 

The Army’s posture in the Pacific as well as its operational activities such as the 

Pacific Pathways exercise program, builds our partner capacity, shapes the security 

environment and sets the theater to project power across the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. 

Army remains committed to the Asia-Pacific. 

7. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Murphy, in your opinion, how are we doing in reassuring 

our partners and allies in the region that we are serious about the Rebalance and 

what else should we be doing? 

Mr. MURPHY. The Army continues to assure its partners and allies through forward presence, rotational forces, military partnership engagements and exercises. 

Recently, General Milley co-hosted the 9th Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference in Bali, 

Indonesia to conduct bilateral and multilateral sessions to determine the best ways 

to maintain and strengthen regional security. We received positive feedback from 

our partners on Pacific Pathways and we look to refine and expand the scopes of 

these exercises and engagements based on recommendations from our allies. If confirmed, I will work closely with Army Senior Leaders to address our focus on the 

Asia-Pacific rebalance and discuss potential additional efforts to continue to 

strengthen our partnerships in the region. 

ENERGY SECURITY

8. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Murphy, I believe energy security is a vital component 

to our overall national security. Do you believe the Department of Defense (DOD) 

has a role to play in U.S. energy security and could you comment on how you view 

energy security as tied to our overall national security? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, the Army has a role to ensure we have reliable, accessible, sustainable, and affordable power for national security, as detailed in the Army’s Energy Security and Sustainability (ES2) Strategy. Increased reliance on power for 

1021 

communications, commerce, transportation, health and emergency services; support 

for homeland and national defense; and the threat of large-scale disruptions can 

have immediate and detrimental impacts on our economy and our national security. 

In particular, the national security vulnerabilities associated with the power grid 

leave the U.S. open to both small/short-duration and large/long-duration power outages. Energy security allows Army installations to remain force projection platforms 

and maintain the national security of the United States of America. 

ENERGY EFFICIENCY INITIATIVES

9. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Murphy, I applaud DOD’s work on energy efficiency initiatives including alternative and renewable energy projects. If confirmed, will you 

commit to continuing the administration’s efforts to expand alternative and renewable energy initiatives? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, I will continue the Army’s efforts to expand alternative and renewable energy initiatives that are focused on enhancing mission effectiveness, 

while ensuring projects and investments are made with a clear cost-benefit analysis. 

MAUI HIGH POWER COMPUTING CENTER

10. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Murphy, I am aware that the Maui High Power Computing Center (MHPCC) as part of the High Performance Computing Modernization 

Program should be undergoing systems modernizations along with the other computing centers. I want to ensure that the plans for the Maui modernization efforts 

are sufficiently focused to modernize their systems. If confirmed, will you work to 

ensure that all of our computing centers are monitored and resourced under the 

modernization program to ensure that they all have the capability to provide required outputs? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, if confirmed I will work to ensure that all of our High Performance Computing centers are provided with the appropriate capability to meet their 

requirements. 

11. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Murphy, if confirmed, will you commit to keeping me 

and my staff informed on the Army’s efforts to keep the computers at the MHPCC 

and the other facilities up-to-date under the High Performance Computing Modernization Program? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, if confirmed I will commit to keeping you and your staff, along 

with all other Congressional stakeholders, informed on all High Performance Computing Modernization Program issues. 

JOINT USE OF TRAINING RANGES

12. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Murphy, I know that soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division (ID) and other units participate in Pacific Pathways and other important military-to-military training opportunities with our allies in the Asia-Pacific region. 

These joint training events, several of which happen on Hawaii’s training ranges 

and at the Jungle Operations Training Center, with our allies build trust, increase 

interoperability, and effectiveness. If confirmed, will you continue to support these 

training opportunities and the facilities that enable them? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, the Army will continue to support the training of 25th ID units, 

Joint units and other allies in the Asia-Pacific region on the ranges and training 

areas in Hawaii in accordance with the combatant commander’s priorities and within the Army’s capabilities Training Center. 

[The nomination reference of the Honorable Patrick J. Murphy 

follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

August 5, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The Honorable Patrick Joseph Murphy, of Pennsylvania, to be Under Secretary 

of the Army, vice Brad R. Carson. 

1022 

[The biographical sketch of the Honorable Patrick J. Murphy, 

which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF PATRICK J. MURPHY

Education: 

Widener University School of Law • September 1996–May 1999 • Juris Doctorate Degree 

King’s College • September 1992–May 1996 • Bachelor of Science 

Employment Record: 

Fox Rothschild, LLP 

• Attorney/Partner • Philadelphia, PA 

• January 2011–current 

NBC News/MSNBC 

• Anchor/Contributor 

• New York, NY 

• April 2013–current 

University of Chicago 

• Visiting Fellow 

• Chicago, IL 

• August 2012–December 2012 

Widener Law School 

• Adjunct Professor 

• Harrisburg, PA 

• September 2011–December 2011 

U.S. Congressman 

• Washington, DC 

• January 2007–January 2011 

Cozen O’Connor 

• Attorney/Associate 

• Philadelphia, PA 

• March 2005–January 2007 

United States Army 

• Captain/Judge Advocate/Prosecutor 

• Fort Bragg, NC 

• May 2003–December 2004 

• Deployed Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–2004) 

United States Army 

• Captain/Command Judge Advocate 

• Tuzla, Bosnia 

• May 2002–September 2002 

• Deployed Operation Joint Endeavor (2002) 

United States Army 

• Captain/Prosecutor/Assistant Professor 

• United States Military Academy 

• West Point, NY 

• May 2000–June 2003 

Honors and Awards: 

Military Awards: 

• Bronze Star for Meritorious Service 

• Army Commendation Medal 

• Army Achievement Medal (2nd Award) 

• Global War on Terrorism Service Medal 

• Army Service Ribbon 

• North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medal 

• Parachutist Badge 

• Air Assault Badge 

• German Armed Forces Proficiency Badge 

Academic Awards: 

• Dean’s Award, Widener University School of Law 

1023 

• Trial Advocacy Honor Society—Hush Pierce Award, Widener University 

School of Law 

Other Awards: 

• Bronze Medallion Recipient of the Legion of Honor from the Chaplain of the 

Four Chaplains (2015) 

• Ambassador Award, Justice for Vets (2015) 

• One of ‘‘The Mighty 25’’ veterans poised to make a difference in 2015, by We 

Are The Mighty (2014) 

• International CLIO Award for collaboration with the Grammy Award-winning 

band Imagine Dragons and the Wounded Warrior Project (2014) 

• Legion of Honor Recipient, Chapel of the Four Chaplains (2014) 

• Straight Ally Award, by the Delaware Legacy Fund (2013) 

• Equality Champion Award, by the Family Equality Council (2012) 

• Profile in Courage Award, Keystone Progress (2011) 

• ‘‘Lawyer on the Fast Track’’, by The Legal Intelligencer (2011) 

• John F. Kennedy Jr. Award, Brown University (2011) 

• International Role Model Award, International Equality Forum (2011) 

• Philadelphia Community Advocate Award, Lambda Legal (2011) 

• Human and Civil Rights Award, Pennsylvania State Education Association 

(2011) 

• ‘‘Who’s Who in American Law’’, by Marquis Who’s Who (2011) 

• Human Rights Campaign (HRC), National Leadership Award (2011) 

• Fenn Award by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library’s New Frontier 

Award Committee (2010) 

• ‘‘Top 100 Irish Americans’’, by Irish America Magazine (2008) 

• ‘‘Pennsylvania Rising Stars’’, by Philadelphia Magazine and Law & Politics 

Magazine (2006 and 2011) 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by the Honorable Patrick J. Murphy in connection with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Patrick Joseph Murphy. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Under Secretary of the Army. 

1024 

3. Date of nomination: 

August 5, 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

October 19, 1973, Abington, PA. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Jennifer Safford Murphy. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. 

Undergraduate: 

Attended: King’s College 

Degree Granted: Bachelor of Science Degree 

Degree Received: May 8, 1996 

Graduate: 

Attended: Bucks County Community College, September 1991–May 1992 

Attended: Widener University School of Law 

Degree Granted: Juris Doctorate Degree 

Degree Received: May 10, 1999 

9. Employment Record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Attorney/Partner, Fox Rothschild LLP, Philadelphia, PA, January 2011–current 

Anchor/Contributor, NBC News/MSNBC, New York, NY, April 2013–current 

Visiting Fellow, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, October 2012–December 2012 

Adjunct Professor, Widener Law School, Harrisburg, PA September 2011–December 2011 

U.S. Congressman, Washington DC/Bucks County, PA, January 2007–January 

2011 

Attorney/Associate, Cozen O’Connor, Philadelphia, PA March 2005–January 2007 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Member, United States Military Academy Board of Visitors, West Point, NY, July 

2011-present. 

Special Government Employee/Foreign Affairs Officer, Department of State, 

Washington DC, October 2013–October 2014. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

Non-equity Partner, Fox Rothschild LLP 

Consultant, Countable 

Anchor/Contributor, NBC News/MSNBC 

Co-Founder/General Counsel, Virtus LLC 

Advisor, Dean’s National Advisory Board, Widener University School of Law 

Member, King’s College President’s Council 

Member, Big Brothers Big Sisters Southeastern Pennsylvania 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

Admitted Attorney, United States Supreme Court 

Admitted Attorney, United States 3rd Circuit Court 

Admitted Attorney, Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

Member, Pennsylvania Bar Association 

Member, Judge Advocate General’s Corps Association 

Member, Philadelphia Bar Association 

Member, Bucks County Bar Association 

Founding Member, Catholic War Veterans Daniel Faulkner Post 

Member, Ancient Order of Hibernians 

3rd Degree Knight, Knight of Columbus 

Life Member, Veterans of Foreign Wars 

1025 

Life Member, American Legion 

Life Member, 82nd Airborne Association 

Hockey Coach, Grundy Grizzlies Atoms Hockey Team 

Member, St. Michael the Archangel Catholic Church 

Senior Advisor, Truman National Security Project 

Senior National Security Fellow, Center for American Progress 

Senior Advisor, VoteVets.org 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

Democratic Nominee, U.S. Congress, 8th District of Pennsylvania 2006, 2008, 

2010. 

Democratic Candidate, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, 2012. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

Democratic National Convention, Platform Committee Co-Chair, 2008 & 2012. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Military: 


15-96_murphy_1.eps
1026 

Bronze Star for Meritorious Service, Iraqi Campaign Medal, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal (2nd 

Award), Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Army Service Ribbon, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medal, Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, German 

Armed Forces Proficiency Badge. 

Civilian: 

Bronze Medallion Recipient of the Legion of Honor from the Chaplain of the Four 

Chaplains (2015). 

Ambassador Award, Justice for Vets (2015). 

One of ‘‘The Mighty 25’’ veterans poised to make a difference in 2015 by We Are 

The Mighty (2014). 

International CLIO Award for collaboration with the Grammy Award-winning 

band. 

Imagine Dragons and the Wounded Warrior Project (2014). 

Legion of Honor Recipient, Chapel of the Four Chaplains (2014). 

Straight Ally Award by the Delaware Legacy Fund (2013). 

Equality Champion Award by the Family Equality Council (2012). 

Profile in Courage Award, Keystone Progress (2011). 

‘‘Lawyer on the Fast Track’’ by The Legal Intelligencer (2011). 

John F. Kennedy Jr. Award, Brown University (2011). 

International Role Model Award, International Equality Forum (2011). 

Philadelphia Community Advocate Award, Lambda Legal (2011). 

Human and Civil Rights Award, Pennsylvania State Education Association (2011). 

‘‘Who’s Who in American Law’’ by Marquis Who’s Who (2011). 

Human Rights Campaign (HRC) National Leadership Award (2011). 

Fenn Award by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library’s New Frontier Award 

Committee (2010). 

‘‘Top 100 Irish Americans’’ by Irish America Magazine (2008). 

‘‘Pennsylvania Rising Stars’’ by Philadelphia Magazine and Law & Politics Magazine (2006 and 2011). 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

Publications: 

April 20, 2015—Supreme Court Amicus Curie Brief in Obergefell v. Hodges. 

November 20, 2014—Professional Publication Veterans Choice + PC3 = More. 

Opportunities for Providers To Serve Local Veterans Health Law Alert with Elizabeth Litten. 

June 4, 2014—Professional Publication PC3 Program: An Opportunity for Health 

Care Providers To Serve Local Veterans Health Law Alert with Elizabeth G. Litten. 

May 4, 2014—Newspaper Article, Don’t Forget Key Works of U.S. Vets The Philadelphia Inquirer. 

March 7, 2014—MSNBC Article, Sexual Assault Bill Goes Down On Procedure, 

MSNBC. 

December 25, 2013—MSNBC Article, How Congress Broke Faith with Our 

Troops, MSNBC. 

November 10, 2013—MSNBC Article, Leaving No One Behind, MSNBC. 

November 2013—Book Introductory Chapter, Evolution of Government Policy Towards Homosexuality in the U.S. Military. 

November 5, 2013—Newspaper Article, Disabilities Treaty Breaks Down Borders 

for Vets, Stars and Stripes. 

July 18, 2013—MSNBC Article, State’s Rights Shouldn’t Trump the Individual 

Right to Vote, MSNBC. 

July 3, 2013—MSNBC Article, The Forgotten War and the Lessons of Freedom, 

MSNBC. 

July 2, 2013—Newspaper Article, Tailor Transitions So All Can See Vets’ Skills, 

Stars and Stripes. 

June 17, 2013—MSNBC Article, Why Senator Gillibrand is Right about Military 

Sexual Assault, MSNBC. 

May 26, 2013—MSNBC Article, Military Families Have No Better Ally Than Tom 

Perez, MSNBC. 

March 26, 2013—Supreme Court, Amicus Curie brief in United States v Windsor. 

March 4, 2013—MSNBC Article, How DOMA Hurts Our Military Families, 

MSNBC. 

February 19, 2013—Newspaper Article, Justice Delayed is Democracy Denied The 

Legal Intelligencer with Melissa Dolin. 

February 12, 2013—MSNBC Article, Message to Congress: It’s Been Two Months 

Since Sandy Hook. Act!, MSNBC. 

1027 

December 11, 2012—MSNBC Article, With Nominations on Hold, Justice Delayed 

is Democracy Denied, MSNBC. 

November 22, 2012—MSNBC Article, Thanksgiving Reminds Us Of Sacrifices 

Made By Others, MSNBC. 

November 10, 2011—Newspaper Article, Congress Has Opportunity to Stand Up 

for Veterans’ Jobs The Morning Call. 

September 20, 2011—Huffington Post Article, Ending a Shameful Chapter in Our 

History, The Huffington Post. 

February 2008—Book, Taking the Hill: From Philly to Baghdad to the United 

States Congress Henry Holt with Adam Frankel. 

16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

I do not keep an archive of written speeches, most of the time I either speak from 

brief notes or without any written materials. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to Congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this Committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, 

or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or 

denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

PATRICK J. MURPHY

This 10th day of November, 2015 

[The nomination of the Honorable Patrick J. Murphy was reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on December 18, 2015, 

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The 

nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 18, 2015.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to the Dr. Janine Anne Davidson 

by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied 

follow:] 

1028 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Committee has recently held a series of hearings on defense reform. 

What modifications of Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 

Act of 1986 provisions, if any, do you believe would be appropriate? 

Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act directed momentous change in the Department of Defense. The focus on joint operations, one of the landmark initiatives, was 

a welcome correction to the stovepiped system of the previous era. It is appropriate 

after thirty years to assess the degree to which the changes have had the desired 

effect and whether reform is needed. I welcome the Committee’s deliberate and 

thoughtful effort to address this issue. There is clearly a need for improvement in 

acquisition, business practices, and personnel management. If confirmed I look forward to working with the committee to identify where Department inefficiencies or 

operational shortfalls can be identified and mitigated. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. I believe my lifelong experience, first in growing up on around naval 

bases as the daughter of a Navy officer, then as a military officer, a defense civil 

servant, and more recently as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, has prepared me to execute the duties of Under Secretary of the Navy. In my career, I have 

had experience at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the national security enterprise. I have deep knowledge of Pentagon processes that will serve me well 

if confirmed. 

DUTIES

Question. Section 5015 of title 10, United States Code, states the Under Secretary 

of the Navy shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary 

of the Navy may prescribe. 

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary 

of the Navy? 

Answer. U.S. Code states that the Under Secretary shall perform such duties and 

exercise such powers as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe. By regulation, the 

Under Secretary is the deputy and principal assistant to the Secretary in managing 

the Department of the Navy. The Under Secretary also serves as the Chief of Staff 

of the Secretariat, the Chief Operating Officer of the Department. In accordance 

with section 904(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 2008, 

the Under Secretary also serves as the Department’s Chief Management Officer. 

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties 

and functions of the Under Secretary of the Navy, as set forth in section 5015 of 

title 10, United States Code, or in Department of Defense regulations pertaining to 

functions of the Under Secretary of the Navy? 

Answer. After review of the statutes and regulations, I do not currently recommend any changes. If confirmed, I will propose any changes that I may identify 

as meriting attention through the appropriate channels. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties, if any, do you expect will be prescribed for you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary to assign me duties that will utilize 

my strengths and experiences in assisting him with advancing his priorities and vision for the Department of the Navy. 

Question. Section 904(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008, directs the Secretary of a military department to designate the Under Secretary of such military department to assume the primary management responsibility for business operations. 

What is your understanding of the business operations responsibilities of the 

Under Secretary of the Navy? 

Answer. The Under Secretary of the Navy is responsible for overseeing the business operations of the Department and directs that the business environment be 

more effective and efficient. If confirmed, I will guide and prioritize our business operations opportunities to streamline processes, communicate, and share resources 

across the DON. Strengthening our fleet’s understanding of costs, developing efficient end-to-end business processes, reinforcing business alignment, and managing 

risks will be the keys to moving the Department toward achieving its business 

goals. 

1029 

Question. How do you perceive your role in setting the agenda for the Navy Deputy Chief Management Officer? 

Answer. The current fiscal environment necessitates that the CMO focus on business operations. To meet these needs, it would be my role to advocate for the Navy 

DCMO to transition from our current focus solely on business IT oversight to the 

full spectrum of an in-house business consultant, capable of bringing cutting edge 

business capabilities and analysis to the department. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Under 

Secretary of the Navy to the following officials: 

The Secretary of the Navy. 

Answer. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy is responsible for, and has the authority necessary 

to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Navy. The Under Secretary of the 

Navy is the deputy and principal assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and acts 

with full authority of the Secretary in managing the Department of the Navy. 

Question. The Chief of Naval Operations. 

Answer. According to title 10, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) performs his 

duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Navy and 

is directly responsible to the Secretary. The Under Secretary deals directly with the 

CNO in all Department leadership meetings and when acting in the Secretary’s 

stead. The Under Secretary works most closely with the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO). 

Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Answer. According to title 10, the Commandant of the Marine Corps performs his 

duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Navy and 

is directly responsible to the Secretary. The Under Secretary deals directly with the 

Commandant in all Department leadership meetings and when acting in the Secretary’s stead. The Under Secretary works most closely with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy. 

Answer. Statutorily, there are four Assistant Secretaries of the Navy performing 

functions and such duties as the Secretary prescribes. If confirmed, I will work with 

each of the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy to achieve the Secretary’s goals. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Navy. 

Answer. The General Counsel of the Navy serves as the senior civilian legal advisor to the Department of the Navy, the Secretary’s chief ethics official and performs 

such functions as the Secretary of the Navy shall direct. If confirmed, I will work 

closely with the General Counsel to achieve the Secretary’s goals. 

Question. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations. 

Answer. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) is the second highest-ranking commissioned officer in the United States Navy, and serves as the second-incommand for the CNO. In the event that the CNO is absent or is unable to perform 

their duties, the VCNO assumes the duties and responsibilities of the CNO. If confirmed, I would foster a close working relationship with the VCNO to ensure that 

policies and resources are appropriate to meet the needs of the Navy. 

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy. 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy is the senior uniformed legal 

advisor to the Secretary of the Navy, provides independent legal advice to the Secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations, and performs duties relating to any and 

all Department of the Navy legal matters assigned by the Secretary. If confirmed, 

I look forward to developing a good working relationship with the Judge Advocate 

General and his staff. 

Question. The Chief Management Officer and Deputy Chief Management Officer 

of the Department of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense serves as the Chief Management Officer 

of the Department of Defense. The Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) is 

the principal staff assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for 

matters relating to the management and improvement of integrated DOD business 

operations. If confirmed, I will work directly with the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

(DOD CMO) and the DOD DCMO on the full range of matters involving the management of the DOD. 

Question. The Navy Inspector General. 

Answer. The Navy Inspector General is the senior investigative officials in the Department of the Navy and is the principal advisor to the Secretary on all matters 

concerning inspection, investigations, and audit follow-up. When directed, the Navy 

1030 

Inspector General inquires into and reports upon any matter that affects the discipline or military efficiency of the Department of the Navy. If confirmed, I will 

work closely with the Inspector General to achieve the Secretary’s goals. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS. 

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next 

Under Secretary of the Navy? 

Answer. The Department of Defense and all of the services are encountering numerous challenges brought on by over a decade of war and the expense associated 

with resetting the force. These factors along with growing instability around the 

world directly impact decisions on current programs, support for the warfighter, and 

investment in future capabilities and requirements. Determining the best balance 

between meeting current challenges, building a relevant and capable future force, 

supporting sailors, marines, their families, and the civilian workforce will pose the 

most significant challenges in the years ahead. 

If confirmed, I would work vigorously to address these challenges and priorities 

and would work closely with DOD, Navy and Marine Corps leadership, and this 

committee to develop and execute strategies. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. The Secretary of the Navy has articulated clear priorities focused on 

Presence, People, Platforms, Power and Partnerships. If confirmed, I look forward 

to working with the Secretary of the Navy, senior military and DOD leadership, and 

this committee to meet these challenges and priorities 

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Under Secretary of the Navy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect the most serious problem to be determining the 

best balance between meeting current challenges, both fiscal and operational, and 

building a relevant and capable future force, while supporting sailors, marines, their 

families, and the civilian workforce. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy to set aggressive, 

but reasonable timelines and management actions to develop and execute strategies 

to address the challenges facing our Navy and Marine Corps. In the role as Chief 

Management Officer, continued improvement to program and budget development, 

oversight, and the cost effectiveness of acquisition programs, will remain major challenges and priorities. 

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish? 

Answer. In 2013, Secretary Mabus established his strategic objectives as Presence, People, Platforms, Power, and Partnerships; supporting these objectives is the 

priority I would establish. Successful implementation of these priorities allows our 

sailors, marines, and civilians to maintain the presence globally on which Americans 

have come to depend. 

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

Question. Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008 designates the Under Secretary of the Navy as the Navy’s Chief Management 

Officer (CMO). Section 908 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2009 requires the CMO of each of the military departments to carry out a comprehensive business transformation initiative. 

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Under Secretary in the capacity as CMO of the Department of the Navy? 

Answer. The CMO’s primary duties are to (a) ensure that the Department can 

carry out its strategic plan, (b) ensure the core business missions of the Department 

are optimally aligned to support the warfighting mission, (c) establish performance 

goals and measures for improving and evaluating overall economy, efficiency, and 

effectiveness and monitor and measure the progress of the Department, and (d) develop and maintain a Department-wide strategic plan for business reform. 

To help ensure management processes, information technology, business systems, 

and administrative services are complementary, integrated and aligned to the Department of the Navy’s mission, the duties and responsibilities of the CMO and 

DCMO are prescribed by the Secretary of Defense so that they may effectively and 

efficiently organize the business operations of the Department. The duty of the 

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DCMO is to assist the CMO in carrying out those objectives and, if delegated, assume primary responsibility for those functions. 

Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify 

you to perform these duties and responsibilities? 

Answer. The Under Secretary must have a thorough knowledge of the Department of the Navy; understand and respect the cultures of the Navy and Marine 

Corps as well as the DON’s civilian workforce. One should understand the way programs and budgets are developed and be a strong, forward-thinking leader. 

If confirmed, I will use my expertise in defense strategy and policy and military 

operations to perform enterprise responsibilities in the oversight of the Navy’s business operations. My diverse experience from serving on active duty as an Air Force 

officer and pilot, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of Plans, and as a senior 

fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and professor of national security has given me extensive exposure and experience in the business 

practices of the department of defense. This experience will help me to lead the way 

toward the identification and implementation of business operations improvements. 

Considering the importance of business operations as it supports our Navy’s direct 

missions, I believe the CMO and DCMO of DOD should set policy, based on sound 

best practices, regarding planning, development, and implementation of business 

practices, and verify that those policies are being followed appropriately and continue to remain best practices as years pass. 

However, I also recognize that the job of CMO encompasses a very diverse set of 

responsibilities and challenges. So I accept that I have much to learn, and will rely 

heavily on the knowledge and advice of military personnel and civilian experts in 

the Departments of Defense and Navy. 

Question. Do you believe that the CMO has the resources and authority needed 

to carry out the business transformation of the Department of the Navy? 

Answer. I believe the CMO has the resources and authority needed to carry out 

the business transformation of the Department. If confirmed, I would work with the 

SECNAV, DOD DCMO, and DOD CMO if I discovered that those resources and authorities were insufficient. 

Question. What role do you believe the CMO should play in the planning, development, and implementation of specific business systems by the military departments? 

Answer. The CMO and DCMO should apply best practices regarding planning, development, and implementation of business systems and verifying that policies are 

being followed appropriately in accordance with DOD guidelines, and if confirmed, 

I would work with the DCMO to institute rigorous investment management and 

business process reengineering (BPR) procedures for their managed business systems. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the statutory provisions 

establishing the position of CMO? 

Answer. At this time, I do not believe that any changes are necessary. I am aware 

that 10 USC § 2222 has recently been modified in section 883 of the FY16 NDAA, 

which provides much more autonomy for the Military CMOs. However, if confirmed, 

I would consult with SECNAV, DOD DCMO, and DOD CMO if my experience led 

me to believe that changes were warranted. 

Question. Section 2222 of title 10, United States Code, requires that the Secretary 

of Defense develop a comprehensive business enterprise architecture and transition 

plan to guide the development of its business systems and processes. The Department has chosen to implement the requirement for an enterprise architecture and 

transition plan through a ‘‘federated’’ approach in which the Business Transformation Agency has developed the top level architecture while leaving it to the 

military departments to fill in most of the detail. The Navy’s business systems, like 

those of the other military departments, remain incapable of providing timely, reliable financial data to support management decisions. In particular, the Government 

Accountability Office has reported that the Navy has not yet followed DOD’s lead 

in establishing new governance structures to address business transformation; has 

not yet developed comprehensive enterprise architecture and transition plan that 

plug into DOD’s federated architecture in a manner that meets statutory requirements; and instead continues to rely upon old, stovepiped structures to implement 

piecemeal reforms. 

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure that the Navy develops 

the business systems and processes it needs to appropriately manage funds in the 

best interest of the taxpayer and the national defense? 

Answer. If confirmed as the Under Secretary of the Navy, I will work every day 

to give the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, Congress, and American 

people the highest return on their investment in their Navy and Marine Corps. Furthermore, I will ensure that the proper business case analyses and appropriate esVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01037 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tablishment and application of business enterprise architectures support the capability of providing timely, reliable data to support management decisions. 

Question. Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the successful transformation of the 

Navy’s business systems? 

Answer. I believe that a single architecture for an organization as large and complex as the DON is extremely difficult and costly; at this point, what business value 

it would add is unclear. All standards, policies, and processes should be established 

to rival the best of those in the private sector. It does mean that I am accountable 

to ensure the appropriate analysis and process development occurs to transform outdated and inefficient business operations into those that are streamlined, cost effective, and well-planned. 

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Navy’s enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the requirements of section 2222? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with DOD DCMO and ensure each 

of our Defense Business Systems meets the obligations specified in USC § 2222 and 

DOD DCMO guidance. 

Question. What are your views on the importance and role of timely and accurate 

financial and business information in managing operations and holding managers 

accountable? 

Answer. Timely and accurate financial and business information is essential in 

managing the Department’s business operations. In order to make informed decisions, the Department’s senior leaders must have credible, reliable, authoritative information at the right time. 

Question. How would you address a situation in which you found that reliable, 

useful, and timely financial and business information was not routinely available for 

these purposes? 

Answer. I would make it a point to understand what business problems were 

being addressed with this information, prioritize their requirement to have processes in place and appropriate systems subsequently needed to produce the data, 

and determine what the cost would be to the Navy. 

Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial and business information 

available to Navy managers? 

Answer. I believe something we’ve learned from the efforts surrounding 

auditability thus far is that it isn’t just a comptroller issue, it’s something that applies to us all. If confirmed, I will work closely with each of the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy to confirm the establishment of specific requirements and execute 

measures thereby required to improve the quality of financial information used for 

decision-making. 

HEADQUARTERS STREAMLINING

Question. The Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters functions of the Department of Defense and 

the military departments. 

If confirmed, what would be your role in streamlining functions, as well as identifying and implementing reductions in the Department of the Navy headquarters? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the key leadership in the Secretariat and the Services to ensure the Navy efficiently meets the consolidation requirements in the NDAA and requirements directed by OSD. I understand that the 

Navy and Marine Corps have plans in place to meet the streamlining goals, and if 

confirmed I will continue those efforts. 

Question. What areas and functions, specifically and if any, do you consider to be 

the priorities for possible consolidation or reductions within the Department of the 

Navy? 

Answer. If confirmed I will work with the Navy team to identify the functional 

areas that can sustain a reduction. At this time I cannot identify which specific 

functional areas those are. I understand the importance of keeping a workforce in 

key areas. So if confirmed, I will be sure to minimize the impact on those key functional areas and the warfighting capability functional areas while meeting the reduction goals. 

Question. To the extent that the Department of the Navy has functions that overlap with the Department of Defense, Joint Staff, or military departments, what 

would be your approach to consolidating and reducing redundancy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with service counterparts, OSD leadership, and the Joint Staff to look for areas of possible consolidation. If confirmed, the 

focus of this review will ensure that reductions in headquarters staffs do not diminVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01038 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ish warfighting capability. The approach would be deliberate while ensuring compliance with the requirements of the FY16 NDAA. 

AUDIT READINESS

Question. The Department of Defense remains unable to achieve a clean financial 

statement audit. The Department also remains on the Government Accountability 

Office’s list of high risk agencies and management systems for financial management and weapon system acquisition. Although audit-readiness has been a goal of 

the Department for decades, DOD has repeatedly failed to meet numerous congressionally directed audit-readiness deadlines. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the Navy’s efforts to achieve a 

clean financial statement audit by 2017? 

Answer. I understand that the Department of the Navy has the Navy and Marine 

Corps 2015 Schedules of Budgetary Activity under audit by independent public accounting firms as interim steps to achieving the 2017 goal. However, despite 

progress on strengthening DON’s financial management environment, a substantial 

amount of work remains to be completed if the Department is to achieve a clean 

audit opinion on all four of the Department of Navy financial statements. 

Question. In your opinion, is the Department of the Navy on track to achieving 

this objective, particularly with regard to data quality, internal controls, and business process re-engineering? 

Answer. Following the Department of Defense Financial Improvement and Audit 

Readiness strategy, I understand that the Department of the Navy is on track to 

achieve audit readiness on all four of its financial statements in 2017. Navy and 

Marine Corps have shared and incorporated lessons learned from their respective 

financial statement audits and other assessments to strengthen the quality of the 

Department of the Navy’s data, tighten internal controls, and implement business 

process standardization. 

Question. If not, what impediments may hinder the Navy’s ability to achieve this 

goal and how would you address them? 

Answer. I understand that the Department of the Navy is on track to achieve a 

clean financial audit by 2017 even though there may be some challenges. Navy, like 

other federal agencies, has complex and diverse business systems that may make 

attaining a clean audit a challenge. If confirmed, I will work with the Department 

leadership to continue the progress toward a clean audit in compliance with the 

2017 statutory requirement. 

Question. In your view, are the steps that the Navy needs to take consistent with 

the steps that DOD needs to take to achieve full auditability by 2017? 

Answer. I understand that the Department of the Navy is highly dependent on 

services provided by the Department of Defense. The Department of the Navy’s 

strategy is consistent with and supportive of DOD’s ability to also achieve full 

auditability by 2017. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Navy moves 

to achieve these objectives without an unaffordable or unsustainable level of onetime fixes and manual work-arounds? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain a steady focus and commitment on all Department efforts that enable audit readiness. This will be critical to success in 2017 

and lay the foundation for a sustainable audit environment well into the future. If 

confirmed, I will review the objectives that have been prepared and determine 

whether they are reasonable and effective. I will support rationalizing the Department’s financial IT systems portfolio, leading to a business environment that supports the warfighter while sustaining clean financial statement audit opinions. 

END STRENGTH

Question. In this year’s budget request and Future Years Defense Program, the 

Department proposes making additional cuts to the Marine Corps Active and Reserve component end strengths. The Department proposes reducing the Marine active component to 182,000 by 2020, and plans to keep the Marine Corps forces at 

182,000 if sequestration continues. 

In your view, can the Marine Corps meet national defense objectives at the 

strength levels proposed without sequestration? What about at the strength levels 

proposed with sequestration? 

Answer. I understand the Commandant of the Marine Corps has testified that the 

Marine Corps can meet the requirements of the Defense Strategic Guidance today 

at the President’s Budget levels, but there is no margin. Lowering end strength due 

to sequestration or enforcement of the Budget Control Act funding caps would not 

allow the Marine Corps to execute the current Defense Strategic Guidance. A new 

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strategy would need to be developed that would take into account fewer warfighting 

units available to deploy in defense of the Nation. 

Question. If the Marine Corps must reduce its active component end strength to 

182,000, where does the Marine Corps take risk with respect to the national defense 

strategy? 

Answer. I understand the Commandant of the Marine Corps has testified that the 

Marine Corps has been forced to prioritize near-term readiness for forward deployed 

marines and assume risk in home station readiness, modernization, infrastructure 

sustainment, and quality of life programs. If confirmed, I will work with Marine 

Corps leadership to minimize the risk to overall Service readiness. 

Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional force shaping 

tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has provided the past three years? 

Answer. I understand that each of the Services is involved in an OSD-led collaborative assessment of the potential need for legislative reforms to various personnel 

authorities, which will ensure the Department has the tools necessary to recruit, develop, shape and retain the talent necessary to meet the mission of the Department 

of the Navy. If confirmed, I will review those efforts in detail to ensure that they 

are appropriate to meet emerging requirements of the Department in general, and 

the specific requirements of the Navy and Marine Corps. 

Question. In your view, should the number of general and flag officers in the Marine Corps and Navy be reduced commensurate with the drawdown of total Marine 

and Navy end strength? 

Answer. I understand that the Services recently conducted a Congressionally-directed review of active component general and flag officer billets. A similar review 

is underway now for the reserve component. If confirmed, I will ensure that any recommendations regarding changes in the number of authorized flag and general officers are based on the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps, considering the nature 

of responsibilities associated with any specific position. 

Question. What are your views on the appropriate size and mix of the Active Duty 

Navy and Marine Corps, and their reserve components? 

Answer. The programmed mix of the Total Force should be based on a requirements-based estimate of force size and Active Reserve mix required to meet current 

and future military challenges in support of the National Defense Strategy. It is essential that we have a deliberative requirements-based approach that provides the 

highly qualified, trained and experienced force needed to maintain the core capabilities of the Navy. The Marine Corps is the Nation’s force-in-readiness and with the 

current size of our active duty force, meets the current defense planning guidance. 

It is my understanding that the Marine Corps is adequately sized to meet the current requirement in the short term, but I am concerned about our capacity to meet 

unexpected operational demands, especially in the event of a Major Contingency Operation. The current reserve mix supports active duty employment as the Marine 

Corps plans to integrate reserves to support the range of military operations. 

Question. How does Navy support to the ground forces in the form of individual 

augmentee missions affect Navy end strength requirements? 

Answer. The individual augmentee (IA) mission is an additional work requirement and therefore is not factored into the NDAA-mandated end strength value. So, 

the total end strength requirement will be unchanged by the IA mission. 

TRANSFORMATION

Question. If confirmed as the Under Secretary of the Navy, you would play an important role in the ongoing process of transforming the Navy and Marine Corps to 

meet new and emerging threats. 

Concerning capability and capacity to meet new and emerging threats, what are 

your goals regarding transformation of the Navy and Marine Corps? 

Answer. A major challenge today is keeping pace with our adversaries under fiscal 

constraints and uncertainty. Resource limitations require that we be innovative in 

our approach to ends, ways and means, while also ensuring that capability, capacity 

and readiness are properly balanced to meet the new and emerging threats. If confirmed, one of my goals would be to transform the Navy and Marine Corps to be 

an even more efficient, highly capable and ready force. 

LOW DENSITY/HIGH DEMAND FORCES

Question. If confirmed, how would you address the Department of the Navy’s challenge in manning low density/high demand units, ratings, and occupational specialties? 

Answer. Continued application of targeted, discretionary special and incentive 

pays, such as the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) or officer community-specific 

1035 

continuation pays will be key in addressing recruiting and retention requirements 

among critical skill areas, particularly those in the high-demand, low-density skill 

sets. Carefully managed special and incentive pays can yield the desired force levels, 

but they must be periodically reviewed to ensure they maintain their efficacy while 

providing an appropriate return on investment. Although special and incentive pays 

are a proven method for increasing retention, if confirmed I will investigate additional avenues for managing talent across the Navy and Marine Corps, with a special emphasis on those areas of high demand and in highly competitive occupational 

specialties. 

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The retention of quality sailors and marines, officer and enlisted, Active 

Duty and Reserve, is vital to the Department of the Navy. 

How would you evaluate the status of the Navy and Marine Corps in successfully 

recruiting and retaining high caliber personnel? 

Answer. I know that for several years Navy has enjoyed recruiting and retention 

of highly qualified sailors in unprecedented numbers. I would anticipate that maintaining such a high-quality force, particularly as the economy improves, will become 

increasingly challenging, while no less critical to meeting the Navy mission requirements and providing options to national leadership. Having previously made institutional investment, the Marine Corps is achieving all Total Force recruiting requirements. Retention is continuously assessed as both the world changes and demographics of our Nation change. 

Question. What initiatives would you take, if confirmed, to further improve Navy 

and Marine Corps recruiting and retention, in both the Active and Reserve components? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continuously monitor the data on recruiting and retention to ensure the Department not only has the right numbers of sailors and marines, but that it attracts and retains the best talent among America’s next generation. I will do everything in my power to ensure the authorities, incentives, and 

technologies needed to maintain this high quality force, with the capabilities necessary to meet emerging global challenges are available to the Department and 

Navy and Marine Corps leaders. 

DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES

Question. What is your understanding of the respective roles of the General Counsel and Judge Advocate General of the Navy in providing the Secretary of the Navy 

with legal advice? 

Answer. The General Counsel of the Navy serves as the chief legal officer for the 

Department of the Navy (DON) and the principal legal advisor to the SECNAV and 

the Secretariat. The Judge Advocate General is the senior uniformed legal advisor 

for the Department and the SECNAV, as well as the principal legal advisor to the 

Chief of Naval Operations. My understanding is that the General Counsel and the 

Judge Advocate General have distinct roles in providing legal advice to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV). 

Question. What are your views about the responsibility of the Judge Advocate 

General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant to provide 

independent legal advice to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps, respectively? 

Answer. In order to execute their statutory responsibilities established in title 10, 

U.S. Code, it is imperative that the Judge Advocate General and Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant employ their knowledge, experience and judgment to provide independent legal advice pertaining to their respective Services. My understanding is that the Judge Advocate General is specifically responsible for providing 

independent legal advice, and reports directly to, the Secretary of the Navy and the 

Chief of Naval Operations. The Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant is the senior uniformed attorney in the Marine Corps and is the primary legal advisor to the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps and Headquarters, Marine Corps on matters falling under the Staff Judge Advocate’s cognizance. The Judge Advocate General and 

Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant are responsible for formulating and implementing policies and initiatives pertaining to the overall provision of legal services 

pertaining to their respective Services. 

Question. What are your views about the responsibility of staff judge advocates 

within the Navy and Marine Corps to provide independent legal advice to military 

commanders in the fleet and throughout the naval establishment? 

1036 

Answer. Staff judge advocates must use their independent professional legal judgment in providing advice to commanders in order to meet operational requirements 

and execute day to day responsibilities. Such advice must be consistent with applicable professional responsibility requirements and community oversight. 

JUDGE ADVOCATE RESOURCING

Question. Several years ago the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) completed a 

study of manpower requirements for the Navy in which it concluded that the Navy’s 

Judge Advocate General Corps was significantly understrength for its mission. Over 

the past several years this Committee has promulgated significant modifications to 

the military justice system. 

What is your understanding of the current and projected manpower requirements 

in the Navy JAG Corps? 

Answer. Based on current and programmed manning, I believe the Navy JAG 

Corps has the manpower to meet its required legal mission. 

The Navy JAG Corps’ continued ability to recruit, access, and retain high quality 

legal talent is critical to meeting JAG Corps manpower requirements. It is important to note that the recruiting environment has become increasingly competitive, 

with applications to the Navy JAG Corps dropping by more than half over the last 

five years as law school admissions have fallen to their lowest level since 1973. At 

the same time, the cost of a legal education has increased dramatically, with Navy 

JAG Corps accessions currently reporting an average total student loan debt exceeding $149,000. The DON will continue to be sensitive to these issues to ensure the 

Department maintains the necessary capacity. 

Question. What is your understanding of the sufficiency of the number of Active 

Duty judge advocates in the Marine Corps to provide legal support for all the Marine Corps’ missions? 

Answer. Judge Advocates play a critical role in the Marine Corps. Advising on a 

range of critical issues from sexual assault to operational concerns, Marine Judge 

Advocates are key advisors who are highly valued and utilized by commanders. I 

have not had the opportunity to review the current and future manning requirements. If confirmed, I am committed to studying the issue to ensure that Marine 

Judge Advocates continue to play an integral role in the Marine Corps. 

Question. If confirmed, will you review the judge advocate manning within the 

Navy and Marine Corps and determine whether current Active Duty strengths are 

adequate? 

Answer. Yes. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. What is your assessment of the Navy’s sexual assault prevention and 

response program? 

Answer. The Navy has demonstrated that sexual assault prevention and response 

is a priority. It is apparent to me that the Navy is continually looking for ways to 

confront this criminal activity and create an environment that facilitates prompt reporting and enables victim care. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Richardson, and General 

Neller are each personally engaged. This senior-leader partnership has been a key 

feature since at least 2009. It is my understanding that victim support has been 

dramatically improved, training programs have been transformed for the better, and 

commanders understand their responsibilities. 

I understand the Navy seeks a Department-wide culture of respect, where sexual 

assault is never tolerated and ultimately eliminated, where all sexual assault survivors receive support and protection, and where offenders are held appropriately 

accountable. I understand the importance and the scale of what to the Department 

must achieve, and I accept the challenge of breaking new ground in doing so. Nothing else is more consistent with our core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment. 

Question. What is your assessment of Navy and Marine Corps programs to address and prevent retaliation or reprisal against individuals who report sexual harassment or sexual assault? 

Answer. I understand that retaliation, including ostracism and maltreatment, is 

a crime punishable under the UCMJ. I understand that in addition to training senior leadership on this matter, a key component to the Department of the Navy’s response is confronting such conduct through strengthening leadership skills among 

managers at the lower ends of the chain of command and in individual workplaces. 

The Department is building new and better training tools for that right now. They 

are also working in partnership with DOD on strategies to identify cases and assess 

1037 

our responses. If confirmed, I will continue to assess this closely and take appropriate measures. 

Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges to the success of those programs? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would actively seek to ensure the Navy implements all 

legislative and Department initiatives and that we continue to actively asses the effects of these programs to eliminate sexual harassment and sexual assault. 

Across these endeavors, I see three fundamental challenges. 

The first involves sustaining commitment and efforts in ways that accurately convey their central and enduring importance. 

The second is continuing to adapt our training and response process as we continue to understand the dynamics of the problem. 

The third is deriving accurate measures of success. For example, as awareness is 

raised about the Department’s new initiatives for victim assistance and prosecutions, an increase in the number of reports may or may not indicate an actual increase in the number of incidents. It may simply demonstrate that more victims feel 

comfortable coming forward. 

Question. If confirmed what changes if any would you make to improve those programs? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would look for best practices across the Service and Departments. Each Service and Military Department is taking innovative measures to 

combat sexual assault. We don’t have to do everything exactly the same, and our 

working environments differ importantly, but there is more we could learn from 

each other. I believe it will be important to maintain an ongoing critical assessment 

and be willing to change course when necessary. 

Question. What is your assessment of Navy and Marine Corps programs and policies to hold individuals accountable for retaliation or reprisal against individuals 

who report sexual harassment or sexual assault? 

Answer. The Department of the Navy (DON) seeks to achieve a culture of gender 

respect, where sexual assault is never tolerated and ultimately eliminated, where 

all survivors receive support and protection, and where offenders are held appropriately accountable. I will find it intolerable when those with the courage to report 

a sexual assault or sexual harassment are subjected to reprisal, maltreatment, or 

ostracism. 

The Navy has a criminal and Inspector General processes to address retaliation 

in all forms. Additionally, the Service JAGs are working with DOD to review legal 

definitions and clarify when command action is warranted. The Department is 

working with DOD on strategies to utilize local Sexual Assault Response Coordinators to receive and report better information on cases as they arise, and to ensure 

that individual information is reviewed by installation Case Management Groups 

for the purpose of protecting and supporting sexual assault survivors. Furthermore, 

they are also developing interactive, live-action training programs that directly address issues of peer support for sexual assault survivors—building on prior successes and lessons learned with a similar approach to promoting bystander intervention with regards to retaliation. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. Both restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults are valuable 

tools for supporting sexual assault survivors. Both seem to be well accepted by sailors and marines. Restricted reporting provides some individuals with a mechanism 

to seek support more on their own terms. I support that opportunity. The most important things we can do is to get victims to come forward. We cannot address this 

problem unless victims come forward. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to the victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. Victims of sexual assault must be supported. Sexual assault prevention 

and victim support are fundamental leadership responsibilities. Commanders are accountable for the mission readiness of their commands, that is, their ability to do 

their job when called to do so. The health, welfare, and safety of their personnel 

need to be the number one priority to ensure mission effectiveness. That means 

commanders are ultimately accountable for the physical and mental well-being of 

the sailors and marines under their charge. Commanding officers must not only set 

the tone for command climate through words and deeds, they must also ensure a 

positive command climate through training and leadership. If confirmed, I will ensure Navy and Marine Corps leaders at all levels have the resources they need to 

implement command-wide training on how to support survivors and to implement 

military policies regarding sexual assault prevention and response. 

1038 

Question. What is your assessment of the Department of the Navy’s implementation of the requirement to establish special victim’s counsel? 

Answer. I understand that it is working well. The Victims’ Legal Counsel (VLC) 

serves as a personal legal advocate to ensure victims are in the best position to leverage all of the tools available to them. Most Navy VLCs have built strong relations with local commanding officers and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response 

(SAPR) program personnel. Their unique role is well respected. As of 11 Dec 15, 

Navy VLC have assisted 1,759 sexual offense victims. VLC Survey feedback indicates victims are extremely satisfied with the services provided by their VLC and 

feel they have a voice in the process. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Navy resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help 

they need? 

Answer. It is my understanding that effective services are widely available, and 

sexual assault victims receive a high priority for care and support. I am aware that 

the Department has established significant resources to provide support to victims, 

including Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC), deployed resiliency counselors, and Victims’ Legal Counsel (VLC), as well as Victim Advocates who, together, represent a full spectrum of resources available to support a victim’s physical, emotional and legal needs. I understand major naval commands have added 

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) officers at the rank of Commander 

or higher to ensure commands are responsive; and I understand the medical community strives to provide individuals with compassionate, competent, and victimcentered care. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Navy has taken to prevent additional 

sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

Answer. The Navy and Marine Corps are expeditionary forces that are forward 

deployed. As such, the Navy engagement in combatting sexual assault is worldwide. Both Services have deployed robust training efforts and command engagement 

Department-wide and have world-wide resources for victim support and criminal investigations. If confirmed, I will continue to watch and be vigilant and demand improvements where they need to be. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources Navy 

has in place to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. I understand that Navy and Marine Corps criminal investigators and litigators are well trained. NCIS has hired cadre of approximately 18 criminal investigators to respond to and investigate sexual assault cases. I understand the Department has hired an additional 54 NCIS agents to focus on sexual assault investigations—specifically in response to the increased NCIS workload resulting both from 

policy requirements to investigate all allegations of sexual assault of any nature, 

and from the success of Department-wide efforts to make sailors and marines more 

comfortable in reporting sexual assaults in the first place. Recent efforts have also 

explored using Reserve or Active Duty Masters-at-Arms personnel to work with 

NCIS in investigating some cases but not conducting victim interviews. The average 

caseload trended down in fiscal year 2015 (to 2014) and the average time from initial notification to ‘‘active complete’’ status is now under 100 days. In addition to 

implementing the VLC program both the Navy and marines have implemented special training for lawyers in sexual assault case management. 

In 2007 the Navy’s Military Justice Litigation Career Track (MJLCT) was established to identify, develop, and retain judge advocates who demonstrate military justice knowledge and trial advocacy skills. Due to the effectiveness of this program, 

an experienced cadre of litigation specialists is spread across the Navy’s prosecution 

offices. This includes nine regional Senior Trial Counsel who litigate, oversee, and 

assist the prosecution of the most complex cases while supervising, mentoring, and 

training subordinate trial counsel. As a general matter, the Navy’s most junior trial 

counsel would have undergone at least two years of formal training and on-the-job 

training in all JAGC principle practice areas before taking on any cases as lead 

prosecutor. Additionally, MJLCT officers and other judge advocates occupying litigation billets are provided advanced training focused on various aspects of sexual assault litigation, prosecution and defense. 

If confirmed, I would monitor these programs and encourage and support NCIS 

and the JAG corps in seeking opportunities to advance continued training and resources to address recognized needs in this area. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. Command leadership is the lynchpin of military culture and command 

climate. Leaders at every level, from the Secretariat to the deck plate and the fire 

team are our best and most critical asset in achieving culture change. Culture 

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change does not happen overnight, but requires sustained focus by and communication from leadership. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. If confirmed, the issue of sexual assault in the Navy and Marine Corps 

will be a priority focus for me. I would support any policy change that enhances the 

confidence in the military’s justice system and ensures that every Sailor and Marine 

has a safe working environment. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Navy? 

Answer. My priority, if confirmed, will be to sustain the emphasis on current efforts. I would ensure these programs are meeting their intended purposes and are 

beneficial to victims and to the Navy in combating sexual assault. I would carefully 

consider the recommendations of the Judicial Proceedings Panel (JPP) and of independent review groups that can improve the Navy’s sexual assault prevention and 

response program. In addition, I would seek to review and evaluate the training of 

leadership at all levels ensure Navy leaders are equipped to create and sustain command climates that are intolerant of sexual assault and in which victims of sexual 

assault can feel safe as they continue to serve the Navy and Marine Corps. 

BALANCE BETWEEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES

Question. The Navy employs many contractors and civilian employees. In many 

cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and 

task forces, and perform many of the same functions as federal employees. Both contractors and civilians make up an integral part of the Department’s total workforce. 

Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees and contractor 

employees is in the best interests of the Navy? 

Answer. I do believe we must continuously evaluate our total workforce balance 

to meet the requirements of 10 USC 129a, to determine the most appropriate and 

cost efficient mix of military, civilian and contractor personnel to perform the mission of the Department of Defense. As requirements change so could the balance of 

the workforce. 

Question. In your view, has the Department utilized contractors to perform basic 

functions in an appropriate manner? 

Answer. I do believe that contractor personnel have been used appropriately. 

However, as previously noted we must continuously evaluate our workforce mix and 

the use of contractors to ensure they are being used efficiently and for the appropriate mission sets/requirements. 

Question. Do you believe that the Navy should undertake a comprehensive reappraisal of ‘‘inherently governmental functions’’ and other critical government functions, and how they are performed? 

Answer. I do not have any reason to believe that the DON needs a comprehensive 

reappraisal of ‘‘inherently governmental functions’’ and other critical government 

functions. I believe this to be a continuous process of workforce balancing and that 

effort is even more critical in downsizing environments as reductions need to be 

made smartly to have the least impact on our ability to perform the mission. 

Question. Are there non-monetary reasons why the Navy would need or desire one 

type of manpower over the other? If so, provide relevant examples where of those 

reasons? Under what circumstances should cost be used as the primary factor? 

Answer. Yes, there are non-monetary reasons that could drive the use of different 

types of manpower. Clearly, the type of requirement impacts the reasoning, i.e. is 

it a military or inherently governmental function. But other factors such as skill set 

requirements, schedule (urgency of requirement), expected duration of effort, etc. all 

impact the manpower decision process. Example could be in cyber where urgent 

need for technical expertise, not currently organic to the DON, would need to be acquired from the private sector. Cost tends to be a primary factor when commercial 

type functions—not impacted by the other factors mentioned—are evaluated for accomplishment. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work with other appropriate officials in the Navy 

to review the contractor and civilian force mix for cost and mission effectiveness? 

Answer. I will work with the appropriate officials in the Navy on the balance of 

our workforce as I see the manpower equation as one of the primary areas impacting both our resources and our ability to execute mission. 

Question. Would you agree that the balance between civilian employees and contractor employees in performing Navy functions should be determined by the best 

interests of the Navy and its mission requirements? 

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Answer. Yes, I agree with that statement. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work to remove any artificial constraints placed 

on the size of the Navy’s civilian and contractor workforce, so that the Navy can 

hire the number and type of employees most appropriate to accomplish its mission? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed I will work with Department officials to determine if 

there are constraints that impact our ability to hire the right workforce to efficiently 

and effectively accomplish the mission of the DON. 

WOMEN IN COMBAT INTEGRATION

Question. The Marine Corps recently released the results of their major research 

study on combat integration. Before reviewing the report, Secretary Mabus indicated that he will not support any exceptions to policy to close any ground combat 

elements to women. 

Will you commit to conducting a thorough review of the report? 

Answer. I am aware that Secretary Mabus is a strong advocate of opening all occupational specialties to women and that he made that recommendation based on 

his careful review of all available data including the Marine Corps Ground Combat 

Element Integrated Task Force (GCEITF) report. If confirmed, I would avail myself 

of all information and facts related to the issue. 

Question. The Marine Corps’ research demonstrated that women suffered higher 

injury rates among women than men when engaged in field combat exercises and 

training. Does that concern you? 

Answer. The health and welfare of all servicemembers is of great concern to me. 

The studies that were conducted provided a significant amount of data concerning 

the physiology, types of injuries, and injury rates sustained by both men and 

women. Through this research, I am confident that we can improve our training to 

mitigate these risks. 

Question. Do you believe Congress should amend the Selective Service Act to require the registration of women? 

Answer. I understand that the Department of Defense is working with the Department of Justice to appropriately address the issue of how the decision to open 

all combat arms positions and units to women may impact the selective service act. 

Question. If women become subject to the draft, should they also be prepared for 

involuntary assignment based upon the needs of the Navy? 

Answer. Secretary Carter’s decision ensures that our all-volunteer military has access to the broadest range of talent, men and women, that the U.S. has to offer. 

In the highly unlikely event of a draft, requiring women to register with Selective 

Service would not necessarily mean women members would be forced to serve in the 

same capacity as men. 

Question. What is your opinion on whether men and women in combat and special 

forces MOSs should be subject to the same physical requirements for participation 

in those MOSs? 

Answer. I support SECDEF’s guidance in his 3 Dec 2015 memo that states ‘‘The 

Services will continue to apply previously developed and validated operationally relevant and objective standards for all career fields to assure that leaders assign 

tasks and career fields throughout the force based on ability, not gender. This approach is integral to preserving unit readiness, cohesion, and morale, and it will 

continue to form the foundation for full integration.’’ Currently, physical fitness 

tests are gender normed to gauge a servicemember’s general health and fitness 

which is why the Marine Corps developed operationally-relevant, occupation-specific, gender-neutral standards specific to each physically demanding job. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that all standards are operationally relevant and accurately reflect the tasks required to accomplish the mission and that women meet 

the same standards as men for the same MOSs. 

Question. What is your opinion on whether men and women in the combat MOS 

should have the same physical fitness tests for the duration of their careers? 

Answer. Navy uses Navy-wide physical fitness tests that are gender- and agenormed independent of a servicemember’s career field. For specific jobs, including 

combat MOSs, all members of a given MOS should meet the same physical standards required for that job as long as they serve in that position. Both the Marine 

Corps and Navy certified that their physical standards are current and in accordance with public law as of September 30, 2015. If confirmed, I will work to ensure 

that equitable opportunities exist for both men and women. 

Question. In light of Secretary Carter’s decision to open all military positions to 

women, what do you believe are the primary challenges to implementing full integration in the Department of the Navy and how do you plan to address them? 

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Answer. The primary challenges to implementing full integration are addressing 

the concerns raised by various Services’ studies as articulated in SECDEF’s 3 Dec 

2015 memo. These concerns include: 

• Transparent Standards—Assigning tasks and career fields throughout the force 

based on ability, not gender; 

• Population Size—Addressing equipment sizing, supply, and facilities; 

• Physical Demands and Physiological Differences—Addressing ways to help mitigate the injury rate and impact to individuals and the teams they are assigned; 

• Conduct and Culture—Addressing attitudes toward team performance through 

education and training; 

• Talent Management—Addressing recruiting, retaining, and advancing based on 

merit-based system; 

• Operating Abroad—Addressing presence of women in cultures where complications may occur due to cultural restrictions; 

• Assessment and Adjustment—Addressing monitoring, assessment, and adjustment issues to enable sustainable success. 

MATERNITY LEAVE

Question. Secretary Mabus recently announced his plan to provide 18 weeks of 

maternity leave for sailors. 

Do you support the Secretary’s decision to allow 18 weeks of maternity leave for 

sailors? 

Answer. Yes, I believe the Services must ensure that the All-Volunteer Force continues to remain competitive with America’s workforce and evolve with the changing 

times to address the needs, desires and goals of those sailors and marines who selflessly serve and sacrifice for our nation. This initiative provides a better balance between the need to retain high-performing, highly-educated and experienced sailors 

and marines, in whom we have already heavily invested. 

Question. If confirmed, what would be your plan to augment or back-fill those positions occupied by female sailors on extended maternity leave? Would you consider 

utilizing reservists to back-fill those positions? 

Answer. The Navy and Marine Corps’ standard process for replacing all losses for 

operational units uses the enlisted distribution system management with similar 

skills to back fill at-sea units. These re-assignments can negatively affect billet ‘‘fit’’ 

for both sea and shore commands, but do not create at-sea manning gaps for deploying commands. Commands have the option to request reservists to back-fill those 

positions, if funding is available. The Marine Corps does not back-fill positions occupied by female marines on Additional Maternity Leave (AML). If confirmed, I will 

work with Navy and Marine Corps leaders to determine the degree to which the 

new maternity leave policy requires adjustments to current procedures for augmenting or back filling. 

Question. In your view, how would the Navy account and pay for the cost of additional personnel to fill positions left vacant by sailors on extended maternity leave? 

Answer. It is my understanding that Navy has implemented plans to mitigate the 

impact of 18 weeks of maternity leave on operational units. Navy’s standard plan 

for replacing losses to operational units, including those for maternity leave, 

leverages sailors at shore establishments with similar skills to back fill at-sea units. 

It is my understanding that this mechanism has the capacity to absorb Navy’s historical at-sea pregnancy rates. The Marine Corps does not back-fill positions occupied by female marines on Additional Maternity Leave (AML). 

Question. Would the Navy require an increase to their authorized end strengths 

to accommodate additional manning requirements? 

Answer. I do not believe that Navy and/or Marine Corps feels an increase in end 

strength is necessary to accommodate the policy, but that it will require careful 

management and monitoring to ensure that operational readiness is not adversely 

impacted or a burden is placed on other sailors or marines to accommodate a member on maternity leave. The policy naturally includes flexibility and discretion for 

when members may take the leave, and permits it to be taken over multiple periods 

to meet the needs of both the member and the Services. 

Question. Do you support paid uncharged paternity leave for male sailors in excess of the 10 days afforded by statute? If so, how many weeks do you believe is 

an appropriate amount of time? 

Answer. Given the higher percentage of male servicemembers currently serving, 

any substantial increase in paternity leave could impact readiness. An increase in 

the current 10 days of uncharged paternity leave afforded by statute would have to 

be carefully examined to thoroughly understand those impacts, and any resulting 

second or third order effects. If confirmed, I will investigate how best to balance the 

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needs of Navy and Marine families against the requirement to remain combat ready 

to determine if changes to the paternity leave policy are needed, and at what cost 

they might be implemented. 

Question. Do you believe the Navy fully understands what the cost of this reform 

will be? If so, describe those costs. 

Answer. The Department of the Navy has not yet been able to accurately determine the cost of the reform. Future attempts will be made to understand the complex monetary and non-monetary (e.g., retention) costs associated with the reform. 

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. If confirmed, what challenges do you foresee in sustaining Navy and 

Marine Corps MWR programs in the future fiscal environment? 

Answer. It is vitally important not to marginalize MWR program contribution to 

readiness and retention in the Marine Corps. If confirmed, I will work with the 

Services to ensure program relevance and sustainability. In a fiscally constrained 

environment, it is critical to optimize MWR’s revenue generating capability and to 

protect the profitability of the military exchanges that help fund MWR programs. 

MILITARY HEALTH CARE

Question. In your view, what should the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 

do to improve access to care in its medical treatment facilities? 

Answer. Timely access to health care—where and when it’s needed—is a top priority for Navy Medicine. Navy Medicine is focused on continual improvements to 

medical care to sailors, marines and their families. Examples that Navy is exploring 

and implementing include: virtual care, mobile convenience, and telemedicine solutions in order to keep sailors, marines and their families healthy and on the job. 

If confirmed, I would support the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery’s efforts to improve both access and convenience through such innovative, 21st century solutions. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Surgeon General of the 

Navy to improve the healthcare experience for sailors, marines and their families? 

Answer. Keeping sailors, marines and their families healthy and on the job is 

Navy Medicine’s top priority. The Navy does provide services that don’t require a 

trip to the hospital, and it is my understanding that they are expanding those services. However, when services are needed at a hospital, the Navy is working to ensure it is easy and timely to get those services, and that those services are top quality and patient-centered. 

If confirmed, I would work with the Surgeon General of the Navy to continue 

those efforts and drive toward, and resource, the tenets of a high reliability organization. Grounded in the sacred trust we share in caring for America’s sons and 

daughters, our sailors, marines and their families deserve the best healthcare experience possible. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. sailors, marines and their families in both the active and reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go 

with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for sailors, 

marines and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family 

readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced, especially in light of current fiscal constraints? 

Answer. Sailors, marines and their families are the Department of the Navy’s 

greatest assets. Understanding and addressing their needs can be more challenging 

in times of war or contingency operations, particularly in a fiscally constrained environment. This requires a focus on communication. If confirmed, I will work with the 

Services to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, the Department remains 

agile and responsive to the needs of servicemembers and their families, within fiscal 

realities. Whether assisting them in transitioning to civilian life, or supporting their 

financial health throughout their service, addressing their needs and desires will be 

essential to success. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continue to be of great 

concern to the Committee. 

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If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide prevention programs 

and policies for the Department of the Navy to prevent suicides and increase the 

resiliency of sailors and marines and their families? 

Answer. I share the Department of the Navy view that every suicide is a tragedy, 

and that suicide is also a leadership issue. I understand that the Services have 

taken significant steps to improve suicide prevention efforts. If confirmed, I will support efforts to encourage strength and resilience among sailors, marines and their 

families, and to foster command climates supportive of psychological health and 

help-seeking behavior. It is critical that the Department continues to emphasize the 

importance of personal responsibility, peer-support and bystander intervention, and 

that it continues to emphasize that seeking help is a sign of strength. 

SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED, ILL, AND INJURED SAILORS AND MARINES

Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from the Navy and the Federal Government for support 

services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. 

What is your assessment of the progress made by the Navy and Marine Corps 

to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured sailors 

and marines? 

Answer. I appreciate the Committee’s and Congress’ continued interest and support for wounded warriors and their families and caregivers. This is an enduring 

mission that will continue long past the current conflicts as we provide a lifetime 

of support to our seriously wounded, ill, and injured sailors and marines. 

To date Navy Wounded Warrior-Safe Harbor has provided non-medical support to 

more than 2,288 sailors and Coast Guardsmen that are enrolled in the program. 

They have also provided assistance to an additional 1,540 servicemembers with less 

severe conditions who still need help. The Marine Corps’ Wounded Warrior Regiment provides support to a monthly average of approximately 850 marines who are 

joined to a subordinate element and / or assigned a recovery care coordinator. In 

an effort to ensure marines who transition from Active service are not left without 

necessary support, the Wounded Warrior Resource and Outreach Call Center has 

provided assistance to nearly 32,000 post 9/11 medically retired and veteran marines since its inception in 2009. 

It is my understanding that much progress has been made since the programs 

were established under the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. Non-medical 

care management teams throughout the country tailor support to each enrolled 

servicemember’s recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration needs. This support can 

include Comprehensive Recovery Plan development, addressing pay and personnel 

issues, connecting them to family resources, offering adaptive sports and recreation 

opportunities, and linking them to education, employment, and training benefits. 

Support does not conclude at the door of a medical treatment facility or when a 

wounded warrior’s military career concludes. It offers enrollees a host of services 

that ease their transition to civilian life and ensures they are cared for throughout 

their lifetimes. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase the Navy’s support for wounded sailors and marines, and 

to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. In 2008, Congress expanded support for our wounded warriors beyond 

combat wounded to include serious illness and injuries. It is my understanding that 

the vast majority of sailors and marines are enrolled as a result of non-combat conditions. These programs address an enduring need and must remain capable of responding when or if the Nation engages in a future conflict. If confirmed, I will work 

to ensure that they are properly resourced into the future even in the midst of these 

challenging budget environments. 

SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ACCOUNTABILITY

Question. While representative of a small number of individuals in DOD, reports 

of abuses of rank and authority by senior military and civilian leaders and failures 

to perform up to accepted standards are frequently received. Whistleblowers and 

victims of such abuses often report that they felt that no one would pay attention 

to or believe their complaints. Accusations of unduly lenient treatment of senior officers and senior officials against whom accusations have been substantiated are also 

frequently heard. 

What are your views regarding the appropriate standard of accountability for senior civilian and military leaders of the Department? 

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Answer. Even if isolated, the abuse of rank or authority can undermine trust in 

a military organization. Senior civilian and military leaders must uphold the highest standards of integrity and principled leadership. An organization that fails to 

hold senior individuals accountable when warranted sends the wrong message to 

sailors, marines and civilian personnel in the Department of the Navy as well as 

to the public. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that senior leaders 

of the Navy and Marine Corps are held accountable for their actions and performance? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to foster the Navy and Marine Corps’ earnest commitment to the highest ethical standards of principled leadership and service. I will ensure timely investigation of allegations. I will ensure that, when required, accountability actions are exercised in strict adherence to principles of due 

process, consistent with law and regulation, and transparent to our Congressional 

oversight committees and the American public. 

SHIPBUILDING PLAN

Question. Despite the Navy’s 308-ship requirement to meet the maritime demands 

of the National Military Strategy, it is currently operating with 272 battle force 

ships. Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has concluded that the 

Navy has underestimated the costs for its shipbuilding plan by approximately 12 

percent. 

Do you consider the 308-ship force structure requirement to be appropriate given 

the current and future strategic environment? If not, please describe what changes 

may need to be made. 

Answer. Currently, yes. The 308-ship Force Structure Assessment (FSA) update 

was completed in 2014 based on the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. The 308- 

ship battle force possesses the minimum capability and capacity to continue protecting American interests, to deter or contain conflict and, if called upon, to fight 

and win our nation’s wars. 

Question. Do you agree with the CBO’s assessment that there is significant cost 

risk associated with executing the Navy’s shipbuilding plan? 

Answer. While I’m not familiar with the analytic methodology used in the CBO’s 

assessment, if confirmed, I will ensure that the differences between the Navy and 

CBO shipbuilding cost estimates are understood. 

Question. What actions do you believe are necessary to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plan within the Navy’s budget estimates? 

Answer. I know that the Department is focused on affordably acquiring all of the 

weapon systems that the Navy and Marine Corps team requires. If confirmed, I will 

work closely with ASN(RDA) to ensure that all cost reduction opportunities are explored and that budget estimates are realistic. 

Question. How would you characterize the risks to national security posed by the 

current shortfall in battle force ships and tactical aircraft? 

Answer. It is my understanding that today, the Navy meets all requirements of 

the current defense strategy, albeit with considerable risk. 

Question. What adjustments to the respective shipbuilding programs are necessary and appropriate to reduce operational risk? 

Answer. Based on our current strategy, I believe the FY 2016 President’s Budget 

Request reflects the best balance of available resources to meet the Department of 

Navy requirements. If confirmed, I will continuously evaluate this question as a critical part of my responsibilities. 

Question. What further adjustments would you consider if the Navy’s shipbuilding 

program comes under further pressure due to cost growth? 

Answer. The Navy has been working hard to reduce cost growth and increase affordability and stability within all of the shipbuilding programs. Should these measures prove inadequate, if confirmed, I will work with Defense Department leaders 

and the Congress to determine the appropriate responses and to develop acceptable 

adjustments. 

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Question. After more than $2 billion in cost growth in each of the first three Fordclass aircraft carriers, the costs of these ships range from $11.5 billion to $13.5 billion. 

Do you support the on-going Navy study of alternatives for future development 

of aircraft carriers that would replace or supplement the Ford-class carrier? 

Answer. I fully support consideration of alternatives to the current aircraft carrier 

design as well as changes to the existing Ford-class design to reduce cost while reVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01050 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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taining essential capability. The study should provide insight into the requirements, 

capabilities, costs, and alternatives for aircraft carriers. If confirmed, I look forward 

to reviewing the findings. 

Question. In your view, should the Navy build 11 Ford-class aircraft carriers or 

should the Navy pursue a different mix of platforms for sea-based tactical aviation? 

Answer. The current plan for the Ford-class construction is the Navy’s plan for 

meeting the demand for an 11 aircraft carrier force. If confirmed and once the alternative study is completed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief 

of Naval Operations to explore the right mix of platforms. 

Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report states the reliability of four systems—the electromagnetic aircraft 

launching system, advanced arresting gear, dual band radar, and advanced weapons 

elevators—are the most significant risks to the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN–78) for 

successfully completing initial operational test and evaluation. 

What is your understanding of the testing and reliability status of each of these 

key systems on CVN–78, which is scheduled to deliver in June 2016? 

Answer. I understand that production of CVN 78 is nearly complete and that the 

Navy is now focused on completing construction of the ship, completing the ship’s 

test program, and taking delivery of the ship. I understand that the four systems 

highlighted by DOT&E are indeed new technologies introduced to the ship and because they are new, provide risk to the program. I understand that testing on many 

of these systems has begun and, if confirmed, I will ensure that progress on testing 

is regularly conveyed to the Committee. 

Question. What is your understanding of the measures being taken to ensure 

these key systems are stable for the next aircraft carrier, USS John F. Kennedy 

(CVN–79)? 

Answer. I understand that the Navy continues to incorporate lessons learned from 

CVN 78 test programs and shipboard installation into CVN 79 plans. 

OHIO-CLASS REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Question. Navy leaders have testified that the Ohio-class Replacement Program 

will require significant investment and will result in equivalent reductions in the 

Navy budget, if a higher Navy topline or outside funding is not provided. 

What is your view on how the Ohio-class Replacement Program should be funded? 

Answer. It is absolutely critical for the Nation to replace the Ohio-class submarines. I understand that the Navy is taking appropriate measures to limit requirements and control cost for this Class while maintaining the level of performance necessary to ensure the high survivability provided by the sea-based strategic 

deterrent. Ultimately, however, the unique requirements of this program drive high 

cost to the Navy’s overall shipbuilding program which, absent a higher topline, 

would equate to approximately one-third of the historic average shipbuilding budget. 

Such an impact to Navy shipbuilding over the 15 year period of building the Ohio 

Replacement submarines would have a direct impact to the future Navy Force 

Structure and therefore, the ability of the Navy to meet its mission in the decades 

ahead. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Defense Department leadership 

and the Congress to address this significant challenge. 

Question. Navy leaders have testified that 12 Ohio-class replacement submarines 

must be procured and the Ohio-class Replacement Program schedule cannot be delayed in order to ensure the first deterrent patrol occurs in 2031. 

Do you support the view that there is no room for delay of the Ohio-class Replacement Program? 

Answer. I understand that the Navy has stretched the Ohio-class to the maximum 

extent possible, from 30 to 42 years and that there is no room for further delay of 

the Ohio Class Replacement without introducing risk to meeting the requirements 

for the sea-based strategic deterrent. If confirmed, I will review this assessment in 

further detail with appropriate requirements and acquisition arms of the Department of Defense and determine whether there are further appropriate steps available to mitigate the schedule risk associated with meeting our strategic requirements. 

Question. Congress established the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund in section 1022 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015. 

What are your views on how the Navy should use this Fund to acquire Ohio-class 

replacement submarines? 

Answer. It is clearly in the best interest of the Department of Defense and the 

Congress to ensure the Ohio Replacement Program is executed as efficiently as possible in order to meet the significant cost and schedule challenges posed by this high 

1046 

priority program. I understand that this need has been the motivation behind the 

formulation of the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund. If confirmed, I will review 

and, as appropriate, identify measures necessary to further reduce cost and schedule 

risk associated with developing, designing, and building the Ohio Replacement 

Class submarines. It is likely that such measures will include additional authorities 

to be granted by Congress, and to the extent that these authorities are included in 

the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, then I will work closely within the Department of Defense and with the Congressional Defense Committees to ensure concurrence as well as full transparency in the exercise and oversight of these unique 

authorities. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD)

Question. The Navy plays an important role in defending the Nation against the 

threat of long range ballistic missile attack and in defending allies, friends, and deployed forces against theater ballistic missile threats. Today, the Navy has approximately 33 BMD-capable ships, with just three of these having the advanced BMD 

5.X capability. In 2020, the Navy projects having 39 BMD ships, with 16 having 

BMD 5.X capability. 

Do you view ballistic missile defense as a core Navy mission? 

Answer. Yes, it is a proven capability the Navy provides to the Joint Force. 

Question. What options should be explored to reduce the shortfall in meeting the 

stated requirement of 40 ships with the advanced BMD 5.X capability? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Navy and Missile Defense Agency leadership to explore all options for fielding capability earlier than currently planned 

while balancing fiscal realities. 

CRUISE MISSILES

Question. What is your understanding of the Navy’s cruise missile defense strategy? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Navy has conducted numerous analyses to 

defend naval forces and advanced bases from the cruise missile defense threat and 

has invested in near, mid, and far term capabilities to counter the emerging threat. 

The Department of the Navy will continue to resource capabilities and provide properly trained and equipped forces to the combatant commanders. 

Question. In your view, how serious is the cruise missile threat to the Navy? 

Answer. The cruise missile threat is very serious to the Navy and nation. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the Navy is 

adequately addressing this threat? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of the Navy properly resources cruise missile defense, and that those resources are properly balanced across 

the Department. 

AMPHIBIOUS FLEET REQUIREMENTS

Question. What is your view of the need for and size of the Navy’s amphibious 

ship fleet? 

Answer. Amphibious ships are a critical element of joint force capabilities. I support the current requirement of 38 amphibious ships and the plan to build 34, given 

fiscal constraints. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Navy and Marine Corps leadership to continue to meet amphibious requirements. 

Question. What alternatives would you consider to augment amphibious ships in 

providing lift to Marine Corps units? In what scenarios would these alternatives be 

necessary and appropriate? 

Answer. The Marine Corps and Navy have been innovative in their use of alternative lift options for permissive environments. Given the evolving threats, however, 

I would be wary of using such options to mitigate any shortfalls in the amphibious 

ship requirements specifically for assault echelon. If confirmed, I look forward to 

working closely with Navy and Marine Corps leadership to identify the most appropriate solutions in supporting our Naval Expeditionary Force and operations around 

the globe. 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS)

Question. In December 2014, the Secretary of Defense announced his decision to 

upgrade the Littoral Combat Ships, designated LCS–33 through LCS–52, to provide 

a more capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the 

capabilities of a frigate. 

Do you support the Secretary of Defense’s decision to upgrade the LCS? 

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Answer. From what I have read, I believe the modifications to the LCS design 

will add valuable lethality and survivability capability improvements to the final 20 

hulls. 

Question. What is your understanding of the acquisition strategy for the LCS and 

LCS mission modules, as modified by the Secretary of Defense’s decision? 

Answer. I understand that in December 2014, the Secretary of Defense decided 

that the Navy will procure a modified LCS (Frigate) to follow the current LCS design, resulting in an inventory of 32 LCS and 20 Frigates. If confirmed, I will review 

the acquisition strategy details with ASN(RDA). 

Question. What is your view of the peacetime and wartime mission of the LCS? 

Answer. LCS provides the Navy critical capabilities to Surface Warfare (SUW), 

Mine Countermeasures (MCM), and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) requirements 

in both open ocean and the littorals. 

Question. What is your understanding of the requirements for survivability of the 

LCS? 

Answer. I understand that concerns about LCS survivability are what led to Secretary Hagel’s directed review of LCS alternatives, which resulted in the shift to an 

enhanced design. I am aware that all ships have an assigned level of survivability 

in keeping with their mission and concept of operations. If confirmed, I will review 

with the Chief of Naval Operations the survivability levels for LCS. 

Question. What is your understanding of the delivered survivability capability of 

the LCS? 

Answer. Since 5 LCS ships have been accepted by the Navy and are serving in 

the fleet, it is my understanding that they meet the survivability requirement for 

the Class. 

Question. Do you support the Navy force structure assessment requirement of 52 

small surface combatants? If not, please explain. 

Answer. I support the Department’s current inventory objective of 52 small surface combatants which has been validated by the Navy’s Force Structure Assessment. In keeping with the Secretary of Defense’s decision to transition to a frigate, 

the 52 ships will be met by a combination of 32 LCS and 20 Frigates. 

TACTICAL FIGHTER PROGRAMS

Question. The F–35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, which is the largest and most 

expensive acquisition program in the Department’s history, was formally initiated 

as a program of record in 2002 with a total planned buy of 2,443 aircraft for the 

U.S. At projected procurement rates, the aircraft will be procured by the Department well into the 2030 decade to reach its total quantity buy. The program has 

not yet completed its systems development and demonstration phase, and is not due 

to enter full rate production until 2019, 17 years after its inception. 

The overall requirement for 2,443 aircraft was established nearly 20 years ago. 

Since that time, however, there have been countervailing pressures to: (1) reduce 

force structure to conserve resources; (2) improve capability to respond to prospective adversary technological advances and increased capabilities from updated 

threat assessments; and (3) respond to an evolving national defense strategy. 

Do you believe the Department of the Navy’s F–35B and F–35C requirements are 

still valid? 

Answer. Yes, both the F–35B and the F–35C will be vital parts of future Naval 

Aviation and critical to meeting warfighting requirements. 

Question. Do you believe the Department of the Navy can afford and needs to procure 310 more F–35Cs with a procurement cost of over $42 billion? 

Answer. The F–35C provides essential 5th generation strike fighter capability to 

the Department’s Carrier Air Wings. Without this capability, the Navy cannot 

achieve air superiority. The Department of the Navy currently has a requirement 

for 340 F–35Cs. If confirmed, I will work with ASN (RD&A) and the joint program 

office to most affordably procure the F–35C and will work with the Chairman and 

other service chiefs to revalidate the appropriate number of aircraft the Navy requires to meet the mission. 

Question. Do you believe that the Navy will still want to buy the F–35C, an aircraft design that will be 30 years old before the Navy production is scheduled to 

finish? 

Answer. The Navy is committed to making the F–35C the next Carrier Air Wing 

fighter, complementing the F/A–18E/F until that aircraft reaches the end of its lifetime in the 2030s. 

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pecially in the Asia-Pacific theater of operations where the ‘‘tyranny of distance’’ is 

such a major factor? 

Answer. Currently, I do. There are capability, inventory, and readiness aspects to 

delivering the required force mix. If confirmed, I will work with leadership to determine the best options to pace the threat in a dynamic security and fiscal environment. 

Question. The Secretary of the Navy recently remarked that he believed the F– 

35 should be and would be the nation’s last manned fighter aircraft. 

Do you believe this to be true? 

Answer. It is crucial that we push the boundaries of what unmanned technologies 

can achieve; the next generation in tactical aviation will play a large part in this 

transformation. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy to aggressively advance the development of unmanned systems. 

Question. What will be your role in leading capabilities and requirements development to increase the role of unmanned aerial combat systems in the Navy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to make the continued development of unmanned 

systems a hallmark of my tenure. I intend to lead the Navy into new ways of thinking about combinations of people and technologies to maximize our operational advantage. 

Question. How do you see the future balance developing between manned and unmanned combat aircraft for the Navy’s future force structure? 

Answer. I believe that the advent of advanced information technology is redefining the approach to obtaining the most effective relationship between people and 

technology. There is vast potential to change the balance of manned and unmanned 

platforms in combat aircraft and across all platforms, and this potential is a key 

to helping the United States minimize the risk to our people and stay ahead of rapidly evolving threats. 

READINESS

Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps to meet national security requirements across the full spectrum of military operations? 

Answer. My understanding is that while forward deployed Navy forces continue 

to meet readiness standards, there is concern about Navy’s ability to meet the 

timelines associated with providing either follow-on or ‘‘surge’’ forces should they be 

requested by combatant commanders. For instance, Navy is currently not meeting 

its required crisis response capacity and does not fully recover until 2021. For the 

Marine Corps, deployed units are sufficiently resourced to undertake assigned missions but about half of non-deployed units are insufficiently resourced to full spectrum readiness levels limiting their readiness to respond to unexpected crises or 

major contingencies. If confirmed, one of my first actions will be to review the readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps team. 

Question. What is your assessment of the near-term trend in the readiness of the 

Navy and Marine Corps? 

Answer. The 2016 President’s Budget Request provides the minimum resources to 

achieve the levels of readiness to meet requirements by 2021. This plan still includes considerable risk, and does not allow for any unexpected contingencies. 

Question. How critical is it to find a solution to sequestration given the impacts 

we have already seen to readiness in fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015? 

Answer. It is absolutely critical. Without relief from the current budget caps, 

Navy will fall farther below requirements to the point that it will not be able to 

meet the responsibilities in the current strategy. The recent Bipartisan Budget 

Agreement is helpful in that it provides stability but at a reduced resource level. 

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the 

Commandant to determine the implications of these reductions. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the methods currently 

used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of Navy and Marine 

Corps equipment? 

Answer. Both the Navy and Marine Corps have detailed processes that attempt 

to balance the real time and projected needs of the operators/warfighters with the 

scheduled lifecycle sustainment requirements and depot maintenance capacity. 

These processes need to be designed to accommodate surges and other unplanned 

operations, which have become, and will continue to be, the norm. 

My understanding is that the Navy and Marine Corps maintenance requirements 

processes are thorough, but I am concerned about the time allotted to conduct reset 

maintenance of the force given the high operational tempo and COCOM demand signal. 

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Question. Given the backlog in equipment maintenance over the last several 

years, do you believe that we need an increased investment to reduce this backlog? 

Answer. It is my understanding is that the FY 2016 President’s Budget Request, 

with OCO funding, has provided funding to address this backlog. However, it will 

take time to physically complete the work. 

The budget fully funds ship maintenance to continue life cycle maintenance reset 

of CVNs and surface force ships. To address workload to be completed in public 

shipyards, the budget also provides funds for additional workforce in public shipyards and will send selected submarines to private shipyards. Navy has also funded 

aviation depot maintenance to capacity. As with the ships, it will take time to work 

through the backlog. 

Question. How important is it to reduce the materiel maintenance backlog in 

order to improve readiness? 

Answer. It is very important. I understand maintenance backlogs have delayed 

deployments, which have in turn forced extensions for those already deployed. This 

comes at a cost to the resiliency of sailors and marines, sustainability of equipment, 

and service lives of ships and equipment. 

Question. How important is it to receive OCO funding after the end of combat operations in order to ensure all equipment is reset? 

Answer. It is very important. The Department of the Navy remains reliant on 

OCO funding for ongoing overseas operations, reset, and some enduring requirements. 

Question. In your judgment, is recent operational tempo adversely affecting the 

readiness or retention of sailors and marines on active duty and in the reserve component? 

Answer. I believe the Chief of Naval Operations recently highlighted the fact that 

after three years of budget shortfalls and a high operating tempo, Navy is currently 

operating with considerable risk in its ability to fully execute warfighting mission 

in accordance with existing plans. I am unaware of any significant impact the current tempo of operations is having on retention, in general, but I imagine that it 

will just be a matter of time, especially in an improving economy, before sailors and 

their families begin to vote with their feet and choose to leave. Near-term operational readiness and the readiness of those marines who are forward deployed and 

forward engaged remains a top priority. The Marine Corps continues to reconstitute 

to a ready force after over a decade of persistent conflict. As the Nation’s ready 

force, the Marine Corps does not have the luxury to take an operational pause after 

completing major operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. I will work with the Department and the Congress to ensure the Marine Corps is properly resourced to deliver 

a ready Marine Corps today and in the future. 

Question. Navy leaders have stated rotational deployments will be stabilized and 

more predictable through continued implementation of an improved deployment 

framework called the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O–FRP). 

What is your understanding of the O–FRP? 

Answer. My understanding is that O–FRP is designed to align manning, maintenance, and modernization of platforms with training in order to achieve readiness 

and meet regional needs in the most effective and efficient manner. O–FRP should 

allow the Navy to achieve stable and predictable 7-month deployments, which will 

help to reset our readiness and increase certainty for our sailors and families. 

Question. Do you support implementation of the O–FRP? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work closely with the CNO to ensure O–FRP remains on track to meet strategic objectives. 

Question. To what extent will implementation of the O–FRP improve the material 

readiness of the fleet? 

Answer. My understanding is that O–FRP is designed to improve material readiness by providing greater stability and predictability in maintenance schedules. Restoring predictability to maintenance periods, when combined with sufficient and 

predictable resources in our shipyards and depots should allow for better maintenance outcomes and improved overall fleet readiness. 

Question. What metrics should Congress use to track the material readiness and 

material condition of Navy ships and aircraft, as well as the effectiveness of O–FRP? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the material readiness of our 

fleet is promptly known to Departmental leadership and the Congress. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM

Question. Do you believe that the current balance between short- and long-term 

research is appropriate to meet current and future Department of the Navy needs? 

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Answer. I believe that we must maintain a balance across our R&D investments 

to ensure our current Fleet is equipped with the capabilities they need today, to 

maintain the Navy and Marine Corps operational advantage by developing and 

fielding next generation weapon systems to change the face of future naval warfare 

and avoid technological surprise by aggressively pursuing high risks R&D initiatives. I also believe an increase in rapid prototyping and experimentation with the 

Fleet will help to inform the Department’s R&D budget and ultimately deliver the 

capabilities our naval forces need today and well into the future. 

Question. If confirmed, what direction would you provide regarding the importance of innovative defense science in meeting Navy and Marine Corps missions? 

Answer. S&T investments provide the underpinning for assurance that our naval 

forces retain and widen our technological superiority in naval warfare. If confirmed, 

I will work with Navy leadership to properly invest in innovative defense science 

and technology; increase rapid prototyping and experimentation to expedite fielding 

of new and advanced warfighting capabilities. I would advocate pursuit of game 

changing science and technology discoveries to spawn the development and realization of new operational concepts. 

Question. If confirmed, what guidance would you give to ensure research priorities 

that will meet the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps in 2020? 

Answer. To remain competitive against emerging threats, research in new technologies needs to be coupled with innovative concepts for future war fighting. If confirmed, my guidance and oversight of research efforts will be focused on ensuring 

we are as creative in our development of new technologies as we are in our ideas 

of how to use them. 

MILITARY SPACE AND CYBER

Question. Do you believe that the current Department of Defense management 

structure for space and cyber programs sufficiently protects Navy and Marine Corps 

space and cyber equities? 

Answer. Yes. My understanding is that the new management structure for space 

programs, which has designated the Secretary of the Air Force as the Principal Department of Defense Space Advisor, provides the Navy and Marine Corps sufficient 

opportunity to actively represent critical equities affecting space & cyber mission 

areas and capabilities. Similarly, the current Department of Defense structure also 

appropriately balances Service and Joint cyberspace equities. If confirmed, I will review this management structure with Department of Navy space and cyber community leaders to ensure Department of Navy equities are adequately represented. 

Question. In your view, how actively should the Navy and Marine Corps be engaged in the management of space and cyber programs? 

Answer. The Navy and Marine Corps have a responsibility to manage programs 

which provide the capability to operate and defend its networks and space capabilities. The Department’s focus ensures the security and resiliency of weapons systems 

and warfighting platforms. The Services must remain actively involved as these capabilities are critical to the success of Service mission in the modern cyber and 

space reliant operating environment. 

Question. In your view, is the Navy and Marine Corps adequately involved in the 

requirements process for space and cyber programs? 

Answer. Yes. The Navy and Marine Corps participation in the space & cyber requirements process generally occurs through their respective service requirements 

processes and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process. 

My understanding is that the recent standup of the Principal Department of Defense Space Advisory Staff and the DOD Principal Cyber Advisor should improve 

Joint participation and better facilitate requirements development for future space 

and cyberspace capabilities. 

Question. What is the Navy and Marine Corps’ appropriate long-term role in space 

and cyber systems, other than as a user of space and cyber products? 

Answer. My understanding is that, in addition to being a user of space and cyber 

products, the Department has structured the Naval Science and Technology Strategy to discover, develop and deliver decisive naval capabilities, near- to long-term, 

by investing in a balanced portfolio of breakthrough scientific research, innovative 

technologies and talented people. In addition, the Navy and Marine Corps are working to incorporate the cyber domain into all of the Services’ efforts to make reducing 

cyber vulnerability as fundamental a priority as physical protection of personnel, 

ships, aircraft, submarines, land systems and infrastructure. 

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ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Question. In your view, what steps must the Navy take to regain supremacy in 

electronic warfare, both offensive and defensive? 

Answer. I see electronic warfare as a warfare domain that offers great promise 

for innovation and experimentation with potential to increase the offensive and defensive capabilities of the Navy/Marine Corps team. Electronic Warfare will make 

our ships and aircraft hard to find, hard to kill and lethal. To that end, if confirmed, 

I would support the Navy’s continued investment in technologies and policies to leap 

ahead in the Electronic Warfare domain 

JOINT OPERATIONS

Question. Naval operations are becoming increasingly ‘‘joint’’ as marines plan to 

deploy in larger numbers and on a wider range of ships; the U.S. Army and Air 

Force begin to invest in counter-maritime capabilities; and air and naval forces continue to develop and implement interoperable capabilities to defeat anti-access and 

area-denial (A2/AD) networks—a process that started with the Air-Sea Battle Concept in 2010. 

How would you characterize your familiarity with how each of the Services organize, train and equip their forces? 

Answer. Under title 10, man, train, and equip responsibilities reside with each 

Service. The challenge remains to produce a more effective operational Joint force. 

My understanding is that within the Navy and Marine Corps, there is a continuing 

effort through the Naval Board to align the naval Services when it comes to war 

gaming and long range planning. The intent is through early and continuous collaboration to improve cross-domain capability and capacity. 

Question. Are there other innovative ideas you are considering to increase Joint 

interoperability and ensure opportunities to improve cross-domain capability and capacity are not missed? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Service Chiefs and combatant commanders to seek new ways to combine forces in adaptive and responsive 

force packages. I look forward to improving information sharing standards and architectures within the Naval and Joint Forces to enhance interoperability. 

INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. Decades of under-investment in installations has led to increasing backlogs of facility maintenance needs, substandard living and working conditions, and 

has made it harder for the Services to take advantage of new technologies that could 

increase productivity. 

Do you believe the Department of the Navy is investing enough in its infrastructure? Please explain. 

Answer. In order to comply with fiscal constraints and maintain operational readiness, the Naval forces have been compelled to continue accepting risk in infrastructure investment and operations. However, if confirmed, I’ll remain committed to investing in our Shipyards and Depots and exceeding the minimum 6 percent investment described in 10 USC 2476. I will also support the ongoing prioritization of nuclear weapons support, base security, airport/seaport/range operations, and quality 

of life programs for our sailors, marines and families. It is essential that we accept 

risk judiciously by prioritizing life/safety issues and efficiency improvements to existing infrastructure and repairing only the most critical components of our mission 

critical facilities. By deferring less critical repairs, especially for non-mission-critical 

facilities, the Department of the Navy is allowing certain facilities to degrade and 

causing our overall facilities maintenance backlog to increase. This backlog must 

eventually be addressed. 

ACQUISITION REFORM

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 emplaced 

myriad changes to defense acquisition processes, including reinserting service chief 

influence and accountability into acquisition processes. 

Do you support the acquisition reform provisions in the Fiscal Year 2016 National 

Defense Authorization Act? 

Answer. Yes. I support many of the provisions in the FY 16 NDAA. In particular, 

I support the legislation that reinforces the roles of the CNO and CMC in decisions 

regarding the balancing of resources and priorities, and associated tradeoffs among 

cost, schedule, technical feasibility, and performance on major defense acquisition 

programs. This legislation is consistent with the Department of the Navy’s Gate ReVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01057 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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view process. This is a collaborative process that involves the CNO and CMC or 

their representatives throughout the acquisition process. 

Question. What additional acquisition-related reforms do you believe the Committee should consider? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with SECNAV, USD (AT&L), and ASN (RDA) 

to identify reforms that help the Services more effectively manage program risks 

and budget uncertainty associated with major defense acquisition programs. I look 

forward, if confirmed, to working with the Committee to improve these processes. 

Question. How can the Department and the Navy better access and integrate commercial and military technology to remain ahead of its potential adversaries? 

Answer. Continual sharing of requirements and technological ideas between DON 

and industry is critical. If confirmed, I will ensure that communication with industry is robust and will continue to seek ideas from large and small businesses by use 

of existing tools such as the Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF), the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, and the Small Business Technology Transfer 

(STTR) program. 

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. Officials of the Department of Defense, including previous Secretaries 

of the Navy, have advocated for accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. 

Do you support United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the 

Law of the Sea? 

Answer. Yes, I strongly support accession to the United Nations Convention on 

the Law of the Sea. For over thirty years the United States has benefited greatly 

from the legal regime provided by the Convention. The U.S. position that this complex framework reflects customary international law, and thus the U.S. is entitled 

to its benefits without accession to the treaty itself is not universally accepted. Accession would eliminate the need for the U.S. to assert that vital portions of the 

Convention addressing traditional uses of the oceans are reflective of customary 

international law. Where the Convention broke new ground, such as in the creation 

of a mechanism for securing international recognition of extended continental shelf 

claims, the U.S. cannot rely on customary international law to guarantee acceptance 

of its own extended continental shelf claims, including in the Arctic region. The U.S. 

should lead in maintaining a stable set of rules for the oceans and not being a party 

to the treaty prevents us from maintaining a credible position to influence these 

issues. We should lead in the development of law and policy for oceans and becoming a party to the treaty puts us in the strongest position to do so. 

Question. How would you respond to critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States? 

Answer. The ability of our armed forces to operate freely on, over, and above the 

world’s oceans is critical to our national security. The Convention codifies binding 

tenets of international law that are essential to the global mobility and operations 

of our military. These include the right of unimpeded transit passage through 

straits used for international navigation, the twelve nautical mile limitation on the 

maximum breadth of the territorial sea, and the reaffirmation of sovereign immunity for our warships. As a maritime nation, free access to the oceans has always 

been critical to our security and economic well-being. Becoming a party to the Convention provides us with a credible position to raise issues and concerns for the freedom of navigation under which maritime commerce is able to move safely and securely on ships around the world. 

Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of 

the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime disputes such as in the 

South China Sea and in the Arctic? 

Answer. Events in the South China Sea and the Arctic are illustrative of the significant and increasing pressures on the maritime environment. This calls for 

United States leadership. Unfortunately, we are the only permanent member of the 

United Nations Security Council and the only Arctic nation that is not a party to 

the Law of the Sea Convention. The Convention provides the only internationally 

accepted process for nations to establish legal title to a continental shelf beyond 200 

nautical miles from their coasts. Only by submitting its claim of an extended continental shelf to the Commission set up under the Convention can the U.S. guarantee 

international acceptance of its claim to an extended continental shelf off its coasts, 

including sovereign rights to potentially vast energy resources in the Arctic. We 

need to be inside the Convention to bring the full weight of our leadership to influence the resolution of South China Sea and Arctic issues and to have the most effective impact on other future developments in oceans. 

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U.S. FORCE POSTURE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Question. The Department continues the effort to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific as announced in the January 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance. 

Are you satisfied with the rebalance efforts to date? 

Answer. Thus far, I am satisfied with the Navy and Marine Corps rebalance efforts to date as part of a longer term plan. These plans have and will continue to 

result in a significant adjustment in U.S. Navy force structure and capabilities in 

the Asia-Pacific region. 

Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the Asia-Pacific region 

over the next couple of years and what specific Navy and Marine Corps capabilities 

or enhancements are needed in to meet those priorities? 

Answer. Our U.S. regional priorities remain a) preservation of a rules-based international order, b) regional stability, and c) enhanced alliance/partner relationships. 

Naval forces contribute significantly to all three with their credible forward presence, which contributes to conventional deterrence against aggressive behavior. In 

order to protect our interests, the U.S. faces a range of challenges in the Asia-Pacific 

region, including provocations by North Korea and the growth of its ballistic missile 

programs, as well as China’s expansion into the Pacific and Indian oceans, supported by their rapidly growing navy. Our naval capabilities, including our strategic 

deterrent, must be modernized to continue supporting the stability essential to this 

region’s significant contributions to the global economy. Moreover, we require sufficient capacity (ships, subs and tactical aviation) to be able to sustain deployed and 

lethal naval forces. 

ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL

Question. Over the past few years, much has been made of the emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the U.S. Navy’s freedom of movement and action 

in certain regions. 

Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities are a concern? 

Answer. Yes. The development and proliferation of advanced systems that can 

sense, target and strike Naval assets at increasing ranges and accuracy is a vital 

concern to me. If confirmed, I will work with other defense leaders and leaders in 

industry to develop technologies and concepts of operations that assure all-domain 

access by the joint force. 

Question. If so, what do you believe the Navy and Marine Corps need to be doing 

now and in the next few years to ensure continued access to all strategically important segments of the maritime domain? 

Answer. The free use of the maritime commons is critical to the global economic 

system and U.S. national interests. I believe the Navy should continue to first and 

foremost be present and exercise freedom of navigation in international waters and 

to reassure our allies and partners. Further the Navy and Marine Corps must continue to develop new concepts, platforms, and technologies that can effectively address this emerging threat to access. The marines should continue their work to creatively adapt their operating concepts for more distributed maneuver into contested 

littoral areas. 

CHINA ASSERTIVENESS

Question. How has China’s aggressive assertion of territorial and maritime claims, 

particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea, affected security and stability in the region? 

Answer. China’s actions in the South and East China Seas, as well as its rapid 

military modernization and growing defense budgets, have led many in the region, 

including the U.S., to question its long-term intentions. China has still not clarified 

its 9–Dash Line claim, and it continues to conduct land-reclamation and construction activities in the South China Sea. Such behavior has been destabilizing for the 

region and has increased the risk of miscalculation or conflict among regional actors. 

Our allies and partners in the region are increasingly looking to the U.S. for leadership and support in the face of these challenges, and so our response to China’s 

challenges to the international maritime order should be firm and consistent. 

CHINA

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of the United States-China 

military relationship? 

Answer. The United States-China military-to-military relationship is a critical 

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gional maritime strategy. Right now, I believe the military relationship is contributing to stability in the region. This stability allows us to increase cooperation on 

areas of overlapping interests, while improving our ability to manage other aspects 

of the security relationship responsibly. The broader bilateral relationship can improve through strengthening trust and transparency between the two militaries, 

without sacrificing operational security. 

Question. What are your views regarding China’s interest in and commitment to 

improving military relations with the United States? 

Answer. While I have had very little interaction with Chinese military leaders, 

my understanding is that China’s leadership understands that as they increase 

their interaction throughout the region, they have a shared interest with the United 

States in preserving lines of communications to maximize common interests and 

minimize miscalculations. 

Question. What is your view of the purpose and relative importance of sustained 

defense-to-defense relations with China? 

Answer. I believe China recognizes the U.S. will have an enduring presence in the 

Pacific and therefore has a clear interest in sustaining military-to-military contacts. 

If confirmed, I will continue to use the military relationship as a tool to build sustained and substantive dialogue, develop areas of practical cooperation, and manage 

competition in a way that protects national interests and supports overall stability 

in the relationship and the Asia-Pacific region. 

UNMANNED SYSTEMS

Question. The Navy’s current plan for the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne 

Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system aircraft is to develop an airframe optimized for unrefueled endurance (14 hours) and the ISR mission. 

Given the combat radius of the planned carrier air wing, are you concerned the 

Navy’s aircraft carriers will lack the ability to project power at relevant distances, 

given emerging anti-access/area-denial threats? 

Answer. Yes, I am concerned. Rapidly evolving technological and security environments require the Department of the Navy to continually work to develop new concepts and technologies. If confirmed, I will work with Navy leadership to ensure 

there is an integrated and affordable approach to assessing warfighting capabilities 

of the entire Air Wing. 

STRATEGIC THINKING

Question. How do you plan to foster a dedicated, educated, and assigned group 

of strategic thinkers and planners who rise to the rank of flag rank officer? 

Answer. The strength of our Navy and Marine Corps team remains its people. If 

confirmed, I will provide the Secretary my frank assessment of the existing professional and educational opportunities available to our officer cadre within each of 

their respective career paths, and will make recommendations regarding any 

changes necessary to ensure the best strategic thinkers and planners are developed 

and nominated. 

The Navy and Marine Corps must improve their ability to develop senior leaders 

who are able to formulate and implement strategy. The promotion and selection 

processes are effective at choosing accomplished officers, well versed in operationallevel planning, programming and engineering thinking, but may not always pick officers for executive positions who are skilled in the strategic arts. Today’s geo-strategic environment demands we have military leaders who can ensure that programs 

and technologies are linked to strategy and concepts of operations that are focused 

on what it takes to secure America’s strategic interests around the world. 

The CNO and CMC began initiatives to enhance the strategic education of officers, and added an officer subspecialty for strategy. I will work with them to support these efforts and investigate the possibility of creating a cadre of strategists 

who have strategy development and implementation as their primary specialty and 

whose career paths place them in billets where their intellectual contributions will 

have a cascading effect on the overall direction of the Navy and Marine Corps. 

CONVENTIONAL VS. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Question. What role do you see for the Navy and Marine Corps in conventional 

deterrence? 

Answer. Naval forward presence is critical to conventional deterrence. Captured 

in the phrase that the Navy is ‘‘where it matters, when it matters’’ is the ability 

of our entire Navy/Marine team to operate forward with combat credible forces to 

enhance stability and deter undesired behavior. Our flexible forward-deployed posture materially contributes to deterrence and generates crisis response options. 

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Question. How do strategic and conventional deterrence complement one another? 

Answer. Strategic and conventional deterrence are complementary. Our nation’s 

strategic deterrent has been a bedrock of peace and stability, precluding major wars 

for over 50 years. The Navy’s contribution to this is the SSBN force, which has provided a survivable and responsive capability and 100 percent alert coverage since 

the 1960s. The force recently celebrated its 4,000th strategic deterrent patrol. Complementing this strategic deterrent our conventional naval forces are present to 

been seen and to reassure our partners that we have a global reach that protects 

the international system. Both work in tandem with the Joint force to guarantee 

stability. 

OFFSET TECHNOLOGIES

Question. During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key technologies to offset 

the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces: precision guided munitions, 

stealth technology, and satellite-based navigation. These three technologies have 

given U.S. forces unparalleled superiority until now. However, with advancements 

by our emerging adversaries, it seems like the military technological superiority is 

beginning to erode. As a result, it is critical that the United States once again focus 

on offsetting the erosion of our technology advantages being achieved by our potential adversaries. 

Question. Which technology priorities do you believe the Navy and Marine Corps 

should be pursuing to maintain the military technological superiority of the United 

States? 

Answer. Our adversaries are indeed pursuing and increasing their investments in 

military modernization programs that threaten our technological superiority. If confirmed, I believe we should focus on affordable technology priorities that develop a 

more capable and ready force, and capabilities broadly applicable to a wide variety 

of threat. In addition, we should investigate using advanced capabilities in new innovative ways to help us meet our military objectives. In particular, I believe that 

key warfighting areas such as power projection, electronic warfare and cyber, antiaccess/area denial (A2AD), air warfare, and undersea warfare are all important priorities. I would place special emphasis on unmanned systems. 

Question. What strategies would you recommend be implemented to develop these 

technology priorities? 

Answer. I would recommend we focus on prioritizing development of advanced capabilities and looking at how we can use them differently in a more innovative fashion to gain a warfighting advantage. For the longer term, I would recommend planning our research and development efforts to focus on future threats and how to address them. 

Question. What role should the services play in their development? 

Answer. The Services need to work collaboratively with the Department of Defense, as well as other government agencies, industry, universities, labs, think 

tanks, and partner nations. The faster cycle time of technology advancement today 

demands that we share the vibrant innovation across all entities in order to stay 

competitive. By working together and sharing the strengths each brings to the table, 

the Services can find synergies to apply to the joint fight. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. If confirmed, what direction would you provide regarding the importance of innovative defense science and technology in meeting Department of the 

Navy missions? 

Answer. S&T investments provide the underpinning for assurance that our naval 

forces retain and widen our technological superiority in naval warfare. If confirmed, 

I will work with Navy leadership to properly invest in innovative defense science 

and technology; increase rapid prototyping and experimentation to expedite fielding 

of new and advanced warfighting capabilities; and advocate pursuit of game changing science and technology discoveries to spawn the development and realization of 

new operational concepts. 

Question. Do you believe the current balance between short- and long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Navy needs? 

Answer. I believe that we must maintain a balance across our R&D investments 

to ensure our current Fleet is equipped with the capabilities they need today, to 

maintain the Navy and Marine Corps operational advantage by developing and 

fielding next generation weapon systems to change the face of future naval warfare 

and avoid technological surprise by aggressively pursuing high risks R&D initiatives. I also believe an increase in rapid prototyping and experimentation with the 

1056 

Fleet will help to inform the Department’s R&D budget and ultimately deliver the 

capabilities our naval forces need today and well into the future. 

Question. What role would you have in helping the Department implement the 

nascent Third Offset Strategy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with DOD and Navy and Marine Corps 

leadership to ensure we are providing the right strategic direction, that we are rigorously exploring innovative operating concepts via wargaming, and prioritizing our 

S&T investments in support of the ongoing innovation programs in the Department 

of the Navy that support the Third Offset Strategy. 

TECHNICAL WORKFORCE

Question. A significant challenge facing the Department of Defense today is an 

impending shortage of high quality scientific and engineering talent to work at Defense laboratories and technical centers. 

In your view, what are the pros and cons of having Active Duty Navy and Marine 

Corps personnel trained and working as scientists and engineers within the Department of the Navy research and acquisition system? 

Answer. Active duty Navy and Marine Corps personnel in many cases have the 

best understanding of the performance requirements of defense systems and platforms. In the capacity of scientists and engineers, sailors and marines who understand both the operational environment and the technical dimensions of acquisition 

decisions will be able to positively influence future acquisition requirements. Having 

the end-user actively engaged in developing technology and defining requirements 

may also help shorten the acquisition timeline. The challenge to the DON is the 

availability of sailors and marines to fill new positions as scientists and engineers. 

Question. How would you ensure that directors of labs in your service have the 

tools they need to dynamically shape their S&T workforce? 

Answer. I am aware that laboratory directors currently have authorities to rapidly 

respond to emerging technology threats through the Naval Innovative Science and 

Engineering (NISE) program which allows the directors to make investments in 

basic and applied research, technology transition, workforce development, and laboratory revitalization. In addition, I am aware that the laboratory directors have direct hiring authority to hire key scientists and engineers quickly. If confirmed, I will 

work with Navy leadership to continue to identify ways to build upon these policies 

and others to ensure the S&T workforce is equipped with the tools, facilities, knowledge and experience to maintain technological superiority over emerging threats. 

TEST AND EVALUATION ISSUES

Question. What do you see as the role of the developmental and operational test 

and evaluation communities with respect to rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition, and 

other evolutionary acquisition processes? 

Answer. The developmental and operational test and evaluation communities play 

valuable roles in rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition or evolutionary acquisition. For 

these various acquisition processes, testing will help in obtaining useful knowledge 

to support systems development, make programmatic acquisition decisions, and inform users about the system’s operational characteristics and performance. 

Question. What are your views on the appropriate roles of OSD developmental 

and operational testing organizations with respect to testing of Navy and Marine 

Corps systems? 

Answer. OSD test organizations can provide useful inputs on test and evaluation, 

participate on acquisition program test and evaluation working groups, and provide 

constructive critiques in their evaluations of system performance. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under 

Secretary of the Navy? 

Answer. Yes. 

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Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

BEST VALUE CONTRACTING

1. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Davidson, there has been a recent trend in some of the 

Services to buy more products through Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) 

and reverse auction acquisition methods. I have become aware of cases where these 

methods have even been used for the procurement of personal protective equipment 

where safety and quality are critical and the failure of the item could result in combat casualties. Our troops, who put their lives on the line for our freedom and security, should not be sent into harm’s way with the cheapest equipment, but rather 

the best. In combat, as well as in training, quality personal protective equipment 

can prevent serious injuries and can even be the difference between life and death 

for our servicemembers. That is why I worked to include section 884 in this year’s 

NDAA, which was recently signed into law. This provision requires the Secretary 

of Defense to ensure that the Services, in procuring an item of personal protective 

equipment or a critical safety item, use source selection criteria that is predominately based on technical qualifications of the item, if the level of quality or failure 

of the item could result in death or severe bodily harm to the servicemember. If confirmed, will you review this provision in the NDAA and ensure that your Service 

complies with this law? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. If confirmed as the Under Secretary of the Navy, my number one 

priority will always be to keep our sailors and marines safe. In this regard, nothing 

is more important than buying high quality personal protective equipment. I will 

ensure that the Department of the Navy complies with section 884 of this year’s 

NDAA. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

REBALANCE TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC

2. Senator HIRONO. Dr. Davidson, I am very concerned with ensuring that our Rebalance to Asia-Pacific is more than just rhetoric. What are your views on advancing 

a tangible rebalance? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. The plan in execution by the Department of Defense will meet the 

objectives of the broader U.S. Government effort to rebalance to the Asia Pacific. 

I understand that the Navy is on track to position 60 percent of its forces in the 

region by 2020. It is also my understanding that the Navy is deploying its most cutting-edge technology to the Pacific, including the advanced Zumwalt destroyer, the 

latest Virginia-class submarine, the P–8 maritime patrol aircraft, the E–2D airborne 

early warning aircraft, the joint strike fighter (F–35), and USS Ronald Reagan 

(CVN 76) aircraft carrier homeported in Japan. The Marine Corps retains a robust 

presence in the region, including a sustained forward presence in Okinawa and new 

rotations to Darwin, Australia. 

3. Senator HIRONO. Dr. Davidson, in your opinion, how are we doing in reassuring 

our partners and allies in the region that we are serious about the Rebalance and 

what else should we be doing? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. I believe that our persistent forward presence, capability, and institutional capacity facilitates robust naval activity in the region that deepens alliances, strengthen partnerships, builds strategic relationships, sharpens U.S. 

warfighting competence, and enables prompt and ready response to conflict and natural disaster contingencies. I understand that the Navy is developing interoperability and building partner capacity across the Asia Pacific region through cooperaVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01063 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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tive deployments as well as leading over 170 exercises and 600 training events annually with allies and partner nations. 

ENERGY SECURITY

4. Senator HIRONO. Dr. Davidson, I believe energy security is a vital component 

to our overall national security. Do you believe the Department of Defense (DOD) 

has a role to play in U.S. energy security and could you comment on how you view 

energy security as tied to our overall national security? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. The Department of Defense’s ability to provide for the national security depends on having assured access to reliable energy supplies and using that 

energy as efficiently as possible to maximize our capabilities. The Navy and Marine 

Corps’ mission is to provide global presence to ensure stability, deter potential adversaries, and provide options in times of crisis. Assured access to energy is critical 

to that mission as well. I support the Department of the Navy’s efforts to transform 

how it uses energy to maximize strategic options, boost combat effectiveness, and 

better protect our sailors and marines. 

ENERGY EFFICIENCY INITIATIVES

5. Senator HIRONO. Dr. Davidson, I applaud DOD’s work on energy efficiency initiatives including alternative and renewable energy projects. If confirmed, will you 

commit to continuing the administration’s efforts to expand alternative and renewable energy initiatives? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes. I will support Department of the Navy efforts to develop renewable energy and energy efficiency projects because they are critical to improving 

our energy security and warfighting capability. 

LONG TERM PER DIEM

6. Senator HIRONO. Dr. Davidson, the work that the men and women of our Services do, including our DOD civilians, is critical to our national security. While I support DOD’s efforts to seek cost efficiencies, I am deeply concerned by the potential 

impact that cutting per diem for long-term temporary duty may be having on the 

hardworking men and women of our Services and their ability to focus on their mission. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that the men and women who work away 

from home for extended periods of time will not be required to pay out-of-pocket for 

their travel and that the Services will be provided the flexibility needed to support 

these hardworking members and civilians and that necessary temporary duties 

(TDY) go empty because of the new long-term TDY per diem policy? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. I concur that we need to support the efforts of our hardworking 

men and women who work away from home for extended periods of time. As I understand it the intent of the new per diem policy was for individuals who were on 

longer term TDY to plan for lodging arrangements that would take advantage of the 

extended stay and select temporary lodging that on a per day basis would be less 

expensive than if their stay was for a short duration. If I am confirmed, I will look 

into the impact of this policy on the out of pocket expenses of our military and civilian travelers. 

[The nomination reference of Dr. Janine Anne Davison follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

September 21, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Janine Anne Davidson, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of the Navy, vice Robert 

O. Work, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Dr. Janine Anne Davidson, which 

was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 

referred, follows:] 

1059 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF JANINE A. DAVISON

Education: 

• University of Colorado, Boulder 

• Attended: 1984–1988 • Degree Granted: Bachelor of Science, Architectural Engineering • Degree Received: May 1988 • University of South Carolina 

• Attended: 1998–2005 • Degree Granted: Doctor of Philosophy, International Studies • Degree Received: December 2005 • Degree Granted: Masters of Arts, International Studies 

• Degree Received May 2002 

Employment Record: 

List all jobs held since college including title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. 

Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC 

• Senior Fellow, Defense Policy 

• January 2014–present. 

Georgetown University, Washington, DC 

• Adjunct Professor 

• January 2015–May 2015. 

George Mason University, Arlington, VA 

• Assistant Professor 

• August 2008–May 2009; and August 2012–January 2014. 

Center for New American Security, Washington DC 

• Non-Resident Senior Fellow 

• 2013–2014. 

Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC 

• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans 

• April 2009–March 2012. 

Center for New American Security, Washington DC 

• Non-Resident Senior Fellow 

• 2013–2014. 

Brookings Institution, Washington, DC 

• Non-Resident Fellow 

• August 2008–April 2009. 

Northwestern University Medill School of Journalism, Washington DC campus 

• Adjunct Professor 

• 2008 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, Pentagon, Washington, DC 

• Director, Stability Operations Capabilities 

• May 2006–June 2008 

George Mason University, Arlington, VA 

• Adjunct Professor 

• 2005–2006. 

Hicks and Associates, Arlington, VA 

• Director, Counterinsurgency Studies 

• 2005–2006 

DFI International, Washington, DC 

• Associate 

• 2003–2004 

United States Air Force 

• Captain 

• 1988–1998 

Honors and Awards: 

Military Awards 

• 1995 Distinguished Graduate, Air Force Squadron Officers School. 

• 1994 Instructor of the Year, 12th Flying Training Wing. 

• 1990–1998 Air Force Medals: Air Force Commendation, Air Force Achievement, National Defense, SW Asia. 

• 1986 Air Force Vice Commandant Award for Leadership. 

• 1984–1988 Undergraduate Academic Scholarship, 4-year Air Force ROTC. 

Federal Civilian Awards 

• 2012 Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service. 

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• Academic Awards 

• 2010 Distinguished Alumnus Award, College of Arts and Sciences, University 

of South Carolina. 

• 2006 Dissertation Award, Committee for the Analysis of Military Operations 

and Strategy, American Political Science Association (APSA). 

• 2003 Pre-Doctoral in-Residence Foreign Policy Fellowship, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 

• 2001 Governor John C. West Fellowship. 

• 1998, 1999, 2000 Graduate Student Fellowship, USC Graduate School 

Other Awards 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by the Dr. Janine Anne Davidson in connection 

with her nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Janine Anne Davidson. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Under Secretary of the Navy. 

3. Date of nomination: 

September 21, 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

April 24, 1966, Oxnard, CA. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to David J. Kilcullen. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. 

Undergraduate: 

University of Colorado, Boulder 

Attended: 1984–1988 

1061 

Degree Granted: Bachelor of Science, Architectural Engineering 

Degree Received: May 1988 

W.T. Woodson High School, Fairfax, VA 

Attended: 1981–1984 

Degree Granted: High School Diploma Degree 

Received: June 1984 

Graduate: 

University of South Carolina 

Attended: 1998–2005 

Degree Granted: Doctor of Philosophy, International Studies 

Degree Received: December 2005 

Degree Granted: Master of Arts, International Studies 

Degree Received May 2002 

9. Employment Record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC 

Senior Fellow, Defense Policy 

January 2014–present 

Georgetown University, Washington, DC 

Adjunct Professor 

January 2015–May 2015 

J9 Consulting, LLC, Falls Church, VA 

Managing Member 

March 2014–present 

C2 Technologies, Vienna, VA 

Consultant 

July 2013–June 2014 

George Mason University, Arlington, VA 

Assistant Professor 

August 2008–May 2009; and August 2012–January 2014 

Center for New American Security, Washington DC 

Non-Resident Senior Fellow 

2013–2014 

Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans 

April 2009–March 2012 

Brookings Institution, Washington, DC 

Non-Resident Fellow 

August 2008–April 2009 

Northwestern University Medill School of Journalism, Washington DC campus 

Adjunct Professor 

2008 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, Pentagon 

Washington, DC 

Director, Stability Operations Capabilities 

May 2006–June 2008. 

George Mason University, Arlington, VA 

Adjunct Professor 

2005–2006. 

SAIC, Arlington, VA 

Director, Counterinsurgency Studies 

2005–2006 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Reserve Forces Policy Board 

Member 

March 2015–present 

Senior Advisors Group for General Phillip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander 

Europe 

Member/lnformal 

1062 

July 2014–present 

Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense 

Consultant 

May 2012–present 

National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force 

Commissioner 

May 2014–April 2015 

Presidential Transition Team, Defense Department, Washington DC 

Member 

November 2008–January 2009 

Officer and Senior Pilot, United States Air Force 

1988–1998 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

J9 Consulting LLC: Sole Owner and Managing Member/inactive. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

Board of Advisors, Truman National Security Project, since 2013. 

Council on Foreign Relations, Life Member since 2008. 

13.Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

N/A. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

Re-elect Barak Obama 2012, National Security Policy volunteer. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

$1,500.00 Hillary for President 2015. 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

2012 Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service. 

2010 Distinguished Alumnus Award, College of Arts and Sciences, University of 

South Carolina. 

2006 Dissertation Award, Committee for the Analysis of Military Operations and 

Strategy, American Political Science Association (APSA). 

2003 Pre-Doctoral in-Residence Foreign Policy Fellowship, Brookings Institution, 

Washington, D.C. 

2001 Governor John C. West Fellowship. 

1998, 1999, 2000 Graduate Student Fellowship, USC Graduate School. 

1995 Distinguished Graduate, Air Force Squadron Officers School. 

1994 Instructor of the Year, 12th Flying Training Wing. 

1990–1998 Air Force Medals: Air Force Commendation, Air Force Achievement, 

National Defense, SW Asia. 

1986 Air Force Vice Commandant Award for Leadership. 

1984–1988 Undergraduate Academic Scholarship, 4-year Air Force ROTC. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

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15-96_davidson_1.eps
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15-96_davidson_2.eps
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15-96_davidson_3.eps
1066 

16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

N/A. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to Congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this Committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, 

or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or 

denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 


15-96_davidson_4.eps
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[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

JANINE A. DAVIDSON

This 12th day of November, 2015 

[The nomination of Dr. Janine Anne Davidson was reported to 

the Senate by Chairman McCain on December 18, 2015, with the 

recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on March 17, 2016.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to the Honorable Lisa S. Disbrow 

by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied 

follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Committee has recently held a series of hearings on defense reform. 

What modifications of Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 

Act of 1986 provisions, if any, do you believe would be appropriate? 

Answer. I have no specific suggestions for modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols 

legislation at this time, but I agree with the overall goal of defense reform: to ensure 

the effective employment of our Nation’s Armed Forces. The Secretary of Defense 

is carefully examining this issue and if confirmed I will support that effort. Also, 

if I am confirmed and identify areas that merit reform, I will propose those changes 

through the appropriate established process. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. I believe that my 30 years of combined leadership, policy, and requirements with the Department of Defense has prepared me to serve as the Under Secretary of the Air Force. I’ve been a member of the Air Force, both in uniform and 

civil service, since earning my commission from Officer Training School in 1985. 

In my current position as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management & Comptroller), I am responsible for the efficient and effective management 

of Air Force resources and providing for the welfare for more than 664,000 active 

duty, Guard, Reserve and civilian airmen and their families. Before that, I served 

as the Vice Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment on the Joint 

Staff. There, I was responsible for developing future warfighting capabilities; conducting joint force structure and warfighting studies; evaluating Department of Defense plans, programs, and strategies for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

If confirmed as Under Secretary of the Air Force, I look forward to continuing to 

apply this experience in support of the Air Force, airmen and their families. 

DUTIES

Question. Section 8015 of title 10, United States Code, states the Under Secretary 

of the Air Force shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary 

of the Air Force may prescribe. 

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary 

of the Air Force? 

Answer. The position of the Under Secretary of the Air Force is established by 

law within the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Subject to the Secretary of 

1068 

the Air Force’s direction and control, the Under Secretary exercises the full authority of the Secretary to conduct the affairs of the Department of the Air Force (except 

as limited by law, regulation or limitations imposed by the Department of Defense 

or the Secretary of the Air Force). The Under Secretary also serves as the Chief 

Management Officer of the Air Force. 

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties 

and functions of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, as set forth in section 8015 

of title 10, United States Code, or in Department of Defense regulations pertaining 

to functions of the Under Secretary of the Air Force? 

Answer. At this time, I am unaware of any reason to change the duties and functions of the Under Secretary as set out in title 10 and pertinent Department of Defense regulations. If I am confirmed and I identify areas that I believe merit 

changes, I will propose those changes through the appropriate established processes. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties, if any, do you expect will be prescribed for you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary of the Air 

Force to further her vision and goals for the Air Force. I expect the Secretary to 

prescribe duties for me relating to the Under Secretary of the Air Force’s responsibilities, particularly in the role of Chief Management Officer. 

Question. Section 904(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008, directs the Secretary of a military department to designate the Under Secretary of such military department to assume the primary management responsibility for business operations. 

What is your understanding of the business operations responsibilities of the 

Under Secretary of the Air Force? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the business operations responsibilities of 

the Chief Management Officer, consistent with section 904 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, include the following: ensuring the Air 

Force’s capability to carry out the Department of Defense’s strategic plan in support 

of national security objectives; ensuring the core business missions of the Department of the Air Force are optimally aligned to support the Department’s warfighting 

mission; establishing performance goals and measures for improving and evaluating 

overall economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and monitoring and measuring this 

progress; and working with DOD’s Chief Management Officer to develop and maintain a strategic plan for business reform. 

Question. How do you perceive your role in setting the agenda for the Air Force 

Deputy Chief Management Officer? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary to prescribe duties for me relating 

to the Under Secretary of the Air Force’s responsibilities as the Chief Management 

Officer. In turn, I will appropriately set the agenda for the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO). The Air Force recently re-designated the DCMO role, along 

with the Office of Business Transformation, as the Deputy Under Secretary of the 

Air Force, Management, reporting to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. I expect 

the DCMO role to continue to include facilitating continuous process improvement 

across the Air Force and chairing already established working groups that contribute to improvements to the efficiency and effectiveness of the Air Force mission, 

core competencies and functional areas. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship with: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense serves as the principal assistant to the President on all 

Department of Defense matters. The Secretary of the Air Force is subject to the 

authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary 

of the Air Force works for the Secretary of the Air Force. The Under Secretary also 

serves as the Chief Management Officer of the Air Force, the senior energy official, 

and the focal point for space at the Air Force headquarters. As the focal point of 

space for the Air Force, the Under Secretary coordinates all of the space functions 

and activities across the Air Force, and is the primary interface to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense for space matters. If confirmed, I would look forward to working closely with the Secretary of Defense and his office on space-related matters, energy issues, and other matters as directed by the Secretary of the Air Force. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense assists the Secretary of Defense in carrying out his duties and responsibilities and performs those duties assigned by the 

Secretary of Defense or by law. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy 

1069 

Secretary of Defense on a range of matters. In particular, I would look forward to 

working with and supporting the Deputy Secretary of Defense in his role as Chief 

Management Officer of the Department of Defense. 

Question. The Chief Management Officer and Deputy Chief Management Officer 

of the Department of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for 

matters relating to the management and improvement of integrated Department of 

Defense business operations. In this role the DCMO is charged with leading the synchronization, integration, and coordination of the disparate business activities of the 

Department to ensure optimal alignment in support of the warfighting mission. If 

confirmed, I look forward to building on the close working relationship I established 

with the DCMO in my current position in my new capacity as the Air Force Chief 

Management Officer. 

Question. The Secretary of the Air Force. 

Answer. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Air Force. The Under Secretary of the Air Force is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary to assign me a wide 

range of duties and responsibilities involving, but not limited to, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, maintaining, and administering the Air Force. I look forward to working closely with the Secretary as her deputy and principal assistant. 

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is directly responsible to the Secretary 

of the Air Force and performs duties subject to his authority, direction, and control. 

For the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff is responsible for providing 

properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support the combatant commanders in their mission accomplishment. The Chief of Staff oversees members and 

organizations across the Air Force, advising the Secretary on plans and recommendations, and, acting as an agent of the Secretary, implementing plans upon 

approval. If confirmed, I would foster a close working relationship with the Chief 

of Staff to ensure that policies and resources are appropriate to meet the needs of 

the Air Force and respect his additional responsibilities as a member of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 

Question. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force assists the Secretary of the Air 

Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in conducting the affairs of the Department of the Air Force, fulfilling duties that the Chief of Staff, with the approval of 

the Secretary, may delegate to him. The Vice Chief of Staff is also a Co-Chairman 

of the Air Force Council with the Under Secretary of the Air Force. If confirmed, 

I look forward to working closely with the Vice Chief of Staff. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force carry out the goals and priorities of the Air Force. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary in building a strong 

team through close relationships and information sharing, and I look forward to 

working with the Assistant Secretaries to further the Secretary’s vision. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force. 

Answer. The General Counsel (GC) is the senior civilian legal advisor to Air Force 

senior leaders and all officers and agencies of the Department of the Air Force. The 

GC serves as the chief ethics official. If confirmed, I look forward to developing a 

strong working relationship with the GC and his staff. 

Question. The Inspector General of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Inspector General (IG) of the Air Force is a general officer who is 

detailed to the position by the Secretary of the Air Force. When directed, the IG 

inquires into and reports on matters affecting the discipline, efficiency, and economy 

of the Air Force. He also proposes programs of inspections and investigations as appropriate. If confirmed, I would look forward to developing a good working relationship with the IG. 

Question. The Surgeon General of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Surgeon General (SG) of the Air Force is the functional manager of 

the Air Force Medical Service and provides direction, guidance, and technical management of Air Force medical personnel at facilities worldwide. The SG advises the 

Secretary of the Air Force and Air Force Chief of Staff, as well as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, on matters pertaining to the medical aspects 

of the air expeditionary force and the health of Air Force personnel. If confirmed, 

I would look forward to developing a good working relationship with the SG. 

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force. 

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Answer. The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) is the senior uniformed legal advisor to Air Force senior leaders and all officers and agencies of the Department of 

the Air Force and provides professional supervision to TJAG’s Corps in the performance of their duties. If confirmed, I will look forward to developing a good working 

relationship with TJAG and the TJAG staff. 

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is the senior uniformed National 

Guard officer responsible for formulating, developing, and coordinating all policies, 

programs, and plans affecting Army and Air National Guard personnel, and is also 

a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Appointed by the President, he serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff on National Guard matters. He is also the principal adviser to the Secretary 

and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard issues and serves as the 

Department’s official channel of communication with the governors and adjutants 

general. If confirmed, I will look forward to developing a good working relationship 

with the chief of the National Guard Bureau on appropriate matters affecting the 

Air Force. 

Question. The Under Secretaries of the military services 

Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work diligently to foster a close working relationship with the Under Secretaries of the Army and Navy. I look forward to sharing information and expertise that will assist in the management of the Department 

of the Air Force and our coordination with the other Services on matters of mutual 

interest, particularly in our capacities as Chief Management Officers for our respective Services. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next 

Under Secretary of the Air Force? 

Answer. The Air Force must continue find innovative ways to do the following in 

the face of continued fiscal challenges: Ensure the Air Force can meet the increasing 

demand for airpower, while improving our readiness. Modernize air and space capabilities. 

Continue to strengthen the nuclear enterprise. Evolve our cyber enterprise. 

Address contested and congested Space. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. Ensuring the Air Force can meet the increasing demand for airpower, 

while improving our readiness requires a multi-faceted approach. A shortfall in Air 

Force capability has a disproportionately negative effect on the success of the joint 

force. We have to continue to be agile and innovative to meet the demand for airpower, while also making it affordable. Inclusion across the Air Force components 

is vital to create the strategic agility required to meet the challenges emerging from 

strategic uncertainty, fiscal constraints, and rapidly evolving threats. In order to 

meet our AF goal of 80 percent full spectrum combat readiness by 2023, the Air 

Force must set end strength commensurate with increasing global requirements; 

must divest aging platforms and infrastructure in order to free up fiscal resources 

and experience manpower; and will continue to advocate for funding stability and 

increased dwell time to sharpen needed skills. 

Modernizing air and space capabilities. We must ensure the Air Force can always 

provide responsive and effective Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power. The 

Air Force’s top three acquisition programs, the F–35, the KC–46 and the long-range 

strike bomber, are operational imperatives for the joint force of 2025 and beyond. 

Developing and delivering air superiority must be a multi-domain, technology-driven 

process focused on capabilities and capacity. Without consistent investment and improvement, continued U.S dominance of the air is in doubt. Rapidly changing operational environments mean we can no longer develop weapon systems on the traditional linear acquisition process. Capability development now requires adaptable, affordable and agile processes with increasing collaboration between our science and 

technology, acquisition, and requirements professionals, as well as our sister services. 

Continue to strengthen the nuclear enterprise. The Air Force provides two legs 

of the nuclear triad while maintaining forward-based capabilities in support of 

NATO. Our long-term investment strategy for our nuclear forces is active modernization/recapitalization of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, bombers, dual-capable aircraft and associated infrastructure. We will continue to improve the way we 

do the business of the nuclear mission. These improvements will cultivate a positive 

culture built on prestige, investment, integrity and excellence at every level. 

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Evolve our cyber enterprise. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed the standup of Task Force Cyber Secure, responsible for synchronizing all efforts seeking to 

improve the security of our information and warfighting systems. The ultimate role 

of the task force is to enable the Air Force to fly, fight and win in a cyber-contested 

environment, ultimately increasing the robustness and resilience of critical Air 

Force systems for core missions in and through cyberspace. Meanwhile, the Air 

Force must continue to integrate cybersecurity throughout the lifecycle of weapon 

system development in all mission areas. 

Space has become increasingly contested, congested, and a critical enabler of 

every mission the DOD conducts. We need to continue to improve our space situational awareness capabilities for information collection and processing, while looking 

at ways to add resilience to our space systems. We must partner with industry and 

international partners, as a healthy space industrial base is essential to national security and U.S. civil space goals and objectives. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Under Secretary of the Air Force? 

Answer. I’m unaware of any serious problems in the performance of the functions 

of the office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force. If confirmed and if I identify 

any problems as the Under Secretary, I will work tirelessly toward finding and implementing solutions. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. Again, I am unaware of any serious problems in the performance of the 

functions of the office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

Question. Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008 designates the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the Air Force’s Chief Management Officer (CMO). Section 908 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2009 requires the CMO of each of the military departments to carry out 

a comprehensive business transformation initiative. 

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Under Secretary in the capacity as CMO of the Department of the Air Force? 

Answer. The duties and responsibilities of the Under Secretary in the capacity as 

CMO is to ensure effective and efficient management of Air Force business operations. 

Responsibilities of the Chief Management Officer, consistent with section 904 of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, section 908 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 to include the following: ensuring the Air 

Force’s capability to carry out the Department of Defense’s strategic plan in support 

of national security objectives; ensuring the core business missions of the Department of the Air Force are optimally aligned to support the Department’s warfighting 

mission; establishing performance goals and measures for improving and evaluating 

overall economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and monitoring and measuring this 

progress; and working with DOD’s Chief Management Officer to develop and maintain a strategic plan for business reform. 

Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify 

you to perform these duties and responsibilities? 

Answer. My background and expertise make me uniquely qualified to serve in the 

capacity the Air Force’s Chief Management Officer (CMO). Having served over 30 

years in the capacity of a either military officer or DOD civilian, I have arrived at 

a point where I am confident in my ability to manage Air Force business operations, 

cultivate AF and OSD-level relationships, and carry out CMO responsibilities as defined in USC, DOD policy, and AF Mission Directives. 

Question. Do you believe that the CMO has the resources and authority needed 

to carry out the business transformation of the Department of the Air Force? 

Answer. I believe Congress has given adequate CMO authority to carry out business transformation of the Department of the Air Force. Resourcing is a challenge, 

allocation has been given for top priorities, such as auditability compliance, but the 

speed which needed business transformations can be achieved is limited by Air 

Force budget constraints. 

Question. What role do you believe the CMO should play in the planning, development, and implementation of specific business systems by the military departments? 

Answer. To directly engage on matters of strategic and implementation importance among my OSD and Service counterparts in the Department. My role includes 

directing and overseeing the activities of the Air Force Deputy Chief Management 

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Officer (DCMO) who engages on military departments implementations through the 

Defense Business Council. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the statutory provisions 

establishing the position of CMO? 

Answer. At this time, I am unaware of any reason to change the duties and functions of the Under Secretary as set out in title 10 and pertinent Department of Defense regulations. If I am confirmed and I identify areas that I believe merit 

changes; I will propose those changes through the appropriate established processes. 

Question. Section 2222 of title 10, United States Code, requires that the Secretary 

of Defense develop a comprehensive business enterprise architecture and transition 

plan to guide the development of its business systems and processes. The Department has chosen to implement the requirement for an enterprise architecture and 

transition plan through a ‘‘federated’’ approach in which the Business Transformation Agency has developed the top level architecture while leaving it to the 

military departments to fill in most of the detail. The Air Force business systems, 

like those of the other military departments, remain incapable of providing timely, 

reliable financial data to support management decisions. 

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure that the Air Force develops the business systems and processes it needs to appropriately manage funds 

in the best interest of the taxpayer and the national defense? 

Answer. Consistent with section 883 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

of 2016, I would ensure the process associated with business systems development 

has been, or is being, reengineered to be as streamlined and efficient as practicable; 

the system and business system portfolio are or will be in compliance with the defense business enterprise architecture; the system has valid, achievable requirements and a viable plan for implementing those requirements; the system has an 

acquisition strategy designed to eliminate or reduce the need to tailor commercial 

off-the-shelf systems; and it is in compliance with the Department’s auditability requirements. 

Question. Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the successful transformation of the Air 

Force business systems? 

Answer. Yes. A comprehensive and integrated enterprise architecture and transition plan are crucial to ensure across the Department of Defense and the Air Force 

we leverage common solutions to address critical business requirements, reduce duplication, and realize effective mission support in an affordable fashion. Enterprisewide architectures help us ensure compliance with key, common requirements, such 

as [SFIS and DPAP data standards. We work closely with the Air Force Chief Information Officer on Air Force Enterprise Architectures and the OSD Deputy Chief 

Management Officer on Defense Business Enterprise Architecture. 

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Air Force’s 

enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the requirements of section 2222? 

Answer. Section 2222 of title 10, United States Code, requires that the Secretary 

of Defense develop a comprehensive business enterprise architecture and transition 

plan to guide the development of its business systems and processes. The Department has chosen to implement the requirement for an enterprise architecture and 

transition plan through a ‘‘federated’’ approach in which the OSD Defense Business 

Council has developed the top level architecture while leaving it to the military departments to fill in most of the detail. 

I would take steps to ensure we continue to evolve Air Force enterprise architectures and transition plans to achieve the requirements of section 2222 and satisfy 

priority mission and business requirements the Air Force is responsible. 

Question. What are your views on the importance and role of timely and accurate 

financial and business information in managing operations and holding managers 

accountable? 

Answer. Timely and accurate financial and business information is essential to 

managing operations and holding managers accountable. Several ongoing AF business transformation initiatives will improve the timeliness and accuracy of AF financial and business information. We are making key investments, though significantly constrained by budget limitations. 

Question. How would you address a situation in which you found that reliable, 

useful, and timely financial and business information was not routinely available for 

these purposes? 

Answer. We address aspects of this issue with the Air Force DEAMS implementation. In general, if I were presented an issue related to reliable, useful, and timely 

financial and business information, I would engage our business leaders and my 

Deputy Chief Management Officer to apply our disciplined process of Services Development and Delivery process to define the problem, needed improvement, and reVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01078 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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quirements to meet the need. We would ensure we comply with section 2222 as well 

as any other applicable laws, policies, and regulations pertaining to the financial 

and business area situation. 

Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial and business information 

available to Air Force managers? 

Answer. I envision playing a key leadership and oversight role if confirmed. I will 

direct and oversee the activities of the Air Force Deputy Chief Management Officer 

(DCMO) and Air Force Office of Business Transformation, SAF/MG, in carrying out 

Air Force business transformation initiatives to improve our financial and business 

processes, information, and capabilities we provide Air Force managers. My primary 

objective will be ensuring efficient and effective management of Air Force Business 

operations. I will motivate actions and efforts from major transformation to 

leveraging airmen front-line innovation. 

HEADQUARTERS STREAMLINING

Question. The Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters functions of the Department of Defense and 

the military departments. 

If confirmed, what would be your role in streamlining functions, as well as identifying and implementing reductions in the Department of the Air Force headquarters? 

Answer. One of the Under Secretary of the Air Force duties given me by Secretary 

James, was oversight of the Air Force inputs to the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) of the Department of Defense’s review of the Department’s major headquarters. Secretary James and I agree this involvement, as well my past experience 

as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller 

and Vice Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment on the Joint Staff, 

position me to effectively chair the internal Air Force group devising options and 

cost estimates for consolidating and/or eliminating a headquarters. 

Question. What areas and functions, specifically and if any, do you consider to be 

the priorities for possible consolidation or reductions within the Department of the 

Air Force? 

Answer. Since 2010 the Air Force reduced its headquarters and support functions 

costs so as to not cut deeper in mission forces, readiness, and future military capabilities. In 2010, Secretary Gates gave us a $1.3B O&M savings target for overhead 

and support functions spending. To hit this savings target between 2010 and 2012 

we cut redundancy in next echelon support functions at regional major commands 

and their subordinate headquarters and centralized common administrative services. In 2013, Secretary Hagel gave us a $0.63B O&M savings target for three Air 

Force components management headquarters spending across a 5-year period. We 

went beyond management headquarters and planned to save $ 1.15B O&M across 

all headquarters and administrative activities over that period. We achieved the 

major portion of these savings from consolidating and eliminating redundancy between active component headquarters staffs through business process re-engineering 

for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE), acquisition, cyber and 

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) management as well as installation and mission support. A smaller yet still significant portion was tied to planned 

force structure reductions in our fiscal year 2015 budget. 

The Air Force has already achieved savings in our headquarters by consolidating 

responsibilities of Major Commands (MAJCOMs) and Numbered Air Forces (NAFs). 

However, to achieve more savings than we already have planned, we need to have 

a reduction in the demand signal from the combatant commands as well as force 

structure reductions. 

Question. To the extent that the Department of the Air Force has functions that 

overlap with the Department of Defense, Joint Staff, or military departments, what 

would be your approach to consolidating and reducing redundancy? 

Answer. One of the observations from the major headquarter activities review led 

by OSD DCMO is the variance between Department of Defense components on functions done at the headquarters vice units a couple echelons down from the headquarters. With this, we may be able to consolidate certain functions across organizations and divest the workload to lower organizational level units as a cost savings. 

Additionally, we are engaged in Secretary Carter’s review of the 1986 GoldwaterNichols Act and believe efficiencies are possible in our current joint headquarters 

structure. 

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COMBAT AIR FORCES CAPACITY

Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance and the 2014 QDR, U.S. forces should be able to ‘‘defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of—or impose 

unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.’’ 

In your opinion, is OSD’s force sizing construct an adequate approach for the Air 

Force given the dynamics of the current and projected geostrategic and fiscal environments? 

Answer. Yes, the force sizing construct, which also includes homeland defense and 

supporting global counter-terror operations, is an adequate approach to address the 

challenges of the current and projected environment. The dynamic fiscal environment does not change the force required to meet this construct, but does present 

challenges to the Air Force in how we can best achieve the necessary balance of 

force readiness, capacity and capabilities required by the construct. 

Question. In your view is the Air Force accepting higher risk with the current 

strategy; can it execute the strategy, or are increased resources required by the Air 

Force with regard to airpower capability and capacity? 

Answer. Yes, increased resources would help the Air Force address this problem 

and be an appropriate response to the continuous demands placed upon the Air 

Force. The Joint Force has become dependent on the Air Force to provide air superiority, airborne ISR, precision strike, space-based navigation and surveillance, cyberspace access, rapid global mobility, and the command and control that integrates 

Joint Force airpower. As a result, capability, capacity, and readiness issues pose a 

complex problem that could make it difficult for the Air Force—and the Joint 

Force—to execute the current strategy. 

Question. Based on the current defense strategy, defense planning scenarios, and 

force-sizing construct, what are your views on the ability of the Air Force to meet 

current and future combatant commander requirements with regard to combat 

fighter, bomber, and joint enabler force structure capacity? 

Answer. Today’s Air Force is smaller, older, and less ready than at any time in 

its history. Our sister services have gained some breathing space to reconstitute and 

modernize after the reduction of land forces in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, after 

25 years of deployments, the Air Force remains engaged in sustained ISR operations 

around the world, as well as combat air operations in Iraq and Syria. These operations have consumed readiness and prematurely aged combat systems. The Air 

Force strives to balance capability, capacity, and readiness in order to provide a 

force that is both sized and shaped to meet the strategy. Absent any additional resources, it will be difficult to meet the demands of future combatant commander requirements with regard to combat fighters, bombers and joint enablers. 

LONG RANGE STRIKE—BOMBER (LRS–B)

Question. The Air Force recently awarded the largest development contract in several decades for a new strategic bomber. 

In your view, what capabilities does the LRS–B provide in the future that the Air 

Force doesn’t already have in its current bomber force, other than a newer platform? 

Answer. In the near future, all legacy bombers will have increased mission degradation in contested environments and the AF must develop the LRS–B now to ensure we maintain the capability to counter emerging threats. The LRS–B will provide the ability to penetrate modern air defenses to accomplish objectives despite 

an anti-access/area denial environment. While providing long range, mixed payload 

and ability to be highly survivable in heavily defended airspace and attack targets 

without prohibitive losses, the LRS–B is able to support of national security objectives. 

The LRS–B will support the nuclear triad providing a visible and flexible nuclear 

deterrent capability that will assure allies and partners. Additionally, the LRS–B 

is one part of a family of systems portfolio—including ISR, electronic warfare, 

prompt strike, communications, and weapon effects. 

Furthermore, the LRS–B is being designed to have an open architecture, able to 

integrate new technology and respond to future threats across the full spectrum of 

operations. This emphasizes supportability to enable continued competition and long 

term affordability for this platform across the life cycle. 

Question. Secretary Gates cancelled the previous ‘‘Next Generation Bomber’’ program in 2007 over concerns of cost growth and schedule risk. In your opinion, what 

steps did the Air Force take with the establishment of the LRS–B program to assuage those concerns? 

Answer. The guiding principles for the LRS–B program focused on keeping the 

design simple in order to reduce system and programmatic complexity. This fundaVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01080 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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mental to this approach is having stable and achievable requirements, and we have 

kept these stable. We are achieving these requirements by leveraging experience 

from other programs and through the re-use of existing and mature technologies to 

minimizing new technology development and risk. 

Additionally, the establishment of a firm Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) 

requirement, not previously done on a major aircraft development program, kept the 

affordability as a constant focus area and restrained desires to adjust requirements. 

Other steps taken include LRS–B being designed to have an open architecture, able 

to integrate new technology and respond to future threats across the full spectrum 

of operations. This emphasizes supportability to enable continued competition and 

long term affordability for this platform across the life cycle. 

Question. What is your assessment of the acquisition strategy for the LRS–B and 

how does it provide the best value for the American taxpayer? 

Answer. From the beginning of the program there has been a focus on the lifecycle 

costs—manufacturing, sustainment and upgrade potential—to ensure that we could 

not only develop and procure the LRS–B, but also operate and sustain the platform 

in the future. 

The LRS–B program acquisition strategy focused on simplicity, stability, risk reduction/avoidance and affordability across the life cycle of the program. 

The program is founded on stable and achievable requirements, while requiring 

the re-use of existing and mature technologies. The acquisition strategy set for a 

plan for the program to execute a robust risk reduction phase to ensure mature designs prior to a down-select decision. Additionally the program incorporates open architecture, which will allow more rapid integration of new technology and respond 

to future threats across the full spectrum of operations. This emphasizes 

supportability to enable continued competition and long term affordability for this 

platform across the life cycle. 

Question. In your view, how does the LRS–B acquisition strategy mitigate previous acquisition program failures such as significant cost and schedule overruns 

and performance deficiencies experienced with the B–1, B–2, F–22, and F–35 programs? 

Answer. The guiding principles for the LRS–B program focused on keeping the 

design simple in order to reduce system and programmatic complexity. Fundamental to this approach is having stable and achievable requirements, and we have 

kept them stable. We are achieving these requirements by leveraging experience 

from other programs and through the re-use of existing and mature technologies to 

minimizing new technology development and risk. 

By using existing and mature technologies, the development risk is reduced from 

that experienced on previous programs. Overall this ensures achievable requirements and not nested ACAT ID programs. Building on this, the acquisition strategy 

includes a well thought out incentive plan for development and initial production 

to ensure the program remains on schedule and budget. 

Question. In your opinion, why would the Air Force choose a cost-plus/incentivefee contract vehicle over a fixed-price contract for the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the LRS–B? 

Answer. After careful consideration of all possible contract types and analysis of 

the pros and cons of each type, the Department of Defense decided on a Cost Plus 

incentive fee arrangement for the Engineering Manufacturing and Development contract, which meets both statutory and regulatory guidance. We conducted risk reduction efforts during the technology development phase, but there is still integration risk that remains. This contract type is an appropriate balance for a new design 

activity versus upgrade or derivative aircraft program. There were several factors 

taken into account and the decision was outlined in the Request for Proposal, evaluated during multiple peer reviews and approved by the Milestone Decision Authority. 

F–35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

Question. The F–35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, which is the largest and most 

expensive acquisition program in the Department’s history, was formally initiated 

as a program of record in 2002, with a total planned buy of 2,443 aircraft for the 

U.S. The program has not yet completed the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase, and is not due to enter full rate production until 2019, 17 years 

after its inception. At projected procurement rates, the aircraft would be procured 

by the Department well into the 2030 decade to reach its total quantity buy. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying S. 1376, the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, requires the Secretary of Defense 

to assess the current requirement for the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter total program 

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of record quantity, and then revalidate that quantity or identify a new requirement 

for the total number of F–35 aircraft the Department would ultimately procure. 

What will be your role in assisting the Secretary of the Air Force to revalidate 

the Air Force’s F–35A total program quantity, currently established at 1,763 aircraft? 

Answer. The Air Force continually evaluates procurement programs such as the 

F–35 to determine whether adjustments should be made. Factors such as current 

and future threat environments, available resources, and operational requirements 

are regularly assessed to update/revise our program of record. As Under Secretary, 

I will work with the appropriate stakeholders to ensure we provide the Secretary 

a recommended F–35 buy that balances warfighter needs within the context of current budget realities. 

Question. Do you believe the Air Force’s current and planned force mix of shortrange fighters and long-range strike aircraft is sufficient to meet current and future 

threats around the globe, and most especially in the Asia-Pacific theater of operations where the ‘‘tyranny of distance’’ is such a major factor? 

Answer. The Air Force is committed to balancing long and short range capabilities 

in order to meet warfighter requirement in various scenarios. In these scenarios, we 

find that developing a capability mix of long range, increased payload, and highly 

survivable fighters and bombers suitable for operations in a highly contested theater 

is essential to enabling the rest of the Joint Force. In the short term, we’d like to 

have more penetrating long range capacity to ensure persistent air operations in 

long range scenarios. That’s why the LRS–B is so important. We’ll need to continue 

to address our short term capabilities by integrating new weapons, sensors, and defensive capabilities onto our legacy bomber fleet, and we’ll need to make sure the 

LRS–B remains an affordable augmentation and replacement of our legacy bomber 

fleet. The Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS–B) is one part of our commitment to 

long range capabilities and we are looking at options to both increase the range of 

our fighter forces and improve the capabilities of our legacy bombers for Asia-Pacific 

scenarios. However, increased resources will be required to develop such capabilities 

without taking unacceptable risk in other mission areas. 

Question. If the Air Force were to revalidate their original 1,763 F–35A requirement, and continue procurement of even 80 aircraft per year, it will take approximately 20 years to purchase all F–35As. In your opinion, can the Air Force afford 

this effort in light of KC–46A, LRS–B, JSTARS, T–X, nuclear enterprise modernization, and myriad other investment programs all anticipated to be required simultaneously in the decade of the 2020s? 

Answer. Our annual budget submissions represent our best attempt at ensuring 

we achieve these critical mandates. However, given the current and projected future 

threat environment, the Air Force will require additional resources to simultaneously modernize and sustain existing conventional and nuclear force structure, recapture readiness with additional training facility capacity and manpower, and 

more expeditiously recapitalize the fleet. 

Question. After completion of the SDD and commencement of full rate production, 

the F–35 will require a robust Follow-On Development program to ensure the aircraft capabilities continue to outpace our potential adversaries’ technological advancements. 

In your opinion, should the F–35 follow-on development program be designated 

as a separate Major Defense Acquisition Program from the current F–35 program 

of record? 

Answer. The F–35 follow-on development program, now known as the follow-on 

modernization program, is a continuation of the existing program rather than a new 

sub program. does not need to be designated as a separate Major Defense Acquisition Program. The existing management and oversight structure in place for the F– 

35 Program will be used to manage the follow-on modernization effort. 

Question. The different variants of the F–35 for each Service have specific followon capabilities required for each, and even common capabilities are prioritized in 

different ways between the Services depending upon their assigned warfighting requirements. Do you believe the Joint Program Office should be disbanded and each 

Service stand up their own F–35 program offices to better accommodate the needs 

of each Service with respect to required follow-on capabilities? 

Answer. The F–35 Joint Program Office should not be disbanded. The F–35 Program Office is accommodating the needs of the Air Force as we define the required 

capabilities to be developed during the follow-on modernization phase. In addition, 

a single program office provides one voice to the contractor and allows the Air Force 

to share development costs with the Navy and our Partners. 

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REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT (RPA) ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT

Question. The Air Force has struggled for nearly a decade to assimilate and normalize the medium altitude ISR mission and its MQ–1 and MQ–9 fleets into the 

Air Force capabilities portfolio, resulting in severe manning shortages due to insufficient training pipelines, and causing low retention and poor morale across the enterprise. 

In your view, what steps should the Air Force take to remedy these issues? 

Answer. DOD and Air Force leadership have been personally working solutions 

to both of these issues and, over the next couple of weeks will be announcing their 

decisions. I would respectfully request we delay the discussion of this issue until 

after that has taken place. I would then be pleased to respond in detail. 

Question. The U.S. Army operates some of the same medium altitude ISR platforms as the Air Force, uses warrant officers and enlisted personnel to supervise 

and conduct ISR and strike operations, and are led by very few officers. What is 

your assessment of the Air Force reintroducing a warrant officer program or using 

enlisted personnel to operate its RPA fleets to increase manning and reduce costs, 

as well as relieve manning level stress on other rated career fields? 

Answer. DOD and Air Force leadership have been personally working solutions 

to both of these issues and, over the next couple of weeks will be announcing their 

decisions. I would respectfully request we delay the discussion of this issue until 

after that has taken place. I would then be pleased to respond in detail. 

Question. How do you see the Air Force integrating the medium altitude ISR mission into its future operating concepts? 

Answer. Both the medium and high altitude ISR missions are already integrated 

into our operational concepts and are critical to our success in the full spectrum of 

warfare. The lessons of past 15 years (and beyond) have not been lost on your Air 

Force and have proven the importance of the integration of both. Equal, is the importance of the integration of high/medium ISR, space capabilities and cyber, as well 

as non-traditional ISR, to build complete battlespace awareness. 

MANAGEMENT OF SPACE ACTIVITIES

Question. As the Under Secretary of the Air Force, you would have an important 

role in helping the Secretary of the Air Force discharge her responsibilities as the 

Department of Defense Principal DOD Space Advisor or PDSA, in particular, for developing, coordinating, and integrating policy, plans and programs for major defense 

space acquisitions. 

If confirmed, how will you support the PDSA in carrying out her missions? 

Answer. The Under Secretary is designated as the primary Headquarters Air 

Force official responsible for space matters. Additionally, the Under Secretary supports the SecAF in all her responsibilities, to include serving as the primary space 

advisor to senior DOD officials. From an administrative standpoint, this includes reviewing materials, reports and requests to extend experiments prior to PDSA approval. In addition, the PDSA and I continue a pro-active approach to study space 

concerns and issues through the Space Mission Update process. We collaborate on 

upcoming policy initiatives and concerns on specific topics, to include rendezvous 

and proximity operations and international space cooperation, to inform the PDSA’s 

advisory role. Finally, the Under Secretary of the Air Force should be an active participant in the Defense Space Councils (DSCs) and monitor the annual Space Strategic Process Reviews (SPR). 

Question. In your view, what are the authorities of the PDSA: (1) the budgets, 

programs, and plans of the various Service and Defense Agency space programs; 

and (2) milestone decisions for space acquisition programs of the various Services 

and Defense agencies? 

Answer. The PDSA will provide the DOD Space Enterprise with more focused 

strategic planning and programming in order to respond to present and evolving 

threats to our Nation’s space constellation and capabilities, as well as adversary 

space capabilities that threaten our forces. 

The PDSA has the authority to: 

1. Provide the Deputy’s Management Action Group (DMAG) and SECDEF with 

prioritized programmatic choices for space capabilities through the annual Program and Budget Review cycle 

2. Provide oversight to the Space Security and Defense Program 

3. Actively participate in the Defense Acquisition Board and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and related subordinate bodies, to support tighter 

alignment of requirements and acquisition decisions with space strategy and 

space policy 

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4. Review the budget submission of every entity with responsibilities for space capability development and assess their compliance with National Security Council-approved Implementation Plans and departmental policy and programmatic 

guidance 

5. Assess the strengths and weaknesses of the DOD Space Portfolio 

6. Conduct collaborative assessments of the National Security Space (NSS) architecture with the Intelligence Community 

The DepSecDef has increased the PDSA’s authority as the Department’s senior 

space official on all space-related Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and 

Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The PDSA or designated senior representative 

will be present on all milestone decision reviews for space programs. 

Per the DepSecDef Designation memo, the PDSA is responsible as the primary 

space advisor to the Deputy’s Management Action Group (DMAG), Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), additionally the PDSA is the primary space advisor to senior DOD officials including the 

Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Office of Secretary of Defense 

Principal Staff Assistant (PSAs) and the Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

Vice Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, the PDSA is the Principal DOD Space Control Advisor. 

As the chair of the Defense Space Council (DSC), the PDSA has expanded the 

DSC membership to include all DOD elements with space programmatic authorities. 

This combined with leading an annual Space Strategic Posture Review (assisted by 

CAPE) with a focus on strategic portfolio-level decisions vice individual programmatic actions. 

PDSA is advised and assisted by Service and OSD leads for strategy, space policy, 

plans, programming, budget, acquisition, architecture assessment and operations. 

This supports the DepSecDef’s vision of a more cohesive and unified governance 

model. 

Question. What are you views regarding defending our U.S. assets in space? 

Answer. We recognize that space is a congested and contested environment and 

is a critical element that underpins everything we do in the military. However, the 

relative superiority the U.S. has held in space power has diminished. Yes, we still 

project phenomenal capabilities in and through space, but our comparative advantage is threatened by external actors. We must ensure our right to self-defense in 

any domain, which includes space. 

Question. How do you differentiate the Joint Interagency Combined Operations 

Center (JICSPOC) and how will you ensure it does not duplicate the Joint Space 

Operations Center (JSPOC)? 

Answer. JICSPOC seeks to improve unity of effort and information sharing across 

the national security space (NSS) community to effectively respond to potential future real-world threat events. It does this through experimentation to develop integrated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), courses of action and inform future space command and control and system requirements. 

Due to its experimental nature, the JICSPOC does not duplicate the real-world 

command and control functions performed daily by JSPOC. 

Question. Do you support the JSPOC taking on the role as a BMC2 mission center 

for defending our space assets? 

Answer. The JSPOC has been successfully conducting command and control of assigned space forces to include defending those assets for over 10 years. The potential 

threat to our space systems continues to grow. In response, the JICSPOC was developed to conduct experimentation on improving unity of effort across the national security space community. I support this effort as a critical first step to inform decisions on future roles. 

Question. Are you concerned with ground system supporting the GPS III constellation (OCX)? 

Answer. GPS provides a critical warfighter capability and is a ubiquitous worldwide utility. As a result, the current challenges with the OCX program are at the 

forefront of senior Air Force leadership concerns. 

Question. What efforts will you take in ensuring its costs and schedules are being 

monitored? 

Answer. The Air Force and the OCX prime contractor (Raytheon) will continue to 

focus on a more efficient execution of the developmental effort to field this critical 

capability. In addition, the Air Force is going to take a performance-driven approach 

by instituting significant oversight with weekly program management reviews and 

quarterly reviews by USD(AT&L). 

Question. Do you support revising the ground system acquisition to a firm fixed 

price if the program continues to slip? 

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Answer. The current path forward is to continue with the current cost-type contract. The Air Force needs to assure mission success and delivery of this critical 

warfighter capability. Converting the contract to fixed price would limit the Air 

Force’s insight and oversight of the program and potential loss of focus to provide 

this critical capability as soon as possible. 

Question. Do you support developing a back-up alternative program if necessary 

in case the current program defaults on its cost and scope? 

Answer. The Air Force has committed to making risk mitigation investments in 

alternate program paths to preserve off-ramps should continue problems with OCX 

prove intractable. 

Question. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has consistently pointed 

to fragmented leadership as a key contributor to disconnects in space programs and 

acquisition problems. 

What do you think your role would be, if confirmed, in bringing together the space 

community versus protecting only the institutional interests of the Air Force? 

Answer. If confirmed, I certainly will support Secretary James to the utmost of 

my ability, but is important to understand there is a clear delineation between her 

role as PDSA and as Secretary of the Air Force. The PDSA construct provides strategic governance and unity of effort across the DOD space enterprise and increased 

collaboration across the broader National Security Space enterprise (NASA, Commercial, Civil). In my Air Force position I will represent the Air Force component 

of that enterprise, just as any other Service or Agency would, to the PDSA. However, once enterprise decisions are made, it is my duty to ensure Air Force aligns 

with the broader enterprise priorities. 

Question. How would you foster better cooperation and coordination with agencies 

inside and outside the Defense community? 

Answer. The Defense Space Council (DSC), chaired by Secretary James as the 

PDSA, continues to serve as the cornerstone for enterprise-wide governance and cooperation. DSD recently directed its expansion, through the addition all NSS stakeholders such as MDA, DARPA and DISA. With an empowered PDSA and comprehensive membership from all aspects of NSS the DSC will continue to set the 

tone for enhanced cooperation across the enterprise. 

The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) established 

the Joint Space Doctrine and Tactics Forum (JSDTF) to improve DOD space by increasing coordination between the DOD and IC. In addition, it will develop the 

warfighting culture within the NSS and create operational concepts and tactics, 

techniques and procedures (TTPs) for future space operations. The JSDTF is a twotiered structure co-chaired by the CDRUSSTRATCOM and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The Forum met several times and spurred a 

national-level tabletop exercise along with a Joint Publication overhaul that will 

boost emphasis in the space control mission area. The JSDTF has already yielded 

benefits in fostering a common culture across National Security Space. 

Question. Do you see a need to strengthen the authority of the Under Secretary 

of the Air Force or to establish any new authority to ensure better government-wide 

coordination for space? 

Answer. The Department has already recognized the need to respond to a changing future and the possibility that conflict could expand to space and is taking prudent steps in the focus areas of acquisition, operations, programming, capabilities 

and governance to ensure an enterprise vice a stovepiped approach to future readiness. The PDSA model is new but already making strides in governance. At this 

point I think we have the appropriate authorities in place to guarantee a unified 

effort across all four focus areas. 

Question. Do you foresee circumstances in the future that would favor the consolidation and establishment of space forces as a separate service either as its own department or within an existing military department? 

Answer. I know this question has arisen in many forms over the years. While I 

will not say it could never happen, I do not see it as a near-term necessity. Space 

is already integrated into nearly every aspect of our terrestrial warfighting capabilities in all Services. The steps we are already taking toward enhanced governance 

are appropriate and have DOD space on the correct path. As we continue to enhance 

our capabilities, and develop our operational concepts through the JSDTF/JICSPOC 

relationship, that is certainly one potential future; but I believe it is premature to 

make a definitive statement either way at this time. 

READINESS

Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of the Air Force to 

meet national security requirements across the full spectrum of military operations? 

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Answer. Our combat coded unit’s readiness is assessed against full spectrum military operations. Less than one-half of those units are rated as ready. However, if 

called upon, your Air Force can present the President with formidable air, space and 

cyber options to meet almost any crisis. 

Question. What is your assessment of the near-term trend in the readiness of the 

Air Force? 

Answer. Past year’s investments in modernization, force structure, readiness and 

manpower were predicated on several assumptions. First, that the wars in the Middle East were drawing to a close and our units would be coming home to train, and 

second, that we would be allowed to reduce force structure to pay for modernization 

and recapitalization, and to use the manpower to convert to our new aircraft and 

missions. Neither of those materialized which will challenge us to make any near 

term improvements in readiness. Training and maintenance manpower continue to 

drive our low readiness rates. 

Question. How critical is it to find a solution to sequestration given the impacts 

we have already seen to readiness in fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015? 

Answer. Sequestration would result in even more significant losses of readiness 

and would significantly prolong any recovery, even once full funding was restored. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the methods currently 

used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of Air Force equipment? 

Answer. Air Force sustainment requirements for our aircraft, engines, and other 

equipment are developed to ensure these systems are safe and operating properly 

to train to full spectrum missions. This ongoing sustainment includes activities such 

as periodic inspections and component maintenance. For example, aircraft depot 

maintenance is accomplished on a cyclical basis to support the life cycle of the weapon system. These maintenance requirements are enduring and underpin Air Force 

readiness to support the warfighter. Ongoing operations have accelerated maintenance and supply requirements and have challenged us to keep pace. To cope with 

the high operations tempo we continue to rely on OCO funding. 

Question. Given the backlog in equipment maintenance over the last several 

years, do you believe that we need an increased investment to reduce this backlog? 

Answer. Past sequestration budgets, resulted in significant backlogs at the depots, 

parts that are critical to our combat units to regain readiness. We are now funding 

WSS to the maximum we can execute, but that is still below the requirement. 

Question. How important is it to reduce the materiel maintenance backlog in 

order to improve readiness? 

Answer. Funding predictability is essential to maintenance and supply planning, 

and the Air Force’s ability to properly sustain our equipment is essential to readiness. The supply chain and depot workforce require long lead times to posture; 

therefore, sufficient and stable funding is essential to effectively manage the Air 

Force’s sustainment enterprise. 

Question. How important is it to receive OCO funding after the end of combat operations in order to ensure all equipment is reset? 

Answer. Transferring OCO funding to our baseline is one of the necessary conditions for a full readiness recovery. Major Air Force weapon systems do not have onetime ‘‘reset’’ requirements. The sustainment of these platforms is an enduring requirement and requires a persistent investment. OCO funding to maintain or extend 

the service life of our platforms, or to accelerate their replacement will be most important. It will also take years of additional OCO funding to replace the munitions 

inventory we have either depleted or deferred. There are many more instances 

where OCO funding must continue beyond combat operations, but these are two examples of the most critical. 

NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE MODERNIZATION

Question. Following completion of the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review, the Air 

Force established internal processes to track implementation of recommendations 

and to ensure the sustained focus of senior Air Force leadership. 

What are the processes and metrics by which the Air Force measures improvement in the nuclear mission across the Air Force. If confirmed, what would be your 

role? What shortcomings or gaps continue to exist? 

Answer. The Air Force continues to work towards strengthening nuclear enterprise assessment processes and developing meaningful metrics to ensure the 

changes we institute are measurable and enduring. In support of that objective, the 

findings and recommendations of the Nuclear Enterprise Reviews have assumed a 

central place in the Air Force’s governance process for the nuclear enterprise. 

Through forums like the Nuclear Oversight Board, chaired by the Secretary and 

Chief of Staff with participation from all 10 major command commanders, I intend 

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to ensure the Air Force continues to apply sustained focus on improving the health 

of the nuclear enterprise. 

STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS

Question. Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next 15 plus years, DOD will also 

have to sustain the current strategic nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking. 

Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to afford the costs 

of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the rest of the DOD commitments? 

Answer. As a vital component of our national security strategy, I am fully committed to the modernization of our nuclear deterrence forces so they remain credible 

and effective in the years ahead. Affordability is always a key consideration in managing any major acquisition effort, as is the stability and consistency of appropriations—factors that are more relevant than ever as DOD commitments and fiscal 

constraints grow. If confirmed, I am committed to working across DOD and with the 

Congress to achieve affordable nuclear modernization and sustainment. 

Question. If confirmed will you review the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent 

(GBSD) system to ensure that it uses high technology readiness level technologies, 

has requirement that do not change after milestone B and is cost effective? 

Answer. Yes. I am committed to ensuring that affordability, stable requirements, 

and the use of mature technologies remain cornerstones of the Air Force’s strategy 

to field GBSD. 

Question. If confirmed will you work with the Air Force’s Global Strategic Command to ensure the GBSD goes through its milestone A review in Fiscal Year 2016? 

Answer. Yes. The GBSD program remains on track for its milestone A review in 

Fiscal Year 2016. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the efforts of stakeholders 

across the Air Force—including elements of Air Force Global Strike Command, 

Headquarters Air Force, and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center—remain tightly integrated to keep this critical program on schedule. 

Question. If confirmed will you work with the Air Force’s Global Strategic Command to ensure the Long Range Standoff Weapon goes through its milestone A review in Fiscal Year 2016? 

Answer. Yes. The LRSO program remains on track for its milestone A review in 

Fiscal Year 2016. If confirmed, I will work to ensure collaboration on LRSO remains 

strong both within the Air Force as well as with our mission partners at the Department of Energy as they work to align development of a life-extended warhead for 

the LRSO. 

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

Question. Section 1052 of the Fiscal year 2014 NDAA established a ‘‘Council on 

Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control and Communications System’’. 

What do you see as the most pressing challenges in nuclear command, control and 

communications from a policy and acquisition perspective? 

Answer. Nuclear command and control must be an enduring priority of which one 

challenge is to sustain existing capabilities until new, modernized capabilities can 

be fielded. We designated the nuclear command, control, and communications system as a weapon system and assigned Air Force Global Strike Command as the lead 

major command. 

There are significant challenges given the legacy systems that are part of our 

operational baseline architecture in this area and the cybersecurity vulnerabilities 

sometimes introduced when applying commercial solutions directly. Walking a line 

between GOTS and COTS and having the patience and resources to fund potential 

solutions are the most pressing challenges in NC3. To this end, we must strike a 

carefully considered, risk managed balance between readiness and modernization. 

Much of our existing capabilities are supported on platforms which have reached or 

are nearing end of life and must be upgraded. Decisions on the timing and 

prioritization of our sustainment and investment portfolios are a top priority. 

Question. What do you see as the most pressing challenges in overall national 

leadership communications from a policy and acquisition perspective? 

Answer. The cyberspace domain is a key enabler in providing fully assured national leadership communications capabilities, which depend upon both military and 

commercial communication systems. The most pressing challenges are competing 

budget priorities to acquire an efficient and integrated capability as well as system 

compatibility across the enterprise to address Service-specific requirements. The Air 

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Force will continue to look at options that will enhance interoperability and compatibility of our national leadership communications platforms and systems. 

One challenge is to sustain existing capabilities until new, modernized capabilities 

can be fielded. Another challenge is providing an assured, survivable and enduring 

communications capability that allows senior defense advisors to communicate with 

the President, the combatant commands and strategic Allies during normal day-today operations and during national crises from a fixed, mobile or airborne location. 

The ability to provide our national leadership secure, reliable voice, video and data 

communications is a critical capability. 

Question. If confirmed will you actively support section 1052 to ensure the President has at all times control of nuclear weapons? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If confirmed will you review the status of the Air Force’s support to the 

NATO nuclear mission and report back to this committee on key findings that are 

in need of future improvement including personnel and material? 

Answer. Yes, the Air Force fully supports NATO’s nuclear mission, which is a cornerstone of our nuclear assurance. I will review our current efforts to identify possible areas to improve our support. I look forward to working with Congress to ensure the airmen in Europe have the appropriate resources. 

SECRETARY HAGEL’S REVIEW OF THE NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE FORCE IMPROVEMENT

PROGRAM

Question. In 2014 Secretary Hagel conducted an assessment of the state of nuclear deterrence operations of the Department of Defense, commonly known as the 

‘‘Creedon-Fanta’’ report. 

Do you agree with its findings? 

Answer. Yes. To date, we have implemented a number of the Air Force-specific 

recommendations in both the internal and independent Nuclear Enterprise Reviews. 

If confirmed, I will continue to implement the remaining recommendations. 

Question. How do you think they may be improved upon over the next five years? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Air Force continues implementing 

and tracking Nuclear Enterprise Reviews follow-on actions. Our goal is a systematic 

and responsive process that will yield tangible and lasting improvements. 

Question. Will you actively support the findings and their implementation? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to promote a culture of critical self-assessment and continuous improvement within the nuclear enterprise. 

Question. Will you work with the Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation Office 

as part of a continual assessment of the Air Force nuclear programs and, if asked, 

report the status of that to the Congress? 

Answer. Yes, our continued partnership with the Cost Analysis and Program 

Evaluation Office is critical to the implementation of Nuclear Enterprise Reviews. 

This relationship will ensure senior leader focus and accountability remain strong. 

Question. Please explain how you interpret the Air Force’s Force Improvement 

Program and what actions will you take to support those efforts? 

Answer. The Force Improvement Program (FIP) was a 2014 effort intended to address urgent, short-term operational needs. FIP was only one element of a much 

broader Air Force effort to recapitalize its nuclear enterprise. The FY17 PB reflects 

the Air Force’s commitment to pursuing a comprehensive approach to meeting NDO 

requirements. 

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE (NCSAF)

Question. In the Air Force’s response to the NCSAF recommendation (#42) on Up 

or Out policy, the Commission recommends, ‘‘Congress should amend restrictive aspects of current statutes that mandate ‘‘up-or-out’’ career management policies to 

enable the Air Force to retain airmen of all components actively working in career 

fields where substantial investment in training and career development has been 

made and where it serves the needs of the Air Force.’’ 

In your opinion, would the reinstitution of a warrant officer program in the Air 

Force attract and keep certain skilled people who are more interested in remaining 

in a particular career field rather than worrying about additional institutional requirements they must accomplish for promotion in the officer ranks? 

Answer. The Air Force previously considered reinstituting WOs in 2008, 2012 and 

most recently with regard to RPA pilots in 2015; however, the Air Force believes 

adding a third category of serving members in addition to officers and enlisted airmen does not align well with our Air Force culture and our enlisted force development objectives. That said, the Air Force sees value, whether it be through our highly talented enlisted force, adjustments to ‘‘up or out,’’ or other mechanisms, such as 

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providing a flexible ‘‘technical track’’ in being able to attract and retain talented airmen. We recognize not all officers need to be developed the same way and requirements in some leadership tracks may not apply to airmen in technical tracks. Some 

of these areas would require legislative assistance like reform of ‘‘up or out,’’ but 

others could be pursued today and the Air Force has been investigating multiple options. 

Question. Do you believe certain career fields could receive benefit from a warrant 

officer program in operational or technical positions such pilot training instructor 

pilots, remotely piloted aircraft pilots, and cyber warfare specialties? 

Answer. The Air Force is a highly technical force, and we believe our enlisted 

corps has the technological and leadership capability to perform to the same level 

of a WO corps without instituting a fundamental change in our NCO developmental 

and progression. As such, the Air Force is actively exploring the utilization of enlisted members as RPA operators to assist in the long-term development and stabilization of the RPA community. Our enlisted force has already demonstrated this 

capability within the cyber and space communities. We are also exploring numerous 

other alternatives (e.g. ‘‘technical track,’’ ‘‘up or out reform’’) that will provide capability without having to alter Air Force culture. Another key aspect is to increase 

‘‘permeability’’ between our Active and Reserve components, providing increased cooperation within existing resources while leveraging existing talent and capabilities. 

Finally, we must also factor in the tremendous capability that our civilian force 

brings throughout the enterprise. 

Question. In the Air Force’s response to the NCSAF recommendations, the recommendation (#5) to disestablish the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) is the 

only commission recommendation with which the Air Force outright disagrees. 

Can you provide your views regarding this disagreement? 

Answer. The Air Force is concerned that this recommendation lacks the research, 

data, and analysis necessary to disregard six decades of organizational lessons 

learned and undo congressionally instituted reforms that have led to today’s costefficient and mission-effective force for our Nation. This recommendation would also 

weaken the Chief of the Air Force Reserve’s ability to execute key statutory obligations in the management of congressionally authorized and appropriated resources. 

It would place at risk the sustained readiness of Air Force Reserve forces, which 

afford the Nation operational capability, strategic depth, and surge capacity across 

all Air Force core missions. 

Question. If AFRC were not disestablished, in your view does there still need to 

be what appears as redundant staffs between AFRC headquarters and the staff for 

the Chief of the Air Force Reserve in the Pentagon? 

Answer. There are not two, redundant staffs. In accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 

10174, the Commander of Air Force Reserve Command also serves as the Component Chief of the Air Force Reserve. As a result of this statutory requirement, he 

has two distinct roles necessitating a small component staff (90 airmen) along with 

an appropriately-sized major command staff. It is important to note there is no overlap in staff functions. 

Question. To your knowledge, do other major commands maintain staffs at both 

their own headquarters and at the Air Staff? 

Answer. The Commander of Air Force Reserve Command is, statutorily, also the 

Chief of the Air Force Reserve. No other major command commander is also a component commander requiring a component staff. 

AUDIT READINESS

Question. The Department of Defense remains unable to achieve a clean financial 

statement audit. The Department also remains on the Government Accountability 

Office’s list of high risk agencies and management systems for financial management and weapon system acquisition. Although audit-readiness has been a goal of 

the Department for decades, DOD has repeatedly failed to meet numerous congressionally directed audit-readiness deadlines. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the Air Force’s efforts to achieve 

a clean financial statement audit by 2017? 

Answer. The AF remains cautiously optimistic that we will be prepared to undergo a full financial statement audit beginning Sept 30, 2017. We have a dedicated 

Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) team leading this effort, with 

audit coaching provided by Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), a recognized audit 

leader in the federal and private sectors. Our efforts are governed by a cross-functional executive steering committee, and our senior leader’s performance plans hold 

them accountable to a performance standard that supports our FIAR objectives. We 

actively participate in forums sponsored by OUSD(C), and collaborate with the other 

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components and service providers, to both lead and support the department-wide effort to achieve auditability. 

Based on the experience of other federal and private sector audits, it is unlikely 

that we will immediately receive an unmodified opinion. A review of audits for similar agencies indicates that it takes an average of five to eight years to resolve the 

findings necessary to receive an unmodified opinion. The entire AF enterprise is engaged to help us exceed this expectation and, as evidenced by our significant 

progress over the past four years, we will continue to address each audit preparation challenge in accordance with our FIAR plan. 

Question. In your opinion, is the Department of the Air Force on track to achieving this objective, particularly with regard to data quality, internal controls, and 

business process re-engineering? 

Answer. Yes. The AF is on track to meet the mandate to be audit ready by Sept 

30, 2017 and begin a full financial statement audit for fiscal year 2018. Our audit 

preparation activities are guided by a comprehensive master plan with regular 

progress evaluations. In specific reference to data quality, internal controls, and 

BPR, we have completed control reviews in 50 of 78 systems (25 of 46 are Air Force 

owned), and have developed corrective action plans (CAPs) for all internal findings. 

These CAPs encompass data quality improvements and business process re-engineering. Our Schedule of Budgetary Activity (SBA) auditors, Ernst & Young (EY) 

also produced a list of approx. 180 system findings for us to address, most of which 

were discovered in our internal reviews. We are confident that we will be able to 

close or adequately mitigate these findings and remain on track for a full financial 

statement audit. 

Question. If not, what impediments may hinder the Air Force’s ability to achieve 

this goal and how would you address them? 

Answer. The Air Force is on track to achieve its objective to undergo a full financial statement audit by Sept 30, 2017. The highest risk areas for audit are (1) reconciling Funds Balance with Treasury, (2) reconciling the universe of transactions, (3) 

supporting all journal vouchers, (4) substantiating existence, completeness, and 

valuation for property, plant, and equipment, and (5) strengthening IT system controls. 

The Air Force is actively addressing all of these risks. I’m proud to say the Air 

Force was the first service to receive a favorable opinion on our Funds Balance with 

Treasury reconciliation, and our process was used as a model for the other Services. 

With the help of DFAS, we reconciled 39/45 universe of transaction systems for our 

recent SBA audit, with approx. 25 remaining for our full financial statement audit. 

We accomplished this in just over two years. Following the DFAS model for journal 

voucher support, we continue to strengthen our documentation, as well as participate in various working groups to eliminate journal vouchers where possible. We 

achieved favorable opinions on our assertions for the existence and completeness of 

mission critical assets, we currently have AF/PWC teams conducting asset 

verification, and we are actively participating in OUSD(C) working groups to determine the department strategy for valuation. As referenced earlier, we have and will 

continue to develop and implement corrective action plans to eliminate or mitigate 

our IT control weaknesses. 

Question. In your view, are the steps that the Air Force needs to take consistent 

with the steps that DOD needs to take to achieve full auditability by 2017? 

Answer. Yes. The Air Force approach to audit readiness is consistent with the Department of Defense. As an active member of the FIAR Governance Board, the Air 

Force collaborates with other components and functional partners to establish goals, 

objectives and guidance to produce auditable financial statements for the Department. The Air Force adheres to the guidance published by OUSD(C) which controls 

the standards for sampling, threshold, and scope to be used during audit readiness 

efforts. The Air Force shares plans and findings with the other Services, and collaborates with them to leverage lessons learned. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Air Force 

moves to achieve these objectives without an unaffordable or unsustainable level of 

one-time fixes and manual work-arounds? 

Answer. The Air Force has established a governance process to oversee our audit 

readiness objectives, which is aligned to our Investment Review process, to ensure 

Senior Leadership oversight across the Air Force enterprise. This governance is 

aligned to OSD governance to ensure Department-wide integration of efforts to 

achieve our audit objectives and to avoid stove-piped, unaffordable, and 

unsustainable fixes. A key element of this governance is the standardization of business processes across the Air Force to ensure they are traceable and auditable. In 

order to do this, the Air Force implemented a standard set of tools to validate, docuVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01090 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ment, re-use, and sustain the results from our audit readiness efforts, while also ensuring auditability of our Information Technology systems. 

Utilizing these standards and tools enables Senior Leader oversight on the corrective action plans being implemented across the Air Force in collaboration with the 

Army, Navy, and Service Providers throughout the Federal Government. This holistic, enterprise-wide approach will allow us to determine impacts of business process 

changes, ensure alignment with the DOD Business Enterprise Architecture, and inform our IT investment decisions. Finally, our strategy will provide a mechanism 

to encourage culture change, which is necessary for future continuous process improvement, the results of which will also be documented and auditable. 

AIR FORCE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

Question. What major improvements would you like to see made in the Air Force’s 

development and deployment of major information technology systems? 

Answer. Today our IT systems are hamstrung by legacy processes executed within 

stovepipe systems that force multi-year budgeting and implementation. These 3–5 

year, and often longer, development cycles are not in alignment with best practices 

nor the pace of technology. Budgeting and requirements processes that focus on 

operational vice technical requirements, coupled with budgeting processes that enable proven pathfinder efforts to more rapidly acquire and deploy capability is needed. Execution to meet requirements of business processes and the underlying systems is widely distributed across the Department, and across Air Force. 

A streamlined approach to getting to the Joint Information Environment is needed. Deliberate unified programs of record within the Air Force and across the Department will being to build the enabling framework. We’ve seen some progress 

with the Joint Regional Security Stacks, and should continue to improve sound governance to build out the remainder of the transformation plan to leverage common 

computing environments and cloud based technologies. 

Question. How will you encourage process and cultural change in organizations 

so that they maximize the benefits that new enterprise information technology systems can offer in terms of cost savings and efficiency? 

Answer. Our Total Force cyberspace workforce continues to transform under the 

leadership of the Air Force CIO. In addition, the department will soon publish an 

updated set of policies for how we govern and operate enterprise IT/cyberspace capabilities. We also have several strategic initiatives underway, including formulating 

a cyber-aptitude test for recruitment, standing up a cyber innovation center at 

USAF Academy (AFCIC) for workforce and new officer development, and leveraging 

the new Silicon Valley detachment (Defense Innovation Unit Experimental—DIUx) 

for commercial technology infusion. I will continue to encourage such initiatives. 

We are undertaking a nascent effort to align the Air Force IT governance and requirements processes with the Defense Enterprise Service Management Framework 

(DESMF). The DESMF takes advantage of commercial best practices to focus organization efforts on the IT services necessary to support mission outcomes. This focus 

on mission outcomes will enable the implementation of several initiatives recommended by our Task Force Cyber Secure to pay significantly more attention to 

the cyberspace platform that underpin the execution of our Air Force core missions. 

Question. In your view, what is the relationship between Air Force efforts to implement enterprise information technology programs and supporting computing 

services and infrastructure to support Air Force missions, to the efforts being undertaken by the Defense Information Systems Agency and the Assistant Secretary of 

defense for Networks and Information Integration? 

Answer. The Air Force is a full and leading partner with DOD CIO, DISA and 

our sister Services in the design and implementation of the Joint Information Environment (JIE). The Air Force has provided its extensive expertise garnered from our 

AF Network (AFNET) consolidation to shape JIE architectures and processes. Consolidating requirements, resources and overlapping operational frameworks with the 

broader Joint community will enable the Air Force to shift its focus from making 

capital investments in commodity IT services and capabilities in favor of acquiring 

these ‘‘as a service’’ from DISA or commercial providers. This partnering with DISA 

and the Services has highlighted the cultural stubbornness within the AF to release 

our control of IT services. Our requirements and governance processes must shift 

to documenting our operational requirements instead of poring over the technical 

details of how those requirements are met. 

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ACQUISITION REFORM

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 emplaced 

myriad changes to defense acquisition processes, including reinserting service chief 

influence and accountability into acquisition processes. 

Do you support the acquisition reform provisions in the Fiscal Year 2016 National 

Defense Authorization Act? 

Answer. We support the acquisition reform provisions and appreciate the Congressional support. The Air Force needs to focus on our main mission—fighting and winning our nation’s wars. To do this, we must balance current readiness and future 

modernization of the Air Force. Going forward continued Congressional support will 

enable the Air Force to build a modernized force that is agile, adaptable, and resilient, capable of once again widening the technological gap between us and the adversary. 

Question. What additional acquisition-related reforms do you believe the Committee should consider? 

Answer. There are a number of acquisition-related reform proposals being considered at the OUSD(AT&L)-level. The proposals focus on workforce improvements, 

streamlining processes, and fostering innovation. We will continue to support those 

proposals. 

Question. How can the Department and the Air Force better access and integrate 

commercial and military technology to remain ahead of its potential adversaries? 

Answer. The current strategic context is marked by rapid change (technological, 

social, political, economic, and cultural) and the widespread diffusion of commercially available technologies are adding complexity and unpredictability. It is clear 

our adversaries are trying to leverage technologies to advance their goals. We need 

to outpace them, therefore warfighting experimentation and rapid prototyping is a 

critical methodology to help us achieve strategic agility. The Air Force is doing just 

that. 

It is important to understand that warfare is a human endeavor. Focusing on 

technology for technology’s sake (i.e., using tech transition as a metric) without considering the doctrine, organization, training, policy, and other factors required to 

provide a complete military capability will result in poor integration of technology. 

The decisions on what technologies to explore, how they might be employed, and 

whether to incorporate them into a military capability has to be based on credible 

analysis backed by quantifiable data, not paper studies and analyses loaded with 

assumptions. 

The most effective and efficient way to accomplish this is by conducting logical, 

well-thought out experimentation campaigns that bring together the operational 

community, technologists, systems engineers, and acquirers to understand how new 

technologies (commercial or from government labs) can best be employed. This will 

dramatically shorten the fielding cycle and reduce cost, performance, and schedule 

risks. 

To gain better access to commercial technologies, the Air Force is supporting a 

Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative to inform DOD managers on methods and best 

practices to engage more effectively with commercial technology companies. Access 

to the broader technology base, enhances our solution sets to address potential adversary’s existing and emerging threats. The Air Force, under Secretary James’ 

Bending the Cost Curve, is also encouraging innovation through active industry engagements to improve the way we procure our systems and drive down cost. One 

of the major themes of this initiative is expanding competition among traditional 

and non-traditional industry partners, which then allows for better access to emerging technologies. 

AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. If confirmed, what direction would you provide regarding the importance of innovative defense science and technology in meeting Air Force missions? 

Answer. The innovative technology produced by the Air Force Science and Technology (S&T) Program balances high-risk with high-return science and knowledge. 

If confirmed, the direction I provide would focus on supporting the Air Force capabilities fundamental to providing agile and responsive intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance, projecting power in anti-access and area denial environments, operation in space and cyberspace, maintaining a safe, secure and effective strategic deterrent, and integration of operations in all three domains (air, space and cyberspace). 

Question. Do you believe the current balance between short- and long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Air Force needs? 

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Answer. Yes, the future success of the Air Force will depend on continued innovation and technical excellence in our research. We must balance our portfolio across 

many factors. We must develop technologies across, near-, mid-, and far-term timeframes, across core Air Force mission areas, and between requirements pull efforts 

to address known capability needs and technology push efforts to pursue revolutionary technologies. The future strategic environment will require an agile, affordable, and flexible military. Therefore, the Air Force S&T Program must continue to 

invest in a broad portfolio of research to anticipate future needs and maintain a 

good balance between: near-term, quick-reaction capability support; mid-term technology development to modernize the force; and revolutionary technologies that address far-term warfighting needs. 

Question. What role would you have in helping the Department implement the 

nascent Third Offset Strategy? 

Answer. As outlined in the Air Force Strategy, A Call to the Future, I will continue to support the pursuit of game-changing technologies to maintain and advance 

our technological superiority. The Air Force Research Laboratory maintains awareness of advancing technology and harvests opportunities to inject them into new Air 

Force capabilities. As part of the Third Offset Strategy, the Air Force is pursuing 

hypersonics, directed energy, and autonomous systems, to name a few technology 

areas. I plan to continue to reinvigorate our development planning efforts that will 

leverage robust experimentation campaigns and evaluate the impact of new capability concepts and offset strategies. 

AIR FORCE LABORATORIES

Question. What role should Air Force laboratories play in supporting current operations and in developing new capabilities to support Air Force missions? 

Answer. We must prioritize our efforts and balance the allocation of our resources 

appropriately. To accomplish this, we must clearly understand our warfighter’s capability gaps, the potential capability inherent in new technology, and the cost associated with maturing, integrating and transitioning it to the warfighter. For current 

operations, we must continue to improve processes to rapidly respond to urgent 

warfighter needs with innovative solutions. We must continue to forge ahead on a 

path of innovation to achieve strategic agility, breaking paradigms and leveraging 

technology to design agility and affordability into our capability development. This 

requires an ever-closer relationship between our research laboratory, operators, and 

acquisition and requirements communities. These steps will enable effective investment in research programs that will maximize the benefit to the warfighter and ensure the continued national security of the United States. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that Air Force laboratories have the 

highest quality workforce, laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so 

that they can continue to support deployed warfighters and develop next generation 

capabilities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will actively work with the Air Force S&T Executive, the 

Air Force Chief Scientist and Air Force Research Laboratory leadership to ensure 

we maintain a high quality workforce and infrastructure and resource those priorities accordingly. Ensuring the Air Force continues to have war-winning technology 

requires the proactive management of its current Science, Technology, Engineering, 

and Mathematics (STEM) workforce and a deliberate effort to grow the laboratory 

scientists and engineers of the future. Those researchers need state-of-the-art laboratory facilities to best support deployed warfighters with ready-to-use technologies 

and develop next generation capabilities. I will rely on and support the senior leadership of the acquisition community to assess and invest in infrastructure and the 

workforce necessary to support the future technology needs of the Air Force. 

Question. Do you support the full utilization of authorities established by Congress under the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration program? 

Answer. Retaining the current world-class, highly-skilled workforce is an important part of the Air Force’s Bright Horizons STEM Workforce Strategy. I understand that the Laboratory Demonstration program has done much to ensure the Air 

Force Research Laboratory’s ability to attract and retain personnel since its inception in 1997. This flexible system has helped to achieve the best workforce for the 

mission, adjust the workforce for change, and improve overall quality. If confirmed, 

I will work with the laboratory leadership to monitor the Laboratory Demonstration 

program to ensure it remains effective for its primary purpose and propose changes 

to the program, if they become required. Congressionally-authorized personnel and 

hiring authorities have greatly helped to improve the Air Force’s compensation and 

hiring abilities. 

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Question. Do you believe that the Air Force’s laboratories and engineering centers 

should have a separate, dynamic personnel system, uniquely tailored to support laboratory directors’ requirements to attract and retain the highest quality scientific 

and engineering talent? 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to carefully examining the Air Force’s experience with the Laboratory Demonstration program and working with the laboratory 

leadership to determine future needs and authorities for the program. I will also 

monitor our ongoing expansion of the Acquisition Demonstration program to ensure 

we continue supporting efforts to recruit, retain and develop a world-class STEM 

workforce for the Air Force and the Nation. 

Question. How will you assess the quality of Air Force laboratory infrastructure 

and the adequacy of investments being made in new military construction and 

sustainment of that infrastructure? 

Answer. I am aware that the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) effort, 

successfully completed in September 2011, provided several new, state-of-the-art facilities within the Air Force Research Laboratory. While this provided us an opportunity to consolidate and improve many laboratory facilities, the Air Force continues 

to have prioritized needs for military construction (MILCON) projects in other areas 

of the Air Force Research Laboratory. I will also ensure we continue to leverage 

minor MILCON authorities for laboratory renewal and infrastructure sustainment. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with the leadership of the acquisition community 

to ensure that we remain vigilant and upgrade our S&T infrastructure in a timely 

manner, so that major research and programs are not put at risk due to aging facilities. 

Question. Are you concerned about the current or future supply of experts in defense critical disciplines, particularly personnel with appropriate security clearances, to hold positions in defense laboratories? 

Answer. Yes, I am always concerned about maintaining a solid representation of 

Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) professionals in the critical defense disciplines our laboratories and acquisition enterprise require. Nurturing the 

next generation of STEM professionals is an Air Force, DOD and national concern. 

To maintain the U.S. military’s decisive technological edge, the Department must 

be able to recruit, retain and develop a capable STEM workforce in the face of 

worldwide competition for the same talent. An objective of the Air Force STEM 

Strategic Communication Plan is to encourage all airmen to attract tech-savvy students to an Air Force career. The Air Force has successfully used tools such as the 

Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation (SMART) scholarship for 

service program to accomplish this mission. Over the past eight years, the Air Force 

has averaged 60 scholarships per year to scientists and engineers. After payback of 

the recipient’s service commitment, the Air Force has retained 88 percent of scholars in Air Force jobs. Additionally, the Air Force’s Bright Horizons STEM Workforce 

Strategy addresses and investigates requirements to attract and retain the right 

STEM qualified people in the right place, at the right time, and with the right 

skills. 

TEST AND EVALUATION ISSUES

Question. What do you see as the role of the developmental and operational test 

and evaluation communities with respect to rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition, and 

other evolutionary acquisition processes? 

Answer. The role of the developmental and operational test and evaluation communities is the same as in a normal development. 

That role is to: 

- Ensure test objectives address operational requirements and concepts 

- Ensure requirements are testable 

- Ensure test capabilities, including workforce, are adequate and available 

- Validate system performance against requirements 

- Ensure effectiveness and suitability are assessed in a representative operational 

environment 

Question. What are your views on the appropriate roles of OSD developmental 

and operational testing organizations with respect to testing of Air Force systems? 

Answer. OSD should only provide oversight of service testing approaches for 

major acquisitions and provide the associated congressional reporting. Detailed test 

management, execution, and reporting should be left to Service test organizations. 

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AIR FORCE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The retention of quality airmen, officer and enlisted, Active Duty and 

reserve, is vital to the Department of the Air Force. 

How would you evaluate the status of the Air Force in successfully recruiting and 

retaining high caliber personnel? 

Answer. In all components, the Air Force is meeting its recruiting targets, however the size of the youth market, propensity of high school graduates to serve, and 

market competition (especially for highly-skilled areas such as aviation/remotely piloted aviation, cyber, engineers and special operators) are all growing concerns. 

Overall, the Air Force continues to retain well; however, as the Air Force grows 

to restore readiness and meet increasing operational demands across the globe, we 

must address key capability gaps in the nuclear, maintenance, cyber, intelligence, 

surveillance and reconnaissance as well as support career fields. 

Question. What initiatives would you take, if confirmed, to further improve Air 

Force recruiting and retention, in both the active and reserve components? 

Answer. I think it imperative that we look at recruiting and retention from a holistic, or what we routinely refer to as Total Force, perspective. Any approach must 

address both the active and reserve components’ unique roles, capabilities and limitations, but also the interrelationship between the two. More specifically, as part of 

Secretary Carter’s Force of the Future proposals we will work with his staff and the 

other Services to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of recruiting and accessions. We’ll review use of modern data analytics, expansion of non-cognitive testing, 

digitizing the Military Entrance Processing System (MEPS) process, and examining 

other enhancements to how we recruit, who we recruit and where we recruit. It is 

essential that we continue to expand our traditional recruiting pools to gain access 

to a greater pool of candidates and ensure we recruit the best talent available. Having consistently funded advertising and marketing (cohesive for all accession 

sources) will ensure national Total Force brand recognition that contributes to recruiting the right people, the right skills, at the right time. 

On retention, we must continue our emphasis on compensation, specifically our 

special and incentive pays to retain airmen in critical skills. However, retention is 

about much more than just pay. Maintaining quality of life for our airmen and their 

families is imperative. Funding for our Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) and 

airman and family programs is essential to retain and create a culture of resiliency 

and high morale among airmen and their families. Last, we must continue to leverage Force of the Future initiatives, to attract and retain talent while mindful of our 

overall readiness and ability to meet demanding missions worldwide. 

DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES

Question. What is your understanding of the respective roles of the General Counsel and Judge Advocate General of the Air Force in providing the Secretary of the 

Air Force with legal advice? 

Answer. Both the General Counsel and the Judge Advocate General (TJAG) have 

important roles in providing legal advice to the Secretary and senior Air Force leaders. The General Counsel is established within the Office of the Secretary of the Air 

Force and, subject to the direction and control of the Secretary, serves as the chief 

legal officer and Designated Agency Ethics Official of the Air Force. The law also 

provides that TJAG is the legal advisor of the Secretary and of all officers and agencies of the Air Force. These dual statutory roles have been strengthened by the robust working relationship that the General Counsel and TJAG have established between their organizations. The General Counsel and TJAG have a collaborative 

working relationship in addressing challenging legal issues that face the Air Force, 

with each maintaining the crucial ability to provide independent legal advice that 

is vital to the Air Force senior leader decision-making process. If confirmed, I look 

forward to establishing effective working relationships with both the General Counsel and TJAG. 

Question. What are your views about the responsibility of the Judge Advocate 

General of the Air Force to provide independent legal advice to the Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force? 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General’s ability to provide independent legal advice 

to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force has been 

statutorily recognized as essential to the effective delivery of legal services. I share 

that view. Uniformed attorneys bring another perspective and can provide insight 

and advice shaped by years of service throughout the Air Force. 

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Question. What are your views about the responsibility of staff judge advocates 

within the Air Force to provide independent legal advice to military commanders? 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General’s ability to provide independent legal advice 

to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force has been 

statutorily recognized as essential to the effective delivery of legal services. I share 

that view. Uniformed attorneys bring another perspective and can provide insight 

and advice shaped by years of service throughout the Air Force. 

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL CORPS RESOURCING

Question. What is your understanding of the current and projected manpower requirements in the Air Force JAG Corps? 

Answer. The Air Force JAG Corps continuously evaluates emerging mission requirements (e.g., air and space law, cyberspace law, and sexual assault victim representation) to project future manpower demands. The Air Force JAG Corps, based 

on current mission sets, has sufficient manpower authorizations to meet existing 

mission requirements, notwithstanding the ongoing discussion regarding the reinstatement of key leadership positions described in the response to question 2 below. 

Of note, in March 2015, the Secretary of the Air Force authorized an increase in 

Air Force JAG Corps manpower authorizations (58 officer positions and 15 enlisted 

positions) to resource the Special Victims’ Counsel Program and other key military 

justice positions in an effort to enhance the Air Force’s capability to combat sexual 

assault. 

Question. If confirmed, will you review the judge advocate manning within the Air 

Force, including leadership requirements, and determine whether current Active 

duty strengths are adequate? 

Answer. I will continue to work closely with the Air Force Judge Advocate Corps’ 

senior leadership to ensure sufficient manning to meet existing and emerging mission requirements. As an example, the Secretary of the Air Force recently provided 

a report to the Congressional Defense Committees, as directed by the Senate Report 

accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Senate 

Report 114–49, page 133–34), describing the importance of reinstating three key 

senior leadership positions (brigadier general positions) within the Air Force JAG 

Corps. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. What is your assessment of the Air Force’s sexual assault prevention 

and response program? 

Answer. We are making progress in the right direction thanks to funding and support from Congress, but we still have work ahead of us to combat this crime. Since 

fiscal year 2012, sexual assault prevalence has decreased while sexual assault reporting in the Air Force has increased, indicating the program’s progress in both 

preventing sexual assault and increasing airmen’s confidence in the program. Another indication of airmen’s confidence is the increase in the percentage of unrestricted reports, which is up to 70 percent from 64 percent in 2013. Next year, the 

Air Force will be rolling out a scientifically proven prevention program to the Force; 

we anticipate great benefits from using this new approach. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Air Force’s programs to address and 

prevent retaliation or reprisal against individuals who report sexual harassment or 

sexual assault? 

Answer. Our current effort is to understand the scope of the problem and capture 

data through our Sexual Assault Response Coordinators who review incidents at 

monthly Case Management Group meetings. Discussing retaliation incidents during 

our Case Management Group meetings is key to allowing our commanders to address retaliation incidents through command channels. These meetings are hosted 

by the installation or host wing Vice Commander and include the SARC, the legal 

advisor, investigators and unit commanders. The CMG will monitor all reports of 

retaliation until each case has reached final disposition or the retaliation has been 

appropriately addressed. What we’re finding is that most of the retaliation victims 

are reporting is when their peers in their unit treat them differently, whether these 

acts are intended to be retaliatory or are simply misguided with good intentions. I’m 

not satisfied we’ve done enough to address retaliation, but we’re going to continue 

to work with DOD and our sister services to get at this problem. 

Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges to the success of those programs? If confirmed what changes if any would you make to improve those programs? 

Answer. We’re making progress by tracking reports of retaliation, but we need to 

understand what types of incidents airmen experience as retaliation and why they 

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haven’t reported retaliation when they experience it. If confirmed, I will ensure we 

find actionable ways to use the data we are currently gathering to improve the care 

we provide to our airmen. 

Question. What is your assessment of Navy and Marine Corps programs and policies to hold individuals accountable for retaliation or reprisal against individuals 

who report sexual harassment or sexual assault? 

Answer. A commander has a range of disciplinary tools to hold an airman accountable for retaliation or reprisal. These options include administrative action, 

nonjudicial punishment, and court-martial. The commander’s decision is based on 

the specific evidence, facts, and circumstances of the individual case, including the 

nature or consequences of the misconduct. For example, a complaint of social ostracism by an airman’s peers could result in a less severe disciplinary action than an 

allegation that an airman’s supervisor has reprised against an airman. The Uniform 

Code of Military Justice and Air Force regulations make it possible for a commander 

to take disciplinary action against an airman found to have committed an act of retaliation or reprisal. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. Giving victims the ability to file a restricted report empowers them to 

access services and support that are unmatched in the civilian community, without 

fear of impacting their privacy, reputation, career or any other personal concern. Although restricted reporting limits the service’s ability to hold perpetrators accountable, it does allow the Air Force to preserve evidence collected during a sexual assault forensic exam when the victim elects this option. The evidence may be used 

in support of a future investigation should the victim later decide to change their 

report to unrestricted. If one of our airmen is assaulted, we must empower them 

with choice and control and focus on restoring them to become survivors. Another 

indication of the success of our efforts is a proportional increase in unrestricted reporting; suggesting airmen’s confidence in the military justice system and overall 

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program is increasing. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to the victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. The chain of command is deeply and directly involved in providing support to victims of sexual assault. Even before a specific allegation arises, commanders are responsible for ensuring all airmen are educated on sexual assault prevention and response. When a commander is notified of a sexual assault allegation, 

he or she takes immediate steps to ensure the victim’s safety and well-being as well 

as the safety of the accused. Specifically, the commander makes sure that the victim 

is physically safe, emotionally stable, and being provided assistance from all available resources and agencies, including the SARC, legal office, medical, and chaplain. 

The commander is also directly involved in decisions such as if the victim requests 

an expedited transfer to another location; has the authority to issue a no-contact 

order or a military protective order; and is specifically responsible for keeping the 

victim informed on actions being taken on the case. Furthermore, the commander 

stays informed about the victim’s well-being and the status of the case and, in turn, 

informs the multi-disciplinary Case Management Group to ensure the victim is fully 

supported. In conjunction with the legal office, the chain of command obtains input 

from the victim as the case is processed for disposition and adjudication. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Department of the Air Force’s implementation of the requirement to establish special victim’s counsel? 

Answer. The Air Force led the way with the implementation of its Special Victims’ 

Counsel (SVC) Program on 28 January 2013 as a pilot program within the DOD to 

combat sexual assault and provide world class response capabilities to victims. Due 

to the unrivaled success of the Air Force SVC Program, on 14 August 2013, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directed each Service establish a special victims’ advocacy 

program. In June 2014 the Program expanded eligibility to children, and the 2016 

NDAA expands eligibility to DOD civilians. Since the stand-up of the Air Force SVC 

Program, SVCs have represented 2,065 victims of sexual assault, and of those 1,063 

were represented in courts-martial. Anonymous victim impact surveys reflect an 

overwhelming positive experience with their SVC representation. Ninety-nine percent indicate that they would recommend an SVC to a victim of sexual assault. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Air Force’s resources 

and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and 

legal help they need? 

Answer. The Air Force provides a multitude of legal resources to assist victims 

of sexual assault. Due to the consistent increase in demand for special victim’s counsel and prosecutor services, the Air Force has added additional manpower resources 

and funding for the program. These positions are currently manned between 60–70 

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percent. Once the vacant SVC/SVP billets are filled, the Air Force will be adequately 

manned to provide legal support to those victims currently eligible for SVC services. 

Victims also have a variety of medical and psychological resources available to 

them. The Air Force Medical Service has trained Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners 

at every Military Treatment Facility to serve as the medical point of contact postassault when medical care for the purposes of collecting forensic evidence or assessing and treating medically-related injuries is necessary. Victims are offered mental 

health support by providers who are expertly trained to deliver both crisis-counseling services and ongoing care often needed when overcoming trauma events. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Air Force has taken to prevent additional sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

Answer. In my view, the decrease in prevalence and the increase in reporting are 

strong indicators that the Air Force‘s efforts are making progress. The Air Force has 

built a robust response system that’s unmatched in the civilian community, now we 

will be building on that foundation to initiate a 5-year prevention strategy, which 

I believe will continue our progress in eliminating sexual assault from our ranks. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources Air 

Force has in place to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. The Air Force continues to build on the training and resources for the 

airmen charged with investigating and prosecuting allegations of sexual assault. Air 

Force Office of Special Investigation special agents are trained and credentialed at 

the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to conduct felony-level investigations, 

including of sexual assaults. Air Force judge advocates receive specialized training 

to partner with OSI agents on sexual assault investigations and to prosecute sexual 

assault cases. In addition, the Air Force added 24 OSI special agents to focus on 

sexual assault investigations at certain installations and designated 9 senior trial 

counsels with advanced training to specialize in prosecuting sexual assault cases. 

The Air Force has also funded 9 examiners at the United States Army Criminal Investigations Laboratory (USACIL) who work exclusively on testing DNA samples for 

Air Force sexual assault cases. Even given this current status regarding training 

for investigators and prosecutors, we risk serious jeopardy to the integrity of our 

military justice process if we don’t focus equally on the resourcing and training of 

the Air Force defense bar. If military members and the American public begin to 

believe that our system has lost balance, they will lose faith in the fairness of the 

system. I believe the training and resources for Air Force defense counsel are currently adequate and I will do my part to ensure they remain that way. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. The chain of command has, and should retain, ultimate responsibility for 

the morale, welfare, good order, discipline, and effectiveness of military units. In the 

past, commanders have effectively dealt with issues including racial integration, illegal drug use during the Vietnam War, and the repeal of ‘‘Don’t Ask-Don’t Tell’’. 

We are ensuring commanders place the same focus and emphasis on sexual assault 

prevention and response and we hold commanders accountable for the professionalism of the airmen they command. Every airman must be treated with dignity 

and respect, and commanders must have both the incentives and the tools to do so. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. Creating a separate, external function for prosecutions of sexual assault 

risks severe negative consequences from constraining commanders’ authority and responsibility to hold airmen accountable. Currently, the commander, supported by 

his or her staff judge advocate, plays a pivotal role in the military justice system, 

which is the essential tool to deliver a disciplined Air Force ready to defend the nation. Air Force commanders and their lawyers agree on the appropriate disposition 

in over 99 percent of cases where the staff judge advocate recommends trial by 

court-martial. Outsourcing military justice decisions to external lawyers diminishes 

the authority of commanders and cannot achieve optimal military discipline. Furthermore, removing commanders from military justice decision making sends the 

confusing message to airmen that you can trust your commander to send you into 

battle, where your commander’s decisions may require your ultimate sacrifice, but 

you cannot trust your commander to hold an airman accountable for committing a 

crime. This message is more than just confusing; it degrades airmen’s trust and confidence in their commanders and, in turn, degrades the military discipline necessary 

to accomplish the mission of national defense. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Air Force? 

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Answer. I will ensure we continue to properly resource this program with money 

and manpower at all echelons. We are making progress in the right direction, and 

the new five-year prevention and response strategy Secretary James recently signed 

will continue to build on our successes. The true key to defeating this crime is to 

prevent perpetration of it, rather than continue to respond to victims of it, and the 

scientifically-based approach to prevention we will take over the next 5 years will 

help eliminate this crime from our ranks. 

BALANCE BETWEEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES

Question. The Air Force employs many contractors and civilian employees. In 

many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same 

projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions as Federal employees. Both contractors and civilians make up an integral part of the Department’s total workforce. 

Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees and contractor 

employees is in the best interests of the Air Force? 

Answer. I do believe we must continue to ensure that inherently governmental 

functions are performed by organic personnel and scrutinize those areas where the 

distinction is blurred. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Secretary and 

leaders across the Air Force to assess this matter to ensure compliance with the law 

and strive to develop the optimum balance between our civilian and contractor 

workforce. 

Question. In your view, has the Department utilized contractors to perform basic 

functions in an appropriate manner? 

Answer. Yes. Contractors are integral to how the Air Force accomplishes its mission for the security of our nation. Through our requirements review process, we 

continue to challenge ourselves in determining the best approach (a value consideration business case) for the Air Force in the long term. I believe there continues 

to be a great effort in this area to ensure we maintain the capability in performing 

our core functions and ensure the functional expertise to properly oversee contract 

operations. 

Question. Do you believe that the Air Force should undertake a comprehensive reappraisal of ‘‘inherently governmental functions’’ and other critical government functions, and how they are performed? 

Answer. I believe the Air Force does a good job in avoiding contracting for inherently governmental and critical functions, and we should maintain that vigilance. 

Question. Are there non-monetary reasons why the Air Force would need or desire 

one type of manpower over the other? If so, provide relevant examples where of 

those reasons? Under what circumstances should cost be used as the primary factor? 

Answer. Generally, outside of inherently governmental and critical functions, cost 

should be the tipping factor assuming that there is a choice between contract and 

civilians. There are instances where one or the other of those may not be available 

at a given location or within a given timeframe. There are also instances where we 

should maintain a certain level of in-house capability, expertise, and knowledge 

which could potentially override costs. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work with other appropriate officials in the Air 

Force to review the contractor and civilian force mix for cost and mission effectiveness? 

Answer. Yes, I will. 

Question. Would you agree that the balance between civilian employees and contractor employees in performing Air Force functions should be determined by the 

best interests of the Air Force and its mission requirements? 

Answer. Yes, I will. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work to remove any artificial constraints placed 

on the size of the Air Force’s civilian and contractor workforce, so that the Air Force 

can hire the number and type of employees most appropriate to accomplish its mission? 

Answer. Yes, I will. 

WOMEN IN COMBAT INTEGRATION

Question. Do you believe Congress should amend the Selective Service Act to require the registration of women? 

Answer. I definitely see the need for SSA participation to be actively reviewed, 

but recognize that this is a national issue that extends past departmental policy. 

Question. If women become subject to the draft, should they also be prepared for 

involuntary assignment based upon the needs of the Air Force? 

1094 

Answer. The Air Force routinely considers the desires of all our members with respect to which occupation they are classified in and where they are assigned, but 

the needs of the Air Force remain paramount to maintain our mission readiness. 

That would remain consistent if women were subject to the draft. 

Question. What is your opinion on whether men and women in the combat career 

fields should have the same physical fitness tests for the duration of their careers? 

Answer. The Air Force’s physical standards are linked to specific air force specialty codes and are tied to the operational mission . . . they are gender neutral. I 

support this approach of linking standards to operational tasks, devoid of gender 

considerations. I would also note, that AF standards have not changed, and will not 

change based on career fields opening to both genders. Our current predictive tests 

and standards have been validated to tie to occupational standards. The same 

standard will be used to assess females as well as males. Specifically, in regard to 

combat career fields, the Air Force has validated and verified occupational standards based on battlefield requirements and the Air Force plan requires the physical 

and mental standards for Battlefield airmen specialties be occupationally specific 

and operationally relevant. 

Question. In light of Secretary Carter’s decision to open all military positions to 

women, what do you believe are the primary challenges to implementing full integration in the Department of the Air Force and how do you plan to address them? 

Answer. The Air Force has already developed and validated their mental and 

physical standards as being gender neutral and in-compliance with public law. 

Going forward, my role would be to ensure the Air Force implements and maintains 

these physical and mental standards in compliance with Public Laws 103–160 and 

113–66, and Public Law 113–291, section 524. In addition, I will help ensure the 

Air Force Inspector General is also engaged to validate the physical and mental occupational standards and our implementing methodologies are in compliance with 

the Public Laws mentioned, at a minimum of every three years through compliance 

inspection programs. 

We must continue to be deliberate, methodical, evidence-based, and iterative to 

ensure readiness and combat effectiveness to protect the welfare of our airmen. 

Through this, the Air Force will follow its natural timeline to recruit, assess, select, 

train and assign females into these newly opened occupations. 

MATERNITY LEAVE

Question. The Secretary of the Air Force recently announced she would follow the 

Navy Secretary’s plan to provide 18 weeks of maternity leave for sailors. 

What is your view on whether the Air Force should follow the Navy’s policy to 

extend maternity leave to 18 weeks? 

Answer. The Air Force is reviewing the policy for maternity leave in conjunction 

with OSD and the other Services in light of the Navy’s recent policy change. Readiness and operational impacts have been an integral part of that discussion and have 

been considered. The Secretary has been very clear in her support of expanded maternity leave as a key aspect of meeting retention goals and maintaining top talent. 

Question. If the Air Force were to follow the Navy’s lead, what would be your plan 

to augment or back-fill those positions occupied by female airmen on extended maternity leave? Would you consider utilizing reservists to back-fill those positions? 

Answer. The Air Force would look at a variety of options. Planning and scheduling at the unit level is an important factor in being able to mitigate some of the 

potential impact. Other options could include increasing end strength; use of reservists, temporary contract support, detailees from other units, or other management 

actions such as transferring workload within the unit. 

Question. In your view, how would the Air Force account and pay for the cost of 

additional personnel to fill positions left vacant by airmen on extended maternity 

leave? 

Answer. There is an associated cost, but we also currently have significant costs 

associated with decreased retention, increased accession and training requirements 

and lost expertise. While not directly linked, our request for military end-strength 

growth will also assist in minimizing the operational impact to a force that is already stretched thin. 

Question. Do you support uncharged paternity leave for male airmen? If so, how 

many weeks do you believe is an appropriate amount of time? 

Answer. As with maternity leave, paternity leave is also under active consideration (as are other forms of ‘‘parental leave’’ (adoption, single parent etc.) In conjunction with OSD and the other Services, we must fully consider all aspects of each 

proposal, to include the operational impact. The specific proposal and timelines are 

1095 

still being discussed. Changes to this leave category would require legislation to adjust the current law. 

Question. Do you believe the Air Force fully understands what the cost of this reform will be? If so, describe those costs. 

Answer. Extending maternity leave from 6 to 18 weeks will cost approximately 937 lost man-yrs. or $113 M annually. In addition to the fiscal cost, there is also 

a cost in terms of operational capability. This will vary by unit and specialty code 

depending upon the number of women in the respective career field or unit. As such, 

it is important to be able to take a flexible approach and provide as many options 

for commanders to deal with their respective impacts. 

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. If confirmed, what challenges do you foresee in sustaining Air Force 

MWR programs in the future fiscal environment? 

Answer. Taking care of people remains Air Force’s number one priority and robust 

MWR programs are paramount to achieving mission success. MWR programs are essential in supporting USAF’s objectives of ‘‘Building and Maintaining Ready, Resilient airmen & Families.’’ Continuous constrained budgets undoubtedly tax our ability to provide the funding needed; however, Air Force leadership remains committed 

to holding the line on sufficient support to help meet total force quality of life needs. 

MWR Programs are the right investment for airmen and their families, even in 

times of scarce resources, as they are directly tied to resilience, morale and ultimately readiness/mission performance. 

MILITARY HEALTH CARE

Question. In your view, what should the Air Force Medical Service do to improve 

access to care in its medical treatment facilities? 

Answer. The Air Force Medical Service has taken several important steps this 

year to improve access to care and those steps are having a positive impact. Examples include simplified appointing schedules and a policy to grant access upon the 

first contact with the patient. The Surgeon General has identified additional measures such as reduction of staffing gaps during personnel transitions that will further 

improve access to care. I will work with the Surgeon General to ensure our staffing 

and scheduling processes meet the demand of the populations we serve. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Surgeon General of the Air 

Force to improve the healthcare experience for airmen and their families? 

Answer. In addition to providing great access to care, the Surgeon General’s 

Trusted Care initiative is a comprehensive approach to preparing our medical professionals to provide reliably safe, patient-centered care. We are building an action 

plan that includes tiered developmental education and training to ensure our people 

are skilled and knowledgeable in streamlining processes to improve the experience 

of care and leading a culture of safety. The Surgeon General has implemented a new 

performance management system that measures patient satisfaction as well as quality of care. I will work with the Surgeon General to ensure these initiatives move 

forward for the benefit of those we serve in our military treatment facilities and at 

our deployed sites. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. airmen and their families in both the active and reserve components 

have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational 

deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for airmen 

and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness 

needs are addressed and adequately resourced, especially in light of current fiscal 

constraints? 

Answer. Taking care of people is the Air Force’s number one priority. The most 

important family readiness issue for airmen and their families is investment in airmen and family programs and the MWR Portfolio. MWR and family programs have 

a direct impact to retention, resiliency, and readiness. Understanding the current 

and future budget constraints, we must fund airmen and family programs with the 

greatest impact to retention, resiliency and readiness. Doing so builds a ‘‘community’’ of airmen and families not just working for the Air Force, but who are Air 

Force Members. Funding programs centered on airmen and families creates ‘‘touch 

points’’ that strengthen our sense of Air Force community. There is no stronger impact to success than airmen who are able to focus on the mission because they know 

the family back home is part of a close-knit community. 

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SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continue to be of great 

concern to the Committee. 

If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide prevention programs 

and policies for the Department of the Air Force to prevent suicides and increase 

the resiliency of airmen and their families? 

Answer. I would take an active role in supporting the development of an Air Force 

integrated prevention strategy focused on suicide, sexual assault, substance abuse 

and family member maltreatment. The AF Suicide Prevention Summit held in September brought together the foremost subject matter experts from across DOD, Federal agencies and academia to address this critical issue and generated a strong 

strategy to reverse the rising trend. I am committed to moving forward with a comprehensive action plan and working collaboratively with the Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) and other Services to significantly reduce the frequency of 

suicide in our force. I will also ensure the Air Force continues to actively research 

means of more effectively mitigating risk for suicide within the force, including continued progress toward a resilient culture of airman through Comprehensive Airman Fitness. 

SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED, ILL, AND INJURED AIRMEN

Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from the Air Force and the Federal Government for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, 

successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. 

What is your assessment of the progress made by the Air Force to improve the 

care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured airmen? 

Answer. We continue to keep care for our Wounded, Ill and Injured (WII) at the 

forefront, and are making steady progress in elevating that care. We have created 

Care Management Teams to guide our WII through their recovery and transition, 

and the synergy and focus these teams provide are increasing support for our WII 

airmen and their families. Even so, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and I 

are assessing WII airmen program outcomes in an effort to strengthen our support 

even more as we look to the future. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase the Air Force’s support for wounded airmen, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. The Air Force A1 and SG teams will continue to collaborate closely to 

ensure our WII receive the highest level of support possible by applying medical 

care advancements and maintaining our capability to grow our capacity if the need 

arises. 

SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ACCOUNTABILITY

Question. While representative of a small number of individuals in DOD, reports 

of abuses of rank and authority by senior military and civilian leaders and failures 

to perform up to accepted standards are frequently received. Whistleblowers and 

victims of such abuses often report that they felt that no one would pay attention 

to or believe their complaints. Accusations of unduly lenient treatment of senior officers and senior officials against whom accusations have been substantiated are also 

frequently heard. 

What are your views regarding the appropriate standard of accountability for senior civilian and military leaders of the Department? 

Answer. The success of our Air Force depends on airmen having complete trust 

and confidence in one another. Each of us must live by our core values of Integrity 

First, Service Before Self and Excellence In All Do. As senior leaders we must maintain the highest levels of adherence to these values. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that senior leaders 

of the Air Force are held accountable for their actions and performance? 

Answer. As senior leaders in our world’s greatest Air Force, we must be held to 

the highest levels of accountability and professional conduct. We must also ensure 

that we create a safe and respectful environment for all our airmen. If confirmed, 

I will ensure that results of investigations are taken seriously and given full review 

and that appropriate administrative, disciplinary, and/or legal action is taken where 

necessary. 

1097 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are 

able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee 

and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under 

Secretary of the Air Force? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

BEST VALUE CONTRACTING

1. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Disbrow, there has been a recent trend in some of 

the Services to buy more products through Lowest Price Technically Acceptable 

(LPTA) and reverse auction acquisition methods. I have become aware of cases 

where these methods have even been used for the procurement of personal protective equipment where safety and quality are critical and the failure of the item 

could result in combat casualties. Our troops, who put their lives on the line for our 

freedom and security, should not be sent into harm’s way with the cheapest equipment, but rather the best. In combat, as well as in training, quality personal protective equipment can prevent serious injuries and can even be the difference between 

life and death for our servicemembers. That is why I worked to include section 884 

in this year’s NDAA, which was recently signed into law. This provision requires 

the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Services, in procuring an item of personal protective equipment or a critical safety item, use source selection criteria that 

is predominately based on technical qualifications of the item, if the level of quality 

or failure of the item could result in death or severe bodily harm to the servicemember. If confirmed, will you review this provision in the NDAA and ensure that your 

Service complies with this law? 

Secretary DISBROW. I am familiar with Title VIII—Acquisition Policy, Acquisition 

Management and Related Matters of the FY15 NDAA and support its intent. If confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure the continued prioritization of our servicemembers’ 

safety in our acquisitions, to continue to analyze each requirement individually and 

be prepared to utilize all available source selection methods on the best value continuum. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

REBALANCE TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC

2. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Disbrow, I am very concerned with ensuring that 

our Rebalance to Asia-Pacific is more than just rhetoric. What are your views on 

advancing a tangible rebalance? 

Secretary DISBROW. The Asia-Pacific region remains of central importance to the 

national security of our Nation as the world’s strategic and economic centers of 

gravity evolve. The Air Force is committed, working with our joint partners and allies, to ensure regional stability and mutual freedom of access to the global commons through cooperative military relationships. 

The United States demonstrates the importance of air and space capabilities by 

stationing the majority of the Air Force’s permanent overseas forces in the Asia-Pacific region and will continue to do so into the foreseeable future. This regional presVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01103 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
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ence, combined with continental United States-based forces, provide critical operational capabilities to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command , to include global attack with extended nuclear deterrence and assurance, strategic mobility, airborne 

and space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, precision navigation 

and timing, and command, control, and communications. 

3. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Disbrow, in your opinion, how are we doing in reassuring our partners and allies in the region that we are serious about the Rebalance 

and what else should we be doing? 

Secretary DISBROW. The effort to reassure our partners and allies in the region 

is of utmost priority and we prove our commitment in many multifaceted ways; including investment in new strike platforms such as Long Range Strike Bomber and 

Theater Security Cooperation programs. In addition, the Air Force has a long history of partnerships with air forces in the Asia-Pacific region and will continue to 

increase our security cooperation activities to help regional allies and partner nations establish, improve, and sustain air, space, and cyberspace capabilities. 

As part of our commitment to the Rebalance we continue to deepen and broaden 

bilateral and multilateral partnerships through continued engagement with our key 

allies-Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In concert with 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commander, we continue 

to pursue and strengthen defense relationships with Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Vietnam, New Zealand, and others. 

The Air Force also continues to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the region by 

providing much needed humanitarian assistance and disaster relief throughout the 

region when a crisis or natural disaster unfolds. 

ENERGY SECURITY

4. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Disbrow, I believe energy security is a vital component to our overall national security. Do you believe the Department of Defense 

(DOD) has a role to play in U.S. energy security and could you comment on how 

you view energy security as tied to our overall national security? 

Secretary DISBROW. I believe energy security is absolutely critical to our overall 

national security. Energy fuels every sortie, launches every space mission, and enables all command and control. I believe it is critical for the Air Force to improve 

its ability to manage energy supply and demand in a way that enhances mission 

capability and readiness, while helping address the Nation’s broader energy challenges. Consequently, I fully support the Air Force’s current initiatives to establish 

mission assurance through energy assurance, building strategic energy agility 

through resilient, cost-effective, and clean sources. These initiatives will reduce 

costs and provide energy through contingencies, even those that may deny energy 

sources for long periods. 

ENERGY EFFICIENCY INITIATIVES

5. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Disbrow, I applaud DOD’s work on energy efficiency 

initiatives including alternative and renewable energy projects. If confirmed, will 

you commit to continuing the administration’s efforts to expand alternative and renewable energy initiatives? 

Secretary DISBROW. Optimizing the way the Air Force uses energy increases our 

energy resiliency. I support DOD’s efforts to increase energy efficiency and pursue 

clean energy projects in areas which do not compromise national security. If confirmed, I will aggressively support the Air Force’s current energy efficiency strategy 

which includes pursuing alternative and renewable energy sources. 

MAUI HIGH POWER COMPUTING CENTER

6. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Disbrow, I am aware that the Maui High Power 

Computing Center (MHPCC) as part of the High Performance Computing Modernization Program should be undergoing systems modernizations along with the 

other computing centers. I want to ensure that the plans for the Maui modernization efforts are sufficiently focused to modernize their systems. If confirmed, will 

you work to ensure that all of our computing centers are monitored and resourced 

under the modernization program to ensure that they all have the capability to provide required outputs? 

Secretary DISBROW. The Maui High Performance Computing Center (MHPCC) 

houses one of Department of Defense Supercomputing Resource Centers. It is one 

of the most powerful computer systems in the department, offering a large-scale 

parallel computing platform and a high-speed communications infrastructure used 

to process and translate data into Space Situational Awareness information. If conVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 Feb 21, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01104 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24274.TXT WILDA
1099 

firmed, I look forward to working with this committee and colleagues within the Department of Defense to find ways to properly monitor and resource this important 

capability. 

7. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Disbrow, if confirmed, will you commit to keeping 

me and my staff informed on the Army’s efforts to keep the computers at the 

MHPCC and the other facilities up-to-date under the High Performance Computing 

Modernization Program? 

Secretary DISBROW. If confirmed, you have my commitment to work with our 

Army and Department of Defense partners to ensure you and your staff are continuously informed of our efforts to keep these important systems and facilities up-todate. 

[The nomination reference of the Honorable Lisa S. Disbrow 

follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

September 21, 2015. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Lisa S. Disbrow, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of the Air Force, vice Eric K. 

Fanning, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of the Honorable Lisa S. Disbrow, which 

was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 

referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LISA S. DISBROW

Education: 

National War College 

• 2001–2002 

• Master of Science, National Security Strategy 

Air Command and Staff College 

• 1998 

George Washington University 

• 1991 

• Master of Art, International Affairs 

University of Virginia 

• 1980–1984 

• Bachelor of Arts, Foreign Affairs 

Employment Record: 

United States Air Force 

• Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management & Comptroller) 

• July 2014—Present 

• April 2015–Present, Also performing the duties of the Under Secretary of the 

Air Force 

1100 

Joint Staff, Department of Defense 

• Vice Director, J8 

• April 2007–July 2014 

White House/Department of Defense 

• Special Advisor for Policy Implementation, National Security Council 

• May 2006–March 2007 

White House/Department of Defense 

• Senior Director for Policy Implementation, National Security Advisor 

• February 2006–May 2006 

Joint Staff, Department of Defense 

• Deputy Director, Force Management 

• May 2003–February 2006 

Joint Staff, Department of Defense 

• Deputy Chief, Studies, Analysis and Gaming Division, J8 

• January 1998–May 2003 

Joint Staff, Department of Defense 

• Operations Analyst, J8 

• December 1995–January 1998 

National Reconnaissance Office 

• Senior Engineer 

• January 1993–December 1995 

United States Air Force 

• Active Duty Officer, Directorate of Intelligence 

• April 1985–December 1992 

Honors and Awards: 

Military Awards 

• 2014 Lieutenant General Glen A. Kent Leadership Award 

Federal Civilian Awards 

• 2014 CJCS Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award 

• 2013 Distinguished Executive Presidential Rank Award Finalist 

• 2010 Competitive DOD Distinguished Civilian Service Award 

• 2008 Meritorious Executive Presidential Rank Award 

• 2006 Joint Meritorious Civilian Service Award 

• 2000–2001 Joint Meritorious Civilian Service Award 

• 1996–1997 Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award 

Academic Awards 

• April 2002, United States Army Association Paper of the Year, National War 

College Class of 2002, ‘‘Decision Superiority’’ 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by the Honorable Lisa S. Disbrow in connection 

with her nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ROOM SR-228 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

1101 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Lisa Stephens Disbrow (1993–present)—Married name. 

Lisa Stephens Valero (1983–1993)—Married name. 

Lisa Kay Stephens (1962–1983)—Maiden name. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

3. Date of nomination: 

September 21, 2015. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

September 29, 1962, Clifton Forge, VA. 

6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Harry Clyde Disbrow, Jr. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. 

• University of Virginia, 1981-1984, BA, Foreign Affairs, 1984 

• George Washington University, MA, International Affairs, 1990 

• National War College, 2001-2002, MS, National Security Strategy, 2002 

9. Employment Record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

1. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management & Comptroller) 

performing the duties of Under Secretary of the Air Force; April 2015–present 

2. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management & Comptroller); 

July 2014–present 

3. Vice Director, Joint Staff/J8; Joint Staff/Department of Defense; April 2007– 

July 2014 

4. Special Advisor for Policy Implementation, National Security Council; White 

House/Department of Defense; May 2006–March 2007 

5. Senior Director for Policy Implementation, National Security Advisor; White 

House/Department of Defense; February 2006–May 2006 

6. Deputy Director, Force Management; Joint Staff/Department of Defense; May 

2003–February 2006 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

None. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

None. 

1102 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

Social Club/Organization Dates Position Restrictive Membership Policies Name/Address/Telephone Of 

Verifying Membership Official 

American Society of 

Military Comptrollers 

2014–present Member Must be actively employed in 

military comptrollership, as 

active duty or civilian personnel for DOD or USCG 

Washington Chapter 

alrunnels@ 

asmconline.org 

American Legion Post 24 

Alexandria 

2011 present Member (passive 

member) 

Veteran Jim Glassman 

Post 24 

400 Cameron St. 

Alexandria VA 

22314 

703-683-5564 

Daughters of American 

Revolution 

2006–present Inactive Member Must have a relative who 

aided in achieving American independence 

Pentagon Chapter 

registrar@pentagon 

chapterDAR.org 

Colonial Dames 2008–present Inactive Member Must have a relative who resided in one of the 13 

Colonies between 1607– 

1775 

Air Force Association Mid-1980s– 

present 

Member (passive) No 800-727-3337 

1501 Lee Hwy 

Arlington VA 

22209 

AARP 2009–present Member (passive) Must be 50 888-531-8722 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None. 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Scholarships: 

Masters Degree program through Defense Intelligence Agency’s Defense Advanced 

Language and Area Studies Program 

DOD Civilian Senior Executive Service Awards: 

1996–1997, Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award. 

2000–2001, Joint Meritorious Civilian Service Award. 

2006, Joint Meritorious Civilian Service Award. 

2008, Meritorious Executive Presidential Rank Award. 

2010, Competitive DOD Distinguished Civilian Service Award. 

2014, CJCS Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award. 

2014, Lieutenant Glen A. Kent Leadership Award. 

Honor Society: 

Sigma Iota Rho Honors Society for International Studies 

Awards: 

United States Army Association, ‘‘Paper of Year’’ National War-College Class of 

2002, ‘‘Decision Superiority’’, April 2002 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

1103 

None, other than papers for graduate and undergraduate degree courses and military professional education courses. 

16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

4 June 2015—Arnold Air Society / Silver Wings National Conclave—Distinguished 

Speaker Series. 

5 May 2015—National Security Forum: ‘‘America’s Role in an Uncertain World’’. 

(no formal documentation of speeches as presented). 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to Congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this Committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, 

or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or 

denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to 

this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in 

the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

LISA S. DISBROW

This 12th day of November, 2015 

[The nomination of the Honorable Lisa S. Disbrow was reported 

to the Senate by Chairman McCain on December 18, 2015, with the 

recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on January 20, 2016.] 

(1105) 

APPENDIX 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE ON BIOGRAPHICAL

AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

2. Position to which nominated: 

3. Date of nomination: 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

5. Date and place of birth: 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

7. Names and ages of children: 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

1106 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Information furnished in Parts B through F will 

be retained in the committee’s executive files and will not be made available to the 

public unless specifically directed by the committee. 

Name: 

PART B—FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS

1. Will you sever all business connections with your present employers, business 

firms, business associations or business organizations if you are confirmed by the 

Senate? 

2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the government? If 

so, explain. 

3. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after completing government service to resume employment, affiliation or practice with your previous employer, business firm, association or organization? 

4. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after 

you leave government service? 

5. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where? 

6. If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable? 

1107 

PART C—POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and 

other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers. 

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which 

could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been 

nominated. 

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you 

have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or 

acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict 

of interest in the position to which you have been nominated. 

4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have engaged for 

the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modification 

of any legislation or affecting the administration and execution of law or public policy. 

5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any 

that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide a copy 

of any trust or other agreements.) 

6. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions provided by the 

General Counsel of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Attorney 

General’s office concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments 

to your serving in this position? 

PART D—LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional 

conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, 

professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, 

provide details. 

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, 

State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of any Federal, State, county 

or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, 

provide details. 

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details. 

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo contendere) 

of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense? 

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination. 

PART E—FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a 

foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please 

fully describe such relationship. 

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, accounting, 

public relations firm or other service organization, have any of your or your spouse’s 

associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe 

such relationship. 

1108 

3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any compensation 

from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish details. 

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registration 

Act? If so, please furnish details. 

PART F—FINANCIAL DATA

All information requested under this heading must be provided for yourself, your 

spouse, and your dependents. 

1. Describe the terms of any beneficial trust or blind trust of which you, your 

spouse, or your dependents may be a beneficiary. In the case of a blind trust, provide the name of the trustee(s) and a copy of the trust agreement. 

2. Provide a description of any fiduciary responsibility or power of attorney which 

you hold for or on behalf of any other person. 

3. List sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income 

arrangements, stock options, executory contracts and other future benefits which 

you expect to derive from current or previous business relationships, professional 

services and firm memberships, employers, clients and customers. 

4. Have you filed a Federal income tax return for each of the past 10 years? If 

not, please explain. 

5. Have your taxes always been paid on time? 

6. Were all your taxes, Federal, State, and local, current (filed and paid) as of the 

date of your nomination? 

7. Has the Internal Revenue Service ever audited your Federal tax return? If so, 

what resulted from the audit? 

8. Have any tax liens, either Federal, State, or local, been filed against you or 

against any real property or personal property which you own either individually, 

jointly, or in partnership? 

(The committee may require that copies of your Federal income tax returns be 

provided to the committee. These documents will be made available only to Senators 

and the staff designated by the Chairman. They will not be available for public inspection.) 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

—————————————————. 

This ————— day of —————————————, 20———. 

1109 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE ON BIOGRAPHICAL

AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CERTAIN SENIOR

MILITARY NOMINEES

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES FOR CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: 

Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional 

sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which 

the continuation of your answer applies. 

If you have completed this form in connection with a prior military nomination, 

you may use the following procedure in lieu of submitting a new form. In your letter 

to the Chairman, add the following paragraph to the end: 

‘‘I hereby incorporate by reference the information and commitments contained 

in the Senate Armed Services Committee form ‘Biographical and Financial Information Requested of Nominees for Certain Senior Military Positions,’ submitted to the Committee on [insert date or your prior form]. I agree that all 

such commitments apply to the position to which I have been nominated and 

that all such information is current except as follows:... .’’ [If any information on your prior form needs to be updated, please cite the part of the form 

and the question number and set forth the updated information in your letter 

to the Chairman.] 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

2. Position to which nominated: 

3. Date of nomination: 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses. Also include 

your office telephone number.) 

5. Date and place of birth: 

6. Marital Status: (Include name of husband or wife, including wife’s maiden 

name.) 

7. Names and ages of children: 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

1110 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from 

the Administration in power? 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Information furnished in Parts B through E will 

be retained in the committee’s executive files and will not be made available to the 

public unless specifically directed by the committee. 

Name: 

PART B—FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS

1. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your military service. If so, explain. 

2. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after 

you leave military service? 

PART C—POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and 

other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers. 

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which 

could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been 

nominated. 

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you 

have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or 

acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict 

of interest in the position to which you have been nominated. 

4. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any 

that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide a copy 

of any trust or other agreements.) 

5. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions provided by the 

General Counsel of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments 

to your serving in this position? 

6. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where? 

1111 

PART D—LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional 

conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, 

professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, 

provide details. 

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, 

State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of Federal, State, county or 

municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details. 

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or litigation? 

If so, provide details. 

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo contendere) 

of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense? 

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination. 

PART E—FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a 

foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please 

fully describe such relationship. 

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, accounting, 

public relations firm or other service organization, have any of your or your spouse’s 

associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe 

such relationship. 

3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any compensation 

from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish details. 

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registration 

Act? If so, please furnish details. 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

—————————————————. 

This ————— day of —————————————, 20———. 

Æ