EMBASSY 

CONSTRUCTION

State Needs to Better 

Measure Performance 

of Its New Approach

Report to Congressional Requesters

March 2017

GAO-17-296

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-296, a report to 

congressional requesters

March 2017

EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION

State Needs to Better Measure Performance of 

Its New Approach

What GAO Found

In 2011, the U.S. Department of State's (State) Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations (OBO) established the Excellence approach in response to concerns 

regarding the aesthetics, quality, location, and functionality of embassies built 

using its Standard Embassy Design (SED). The SED utilized a standard 

prototypical design for new embassies and consulates along with a streamlined 

delivery method combining responsibility for design and construction under a 

single contract. Under the Excellence approach, OBO now directly contracts with 

design firms to develop customized embassy designs before contracting for 

construction. OBO officials believe that greater design control under Excellence 

will improve embassies’ appearance in representing the United States, 

functionality, quality, and operating costs. 

Excellence consists of several key elements and involves trade-offs. For 

example, OBO now allots time and funding to develop customized designs and 

hires leading design firms to produce them. These design firms have faced initial 

adjustment challenges designing U.S. embassies, and OBO only recently began 

evaluating their performance as required by federal regulation. OBO’s new 

approach poses cost and schedule trade-offs since, for example, OBO now has 

greater design control but may also be responsible if design problems are 

identified during construction. GAO’s survey found that OBO staff who 

responded held split or conflicting opinions on Excellence compared with SED.

U.S. Embassy in Panama Constructed under Standard Embassy Design and Rendering of U.S. 

Consulate General in India to Be Delivered under the Excellence Approach

While OBO has established guidance to implement Excellence, it lacks tools to 

fully evaluate the performance of this new approach. Performance measures are 

essential tools for managers to evaluate progress toward a program’s goals, as 

noted in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. However, 

OBO has not established performance measures to specifically evaluate and 

communicate the effectiveness of Excellence in delivering embassies. Moreover, 

OBO’s bureau-wide strategic measures do not address Excellence priorities,

such as greater adaptability to individual locations, functionality, or sustainability. 

OBO also lacks a reliable system to monitor operating performance, such as 

building energy usage, and a centralized database to broadly manage the 

Excellence program, to include effectively reporting on projects’ design and 

construction costs and schedules. Without performance measures and reliable 

systems to collect and analyze relevant data, OBO cannot fully assess the value 

of shifting to the Excellence approach and away from the SED.

View GAO-17-296. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Courts at (202) 512-8980 or 

courtsm@gao.gov or David J. Wise at (202) 

512-5731 or w ised@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

In 1998, terrorists bombed the U.S. 

embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar 

es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 220 

people and injuring 4,000. In 1999, 

State began a new embassy 

construction program, administered by 

OBO, which to date has received $21 

billion, according to State. OBO’s 

primary goal was to provide secure, 

safe, and functional workplaces, and it 

adopted SED with a streamlined, 

standard design for all embassies. In 

2011, OBO replaced the SED with the 

Excellence approach, which makes 

use of customized designs for each 

embassy. 

GAO was asked to review the 

implementation of Excellence. This 

report examines (1) the reasons for 

State’s shift to the Excellence 

approach, (2) key elements and 

tradeoffs of the new approach, and (3) 

the extent to which State has 

established guidance and tools to 

implement and evaluate its Excellence 

approach. GAO analyzed information 

from State policy, planning, funding, 

and reporting documents and 

interviewed State and industry officials. 

GAO also surveyed OBO staff about, 

among other things, the sufficiency of 

OBO’s policies, procedures, and 

technical guidance for the Excellence 

approach. GAO will examine project 

cost and schedule issues in a 

subsequent report.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making four recommendations

that State take several steps to

strengthen performance measures and 

reporting, monitoring mechanisms, and 

data systems for the Excellence 

approach. State concurred with all four 

recommendations.
Page i GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Letter 1

Background 4

OBO Established Excellence in an Effort to Improve Embassy 

Delivery Approach 12

OBO’s Greater Design Control Requires Greater Up-Front 

Resources and Has Cost and Schedule Trade-Offs 22

OBO Has Established Some Implementation Guidance but Lacks 

Tools to Assess Performance under Excellence 42

Conclusions 54

Recommendations for Executive Action 55

Agency Comments 55

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 58

Appendix II Results of GAO’s Survey of Staff of the Department of State’s 

Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations 62

Appendix III Selected Comments from Our Survey of Bureau of Overseas 

Buildings Operations Staff, with Summary Tabular Analyses 69

Appendix IV Timeline of Department of State Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations, Standard Embassy Design, and Excellence 77

Appendix V Guiding Principles of Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities; U.S. 

Department of State Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations 78

Appendix VI Approaches to Achieve Excellence; U.S. State Department, Bureau 

of Overseas Buildings Operations 79

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Appendix VII Timing of Industry Advisory Reviews within the Bureau of Overseas 

Buildings Operations Design Process 80

Appendix VIII Comments from the U.S. Department of State 81

Appendix IX GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 84

Tables

Table 1: New Construction Contracts Awarded Fiscal Year 2011 

through 2015, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations 11

Table 2: Funding Authorized for Design and Project Development, 

Fiscal Year 2011 through 2015, U.S. Department of State, 

Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) 23

Table 3: Industry Studies and Experts Identified Trade-offs 

Inherent in the Design-Build (DB), Design-Build with 

Bridging (bridging), and Design-Bid-Build (DBB) Project 

Delivery Methods 33

Table 4: Summary of Survey Comments Expressing Opinions on 

Benefits and Challenges Attributed to the Excellence 

Approach 36

Table 5: Summary of GAO’s Analysis of Survey Comments 

Expressing Positive and Negative Opinions toward the 

Excellence Approach to the Design and Construction of 

New Embassies and Consulates 39

Table 6: Distribution of Agree-Disagree Responses from Bureau 

of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) Staff Expressing 

Opinions on the Implementation of the Excellence 

Approach 46

Table 7: Responses on the Effectiveness of Excellence by Tenure 

at the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations 67

Table 8: Responses from Major Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations Offices on the Effectiveness of Excellence 67

Table 9: Summary of Survey Comments Expressing Opinions on 

Benefits and Challenges Attributed to the Excellence 

Approach 70
Page iii GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Table 10: Summary of GAO’s Analysis of Survey Comments 

Expressing Positive and Negative Opinions toward the 

Excellence Approach to the Design and Construction of 

New Embassies and Consulates 73

Figures

Figure 1: U.S. Department of State Standard Embassy Design 

Components 7

Figure 2: U.S. Department of State Standard Embassy Design 

and Derivative 8

Figure 3: Construction of a U.S. Embassy under Design-Build 

Project Delivery Method 13

Figure 4: Construction of a U.S. Embassy under Bridging Project 

Delivery Method 18

Figure 5: Construction of a U.S. Embassy under Design-Bid-Build 

Project Delivery Method 21

Figure 6: Generalized Time Lines for Project Delivery Methods 

Used in State’s Capital Security Construction Program, 

as Estimated by the Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations 26

Figure 7: Concept Designs Proposed and Subsequent Schematic 

Design Developed for the New U.S. Consulate in 

Hyderabad, India 31

Figure 8: Selected Survey Comments from Staff of the Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations regarding the Current 

Excellence Approach and the Previous Standard 

Embassy Design Approach 41
Page iv GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Abbreviations

AGC Associated General Contractors of America

AIA American Institute of Architects

BIA Bridging Institute of America

Bridging design-build with bridging

DB design-build

DBB design-bid-build

DBIA Design-Build Institute of America

DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Excellence Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities

GSA General Services Administration

IAG Industry Advisory Group

ID/IQ Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity contract

LEED Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design

OBO Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations

SED Standard Embassy Design

State U.S. Department of State

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Page 1 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

March 16, 2017

Congressional Requesters

The U.S. Department of State (State) maintains facilities at more than 285 

diplomatic missions (posts) located around the world, including 

embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic offices. More than 86,000 

U.S. government employees are housed in these facilities. On August 7, 

1998, terrorists bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar 

es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 220 people and injuring 4,000 others. 

The ensuing Accountability Review Board found that unless State 

addressed security vulnerabilities at U.S. embassies, U.S. government 

employees would remain at risk from terrorist activity. In 1999, State 

began its multiple-year Capital Security Construction Program, 

administered by the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), 

which to date has received $21 billion, according to State.1 In 

administering the program, OBO’s primary goal was providing overseas 

U.S. diplomatic personnel with secure, safe, and functional workplaces. 

OBO sought to achieve that goal by using a Standard Embassy Design 

(SED) approach that relied heavily on the use and site-adaptation of a 

standard design for new embassies and consulates (both referred to 

hereafter as embassies) and a streamlined delivery method combining 

responsibility for final design and construction under a single contract.2

OBO also intended that new embassies would be efficient, state-of-the-art 

 1The Capital Security Construction Program began in fiscal year 1999. Its goal was to 

replace embassies that did not meet security standards. Today, the Capital Security 

Construction Program is funded through direct appropriations to State as well as 

contributions from other U.S. agencies with overseas staff—received under the Capital 

Security Cost-Sharing Program. Congress established this cost-sharing program in fiscal 

year 2005 to provide additional funding for the Capital Security Construction Program by 

assessing agencies a per-capita staffing charge. According to State, the intent was to 

accelerate construction of new embassies and to ensure that agencies assign only the 

number of staff needed to accomplish their overseas missions. According to State, in 

fiscal year 2016, State allotted approximately $1 billion to the Capital Security 

Construction Program from funds received via direct appropriations—under the Embassy 

Security, Construction, and Maintenance appropriation—and was authorized to assess 

and receive roughly $1.2 billion in additional funds through other federal agencies’ costsharing contributions. 

2In 2003, the OBO Director who implemented the SED approach reported to the Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations that OBO’s mission was to accelerate the construction of 

new facilities that can satisfy State’s stringent security standards and provide U.S. 

diplomatic personnel with safe, secure, and functional facilities in which to conduct the 

foreign policy of the United States. 

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

facilities. In 2006, we reported that by using the SED and a streamlined 

delivery method, OBO had made significant progress in completing new 

embassies and, on average, reduced the time required to complete 

projects.3

In 2011, OBO replaced the SED approach with Design Excellence, now 

referred to simply as Excellence, which makes use of customized, 

individual designs for each embassy and emphasizes innovation. In April 

2011, OBO announced the newly established Excellence approach to its 

Industry Advisory Panel and, with it, a revised OBO mission. That new 

mission is “to provide safe, secure, and functional facilities that represent 

the U.S. government to the host nation and support our staff in the 

achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives. These facilities should 

represent American values and the best in American architecture, design, 

engineering, technology, sustainability, art, culture, and construction 

execution.” Some Members of Congress and others have raised concerns 

that this new approach may result in embassies that take longer and cost 

more to build. From fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2015, OBO 

allotted nearly $300 million for the project development and design of 16 

Excellence projects and awarded over $900 million in construction 

contracts for 6 of those Excellence projects.

You asked us to review the Excellence approach to the design and 

construction of new embassies and consulates. This report examines (1) 

the reasons for State’s shift to the Excellence approach, (2) key elements 

and trade-offs of the new approach, and (3) the extent to which State has 

established guidance and tools to implement and evaluate this approach.

To conduct this review, we obtained and analyzed information from 

agency policy, planning, funding, and reporting documents, administrative 

memos, and select project documentation. We will examine project cost 

and schedule issues in a subsequent report. We also interviewed State 

officials from OBO; the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS); the Office of 

Management, Rightsizing, Policy, and Innovation; and the Office of 

Acquisitions Management. Within OBO, we spoke with officials in offices 

responsible for site acquisition, planning, project development, design 

and engineering, cost management, construction management, facility 

management, policy and program analysis, and financial management. 

 3GAO, Embassy Construction: State Has Made Progress Constructing New Embassies, 

but Better Planning Is Needed for Operations and Maintenance Requirements,

GAO-06-641 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006).
Page 3 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

We also interviewed officials from a variety of architecture and 

engineering design firms and construction contractors that have worked 

for State. Additionally, we spoke with industry groups such as the 

American Institute of Architects (AIA), the Associated General 

Contractors of America (AGC), the Bridging Institute of America (BIA), 

and the Design-Build Institute of America (DBIA). Also, because the 

decision to adopt Excellence was made in 2011—and the work leading up 

to the decision was undertaken in 2010—we interviewed key former OBO 

officials with direct experience with OBO’s efforts to improve the Capital 

Security Construction Program at that time, including some who served 

on OBO’s management steering committee for Excellence.

We also conducted a web-based survey of OBO staff from July 15 

through August 12, 2016, soliciting their views on the sufficiency of OBO’s 

strategic vision, policies, procedures, and technical guidance for the 

Excellence approach as well as any particular efficiencies or challenges 

brought about by the approach.4 We sent the survey to 1,511 OBO staff, 

705 (47 percent) of whom responded.5 We do not make any attempt to 

extrapolate the findings to the remaining 53 percent of eligible employees 

who chose not to complete our survey. The results of our survey provide 

measures of employees’ views at the time they completed the survey in 

July and August 2016. Over 550 respondents provided responses to at 

least one open-ended question in our survey. We analyzed and 

categorized these comments for specific questions and have included 

selected quotes to characterize the results of that analysis. Respondents 

generally provided more negative comments than positive ones; however, 

where possible, we have tried to present a balanced selection of positive 

and negative comments. In some cases we edited responses for clarity or 

grammar. Views expressed in the survey may not be representative of all 

OBO staff views on given topics. See appendix I for more detailed 

information on our scope and methodology, and see appendix II for 

survey results. In addition, see appendix III for selected responses to 

open-ended survey questions that touched upon issues we reviewed 

 4Those surveyed included both OBO direct hire and contracted support staff working at 

OBO’s offices, which we refer to in the report generally as “OBO staff.” In general, OBO 

staff comprises U.S. civil service staff, U.S. Foreign Service officers, and some 

contractors.

5We initially sent the survey to 1,531 OBO staff but later determined that 20 of them had 

left the agency prior to survey activation or were duplicates. We determined these staff to 

be out of scope and removed them from the overall population.
Page 4 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

through our separate audit work and that we compiled for illustrative 

purposes.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2015 to March 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Following terrorist attacks against the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, 

in 1983, State began an embassy construction program—known as the 

Inman program—to protect U.S. personnel.6 However, State completed 

only 24 of the 57 planned construction projects, in part due to poor 

planning, systemic weaknesses in program management, difficulties 

acquiring sites, schedule delays, cost increases, and subsequent funding 

limitations. Following the demise of the Inman program in the early 1990s, 

State initiated very few new construction projects until after the two 1998 

embassy bombings in Africa. Following those attacks, the Secure 

Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 required State 

to maintain a list of diplomatic facilities to be scheduled for replacement 

based on their vulnerability to attack.7 In response, State initiated the 

Capital Security Construction Program to construct new, secure facilities 

overseas. At that time, State determined that diplomatic facilities at more 

than 180 posts—more than half of U.S. overseas missions—needed to be 

replaced to meet security standards. In 2016, State reported that from 

2000 through 2014, it moved over 30,000 staff into more secure facilities.

 6The 1983 and 1984 bombings of U.S. embassy facilities in Beirut killed approximately 

100 people. In response, the Secretary of State convened an Advisory Panel on Overseas 

Security, under Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, to review security at U.S. diplomatic facilities. 

The panel’s 1985 recommendations included making security improvements to almost half 

of the U.S. diplomatic facilities overseas. Thereafter, Congress provided funds to support 

strengthened security measures for U.S. diplomatic operations abroad. 

722 U.S.C. § 4865 note. Obligations and expenditures.

Background

Events Leading to 

Development of the SED
Page 5 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 

calls for new diplomatic facilities to be sufficiently sized to ensure that all 

U.S. government personnel at a post are located on a single secure site 

and that those facilities are set back not less than 100 feet from the site’s 

perimeter boundary.8 Before constructing a new embassy, State must 

certify to Congress that, among other things, the facility incorporates 

adequate measures for protecting classified information and activities as 

well as personnel working in the facilities.9 OBO contracts with 

architectural and engineering firms (design firms) to develop designs 

meeting security and other project requirements. These design firms 

submit their designs for reviews by OBO and DS to ensure conformance 

with building code and security standards, respectively. DS, in 

consultation with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, must 

certify that the design meets security standards prior to the start of 

construction.10 While this certification occurs in the design phase of a 

project, DS also has other roles in the process, such as participating in 

site selection, ensuring OBO contractors have necessary security 

clearances, and ensuring facilities are securely constructed.

To address some of the performance problems experienced during the 

Inman program, OBO implemented reforms to its business processes in 

structuring the new Capital Security Construction Program. Among the 

most prominent reforms were the development of the SED to expedite the 

planning, contract award, design, and construction of new diplomatic 

compounds and use of the design-build (DB) project delivery method, 

which combines responsibility for design and construction under a single 

contract and allows contractors to begin basic construction before the 

design is fully completed.11

 8These requirements are subject to waiver by the Secretary of State.

9Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 

160 (Dec. 22, 1987), codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 4851 note. Construction security 

certification.

10When facilities do not or cannot meet certain security standards, State mitigates 

identified vulnerabilities to the extent feasible and documents standards that cannot be 

met through its waivers and exceptions process.

11OBO used a design firm to convert the design for the U.S. embassy in Kampala, 

Uganda, (designed in 1999) into a standard that could be site adapted for future embassy 

projects; this became known as the SED.

The SED Approach
Page 6 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Initially there were three common SED classes—small, medium, and 

large—based on the size of a post. For planning purposes, each size had 

predefined schedules and costs associated with them.12 The SED itself 

was a set of documents providing prototypical plans (for a medium SED), 

specifications, and design criteria, and explaining how to adapt those to a 

particular site and project.13 The SED was not a complete design but 

rather a standardized template for the structural, spatial, and security 

requirements of a new embassy compound to guide a contractor’s final 

design. Compound elements described by the SED generally included the 

main office building; U.S. Marine Security Guards’ living quarters; a 

warehouse; a utility building; compound access control buildings and 

perimeter walls; and parking facilities. The SED also allowed for the 

standardization of building components such as security windows and 

doors. Figure 1 shows the prototypical facilities defined by the SED.

 12OBO subsequently developed cost and size parameters for an extra-large SED and mini 

SED, in 2004 and 2007, respectively. In 2008, OBO explored the development of a 

vertical SED (or urban SED) to assess if the SED could be applied to smaller sites—less 

than the 10-acre typical embassy planning size—in urban areas. However, both OBO and 

State’s Inspector General recognized that some projects in urban locations, like London 

and Mexico City, would likely require their own unique, custom designs. 

13While cost and size parameters existed for the various SED sizes, OBO officials 

reported that the SED design drawings were based on a medium SED.
Page 7 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Figure 1: U.S. Department of State Standard Embassy Design Components

The main office building within the SED was organized around two 

parallel wings connected by a central lobby. Occasionally site conditions 

such as size, shape, or topography required deviating from that typical 

configuration; OBO refers to such projects as SED “derivatives.” From 

2001 through 2015, OBO constructed more than 50 embassies using the 
Page 8 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

SED approach.14 Figure 2 shows examples of both the typical SED and 

derivative SED office building configurations.

Figure 2: U.S. Department of State Standard Embassy Design and Derivative

In 2006, we reported that OBO had made significant progress 

constructing new diplomatic compounds using the SED approach.15 We 

found that the average time to design and construct the 18 new 

 14Of the more than 70 new compounds built since 2000 and through 2015, 48 were SEDs 

and 5 were derivatives of the SED. The remainder were either very large non-SED 

projects such as the U.S. embassy in Beijing, China; very small non-SED projects such as 

the U.S. embassy in Koror, Republic of Palau; or projects that preceded the establishment 

of the SED, such as the two new embassies built after the 1998 bombings.

15GAO-06-641.
Page 9 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

embassies completed from 1999 to 2005 was about 3 years (36.7 

months). This was nearly 3 years faster than embassies built during the 

Inman era, even though the newer facilities were significantly larger and 

more complex. We also found that reforms implemented by OBO, 

including the switch to the SED and the DB contract delivery method, had 

reduced project completion times, although it was difficult to quantify the 

effects of any single reform. In 2007, OBO reported that the SED, 

combined with DB project delivery, was expected to reduce overall 

delivery time—from site selection to occupancy—by 34 percent.16 In 

2008, State’s Inspector General found that OBO’s continued use of the 

SED, in conjunction with the DB delivery method, was generally 

effective.17 Additionally, State’s Inspector General found that the SED 

permitted faster certification of project designs and accreditation by DS 

because the standardized design specifications were fully vetted for 

conformity to security standards.18

OBO took some actions to incorporate sustainability principles in the SED 

to meet federal energy mandates to reduce energy and water 

consumption. In 2006 OBO committed, in concert with 20 other federal 

agencies, to seek common strategies for planning, acquiring, siting, 

designing, building, operating, and maintaining federal facilities in an 

energy efficient and environmentally sustainable manner.19 In 2008, OBO 

established Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) 

 16American Institute of Architects, AIA Best Practices, contributed by the U.S. State 

Department and the General Services Administration, Adapting Standard Embassy 

Design to Specific Sites, Revised May 2007.

17U.S. State Department, Office of the Inspector General, Report of Inspection: Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations,Report Number: ISP-I-08-34 (Washington, D.C.: August 

2008). 

18Certification entails the review and approval of new embassies’ designs to ensure they 

meet security standards before construction begins. Accreditation consists of security 

inspections during construction to verify that security design requirements are adhered to 

and installed security systems operate as intended. 

19In 2007, those strategies were codified through Executive Order 13423: Strengthening 

Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management. That order was 

replaced in 2015 by Executive Order 13693: Planning for Federal Sustainability in the 

Next Decade. OBO officials reported that while those orders do not directly apply to 

diplomatic facilities constructed overseas, OBO seeks to meet those sustainability 

requirements where possible. 
Page 10 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

certification as a design standard for its SED projects.20 In 2009, OBO 

documentation indicates OBO elevated its sustainability requirement for 

SED projects from LEED Certified to the higher certification level of LEED 

Silver.

In 2011, OBO announced a new project approach it termed Design 

Excellence, intended to deliver embassies that (1) best represent the U.S. 

government overseas, (2) are functional and secure, (3) incorporate 

sustainable design and energy efficiency, (4) are cost-effective to operate 

and maintain, (5) have greater proximity to host-government counterparts 

and users via more centrally-located urban sites, and (6) better respond 

to the unique needs and context of specific posts. OBO subsequently 

phased out the SED as the basis for embassy designs, and according to 

OBO officials, SED specifications, standards and guidance were 

incorporated into OBO’s Design Standards and Design Guide.21 In 2013, 

OBO renamed its approach “Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities”

(Excellence) to convey what OBO officials have said is a more holistic 

effort to improve every aspect of OBO’s operations, including real estate 

acquisition, security methods and technologies, cost management, 

construction management, and facilities management.

Table 1 shows 23 new construction contracts awarded since Excellence 

was approved and through fiscal year 2015 at a total value of $3.67 

billion, according to State data.22 Of these, OBO reports 6 as being 

Excellence projects; the other projects include projects with certain 

Excellence features in terms of site, permit, or other requirements; SEDs; 

and derivative SEDs.23 OBO officials assert that although Excellence was 

 20LEED is a green building rating system established by the U.S. Green Building Council 

that defines sustainable features for buildings and includes a set of performance 

standards that can be used to certify their design. By meeting the standards during facility 

design and construction, builders can earn credits and become certified in accordance 

with an ascending four-level scale—Certified, Silver, Gold, and Platinum.

21OBO’s Design Standards were released in 2013, and have been subsequently updated. 

OBO’s Design Guide was released in 2016. We did not assess the degree to which those 

documents contain SED elements.

22In fiscal year 2016—in the middle of our review, and thus outside our scope because of 

the timing—OBO reported awarding construction contracts for three additional projects, 

one each in Colombo, Sri Lanka; Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; and Hyderabad, India.

23According to OBO, SED and derivative SED contract awards after the approval of 

Excellence are generally transition projects whose requirements were already developed 

under the SED program. 

The Excellence Approach
Page 11 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

approved in 2011, OBO never planned to award any Excellence 

construction contracts until fiscal year 2014. No Excellence projects had 

been completed as of the end of fiscal year 2016 (September 30, 2016).

Table 1: New Construction Contracts Awarded Fiscal Year 2011 through 2015, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Overseas 

Buildings Operations

Dollars in millions

Project Fiscal year Contract award value

Excellence projects

Nuevo Laredo, Mexico 2014 $109.4

Pristina, Kosovo 2014 158.4

Harare, Zimbabwe 2015 199.2

Maputo, Mozambique 2015 181.8

Matamoros, Mexico 2015 120.8

Niamey, Niger 2015 145.6

Excellence subtotal $915.2

Non-Excellence projects

Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan 2011 $116.8

Oslo, Norway 2011 177.9

Rabat, Morocco 2011 150.6

Vientiane, Laos 2011 109.7

Cotonou, Benin 2012 126.0

Jakarta, Indonesia 2012 302.4

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia 2012 100.5

Mbabane, Swaziland 2012 108.6

Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea - contract 1 2012 50.2

Taipei, Taiwan–phase 2 2012 121.8

London, England 2013 565.9

Nouakchott, Mauritania 2013 130.7

Paramaribo, Suriname 2013 114.9

The Hague, Netherlands 2013 125.0

Ashgabat, Turkmenistan 2014 196.5

Ndjamena, Chad 2015 159.7

Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea – contract 2 2015 96.8

Non-Excellence subtotal $2,754.0

Total construction contracts $3,669.2

Source: Department of State data and documentation. | GAO-17-296
Page 12 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Notes: Contract values do not include any contract cost increases or decreases made subsequent to 

contract aw ard, and are based on State data rather than actual contract awards and modifications.

Excellence projects include those projects that the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) 

reports w ere contractually awarded with the intent that construction of facilities w ould incorporate 

State’s Guiding Principles for Excellence. Non-Excellence projects include those projects that OBO 

reports as being a Standard Embassy Design (SED), a modified SED (derivative), and other projects 

that may have some Excellence features but that OBO does not consider Excellence projects.

Excellence projects in design (i.e., not yet under construction) as of the end of fiscal year 2015, w ere 

(1) Ankara, Turkey; (2) Asuncion, Paraguay; (3) Beirut, Lebanon; (4) Colombo, Sri Lanka; (5) 

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; (6) Erbil, Iraq; (7) Hyderabad, India; (8) Guatemala City, Guatemala; and (9) 

Mexico City, Mexico.

According to OBO documentation, a contract for the Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, project w as 

terminated in 2015; the resulting value at termination w as $31.4 million.

See appendix IV for a timeline illustrating the history of OBO’s building 

program from 1998 through 2016.

Although combining the SED with a DB project delivery method enabled 

OBO to accelerate the construction of new embassies, concerns raised 

by various stakeholders about the aesthetics, quality, location, and 

functionality of SED facilities prompted OBO to take some steps to 

improve the SED concept and eventually transition to Excellence. These 

steps included the introduction in 2008 of the design-build with bridging 

method (bridging), whereby OBO first contracts with a design firm to 

develop a project-specific, partial design that a construction contractor 

and its design firm then completes. After a nearly yearlong review, in April 

2011 OBO approved a series of recommendations and planned actions to 

implement Excellence. A significant change announced at this time was 

OBO’s increased use of design-bid-build (DBB) as another delivery 

method alongside bridging. Generally under DBB, OBO first solicits and 

contracts with a design firm to develop a 100-percent design, which is 

then used to solicit bids from prospective construction contractors.

During the SED era, OBO predominately used a DB project delivery 

method. DB integrates design and construction responsibilities into a 

single contract. Under this model, the DB contractor is responsible for 

OBO Established 

Excellence in an 

Effort to Improve 

Embassy Delivery 

Approach

Concerns with SED and 

Desire to Improve 

Embassies Motivated 

OBO’s Shift to Other 

Approaches

OBO First Shifted to DesignBuild with Bridging
Page 13 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

design and construction and thus bears the risks, such as added cost, for 

any design problems because it (not OBO) hires the design firm to bring 

the design to completion. According to industry experts, DB is generally 

recognized as the best project delivery method for supporting accelerated 

delivery, in part because the DB contractor may undertake some 

construction while design is still in progress. Under OBO policy, in the 

SED approach OBO provided the DB contractor with the SED prototypical 

design—to include standard site and building plans, technical 

specifications, design criteria, and instructions for its adaptation for a 

particular project and contract requirements. The contractor’s design firm 

would then use the SED documentation to develop a 100-percent design 

adapted for a site at a particular post, becoming the architect-of-record. 

According to the AIA, in general, the architect-of-record for a project 

prepares the bulk of the design and construction drawings and assumes 

professional responsibility for the design. Although the DB contractor’s 

design firm completed the project design, OBO’s policy was to hire its 

own design firm beforehand to conduct project development activities 

such as due-diligence planning surveys, site studies, and other analyses 

needed to inform the project’s design. Figure 3 provides an overview of 

the embassy construction process under OBO’s implementation of DB.

Figure 3: Construction of a U.S. Embassy under Design-Build Project Delivery 

Method

Note: This is a general representation of this OBO project delivery method. It may not represent every 

project.

According to former senior OBO officials, the OBO Director who had 

implemented the SED viewed OBO’s mission as needing to build secure 

embassies as fast as possible and within a fixed budget, given the large 

number of facilities that State needed to replace. They stated that the 

then Director’s commitment was that OBO would combine a standardized 

design with the DB delivery method to speed design and construction and 
Page 14 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

limit the costs to build each embassy to no more than $100 million (based 

on a large SED). OBO also maintained at that time that the SED generally 

would take no more than 36 months to build—inclusive of the time for 

contract acquisition, design, and construction—depending on the post 

size.24 According to these former senior OBO officials, those estimates 

did not always reflect the budget and time needed to build some SED 

embassies. They also stated that adapting the SED to the unique 

requirements of some posts—such as a very large consular services 

operation—was challenging and that the SED did not always account for 

quality and long-term maintenance and operations cost considerations. In 

addition, one former OBO official stated that although the emphasis in the 

SED approach on speed and cost control enabled OBO to promote that it 

had moved a certain number of people into secure facilities each year, 

this was an indicator of performance related to a single goal: project 

delivery. He noted that OBO did not use any performance indicators 

related to design and construction quality to evaluate the new SED 

facilities being built.

Although the SED approach enabled OBO to accelerate the construction 

of new embassies intended to meet rigorous new security requirements, 

some stakeholders raised concerns about the aesthetics, quality, location, 

and functionality of those facilities.

Aesthetics. One design firm we spoke with said there were criticisms that 

SED embassies were “cookie cutter” facilities that looked like fortresses. 

In 2010, then U.S. Senator John Kerry and former Secretary of Defense 

William Cohen—key advocates of Excellence—reported newly 

constructed embassies were not sending the right message. They 

described new embassies as cold concrete facilities at a forbidding 

distance hidden away from city life, with little regard for the local 

surroundings, undermining U.S. diplomats’ message and mission. They 

asserted that State was constructing a standardized “embassy in a box,”

uniform in appearance, quickly assembled, and fortress-like.25

Quality. According to some former senior OBO officials, OBO’s emphasis 

on speed and cost under the SED approach resulted in some poor-quality 

 24According to OBO officials, no embassy, location, or site was the same, so regardless of 

a maximum timeframe, each construction schedule had to align with its site-specific 

conditions.

25See Senator John Kerry and William Cohen, Concrete Bunker U.S. Embassies Send 

Wrong Message, Special to CNN, May 12, 2010.
Page 15 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

buildings. According to these officials and one design firm we interviewed, 

the time and budget pressures sometimes resulted in OBO and its 

contractors making trade-off decisions such as using less costly and 

lower-quality building systems or materials. For example, one former 

official reported that the SED approach resulted in some projects where 

contractors used lesser-quality exterior stone or metal cladding on 

building exteriors. In some projects, he indicated that contractors installed 

heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning systems that were minimally 

acceptable under the SED but not the best solution for the post’s 

geographic climate.

Location. OBO officials commented that in some cases the 10-acre lot 

specified by the SED required siting the embassy too far from urban 

centers where foreign government offices and other embassies are 

located. This issue also arose in a 2007 report to State entitled The 

Embassy of the Future.26 Guided by a commission composed of former 

U.S. ambassadors, among others, the report recommended that State 

avoid constructing embassies in locations remote from urban centers. It 

also noted that although the appearance of embassies as influenced by 

security requirements deserves careful consideration, their location is of 

higher importance.27

Functionality. One former OBO official stated that because the SED was 

“very complete” as a standardized design concept and was based on a 

completed embassy in Africa, its design was not always conducive to 

being site adapted and applied to other regions in the world. For example, 

the design criteria for the heating and cooling systems generally specified 

by the SED may not always have been the best for climates that are very 

hot, cold, or humid. Some design firms we spoke with echoed that 

assessment, saying that project size, site shape or topography, regional 

climate, or special post needs could render the SED difficult to apply.

OBO’s most recent former Director has also stated that the SED did not 

always permit OBO to meet posts’ varied needs.28 Former OBO officials 

told us that, in some cases, functional elements such as warehouses 

 26Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Embassy of the Future (Washington, 

D.C.: 2007).

27The commission identified two new embassies—in Tbilisi, Georgia, and Zagreb, 

Croatia—that it assessed as being too far outside those capitals’ urban areas for effective 

diplomatic operations. 

28Examining New Embassy Construction: Are New Administration Policies Putting 

Americans Overseas in Danger?, Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government 

Reform, 113th Cong. 12–17 (2014) statement of Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. Dept. of State. 
Page 16 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

were eliminated from SED projects to deliver them on time and within 

budget.29 Additionally, current OBO officials emphasized a need to 

acknowledge the frequency of which the scope of SED projects were 

reduced to keep projects on time and within cost, without a corresponding 

reduction to schedule and budget.30

Issues with the SED approach have been documented in past OBO and 

GAO studies. For example, in 2008, OBO initiated a “look back” study to 

examine shortcomings with the early SED projects (2001-2007). The 

study identified deficiencies in newly completed SEDs stemming from 

building functionality issues, construction flaws, maintenance issues, and 

de-scoped facilities. Our 2010 review also examined functionality at 22 

new embassy compounds where construction began in or after fiscal year 

1999 and was completed by September 30, 2009.31 Officials at 21 of the 

22 posts reported that the design of some spaces within their facility did 

not fully meet their functional needs, with an average of five functionalityrelated issues per post.32 We reported that in some cases, functionality 

challenges resulted in the need to conduct costly follow-on projects after 

posts occupied the embassy. OBO officials assert that by using the SED 

approach, a deficiency in one project was effectively built into each active 

project as it was a standardized approach to project delivery. By 

comparison, OBO officials assert that by designing each project 

individually, the Excellence approach provides OBO with the ability to 

more quickly identify and make changes or improvements from project to 

project.

 29In its 2008 inspection of OBO operations, State’s Inspector General also reported on this 

issue and provided examples such as the elimination or size reduction of the multipurpose 

room, kitchen, and recreation facility on the new embassy project in Bamako, Mali.

30In 2010, we reported that programmatic support facilities, such as warehouses, 

recreational facilities, and cafeterias, were eliminated from a project’s scope before any 

changes were made to office space, according to OBO officials. State officials noted that, 

in some cases, reducing the scope of a project may have been preferable to delaying the 

project. GAO, New Embassy Compounds: State Faces Challenges in Sizing Facilities and 

Providing for Operations and Maintenance Requirements,GAO-10-689 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 20, 2010).

31GAO-10-689. 

32Functionality issues cited included inadequate or nonexistent warehouses; inappropriate 

size or design of areas such as consular affairs sections, maintenance shops, cafeterias, 

and recreational facilities; inadequate parking; and challenges in utilizing representational 

spaces—the public spaces most often seen and/or used by visitors. 
Page 17 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

OBO took some steps to improve the exterior look of embassies prior to 

adopting the Excellence approach. According to former senior OBO 

officials we spoke with, OBO recognized there were some legitimate 

criticisms about the aesthetics and architecture of the embassies built 

under SED. Those officials indicated that one of OBO’s interim Directors 

initiated a study to improve future embassy projects such that they better 

fit in with the streets and spaces around an embassy.33 These officials 

cited OBO’s 2011 Embassy Perimeter Improvement Concepts & Design 

Guidelines as a direct effort to improve the exterior appearance of 

embassies by using various design techniques and landscaping so that 

they would look less “fortress-like.”34

OBO had previously prepared a report, in 2008, that reviewed its 

embassy construction process and the SED.35 To address some of the 

problems found in this report—such as the need to balance SED 

standardization with unique post conditions—OBO’s then-Director 

approved the use of DB with bridging in 2008.36 Generally under this 

delivery method, OBO first contracts with a design firm (the bridging 

architect) to develop a project-specific, partial design package (bridging 

design) that conveys State’s design vision and a higher level of detail for 

key design requirements. Upon completing a project’s bridging design, 

OBO’s procedure is to separately contract with a DB contractor to 

complete the design and build the project. Therefore, unlike the SED, 

each bridging design is project-specific, customized, and separately 

contracted to a design firm. According to senior OBO officials, as well as 

construction contractor and design firm officials, the current extent of 

design represented by Excellence bridging documents varies by project 

 33In 2007, some Members of Congress expressed concerns about the construction of the 

new embassy in Baghdad. The leadership of OBO changed in 2008, and from roughly

2008 through mid-2011, two interim Directors from the U.S. Foreign Service filled the OBO 

director positon. 

34OBO, Embassy Perimeter Improvement Concepts & Design Guidelines, June 2011. 

Released just after Excellence was approved, this study was initiated before Excellence, 

according to former OBO officials we spoke with.

35U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Capital Acquisition 

Process Working Group, Findings and Recommendations, abridged final report, Sept. 19, 

2008. The report was provided as a memorandum to State’s Under Secretary for 

Management.

36While the decision to use formal bridging designs was approved in 2008, OBO did not 

implement project-specific bridging for SED projects and subsequent Excellence projects 

until 2009. 
Page 18 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

but generally approximates an overall 35- to 50-percent design. Those 

officials indicated that bridging designs include multiple design disciplines 

whereby elements such as architectural design may be developed to a far 

greater extent than others, such as electrical design. Under this method, 

the DB contractor and its design firm are responsible for completing the 

design. Figure 4 provides an overview of the embassy construction 

process under bridging.

Figure 4: Construction of a U.S. Embassy under Bridging Project Delivery Method

Note: This is a general representation of this OBO project delivery method. It may not represent every 

project.

In 2009, we reported that by providing more design detail up front, OBO 

believed bridging would more effectively translate project requirements to 

contractors, speed the design security certification process, and enable 

construction to begin sooner.37 OBO documentation also indicates that 

OBO believed bridging would better define the desired look and quality for 

projects than the SED alone could achieve and provide less room for the 

contractor to make interpretations and change OBO’s vision of the 

project. However, according to OBO documentation, the effort, cost, and 

time to produce a contract solicitation with bridging documents can be 

significantly more than that required for a typical DB contract using the 

SED.

 37GAO, Embassy Construction: Additional Actions Are Needed to Address Contractor 

Participation, GAO-09-048 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 16, 2009). 
Page 19 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

In 2009, the American Institute of Architects (AIA) submitted a report to 

OBO entitled Design for Diplomacy, New Embassies for the 21st 

Century.

38 Informed by a task force composed of architects, engineers, 

former ambassadors, staff from the U.S. General Services Administration 

(GSA), OBO design professionals, and others, the AIA recommended that 

OBO “adopt Design Excellence as a mandate to advance a new 

generation of secure, high performance embassies and diplomatic 

facilities that support the conduct of American diplomacy.” It outlined 

several actions it viewed as necessary to realize the benefits of design 

excellence.39 AIA officials we spoke with said that AIA never expressly 

advocated that the SED be completely abandoned, because that 

approach might remain appropriate for some projects. However, these 

officials noted that as more SED projects were built, AIA’s members (i.e., 

architects) believed that SEDs were not the optimal choice for most 

projects, as the standardized design was not always conducive to 

adapting to different climates, countries, or unique post functions.

In April 2010—a year before formally instituting Excellence—OBO 

released “Guiding Principles of Design Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities”

(Guiding Principles) to its Industry Advisory Panel.40 See appendix V for a 

summary of these principles. At that time, State also announced OBO’s 

intent to create the Design Excellence approach, with the goal to produce 

diplomatic facilities outstanding in all respects, including security, 

architecture, construction, sustainability, operations and maintenance.41

OBO’s “Guide to Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities” (Guide to 

 38American Institute of Architects, Design for Diplomacy: New Embassies for the 21st 

Century (Washington, D.C.: July 2009).

39Those actions generally included the following: establish a design excellence policy; 

institute a peer review process for selecting design firms and reviewing project designs; 

provide design excellence policy guidance for project activities, including site selection, 

planning, design, construction, and maintenance; apply appropriate building systems 

technology to projects according to their location and factors related to cost and 

maintainability; and convey to Congress the benefits of adopting a design excellence 

program.

40OBO reports that its Guiding Principles were prepared with support from stakeholders 

within State, the design community, the AIA, and key congressional stakeholders. 

41OBO’s Guiding Principles are based on the 1962 “Guiding Principles for Federal 

Architecture,” which OBO asserts are still relevant today. Those 1962 principles are the 

basis for the GSA’s Design Excellence program, which the GSA applies to domestic 

federal construction projects that it oversees.

OBO Later Shifted to 

Excellence
Page 20 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Excellence) released in July 2016, states that the new approach will result 

in innovative, new American landmarks around the globe.42

OBO’s establishment of Excellence was informed by a nearly yearlong 

review—begun in June 2010—by seven internal OBO working groups 43

overseen by a steering committee composed of OBO’s senior managers 

and chaired by OBO’s then Deputy Director (who later served as OBO’s 

Director from June 2012 through January 2017). OBO also sought 

assistance from GSA, which assigned GSA’s Director of Design 

Excellence to subsequently participate as an external advisor to the 

Steering Committee.44 OBO’s working groups were tasked with examining 

OBO policies and procedures and providing the steering committee with 

recommendations as to how best to integrate design excellence into all of 

OBO’s activities. This review resulted in over 60 recommendations and a 

series of planned actions that were approved in an April 2011 decision 

memo (Excellence decision memo) as a means to implement 

Excellence.45 The review also identified some specific changes to OBO’s 

processes in the areas of (1) site selection; (2) project delivery method; 

(3) design standards and guidelines; (4) hiring of outside architectural and 

engineering design firms; (5) design reviews; and (6) life-cycle cost 

analysis, among other areas. See appendix VI for a table describing the 

approaches OBO identified to achieve its goals under the Excellence 

approach.

 42U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Guide to 

Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities, July 2016.

43These multidisciplinary working groups covered (1) Program Planning and Execution, 

(2) Site Selection, (3) Programming, (4) Project Planning and Development, (5) Design 

Goals and Standards, (6) Project Construction, and (7) Operations and Maintenance.

44That individual was the only external advisor on the steering committee. In January 

2012, that individual was hired by State to oversee OBO’s Excellence approach and 

served as OBO’s Deputy Director for the offices of Program Development, Coordination, 

and Support; and Construction, Facility, and Security Management. That individual 

subsequentlyresigned from State in January 2017.

45OBO officials reported that nearly half of those recommendations were fully 

implemented—such as the recommendation to employ peer review in the design 

process—and the others will be ongoing, such as the recommendation to “measure 

performance of planners, designers, and builders for design excellence and project 

performance in the federal government-wide contractor performance database.”
Page 21 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

A significant change under Excellence since 2011 has been OBO’s shift 

to an increased use of the DBB delivery method alongside bridging.46

Generally under DBB, OBO first solicits and contracts with a design firm 

to develop a 100-percent design.47 Under this method, OBO then uses 

the completed design to solicit bids from prospective construction 

contractors. According to OBO documentation, OBO selects a project’s 

delivery method, either bridging or DBB, based on an evaluation of local 

context, project complexity, construction factors, and urgency. According 

to OBO officials, the timing of a construction award (i.e. the planned fiscal 

year when OBO expects to receive funding to make an award) is also a 

key determining factor regarding delivery method. Figure 5 provides an 

overview of the embassy construction process under DBB.

Figure 5: Construction of a U.S. Embassy under Design-Bid-Build Project Delivery 

Method

Note: This is a general representation of this OBO project delivery method. It may not represent every 

project.

 46According to OBO, while it predominately employed DB during the SED program era, 

OBO did utilize DBB for a few select iconic projects, such as the new embassy 

compounds constructed in Berlin, Germany, and Beijing, China.

47OBO’s intent is that the contracted design firm will be retained—after the design is 

complete—to review the construction contractor’s documents and perform any additional 

design, as needed. DBB is the same delivery method used by OBO for the Inman 

program.
Page 22 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Changes made under Excellence provide OBO with greater design 

control, but carry trade-offs. Key elements under the Excellence approach 

include (1) allotting funding and time for developing custom designs; (2) 

hiring leading design firms for projects and promoting innovation in 

design; (3) conducting peer reviews of designs; and (4) using bridging 

and DBB project delivery (rather than DB). We found that OBO now funds 

the development of customized designs and provides up to 24 months for 

front-end design work. OBO also seeks to hire leading U.S. design firms 

to develop those designs for each project. New design firms OBO has 

hired for Excellence projects have faced some challenges, and OBO only 

recently began assessing their performance. OBO also requires design 

reviews by industry advisors. This shift to more design-focused delivery 

methods—from DB to bridging and DBB—has design, schedule, and cost 

trade-offs. OBO’s staff had split opinions regarding the Excellence 

approach compared to the SED approach.

OBO’s Excellence approach—using bridging and DBB—represents a new 

investment to develop innovative, project-specific designs. Previously, the 

SED approach combined with DB delivery made use of the same 

standard design, which DB contractors’ design firms would adapt to a 

specific site. Thus OBO did not contract with design firms to develop 

customized designs. One senior OBO official said that OBO’s intent under 

Excellence is to “own the quality of each project” and that contracting for 

project-specific designs provides control over the design process to avoid 

what OBO reports were quality issues with some SED projects. OBO 

reports it has awarded 24 new embassy or consulate design contracts—

for either 100-percent designs or partial bridging designs—during fiscal 

years 2011 through 2015.48 The first design contract solicited as an 

Excellence project, according to OBO, was awarded in January 2013 for 

the new U.S. embassy to be built in Mexico City.49

Design-related activities include both actual project design, which entails 

the preparation of plans, drawings, and specifications; and project 

development, which included due diligence efforts such as boundary, 

 48In fiscal year 2016—in the middle of our review, and thus outside our scope because of 

the timing—OBO reported awarding design contracts for three embassy or consulate 

projects in Guatemala City, Guatemala; Nogales, Mexico; and Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

49The design for the new U.S. embassy in Mexico City’s was completed in August 2016. 

By the end of fiscal year 2016, according to OBO officials, a construction contract had not 

been awarded due to environmental site remediation and project scope issues.

OBO’s Greater 

Design Control 

Requires Greater UpFront Resources and 

Has Cost and 

Schedule Trade-Offs

OBO Now Allots Project 

Funding and up to 24 

Additional Months to 

Develop Excellence 

Designs
Page 23 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

utility, and soil surveys. OBO officials stated that they could not distinctly 

segregate the cost for project designs from project development costs 

needed to complete a project’s design under any project delivery method, 

including DB using the SED. Furthermore, according to OBO officials, 

because such costs were funded out of a central pot of money during the 

SED era, they cannot be broken out of those earlier contracts. Table 2 

shows the amount of funding OBO has authorized for both project design 

and development activities from fiscal year 2011 through 2015 at a total 

value of over $400 million. OBO identified 16 of these 24 project designs 

as being Excellence projects.

Table 2: Funding Authorized for Design and Project Development, Fiscal Year 2011 through 2015, U.S. Department of State, 

Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO)

Dollars in millions

Project Fiscal Year Design Type

Funding authorized for

design and project development

Excellence projects

Maputo, Mozambique 2012 100% design 15.0

Erbil, Iraq 2013 100% design 26.3

Harare, Zimbabwe 2013 Bridging design 5.9

Mexico City, Mexico 2013 100% design 56.5

Pristina, Kosovo 2013 Bridging design 5.5

Colombo, Sri Lanka 2014 Bridging design 8.4

Hyderabad, India 2014 Bridging design 14.9

Matamoros, Mexico 2014 Bridging design 4.2

Ankara, Turkey 2014 100% design 18.9

Asuncion, Paraguay 2014 100% design 16.6

Beirut, Lebanon 2014 100% design 44.8

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia 2014 100% design 17.6

Nuevo Laredo, Mexico 2014 Bridging design 4.5

Guatemala City, Guatemala 2015 Bridging Design 6.4

New Delhi, India 2015 100% design 35.0

Niamey, Niger 2015 Bridging design 6.2

Excellence subtotal $286.7

Non-Excellence projects

Cotonou, Benin 2011 Bridging design 4.1

London, England 2011 100% design 61.5

Mbabane, Swaziland 2011 Bridging design 3.9
Page 24 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Project Fiscal Year Design Type

Funding authorized for

design and project development

Ndjamena, Chad 2012 Bridging design 8.4

Paramaribo, Suriname 2012 100% design 10.4

Ashgabat, Turkmenistan 2013 Bridging design 7.2

Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea 2013 100% design 10.1

The Hague, Netherlands 2013 100% design 8.1

Non-Excellence subtotal $113.7

Total design and project development $400.4

Source: GAO analysis based on Department of State data and project authorization documents. | GAO-17-296

Notes:

Figures shown capture funding authorized by OBO for design and project development activities, 

w hich generally include both design (i.e., the development of plans, draw ings, and specifications) and 

various due-diligence planning surveys, studies, and other analyses needed to complete a project’s 

design under any project delivery method.

Values do not necessarily reflect contract values and are based on OBO data rather than actual 

contract aw ards and modifications.

OBO includes design costs—forthe development of plans, draw ings, and specifications—as a 

combined cost w ith other design and project development activities. Because those costs are 

combined, OBO could not provide GAO w ith the specific cost of design (separate from project 

development costs) for each of its projects.

Excellence projects include those projects that OBO reports were contractually awarded with the 

intent that construction of facilities w ould incorporate State’s Guiding Principles for Excellence. NonExcellence projects include those projects that OBO reports as being a Standard Embassy Design 

(SED), a modified SED (derivative), and other projects that may have some Excellence features but 

that OBO does not consider Excellence projects.

OBO’s Excellence approach—using bridging and DBB—also represents a 

new investment in up-front design time, potentially up to 2 additional 

years (compared to the SED approach) to develop custom, innovative 

designs before OBO contracts for construction.50 OBO maintains that this 

additional design time is integrated into its projects such that planned 

construction contract award dates are not affected and remain consistent 

with OBO’s overall Capital Security Construction Program schedule for 

constructing new secure facilities. In other words, by starting projects 

earlier, OBO asserts that it can still meet the Capital Security 

 50In its 2009 report to OBO, AIA said that Design Excellence requires more time spent 

during the planning and design process than using a more standardized approach.
Page 25 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Construction Program schedule for delivering new embassies.51 However, 

because the first set of Excellence construction projects were awarded in 

fiscal year 2014 and are still in progress, it is currently unknown whether 

OBO will deliver new facilities consistent with the overall program 

schedule. OBO’s process under both bridging and DBB is now to award 

contracts to design firms to produce custom project designs, and OBO 

planning documentation generally estimates up to 2 years (24 months) for 

the design process of a generic new embassy. OBO documentation 

generally indicates that when there is sufficient time available for 

conducting planning and design activities before awarding a construction 

contract, OBO is inclined to utilize DBB, which OBO asserts often results 

in a superior end product. OBO officials cautioned that its generic 

timeframes are just a starting point, and that every project can encounter 

unique challenges. Figure 6 shows OBO-generic timelines under the prior 

SED approach (using DB)—which were established based on the size of 

a post—in comparison with OBO’s generic schedules for Excellence 

bridging and DBB projects, the latter two providing up to 24 months of 

additional design work before construction begins.

 51Based on its analysis of the security vulnerabilities affecting posts, DS guides State’s 

annual process to assess and, if warranted, revise its “Top 80” list of candidates for 

replacement embassies. Once the annual Top 80 list is established, OBO then develops 

its Capital Security Construction Program schedule. That schedule covers the current 

fiscal year plus 5 additional years and identifies planned construction contract awards by 

year based on projected funding estimates. OBO reports that the schedule is flexible and 

that planned fiscal year awards may be changed because some projects will be delayed 

due to challenges such as host government planning approvals, site acquisition, scope 

changes late in the project’s development, or contract award issues. OBO identifies 

backup projects for each fiscal year that may be advanced if originally scheduled contract 

awards are delayed. OBO’s Director approves the Capital Security Construction Program 

schedule and any substitution of backup projects.
Page 26 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Figure 6: Generalized Time Lines for Project Delivery Methods Used in State’s Capital Security Construction Program, as 

Estimated by the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
Page 27 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

One of OBO’s Guiding Principles for Excellence is that OBO will hire 

leading U.S. design firms based on their design achievements and 

portfolio of work.52 OBO’s intent in hiring leading design firms is, in part, to 

promote the innovation of American architecture, engineering, and design 

disciplines as well as U.S. technology, manufacturing, and product 

design. According to OBO, selection of these firms is based, in part, on 

their achievements in the design field and work on projects similar in 

scale and complexity to an embassy project. OBO’s guidance indicates 

that material advances and new technologies can result in the delivery of 

better diplomatic facilities and that OBO must invest in innovation. For 

most of its design projects, OBO utilizes an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite 

Quantity (ID/IQ) contract mechanism—under which five design firms have 

been hired—to task design firms to develop project designs, when 

needed.53 In some instances, OBO prefers to issue project-specific 

solicitations and contracts for more unique and challenging projects, such 

as the London and Mexico City embassy designs.

Under the SED approach, design firms typically conducted due diligence 

and project development (i.e., planning activities) for OBO to ensure 

projects were ready for design and construction by the DB contractors.54

Under Excellence, OBO contracts with design firms to develop Excellence 

designs before awarding a construction contract, according to OBO. Four 

of the five firms hired by OBO under its current ID/IQ are new to embassy 

construction work. Officials we spoke with—including DS officials, design 

firms, construction contractors, and former OBO officials—identified some 

adjustment challenges facing design firms new to OBO that have never 

designed an embassy before. For example, having to become familiar 

with State’s unique security requirements for diplomatic facilities is a 

challenge for those design firms. DS officials reported the firms require a 

 52Before the SED era, State hired leading U.S. architects to design some of the 

embassies that were built. 

53The ID/IQ expedites tasking because the firms will already have been selected and have 

prenegotiated terms and conditions. The current 5-year ID/IQ—1 base year and 4 option 

years—began in 2013 and runs through 2017.

54Due-diligence activities include conducting surveys of a site’s existing conditions, such 

as soil and utility information. Project development services generally consist of 

documenting planning issues, such as, the local permitting processes and the availability 

of local construction labor. Under the SED approach, OBO also generally provided site 

utilization diagrams to convey how buildings—such as the office building and U.S. Marine 

Security Guard Quarters—might be arranged on the site. Also, OBO provided some 

planning drawings to show how a project’s space requirements might be arranged and the 

site adapted within the SED framework.

Design Firms New to OBO 

Have Faced Adjustment 

Challenges; OBO 

Recently Began Assessing 

Their Performance
Page 28 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

great deal of work to bring them up to speed on State’s security 

requirements. To mitigate this situation, DS has been conducting “101 

Certification Workshops” for new design firms so that they understand 

DS’s approach to the security certification of new embassy designs. 

Those officials stated that conducting those workshops and reviewing 

customized Excellence designs has increased DS’s workload.55

Newer design firms have also been challenged by such issues as lack of 

sufficient staff with required security clearances, information systems, or 

office space to independently and securely perform the contracts, 

according to DS and design firm officials. Some of the new-to-OBO 

design firms further indicated that they have contracted—as partners or 

subcontractors—design firms that have worked on past OBO projects to 

assist the new-to-OBO firms in navigating State’s standards and process.

OBO did not begin conducting performance evaluations of its design firms 

until recently. Recommendations from the 2011 Excellence decision 

memo indicated that OBO would (1) measure performance of its 

designers for Design Excellence and project performance, and (2) use the 

federal contractor performance reporting system to promote consistency, 

increase data integrity, and motivate contractor performance. The Federal 

Acquisition Regulation requires agencies to conduct contractor 

performance evaluations. Such evaluations are intended to provide 

essential information regarding whether to award future contracts to these 

design firms.56 We found that OBO had not been conducting contract 

performance evaluations of the design firms contracted to deliver 

Excellence designs. OBO officials acknowledged they had not been 

recording performance evaluations. As a result of our inquiry and a 

subsequent request from State’s contracting office, OBO has trained staff 

and as of August 2016 had initiated design firm evaluations for six of its 

Excellence projects.

 55DS officials stated that they have increased staff resources to review designs and allow 

extra time for the design certification process. 

56The evaluation criteria to assess contractors’ performance may include quality, cost 

control, management, regulatory compliance, use of small business subcontractors, and 

other criteria an agency may establish for a contract.
Page 29 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

The Excellence approach entails greater involvement by OBO’s industry 

advisors. In 2012, OBO made changes to its industry advisory body, 

previously called the Industry Advisory Panel.57 It is now called the 

Industry Advisory Group (IAG) and OBO increased the number of 

members from up to 9 advisors representing industry organizations—

such as AIA, Associated General Contractors of America (AGC), and 

Design-Build Institute of America (DBIA)—to up to 35 members, who 

must, among other criteria, be members of professional organizations and 

trade groups involved in property management issues, but who represent 

the companies employing them (not those organizations or industry 

groups). OBO officials indicate the change was made to allow OBO to 

have broader industry representation.

In September 2014, OBO established a new policy mandating OBO 

senior management and industry peer design reviews, called OBO senior 

management and IAG design reviews. The policy requires that two such 

design reviews be conducted for each new project and that OBO’s 

Director will designate three members from its IAG or other adjunct 

professionals to serve as reviewers. These reviews are intended to assist 

OBO in making certain that projects are well-conceived and can be 

realized in an efficient and cost-effective manner.58 The first design 

review occurs during the Concept Design Phase. The design firm 

awarded the design contract must submit three viable concepts that it 

assesses as achievable within the project budget, according to OBO 

policy. The design firm must explain the factors that influenced each of 

the three proposed designs, including any opportunities and constraints. 

During the concept design review, OBO senior management and IAG 

panel members may raise and discuss any concerns about the proposed 

concepts or issues affecting scope, schedule, or cost. After considering 

the IAG panel’s recommendations, OBO selects one concept to be 

designed to a greater level of detail.

 57The purpose of OBO’s industry advisory body is to advise OBO on areas of research 

and development, real estate, planning, program development, design, engineering, 

construction, historic preservation, sustainability, natural hazards, emergency operations, 

security, operations, and maintenance.

58The industry peer design reviews are in addition to separate design reviews that OBO 

and DS staffs conduct to ensure projects meet building code, security standards, and 

other project requirements. Similar industry peer reviews were conducted during the 

Inman era but were ceased under the SED approach. 

Excellence Approach 

Includes Design Reviews 

by Industry Advisors
Page 30 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

The second set of design reviews, outlined in OBO policy, occurs during 

the Schematic Design Phase, when the selected concept has been more 

fully designed. The schematic review examines aspects of the proposed 

design—though not a final design—against the project’s requirements, 

approved schedule, and estimated construction contract price. The review 

examines site context and surroundings; the proposed building systems, 

including security systems and sustainability features; the exterior and 

interior design elements and materials; and how the local environment 

and construction labor may impact the design. The general purpose is to 

highlight opportunities to strengthen the project before the design 

progresses further and is completed.

Following both OBO senior management and industry concept and 

schematic design reviews, the contracted design firm makes a 

presentation to OBO’s Director. OBO’s Director may either approve the 

proposed schematic design to be used for a project or indicate necessary 

changes to the design for its subsequent approval. After OBO’s Director 

has approved the schematic design for a project, the final design must be 

in keeping with the approved design. Senior OBO officials indicated 

industry advisory design reviews do not add additional time in OBO’s 

process, as they occur within the overall time allotted for design. See 

appendix VII for a figure depicting where IAG design reviews occur within 

OBO’s overall design process.

The first Excellence project to go through the industry design review 

process was the new U.S. embassy planned for Mexico City. Through 

April 2016, OBO had conducted a total of 27 industry design reviews on 

14 Excellence projects.59 Figure 7 shows the three design concepts that 

underwent an IAG design review and the schematic design of the 

selected concept for the new consulate in Hyderabad, India.

 59These were Ankara, Turkey; Asuncion, Paraguay; Beirut, Lebanon; Colombo, Sri Lanka; 

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; Erbil, Iraq; Guatemala City, Guatemala; Harare, Zimbabwe; 

Hyderabad, India; Matamoros, Mexico; Mexico City, Mexico; New Delhi, India; Niamey, 

Niger; and Pristina, Kosovo.
Page 31 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Figure 7: Concept Designs Proposed and Subsequent Schematic Design Developed for the New U.S. Consulate in Hyderabad, 

India

Design firms we spoke with had varying views on the utility of OBO’s 

industry advisory reviews. For example, two design firms reported that 

although the contractual requirement to develop three design concepts for 

review and consideration adds some value, making it a formal 

requirement and holding a structured, peer-reviewed process adds 
Page 32 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

additional time, cost, and work.60 Another design firm new to OBO found 

the process valuable, particularly when peer reviewers (members of the 

IAG design review panel) already have OBO experience and can provide 

advice on potential embassy design pitfalls.

OBO’s Guide to Excellence indicates that different delivery methods have 

design, schedule, and cost implications that must be evaluated relative to 

the characteristics of each project and that OBO’s Director must approve 

the delivery method for each project. Since 2011, OBO has generally 

been using both bridging and DBB as delivery methods to have more 

control over project designs, according to OBO officials. OBO officials 

believe that greater design control under Excellence will improve 

embassies’ appearance in representing the United States, functionality, 

quality, and operating costs. Table 3 lists various design, schedule, and 

cost trade-offs inherent in the DB, bridging, and DBB project delivery 

methods identified by industry studies and experts we interviewed.

 60In 2014, a design firm also conveyed to OBO that its senior management and industry 

advisory peer review process extends the project schedules and that the purpose of these 

multiple reviews is unclear. 

Different Project Delivery 

Approaches Offer Distinct 

Design, Schedule, and 

Cost Trade-Offs
Page 33 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Table 3: Industry Studies and Experts Identified Trade-offs Inherent in the Design-Build (DB), Design-Build with Bridging 

(bridging), and Design-Bid-Build (DBB) Project Delivery Methods

Design

• In its 2009 report to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), the American Institute of Architects (AIA) asserts that 

design excellence is enhanced by greater participation of architects and engineers throughout the design and documentation 

stages, which does not always occur in DB projects. Under DB, the industry generally recognizes that an owner (e.g., OBO) gives 

up some design control as compared with other delivery methods and some industry groups indicate that DB may be 

inappropriate if an owner seeks an iconic design. Bridging Institute of America (BIA) officials identify bridging as a good 

alternative between DB and DBB, because the bridging method provides the owner with some of DBB’s design control and some 

of DB’s scheduling advantages while reducing cost and schedule risks (i.e., increased costs and schedule delays). According to 

BIA officials, the architecture community is generally an advocate for DBB and the construction industry is more often an 

advocate for DB.

• A Construction Management Association of America study reported that DBB provides an owner with significant design control, 

since a project will be fully designed prior to hiring a construction contractor.aDesign-Build Institute of America (DBIA) officials 

told us that the DB method can deliver facilities with outstanding designs if an agency makes a best-value decision to award a DB 

contract based, in part, on the qualifications of the DB contractor’s proposed design team rather than on the lowest price 

proposal, which may affect the quality of the design the agency receives.b

Schedule

• According to industry experts, DB is generally recognized as supporting faster delivery schedules. The industry generally refers to 

such an emphasis on accelerating project delivery as “fast-tracking.” In 2003, OBO’s then-Director reported to Congress that 

OBO intended to reduce the construction period for new embassies through a fast track process, referring to the SED approach.

However, AIA and the Associated General Contractors of America have reported that—although some project owners place a 

premium on schedule, and therefore favor DB, so as to move people or functions into new facilities as soon as possible—a 

potential downside to fast tracking is that some design elements may be locked in early, which may make later changes, if 

needed, difficult and costly.c

• An industry survey conducted by a leading construction data analytics company generally found agreement among building 

owners, architects, and contractors that DB has a positive impact on project duration. In the survey, 20 percent of owners 

reported their DB projects finishing ahead of schedule, while only 7 percent of owners reported DBB projects finishing ahead of 

schedule.dSimilarly, a Construction Industry Institute study—based on an examination of over 350 projects—found DBB projects 

examined had a median schedule growth rate of 4.4 percent meaning that the total actual project duration exceeded the 

schedule’s predicted duration by 4.4 percent. In comparison, DB projects examined schedule growth was near 0 percent. The 

study included representatives from OBO and other organizations.e

Cost

• The industry has generally reported that when an owner assumes more design control—as under DBB—this poses greater risk 

for cost increases if the construction contractor finds problems with the constructability of the design provided by the owner. DBIA 

and BIA officials we spoke with emphasized that because the owner hires the architect to prepare a 100 percent design under 

DBB, the owner assumes the project risk if there are any errors or omissions in the design. In their view OBO—in exerting direct 

design control over its projects under Excellence—now bears the cost risk for any potential errors, omissions, and ambiguities in 

those designs and thus increases the likelihood for costly change orders and claimsf

by the construction contractors (if not also 

schedule delays) resulting from conflicts between the design as documented and its actual construction.g Under DB, the 

Construction Management Association of America notes such conflicts are internal to the DB contractor (and its design team), 

meaning the owner does not have to resolve conflicts between two contract parties (i.e., the owner’s design firm and the 

construction contractor) as happens under DBB.This advantage of the DB method lowers the owner’s exposure to cost 

increases, since the contractor is responsible for resolving any design issues with its design firm, according to industry reports.

• Both the Construction Industry Institute study and the industry survey mentioned previously attempted to address comparative 

costs of DB and DBB. Projects using DBB in the Construction Industry Institute study had a 50 percent likelihood of realizing a 

cost increase ranging from 2 to 11 percent, whereas the comparable cost growth figure for DB projects in the study was from 0 to 

7 percent. The industry survey reported very large differences of opinion as to which delivery approach best reduces project 

costs, particularly among the opinions expressed by architects versus those expressed by contractors.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296
Page 34 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

a

The Construction Management Association of America, An Ow ner’s Guide to Project Delivery 

Methods (August 2012).

b

OBO reported to us that under Excellence, it is now making some project aw ards based on a bestvalue determination, rather than aw arding the project to the low est priced, technically acceptable 

contractor proposal. Further information on DB best-practices can be found in Design Build Institute 

of America, Federal Sector, Design-Build Done Right; Best Design-Build Practices, Nov. 2015.

c

American Institute of Architects and Associated General Contractors of America, Primer on Project 

Delivery, Second Edition; joint publication, 2011.

d

McGraw Hill Construction, Project Delivery Systems: How They Impact Efficiency and Profitability in 

the Buildings Sector (Bedford, Mass.: 2014). That study w as supported by AIA and DBIA.

e

Construction Industry Institute, Project Delivery Systems: CM at Risk, Design/Build, 

Design/Bid/Build, RS133-1 (Austin, Tex.: December 1997). Other representatives included the U.S. 

Navy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the University of Texas, Pennsylvania 

State University, and private sector companies such as General Motors Corporation.

f

Change orders are issued to modify contracts, which in some cases can be a change to correct 

design errors or omissions found by the ow ner or contractor. Claims are w ritten demands or w ritten 

assertions by one of the contracting parties seeking the payment of money in a set amount; the 

adjustment or interpretation of contract terms; or other relief arising under, or relating to, the contract. 

Both change orders and claims may increase project costs.

g

In general, conflicts may arise in constructing a project because the design is incomplete, lacks 

clarity, or the design firm did not fully coordinate the design disciplines, such as architectural, 

structural, electrical, or mechanical designs. For example, if the design is not fully coordinated, 

mechanical air ducts might be designed to occupy the same space as the structural or electrical 

systems, thus creating a conflict.

Construction contractor representatives we spoke with reported seeing 

these issues play out in the execution of OBO’s Excellence approach. 

AGC’s representative told us that the more customized designs under 

Excellence create increased risks for design problems or errors that could 

result in cost and schedule increases. Two OBO construction contractors 

we spoke with reported that OBO’s bridging and DBB projects cost more 

and take longer from start of design to completion when compared with a 

SED DB project. In part, these contractors said they had found some 

problems with some aspects of the designs, which took time to resolve 

with OBO and OBO’s contracted design firms. Those contractors also 

said OBO’s Excellence projects tend to specify more unique materials or 

custom-made products, which also adds to construction costs.61 These 

contractors also stated that they are tracking more change orders and 

redesign work on current OBO projects, which further indicates the 

potential for cost and schedule growth under Excellence. Finally, 

contractors we spoke with said that while OBO now uses bridging to 

develop a partial customized design for some OBO projects, their own 

firms’ design costs for a bridging project will not be lower than a similar 

 61For example, one contractor said that more customized security windows used in 

Excellence projects increases construction costs. Under the SED, OBO standardized the 

types and sizes of windows used in projects.
Page 35 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

SED DB project.62 They said this is because their own design firms are 

still responsible for the design and must validate any design information 

that OBO’s bridging architects develop.

OBO staff expressed a wide range of opinions in response to our survey 

request for comments regarding any specific benefits or challenges 

brought about by Excellence in their specific area of expertise.63 Some 

421 respondents provided comments covering diverse topics that we 

evaluated and grouped into 20 categories. Staff often held opposing 

views regarding a wide range of Excellence issues such as developing 

Excellence standards or procedures, facilitating stakeholder input, and 

focusing on maintenance and sustainability. Staff providing comments 

generally provided more negative narratives than positive ones. Table 4 

summarizes the results of our analysis.

 62One contractor said the fees they pay their architect to complete the design for an OBO 

bridging project are about double what they had paid to develop a SED-based design. 

This is because bridging designs for Excellence projects require more coordination 

between the contractor and OBO to ensure the intent of bridging design is maintained.

63Those surveyed included both OBO direct hire and contracted support staff working at 

OBO’s offices, which we refer to in the report generally as “OBO staff.”

OBO Staff Held Split 

Opinions on the 

Excellence and SED 

Approaches

Benefits and Challenges of 

Excellence
Page 36 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Table 4: Summary of Survey Comments Expressing Opinions on Benefits and Challenges Attributed to the Excellence 

Approach

Benefit comments Quantity Challenge comments Quantity

Control/flexibility of designs and site selection. 39 —

Aesthetic/ architectural improvement (“iconic 

designs”).

27 —

Development and/or improvement of standards, 

processes, procedures, templates, documents, 

etc.

69 Lack of, inadequate, or inconsistent application of 

policies/procedures/standards/ systems; uncertain 

impact of new policies, etc.

175

Improved coordination; facilitating input from 

different stakeholders/internal teams; consensus 

and leadership around program objectives.

60 Inadequate coordination; failure to facilitate input from 

various stakeholders/internal teams.

82

Increased focus on maintenance/ sustainability/ 

life cycle analyses.

50 Not enough emphasis on maintenance/sustainability/ 

life cycle analyses.

62

Greater oversight of/cooperation with 

construction contractors; improvement of the 

commissioning process.

15 Inadequate oversight and/or training of contractors; 

issues related to contracts/contract management; 

issues related to commissioning.

76

Improved design review process. 13 Problematic/burdensome design review and/or 

certification process.

51

— New/slow/problematic processes and/or requirements 

resulting from more complex and varied projects.

89

— Schedule challenges; extended timelines. 88

— Budget challenges; high costs. 86

— Leadership/management issues. 80

— Staffing issues. 47

— Construction challenges. 26

— Design errors and omissions. 28

— Limited data tracking/sharing; difficulties measuring 

performance and results.

24

Legend: — = No contrasting comments w ere identified in this category.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296

Note: In response to tw o questions asking for examples of (1) benefits or efficiencies and (2) 

challenges or inefficiencies, 421 respondents left 760 comments, some of w hich were counted in 

more than one category. Opinions expressed in the survey may not be representative of the opinions 

held by all Department of State Bureau of Overseas Operations staff.

For examples of specific benefits and challenges cited, see appendix III.

We asked OBO staff to characterize Excellence compared with the SED 

approach in terms of producing diplomatic facilities that are outstanding in 

all respects, including security, architecture, construction, sustainability, 

operations and maintenance. Of the 339 staff expressing an opinion, 157 

(46 percent) identified the SED as generally more effective, 109 (32 

Comparison of Excellence and 

SED Approaches
Page 37 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

percent) identified Excellence as generally more effective, and 73 (22 

percent) believed they were equally effective.64

We analyzed responses by length of service in OBO. Some 288 staff with 

5 years or less experience responded to the question. These respondents 

were hired around or after the introduction of Excellence in 2011. Most 

respondents with 5 years or less experience, 204, did not provide an 

opinion about Excellence or SED. Of the 84 respondents with 5 years or 

less who did express an opinion, 37 (44 percent) indicated Excellence 

was more effective, 31 (37 percent) reported SED was more effective, 

and 16 (19 percent) found both equally effective. On the other hand, 

many OBO staff with 6 or more years of experience who responded (255 

out of 395) offered an opinion. Of the 255 staff with more than 5 years’

experience who had an opinion, 72 (28 percent) indicated Excellence was 

more effective, 126 (49 percent) reported SED as more effective, and 57 

(22 percent) found both equally effective.

We also selected offices for further analysis based on size. Of the 

respondents expressing an opinion to the question from particular offices 

within OBO (specifically not including those with “No opinion/no basis to 

judge” or who provided no response), the four largest offices found SED 

generally more effective.65 Staff from Facility Management were most 

closely divided. Of the 62 Facility Management staff who had an opinion, 

24 (39 percent) said that the SED program is generally more effective 

than the Excellence program, while 20 (32 percent) said that Excellence 

is generally more effective, with the remaining 18 (29 percent) reporting 

one program as effective as the other. A larger percentage of 

Construction Management and Design and Engineering staff reported 

SED as generally more effective. Of the 79 Construction Management 

staff who had an opinion, 44 (56 percent) said that the SED program is 

generally more effective, compared to 20 (25 percent) who said 

Excellence is generally more effective. Of the 58 Design and Engineering 

 64The remaining 366 staff either responded “No opinion/No basis to judge” to the question 

or did not provide any response to the question.

65According to OBO, the Facility Management office is its largest office in terms of staff, 

followed by Construction Management. The Office of the Executive Director for Resource 

Management is the third largest office, however very few from that office responded to our 

survey and none expressed an opinion. The Design and Engineering office provided the 

third most numerous responses. The Security Management office and the office of Project 

Development and Coordination were fourth and fifth. Offices with 25 responses or fewer 

are rolled into one row in table 8 in app. II.
Page 38 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

staff who had an opinion, 28 (48 percent) said that the SED program is 

generally more effective, compared to 18 (31 percent) who said 

Excellence is generally more effective.

The greatest division among the large offices was in Security 

Management, with 21 out of 29 (72 percent) who had an opinion reporting 

SED was generally more effective than Excellence, compared with 3 out 

of 29 (10 percent) reporting Excellence was generally more effective. 

These offices are among those most directly involved in the planning, 

design, construction, maintenance, and security at U.S. facilities 

worldwide.

Other offices were more supportive of Excellence. Of the 24 respondents 

from the Office of Project Development and Coordination who had an 

opinion, 13 (54 percent) reported that Excellence is generally more 

effective than SED. All remaining offices were more narrowly split, with 35 

out of 87 (40 percent) reporting Excellence as more effective than SED 

and about 32 out of 87 (37 percent) reporting SED more effective. The 

OBO Front Office firmly supported Excellence as more effective than SED 

with five of six (83 percent) of respondents who had an opinion saying so.

Some 403 staff provided narrative comments comparing SED with 

Excellence. We categorized the comments, some of which fell into more 

than one category. The most common positive comment regarding 

Excellence cited aesthetic or architectural improvements, while the most 

common negative comment noted higher costs under Excellence 

compared to SED. The tally for the categories is in table 5 below.
Page 39 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Table 5: Summary of GAO’s Analysis of Survey Comments Expressing Positive and Negative Opinions toward the Excellence 

Approach to the Design and Construction of New Embassies and Consulates

Positive comments Quantity Negative comments Quantity

Aesthetic/architectural improvement (“iconic designs”) 62 Excellence prioritizes design over functionality 27

Control/flexibility of designs and site selection 42 —

Excellence embassies demonstrate an increased focus 

on maintenance/ sustainability/life cycle analyses

31 —

Excellence embassies are more secure 11 Standard Embassy Design (SED) faster, more 

efficient, more cost effective at building safe/ 

secure facilities

32

Improved coordination; facilitating input from different 

stakeholders/ internal teams; consensus and 

leadership around program objectives

10 —

SED and Excellence both have positive and/or 

negative attributes;no or minimal difference; 

appropriateness of either program depends on the type 

of project or metric used to compare

41

— Excellence costs more compared with SED 

(“budget challenges”)

74

— Excellence takes more time compared with SED 

(“schedule challenges”)

64

— Excellence introduces new/ slow/ problematic 

processes and/or requirements resulting from more 

complex and varied projects

51

— Under Excellence (compared with SED): Lack of, 

inadequate, or inconsistent application of policies/ 

procedures/ standards/ systems; poor 

communication of policies, etc.

38

— Under Excellence (compared with SED): 

Inadequate oversight and/or training of contractors; 

issues related to commissioning; issues related to 

contracts/ contract management

22

— Under Excellence (compared with SED): Staffing 

issues

19

— Under Excellence (compared with SED): 

Problematic and/or burdensome design review/ 

certification process

17

— Under Excellence (compared with SED): 

Leadership/ management issues

14

— Excellence buildings too complex for many 

locations

13

Legend: — = No contrasting comments w ere identified in this category.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296
Page 40 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Note: In response to one question comparing SED to Excellence, 403 respondents left comments, 

some of w hich were counted in more than one category. Opinions expressed in the survey may not 

be representative of the opinions held by all Department of State Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations staff.

Figure 8 lists some selected comments comparing the SED and 

Excellence approaches.
Page 41 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Figure 8: Selected Survey Comments from Staff of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations regarding the Current 

Excellence Approach and the Previous Standard Embassy Design Approach

When asked whether Excellence had generally improved the Capital 

Security Construction Program (i.e., the embassy construction program), 
Page 42 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

OBO staff who responded were more evenly divided. Of the 470 

respondents expressing an opinion, 174 (37 percent) generally agreed 

that Excellence improved the program, while 161 (34 percent) 

respondents generally disagreed, and 135 (29 percent) neither agreed 

nor disagreed.66

While OBO has established some policies and other guidance to 

implement Excellence, it lacks tools to fully evaluate the performance of 

the new approach. OBO continues to document changes in its policies, 

procedures, standards, and other guidance. In our survey, OBO staff 

generally were evenly split on the sufficiency of OBO’s efforts in these 

areas. However, OBO has not defined performance measures specific to 

Excellence goals at either the strategic or project level, such as greater 

adaptability to individual locations, functionality, or environmental 

sustainability. OBO also lacks a centralized database to broadly manage 

Excellence by enabling, for example, effective reporting on projects’

design and construction costs and schedules. Without performance 

measures specific to Excellence and sufficient systems to collect and 

analyze relevant data, OBO will not be able to demonstrate whether the 

performance of Excellence projects over time justifies the increased 

emphasis on and investment in their designs.

While OBO has created or updated some policies and other guidance to 

implement Excellence, it has taken more time to do this than OBO 

estimated in 2011. Key guidance deliverables in OBO’s 2011 Excellence 

decision memo—identified as “critical elements” by OBO—were to be 

produced within the first year after Excellence was approved. However, it 

took more time than OBO estimated to issue some of those key elements. 

For example, OBO replaced the SED with the new OBO Design 

Standards in 201367 and released its Guide to Excellence in 2016, despite 

 66Another 227 indicated they had no basis to judge or no opinion. For this analysis we 

combined the response categories of strongly agree and somewhat agree into the 

generally agree category; we also combined the strongly disagree and somewhat 

disagree response categories into the generally agree category. For the full results, see 

app. II.

67OBO officials report that lessons learned from the SED were incorporated into OBO’s 

new Design Standards. 

OBO Has Established 

Some Implementation 

Guidance but Lacks 

Tools to Assess 

Performance under

Excellence

OBO Continues to 

Document Changes in Its 

Policies, Procedures, 

Standards, and Guidance
Page 43 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

its initial plan to release these documents within a year of the memo.68

New or updated policies issued in support of implementing Excellence 

were also not in place until nearly 2 years or more after Excellence was 

approved in 2011.69 For example, in recent years OBO has finalized 

several policies, such as the following:

• 2013 Site Selection: This new policy emphasizes criteria for urban 

sites; attributes of the preferred site include (1) considering American 

values in promoting a sense of openness, accessibility, and 

transparency through location; (2) proximity to key host-government 

facilities, embassies of other countries, and businesses and cultural 

centers; and (3) an urban setting that provides connectivity to public 

transportation and infrastructure, making the mission accessible to 

visitors and clients.70

• 2014 OBO Senior Management and Industry Advisory Group 

Design Reviews:This new policy requires two reviews by external 

industry advisors and approval of Excellence designs by OBO’s 

Director.

• 2015 OBO Core Project Team: This new policy requires OBO’s 

Design Manager71 to be an integrated team member—with OBO’s 

Project Manager, Project Director, and Construction Executive72—to 

 68OBO’s Guide to Excellence indicates it is intended to provide a broad overview of OBO’s 

goals, policies, and procedures. In 2016, OBO also released its OBO Design Guide which 

provides noncontractual information to design firms on how to design a diplomatic office 

building and addresses communication between various project stakeholders, including 

OBO, staff and other agencies at posts, the design team, and contractors.

69OBO’s policy on establishing and updating policies and procedures states, “As with any 

complex organization, OBO benefits from having established policies and procedures.” 

70See U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 15 FAM 470, New 

Embassy/Consulate Site Selection. 

71The policy establishes that OBO’s Design Manager is authorized to manage the design 

development and is responsible for the integrity, accuracy, and quality of the design, and 

leads the project team to resolve design issues. 

72The Project Manager oversees the project’s development and design contracts. The 

Project Director (PD)—located overseas—provides oversight of the construction 

contractor and the contract. Once a DB or construction contract is awarded, the PD has 

principal authority for ensuring that scope, schedule, and budget are executed as 

approved by OBO’s Director and that the project is constructed in accordance with the 

approved design. The Construction Executive manages Washington-based issues on 

behalf of the PD.
Page 44 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

ensure that decisions about a project’s design are integrated at 

project inception and maintained through project completion.

• 2016 Architect/Engineer Team Selection:This revision to an 

existing policy governs the evaluation and award of design contracts 

to design firms. The revision expands the evaluation panel from at 

least three to up to seven members, with key changes being the 

addition of an OBO Director’s designee; a representative with a 

connection to the post or regional bureau; and an external advisor (a 

federal employee from another agency).73

A report commissioned by OBO provided insight into the challenges faced 

in implementing Excellence. In June 2014, OBO modified an existing task 

order with one of its design firms to require the firm to participate in a 

roundtable discussion about Excellence and identify ways Excellence 

might be more effectively communicated and managed. The design firm 

subsequently delivered a report, based on the roundtable and its own 

experiences, with the firm’s findings and recommendations on how to 

improve Excellence.74

The roundtable included OBO officials, DS, the Office of Logistics 

Management, and contractors. The resulting consultant’s report noted 

that OBO had transformed its design approach, design guidelines, project 

requirements, and preferred project delivery methods. According to the 

report, this transformation presented significant opportunities. For 

example, the introduction of highly regarded design firms new to working 

with OBO offered tremendous potential for innovation and overall quality 

of building design and performance. However, the report also identified 

challenges with Excellence, including the following:75

 73The other members are OBO technical subject-matter experts generally from OBO’s 

design, project development, and construction offices. 

74According to State officials, State did not identify any organizational conflicts of interest 

related to this work, and the order did not limit the design firm’s participation on future 

Excellence design work.

75OBO officials noted that although OBO participated extensively in the roundtable 

discussion, the specific recommendations and findings in the report are those of the 

contractor. 

OBO Has Introduced 

Innovation but Faced 

Challenges in 

Implementing Excellence
Page 45 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

• There did not appear to be an entity responsible for instituting and 

managing the significant organizational change that the Excellence 

approach imposed.

• The Excellence process had altered the internal practices at OBO and 

its offices; with every project, its implementation has resulted in 

nuances in the definitions of the Design Standards that led to 

variations in their implementation, document submittal requirements, 

milestone analysis, and security risk assessments.

• While the new Design Standards were more comprehensive, they 

were very difficult to navigate, particularly as a Portable Document 

Format (PDF) file with over 8,000 pages.

• Senior management reviews and the IAG peer review process 

extended project schedules, and their purpose appeared unclear.

The consultant’s report made numerous recommendations to OBO, 

including that OBO (1) seek to manage and clarify change internally; (2) 

assign dedicated staff to be responsible for instituting change; (3) utilize 

more standardization for project requirements, while acknowledging the 

recommendation may seem counterintuitive in light of OBO’s move away 

from the SED; (4) further define the Excellence program to capture the 

new standards and processes OBO was instituting; and (5) train OBO 

personnel and modify internal systems and practices to be compatible 

with the new OBO project delivery methods and design standards.

In discussing OBO’s implementation of Excellence with us, senior OBO 

officials stated that they continue to work to improve OBO’s processes. 

They noted that the development or updating of OBO policies and 

procedures takes considerable time because numerous OBO technical 

offices must weigh in on any needed or proposed changes and that OBO 

management must then review and approve those changes (or send 

them back for revisions). Senior OBO officials also maintained that it was 

difficult to “describe a program at the same time that you are 

implementing it.” One former senior OBO official stated that OBO’s 

priority during the transition to Excellence was trying to implement the 

new program and that they may have lagged in establishing policies and 

procedures to document changes to OBO’s processes.
Page 46 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

In our survey seeking feedback on Excellence, we asked OBO staff 

whether they agreed or disagreed with seven statements about OBO’s 

establishment and communication of strategic direction, policies, and 

guidance for doing their daily jobs. OBO staff who responded agreed 

most strongly with statements about the provision of policies and 

standards for their daily jobs. They divided more narrowly on statements 

about strategic vision and guidance (see table 6). The largest percent of 

OBO staff who responded generally agreed with the statement: “Since 

2011, OBO has provided clear and comprehensive technical standards 

and guidelines related to my job.” The largest percent of OBO staff who 

responded generally disagreed with the statement: “Since 2011, OBO has 

provided clear and comprehensive strategic or long-term guidance to 

implement its planning, design, construction, and maintenance approach.”

Table 6: Distribution of Agree-Disagree Responses from Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) Staff Expressing 

Opinions on the Implementation of the Excellence Approach

Percentage of n for each question

Survey questions Generally agree

Neither

agree nor disagree Generally disagree

OBO senior leadership has effectively conveyed their strategic 

vision of Excellence. (n=557) 43 19 38

OBO senior leadership has successfully guided the 

organization in defining, implementing and supporting 

Excellence. (n=540) 43 20 37

The Excellence initiative has generally improved the Capital 

Security Construction Program. (n=470) 37 29 34 

OBO has provided clear, comprehensive strategic or long-term 

guidance to implement its planning, design, construction, and 

maintenance approach. (n=533) 40 20 41 

OBO has established clear, comprehensive bureau-wide 

policies related to my job. (n=550) 46 22 33 

OBO has provided clear, comprehensive office-level SOPs 

related to my job. (n=604) 44 17 39 

OBO has provided clear, comprehensive technical standards 

and guidelines related to my job. (n=585) 50 18 31 

Legend: SOP = standard operating procedure.

Source: GAO. | GAO-17-296

Notes: All questions specifically referenced Excellence implementation since 2011. For each of these 

seven questions, on average, about one in five respondents indicated that the statement w as outside 

their expertise or that they had no opinion and those respondents are not included in the results of 

this table. The number of respondents for each question varied, resulting in different “n” values (total 

number of responses for each question).

Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Survey Respondents Held 

Mixed Opinions on OBO’s 

Provision of Guidance 

Related to Excellence
Page 47 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

For this analysis, w e combined the response categories of strongly agree and somew hat agree into 

the generally agree category; w e also combined the strongly disagree and somew hat disagree 

categories into the generally disagree category.

Opinions expressed in the survey may not be representative of all OBO staff opinions.

While OBO has established Excellence and taken some steps to 

implement it, OBO has not established strategic or project-level 

performance measures to evaluate and communicate the effectiveness of 

the Excellence approach in delivering embassies under the Capital 

Security Construction Program. Performance measures are essential 

tools for managers to evaluate progress toward a program’s objectives. 

GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state 

that agencies’ internal controls should include the establishment and 

review of performance indicators.76 Furthermore, State’s Foreign Affairs 

Manual indicates that State must maintain effective systems of internal 

controls that incorporate GAO’s internal control standards.77 In addition, 

the AIA 2009 report stated that “OBO should be willing to evaluate and 

explain the benefits of integrating security with design excellence, and the 

potential benefits to life-cycle costs, design, operations, maintenance, 

public image, and public diplomacy. OBO’s ability to explain the benefits 

will require some empirical evidence of claims made for those tangible 

items such as cost benefit and operations.”

Both OBO’s 2011 approval of Excellence and 2016 Guide to Excellence 

assert that a design excellence program will provide the best value for the 

U.S. taxpayer. According to GAO’s Business Process Reengineering 

Assessment Guide, if an agency decides to initiate a reengineering 

project, it should develop and communicate a compelling business case 

to customers and stakeholders that supports this decision.78 Such a 

 76GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). The standards were updated in 2014, and GAO has 

indicated that for quantitative objectives performance measures may be a targeted 

percentage or numerical value. For qualitative objectives, management may need to 

design performance measures that indicate a level or degree of performance, such as 

milestones. See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO-14-704G, (Washington, D.C.: September 2014). 

77See U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 2 FAM 020 Management 

Controls.

78GAO, Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide, GAO/AIMD-10.1.15, 

(Washington, D.C.; May, 1997). A business case is also a key tool for communicating the 

rationale and for managing expectations, particularly with the agency’s own staff.

OBO Lacks Performance 

Measures to Evaluate the 

Potential Costs and 

Benefits of Excellence
Page 48 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

business case should contain critical performance measures relating to 

the organization’s core business processes, such as cost, quality, service, 

and speed. As an agency completes its process redesign work, the 

business case should be updated to present a full picture of the benefits, 

costs, and risks involved in moving to a new process. Without meaningful 

performance indicators, an agency has no way of knowing if the new 

process has produced the desired results and whether those results 

compare favorably or not to the previous process.

OBO’s strategic plan does not define how OBO intends to evaluate the 

performance of the Excellence approach. State’s 2010 press release 

announcing Excellence and OBO’s 2011 Excellence decision memo both 

noted that a comprehensive strategic plan was to be implemented in 2011 

and would act as a roadmap for developing Excellence policies and 

procedures. OBO senior officials told us that a 2010 presentation—

briefed to the then Secretary—was OBO’s strategic plan for Excellence 

implementation.79 The briefing document does not say how Excellence is 

to be evaluated—one of the functions of a strategic plan—nor does it 

outline any performance indicators to show how OBO would assess and 

report on the extent to which Excellence facilities are any more safe, 

secure, functional, sustainable, or more effective in better supporting U.S. 

diplomacy than the SED facilities.

State’s department-level fiscal year 2014-2017 strategic plan is largely 

silent on Excellence.80 Its single Capital Security Construction Programrelated performance indicator is the relocation of 6,000 U.S. government 

employees into more secure and functional facilities by September 30, 

2017. OBO used a similar performance indicator under the SED 

approach. This indicator provides no performance assessment on the 

extent to which Excellence facilities are any more functional, sustainable, 

or effective in supporting U.S. diplomacy. Furthermore, the projected 

target may be low relative to past performance, since 6,000 employees 

moved by September 2017 equates to an average of 1,500 employees 

relocated per fiscal year (2014 through 2017).81 However, State reports 

 79That briefing was titled “Design Excellence” and dated April 14, 2010. 

80U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), FY 

2014 – FY2017 Strategic Plan (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2014).

81State’s combined Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2017 

Annual Performance Plan shows State’s target of moving 6,000 employees into secure 

facilities by September 2017 is based on a multiyear average target of moving 1,500 

people in each fiscal year from 2014 through 2017. 

OBO Has Not Established 

Strategic Performance 

Measures Specific to 

Excellence
Page 49 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

that from 2000 through 2014 it moved over 30,000 people into more 

secure facilities—which equates to an average of over 2,100 people per 

year (based on actual performance).82 As a result, it is unclear whether 

State’s target is an appropriate measure given OBO’s past performance.

Excellence is briefly discussed in OBO’s bureau-level Functional Bureau 

Strategy for fiscal years 2015–2017.83 It states that OBO is implementing 

design innovation and that Excellence will introduce improved use of 

functionality, sustainability, and security for diplomatic facilities. That 

strategy document includes bureau-level design and construction related 

performance indicators, among others related to other OBO operations. 

Those indicators include the following, among others:

• average duration [schedule] and cost growth for capital construction 

projects completed annually;

• design standards are met and updated on an annual basis 

incorporating lessons learned and other feedback from stakeholders 

from prior years; and

• percent of new embassy and consulate compounds designed to 

achieve LEED Silver certification.

While the first set of indicators can quantitatively measure performance 

and enable OBO to report on the efficiency of project delivery under 

Excellence (as OBO did previously under the Inman program and under 

SED), those schedule and cost indicators do not address new aspects of 

Excellence, such as lower operating costs or better support for U.S. 

conduct of diplomacy. In addition, the latter two indicators in the list above 

are, if anything, even less useful for assessing Excellence performance. 

First, OBO updates its design standards annually and conducts design 

reviews to ensure that projects meet those standards. Thus, it is unlikely 

OBO would fail to meet this performance indicator. Second, according to 

OBO documentation, LEED Silver certification has been an OBO design 

standard since 2009, before Excellence. Thus, to meet design standards, 

every Excellence embassy built—with an emphasis on greater 

 82U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2016; 

Appendix 1: Department of State, Diplomatic Engagement(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 

2015).

83U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Functional Bureau 

Strategy, FY2015-FY2017.Functional bureau strategy documents are bureau-level 

planning components of State’s planning, budgeting, and performance management 

cycle. They are intended to support the State-USAID joint strategic plan.
Page 50 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

sustainability—should be at least LEED Silver, so the indicator should be 

100 percent, or very near to it. Furthermore, the LEED indicator assesses 

only the performance implied by the design itself, not the actual building 

operations and maintenance performance and whether the actual utility 

usage and costs are equal to or less than initially estimated in the 

designs.

While no Excellence projects can be evaluated yet, as none have been 

completed, without additional performance indicators relevant to the goals 

of the Excellence approach, OBO has no way of knowing if its new 

process is achieving the desired results. Furthermore, it lacks an 

important tool for reporting on the Excellence approach to congressional 

overseers, the public, and other State stakeholders such as other U.S. 

diplomatic agencies that must help pay some of the costs for constructing 

and maintaining new embassies.

OBO also lacks post-specific performance measures to track and 

evaluate the long-term performance of its embassies. According to Office 

of Management and Budget guidance, more than 80 percent of a 

building’s total cost over its lifespan can consist of ownership costs such 

as operations, maintenance, and energy usage. When combined with 

front-end costs such as design and construction, these costs embody a 

project’s “life-cycle costs.”84 OBO has attempted to address long-term 

operations and maintenance costs on the front-end by, for example, 

committing to include LEED Silver certification in its design standards 

since 2009, according to OBO officials. Other sustainability “stretch”

initiatives OBO considers desirable (though not required) under 

Excellence include trying to achieve LEED Platinum certification, 

increasing use of renewable energy sources, reducing greenhouse gas 

emissions, and achieving net-zero energy and water consumption on its 

compounds, whereby enough renewable energy or water is generated to 

meet a post’s requirements. OBO design standards also require design 

firms to incorporate operations and maintenance cost analysis into 

embassy designs through sustainability studies. From 2001 through 2015, 

in locations where OBO has constructed a new diplomatic compound, 

 84The Office of Management and Budget defines the cost of a capital asset as its full lifecycle cost, including all direct and indirect costs for planning, procurement (purchase price 

and all other costs incurred to bring it to a form and location suitable for its intended 

use)—[e.g., site, design, and construction costs]—, operations and maintenance 

(including service contracts), and disposal. 

OBO Is Exploring Ways to 

Better Track and Evaluate 

Long-Term, Project-Level 

Performance
Page 51 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

OBO reported it has constructed 26 new LEED-certified embassy or 

consulate office buildings, 19 of which were SEDs.85

However, despite the additional emphasis now focused on operations and 

maintenance on the front end during design, OBO has no post-specific 

performance measures related to operations and maintenance cost 

performance after a new embassy is constructed. One reason for this is 

the lack of available or reliable data. OBO officials stated that although 

some embassies do have utility meters on site, getting data from there 

back to Washington, D.C., is challenging. While OBO does have a data 

system in place to capture some operations and maintenance 

information, such as utility usage, it is dependent upon manual entry of 

data at each specific post. According to OBO officials, this lowers data 

reliability, and differences in data entry compliance by posts over time 

make historical analysis of operations and maintenance costs difficult. 

Also, while some posts have building-level meters for the main office 

building, other posts have compound-level utility meters that track data for 

multiple buildings, making broader data comparisons difficult across 

posts.

OBO is taking some steps to address this situation. According to OBO’s 

2016 Guide to Excellence, OBO is in the process of developing project 

and portfolio operations and maintenance cost assessment procedures to 

account for these costs over the estimated life of embassies. In 2016 

OBO initiated an effort to develop a methodology and process to better 

assess the full life-cycle cost of its projects. OBO’s July 2016 statement of 

work on its Life-Cycle Cost Assessment effort shows that OBO intends to 

develop a methodology and plan to assess the total cost of ownership of 

projects and facilities, which takes into account the costs of (1) 

acquisition, (2) design, (3) construction, and (4) operations and 

maintenance. According to OBO officials, this effort represents a gradual 

shift in OBO’s orientation, whereby OBO’s portfolio is expected to reflect 

less emphasis on new construction and greater attention to maintenance, 

repair, and renovations. Therefore, decisions must be made regarding 

what metrics should be tracked.

 85Additionally, 29 projects in design or construction are planned to achieve LEED 

certification; 16 of those are Excellence projects. Figures do not include other LEED 

certified projects, such as buildings that were renovated to LEED criteria, ancillary 

buildings such as a Marine Security Guard Quarters, or annex office buildings 

subsequently constructed on a compound such as those for the U.S. Agency for 

International Development.
Page 52 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

OBO is also working with State’s Office of Management, Rightsizing, 

Policy, and Innovation on a pilot effort—called “MeterNet”—with the intent 

to install more metering systems on embassy compounds and to transmit 

performance data back to Washington. Under MeterNet, State intends to 

automate and improve the collection of data on electrical energy usage 

(both utility and renewable sources), water usage, and fuel consumption. 

According to OBO officials, MeterNet should relieve posts of manual data 

entry and also enable OBO to more accurately monitor, collect, and 

analyze more reliable data on sustainable energy and water performance. 

OBO anticipates that this in turn will enable facility managers to manage 

energy consumption data across State’s facilities, as well as analyze and 

track energy usage trends over time, such as energy per square foot or 

overall electricity demand. OBO has also been working with the 

Department of Energy to address challenges with its existing utility data 

system. According to OBO officials, OBO has not yet determined how 

MeterNet will interface with OBO’s existing data systems.

The steps OBO has taken to improve monitoring of post-specific 

operations and maintenance costs are at a very early stage. Until OBO 

clearly defines a process to assess the performance of its projects after 

construction and establishes reliable data systems to track and report this 

performance, OBO will lack an essential tool for determining whether 

completed projects—whether Excellence or SED facilities—are 

performing as intended by their designs from either a sustainability (e.g., 

energy and water usage) or an operating and maintenance cost 

standpoint.

OBO currently lacks easily accessible data to provide overall project 

management information. During our review, we requested a variety of 

data related to OBO’s embassy construction projects from January 2001 

through September 2015, such as contract award amounts, site 

acquisition costs, delivery method, completion dates, and other data. 

However, OBO was unable to easily provide such information. According 

to OBO officials, while these data did exist and could be retrieved, the 

data were not available in any centralized data source. Rather, each OBO 

office maintained separate data relevant to its own operations, and so 

consolidated and current data to provide overall project information were 

unavailable.

OBO offices consolidate certain project management information in 

periodic project performance reviews, whereby individual offices and 

project teams report on cost, schedule, and scope for specific embassy 

OBO Is Exploring a 

Centralized Data Solution 

to Better Manage Projects 

and Track Cost and 

Schedule Performance
Page 53 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

projects. However, while this can facilitate some data retrieval from a 

specific ongoing project, according to OBO officials it can be difficult and 

time consuming to find information on older, completed projects for which 

there is no longer an active project team. We reported on similar data 

issues in September 2014, when OBO could not provide all of the real 

property files we requested, at that time also citing lack of centralized 

data, maintenance by different groups within OBO, and difficulty of 

retrieval.86

According to federal internal control standards, quality information is an 

essential tool for agency management to achieve an agency’s 

objectives.87 According to these standards, a process should exist that 

uses the agency’s objectives and related risks to identify the information 

requirements needed to achieve the objectives and address the risks. 

Furthermore, such data should be sufficiently relevant, reliable, and 

accessible to agency management. Additionally, OBO’s 2011 Excellence 

decision memo cited the need for a comprehensive information 

technology platform that would integrate and make available all OBO 

project information; promote effective review, communication, and 

decision making; and support the maintenance and operations of 

completed facilities.

No such system existed at OBO in October 2015 at the time of our data 

request. In response to our request, OBO began assembling a wide 

range of project management data to fulfill our request as well as to better 

provide information to Congress. We received these data in the form of a 

spreadsheet 10 months later in August 2016. OBO officials attributed this 

delay to the aforementioned difficulty of retrieving historical project data 

as well as having to address concurrent information requests from 

Congress and State’s Inspector General. The database we received 

covers projects from January 2001 through September 2015, includes 

many elements of the information we requested, and also includes some 

other information useful to OBO management. According to OBO officials, 

these data were compiled by OBO office units and project managers 

based on the latest documentation available.

 86GAO, Overseas Real Property: State Department Needs to Improve Guidance and 

Records Management,GAO-14-769 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2014).

87GAO-14-704G.
Page 54 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

OBO recently established an initiative—termed the Ideal Operational 

State—to explore long-term ways to centralize and standardize data 

collection across OBO’s operations. According to OBO officials, this 

Excellence-related initiative is intended to provide a long-term data 

solution that will allow for better program management across OBO’s 

business activities as well as better tracking of project metrics such as 

cost and schedule performance. The study group tasked with assessing 

OBO’s current information technology systems and potential market 

alternatives held a kickoff in May 2016 and, after a series of working 

sessions and vendor evaluations, recommended a series of actions to 

OBO’s senior management, including an upgrade and modification of 

existing OBO management software. OBO management approved action 

on these recommendations in October 2016.

Until OBO develops an effective, centralized data system capturing 

essential and reliable project management data as well as cost and 

schedule performance across its project portfolio, not only will OBO 

management lack a critical tool for consolidating key project data, 

assessing performance, and guiding strategic oversight and internal 

control, but it will also be hampered in responding to oversight queries by 

Congress, GAO, and State’s Inspector General.

At the heart of OBO’s changes under the Excellence approach is the 

premise that greater design focus and control will produce more 

innovative, functional, and sustainable embassies that are just as secure 

as those built using the SED but that will be more cost efficient to operate 

and maintain. From fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2015, OBO has 

allotted hundreds of millions of dollars to fund more customized designs 

rather than applying a standardized design to build new embassies. 

Though a greater upfront investment in design may yield embassy 

improvements, it carries with it increased risk to project costs and 

schedule. While OBO is attempting to manage this risk, without strategic 

or project-level performance measures specific to the goals of Excellence, 

OBO cannot fully assess the merits of this new approach. Furthermore, 

as projects initiated during Excellence’s implementation come to fruition 

and begin operations, such measures will be essential to any long-term 

assessment of their performance. Establishing reliable data systems to 

measure, record, and report on building performance can help OBO 

management evaluate all costs that occur over a building’s lifespan. 

Further, centralized project management data are also needed to allow 

OBO to quantify and assess design and construction costs under 

Excellence for each project. While OBO has begun efforts to establish 

Conclusions
Page 55 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

such systems, it will take time to complete these initiatives and collect 

these crucial data. Nevertheless these steps are essential to creating safe 

and lasting buildings that best represent the United States while ensuring 

that projects make efficient use of resources and assess the value of 

shifting to the Excellence approach rather than continuing to use the 

SED.

To better assess OBO’s performance, we recommend that the Secretary 

of State take the following four actions:

1. Determine whether the existing OBO program performance measure 

and annual target of moving 1,500 people into safe, secure, and 

functional facilities is still appropriate or needs to be revised.

2. Establish additional performance measures applicable to the new 

goals of the Excellence approach in support of the Capital Security 

Construction Program.

3. Finalize the mechanisms OBO will use to better track and evaluate 

the actual operations and maintenance performance of its buildings—

whether Excellence or SED—and document through appropriate 

policies, procedures, or guidance.

4. Finalize the mechanisms OBO will use to centrally manage project 

management data (to include project cost and schedule information), 

currently termed the Ideal Operational State, and document through 

appropriate policies, procedures, or guidance.

We provided a draft of this report to State for comment. State provided 

technical comments on the draft, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

State also provided written comments that are reproduced in appendix 

VIII. In its written comments, State concurred with our four 

recommendations and described actions planned or under way to 

address each of them. State said it will

1. Perform a comprehensive evaluation of its performance measure and 

annual target of moving 1,500 people into safe, secure, and functional 

facilities and determine whether that target remains appropriate.

2. Develop new metrics applicable to the Excellence approach.

3. Finalize the mechanisms it will use to better track and evaluate the 

actual operations and maintenance performance of its buildings, 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments
Page 56 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

stating that this will occur after its life cycle cost analysis methodology 

project produces its final report.

4. Finalize the mechanisms OBO will use to centrally manage project 

management data, noting that State expects the ultimate product of 

this multiyear effort to provide a comprehensive framework for 

managing project data.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretary of State. In addition, the report is available 

at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

either Michael J. Courts at (202) 512-8980 or at courtsm@gao.gov or 

David J. Wise at (202) 512-5731 or at wised@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Office of Congressional Relations and Office of Public Affairs can be 

found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix IX.

Michael J. Courts

Director, International Affairs and Trade

David J. Wise

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Page 57 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

List of Requesters

The Honorable Ron Johnson

Chairman

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz

Chairman

The Honorable Elijah Cummings

Ranking Member

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Ron DeSantis

Chairman

The Honorable Stephen Lynch

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Darrell Issa

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 58 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

This report examines (1) reasons for the Department of State’s (State) 

shift to its Excellence approach, (2) key elements and trade-offs of the 

new approach, and (3) the extent to which State has established 

guidance and tools to implement and evaluate its Excellence approach.

To conduct this review, we obtained and analyzed information from State 

policy, planning, funding, and reporting documents, administrative 

memos, and select project documentation. We also interviewed officials 

from State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO); Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security (DS); Office of Management, Rightsizing, Policy, and 

Innovation; and Office of Acquisitions Management. Within OBO, we 

spoke with officials from offices responsible for site acquisition, planning, 

project development, design and engineering, cost management, 

construction management, facility management, policy and program 

analysis, and financial management. We also interviewed officials from a 

variety of architecture and engineering (design) firms and construction 

contractors that have worked for State. Additionally, we met with experts 

from several industry groups. In general, we did not review acquisition 

plans, the complete contracts for each project, or the terms and 

conditions that could have impacted cost, schedule, and performance of 

any project.

To identify the reasons for State’s shift to its Excellence approach, we 

analyzed relevant industry studies and OBO assessments from before the 

introduction of Excellence. We also examined the outputs from OBO’s 

2011 Excellence working groups as well as other Excellence 

documentation, such as OBO’s “Guiding Principles of Design Excellence 

in Diplomatic Facilities” and OBO’s 2011 memo approving the Excellence 

approach. Also, because the decision to adopt Excellence was made in 

2011—and the work leading up to the decision was undertaken in 2010—

we interviewed key former OBO officials with direct experience with 

OBO’s efforts to improve the Capital Security Construction Program at 

that time, including some who served on OBO’s management steering 

committee for Excellence.

To examine the key elements and trade-offs of the new approach, we 

collected and analyzed OBO policy and procedures directives, 

administrative memos, budget documentation, project authorization 

documents, design standards, and design-related documentation. We 

discussed changes in OBO’s process with relevant officials from OBO, 

DS, and the Office of Acquisitions Management. We also discussed these 

changes with officials from design firms and construction contractors that 

had previously worked, or are currently working for State. Furthermore, 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 59 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

we consulted industry studies and spoke with experts from industry 

groups, including the American Institute of Architects, the Associated 

General Contractors of America, the Bridging Institute of America, and the 

Design-Build Institute of America to determine the trade-offs inherent to 

different delivery approaches.

To determine the extent to which State has established guidance and 

tools to implement and evaluate its Excellence approach, we examined 

changes to OBO’s policies and procedures directives, design standards, 

standard operating procedures, and other guidance since 2011. We 

compared these changes to goals and recommendations from OBO’s 

approval of Excellence and also reviewed an OBO-sponsored study of its 

implementation progress. Additionally, we reviewed strategic planning 

documentation, to include State’s strategic plan, OBO’s Functional 

Bureau Strategy, and State’s Annual Performance Report. We also 

consulted federal standards for internal control and business process 

reengineering guidance.1 We also met with officials from OBO and the 

Office of Management, Rightsizing, Policy, and Innovation to discuss 

efforts to evaluate embassy buildings and to improve OBO’s data 

management.

To supplement our findings, we conducted a web-based survey of OBO 

staff from July 15 through August 12, 2016, soliciting their views on the 

sufficiency of OBO’s strategic vision, policies, procedures, and technical 

guidance for the Excellence approach as well as any particular 

efficiencies or challenges brought about by the Excellence approach.2

This survey was sent to 1,511 OBO staff, 705 (47 percent) of whom 

responded.3 We do not make any attempt to extrapolate our findings to 

the remaining 53 percent of eligible employees who chose not to 

complete our survey. The results of our survey provide measures of 

 1GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). Updated in 2014, see GAO, Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government ,GAO-14-704G (Washington, D.C.: September 2014). 

GAO, Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide, GAO/AIMD-10.1.15 

(Washington, D.C.: May 1997).

2Those surveyed included both OBO direct hire and contracted support staff working at 

OBO’s offices, which we refer to in the report generally as “OBO staff.” In general, OBO 

staff comprises U.S. civil service staff, U.S. Foreign Service officers, and some 

contractors.

3We initially sent the survey to 1,531 OBO staff but later determined that 20 of them had 

left the agency or were duplicates. We determined these 20 to be out of scope and 

removed them from the overall population. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 60 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

employees’ views at the time they completed the survey in July and 

August 2016.

Because we surveyed all OBO staff, the survey did not involve sampling 

errors. To minimize nonsampling errors, and to enhance data quality, we 

employed recognized survey design practices in the development of the 

questionnaire and in the collection, processing, and analysis of the survey 

data. To minimize errors arising from differences in how questions might 

be interpreted and to reduce variability in responses that should be 

qualitatively the same, we conducted pretests with six OBO employees. 

To ensure that we obtained a variety of perspectives on our survey, we 

randomly selected one employee from each of the following offices to 

pretest the survey: Area Management; Construction, Facility, and Security 

Management; Design and Engineering; Planning and Real Estate; 

Program Development, Coordination and Support; and Security 

Management. Based on feedback from these pretests, we revised the 

survey in order to improve the clarity of the questions. An independent 

survey specialist within GAO also reviewed a draft of the questionnaire 

prior to its administration. To reduce nonresponse, another source of 

nonsampling error, we followed up by e-mail with employees who had not 

responded to the survey to encourage them to complete it.

To analyze open-ended comments provided by those responding to the 

survey, we conducted a content analysis in two steps. In the first step, 

analysts read the comments and jointly developed categories for the 

responses. In the second step, each open-ended response was coded by 

one analyst, and then those codes were verified by another analyst. Any 

coding discrepancies were resolved by the analysts agreeing on what the 

codes should be.

Additionally, many comments touched upon findings we developed 

through our separate audit work. We have included some of these 

comments for illustrative purposes in appendix III. Respondents generally 

provided more negative comments than positive ones; however, where 

possible, we have tried to present a balanced set of positive and negative 

comments. In some cases, we edited responses for clarity or grammar. 

Views expressed in the survey may not be representative of all OBO staff 

views on given topics.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2015 to March 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 61 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Results of GAO’s Survey of Staff 

of the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations

Page 62 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

We conducted a web-based survey of the Department of State’s (State) 

Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) staff from July 15 

through August 12, 2016, soliciting their views on the sufficiency of OBO’s 

strategic vision, policies, procedures, and technical guidance for the 

Excellence approach to the design and construction of U.S. embassies 

and consulates, as well as any particular efficiencies or challenges 

brought about by the approach.1 We sent the survey to 1,511 OBO staff, 

705 (47 percent) of whom responded.2 We do not make any attempt to 

extrapolate the findings to the remaining 53 percent of eligible employees 

who chose not to complete our survey. The results of our survey provide 

measures of employees’ views at the time they completed the survey in 

July and August 2016. The questions we asked in our survey are shown 

below. Our survey comprised both fixed-choice and open-ended 

questions. In this appendix, we include all survey questions and 

aggregate results of responses to the fixed-choice questions and the 

number of responses provided to the open-ended questions. We do not 

provide text of the responses to the open-ended questions. For a more 

detailed discussion of our survey methodology, see appendix I. For our 

summary analysis and selected examples of comments provided in 

response to open-ended questions, see appendix III.

 1Those surveyed included both OBO direct hire and contracted support staff working at 

OBO’s offices, which we refer to in the report generally as “OBO staff.”

2We initially sent the survey to 1,531 OBO staff but later determined that 20 of them had 

left the agency or were duplicates. We determined these 20 to be out of scope and 

removed them from the overall population.

Appendix II: Results of GAO’s Survey of 

Staff of the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations
Appendix II: Results of GAO’s Survey of Staff 

of the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations

Page 63 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Numeric Responses to GAO’s Survey of State’s Embassy 

Construction Program

Demographic information

1. About how long have you worked with OBO?

 Less than 1 year 76 respondents

 1 to 5 years 218 respondents

 6 to 10 years 150 respondents

 11 to 20 years 170 respondents

 More than 20 years 89 respondents

Provided no answer to this question 2 respondents

2. Which of the following categories best describes your position?

 Civil Service 264 respondents

 Foreign Service 214 respondents

 PSC3 134 respondents

 Other: _______________________ 86 respondents

Provided no answer to this question 7 respondents

3. How many new NEC/NCC4 projects have you worked on or supported 

as an OBO employee? Please do not include annexes or where you 

were covering for someone else.

 None 127 respondents

 1 to 3 162 respondents

 4 to 6 100 respondents

 7 to 12 72 respondents

 More than 12 239 respondents

Provided no answer to this question 5 respondents

4. Where is your current posting?

 Headquarters (SA-6) 501 respondents

 Overseas 196 respondents

Provided no answer to this question 8 respondents

5. In which OBO office do you currently work?

OBO Front Office (FO):

 Director, Deputy Directors, all Managing 

 3Personal services contractor.

4New embassy compound/new consulate compound.
Appendix II: Results of GAO’s Survey of Staff 

of the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations

Page 64 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

 Directors, and executive staff 9 respondents

Planning and Real Estate (PRE):

 Acquisitions and Disposals 11 respondents

 Master Planning and Evaluations 3 respondents

 Real Property Leasing 14 respondents

 Strategic Planning 16 respondents

Project Development, Coordination, and Support (PDCS):

 Cost Management 11 respondents

 Design and Engineering 84 respondents

 Project Development and Coordination 40 respondents

Construction, Security, Facilities Management (CSFM):

 Construction Management 120 respondents

 Facility Management 165 respondents

 Security Management 51 respondents

Operations (OPS):

 Area Management 18 respondents

 Fire Protection 18 respondents

 Safety Health and Environmental 

 Management 10 respondents

Resource Management (RM):

 Financial Management 8 respondents

 Office of the Executive Director 25 respondents

 Policy and Program Analysis 5 respondents

Other:

 Other: ____________________________ 52 respondents

 I’d rather not identify my office 42 respondents

 Provided no answer to this question 3 respondents

Program Direction

6. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the 

program direction of OBO’s construction program? What perspectives 

or specific examples can you provide to illustrate your answers?
Appendix II: Results of GAO’s Survey of Staff 

of the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations

Page 65 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Outside 

my 

expertise

Strongly 

agree

Somewhat 

agree

Neither 

agree 

nor 

disagree

Somewhat 

disagree

Strongly 

disagree

No 

opinion

No 

response

Number of 

written 

responses 

provided

a. Since 2011, OBO senior 

leadership—Director, 

Deputy Directors, and 

Managing Directors—

have effectively 

conveyed their strategic 

vision of what Excellence 

is.

71 91 148 104 106 108 75 2 267

b. OBO senior leadership—

Director, Deputy 

Directors, and Managing 

Directors—has 

successfully guided the 

organization in defining, 

implementing and 

supporting State’s 

Excellence Initiative.

79 81 149 109 104 97 77 9 203

c. The Excellence Initiative 

has generally improved 

the Capital Security 

Construction Program.

137 77 97 135 72 89 90 8 203

d. Since 2011, OBO has 

provided clear and 

comprehensive strategic 

or long-term guidance to 

implement its planning, 

design, construction, and 

maintenance approach.

83 74 138 104 116 101 75 14 195

e. Since 2011, OBO at an 

overarching level has 

established clear and 

comprehensive policies 

(e.g., PPDs, Foreign 

Affairs Manual, Foreign 

Affairs Handbook,) 

related to my job.

61 98 155 118 89 90 85 9 171

f. Since 2011, OBO at an 

office level has provided 

clear and comprehensive 

standard operating 

procedures related to 

my job.

34 103 163 105 114 119 57 10 199

g. Since 2011, OBO has 

provided clear and 

comprehensive 

technical standards 

and guidelines related 

to my job.

37 119 176 107 92 91 66 17 184
Appendix II: Results of GAO’s Survey of Staff 

of the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations

Page 66 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

7. Since 2011, what, if any, benefits or efficiencies—related to how OBO 

now plans, designs, constructs, and maintains NECs/NCCs—have been 

introduced within your specific area of expertise (i.e., site acquisition, 

planning, cost estimating, project management, scheduling, design, 

construction, security management, and facility management)?

• We received 373 written responses to this question.

8. Since 2011, what, if any, challenges or inefficiencies—related to how 

OBO now plans, designs, constructs, and maintains NECs/NCCs—have 

been introduced within your specific area of expertise (i.e., site 

acquisition, planning, cost estimating, project management, scheduling, 

design, construction, security management, and facility management)?

• We received 387 written responses to this question.

9. To the extent you have knowledge, how would you characterize the 

Excellence program (roughly 2011 to present) as compared to the SED 

program (roughly 2001 to 2011) in terms of producing diplomatic facilities 

that are outstanding in all respects, including security, architecture, 

construction, sustainability, operations and maintenance?

1. The Excellence program is generally more 

 effective than the SED program. 109 Respondents

2. The SED program is generally more effective 

 than the Excellence program. 157 Respondents

3. The Excellence program is generally as 

 effective as the SED program. 73 Respondents

4. No opinion/no basis to judge 345 Respondents

Provided no responses to this question 21 Respondents

9a. What specific examples regarding security, architecture, construction, 

sustainability, or operations and maintenance can you provide to illustrate 

your answer?

• We received 403 written responses to this question.
Appendix II: Results of GAO’s Survey of Staff 

of the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations

Page 67 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Table 7: Responses on the Effectiveness of Excellence by Tenure at the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations

To the extent you have knowledge, how would you characterize the Excellence program (roughly 2011 to present) as 

compared to the SED program (roughly 2001 to 2011) in terms of producing diplomatic facilities that are outstanding in all 

respects including security, architecture, construction, sustainability, operations and maintenance?

Staff tenure 

1. The 

Excellence 

program is 

generally 

more 

effective than 

the SED 

program.

2. The SED 

program is 

generally 

more 

effective than 

the 

Excellence 

program.

3. The 

Excellence 

program is 

generally as 

effective as 

the SED 

program.

4. No opinion/ 

no basis to 

judge.

No Response 

to this 

question. Totals 

Less than 1 year 6 4 1 61 4 76

1 to 5 years 31 27 15 143 2 218

6 to 10 years 29 33 11 72 5 150

11 to 20 years 29 64 26 44 7 170

More than 20 years 14 29 20 24 2 89

No Response to Tenure Question — — — 1 1 2

Totals 109 157 73 345 21 705

Legend: SED = Standard Embassy Design.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296

Table 8: Responses from Major Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations Offices on the Effectiveness of Excellence

To the extent you have knowledge, how would you characterize the Excellence program (roughly 2011 to present) as 

compared to the SED program (roughly 2001 to 2011) in terms of producing diplomatic facilities that are outstanding in all 

respects, including security, architecture, construction, sustainability, operations and maintenance?

Office

1. The 

Excellence 

program is 

generally 

more 

effective than 

the SED 

program.

2. The SED 

program is 

generally 

more 

effective than 

the 

Excellence 

program.

3. The 

Excellence 

program is 

generally as 

effective as 

the SED 

program.

4. No opinion/ 

no basis to 

judge.

No response 

to this 

question. Totals

Facility Management 20 24 18 98 5 165

Construction Management 20 44 15 37 4 120

Design and Engineering 18 28 12 25 1 84

Security Management 3 21 5 21 1 51

Project Development and Coordination 13 8 3 16 — 40

12 remaining offices and 2 categoriesa 35 32 20 147 8 242

No response to office question — — — 1 2 3

Totals 109 157 73 345 21 705

Legend: SED = Standard Embassy Design.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296
Appendix II: Results of GAO’s Survey of Staff 

of the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations

Page 68 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

a

The “12 remaining offices” are the Office of the Executive Director for Resource Management, Area 

Management, Fire Protection, Strategic Planning, Real Property Leasing, Acquisitions and Disposals, 

Cost Management, Safety Health and Environmental Management, Financial Management, Policy 

and Program Analysis, Master Planning and Evaluations, and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations Front Office. These offices had 25 or few er total responses. The “2 categories” are from 

our survey: “other offices” and “I’d rather not identify my office.”

10. What additional information, if any, would you like to share in order to 

further elaborate on any of the responses you provided above?

• We received 338 written responses to this question.
Appendix III: Selected Comments from Our 

Survey of Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations Staff, with Summary Tabular 

Analyses

Page 69 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Of the 705 respondents, 550 provided comments in response to at least 

one open-ended question in our survey of Department of State Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) staff. For specific questions, we 

analyzed and categorized respondents’ comments and have reproduced 

selected comments below to characterize the results of that analysis. In 

addition, since many of the comments touched upon findings we 

developed through our separate audit work, we have also included some 

of those comments for illustrative purposes. Respondents generally 

provided more negative comments than positive ones; however, where 

possible, we have tried to present a balanced selection of positive and 

negative comments. In some cases, we edited responses for clarity or 

grammar. Views expressed in the survey may not be representative of all 

OBO staff views on given topics.

Table 9 summarizes the results of our analysis to categorize comments 

expressing opinions on the benefits and challenges of OBO’s Excellence 

approach to the design and construction of new embassies and 

consulates.

Appendix III: Selected Comments from Our 

Survey of Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations Staff, with Summary Tabular 

Analyses
Appendix III: Selected Comments from Our 

Survey of Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations Staff, with Summary Tabular 

Analyses

Page 70 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Table 9: Summary of Survey Comments Expressing Opinions on Benefits and Challenges Attributed to the Excellence 

Approach

Benefit comments Quantity Challenge comments Quantity

Control/flexibility of designs and site selection. 39 —

Aesthetic/ architectural improvement (“iconic 

designs”).

27 —

Development and/or improvement of standards, 

processes, procedures, templates, documents, 

etc.

69 Lack of, inadequate, or inconsistent application of 

policies/procedures/standards/ systems; uncertain 

impact of new policies, etc.

175

Improved coordination; facilitating input from 

different stakeholders/internal teams; 

consensus and leadership around program 

objectives.

60 Inadequate coordination; failure to facilitate input 

from various stakeholders/internal teams.

82

Increased focus on maintenance/ sustainability/ 

life cycle analyses.

50 Not enough emphasis on 

maintenance/sustainability/ life cycle analyses.

62

Greater oversight of/cooperation with 

construction contractors; improvement of the 

commissioning process.

15 Inadequate oversight and/or training of contractors; 

issues related to contracts/contract management; 

issues related to commissioning.

76

Improved design review process. 13 Problematic/burdensome design review and/or 

certification process.

51

— New/slow/problematic processes and/or 

requirements resulting from more complex and 

varied projects.

89

— Schedule challenges; extended timelines. 88

— Budget challenges; high costs. 86

— Leadership/management issues. 80

— Staffing issues. 47

— Construction challenges. 26

— Design errors and omissions. 28

— Limited data tracking/sharing; difficulties measuring 

performance and results.

24

Legend: — = No contrasting comments w ere identified in this category.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296

Note: In response to tw o questions asking for examples of (1) benefits or efficiencies and (2) 

challenges or inefficiencies, 421 respondents left 760 comments, some of w hich were counted in 

more than one category. Opinions expressed in the survey may not be representative of the opinions 

held by all Department of State Bureau of Overseas Operations staff.
Appendix III: Selected Comments from Our 

Survey of Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations Staff, with Summary Tabular 

Analyses

Page 71 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

The two text boxes that follow contain selected narrative responses on, 

respectively, the top four most-cited benefits and the top four most-cited 

challenges of the Excellence approach.

Selected Survey Comments on the Top Four Most-Cited Benefits of the Excellence Approach

Development and/or improvement of standards, processes, procedures, templates, documents, etc.:

• The 2016 OBO Design Standards have greatly improved the design process.

• We’ve started doing constructability reviews during design, which is helpful at making sure the designers are realistic in what they 

propose and that projects can be implemented in the specific region.

Improved coordination; facilitating input from different stakeholders/internal teams; consensus and leadership around 

program objectives:

• The different offices in OBO seem to work more closely together through the life of the project. There is still some “stove-piping,”

but it generally works better than previous years.

• Seems to be better coordination between OBO and the embassies and consulates.

Increased focus on maintenance/sustainability/life cycle analyses:

• OBO has recently directed its attention to the large role Facility Management undertakes during and after the construction of [an 

embassy]. It takes OBO 3 to 5 years to get a [an embassy] constructed, but OBO Facility Management has the responsibility for 

operations and maintenance for [the embassy’s] following 50 years of life. Facility Management now has a role in design and is 

working toward obtaining a meaningful role in the construction phase.

• Operations and Maintenance (O&M) are finally being brought into the full realm of planning, design, and construction of new 

facilities by current management. The greatest expense to the [U.S. government] is not in the planning or the design or the 

construction of new facilities, it is in the O&M of facilities over their 50-year average life cycle. OBO must bring greater focus as 

an organization on not just design excellence but on the “Total Ownership Cost” by incorporating the facility management experts 

and into every single facet [i.e., planning, design, construction, etc.] in order to minimize the O&M costs to the taxpayer over that 

50-year life cycle. This will require resources, [which are] not currently at hand.

Greater control/flexibility of designs and site selection:

• My understanding is that previous to 2011 most projects were SED design-build. While this is a very efficient delivery method for 

some projects, it is not necessarily the best fit for every project. I believe that the Excellence Initiative provides the flexibility to 

review and select the most appropriate design and delivery method for each project taking into account the unique budget, 

schedule, and site-specific parameters each project has.

• Since 2011, we have co-led the effort to search for and legitimize smaller sites in downtown or urban locations. Prior to 2011, the 

practice was to find overscaled sites outside of the urban core. The Excellence initiative allows for greater flexibility and 

customization to a specific site (relative to SED), allowing for greater efficiencies. Those efficiencies can, and often do, lead to 

reduced construction and operational costs.

Legend: OBO = Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations; SED = Standard Embassy Design.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296
Appendix III: Selected Comments from Our 

Survey of Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations Staff, with Summary Tabular 

Analyses

Page 72 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Selected Survey Comments on the Top Four Most-Cited Challenges of the Excellence Approach

Lack of, inadequate, or inconsistent application of policies/procedures/standards/systems; uncertain impact of new policies, 

etc.:

• The transition from “design-build” back to “design-bid-build” construction has been poorly implemented. Project design documents 

have not fully achieved the transition to the level of quality and detail required for overseas “design-bid-build” construction. The 

effort to move from standard design documents has further made achieving the level of quality for construction and security more 

difficult.

• Clear, applicable, specific, and enforceable standards have been watered down or replaced with less specific and in some cases 

tentative suggestions. Senior OBO management has difficulty objectively articulating design excellence goals or even attempting 

to measure results. Contract performance in particular is difficult to measure or, in some cases not obtained due to lack of 

quantifiable criteria.

New/slow/problematic processes and/or requirements resulting from more complex and varied projects:

• Challenges have been introduced in realizing design intent in most of the underdeveloped countries that construction occurs in. 

Designs are complex and the materials exotic for the location. Inefficiencies have been introduced in requiring senior 

management reviews of [design-build] projects without fully defining what the intent of such reviews are. Challenges have been 

introduced in the constructability of building features. Challenges introduced with reliance on outside architect firms to develop 

plans and drawings and to judge design intent or answer questions.

• My required time spent on projects has at least doubled because of the policies put in place since 2011. In terms of 

improvements, more aesthetically pleasing facilities are being produced, but in my opinion the amount of effort required to attain 

good design is very disproportionate to the effort required to achieve this goal. This is due to a poorly organized process and a 

severe lack of communication throughout the organization.

Schedule challenges; extended timelines:

• Schedules are consistently moved forward with longer timelines to accomplish the design portion of the project.

• Planning and design take much more time and effort than before. Assurance of meeting security criteria is challenging, since 

every new embassy is a “one of a kind” project. More daunting is the process by which the Front Office approves design 

concepts. That alone has added 3 to 6 months to the planning and design schedule.

Budget challenges; high costs:

• Since no two posts have the same size, plan, finish materials, exterior components, or operating systems, I see no efficiencies 

whatsoever. The push for high initial budgets is to be able to cover the costs associated with the fancier design elements.

• Site acquisition is more difficult, and more costly than ever. Only urban locations and not cheaper bigger suburban sites are even 

considered. Project design costs are exponentially higher through the Excellence program. Higher costs mean fewer projects 

being planned for or constructed in any given year.

Legend: OBO = Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations; SED = Standard Embassy Design.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296
Appendix III: Selected Comments from Our 

Survey of Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations Staff, with Summary Tabular 

Analyses

Page 73 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Table 10: Summary of GAO’s Analysis of Survey Comments Expressing Positive and Negative Opinions toward the 

Excellence Approach to the Design and Construction of New Embassies and Consulates

Positive comments Quantity Negative comments Quantity

Aesthetic/architectural improvement (“iconic designs”) 62 Excellence prioritizes design over functionality 27

Control/flexibility of designs and site selection 42 —

Excellence embassies demonstrate an increased focus 

on maintenance/ sustainability/life cycle analyses

31 —

Excellence embassies are more secure 11 Standard Embassy Design (SED) faster, more 

efficient, more cost effective at building safe/ 

secure facilities

32

Improved coordination; facilitating input from different 

stakeholders/ internal teams; consensus and 

leadership around program objectives

10 —

SED and Excellence both have positive and/or 

negative attributes;no or minimal difference; 

appropriateness of either program depends on the type 

of project or metric used to compare

41

— Excellence costs more compared with SED 

(“budget challenges”)

74

— Excellence takes more time compared with SED 

(“schedule challenges”)

64

— Excellence introduces new/ slow/ problematic 

processes and/or requirements resulting from 

more complex and varied projects

51

— Under Excellence (compared with SED): Lack of, 

inadequate, or inconsistent application of 

policies/ procedures/ standards/ systems; poor 

communication of policies, etc.

38

— Under Excellence (compared with SED): 

Inadequate oversight and/or training of 

contractors; issues related to commissioning; 

issues related to contracts/ contract management

22

— Under Excellence (compared with SED): Staffing 

issues

19

— Under Excellence (compared with SED): 

Problematic and/or burdensome design review/ 

certification process

17

— Under Excellence (compared with SED): 

Leadership/ management issues

14

— Excellence buildings too complex for many 

locations

13

Legend: — = No contrasting comments w ere identified in this category.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296
Appendix III: Selected Comments from Our 

Survey of Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations Staff, with Summary Tabular 

Analyses

Page 74 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Note: In response to one question comparing SED to Excellence, 403 respondents left comments, 

some of w hich were counted in more than one category. Opinions expressed in the survey may not 

be representative of the opinions held by all Department of State Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations staff.

Selected Survey Comments Regarding the SED and Excellence Approaches

• The SED model streamlined many processes which apparently translated into a more expedient overall delivery of new facilities. 

The Excellence program successfully addresses many of the SED program drawbacks (“embassies looking similar and like 

fortresses”), however, at a price (arguably longer and more expensive projects). The decision clearly needs to be made whether it 

is worth that price.

• While the SED program was severely limiting, it is my belief that there is a middle ground between the SED and the Excellence

program—where OBO has a set of standards, specifications, and requirements that are clearly communicated to the design firm 

while allowing them to customize the footprint and design features of the building. OBO has buildings in its portfolio that were built 

using “SED Criteria” that are not “prison-like” and forbidding. It can be done in a thoughtful and efficient way that would appeal to 

people architecturally. In plain words—OBO didn’t have to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

• On the positive side, designing unique facilities improves the aesthetics of the U.S. presence abroad and sets an example for

building system efficiencyand innovative systems to the world. On the negative side, each unique design requires re-inventing 

the wheel and creates additional challenges for the designer to integrate physical and technical security, as well as accounting for 

building maintenance and upkeep. These designs are often difficult to implement overseas, and the state-of-the-art systems are 

difficult to maintain in some countries with unique equipment and a significant increase in facilities staff. Unique designs are more 

difficult and frequently more expensive to implement, creating an impact on time and cost.

• The Excellence program designs buildings that are architecturally pleasing, but in order to achieve nice aesthetics and achieve 

the security mandates that embassies must adhere to, I believe a cost premium exists in order to meet the aesthetics of the 

embassies designed under the Excellence program. I think a compromise can be achieved, and in that compromise some cost 

savings could be realized, but in my opinion the pendulum has swung completely opposite that of the SED, and the evidence is in 

a cost comparison between the embassies designed under the SED program to those designed under the Excellence program.

• The designs of [embassies] are more challenging or difficult to introduce, implement, and execute. Every design is unique and 

different, takes longer to evaluate, and requires more coordination; more issues are encountered that need to be resolved. The 

construction of [embassies] is also more challenging or difficult to execute. The distinct construction materials used are more 

expensive, take longer to procure and transport, and are more difficult to install. Therefore, the schedule is longer, especially if 

there are more issues encountered during design and construction, and the cost of construction and contingencies are much 

higher.

• SEDs were all about schedule and budget and when either of these were threatened, things were de-scoped or glossed over. 

Many times those were support annexes (shops, storage facilities) that allowed the facilities to be properly maintained or morale/ 

welfare/recreation facilities or amenities, meaning that these things had to be added after the fact, putting a great deal of pressure 

on posts. Excellence does a better job in terms of incorporating architectural features, energy efficiency and sustainability design, 

and delivering a fully realized compound.

• I believe that the Excellence program produces a better product and platform for diplomacy; however, most of us also 

acknowledge that the SED program gave us the ability to execute faster when needed. They should not be mutually exclusive. 

There are principles in the SED that can be applied and probably should not have been just “thrown out.” It should have been a 

good solution for an expeditious need, in a place where appropriate. We also know that it did not work well everywhere, and in 

places with stringent code, zoning, or other restrictions (including the desire to operate in an urban context), it was definitely not a 

good solution. As long as the Front Office doesn’t focus solely on aesthetics, the Excellence program should produce some 

outstanding facilities that have far more flexibility than the SED, better functionality, and improved suitability for the country in 

which they reside.

Legend: OBO = Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations; SED = Standard Embassy Design.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296
Appendix III: Selected Comments from Our 

Survey of Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations Staff, with Summary Tabular 

Analyses

Page 75 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Many responses to open-ended questions in the survey touched upon 

issues we reviewed through our separate audit work. We have included 

some of these responses for illustrative purposes in the text boxes that 

follow. In some cases, we edited comments for clarity or grammar.

Selected Survey Comments on Concerns with SED

• The SED program was a failure for site specific implementation. It is generally known around OBO that there was no such thing 

as a real SED building. Due to the technical requirements and the site specific requirements, all SED compounds required 

adaptation, usually at significant cost and time.

• The SED had plenty of problems. Yes, the main issue was the boring and unimaginative concrete box; however, it did produce 

embassies. There is a middle road that opens up the options and opportunities for improved design without going overboard.

• The SED program was effective in quickly and efficiently providing safe and secure facilities to perform diplomatic activities 

overseas using the [design-build] delivery method. However, the designs were not very attractive and didn’t represent the best in 

American architecture.

Legend: OBO = Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations; SED = Standard Embassy Design.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296

Selected Survey Comments on the Desire to Improve Embassies under the Excellence Approach

• The Excellence initiative is a better way to design the [State] Department’s projects and buildings. It takes advantage of 

innovation in the design generated by architects and engineers from different points of view. The SED program produced more 

and more generic buildings that translated into more or less a template mentality.

• The architecture is less fortress-like, more approachable to local populations, more culturally sensitive (more diplomatic). It is 

more attractive and something that Americans can be prouder of, as well as being greener and increasingly sustainable.

• From my limited experience with OBO, it appears as though the Excellence program attracts better design firms to the program.

Better design firms should result in a better end product. The Excellence program also appears to result in more excitement from 

the host country and allows for embracing culturally specific designs.

Legend: OBO = Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations; SED = Standard Embassy Design.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296

Selected Survey Comments on Industry and Senior OBO Management Design Reviews

• The incorporation of the Industry Advisory Reviews gives design firms real-time feedback from their peers on not only how to 

support the Excellence program, but how to save costs and make buildings more efficient during the design process.

• I think that the new processes are moving forward, and we are seeing some positive results with stronger designs and hopefully, 

construction. For example, there were positive reactions by both the staff and private sector architects to the Industry Advisory 

Reviews that I attended.

• Too much time and effort is spent on reviews by OBO Front Office and outsiders. Front Office seems to be inconsistent in what it 

wants in a design and will change its mind from one review to the next. We are hiring professional design firms. They should be 

able to do their jobs.

• The design process has been significantly impacted by the introduction of numerous senior management and Industry Advisory 

Group reviews. These reviews are expensive and time consuming. An independent evaluation of their value versus their cost is 

warranted.

Legend: OBO = Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations; SED = Standard Embassy Design.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296
Appendix III: Selected Comments from Our 

Survey of Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations Staff, with Summary Tabular 

Analyses

Page 76 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Selected Survey Comments on OBO Guidance Related to the Excellence Approach

• I do believe OBO as a whole is trying to maintain and keep up with outdated policies. In my observations OBO is very 

understaffed or doesn’t have the right mix of professionals necessary to maintain policy and regulations.

• There is no mention anywhere of changes to the security program brought on by Design Excellence. In my opinion, no one has 

ever thought through what it means to construct anything other than a SED. There is no Design Excellence guidance for security 

professionals.

• The Guiding Principles are widely available to staff and clearly reflect the vision of the senior leadership.

• The Design Excellence guide took 2 years to write; then they wanted the operations and maintenance piece added but gave us 

initially only 2 weeks.

• Case in point. Just yesterday an OBO notice came out on the Excellence Initiative. No doubt it had something to do with the 

timing of this [GAO] survey.

• OBO has been working to modify policies and procedures directives (PPDs), etc.; however, it takes time, and it is difficult to get 

people to take the time away from their regular duties to step back and look at policies. 

Legend: OBO = Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations; SED = Standard Embassy Design.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296

Selected Survey Comments on the Need for Excellence-Specific Performance Metrics

• I have not seen any performance metrics that compare before/after the Excellence Initiative.

• What are the performance metrics used to measure this [Excellence]?

• Senior OBO management has difficulty objectively articulating Design Excellence goals or even attempting to measure results.

• I am not aware of any metrics for evaluating the “Excellence” of a project and the many facets involved in assessing a building.

• What metrics does OBO employ to measure “effectiveness” or “efficiency,” specifically, strategically? Answer: none. Each project 

takes as long as it takes. The project costs what it costs.

• Several presentations have been given and a few documents produced to try to articulate Design Excellence; however, much of 

the concept is subjective, due to the emphasis on architecture, and cannot be measured or effectively monitored for performance.

• There are no real performance measures; total operations and maintenance costs are unknown.

Legend: OBO = Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations; SED = Standard Embassy Design.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296

Selected Survey Comments on the Need for Better Project Data and Systems

• Project database does not have a user manual or guide, either. Who does this? Why create a database and never provide a user 

guide or how-to manual for the user of the data? We are supposed to have a new and better projects database.

• We used the same databases/networks and computers for the last 10+ years. Not enough server space to store the size/volume 

of electronic files/docs that we produce. The “Ideal Operational State” research/data collection effort, however, we hope, will 

resolve some of these technological issues.

• The Ideal Operational State effort is an excellent opportunity to manage the Life Cycle Cost Analysis of the entire business 

process life cycle. The existence of the Ideal Operational State, while itself a very good thing, indicates the need for more

strategic alignment of process with and definition of a vision.

Legend: OBO = Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations; SED = Standard Embassy Design.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-17-296
Appendix IV: Timeline of Department of State 

Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, 

Standard Embassy Design, and Excellence

Page 77 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Appendix IV: Timeline of Department of State 

Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, 

Standard Embassy Design, and Excellence
Appendix V: Guiding Principles of Excellence 

in Diplomatic Facilities; U.S. Department of 

State Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations

Page 78 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Guiding Principles of Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities; U.S. State Department Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations 

(OBO)

Guiding principle Intent

Purpose and function Embassies and consulates have two essential purposes: to be safe, secure, functional, and 

inspiring places for the conduct of diplomacy, and to physically represent the U.S. government to 

the host nation. 

Site The site and location of an embassy have practical as well as symbolic implications. OBO will 

develop sites that best represent the U.S. government and its goals, and enhance the conduct of 

diplomacy. Whenever possible, sites will be selected in urban areas, allowing U.S. embassies to 

contribute to the civic and urban fabric of host cities. 

Design OBO will evaluate designs on the basis of their success in skillfully balancing requirements, and on 

how well the design represents the United States to the host nation. Designs are to be functionally 

simple and spatially flexible to meet changing needs and be enduring over time. An official embassy 

style will be avoided. Designs will be cost-effective. Each design will be responsive to its context, to 

include the site, its surroundings, and the local culture and climate. The designs will make use of 

contextually appropriate and durable materials and incorporate the latest in security and safety 

features. The grounds should be functional and representational spaces. They will be sustainable, 

include indigenous plantings, and incorporate existing site resources, such as mature trees.

Engineering The facilities will incorporate advanced methods, systems, technologies, and materials appropriate 

to the facility and local conditions, including the site, climate, natural hazards, security, and the 

practical reality of construction, maintenance, and operations in the host nation.

Safety and security The safety and security of staff and visitors is paramount. Designs and construction will meet or 

exceed all security and safety standards and specifications. 

Sustainability Buildings and grounds will incorporate sustainable design and energy efficiency. Construction, 

maintenance, and operations practices will be sustainable.

Architectural and engineering

professional services

OBO will hire leading American architects and engineers. Selection will be based on the quality of 

their design achievements and portfolio of work. The selection methodology will be open, 

competitive, and transparent.

Construction and 

craftsmanship

Construction professionals will be engaged throughout the process to ensure the best possible 

design and implementation. OBO is committed to selecting the most qualified building contractors 

with a record of delivering high quality projects.

Operations and maintenance Operations and maintenance professionals will be engaged throughout the design and construction 

process. Buildings and sites will be economical to operate and maintain and will utilize equipment 

and materials that are durable, dependable, and suitable. Designs will be based on life-cycle 

analysis of options that take into account longterm operations and maintenance. 

Art Embassy buildings and grounds are an opportunity to showcase the best of American and host 

nation art and culture. OBO is committed to integrating art into its facilities such that each property 

will be both an individual expression of Excellence and part of a larger body of work representing 

the best that America’s designers and artists can leave to later generations.

Historically, architecturally, or 

culturally significant 

properties and collections

OBO is committed to preserving the State Department’s historical, cultural, and architectural legacy. 

The Secretary of State’s Register of Culturally Significant Property is the official listing of important 

diplomatic architecture overseas and properties that figure prominently in our country’s international 

heritage. 

Source: GAO based on Department of State documentation. | GAO-17-296

Appendix V: Guiding Principles of Excellence 

in Diplomatic Facilities; U.S. Department of 

State Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations
Appendix VI: Approaches to Achieve 

Excellence; U.S. State Department, Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations

Page 79 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Approaches to Achieve Excellence; U.S. State Department, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO)

Strategy General Intent

Holistic approach to project 

delivery

Project teams include all key stakeholders such as users, tenant agencies, and OBO disciplines, as 

well as members of the architectural, engineering, and construction contractor teams.

Information technology (IT) OBO’s IT platform integrates and makes available all project information, promoting effective review, 

communication, and decisionmaking during project development, construction, maintenance and 

operations.

Project delivery methods OBO uses either Design/Build or Design/Bid/Build. Neither delivery method is a default. Context, 

complexity, construction environment, and urgency are evaluated when selecting a method for each 

project.

Sites OBO recognizes the representational and symbolic importance of site location. OBO has revised 

site scoring criteria to acquire sites in urban areas. OBO considers redevelopment of strategicallylocated U.S. government owned sites.

Architect and engineer (A-E) 

selection

OBO contracts with the most talented A-E firms, whether long-established or emerging new firms. 

The selection process focuses on the portfolio of work, team members, and past performance.

Design process OBO effectuates high-quality design through design processes such as on-site design charrettes, 

on-board working sessions, constructability and maintainability reviews, senior management 

approvals, and peer reviews. 

Design goals The Guiding Principles outline the fundamental design goals of all of our projects. These include the 

integration of purpose, function, security, safety, flexibility, sustainability, maintainability, and art.

Ensuring long-term value OBO uses sustainability principles and life-cycle cost analysis to ensure that facilities provide the 

lowest overall long-term cost of ownership, consistent with quality and function. 

Construction contractor 

selection

OBO is working to expand the pool of contractors and reach out to new emerging firms to promote 

competition and ensure the best outcome.

Best value contract award OBO is using the Best Value method, which includes factors such as past performance and team 

qualifications, as well as consideration of lifecycle costs in the evaluation process.

Early contractor involvement OBO involves construction contractors in early stages, particularly on long-term and complex 

projects, to ensure the best outcome and reduce risk. 

Operations and maintenance Reference guides and training programs are developed for each major project. The guide includes 

information such as design intent, systems information, maintenance requirements, and 

troubleshooting. This ensures that facilities are operated and maintained properly and that future 

modifications to the building are in keeping with the original design intent.

Guide to Excellence A Guide to Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities has been released on the OBO website 

(www.state.gov/obo). The guide is comprehensive and highlights how Excellence goals and 

priorities will be achieved in each phase of a project. The Guide is a basic “how to” manual.

Revised architectural and 

engineering design 

guidelines

Design requirements have been revised to support Excellence. The requirements emphasize highperformance buildings, flexibility and best design practices, while moving away from a fixed solution.

Recognizing Excellence An Excellence awards program is in development. The program will recognize projects that 

exemplify Excellence.

Source: GAO based on Department of State documentation. | GAO-17-296

Appendix VI: Approaches to Achieve 

Excellence; U.S. State Department, Bureau 

of Overseas Buildings Operations
Appendix VII: Timing of Industry Advisory 

Reviews within the Bureau of Overseas 

Buildings Operations Design Process

Page 80 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Appendix VII: Timing of Industry Advisory 

Reviews within the Bureau of Overseas 

Buildings Operations Design Process
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State

Page 81 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State

Page 82 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State

Page 83 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction
Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 84 GAO-17-296 Embassy Construction

Michael J. Courts, (202) 512-8980 or courtsm@gao.gov

David J. Wise, (202) 512-5731 or wised@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above, Leslie Holen (Assistant Director, 

International Affairs and Trade), Michael Armes (Assistant Director, 

Physical Infrastructure), David Hancock, John Bauckman, Eugene Beye, 

Melissa Wohlgemuth, and Elisa Yoshiara made key contributions to this 

report. Technical assistance was provided by David Dayton, Jill Lacey, 

Alex Welsh, and Neil Doherty.

Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100233)
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