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AN OVERVIEW OF THE NATION’S 

WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT & 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

December 10, 2015 

Serial No. 114–55 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan 

STEVE KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts 

DON S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

MARK TAKANO, California 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT

HON. JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR. 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

RANDY WEBER, Texas 

JOHN MOOLENAAR, Michigan 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

MARK TAKANO, California 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

HON. BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DON BEYER, Virginia 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

December 10, 2015 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Jim Bridenstine, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House 

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 9 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Statement submitted by Representative Donald S. Beyer, Jr., Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, 

and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................... 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14 

Statement by Representative Barry Loudermilk, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House 

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 18 

Witnesses: 

Dr. Stephen Volz, Assistant Administrator, National Environmental Satellite, 

Data, and Information Services, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 20 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 23 

Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, 

Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 37 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 39 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 63 

Appendix I: Additional Material for the Record 

Statement submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 

Representatives .................................................................................................... 88 

Statement submitted by Representative Suzanne Bonamici, Ranking Minority 

Member, Subcommittee on Enviorment, Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................... 89 

(1) 

AN OVERVIEW OF THE NATION’S 

WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAMS 

AND POLICIES 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Bridenstine 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Environment] presiding. 
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Chairman BRIDENSTINE. The Subcommittee on the Environment 

and the Subcommittee on Oversight will come to order. 

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of 

the Subcommittee at any time. 

Welcome to today’s hearing titled ‘‘An Overview of the Nation’s 

Weather Satellite Program and Policies.’’ 

I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement and 

then to the Ranking Member as well. 

We’ve had a number of hearings about all kinds of issues related 

to satellites from the current programs of record to commercial satellites. We’ve heard testimony about JPSS and GOES–R already 

once this year, and this is a second opportunity to do so. 

Some of the concerns that I have are the delay of the GOES–R 

satellite program from March of 2016 to October of 2016. Obviously 

this is a concern for the weather of our country, being able to predict and forecast accurate and timely weather events, critically important infrastructure for the data that feeds our numerical weather models, which keep all of our constituents safe. 

So this is a good hearing. We have heard testimony before. Going 

along with the delay in GOES–R, we have an extension of the life 

expectancy of some of our current programs, and we have questions 

about if that is realistic or not. We have seen now NOAA–16 break 

apart in space over Thanksgiving, and that gives a lot of us concern about maybe it didn’t just break apart on itself. I know some 

have suggested that but something had to occur, whether it was a 

malfunction on board the satellite, even though it was beyond its 

lifetime, or it could have been hit by debris. Whatever the case is, 

it broke apart and now is contributing to more orbital debris, which 

is a concern. 

That being the case, you think about orbital debris, you think 

about the Suomi NPP satellite that also is coming to the end of its 

useful life and it’s not shielded. It wasn’t designed for long-term 

service. It was designed more for testing and validation. So when 

you look at the SUOMI–NPP satellite, is it being pelted by debris? 

Is it at risk? And of course, would that create, you know, a gap as 

it relates to our polar orbiting satellite programs and the challenges that we’ve had with JPSS to date as well. 

We’d also like to discuss NOAA’s Commercial Space Policy, which 

is a wonderful start to, I think, great opportunities for the future 

to provide more resiliency and redundancy, disaggregated and distributed architectures that the commercial industry can provide to 

augment our numerical weather models with data coming from the 

private sector, and some of the issue that are going on there. And 

finally, the issue with debris mitigation, I think are critically important not only to NOAA but to national security space and civil 

space as well, and commercial space. 

So I’m looking forward to this hearing, looking forward to the 

testimony of our witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Bridenstine follows:] 
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Chairman BRIDENSTINE. And I’d like to recognize now the Ranking Member, Mr. Beyer, for his opening statement. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and thank 

you, Chairman Bridenstine and Chairman Loudermilk, for holding 

today’s hearing. I’d also like to thank and welcome our witnesses 

this morning. 

As has been stated by our Chairman, the goal of the Committee’s 

oversight in this area is simple. It’s to ensure that both the Joint 

Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and the Geostationary Operational 

Environmental Satellites (GOES) are technically sound and operationally robust when they’re completed, which we all hope is as 

soon as possible. As satellites that have a critical role in weather 

forecasting, losing coverage of either system could have serious, 

perhaps catastrophic effects on our public safety. 

Unfortunately, NOAA’s development of both of these weather 

satellite systems has had a rocky path. They’ve been plagued by 

cost growth, poor schedule performance, technical issues and management challenges. 

During the Subcommittee’s hearing on these projects in February 

it seemed that JPSS was the more troubled of the two but now it 

looks like GOES–R has now been delayed by more than six months 

until, as the Chairman said, the new October 2016 launch date, 

which may still be at risk. 

These ongoing delays on these programs increase the cost of the 

satellites, distort NOAA’s budget, and limit the agency’s resources 

for weather forecasting and important research into weather, 

oceans, and climate science. 

We know that satellite acquisition is no easy task and these 

problems are not unique to NOAA. They routinely occur in the development of satellite programs by the Department of Defense, the 

U.S. intelligence community, NASA. But that isn’t an excuse, and 

I believe that NOAA recognizes that this is an unsustainable 

model, and that going forward the agency will need to find a more 

efficient and more reliable means of putting its instruments into 

orbit. 

Shifting back to the work conducted by Mr. Powner and his team 

at GAO, it’s my understanding that since 2012 they’ve issued 23 

recommendations to NOAA that they believe will strengthen the 

agency’s acquisition efforts and improve their contingency planning, but to date, just six of these recommendations have been implemented. So I’m interested in learning more today about the remaining recommendations and NOAA’s progress in addressing 

them. 

Additionally, I think it’s important for Congress and this Committee to have a clear understanding of NOAA’s policies and planning as it relates to these critical satellites. NOAA’s decision to 

change the expected lifespan of its weather satellites needs to be 

transparent and clearly documented. NOAA’s satellites also provide 

the data necessary for our weather models and the critical forecasting and warning products and services provided by the National Weather Service. In fact, the capabilities of the National 

Weather Service are directly dependent on the quality and success 

of our satellite programs as well as a highly skilled workforce. 
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So while it’s not the focus of today’s hearing, I want to mention 

some important work GAO is conducting on behalf of my colleagues, Ms. Bonamici, Mr. Lipinski, and me. Specifically, we’ve 

been concerned about the number of vacancies that currently exist 

in the National Weather Service’s field offices, and we’ve asked 

GAO to review present and future staffing levels in order to support the agency’s efforts to evolve its operational components and 

to increase its decision support services. Ensuring an adequate 

workforce is also central to achieving NOAA’s public safety mission. We can’t afford a weather satellite gap, and it is essential 

that NOAA keep these programs on track. I know these are both 

technically difficult and critically important issues that NOAA 

needs to address. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Chairman. I look forward 

to today’s hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beyer follows:] 
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Chairman BRIDENSTINE. I thank the Ranking Member for his 

opening statement. 

I’d like to recognize the Chairman of the Oversight Committee, 

Mr. Loudermilk from Georgia. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to 

our witnesses, and thank you for being here. Mr. Chairman, thank 

you for holding this hearing. 

Today we’ll be hearing from GAO and NOAA regarding the polar 

orbiting and geostationary satellite programs. The JPSS and 

GOES–R programs that NOAA maintains have experienced setbacks. Today we intend to learn what has changed since our last 

hearing back in February of this year. 

Earlier this year, GAO published a report detailing its concern 

that the NOAA polar satellite program, JPSS, is facing an unprecedented gap in satellite data. GAO believes that while JPSS remains within its new lifecycle cost estimate and schedule baselines, 

recent rises in component costs and technical issues during development increase the likelihood of a near-term data gap. Additionally, although NOAA has recently reduced its estimated potential 

gap from fifteen to only three months, GAO noted that this assessment was based on incomplete data and does not account for the 

risks posed by space debris to satellite hardware. This is even more 

concerning given the recent breakup of a retired NOAA satellite in 

orbit. GAO estimated in its report that a data gap may occur earlier and last longer than NOAA anticipates. 

Perhaps even more troubling is the potential data gap facing 

NOAA’s GOES–R program, the geostationary satellite system. 

Since its inception, the GOES–R program has undergone significant increases in cost and reductions in scope, and as GAO’s report 

indicates, NOAA has yet to reverse or even halt this trend, as we 

have seen with the most recent delay to the launch, pushing a 

March 2016 launch date back to October 2016. This means we 

could be facing a long period without a backup satellite in orbit. 

History has shown us that backups are sometimes necessary to 

reduce risk to public safety and the economy. In 2008 and 2012, 

the agency was forced to use backup satellites to cover problems 

with operational satellites, a solution we may once again find ourselves needing. 

When talking about the consequences of a gap in weather data, 

the first thought in the minds of many is of the devastating effects 

of extreme weather on the ground. However, professional and personal history shows me—allows me to discuss the impact of gap 

weather data on aviation weather. 

As a private pilot, I know the importance of having accurate and 

timely weather forecasts to assess flying conditions. Pilots require 

accurate weather data to evaluate conditions on the ground and in 

the sky throughout the entire flight process, from takeoff to landing. Without accurate data a pilot runs the risk of what we call 

‘‘getting behind the plane,’’ a general aviation phrase which means 

that the plane is responding to the conditions and the pilot is responding to the plane, a situation that spells trouble for even the 

most seasoned pilots. 

Experience as a pilot does not exempt someone from getting behind the plane as weather deteriorates, as I have conducted many 
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search-and-rescue missions over the years, even led some of those, 

and without exception, every missing aircraft that we ended up 

finding as a result of weather resulted in a fatality. We were basically taking remains home to the families so they can be comforted 

they were found. Your experience doesn’t matter. 

Even the most experienced aviators when they get in a weather 

situation, it can spell disaster, one of those being Scott Crossfield. 

Scott Crossfield is a pioneer in aviation in America. He was the 

second to break the sound barrier. We conducted a search-and-rescue mission to find the remains of his plane as it broke up in a 

thunderstorm over northeast Georgia. 

My personal experience as well: once flying to Florida, I had accurate satellite weather data in the cockpit with me which showed 

thunderstorms coming off the Gulf of Mexico. I was able to accurately determine not only that I should be able to beat the thunderstorm into my destination but also alternate airports to my west 

that were clear and available. Without that, I could’ve ended up in 

a very difficult situation or not made it to my destination. As I was 

flying in, I also heard of other pilots who didn’t have that information with mayday calls being into the weather. 

With our reliance on GPS weather data, Mr. Chairman, I’m 

afraid that without accurate weather, these incidents would be 

more frequent. 

From this perspective, you can see how a gap in weather data, 

and consequently less accurate forecasts, could negatively affect not 

only commercial flight safety, but also the $1.5 trillion in total economic activity that the aviation industry contributes to the national economy. 

I hope that today’s hearing will shed some light on the complex 

schedule and cost demands facing NOAA’s weather satellite programs and that the Subcommittees will walk away better equipped 

to consider these issues moving forward. 

And Mr. Chairman, I know that as an aviator yourself, you understand this as well, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Loudermilk follows:] 
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Chairman BRIDENSTINE. I’d like to thank the Chairman, Chairman Loudermilk, for his comments. Certainly, I have been in those 

situations myself, and I appreciate your testimony on them. 

Let me introduce our witnesses. First, our first witness today is 

Dr. Stephen Volz, Assistant Administrator of National Environmental Satellites, Data and Information Services at NOAA. Dr. 

Volz has a Ph.D. in experimental condensed matter physics from 

the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, a master’s degree 

in physics from The University of Illinois, and a bachelor’s degree 

in physics from the University of Virginia. 

Our second witness today is Mr. David Powner, Director of Information Technology Management Issues at the GAO. Mr. Powner 

received his bachelor’s degree in business administration from the 

University of Denver and attended the senior execute fellows program at Harvard. 

In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony 

to five minutes. Your entire written statement will be made a part 

of the record, and we on this Committee have mostly probably already read it. 

I now recognize Dr. Volz for five minutes to present his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. STEPHEN VOLZ, 

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE, 

DATA, AND INFORMATION SERVICES, 

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION 

Dr. VOLZ. Well, good morning, Chairmen Bridenstine and 

Loudermilk, Ranking Member Beyer, and Members of the Subcommittees. Thank you for the invitation to participate in today’s 

hearing and to discuss the status of NOAA’s satellite programs. 

As both of you or many of you have mentioned, NOAA provides 

environmental intelligence in a global way that is timely, accurate, 

actionable and reliable space-based information to citizens, communities and business as they need to stay safe and to operate efficiently. 

The NOAA satellite portfolio provides continuous satellite data 

that are integral to weather forecasting, and NOAA, working with 

NASA, conducts essential satellite development to ensure the continuity of this critical service. 

Our current operational geostationary and polar-operating satellites provide on a 24/7 basis the space-based weather data required to support NOAA’s National Weather Service and as well as 

the private weather industry and many other users who rely on 

those services as well. 

The geostationary satellites currently in orbit, GOES–East and 

GOES–West, provide constant monitoring from the Atlantic Ocean, 

the continental United States, Hawaii, and the Pacific for weather, 

and they are backed up by our fully functioning spare satellite, 

GOES–14, situated midway between them ready to ride backup, as 

was mentioned as the need for in the event of a significant satellite 

anomaly to either of the others. 
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We are currently working towards an October 2016 launch for 

the next-generation geostationary satellite, GOES–R. While we are 

working diligently towards this date, there are still risks ahead of 

us to get this new highly capable and complex satellite launched 

on time. NOAA and NASA are working with contractors to identify 

and mitigate risks by applying all appropriate resources and expertise to meet this important launch milestone. To that end, we are 

monitoring the health of our current on-orbit assets to ensure that 

we maximize their operational utility until the GOES–R series satellites are launched, checked out and placed into operations. 

Meanwhile, while that’s going on with the flight hardware, the 

ground system for GOES–R and the user community continue to 

prepare for the launch and rapid exploitation of the new data 

stream once it begins. 

For the polar-orbiting satellites, the first satellite of the JPSS 

program, the Suomi NPP satellite, is performing exceptionally as 

NOAA’s primary afternoon polar satellite. Four years into its operating mission, the high-resolution sounds of the Suomi NPP, ATMS 

and CrIS instruments are continuously providing essential observations, feeding the National Weather Service’s numerical weather 

prediction models and ultimately the weather forecasts we all depend on. The Suomi NPP VIIRS imagery has brought much improved observations of sea ice in Alaska and Arctic waters as well 

as new and much more sensitive VIIRS low-light nighttime cloud 

imagery for that region as well. Weather observations from polar 

orbiting satellites are particularly important in Alaska and the 

polar regions where geostationary satellites cannot effectively observe. 

No matter than in March 2017, the second satellite of the JPSS’s 

program, JPSS–1, will be launched joining Suomi NPP in providing 

global coverage and increasing the data flow supporting the NWS 

and the user community. 

JPPS–2 continues in development managed expertly by NASA 

and NOAA team and is proceeding on schedule for a late 2021 

launch as well. 

NOAA’s observing system includes beyond these two satellite 

systems, the Jason-2 and DSCOVR satellites, and soon will include 

Jason-3, the COSMIC–2 constellation and radio occultation measurements, and hopefully the Cooperative Data and Resure Services 

mission, CDARS. These smaller and more focused missions provide 

essential environmental observations augmenting and complementing the polar and geostationary platforms. 

In all of these systems, NOAA draws extensively on the expertise 

of academia and private industry, relies heavily on productive partnerships with other U.S. agencies including specifically the U.S. 

Air Force and NASA, and on international agencies including 

EUMETSAT and CNES, and the National Space Organization of 

Taiwan to meet our observing needs. We also are expanding our 

approach to access to space through the commercially hosted payload approach for CDARS to find more efficient methods of access 

to space. 

In closing, since joining NOAA just over a year ago, I have continued to work the started by my predecessors to steadily rebuild 

the robustness of the Nation’s operational weather satellite con-
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stellations. Our current polar-orbiting and geostationary satellites 

are aging but are generally healthy as they continue to provide the 

observations enabling those weather and environmental monitoring 

missions. We are making steady progress to launch the next generation of polar and geostationary satellites in the coming year to 

continue and improve the reliability and quality of these Earth observations. NOAA works closely with NASA, our acquisition agent, 

and with our industry and academic partners to implement proven 

development processes so that we can meet our critical mission 

milestones. 

Decisions continue to be made by individuals, governments, and 

businesses based on the weather forecast. Space-based observations 

are vital, the ability of NWS and commercial weather providers to 

produce and delivery these forecasts, and NOAA values the longstanding interest of the Committee in our satellite programs, and 

we appreciate the Congressional support to ensure these critical 

national weather programs achieve the robust state that is needed 

to support the Nation’s weather enterprise. 

Thank you, and I look forward to the conversation. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Volz follows:] 
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Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Thank you for your testimony, Dr. Volz. 

You were right on the five minute mark, which is what we expect 

from our NOAA and former NASA folks, so thank you for that. 

Mr. Powner, you are recognized for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. DAVID POWNER, 

DIRECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT 

ISSUES, 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. POWNER. Chairman Bridenstine, Loudermilk, Ranking Member Beyer, and Members of the Subcommittees, earlier this year, 

we testified on the GOES–R and JPSS satellite acquisitions. At 

that time we expressed concerns about the GOES–R March 2016 

launch date and potential gaps in satellite coverage. 

As we have heard, the GOES–R launch date has been delayed 

again. I will provide updates on both acquisitions by displaying 

three graphics, which highlight key launch dates and expected lifespans of these satellites, many of which have been recently extended. 

On the first graphic, it displays the three GOES–R satellites that 

are currently in space. The first bar is GOES–13, which covers the 

eastern half of the United States. The third bar is GOES–15, which 

covers the western half. The middle bar is GOES–14, which is your 

on-orbit spare. NOAA’s policy is to have an on-orbit spare if something goes wrong with one of the operational satellites. 

The red bars here represent an extension to the lifespan of the 

operational satellites from the last time we testified. When asked 

what this was based on, we were given a 2005 document supporting the lifespan extension. So a key question is why NOAA did 

not disclose this lifespan extension sooner. 

I’ll add that in NOAA’s 2016 budget submission, these red extensions were not included on their fly-out charts. This is an area 

where NOAA needs to be more open and transparent with the Congress, especially since longer lifespans affect the timing of future 

launches and the annual funding of these satellites, as I’ll get into 

on the next chart. 

But before we leave this chart, I’d like to comment on, there have 

been problems with GOES–13 that have been mentioned, and the 

backup has been moved into operation several times. Also, currently a key sensor on GOES–13 has not been working since November 20th. 

Moving to the next chart, what this next chart does, the first 

three bars basically just replicate what you just saw with the extended lifespan. The fourth bar represents GOES–R and the delay 

in the launch of GOES–R to October 2016. I have three comments 

on this chart. 

First, the GOES–R bar, the fourth bar down, the delay occurred 

due to technical problems in about two years of extremely poor 

schedule performance. The program was losing about 10 days per 

month for a 24-month period. Mr. Chairman, in our opinion, NOAA 

should have more clearly disclosed the poor schedule performance 

to this Committee. 

My second point is the potential gap in backup coverage. The 

gold vertical bar here represents this projected gap. GOES–13, 
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even with the lifespan extension, reaches the end of its useful life 

about mid-2016, and 2014 and 2015 are your operational satellites. 

So there is no backup in orbit from mid-2016 until GOES–R 

launches and performs a six month checkout through about March 

or April of 2017. And if the GOES–R October 2016 launch date is 

not met, this gap in backup coverage becomes even greater. 

My third and final point on this chart is the final two bears, 

GOES–S and T. We agree that both GOES–R and JPSS need to 

have robust constellations to ensure continuity of coverage, and 

this is exactly why we placed the potential gaps in weather satellites on GAO’s high-risk list in January 2013. But extending 

these lifespans requires a relook at the timing of out-year satellites. 

With the third chart, I’d like to move the discussion from GOES– 

R to JPSS, the polar satellites. As you can see here, the red arrow 

represents a four-year lifespan extension on NPP, the current operational polar satellite in the afternoon orbit. We question whether 

this should extent to 2020, given NOAA’s latest analysis supporting 

this. However, the good news here with JPSS is there is an annual 

review that is used to update the polar satellite lifespans, unlike 

the GOES programs. 

Regarding the J–1 launch, the middle bar here, of March 2017, 

we are more concerned about this date than we have been prior. 

Key reasons are continued delays in delivery of the key instrument 

ATMS, continued delays in the ground system, and continued problems with a component on the spacecraft. 

And finally, on the chart, we think there is increased risk with 

J–2 since we have a new spacecraft contractor. On GOES, the story 

was that the performance will greatly improve with the delivery of 

the second GOES because there was a fair amount of learning with 

the first. It seems odd that that same logic wouldn’t be applied to 

the second JPSS satellite. 

In conclusion, NOAA needs to be more transparent on risks and 

satellite lifespans. There needs to be a consistent policy to evaluate 

satellite lifespans, not just for JPSS but also for GOES, and we still 

have major concerns with the backup, with the gap in the backup 

for GOES–R, and also between NPP and JPSS–1, but after GOES– 

R and JPSS–1 launch, given NOAA’s recent extensions, we’re really not concerned about gaps after that point. In fact, Congress 

might have opportunities to reduce annual expenditures on these 

programs in upcoming years. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:] 
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Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Powner, for your testimony. I recognize myself for five minutes for questions. 

I just wanted to go back to Dr. Volz. The commercial space policy 

I think is a great starting point. I think there’s more information 

that needs to be forthcoming on how to actually interact with 

NOAA on the commercial capabilities that are out there right now. 

One of my questions is, right now when it comes to GPS radio 

occultation, we already have one company with satellites in space 

that are being tested and validated through UCAR, and we have 

other companies that are going to be launching next year numerous 

satellites into space. We heard testimony from you, and it’s in your 

written testimony as well, about the COSMIC program. When we 

think about commercial applications, when we think about the 

2010 Space Policy, Commercial Space Policy, would it not be appropriate to take advantage of these commercial opportunities rather 

than continue to develop COSMIC for however many millions of 

dollars that that’s going to take? 

Dr. VOLZ. So related to the value, the capabilities of the oncoming commercial capabilities, you mentioned we do have assets now 

in space. Spire is one organization that has launched some satellites, and there are several others that are likely to launch in the 

near term, and from the NOAA perspective, we’re very interested 

in seeing the performance of these satellites demonstrated on orbit. 

The COSMIC program that was launched first in 2006 and has 

been flying for many years providing radio occultation to NOAA 

and integrated into our numerical weather modeling is a proven 

and demonstrated performance capability that we have been taking 

advantage of. The COSMIC–2 is an extension of that, and we expect when the launch occurs in about a year, to add those observations into our data system. The value, the potential value of these 

new commercial ventures are very high but it’s still potential, and 

I see we should be engaged with them, we should be watching and 

observing and analyzing the data that come from them once we develop the appropriate interaction engagement mechanism, but it 

should be compared against some standard, some measurement capability that we have as well with COSMIC already. 

So I think that ‘‘both and’’ is the approach I would take in approaching these. I think we need the COSMIC–2 because it continues a necessary measurement and it will provide an excellent 

benchmark for comparison for these alternative approaches which 

use the same method, the same measurement technique but a different implementation. So validating those on-orbit activities and 

observations will be key as we go forward, and I look forward to 

the opportunity to do that. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Your boss, Manson Brown, last month 

here in DC. at a business roundtable mentioned that he supports 

a line item in the President’s budget request for a tech demonstration of commercial satellite weather data. Do you also support a 

line item for commercial satellite weather data? 

Dr. VOLZ. I support my boss, which is a good start. I do support—— 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Good idea. 

Dr. VOLZ. —the principle that we do need a focused effort to 

demonstrate the capability of these operations. So yes, I would sup-
64 

port that. We’ve been working with NOAA, on a commercial policy 

that went out and is now being reviewed for updates, on the 

NESDIS side, as we do the actual implementation. We’ve been 

working on a process, an engagement process, for how we would 

work with industry, work with potential vendors to provide data, 

to secure data, to evaluate the data when it comes in and then decide whether it’s capable of supporting the long-term operational 

contract or contractual mechanism. We had a workshop this Monday, which was well attended by at least three of the radio occultation potential providers, to talk about how we can have a productive interaction and how we can have a relationship going forward 

to support what would be a demonstration project which could 

eventually lead to a sustained operational delivery of data. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. The line item that Manson Brown 

talked about, any idea of what that dollar amount might be that 

is going to be in the President’s budget request? 

Dr. VOLZ. I would be speaking from one-half of the equation if 

I knew because I know what it takes for me to develop a satellite 

and to develop and to process the data, and that’s what we’re focusing on, what it would take for us to evaluate and to process the 

data. 

As far as what the commercial side would need as an investment 

or procurement is a part that we still have to explore. So I’m not 

sure what would be the appropriate price point for our vendors to 

make their business models close because obviously that’s a very 

proprietary element. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. So—— 

Dr. VOLZ. It’s an engagement we need to have to get a better feel 

for that. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Right, and I would encourage you to engage with those vendors. 

The great thing for the taxpayer and for the people on this Committee is that those commercial vendors are launching into space 

right now with clients that aren’t necessarily NOAA, and that gives 

us an opportunity to share the costs so that it’s not just the U.S. 

government taking on the burden but also transportation companies, agricultural companies, insurance companies, et cetera, that 

are interested in this kind of data. So the price point may be a lot 

less than what we anticipate, and you know, the idea that they’re 

making, you know, the business case without the government involved is positive as well, which only makes it that much more interesting for us to be willing to reach out and purchase that data. 

I am out of time. I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Beyer, 

for five minutes. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Dr. Volz, I have a culture question for you, and it’s not a hostile 

question, just to warn you up front. Now, Mr. Powner talked about 

‘‘extremely poor schedule performance’’ on one aspect of this. I read 

all Rick Atkinson’s trilogy on the war in Europe, World War II, and 

Eisenhower again and again gave impossible timelines to his generals for invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Italy and Normandy. If 

you read Walter Isaacson’s book on Steve Jobs, Jobs again and 

again gave his team impossible tasks. 
65 

So the question is, does NOAA surge? Do people work nights and 

weekends? Is there a sense of urgency about these things, and how 

is that urgency modeled by the leadership? Or is it business as 

usual, people come in at 9 on Monday morning and go home at 5 

on Friday afternoon? 

Dr. VOLZ. So starting with the ending of what you just stated, 

I’ve not seen a more dedicated team working on any program that 

I’ve seen on GOES–R and JPSS, and that’s independent of whether 

they’re NASA, NOAA, Lockheed Martin, Ball Aerospace, any of our 

vendors. So there’s no sense of casual execution of the program. 

There’s a strong dedication to the mission and to the time and the 

effort they put into it, well beyond what I could ever expect to tell 

them to do. 

So your observation related to, is it a culture of setting unrealistic deadlines and expectations, we’re very sensitive, I’m very sensitive to that. If you set a schedule which is unachievable from day 

one, then nobody treats it seriously. If I’m already behind the eight 

ball, then it doesn’t matter if I work extra or not. So it is a negative impact, I think, on performance. 

On GOES–R, when we set up the program some time ago, we 

have standard methodologies within NASA and NOAA about cost 

confidence and schedule confidence and probability of success. It’s 

called a Joint Confidence Level, JCL for cost and schedule, and 

there’s usually an acceptance that you budget to about a 70 percent 

confidence which means seven out of ten missions will meet or exceed that and three out of ten will need more time or more money, 

or both. That’s sort of the baseline approach, assuming that you 

will perform to that. 

On GOES–R, sometimes you choose a more aggressive schedule 

for a planetary mission because you have a tight window for 

launch. For the GOES–R program, we chose to proceed from our 

confirmation on first delivery on a 50 percent or thereabouts confidence schedule knowing it was aggressive but not unachievable 

because we understood the criticality of getting this measurement 

on orbit and because we thought we would challenge ourselves and 

we would track our performance against that. We never sacrificed 

the performance during that process so we didn’t skip tests that we 

thought were important or necessary in order to achieve that but 

we tracked then the reserve depletion of our time. And as David 

Powner mentioned, the negative performance over about two years 

from mid-2013 to mid-2015 were strong. We were not meeting our 

schedule but we were still meeting the earliest schedule we could 

achieve. 

Mr. BEYER. Let me try to fit one more question in here too, Dr. 

Volz. 

So Mr. Powner, the GAO had made 11 recommendations regarding JPSS, and NOAA’s only implemented two of them, and 12 recommendations regarding GOES–R, and NOAA’s implemented four 

of those. Can you explain the gap between the recommendations 

made by GAO and the ability to respond? 

Mr. POWNER. Yeah, a lot of those recommendations are to address the gap. It’s on the contingency planning efforts, and Dr. Volz 

and I had a good conversation about this. I think a lot of them are 

in flight. They’re not fully wrapped up yet, so we want to see more 
66 

of that done to address a lot of the gaps. I think the issue with this 

poor schedule performance and whether it’s achievable or not, I 

think we need to be more open with our risks. So when we were 

here in February talking about missed milestones on the GOES– 

R program, and we didn’t think they were going to hit that launch 

date of March 2016, and NOAA had data saying that we had poor 

schedule performance for two years. Our point is that you need to 

be open with your risks in order to hit your dates. When you’re 

open with your risks—and I know this Committee’s been very supportive of NOAA to ensure that these satellites get up there on 

time—we need to collectively work on these risks and be open with 

them so that we can all collectively address the issues that are at 

hand. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you. 

And very quickly, Dr. Volz, on the life plan extension, Mr. 

Powner talked about NOAA should have disclosed that sooner, that 

that data’s been around since 2005, it almost, if I were a skeptical 

person, I think we’d extended the lifespan in order to make sure 

that we don’t look like there’s a gap. Can you explain this? 

Dr. VOLZ. Well, the particular study that Mr. Powner mentioned 

was a study from 2005 of whether we could expect the instruments 

would last longer than the contractual lifetime. But that’s only a 

piece of the puzzle that we use when we calculate or we estimate 

the projected future life of a mission. 

And one of the other pieces, which really required the expenditure of time, was with the GOES–NOP is to see how those satellites operate on orbit. This was the first flight of the Boeing 601 

bus in a geostationary operation like we had for GOES–NOP. We 

need to see when we have satellite or a new capability on orbit 

time on orbit to see how it’s going to operate, what its performance 

is going to be, are we going to see life-limiting features start to develop. So it took many years, years of watching those satellites to 

operate from 2006, 2008 and 2009 when they were launched to develop a confidence in the family of satellite buses so that we could 

then say all right, now I’m comfortable saying the projection life 

will be longer than it is, and that’s where we came to about at this 

time last year. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. I’ll recognize the gentleman from Georgia, the Chairman of the Oversight Committee, Mr. Loudermilk, for 

five minutes. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to continue on with the line of questioning that my good 

friend, Mr. Beyer, brought up. Mr. Powner, you brought up the 

slides and the charts indicating the lifecycle, the launch dates, and 

now we’re extending the lifespan and the useful life of both satellite programs. It’s been extended by three years. 

And Dr. Volz, you just mentioned that there was other data that 

was considered beyond just the 2005 documents that was provided 

to this Committee. One question: Why was only the 2005 document 

provided to this Committee when we requested data to back up 

why you’re extending the lifespan of these satellites? 

Dr. VOLZ. Well, actually, sir, in the submission, in response to 

the letter we received, we submitted that study but also an anal-
67 

ysis and explanation of how we did use the on-orbit performance 

validation of these instruments over time and the satellites over 

time as one of the rationales for extension, and also what we also 

provide on a regular basis are monthly status reports on all of our 

satellites, and we provided a couple of examples of the status of 

every subsystem of the spacecraft that we do on a routine basis. 

So while we haven’t provided that, and it’s a good point that Mr. 

Powner made, we haven’t provided a regular routine mechanism or 

what the health is of all our satellites, and one of the observations 

I had to my team is that we should be doing that, so on an annual 

basis at least providing an update of the health of our constellations overall so we don’t have a ten year cycle for updating lifetimes and we talk about it on a regular basis as part of our annual 

reporting. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. So are the studies that you’re referencing as 

extensive as what was done in 2005? 

Dr. VOLZ. No, the study in 2005 was a specific request to ITT, 

the instrument vendor who build the sounder/imager for the 

GOES–NOP series and the previous ones as well. The study was 

specifically directed to say although the instrument was designed 

for a particular lifetime, what does the vendor think the likelihood 

of that instrument lasting past, well past that lifetime. So we really had to go to the vendor who built it, who knew all the parts to 

say exactly what do you think analytically pre-launch these things 

are likely to see. So that’s one piece of it. It’s a very specific analysis. 

The analysis I mentioned from our operations team looks at all 

of the operating performance of a series of satellites and watches 

each of those from a day-to-day, month-to-month basis and then 

from that develops a statistical understanding of the likelihood of 

continued operation of features that may show up in initial wear 

factors in the spacecraft that we need to understand as they age 

on orbit. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. So—— 

Dr. VOLZ. It’s different kinds of studies. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. The information you provided the Committee 

said that increasing lifespan of the satellite by three years is plausible. Is that—— 

Dr. VOLZ. I think that’s a reasonable way to put it, yes, sir. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Well, the definition of plausible has actually 

three definitions: possibly true, believable or realistic. Which one of 

those is it, possibly true, believable, or realistic? 

Dr. VOLZ. I’m not sure they’re all mutually exclusive. I would say 

it’s a realistic assessment based on the knowledge that they are 

likely to survive through this period. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. So with that, by expanding it by three 

years, are we increasing the likelihood that we could have a data 

gap? 

Dr. VOLZ. Relying on aging assets for a longer period of time is 

a riskier approach than I would like to take for sure, sir. I would 

prefer to have GOES–R up there in March of 2016 as opposed to 

October of 2016. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. We want it to be a GOES–R, not a ghost. 
68 

Dr. VOLZ. Yes, but I would also want it to be a GOES–R that’s 

functioning and capable and tested out and not GOES–R that is 

rushed so that it may have failures or it may have shortcomings 

or testing incompleteness that we had to do in order to get it to 

launch. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. I fully concur. 

Mr. Powner, would you like to weigh in on the feasibility? Are 

we increasing the possibility of a data gap? 

Mr. POWNER. Well, clearly, there’s the gap on the GOES constellation, the geostationary constellation. The potential for a gap 

in backup capability is—you can see it from the chart there. 

There’s a likelihood that we’re going to have that situation. I think 

the key with the extension of these lifespans, NOAA needs to have 

a very clear policy on how they evaluate these constellations. I 

know we start with design lives and then we evaluate the reliability and availability of the constellation through detailed analysis. On JPSS, they do a very good job, okay. We have an annual 

update. On GOES, we don’t see it. So I think there ought to be 

some consistency here because when you start moving these lifespans, it really affects the timing of when we build and launch 

these future satellites, and we all know these two programs consume a large part of NOAA’s budget. Maybe you could slow those 

down in out years and budget could be used for other things. I’m 

not saying that these aren’t important; they are. But there’s implications to moving these lifespans out. You can’t just move them out 

and say build them as quick as we have with the original plan. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. I just 

would like to add that, you know, fiscal responsibility, efficiency, 

taking care of taxpayer money is very important, but we’re talking 

about an issue that can deal with the safety and the lives of others. 

So I yield. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. I’d like to thank the Chairman. 

For Dr. Volz, we understand you’ve been doing this job now for 

just over a year. These challenges have been developing over time, 

and we know you’re working really hard to make sure that these 

issues are addressed. From our perspective, I’ll just be real quick 

before I hand it over to Mr. Bera, from our perspective, we learn 

that there’s going to be a delay in launch for GOES–R, and at the 

same time we learn that we’re going to extend the life of another 

satellite. We’re going to predict that it’s going to last longer, and 

it looks like it could be intentional that we’re just extending is to 

that we can get to the next launch, and I’m not saying that’s what 

happened. I’m saying that as Mr. Powner said, if there was more 

transparency, if we knew that well ahead of time, it wouldn’t have 

appeared this way. So just—I’m sharing my sentiments on that. So 

transparency helps us, and we want to help you. 

So I turn it over to my friend from California, Mr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the Ranking 

Member. 

You know, when I think about weather forecasting, thinking 

about this with my district, state, and much of the American West 

in mind because we’re going through a devastating drought right 

now, and it’s the fourth year of historic and unprecedented 

drought. When I think about my district, you know, Folsom Lake, 
69 

which supplies drinking water for, you know, close to half a million 

people in my region, it’s a historic low right now. So just having 

the predictability of weather is going to be incredibly important because again, in California and in Sacramento, we have this dual 

risk. We have years where we have incredibly high flood risk and 

then obviously now we’re living through this drought. So better 

forecasting allows us to better manage a precious asset: water. 

And you know, that’s why I share the concern of my colleagues 

here. If there is a gap in that ability, that does put us at risk, it 

puts the Nation at risk and, you know, it really does make it difficult to manage. 

I’m going to shift a little bit. If in fact there is a gap, we know 

there’s commercial weather satellites out there that are providing 

commercial data. Is that true, Dr. Volz? 

Dr. VOLZ. I don’t know if any commercial assets that are providing equivalent data and observations to the nature of what we 

provide that support our weather services. So there may be specific 

measurements that might be available, but in general, there are no 

commercial assets of equivalent or capable nature. 

Mr. BERA. So there’s no commercial backup that would be available. 

NOAA’s data that comes from GOES and the other satellites, 

that’s publicly available to anyone who wants it, or is that still—— 

Dr. VOLZ. Correct. 

Mr. BERA. So it’s a public asset? 

Dr. VOLZ. Correct, sir. 

Mr. BERA. That’s available to anyone around the world? 

Dr. VOLZ. Correct, just as other nations’ assets and measurements are available and to others as well. It’s a global cooperation 

and sharing agreement on the observations for weather and climate. 

Mr. BERA. And you’d consider that really would be a critical public asset for the common good? 

Dr. VOLZ. Yes, sir, entirely so. 

Mr. BERA. If we think about commercialization then, and this 

data—so if we were to shift from, you know, a public expenditure 

for the common good to more commercialization of this data, is 

there a risk that, k, that’s no longer available, you folks have to 

pay, subscribe et cetera? Is that going to—— 

Dr. VOLZ. There is a perception. The approach that NOAA has, 

that we have, is that weather services that we provide, for the observations that feed those are a public good and are necessary for 

health, safety and security for the Nation and for our citizens, so 

the idea of commercial available data sets are not necessarily at 

odds with public services provided by NOAA if we can find the 

right terms and conditions for which to work with the commercial 

side to use their data in our models, in our operations. 

Now, data which is restricted, which are only available to individuals, are not something that would be consistent with that approach. It’s not something we would support. It doesn’t mean commercial vendors can’t make observations and sell it any way they 

want. That’s fine. That’s certainly open to anybody. 

Mr. BERA. But again, from my perspective, there is some concern 

that if we’re taking the taxpayer assets and then, you know, con-
70 

tracting that out to commercial vendors to replace some of the work 

that NOAA’s doing, you, over time, can lose the ability of this public good, this common good data set, and I don’t know if that’s a 

concern that, you know, folks at NOAA have. 

Dr. VOLZ. That would definitely be a concern. If our ability to deliver on the services and the observations that are necessary for 

health and safety and for aviation safety and all the other operations that we do is restricted because the funds are diverted to a 

different approach, which is proprietary and controlled in a different way, that would be a negative approach that we would not 

support, and I don’t support it. 

Mr. BERA. And knowing that, you know, when we look at space 

exploration, you know, there’s, you know, what is ongoing both at 

NASA and, you know, what we’re talking about here in NOAA, this 

public-private partnership that is emerging, if you’re kind of forecasting where weather forecasting—a little oxymoron there. But if 

we’re predicting where weather forecasting is going, where do you 

see this commercial public-private partnership in the near future? 

Dr. VOLZ. Well, similar to what you referenced on the NASA 

side, there are features, there are capabilities that we already rely 

on heavily on the commercial side to provide. For the most part, 

we don’t build our own launch vehicles. Commercial does that. For 

the most part, we don’t build our own spacecraft. We go to commercial vendors for that. All the instruments we buy are from commercial vendors. So there’s an extensive public-private engagement in 

the execution of our weather services. What we’re talking about is 

the potential next step, which is to secure data as opposed to capabilities that we deploy, and I think there is an opportunity for us 

to do that in a way which doesn’t sacrifice those public goods that 

I mentioned a few moments ago. So I think as the commercial sector becomes more capable and is able to deliver a more quality 

product, a data product, I think there’s certainly a possibility for 

strong engagement that can fit within our business model and can 

support our commercial sector better. 

Mr. BERA. Great. Thank you. 

I’ll yield back. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. I recognize the gentleman from Ohio, 

Mr. Johnson, for five minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, thank 

you for being here with us this morning. 

Dr. Volz, how many of the viable U.S. commercial providers for 

satellite data do you intend to bring under contract in the next 

three to five years? 

Dr. VOLZ. That’s a very open-ended question. It depends on resources, it depends on how many actually apply if we go out with 

an RFP or a—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. How many do you need to bring under? How many 

do you want to bring under? 

Dr. VOLZ. I’m more concerned with getting a data flow, to getting 

the operational data I need. If we go through with an approach, a 

pilot approach, and we find one vendor that has the quality set of 

information that we need, that we can use, that meets our criteria, 

that is financially viable, that’s a satisfactory result for me. If I get 

three to four competing and they’re all providing something that I 
71 

can afford to support several, because I need the data from several, 

I can support that as well subject to availability of funds and the 

cost points on these vendors. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Has NOAA done a cost-benefit analysis of 

gap mitigation alternatives to determine which ones are likely to 

be the most effective and worthy of investment? 

Dr. VOLZ. When we went through the gap analysis and the exercises in 2011, 2012 and 2013, we had a report called the Riverside 

Report, which I imagine you’ve already read, which identified a 

number of mitigation approaches to lessen the impact of loss of a 

major asset. We selected a number of those to complete. We have 

been executing on those mitigation approaches. We did not do an 

allocation of ‘‘1’’ through ‘‘N’’ to say which is the most effective and 

least effective but we saw they applied to different areas of our observing system and we applied the ones that were possible to impact, to effect, and we have been working on those. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Why do you not see the need to do the mitigation 

to look at the most effective? 

Dr. VOLZ. I would say that we did that in, I wouldn’t say ad hoc, 

but in a best-effort approach. It’s hard to do an assessment of a 

particular measurement and what’s the benefit of that to an integrated global model which relies on multiple inputs to say. So I 

would say probably the difficulty of doing a cost-benefit analysis 

when the output is the value of a weather product which, you 

know, three to five, three to seven day forecasts, it’s very hard to 

quantify the value of that from a cost approach. We do look at the 

efficacy of those approaches: is it a necessary part to address a particular measurement capability, and we did prioritize. We put our 

effort and our attempts into working on those more importantly. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Sure. As a general aviation pilot myself, I can tell 

you that the accuracy of that data and the ability to look out and 

get those accurate forecasts both near term and long term are important. 

Have any studies been performed on the cost, benefits and tradeoffs between different potential launch dates for the later satellites 

such as GOES–U or for JPSS, JPSS–3? 

Dr. VOLZ. Yes, sir, and that points to the excellent point that Mr. 

Powner brought up is that what we can do in the latter years once 

we get to a robust state, which is accomplished by getting GOES– 

R and GOES–S launched. Do we have to launch GOES–T and U 

on a rapid time frame? And the answer is probably not. We would 

launch on need at some point when we get to that. 

So we’ve looked at—there are two comparisons here. One is the 

cost of storage if we build and then store, and the other is, the cost 

impacts of delaying the development, and we have done the assessments, and based on industry assessments and industry models of 

the efficiency of building four in a rapid sequence is more effective 

in terms of buying the parts and getting the workforce engaged and 

buying down the risk of the implementation than building one, 

waiting a few years, building a second, and building a third. So we 

actually have seen the examples from aerospace and from other industry examples of the efficiency of building first, launch later if 

necessary has a certain cost benefit from the build and development cycle and a significant risk benefit because you buy down the 
72 

risk by building them all at the same time when you have the 

parts and the availability and the engineering. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. All right. 

Earlier this year, your office hosted a community engagement 

workshop to inform outside groups and the commercial sector of 

progress NOAA has made through incorporating commercial technologies, and this week you hosted another such event. What updates occurred between the previous workshop held in April and 

the one this week? What did you learn? 

Dr. VOLZ. In the April workshop, we talked mostly about principles, about the engagement desires, what we would like to do 

going into the future. In the workshop we had just this week, we 

spent a great deal of time talking about the actual process by 

which we would use data, how data are used from observation to 

services and products so that we were very clear, very articulate 

in trying to explain—well, discern how articulate it was, depending 

on the feedback—to explain how the data are used in our systems 

and how different vendors can tailor their business models to deliver data to us at different places in our value chain. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Are you talking to individual companies as 

well to get a broader perspective? 

Dr. VOLZ. We have gone out with RFIs asking for inputs on particular measurement types. We’ve gone out with RFIs recently just 

in August about technology, next-generation technology approaches 

that they think are worthy of investment or are ready for application, ready for prime time as operational. In terms of the overall 

engagement, we have talked on a one-on-one basis, I have not, but 

some of my staff has, on where they—keeping us informed on 

where they are in the development cycle and where we are in our 

process cycle. In general, I’m trying to talk to them all at once so 

we have these workshops on a regular basis so they all see, everybody can see where we are as we move forward. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. All right. 

Mr. Chairman, yield back. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. I now recognize the weather guru from 

California, Mr. Perlmutter, but I would warn the witnesses that 

his—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Colorado. Colorado. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Colorado. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Colorado. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. From Colorado. I would warn the witnesses that his jacket is off and his sleeves are rolled up. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for 

holding this Committee hearing, and to you two gentlemen, thank 

you for being here again. These are very important assets of the 

United States, as Mr. Loudermilk said, you know, dealing with life, 

limb and property as well as science, and, you know, I think I mentioned the last time you were here, I’ve been working on this since 

2009 and 2010 with NPOESS, and what I’d like to do is just sort 

of go back to basics and understand the structure, the decisionmaking structure here. 

So I come from a construction family, and with respect to JPSS 

and the GOES systems, am I correct when I look at it as NOAA 

is the owner, NASA is sort of the general contractor, and then the 
73 

private companies, the Lockheed’s, the Ball’s, the Orbital ATK’s are 

in effect the subcontractors? Is that a fair way to describe this? 

And this is to both of you. So Dr. Volz? 

Dr. VOLZ. Yes, except that I’d add a nuance there. Yes, NOAA 

is the owner but NOAA’s also the architect. So the architect doesn’t 

just give the plans and walk away. The architect is there with the 

general contractor and is there when the general contractor sometimes is talking to his subcontractors to make sure that what he 

had in mind in the architecture is what is actually being implemented. So that’s the role NOAA plays. We do not have the engineering depth that NASA does and we rely on that depth, but we 

are there with the requirements, with the user community interfaces so that we know what the end use is of every one of these 

observations, which allows us then to work hand in glove with 

NASA and with the major contractors to make sure that end use 

is remembered, is kept in mind as you go through the whole development process. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Mr. Powner? 

Mr. POWNER. Yeah, and I would just add that the contracting situation with the spacecraft, each sensor and the ground component, 

they all have prime contractors with subs. So you have many contractors and subcontractors involved with each of those many components. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Well, the reason I’m asking that question is 

because whether it was NPOESS or now GOES and JPSS, there 

is a little separation between NOAA as the owner/architect, if you 

will, and the general contractor, NASA. Before it was NOAA and 

the Air Force. And we’ve had—I mean, obviously we wouldn’t be 

here if we weren’t having some delays and some hiccups in how 

these things are proceeding, and sometimes I feel like NOAA, you 

know, gets hammered when in fact it’s really been either the Air 

Force or NASA that has caused some of the hiccups, and they’re 

not sitting here today. Am I mistaken in that at all? 

Dr. VOLZ. We can go too far with the analogy between NPOESS 

and where we are now. I believe in the NPOESS days, there was 

a greater separation between the different owners and executors of 

the program, which led to some of the disconnect, some of the problems. The requirements flow-down into the implementation was 

much more complex under NPOESS than it is now. 

I believe now with the NASA–NOAA relationship and the 

NASA–NOAA contractor relationship that we have on JPSS and on 

GOES–R, we have a much better connectivity across that line. 

There are leads and follows but it’s much better than it has been 

in the past. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Well, let me tell you where I’m going with this 

because I’ll run out of time. 

You know, as a Coloradan, we were disappointed when Ball 

didn’t get the follow-ons in the JPSS program. NASA was the acquisition point person or point agency, and obviously the contractor 

there. What I’m concerned about is just as Mr. Powner was saying, 

you know, the Navy has a very good system of building submarines. You know, they really do have an assembly-line approach. 

And given the fact that we’ve had these delays, Dr. Volz, more to 

you but also to Mr. Powner, I mean, shouldn’t we be trying to do 
74 

something like that with these satellites so that you can get them 

done in a way that’s timely, that’s well tested? Am I making a mistake here? 

Dr. VOLZ. No, I think you have a perfect example between 

GOES–R and JPSS in that if you’re building a series, a fleet, it 

does make sense to define the requirements once and do the implementation once, and that’s where we are right now. That’s how we 

set it up with the program with the GOES program. You still have 

problems, and we’re talking about. That’s why we’re here because 

of the issues in the development of the GOES–R program but we 

hope that we’ll work through those and overcome them. With the 

JPSS, the Suomi NPP JPSS program, we did not have that same 

construct. We were building them one at a time and there are definitely significant inefficiencies in doing it that way whether it’s an 

intentional change in a major subcontract like the spacecraft from 

Ball Aerospace or Orbital ATK or it’s an unintentional change because the work—the production lines have changed and the capabilities, the subcontractors change out and you can’t control it. So 

by going with the one-at-a-time approach, you definitely are setting 

yourselves up for a more risky approach, which is one of the reasons the PFO, the follow-on to JPSS, is intended to be buy both at 

once, eliminate those risks of coming with multiple serial buys so 

that you do minimize the risk of implementation. And I’ll let David 

answer too. 

Mr. POWNER. We’ve had a lot of risks and delays on both these 

programs. I don’t know why you’d add more risk with the—that 

was our point on J–2, and especially when we sat down on GOES 

and the delays and we said okay, well, what’s going to be different 

with your schedule performance, and they said well, we learned a 

lot, okay, in the second one we’re going to be a lot better at it. Well, 

don’t you—that logic probably applies to J–2. There’s a lot of issues 

on J–1, work-arounds with subcontractors and the whole bit, and 

Ball Aerospace can lay out all those things. A new contractor 

doesn’t have all that history going forward so we think there is risk 

with that shift, and we’re looking for more continuity where we 

kind of get an assembly line here. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. All right. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. I’d like to thank the gentleman from 

Colorado. 

I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Babin. 

Mr. BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

to our witnesses. 

Dr. Volz, if the government has weather or climate missions that 

you could catch a ride on a commercial satellite to the benefit of 

all parties, it would seem to me to be a cost-effective and sustainable option. Has NOAA taken advantage of these hosted payload 

options for weather or climate missions? If so, why or why not? 

Dr. VOLZ. You’re correct. If we can find a ride,and that meets our 

requirements, it’s an appropriate and potentially more efficient way 

to do it. We are suggesting and proposing that approach for our 

search-and-rescue and A–DCS systems—it’s called CDARS which 

would use the Air Force’s hosted payload solutions approach for 
75 

buying space, spare space on commercial launch vehicles, or commercial spacecraft, not just launch vehicles, yes. 

Mr. BABIN. Sure. Okay. Thank you. 

And again, since the President’s fiscal year 2016 budget request 

transfers responsibility for developing climate instruments and climate satellites from NOAA to NASA, will NOAA funds that were 

meant to pay for such instruments and satellites stay within 

NOAA for use in gap mitigation efforts or will they be transferred 

to NASA to offset the cost of their development? And what effect 

would such development have on NASA’s budget? Please provide 

the Committee with a funding breakout of how this arrangement 

would look. 

Dr. VOLZ. So I’ll be happy to provide you with a follow-up on the 

funding breakout. 

From looking at the transition of the couple of measurements 

from NOAA to NASA,there were no funds transferred from NOAA 

to NASA, there were no funds allocated. We were underfunded to 

execute those activities on the NOAA side. It was a prioritization 

question. And the concern was, they would have been left off the 

table entirely because they weren’t funded from the NOAA side. It 

wasn’t that we had funds that we should then move over to cover 

it somewhere else. So it was both a question of focus and let NASA 

do the climate but also an inability on our side to support those 

programs because we had to support the primary weather mission 

that was our focus. 

Mr. BABIN. Okay. Then Mr. Powner, you seem to have major concerns about NOAA’s transparency and openness with Congress. 

What are the key issues that drive your concerns here? 

Mr. POWNER. So we had a hearing in February on these two programs, and then what happened was, the lifespan extension occurred in April. The fly-out charts changed in April. And we think 

if a major change occurs like that, this Committee should have 

been informed. That’s one example. 

Mr. BABIN. Okay. 

Mr. POWNER. Another example is, I think the schedule performance could have been disclosed much more directly and openly to 

this Committee when we had that hearing in February. 

Mr. BABIN. Absolutely. 

Mr. Volz, would you like to comment on that? 

Dr. VOLZ. Sure. On the first one, the fly-out chart change, that’s 

on me. As I came in from NASA, I remember looking at the flyout charts over the years and trying to understand, you know, 

what the logic was in those, and I brought in with my experience 

there are different analyses, different approaches to assessing the 

extended life since I’ve done that for many years at NASA that 

would be applicable, I thought, to these systems and these programs, and that’s what I asked for. It was my error not knowing 

how sensitive it was, how important it was that we communicate 

those. So we will, as I said, we will make that a regular thing in 

the future. 

On the other question, which I’m drawing a blank—what was the 

second one? 

Mr. BABIN. Schedule performance. 
76 

Dr. VOLZ. On the schedule performance, that’s a fair point, and 

to the degree that we’re not communicating well, quantifying the 

risks that we see in the execution of these programs, I think we 

need to do a better job of that. We work regularly with your staffers, with the Committee, with our quarterly briefings, and to the 

degree that those are not communicating appropriately, I’m happy 

to find a better way to do that, to improve that communication. 

Mr. BABIN. Okay. And once again, Mr. Powner, one of NOAA’s 

challenges is that it needs to obtain more and better weather data 

with less money. One way to do that is to buy data from the commercial sector instead of trying to launch satellites by themselves, 

but NOAA satellite division, NESDIS, has also been delegated the 

authority granted by Congress to the Secretary of Commerce to 

regulate these new commercial providers, and they’re having trouble granting licenses on a timely basis. Isn’t it a conflict of interest 

for a bureaucracy to regulate the industry that is competing with 

its traditional satellite programs, and should the authority to regulate and promote this new innovative and money-saving industry 

be moved to the Office of the Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere instead of being buried inside NESDIS? 

Mr. POWNER. Yes, that’s—in terms of where that should reside, 

I think the key point here is this: We need robust constellations for 

both GOES and JPSS. We’re always going to have NOAA own and 

operate these big satellite programs. That’s not going to go away. 

But we need to supplement these constellations with commercial 

data to ensure that we have a robust constellation. So I think 

where everyone wants to go with the use of commercial products 

and the like, we need to look strongly at that to build the most robust constellation. That’s what’s most important for the American 

taxpayer in this country. 

Mr. BABIN. Absolutely. Okay. 

Thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. The gentleman yields back. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Posey, for five 

minutes. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Volz, in your opinion, how likely is GOES to meet its launch 

date of October of 2016? 

Dr. VOLZ. I think our current performance and the scheduled 

execution is strong. We definitely have margin against our August 

delivery date to the launch site. The poor performance that was 

mentioned by Mr. Powner in the two years leading up to the thermal vacuum test in July and August is real, and following then, 

when we reestablished this schedule for an October launch date, 

we provided a new schedule approach for Lockheed Martin and for 

NASA and for NOAA to work together. Since then, since the September, October, November period, as opposed to 10 days a month 

of reserve being used up, they are ahead of schedule. So the way 

that we have rephrased the schedule and reframed it with reserve 

appropriately has been working, and the program is working on 

schedule since that time in the face of problems and issues like we 

typically see during integration and tests. So I’m reasonably confident that we will meet the October launch date. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Thank you. 
77 

Mr. Powner, do you see that the same way? 

Mr. POWNER. Well, we are aware of, there’s some failed transistor parts that affect battery operation and the whole like. I think 

that’s been a key risk going forward that we have heard that that 

October launch date possibly could be at risk. That’s a key issue. 

I don’t know where we’re at on that right now but that’s something 

that we’re watching. We’re still cautiously optimistic on these 

launch dates going forward because we’ve heard indicators that 

there’s still some risk to the October 2016 date. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Well, you partially answered my next question 

for Dr. Volz, and that is, what do you see as the biggest factors 

that could cost another launch delay? 

Dr. VOLZ. We still have some mechanical and environmental testing ahead of us, and the likely factors on the GOES–R spacecraft 

since it has been integrated and the particular transistor failure in 

the power-regulating unit has been corrected and the pieces are 

back in integration, is the nature of similar things like that happening that could be a bigger problem that takes time to resolve— 

a parts problem, a mechanical problem during tests. Those are still 

ahead of us, so until we get through the mechanical testing, the vibration testing, acoustic testing, those are major tests that we still 

have to complete. The ground system is solid. The radar—the antennas are completed and ready for receipt. The user community 

is prepared. It’s getting the spacecraft through the last 8 months 

of environmental testing to launch which is always a challenge but 

that I see as a systemic challenge that we have for the program 

right now. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Thank you. 

What are some of the potential impacts of a delay of GOES–R 

launch? You know, will it increase the lifecycle cost? 

Dr. VOLZ. It will not increase the lifecycle—well, it depends on 

the type. If we have a major issue, you know, within the expected 

range of delay here or there or the operations that we have to do 

to execute, we are operating within the lifecycle cost budget, within 

the annual budgets, so I do not expect that based on what we see 

now that we need additional funding for the GOES–R program. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. What is the current estimated time during 

which GOES constellation will not have a backup satellite available? 

Dr. VOLZ. That’s a good segue-I don’t predict that we will have 

any point that we won’t have a backup satellite available based on 

our estimation of the current life expectancy of these satellites. 

However, we are all only one failure away from losing a satellite. 

That can always happen. So between now and the launch of 

GOES–R, our estimation is the satellites we have on orbit are functioning, aging and healthy, as I said in my introduction, and I do 

not expect that we will have a gap. However, if we do, if we lose 

one of our assets, we do have a backup in space, and if we lose 

that, if we’re reduced to two satellites, we have anticipated this 

possibility and worked cooperative relationships with our international partners so that they could loan us a satellite in the dire 

circumstances that we have two major system failures. 

Mr. POSEY. And I was going to ask, has this ever happened in 

the past? 
78 

Dr. VOLZ. It has in the past occurred that we have worked this 

with EU MET SAT in the past to borrow some assets from our foreign partners and we’ve contributed assets in the same as the global constellation of geostationary satellites have needed the partnership sharing arrangement that we’ve had, and it’s been successful 

and it has been exercised two or three times in the past. 

Mr. POSEY. We had a hearing earlier and had testimony about 

the sunburst that crossed our orbit last year that we missed by 

about one week that would have virtually, some experts say, 

knocked out every single commercial satellite. How would that 

have affected yours? 

Dr. VOLZ. I don’t know the magnitude of that particular solar 

event that might have hit us. Our satellites are hardened for what 

we understand what the normal environment is, normal meaning 

some deviation from the normal environment. A major solar storm 

would have an impact on all of our satellites. And ‘‘major’’ is hard 

to determine exactly what it is. But we are as vulnerable as some 

other satellites to major solar flare events, and we do what we can 

to harden it. We may be more hardened than some of the commercial ones but it’s still the event—a significant event would have an 

impact on us. 

Mr. POSEY. Mr. Powner, do you want to comment? 

Mr. POWNER. I have nothing further to add on that. 

Mr. POSEY. Yeah, and I’m concerned about, you know, what we 

do to harden these, you know, how much they can be hardened, if 

there’s any cost that’s prohibitive in doing that. I just don’t think 

that Congress quite frankly or the public communications industry 

has taken that serious enough. We had experts come in here and 

tell us basically it would change the world as we’ve known it. They 

say the impact would be in the trillions, and they talked multiple 

trillions because they wouldn’t even dare attempt to quantify it. 

But we seem to be doing so little about hardening these for the 

solar eruption is what they called it or EMPs. They just dismiss 

that as well, before somebody’d use an EMP against us, there’d 

have to be bigger problems, which is not true, and so is there a 

plan that contains NOAA’s ongoing strategies to mitigate a satellite data gap? 

Dr. VOLZ. Yes, sir, there is, and it’s been exercised for the last 

several years of our program, and that is the point of getting 

JPSS–1 and 2 and the PFO under contract to get to a situation, 

and directly to your point, where we have a spare, a hot spare on 

orbit for our polar and geostationary satellites, and in the event of 

a significant event, we’re thinking about a meteorite but it could 

be a solar flare, we can redeploy an equivalently capable asset 

within a year. That’s the objective, and that’s one way, rather than 

trying to harden a satellite against an unknown size of event is to 

have a replacement satellite that is readily available, and when 

you look at the GOES–T and U available, we won’t necessarily 

launch those to have them sit in orbit. We could have them sitting 

on the ground for deployment in the case of an event like that as 

a replenishment when we have a failure. 

So our programs do support getting to a robust state but we’re 

not there yet. 
79 

Mr. POSEY. That’s a great plan, but if we had an impact, the consequence of the one the scientists told us last year, it’s very possible that there would not be an electronic grid to enable you to 

send up the replacement within a year. 

Dr. VOLZ. Fair enough. The magnitude of the event is—there are 

events of a size that we can’t model for or plan for, but we are 

planning for the loss of satellite assets over something that may 

only affect the satellites and not the whole ground infrastructure. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your indulgence. I yield back. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Mr. Powner, would you like to address— 

I saw you maybe indicating you had a comment when he mentioned that the GOES–R delay could have an impact on lifecycle 

costs. Did you want to say something about that? 

Mr. POWNER. Yeah. Well, lifecycle costs—so there are reserves, 

okay, and you have an overall lifecycle. Any delay, there’s going to 

be an impact on cost. I mean, this last delay, there was an impact 

on cost. So I just want to be clear on that. Any delay that we further have, there will be an impact on cost and there will be an impact on the potential increase and the potential gap in backup capability. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. That’s important for those of us on this 

Committee to understand. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer, for 

five minutes. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to thank the witnesses. 

Mr. Powner, you mentioned that NOAA needs a clear policy on 

what analysis should drive the adjustment of satellite lifespans. 

Can you expand on that and—— 

Mr. POWNER. So some background here. If you look at like what 

DOD does, they actually have very robust analysis on the availability and reliability of their operational satellites. To NOAA’s 

credit, on JPSS, they do a pretty nice job on JPSS. They do an annual assessment on that availability and reliability. We don’t see 

it on GOES. But even too, they just need to be real clear on what 

their policy is on how they determine the lifespan. So for instance, 

I’ve been doing this a long time, looking at NPOESS for this Committee even prior to some of the dates that Congressman Perlmutter made. Our understanding is that the GOES policies, you 

have a backup on orbit. On the polar constellation, we always 

thought the policy was, you have a backup on the ground but now 

I’m hearing a backup in orbit. We just need to be clear on what 

our policy is on ensuring a robust constellation, and it’s—NOAA is 

not always clear. They’re not always clear, and we need to get that 

clarity so that we have a robust constellation. 

Mr. PALMER. Let me ask you this. How can NOAA determine 

that appropriate progress has been made on implementing gap 

mitigation activities, Mr. Powner? 

Mr. POWNER. Well, you know, we looked at this with our last review when we testified in February. There’s a lot of good work on 

mitigation activities, and I do think there are some mitigating factors that yield greater benefits. We’ve heard like aircraft observations, some of the adjustments to the models and the like, and 
80 

NOAA’s working on those things. So a lot of that’s being worked 

on now, and that goes back to some of the comments and questions 

earlier on our recommendations. We want to see some of those 

mitigation activities rounded out even further so that if in fact we 

have gaps leading up to March 2017, that we have some of these 

backup capabilities. 

Mr. PALMER. In that regard, and Dr. Volz, you may want to comment on this, go back to Mr. Posey’s question right there at the end 

about having—whether you’ve got a satellite, a backup system already in orbit or if you’ve got backup systems on the ground, do 

you have backup launch capabilities? Because if you do have a 

massive solar event or some other EMP-type event, would you have 

the capability to launch more satellites? 

Dr. VOLZ. We rely on the launch services provided through the 

national assets, the same launch service that support—the defense 

department, NASA, NOAA. We all use the same commercial launch 

providers. In the event of a catastrophic loss of a significant asset, 

we also have the capability and to prioritize our mission over others, I believe, so I think if that were—— 

Mr. PALMER. What I’m asking is, and you may not be able to answer this if you’re relying on other agencies, other parts of the government for the launch capability, but it’s not just losing the asset 

in space, it’s—if you had a catastrophic event like an EMP where 

your ground systems are eliminated, do you have backup systems 

or—you may not be able to answer this—are there backup systems 

that could launch, that have been hardened, that we could get in 

place to get something back in orbit? 

Dr. VOLZ. And I’m not the right person to ask what the backup 

capabilities are for the launch. 

Mr. PALMER. All right, Mr. Powner, I’m going to go back to you. 

For JPSS, your report from earlier this year focused on a potential 

gap in the 2015–2017 time frame. Are there similar concerns about 

a gap between the first and second JPSS satellites in the early 

2020s? 

Mr. POWNER. The first and second—we have not—we’re not concerned about a gap between the first and second, assuming we hit 

the March date and JPSS–2 stays on board. The issue with the gap 

between NPP and J–1, you know, if you didn’t have this recent 

four-year extension on the lifespan, there would be a gap. So, you 

know, the key here is, we hope that NPP continues to function well 

and we hope that J–1 does launch on March 2017 so that we don’t 

have a gap between NPP and J–1. That’s still a concern of ours. 

That’s still a concern. Until we launch J–1, we’re concerned about 

a gap. 

Dr. VOLZ. And if I may, sir, I have almost the exact opposite assessment. Based on watching the Suomi NPP instrument and mission fly over the past four years, based on our analysis and our understanding and mitigation steps we’ve taken in execution of those 

operations, I have a stronger confidence now that the satellite, barring a meteorite or some other activity, is likely to function for a 

great many years because I’ve seen these satellites do that over 

time. I think the uncertainty in launch of—the gap between J–1 

and J–2 is because we haven’t launched J–1 yet is a larger probability of something I’m more concerned about going forward. 
81 

But we’re talking about probabilities and risks, and we have to 

address all of these. So I don’t think that once J–1 is launched that 

our risk of a gap has necessarily gone away. We still have to worry 

about getting J–2 developed and delivered on orbit as quickly as we 

can. 

Mr. POWNER. One thing if I could add, I do think NPP overall 

is functioning well. It’s not perfect. You can read their own availability analysis, and there’s questions about ATMS lasting beyond 

the five-year life, not a nine-year life. So there’s watch items there, 

and we need to continue to watch that so I don’t want—there’s 

not—we need to be real clear that there still are risks with NPP. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is expired. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. I thank the gentleman from Alabama. 

We’re going to go into a second round of questions, and I recognize myself for five minutes. 

I wanted to share with you guys some of the challenges I see 

going forward as it relates to the commercial data buy. The President’s budget request is due to this Congress in February. We’ll do 

a budget process in March. Then we start doing-we’ll be doing authorizations along this way and appropriations even before, or I 

should say after. What I would be interested in is what that number might be, and I know you probably don’t have that number for 

a line item for a commercial data buy. I want to be clear that we’re 

expecting that, and I’d like—if you’re able to provide that to us 

even before February, it’d be very valuable as we go through the 

authorizations and the appropriations processes. So just, you’re 

under no obligation to give us anything until the President’s budget 

request, I understand that, but if you can help, we want to be helpful as well, so that would be good. 

On the NOAA Commercial Space Policy that came out on September 1st, it’s been open for comments. The comment period 

closed October 1st. There have been 15 comments. Do you have a 

timeline when the final policy might be released? 

Dr. VOLZ. Yes, sir, and we had 15 respondents. When we looked 

through the responses, we came up with on the order of 90 different actionable comments that we think should be addressed in 

some way or another. NOAA has set up a team and is working to 

review those and adjudicate those. I’m expecting, and I’ve been told 

by management within NOAA that we expect the revised policy to 

be coming out within a few weeks, within the coming weeks. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Oh, that’s great. 

Dr. VOLZ. And in the meantime, we’ve been working the process. 

The workshop on Monday was addressing that, and we would like 

to follow up with a release of a draft process for comments, just 

like we did with the policy, within a few weeks after the release 

of the formal policy. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. So after the release of the formal policy, 

there will be more comments? 

Dr. VOLZ. No, a draft release of the NESDIS process, which is 

the next level of detail down about execution of an engagement 

with industry. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Got it. And when you can—you said we 

can expect that a couple weeks after—— 

Dr. VOLZ. After the release of the NOAA policy. 
82 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Fantastic. So we’re talking about January, February? 

Dr. VOLZ. Yes. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Okay. Fantastic. Let’s see. 

I want to go through a couple of comments, or I should say statements that were made regarding the space policy, and I want to 

get a reaction from you on it. One statement is that—and I’ll just 

read it. It says: ‘‘In its entirety, the latest iteration of NOAA’s policy fails to make a distinction between raw satellite data that 

would be ingested into NOAA’s operational weather models, which 

is the intended focus of this policy, versus the output of those models and derived data products. It is the full, free, and open access 

to model output, derived data products and current ground conditions that underpins the robust U.S. commercial weather sector.’’ 

Do you agree there’s a difference between the output and the raw 

data, like the satellite data coming down from the satellites? 

Dr. VOLZ. Let me predicate this with saying I’m not an expert 

on WMO–40, which talks about the essential versus non-essential 

or additional data sets, and they address mostly the issue of the 

data. There is a difference between input data and output products 

for certain, no question about that. So a simple answer to your 

question is yes, there is a difference between those, and I don’t 

know that the policy was meaning to address the output products, 

the output services as they are free and open to all. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

Dr. VOLZ. But it is focused on, from my perspective in using commercial data in our operations, is how we deal with the data that 

we receive from the vendors, which is the input data that you’re 

referring to. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. So going back to your mention of the 

WMO–40, there’s another statement here. It says, ‘‘WMO–40 resolutions 40 and 25 explicitly permit private-sector companies to restrict the redistribution of their data and allow those same member 

countries flexibility and discretion in determining which data sets 

are freely exchanged and under what conditions they choose to do 

so.’’ So it looks to me like under WMO–40, private industry that 

is providing data to augment the numerical weather models, that 

data should be protected. Would you like to make a comment on 

that? 

Dr. VOLZ. Probably not. I am not—— 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Probably not, you don’t—— 

Dr. VOLZ. I’m not a WMO–40 expert—— 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

Dr. VOLZ. —so I don’t know all the nuances of it. So certainly— 

so I probably should let it go at that, and we’d be happy to have 

a different, separate conversation related to WMO–40. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. I’d like to get, you know, these kind of 

resolutions in this final space policy coming from NOAA, Commercial Space Policy, and I know it’s going to be in a couple of weeks 

but these are the kind of things that absolutely must be definitely 

determined before—if we’re going to have a robust commercial segment that can augment our numerical weather models and save 

money for the taxpayers, and that’s my concern: more data, better 
83 

data, and cost savings to the taxpayer. And I think we can do that 

but we’ve got to be really clear about what’s required here. 

I’ve got about—well, I’m out of time. So I’m going to stop now 

and recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Beyer. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Dr. Volz, in Mr. Powner’s testimony, he talked about how 

the delivery one of the satellite’s critical instruments, the ATMS, 

Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder, had been delayed, but in 

the last quarterly update that this Committee received, NOAA said 

that it had to be delivered by the end of November to maintain the 

JPSS–1 launch date. And your testimony now, you say that you 

can maintain that launch date despite the fact that the ATMS 

won’t be delivered until the end of December. Can you explain the 

conflict? 

Dr. VOLZ. The ATMS delivery date per the plan that we established in the summer was no later than the end of November to 

support the plan going forward to a December 2016 launch date, 

correct. The ATMS has slipped to now late December and potentially early January, and we have had to look into what we have 

had to take time out of reserve, schedule reserve. The late November date was planned for and did not encumber any of the reserve, 

the schedule reserve left in the schedule beyond the November. We 

had to debit against those reserves to accommodate the late delivery of the ATMS. 

Mr. BEYER. You had flexibility—— 

Dr. VOLZ. We still had some flexibility. It wasn’t a no-reserve 

date for delivery in November. We have flexibility. We’ve been 

using it. 

Mr. BEYER. Great. In your testimony, Dr., you talked about that 

the GOES–R team is applying all the lessons learned from the last 

two years to do timely and successful completion of GOES–S, T, U 

satellites. Does the same theory work with the JPSS? Because I 

know you’ve now moved to a new contractor for JPSS–2. Any risks 

because you’re not building with the old contractor on what you 

learned doing that? 

Dr. VOLZ. Yes. I mean, I agree with Mr. Powner that going to a 

new contractor—so let me go two points. First, what I said is, we’re 

applying the lessons learned over the last two years in the integration tests at GOES–R to make sure that the schedule we have laid 

out through this time next year, October of next year for the 

launch, includes those lessons learned, and that’s why we have confidence based on the last 3 months that we’re meeting schedules. 

We still need to revisit what that means for the GOES–S, T and 

U schedules as we roll through that, and we’re doing that right 

now. 

Now, as far as changes in the contractor, going from one spacecraft vendor to another for the JPSS, that does increase risk. That’s 

a factor. That’s a risk factor now that we’ve added to the system. 

It was not there before. And I agree with you that it does. You 

can’t say that’s not the case. 

Now, whether and where that ranks in the overall risks of different risks within the program including cost and schedule risk is 

something we had to look at when we made the procurements 

when we went through the process. So it is an increase in risk but 
84 

not necessarily an increase in the overall programmatic execution 

risk because we have to look at many factors when we consider 

program risk. 

Mr. BEYER. So clearly, when you made the new award, it was understanding that this was a piece of the overall puzzle? 

Dr. VOLZ. Correct, sir. 

Mr. BEYER. Mr. Powner, you said the very attractive idea that 

perhaps Congress could reduce its expenditures in upcoming years. 

Can you expand on that a little? 

Mr. POWNER. Well, clearly when you look at the out years satellites, the follow-on for the polar constellation and then when you 

get into the out year GOES, there’s a question about what’s the 

most economical way to go forward. Do you build everything as 

quickly as you can get and get economies of scale there and perhaps store them on the ground? Perhaps. Do you perhaps slow 

down the acquisition of some of those out year satellites? Perhaps. 

And I think what—and I know this Committee, we’ve worked with 

both your staff and the Majority staff. They’re looking for analysis. 

There was a comment made that Congressman Johnson asked a 

question about this, about tradeoff assessments. I’m not aware of 

those tradeoffs assessments that have satisfied your staff on this 

Committee. I think they need those tradeoff assessments to make 

the right decisions on out year deliveries. 

Mr. BEYER. Great. Thank you. 

Dr. Volz, did you have any comments? 

Dr. VOLZ. Yeah, I would like to respond to that, and I agree entirely that the out year execution needs to be addressed. What we 

have focused our activities on over the last five years as we came 

to the assessment of risk on both the polar and geostationary satellites, is that we did not have a robust configuration on orbit. Our 

first and overriding priority was to get to a situation where we 

were fault-tolerant. We had a single fault—you know, we could suffer the loss of a satellite asset and not disable the weather system, 

and so that has dictated the aggressive approach to building the 

GOES–R satellites and our aggressive schedule so that as we went 

through what could be a mission-ending failure. The same with the 

JPSS. So that has been our primary motivation. Once we get to 

that—where we’re comfortable in that risk-tolerant or fault-tolerant situation on orbit exactly as Mr. Powner mentioned, we can 

look at what is the cadence that we need to launch, but we need 

to have the assets available to have the flexibility of making those 

choices. Until we have that, then we can’t do anything to make it 

better or worse. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. I’d like to thank the Ranking Member, 

and in closing—oh, very good to see you down there. I recognize the 

gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer, for five minutes. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for recognizing me. I’m 

trying to do my job. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. What the taxpayers in Alabama expect. 

Mr. PALMER. Exactly. Mr. Volz, the President’s budget requested $380 million for the 

Polar Follow-on program. Having seen the cost overruns and delays 
85 

faced by the current satellites, I think maybe you can understand 

our hesitation to fully—or some of us, our hesitation to fully support fully funding this program. How exactly are these funds going 

to be used? 

Dr. VOLZ. Thank you for the question, sir. The Polar Follow-on 

includes the third and fourth series of the JPSS satellites. The 

funds for this, the initial $380 million, are primarily to start, and 

to the extent of about 85 percent of those going directly to the instrument providers who have built the instruments for Suomi NPP 

and JPSS–1 and 2. The benefit of this approach that we tried to 

articulate is that we are buying the satellite instruments, which 

are the highest risk, potentially the highest, the most impactful 

elements of any satellite system, at a time, at a bulk buy or buying 

two at once, maximizing the efficiency of the procurement at a time 

when the instrument vendors are ready to build those, having just 

finished the same instruments on JPSS–2. 

So the money will be going to the extent of 85 percent of it or 

90 or thereabouts directly to the main four vendors who are supplying instruments for the JPSS–3 and 4 satellites. 

Mr. PALMER. Are those vendors building the components that you 

think are most crucial? 

Dr. VOLZ. They will be prioritizing—— 

Mr. PALMER. That’s 85 percent of the money, so the majority of 

the money’s going to that? 

Dr. VOLZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PALMER. All right. Let me ask you one other question, or I’ll 

ask one other question, Mr. Powner. In GAO’s opinion, would 

NOAA incur higher costs if they did not receive all of the requested 

funds to initiate the polar follow-on programs? 

Mr. POWNER. I’m not certain. This is back to where the appropriate analysis and the tradeoff assessment needs to be given to 

this Committee, to GAO so that we can actually answer that question. You need analysis that supports it. 

Mr. PALMER. To close this, and I assume this will close the hearing, I just think, you know, handing NOAA another blank check to 

build satellites whenever they—when they can’t get the ones that 

they have off the ground it appears a bit irresponsible, Mr. Chairman, and I think NOAA needs to fix their systematic problems that 

have plagued the program for years before we throw any more 

money at it. 

I yield the balance of my time. 

Chairman BRIDENSTINE. I’d like to thank the gentleman from 

Alabama. 

It is—it’s a very challenging issue that, you know, we have 

delays, we have these challenges, and it seems the only answer is 

more money, more time, more money, more time, and if we don’t 

provide it, then we have, you know, quite frankly, even bigger 

problems with data gaps and the inability to predict weather. So 

it puts us here in Congress in a tough position when we have these 

issues. 

But I want to close—you know, I really believe that we can augment a lot of these challenges with commercial data. I believe that 

it can reduce the cost. I believe it can prevent these kind of scenarios from even occurring if we do it right, and we might not be 
86 

there today, and I understand that. These kind of things take time. 

What I’m—I’m very grateful that in the next couple of weeks, you 

know, before the end of the year, we’re going to see a final commercial space policy from NOAA and then more policies that come after 

that so that our, you know, private sector knows how to work with 

NOAA in order to provide the data that can augment our systems. 

When I see that final Commercial Space Policy, I would really 

like to see two major things. One is that there’s a difference between upstream and downstream, a difference between flat-out raw 

data, ones and zeros coming off of a satellite, and the downstream 

which are, you know, the end products that are available to the 

public and in the national interest. And I’d also like to see a very 

clear resolution that in fact WMO–40 and WMO–25 explicitly permit private-sector companies to restrict the redistribution of their 

data and allow those same member countries flexibility and discretion in determining which data sets are freely exchanged and 

under what conditions they choose to do so. I think that’s important as we develop this commercial industry that is going to be 

good for the taxpayer, good for those of us who are trying to protect 

lives and property, and I think these are important issues that 

need to be put into the Commercial Space Policy. 

With that, I want to thank our witnesses for all of your time 

today, thank you for the hard work that both of you do, and with 

that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.] 
(87) 

Appendix I 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
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STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY COMMITTEE RANKING MEMBER

EDDIE BERNICE JOHSNON
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STATEMENT BY SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIORMENT RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

RANKING MINORITY MEMBER SUZANNE BONAMICI
90 

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