Office of the Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

OVERSIGHT ★ INTEGRITY ★ GUIDANCE

Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ 

Monitoring of Inmate Communications 

to Prevent Radicalization

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

The full version of this report contains information that the Department considered to be law enforcement sensitive 

and therefore could not be publicly released. To create this public version of the report, the Office of the Inspector General redacted (blacked out) portions of the full report. 

Audit Division 20-042 March 2020 
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Executive Summary 

Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Monitoring of Inmate Communications 

to Prevent Radicalization 

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(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to review the

Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) policies, procedures,

and practices for monitoring terrorist inmates and the

BOP’s efforts to prevent further radicalization within its

inmate population.

(U) Results in Brief

(U) As of March 2018, the BOP had more than

500 incarcerated inmates with a known nexus to

domestic or international terrorism (terrorist inmates).

BOP policy requires that all social communications of

high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates, are

monitored. However, we found that the BOP had not

identified all terrorist inmates in its custody and thus

did not adequately monitor their communications.

Although the BOP, in 2005, began to provide the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with a list of soon

to be released inmates, we found BOP did not take

appropriate steps to ensure that information about all

formerly incarcerated terrorists was provided to the

FBI. In addition, we found that terrorist inmates who

had been placed under a Special Administrative

Measure (SAM) requiring 100-percent live

communication monitoring by the sponsoring law

enforcement agency, which for most terrorist inmates is

the FBI, were not being monitored effectively because

of the technological limitations of the BOP’s monitoring

capabilities. Further, between January 2015 and

December 2017, we found that the BOP had not

monitored or only partially monitored thousands of

communications of high-risk inmates, including terrorist

inmates not under a SAM directive; did not review

thousands of inmate emails, some of which contained

potentially concerning language; and permitted terrorist

inmates to communicate with unknown or un-vetted

contacts.

(U) Recommendations

(U) We make 19 recommendations to improve the

BOP’s accounting for, monitoring of, and security over

terrorist inmates.

(U) Audit Results

(U) BOP Needs to Better Identify its Population of

Incarcerated Terrorists – BOP policy requires that all

social communications of high-risk inmates be

monitored, which includes terrorist inmates. To do so,

the BOP must be able to identify inmates through all

phases of incarceration who had, continue to have, or

may develop a nexus to terrorism. During our audit,

we found that the BOP had not identified 28

incarcerated international and domestic terrorist

inmates, primarily because law enforcement agencies

did not provide the BOP with enough background

information on the inmate. We believe BOP can

improve its intake process by taking certain steps such

as ensuring all institutions are performing intake

interviews and incorporating criminal history checks on

inmates upon their arrival.

(U//LES) Additionally, we found that the BOP recently

updated its definition of a terrorist to include a 

“ ”; yet, the BOP did 

not reassess its current inmate population in light of this 

revised definition. As a result, we identified four inmates 

who met the revised definition but were not on BOP’s 

terrorist inmate list. Because of this, we believe other

inmates who meet the BOP’s updated definition of a 

terrorist could be in BOP custody without its knowledge.

(U) Formerly Incarcerated Terrorists – FBI officials

expressed concern that the average age of the terrorist

inmate population is getting younger and that the

average prison sentence is getting shorter. Therefore,

the FBI believes the risk of released terrorist inmates

recidivating is increasing. Since 2001, the BOP has

released more than 600 terrorist inmates. However, it

was not until 2005 when the BOP began to provide the

FBI with a list of terrorist inmates who are about to be

released from custody so the FBI could perform

appropriate follow-up activities if necessary. During our

review, we found at least 40 inmates with a previously

identified terrorism nexus that the BOP released without

notifying the FBI, because, according to the BOP, it did 

not believe it had sufficient information to consider these 

40 individuals to be terrorist inmates.
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Executive Summary

Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Monitoring of Inmate Communications 

to Prevent Radicalization

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(U) Special Administrative Measures – A Special 

Administrative Measure (SAM) directive can be 

authorized by the Attorney General for any inmate who 

is deemed to pose a current threat to national security 

or public safety. A SAM directive requires 100-percent 

live monitoring by the sponsoring law enforcement 

agency of an inmate’s communications and can impose 

other restrictions on an inmate, such as limiting 

communications to immediate family. As of May 2018, 

the BOP was facilitating the FBI’s monitoring of the 

communications of more than 20 terrorist inmates 

under a SAM directive. However, at the BOP facilities 

we visited with SAM inmates, we found that the BOP 

needed to improve its technological capabilities and the 

quality of its monitoring so the FBI can more effectively 

monitor these inmates. 

(U) Although it is not formally required in the SAM 

directive, we were told that the BOP and FBI agreed in 

2018 to jointly review publications (books and 

magazines) for impermissible content, such as content 

that might facilitate criminal activity or present a threat 

to national security, before they are provided to a 

terrorist inmate subject to a SAM directive. Prior to this 

agreement, the FBI learned that the BOP did not 

provide several books sent to SAM inmates for its 

review and it later determined at least one of the books 

was impermissible. The FBI also requested that the 

BOP conduct an inventory of all publications in the 

possession of terrorist inmates; however, the BOP has 

not done so. During our review, we also identified 

books in the possession of a terrorist inmate that the 

FBI found promoted terrorism. 

(U) Monitoring of Inmates’ Social 

Communications - The BOP provides most inmates, 

including terrorist inmates, with the ability to email, 

make telephone calls, and receive postage mail. BOP 

policy requires staff to monitor 100-percent of the social 

communications sent or received by high-risk inmates, 

including terrorist inmates. The only exception to this 

requirement is for privileged communications between 

the inmates and their attorney or the courts. In 

addition, the BOP requires its staff to randomly monitor 

general population inmates’ social communications to 

help prevent dangerous activities. 

(U) We found that in a span of approximately 

33 months, BOP inmates sent and received hundreds of 

millions of emails. These emails are in addition to

millions of pieces of postage mail, phone calls, and 

video sessions. BOP staff expressed frustration because 

the volume of social communication makes it impossible 

to monitor communications consistent with BOP policy. 

We found thousands of communications made by 

terrorists and other high-risk inmates that were only 

partially monitored. We also ran a query of selected 

words in BOP’s email system and found the process to 

be time intensive. Overall, we identified more than 

7,000 emails that had not been monitored at all, and 

determined through further testing that some of these 

emails contained content that needed to be evaluated 

by the BOP and counterterrorism experts. 

(U//LES) Conversations in the Cellblock and with 

Visitors – We found the BOP’s equipment in its two 

Communications Management Units (CMU) was 

insufficient for BOP staff to perform adequate 

monitoring of certain terrorist inmate conversations. 

BOP staff at both CMUs stated that the quality of sound 

was especially problematic when 

 are in 

operation. In addition, we found that one of the two 

CMUs has 

. We also found that only 

27 terrorist inmates were housed in CMUs as of May 

2017, 

. 

Further, most non-CMU facilities do not have the 

capability to adequately monitor conversations between 

inmates and visitors, 

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(U) AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’

MONITORING OF INMATE COMMUNICATIONS 

TO PREVENT RADICALIZATION

(U) TABLE OF CONTENTS 

(U) INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1

(U) AUDIT RESULTS ....................................................................................... 5

(U) BOP Needs to Take Additional Action to Identify All Incarcerated Terrorists ...... 5

(U) Inaccuracies in the BOP’s List of Incarcerated Terrorists ....................... 6

(U) Comparison to the NSD’s List of Convicted International 

Terrorists ........................................................................... 7

(U) Comparison to the NSD’s List of Sealed Convictions of 

International Terrorists ........................................................ 8

(U) Comparison to the BOP’s Posted Picture File .............................. 8

(U) FBI’s Review of the BOP’s Sovereign Citizen Lists ....................... 8

(U) The BOP Receives Inadequate Information to Identify New Terrorist 

Inmates ...................................................................................... 9

(U) BOP’s Additional Efforts to Identify Terrorists Arriving at its 

Institutions ............................................................................... 10

(U) BOP Needs to Notify FBI of All Formerly Incarcerated Terrorists ................... 11

(U) BOP and FBI Need to Improve the Monitoring of Inmates Subject to Special 

Administrative Measures ...................................................................... 11

(U) ADX Florence ................................................................................ 12

(U) MCC New York .............................................................................. 14

(U//LES) .............................................................................. 15

(U) Other SAM Directive Monitoring Issues at BOP Facilities ..................... 15

(U) SAM Directive Terrorist Inmates at Non-BOP Facilities ........................ 16

(U) BOP Needs to Effectively Manage Inmate Sharing of Discovery Materials ....... 17

(U) BOP Needs to Improve its Monitoring of Inmate Communications ................. 18

(U) Communication Channels and Restrictions ........................................ 19
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(U) Monitoring of Email........................................................................ 21

(U) BOP is Unable to Handle the Volume of Email .......................... 21

(U) Monitoring of Email Communications Made by High-Risk 

Inmates........................................................................... 22

(U) TRULINCS - Key Word List..................................................... 23

(U) Security Concerns with BOP’s Controls of Email Access and Use . 25

(U) Monitoring of Telephone Calls ......................................................... 27

(U) Monitoring of Terrorist Inmate Telephone Calls ........................ 28

(U) Monitoring of Non-Terrorist High-Risk Inmate Calls................... 30

(U) Monitoring of General Population Telephone Calls ..................... 31

(U) Inmate Circumvention of Telephone Monitoring Controls ........... 32

(U) Monitoring of Postage Mail.............................................................. 33

(U) Monitoring of Video Sessions........................................................... 34

(U) Cellblock Conversations.................................................................. 35

(U) Visitors ........................................................................................ 35

(U) Additional Security Measure – the Posted Picture File .................................. 36

(U) CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................... 38

(U) STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS..................... 41

(U) STATEMENT OF INTERNAL CONTROLS....................................................... 42

(U) APPENDIX 1: AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY .................... 43

(U) APPENDIX 2: BOP SPECIAL HOUSING UNITS RESTRICTIONS ON 

SOCIAL COMMUNICATIONS.................................................................. 47

(U) APPENDIX 3: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

PRISONS’ RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT AUDIT REPORT............................... 49

(U) APPENDIX 4: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND 

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT.................... 55
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(U) AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’

MONITORING OF INMATE COMMUNICATIONS 

TO PREVENT RADICALIZATION 

(U) INTRODUCTION1

(U) Between 2006 and 2018, the number of inmates with a known nexus to 

international or domestic terrorism in the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) custody 

increased by approximately 250 percent from 146 to approximately 512.2

 In that 

same time period, the total population of BOP inmates has fluctuated between 

approximately 193,000 inmates and approximately 219,000 inmates. One of the 

BOP’s strategic goals is to “provide for public safety and national security by 

focusing on prevention, disruption, and response to terrorist activities via secure 

institutions and proactive management practices which mitigate terrorist threats.” 

To address this strategic goal, the BOP’s policy is to monitor all social 

communications of high-risk inmates, including inmates with a known nexus to 

international and domestic terrorism (terrorist inmates).3

 Additionally, to help 

 

1

 (U) The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General 

provided the official response to this report in September 2019. The issuance of this final report was 

delayed as we worked with the BOP and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to satisfactorily 

resolve concerns regarding the public release of certain language in our report. 

2

 (U//LES) The BOP’s Counterterrorism Unit (CTU), utilizes the definition of terrorism found in 

22 U.S.C § 2656f (d)(2) when identifying its terrorist inmate population. To aid in this determination, 

the CTU relies on information provided by investigators, prosecutors and the courts, as well as its own 

background research. A more detailed description of the BOP’s process of identifying terrorist inmates 

is discussed below. In our review of the BOP’s list of terrorist inmates, we disagreed with some of the 

BOP’s determinations and narrowed the list to 512 terrorist inmates for our audit. For example, we 

found inmates on the BOP’s list that the United States Marshals Service (USMS) confirmed had been 

released from custody. Notably, some of the terrorist inmates were convicted 

. For simplicity, we refer 

to all of these individuals as “terrorist inmates” throughout this report. We also describe some of 

these terrorist inmates as “in-transit.” These terrorist inmates were arrested in 2015, 2016, and 

2017, and at the time of our audit were on their way to BOP facilities or being detained pending trial 

or sentencing at a BOP institution or by the USMS at state, local, or contract jails. The total number of 

terrorists in federal or state detention but not in BOP custody is unknown. 

3

 (U) International and domestic terrorism are defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2331. Section (1) of 

the statute defines international terrorism as activities that “(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous 

to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that 

would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; 

(B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (ii) to influence the policy of 

a government by intimidation or coercion, or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 

destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of 

the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are 

accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their 

perpetrators operate or seek asylum.” Domestic terrorism is defined in section (5) of the statute and 

includes activities that “(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal 

laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a 

civilian population, (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, (continued) 
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prevent radicalization and potentially identify individuals radicalized after 

incarceration, the BOP performs random monitoring of the communications of all 

inmates who are not designated as high-risk and conducts other security controls, 

such as vetting of visitors, volunteers, and contractors; and making staff aware of 

inmates with violent histories and terrorist associations.4

(U) In September 2006, the Department of Justice (Department) Office of 

the Inspector General (OIG) completed a review of the BOP’s monitoring of postage 

mail for high-risk inmates.5

 The review was conducted because it was determined 

that 3 international terrorists involved in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade 

Center had written approximately 90 letters to Islamic extremists between 2002 

and 2004 while incarcerated at Administrative Maximum Facility (ADX) Florence, 

Colorado. The recipients included the alleged leader of a plot to blow up the 

National Justice Building in Madrid, Spain and members of a Spanish terror cell with 

links to other terrorists suspected in the March 11, 2004, attacks on commuter 

trains in Madrid, Spain. In that report, we found that the BOP had not effectively 

monitored the postage mail or verbal communications (telephone and cellblock 

conversations) of terrorists, a category of high-risk inmates. The report made 

13 recommendations to the BOP to improve its monitoring of all high-risk inmate 

communications. The BOP established policies and procedures to address each of 

the recommendations in our 2006 review. 

 

or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and 

(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” 

(U//LES) International and domestic terrorists are not the only type of inmates considered by 

the BOP to be high-risk. In addition to terrorists, the BOP defines high-risk inmates as inmates who 

have: 

. 

(U) The BOP checks legal mail for contraband in the presence of the inmate, but does not read 

the contents of legal mail in order to avoid violating attorney-client privilege. Our testing in this 

report is focused on social communications; and we did not audit or test legal correspondence. 

4

 (U) The BOP defines radicalization as the process by which individuals come to believe that 

their engagement in, or facilitation of, non-state violence to achieve social and political change is 

necessary and justified. For prison radicalization, the emphasis is placed on the process by which an 

individual adopts a particular ideology. 

5

 (U) U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons’ Monitoring of Mail for High-Risk Inmates, Report I-2006-009 (September 2006). 
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(U) Since our 2006 review, the BOP has provided many inmates with two 

new communication methods: email and video sessions.

6

 Because of the growth in 

the number of incarcerated terrorists and the new communication methods 

provided to them, we conducted this review to evaluate the effectiveness of BOP’s 

monitoring of inmate communications and other internal controls to prevent 

radicalization.

(U) OIG Audit Approach

(U) Specifically, our audit objective was to review the BOP’s policies, 

procedures, and practices for monitoring terrorist inmates and the BOP’s efforts to 

prevent further radicalization within its inmate population. Unless otherwise noted, 

the scope of our audit generally covers communications made by high-risk inmates, 

including terrorists, and general population inmates between 2015 and 2017. To 

accomplish our objective, we interviewed over 100 BOP officials, including 

Correctional Officers, Lieutenants, Special Investigative Staff, Intelligence Analysts, 

Chaplains, Associate Wardens, and Wardens. We also met with officials and 

obtained information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National 

Security Division (NSD), Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO), Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC), United States Marshals Service (USMS), and the United 

States Attorney’s Offices (USAO) for the Southern District of New York and the 

District of Colorado. Additionally, we conducted site visits at seven BOP locations 

(three complexes and four individual facilities), as shown in Table 1 below.

 

6

 (U) At the time of the OIG’s 2006 review, BOP had implemented email communications for 

inmates at only 11 BOP facilities. By 2009, the BOP was offering email communications at all BOP 

facilities to all inmates who were not under special restrictions. In 2015, the BOP started testing video 

session services at 15 BOP female institutions. In September 2018, the BOP has expanded the testing 

to additional female inmates at one institution and plans to expand it to one more female institution, 

but there are no plans to offer it bureau-wide.
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(U) Table 1

(U) BOP Locations Selected for Review

BOP Institutiona Security 

Level Location

Federal Correctional Complex (FCC) Allenwood

 U.S. Penitentiary (USP) Allenwood High

 Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Allenwood Medium Allenwood, Pennsylvania

 FCI Allenwood Low

FCC Florence

 ADX Florence Maximum

 USP Florence High Florence, Colorado

 FCI Florence Medium

FCC Terre Haute

 USP Terre Haute High Terre Haute, Indiana

 FCI Terre Haute Medium

Individual Facilities (not in a BOP complex)

 FCI Dublin Low Dublin, California

 Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) New York Mixed New York, New York

 Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) Brooklyn Mixed Brooklyn, New York

 USP Lewisburg High Lewisburg, Pennsylvania

(U)

a We did not visit the Federal Prison Camps (minimum security) at these complexes.

(U) Source: DOJ OIG

(U) The purpose of our site work was to interview staff at each facility, and

observe the facilities and monitoring equipment available to staff. During our site 

work, we interviewed FBI officials at the local FBI offices that had jurisdiction over 

each of the above institutions. We also obtained source documents and data 

regarding the methods and procedures for monitoring inmates’ communications, as 

well as the transactional data from monitoring activities. We also reviewed policies, 

guidelines, regulations, laws, electronic data, correspondence, internal case 

management data, and other work products.

(U) The Audit Results section of this report details the processes and factors 

involved in identifying the terrorist population incarcerated within the BOP’s 

institutions; communication between the BOP and other Department components 

regarding the release of terrorist inmates; and the OIG’s analysis of the BOP’s 

monitoring of communications of terrorist and of other high-risk inmates, as well as 

inmates under a Special Administrative Measures (SAM) directive. See Appendix 1 

for further discussion of the audit objective, scope, and methodology.
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(U) AUDIT RESULTS

(U) BOP policy requires the monitoring of all communications of 

high-risk inmates, which includes the more than 500 terrorist inmates in BOP 

custody during the time period of our review. However, we found that the 

BOP had not identified all terrorist inmates in its custody and, therefore, may 

not have appropriately monitored their communications. Additionally, we 

found that the BOP did not fully monitor all of the communications of its 

already identified terrorist and other high-risk inmates. We also found that 

the technological limitations of the BOP’s telephone monitoring capabilities

hindered the FBI’s ability to effectively monitor certain incarcerated terrorists 

who are subject to more stringent monitoring under a Special Administration 

Measure (SAM) directive. Furthermore, we found that the BOP’s ability to 

effectively monitor certain conversations of terrorist and other high-risk

inmates at the BOP’s two Communications Management Units (CMU) was 

limited, despite the fact that CMUs were specifically designed for enhanced 

monitoring of select inmates.7 We also determined at one of the institutions 

we visited that BOP staff did not ensure that materials provided to terrorist 

inmates as part of discovery, including radical documents, were not shared

with other inmates. Lastly, we found at the institutions we visited that the 

BOP has not: satisfactorily monitored general population inmate

communications to detect any potential radicalization from within its 

institutions; sufficiently mitigated vulnerabilities exposed by inmate efforts to 

avoid monitoring; or appropriately made all institution staff aware of inmate 

terrorists incarcerated at its institutions.

(U) BOP Needs to Take Additional Action to Identify All Incarcerated 

Terrorists

(U) In order for the BOP to monitor all incarcerated terrorist communications, 

the BOP first has to identify the incarcerated terrorists at its institutions. The 

2017 BOP annual training on Countering Inmate Extremism emphasized this need. 

At the beginning of this audit in May 2017, the BOP provided the OIG with a list 

that identified 431 international terrorists and 103 domestic terrorists incarcerated

at or being transitioned into its institutions.

8

 

7

 (U) CMUs are for inmates (including terrorist inmates) who, due to their current offense, 

conduct, or other verified information, require increased monitoring of communications with persons in 

the community to protect the safety, security, and orderly operation of BOP facilities, and to protect 

the public.

8

 (U) The BOP also has inmates in custody who were convicted of terrorism-related offenses 

and are currently admitted to the Federal Witness Security Program that are not included here 

for security reasons.
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(U) Inaccuracies in the BOP’s List of Incarcerated Terrorists

(U//LES) The BOP’s terrorism definition follows 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2), 

which defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 

against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” 

However, the BOP further identifies terrorist inmates as either “

.” Those definitions are:

(U) To determine the accuracy of the BOP’s list of incarcerated terrorists we 

performed an analysis of Department records. As described in greater detail 

below, through this analysis we identified 28 inmates housed in BOP institutions or 

in-transit to BOP institutions who we believed met the BOP’s definition of an

international or domestic terrorist but were not on the BOP’s list of identified 

terrorist inmates provided to us when we began our audit. Ultimately, the BOP 

agreed that 23 of these 28 inmates met its definition of a terrorist. As of July 

2018, the BOP had added all 23 of these inmates to its list of incarcerated 

terrorists; however, the BOP declined to add three of the inmates because it

determined that they did not meet its terrorist definition, despite these individuals 

being nominated by the FBI to the consolidated terrorist watchlist prior to 

becoming BOP inmates.9

(U) Specifically, we tested the accuracy of the list of terrorist inmates the 

BOP provided to us against: (1) the Department’s National Security 

Division’s (NSD) list of individuals who either have been convicted of violations of 

federal statutes that are directly related to international terrorism (regardless of 

the offense of conviction), or convicted of violations of a variety of other statutes 

where the federal investigation involved an identified link to international 

terrorism, which identified 18 inmates who were not on the BOP’s list; (2) NSD’s 

 

9

 (U) The Department asked us not to provide information to the BOP on the remaining 2 of 

the 28 inmates because their convictions were sealed by the court for ongoing operational reasons. 

Therefore, the BOP was unable to make a designation determination for these two inmates. 
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list of sealed convictions of international terrorists, which identified 2 inmates who 

were not on the BOP’s list; (3) the BOP’s Posted Picture File, which identified 5 

inmates who were not on the BOP’s list; and (4) the BOP’s list of incarcerated 

sovereign citizens, which identified 3 inmates who were not on the BOP’s list.

10

(U) Comparison to the NSD’s List of Convicted International Terrorists 

(U) After comparing the NSD’s list of convicted international terrorists to the 

BOP’s list of terrorist inmates, we identified 18 inmates on the NSD’s list of 

international terrorists that were not on the BOP’s list. We provided these names to 

the BOP, and it reviewed their criminal histories to determine if they met the BOP’s 

definition of terrorism.11 

(U//LES) The BOP determined that the 18 inmates met its definition of a 

terrorist and it added all of these individuals to its list of terrorist inmates. 

According to a BOP official, the BOP had not identified four of these individuals as 

terrorists because the BOP’s definition of a nexus to terrorism had not yet included 

a “ .” In April 2017, the BOP added these words 

to its existing definition of terrorism but it did not apply the revised definition to its 

current inmate population. As a result, we believe other inmates who meet the 

updated definition of a terrorist could potentially be in BOP custody. The 

four individuals referenced above were linked 

 which the U.S. Department of State added to 

its list of foreign terrorist organizations in . For the remaining 14 

inmates, the BOP explained to us that it could not add these inmates to its list 

because the inmates’ information had not yet been uploaded into the BOP’s SENTRY 

database. However, we found that 2 of these inmates were already in SENTRY 

 

10

 (U) The NSD’s list tracks convictions resulting from international terrorism investigations 

conducted since September 11, 2001. Criminal cases arising from international terrorism 

investigations are divided into two categories. Category I cases involve violations of federal statutes 

that are directly related to international terrorism while Category II cases include defendants charged 

with violating a variety of other statutes where the investigation involved an identified link to 

international terrorism. The NSD told us that it does not maintain a list of convictions related solely to 

domestic terrorism because many of these cases are prosecuted at the State level. 

 (U) The BOP’s Posted Picture File of inmates includes individuals who are potentially 

disruptive, escape risks, or pose a present threat to staff or institutional security. All terrorist inmates 

are included on the Posted Picture File. All BOP staff have to review the pictures and criminal histories 

of all the inmates on the Posted Picture File at least quarterly. 

(U) The BOP defines sovereign citizen as an individual with an ideological belief that they are 

separate and independent from government control, oversight, and the restrictions of rule of law, 

based on personal beliefs, which may be religious, political, or personal in nature. The sovereign 

citizen movement is a loosely organized collection of groups and individuals who have adopted an 

anarchist type ideology where its adherents believe the federal government of the United States is 

illegitimate. 

11

 (U) Two of these inmates were not on the BOP’s terrorist list when we began our testing. 

Prior to the OIG providing the information to the BOP, the BOP had added them to its list. 
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when we began our testing and were not identified as terrorist inmates for 162 and 

452 days, respectively. 

(U) Comparison to the NSD’s List of Sealed Convictions of International 

Terrorists 

(U//LES) The NSD’s list of convictions of international terrorists does not 

include convictions of international terrorists that were sealed pursuant to a U.S. 

court order. Because of this limitation, we asked NSD for a list of those sealed 

convictions. NSD informed us that it did not maintain such a list; however, NSD 

officials reviewed their records and provided us with a list of sealed convictions 

of international terrorists as of April 6, 2018. We compared that list to the BOP’s 

list of terrorist inmates and found that international terrorists were on 

the BOP’s list of terrorist inmates. For the remaining international terrorists whose 

convictions were under seal, the BOP had not been provided sufficient information 

to identify the inmates as terrorists. In order for the BOP to appropriately monitor 

all incarcerated terrorist communications and ensure the safety of its staff, it must 

be aware of the terrorist inmates in its custody. Therefore, we recommend that the 

Department develop a mechanism to notify the BOP of all terrorists in its custody, 

including those whose convictions are under a sealed U.S. court order. 

(U) Comparison to the BOP’s Posted Picture File

(U) As noted above, the BOP’s Posted Picture File includes inmates who are 

potentially disruptive, escape risks, or pose a present threat to staff or institutional 

security, such as terrorist inmates. We compared the BOP’s Posted Picture File at 

two locations, MCC New York and MDC Brooklyn, to the BOP’s list of terrorist 

inmates. This resulted in our identification of five more international terrorists who 

were not on the BOP’s list of incarcerated terrorists when we began our testing, and 

the BOP agreed that all five should be designated as terrorist inmates. Although 

the BOP had added four of these five inmates to its list prior to our formal 

notification to the BOP about them, a review of these inmates’ records showed that 

all five inmates had been incarcerated at BOP detention centers for almost a year 

before being added to the BOP’s list. A BOP official explained that they were not 

included earlier because MCC New York and MDC Brooklyn did not notify the BOP’s 

Counterterrorism Unit (CTU) in Martinsburg, West Virginia of the terrorists’ arrival 

at those institutions.12

 Given what we found by reviewing the Posted Picture File at 

just two BOP institutions, we are concerned that other BOP institutions also may 

have failed to notify CTU of terrorist inmates at their institutions. 

(U) FBI’s Review of the BOP’s Sovereign Citizen Lists

(U) We also asked the BOP to provide us with a list of all of its inmates with 

ties to sovereign citizen movements, as we believed some of these individuals could 

meet the BOP’s definition of a terrorist. On October 23, 2017, the BOP provided us 

 

12

 (U) Only CTU can add a terrorism designation to an inmate’s record in the BOP’s systems.
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

9 

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

with a list of 462 incarcerated sovereign citizens, most of whom had not been 

designated by the BOP as a terrorist inmate.13 We provided this list to the FBI to 

see whether it believed any of these individuals met the FBI’s definition of a 

terrorist. The FBI’s review identified 3 individuals who it believes have a nexus to 

terrorism and who have been included on the U.S. government’s consolidated 

terrorist watchlist for at least 5 years. We shared the results with the BOP and it 

determined that the inmates did not meet the BOP’s criteria for terrorism; 

therefore, the BOP did not add them to its terrorist inmate list. We find it 

troublesome that the BOP does not recognize the terrorist definition utilized by the 

FBI, which views these individuals as domestic terrorists. 

(U) Based on our analysis as outlined above, we determined that the BOP 

had not identified a total of 28 terrorist inmates within or in-transit to its 

institutions when we began our testing. Because the BOP did not identify these 

individuals as terrorist inmates when they entered its custody, it cannot be certain 

that the inmates were appropriately monitored or that adequate preparations were 

made for the arrival of in-transit terrorist inmates at BOP institutions.14

 We 

recommend that the BOP work with the Department to determine: (a) an accurate 

population of international and domestic terrorists incarcerated at, or in-transit to, 

its institutions; and (b) determine whether any existing and previously unmonitored 

communications, such as emails or recorded telephone calls, should be reviewed. 

(U) The BOP Receives Inadequate Information to Identify New Terrorist Inmates 

(U//LES) Because the BOP had not identified 28 terrorist inmates located 

within or in-transit to its institutions when we began our testing, we asked BOP 

officials how they typically identify an inmate as a terrorist. BOP officials stated 

that this identification is made either prior to or upon the inmates’ arrival at a BOP 

institution by reviewing their prior history of terrorism-related behavior that may be 

detailed in law enforcement documents, including pre-sentence reports prepared by 

the U.S Probation Office in connection with their sentencing, or by reviewing 

information obtained through a public records search. However, the criminal 

history information provided to the BOP by the arresting agency and the U.S. court 

system is sometimes insufficient in identifying the individual’s nexus to terrorism. 

This situation usually occurs when an individual has been arrested or convicted of 

criminal charges that are 

. 

(U) According to NSD’s records, the Department has obtained convictions of 

more than 300 international terrorists since September 11, 2001, on various 

criminal charges that do not relate to terrorism. In these cases and others, BOP 

 

13

 (U) According to the BOP’s records, 5 of the 462 sovereign citizens were on the BOP’s list of 

terrorists. 

14

 (U) As discussed in the Monitoring of Inmate Communications section of this report, the 

BOP is required to monitor 100 percent of incarcerated terrorist communications. These previously 

unidentified terrorists’ communications could have been monitored by the BOP for other purposes. 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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officials stated that they have often had to rely on media coverage or an internet 

search in an attempt to identify the individual’s ties to terrorism. BOP officials 

estimated that they currently identify about 80 to 90 percent of arriving inmates’ 

nexus to terrorism through public record searches prior to or upon the individual’s 

arrival at BOP institutions. For example, two individuals were recently being 

detained on charges of conspiring to commit money laundering and conspiring to 

deal in unlicensed firearms. According to BOP officials, it identified both inmates’

nexus to terrorism through media reports that indicated that they had ties to 

Hezbollah, which was added to the Department of State’s Foreign Terrorist 

Organization list on October 8, 1997.

(U) BOP’s Additional Efforts to Identify Terrorists Arriving at its Institutions

(U) In addition to internet searches, BOP staff interview arriving inmates to 

determine their criminal background, perform a visual search, and ask inmates to 

self-report any gang or terrorist affiliations. The primary purpose of this process is 

to ensure rival gangs are separated within the prison to safeguard the health, 

safety, and security of the institution’s personnel. We found one of the seven BOP 

locations that we visited was not performing these interviews. A BOP official from 

this particular institution stated that this deviation from their normal process was 

caused by a lack of personnel to perform this function. We believe performing 

these interviews is a best practice and it should be performed at all BOP 

institutions. We recommend that the BOP assess which of its institutions do not 

conduct arrival interviews and determine whether BOP policy should require these 

interviews to potentially help identify terrorist and other high-risk inmates.

(U) In addition to the interviews, we found some BOP personnel were 

identifying terrorists by running the names of arriving inmates against the National 

Crime Information Center (NCIC) database.

15

 The U.S. government’s consolidated 

terrorist watchlist, which is maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a 

multi-agency organization administered by the FBI, exports a subset of records on 

individuals with a nexus to terrorism to NCIC.16 We believe the practice of running 

the names of all arriving inmates against NCIC is a best practice and can help identify 

individuals believed to currently have a nexus to terrorism. Therefore, we 

recommend that the BOP explore all available and alternative processes, including 

 

15

 (U) NCIC is an electronic clearinghouse of crime data that, among other things, helps 

criminal justice professionals apprehend fugitives, locate missing persons, recover stolen property, 

and identify terrorists. By the end of 2015, NCIC contained 12 million active records in 21 files. One 

of the 21 files is the Known or Appropriately Suspected Terrorist file.

16

 (U) The 2015 U.S. government Watchlist Guidance defines “known terrorist” as an 

individual who has been (a) arrested, charged by information, indicted for, or convicted of a crime 

related to terrorism and/or terrorist activities by U.S government or foreign government authorities; 

or (b) identified as a terrorist or a member of a terrorist organization pursuant to statute, Executive 

Order, or international legal obligation pursuant to a United Nations Security Council Resolution. It 

defines “suspected terrorist” as an individual who is reasonably suspected of engaging in, having

engaged in, or intending to engage in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of or in 

furtherance of, or related to terrorism and/or terrorist activities.
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11

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

routine NCIC checks, with the Department for screening incoming inmates for 

terrorist connections, and implement policy and procedures as appropriate. 

(U) BOP Needs to Notify FBI of All Formerly Incarcerated Terrorists 

(U//LES) FBI officials informed us that since September 11, 2001, the average 

age of terrorist inmates is getting younger and their prison sentences are getting 

shorter, and therefore the risk of terrorist inmates recidivating is increasing. As a 

result, since 2005 the BOP has provided to the FBI a list of terrorist 

inmates who are scheduled for release from BOP custody . This

information enables the FBI to perform an assessment on the soon-to-be released 

terrorist inmate to determine any risk they may pose to national security. The FBI 

informed us that this process was formalized in FBI policy in July 2018, and it has 

since provided additional guidance to its field offices on how to properly assess 

these soon to be former inmates. 

(U) In October 2017, the BOP provided us with a list of 617 previously 

incarcerated terrorist inmates that had been released from BOP custody since 2001. 

Because of the discrepancies we found in the BOP list of terrorist inmates, as 

discussed above, we compared the NSD’s historical list of unsealed convicted 

international terrorists to the BOP’s October 2017 list of formerly incarcerated 

international terrorists. Based on this comparison, we found 46 inmates on NSD’s 

list who had an established nexus to terrorism were released from BOP institutions, 

and were not included on the BOP’s October 2017 list. Accordingly, the FBI would 

not have been notified of their release. 

(U) In response to our finding, BOP officials stated that they did not have 

enough information from the Department to determine whether the 46 former 

inmates met the BOP’s definition of a terrorist. We recommend that the BOP work 

with the Department to develop a complete universe of previously unidentified 

terrorist inmates and obtain information from the Department that will help the BOP 

determine if the 46 released inmates we identified meet its definition of a terrorist. 

If any of them do, then we recommend that the BOP add them to its historical list 

of formerly incarcerated terrorists to make it accurate and notify the FBI of their 

release. 

(U) BOP and FBI Need to Improve the Monitoring of Inmates Subject to 

Special Administrative Measures 

(U) The BOP assists the FBI’s monitoring of terrorist inmates who are under a 

Special Administrative Measure (SAM) directive. As of May 1, 2018, there were 

27 terrorist inmates in BOP custody that were under an FBI sponsored SAM 

directive. According to 28 C.F.R. § 501.3: 

(U) Upon direction of the Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of 

Prisons may authorize the Warden to implement Special Administrative 

Measures that are reasonably necessary to protect persons against the 

risk of death or serious bodily injury... These procedures may be 

implemented... [when] there is a substantial risk that a prisoner’s 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

12

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

communications or contacts with persons could result in death or 

serious bodily injury to persons... These special administrative 

measures ordinarily may include... limiting certain privileges, 

including, but not limited to, correspondence, visiting,... and use of the 

telephone, as is reasonably necessary to protect persons against the 

risk of acts of violence or terrorism. 

(U) The sponsoring law enforcement agency or a United States Attorney’s 

Office (USAO) can request a SAM directive be placed on an inmate. If the Attorney 

General agrees, then a SAM directive is issued requiring 100-percent monitoring of 

the inmate’s communications, among other measures such as limiting with whom 

the inmate can communicate. SAM directives are issued for a length of 1 year and 

at the end of that term, SAM directives can be extended by the Attorney General or 

his designee. Unlike the BOP’s 100-percent monitoring of terrorist inmates, those 

under a SAM directive are monitored by the sponsoring law enforcement agency, 

which is the FBI for most terrorist inmates. If a SAM directive expires, then the 

responsibility for monitoring the terrorist inmate’s communications reverts back to the 

BOP. 

(U//FOUO) As of May 2018, the 27 terrorist inmates subject to a SAM 

directive were located at four BOP facilities: ADX Florence, Colorado; USP Florence, 

Colorado; MCC New York, New York; and . We also learned 

during the audit that there were three additional individuals with a nexus to 

terrorism who are subject to a SAM directive that are 

. To test the SAM monitoring process, we interviewed BOP and FBI 

officials, and observed the monitoring process at ADX Florence and MCC New York. 

We also interviewed FBI Special Agents and Task Force Officers performing the 

monitoring of the . As described in greater 

detail below, we found some SAM directive-related issues at ADX Florence and 

MCC New York, as well as some overall general concerns with monitoring of 

terrorist inmates subject to a SAM directive. 

(U) ADX Florence 

(U//LES) All terrorists inmates at ADX Florence, those under a SAM directive 

and those not under a SAM directive, have their telephonic communications limited 

to two to four 15-minute phone calls per month.17

 In order to make these 

telephone calls, the terrorist inmate must schedule the call 14 days in advance. 

This advance notice allows the BOP to schedule the monitoring of the call, verify 

that the receiver of the call is a pre-approved contact, and arrange for translation, 

if necessary. For terrorist inmates under a SAM directive at ADX Florence, the 

terrorist inmate’s communications are monitored by the FBI’s National Joint 

Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) with the support of the local FBI Area Office and 

 

17

 (U) Typically, inmates receive additional minutes per month in November and December. 

ADX Florence inmates under a SAM directive are in one of three phases of the program. Phase 1 

inmates get less privileges than Phase 2 or 3 inmates. 
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UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

additional language specialists in other FBI Field Offices.18 Therefore, the BOP has 

to schedule the call time with the FBI, so that FBI personnel and translators, if 

necessary, can be listening to the live call. The FBI’s responsibility is to request 

that the BOP 

. 

(U) We found that due to technological limitations the FBI is unable to 

directly connect from its office to a live call at ADX Florence. Accordingly, in order 

to enable the FBI to listen to the terrorist inmate’s call at ADX Florence, the BOP 

either: (1) plays the call on computer speakers and has the FBI listen on a speaker 

phone that the BOP places beside the computer’s speakers, or (2) the BOP tapes 

two phone handsets together, with the terrorist inmate’s call as the output on one 

handset and the FBI monitors listening to the call through the other handset. A BOP 

official stated that this issue has been ongoing for more than 8 years. While we 

cannot confirm that this leads to ineffective monitoring on every SAMs inmate call, 

FBI officials complained to us about both setups. Specifically, FBI personnel stated 

that the FBI translator and monitor often have a hard time hearing what is being 

said and, therefore, could potentially miss an opportunity to terminate a call if 

necessary. After the call has been completed, the BOP provides a higher quality 

recording of the telephone conversation to the FBI. However, the FBI told us that 

the translation summary of the live call and the recorded call can be significantly 

different due to the limited technological capabilities at ADX Florence. 

(U) In addition to these limited phone call privileges, incarcerated terrorists 

at ADX Florence subject to a SAM directive may also send a maximum of six pages 

(three pieces, double sided) of postage mail per week to an approved contact and 

can receive unlimited incoming postage mail. The NJTTF receives the mail and 

reviews it before it is sent or received by the terrorist inmate. We did not find any 

issues with the handling of the postage mail at ADX Florence. 

(U//LES) In September 2017, the FBI initiated steps to permanently move 

FBI personnel to the BOP’s CTU office location in Martinsburg, West Virginia, where 

they can directly monitor terrorist inmate calls. Additionally, these FBI personnel at

the CTU will help guide any FBI field office monitoring of a terrorist inmates under a 

SAM directive that are not incarcerated at ADX Florence.19 As of February 2018, 

 permanent FBI personnel had been placed at the CTU. We listened to the 

 

18

 (U) The NJTTF provides administrative, logistical, and training support to the Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). The NJTTF also coordinates special information and intelligence 

gathering initiatives assigned by FBI Headquarters and synthesizes terrorism intelligence for use by 

the JTTFs, NJTTF member agencies, and other agencies in the intelligence community. JTTFs provide 

one-stop sharing of information regarding terrorist activities in more than 104 cities nationwide, 

including at least one in each of the FBI’s 56 field offices. 

19

 (U//FOUO) Prior to and during a trial, as well in the pre-sentencing phase, the originating 

FBI field office monitors the terrorist inmate under a SAM directive 

. The NJTTF assumes responsibility to monitor these inmates once they are sentenced and 

designated by the BOP for ADX Florence. 
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UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

quality of the sound for these calls at the CTU and it appeared to be an adequate 

connection. We believe this new arrangement will improve the quality of the sound 

for those monitoring future calls; however, the arrangement will not address the 

situation when an FBI translator is needed, but not located at the CTU. In these 

instances, the translator will still have to be connected into the call in one of the 

two methods identified above, unless technological improvements are made.

(U) MCC New York

(U) Terrorist inmates under a SAM directive at MCC New York are limited to 

two 15-minute telephone calls per month. These calls must be scheduled in 

advance and the terrorist inmate must notify the BOP of the language they wish to 

use on the call. At MCC New York, New York JTTF Task Force Officers stated that 

when a call occurs an FBI Special Agent from the local FBI field office or a Task 

Force Officer from the New York JTTF will usually come to the facility to listen in on 

the call. The translator, when in another location, will call MCC New York on 

another line and listen via one of the two means described above. We visited 

MCC New York, observed the setup for the telephone used by inmates under a SAM 

directive, and listened to one call. The phone call was played on computer

speakers in a secure room so that the FBI translator located in Jacksonville, Florida,

could listen on a speaker phone sitting next to those computer speakers. However, 

contrary to what we were told were normal FBI procedures for monitoring calls at 

MCC New York, no FBI Special Agent, New York JTTF Task Force Officer, or NJTTF 

personnel was present or connected to the call to monitor it. When we inquired 

why an FBI Analyst did not listen to the call, an FBI official stated that having an

FBI translator listening to the call satisfied the SAM requirement that all calls are to 

be contemporaneously monitored by the FBI. We asked the FBI translator located 

in Jacksonville about the quality of the sound and he stated he could not hear much 

of anything. Based on this observation and what we found at ADX Florence, we 

recommend that the BOP review the quality of the telephone monitoring equipment 

at institutions requiring FBI monitoring of inmates under a SAM directive, and work 

with the FBI to make improvements to ensure effective monitoring can be 

conducted with the equipment at each of those institutions.

(U) The postage mail of terrorist inmates who are subject to a SAM directive

at MCC New York is sent to the local JTTF, where JTTF personnel review and 

approve it before it is sent out or received by a terrorist inmate. As stated above, it 

is the responsibility of the originating FBI field office to monitor terrorist inmates 

under a SAM directive as they await trial or sentencing. However, we found the 

leadership of the FBI New York Field Office was unaware of this particular process. 

The leadership thought that personnel from the NJTTF were performing this 

monitoring function. The FBI Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the JTTF stated 

that he would request that the NJTTF provide guidance on how the FBI New York 

Field Office should be performing this monitoring to ensure the proper monitoring 

steps are being taken by JTTF personnel. In September 2018, the FBI formalized 

its SAM monitoring procedures, which identifies the Originating Office Case Agent or 

individual(s) designated by the Originating Office Case Agent as the responsible 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

15

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

party for monitoring an inmate under a SAM directive due to their proximity to the 

inmate awaiting trial or sentencing. 

(U//LES) We also noted during our visit that one of the terrorist inmates 

under a SAM directive at MCC New York had received the same visitor on several 

occasions. The visitor and the terrorist inmate were put in the same room with a 

partition in between them and with microphones placed in the room for monitoring 

purposes. A Task Force Officer at the New York JTTF stated that he monitored 

these visits from another room at MCC New York; however, he explained to us that 

the sound quality was poor and that if the parties in the visiting room 

 he was unable to hear what they were saying. According to the officer, 

he had to repeatedly ask the BOP to call down to the correctional officer standing 

outside the visiting room to tell . We recommend 

that the BOP assess the sound quality in BOP visiting rooms utilized by terrorist 

inmates subject to SAM directives and improve the microphones in any identified 

facilities with inadequate equipment so that the FBI can effectively perform its 

monitoring as required under the SAM directive and the BOP can perform similar 

monitoring of its terrorist and other high-risk inmates. 

(U//LES) 

(U//LES) We interviewed the FBI Special Agent in 

who is monitoring the one terrorist inmate housed . According to the 

Special Agent, this terrorist inmate had not made any phone calls, but had received 

correspondence and one visit from his spouse. The Special Agent monitored the 

social visit and the mail correspondence. The BOP allows this inmate to check 

books in and out of the BOP Religious Service’s library and the Special Agent has 

reviewed those books for any radical material. The FBI Special Agent also 

confirmed that this terrorist inmate does not have email access. 

(U) Other SAM Directive Monitoring Issues at BOP Facilities 

(U//FOUO) We found that the BOP did not provide to the FBI for its review all 

publications that had been sent to terrorist inmates under a SAM directive. 

Section 8 of the SAM directive states that to prevent an inmate from receiving and 

acting upon 

an inmate’s access to materials of mass communications is 

restricted. For publications and newspapers, the inmate may have access to the 

publications or newspapers that are determined not to facilitate criminal activity, or 

be detrimental to national security; the security, good order, or discipline of the 

institution; or a threat to the protection of the public. In addition, Section 9 of the 

SAM directive states that an inmate may have access to books that do not facilitate 

criminal activity or present a substantial threat to national security or the security, 

discipline, or good order of the institution. 

(U) In order to manage these provisions, the FBI proposed that the BOP 

would be responsible for reviewing publications to determine whether they present 

a substantial threat to the security, discipline, or good order of the institution, while 

the FBI would be responsible for reviewing publications to determine whether they 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

16

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

contained any content that may facilitate criminal activity or present a substantial 

threat to national security. The BOP, however, told us it believes that it should be 

able to process innocuous books and not have to provide them to the FBI because 

the FBI previously denied books to inmates such as former President Obama’s 

Memoir and a book written by former President Carter. However, we found that 

these particular books were denied by the FBI because they came from an 

unapproved contact—not due to the content of the books.

(U) We found that, in 2017, terrorist inmates under a SAM directive received 

a total of 179 books and that both the BOP and FBI reviewed most of them. Of 

these 179 books, the BOP denied 5 and the FBI denied 36. We also found that the 

BOP processed 21 of the books without FBI review. Subsequently, the FBI 

concluded that at least 1 of these 21 books should not have been provided to the 

terrorist inmates as the book promoted acts of terrorism.

(U) In January 2018, officials from the FBI, BOP, OEO, and USAO for the 

District of Colorado participated in a conference call to discuss the issue of 

publication review for inmates subject to a SAM directive. As a result of the call, it 

was decided that the BOP would provide to the FBI a list of books that have arrived 

in the postage mail for terrorist inmates under a SAM directive. The parties agreed 

that the FBI would then be given two business days to determine whether a 

particular book on the list required further review. If the FBI chooses to review a 

book, it must complete the review within 14 days if the book is written in English 

and 60 days if written in a foreign language. If the FBI recommends denying a

book after its review, it must document specific quotes or contextual background

from the book to support the recommendation. In addition, the FBI Office of 

General Counsel’s National Security Law Branch agreed to provide concurrence on 

whether to recommend the denial of a book. This process was implemented in 

January 2018.

(U) Because terrorist inmates might have been receiving books that could

pose a threat to national security prior to this agreement, the FBI requested that 

the BOP perform a detailed inventory of books that are already in the possession of 

terrorist inmates subject to a SAM directive. However, as of February 2018, the 

BOP had not performed a detailed inventory of the books in the cells of these 

inmates. The BOP stated that it “does not have a national policy, which requires 

institutions to maintain an inventory of an inmate’s cell who is on a SAM [directive], 

nor do any of the current SAM [directives] require [the BOP] to do so.” We believe 

an inventory would be helpful so the FBI and the BOP would be aware of and could 

review any radical material that previously may have come into the possession of 

these terrorist inmates. We recommend that Department determine whether the 

BOP should conduct an inventory of the books and publications found in the cells of 

all terrorist inmates and provide it to the FBI for review.

(U) SAM Directive Terrorist Inmates at Non-BOP Facilities

(U) We identified three additional terrorist inmates who are subject to a SAM 

directive and are incarcerated at three non-BOP facilities. We interviewed the FBI 

Special Agents who work with these external entities to monitor these terrorist 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

17

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

inmates. Although we found some differences in the level of monitoring being 

performed, we generally found the FBI has been able to adequately monitor all 

three individuals. We learned that the inmate at one of the non-BOP locations 

attempted to get another inmate to send an email for him in order to circumvent 

the monitoring. The other inmate refused to send the email and notified 

correctional staff of this attempt to circumvent their monitoring procedures. The 

correctional staff took steps to prevent the individual from attempting this 

circumvention again. 

(U) Overall, we believe that the BOP and the FBI should establish a more 

consistent and organized approach to monitoring of terrorist inmates who are 

subject to a SAM directive. The movement of FBI personnel into the CTU should 

improve the monitoring of terrorist inmates under a SAM directive based on the 

improved sound quality alone. However, this movement of FBI personnel will not 

resolve the sound issue when a translator has to connect to a live call. 

(U) BOP Needs to Effectively Manage Inmate Sharing of Discovery 

Materials 

(U//LES) In September 2016, Ahmad Khan Rahimi detonated two bombs and 

placed several bombs that did not detonate in New York City and at locations in 

New Jersey. He was subsequently convicted of terrorism offenses for his actions. 

During his trial, he was detained at MCC New York. Through the discovery process, 

the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) provided 

voluminous documentation to his defense team on a laptop and multiple external 

hard drives, which contained electronic material and other evidence that the FBI 

had found during their investigation. During our audit, it came to our attention that 

Rahimi had been sharing with other MCC New York inmates more than 20 radical 

Islamic recruiting videos and other radical literature, which was included in the 

government’s discovery production to Rahimi. Although the BOP was provided with 

information indicating that several inmates had received this material, the BOP 

ultimately could only identify one inmate (Inmate 1) who received it. Inmate 1 had 

been incarcerated on charges that he (1) 

and (2) 

. In February 2018, Inmate 1 pled guilty 

to these charges. 

(U//LES) We asked BOP and SDNY officials how this sharing of radical 

material could have occurred at MCC New York. We found that defendants in 

multiple trials are permitted to sit in the same room side-by-side viewing their 

respective discovery materials. Where the inmate has been charged with providing 

material support to terrorist organizations, the discovery material is likely to include 

inappropriate, radical videos, images, or documents. BOP staff are responsible for 

monitoring this room in addition to ongoing education classes that occur in other 

rooms. An SDNY investigation determined that Rahimi’s hard drive had been 

plugged into Inmate 1’s computer, which allowed Rahimi or Inmate 1 to save 

Rahimi’s discovery material, including radical material, onto Inmate 1’s computer. 

BOP officials searched Rahimi’s cell and found that he had lists of radical speeches 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

18

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

within his discovery material. In reviewing the material, BOP officials found in 

addition to the speeches that Rahimi’s discovery materials included videos of 

. The BOP told us that Rahimi found a way, that it 

has been unable to determine, to 

. The BOP does not know how many other inmates received this material. 

(U//LES) Rahimi was subsequently placed under a SAM directive, convicted 

on federal charges, and is currently housed at a state correctional facility while 

awaiting trial on state charges. Inmate 1 was 

. 

(U) We reviewed Rahimi’s and Inmate 1’s other possessions and noted that 

Rahimi had books that the FBI identified as promoting terrorism. Additionally, 

Inmate 1 had a list of all Muslim inmates located at MCC New York, which BOP 

officials confirmed Inmate 1 should not have had. 

(U) We are concerned that we identified the items noted above after the BOP 

had already searched both terrorist inmates’ possessions during its investigation 

into their sharing of radical material. We are also concerned that MCC New York 

allowed terrorist inmates and non-terrorist inmates to sit in the same room while 

viewing potentially radical material that may be contained within their discovery 

documents. We recommend that the BOP work with the Department to establish 

procedures to prevent terrorist inmates from viewing discovery materials in the 

presence of other inmates and consider additional steps to minimize the risk that 

discovery material containing radical or harmful content can be inappropriately 

shared with other inmates. 

(U) BOP Needs to Improve its Monitoring of Inmate Communications 

(U) In response to the issues identified in our 2006 review, the then-BOP 

Director provided guidance at a Wardens’ meeting where he established the 

requirement to monitor 100-percent of high-risk inmates’, including terrorists’, 

social communications. In 2016, the BOP Special Investigative Supervisors (SIS) 

Manual was updated to reflect this guidance and noted that it should not preclude 

the random monitoring of general population communications. The BOP requires at 

least 5-percent monitoring of general population phone calls and random 

monitoring of general population inmates’ other social communications. The SIS 

policy further states “these procedures are necessary to ensure public safety, 

national security, and the orderly operation of institutions.”

(U//LES) The BOP provides multiple communication channels to inmates. 

These channels may include: email, phone calls, postage mail, and video sessions. 

Furthermore, inmates communicate with each other in cellblock conversations and 

they have visitors that communicate with them in visiting rooms.20 Whether the 

 

20

 (U) BOP inmates also communicate with contractors and volunteers. BOP officials stated 

that approximately 72 percent of all volunteers are in religious services. We will be reporting on the 

BOP’s monitoring of religious services to prevent radicalization in a separate audit report. 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

19

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

communications are monitored or not, BOP officials stated that they 

 for all terrorist inmates’ outgoing telephone calls and incoming and 

outgoing emails with the FBI. Overall, we found the BOP was: (1) not monitoring 

all terrorist inmate and high-risk non-terrorist inmate communications as required, 

(2) not adequately preventing inmates from circumventing communication controls, 

(3) not listening to communications between most terrorist inmates and visitors, 

and (4) in certain circumstances using very limited and inadequate equipment to 

monitor cellblock conversations of terrorists. 

(U) Communication Channels and Restrictions 

(U) The required monitoring for a particular communication channel is 

determined by an inmate’s designation as either a high-risk inmate or general 

population inmate. Additionally, the volume allowed for each communication 

channel is dependent on an inmate’s threat level and where the inmate is housed. 

For terrorist inmates, they are housed at various locations based on their threat to 

national security or threat to the safety of BOP personnel and the public. As shown 

in Figure 1, the BOP housed the 512 terrorist inmates identified as of March 2018,

at low, medium, high, and maximum security facilities, and at mixed security 

facilities, such as medical centers and detention centers. The chart also shows the 

number of terrorist inmates housed at a Communications Management 

Units (CMU), a special unit designed to enhance the BOP’s monitoring. Lastly, the 

chart shows terrorist inmates housed at contract prisons and Residential Reentry 

Centers, and any terrorist inmates who are in-transit to BOP institutions.21

 

21

 (U) According to the BOP, inmates requiring heightened monitoring, including terrorist 

inmates, should not be designated to contract facilities. We were told by the BOP that in the event an 

individual in a contract facility is determined to have a nexus to terrorism the individual would be 

transferred into a BOP-controlled facility. However, as noted in Figure 1, during our audit we 

identified three terrorist inmates housed at contract prisons. As a result of our testing two out of the 

three inmates were added to the BOP’s terrorist list in January 2018 but were released within a year of 

being identified as terrorist inmates because they completed their sentence of incarceration. The 

remaining inmate was transferred to a BOP facility. 

(U) The BOP also told us that the communications of inmates housed at Residential Reentry 

Centers, which are inmates who are about to be released from BOP custody, are not monitored. 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

20

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Figure 1

(U) Number of Terrorist Inmates at BOP Institutions

As of March 2018a

(U) a The Transfer Center is a federal short-term detention center where convicted inmates 

are held temporarily while being transferred from one prison to another.

(U) Source: OIG Analysis of BOP’s Incarcerated Terrorist Population

(U) BOP facilities house some terrorist inmates in special housing facilities

depending on their conviction, threat level, or cooperation with U.S. government 

officials. These special housing facilities include:

 (U) CMUs - for inmates who, due to their current offense, conduct, or 

other verified information, require increased monitoring of 

communications with persons in the community to protect the safety, 

security, and orderly operation of BOP facilities, and to protect the public.

 (U) Control Units (CU) - for the most dangerous inmates at 

ADX Florence.

 (U) Protective Custody Units (PCU) - for inmates admitted to the 

federal Witness Security Program.

 (U) Special Housing Units (SHU) - for inmates who are securely 

separated from the general population to ensure the safety, security, and 

orderly operation of correctional facilities, and to protect the public.

 (U) Special Management Unit (SMU) - for inmates who pose unique 

security and management concerns, such as having participated in or 

having had a leadership role in geographic group gang-related activity.

 (U) Special Confinement Unit (SCU) - for male inmates who have 

received a sentence of death in the Federal Court system.

29 27

56

109

83

3

9

17

68

2

18 11 5

16 23 20

0 4

9

1 1 1

International Terrorists Domestic Terrorists
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

21

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

 (U) Special Security Unit (SSU) - for the ADX Florence inmates who are 

under restrictions imposed by a SAM directive.

(U) Each of these units was created by the BOP to address a particular 

security concern; thus, each has different restrictions on inmate communications. 

It may limit the volume of communications per channel or number of 

communication channels offered to the terrorist inmate. In our review, we audited 

the monitoring process for email, phone calls, postage mail, video sessions, 

cellblock conversations, and visitors for terrorist inmates, other high-risk inmates, 

and general population inmates.

22

(U) Monitoring of Email

(U) The BOP provides email accounts to incarcerated inmates, including

many of its terrorist inmates, through a system named the Trust Fund Limited 

Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS). In TRULINCS, each inmate has to sign a

general agreement that their communications can be monitored by the BOP and the 

inmate will not abuse the system. Every time the inmate logs into TRULINCS, the 

inmate has to acknowledge that the communications will be monitored and agree to 

not abuse the system. For terrorist and other high-risk inmates, BOP staff are 

supposed to review all of the emails being sent or received for content before the 

emails are released to the recipient or received by the inmate. For general 

population inmates, the BOP requires institutions to perform random monitoring of 

emails sent or received by general population inmates but has not set a standard 

for the number of emails that should randomly be reviewed.

(U) BOP is Unable to Handle the Volume of Email

(U) Inmates are charged $.05 per minute to use TRULINCS, which allows

most inmates with money in their BOP account to send and receive a significant

number of emails.23 Inmates at all BOP institutions sent more than 390 million 

emails and received more than 420 million emails between January 1, 2015, and 

September 15, 2017. Based on the sheer volume of emails and BOP staffing levels, 

several BOP staff members told us that meeting both requirements of mandatory 

monitoring of high-risk inmates and random monitoring of general population 

inmates is just not possible. BOP staff members told us that they believe the 

solution to this problem is to place limitations on the number of emails that inmates 

can send and receive, or increase the rate charged for email use, which they 

believe would reduce the volume.

(U//LES) Once a BOP staff member reviews and clears an email it is 

immediately sent or received by the inmate. When necessary, TRULINCS allows

BOP staff to send emails for translation with a push of a button. However, because 

of the cost to perform the translations, BOP staff are not allowed, without cause, to 

 

22 (U) See Appendix 2 for any restrictions established by the special housing units.

23

 (U) Each email is limited to a maximum 13,000 characters, and cannot contain pictures or 

attachments.
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

22

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

send non-high-risk inmates’ emails for translation. Therefore, general population 

inmates who write in a foreign language generally do not have their emails 

monitored. We found that BOP personnel were sending high-risk inmates’ emails 

for translation and translation summaries were being performed by a BOP 

contractor within . However, we were unable to tell whether BOP staff 

actually read the translated emails since the system does not record monitoring 

duration. We also noted that unless emails are placed on hold, TRULINCS 

automatically releases them after 1 hour whether or not BOP personnel have read 

the email or a translation summary, if necessary. 

(U) We agree with BOP staff that reasonable limitations are needed in order 

to effectively monitor general population emails while also satisfying the monitoring 

requirements for high-risk inmate communications. The limited time staff have to 

review emails along with other forms of communication, and the inability to obtain 

official translations for general population emails without prior approval is 

concerning because some general population inmates may exhibit radical or other 

high-risk behavior after incarceration. We recommend that the BOP establish a 

standard that will help ensure general population emails are monitored in a 

consistent manner and establish a policy that allows staff to forward for translation 

general population emails in accordance with this standard. The BOP should also 

eliminate the automatic delivery of email to high-risk inmates because such a 

practice is inconsistent with the BOP’s policy requiring that all such email be 

reviewed by BOP staff before delivery. 

(U) Monitoring of Email Communications Made by High-Risk Inmates 

(U) As previously stated, the BOP requires 100-percent monitoring of emails 

sent and received by all inmates designated as high-risk, which includes terrorist 

inmates. For the seven locations we visited, we reviewed TRULINCS reports that 

showed the number of emails sent or received by all of the high-risk inmates 

incarcerated at those institutions. As shown below in Table 2, we reviewed the 

BOP’s data and found that the BOP reviewed approximately 99 percent of the email 

communications.24

 The BOP stated that either human error or the volume of 

communications caused the remaining emails to not be monitored as required. 

 

24

 (U//FOUO) Email metadata is kept for years, but the actual emails are only maintained 

for 180 days unless locked by BOP staff. 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

23

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U) Table 2

(U) Total Number of High-Risk Inmate Emails

Monitored and Unmonitored

August 30, 2017 to February 26, 2018

At the 7 Locations We Visited

Sent or 

Received Total Emails Number of EmailsMonitored

Number of Emails

Not Monitored

Percentage 

Not Monitored

Incoming 158,812 158,085 727 .5

Outgoing 96,435 95,834 601 .6

Totals 255,247 253,919 1,328 .5

For All BOP Institutions

Sent or 

Received Total Emails Number of EmailsMonitored

Number of Emails

Not Monitored

Percentage 

Not Monitored

Incoming 975,784 965,216 10,568 1.1

Outgoing 738,237 735,533 2,704 .4

Totals 1,714,021 1,700,749 13,272 .8

(U) Source: BOP

(U) Although the percentage of high-risk inmate emails not monitored was 

very low, we are concerned that staff may not have been fully focused on the 

content of the emails when they were reading them. Several BOP staff stated that 

they are often listening to an inmate’s phone call or performing other tasks while 

reading emails sent or received by high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates. 

In fact, during our field work we observed a staff member listening to inmates’

phone calls while reading inmates’ emails. We also observed a staff member

listening to inmates’ phone calls while a television was loudly playing the news and 

they were processing BOP staff through a security checkpoint at the institution. 

BOP staff stated multi-tasking was the only way that they can get all of their 

monitoring duties done given the volume of emails and other communication 

channels. We are concerned crucial email content could be overlooked by BOP staff 

who believe they must multi-task while performing their email review duties. We 

therefore recommend that the BOP review and implement policy and procedures to 

ensure that BOP staff are providing appropriate attention to the communications 

they are required to monitor.

(U) TRULINCS - Key Word List

(U) The TRULINCS system has the capability of searching key words within 

emails and, with the enormous volume of both high-risk and general population 

email correspondence, we believe the BOP should use technology to identify emails 

requiring further review. In its response to our 2006 review, the BOP stated that 

“all incoming and outgoing messages are screened against key words and 

assessed” by BOP personnel. However, we found during this review, that the BOP 

is not effectively screening emails against key words and we believe that TRULINCS 

does not adequately notify BOP staff of emails that contain specific key words.

(U//LES) The BOP established a national key word list so that when an email 

is opened by BOP staff for review the system would highlight any of these key 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

24

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

words if they were contained within the email. However, we found the BOP does 

not effectively use the national key word list, which was limited to 

.” Although each BOP institution can create their own 

supplemental list, we found that two institutions we visited did not add any words 

to supplement the national key word list. We asked BOP officials why it did not use 

additional key words that might identify a misuse of the system by an inmate or 

could uncover a threat, including a terrorist threat, made by an inmate. For 

example, we asked why words such as 

 or any other potentially threatening words 

were not contained on the national list. 

(U//LES) BOP officials told us that although it would be useful to have a more 

comprehensive key word list, there is a danger it 

. According to these officials, 

the national key word list was previously four pages long, but it was not useful at 

that length because it identified a large volume of emails that did not actually 

require closer scrutiny. These officials stated that BOP personnel can still query 

emails for those words if they choose, create their own supplemental list, and run a 

report to view all emails that contain any key word on the national or supplemental 

list. 

(U//LES) To test the functionality of the query system, we obtained emails 

sent or received by all inmates (terrorist and non-terrorist) to determine how many 

emails were not being read by the BOP that contained potentially concerning terms. 

We initially started this testing with a list of 32 terms that we thought might be 

indicative of a threatening email. We quickly found that conducting a search for a 

single term was . 

Therefore, we narrowed our list of terms, eliminating broader terms such as 

“ .” 

(U) Overall, our narrowed list of terms led us to over 7,000 emails that 

contained our terms but were not read by the BOP. To determine if there was an 

actual threat posed by these emails, we took a random sample of 100 of the emails 

to review their content in detail. We found that most of these 100 emails contained 

general conversation or discussion that did not appear to be connected to illicit 

activities. However, we found that 8 percent of the emails included language we 

believe warranted further review. Specifically, we identified: 

 (U) Four emails from inmates to outside contacts requesting publications 

authored by writers with extremist ideologies. 

 (U) An email from an inmate with information about power struggles with 

other inmates. The inmate describes multiple inmates vying for 

leadership positions within the institution’s religious group and asks for 

the recipient, a foreign organization, to provide advice regarding how the 

group should select its leadership. 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

25

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

 (U) An email from an inmate to a call forwarding service to create an 

account on which the inmate can send emails to texting services, which is 

a violation of BOP policy.

 (U) Two email conversations between inmates and contacts with 

potentially concerning language (discussion of preparation for war and 

striking the enemy first) in need of analysis by counterterrorism experts.

(U) We provided these eight emails to the BOP and requested that they 

review them for any national security risks. As a result of the review by the BOP

Task Force Officer embedded with the National Joint Terrorism Task Force 

Correctional Intelligence Program, three of the eight emails were found to be 

concerning enough to refer them to the BOP’s CTU for further monitoring of these

inmates’ social communications. The BOP ended its monitoring of two out of the 

three inmates after a period of time, while the other inmate has since been 

released from BOP custody.

(U) Because of the sheer volume of email within the BOP system, we believe 

the BOP should use the TRULINCS system and available technology to help identify 

the highest risk communications. We recommend the BOP create a more thorough 

and useful national list of key words, assess available technology that could assist 

in identifying concerning email communications, and develop a mechanism in 

TRULINCS to automatically notify staff of any emails that require closer scrutiny.

(U) Security Concerns with BOP’s Controls of Email Access and Use

(U//LES) BOP policy states “the [Warden] can prohibit or discontinue the 

operations of [TRULINCS], or an individual’s participation in [TRULINCS] whenever 

it is determined to jeopardize the safety, security, or orderly operation of the 

correctional facility, or the protection of the public and staff.”25 According to BOP 

policy, “inmates access their [email] accounts using their eight-digit register 

number; nine-digit phone access code (PAC); and fingerprint identification or fourdigit Commissary personal identification number (PIN).” BOP staff stated that 

inmates, including terrorist inmates who are on a high-risk list, will attempt to use 

another inmate’s email account that is not on a high-risk list to send and receive 

email to avoid monitoring. When we asked BOP officials what controls were in 

place to avoid this behavior, we were told that the BOP installed fingerprint 

identification at the TRULINCS terminals. However, we found that not all Wardens 

have authorized the installation of the equipment and not all fingerprint readers are 

utilized. Additionally, SIS staff, which conduct investigations to detect misuse of 

the email system, complained to us that it is difficult to conduct such investigations 

 

25

 (U) 28 C.F.R 500.1 defines “Warden” as “the chief executive officer of a U.S. Penitentiary, 

Federal Correctional Institution, Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Federal Prison Camp, Federal 

Detention Center, Metropolitan Correctional Center, or any federal penal or correctional institution or 

facility. Warden also includes any staff member with authority explicitly delegated by any chief 

executive officer.” We use the term Warden in this report to indicate anyone with the authority over 

the institution.
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

26

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

because of TRULINCS terminals is either poor or the 

 for SIS staff who is misusing the system. Even 

though SIS staff told us that inmates are regularly misusing the email accounts and 

should be punished for those violations, they also told us that they often do not 

 a violation has occurred. In our review of the 

disciplinary histories over the last 5 years of 123 terrorist inmates at the 7 locations 

that we visited, we identified only 1 instance where the BOP held a terrorist inmate 

accountable for an email violation. Additionally, we found instances where emails 

that contained radical ideology were caught by SIS staff but the inmate was not 

disciplined for the infraction. 

(U//LES) In addition, we found that terrorist and other high-risk inmates 

were able to communicate with unknown parties, in violation of BOP rules. 

TRULINCS allows each inmate, including high-risk inmates, to have 30 active email 

addresses in their contact list. However, TRULINCS also permits inmates to move 

contacts from their active list to an inactive status and then back again as they wish 

with few limitations. The result is that inmates can email an unlimited number of 

contacts. Moreover, we found that these email addresses are 

.

26

 BOP staff informed us that inmates can and will send emails to email 

addresses owned by unknown parties that could be located anywhere in the world. 

During our review, we determined that many terrorist inmates had been sending 

emails to the same overseas organization and others had been emailing to 

international email addresses. 

(U//LES) BOP staff also informed us that inmates, to further hide who the 

inmate is communicating with, often 

. The end user can 

. As a 

result of this service, the BOP does not know 

 to the inmate. We observed some of these in 

inmates’ TRULINCS accounts and confirmed that the BOP cannot identify with 

whom the inmate is interacting. 

(U) We found that the BOP also does not have sufficient control over inbound 

emails. Several BOP staff worried about mass emails being sent to multiple 

inmates’ email accounts. Because most inmates have an email account, individuals 

and companies can send mass emails to multiple inmates.27

 BOP personnel have 

detected radical emails being sent to multiple inmates. BOP staff also expressed

concern to us about the possibility of a mass email being sent to all inmates in a 

 

26

 (U) The BOP requires prior approval for some inmates before they can contact a particular 

person via email. There are currently 1,774 inmates listed as Contact Pre-Approval in TRULINCS. 

Many of the inmates in this category are housed in special units that limit email access. The BOP may 

also require contact pre-approval for inmates that violate general correspondence policy or that have 

been identified as a security threat. 

27

 (U) Any incoming mass emails will only be delivered to inmates who accept the message, 

which will add the sender to the inmate’s contact list. Additionally, an outside email can only be sent 

to 100 inmates at a time. 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

27

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

particular group such as Al Qaeda, Aryan Circle, Al-Shabaab, or ISIS inmates 

directing them to take coordinated action on a certain day. We agree with this 

concern and noted that, although the BOP has the technological capability through 

TRULINCS to prevent mass emails, BOP officials cited legal concerns for not utilizing 

such features resulting in a default situation where the BOP has chosen not to 

prevent mass emails from coming in to its system unless a nationwide block is put 

on the sender’s email address. As a result, such emails could be treated differently 

depending on the institution, presenting the risk of inconsistent and disjointed 

handling of such emails. 

(U//FOUO) The TRULINCS system contains a feature that allows the BOP to

block an email address from all inmates.28 This would be a useful feature for 

instances where inmates contact an email address for which the end user is 

unknown, inmates use another inmate’s email account, an email address is used to 

send mass emails to inmates, or when other misuse of the email system occurs. 

However, it appears that the BOP 

. We found that the BOP has nationally blocked a total of 114 email 

addresses since 2005. 

(U) We have serious concerns about the lack of control over email use within 

the BOP system, especially when it comes to use by high-risk inmates, such as 

terrorist inmates. Because BOP staff do not always know who terrorist and other 

high-risk inmates may be communicating with, we believe a significant risk exists 

not just to the particular institution, but to the general public as well. Through the 

use of email, we are concerned that inmates and their associates outside of BOP 

institutions can plan criminal and terrorist activities with a low risk of being 

discovered. Additionally, BOP staff’s concern about mass emails being directly sent 

to high-risk, terrorist inmates also poses a significant risk as these emails may 

attempt to coordinate criminal or terrorist activities within and among BOP 

institutions. Accordingly, we recommend that the BOP establish controls that

mitigate the risk of inmates communicating with unknown and un-vetted parties, 

and take steps, including the utilization of available technological features as found 

in TRULINCS, to reduce the risk of mass emails being received by high-risk 

inmates, including terrorist inmates. 

(U) Monitoring of Telephone Calls 

(U) BOP Policy states “the [BOP] provides the Trust Fund Inmate Telephone 

System (TRUFONE) for inmates to supplement written correspondence to maintain 

family and community ties.” To make a telephone call, each inmate logs into 

TRUFONE with their PAC number and has to verbally state their name, as the 

system includes a voice recognition security control where applicable. Once logged 

into the system, the inmate is allowed to make telephone calls of up to 15 minutes 

 

28 (U) The BOP’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) requires the SIS staff to perform a full 

investigation into a particular email address in order to recommend and justify a national block of an 

email address. 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

28

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

in length and can make a total of 300 minutes in calls per month.29 All inmate calls 

can either be monitored live or a recording can be listened to by BOP staff. Most of 

the BOP’s telephone monitoring is listening to recorded and not live calls.

(U//LES) BOP Policy requires 100-percent monitoring of all high-risk inmates, 

including terrorist inmates, telephone calls and at least 5 percent of all completed 

general population inmate calls.30 We found that the BOP has not met its 

monitoring requirements for high-risk inmates. With regard to general population 

calls, while the BOP monitored 5 percent of all completed calls, we found that in 

doing so the BOP staff listened to a 

.

31

 Additionally, with regard to both high-risk and general population inmate 

calls, we found that BOP staff were monitoring calls while performing other tasks. 

We believe that multi-tasking during monitoring inevitably reduces the quality of 

the monitoring. In addition, similar to email, we found that some high-risk and 

general population inmates have developed methods to circumvent controls to 

avoid call monitoring. 

(U) Monitoring of Terrorist Inmate Telephone Calls 

(U) At the 7 locations we visited, we found the BOP had not listened to 

44 calls made by high-risk inmates (terrorists and high-risk non-terrorists).32 Three 

of these calls were made by terrorist inmates. Further, we observed that TRUFONE 

will mark a call as monitored even if only a portion of the call has been listened to 

by BOP personnel. To determine whether the BOP was fully listening to calls as 

required, we tested 53,675 calls made by terrorist inmates that were marked as 

monitored between January 1, 2015, and September 27, 2017, at the 7 locations 

we visited. Using data provided by the BOP, we were able to determine whether a 

call had been fully or partially reviewed if a staff member selected another call to 

monitor when less time had elapsed than the previous call’s duration. Through our 

testing we found that the BOP had partially monitored 14,114 or 26.3 percent of 

these calls. The following table shows the percentage of calls that were not fully 

monitored. 

 

29

 (U) Inmates, including terrorist inmates, get additional minutes over the holidays. 

Typically, the Warden grants 100 additional minutes in November and December. Inmates housed in 

special housing units will have communication restrictions in place. See Appendix 2 for more 

information on these restrictions. 

30 (U) A “completed call” is a call where someone answered and accepted the call. Some calls 

are not completed because either someone did not answer the phone or the receiver of the call rejects 

the call. 

31

 (U//FOUO) so any calls 

listed as 1 minute in duration are not necessarily 1 minute in length. We did not review the content of 

any calls marked as 1 minute in TRUFONE. 

32

 (U//FOUO) Given the limitations of the BOP’s call data, we could not test 100 percent of all 

terrorists’ calls. Although phone call metadata is kept for by the BOP, the actual recorded 

calls are only maintained for , unless locked by BOP staff. 
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

29

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U) Table 3

(U) Number of Terrorist Inmate Calls Partially Monitored

Between January 1, 2015 and September 27, 2017

BOP Institutiona Number of Calls Number of Calls

Partially Monitored

Percentage of 

Partially Monitored 

Calls

FCC Allenwood 5,572 1,019 18.3

FCC Florence 8,525 1,780 20.9

FCC Terre Haute 9,327 2,697 28.9

FCI Dublin 543 100 18.4

MCC New York 16,785 2,400 14.3

MDC Brooklyn 12,212 6,004 49.2

USP Lewisburg 711 114 16.0

TOTALS 53,675 14,114 26.3

(U) a At FCC Florence, the BOP had a federal camp. The data we tested did not include any calls that 

were made by inmates in the camp.

(U) Source: OIG Analysis of BOP’s TRUFONE Data

(U) The total timeframe of the calls that we tested ranged from 2 minutes to

15 minutes with an average of 9 minutes. For the 14,114 partially listened to calls, 

we reviewed these calls to determine what percentage of the call was listened to by 

BOP staff. As shown in Figure 2, we found BOP personnel listened to less than 

25 percent of most of these calls.

(U) Figure 2

(U) Percentage of the Terrorist Calls

That Were Listened to by BOP Personnel

Between January 1, 2015 and September 27, 2017

(U) Source: OIG Analysis of BOP’s TRUFONE Data

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

1 to 25% 26 to 50% 51 to 75% 76% to Max

Allenwood Brooklyn Dublin Florence Lewisburg New York Terre Haute
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

30

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U) We were also made aware of a contractor that was removed from service

for allowing inmates to use an unmonitored phone in the Education Department of 

one of the seven locations that we visited. Two terrorist inmates were incarcerated 

at that institution and potentially could have used this phone to avoid being 

monitored. In fact, we learned that one of the two terrorist inmates worked as a 

custodian in the Department with that unmonitored line.

(U) Monitoring of Non-Terrorist High-Risk Inmate Calls

(U) As noted earlier in this report, because there is a risk that inmates could 

become radicalized after entering a BOP institution it is important for the BOP to take 

steps to appropriately monitor all inmate activity, especially those in other high-risk 

categories. Therefore, we also tested the monitoring of high-risk, non-terrorist

inmate’s telephone calls. To determine whether the BOP was monitoring all nonterrorist high-risk inmates’ calls as required, we tested their calls made between 

January 1, 2015, and September 27, 2017, at the seven locations we visited. As 

noted in the previous section, we found that the BOP had not listened to 44 calls 

made by high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates. For the remaining high-risk 

non-terrorist inmate calls, we found that the BOP listened to all of 277,683 calls 

made by these high-risk inmates, but partially listened to 56,085 of those calls. 

The following table shows the percentage of calls that the BOP had not fully 

monitored.

(U) Table 4

(U) Number of Non-Terrorists’ High-Risk Calls Partially Monitored

Between January 1, 2015 and September 27, 2017

BOP Institution Number Calls Number of Calls Partially

Monitored

Percentage of 

Partially 

Monitored Calls

FCC Allenwood 87,489 9,384 10.7

FCC Florence 50,590 12,177 24.1

FCC Terre Haute 65,758 20,914 31.8

FCI Dublin 7,381 586 7.9

MCC New York 6,496 1,003 15.4

MDC Brooklyn 11,564 4,303 37.2

USP Lewisburg 48,405 7,718 15.9

TOTALS 277,683 56,085 20.2

(U) Source: OIG Analysis of BOP’s TRUFONE data

(U) The total timeframe of the calls that we tested ranged from 2 minutes to 

15 minutes with an average of 9 minutes. For the 56,085 partially monitored calls, 

we reviewed these calls to determine what percentage of the call was listened to. 

As shown in Figure 3, we found that BOP personnel listened to less than 25 percent 

of most of these calls.
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(U) Figure 3

(U) Percentage of Calls of High-Risk Non-Terrorist Inmates

That Were Partially Listened To By BOP Personnel

Between January 1, 2015 and September 27, 2017

(U) Source: OIG Analysis of BOP’s TRUFONE Data

(U) We believe that the number of only partially monitored terrorist and nonterrorist high-risk inmate calls presents a potential security vulnerability for the

BOP. Critical information could be missed by BOP staff during monitoring of these 

calls that otherwise could be caught with the full monitoring that is intended, 

especially when it comes to terrorist and other high-risk inmates. We therefore 

recommend that the BOP establish a TRUFONE control that allows the system to 

alert BOP management of any calls that were not completely monitored.

(U) Monitoring of General Population Telephone Calls

(U) As noted above, part of the BOP’s strategy to prevent radicalization after 

an inmate is admitted to a BOP institution is to monitor their activities based on the 

assessed risk of the inmate. As such, we also tested the random monitoring 

requirements of general population inmate telephone calls. According to the BOP 

policy, a minimum of 5 percent of these calls should be monitored. BOP regional 

management can establish a higher percentage of calls to be randomly monitored if 

they choose. For example, two of six regions have set higher monitoring 

percentages—the Northeast Region which requires 12 percent and the Western 

Region which requires 6 percent.

(U) Because of the volume of phone calls made by general population

inmates, we only tested the calls made in April 2017 for the seven locations we 

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

1 to 25% 26 to 50% 51 to 75% 76% to Max

Allenwood Brooklyn Dublin Florence Lewisburg New York Terre Haute
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UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

visited. As shown in Figure 4, for April 2017, the BOP monitored 57,264 calls out of 

a total of 275,630 calls or 20.8 percent of all calls made by general population 

inmates at these institutions. We noted that 8,422 of the monitored general 

population calls that were monitored were 1 minute or less, making up more than 

14 percent of all of the general population calls monitored in April. One BOP staff 

member admitted that they monitor 1-minute calls in order to increase their 

percentage of monitored calls. 

(U) Figure 4 

(U) Number of General Population Calls Monitored 

April 2017

(U) Source: OIG Analysis of BOP’s TRUFONE Data

(U) Inmate Circumvention of Telephone Monitoring Controls 

(U//LES) BOP Policy states “to ensure the Trust Fund’s financial integrity and 

for institution security, inmates place all personal telephone calls over TRUFONE 

and may not circumvent it via call forwarding, automatic electronic forwarding, 

three-way calling, or any other means.” However, we found the BOP does not 

 and that inmates will sometimes use 

. Moreover, by calling local telephone 

numbers, BOP officials informed us that inmates, including terrorist inmates, can 

have their calls . 

We also found that inmates will circumvent call monitoring by 

. This circumvention is accomplished when an 

.

(U) We believe the apparent ease with which inmates may circumvent the 

controls built into TRUFONE creates a significant security risk. As with email, 

inmate communication with unknown parties via telephone calls may allow for the 

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

Allenwood Brooklyn Dublin Florence Lewisburg New York Terre

Haute

11,370 11,647

4,327

6,839 7,114

3,888 3,657

1,983 954

1,840

1,482 739

320 1,104

Number of Monitored Calls Less than 1 Minute In Length

Number of Monitored Calls Longer Than 1 Minute in Length
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planning and execution of potential criminal or terrorist activities. Accordingly, we 

recommend that the BOP reassess its TRUFONE controls and take steps to prevent 

terrorist and other high-risk inmates from communicating with unknown and 

unapproved contacts.

(U) Monitoring of Postage Mail

(U) BOP inmates are permitted to receive and send postage mail. In our 

2006 review, we found the BOP was not adequately monitoring postage mail. In its 

response, the BOP believed that its new initiative of providing email to all prisoners 

at BOP institutions would lower the volume of postage mail and thus create a more 

manageable postage mail volume for the BOP to monitor. However, after 

implementation of email at 17 BOP institutions, postage mail declined only slightly. 

Thus, in addition to monitoring nearly the same amount of postage mail, BOP staff 

are now required to also monitor tens of thousands of emails as discussed above.

(U) We reviewed BOP data that shows high-risk inmates, including terrorist

inmates, received more than 1.3 million pieces of postage mail and sent more than 

1.2 million pieces of postage mail between January 2015 and December 2017. BOP 

data shows that during this time frame 2,329 pieces of postage mail were not 

reviewed as required.33

(U) Table 5

(U) Number of High-Risk Inmates’ Postage Mail Monitored

Between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2017

Calendar 

Year

Number of Incoming

Pieces of Postage Mail

Number of Outgoing

Pieces of Postage Mail

Total Number of 

Unmonitored Pieces of 

Postage Mail

2015 416,276 395,993 2

2016 473,380 413,489 2,327

2017 488,237 447,269 0

TOTALS 1,377,893 1,256,751 2,329

(U) Source: BOP

(U) The data shows nearly all of the high-risk inmates’ unmonitored postage 

mail occurred in 2016. However, we do not believe the data is completely accurate. 

According to the BOP, postage mail for high-risk inmates averages about 75,000 to 

80,000 pieces each month. Unlike telephone and email correspondence, which is 

tracked in the BOP’s systems, the BOP does not have an automated system for

tracking incoming and outgoing postage mail. Postage mail sent and received by 

high-risk inmates is hand counted and self-reported by the institutions which may 

contain calculation errors because of this manual process. Currently, the BOP is 

 

33

 (U) Monitoring of postage mail consists of inspecting for drugs, weapons, explosives, and 

other contraband, and reading postage mail for security concerns. Our report focused on the BOP’s 

procedures and process for reading mail.
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considering the use of technology to scan all incoming postal mail and deliver it to 

inmates electronically. 

(U) We reviewed the disciplinary records over a 5-year period of 123 terrorist 

inmates incarcerated at the 7 locations we visited. Of this sample, 10 inmates were 

disciplined for 12 postage mail violations during this time. Additionally, we found 

examples of postage mail that had been sent from BOP institutions during this time 

period but contained material or information that should have caused the rejection 

of the mail. These examples include: 

 (U) In October 2015, a high-risk inmate located in FCI Dublin mailed a letter 

to her husband who was incarcerated in ADX Florence. The letter discussed 

the wife’s intention to compromise a staff member at FCI Dublin.34

 (U) In January 2017, BOP officials were notified by the Director of Security 

for a major entertainment company that a high-risk inmate sent a 

handwritten letter to a television show host, claiming allegiance to ISIS and 

stating that he was actively recruiting other inmates to take violent action 

against law enforcement, federal judges, federal buildings, and U.S. attorneys. 

The BOP designated this inmate an international terrorist as a result of this 

incident. 

(U) The above examples of lapses in the screening of postage mail as well as 

postage mail violations that resulted in discipline indicate that the risks posed by 

high-risk inmates misusing postage mail are significant. Therefore, we believe the 

BOP should continue to research technology that would enable staff to scan and 

electrically track high-risk inmates’ postage mail as they do with email and phone 

calls. 

(U) Monitoring of Video Sessions 

(U) In January 2015, the BOP started testing video session services at female 

institutions. The system was called TRULINCS Video Service (TVS). Between 

January 1, 2015 and September 15, 2017, there were more than 208,000 TVS calls.35 

Each session could be up to 25 minutes long. These calls were supposed to be 

between one inmate and one person on the other end of the session. The BOP staff 

monitoring the recorded call can see both sides of the session. 

(U) The BOP provided the OIG with data for 2,575 TVS sessions made by 

high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates, from January 1, 2015 to 

December 31, 2017. The data showed that 304, or 11.8 percent, of these sessions 

were not monitored by BOP staff as required. We reviewed the sessions made by a 

terrorist inmate at one female BOP institution and found that three TVS sessions 

 

34

 (U) This letter is not included in the Table 6 total for 2015 as reported by the BOP above. 

35

 (U//FOUO) TVS session metadata is kept for , but the recorded session is only 

maintained for , unless locked by BOP staff. 
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were not properly monitored by BOP staff. All three sessions were in a foreign 

language and they had not been translated. The SIS staff at that institution stated 

they did not know the process for downloading and sending the TVS sessions for 

translation to enable proper monitoring. We viewed one of the three sessions and 

it was between the terrorist inmate and multiple people on the other end of the call. 

The staff at this institution has now received instruction on its responsibilities for 

monitoring these TVS interactions. 

(U) Cellblock Conversations 

(U//LES) In our 2006 report, the OIG found that the BOP was not monitoring 

cellblock conversations of terrorist inmates. At the time, BOP officials stated that it 

was in the process of establishing up to six Communications Management 

Units (CMU) that would include microphones so the cellblock conversations could be 

monitored. As of 2018, the BOP has established only two CMUs. BOP staff at both 

the CMUs stated that some of the monitoring equipment was insufficient for them 

to monitor conversations , when the 

 or when the . Additionally, USP Marion has 

multiple . Additionally, we found that 

only 27 of the 534 terrorist inmates are housed in CMUs as of May 2017, so most 

cellblock conversations involving terrorist inmates are not monitored. We believe it 

is important to monitor communications involving terrorist inmates in their cells and 

when they are housed in close proximity elsewhere in BOP institutions, as well as 

between other high-risk inmates and terrorist inmates. We recommend that the 

BOP review cellblock conversation monitoring policy, procedures, and capabilities to 

determine whether and how improvements can be made to achieve security goals, 

including improvement of audio monitoring systems. 

(U) Visitors 

(U) Prior to entering a BOP facility, visitors must submit their personal 

identification information and the BOP may require an NCIC background check. The 

NCIC reveals, among other criminal history details, whether the subject is a known 

or suspected terrorist. The Warden may deny admission to a potential visitor if 

there is a belief that the visitor could pose a threat to the safety or security of the 

institution. According to Department records, there were 100 encounters with 

known or suspected terrorists at BOP institutions over the last 4 years.36

 We 

reviewed a judgmental sample of 17 of those 100 encounters and determined that 

15 of them resulted from queries of NCIC undertaken by BOP staff either for 

terrorist inmates that were going to be incarcerated at that BOP facility or those 

that were being released by the institution. For the remaining two encounters, one 

was an associate of a known or suspected terrorist who attempted to visit a non-

 

36

 (U) An encounter is an event where an individual is identified during a screening process as 

someone who is a potential match to an identity in the Terrorist Screening Database. For example, an 

encounter may occur when an individual attempts to board an aircraft, apply for a passport or visa, 

enter an U.S. port of entry, or has an interaction with law enforcement. 
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terrorist inmate who was a family member.37 After an FBI review, the visitor was 

removed from the consolidated terrorist watchlist. The final remaining encounter 

involved a known or suspected terrorist who attempted to visit a terrorist inmate 

whom the visitor claimed was a long-time friend. The BOP denied the visit after 

consulting with the appropriate counterterrorism authorities. 

(U//LES) Visiting rooms are designed to provide adequate supervision and 

prevent the passage of contraband. The physical contact between inmates and 

visitors is limited by rules of conduct, video monitoring by the SIS department, inperson monitoring by correctional officers, and the layout of the room. However, 

BOP staff told us that most facilities do not have the capability to monitor the actual 

conversations of the inmates and visitors. This is concerning because, unlike 

communications that occur via telephone and email that are recorded in BOP 

systems, in most cases, conversations between terrorist inmates and their visitors 

produce no record for review. Of even greater concern are 

. Currently, BOP policy states that all high-risk inmates, including 

terrorist inmates, are subject to 100 percent social communication monitoring, 

including their communications with visitors. As noted earlier, a significant number 

of terrorist inmates are housed in medium- or low-security facilities, which 

generally do not record visitor conversations. We believe this presents a risk that 

terrorist activities could go unnoticed. Therefore, we recommend that the BOP 

revisit its social communication monitoring policy for high-risk inmates, including 

terrorist inmates, to better ensure that all visits between terrorist inmates and their 

visitors are sufficiently monitored. 

(U) Additional Security Measure – the Posted Picture File

(U) Each institution within the BOP maintains a Posted Picture File which 

includes pictures of inmates in need of additional monitoring or who may pose a 

risk to the safety or security of the institution, as well as a short summary of the 

reason they are included on the list. The Posted Picture File must be reviewed at 

least on a quarterly basis by all staff. All terrorist inmates are listed on the Posted 

Picture File. 

(U) New inmates are added to the list through nomination by the SIS 

department and must be approved by the Warden of the institution. If the Warden 

has not approved the inmate for inclusion, then the individual’s picture and criminal 

history will not appear on the Posted Picture File. In our sample of 80 terrorist 

inmates at the 7 locations we visited, we identified 3 terrorist inmates who were not 

nominated to the Posted Picture File, and 8 terrorist inmates who had been 

nominated but, as of the date of our site visit, had not been approved by the 

 

37 (U) Associates are individuals who have a defined relationship with the known or suspected 

terrorist, but whose involvement with the known or suspected terrorist’s activities is unknown.
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Warden to be added to the file. For the remaining 69 terrorist inmates, they were 

not always added to the posted picture file in a timely manner, as shown in Table 7.

(U) Table 6

(U) Time Between Terrorist Inmates’ Arrival

At a BOP Institution and Their Addition to the Posted Picture File

Time to Approve Number of Terrorist Inmates

Less than 1 Month 50

1 to 5 Months 5

6 to 12 Months 4

Greater than 1 Year 10

(U) Source: DOJ OIG Analysis of BOP’s Posted Picture and SENTRY Data

(U) We believe this is a concern because staff members may be unaware of 

the inmates’ nexus to terrorism that would inform staff of the danger the inmates

pose and notify staff that these inmates’ actions need to be monitored. We 

recommend the BOP establish timelines for staff to nominate terrorist inmates for 

inclusion on the Posted Picture File and for Wardens to approve or deny the 

nominations.
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(U) CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(U) We identified significant deficiencies related to the BOP’s identification of

terrorist inmates and its monitoring of terrorist, other high-risk, and general 

population inmate communications. Specifically, we found the BOP’s list of terrorist 

inmates provided to us at the beginning of our audit did not include 28 incarcerated 

individuals that had an identified nexus to terrorism and, as a result, their 

communications were likely not monitored according to BOP policy. The failure to 

identify these inmates as terrorist inmates was primarily caused by the Department 

not providing enough information to the BOP to make a proper identification of 

these individuals as terrorist inmates. Despite this information sharing issue, we 

believe the BOP can improve the process of identifying terrorist inmates by 

ensuring intake interviews are consistently conducted at all BOP institutions and by 

running all incoming inmates through NCIC upon arrival. 

(U) In addition, the Department has more than 20 individuals under the

100-percent monitoring requirements of a SAM directive. However, the

technological limitations of the BOP’s telephone monitoring capabilities hindered the

FBI’s ability to effectively monitor certain incarcerated terrorists who are subject to

the more stringent monitoring requirements of these SAM directives. Further,

although the Department has tried to address the monitoring of publications

received by terrorist inmates under a SAM directive, we also found at least one

instance where a terrorist inmate received at least one book containing radical

material. The FBI has requested an inventory of the books and publications of

terrorist inmates under a SAM directive to ensure that these prisoners do not have

radical material, but the BOP has not performed this inventory.

(U) We also found the BOP has allowed at least one terrorist inmate to view

radical material provided to him through the discovery process in front of other 

inmates. Additionally, we found the BOP had not monitored or only partially 

monitored thousands of social communications, including emails and telephone 

calls made by terrorist inmates as required. The BOP also did not consistently 

discipline inmates for misuse of its communication systems, adequately vet inmate 

email or telephone contacts, or adequately address inmates’ misuse and 

circumvention of controls built into the communications systems. We believe the 

sharing of inmates’ accounts and the use of call forwarding technology to mask the 

identity of the other party to the communication especially pose significant security 

risks. We also found that the BOP was not effectively using an available function 

of the TRULINCS system that can highlight key words within emails that might be 

an indicator of a threat to the institution, national security, or the public. Lastly, 

we found the BOP had not added all terrorist inmates to its Posted Picture File and 

therefore, was not making staff aware of potentially dangerous terrorists being 

held in their custody. 
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(U) We recommend that the BOP:

1. (U) Work with the Department to determine: (a) an accurate population of 

international and domestic terrorists incarcerated at, or in transit to, its 

institutions; and (b) determine whether any existing and previously 

unmonitored communications, such as emails or recorded telephone calls,

should be reviewed.

2. (U) Assess which of its institutions do not conduct arrival interviews and 

determine whether BOP policy should require these interviews to potentially 

help identify terrorist and other high-risk inmates.

3. (U) Explore all available and alternative processes, including routine NCIC 

checks, with the Department for screening incoming inmates for terrorist 

connections, and implement policy and procedures as appropriate.

4. (U) Work with the Department to develop a complete universe of previously 

unidentified terrorist inmates and obtain information from the Department 

that will help the BOP determine if the 46 released inmates we identified 

meet its definition of a terrorist. If any of them do, then we recommend that 

the BOP add them to its historical list of formerly incarcerated terrorists to 

make it accurate and notify the FBI of their release.

5. (U) Review the quality of the telephone monitoring equipment at institutions 

requiring FBI monitoring of inmates under a SAM directive, and work with the 

FBI to make improvements to ensure effective monitoring can be conducted 

with the equipment at each of those institutions.

6. (U) Assess the sound quality in BOP visiting rooms utilized by terrorist 

inmates subject to SAM directives and improve the microphones in any 

identified facilities with inadequate equipment so that the FBI can effectively 

perform its monitoring as required under the SAM directive and the BOP can 

perform similar monitoring of its terrorist and other high-risk inmates.

7. (U) Work with the Department to establish procedures to prevent terrorist 

inmates from viewing discovery materials in the presence of other inmates 

and consider additional steps to minimize the risk that discovery material

containing radical or harmful content can be inappropriately shared with 

other inmates.

8. (U) Establish a standard that will help ensure general population emails are 

monitored in a consistent manner and establish a policy that allows staff to 

forward for translation general population emails in accordance with this 

standard.

9. (U) Eliminate the automatic delivery of email to high risk inmates.

10. (U) Review and implement policy and procedures to ensure that BOP staff 

are providing appropriate attention to the communications they are required 

to monitor.
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11. (U) Create a more thorough and useful national list of key words, assess

available technology that could assist in identifying concerning email 

communications, and develop a mechanism in TRULINCS to automatically 

notify staff of any emails that require closer scrutiny.

12. (U) Establish controls that mitigate the risk of inmates communicating with 

unknown and un-vetted parties and take steps, including the utilization of 

available technological features as found in TRULINCS, to reduce the risk of 

mass emails being received by high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates.

13. (U) Establish a TRUFONE control that allows the system to alert BOP 

management of any calls that were not completely monitored.

14. (U) Reassess its TRUFONE controls and take steps to prevent terrorist and 

other high-risk inmates from communicating with unknown and unapproved 

contacts.

15. (U) Review cellblock conversation monitoring policy, procedures, and 

capabilities to determine whether and how improvements can be made to 

achieve security goals, including improvement of audio monitoring systems.

16. (U) Revisit its social communication monitoring policy for high-risk inmates, 

including terrorist inmates, to better ensure that all visits between terrorist 

inmates and their visitors are sufficiently monitored.

17. (U) Establish timelines for staff to nominate terrorist inmates for inclusion on 

the Posted Picture File and for Wardens to approve or deny the nominations.

(U) We recommend that the Office of the Deputy Attorney General: 

18. (U) Determine whether the BOP should conduct an inventory of the books 

and publications found in the cells of all terrorist inmates and provide it to 

the FBI for review.

19. (U) Develop a mechanism to notify the BOP of all terrorists in its custody, 

including those whose convictions are under a sealed U.S. court order.
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(U) STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND 

REGULATIONS

(U) The BOP’s management is responsible for ensuring compliance with 

applicable federal laws and regulations. However, in planning our audit, we 

identified the following laws and regulations that concerned the operations of the 

auditee within the context of the audit objectives:

 (U) Executive Order 12333

 (U) Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6

 (U) Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act

 (U) 18 U.S.C. § 4012

 (U) 18 U.S.C. § 4042

 (U) 18 U.S.C. § 4086

 (U) 18 U.S.C. § 2331

 (U) 22 U.S.C. § 2656f 

 (U) 28 C.F.R. § 501.3

(U) Nothing came to our attention that caused us to believe that the BOP 

was not in compliance with the aforementioned laws and regulations.
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(U) STATEMENT OF INTERNAL CONTROLS

(U) As required by the Government Auditing Standards, we tested, as 

appropriate, internal controls significant within the context of our audit objectives. 

A deficiency in an internal control exists when the design or operation of a control 

does not allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing their 

assigned functions, to timely prevent or detect: (1) impairments to the 

effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) misstatements in financial or 

performance information, or (3) violations of laws and regulations. Our evaluation 

of the BOP’s internal controls was not made for the purpose of providing assurance 

on its internal control structure as a whole. The BOP’s management is responsible 

for the establishment and maintenance of internal controls.

(U) As detailed in the Audit Results section of this report, we identified 

certain deficiencies in the BOP’s internal controls that we believe adversely affect 

the BOP’s ability to monitor 100 percent of the social communications of high-risk 

inmates, including terrorist inmates housed in its facilities, contrary to BOP policy.

(U) Because we are not expressing an opinion on the BOP’s internal control 

structure as a whole, this statement is intended solely for the information and use 

of the BOP. This restriction is not intended to limit the distribution of this report, 

which is a matter of public record.
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APPENDIX 1

(U) AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

(U) AUDIT OBJECTIVES

(U) The objective of this audit was to review the BOP’s policies, procedures, 

and practices for monitoring terrorist inmates and the BOP’s efforts to prevent 

further radicalization within its inmate population.

(U) SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

(U) We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) Our audit scope was from January 2015 through March 2018. To 

accomplish our objectives, we performed fieldwork at agencies, within the 

Department of Justice, tasked with monitoring inmates with known or suspected 

ties to domestic and foreign terrorism and its efforts to prevent further 

radicalization among its inmate population. Specifically, we conducted interviews 

with officials and reviewed standard operating procedures at various BOP facilities 

and the BOP’s Central Office, the Criminal Division’s Office of Enforcement 

Operations, and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force led by the FBI, to 

determine whether these agencies adhered to established internal controls in 

managing risks posed by these inmates. A judgmental sampling design was applied 

to capture numerous aspects of the BOP records. This non-statistical sample 

design does not allow projection of the test results to the population.

(U) Population Identification

(U) The OIG used the BOP’s population and classification data as well as 

historical data to determine the number of domestic and international terrorists 

identified by the BOP. The OIG compared this data with (1) the National Security 

Division’s (NSD) list of individuals who either have been: (a) charged with 

violations of federal statutes that are directly related to international terrorism 

(regardless of the offense of conviction), or (b) charged with violations of a variety 

of other statutes where the federal investigation involved an identified link to 

international terrorism; (2) NSD’s list of sealed convictions of international 

terrorists; and (3) the BOP’s Posted Picture Files at each institution visited. Where 

the compared lists yielded names of incarcerated individuals with indications of 

links to terrorism who were not on the BOP’s terrorist inmate list, we provided the 

names to the BOP for review and potential identification as domestic or 

international terrorists. In doing so, as discussed in the report, we found 28

terrorist inmates not previously identified by the BOP.
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(U) To evaluate the adequacy of the BOP’s monitoring of inmates’ 

communications, we reviewed the various communication methods available to 

inmates: telephone calls, postage mail, email, video sessions, and visitations. Our 

testing in this report is focused on social communications; and we did not audit or 

test legal correspondence.

(U) Telephone Monitoring

(U) We reviewed the monitoring of telephone calls made by high-risk 

inmates, including terrorists, between January 1, 2015, and September 27, 2017 at 

the seven locations we visited. The design of the telephone system is such that

the duration of the telephone call starts after the call is answered. Since the 

system rounds up calls to the next minute, we excluded these “1-minute” telephone 

calls from our testing universe. Although the transactional data showed whether 

the conversation was selected for review by a staff member, it did not provide 

information as to whether the entire length of the telephone call was monitored. 

The data did contain the exact time that the staff member selected the 

conversation for review, as well as the approximate length of the conversation, 

rounded up to the minute. Thus, we were able to determine whether the call had 

been fully or partially reviewed if the same staff member had selected another call 

to monitor when less time had elapsed than the previous call’s duration. For 

example, if the staff member began monitoring a 10-minute call at 1:05:00 PM and 

selected another call to monitor at 1:07:30 PM, then we could conclude that the 

first call had not been fully monitored. Therefore, monitored calls by the same 

Correctional Officer with elapsed time difference of less than 60 seconds are 

counted as fully monitored calls. Due to the voluminous amount of telephone calls 

made by the general population during this same time period, we limited our review 

of those telephone calls to April 2017.

(U) Postage Mail Monitoring

(U) We obtained the BOP’s records of postage mail sent and received 

between January 2015 and December 2017. The BOP does not require institutions 

to track the volume of mail sent and received by general population inmates, 

therefore our testing included only the postal mail sent and received by high-risk 

inmates, including terrorists that were on the required monitoring list. During our 

site visits we interviewed staff and collected documentation of instances where 

outgoing postage mail was not properly screened resulting in inappropriate material 

or information leaving the institution.

(U) Email Monitoring

(U) To review the effectiveness of the BOP’s email monitoring of high-risk 

inmates, including terrorists, we reviewed the TRULINCS reports between 

August 30, 2017, and February 26, 2018 for the required monitoring inmates at the 

seven locations we visited. As described in Table 2, these reports revealed the 

number of emails sent or received by inmates which were not reviewed by BOP 

staff. We also interviewed staff during site visits at the institutions as to their email 

monitoring procedures and observed them performing monitoring activities. 
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Finally, we interviewed staff members at the institutions we visited. They described 

their personal experiences and concerns with the email system.

(U) To test the BOP’s key word list, we obtained a copy of the BOP’s national 

key word list, as well as the key word lists of the institutions we visited, and 

reviewed the words included. In order to understand the effectiveness of the key 

word list, we visited the Trust Fund Department at the BOP’s Central Office in 

Washington, D.C. Trust Fund staff queried the entire TRULINCS system for emails 

sent or received between August 15, 2017, and February 15, 2018, containing 

10 judgmentally selected words we provided. We recorded the total numbers of 

emails containing the words searched, the number of emails monitored and 

unmonitored by BOP staff. We also randomly selected 10 unmonitored emails per 

word searched and read the content of the emails for conversations that may have 

a link to illicit activity.

(U) Visitation Monitoring

(U) We judgmentally selected 17 NCIC records from a list of over 

100 positive encounters to known or suspected terrorists included on the 

consolidated terrorist watchlist. The judgmental sample only included positive 

encounters from the seven locations we visited and were reviewed to analyze 

whether the BOP took appropriate action.

(U) Video Session Monitoring

(U) We obtained the TVS transactional data and policies related to inmate 

video sessions from the BOP. The BOP provided data for 2,575 TVS calls made by 

high-risk inmates, including terrorists, between January 2015 and December 2017. 

The transactional data reported whether the video session had been monitored by 

BOP staff. The data showed that 304 video sessions or 11.8 percent of these calls 

were not monitored by BOP staff as required. We reviewed the calls made by a 

terrorist inmate at one female BOP institution and found that three TVS calls were 

not properly monitored by BOP staff.

(U) Site Visits

(U) From June 2017 to February 2018, we visited seven BOP institutions, 

some with multiple facilities in the prison complex. Specifically, we visited 

FCI Dublin, FCC Allenwood, USP Lewisburg, FCC Terre Haute, MCC New York, 

MDC Brooklyn, and FCC Florence. We chose these institutions based upon the 

security level of the institution and the number of terrorist inmates incarcerated at 

the time of the visit. We also visited the BOP’s Counterterrorism Unit and the BOP’s

Central Office in Washington, D.C.; FBI Field Offices in New York City, New York; 

Terre Haute, Indiana; and Indianapolis, Indiana; and FBI Headquarters Offices in 

Washington, D.C.
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(U) Interviews

(U) We interviewed over 100 BOP officials, including Correctional Officers, 

Lieutenants, Special Investigative Staff, Intelligence Analysts, Chaplains, Associate 

Wardens, and Wardens. We also met with officials and obtained information from 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Division (NSD), 

Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO), the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), the 

United States Marshals Service (USMS), and the United States Attorney’s 

Offices (USAO) for the Southern District of New York and the District of Colorado.

(U) During site visits, we interviewed Correctional Officers, SIS Technicians, 

Supervisory Investigative Agents, Chaplains, Wardens, Associate Wardens, Unit 

Managers, Case Managers, Reentry Coordinators, and Religious Services staff. We 

also interviewed senior officials and Intelligence Analysts at the CTU regarding their 

monitoring procedures.

(U) Inmate File Review

(U) We analyzed the content of the BOP’s SENTRY files for 123 inmates. 

The case files included inmate profiles, movement histories, disciplinary histories, 

and work assignments for each inmate. We also reviewed the intake assessments, 

intelligence reports, and SIS investigations of some inmates who had disciplinary 

histories relating to radicalization.
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APPENDIX 2

(U) BOP SPECIAL HOUSING UNITS RESTRICTIONS ON 

SOCIAL COMMUNICATIONS

Type of 

Unit

Postage

Mail Email Telephone Calls Visitors Video Sessions

SHU

No stated 

limit, unless 

specifically 

restricted

Not

allowed

Unless specifically 

restricted, inmates 

are allowed one 

telephone call per 

month

Determined

by institution

Not allowed

CMU

Incoming and 

Outgoing: six 

pieces of 

paper, doublesided, to one 

contact may 

be sent once 

per calendar 

week

Email may 

be limited 

to two 

emails, 

per 

calendar 

week, to 

and from 

a single 

recipient 

at the 

discretion 

of the 

Warden

Unless specifically 

restricted, inmates 

are allowed two 

15 minute live 

monitored telephone 

calls per week. This 

is extended to three 

calls per week during 

holiday months.

Up to 

8 hours of 

visiting time 

per month, 

scheduled in 

increments 

up to 4 hours 

at the

discretion of 

the 

institution

Not allowed

SCU at FCC 

Terre 

Haute

Unlimited 

incoming and 

outgoing

Unlimited 15 minute calls

300 minutes/month

All visits are 

non-contact 

and are prescheduled. 

Up to seven 

visits per 

calendar 

month.

Not allowed

SMU

No stated limit Not 

allowed

Level 1: two 

15 minute calls per 

month

Level 2: four 

15 minute calls per 

month

Level 3: 15 calls per 

month with a 150 

minute maximum

Five visits 

per month. 

Levels 1 and 

2 receive 

non-contact 

video visits 

only.

Not allowed
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Type of 

Unit

Postage

Mail Email Telephone Calls Visitors Video Sessions

SAM Units

and

SSU at 

ADX 

Florence

Outgoing: 

Limited to one, 

six-page 

document per 

week

Incoming: No 

stated limit

Generally 

prohibited 

by the 

SAMs 

order

Live monitored calls 

pre-scheduled with 

live translators and 

the applicable law 

enforcement agency 

monitors

Phase One: two 

15 minute calls per 

month

Phase Two: three 

15 minute calls per 

month

Phase Three: four 

15 minute calls per 

month

Livemonitored

non-contact

visits. Prescheduled 

with live 

translators 

and the 

applicable 

law 

enforcement 

agency 

monitors. 

Up to five

visits per 

month.

Not allowed

CUs and 

other 

Special 

Units at 

ADX

Florence

No stated limit Not 

allowed

Control Unit: one 

15 minute call per 

month and one 

15 minute call per 

90 days in 

disciplinary 

segregation

Step-down Unit:

three 15 minute calls 

per month

High Security Adult 

Alternative Housing 

Program: four 

15 minute calls per 

month

Five visits 

per month 

with a 7 hour 

maximum 

duration

Not allowed

(U) Source: BOP
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APPENDIX 3

(U) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

PRISONS’ RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT AUDIT REPORT
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APPENDIX 4

(U) OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND 

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT

(U) The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this audit 

report to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) and the Federal Bureau 

of Prisons (BOP). ODAG’s and BOP’s responses are incorporated in Appendix 3 of 

this final report. In response to our audit report, ODAG and the BOP concurred 

with our recommendations and, as a result, the status of the audit report is 

resolved. The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of 

actions necessary to close the report.

(U) Recommendations for BOP:

1. (U) Work with the Department to determine: (a) an accurate 

population of international and domestic terrorists incarcerated at, or 

in transit to, its institutions; and (b) determine whether any existing 

and previously unmonitored communications, such as emails or 

recorded telephone calls, should be reviewed.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will work with the Department to (a) determine an 

accurate population of international and domestic terrorists incarcerated at, 

or in transit to, its institutions; and (b) determine whether any existing and 

previously unmonitored communications, such as emails or recorded 

telephone calls, should be reviewed.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP, in consultation with the Department, has determined an accurate 

population of international and domestic terrorists incarcerated at, or in 

transit to, its institutions; and determined whether existing and previously 

unmonitored communications, such as emails or recorded telephone calls, 

should be reviewed and taken actions to review those communications.

2. (U) Assess which of its institutions do not conduct arrival interviews 

and determine whether BOP policy should require these interviews to 

potentially help identify terrorist and other high-risk inmates.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will assess which of its institutions do not conduct 

arrival interviews and determine whether BOP policy should require these 

interviews to potentially help identify terrorist and other high-risk inmates.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has assessed which of its institutions does not conduct arrival interviews 

and determined whether BOP policy should require these interviews to 

potentially help identify terrorist and other high-risk inmates.
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3. (U) Explore all available and alternative processes, including routine 

NCIC checks, with the Department for screening incoming inmates 

for terrorist connections, and implement policy and procedures as 

appropriate.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will explore all available and alternative processes, 

including routine NCIC checks, with the Department for screening incoming 

inmates for terrorist connections, and implement policy and procedures as 

appropriate.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has in coordination with the Department explored all available and 

alternative processes, including routine NCIC checks, for screening incoming 

inmates for terrorist connections, and implemented policy and procedures as 

appropriate.

4. (U) Work with the Department to develop a complete universe of 

previously unidentified terrorist inmates and obtain information from 

the Department that will help the BOP determine if the 46 released 

inmates we identified meet its definition of a terrorist. If any of 

them do, then we recommend that the BOP add them to its historical 

list of formerly incarcerated terrorists to make it accurate and notify 

the FBI of their release.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will work with the Department to develop a complete 

universe of previously unidentified terrorist inmates and obtain information 

from the Department that will help the BOP determine if the 46 released 

inmates identified meet its definition of a terrorist. If any of them do, then 

the BOP will add them to its historical list of formerly incarcerated terrorists 

to make it accurate and notify the FBI of their release.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has developed a complete universe of previously unidentified terrorist 

inmates, determined if the 46 released inmates we identified meet its 

definition of a terrorist and if applicable, added these individuals to its 

formerly incarcerated terrorist inmates and notified the FBI of their release.

5. (U) Review the quality of the telephone monitoring equipment at 

institutions requiring FBI monitoring of inmates under a SAM 

directive, and work with the FBI to make improvements to ensure 

effective monitoring can be conducted with the equipment at each of 

those institutions.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will review the quality of the telephone monitoring 

equipment at institutions requiring FBI monitoring of inmates under a SAM 

directive, and work with the FBI to make improvements to ensure effective 
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monitoring can be conducted with the equipment at each of those 

institutions.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has reviewed the quality of the telephone monitoring equipment at 

institutions requiring FBI monitoring of inmates under a SAM directive and 

has worked with the FBI to make necessary improvements to the equipment 

to ensure effective monitoring at each of the identified institutions.

6. (U) Assess the sound quality in BOP visiting rooms utilized by 

terrorist inmates subject to SAM directives and improve the 

microphones in any identified facilities with inadequate equipment so 

that the FBI can effectively perform its monitoring as required under 

the SAM directive and the BOP can perform similar monitoring of its 

terrorist and other high-risk inmates.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will assess the sound quality in BOP visiting rooms 

utilized by terrorist inmates subject to SAM directives and improve the 

microphones in any identified facilities with inadequate equipment so that the 

FBI can effectively perform its monitoring as required under the SAM 

directive and the BOP can perform similar monitoring of its terrorist and 

other high-risk inmates.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has assessed the sound quality in BOP visiting rooms utilized by terrorist 

inmates subject to SAM directives and has improved the microphones in any 

identified facilities with inadequate equipment.

7. (U) Work with the Department to establish procedures to prevent 

terrorist inmates from viewing discovery materials in the presence of 

other inmates and consider additional steps to minimize the risk that 

discovery material containing radical or harmful content can be 

inappropriately shared with other inmates.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will work with the Department to establish procedures 

to prevent terrorist inmates from viewing discovery materials in the presence 

of other inmates and consider additional steps to minimize the risk that 

discovery material containing radical or harmful content can be 

inappropriately shared with other inmates.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP, in conjunction with the Department, has established procedures that 

prevent terrorist inmates from viewing discovery materials in the presence of 

other inmates and has considered additional steps to minimize the risk that 

discovery material containing radical or harmful content can be 

inappropriately shared with other inmates.
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8. (U) Establish a standard that will help ensure general population 

emails are monitored in a consistent manner and establish a policy 

that allows staff to forward for translation general population emails 

in accordance with this standard.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will establish a government contract quality assurance 

surveillance plan to use as the basis for monitoring performance and to 

determine if the services CCS provided meet the contract requirements.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has established a standard that ensures general population emails are 

monitored in a consistent manner and a policy that allows staff to forward for 

translation general population emails in accordance with this standard.

9. (U) Eliminate the automatic delivery of email to high-risk inmates.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will eliminate the automatic delivery of email to highrisk inmates.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has established policies or procedures to eliminate the automatic 

delivery of email to high-risk inmates.

10. (U) Review and implement policy and procedures to ensure that BOP 

staff are providing appropriate attention to the communications they 

are required to monitor.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that will review and implement policy and procedures to 

ensure that BOP staff are providing appropriate attention to the 

communications they are required to monitor.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has reviewed and implemented policy and procedures to ensure that 

BOP staff are providing appropriate attention to the communications they are 

required to monitor.

11. (U) Create a more thorough and useful national list of key words, 

assess available technology that could assist in identifying 

concerning email communications, and develop a mechanism in 

TRULINCS to automatically notify staff of any emails that require 

closer scrutiny.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will create a more thorough and useful national list of 

key words, assess available technology that could assist in identifying 
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concerning email communications, and develop a mechanism in TRULINCS to 

automatically notify staff of any emails that require closer scrutiny.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has created a comprehensive national list of key words, assessed 

available technology to assist in identifying concerning email 

communications, and developed a mechanism in TRULINCS to automatically 

notify staff of any emails requiring closer scrutiny.

12. (U) Establish controls that mitigate the risk of inmates 

communicating with unknown and un-vetted parties and take steps, 

including the utilization of available technological features as found 

in TRULINCS, to reduce the risk of mass emails being received by 

high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will establish controls that mitigate the risk of inmates 

communicating with unknown and un-vetted parties and take steps, including 

the utilization of available technological features as found in TRULINCS, to 

reduce the risk of mass emails being received by high-risk inmates, including 

terrorist inmates.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has established controls that mitigate the risk of inmates communicating 

with unknown and un-vetted parties and has taken steps, including the 

utilization of available technological features as found in TRULINCS, to reduce 

the risk of mass emails being received by high-risk inmates, including 

terrorist inmates.

13. (U) Establish a TRUFONE control that allows the system to alert BOP 

management of any calls that were not completely monitored.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will establish a TRUFONE control that allows the system 

to alert BOP management of any calls that were not completely monitored.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has established a TRUFONE control that allows the system to alert BOP 

management of any calls that were not completely monitored.

14. (U) Reassess its TRUFONE controls and take steps to prevent 

terrorist and other high-risk inmates from communicating with 

unknown and unapproved contacts.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will reassess its TRUFONE controls and take steps to 

prevent terrorist and other high-risk inmates from communicating with 

unknown and unapproved contacts.
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(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has reassessed its TRUFONE controls and has taken steps to prevent 

terrorist and other high-risk inmates from communicating with unknown and 

unapproved contacts.

15. (U) Review cellblock conversation monitoring policy, procedures, 

and capabilities to determine whether and how improvements can be 

made to achieve security goals, including improvement of audio 

monitoring systems.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will review cellblock conversation monitoring policy, 

procedures, and capabilities to determine whether and how improvements 

can be made to achieve security goals, including improvement of audio 

monitoring systems.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has reviewed its cellblock conversation monitoring policy, procedures, 

and capabilities to determine whether and how improvements can be made 

to achieve security goals, including improvement of audio monitoring 

systems.

16. (U) Revisit its social communication monitoring policy for high-risk 

inmates, including terrorist inmates, to better ensure that all visits 

between terrorist inmates and their visitors are sufficiently 

monitored.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will revisit its social communication monitoring policy 

for high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates, to better ensure that all 

visits between terrorist inmates and their visitors are sufficiently monitored.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has reviewed its social communication monitoring policy for high-risk 

inmates, including terrorist inmates, to better ensure that all visits between 

terrorist inmates and their visitors are sufficiently monitored.

17. (U) Establish timelines for staff to nominate terrorist inmates for 

inclusion on the Posted Picture File and for Wardens to approve or 

deny the nominations.

(U) Resolved. The BOP concurred with our recommendation. The BOP stated 

in its response that it will establish timelines for staff to nominate terrorist 

inmates for inclusion on the Posted Picture File and for Wardens to approve 

or deny the nominations.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

BOP has established timelines for staff to nominate terrorist inmates for 
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inclusion on the Posted Picture File and for Wardens to approve or deny the 

nominations.

(U) Recommendations for the Office of the Deputy Attorney General:

18. (U) Determine whether the BOP should conduct an inventory of the 

books and publications found in the cells of all terrorist inmates and 

provide it to the FBI for review.

(U) Resolved. The ODAG concurred with our recommendation. The ODAG 

stated in its response that it will work with the BOP and the Department's law 

enforcement components to determine whether the BOP should conduct an 

inventory of the books and publications found in the cells of all terrorist 

inmates and provide it to the FBI for review.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

ODAG worked with the BOP and the Department's law enforcement 

components to determine whether the BOP should conduct an inventory of 

the books and publications found in the cells of all terrorist inmates and to 

provide it to the FBI for review.

19. (U) Develop a mechanism to notify the BOP of all terrorists in its 

custody, including those whose convictions are under a sealed U.S. 

court order.

(U) Resolved. The ODAG concurred with our recommendation. The ODAG 

stated in its response that it will work with the BOP and the Department's law 

enforcement components to develop a mechanism to notify the BOP of all 

terrorists in its custody, including those whose convictions are under a sealed 

U.S. court order.

(U) This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

ODAG has develop a mechanism to notify the BOP of all terrorists in BOP 

custody, including those whose convictions are under a sealed U.S. court 

order.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20530-0001 

Also at Oversight.gov

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) is a 

statutorily created independent entity whose mission is to detect and deter 

waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and to 

promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s operations.

To report allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, or misconduct regarding DOJ 

programs, employees, contractors, grants, or contracts please visit or call the

DOJ OIG Hotline at oig.justice.gov/hotline or (800) 869-4499.

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oig.justice.gov @JusticeOIG JusticeOIG

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