NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 17-3841

__________ SEAN M. DONAHUE, Appellant

v. R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA, UNITED ST ATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN ITS CAPACITY AS A SOVEREIGN SIGNATORY TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION; THE LUZERNE/SCHUYLKILL COUNTIES WORKFORCE INVESTMENT BOARD, INC.; PR ESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP

___________________ _________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle Distri ct of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-01759) District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

___________________ _________________

Submitted Pursuant to Th ird Circuit LAR 34.1(a) August 21, 2019

Before: MCKEE, COWEN, an d RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 17, 2019)2 ___________ O P I N I O N *

___________ PER CURIAM Sean M. Donahue appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing hi s amended complaint fo r failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, we will affirm. Donahue is a pro se litigant who has filed several federal lawsuits arising out of his state court convictions fo r harassment. Those convictions stemmed from threatening emails that Donahue sent to state employees complaining that he had been improperly denied services at state employment offices. In September 2017, he filed in the District Court another such lawsuit, captioned “Petition for a Writ of Mandamus.” Donahue claimed that a state court criminal senten ce that prohibits him from entering certain employment services offices interferes w ith his ability to utilize preferential job placement benefits that are afforded to ve terans. He named as defendants the United States Department of Labor, the Secretary of Labor, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the Luzerne and Schuylkill Coun ties Workforce Investment Board. The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who granted Do nahue’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) but concl uded that he was not entitled to mandamus relief and that his claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, the Rooker-Feldman

* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pu rsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.3 doctrine, and the Younger abstention doctrine. 1 Nevertheless, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the action be dismissed w ithout prejudice so that Donahue could amend his claims. The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and provided Donahue with 21 days to file an amended complaint. Donahue filed a timely amended pleading, ad ding President Trump as a defendant, and asking the District Court to “intervene” and direct the defendants to provide him with “veterans priority job referrals under the US Jobs for Veterans Act ....” (ECF #6, p. 4-5, 8). The Magistrate Judge again conclude d that mandamus relief was not warranted because Donahue did “not desc ribe a plainly non-discretiona ry duty on the defendants’ part” and did not “set forth we ll-pleaded facts giving [him] an absolute entitlement to the particular form of relief which he seeks.” In addition, the Magistra te Judge stated that Heck barred Donahue’s attempt to seek relief from his conviction in a civil rights action. To the extent that Donahue sought an orde r “quash[ing]” portions of the state court sentencing order, the Magistrate Judge conc luded that his claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the amended complaint be dismissed with prejudic e. Over Donahue’s objections, the District Court adopted the Report and Recommendati on and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. Donahue appealed. 2

1 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Ap peals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 2 Donahue has filed a notice of new eviden ce and motion to strike his state court conviction and trial testimony.4 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint is de novo. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010). Donahue’s claims lack merit. In hi s amended submission, he purported to “correct[] defects” in his initial pleading. (ECF #6, p. 2). But, at bottom, Donahue again asked the District Court to order the defenda nts to vacate his state court sentence and provide him with “veterans prio rity job referrals.” (Id. at p. 4, 10). According to Donahue, the Department of Labor has a “n ondiscretionary duty” to provide him with those referrals. (Id. at p. 6). But, pursuan t to the sentences in his criminal cases, Donahue was prohibited from visiting certain career services offices. He asked the District Court to “intentionally disturb and overturn the outcome of both state criminal trials.” (Id. at 10). As the Magistrate Judge explained, Do nahue is not entitled to mandamus relief. Such relief is available only in extraordinary circumstances. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005 ). A petitioner seeking the writ “must have no other adequate means to obtain the desire d relief, and must show that the right to issuance is clear and indisputable.” Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996). Donahue did not demonstrate that he is clearly entitled to ha ve the Department of Labor provide him with job placement services or to have the state courts overturn his conviction. Notably, Donahue has not mean ingfully challenged th e Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that a “substantial element of di scretion ... is an inherent part of many5 Department of Labor job pl acement programs.” Bartlett Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 828, 831 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Because we find that the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] did not owe any clear, non-discretionary duty to Plaintiffs, we hold that mandamus jurisdic tion does not lie[.]”). And, of course, Donahue had other means of challenging his criminal sentences. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485- 86 (3d Cir. 2001) (providing that the proper av enue for challenging a state conviction in federal court is 28 U.S.C. § 2254). To the extent that Donahue sought to us e a civil rights action to obtain equitable relief – i.e. , to have the District Court overturn his state court sentences – his claim is barred by Heck. Heck holds that, where success in a § 1 983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sent ence, an individual’s suit for damages or equitable relief is barred unless he can dem onstrate that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). Donahue sought to challenge his sentence on the ground that the “State had no legal decision making jurisdiction re garding whether or not an honorably discharged veteran ... received first priority us e of resources.” (ECF #6, p. 3). But, because an order overturning Donahue’s state court sentences would necessarily imply the invalidity of those sentences, hi s claim is Heck-barred. Moreover, if, as Donahue asse rts, an “underlying criminal case is on appeal in the state system,” Appellant’s Br., p. 18, it woul d be inappropriate to interfere with those ongoing state criminal proceedings . See Younger, 401 U.S. at 46. And, to the extent that Donahue sought to challenge a final state co urt conviction, his claim is barred by the6 Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine de prives lower federal courts of jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments. Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010). “[F]our requirements . . . must be met for the Rooker-F eldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘c omplain[s] of injuries caused by [the] statecourt judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district cour t to review and reject the state judgments.” Id. at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)) (alterations in original). Those requ irements have been met here. Donahue was convicted in state court before bringing the underlying action, he complained that his sentence prevents him from obtaining veterans job benefits, and he asked the District Court to overturn the sentence. See Erlands on v. Northglenn Mun. Ct., 528 F.3d 785, 788-90 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that Rooke r-Feldman doctrine barred challenge in federal district court to muni cipal court conviction and fine). Accordingly, we will affirm th e District Court’s judgment.