U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

www.cops.usdoj.gov

Burglary of 

Single-Family Houses

by

Deborah Lamm Weisel

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides Series No. 18
www.PopCenter.org

Got a Problem? We’ve got answers!

Log onto the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing website

at www.popcenter.org for a wealth of information to help

you deal more effectively with crime and disorder in your

community, including:

• Web-enhanced versions of all currently available Guides

• Interactive training exercises

• On-line access to research and police practices

Designed for police and those who work with them to

address community problems, www.popcenter.org is a great

resource in problem-oriented policing.

Supported by the Office of Community Oriented Policing

Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing
Burglary of 

Single-Family Houses

Deborah Lamm Weisel

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 

#99-CK-WX-K004 by the Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions

contained herein are those of the author(s) and do not

necessarily represent the official position of the U.S.

Department of Justice.

www.cops.usdoj.gov

ISBN: 1-932582-17-7

August 2004

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides Series

Guide No. 18

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series i

About the Problem-Specific Guides

Series

The Problem-Specific Guides summarize knowledge about how

police can reduce the harm caused by specific crime and

disorder problems. They are guides to prevention and to

improving the overall response to incidents, not to

investigating offenses or handling specific incidents. The

guides are written for police–of whatever rank or

assignment–who must address the specific problem the guides

cover. The guides will be most useful to officers who

• Understand basic problem-oriented policing principles

and methods. The guides are not primers in problemoriented policing. They deal only briefly with the initial

decision to focus on a particular problem, methods to

analyze the problem, and means to assess the results of a

problem-oriented policing project. They are designed to

help police decide how best to analyze and address a

problem they have already identified. (An assessment guide

has been produced as a companion to this series and the

COPS Office has also published an introductory guide to

problem analysis. For those who want to learn more about

the principles and methods of problem-oriented policing,

the assessment and analysis guides, along with other

recommended readings, are listed at the back of this guide.)

• Can look at a problem in depth. Depending on the

complexity of the problem, you should be prepared to

spend perhaps weeks, or even months, analyzing and

responding to it. Carefully studying a problem before

responding helps you design the right strategy, one that is

most likely to work in your community. You should not

blindly adopt the responses others have used; you must

decide whether they are appropriate to your local situation.
ii Burglary of Single-Family Houses

What is true in one place may not be true elsewhere; what

works in one place may not work everywhere.

• Are willing to consider new ways of doing police

business. The guides describe responses that other police

departments have used or that researchers have tested.

While not all of these responses will be appropriate to your

particular problem, they should help give a broader view of

the kinds of things you could do. You may think you

cannot implement some of these responses in your

jurisdiction, but perhaps you can. In many places, when

police have discovered a more effective response, they have

succeeded in having laws and policies changed, improving

the response to the problem.

• Understand the value and the limits of research

knowledge. For some types of problems, a lot of useful

research is available to the police; for other problems, little

is available. Accordingly, some guides in this series

summarize existing research whereas other guides illustrate

the need for more research on that particular problem.

Regardless, research has not provided definitive answers to

all the questions you might have about the problem. The

research may help get you started in designing your own

responses, but it cannot tell you exactly what to do. This

will depend greatly on the particular nature of your local

problem. In the interest of keeping the guides readable, not

every piece of relevant research has been cited, nor has

every point been attributed to its sources. To have done so

would have overwhelmed and distracted the reader. The

references listed at the end of each guide are those drawn

on most heavily; they are not a complete bibliography of

research on the subject.
About the Problem-Specific Guides Series iii

• Are willing to work with other community agencies to

find effective solutions to the problem. The police alone

cannot implement many of the responses discussed in the

guides. They must frequently implement them in

partnership with other responsible private and public

entities. An effective problem-solver must know how to

forge genuine partnerships with others and be prepared to

invest considerable effort in making these partnerships

work.

These guides have drawn on research findings and police

practices in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada,

Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia.

Even though laws, customs and police practices vary from

country to country, it is apparent that the police everywhere

experience common problems. In a world that is becoming

increasingly interconnected, it is important that police be

aware of research and successful practices beyond the borders

of their own countries.

The COPS Office and the authors encourage you to provide

feedback on this guide and to report on your own agency's

experiences dealing with a similar problem. Your agency may

have effectively addressed a problem using responses not

considered in these guides and your experiences and

knowledge could benefit others. This information will be used

to update the guides. If you wish to provide feedback and

share your experiences it should be sent via e-mail to

cops_pubs@usdoj.gov.
iv Burglary of Single-Family Houses

For more information about problem-oriented policing,

visit the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing online at

www.popcenter.org or via the COPS website at

www.cops.usdoj.gov. This website offers free online access to:

• the Problem-Specific Guides series,

• the companion Response Guides and Problem-Solving Tools

series,

• instructional information about problem-oriented policing

and related topics,

• an interactive training exercise, and

• online access to important police research and practices.
Acknowledgments v

Acknowledgments

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series is very much a

collaborative effort. While each guide has a primary author,

other project team members, COPS Office staff and

anonymous peer reviewers contributed to each guide by

proposing text, recommending research and offering

suggestions on matters of format and style.

The principal project team developing the guide series

comprised Herman Goldstein, professor emeritus, University

of Wisconsin Law School; Ronald V. Clarke, professor of

criminal justice, Rutgers University; John E. Eck, associate

professor of criminal justice, University of Cincinnati;

Michael S. Scott, assistant clinical professor, University of

Wisconsin Law School; Rana Sampson, police consultant, San

Diego; and Deborah Lamm Weisel, director of police

research, North Carolina State University.

Karin Schmerler, Rita Varano and Nancy Leach oversaw the

project for the COPS Office. Megan Tate Murphy

coordinated the peer reviews for the COPS Office. Suzanne

Fregly edited the guides. Research for the guides was

conducted at the Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers

University under the direction of Phyllis Schultze by Gisela

Bichler-Robertson, Rob Guerette and Laura Wyckoff.

The project team also wishes to acknowledge the members of

the San Diego, National City and Savannah police

departments who provided feedback on the guides' format

and style in the early stages of the project, as well as the line

police officers, police executives and researchers who peer

reviewed each guide.

Contents

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

The Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Related Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Factors Contributing to Burglary of Single-Family Houses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Times When Burglaries Occur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Target Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Goods Stolen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Entry Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Burglars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Understanding Your Local Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Asking the Right Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Premises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Offenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Locations/Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Measuring Your Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Responses to the Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Situational Crime Prevention Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Victim-Oriented Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 

Offender-Oriented Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Responses With Limited Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Appendix: Summary of Responses to Burglary of Single-Family Houses . . . . . . . . . . 41

Contents vii
viii Burglary of Single-Family Houses

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Recommended Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
The Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 1

The Problem of Burglary of 

Single-Family Houses

This guide addresses the problem of burglary of single-family

houses. It begins by describing the problem and reviewing risk

factors. It then identifies a series of questions to help you

analyze your local problem. Finally, it reviews responses to the

problem, and what is known about them from evaluative

research and police practice.

Reported U.S. burglaries have dropped dramatically in recent

years, declining 32 percent since 1990. This drop is variably

attributed to a robust economy, increased use of security

devices, and cocaine users' tendency to commit robbery rather

than burglary.1 With an estimated 1.4 million residential

burglaries in 1999, the total number of reported burglaries is

at its lowest since 1966.2 However, many residential

burglaries–perhaps up to 50 percent–go unreported.3 †

Despite the large decline in reported burglaries, burglary

remains the second most common serious crime in the United

States (just behind larceny-theft), accounting for 18 percent of

all serious crime. Burglary accounts for about 13 percent of

all recorded crime in the United Kingdom.4

The burglary clearance rate has remained consistently low,

with an average of 14 percent in the United States and 23

percent in Britain. Rural agencies typically clear a slightly

higher percentage of burglaries. The clearance rate for

burglary is lower than that for any other serious offense.

Indeed, most burglary investigations–about 65 percent–do not

produce any information or evidence about the crime, making

burglaries difficult to solve. Burglary causes substantial

financial loss–since most property is never recovered–and

serious psychological harm to the victims.5

† Burglaries with entry are more

likely to be reported than are

attempted burglaries. In Britain,

about 75 percent of burglaries with

entry are reported, compared with 45

percent of attempted burglaries

(Budd 1999). Burglaries are also less

likely to be reported when there is no

loss, or relatively minor loss (Shover

1991). Kershaw et al. (2001) found

that 75 percent of burglaries with

loss were reported in Britain, while

only 16 percent of burglaries with no

loss were reported.
2 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

To many, burglary is an intractable problem–difficult to solve,

and one in which the police role primarily entails recording

the crime and consoling the victims.6 Although burglaries have

declined in recent years, police strategies such as

Neighborhood Watch and target-hardening have had limited

success in reducing these crimes. However, some quite

specific, highly focused burglary prevention efforts show

promise.

Related Problems

This guide focuses on burglary of single-family houses–

primarily owner-occupied and detached. While there are many

similarities between burglaries of these dwellings and those of

multifamily homes, attached or semidetached houses,

condominiums, and apartments (as well as other rental

housing), the crime prevention techniques differ.† Singlefamily detached houses are often attractive targets–with

greater rewards–and more difficult to secure because they

have multiple access points. Indeed, burglars are less likely to

be seen entering larger houses that offer greater privacy. In

general, greater accessibility to such houses presents

opportunities to offenders.7

In contrast to residents of other types of housing, private

homeowners may use their own initiative to protect their

property–and often have both the resources and incentive to

do so. Residents of single-family houses do not depend on a

landlord, who may have little financial incentive to secure a

property. Most police offense reports include a premise code

to help police distinguish single-family houses from other

types of residences.

† Research does not always clearly

describe the housing types crime

prevention projects cover, or it

combines types. While this guide

focuses on single-family houses,

promising practices for all types of

residential burglaries have been

examined.
The Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 3

Although burglaries of multifamily homes are the most

numerous, some studies demonstrate that single-family houses

are at higher risk.8 National burglary averages tend to mask

the prevalence of burglaries of single-family houses in

suburban areas, where such housing is more common. The

proportion of burglaries of single-family houses will vary

from one jurisdiction to another, based on the jurisdiction's

housing types, overall burglary rates, neighborhood

homogeneity–especially economic homogeneity, proximity to

offenders and other factors.

Other problems related to burglary of single-family houses

not addressed directly in this guide include:

• other types of residential burglaries, including those of

apartments and other housing;

• commercial burglaries;

• drug markets and drug use; and

• other offenses related to single-family houses, including

larceny and assault.

Factors Contributing to Burglary of Single-Family

Houses

Understanding the factors that contribute to your problem

will help you frame your own local analysis questions,

determine good effectiveness measures, recognize key

intervention points, and select appropriate responses.
4 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

Times When Burglaries Occur

Burglary does not typically reflect large seasonal variations,

although in the United States, burglary rates are the highest in

August, and the lowest in February. Seasonal variations reflect

local factors, including the weather and how it affects

occupancy, particularly of vacation homes. In warm climates

and seasons, residents may leave windows and doors open,

providing easy access, while storm windows9 or double-pane

glass10 to protect against harsh weather provides a deterrent to

burglary. The length of the days, the availability of activities

that take families away from home, and the temperature may

all have some effect on burglary.

In the United States, most residential burglaries–about 60

percent of reported offenses–occur in the daytime, when

houses are unoccupied.11 This proportion reflects a marked

change in recent decades: in 1961, about 16 percent of

residential burglaries occurred in the daytime; by 1995, the

proportion of daytime burglaries had risen to 40 percent.12

This change is generally attributed to the increase in women

working outside the home during those decades–leaving

houses vacant for much of the day. Thus, burglaries are often

disproportionately concentrated on weekdays. The temporal

pattern varies in Britain–about 56 percent of burglaries occur

when it is dark.13

Exactly when a burglary has occurred is often difficult for

victims or police to determine. Usually, victims suggest a time

range during which the offense occurred. Some researchers

have divided burglary times into four distinct categories:

morning (7 a.m. to 11 a.m.), afternoon (12 p.m. to 5 p.m.),

evening (5 p.m. to 10 p.m.), and night (10 p.m. to 7 a.m.). This

scheme naturally reflects residents' presence at various times,†

† Some police reports may record

only the earliest possible time of

occurrence, the midpoint of a time

range, the time of the report, or the

shift during which the offense

occurred. These varied recordings

will influence analysis of burglaries'

distribution across time (Waller and

Okihiro 1978).
The Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 5

as well as offender patterns. Some research suggests that

burglars most often strike on weekdays, from 10 a.m. to 11

a.m. and from 1 p.m. to 3 p.m.14–times when even routinely

occupied houses may be empty.

In many cases, determining the times when burglaries occur

helps in developing crime prevention strategies and in

identifying potential suspects. For example, burglaries by

juveniles during school hours may suggest truancy problems.

After-school burglaries may be related to the availability of

alternative activities.

Target Selection 

Burglars select targets based on a number of key factors,

including the following:†

• familiarity with the target, and convenience of the location;

• occupancy;

• visibility or surveillability;

• accessibility;

• vulnerability or security; and 

• potential rewards.

These elements interact. Visibility and accessibility are more

important than vulnerability or security, which a burglar

typically cannot assess from afar unless the resident has left

the house visibly open.

Familiarity with the target, and convenience of the

location. Offenders tend to commit crimes relatively close to

where they live,15 although older, more professional burglars

tend to be more mobile and travel farther.16 Burglars often

† These characteristics are also

classified more generally as

opportunity, risk, and rewards.
6 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

target houses on routes from home to work, or on other

routine travel routes. This tendency makes the following

houses more vulnerable to burglary:

• Houses near a ready pool of offenders. These include

houses near large youth populations, drug addicts, shopping

centers, sports arenas, transit stations, and urban high-crime

areas.17

• Houses near major thoroughfares. Heavy vehicle traffic

that brings outsiders into an area may contribute to

burglaries.18 Burglars become familiar with potential targets,

and it is more difficult for residents to recognize strangers.

Houses close to pedestrian paths are also more vulnerable

to burglary.19

Houses near major thoroughfares are more likely to catch the attention of

burglars passing by. Moreover, it is more difficult to distinguish residents

and visitors from strangers in heavily traveled areas.

Kip Kellogg
The Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 7

• Houses on the outskirts of neighborhoods. Like houses

near major thoroughfares, those on the outskirts of

neighborhoods have greater exposure to strangers. Strangers

are more likely to be noticed by residents of houses well

within neighborhood confines, where less traffic makes

their presence stand out. Such houses include those on

dead-end streets and cul-de-sacs–locations with few

outlets.20

• Houses previously burglarized. Such houses have a much

higher risk of being burglarized than those never

burglarized, partly because the factors that make them

vulnerable once, such as occupancy or location, are difficult

to change. Compared with non-burglarized houses, those

previously targeted are up to four times more likely to be

burglarized; any subsequent burglary is most likely to occur

within six weeks of the initial crime.21 There are a variety of

reasons suggested for revictimization: some houses offer

cues of a good payoff or easy access; burglars return to

houses for property left behind during the initial burglary;

or burglars tell others about desirable houses.22 Burglars may

also return to a target months later, to steal property the

Houses well within neighborhood confines, such as those on dead-end streets

and cul-de-sacs, offer two burglary deterrents: burglars have limited access

to them, and residents are more likely to notice strangers.

Kip Kellogg
8 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

owners have presumably replaced through insurance

proceeds.23 Numerous studies show that revictimization is

most concentrated in lower-income areas, where burglaries

are the most numerous.24

• Houses near burglarized houses. Such houses face an

increased risk of burglary after the neighbor is burglarized.25

Offenders may return to the area of a successful burglary

and, if the previous target has been hardened, select

another house, or they may seek similar property in a

nearby house.

Occupancy. Most burglars do not target occupied houses,

taking great care to avoid them. Some studies suggest burglars

routinely ring doorbells to confirm residents' absence. How

long residents are away from home is a strong predictor of

the risk of burglary,26 which explains why single-parent, oneperson and younger-occupant homes are more vulnerable.

The following houses are at higher risk:

• Houses vacant for extended periods. Vacation or

weekend homes, and those of residents away on vacation,

are particularly at risk of burglary and revictimization.27

Signs of vacancy–such as open garage doors or

accumulated mail–may indicate that no one is home.

• Houses routinely vacant during the day. Houses that

appear occupied–with the lights on, a vehicle in the

driveway, visible activity, or audible noises from within–are

less likely to be burglarized.28 Even houses near occupied

houses generally have a lower risk of burglary.29

• Houses of new residents. Neighborhoods with higher

mobility–those with shorter-term residents–tend to have

higher burglary rates, presumably because residents do not

have well-established social networks.30

• Houses without dogs. A dog's presence is a close

substitute for human occupancy, and most burglars avoid

houses with dogs. Small dogs may bark and attract

attention, and large dogs may pose a physical threat, as

well.31 On average, burglarized houses are less likely to have
The Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 9

dogs than are non-burglarized houses, suggesting that dog

ownership is a substantial deterrent.32 (Security alarms,

discussed below, are also a substitute for occupancy.)

Visibility or surveillability. The extent to which neighbors

or passersby can see a house reflects its visibility or

surveillability. A burglar's risk of being seen entering or

leaving a property influences target selection, making the

following houses more vulnerable to burglary:

• Houses with cover. For prospective burglars, cover

includes trees and dense shrubs–especially evergreens–near

doors and windows; walls and fences, especially privacy

fences; and architectural features such as latticed porches or

garages which project from the front of houses, obscuring

front doors. Entrances hidden by solid fencing or mature

vegetation–characteristic of many older homes are the entry

point in the majority of burglaries of single-family houses.33

High, dense shrubbery and privacy walls and fences provide concealment,

thereby making houses with these features attractive burglary targets.

Kip Kellogg
10 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

• Houses that are secluded. Secluded houses are isolated

from view by being set back from the road, sited on large

lots or next to nonresidential land, such as parks.34 Seclusion

reduces the chance that neighbors or passersby will see or

hear a burglar.

• Houses with poor lighting. For houses which are not

secluded, poor lighting reduces a burglar's visibility to

others. Steady lighting poses the threat that someone may

be available to readily see the burglar, while motionactivated security lighting may serve as an alert in secluded

areas. Lighting, of course, is not a factor in daytime

burglaries, which are more common.

Secluded houses reduce the likelihood that burglars will be seen or heard,

and are therefore attractive targets.

Kip Kellogg
The Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 11

• Houses on corners.

35 Because burglars can often more

easily assess corner-house occupancy, and corner houses

typically have fewer immediate neighbors, they are more

vulnerable to burglary. Burglars may inconspicuously scope

out prospective targets while stopped at corner traffic lights

or stop signs.36

• Houses with concealing architectural designs. For

privacy and aesthetics, some houses are designed and sited

to be less visible to neighbors and passersby. Houses whose

windows and doors face other houses appear to be less

vulnerable to burglary.37 

Accessibility. Accessibility determines how easily a burglar

can enter a house. Thus, the following houses are at greater

risk of burglary:

• Houses easily entered through side or back doors and

windows.38 Side or back entries are the most common

access point for burglars. In some areas, the front door is

the most common break-in point, but this likely reflects

architectural differences.39

Corner houses offer advantages but also pose risks to burglars: they are

more accessible, but police and others can better surveil them.

Kip Kellogg
12 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

• Houses next to alleys. Alleys provide both access and

escape for burglars, and limited visibility to neighbors. In

addition, large side yards facilitate access to the backs of

houses.

Vulnerability or security. How vulnerable or secure a house

is determines how likely a burglar is to target it. The following

houses are particularly at risk.

• Houses with weakened entry points. Poor building

materials can make houses more vulnerable to burglary.

Older houses may have rusting, easily compromised locks

or worn and decaying window and door frames, while

newer houses may be built with cheap materials.

• Houses whose residents are careless about security.

Burglarized houses often have unlocked or open windows

or doors.40 Seasonal variations may determine burglars'

access methods–summer months allow entry through open

windows or doors, while winter months bring an increase in

forced entry.41

Alleys behind houses provide burglars ready

access and escape.

Kip Kellogg
The Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 13

• Houses with few or no security devices. Studies show that

alarms, combined with other security devices, reduce

burglaries. Burglars are less likely to gain entry when a

house has two or more security devices (including window

locks, dead bolts, security lights, and alarms).42 Studies of

offenders show that burglars may avoid houses with good

locks, burglar bars or other security devices. By some

accounts, burglars have already made the decision to

burglarize a dwelling prior to encountering security features

thus press ahead with the burglary. Experienced burglars

may choose to tackle security devices,43 but the devices slow

them down, making them more vulnerable to being seen.

Potential rewards. In selecting targets, burglars consider the

size and condition of a house and the type of cars in the

driveway as indicators of the type and value of the house's

contents.44 Thus, the following houses are vulnerable to

burglary:

• Houses displaying signs of wealth.

45 Large and wellmaintained houses with expensive vehicles are at risk of

burglary. However, burglars avoid the most expensive

houses, presumably because they assume those houses have

more security or are more likely to be occupied.46 

Goods Stolen

Burglars are most likely to steal cash and goods they can easily

carry and sell, including jewelry, weapons, televisions, stereo

equipment, and computers.47 They need transportation to

move larger items, such as electronic equipment, while they

often make off with cash and jewelry on foot.48

Few burglars keep the goods they steal. A study in Britain

showed that burglars typically disposed of stolen property

within 24 hours, usually after stashing it in a semipublic

location. They thus minimized their risk by moving goods
14 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

only short distances.49 They appeared to have few concerns

about being arrested for selling stolen property, reporting they

safely sold goods to strangers and pawnbrokers.50

Burglars tend to dispose of stolen goods through local

pawnshops, taxi drivers and small-store owners.51 Few burglars

use professional fences.52 Pawnshops–often outlets for stolen

goods–have come under increasing scrutiny and regulation in

many communities. Some burglars sell stolen goods on the

street, occasionally trading them for drugs. Burglars

commonly sell stolen goods in bars and gas stations;53 in bars,

they usually sell the goods to staff, rather than customers.54 In

many cases, burglars get little return for the goods.

Entry Methods

In about two-thirds of reported U.S. burglaries (including

commercial ones), the offenders force entry. Unsecured

windows and doors (including sliding glass doors) are

common entry points. Burglars typically use simple tools such

as screwdrivers or crowbars to pry open weak locks, windows

and doors,55 or they may simply break a window or kick in a

door.

In about one-third of burglaries, the offenders do not force

entry; they enter through unlocked or open windows and

doors, especially basement windows and exterior and interior

garage doors.56 There is no consensus about the most

common entry point–it depends on the house's architecture

and siting on its lot.
The Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 15

Burglars

National arrest data indicate that most burglars are male–87

percent of those arrested in 1999.57 Sixty-three percent were

under 25. Whites accounted for 69 percent of burglary

arrests, and blacks accounted for 29 percent.

A lot of research has been conducted with burglars in the last

decade, much of it to examine their decision-making,

especially about target selection. Much of the research comes

from interviews with offenders. Their willingness or ability to

recall burglaries may influence the accuracy of the findings.

Also, since police clear so few burglaries, there are likely major

differences between successful burglars and those who get

arrested. Successful burglars may be older or may differ in

other important ways from those who get caught.

Open garage doors give burglars easy access to items in the garage,

potentially provide access to the house, and, if there are no vehicles in

the garage, indicate that the house is probably unoccupied.

Kip Kellogg
16 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

Burglars can be quite prolific: one study found that offenders

commonly committed at least two burglaries per week.58 Some

studies suggest there is great variability in the number of

burglaries offenders commit.59

Burglars do not typically limit their offending to burglary; they

participate in a wide range of property, violent and drugrelated crime.60 Some burglars, however, appear to specialize

in the crime for short periods.61 Burglars tend to be recidivists:

once arrested and convicted, they have the highest rate of

further arrests and convictions of all property offenders.62

Some research suggests that most burglaries involve more

than one offender.63 But there is considerable variability in cooffending. In one jurisdiction, 36 percent of burglars acted

alone, while in another, 75 percent did. One study revealed

that in about 45 percent of residential burglaries, offenders

had a partner.64 Young offenders are probably more likely to

have one.

Most research categorizes burglars–as novice, middle-range

and professional, for example. Novices, the most common

type, tend to be younger, make minimal gains from burglaries,

burglarize nearby dwellings, and can be easily deterred by

dogs, alarms or locks. Professionals tend to be older, carry out

bigger burglary jobs, willing to take on security devices, and

are more mobile, scouting good targets farther from home.†

Middle-range burglars fall somewhere between the two, and

more often work alone than do the others. A key feature

distinguishing the types of burglars is their outlet for stolen

goods. Professionals tend to have well-established outlets,

while novices must seek out markets for goods.

† Research suggests that the greater

the financial loss due to a burglary,

the less likely the police are to clear it

(Poyner and Webb 1991), indicating

that more skillful offenders commit

the bigger burglaries.
The Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 17

Alternatively, some researchers categorize offenders as either

being opportunistic or engaging in detailed planning65–a

distinction useful for developing effective responses.

Research on burglars reveals the following characteristics:

• Most burglars are motivated by the need–sometimes

desperate–to get quick cash,66 often for drugs or alcohol.

Some offenders, particularly younger ones, are motivated by

the thrill of the offense.67 A small number of burglars are

motivated by revenge against someone such as an exgirlfriend or employer.

• Studies suggest that drug and/or alcohol use and financial

problems contribute to offending.68 Many burglars use their

gains to finance partying, which may be characterized by

frequent and heavy use of drugs and alcohol and a lack of

regular employment.69

• Drug abuse, particularly heroin abuse, has been closely

associated with burglary.70 In fact, some suggest the decline

in U.S. burglaries during the 1990s was at least partly due to

the rise in cocaine users and to their tendency to commit

robbery rather than burglary.71 Heroin and marijuana users

are more likely to be cautious in carrying out break-ins,

while cocaine users may take more risks.72

• Burglars do not tend to think about the consequences of

their actions, or they believe there is little chance of getting

caught.73 Drug and alcohol abuse can impair their ability to

assess consequences and risks.

• Burglars often know their victims,74 who may include casual

acquaintances, neighborhood residents, people for whom

they have provided a service (such as moving or gardening),

or friends or relatives of close friends. Thus, offenders have

some knowledge of their victims, such as of their daily

routine.75

Understanding Your Local Problem 19

Understanding Your Local Problem

The information provided above is only a generalized

description of burglary of single-family houses. You must

combine the basic facts with a more specific understanding of

your local problem. Analyzing the local problem carefully will

help you design a more effective response strategy.

Descriptive information about typical burglars, at-risk houses

and vulnerable areas reflects general characteristics of

burglary in specific places or across a large number of

offenses. However, different burglary patterns appear even

within quite small areas.76 Because burglaries are so numerous,

calculating averages can mask variations, creating a myth

about the typical burglary. Thus, seeking trends within larger

datasets is crucial.

Asking the Right Questions

The following are some critical questions you should ask in

analyzing your particular problem of burglary in single-family

houses, even if the answers are not always readily available.

Your answers to these and other questions will help you

choose the most appropriate set of responses later on.

You may have a variety of hunches about what factors

contribute to your local burglary problem–e.g., alleys, drug

addicts or poor lighting. You should test these hunches

against available data before developing an intervention.

Because burglary patterns may vary from one neighborhood

to another, or from one type of house to another, you may

want to examine the differences between burglarized houses

and a sample of non-burglarized houses. Since sampling can

be complicated, you may wish to consult a sampling expert.
20 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

Premises

• What types of houses are burglarized? One-story, or twostory? Large, or small? Older, or newly constructed? (Visual

surveys of burglarized houses will help you answer these

and other questions.)

• How accessible are the houses? Is there rear access via

alleys or pedestrian paths? 

• How visible are the houses? Are entrances visible? Is the

lighting adequate? Are the lots open and visible? How big

are the lots, and how far are the houses from roads and

neighbors? What type of fencing (if any) exists?

• How exposed are the houses? How close are they to major

thoroughfares, parks or other public areas? Where are they

located in the neighborhood? 

• What types of security do the houses have? What types of

security are in use?

• What house features contribute to burglaries? Substandard

locks, windows or doors?

Victims 

• What are the victims' characteristics? Elderly, and home

during the day? Middle-aged, and away at work? Young,

with changing schedules? Are they new to the area?

• What are the relevant victim behaviors? Do they leave

valuable property exposed? Do they give service providers

access to the house? Do they leave windows or doors

unlocked or open? Do they have and use alarms? Do they

have dogs? Do they leave clues that they are not at home

(e.g., let mail accumulate or leave the garage door open

when the car is gone)?
Understanding Your Local Problem 21

Offenders

• How many burglars work alone? How many work with

others? How or where do those who work with others get

together? Why do they offend together? How do they

offend together? (Arrested offenders are a good source of

information, but remember that they may differ from active

burglars in important ways. In addition, they may be

reluctant to share information if they are concerned about

three-strikes laws.) 

• What are burglars' demographic characteristics, such as age

or gender? What is their ethnicity, as this may relate to

targeted victims? 

• Where do burglars live, work or hang out?

• Do burglars know their victims?

• How active are burglars? Do they account for a few

burglaries, or many? Can you identify subtypes of burglars?

• What, specifically, motivates burglars? Do they need quick

cash to party or to maintain a family? Are they addicted to

drugs, and if so, to what? Are they recently jobless, or are

they long-term offenders?

• Do burglars show evidence of planning their crimes, or do

they take advantage of easy opportunities?

• How do burglars travel to and from the scene? 

• How do burglars dispose of the goods? Through

pawnshops? Through other outlets?

Incidents

• Do burglars force entry? 

• What are the entry points? Windows? Doors? What tools

do burglars use for entry? 

• What side of the house do burglars enter? 

• What house features reduce visibility to the point of

enabling a break-in? 
22 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

• How long do burglaries take? Do burglars take their time,

or are they in and out in a couple of minutes?

• How much revictimization occurs? (Matching the addresses

on offense reports will reveal those that account for a high

proportion of burglaries.) What is the typical time period

between initial and repeat burglaries? 

• What type of goods do burglars steal, and how valuable are

they? How do burglars take the goods from the scene? In a

vehicle? On foot? 

Locations/Times

• Where do burglaries occur? Near schools, stores, parks,

athletic venues, drug markets, treatment centers, transit

centers, or major thoroughfares?

• What time of day do burglaries occur? (There may be

several groups of offenses, including afternoon burglaries

committed by juveniles.)

• What days of the week, weeks of the month, and months

of the year do burglaries occur? Does the time of the

burglaries vary by day, week or month? (Weekday burglary

patterns are likely to vary from weekend patterns; patterns

on school days may vary from those on non-school days,

which include weekends, school holidays and teacher

workdays).

• Are there seasonal variations in the burglaries? For example,

are there more forced entries in the winter?

Measuring Your Effectiveness

Measurement allows you to determine to what degree your

efforts have succeeded, and suggests how you might modify

your responses if they are not producing the intended results.

You should take measures of your problem before you

implement responses, to determine how serious the problem

is, and after you implement them, to determine whether they
Understanding Your Local Problem 23

have been effective. All measures should be taken in both the

target area and the surrounding area. (For more detailed

guidance on measuring effectiveness, see the companion guide

to this series, Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory

Guide for Police Problem-Solvers.) 

When evaluating a response, you should use measures that

specifically reflect that response's impact. For example, police

might give target-hardening advice to all burglary victims or

all residents in a specific area. To determine the impact of the

advice, you must assess the rate of compliance with it. If

residents fail to close or lock windows and doors, installing

locks or alarms will likely have little impact.

In addition, you must determine how many single-family

houses are in your area before measuring response

effectiveness. You can obtain such information from city

planning agencies or other sources.

The following are potentially useful measures of the

effectiveness of responses to burglary in single-family houses:

• Reductions in the number of burglaries in the targeted

areas, including a comparison of those areas' burglary

trends with those of the entire jurisdiction, of the areas

immediately surrounding the targeted areas, and of

comparable areas in the jurisdiction. (If your effort focuses

on the entire jurisdiction, then you should compare your

jurisdiction with similar ones.)

• Reductions in the number of completed burglaries.

(Attempts, or unsuccessful burglaries, may actually increase.)

• Increases in the number of forced-entry burglaries.

• Reductions in the number of victims (addresses)

burglarized, based on police reports. (The number of

reported burglaries may increase after burglary prevention

efforts, due to increased public awareness.)
24 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

• Reductions in the number of repeat burglaries.

• Changes in the number of burglary arrests. (Note that this

measure does not directly reflect changes in the number of

burglaries, but may be an indirect measure of the response.

Even a single arrest can reduce the number of incidents.)

• Changes in the number of burglary prosecutions and

convictions/increases in the number of burglaries cleared–

including exceptional clearances.† (This, too, is an indirect

measure of the response's impact.)

• Increases or reductions in the number of burglaries in

nearby areas. (Burglaries may be displaced and thus increase

in nearby areas, or burglaries may be reduced in those

areas–a spillover effect from the response.) 

• Reductions or increases in other types of crime (including

burglaries of other types of housing).

• Reductions in the value or amount of goods stolen. (You

should also check whether the types of goods stolen have

changed.)

• Increases in the amount of stolen goods recovered. (Note

that such increases are more likely to reflect a specific focus

on stolen property recovery than on burglary reduction

efforts.)

• Improvements in victim satisfaction with police handling of

burglaries, as measured by victim surveys. (Such surveys

should not be generic; they should include questions closely

tied to the response implemented.)

• Changes in public perceptions of safety, as reflected in

citizen surveys. (Such surveys should include specific

questions about perceptions of safety. Improved

perceptions of safety often lag behind actual decreases in

crime. Some crime prevention initiatives reduce perceptions

of safety–making citizens more vigilant may make them

more fearful.)

† An exceptional clearance is

recorded for an offense in which

there is sufficient evidence to arrest

an offender, but a reason outside

police control prevents charging and

prosecuting the individual.
Responses to the Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 25

Responses to the Problem of Burglary of

Single-Family Houses

Your analysis of your local problem should give you a better

understanding of the factors contributing to it. Once you

have analyzed your local problem and established a baseline

for measuring effectiveness, you should consider possible

responses to address the problem.

The following response strategies provide a foundation of

ideas for addressing your particular problem. These strategies

are drawn from a variety of research studies and police

reports. Several of these strategies may apply to your

community's problem. It is critical that you tailor responses to

local circumstances, and that you can justify each response

based on reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy

will involve implementing several different responses. Law

enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in reducing

or solving the problem. Do not limit yourself to considering

what police can do: give careful consideration to who else in

your community shares responsibility for the problem and can

help police better respond to it.

Burglary prevention efforts typically involve a variety of

responses; it has been difficult to assess individual response

effectiveness. However, the following section describes

specific responses that might be combined to form an

effective burglary prevention strategy. Despite the importance

of multiple interventions, you should avoid trying a little bit

of everything; instead, you should use complementary tactics.
26 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

Situational Crime Prevention Responses

A range of burglary prevention responses involve targethardening, increasing the risk–or presumed risk–of detection

for offenders, and reducing the rewards. While police have

historically recommended many of these responses, they are

increasingly used in tandem with one another and with other

strategies. Most research suggests it is the combination of

responses that is effective.

1. Installing burglar alarms. Burglar alarms have become

quite prevalent. An estimated 17.5 percent of U.S. households

have them.77 In Britain, 24 percent of households had alarms

in 1998–a doubling in proportion since 1992.78 At an average

installation cost of $1,200 in the United States, along with

monthly monitoring charges of about $25, alarms are

concentrated among more affluent households.79

Burglar alarms have a high rate of false alerts–perhaps as

much as 95 percent. Despite that rate, alarms are often

recommended for crime prevention. The National Crime

Prevention Institute recommends installing alarms, and some

insurance companies offer urban policyholders discounts for

doing so. (For more detailed information on alarms, see

Guide No. 5 in this series, False Burglar Alarms.) 

Most studies of burglars indicate that many will avoid

residences with alarms, but alarm effectiveness has not been

well evaluated.† As alarms become more prevalent, their

effectiveness may change. If most residences in an area have

alarms, burglars may tend to avoid the area. Even if a burglar

tackles an alarm, its presence may cause him or her to be

hasty; burglars steal less property from houses with alarms.80

† The electronic industry cites a

study of three suburban locales.

Residences with alarms faced a 1.4

percent risk of burglary, while

residences without alarms faced a 2.3

percent risk (Hakim and Buck 1991).

Due to research limitations, these

findings should not be presumed to

hold true for all jurisdictions.
Responses to the Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 27

Portable burglar alarms have been effectively used for crime

prevention. Police agencies have issued them temporarily to

detect offenders. In one burglary prevention project, a small

pool of portable alarms were allocated on a rotating basis,

according to risk.81

2. Installing closed-circuit television (CCTV). CCTV has

been widely used in commercial buildings, public settings and

apartment complexes. It may also be used for single-family

houses, although such applications will be cost-prohibitive for

many, and have not been evaluated. CCTV may deter

burglaries, or offenders might confess when confronted with

incontrovertible evidence. Temporary CCTV installations may

be an option, particularly when used after repeat burglaries or

with an alarm.† CCTV can also be used to verify alarms.

3. Hardening targets. Increasing vulnerable houses' security

can reduce victimization.82 Home security surveys or targethardening assessments may prevent burglaries, but these are

often requested by residents at the lowest risk for burglary.

Even then, residents are unlikely to fully comply with all crime

prevention advice. Those whose houses have been burglarized

or who live near a burglary victim are most likely to follow

such advice.83

Security assessments typically include target-hardening advice

related to locks, windows and doors. Importantly, such

advice–provided immediately after a burglary–also helps the

victim secure the break-in point, to deter a repeat offense.

† See Painter and Tilley (1999) for a

description of CCTV in a variety of

settings.
28 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

Target-hardening makes getting into houses more difficult for

burglars, and includes installing the following: sturdy doors

with dead bolts; window locks, rather than latches; doublepane, storm or divided light windows, or laminated glass that

is forced-entry resistant; pin locks on windows and sliding

glass doors; and sliding glass door channel locks or slide bolts.

Generally, moderate lock security should suffice, as there is no

evidence that more elaborate lock security reduces burglary.84

Door security may be influenced as much by the door's

sturdiness as by its lock. Regardless, residents should use,

rather than simply install, security devices.

Some residents install bars and grills on windows and doors,

but the aesthetic costs deter many residents from doing so.

Installing them may violate building codes and pose a safety

threat by blocking fire exits.

If target-hardening is too expensive, corporate sponsors may

be solicited to fund it.† New construction may also

incorporate target-hardening (see response 9).

Target-hardening can be enhanced through victim education,

as well as public awareness campaigns that encourage likely

victims to take precautions, and that increase offenders'

perceptions of risk. Such efforts may be carried out through

the media, through the police (e.g., going door-to-door), or

through Neighborhood Watch or other community groups.

4. Marking property. Property-marking efforts have had

mixed results. It is difficult to get citizens to have their

property marked. This response appears to be most effective

when combined with extensive efforts to enlist participation,††

and with extensive media warnings to burglars that disposing

of marked property will be more difficult, or that its value will

† In seven cities in Britain, an

insurance company funded targethardening measures for low-income

areas; burglaries declined as a result

(Mawby 2001). In Huddersfield,

England, burglary victims were given

a discount voucher to buy security

equipment (Chenery, Holt and Pease

1997).

†† Police in New South Wales,

Australia, went door-to-door to

persuade citizens to participate, and

provided free marking equipment

(Laycock 1991).
Responses to the Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 29

be reduced.85 As part of this response, police must ensure that

recovered property is carefully evaluated to detect marking.

Property can be marked with bar codes, engraving, dyes and

etching liquids, labels, and electronic tags. In some initiatives,

citizens post window decals to warn potential burglars that

their property is marked.

5. Increasing occupancy indicators. Most burglars avoid

encountering residents, and thus look for indicators of

occupancy. Such indicators include interior and exterior lights

left on (or intermittently turned on and off via timers), closed

curtains, noise (e.g., from a television or stereo), cars in the

driveway, and so forth. Dogs, alarms and close neighbors can

serve as substitutes for occupancy. There are also mockoccupancy devices, such as timers that suggest someone is

home. In addition, residents should avoid leaving clues that

they are away (e.g., leaving the garage door open when the

garage is empty). Before going on vacation, they should have

their mail stopped (or ask a neighbor to pick it up), and

ensure that their lawns will be maintained in their absence.

A dog's presence in a house is an effective

burglary deterrent.

Kip Kellogg
30 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

6. Creating safe havens. Home security can be obtained

through physical design, such as in gated communities or

limited-access "fortress societies," where security guards are

supplemented by alarms and video surveillance.86 Those who

have the economic resources can create such safe havens by

retrofitting existing communities or developing new ones.

Such communities enhance feelings of safety and produce

modest crime reduction benefits. Some police feel that these

designs slow response time and make patrolling more

difficult.87

7. Improving visibility. Many features that make houses

vulnerable to burglary (e.g., isolation) cannot be changed.

However, improving houses' visibility increases the likelihood

that burglars will be spotted–or deters burglars who perceive

greater risk.

Since burglars seek houses with cover, residents should

remove obstructions to visibility. Generally, they should trim

trees and shrubs and modify fencing so that such features do

not block the view of the house from neighbors or passersby.

Well-planned–particularly motion-activated–lighting may

enhance such measures' effectiveness.

Increased lighting may increase natural surveillance in

darkness: however, its impact on crime is highly contextspecific. If no one is around to spot a burglar–for example, at

an isolated house–increased lighting is unlikely to stop the

crime, and may actually make the burglar's job easier. In some

areas, enhanced street lighting has reduced residential

burglaries:88 depending on the neighborhood, it may reduce

fear and encourage greater pedestrian traffic, increasing

opportunities for natural surveillance. In some cases, the

benefits of increased street lighting have extended to daylight

hours, presumably because of increased awareness and

community pride.89
Responses to the Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 31

8. Implementing Neighborhood Watch (NW) programs.

Police have often launched NW programs in response to

residential burglary, but the offenses have not consistently

declined. NW varies widely, but primarily involves neighbors'

watching one another's houses and reporting suspicious

behavior. Many NW programs include marking participants'

property and assessing their home security to harden targets

(see responses 3, 4 and 13). However, many NW participants

fail to mark property or follow target-hardening advice,90

although NW works best when they do so.91 NW has most

often been implemented in low-risk areas with more affluent

homeowners.92 NW has a greater impact when there are some

residents at home during the day.

Neighborhood Watch programs have not

proved to be particularly effective at

reducing residential burglary.

Kip Kellogg
32 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

NW effectiveness can be enhanced by offering introduction

kits to vulnerable new residents; publicizing the program,

including posting stickers on windows or doors, and/or signs

on residents' properties or in the neighborhood; educating

residents through door-to-door campaigns; marking property;

conducting security assessments; and keeping residents

informed about crime trends. (Police departments are

increasingly providing citizens access to crime data and crime

maps via Internet websites.) 

"Cocoon watches" are a variant of NW. Neighbors living near

recently burglarized houses are asked to be particularly alert.

This close set of neighbors–usually, about half a dozen–form

a virtual cocoon around the house,† increasing the likelihood

of detecting a burglar who returns to strike again. In Kirkholt,

England, with a burglary victim's consent, neighbors were

informed about the offense and offered a security upgrade–

increasing awareness about the crime and, perhaps,

neighborhood vigilance.93

Educating residents about crime prevention is an important

element of NW. Since many residential burglaries do not

involve forced entry, simply securing one's house can prevent

crime. In areas where burglars are the neighbors, watchfulness

has different implications. Residents may be intimidated by

offenders, and concerned about retribution.

Other means to increase citizen watchfulness, although

unevaluated, include the following:

• Audible warnings: During Operation Bumblebee, London

police drove around and issued warnings over a public

address system whenever a certain number of burglaries

occurred in an area.94

† This practice has been part of

more comprehensive crime

prevention initiatives, making an

evaluation of effectiveness difficult

(Laycock and Tilley 1995).
Responses to the Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 33

• Reverse 911 systems: Autodialers have been used to notify

residents when burglaries have occurred, offering crime

prevention tips and/or seeking information about

offenders. In Baltimore County, Md., use of an autodialer

resulted in the quick apprehension of offenders.95 The use

of autodialers can be enhanced through mapping, to

establish burglary patterns and thus set boundaries for

residents who are called.

• Resident hotlines: In limited areas, residents may use

hotlines to report a suspicious person ringing doorbells

under the pretext of looking for someone.96 

• Publicity: Media campaigns may enhance the benefits of

any crime prevention initiative. Such campaigns have rarely

been evaluated, but some studies suggest media coverage

deters offenders and encourages citizen participation.97

9. Modifying building codes. Modifying building codes to

comply with best crime-prevention practices is a promising

means to reduce burglaries.98 In Chula Vista, Calif., police

worked with developers to modify new homes, including

installing dead bolts on garage service doors, windows with

forced-entry resistance, and pin locks on sliding glass doors.

In addition, homeowner association rules for new

developments require that garage doors be kept shut. These

measures resulted in a 50 percent decline in burglaries over

two years in a police reporting area.99 In Overland Park, Kan.,

a municipal ordinance was adopted to secure all exterior doors

to reduce forced entry through door kicks, a common entry

method in the jurisdiction.† 100 The increased costs of crimeresistant materials are a primary consideration for builders;

however, high-growth communities may reap substantial

benefits by modifying building codes.

† Overland Park building codes and

crime prevention ordinances can be

found at www.opkansas.org. Security

measures are also written into Simi

Valley, Calif., building codes; the

police department inspects new

houses for compliance. The measures

resulted in a 52 percent decline in

burglaries from 1974 to 1995

(Hoffman 1998).
34 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

Building codes vary from one jurisdiction to another, and

builders may use low-quality security hardware and building

materials. Forced-entry provisions in building codes can be

used to improve window and door security–at relatively low

cost, generally.101 The Peel Regional Police in Canada found

that modifying building codes (at the provincial level) was a

difficult task, but such modifications may be practical in other

settings.

10. Modifying community design. To address the burglary

risk in growing areas, some jurisdictions have adopted

community design principles. Two studies have shown that a

U.K. effort known as Secured by Design has reduced

burglary. The Secured by Design strategy involves limiting

traffic access by building developments on cul-de-sacs,

creating greater oversight around a single road entry into

neighborhoods, maximizing the opportunity for natural

surveillance through strategic window and door placement,

orienting dwellings to maximize oversight of areas, limiting

access to dwellings through site layout, and outfitting houses

with good locks and building products.102 Such designs also

remove or minimize the risk typically associated with corner

houses.

11. Reducing traffic access. In Florida, modifying streets

and closing roads resulted in a decline in burglaries.103 Such

changes should take into account both vehicle and pedestrian

movement–road redesigns will do little to deter burglars who

live in the immediate area. Eliminating pedestrian paths, under

some conditions, has reduced residential crime.104

12. Reducing house access. Home security may be

enhanced by limiting access to houses–for example, by

installing gates in alleys that provide rear access, and installing

fences or planting tall hedges to limit access where visibility

cannot be improved. Although fences may limit visibility on
Responses to the Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 35

some properties, thus hiding a burglar, full-height fences

secured with locked gates can make property access much

more difficult, and hinder a burglar in carrying away stolen

goods. Some plants–such as thick shrubs, or those with

thorny foliage–deter perimeter access to properties and to

parts of houses where visibility cannot be improved.

Pyracantha and yucca are examples of such plants;

appropriate plant selection varies based on climate and

available light and water.105 In England, extensive efforts have

been undertaken to secure private alleys, as many burglars

gain access to homes through rear entries.106 Although gaining

consent to install gates in alleys has been challenging, and, at

the time of this writing, no evaluations were available,

installing gates is felt to be very promising in reducing

burglary. Some access-control measures can also be

incorporated into community design (see response 10).

Victim-Oriented Responses

13. Protecting repeat victims. Because repeat victims

account for a large proportion of residential burglaries–and

because subsequent offenses occur so quickly after the

first–burglary prevention strategies targeting this group have

tremendous potential for reducing crime. A range of burglary

prevention efforts in Britain have been effective in reducing

revictimization,107 but most of these efforts have focused on

public housing or row houses, rather than the detached singlefamily houses addressed in this guide. It is reasonable to

believe, however, that crime prevention strategies targeting

repeat victims would have similar positive effects in the

United States.
36 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

Households with prior victimization are easily identified via

police offense reports.† Residents–once victimized–are highly

motivated to comply with crime prevention advice. Programs

targeting repeat victims have employed a range of prevention

measures,108 such as:

• repairing and securing break-in points,

• hardening the targets,

• establishing cocoon watches,

• installing mock-occupancy devices,

• increasing police patrols,

• installing audible or dummy alarms,

• installing temporary silent alarms (lent by the police to

victims for up to two months),

• increasing outdoor lighting, and

• posting window or door stickers advertising participation in

property marking.

To be most effective, these measures–or others–must be taken

quickly, within 24 hours if possible, before another burglary

occurs.

Offender-Oriented Responses

14. Targeting repeat offenders. Police often know who

repeat offenders are. Surveillance of stolen-property outlets,

such as pawnshops, can identify them. Some police have

conducted observations and curfew checks of offenders

under court supervision.109 Truancy reduction initiatives may

be a component of this strategy. Given the high rates of

recidivism, burglars are likely to reoffend. In one study–of

primarily semidetached dwellings–arresting repeat offenders

(and hardening targets) resulted in a 60 percent decline in

burglaries.110 Targeting repeat offenders has produced more

indictments and convictions, and longer sentences.111

† Poor-quality offense data–premise

miscodes, incident coding errors,

missing information, and the like–

may impede identification of repeat

offenses. A major data "cleaning" is

necessary to make data reliable. See

Curtin et al. (2001) for common

problems with offense data.
Responses to the Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 37

15. Disrupting stolen-property outlets. Pawnshops have

historically been outlets for stolen property, but their

popularity has declined in recent years due to the use of hot

sheets circulated by police; mandatory photographing of

pawners; requirements that pawners provide identification,

and that pawnshops record the information; and factory–

stamped identification–or owner-marked identification–on

products such as televisions and other electronic equipment.

In cases of recurring thefts of specific property (such as

laptops), more extensive property marking (such as Smart

Water† or genetic fingerprinting) or tracking equipment may

be used to monitor theft and stolen property's end

destination.112 Recurring thefts may also point to repeat

burglars.

A range of strategies can be used to disrupt markets for

stolen goods, especially hot products, primarily by reducing

the number of markets available. Such strategies include

targeting fences and publicizing arrests for selling stolen

goods.113

16. Providing substance abuse treatment. Because

substance abusers may resort to burglary to finance their

habits, providing targeted treatment may result in a decline in

offenses. In Merseyside, England, providing methadone

treatment reduced burglaries.114 The relationship between drug

use and property offenses is well established. Early studies of

police crackdowns on drugs–especially heroin–showed

dramatic declines in burglary.115 (Other drugs have been more

closely associated with violent crime.) Studies of substance

abuse treatment–both voluntary and involuntary–demonstrate

declines in criminal activity, declines that remain after

completion of treatment.116

† Smart Water is a concealed

dispenser of indelible dye that can be

used with a silent alarm. It may be

best used to target repeat offenders

or high-risk locations.
38 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

17. Improving initial police response and follow-up

investigations. Efforts in Britain suggest that measures to

increase arrests of offenders result in substantial crime

prevention.† Most measures are part of comprehensive

strategies, making their specific impacts impossible to

evaluate. They might include the following:

• Improving patrol response to burglaries. In one study,

in-progress calls accounted for 10 percent of all reported

residential burglaries; in 90 percent of those cases, the

police did not apprehend an offender at or near the scene.

Of the offenders apprehended after an in-progress call, 43

percent were caught at the scene, and 34 percent were

caught based on information witnesses provided. In this

study, faster and two-unit responses to in-progress calls

resulted in the arrests of more offenders.117 (Most

burglaries, of course, are not reported in progress and

police make most arrests based on the responding officer's

initial actions. Cases should be screened to exclude those

with low solvability.118)

• Analyzing crime patterns. Crime analysis is used to

identify series, spatial and temporal patterns, type of

property being stolen, and modus operandi patterns.

Mapping is becoming particularly useful for detecting

burglary patterns and examining local burglary problems.††

Since burglary is often neighborhood-specific, maps should

reflect neighborhood boundaries and major topographical

elements that effectively separate residential areas.

• Improving physical-evidence collection. Widespread

access to the Automated Fingerprint Identification System

in the United States has provided new potential for

matching latent prints–and increases the need for evidence

collection. Although many crime scenes provide no physical

evidence, those that do can lead to increased arrests of

offenders, or provide supporting evidence.119

† In recent years, the U.K.'s Home

Office has produced a wealth of

information about police best

practices regarding burglary

reduction. See, for example, Tilley et

al. (1999), Bridgeman and TaylorBrown (1996), and Chenery, Holt and

Pease (1997). Much of the literature

is available at

www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/crimred

ucpubs1.html.

†† See, for example, Brown et al.

(1998) and Reno (1998).
Responses to the Problem of Burglary of Single-Family Houses 39

• Building intelligence databases about suspects. Using

confidential informants can be a cost-effective way to get

information about chronic offenders. Anyone arrested may

be a potential informant; other informants may be

recruited.

• Conducting surveillance. Surveillance is very expensive,

but may be used strategically. For example, police in

Edmonton, Alberta, mapped the geographic occurrence of

240 daytime burglaries over seven weeks, and predicted

areas likely to be targeted. Using surveillance, they soon

apprehended two offenders during a break-in, and

subsequently linked them to more than 123 of the

burglaries.120 

Police should assess investigative practices for their utility and

cost-effectiveness. However, crime prevention initiatives

including a range of these practices have resulted in

reductions in burglary.

Responses With Limited Effectiveness

18. Increasing criminal sanctions. Given the low burglaryreporting rates (about 50 percent of offenses are reported),

low clearance rates (about one in eight reported offenses are

cleared), and low conviction rates (about two-thirds of

offenses result in a conviction), the chance of a burglar's

getting caught and sentenced is about 5 percent. One study

suggested that, despite increased penalties, burglars are not

less likely to offend. Increased penalties deter offenders only

if combined with greater perceived risks or fewer anticipated

rewards.121
40 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

Convicted burglars, especially habitual offenders, already face

stiff penalties. Once convicted, about 80 percent of burglars

are incarcerated; the average prison sentence is five years. Of

all property offenders, burglars receive the longest prison

sentences.122

19. Providing generic crime prevention advice. Most

people are never victims of burglary, and generic crime

prevention advice is usually adopted by those who need it the

least. Providing such advice–including conducting home

security surveys requested by residents–absorbs much police

time that would be better focused on houses at higher risk.

Studies in Britain have demonstrated that target-hardening of

dwellings not previously victimized–those determined to be at

risk–is simply not effective.123
Appendix 41

Appendix: Summary of Responses to

Burglary of Single-Family Houses

The table below summarizes the responses to burglary of

single-family houses, the mechanism by which they are

intended to work, the conditions under which they ought to

work best, and some factors you should consider before

implementing a particular response. It is critical that you tailor

responses to local circumstances, and that you can justify each

response based on reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective

strategy will involve implementing several different responses.

Law enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in

reducing or solving the problem.

1.

2.

3.

26

27

27

Installing burglar

alarms

Installing closedcircuit television

(CCTV)

Hardening targets 

Increases

burglars' risk of

detection; deters

burglars if alarms

are overt;

increases arrests if

alarms are silent

or covert

Deters many

burglars; increases

burglars' risk of

detection and

arrest

Makes it more

difficult for

burglars to break

in

...triggered

alarms are

promptly

investigated

...cameras are

well positioned

and not easily

disabled

...houses are not

well secured

Expensive; high

percentage of

false alarms;

burglars may

disable alarms or

work quickly

Expensive, but

costs are

dropping; can be

motion- activated;

provides

investigative

evidence;

complements

burglar alarms

Deters

opportunistic

burglars; residents

who need it the

most may not be

able to afford

security measures

Response

No.

Page No. Response How It

Works

Works

Best If...

Considerations

Situational Crime Prevention Responses
42 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

28

29

30

30

31

33

34

34

Marking property

Increasing

occupancy

indicators

Creating safe

havens

Improving

visibility

Implementing

Neighborhood

Watch (NW)

programs

Modifying

building codes 

Modifying

community

design

Reducing traffic

access

Makes it more

difficult for

burglars to

dispose of goods

Gives burglars the

impression that

residents are

home

Increases

burglars' risk of

detection through

a combination of

security measures

Increases

burglars' risk of

detection 

Increases

burglars' risk of

detection

Makes it more

difficult for

burglars to break

in

Increases

burglars' risk of

detection and

makes it more

difficult for them

to break in

Increases

burglars' risk of

detection

...desirable

property can be

marked

...burglars are

deterred by

occupancy

...perimeter and

entry points can

be controlled

...there is

someone around

to spot a burglar

...there are wellestablished

neighbor relations

and residents can

detect strangers

...residents and

developers

willingly comply

with the codes

...design changes

can be

incorporated into

new

developments

...burglars do not

live in the

neighborhood

Requires residents'

participation and

investigative followup; publicity

increases the

benefits 

Some burglars use

tactics to confirm

occupancy

Expensive; might

displace burglaries

to lower-income

neighborhoods 

Inexpensive; does

not work if no one

is around or if

witnesses fail to act

Difficult to ensure

participation over

time; residents must

be at home during

vulnerable periods 

Not always

expensive; the

results are not

immediate

May have a longterm impact

May inconvenience

residents

Response

No.

Page No. Response How It

Works

Works

Best If...

Considerations
Appendix 43

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

34

35

36

37

37

38

Reducing house

access 

Protecting repeat

victims

Targeting repeat

offenders

Disrupting

stolen-property

outlets

Providing

substance abuse

treatment

Improving initial

police response

and follow-up

investigations 

Makes it more

difficult for

burglars to break

in

Decreases

victims' risk of

further burglaries,

and increases

burglars' risk of

detection

Increases

burglars' risk of

detection

Makes it more

difficult for

burglars to

dispose of goods

Helps offenders

overcome their

addiction,

reducing their

need to commit

burglary to get

money for drugs

and/or alcohol

Increases

burglars' risk of

arrest

...visibility cannot

be enhanced

...burglaries are

concentrated at a

few addresses,

and strategies can

be implemented

quickly

...there is a small,

identifiable group

of chronic

offenders 

...the stolen

goods are in high

demand 

...effective

programs can be

developed and

provided to

chronic offenders

...the current

police response is

not adequate 

Can be tailored to

individual

properties

Combines

prevention and

detection; costeffective; targets the

people who need

help the most

May include truancy

programs, tracking

probationers and

others, or high-level

surveillance

Requires continued

monitoring of

markets for stolen

goods 

Expensive; may be

difficult to target

the right people

May require an

extensive review of

police practices and

resources; may be

effective if strategic

Response

No.

Page No. Response How It

Works

Works

Best If...

Considerations

Victim-Oriented Responses

Offender-Oriented Responses
44 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

18.

19.

39

40

Increasing

criminal sanctions

Providing generic

crime prevention

advice

Raises the

penalties for

burglary, and

reduces its

rewards

Makes it more

difficult for

burglars to break

in

...burglars are

chronic offenders

...residents follow

the advice

Most convicted

offenders already

face stiff penalties 

Difficult to target

those who need it

the most 

Response

No.

Page No. Response How It

Works

Works

Best If...

Considerations

Responses With Limited Effectiveness
Endnotes 45

Endnotes

1 Titus (1999).

2 Federal Bureau of Investigation (2000).

3 Shover (1991).

4 Bridgeman and Taylor-Browne (1996).

5 Nicolson (1994); Waller and Okihiro (1978); Stockdale and Gresham (1995).

6 Skogan and Antunes (1998).

7 Hope (1999).

8 Winchester and Jackson (1982); Hope (1999); Rengert and Wasilchick (2000).

9 Wright and Decker (1994).

10 Chula Vista Police Department (2001).

11 Federal Bureau of Investigation (2000).

12 Rengert and Wasilchick (2000).

13 Budd (1999).

14 Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1999); Rengert and Wasilchick (2000).

15 Shover (1991).

16 Reppetto (1974); Brantingham and Brantingham (1984); Bennett and Wright

(1984).

17 Tilley et al. (1999).

18 Beavon, Brantingham and Brantingham (1994); Rengert and Wasilchick (2000);

White (1990).

19 Poyner and Webb (1991).

20 Brantingham and Brantingham (1984); Rengert and Wasilchick (2000).

21 Pease (1992); Polvi et al. (1990); Farrell (1995).

22 Polvi et al. (1990).

23 Anderson, Chenery and Pease (1995); Polvi et al. (1990); Mawby (2001).

24 Mawby (2001).

25 Curtin et al. (2001); Rengert and Wasilchick (2000).

26 Shover (1991); Reppetto (1974); Rengert and Wasilchick (2000); Winchester

and Jackson (1982).

27 Mawby (2001).

28 Bennett and Wright (1984); Bennett (1992); Reppetto (1974); Waller and

Okihiro (1978).

29 Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1999); Bennett (1992).
46 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

30 Bridgeman and Taylor-Browne (1996); Trickett, Osborne and Ellingworth

(1995); Miethe and McCorkle (1998).

31 Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1999).

32 Nicolson (1994).

33 Chula Vista Police Department (2001).

34 Waller and Okihiro (1978); Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1999); Bennett (1992);

Rengert and Wasilchick (2000).

35 Brantingham and Brantingham (1984); Rengert and Wasilchick (2000).

36 Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1991).

37 Poyner and Webb (1991).

38 Brantingham and Brantingham (1984).

39 National Burglar and Fire Alarm Association (n.d.).

40 Waller and Okihiro (1978); Budd (1999).

41 Curtin et al. (2001).

42 Budd (1999).

43 Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1999).

44 Wright and Decker (1994).

45 Waller and Okihiro (1978).

46 Rengert and Wasilchick (2000).

47 Bridgeman and Taylor-Browne (1996).

48 Poyner and Webb (1991).

49 Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington (2001).

50 Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington (2001).

51 Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington (2001).

52 Wright and Decker (1994); Shover (1991).

53 Wright and Decker (1994).

54 Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington (2001).

55 Wright and Decker (1994); Shover (1991).

56 Chula Vista Police Department (2001); Scottsdale Police Department (1999).

57 Federal Bureau of Investigation (2000).

58 Reppetto (1974).

59 Wright and Decker (1994).

60 Wright and Decker (1994); Shover (1991); Rengert and Wasilchick (2000);

Mawby (2001).

61 Shover (1991); Wright and Decker (1994); Miethe and McCorkle (1998).

62 Shover (1991).
Endnotes 47

63 Wright and Decker (1994); Shover (1991).

64 Coupe and Griffiths (1996).

65 Shover (1991); Reppetto (1974); Miethe and McCorkle (1998); Cromwell, Olson

and Avary (1999).

66 Wright and Decker (1994); Reppetto (1974); Rengert and Wasilchick (2000).

67 Reppetto (1974); Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1991); Rengert and Wasilchick

(2000); Wright and Decker (1994).

68 Bridgeman and Taylor-Browne (1996).

69 Shover and Honeker (1999); Wright and Decker (1994).

70 Mawby (2001).

71 Titus (1999).

72 Rengert and Wasilchick (2000); Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1991); Mawby

(2001).

73 Shover and Honeker (1999); Bennett and Wright (1984); Wright and Decker

(1994).

74 Shover (1991); Budd (1999).

75 Wright and Decker (1994).

76 Morgan (2001); Bottoms, Mawby and Walker (1987).

77 National Burglar and Fire Alarm Association. (n.d.).

78 Budd (1999).

79 National Burglar and Fire Alarm Association (n.d.).

80 Winchester and Jackson (1982).

81 Farrell et al. (1993).

82 Laycock and Tilley (1995).

83 Rountree and Land (1996); Bridgeman and Taylor-Browne (1996); Laycock and

Tilley (1995); Budd (1999).

84 Poyner and Webb (1991).

85 Laycock (1985); Schneider (1986).

86 Reppetto (1974); Blakely and Snyder (1998).

87 Blakely and Snyder (1998).

88 Poyner and Webb (1993).

89 Painter and Farrington (1999).

90 Laycock and Tilley (1995).

91 Mawby (2001).

92 Laycock and Tilley (1995).

93 Forrester et al. (1990).
48 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

94 Stockdale and Gresham (1995).

95 Canter (1998).

96 Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington (2001).

97 Laycock (1991); Mawby (2001).

98 Blanchard (1973).

99 Chula Vista Police Department (2001).

100 Hoffman (1998).

101 Peel Regional Police (1995).

102 Topping and Pascoe (2000).

103 Atlas and LeBlanc (1994).

104 Poyner and Webb (1991).

105 Zahm (1998).

106 Johnson and Loxley (2001).

107 Anderson, Chenery and Pease (1995); Farrell (1995).

108 Chenery, Holt and Pease (1997).

109 Bridgeman and Taylor-Browne (1996); Stockdale and Gresham (1995).

110 Farrell, Chenery and Pease (1998).

111 Reppetto (1984).

112 Chenery, Holt and Pease (1997).

113 Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington (2001).

114 Bridgeman and Taylor-Browne (1996).

115 Kleiman (1988).

116 Kleiman and Smith (1990).

117 Coupe and Griffiths (1996).

118 Eck (1992).

119 Coupe and Griffiths (1996).

120 Warden and Shaw (2000).

121 Decker, Wright and Logie (1993).

122 Miethe and McCorkle (1998).

123 Mawby (2001).
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Appendix 55

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Appendix 57

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58 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

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About the Author 59

About the Author

Deborah Lamm Weisel

Deborah Lamm Weisel is an assistant research professor and

the director of police research in the Department of Political

Science and Public Administration at North Carolina State

University. Her portfolio includes research on police

responses to crime problems such as gangs, street drugs and

graffiti, as well as community policing, safety and security in

public housing, and repeat victimization from burglary and

robbery. Her work has been published in Justice Quarterly, Public

Management, the NIJ Journal, and the American Journal of Police.

She holds a doctorate in political science/public policy

analysis from the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Recommended Readings 61

Recommended Readings

• A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their

Environments, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. This

guide offers a practical introduction for police practitioners

to two types of surveys that police find useful: surveying

public opinion and surveying the physical environment. It

provides guidance on whether and how to conduct costeffective surveys.

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An

Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers, by

John E. Eck (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of

Community Oriented Policing Services, 2001). This guide is

a companion to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. It

provides basic guidance to measuring and assessing

problem-oriented policing efforts.

• Conducting Community Surveys, by Deborah Weisel

(Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community

Oriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along with

accompanying computer software, provides practical, basic

pointers for police in conducting community surveys. The

document is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs.

• Crime Prevention Studies, edited by Ronald V. Clarke

(Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series of

volumes of applied and theoretical research on reducing

opportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations of

initiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems.
62 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

• Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing:The 1999

Herman Goldstein Award Winners. This document

produced by the National Institute of Justice in

collaboration with the Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services and the Police Executive Research Forum

provides detailed reports of the best submissions to the

annual award program that recognizes exemplary problemoriented responses to various community problems. A

similar publication is available for the award winners from

subsequent years. The documents are also available at

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.

• Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime

Reduction, by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home Office

Crime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies and

describes the factors that make problem-solving effective or

ineffective as it is being practiced in police forces in

England and Wales.

• Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for

Crime Prevention, by Marcus Felson and Ronald V.

Clarke (Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98,

1998). Explains how crime theories such as routine activity

theory, rational choice theory and crime pattern theory have

practical implications for the police in their efforts to

prevent crime.

• Problem Analysis in Policing, by Rachel Boba (Police

Foundation, 2003). Introduces and defines problem analysis

and provides guidance on how problem analysis can be

integrated and institutionalized into modern policing

practices.
Recommended Readings 63

• Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein

(McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990).

Explains the principles and methods of problem-oriented

policing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusses

how a police agency can implement the concept.

• Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention,

by Anthony A. Braga (Criminal Justice Press, 2003).

Provides a through review of significant policing research

about problem places, high-activity offenders, and repeat

victims, with a focus on the applicability of those findings

to problem-oriented policing. Explains how police

departments can facilitate problem-oriented policing by

improving crime analysis, measuring performance, and

securing productive partnerships.

• Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the

First 20 Years, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of

Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services,

2000). Describes how the most critical elements of

Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model have

developed in practice over its 20-year history, and proposes

future directions for problem-oriented policing. The report

is also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

• Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in

Newport News, by John E. Eck and William Spelman

(Police Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains the

rationale behind problem-oriented policing and the

problem-solving process, and provides examples of

effective problem-solving in one agency.
64 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

• Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime

and Disorder Through Problem-Solving

Partnerships by Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott

Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. (U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services, 1998) (also available at

www.cops.usdoj.gov). Provides a brief introduction to

problem-solving, basic information on the SARA model

and detailed suggestions about the problem-solving process.

• Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case

Studies, Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke

(Harrow and Heston, 1997). Explains the principles and

methods of situational crime prevention, and presents over

20 case studies of effective crime prevention initiatives.

• Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems:

Case Studies in Problem-Solving, by Rana Sampson

and Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of

Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also available

at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effective

police problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorder

problems.

• Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook

for Law Enforcement, by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services, 2001). Provides an introduction for

police to analyzing problems within the context of

problem-oriented policing.

• Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement

Managers, Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G.

LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explains

many of the basics of research as it applies to police

management and problem-solving.
Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 65

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police

Problem-Specific Guides series:

1. Assaults in and Around Bars. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-00-2

2. Street Prostitution. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-01-0

3. Speeding in Residential Areas. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-02-9

4. Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes.

Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-03-7

5. False Burglar Alarms. Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-04-5

6. Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-05-3

7. Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-06-1

8. Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-07-X

9. Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-08-8

10. Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V.

Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-09-6

11. Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-10-X

12. Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-11-8

13. Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-12-6

14. Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-13-4

15. Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002.

ISBN: 1-932582-14-2

16. Clandestine Drug Labs. Michael S. Scott. 2002.

ISBN: 1-932582-15-0

17. Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 2002.

ISBN: 1-932582-16-9

18. Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel.

2002. ISBN: 1-932582-17-7

19. Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002.

ISBN: 1-932582-18-5
66 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

20. Financial Crimes Against the Elderly.

Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-22-3

21. Check and Card Fraud. Graeme R. Newman. 2003.

ISBN: 1-932582-27-4

22. Stalking. The National Center for Victims of Crime. 2004.

ISBN: 1-932582-30-4

23. Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders. Anthony A.

Braga. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-31-2

24. Prescription Fraud. Julie Wartell, Nancy G. La Vigne. 2004.

ISBN: 1-932582-33-9

25. Identity Theft. Graeme R. Newman. 2004 ISBN: 1-932582-35-5

26. Crimes Against Tourists. Ronald W. Glensor, Kenneth J. Peak.

2004 ISBN: 1-932582-36-3

Response Guides series:

• The Benefits and Consequences of Police Crackdowns.

Michael S. Scott. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-24-X

Problem-Solving Tools series:

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for

Police Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-19-3

Upcoming Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides

Disorder at Budget Motels

Domestic Violence

Mentally Ill Persons

Robbery of Taxi Drivers

Student Party Disturbances on College Campuses

School Break-Ins

Street Racing
Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 67

Bomb Threats in Schools

Underage Drinking

Open-Air Drug Markets

Sexual Offenses in Public Places

Drunk Driving

Cruising

Bank Robbery

Response Guides

Closing Streets and Alleys to Reduce Crime

Problem-Solving Tools

Repeat Victimization

Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem-Solving

Other Related COPS Office Publications

• Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook

for Law Enforcement. Timothy S. Bynum.

• Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First

20 Years. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

• Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems:

Case Studies in Problem-Solving. Rana Sampson and

Michael S. Scott. 2000.

• Community Policing, Community Justice, and

Restorative Justice: Exploring the Links for the

Delivery of a Balanced Approach to Public Safety.

Caroline G. Nicholl. 1999.

• Toolbox for Implementing Restorative Justice and

Advancing Community Policing. Caroline G. Nicholl.

2000.
68 Burglary of Single-Family Houses

• Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing

Crime and Disorder Through Problem-Solving

Partnerships. Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott

Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. 1998.

• Bringing Victims into Community Policing. The

National Center for Victims of Crime and the Police

Foundation. 2002.

• Call Management and Community Policing. Tom

McEwen, Deborah Spence, Russell Wolff, Julie Wartell

and Barbara Webster. 2003.

• Crime Analysis in America. Timothy C. O’Shea and

Keith Nicholls. 2003.

• Problem Analysis in Policing. Rachel Boba. 2003.

• Reducing Theft at Construction Sites: Lessons

From a Problem-Oriented Project. Ronald V. Clarke

and Herman Goldstein. 2003.

• The COPS Collaboration Toolkit: How to Build,

Fix, and Sustain Productive Partnerships. Gwen O.

Briscoe, Anna T. Laszlo and Tammy A. Rinehart.

2001.

• The Law Enforcement Tech Guide: How to plan,

purchase and manage technology (successfully!).

Kelly J. Harris and William H. Romesburg. 2002.

• Theft From Cars in Center City Parking 

Facilities - A Case Study. Ronald V. Clarke and

Herman Goldstein. 2003.

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for

Police series and other COPS Office publications, please call

the Department of Justice Response Center at 800.421.6770

or visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

www.cops.usdoj.gov

FOR MORE INFORMATION:

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the

COPS Response Center at 800.421.6770

Visit COPS Online at the address listed below.

e07021611 Updated Date: July 22, 2004

ISBN: 1-932582-17-7