This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 G. RUSSELL LEONARD and 2 DEBRA LEONARD, husband and wife, 3 Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants-Appellants, 4

v. NO. 30,566 5 GERALD LEONARD and SUZANNE 6 LEONARD, husband and wife , 7 Defendants/Counter-Claimants-Appellees. 8 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY 9 Jane Shuler Gray, District Judge 10 Tucker Law Firm, P.C. 11 Steven L. Tucker 12 Santa Fe, NM 13 Phil Brewer 14 Roswell, NM 15 for Appellants 16 Hinkle, Hensley, Shanor & Martin, L.L.P. 17 Mary Lynn Bogle 18 Roswell, NM 19 for Appellees 201 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 HANISEE, Judge. 2 {1} Plaintiffs appeal the di strict court’s judgment qui eting title to the Leonard 3 Ranch (the Ranch) in favor of Defendants. Following a bench trial, the district court 4 concluded that Plaintiffs granted Defendant s a one-half interest in the Ranch in a 1995 5 quitclaim deed. On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in 6 determining that the delivery of the quitclaim deed constituted a valid and effective 7 present conveyance of absolute title to anundivided one-half interest in the Ranch. 8 We conclude that the district court did not err, and affirm. 9 I. BACKGROUND 10 {2} The Ranch consists of approximately 17,000 acres of land located within 11 Chaves and Lincoln Counties. Defendant Gerald Leonard (Gerald) and his first wife 12 Barbara Leonard (Barbara) ac quired the Ranch in 1973. Gerald and Barbara divorced 13 some time prior to 1995, each retaining a one -half interest in the Ranch. Gerald is 14 now married to Suzanne Leonard(Suzanne), who is also a Defendant in this case. The 15 instant dispute arose pursuant to a sequence of events associated with Barbara’s sale 16 of her one-half interest in the Ranch in 1995 to their son, Plaintiff G. Russell Leonard 17 (Russell), and his wife, Plain tiff Debra Leonard (Debra). 18 {3} To effectuate Barbara’s sale to Plain tiffs, Russell requested that Gerald sign a 192 warranty deed transferring his separate, undi vided one-half intere st in the Ranch to 1 Plaintiffs, in order to ensure that title to Barbara’s one-half in terest passed smoothly 2 to Plaintiffs. In return, Plaintiffs agreed to quit claim Gerald’s one-half interest in the 3 property back to Gerald. In accordance with Russell’s plan, Gerald executed a 4 warranty deed in favor of Plaintiffs as agreed. Later the same day, Russell handed 5 Gerald the quitclaim deed to Gerald’s one -half interest, signed by Plaintiffs, in a 6 sealed envelope. The quitclaim deed statedthat Russell and Debra, “for consideration 7 paid, quit claim 1/2 interest [to] GeraldLeonard[.]” Russell had written a note by 8 hand beneath this language, st ating, “To later negotiate to an extended agreement to 9 pay Gerald Leonard [$]15,000 a year untill [sic] said amount is paid and quitclaim 10 deed is distroyed [sic].” 11 {4} Nearly eleven years later, Plaintiffs initiated the present litigation by filing a 12 complaint to quiet title in 2006. In their comp laint, Plaintiffs asserted that they own 13 in fee simple all lands which comprisethe Ranch, and that whatever interest 14 Defendants possessed was “inferior in law and in equity” to Plaintiffs’ interests. 15 Plaintiffs contend that based on conversations between Russell and Gerald and the 16 resulting deeds, Gerald sold his interest to Plaintiffs. Defendants responded to the 17 complaint asserting their one-half interest in the land, and ultimately filed a second 18 amended answer and counterclaim for quiet title, which additionally alleged a series 193 of separate torts perpetrate d on Defendants by Plaintiffs. The main issue during the 1 bench trial at which Gerald, Russell, Barbara , Debra and Suzanne all testified was the 2 validity and significance of the quitclaim deed, signed by Russell and Debra, and 3 provided to Gerald, purporting to return to Gerald his one-half interest in the Ranch. 4 {5} As Defendants highlight in their brief, th e district court found that, “[p]ut in the 5 best light in favor of [Russell], the terms of the quitclaim deed express an intent to 6 later enter into an agreement for the sale/purchase of [Gerald’s] interest in the 7 [R]anch—and nothing more.” The district court determined that neither the 8 conversation between Russell and Gerald, nor the warranty deed it generated, was 9 intended to be a sale of Gerald’s interest in the property and that no agreement for the 10 sale of Gerald’s interest wa s ever negotiated. The court found that Gerald agreed to 11 sign the warranty deed only on the cond ition that Russell and Debra execute a 12 quitclaim deed immediately following the sale to make clear and known the return to 13 Gerald of Gerald’s own undivided one-half in terest in the Ranch. According to the 14 district court’s findings, Gerald believed that the process of having him and Barbara 15 execute warranty deeds and then having Gerald’s interest quit-claimed back to him 16 assisted with the sale and made it clear th at he retained his undi vided one-half interest 17 in the Ranch. The court explai ned that “[Gerald] did not sell, offer to sell, or agree to 18 sell to [Russell] and Debra . . . in 1994, 1995, or any other time, his undivided [one- 194 half] interest in the [] Ranch.” The district court stated that “[c]onsistent[] with the 1 intent of the parties, the quitclaim deed at issue constituted a present conveyance of 2 an interest in [the Ranch], with all th e rights and privileges associated therewith.” 3 {6} With regard to the handwritten language of the quitclaim deed, the district court 4 specifically stated that it “was unilaterally written by [Russell], without authority or 5 knowledge of [Gerald] and is not binding on [Gerald] and Suzanne Leonard.” The 6 court determined that this handwritten portion of the deed “was, at most, a condition 7 or exception to the rights necessarily inhere ntly attendant to the transfer of title, 8 providing that the parties could ‘later negotiate’ a contract for th e sale of the [one9 half] interest [in the Ranch and that t]hecondition of ‘later’ negotiations has never 10 arisen.” In addition to the foregoing, the district court found that Gerald was unaware 11 of Russell’s handwritten additi on to the quitclaim deed because he did not open the 12 envelope to verify the deed’s content sin ce “he loved” and had “no reason to distrust” 13 Russell. 14 {7} The district court thus quieted title to a one-half interest in the Ranch in favor 15 of Defendants, ordered a partition of Defendants’ one-hal f interest, awarded judgment 16 in favor of Defendants as to each count er-claim asserted, and awarded fees to 17 Defendants. Plaintiffs’ present appeal followed. 18 II. DISCUSSION 195 {8} Plaintiffs maintain that the quitclaim deed signed by Plaintiffs transferring a 1 one-half interest in the land back to Gerald was not validly delivered as a matter of 2 law because at the time of tr ansfer, Russell lacked the pr esent intent to “irrevocably 3 and irretrievably” divest himself of title to the land. In making these arguments, 4 Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s findings and conclusions with regard to its 5 construction of the deed in ascertaining Plaintiffs’ intent and concluding there was 6 valid delivery. 7 {9} “Because the question of whether [the gr antor] intended to deliver the deed is 8 an issue of fact, we disturb the [district] court’s relevant findings and conclusions only 9 if they are unsupported by substantial evidence.” Blancett v. Blancett , 10 2004-NMSC-038, ¶ 20, 136 N.M. 573, 102 P.3d 640. “Substantial evidence is such 11 relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would find adequate to support a 12 conclusion.” Landavazo v. Sanchez , 111 N.M. 137, 138, 802 P.2d 1283, 1284 (1990). 13 In reviewing a substantial evidence claim, “[t]he question is not whether substantial 14 evidence exists to support the opposite resu lt, but rather whether such evidence 15 supports the result reached.” Las Cruces Prof’l Fire Fighters v. City of Las Cruces , 16 1997-NMCA-044, ¶ 12, 123 N.M. 329, 940 P. 2d 177. “Additionally[,] we will not 17 reweigh the evidence nor substitute our j udgment for that of the fact finder,” id. , 18 except “[w]here an issue to be determined rests upon the interpretation of 196 documentary evidence, an appe llate court is in as good a position as the trial court to 1 determine the facts and draw its own conclusions.” Maestas v. Martinez , 107 N.M. 2 91, 93, 752 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Ct. App. 1988). Thus, we review documentary evidence 3 de novo. Id

. 4 {10} “An effective legal delivery of a deed re quires (1) intent by the grantor to make 5 a present transfer and (2) a tran sfer of dominion and control.” Blancett , 6 2004-NMSC-038, ¶ 7. “Thereis no legal delivery, ev en where a deed has been 7 physically transferred, whenthe evidence shows that there was no present intent on 8 the part of the grantor to divest himself of title to the land.” Den-Gar Enters. v. 9 Romero , 94 N.M. 425, 428, 611 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Ct. App. 1980). “[T]he grantor’s 10 present intent must be to pass his completetitle to the grantee and divest himself of 11 all title; otherwise the purported deed is not valid or effective.” Id . “The general rule 12 in deed construction is that the grantor’s intent is to be ascertained from the language 13 employed in the deed or deeds, viewed in light of the su rrounding circumstances.” 14 Valencia v. Lundgren , 2000-NMCA-045, ¶ 13, 129 N.M. 57, 1 P.3d 975; Blancett , 15 2004-NMSC-038, ¶ 7 (stating that the grantor’s intent may also “be determined from 16 words, actions or surrounding circumstances during, preceding or following the 17 execution of a deed”). “Courts will construea deed in such a manner that will uphold 18 the validity of the conve yance, if possible.” Vigil v. Sandoval , 106 N.M. 233, 235, 197 741 P.2d 836, 838 (Ct. App. 1987). 1 {11} Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in concluding that the deed was 2 valid, asserting that the language Russell added in his handwritten note on the deed 3 rendered the transaction an invalid or incomplete conveyance, and maintaining that 4 the deed “had no immediate effect in 1995.” We disagree and conclude that the 5 district court’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence within 6 the record. 7 {12} First and foremost, the handwritten language of the deed, which Plaintiffs argue 8 renders the deed invalid, does not contradictthe deed’s immediate quitclaim intent. 9 Russell’s handwritten note states, “To later ne gotiate to an extended agreement to pay 10 Gerald Leonard [$]15,000 a year untill [sic] said amount is paid and quitclaim deed 11 is distroyed [sic].” This language fails to indicate that the transfer was conditioned 12 on “the happening of a future condition, viz ., some calamity be falling Russell[,]” as 13 Plaintiffs contend. At most, it indicates Russell’s hope to negotiate a future sale 14 pursuant to which he can acquire full interest in the Ranch. None theless, we conclude 15 that such a later purchase, even had it occu rred, would not constitu te a “recall” of the 16 deed. Instead, were it ever completed, it would simply bea separate and independent 17 transfer of the property. The fact that a party effects a completed transfer of property 18 with the hope that he might one day be in a position to repurchase the property does 198 not in any way render invalid the original delivery of the deed. Moreover, had Russell 1 not intended for the quitclaim deed to be effective and valid, there would have been 2 no need for him to purchase Gerald’s half in terest that day or any day in the future. 3 {13} Viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances, the deed’s language 4 demonstrated Russell’s present in tent, as the grantor, to di vest himself of title to the 5 land. Gerald testified that hewas insistent that the quitclaim deed be returned to him 6 on the same day he signed and provided the warranty deed to Russell. On the day of 7 the sale of Barbara’s one-half interest to Plaintiffs, Gerald reiterated that “I’ve had 8 experience with family affairs before . . . I’m going to give you a deed for my half of 9 the [R]anch and you’re going to give it back to me today.” Furthermore, Russell 10 admitted to signing and writing upon the quitclaim deed, neglecting to include the 11 alleged price ($175,000) which he testified he agreed upon with Gerald for the sale 12 of Gerald’s portion of the Ranch, and neve r having paid Gerald any of the amount of 13 the money supposedly agreed to in orde r for Russell to acquire the entire Ranch. 14 {14} Although the note Russell wrote on the deed indicated that he would have liked, 15 at some future point, to negotiate a purch ase of Gerald’s one-half interest in the 16 property, the evidence of the parties’ conduc t before and after the delivery of the deed 17 supports the district court’s determination that no such negotiations were ever 18 undertaken, which could be interpreted by th e fact finder to expl ain why Russell never 199 attempted to make, or otherwise made payments to, Gerald. The language of the 1 deed—both the quitclaim conveyance and the handwritten addition by Russell—fails 2 to establish any present or future sale, terms of such a sale, or agreement of the parties 3 for there to definitively be any sale to Russell of Gerald ’s one-half undivided interest 4 in the Ranch. 5 {15} Finally, even if Plaintiffs’ argument c ould be read in such a manner as to 6 maintain a conditional delivery that was uns atisfied by Gerald, it appears that Russell 7 did not present such a theory at trial, and we decline to permit him to put forth such 8 a theory on appeal, since Defendants did not have the opportunity to make any 9 arguments in law or equity regarding why such a provision should not be enforced in 10 the context of a quitclaim deed. Gerke v. Romero , 2010-NMCA-060, ¶ 18, 148 N.M. 11 367, 237 P.3d 111 (stating that one of the primary purposes of preservation is “to 12 allow the opposing party a fair opportunity to respond to the claim of error and to 13 show why the district court should rule ag ainst that claim” (internal quotation marks 14 and citation omitted)). 15 {16} Although we recognize that Russell pres ented evidence that would support a 16 different version of events and therefore another interpretation of the terms of the 17 deed, “[t]he question is not whether subs tantial evidence exists to support the opposite 18 result, but rather whether such ev idence supports the result reached.” Las Cruces 1910 Prof’l Fire Fighters, 1997-NMCA-044, ¶ 12. Here, base d on the language of the deed 1 and the extrinsic evidence before it, the district court was well within its fact finding 2 authority to determine that the deed was intended to constitute a present conveyance 3 to Gerald that was not dependent on futu re negotiations regarding the possibility of 4 any sale of the property c onveyed by the deed. Abundant evidence, including the text 5 of the deed, Gerald’s testimony, and the circumstances surrounding the sale of 6 Barbara’s property to Russell support the district court’s conclusion that such was in 7 fact precisely what the parties bargained for—a successful sale of Barbara’s interest 8 to Russell and an ensuing tenancy in co mmon shared by the parties. Under the 9 express language of the deed and the district court’s resolution in favor of Defendants 10 of the testimony at trial (which we do not reweigh on appeal), weconclude that the 11 district court’s findings and conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. 12 III. CONCLUSION 13 {17} For the reasons set forth above, we will not disturb the factual findings or legal 14 conclusions of the district court. We affirm. 1511 {18} IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

___________________________________ 2 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 3

WE CONCUR : 4

5 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 6

7 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 8