NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JARRETT CARSON; JOSEPH 

LAWENDOWSKI; JOHN DOE, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

THE ARMY; CHRISTINE WORMUTH, 

Secretary of the Army, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-35938 

D.C. Nos. 3:15-cv-00071-JMK 

3:15-cv-00072-JMK 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

Joshua M. Kindred, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 7, 2022

Anchorage, Alaska

Before: HURWITZ, BRESS, and H. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Jarrett Carson, Joseph Lawendowski, and John Doe (Plaintiffs-Appellants) 

appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the United States Department of the 

Army in this Privacy Act case. See 5 U.S.C. § 522a. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JUN 17 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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1. The district court’s initial partial summary judgment decision did not 

constitute law of the case. Assuming without deciding that the decision conflicted 

with the district court’s final summary judgment decision, law of the case “does 

not preclude a court from reassessing its own legal rulings in the same case.” 

Askins v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 899 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2018). “[A] 

district court has the inherent power to revisit its non-final orders, and that power is 

not lost when the case is assigned mid-stream to a second judge.” Dreith v. Nu 

Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 787–88 (9th Cir. 2011).

2. The district court did not err in holding that the Army could lawfully 

maintain an Anchorage Police Department (APD) report in Doe’s records. 5 U.S.C.

§ 522a(g)(1). The report was relevant to disciplinary proceedings, and the Army 

had no obligation to expunge the report after those proceedings. Garris v. FBI, 937 

F.3d 1284, 1300 (9th Cir. 2019). Doe cannot use the Privacy Act as a vehicle for a 

collateral attack on an underlying employment decision. Houlihan v. Office of 

Personnel Mgmt., 909 F.2d 383, 385 (9th Cir. 1990).

3. Carson and Lawendowski did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether an Army employee’s disclosure of unredacted records to Lawendowski 

proximately caused the disclosure of those records to the media. The record 

provides no basis for attributing the media disclosure to an intentional or willful 

violation of the Privacy Act by the Army. See 5 U.S.C. § 522a(g)(4). 
3 

4. The district court correctly determined that none of the other alleged 

disclosures was actionable. There is no evidence in the record, beyond speculation,

that any disclosure to the Governor of Alaska occurred. The disclosure of records 

to the APD was permissible under the Privacy Act because it was part of a law 

enforcement investigation. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7). The records disclosed to 

Doe’s counsel were properly redacted.

5. Plaintiffs-Appellants did not raise a genuine issue of material fact with 

respect to the Privacy Act’s actual damages requirement. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 

614, 627 (2004). As the district court concluded, Plaintiffs-Appellants cannot prove 

that the Army’s alleged Privacy Act violations proximately caused their discharges 

from the Army and resulting losses of salary and benefits. See Villiarimo v. Aloha 

Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs-Appellants offer only 

speculation and their own uncorroborated testimony to support their other damages 

theories.

AFFIRMED.