NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 12

- 1953

_____________ TAMARA WHITE, Appellant

v. JAMES CLEARY, individually and as an employee of Monmouth Regional High School District; ANTHONY D ’ ORIO, individually and as an employee of Monmouth Regional High School District; MONMOUTH REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT; and ANDREW TEEPLE, individually and as an employee of Monmouth Regional High School District

_ ____________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey District Court No. 3

- 09

- cv - 04324 District Judge: The Honorable Peter G. Sheridan Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 14, 2013 Before : SMITH, CHAGARES, and BARRY, Cir cuit Judges

(Filed: February 6, 2013 )

________________ OPINION

________________2

SMITH, Circuit Judge. Tamara White appeals the District Court ’ s grant of summary judgment on her discrimination and retaliation claims. Be cause no reasonable jury could find for White, we will affirm.
I White taught social studies for nearly two decade s at Monmouth Regional High School in New Jersey. She became the Falcons ’ varsity cheerleading coach in 1995. Although the school ’ s athletic d irector viewed the untenured position as

― a babysitter ’ s job, ‖ 1 White wanted to build a competitive cheerleading program . Over the years, these opposing visions led to recurring clashes between White and the cheerleaders , their parents, and the administrat ors . In 2005, the athletic director wrote a letter informing White that he would not recommend her for the coaching job in the upcoming school year . The letter listed a number of grievances

— for example , White had missed an annual coaches meeting, she did n ot travel with the team to away games, and she prevented the cheerleaders from participating in outside activities. After receiving this letter, White agreed to resign i n exchange for a positive job reference. White was not content to remain on the sidelin e s . Over the next three

1 See App. II at 82

.3

years

— in 2006, 2007, and 2008

— she reapplied for the varsity coaching job . Each year, the school selected a different candidate. After her interview in 2007, the
school ’ s principal, Andrew Teeple, told White that she would get the jo b, but he

soon withdrew the promise in an email. In the same year, White applied to be the school ’ s affirmative

- action officer. The school instead hired an untenured teacher. White began making complaints outside the school. In the summer of 2008, White sp oke at a Board of Education meeting. According to White, s he complained that the cheerleading coaches received unequal pay and that the cheerleading squad received unequal fund ing . But according to other account s , she merely complained about her own employ ment plight. In any event , she also filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Finally, in 2009, White turned to t he federal district court . She sued Monmouth Regional High School District, Teeple, James Cleary ( the superintend e nt ), and Anthony DeOrio ( the current athletic director ) in the U nited
S tates District Court for the District of New Jersey

. She alleged four claims: (1)
hostile work environment under Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination; (2) retaliation u nder the First Amendment ; (3) unequal pay under 29 U.S.C. § 206; and (4) retaliation under Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.4

After filing her complain t, White applied for the junior

- varsity coaching position. As before, the school s elected another candidate. White maintained her suit, and a t the close of discovery, the District Court granted the defendants ’ motion for summary j udgment. White filed a timely notice of appeal. 2
II We exercise plenary review over the District Court ’ s dec ision to grant summary judgment. Orvosh v. Program of Gr p . Ins. for Salaried Emps. of Volkswagen of Am. , 222 F.3d 123, 129 (3d Cir. 2000) . We will affirm ― if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitl ed to judgment as a matter of law

. ‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( a ) . A

― genuine dispute ‖ exists if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. Fakete v. Aetna, Inc. , 308 F.3d 335, 337 (3d Cir. 2002)

. III White ’ s central argument is that material factual di sputes are unresolved

. These supposed disputes include the subject of her Board testimony, the reason she was not hired as the affirmative

- action office r or the varsity coach in 2007, and the reason she was not hired as the assistant coach in 2009. In her view, the disputes should have prevented summary judgment.

2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133 1 , and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.5

We begin by reminding the parties that district courts generally do not make ―factual findings‖ at the summary

- judgment stage. See Appellant’s Br. at 7

– 9, 13 (referring to the District Court’s ―fac tual findings‖); Appellee’s Br. at 14

– 15 (same). Instead, they determine whether a reasonabl e jury could find for the nonmoving party. Fakete , 308 F.3d at 337. Semantic clarity is an important preventative of doctrinal malaise. Linguistic matters aside, th e re are other problems with White’s appeal . Most grievously, her brief makes little effort to connect these supposed factual disputes to her claims. See Appellant ’ s Br. at 8

– 14. In fact, aside from her First Amendment claim, we are uncertain which claims s he wants us to re consider on appeal . Much of White ’ s brief comes perilously close to violating the principle that, ― absent extraordinary circumstances, briefs must contain statements of all issues presented for appeal, together with supporting arguments an d citations. ‖ Simmons v. City of Phila. , 947 F.2d 1042, 1065 (3d Cir. 1991). At any rate, the supposed factual disputes are at most relevant to her hostile

work

- environment claim and to her two retaliation claims. Because t hey are not relevant to her Equa l Pay Act claim , we do not re consider that claim on appeal

. As for the remaining three claims, w e will affirm the District Court’s judgment

. A White claims that the defendants cre ated a hostile work environment in6

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

– 2(a). Such claim s have five elements: (1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of [his or her] sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrime ntally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp. , 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Andrews v. City of Phila. , 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990))

. The District Court concluded that White could not show intentional discrimination. We agree. White argues that a rea sonable jury could find intent based on two events

. First, the school hired an untenured teacher instead of White as the school ’ s affirma tive

- action officer. In our view, this alone is not indicative of intent . Te nure status was not a stated job qualification, and the other teacher wa s well liked. Second , Teeple told White that she would receive the coaching job in 2007 , but he later revoke d that promise. T his similarly fails to show intent. A person may change his mind for perfectly acceptable reasons

. We conclude that W hite ’ s hostile

- work

- environment claim fails. As a result, White ’ s claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination m ust also fail

. See Schurr v. Resorts Int ’ l Hotel, Inc. , 196 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 1999) ( ― Analysis of a claim made pursuant to the NJLAD generally follows analysis of a Title VII claim

. ‖ ).7 B Next, White claims that the school retaliated against her for en gaging in protected activities

. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

– 3. To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the employee engaged in a protected employee activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action after or contemporaneous wit h the employee’ s protected activity; and (3) a causal l ink exists between the employee ’ s prot ected activity and the employer ’ s adverse action. Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J. , 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d C ir. 2001). The District Court concluded that White could not satisfy the third element. Again, we
agree . White spoke at a Board of Education meeting about gender inequality in 2008. She soon filed a complaint with the Equal Em ployment Opportunity Commissio n and eventually filed a lawsuit in 2009 . In White ’ s view, the school retaliated by not hiring her as the affirmative

- action officer in 2007 and by not hiring her as the junior

- varsity coach in 2009. The first problem with this argument is that White was d enied the job as affi rmative

- action officer before she participated in the three protect ed activities

. White argues on appeal that she was denied the job in 2008

— after s he spoke at the Board meeting

— b ut White clearly
state d in her deposition that she appli ed for the job and was denied in 2007. See App. II at 180; see also Supp. App. at 78.8

White also points to the rejection of her 2009 application for the assistant

coach position

. B efore she spoke at the Board meeting , however, the school had repeatedly re

jected her previous coaching application s . We see no reason to conclude that the final rejection was somehow the result of retaliation. T his claim thus fails, along with her claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discri mination. See Schurr , 196 F.3d at 498

. C Finally, White claims that the defendants violated the First Amendment by retaliating against her. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons listed above, White cannot show that her speech was ― a substantial or motivating factor in th e retaliator y action

. ‖ Reilly v. Atlantic City , 532 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Nor can she satisfy the balancing test in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. , 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
* * * For these reasons we will affirm the District Court ’ s j udgment.