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23–641 PDF 2017

NATIONAL SECURITY: THREATS AT OUR BORDERS 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 23, 2016 

Serial No. 114–117 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DESAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

JENNIFER HEMINGWAY, Staff Director 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

TROY STOCK, Staff Director, Subcommittee on Transportation and Public Assets 

DIMPLE SHAH, Counsel 

ALEXA ARMSTRONG, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIE MARX, Clerk 


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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

RON DESANTIS, Florida, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma, Vice Chair 

WILL HURD, Texas 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts, 

Ranking Member 

ROBIN KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina, Chairman 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan, Vice Chair 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on March 23, 2016 ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Ronald D. Vitiello, Acting Chief, U.S. Border Patrol, Customs and Border 

Protection 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 7 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 9 

Mr. Steven C. McCraw, Director, Texas Department of Public Safety 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 20 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 22 

Mr. Brandon Judd, President, National Border Patrol Council 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 41 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 43 

Ms. Jan C. Ting, Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of 

Law 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 48 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 50 

Ms. Eleanor Acer, Senior Director, Refugee Protection, Human Rights First 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 57 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 59 

APPENDIX 

U.S. Border Parol Nationwide Apprehensions, FY 2015– FY 2016 as of March 

3, 2016, Entered by Chairman DeSantis ........................................................... 88 

U.S.C.I.S. Credible Fear Nationality Reports from FY 2014, FY 2015, and 

FY 2016 Q1, Entered by Chairman DeSantis .................................................... 91 

U.S.C.I.S Credible Fear Data and Affirmative Asylum Case Data, Entered 

by Chairman DeSantis ........................................................................................ 100 

Written Statement of Representative Gerald Connolly, Entered by Representative Connolly ....................................................................................................... 101 


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NATIONAL SECURITY: THREATS AT OUR 

BORDERS 

Wednesday, March 23, 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, JOINT WITH THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis [chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security] presiding. 

Present from Subcommittee on National Security: Representatives DeSantis, Mica, Hice, Lynch, and Kelly. 

Present from Subcommittee on Government Operations: Representatives Meadows, Walberg, Buck, Grothman, and Connolly. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The Subcommittee on National Security and the 

Subcommittee on Government Operations will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any 

time. 

The United States confronts a wide array of threats at its borders, ranging from terrorists seeking to harm the United States to 

transnational criminals smuggling drugs and counterfeit goods to 

foreign nationals entering illegally in order to work in the United 

States unlawfully. 

America’s borders and ports are busy places. Every year, tens of 

millions of cargo containers and hundreds of millions of lawful 

travelers enter the country, while tens of thousands of illegal cargo 

entries are seized and hundreds of thousands of unauthorized migrants are arrested or denied entry. 

At the same time, hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants 

evade detection to enter the United States unlawfully and thousands of kilograms of illegal drugs and other contraband are smuggled into the country. 

Recent terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe and 

worldwide have highlighted the national security challenges that 

we face. The November terrorist attacks in Paris transformed Europe’s migration crisis into a security debate, spurring calls for European nations to reevaluate their open border policies. Yesterday’s 

terrorist attacks in Brussels demonstrate the strength of the Islamic State, but also highlight the policies of European nations 

that have facilitated the establishment and growth of Islamic communities within these countries that are parallel to rather than integrated in Western society. 


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Concerns about borders are not limited to Europe. Recent reports 

state that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection has apprehended several members of known Islamist terrorist organizations 

crossing the southern border in recent years. 

The Texas Department of Public Safety has reported that border 

security agencies have arrested several Somali immigrants crossing 

the southern border who are known members of al-Shabaab, the 

terrorist group that launched the deadly attack on the Westgate 

shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, as well as other Somali-based 

groups, including one funded by Osama bin Laden. 

The Texas DPS stated that it had come into contact in recent 

years with ‘‘special interest aliens’’ who come from countries with 

known ties to terrorists or where terrorist groups thrive. 

In all, immigrants from over 30 countries throughout Asia and 

the Middle East have been arrested over the past few years trying 

to enter the United States illegally in the Rio Grande Valley. Now 

the committee has obtained information from the Customs and 

Border Protection that confirms thousands of Indians, Chinese, 

Bangladeshi, and Sri Lankans have been apprehended at our borders in fiscal years 2014, 2015, and the first quarter of 2016. This 

data also shows that individuals have sought to enter the United 

States illegally from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, and beyond. 

One potential vulnerability that such individuals could attempt 

to exploit is our Nation’s generous asylum system. Aliens making 

asylum claims after they are apprehended by Border Patrol for entering illegally are being released into American society by the 

Obama administration. 

The number of aliens making credible fear claims has increased 

exponentially in recent years. According to information provided to 

the committee by USCIS, the number of credible fear claims increased from 4,995 in fiscal year 2008 to 51,001 in fiscal year 2014, 

an increase of 921 percent. 

Additionally, DHS is approving those claims the vast majority of 

the time. In fact, the approval rate is 87 percent. 

By claiming to have a credible fear, these aliens set in motion a 

process that can forestall their removal while allowing them to remain in the United States potentially for years. Dangerous individuals such as gang members, cartel operatives, and even supporters 

and members of terrorist groups, could exploit the system. Such individuals could attempt to enter illegally. And if they successfully 

evade the Border Patrol, they can remain in the United States. If 

they get caught, they can make a credible fear claim and likely be 

released. 

During a recent visit by staff to El Paso, Border Patrol and ICE 

confirmed that they are seeing increased numbers of Bangladeshi, 

Somalis, Pakistanis, and other nationals of countries of concern 

coming across the southern border and claiming credible fear. 

These anecdotal reports are supported by information that 

USCIS provided the committee that states that thousands of nationals of these and other countries have claimed credible fear in 

recent years. For these reasons, Texas DPS has stated that ‘‘an unsecure border with Mexico is the State’s most significant vulnerability as it provides criminals and would-be terrorists from around 


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the world a reliable means to enter Texas and the Nation undetected. This is especially concerning today, in light of the recent 

terrorist attacks and schemes around the world.’’ 

I thank our witnesses for their testimony today and look forward 

to examining issues related to national security threats at our border and what can be done to combat this growing problem. 

I now recognize Mr. Lynch, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on National Security, for his opening statement. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I also want to thank the panelists for helping the committee with 

its work. 

I would like to also thank Chairman Meadows and Ranking 

Member Connolly for holding this hearing as well to examine immigration and border security. 

I would also like to thank our witnesses again for your expertise 

in this area. 

As reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, we are witnessing the largest global forced displacement of 

people since World War II. Conflict, persecution, violence, and flagrant human rights violations have forcibly displaced nearly 60 

million people worldwide, including 19.5 million refugees, 38 million internally displaced persons, and 1.8 million asylum-seekers. 

That is a 60 percent increase from 37.5 million displaced people recorded by UNHCR a decade ago. 

Over 50 percent of the refugee population is now made up of children below 18 years of age, marking the highest child refugee figure in more than 10 years. In 2014, over 34,000 asylum applications were submitted by unaccompanied or separated children 

across 82 countries. That is the highest count on record since the 

agency began collecting this data in 2006. 

The war in Syria and the rise of the Islamic State have been the 

driving factors behind the unprecedented surge in global displacement. Approximately 7.6 million people have been internally displaced within Syria alone, and more than 4 million refugees have 

fled the country since the start of the conflict in 2011. 

The stark increase in global forced displacement coupled with 

devastating terrorist attacks in Paris, San Bernardino, Beirut, 

Istanbul, and Ankara in Turkey, and just yesterday in Brussels, 

Belgium, have led to ongoing policy debates in the U.S. over how 

best to prevent terrorists from infiltrating our legitimate immigration processes. 

This is a critical and necessary examination that must entail 

fact-based oversight of our existing immigration and border security policies across-the-board. In the interest of national security, it 

must also be undertaken in a manner that continues to reflect our 

longstanding international commitment as a signatory to the 1951 

Geneva Convention to protecting highly vulnerable individuals who 

are fleeing from persecution and violence, and as stated in a recent 

letter to Congress signed by 22 U.S. national security leaders from 

Democratic and Republican administrations alike, and I quote, ‘‘We 

believe that America can and should continue to provide refuge to 

those fleeing violence and persecution without compromising the 

security and safety of our Nation. To do otherwise would undermine our core objective of combating terrorism.’’ 


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These leaders included General David Petraeus, the former Commander of U.S. Central Command; George Schultz, the former Secretary of State under President Reagan; and former NATO Supreme Allied Commander James Stavridis, who is now at Tufts 

University. 

In furtherance of this committee’s efforts to review our national 

security framework, Congressman Steve Russell of this committee 

and I recently traveled on an oversight mission to Turkey, Jordan, 

and Lebanon to assess and even participate in the vetting processes required for Syrian refugee settlement to the United States. 

After visiting refugee camps along the Turkish-Syrian and Jordanian-Syrian borders, and meeting with various refugee families, 

we discovered that the vast majority, between 70 and 80 percent, 

are not even interested in resettlement at all. Rather, they seek to 

stay in the neighboring host countries, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, in the hopes of returning home. 

The overwhelming preference of these families is to stay close to 

Syria, indicating that one of our primary national security goals 

should be to ensure that financially strained host countries and 

international humanitarian agencies have the resources necessary 

to provide a dignified life for their refugee populations in place. 

Regarding the vetting process itself, I must say that prior to our 

oversight visit, I had my serious doubts about the effectiveness of 

vetting conducted in virtual warzone environments, and I supported both the Republican and Democratic measures to enhance 

the vetting process. 

I would note that the delegation arrived in Beirut only several 

months after a double suicide bombing in that city that killed over 

40 people. We arrived in Istanbul only 4 days after a suicide bombing in a central square that killed 10 German tourists. And we left 

Kilis province only 1 day before a rocket attack fired from Syria hit 

a Kilis school. 

However, for the small percentage of families who do seek resettlement to the United States, what we found in our oversight of 

vetting centers in all three host countries was a multilayered vetting process that is robust and extensive. It is conducted by specialized U.N. and U.S. agency personnel trained to ensure that only 

the most thoroughly vetted and the most vulnerable, or 1 percent, 

of Syrian refugee applicants are admitted for resettlement. 

They are also very cautious in their work, given that any misstep 

in the vetting process could not only pose a grave danger to the 

American public, but also effectively halt resettlement for millions 

of legitimate refugees. 

It is this type of fact-based oversight that should guide our review of immigration and border patrol procedures across-the-board. 

This is absolutely imperative at a time when our Federal agencies 

responsible for securing homeland security face severe budgetary 

constraints and every homeland security dollar must be allocated 

toward the most critical national security risks. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for holding this hearing, and 

I look forward to discussing these and other issues with our witnesses, and I yield back the balance of our time. 


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Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman. I now recognize the chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Operations, Mr. Meadows, for his opening statement. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

leadership. 

And thank you, Ranking Member Mr. Lynch, for your not only 

fact-based willingness to look at the record, but also your willingness to work in a bipartisan manner to address this serious issue. 

From the surge of unaccompanied minors and family units from 

Central America coming across our border to the ongoing Syrian 

refugee crisis, as well as the fiancee visa that was erroneously 

issued to the San Bernardino terrorist Tashfeen Malik, there seems 

to be no shortage of immigration issues that impact our national 

security. So today’s hearing takes a closer look at the national security implications at our Nation’s porous borders. 

Now, I want to emphasize that it is a national security interest 

that brings us here today. There are plenty of other rhetoric and 

discussion that can go on as it relates to immigration and immigration policy. But, indeed, this is looking at not only immigration but 

at border security and how it affects national security. 

It has been in the forefront of much of the political discussion in 

recent months. The Department of Homeland Security officials 

have often indicated to the American public that our borders are 

more secure today than they have ever been. I think many of us 

have heard that. They tout the low number of apprehensions as 

proof, which seems to be a little counterintuitive to me. 

In fact, the GAO, the Government Accountability Office, has indicated that the DHS has no official metrics in place to measure 

whether our border is secure or not. So those statements are very 

difficult to comprehend, if there are no metrics in place. 

Representatives from the Border Patrol tell us that the situation 

at the border is exactly the opposite of what the administration 

claims. 

Undoubtedly, the United States has a proud history of providing 

refuge to victims of persecution and will continue to be unwavering 

in our commitment to be that beacon of freedom and hope for those 

facing persecution around the world. But when this administration 

fails to enforce our immigration laws, or turns a blind eye to the 

rampant fraud and abuse while rubberstamping— 

rubberstamping—credible fear claims at a rate as high as 92 percent, the integrity of our system is undermined. Our generosity is 

taken advantage of and our national security is at risk. 

We should seek to protect the integrity of our immigration system from fraudulent claims made by those seeking to do us harm 

or subvert our rule of law. Individuals who seek to defraud the asylum process make a mockery of those who are truly persecuted, for 

those who are fleeing from fear. 

The United States is one of the most generous nations in the 

world, and our asylum system is an extension of that generosity. 

And yet, various organizations are coaching people to claim credible fear in order to avoid deportation. 

By invoking the credible fear claim, most aliens enter into a process by which they await proceedings before an immigration judge, 

which at the very least buys them more time in the United States. 


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It often takes years, multiple years, before those court dates take 

place. 

In the meantime, the alien is allowed to obtain a work permit, 

go about their business in the United States and, indeed, could 

embed in our communities. It seems to me that the word is out 

that claiming credible fear is the way to go. 

The numbers sure say that much to me, and as we look at the 

credible fear claims that have grown exponentially in recent years, 

as Chairman DeSantis mentioned in his opening remarks, one of 

my biggest concerns is that nefarious actors have taken advantage 

of our generosity. 

Gang members, cartel operators, supporters of terrorist groups 

can game the system and make use of credible fear to remain here 

in the United States. Even according to DHS, aliens with known 

or claimed ties to cartels and terrorist groups have been apprehended along the border claiming credible fear. 

The data this committee has received confirms that the Border 

Patrol is encountering migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 

Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and 

Turkey. Now this is coming across our southern border, and these 

are just the individuals that were apprehended. 

So what about all of those who were never seen by law enforcement at all and make it into the interior of our country? 

I hope to hear from our witnesses today on their assessment of 

the current holes that might enable these bad actors to take advantage of our system. Most importantly, I would like to hear what 

should be done to address these deficiencies and help ensure the 

safety of the American public. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter 

the following documents into the record. One would be U.S. Border 

Patrol nationwide apprehensions for 2015 and 2016. The other is 

the USCIS credible fear nationality reports for fiscal year 2014, 

2015, and for quarter one of 2016, and the USCIS credible fear 

data and affirmative asylum case data. I ask unanimous consent. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Without objection. 

Mr. MEADOWS. And with that, I would yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank you. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. I will hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any members who would like to submit a written 

statement. 

We will now recognize our panel of witnesses. I am pleased to 

welcome Mr. Ronald Vitiello, Acting Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol 

at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Mr. Steven McCraw, 

director of the Texas Department of Public Safety; Mr. Brandon 

Judd, president of the National Border Patrol Council; Professor 

Jan Ting, professor at the Temple University Beasley School of 

Law; and Ms. Eleanor Acer, senior director of refugee protection at 

Human Rights First. Welcome all. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. 

If you can please rise and raise your right hand? 

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give will 

be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 

you God? 


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Thank you. Please be seated. 

All witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire written statement will be made 

part of the record. 

Mr. Vitiello, you are up. Five minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF RONALD D. VITIELLO 

Mr. VITIELLO. Thank you, Chairman DeSantis, Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Lynch, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittees. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss 

the role of the United States Border Patrol in protecting national 

security and defending threats against our border. 

During my law enforcement career of more than 30 years in the 

U.S. Border Patrol, the border environment has changed not only 

the intentions, tactics, and capabilities of our adversaries, but also 

in our resources, our capabilities, and our operational approach to 

securing the border. 

Today, we focus not only on responding to the complex and rapidly changing border conditions, but we also work to decrease the 

risk and potential threats. We do this through strategic and riskbased deployment of resources, and by expanding and increasing 

our capabilities through intelligence, information-sharing, partnerships, and operational collaboration. 

In all border environments—land, air, and sea—technology is 

critical to security operations. Effective fixed and mobile surveillance and detection systems provide increased situational awareness of illicit cross-border activity. Advanced technology also increases our ability to identify changes in the border environment 

and rapidly respond as appropriate to emerging threats along and 

approaching our borders. 

Detecting and interdicting terrorists and their weapons will also 

be a focus priority of the border security mission. 

Also, the illegal cross-border activities of transnational criminal 

organizations involved in cross-border trafficking of guns, currency, 

human smuggling, and drugs pose a continuous threat to border security and public safety. 

Responding to the continued flow of unaccompanied alien children and families across the Southwest border is also a priority. 

The border regions in the United States are most secure when 

using a whole-of-government approach that leverages interagency 

and international partnerships as a force multiplier. The Border 

Patrol is an active participant in the DHS Southern Border and 

Approaches Campaign, and has a leading role in the Joint Task 

Force-West, an integrated operational approach to addressing the 

threat of transnational criminal organizations along and approaching the Southwest border. This effort directs DHS resources in a 

much more collaborative fashion to address the broad and complex 

range of threats and challenges, including illegal migration; smuggling of illegal drugs, humans and arms trafficking; illicit financing 

of such operations; and the threat of terrorist exploitation of border 

vulnerabilities. 


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The creation of the task force increases information-sharing between Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement 

agencies; improves situational awareness; enhances border-wide 

interdiction operations; and improves our ability to counter 

transnational threats and associated violence. 

Using a risk-based and intelligence-driven approach, the Border 

Patrol and more broadly CBP and DHS will continue to enhance 

our efforts, anticipate and respond to threats to national security, 

and ensure the safety of the U.S. public. 

The continued focus on unity of effort, in conjunction with intelligence and operational integration, the deployment of advanced 

technology, enhances our situational awareness, better enables us 

to effectively and efficiently detect, respond to, and disrupt threats 

in the Nation’s border regions and approaches to the secure the 

homeland. 

In closing, let me state the obvious. It is the men and women of 

CBP and the Border Patrol agents who face the threats that we 

will discuss today. Agents deploy in all manner of weather and 

rough terrain 24/7/365. 

I am blessed to be in their leadership cadre. I am grateful for 

their dedication and professionalism. The Nation is safer, and the 

communities that they serve are better protected because of their 

efforts. They have my unwavering support and continued effort to 

let them do their jobs in the safest manner possible. 

Thank you for having me as a witness today. I look forward to 

the opportunity to testify and your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Vitiello follows:] 


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TESTIMONY OF 

RONALD VITIELLO 

Acting Chief 

U.S. Border Patrol 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Department of Homeland Security 

BEFORE 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Subcommittee on Government Operations 

ON 

"National Security: Threats at our Border" 

March23,2016 

Washington, DC 
10 


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Chairmen Meadows and DeSantis, Ranking Members Connolly and Lynch, and distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today on behalf of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to discuss national security and threats at our border. 

Along the more than 5,000 miles of land border with Canada and Mexico, and approximately 

95,000 miles of shoreline, DHS works with our interagency, and state and local partners to 

secure our borders and the associated airspace and maritime approaches to protect the United 

States against terrorist threats and prevent illegal entry of people and goods into the United 

States while also facilitating lawful trade and traveL 

The border environment is dynamic and requires adaptation to respond to emerging threats and 

changing conditions. We appreciate the partnership and support we have received from these 

Subcommittees, whose commitment to the security of the American people has enabled the 

continued deployment of resources and capabilities DHS needs to secure the border. 

Operational Coordination 

Secretary Johnson's Unity of Effort initiative has put in place new and strengthened management 

processes at DHS Headquarters to enable more effective DHS component operations. In 

addition, DHS-wide border security activities are being strategically guided by the Southern 

Border and Approaches Campaign (SBAC). Aimed at leveraging the range of unique 

Depatiment roles, responsibilities, m1d capabilities, the Cmnpaign enhances our operational 

approach to working together in a more unified way to address comprehensive threat 

environments. 

On November 20, 2014, the Secretary commissioned the creation of three Joint Task Forces 

(JTF) to support the SBAC: JTF-West, JTF-East, and JTF-Investigations. All three incorporate 

elements from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the U.S Coast Guard (USCG), 

Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(USCIS). JTF-West, led by CBP, bears responsibility for the southern land border and the West 

Coast. JTF-East, led by the USCG, is responsible for the Southern maritime and border 

approaches. JTF-Investigations, led by ICE, focuses on investigations in support of JTF-W and 

JTF-E. 

This effort will direct DHS resources in a much more collaborative fashion to address the range 

of threats and challenges, including illegal migration, smuggling of illegal dmgs, human and 

arms trafficking, the illicit financing of such operations, and threat of terrorist exploitation of 

border vulnerabilities. The creation of the JTFs, unified joint task forces along the Southwest 

border and in the approaches to the United States, increases information sharing with Federal, 

state and local law enforcement agencies; improves situational awareness; enhances border-wide 

criminal intelligence-led interdiction operations; and addresses transnational threats and 

associated violence. 

As the lead agency for JTF-W, CBP- specifically the Office of Field Operations (OFO), U.S. 

Border Patrol (USBP), and Air and Marine Operations (AMO) has primary responsibility for 

exercising CBP's border security mission at and between the Nation's ports of entry (POEs). 

These entities coordinate the use of integrated assets to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of 
11 


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terrorism and the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and contraband toward or across 

the borders of the United States. CBP implements intelligence-driven counter network strategies 

focused on areas of greatest risk, and deploys its capabilities to adapt to emerging threats along 

the border. 

The illegal cross-border activities of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and other mala 

fide actors pose a growing threat to border security and public safety. TCOs control most crossborder trafficking of guns and illegal drugs, and there is evidence of their increased involvement 

with human smuggling. Using a risk-informed and intelligence-driven approach, CBP will 

continue to enhance our efforts to anticipate and respond to threats to our national security, 

ensure the safety of the U.S. public, and deter, prevent, and disrupt future illegal activities. 

Responding to the continued flow of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) and families crossing 

the Southwest border is also a priority. During FY 2014, the U.S. Goverrunent experienced an 

unprecedented increase in the number ofUAC crossing the Southwest border, compared to 

previous years. The resulting humanitarian situation challenged the existing facilities, resources, 

and capabilities ofCBP and other Federal agencies with responsibilities to process, transport, 

and care for UAC. During the following year, FY 2015, CBP apprehended nearly 40,000 UAC 

crossing the border- a decrease of41 percent from the more than 68,000 encountered during 

2014. However, as of January 31 this fiscal year, CBP has apprehended more than 20,000 UAC, 

compared to approximately 10,000 apprehended during the same period last year. As we enter 

the traditional season of higher migration, we are closely monitoring this situation and working 

with our partners to ensure that resources and capabilities are in place to accommodate an 

increased number ofUAC, and to maintain safe, orderly processing of children that CBP 

enconnters, without disrupting CBP's vital border security mission. 

The border environment is challenged by continuously evolving tactics of terrorists, smuggling 

and trafficking networks, and other criminals. Detecting changes in threat levels and criminal 

flows across the border environment requires the use of various tactics to gather information and 

intelligence in both low and high threat areas. To detect and respond to ctiminal activity 

crossing or approaching our borders, DHS deploys sophisticated surveillance and detection 

technology and collaborates with domestic and international law enforcement, intelligence, 

defense, and local community partners. 

Advanced Technology and Capabilities 

Thanks to the support of Congress, CBP has deployed capable resources to increase our 

situational awareness, identify changes in the border environment, and rapidly respond, as 

appropriate, to emerging threats and areas of increasing risk. The use of technology in the border 

environment is an invaluable force multiplier to increase situational awareness. 

At and Beyond U.S. Ports ofEntry 

On a typical day, CBP welcomes nearly one million travelers at our air, land, and sea POEs. 

From 2012 to 2015 the volume ofintemational air travelers increased by 14 percent and is 

projected to increase 4 to 5 percent each year for the next five years. CBP continues to address 

the security elements of its mission while meeting the challenge of increasing volumes of travel 

in air, land, and sea environments. We do this through programs that enable us to assess the risk 

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of passengers from the earliest and furthest possible points, and at each point in the travel 

continuum. 

At our POEs, CBP has aggressively deployed Non-Intrusive Inspection (Nil) and Radiation 

Portal Monitor (RPM) technology to help identify contraband and weapons of mass effect. Prior 

to September 11, 2001, only 64large-scale Nil systems, and not a single RPM, were deployed to 

our country's borders. Today CBP has 311 NII systems and 1,282 RPMs deployed. The result 

of this investment in resources is the capacity for CBP to scan 99 percent of all containerized 

cargo at seaports and I 00 percent of passenger and cargo vehicles at land borders for radiological 

and nuclear materials upon arrival in the United States. 

The implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) involved a substantial 

technology investment in the land border environment that continues to provide both facilitation 

and security benefits. Today, as a result ofWHTI, more than 19 million individuals obtained 

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology-enabled secure travel documents. These 

documents are more secure as they can be verified electrorrically in real-time back to the issuing 

authority to establish identity and citizenship. They also reduce the average vehicle processing 

time by 20 percent. 

A direct result of the increased use ofRFID-enabled secure travel documents is CBP's capability 

to increase the national law enforcement query rate, including against the terrorist watch list, to 

more than 98 percent. By comparison, in 2005 CBP performed law enforcement queries in the 

land border environment for only 5 percent of travelers. In terms of facilitation, CBP has also 

capitalized upon these notable improvements by establishing active lane management at land 

POEs; a process analogous to the management of toll booths on a highway. Through active lane 

management CBP can adjust lane designations as traffic conditions warrant to better 

accommodate trusted travelers and travelers with RFID-enabled documents. 

Because we have advance travel information, CBP has the opp01tunity to assess passenger risk 

long before a traveler arrives at a POE. Before an individual travels to the United States, CBP 

has the opportnnity to assess that person's risk via the Electronic System for Travel 

Authorization for those traveling under the Visa Waiver Program, or as part of the inter-agency 

collaborative effort to adjudicate and continuously vet visas. 1 CBP has additional opportunities 

to assess a traveler's risk when he or she purchases a ticket and/or makes a reservation and when 

he or she checks-in. 

Before an international flight departs for the United States from the foreign point of origin, 

commercial airlines transmit passenger and crew manifest information to CBP. CBP's National 

Targeting Center then reviews traveler information to identify travelers who could be determined 

to be inadmissible upon arrival. Through its Regional Carrier Liaison Groups and Inunigration 

Advismy and Joint Security Programs, CBP coordinates with the carriers to prevent these 

travelers from boarding flights bound for the United States. In FY 2015, using these predepartnre programs, CBP prevented 11,611 high-risk travelers from boarding flights. These 

efforts reduce or eliminate the need for resources, which would otherwise be dedicated to 

1 Visas are issued by the Department of State. 

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allowed CBP to decrease the number of CBPOs on the ground at CSI ports, while maintaining 

security outcomes. More than 80 percent of maritime cargo destined for the United States 

originates in, or transits through, CSI locations. In cooperation with host country counterparts, 

high-risk cargo is examined prior to loading on a vessel destined to the United States. 

Additionally, CBP screens 100 percent of all cargo manifests prior to arrival in the United States 

either through CSI locations or at the domestic port of entry for cargo that does not pass through 

a CSI port. 

On May 29, 2015, DHS Security Secretary Johnson announced DRS's intent to enter into 

negotiations to expand air preclearance operations to ten new foreign airports, located in nine 

separate countries. These countries represent some of the busiest last points of departure to the 

United States-- in 2014, nearly 20 million passengers traveled from these ten airports to the 

United States. Preclearance allows for the complete inspection process and security screening to 

occur on foreign soil prior to boarding a direct flight to the United States thereby obviating the 

need for further CBP processing or TSA security screening upon arrival. This enhances border 

and aviation security and allows the United States and our international partners to jointly 

identify and address threats at the earliest possible point. More than 16 million individuals 

traveled through one ofCBP's preclearance locations in Canada, Ireland, the Caribbean, or the 

United Arab Emirates in FY 2015, and our goal is to process 33 percent of US-bound air 

travelers tlu·ough preclearance by 2024. 

Along US. Borders 

Fixed system technology increases CBP's situational awareness and the USBP's ability to detect, 

identify, classify, and track illicit activity by providing line-of-sight surveillance to efficiently 

detect incursions in varying terrain. CBP integrates mobile and portable systems to address areas 

where rugged terrain and dense ground cover may allow adversaries to penetrate through blind 

spots or avoid the coverage areas of fixed systems. 

The Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems and Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) arc 

fixed technology assets used in select areas along the borders. The IFT system is a series of 

fixed surveillance towers and equipment located in Arizona that provide long-range persistent 

surveillance. These tower systems automatically detect and track items of interest, and provide 

centralized operators with video and geospatiallocation of suspected items of interest for 

identification and appropriate action. RVSS provide short-, medium-, and long-range persistent 

surveillance mounted on stand-alone towers or other structures. The RVSS uses day and infrared (IR) cameras, radio, and microwave transmitters to send video to a control room and enable a 

control room operator to remotely and automatically detect, identify, classify, and track targets 

using a video feed. 

CBP also uses Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) and Imaging Sensors (IS), which contribute to 

improved situational awareness, agent safety, and rapid response. These sensors support our 

capability to detect and identify subjects. When a ground sensor is activated, an alarm is 

communicated to a data decoder that translates the sensor's activation data to a centralized 

operations center computer system. IS are a specific type ofUGS with an integrated camera and 

the ability to transmit images or video back to the operations center. 

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returning inadmissible travelers to their points of origin, and instead enables those resources to 

be utilized for facilitating legitimate travel. 

Additionally, CBP's work on business innovations and enhanced partnerships with private 

industry helped lead to the expansion of Trusted Traveler Programs like Global Entry. More 

than 1.7 million people, including more than 414,000 new members this fiscal year, have 

enrolled in Trusted Traveler Programs which allow expedited clearance for pre-approved, lowrisk air travelers upon arrival in the United States. When comparing 2014 and 2015, CBP 

processed 1.6 million more passengers using Global Entry and there were 17 million more kiosk 

uses in 2015. Collaboration efforts between CBP and TSA have created increased security and 

additional efficiencies to better serve the traveling public. The TSA Pre.f ®program 

automatically extends eligibility to current U.S. citizen members ofCBP's Trusted Traveler 

Programs. This partnership enables TSA to extend expedited screening benefits for these 

qualifying trusted travelers, and allows TSA to focus security efforts on travelers with known 

and unknown risks, and contributes to the overall homeland security mission of securing and 

facilitating legitimate travel. 

The United States is the world's largest importer and exporter of goods and services. In FY 2015, 

CBP processed 26.3 million cargo containers through the Nation's POEs, an increase of three 

percent from 2014, with a trade value of $2.4 trillion. To address increasing trade cargo 

volumes, CBP assesses the risk of cargo bound for the United States, whether by air, land, or sea, 

at the earliest point of transit. 

Receiving advanced shipment information allows CBP to assess the risk of cargo before it 

reaches a POE. Since 2009, the Importer Security Filing (ISF) and the Additional Carrier 

Requirements regulation have required importers to supply CBP with an electronically-filed ISF 

consisting of advance data elements 24 hours prior to loading of cargo shipments that will be 

arriving into the United States by vessel. These regulations increase CBP' s ability to assess the 

scope and accuracy of information gathered on goods, conveyances, and entities involved in the 

shipment of cargo to the United States via vessel. 

Since 2010, CBP has operated the Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) pilot project, which 

enables CBP and TSA to receive advance security filing cargo data and help identify cargo 

shipments inbound to the United States by air transport that may be high risk and require 

additional physical screening. Identifying high-risk shipments as early as possible in the air 

cargo supply chain provides CBP and TSA an opportunity to conduct a comprehensive review of 

cargo data while facilitating the movement of legitimate trade into the United States. Benefits to 

ACAS pilot participants include: efficiencies by automating the identification of high risk cargo 

for enhanced screening before it is consolidated and loaded on aircraft and reduction in paper 

processes related to cargo screening requirements. 

CBP also has a presence at foreign ports to add another layer of security to cargo bound for the 

United States. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) places CBP Officers (CBPOs) at foreign 

ports to perform pre-screening of containers before those containers are placed on a United 

States-bound vessel. The CSI program has matured since its inception in 2002 through increased 

partnership with host country counterparts and advances in targeting and technology. This 

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Working in conjunction with fixed surveillance assets, CBP's mobile technology assets provide 

f1exibility and agility to adapt to changing border conditions and threats along the Southwest 

border. Mobile Surveillance Capability systems provide long-range mobile surveillance with a 

suite of radar and camera sensors mounted on USBP vehicles. 

CBP's Tactical Aerostats andRe-locatable Towers program, originally part of the Department of 

Defense (DoD) Reuse program, uses a mix of aerostats, towers, and electro-optical/infra-red 

cameras, to provide USBP with increased situational awareness through an advanced 

surveillance capability over a wide area. This capability has proven to be a vital asset in 

increasing CBP's ability to detect, identify, classify, and track activity. As of December 2015, 

USBP agents seized 122 tons of narcotics and conducted over 50,000 apprehensions of illegal 

border crossers with the assistance of existing aerostats and towers. 

Technology is critical to border security operations. Through the deployment of these 

complementary and effective fixed and mobile systems, CBP gains more coverage and 

situational awareness of surveillance gaps, and increases its ability to adapt to changing 

conditions to effectively detect, identify, classify, track, and interdict potential threats along the 

borders. 

From the Air and the Sea 

AMO increases CBP's situational awareness, enhances its detection and interdiction capabilities, 

and extends our border security zones, offering greater capacity to stop threats prior to reaching 

the Nation's shores. Through the use of coordinated and integrated air and marine capabilities 

including fixed and rotary wing aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), tethered aerostats 

and patrol and interdiction vessels- AMO detects, interdicts, and prevents acts of terrorism and 

the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband toward or across U.S. 

borders. AMO conducts critical aerial and maritime surveillance, interdiction, investigation, and 

multi-domain awareness law enforcement operations, in addition to providing assistance to 

ground personnel. 

AMO P-3 Long Range Trackers and Airborne Early Warning Aircraft provide detection and 

interdiction capability in both the air and marine environments. Sophisticated sensors and high 

endurance capability greatly increase CBP's range to counter illicit trafficking. P-3s are an 

integral part of the successful counternarcotics missions operating in coordination with Joint 

Interagency Task Force (JIA TF)-South. P-3s patrol in a 42 million square mile area that includes 

more than 4 I nations, the Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and maritime 

approaches to the United States. 

Additionally, UAS are increasingly instrumental in CBP's layered and integrated approach to 

border security. AMO has deployed six UAS along the Southwest Border to detect, identify, and 

classify moving tracks of interest over land and sea. Four of these aircraft have Vehicle and 

Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER) capability, which is a side-looking airborne radar that 

detects illegal border crosscrs and relays their positions to field agents, while simultaneously 

capturing terrain change detection information across larger stretches of the border. UAS are 

also used to meet surveillance and other mission requirements along the Northern borders and in 

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the drug source and transit zones. During FY 2015, CBP's VADER-equipped UAS recorded 

9,371 detections of illegal activity. 

Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA) have a multi-mode radar for use over water and land, 

an electro-optical/infrared camera system, and a satellite communications system. This highly 

adaptable and capable aircraft replaces several older, single-mission assets. An equally 

important asset is the DHC-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MP A). It bridges the gap between the 

longer range P-3s and UAS and the smaller MEA. The DHC-8 is an invaluable situational 

awareness platform for AMO in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. 

AMO's persistent surveillance capability is performed through the collection and fusing of 

detection sensor data from a variety of sources, including ground based long and short range 

radar systems, as well as CBP's Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS), which provides air, 

maritime, and limited land domain awareness. This capability is critical in the detection of! owaltitude aircraft and other potential threats attempting to penetrate the border undetected. CBP 

assumed responsibility of TARS from the U.S. Air Force in 2013, providing radar detection and 

monitoring of low-altitude aircraft and surface vessels along the U.S.-Mexico border, the Florida 

Straits, and a portion of the Caribbean. In FY 2015, TARS detected more than 400 suspect 

aircraft originating in Mexico which resulted in 14 seizures and tour arrests, nine of those 

seizures and two of those arrests were made by Mexican government forces and were facilitated 

byAMO. 

Some of the most important advancements in increasing CBP's situational awareness are in the 

area of data integration and exploitation. Downlink technology, paired with the BigPipe system, 

allows AMO to provide a video feed and situational awareness to its law enforcement partners in 

real-time. In addition, the Minotaur mission integration system will allow multiple aircraft to 

share information from multiple sources, providing a never before seen level of air, land, and sea 

domain awareness. As the Minotaur system evolves across the fleet, it will provide increased 

awareness for a greater number of users as the infonnation is integrated into the Air and Mruine 

Operations Center (AMOC). 

A vital component ofDHS's domain awareness capabilities, CBP's AMOC integrates the 

surveillance and law enforcement data capabilities ofDHS's federal and international partners. 

CBP agents assigned to AMOC serve to correlate information from USBP technology with 

AMOC's systems to close the gaps in situational awareness. This combined effort has 

contributed to a reduction in the ultra-light aircraft activity on the Southwest border. FY 2015 

suspect activity has decreased to 59 events from a high of 332 in FY 2010. Overall, AMOC 

evaluated almost 500,000 air tracks in FY 2015 with a 99.99 percent successful resolution rate. 

AMOC has integrated DoD and FAA sensors into the CBP network to expand our awareness 

well beyond the U.S. air and maritime borders. The stemming of the panga-type boat threats on 

the West Coast is attributed to the whole ofDHS (CBP, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement/Homeland Security Investigations) coordinated efforts with Mexican 

partners facilitated through this integration and collaboration. 

Coordinating with extensive law enforcement and intelligence databases, including classified 

systems and communication networks, AMOC enhances our situational awareness and uses its 

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capability to coordinate law enforcement responses to suspect activity in the air, maritime, and 

land domains. AMOC systems are connected to nearly 150 locations in various agencies to 

enable collaboration. 

CBP's continued deployment of fixed and mobile border surveillance technology, integrated 

with AMOC's enhanced-domain awareness capabilities, allows CBP the flexibility to shift more 

officers and agents from detection duties to the interdiction of illegal activities on our borders. 

USBP and AMO use a risk-based strategy to deploy resources and address emerging threats. In 

coordination with the new DHS joint requirements process, USBP uses the Capability Gap 

Analysis Process (CGAP) to conduct mission analysis and identify capability gaps. From this 

analysis, USBP performs follow-on planning to identify operational requirements over the short, 

mid, and long-term and to identify potential solutions, which may (or may not) include 

technology, tactical infrastructure, or other solutions depending on the nature, scope, severity, 

and geographic location of a given capability gap. Terrain, threat, and other considerations vary 

greatly across sectors and regions, making a "one size fits all" approach ineffective. The AMO 

CGAP process is in the developmental stage at this time. Once completed, it will interface with 

USBP processes to further identify aviation technology solutions targeting border secU1ity 

initiatives. 

Additionally, CBP is looking to the future by working closely with the DHS Science & 

Technology Directorate (S&T) to identify and develop additional technologies to improve our 

situational awareness, surveillance, and detection capabilities along our land and maritime 

borders. In August of2015, Secretary Johnson signed a memo establishing Component-led 

Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) as tl1e central mechanism by which DHS identifies technology 

gaps and coordinates and prioritizes its research and development efforts in priority mission 

areas. The Border Security IPT, consisting of senior representatives from S&T, CBP, USCG, 

ICE, Department of Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and Joint Requirements Council (JRC), 

has identified several key R&D needs, including small dark aircraft detection; tunnel detection, 

surveillance and forensics; and maritime surveillance and communications in remote 

environments. 

As conditions on the ground or in the approaches change, CBP will adjust its operational posture 

and will continue to invest and focus border security resources in the most effective and efficient 

way possible to meet the Nation's border security needs. 

Intelligence and Information Sharing 

Criminal intelligence-sharing is a key component in building situational awareness efforts along 

the Northern and Southwest borders. CBP and component agencies contribute to several 

initiatives to improve the combined intelligence capabilities of Federal, state, local, tribal, and 

international partners. 

CBP hosts a monthly briefing/teleconference with state and local partners in order to monitor 

emerging trends and threats along the Northern and Southwest border and provide a crosscomponent, multi-agency venue for discussing trends and threats. The briefing focuses on 

narcotics, weapons, currency interdictions, and alien apprehensions both at and between the 

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POEs. These briefings/teleconferences currently include participants from: DHS Joint Task 

Force-West, ICE; USCG; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation; 

U.S. Northern Command; Joint Interagency Task Force-South; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives; U.S. Attorneys' Offices; Naval Investigative Command; State Fusion 

Centers; and local law enforcement as appropriate. 

The border regions of the United States land, maritime, and air environments cannot be 

effectively policed by a single DHS Component or even a single governmental entity. A wholeof-government approach that leverages interagency and international partnerships as a force 

multiplier has been and will continue to be the most effective way to keep our border secure. 

Providing critical capabilities toward the whole-of-goverrunent approach, DHS works with our 

Federal, state, local, tribal and international partners particularly, Canada and Mexico to 

address transnational threats. 

Through the 21st Century Border Management Initiative, led by a binational Executive Steering 

Committee, the United States and Mexico further strengthen our collaborative relationship and 

discuss topics relating to expanding and modernizing our border infrastructure, securing and 

facilitating the cross-border flows of people and cargo, strengthening public security, and 

engaging the border communities in the creation of this new border vision. Our strong 

partnership with the Goverrunent of Mexico, and our collaborative eff01ts along Mexico's 

Southern border, contributed to the reduced flow ofUAC moving through Mexico to our 

Southwest border. The United States also cooperates extensively with Canada, through the 

Beyond the Border Action Plan, to jointly assess shared threats, within, at, and away from our 

borders, while expediting lawful trade and traveL This collaboration has become even more 

critical in light of the evolving security threats, including the emergence of foreign fighters. 

Through these bilateral initiatives, the United States, working closely with Canada and Mexico, 

jointly address issues pertaining to border management, including border violence, managing the 

flow oflegitimate travelers, and strengthening border security. 

Indicators of Success 

Thanks to the support of Congress, the Nation's long-term investment in border security 

continues to produce significant and positive results. DHS uses many different types of mctrics 

to assess our performance in managing our security risks and facilitation responsibilities. It is 

important to emphasize that there is no single number or target level that can capture the full 

scope of our border security efforts. Instead, there are a series of important indicators that we 

use to assess our perfonnance, evaluate trends, and refine our operations. 

Border Patrol apprehensions-- an indicator of illegal entries totaled 337,117 nationwide in FY 

2015, compared to 486,651 in FY 2014. This represents a more than30 percent decline in the 

last year and almost 80 percent below its most recent peak in FY 2000. CBP officers and agents 

also played a critical counter-narcotics role, resulting in the seizure or disruption of more than 

3.3 million pounds of narcotics in FY 2015. In addition, the agency seized more than $129 

million in unreported currency through integrated counter network operations. In FY 2015, AMO 

contributed to the arrest of 4,485 suspects, the apprehension of more than 51,130 individuals, and 

the interdiction of more than 213,000 pounds of cocaine. 

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USBP uses the Consequence Delivery System (CDS) on the Southwest border as a means to 

standardize decision making in the application of consequences and examines the efficiency and 

effectiveness of individual consequences on various types of individuals without claims for legal 

immigration. Recidivism and the average number of apprehensions per recidivist are the 

strongest indicators of CDS effectiveness. Since CDS implementation in FY 2011, the annual 

repmied recidivism rate has decreased from an average of27 percent to 14 percent in FY 2015 

and average apprehensions per recidivist decreased from 2.71 to 2.38 in FY 2015. Contributing 

factors to the reduction included reducing the percent of apprehensions resulting in a Voluntary 

Return, the least effective and efficient consequence, from 59 percent in FY 2010 to 4 percent in 

FY 2015; and applying more effective and efficient consequences to illegal entrants with a 

higher probability of making subsequent illegal entries. 

CBP reports on several perfonnance measures, in accordance with the Govennnent Performance 

and Results (GRP A) Act of 1993 and the 2010 GPRA Modernization Act, and we are committed 

to the ongoing monitoring and reporting of program accomplishments and progress toward 

meeting mission goals. AMO reports annually on a GPRA metric that tracks the percent of 

detected conventional aircraft incursions resolved along all borders of the United States. ln FY 

2015, AMO reported a 99.3 percent border security success rate for tllis metric. 

DHS recognizes the need for relevant performance measures to verify the effectiveness of our 

operations and assets. Furthermore, as border security operations become increasingly 

integrated, the ability to quantify individual contributions to shared outcomes becomes 

increasingly complex. DHS will continue to collaborate with internal and external partners to 

enhance current meuics, and develop new metrics, that provide meaningful outcome-focused 

measurements of illegal activity, trends, and effectiveness. We look forward to sharing these 

efforts with these Subcommittees in the future. 

Conclusion 

DHS has significantly increased its border security capabilities by adding thousands of frontline 

law enforcement personnel, and making substantial investments in infrastructure, situational 

awareness and surveillance technology, strategically deployed to areas of increasing challenge. 

Tills shift in border security resources and overall border security management is responsible for 

the significant decrease in the illegal flow of people across the Southwest border over the last I 0 

years. 

The continued focus on unity of effo1i, in conjunction with intelligence and operational 

integration, and the deployment of advanced detection technology, enhances situational 

awareness and better enables DHS to plan effectively, enhance its agility, and approptiately 

respond to threats in the Nation's border regions and approaches to secure the homeland. 

Chairmen Meadows and DeSantis, Ranking Members Connolly and Lynch, thank you for the 

opp01iunity to testify today. !look forward to your questions. 

10 
20 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Mr. McCraw, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN C. McCRAW 

Mr. MCCRAW. Mr. Chairman, members, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. Steve McCraw, Texas Department of Public Safety. 

I want to echo a few comments that the chief made, but I would 

be remiss of two things if I didn’t first mention the Governor’s comments yesterday on the aftermath of the Brussels attack, the cowardly attack by terrorists. 

He pointed out that our hearts and prayers are with the Brussels 

victims. Our minds must realize the consequences of open borders. 

And our resolve must be security. 

Clearly, the Governor and the Texas State Legislature understand the scope and magnitude of the threat and vulnerability of 

Texas and the rest of the Nation. 

What happens on the Texas-Mexico border doesn’t just affect 

Texas or even just the border region. It affects the entire Nation, 

whether it is transnational crime or if it is a national security 

threat. 

Clearly, special interest aliens are a problem, and we’ve recognized that. This is not a new phenomenon. As the FBI Special 

Agent in Charge in 2002, we learned that Border Patrol was detaining, detecting, detaining, apprehending individuals from countries with known Al Qaeda presence at that point in time. That’s 

continued on. It’s understandable why Texans are concerned from 

a national security standpoint. 

To that point, we’ve talked about changes that we’ve seen over 

the years, and the chief referred to. Crime is remarkably different. 

It’s more transitory. It’s transnational. It’s organized. It’s more discreet. 

Certainly, it can compromise and undermine public safety and 

homeland security and national security. 

From a Texas standpoint, it’s been very clear in terms from the 

Governor and our State Legislature that two things in terms of 

guiding principles—a sense of urgency and unity of effort. 

Fortunately, with the chief over here, I know when he was sector 

chief of Rio Grande Valley for the Border Patrol, he was a team 

player. And we were able to do unity of effort and work closely with 

him. 

I can tell you right now that if properly resourced, they have the 

leadership and type of people that can get the job done to secure 

the Texas-Mexico border. That’s important. 

Until that time, our strategic intent by our Legislature, our Governor, the Texas Department of Public Safety, working with our 

local and other State partners that includes Texas Military Forces, 

our game wardens, will provide direct support to Border Patrol in 

the detection, deterrence, and interdiction of smuggling events that 

occur between the ports of entry, and do so very aggressively. 

Every day, we deploy Texas State troopers, Texas Rangers and 

special agents in the Department of Public Safety from around the 

State down to the Rio Grande Valley where right now is the epicenter of drug and human smuggling into the United States, and 


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21 

we’ll continue to do so. This will be our direction until the border 

is secure. 

There are a number of things that certainly can be done, if properly resourced. There’s no doubt that Border Patrol can get the job 

done. We look forward to that day when they do have the resources 

to be able to do that. 

That concludes my comments at this point. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. McCraw follows:] 


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Steven C. McCraw 

Director 

Texas Department of Public Safety 

March 23, 2016 

House Committee on Oversight 

and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Subcommittee on Government Operations 
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Steven C. McCraw 

Director 

Texas Department of Public Safety 

March23, 2016 

Good morning, Chairman Meadows, Chairman DeSantis and distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee on National Security and Subcommittee on Government Operations. My name is 

Steven McCraw I am the director of the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS). I would 

like to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the critically important issue 

of assessing the opportunity that individuals, including criminal organizations and terrorists, 

have to exploit the security gaps along the U.S.-Mexico border- and the consequences it has 

had, and will have, for the state of Texas and communities throughout the countty. 

In an ever-changing threat environment, where crime is increasingly transitory, transnational, 

organized, and discreet, and where terrorism has become more disaggregated, an unsecure border 

with Mexico represents a significant national security vulnerability. The porous border with 

Mexico provides cartels a reliable means to infiltrate this country allowing them to smuggle and 

traffic marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine and people into and throughout the United 

States. In Mexico, the cartels engage in petroleum theft, kidnappings, robberies, human 

trafficking, extortions and murders for profit. Cartels employ terrorism tactics, strategies and 

corruption to protect their criminal operations, and they pose a serious threat to Texas and the 

United States as well as to the domestic security of Mexico, one of our nation's most important 

economic trading partners. 

Texas Governor Greg Abbott and the Texas Legislature understand that securing our nation's 

border with Mexico is the sovereign responsibility of the federal government, they recognize that 

the federal government has failed to adequately provide the appropriate resources to secure our 

international border with Mexico. That failure has forced the State of Texas to spend millions of 

dollars of state money to fulfill what is a federal responsibility. 

Governor Abbott has long-recognized the gravity of this situation and in his first year in office, 

he signed into law the toughest border security program in the nation. As part of that plan, more 

than $800 million has been appropriated over the next two years to add more resources, more 

manpower and more assets toward securing our border. This includes state-of-the-art aerial 

assets, enhanced land and maritime patrols, advanced monitoring technology, enhanced 

communication capabilities, 250 new state troopers, a new company of Texas Rangers, pilots, 

additional support personnel, increased overtime and funding to conduct sustained surge 

operations in high threat areas. 

In fact, in response to federal inaction dating back to June 2014, the DPS was then directed by 

state leadership to launch Operation Strong Safety, and most recently, Operation Secure Texas, 

as a multi-agency collaborative effort to deny Mexican cartels and their associates unfettered 

entry into Texas, and their ability to commit border-related crimes, as well as reduce the power 

of these organizations, whose success depends on their ability to operate on both sides of the 

border. In total, Texas has designated roughly $1.7 billion in state funds since 2005 to amplify 

2 
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border security efforts. With the increased funding authorized by our state leaders, Texas is 

further intensifying its border security operations by providing direct assistance to the U.S. 

Border Patrol to deter, detect and interdict smuggling along the Texas/Mexico border through the 

deployment of an integrated network of detection and communication technologies and an 

increase in ground, air and marine interdiction assets. 

These additional resources allows DPS to expand current efforts with other state law 

enforcement agencies as well as our local partners, as well as federal partners and the Texas 

Border Prosecution Unit to degrade the smuggling infrastructure used by the cartel plaza bosses 

to smuggle dmgs and people into Texas. And the number of public cotruption investigations 

along the border will increase with the additional Texas Rangers working with the FBI's Public 

Cormption Task Force. Additionally, this also increases the funding for local law enforcement 

and border county prosecutors, and expands the Texas Anti-Gang program to crack down on the 

gangs who support Mexican cmiel smuggling and trafficking operations throughout the state. 

Again, these increased efforts would not be possible without additional resources provided by 

Governor Abbott's Office and the Texas Legislature. 

As a state that puts such a high priority and resource focus on protecting its people and property, 

these kinds of threats manifest themselves in a variety of ways. Most recently, Texas has found 

itself at odds with the Obama administrations attempt to resettle tens of thousands of Syrian 

refugees in communities across the U.S. Make no mistake, Texas has been active in providing 

refugee asylum to thousands from across the globe. In fact, according to the Texas Health and 

Human Services Commission, Texas accepts approximately ten-percent of all refugees resettled 

in the United States. 

The difference now is the insistence that Texas resettle refugees whose background and threat to 

our state can't be quantified. Governor Abbott has been very clear that we cannot allow charity 

for some to compromise security for all. To that end, our Governor continues to work with 

Conf.'!"ess to increase states role in the refugee resettlement process. In fact, last week language 

was inserted in the Refugee Program Integrity Restoration Act of2016 that is before the U.S. 

House Judiciary Committee. Language in that act would add states a layer of protection and 

prerogative. 

In relation to this committee's focus today - National Security: Threats at Our Borders - I 

would like to present you with information contained in a study produced by a Texas DPS Senior 

Analyst as part of his graduate research at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) for 

Homeland Security and Defense https://www.hsdl.org/?vicw&did=788177 as wc11 as 

findings from several U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) studies. 

First, I'd like to reference the general scope and volume of Special Interest Alien (SIA) 

smuggling as outlined in the NPS study, which indicates that several thousand SIAs - that is, 

migrants from 35 40 countries of interest where Islamic terrorist organizations operate- have 

been apprehended reaching the southwest land border each year since 9/11 (pp. 16-17 of the NPS 

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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 15 here 23641.015

study), smuggled through Latin America and Mexico, at a relatively consistent annual average 

volume. 

Also according to the study, an example of what's happening in Texas alone can be illustrated by 

a report citing U.S. Customs and Border Protection data, asserted that more than 740 encounters 

with S!As just in Texas reflected a 15 percent increase over the same period in 2014, among 

them migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Somalia, and 

Turkey. These are just the individuals who were apprehended. As indicated in the study, 

unknown numbers of SlAs slip over the border, and some may or may not be caught at some 

future point in the interior of the country. 

Many are believed to apply for U.S. political asylum after their apprehensions in the brush 

between ports of entry or upon turning themselves in to an immigration officer at a port of entry, 

according to the study. 

According Congressional research reporting cited in the study (p. 80), Middle Eastern and South 

Asia migrants consistently ranked among the top 20 approved asylum seekers from 2000 through 

2009, long raising national security concerns that these SIA migrants from countries of interest 

are committing asylum fraud. 

The study also highlights an asylum fraud loophole and the U.S. inability to detect and prosecute 

asylum fraud. (pp. 80-85) For instance, the study refers to S!A smugglers and their clients from 

35 "countries of interest," arriving through Mexico at a U.S. Port of Entry, depend heavily on 

fraud vulnerabilities in the U.S., primarily the lack of political asylum fraud detection and 

prosecution capability. 

The study notes that the probability of achieving access to the American asylum process is 

critical to migrant recruitment and business continuity of the smuggling organization, since 

asylum mitigates the risk of deportation, which migrants and smugglers understand would entail 

the loss of significant once-in-a-lifetime sums for smuggling fees and suppress new-client 

recruitment. Therefore, S!A smugglers have incorporated into their operations advice on how to 

achieve U.S. asylum (pp. 80-85). 

The study also references court records showing that four of 19 prosecuted SIA smugglers 

addressed in the NPS study knowledgably abused vulnerabilities in asylum vetting processes by 

claiming fraudulent persecution stories that authorities and systems are unable to verify, and by 

omitting disqualifying personal histories such as terrorism associations and criminality. The 

smugglers were highly knowledgeable in U.S. asylum law and processes, taking pains to instruct 

their clients how to file fraudulent petitions, and coaching their stories in ways that were likely to 

ring well with asylum officers, as part of their smuggling services. 

The NPS study also cites government reporting dating from 2002 to recently consistently 

pointing out lack of progress in detecting and deterring this kind of asylum fraud. It presents a 

2002 GAO report, which concluded that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service 

(INS) did not know the extent of immigration benefit fraud, to include asylum fraud. The NPS 

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study references a 2008 GAO survey of asylum officers that showed that 75 percent believed 

they needed additional training to help them detect fraud, conduct security checks and assess the 

credibility of asylum seekers. The problem apparently has not been addressed in any of the years 

since, according to information cited by the NPS study. In 2014, a U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) report showed that up to 70 percent of asylum cases contained proven or 

possible fraud. 

The latest GAO assessment of this problem, released in December 2015 

http://www.gao.govfassets/680/67394l.pdf- concluded that "DHS and the U.S. Department of 

Justice (DOJ) have limited capabilities to detect and prevent asylum fraud" despite dedicated 

antifraud entities. It said asylum officers in seven of eight asylum offices conceded they had 

granted asylum in eases in which they suspected fraud. 

To date, the GAO assessment stated that a mere 35 United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USCIS) officers are deployed across all eight asylum oHices conducting background 

checks to resolve national security "hits" and fraud concerns. Another finding was that USCJS 

still provides limited fraud training for asylum officers and has no plan for determining how 

much training is needed. 

Adding to the concern that threats and vulnerabilities are not being adequately addressed, 

according to GAO, DHS and DOJ rarely prosecute asylum fraud. Federal law enforcement 

agencies, such as ICE's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), rarely investigate the asylum 

fraud referrals they receive. Four of the eight USCIS offices only referred 0 or 1 asylum fraud 

case to HSI from 2010 to 2014. One office reported HSI had not accepted a referral since 2010. 

Another office reported that HSI had not accepted a referral in the previous two years and that 

the local U.S. Attorney's office does not accept referrals. The 2015 GAO study also found that 

USCIS has never assessed fraud risks. and still has no approach for assessing fraud risk. 

The 2015 NPS study noted media reporting to the effect that when hundreds of Syrian war 

refugees began crossing the Mexico-California border in 2012 after traveling on Mexican tourist 

visas, and claimed asylum, concerns were expressed about whether or not the security vetting 

process was capable of identifying Islamic extremists who might be among them. 

Lastly, the NPS study concluded that research had uncovered "a surprising number of terrorism 

reference points associated with SlAs and their smugglers." (p.l35) Among the more prevalent 

of these were Somalis, who crossed the southern border and were later accused in court 

proceedings of terrorism involvements while halfway through or all the way through the asylum 

process. (p. 1, and pp. 135-136). Other public infonnation the NPS study found during research 

included crossings by members of Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers, and two purported members of a 

Bangladesh teJTorist organization. (p. 84) 

This infonnation is worthy of attention and consideration by our nation's leaders and 

policymakers, because if these vulnerabilities are left unchecked, it will allow opportunities for 

heinous criminals, including potential terrorist organizations and lone wolf actors, to exploit our 

international border, unlawfully enter the country and cany out their illicit activities. 

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In Texas, we see the exploitation of the security gaps along our border by Mexican cartels and 

their counterparts on a daily basis. The current epicenter of human and drug smuggling activity is 

the Rio Grande Valley of Texas, which is further complicated by the recent surge of migrants 

from Central America and Cuba along the Southern border. As mentioned previously, the state of 

Texas leadership has repeatedly called upon the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

for additional assets and resources for the U.S. Border Patrol and the Office of Field Operations 

to strengthen our border defenses and combat transnational criminal activity along the TexasMexico border. Unfortunately, even the September 2015 request from Governor Abbott to DHS 

for additional aerial observation and other resources has gone unfulfilled. As a result, in 

December 2015, Governor Abbott directed the following actions: 

• Extend the deployment of the National Guard troops at strategic locations on the 

border intended to reduce illegal entry; 

• Instruct the Texas Department of Public Safety to coordinate with the Texas Parks & 

Wildlife Department to increase the number of boats and tactical officers at strategic 

locations on the Rio Grande River; 

• Instruct the Department of Public Safety to increase aerial observation missions to aid 

interdiction efforts; 

• Provide Grants to Ellis and Rockwall counties to aid their efforts to respond to the 

unexpected relocation of unaccompanied minors to their counties. 

• Re-urge the Department of Homeland Security to increase border patrol agents in Texas. 

Most recently, DHS requested a 50 percent reduction of persistent aerial detection, situational 

awareness, and monitoring support for Operation Phalanx from the Department of Defense. This 

request is troubling, given the additional resources requested by Governor Abbott last 

September. Any decrease in aerial observation is not only imprudent, but contradicts the very 

mission of comprehensive border security enforcement. Just last month, Governor Abbott joined 

Texas Congressman Henry Cuellar, whose district is losing 50 percent of the aerial surveillance 

referenced above, in requesting that DHS explain why the federal government is pulling back on 

border enforcement. Texas provides extensive manpower, resources and oversight in support of 

Operation Phalanx, and expects the federal government to similarly fulfill its obligation to secure 

the border. 

Despite this setback caused by the federal government -the very entity responsible for securing 

our nation's border with the support from our state's leadership, DPS will continue working 

with its local and federal partners to target transnational criminal activity including dmg 

trafficking, labor trafficking, sex trafficking and money laundering in key Texas transshipment 

and trafficking centers and other impacted areas throughout the state. As discussed, Governor 

Abbott and the Texas Legislature have invested a substantial amount of state resources in border 

security at a time when the state has many other vital priorities such as education, transportation 

and public health; however, there is an understanding in Texas that protecting our citizens is a 

fundamental duty of the government, and they have conunittcd to doing whatever is necessary to 

protect the people of Texas. That said, make no mistake that Governor Abbott and the Texas 

6 
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Legislature fully expect to be reimbursed by the federal government as this action would not be 

necessary if the federal government fulfilled its obligation to secure our nation's border. 

In Texas, we understand the importance of close partnerships and unity of effort in combating 

crime and terrorism. It is important to note that it is our local law enforcement community along 

the Texas/Mexico border also serves on the front line in protecting our citizens from 

transnational crime. To that end, we have combined the capabilities and expertise of border 

sheriffs, chiefs of police, Texas Military Forces, and other essential state and local law 

enforcement agencies, including constables and state game wardens, to provide direct assistance 

to the U.S. Border Patrol with their vitally important mission. 

In addition, the type and amount of resources that DPS has committed to this critical federal 

mission does not adequately reflect the substantial additional resources provided by local law 

enforcement, Texas Military Forces and Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. Texas employs a 

unified command structure to coordinate ground, marine, and air resources around-the-clock, and 

we have developed contingency plans to address myriad transnational threats. Importantly, we 

enhance the impact of border security operations by degrading the smuggling structure operating 

within our border communities through multiagency investigations and prosecutions that target 

key drug and human smuggling networks essential to cartel operations. 

The impact of Operation Secure Texas reaches far beyond the immediate border area, because as 

we know, human and drug trafficking impact the entire country and represents a threat to both 

public safety and national security. 

For instance, if a community in this country has a drug problem - such as the cmTent heroin 

addiction epidemic and substantial increase of heroin-related deaths in the northeast region of 

United States- they have a Mexican Cartel and unsecure border problem; and if a community is 

plagued by transnational gangs such as MS-!3 and MS-18, they have an unsecure border 

problem. 

Rather than waiting for the effects of Mexican cartel activity to further penetrate Texas 

communities and other states, Texas has chosen to fight the problem at the source the porous 

border with Mexico. The foremost priority of Texas Sheriffs, Chiefs of Police and other local 

and state law enforcement agencies in the Texas border region has been and will continue to be 

the protection of its citizens from all threats including transnational crime, and our second 

priority is to assist the U.S. Border Patrol in securing the Texas-Mexico border, which directly 

relates to our first priority. 

I would also like to recognize and commend the brave men and women of the U. S. Border 

Patrol for their laudable actions in addressing their formidable responsibilities with the limited 

resources they have been provided. We are grateful for their dedication to keeping our nation 

safe from an aiTay of public safety and homeland security threats, while facing incredible 

challenges every day. 

7 
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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 19 here 23641.019

Lastly, I would like to thank you, Chairman Meadows, Chairman DeSantis and the other 

distinguished members for your unwavering commitment to addressing the security 

vulnerabilities at our nation's borders, which underscore the need for immediate federal action to 

ensure the safety of all Americans. 

[Attached is the strategic intent, activity and the current level of DPS resources dedicated to the 

ongoing surge operation in Texas.] 

[INSERT FEB 2016 DASHBOARD HERE] 

8 
30 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 20 here 23641.020

Texas Border Security 

February 2016 

Strategic Intent 

The Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) will work with its local and state partners to 

provide direct assistance to U.S. Customs and Border Protection to deter, detect and 

interdict smuggling along the Texas/Mexico border through the deployment of an integrated 

network of detection and communication technologies and an increase in ground, air and 

marine interdiction assets. 

DPS will work with its local and federal partners and the Border Prosecution Unit to degrade the 

smuggling infrastructure used by the cartel plaza bosses to smuggle drugs and people into 

Texas. 

The Texas Rangers will work with the Border Prosecution Unit and our federal partners to deter 

smuggling related corruption along the border by increasing the number of public corruption 

investigations, arrests and prosecutions. 

DPS will work with its local and federal partners to target transnational criminal activity including 

drug trafficking, labor trafficking, sex trafficking and money laundering in key Texas 

transshipment and trafficking centers and other impacted areas throughout the state. 

(I) DPS Deterrence and Detection Assets Deployed 

DPS continues to enhance the level of detection coverage directly on the border with increases 

in tactical boats, the deployment of motion detection cameras, increases in camera installation 

capacity, increases in the number of helicopters capable of using FLIR day and night. assessing 

the viability of contracting for Aerostat coverage, acquisition of a high-altitude border 

surveillance aircraft, and the integration of all essential detection. tracking and communication 

technologies. 

A. DPS Maritime Assets 

The State of Texas has deployed DPS and TPWD boats on the Rio Grande River to deter and 

detect smuggling activity. 

DPS Boats Assigned to the Border: 
31 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 21 here 23641.021

Full-time Personnel: 22 

Personnel Temporarily Deployed to OST: 18 

Additional Overtime FTE Equivalents from working OT: 30 

DPS Officers temporarily deployed to the border work 12-14 hour shifts with no days off to 

increase coverage. 

Total Personnel Strength: 70 

B. Ground Sensors 

The State of Texas does not have motion-detection ground sensors; however, U.S. Border 

Patrol sensors are monitored by DPS Aircraft that receive direct alerts when activated, and DPS 

Aircraft provide confirmation and coordinate interdiction efforts. 

C. Detection Cameras 

The State of Texas has implemented a camera detection program leveraging low-cost, highcapability motion-detection and low-light camera technology. Through this program, detections 

are immediately relayed to U.S. Border Patrol and DPS Command Posts, and directly to 

interdiction assets on the ground and DPS surveillance aircraft. The Texas Rangers and the 

U.S. Border Patrol work closely together to dramatically expand the ability to detect smuggling 

events in real time through this program. 

i. DPS Installation Team 

U.S. Border Patrol Technical Agents have installed and provided maintenance service for the 

vast majority of these cameras to date. Most recently, the DPS Special Operations Group has 

provided installation support to U.S. Border Patrol. To further increase capacity, DPS has 

established an installation team using Texas State Guard personnel. 

Number of New Installations in January 2016: 

Texas State Guard Personnel Assigned: 

ii. Detection Cameras Deployed* 

44 

13 

614 

386 

7 

19 

2,342 

341 

26 

prior to operational period beginning June 2014 for a total of 

2 
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D. Aerostats 

Aerostats are buoyant balloons that remain tethered to the ground and are used to provide fixed 

long distance visual and radar coverage of an area. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) currently operate five Aerostats on the border in the Rio Grande Valley. Texas Gov. Greg 

Abbott has requested that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security provide CBP with five 

additional Aerostats to operate on the Texas-Mexico border. 

I ... ~.... (DPS)* 5 5 {CBP) I T~ 5 5 

*DPS' Request for Information to assess viability of the state contracting for increased Aerostat 

coverage is pending. 

E. Aviation Assets 

The State of Texas has deployed DPS and Texas Military Forces aircraft to detect smuggling 

attempts along the Texas-Mexico border and to assist in interdicting those attempts. The fixedwing aircraft receive direct alerts from U.S. Border Patrol ground sensors and DPS motiondetection camera activations, and the helicopters receive the DPS motion-detection camera 

alerts. All DPS aircraft can communicate directly with U.S. Border Patrol Agents and Troopers 

on the ground. 

*DPS helicopters in Longview and Waco have been reassigned to the border. 

**An additional high-altitude aircraft for DPS was approved by the Texas Legislature and is in 

the procurement process. 

Pilots and Tactical Flight Officers Permanently Assigned: 

Pilots and TFOs Temporarily Deployed to OST: 

Additional Overtime FTE Equivalents from working OT: 

Total Personnel Strength: 

(II) Interdiction 

3 

25 

8 

4 

37 

1 
33 


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Once detected, it is important the smugglers either be interdicted or denied entry, which 

requires a well-coordinated and timely law enforcement response that can only be achieved with 

a sufficient number of personnel staffed around the clock. 

A. Troopers 

Troopers Currently Permanently Assigned: 

New Permanent Trooper Positions Hired and Deployed: 

Troopers Temporarily Deployed to OST from other areas: 

Additional Overtime FTE Equivalents from working OT: 

Total Trooper Strength: 

B. Cortina Units 

Cortina Units are joint DPS and U.S. Border Patrol interdiction teams. 

Total Cortina Units 

C. Tactical Operations 

563 

124 

230 

313 

1,230 

30 

DPS Special Operations Group and U.S. Border Patrol Special Operations conduct joint tactical 

operations in remote and high-threat areas. The Texas Rangers oversee DPS tactical 

operations, which include Ranger Recon teams, the DPS Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) 

team, and six Regional Special Response Teams (SRT). 

D. Logistics and Planning 

Logistical and Planning Experts Permanently Assigned: 4 

Logistical and Planning Experts Temporarily Deployed to OST: 4 

Total Personnel Strength: 8 

E. Intelligence and Information Sharing 

The Joint Operations Intelligence Centers (JOIC) centralize all of the border incident data 

across 53 counties and 171 law enforcements agencies to provide a shared view of the threat 

picture and trending patterns. 

Joint Operations Intelligence Centers: 6 

Texas Rangers: 2 

DPS Border Liaison Officers: 6 

State Guard Personnel: 35 

HQ Intelligence Analysts Permanently Assigned: 10 

Border Region Intelligence Analysts Permanently Assigned: 11 

Intelligence Analysts Temporarily Deployed to OST: 4 

4 
34 


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Total Personnel Strength: 68 

F. Communications 

Communications Operators Permanently Assigned: 24 

Communications Operators Temporarily Deployed to OST: 4 

Total Personnel Strength: 28 

(Ill) Targeting the Smuggling Infrastructure 

The arrests of members and associates of smuggling groups and criminal networks operating in 

the border region, such as cartel operatives, statewide and regional gangs, transnational 

criminal gangs, wanted and convicted felons, and criminal aliens, degrades the smuggling 

infrastructure and increases community safety. 

Special Agents Permanently Assigned: 

Special Agents Temporarily Deployed to OST: 

Additional Overtime FTE Equivalents: 

Total Agent Strength: 

167 

25 

61 

253 

Inter-Agency Targeting Team (ITT): 5 U.S. Border Patrol Agents, 2 DPS Special Agents, 1 

Trooper, 1 DPS Intelligence Analyst 

(IV) Targeting Border Corruption 

The Mexican cartels seek to corrupt individuals and institutions on both sides of the border to 

support their smuggling operations. Successful investigations degrade the cartels' smuggling 

ability and serves as an important deterrent to those who would betray public trust and the rule 

of law. 

Texas Rangers Permanently Assigned*: 

Texas Rangers Temporarily Deployed to OST: 

Additional Overtime FTE Equivalents: 

Total Personnel Strength: 

45 

7 

17 

69 

*Texas Rangers also assist local law enforcement agencies in the investigation of major crimes 

such as homicides, kidnappings, robberies and sexual assaults. 

1,214 FTE assigned personnel plus 425 additional overtime FTE equivalents. DPS Officers 

temporarily deployed to the border work 12-14 hour shifts with no days off to increase coverage. 

Total DPS FTE support to OST Operations: 1,763 

*Does not include the number of DPS Special Operations Group Personnel assigned to border 

tactical missions. 

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DPS Operational Activities 

C nmma . . 1/H" h Th t C . . I A IQI rea nmma rrests m t h B d R e or er eg1on 

Lasf69days Last 12 months Operation .total 

·. . (1211$-01/16) (02/15-01/16) .. (6/14-01/16) 

High Threat 272 1,722 2,639 Texas Highway Criminal Arrests• · .. 

Patrol Total Criminal 2,073 12,371 18,523 Arrests 

HighTnrelit 104 767 1,127 OPSSpeeial Criminal.Arrests• 

Agents Total Criminal 381 2,224 3,427 Arrests 

Texas Rangers High Threat 37 272 .· 411 Criminal Arrests• 

High Threat 413 2,761 4,177 Criminal Arrests* DPSTotal_ ... Total Criminal 2,491 14;867 22,361 Arrests 

*Felony OW/, mtox1ca!Jon manslaughter and other ser1ous traff1c offenses, as well as Illegal Alien 

detentions and referrals to U.S. Border Patrol are not included in the arrest statistics above. 

DPSM anne U m "tO Jpera r 1ons 

Last.60 davs(12/15-01/16) .· ... 244 

Lasf12 months {02115-01/16) 1,460 .· 

Operation total (6/14-01/161 ·. 2,232 

DPS Tactical Operations ------ Last 60 days (12/15-01/16) 434 

Last 12 months (02115-01/16) 1,646 . 

Operation total {6/14-01/16) 2,542 

7 
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DPSA ~ppre h ens1on s uppo rt t 0 US B d P or er a t ro I 

Last 60 days Last 12 months Operation total 

(12/15-01/16) (02/15-01/16) (6/14-01116) 

Illegal Alien Detections and Interdiction Assistance 

Cameras 12,078 61,259 86;105 

Aviation 497 5,009 8,527 

Tactical Marine.Unit 87 448 656 

Illegal Alien Detentions and Referrals 

Tactical Marine Unit 207 1,335 2;234 

Texas Hi~hwav Patrol* 187 187 .. 187 

Total Apprehension Support to 13,056 68,238 97,709 U.S. Border Patrol ··. 

*DPS d1d not capture Texas H1ghway Patrol Illegal Alien DetectiOns and Referrals pnor to 

December 1, 2015 and is now being captured state-wide. 

VI a ue o fD rugs S e1ze . d b )y DPS . m th e B d R or er eg1on * 

DPSOnly 

Last 60 days {12/15~01/16) $97,152,3135 

Last12 months (02115-01/16) $643,128,389 

Operation total (6/14-01/16) $1,162,730,501 

* These totals do not mc/ude se1zures where DPS prov1ded d!fect support to another agency. 

c urrency S e1ze . d b )y DPS . m th e B d R or er eg1on * 

OPSOnly 

Last 60 days (12/15·01116) $3, 1{)9,553 

Last 12 months (02/15-01/16) $18,744,757 

Operation total (6/14-01/16) $24,429,715 

*These totals do not mclude se1zures where DPS prov1ded direct support to another agency. 

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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 27 here 23641.027

Smuggling Trends 

The Texas Legislature provides funding to centralize the collection and sharing of border 

incident data across all jurisdictions in the border region, which comprises local, state, and 

federal agencies across 53 counties and more than 171 separate law enforcement agencies in 

the border region. 

Illegal Alien Apprehensions - Last 24 Months 

Feb 2014- Jan 2016 

50,000 -,--~~~~-------·····-···--·------------------~~~-

45,000 +------·-c 

40,000 +-·-···---;# 

35,000 T---:;~""'-·-

30,000 

25,000 

20,000 +--·--------.. ---~~-----.. ----::;;;-""""'"""'---=~""""""--~:":_ __ 15,000 ;, __ , .. - .............................. _., ... _ = ... :.:::~"""'-c·~~=---..................................... _,, ........... _, __ _ 

10,000 +--.. ----~---------··- .. ·--··----------·---------.. ----.. ---··---·-- 5,000 _, _________ , _________ ,,,,., _________ ,.,,_,,. ________________ , ____ _ 

0 +--,_~ .. -,-.--····--~~-,---,~~-,--r-~"'"-r·-:--c~-,-y-~-·~~ 

:::1 "' "' "' ""' ""' ";' ... > C: a. ~ < ~ -=: 

US 8 d P or er a t ro IIAA ppre h ens1ons . m th e 8 d R or er eg1on 

FY 2016 (10/15~01/16)* 89,147 

FY 2015** .· 221,684 

FY 2014** 341,132 

*UnoffiCial US. Border Patrol statistics. * *CBP reconciled apprehensions. Data mcludes El 

Paso Sector, which comprises parts of TX and NM 

US 8 d P or er a t ro IF am1y "I U m "tA ppre h ens1ons m th e 8 d R or er eg1on .. 

FY 2016 (10/1$-01/16)* 20,428 

FY 2015** 32,949 

FY2014** 61,605 

*UnoffiCial US. Border Patrol stattsttcs. **CBP reconciled apprehensiOns. Data mcludes El 

Paso Sector, which comprises parts of TX and NM 

9 
38 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 28 here 23641.028

U.S. Border Patrol Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions in 

th e B d R or er eg10n . 

FY 2016 (10/15-01/16)* 15,962 

FY2015** 31,109 

FY.2014** 58,312 

'' *UnoffiCial U.S. Border Patrol slai1SI1cs. **CBP reconciled apprehensions. Data mcludes El 

Paso Sector, which comprises parts of TX and NM 

10 
39 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 29 here 23641.029

Value of Drugs Seized - Last 24 Months 

Feb 2014- Jan 2016 

$800,000,000.00 

$700,000,000.00 

$600,000,000.00 

$500,000,000.00 

$400,000,000.00 

$300,000,000.00 

$200,000,000.00 

$100,000,000.00 

$-

;:!; 

.:. 

a. 

"" 

"' ;:!; "' .... .1 >- i: 

"' ~ ~ 2 

-RGV --coastal Bend -~Laredo --Del Rio --Marfa Paso 

VI a ue o fD rugs s· e1ze d'thB m e or d R er eg1on 

Last60 days (12{15-01/16} $1 154,506,373 

Last 12 months (02/15-01/16} •. $6,779,361,001 

Operation total(6/14-01/16) $11,573,706,775 

Note: The above border reg1on stat1st1cs represent local, state and federal se1zures. 

11 
40 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 30 here 23641.030

Currency Seized - Last 24 Months 

Feb 2014- Jan 2016 

7,000,000.00 .,.-----------------------·----·---------

6,000,000.00 -1---·-----·-··-·-···-·····---------·----llr-· 

5,000,000.00 +---------------·-·-------·-··--1-l--·---·-------

4,000,000.00 +----·------------------t-+----

0.00 

"' "' "' "' :"; ; "' "' 1 :"; :"; ~ "' "' ~ "' ~ ~ "' ~ ~ ..-< '2 ..-< ,.... ,.... ..-< ..-< ..-< ,.... ..-< 

.6 '- > § ~ Oo 6. ::. v ~ .6 '- '- > c ~ Oo 6. 

.:1: ~ a. 

~ ::> <l! c'5 0 <l! .:1: ~ a. "' ~ ::> <l! <J: <J: Vl z CJ < c'5 2' <J: V) 

--RGV --coastal Bend ~-Laredo --Del Rio 

Currency Seized in t e h B d R or er egion 

Last 60 days (12/15-01/16) $3,776,160 

Last 12 months {02/15·01/16) $28,886,206 

Operation total (6/14-01/16) $38,821,097 

Note: The above border reg1on stat1st1cs represent local, state and federal se1zures. 

12 
41 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Judd, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF BRANDON JUDD 

Mr. JUDD. Chairman DeSantis, Chairman Meadows, Ranking 

Member Lynch, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf of 

the 16,500 Border Patrol agents which I represent. 

I am going to stick to my comments on the national security 

threat of the border and leave out the rhetoric and what might 

have led to it. But what I will tell you is that the Obama administration and CBP Commissioner Kerlikowske have repeatedly told 

the American public that the border is more secure today than it 

has ever been. As a Border Patrol agent, I will tell you the exact 

opposite. 

Commissioner Kerlikowske and the administration have pointed 

to a decrease in arrests over the past several years, but they failed 

to give the American public key indicators such as the number of 

arrests of persons from countries with known terrorist ties or from 

countries that compete economically with our interests. 

In all of fiscal year 2015, the United States Border Patrol arrested five persons from Afghanistan, 57 from Pakistan, and 1,327 

from the People’s Republic of China. Already in the first 5 months 

of this fiscal year, the United States Border Patrol has arrested 18 

from Afghanistan—the first quarter, five of all last year, the first 

quarter—18 from Afghanistan, 79 from Pakistan—all of 2015, 

again, was 18—and 619 from the People’s Republic of China. Those 

numbers should alarm everyone. 

We are seeing a similar trend from other key countries like Albania, Bangladesh, and Brazil. 

If the single factor for the litmus test is lower numbers, then 

compared to fiscal year 2015, one must conclude we are failing. 

As someone who has been involved in border protection for over 

18 years, I can unequivocally tell you the border is not secure, and 

the situation is getting worse instead of better. 

Arrests are not the only factor in determining whether the border is secure. We have to look at the totality of the situation, such 

as violence, the number of persons evading arrest, and whether organized crime continues to turn a profit. 

In the context of the times, we must also look at whether persons 

from country who would do us harm are able to exploit our weaknesses through our policies or the lack of manpower on the border. 

It is well-documented that criminal cartels control the border in 

the same way inmates control most prison facilities. The cartels are 

extremely well-organized, pathologically violent, and have an entire 

infrastructure on both sides of the border. 

In Mexico, it is estimated that over 150,000 people have been 

killed in cartel-related violence. They have killed police officers, 

judges, elected officials, and ordinary civilians who have crossed 

their path. 

This is the opponent Border Patrol agents face daily. It is an opponent that controls all aspects of border crimes, including narcotics and illegal immigrant smuggling. 

One key way to determine whether the cartels are winning is to 

analyze key data of entries to arrest. Two weeks ago, I was visiting 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
42 

a station in the Del Rio Border Patrol sector. During that week 

that I was there—I was there 1 day, but during that week in which 

I was there, a total of 157 known entries came into the United 

States through that station’s area of responsibility. 

Of those 157: 74 were arrested; 54 were known to have evaded 

arrest and furthered their entry into the United States; 17 were 

able to evade arrest and make it back to Mexico; and 12 were still 

outstanding and unaccounted for. 

That is a 47 percent arrest rate. That is not very good. 

But it’s not the Border Patrol agents’ fault. We’re just simply 

overmanned. We don’t have the resources that are necessary. 

In fact, yesterday I received an email from an agent in Arizona, 

and that email said that there was a 10-mile stretch for 2 days, 

and this is documented on the reports from the Border Patrol management, a 10-mile stretch of border that was unmanned for 2 

whole days. 

Criminal cartels were able to go to the fence, cut a hole in the 

fence, drive two vehicles through that hole and escape. They were 

able then to put the fence back up and try to hide the cuts that 

they had made. 

Border Patrol agents were able to go down and see the vehicle 

tracks. There was actually a camera that did catch the two vehicles 

on the border. They didn’t see the vehicle drive through the border, 

but the tracks clearly indicate that it was, and there was no were 

no other vehicles coming from east, so it had to be those two vehicles that crossed the border. 

The scariest part of those vehicles entering into the United 

States is we don’t know what was in this vehicles. We have no 

idea. 

Of those persons that were able to evade arrest in this Del Rio 

station, those 54 and the 12 outstanding, we don’t know where they 

were from. 

It’s unfortunate that we’re currently in this situation in which it 

appears that we invite what we’re currently experiencing. And because we are overmanned—and it’s not that they didn’t want to 

man the border in these two areas in Arizona that this vehicle 

drove through, they just didn’t have the manpower to do it. That 

is the unfortunate situation today. 

I look forward to answering any and all of your questions. Thank 

you very much. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Judd follows:] 


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National Border Patrol Council 

Testimony of Brandon Judd 

On behalf of the 

National Border Patrol Council 

In front of The Oversight and Government Affairs Committee, 

Subcommittee on National Security 

March 23, 2016 

Chainnan DeSantis and Ranking Member Lynch thank you for providing me the opporiunity to 

testify on behalf of the National Border Patrol Council (NBPC). 

The NBPC represents the interests of 16,500 line Agents at the Border Patrol. My name is 

Brandon Judd and I am President of the Council. I have been a Border Patrol Agent for 

nearly 20 years and although I am currently assigned in Montana, I have worked the 

majority of my career in the El Centro California and Tucson Arizona sectors. 

Current Situation on the Border 

The Obama Administration and CBP Commissioner Kerlikowske have repeatedly told the 

American Public that the border is more secure today than it's ever been. As a Border 

Patrol Agent, l will tell you the exact opposite. Commissioner Kerlikowske and the 

administration have pointed to a decrease in arrests over the past several years, but they 

fail to give the American public key indicators such as the number of arrests of persons 

from countries with known terrorist ties or from countries that compete economically with 

our interests. In all of Fiscal Year 2015, the United States Border Patrol arrested 5 persons 

from Afghanistan, 57 from Pakistan and 1,327 from the Peoples Republic of China. Already 

in the first five months of this fiscal year, the United States Border Patrol has arrested 18 

from Afghanistan, 79 from Pakistan and 619 from the Peoples Republic of China. Those 

numbers should alarm everyone and we are seeing a similar trend from other key 

countries like Albania, Bangladesh and Brazil. If the single factor for the litmus test is lower 

numbers, then compared to fiscal year 2015, one must conclude that we are failing. 

As someone who has been involved in border protection for over 18 years, I can 

unequivocally tell you the border is not secure and the situation is getting worse instead of 

better. Arrests are not the only factor in determining whether the border is secure. We 

have to look at the totality of the situation such as violence, the number of persons evading 

arrest and whether organized crime continues to turn a profit. In the context of the times, 

we must also look at whether persons from countries who would do us harm are able to 

exploit our weaknesses, through our policies or the lack of manpower on the border. 
44 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 32 here 23641.032

It is well documented that criminal cartels control the border in the same way inmates 

control most prison facilities. The cartels are extremely well organized, pathologically 

violent and have an entire infrastructure on both sides of the border. In Mexico, it is 

estimated that over 150,000 people have been killed in cartel related violence. They have 

killed police officers, judges, elected officials, and ordinary civilians who have crossed their 

path. And this is the opponent Border Patrol Agents face daily. It is an opponent that 

controls all aspects of border crimes, including narcotics and illegal immigrant smuggling. 

One key way to determine whether the cartels are winning is to analyze key data of entries 

to arrest. 

Two weeks ago, I was visiting a station in the Del Rio Border Patrol Sector. During the two 

weeks in question, the station had a total of 157 known entries, of which 7 4 were arrested, 

54 were known to have evaded arrest and furthered their entry into the United States, 17 

were able to evade arrest and make it back into Mexico, and 12 were still outstanding and 

unaccounted for. Simply put, Border Patrol Agents are being overwhelmed and not being 

given the resources necessary to complete the mission and the cartels are making a profit. 

The scariest part of these statistics is that of those who got away, we don't know who they 

are or from what country they came. 

Administration Policies are another area in which cartels are able to exploit our 

weaknesses. The new prosecutorial discretion guidelines determine whether or not we 

release someone with a notice to appear, without a notice to appear or hold them in our 

custody until deportation proceedings commence. This is another key factor. Since january 

of 2015, it is my understanding that the United States Border Patrol, due to DHS 

prosecutorial discretion guidelines, released more than 3,800 illegal aliens who were in our 

custody and were subject to deportation proceedings. These 3,800 persons were from 

countries all over the globe such as India, China, the United Kingdom, Brazil, etc. They were 

released simply because they claimed to have been in the United States continuously since 

january of 2014 and were not issued a notice to appear. This is amnesty through policy. In 

short, the administration is choosing to bypass congress whose job it is to determine the 

laws by legislating through policy. 

Why this disconnect between the reality of what Border Patrol Agents see every day and 

what you are being told here in Washington by the Administration? Unfortunately, I 

believe that it is politics. 

One of the main arguments used against immigration reform last Congress was that if you 

provided legal status to illegal immigrants, you would only be incentivizing the next wave 

of illegal immigrants. That is what happened after Congress passed the Immigration 

Reform Control Act (I RCA) of 1986. The year before Congress passed !RCA, the Border 

Patrol was apprehending approximately 1 million illegal aliens per year. The year !RCA 

passed this figure jumped to 1.6 million. 

The Administration in their desire to pass comprehensive immigration reform, told 

Congress and the American people that this time it would be different. It was different 

because the border was secure and even if there was a wave, we could stop it. The 
45 


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Administration boasted that Border Patrol catches more than 75 percent of the border 

crossers. 

The problem was that these assertions had no basis in reality. If you ask any Border Patrol 

Agent what we catch, they will tell you it is no more than 40 percent of the traffic on the 

southern border. On the northern border, that figure is probably less than 10 percent 

because we only have 300 Border Patrol Agents on duty at any one time. This is for a 

northern border that is 4,000 miles long. 

The "border is secure" was the Administration's sales pitch and the problem now is that 

they cannot walk it back. The Administration cannot ask for more Border Patrol Agents or 

resources because they have painted themselves into a corner. For the field Agents that I 

represent, this is completely unacceptable. You cannot begin to fix a problem until you 

admit that a problem exists. 

Steps that can be taken 

There are a number of factors that are driving most of the traffic we are seeing. Many point to 

the endemic violence in Central America. Without a doubt, violence and instability in Central 

America is a factor and about 50 percent of the traffic now consists of Central Americans. It is 

not however the primary factor driving this migration. 

When Border Patrol Agents arrest illegal immigrants, we interview them. Most illegal 

immigrants believe that they will either not be caught, or even if they are caught, they will not be 

deported back to their home country. Most believe, especially family units, that they will simply 

be issued a Notice to Appear (NT A) and will be released. 

The second driver is the idea that they need to get here before some ambiguous deadline. Some 

of them do not even know when the deadline is, only that they need to beat it if they want to stay 

permanently in the United States. We call this the myth of the "permisso" and it is most likely 

being advanced by the drug cartels that control all the illegal alien and drug smuggling along the 

border. 

For the cartels, human smuggling is big business worth hundreds of millions of dollars each year. 

Most aliens are paying close to $10,000 per person. Higher value aliens, such of those from the 

Middle East or Asia, pay almost double this figure. These unaccompanied minors and family 

groups also serve another more lucrative purpose. They arc human screens that tie up Border 

Patrol Agents while the cartels smuggle narcotics and higher value aliens behind them who, if 

caught, will be deported back to their home country. 

If there is one thing that could be done to correct this problem, it would be to end the catch and 

release policy we cun·ently have. The individuals that we apprehend are not foolish. Before 

investing nearly a lifetime in savings, they weigh the costs and benefits of attempting to cross the 

border. If they knew that if they were caught they would be detained, adjudicated, and 

repatriated to their home country, the calculation changes dramatically. I guarantee that if this 

was the case, the numbers would fall dramatically. 
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The second action deals with resources. As I stated earlier, at best we are apprehending 40 

percent of the illegal immigrants crossing. This low capture rate leaves the perception that 

crossing the border illegally is a viable option. I am happy to discuss this in greater detail during 

the question and answer period, but we need more manpower to do our job. 

Another disturbing trend is the rise of criminal aliens. Twenty years ago, the individuals we 

were arresting were hard working people that simply wanted to earn money for their 

family. Across the southwest border, we are finding today that about 20 percent of the 

individuals apprehended have been previously criminally deported. I was in San Diego last 

month and the Agents there told me that some nights the percentage of criminal aliens is 

well over 50 percent. Again, the numbers of apprehensions are lower, but the mix of 

hardened criminals is completely different from what we have previously seen. 

Today our largest trouble area is in Texas. Criminal cartels are once again proving adept at 

understanding and working around our policies. Late in the year of 2013 and throughout 

all of 2014, an unprecedented number of unaccompanied minors entered our country 

illegally through the Rio Grande Valley Sector of operations. Instead of presenting 

themselves legally at Ports of Entry and asking for asylum, the unaccompanied minors 

were forced by the cartels to enter illegally at dangerous points along the border. In most 

cases, these minors were not trying to escape or evade apprehension; they were simply 

crossing the border illegally and giving themselves up. 

The cartels understood that the unaccompanied minors would force the Border Patrol to 

deploy Agents to these crossing areas in order to take the minors into custody. I want to 

stress this point because it has been completely overlooked by the press. The 

unaccompanied minors could have walked right up to the Port of Entry and asked for 

asylum. Why did the cartels drive them to the middle of the desert and then have them 

cross over the Rio Grande, only to surrender to the first Border Patrol Agent they carne 

across? The reason is that it completely tied up our manpower and allowed the cartels to 

smuggle whatever they wanted across our border. 

The creation of holes in Border Patrol operations was only one benefit to the cartels by the 

unaccompanied minor surge. The other was the exploration of our "catch and release" 

policy. As this surge became too much to handle, the Border Patrol and the Enforcement 

and Removal Office began releasing nearly everyone we arrested. 

I believe this release allowed the cartels to increase their smuggling profits. With catch and 

release, the cartels could credibly say to potential customers that they would be able to 

remain in the United States without fear of deportation, as long as they asked for asylum 

upon being apprehended. Although the problem began with unaccompanied minors, as 

word quickly spread of everyone being released, we started to see more crossings of 

complete family units, leading to a bigger problem than what we had in 2014. And once 

again, we are playing catchup to a problem that in part we created through policy. 

All individuals that were released during this period of time were given an official 

document that ordered them to appear before an immigration judge at some future 

date. These orders are called Notices to Appear (NTA). The only problem however, is that 

these official orders are usually ignored, so much so that Border Patrol Agents have dubbed 
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them Notices to Disappear. The latest data that I have seen shows that approximately 40 

percent of the individuals being issued NT As do not show up. 

The willful failure to show up for court appearances by persons that were arrested and 

released by the Border Patrol has become an extreme embarrassment for the Department 

of Homeland Security. It has been so embarrassing that DHS and the U.S. Attorney's office 

has come up with a new policy. 

Simply put, the policy makes mandatory the release, without an NTA, of any person 

arrested by the Border Patrol for being in the country illegally, as long as they do not have a 

previous felony arrest conviction and as long as they claim to have been continuously in the 

United States since January of 2014. The operative word in this policy is "claim." The 

policy does not require the person to prove they have been here, which is the same burden 

placed on them during deportation proceedings. Instead, it simply requires them to claim 

to have been here since January of2014. 

Not only do we release these individuals that by law are subject to removal proceedings, 

we do it without any means of tracking their whereabouts. Agents believe this exploitable 

policy was set in place because DHS was embarrassed at the sheer number of those who 

choose not to follow the law by showing up for their court appearances. In essence, we pull 

these persons out of the shadows and into the light just to release them right back to those 

same shadows from whence they came. 

Let me give you an example from my sector in Montana. Several months ago we arrested 

an illegal alien with a felony domestic violence arrest from another state. He was released 

because his trial had not occurred and therefore had not been convicted. Mind you he had 

not been acquitted either, but we had to let him go all the same. 

Under the law he should have been set up for removal proceedings, but under the policy he 

was let go. And he was let go even though he first proved that he cared so little about our 

laws that he entered the United States illegally, and once here, he proved further disdain by 

getting arrested for a serious violent act against another. What did we teach him and 

everyone else he undoubtedly told about his experience? We taught him our laws mean 

very little, but policies mean everything. 

Immigration laws today appear to be mere suggestions. There are little or no 

consequences for breaking the laws and that fact is well known in other countries. If 

government agencies like DHS or CBP are allowed to bypass Congress by legislating 

through policy, we might as well abolish our immigration laws altogether. 

I believe it is all our hope that people choose to govern themselves by honoring and 

sustaining the laws without compulsion. However if they do not, there must be a 

consequences and an enforcement mechanism that oversees compliance. In the absence of 

consequences and enforceable laws, innocent people are hurt, criminals are rewarded, 

chaos abounds, and cartels reap huge financial benefits. 

!look forward to answering any of your questions. 
48 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Professor Jan Ting, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JAN C. TING 

Mr. TING. I share the comments of my copanelists. Thanks to the 

two subcommittee chairmen and all the members for inviting us 

here today. 

I also share the concern over the statistical information that the 

members, particularly Mr. Meadows, have referred to. And I share 

the concern that Mr. Judd has just expressed about the situation 

at our border. 

I want to talk about two issues, in particular, expedited removal 

and credible fear, that I think bear on the concern that many of 

us here share. 

Prior to 1996, we had no expedited removal, and arriving aliens 

in the United States could basically stay for a long time by making 

an asylum claim. There was an enormous backlog, and they were 

put in line and released on their own recognizance. 

There was also a 60 Minutes piece which showed that people 

were landing at Kennedy Airport every single day without documentation and being released into the general population. That I 

think pushed Congress in 1996 to enact expedited removal, which 

on its face provides a way to turn arriving aliens around who lack 

any documentation. 

The problem is, as I discuss in my written comments, in one of 

the classic bipartisan compromises for which Congress is alternately praised and condemned, Congress enacted expedited removal in a way that provides that if the—first of all, they did two 

things. 

First of all, they determined that the first interview would be a 

credible fear interview. In the end, even though they tried to take 

the immigration judges out, as I discuss in my written comments, 

the immigration judges get back into the process anyway. So while 

it looks good on its face, expedited removal in practice hasn’t 

worked out very well, even though it has been expanded not just 

to arriving aliens but within 100 miles of the border. 

So expedited removal is potentially a useful tool, but it’s hobbled 

by this credible fear determination and by the ultimate right to 

delay removal by an appeal to an immigration judge. So there are 

two problems. 

I talked in my written comments about credible fear, and where 

did credible fear come from anyway? I have some knowledge about 

that, because I know that in 1991 in the midst of the Haitian migrant crisis, when we had a lot of Haitians heading for the United 

States, we were trying to kind of in a chaotic situation manage that 

flow and provide asylum interviews for people. It was very difficult. 

In fact, we started operating the detention facilities at Guantanamo in an effort to cope with that migrant crisis. 

And the Immigration and Naturalization Service invented credible fear kind of on-the-fly as a way of screening out people who 

obviously were not entitled to asylum. If people couldn’t even 

present a story, which, if true, would entitle them to asylum, we 

determined that they could be turned around immediately and returned to Haiti without a full-blown asylum interview. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
49 

On the other hand, for those people who could articulate a coherent story that seemed credible, they would be allowed to advance 

to a full-blown asylum interview, recognizing there was a backlog 

for that and it would slow the process down. But for those people, 

they would get the full asylum interview. 

As it turns out, that credible fear practice was very short-lived, 

because the numbers were so enormous that President Bush, 

George H.W. Bush, determined that we couldn’t continue processing migrants from Haiti. And he determined that they would all 

be returned to Haiti without any processing at all. 

Obviously, that was challenged by many advocates and went all 

the way to the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Supreme Court of the United States in 8-to-1 decision in a case called 

Sale v. United States, which I cite in my written remarks, the Supreme Court of the United States held that that was fine, that the 

United States had no obligation under its own laws or under international law to conduct asylum interviews on the high seas. 

So credible fear was a temporary measure that probably wasn’t 

even necessary in the end. It only lasted for a few months. 

And I was startled to see credible fear appear in the statute of 

the United States as part of our expedited removal process. When 

expedited removal came in, credible fear shows up in the statute. 

Where does that come from? 

So while it was invented as a device to screen out migrants, as 

has been commented on, it’s being used now as a device to screen 

people in, so they don’t have to actually approve their asylum 

claims. All they have to do is state a credible fear and they are basically in. They join the queue for an immigration judge, so they 

can make their asylum claim in removal proceedings. And we know 

that can sometimes take a long time. 

And that the word is out, this is how you do it. You make a good 

credible fear claim and you’re in. In this age of modern, instantaneous communications, that word spreads quickly. 

So I am very concerned about that. And I have a number of proposals. I’m over time already, but I do want to say, I think we need 

to train more asylum officers. We ought to train all of our immigration offices, including Border Patrol agents, in asylum law, and we 

ought to have them do asylum interviews. 

I think we ought to, as I propose in my written comments, remove credible fear from the statute. It doesn’t belong there. We 

should go straight to an asylum interview. And we ought to have 

enough asylum officers, including trained Border Patrol agents and 

other Customs and Border Patrol officers, to do that. 

I have other recommendations, and I refer you to my written 

comments. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Ting follows:] 


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Testimony of Jan C. Ting 

Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law, Philadelphia (Former Assistant 

Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice) 

United States House of Representatives 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittees on National Security and Government Operations 

March 23,2016, Rayburn House Office Building 2154,9 a.m. 

''National Security: Threats at Our Borders" 

I. Introduction 

I thank Chairman DeSantis and Chairman Meadows and all the members of 

Subcommittees on National Security and Government Operations of the U.S. House of 

Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform for the invitation and 

opportunity to testify today on the adequacy and enforcement of our nation's immigration laws. 

I commend the two subcommittees for holding this hearing in light of the December 2015 

report of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) finding limited capabilities at both 

USCIS and EOIR to detect asylum fraud, reliance on a paper-based system for asylum 

applications at USCIS, and the absence of clear and specific fraud detection responsibilities for 

USCIS asylum officers. 1 Committee members are aware that in FY 2014 there was an 

unprecedented surge of unaccompanied alien minors (UAMs) and alien tninors accompanied by 

alien adults claiming to be parents (family units), nearly 137,000 aliens in these two categories, 

who illegally entered the United States through our southern border.2 Initial reports suggest that 

we are headed for an even greater surge ofUAMs and family units projected to illegally enter the 

United States in FY 2016.3 

1 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GA0-16-50, "ASYLUM: Additional Actions Needed to Assess and Address 

Fraud Risks" (2015). See also Dan Cadman, "GAO Vets Asylum Vetting and Finds It Lacking", Center for 

Immigration Studies, Dec. 9, 2015, http://cis.org/cadman/gao-vets-asylum-vetting-and-finds-it-lacking. 

2 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children FY 2014", 

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2014. 

3 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "United States Border Patrol Southwest Family Unit Subject and 

Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016", http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwestljPage 
51 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 37 here 23641.037

It seems almost self-evident that bureaucratic weaknesses in our border security 

combined with high numbers of undocumented aliens attempting to illegally enter the United 

States present compelling opportunities for foreign terrorists and criminals to gain entry to this 

country, and an enormous security risk for the American people. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has reportedly apprehended members of 

known Islamist terror organizations crossing our southern border, including Somali members of 

al-Shabab and other terrorist groups in Somalia, and members of terrorist organizations in Sri 

Lanka and Bangladesh. Undocumented aliens from 35 countries in the Middle East and Asia 

have been arrested in the Rio Grande Valley in recent years. 4 Syrians in possession of stolen 

European passports intending to gain entry to the U.S. have been reported arrested in Central 

America/ and Syrians have been arrested at our southern border.6 

So the concern of Congress for border security and how it can be improved is both timely 

and appreciated. 

II. Expedited Removal 

Before 1996, unauthorized aliens arriving in the U.S. could delay their removal by 

making a claim for asylum, which because of backlogs in processing and a shortage of detention 

space, often resulted in release on their own recognizance with an order to appear for a removal 

hearing before an immigration judge at a later date when their asylum claim would be 

considered. Most such arriving aliens failed to comply with their orders to appear for their 

scheduled hearing. In a famous report on the television program "60 Minutes" on CBS, Leslie 

Stahl showed that undocumented aliens were arriving at Kennedy International Airport every 

single day, and were routinely being released into the population the day of their arrival without 

any background check or assurance that they would appear for their scheduled hearing. 

border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016. See also Caroline May, "Border Surge Accelerates- On Pace to Exceed 

177,000 Migrants By End of Fiscal Year", January 12, 2016, http://www.breitbart.com/biggovernment/2016/01/12/border-surge-accelerates-on-pace-to-exceed-177000-migrants-by-end-of-fiscal-year . 

4 "Texas Officials Warn of Immigrants with Terrorist Ties Crossing Southern Border", Washington Post, Feb. 26, 

2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/02/26/texas-officials-warn-of-immigrants-withterrorist-ties-crossing-southern-border . 

5 Alan Gomez, "Report: U.S.-bound Syrians arrested in Honduras with fake passports", USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 2015, 

http://www.usatoday.com/storv/news/world/2015/11/18/report-us-bound-syrians-arrested-honduras-fakepassports/76016812/ . 

6 Beth Breeding, "Goodlatte & Grassley Press DHS for Info on Threat of Isis Entering U.S. at SW Border'', Nov. 24, 

2015, http://goodlatte.house.gov/press releases/818 . 

21Page 
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In 1996 Congress responded to that situation by enacting "expedited removal" for 

arriving aliens who either lacked proper documentation or engaged in misrepresentation in 

attempting to enter the U.S., a reform which had long been requested by U.S. immigration 

enforcement authorities. The new provision nominally provided for the removal of such aliens 

without a formal removal hearing and without the order of an immigration judge. 

But in one of the classic bi-partisan compromises for which Congress is alternately 

praised and condemned, Congress combined tough, mandatory removal with an enormous 

loophole. The statute enacted by Congress provided that, "If an immigration officer determines 

that an alien ... who is arriving in the United States or is described in clause (iii) is inadmissible 

under section 212(a)(6)(C) (misrepresentation) or 212(a)(7) (without documents), the officer 

shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the 

alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum ... or a fear ofpersecution."7 Clause (iii) of 

the new statute permitted the Attorney General to designate other, non-arriving aliens for 

expedited removal if they could not prove 2 years of physical presence in the United States. 

Clause (iii) was invoked in 2002 to extend expedited removal to aliens who arrived by 

sea but don't have 2 years of physical presence. 8 Expedited removal was expanded again in 

2004 to aliens who entered without inspection, within 100 miles of a land border, and who can't 

prove continuous presence for more than 14 days. 9 That rule was further extended to within 100 

miles of a maritime border in 2006. 10 

So expedited removal now clearly applies to recent alien arrivals near our land and 

maritime borders. The problem is the loophole for any alien who "indicates either an intention to 

apply for asylum ... or a fear of persecution." 

The statute provides that aliens subject to expedited removal but who indicate an 

intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution shall be referred to an asylum officer for an 

interview. The asylum officer shall conduct interviews of referred aliens either at a port of entry 

"or at such place designated by the Attorney General." If the asylum officer determines an alien 

has "a credible fear of persecution" then "the alien shall be detained for further consideration of 

the application for asylum." If the asylum officer determines an alien does not have a credible 

7 INA Section 235(b)(l)(A). 8 USC Section 1225(b)(l)(A). 

8 67 Fed. Reg. 68924 (2002). 

9 69 Fed. Reg. 48877 (2004). 

10 "DHS Announces Expedited Removal Along Northern Border and All Coastal Areas", 83 Interpreter Releases 253 

(2006). 

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fear of persecution, "the officer shall order the alien removed from the United States without 

further hearing or review." 11 

That sounds tough until a second loophole kicks in which provides that even these aliens 

determined by an asylum officer to lack a credible fear of persecution, "upon the alien's request" 

shall receive a "prompt review by an immigration judge" of the lack of credible fear 

determination by the asylum officer. 12 So immigration judges are taken out of the expedited 

removal process at the beginning, only to be brought back in at the end before expedited removal 

can actually be executed. 

III. Credible Fear 

The number of "credible fear" referrals has increased from less than 5,000 in FY 2008 to 

over 36,000 in FY 2013, to over 51,000 in the peak year of the border surge in FY 2014. While 

the number of referrals dipped to just over 48,000 in FY 2015, the 21,492 referrals received in 

the first quarter of FY 2016 along suggest that we may be headed for a new record this year. 13 

The percentage of all referred cases where credible fear was found by asylum officers has 

fluctuated from year to year but the trend has been generally upwards from 64.15% in FY 2008 

to 77.72% in the first quarter ofFY 2016. 14 So credible fear has not been very effective at 

reducing the numbers of unauthorized aliens waiting in line for immigration judge hearings. 

The concept of"credible fear" was instituted by the former Immigration and 

Naturalization Service as an informal device for screening the large number of Haitians 

interdicted on boats on the hlgh seas headed for the United States after the Haitian coup of 1991. 

The idea was that people interdicted on boats who could not even articulate a credible fear that 

might qualifY them for asylum would be repatriated to Haiti without further deliberation, and that 

Haitians who were able to articulate a credible fear of persecution would receive full asylum 

interviews either at the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba or elsewhere. 

As it turned out, thls informal screening out device had a short life, quickly superseded 

by events. Because the increasingly large number of Haitian migrants on boats became 

unmanageable, President Bush in 1992 issued an executive order that all migrants interdicted on 

the hlgh seas should be repatriated directly without any refugee processing at all. The executive 

11 INA Section 235(b)(l)(A), (B). 8 USC Section 1225(b)(l)(A), (B). 

12 INA Section 235(b)(l)(B)(iii)(lll). 8 USC Section 122S(b)(1)(B)(iii)(lll). 

13 Data provided by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on March 10, 2016. See also Cindy Chang 

and Kate Linthicum, "U.S. seeing a surge in Central American asylum seekers", los Angeles Times, Dec. 15, 2003, 

http:l/articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/15/local/la-me-ff-asylum-20131215. 

14 1bid. 

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order was challenged in court as a violation of both U.S. and international refugee law. The 

district court upheld the executive order against the challenge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Second Circuit reversed the district court. And the U.S. Supreme Court by an 8 to 1 majority 

vote reversed the Second Circuit and upheld the executive order, concluding that neither U.S. nor 

international refugee law limits the President's power to repatriate undocumented aliens 

intercepted on the high seas. 15 

So when Congress enacted "expedited removal" in 1996, I was surprised to see that 

Congress had incorporated the concept of"credible fear" into the statute, possibly in the hope 

that it might again serve as a screening-out device to reduce the number of arriving and recently 

arrived undocumented aliens allowed to join the line waiting to make asylum claims in removal 

proceedings before inunigration judges. Congress for the first time provided a statutory 

definition of "credible fear" as "a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the 

statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to 

the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum". 16 

Congress also as part of the enactment of "expedited removal" for the first time included 

a definition of "asylum officer" in the statute as meaning "an immigration officer who--(i) has 

had professional training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview techniques 

comparable to that provided to full-time adjudicators of application under section 208 (asylum), 

and (ii) is supervised by an officer who meets the condition described in clause (i) and has had 

substantial experience adjudicating asylum applications." 17 

IV. Recommendations. What should be done? 

A. All Border Patrol and other Customs and Border Protection officers should receive 

training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview techniques as part of their basic 

training. All current Border Patrol and other CBP officers should be offered such 

training if they did not receive it in basic training. Such trained and qualified officers 

should be authorized by statute to make asylum adjudications as part of the expedited 

removal process. 

B. All references to "credible fear", and involvement of immigration judges in expedited 

removal should be removed from the statute. INA Section 235(b)(l)(B)(iii)(I) could then 

be amended to read: "If an asylum-trained officer determines that an alien subject to INA 

Section 235(b)(l) is not a refugee as defined in INA Section 10l(a)(42), the officer shall 

15 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 

16 1NA Section 235(b)(1)(B)(v). 8 USC Section 122S(b)(1(B)(v). 

17 INA Section 235(b)(1)(E). 8 USC Section 1225(b)(l)(E). 

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order the alien removed from the United States without any further hearing or review." 

Such trained officers should also be able to recommend asylum grants in appropriate 

expedited removal cases subject to supervision from an officer who "has had substantial 

experience adjudicating asylum applications" and who can exercise the statutory 

requirement of discretion in granting asylum on behalf of the Secretary of Homeland 

Security. 

C. Mandatory detention should be explicitly required by statute for all aliens in the U.S. 

subject to expedited removal until they are either removed or granted legal status. 

Increased reliance should also be placed on INA Sec. 23S(b )(2)(C) which authorizes the 

return of arriving aliens to contiguous territory from which they arrived pending 

immigration proceedings. The statute should be clarified to specifY that, "In the case of 

any alien who is arriving on land (whether or not at a designated port of arrival) from a 

foreign territory contiguous to the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security may 

return the alien to that territory pending any proceeding to determine the alien's 

immigration status." 

D. Just as the credible fear device may have been quickly devalued as alien smugglers 

gamed the system to spread the stories that "work" in demonstrating credible fear, so the 

asylum statute itself, INA Section 208, perhaps a useful addition to our immigration law 

when enacted in 1980, may also have lost value as the stories have spread that "work" in 

convincing an adjudicator to grant asylum. Two years ago in testimony to another 

committee of the U.S. House ofRepresentatives on February 11,2014, I suggested that 

making asylum claims has become commonplace as a path to an immigrant green card 

for aliens without other alternatives, and that false asylum claims have become common 

and often deceive U.S. asylum adjudicators into granting asylum. 18 The perception that 

false asylum claims often work and at least delay removal of illegal aliens from the U.S., 

sometimes for long periods, adds to the benefit side of the cost/benefit analysis attracting 

illegal immigration to the U.S., and adds to the administrative and processing costs of 

immigration law enforcement and the U.S. taxpayers. 

How did the U.S. meet its international law obligations under the Convention and 

Protocol on the Status of Refugees before 1980? The answer is through withholding of 

deportation, now called withholding of removal, INA Section 241 (b )(3), 8 USC Section 

1231(b)(3). That statute prevents the removal of an alien to any country if, "the alien's 

life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, 

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 

18 http://jud iciarv.house.gov I cache/files/ ce51425e-3e89-4007 -a98d-7153ac6f2b4c/jan-c-ting-asylum-fraudtestimony-final.pdf. 

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I would like to see Congress consider enhancing Section 241(b)(3) by adding to it some 

of the benefits of asylum like work authorization and adjustment of status to legal 

permanent resident, and the following to join of a spouse and minor children, with the 

goal of replacing the asylum statute with a single enhanced withholding of removal state 

for the protection of refugees. That statute has and will have a higher burden of proof 

than the asylum statute, 19 and should therefore be less susceptible to fraud. . 

That concludes my testimony. I'll close by again thanking Chairman DeSantis, Chairman 

Meadows, and all the members of the two subcommittees for the invitation and opportunity to 

testify today. 

19 See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 

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57 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Ms. Acer, you are up for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ELEANOR ACER 

Ms. ACER. Thank you so much, Chairman DeSantis, Chairman 

Meadows, Ranking Member Lynch, and members of the subcommittees. It is an honor to be here today to offer our views regarding national security at our borders and the importance of the 

U.S. commitment to protect refugees. 

The horrific terrorist attacks in Brussels yesterday are yet another reminder of the terrible harms that terrorists are inflicting 

on innocent civilians around the world. 

Human Rights First is a nonprofit organization with offices in 

Texas, New York, and Washington, D.C. We operate one of the 

largest pro bono legal representation programs for asylum-seekers 

in the country, working in partnership with lawyers from some of 

the Nation’s leading law firms. 

The United States can and must protect its national security, 

and can and must do so while also complying with its human 

rights and refugee protection commitments, as made clear in the 

letter from leading national security experts of both parties referenced earlier by Ranking Member Lynch. 

Both at the formal points of entry as well as at our land borders, 

CBP has extensive tools and databases to identify individuals who 

present a risk to national security, including databases that contain information from various U.S. agencies and foreign sources. 

For cases that enter the process through credible fear as well, DHS 

asylum officers also conduct a range of vetting and checks. Before 

an individual can be granted asylum, they have to be either interviewed by an asylum officer or through an immigration court hearing. 

Only a very small portion of the world’s refugees seek protection 

here in the United States. The increase in Central American claims 

from the Northern Triangle, including children and families, have 

not only affected the United States. The U.N. refugee agency has 

reported that the countries of Mexico, Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama have seen the number of asylum applications 

from the Northern Triangle countries grow to nearly 13 times what 

it was in 2008. 

While a very small portion of asylum-seekers also come from outside the hemisphere, many of those small numbers come from top 

refugee-hosting states, as well as from China. 

U.S. leadership in protecting refugees is not only a reflection of 

American ideals, it also advances U.S. national security and foreign 

policy interests. 

Earlier this year, I too visited Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey to 

assess the Syrian refugee crisis. The critical infrastructures of 

frontline refugee-hosting states are under severe pressure. And as 

Ryan Crocker, former U.S. Ambassador to Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, has explained, U.S. efforts to share in hosting some Syrian 

refugees affirmatively advance U.S. national security interests by 

helping to protect the stability of a region that is home to some key 

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In our policies and practices, as well as in public rhetoric, it’s 

critical to distinguish between the victims of terror and repression 

on the one hand, and the perpetrators of horrific acts on the other. 

As a number of leading U.S. national security experts have described, efforts to bar Syrian refugees, for example, are counterproductive from a national security perspective, as they actually 

help the ISIL narrative. Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff 

has cautioned that you don’t want to play into the narrative of the 

bad guy. That’s giving propaganda to the enemy. 

A strong asylum and immigration system that adjudicates the 

immigration removal cases before it in a timely and fair manner 

is essential both for ensuring the integrity of the U.S. immigration 

process as well as for protecting refugees from return to places of 

persecution. 

Yet, over 480,000 immigration court removal cases have now 

been pending for an average of 667 days in the U.S. immigration 

courts, with projected average wait times around 3 years. We urge 

Congress to support the addition of immigration judges and additional support staff to address this backlog. 

Finally, the current asylum system is actually failing to provide 

protection in a manner consistent with this country’s commitments. 

Over the years, so many barriers and hurdles and technical complexities have been added to the asylum system that refugees who 

seek the protection of the United States often find themselves denied asylum, delayed in receiving protection, or, in many cases that 

we see from our work day in and day out, lingering for months in 

jails and jail-like immigration detention facilities. 

In our experience, the expedited removal system and the credible 

fear process, which I think has a 78 percent pass right now, is actually preventing many legitimate refugees from even applying for 

asylum. I am happy to answer questions about this. 

Many cannot navigate this increasingly complicated system without legal counsel, and many go unrepresented because they cannot 

afford that. 

In my testimony, I have outlined a number of additional recommendations, and I’m happy to talk about those. Thank you so 

much for the opportunity. 

[Prepared statement of Ms. Acer follows:] 


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Testimony of Eleanor Acer 

Senior Director, Refugee Protection 

Human Rights First 

The Oversight and Government Reform Committee Joint Subcommittee Hearing 

with the Subcommittee on National Security and the Subcommittee on 

Government Operations 

"National Security: Threats at Our Borders" 

March 23, 2016 

Human Rights First is a non-profit, nonpartisan human rights advocacy organization that challenges 

America to live up to its ideals. For over 30 years, we've built bipartisan coalitions and teamed up with 

frontline activists and lawyers to tackle issues that demand American leadership, including the 

protection of the rights of refugees. With offices in Houston, Texas, New York, and Washington D.C., 

Human Rights First oversees one of the largest pro bono legal representation programs for refugees in 

the country, working in partnership with volunteer attorneys at many of the nation's leading law firms. 

Human Rights First appreciates the opportunity to testify at this hearing. 

This hearing is focused on "National Security: Threats at Our Borders" including steps that the U.S. 

government can take to mitigate the potential of terrorists trying to enter the country. Human Rights 

First believes that the United States can and should protect its national security while also complying 

with its human rights and refugee protection commitments. As a bipartisan group of former national 

security advisors, CIA directors, defense secretaries, secretaries of state, and homeland security 

secretaries pointed out in December 2015, in the context of resettlement of Syrian refugees, "America 

can and should continue to provide refuge to those fleeing violence and persecution without 

compromising the security and safety of our nation." 

Overall apprehensions at the U.S. borders are at a 40-year low and the number of border patrol officers 

is at an all-time high. According to a December 22, 2015 statement by Secretary of Homeland Security 

len Johnson, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) statistics show a "drastic decrease in those 

apprehended at the border in FY2015- 337,117- the second lowest apprehension number since 1972, 

reflecting a lower level of attempted illegal migration at our borders." United States Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP), both at ports of entry and along the borders, has extensive access to tools and 

databases designed to identify individuals who present a threat to national security. For instance, CBP 

has an extensive law enforcement and national security database that contains records relating to law 

enforcement, inspection and intelligence. This database contains various types of information from a 

variety of federal, state, local, and foreign sources, and the database contains records pertaining to 

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known or suspected terrorists, wanted persons, and persons of interest for law enforcement and 

counterterrorism purposes. 

Globally, in the wake of escalating and unresolved conflicts and persecution around the world, the 

number of refugees has increased, reported by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to be 19.5 million in 

total. Only a very small portion of the world's refugees have sought protection from the United States. 

The number of people, including children and families, seeking protection from the escalating violence 

and persecution in the Northern Triangle countries of Central America has increased in recent years. 

(This increase has not just affected the United States; as UNHCR explained in its recent report, Women 

on the Run, "[c]ombined, Mexico, Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama have seen the number of 

asylum applications from citizens fleeing the [Northern Triangle Countries] grow to nearly 13 times what 

it was in 2008.") Some of those who seek asylum in the United States come from countries outside this 

region, including from other top refugee-producing places such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, as well as 

from China. This is not a new phenomenon. America has long provided refuge to people fleeing 

political, religious and other forms of persecution around the world. And the United States, pursuant to 

its commitments under U.S. law and international conventions, has a process for identifying those who 

meet the standards for refugee protection, and those who do not. 

Protecting the persecuted is a core American value. Reflecting this country's deep-seated commitment 

to liberty and human dignity, as well as its pledge under the Refugee Convention's Protocol, the United 

States has long led efforts to protect those who flee from political, religious, and other persecution. The 

U.S. asylum system has protected thousands of refugees from being returned to places where they 

would face political, religious, or other persecution. Through its pro bono legal representation initiatives, 

Human Rights First and its pro bono attorneys see these people day in and day out: they are victims of 

religious persecution from China; women escaping honor killings, trafficking and horrific domestic 

violence; gay men attacked in countries where they face constant threats; human rights advocates who 

stand up against oppression in Syria or against the perpetrators of brutal violence in Central America; 

and ordinary people who are persecuted for who they are or what they believe. 

U.S. leadership in protecting refugees is not only consistent with American ideals, it also advances U.S. 

national security and foreign policy interests. Earlier this year, I visited Jordan, lebanon, and Turkey to 

assess the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on these front-line states and to assess the U.S. response. 

Over 4.8 million refugees have fled from Syria to other countries in the region, and over 11 million are 

displaced within Syria. I had previously visited the region last year, as well as a year earlier. The critical 

infrastructures of these front line refugee hosting states- Jordan, lebanon, and Turkey- are straining 

under pressure of hosting so many refugees. Lebanon is hosting over 1 million registered Syrian refugees 

(making one out of every four persons in lebanon a Syrian refugee), Jordan is hosting over 600,000, and 

Turkey is hosting over 2.8 million. U.S. leadership in addressing the plight of refugees is not only 

necessary from a humanitarian and human rights perspective, it also advances U.S. national security 

interests. Ryan Crocker, former U.S. Ambassador to Syria, Iraq and lebanon, has explained that a U.S. 

initiative to share in hosting some Syrian refugees "affirmatively advances U.S. national security 

interests" and that increased aid and resettlement of refugees from Syria "helps protect the stability of a 

region that is home to U.S. allies." Similarly, the bipartisan group of former high level national security 

officials referenced above concluded that initiatives to resettle refugees "help advance U.S. national 

security interests by supporting the stability of our allies and partners that are struggling to host large 

numbers of refugees." 

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The United States is facing much smaller numbers of asylum seekers at our borders than the numbers 

facing the states surrounding Syria and those countries have far fewer resources and much less capacity 

than the United States. The United States must lead by example in order to encourage other states to 

continue to do their part. As the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Immigration 

Policy, co-chaired by former Florida Governor Jeb Bush and former Clinton White House chief of staff 

Thomas "Mack" Mclarty, pointed out: "The treatment of refugees and asylum seekers is [a] dimension 

of immigration policy that reflects important American values." That task force's report also stressed the 

example that the United States sets for the world: the U.S. commitment to protect refugees from 

persecution is "enshrined in international treaties and domestic U.S. laws that set the standard for the 

rest of the world; when American standards erode, refugee face greater risks everywhere." 

In both our policies and practices, as well as in public rhetoric, it is critical to distinguish between the 

victims of terror and repression on the one hand, and the perpetrators of horrific acts on the other 

hand. This is not only essential from a refugee protection and human rights perspective, but labeling 

the victims of violence and terror as security threats also undermines U.S. national security and foreign 

policy objectives. As a number of leading U.S. national security experts have described, in the context of 

the resettlement of Syrian refugees, refusing to provide refuge to Syrian refugees is counterproductive 

from a national security perspective as it helps ISIL's narrative. For instance, former DHS Secretary 

Michael Chertoff told the Wall Street Journal in November 2015 that admitting Syrian refugees "allows 

us to truthfully say that we're not hypocrites or bigoted against Muslims or people from other cultures. 

That has a positive impact in terms of the disposition people around the world have toward the U.S. You 

don't want to play into the narrative of the bad guy. That's giving propaganda to the enemy." 

Rigorous Safeguards Exist at the U.S. Border 

As noted above, the United States has rigorous systems at its borders and ports of entry for identifying 

potential threats, and access to a wide range of databases to identify security threats, foreign fighters, 

false passports and other risks. These include databases with access to a wide range of law enforcement 

and counter-terrorism related information from a variety of federal, state, local, and foreign sources, 

including records pertaining to known or suspected terrorists, wanted persons, and persons of interest 

for law enforcement and counterterrorism purposes. These mechanisms should be regularly reviewed 

and strengthened as necessary. 

In addition to vetting through CBP and its databases, in connection with any protection requests at the 

border, U.S. authorities have a range of effective tools to identify potential threats or abuse. For 

protection requests that enter the system through the credible fear process, the Department of 

Homeland Security has explained that USCIS Asylum Officers conduct a mandatory check of both the 

CBP law enforcement and national security database (described above, and known as "TECS") and USVISIT/IDENT during the credible fear process. US-VISIT/IDENT is a DHS system managed by the National 

Protection and Programs Directorate's (NPPD) Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), and 

includes biometric information related to the travel history of foreign nationals and Watchlist 

information. It also contains visa application information owned by the Department of State. This 

system is used to confirm identity, determine previous interactions with government officials and detect 

imposters. Fingerprints are also electronically submitted to the US-VISIT/IDENT database, where they 

are stored and matched to existing fingerprint records. This system is used to confirm identity and 

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determine previous interactions with government officials. DHS has explained, in the written testimony 

cited below, that this information helps to confirm identity and inform lines of questioning. 

Moreover, with respect to cases that enter the system through the credible fear process, asylum officers 

-at the credible fear stage- also ensure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) name check and 

fingerprint checks have been initiated. DHS, in written testimony, stated that "[t]he USCIS asylum 

officer's determination as well as information on the individual's identity, including how he or she 

established it, results ofthe security checks, and any adverse information is recorded and placed in the 

alien's file upon completion of the credible fear process. This information is then provided to ICE." 1 As a 

result, ICE will have this information with respect to individuals who pass the credible fear screening 

process and are put into immigration court removal proceedings and to consider in connection with 

custody decisions and determinations. 

Wrongdoers and Security Threats Excluded from Protection 

In addition, the Refugee Convention's "exclusion clauses" require host countries to exclude from the 

Convention's protections any person who has committed heinous acts or grave crimes that make him 

undeserving of international protection as a refugee, even if that individual has a well-founded fear of 

persecution. A separate provision of the Convention allows the return of a refugee who poses a danger 

to the security of the host country. The United States incorporated into its law the Refugee Convention's 

promise to provide protection to refugees, but also codified bars to asylum and withholding of removal 

intended to reflect the Convention's exceptions. 

U.S. immigration laws prohibit granting asylum and any form of refugee protection to: people who 

engaged in or assisted in or incited the persecution of others; people who have been convicted of a 

particularly serious crime in the United States; people who have committed a serious non-political crime 

abroad; people who have engaged in terrorist activity; people who are representatives of foreign 

terrorist organizations; or people who otherwise pose a threat to the security of the United States.' The 

inadmissibility provisions of U.S. immigration law are so broad that they have regularly ensnare refugees 

with no real connection to terrorism, such as a refugee from Burundi who had a rebel group rob him of 

four dollars and his lunch, an Iraqi former interpreter for the U.S. Marine Corps who was informed that 

his past connection to a Kurdish group allied with the United States and his opposition to Saddam 

Hussein made him inadmissible, and an Iraqi widow who had a member of a designated terrorist 

1 See Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Combined Testimony of DHS before the House Judiciary Homeland 

Security Committee for a hearing on "Asylum Abuse: Is it Overwhelming Our Borders" (December 12,2013) 

available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/e9043d83-e429-4d21-9621-c681c6499251/combined-dhstestimony.pdf; fact sheet from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on file with Human Rights First; 

USCIS, Affirmative Asylum Procedures Manual (November 2013) available at 

http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/nativedocuments/Asylum_Procedures_Manual_2013.pdf. 

2 1NA § 208(b)(2) (8 U.S.C. § 1158(b){2)) (bars to asylum); INA§ 241(b)(3){B) (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)) (bars to 

wi~hholding of removal). 

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organization buy flowers in her flower shop (incidentally while the group was under U.S. military 

protection).3 

A Strong System is Staffed Adequately to be Timely, Fair, and Effective 

A strong asylum and immigration system that adjudicates immigration removal cases in a fair and timely 

manner is essential both for ensuring the integrity of the U.S. immigration process as well as protecting 

refugees from return to places of persecution. However, in order to effectively secure the integrity of 

the system, the agencies responsible for asylum adjudication -the Department of Justice's Executive 

Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) and the Department of Homeland Security's United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)- must be properly staffed and resourced to adjudicate 

cases in a fair and timely manner, and to eliminate backlogs that can leave the system vulnerable to 

abuse. 

According to the most recent data, over 474,000 immigration removal cases have now been pending for 

an average of 667 days in the U.S. immigration courts, with projected average wait-times around three 

years- with many waiting much longer. While immigration enforcement and related funding have 

increased significantly in recent years, funding and staffing for the immigration courts have lagged well 

behind. Not only can delays increase the vulnerability of our immigration system to abuse and prevent 

refugees from having their cases adjudicated in a timely manner, but they often leave refugee families 

stranded in difficult and dangerous situations abroad. Human Rights First just issued a report assessing 

the need for additional staffing to address the backlogs in the U.S. immigration courts. Entitled the "U.S. 

Immigration Court: A Ballooning Backlog that Requires Action," the report urges appropriations and 

other actions to address the backlogs and ensure timely and fair asylum and immigration proceedings. 

Moreover, our current asylum system fails to provide protection in a manner consistent with this 

country's commitments and legal obligations to protect refugees fleeing persecution. Over the years, so 

many barriers, hurdles and technical complexities have been added to the asylum system, including 

through multiple rounds of legislation, that refugees who seek the protection of the United States often 

find themselves denied asylum, delayed in receiving protection, or lingering for months in jails and jaillike immigration detention facilities. Many cannot navigate this increasingly complicated system without 

legal counsel, and many go unrepresented as they cannot afford to retain private counsel. In addition to 

supporting a fair and timely decision-making process for those seeking this country's protection, 

Congress should eliminate unjust barriers that deny or delay U.S. protection to refugees and implement 

the recommendations of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom relating to expedited 

removal and detention. America should stand firm as a beacon of hope that will not turn its back on 

those seeking protection from persecution. 

Recommendations 

In addition to continuing to review and update key databases and tools, Human Rights First 

recommends the following steps to strengthen U.S. processes for identifying and protecting refugees at 

U.S. borders and ports of entry: 

3 For more background, see Human Rights First, Refuge at Risk: The Syria Crisis and U.S. Leadership, November 

2013; Human Rights First, Denial and Delay: The Impact of the U.S. Immigration Law's "Terrorism Bars" on Asylum 

Seekers and Refugees in the United States, 2009. 

5 
64 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 48 here 23641.048

Address the ballooning backlog in the immigration courts. Congress should allocate funding for 75 

immigration judge teams in FY 2017 and another 75 judge teams in FY 2018, in addition to 

supporting the President's budget request for an infrastructure expansion to facilitate the 

onboarding of new immigration judges. 

Support Expansion of Legal Orientation Programs and Access to Counsel Measures that Improve 

Fairness and Efficiency. Over 80 percent of detained individuals do not have representation in their 

immigration proceedings. LOPs- and quality legal counsel -can help non-represented individuals 

understand their eligibility, and in some cases lack of eligibility, for asylum and other potential forms 

of immigration relief. Those who are represented overwhelmingly appear for their immigration 

court appointments. Congress should sufficiently fund DOJ to ensure that LOPs are funded and in 

place at ail facilities used for immigration detention. According to a 2012 DOJ report, LOP reduced 

the amount of time to complete immigration proceedings by an average of 12 days. Factoring in the 

savings- primarily to DHS through reduced length of time spent in detention- LOP has been shown 

to have a net savings of approximately $18 million. 

Remove unnecessary impediments that delay cases and block refugees from this country's 

protection, including elimination of the asylum filing deadline. As Dr. Richard land has described, 

"When people escape horror and come to the United States in desperate need of freedom and 

safety, we shouldn't turn them away because of a bureaucratic technicality." 

End Detention of Families seeking asylum. DHS should stop sending families seeking asylum to 

immigration detention. Not only is such detention inconsistent with this country's human rights and 

refugee protection commitments, but it is also damaging to the health of children. 

Implement U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) Recommendations on 

those fleeing religious and other forms of persecution. The Department of Homeland Security and 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement should implement U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom recommendations, including: maintaining, effectively implementing and 

codifying the existing parole guidance into regulations; expanding legal orientation presentations; 

only using detention facilities that do not have jail-like conditions when asylum seekers are 

detained; and limiting the use of expedited removal given implementation deficiencies. 

6 
65 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. The chair now recognizes himself for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. McCraw, your agency issued a report saying that several Somali immigrants crossing the border who are known members of 

al-Shabaab have been apprehended, as well as other Somali-based 

terrorist groups. Can you describe the aliens of special interest that 

you have seen coming across the border, the threat posed, and how 

Texas is dealing with that population? 

Mr. MCCRAW. As previously testified by others here, clearly, 

there are special interest aliens anywhere from Afghanistan to 

Yemen that have been coming across the Texas-Mexico border that 

have been detected and apprehended by Border Patrol. That is a 

fact. 

As it relates to al-Shabaab, the connection to Somalians, it’s an 

FBI case. It was prosecuted and is open-source information regarding the support—a Somalian smuggling operation out of San Antonio that would bring Somalians across and help them resettle 

across the United States. And there had been a nexus determined 

in the investigation to terrorism. 

We’re mindful of that. We’re also mindful of other aspects, in 

terms of it. 

Until we get a handle on our borders, until we’re secure between 

the ports of entry, and no one is able to cross between the ports 

undetected, there’s no way to tell in terms of the scope and magnitude of the problem that we—exists right now, frankly. 

And there’s no excuse not to secure the border. It can be done. 

If the proper resources are applied and Border Patrol given those 

resources, it absolutely can be done. 

Until that time, Texas has made it very clear the Governor and 

State Legislature want to spend whatever it takes to support Border Patrol to get it done, because it’s too important to Texas. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Mr. Judd, CBP will often say that since apprehensions are down, the border is more secure. How does that number 

account for those who the Border Patrol doesn’t ever see? 

Mr. JUDD. It doesn’t. As I previously stated, those drivethroughs, because there were no agents assigned in that area in 

which the drive-through took place, if it wasn’t for a camera that 

actually saw the vehicles, we wouldn’t have even known that those 

vehicles had crossed. 

So if we don’t have the resources to assign to a specific area, 

then we don’t know what is crossing that area. 

And I would like to correct myself. I looked back at my notes. It 

wasn’t 2 days that that area was open. It was open for a long 

stretch of period of time, but I don’t know exactly how long. I know 

that it was at least one shift and more than that. So I just wanted 

to correct that. 

Mr. DESANTIS. We have received reports from Border Patrol 

agents that sectors and offices reporting lower apprehension numbers are often rewarded, and that apprehensions when they fall between jurisdictions of different offices within a sector, those apprehensions are simply not counted. 

Have you heard similar reports suggesting that CBP might be 

fudging the apprehension data? 


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Mr. JUDD. Not only have I heard similar reports, I’ve actually 

seen it. When I was assigned to the intel office at one of the Border 

Patrol stations which I worked, there was a note that came across 

the desk from a watch commander, a high-ranking manager, that 

said you must remove these numbers from the got-away report, because there’s no entry point, and therefore, if there’s no entry 

point, then we can’t say where it entered, and therefore, we can’t 

reconcile the numbers. 

The question that was posed to this watch commander was, well, 

we know that they got away. Where are we going to report that 

they got away? He said, well, if there’s no entry point, then there 

were no got-aways. And we said but we have the evidence that 

they got away. He said no, there are no got-aways, remove it. And 

we were forced to remove it. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And I hear some of the witnesses talking about 

resources, and I agree resources are an issue. 

But, Mr. Judd, isn’t our functional policy basically catch-and-release at this point? In other words, you can have beefed up Border 

Patrol, but if people know that if they just get across the border, 

they are most likely going to be given a citation and be released 

and then they come back in a year or whatever, to me, that is still 

going to be a major incentive for people to come in illegally. Am 

I wrong? 

Mr. JUDD. Well, the resources are important and, in part, you’re 

correct. In part, you’re wrong. 

In, let’s say, for instance, the Del Rio sector, the Del Rio sector 

does not necessarily release a whole lot of illegal aliens. Because 

they have Immigration and Customs Enforcement, they have the 

bed space to hold onto these people. 

So the main determining factor is, do we have the space to hold 

onto these individuals? If we do have the space to hold onto them, 

then Immigration and Customs Enforcement, they do hold onto 

them. But if we don’t have the space for them, then we release 

them. That’s where the resources come into play. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Professor Ting, CBP has confirmed that aliens 

from special interest countries are being apprehended by Border 

Patrol. USCIS has confirmed that aliens claiming credible fear 

have been subject to terrorism bars in the INA. 

Do you think that the administration’s policies regarding aliens 

who arrive at the border could encourage more nefarious actors to 

attempt to enter the United States illegally along the Southwest 

border? 

Mr. TING. I think it’s reasonable to assume that the nefarious actors you’re referring to are constantly looking for ways to gain 

entry to the United States. 

As I said earlier, in the age of instantaneous communications, 

the flaws in our border security system are known instantaneously 

and are carried in the media. I think it’s a legitimate concern. And 

I applaud the committee here for taking an interest in this subject. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So once that word gets out, as you say, basically, 

if you are somebody who wants to do the United States harm, you 

can come to the border, claim credible fear, you will likely be released, receive a work permit, and then you will have a court date, 

what, in a couple years? 


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Mr. TING. Yes. In the olden days, what used to happen, I believe, 

is that if people came to the border and wanted to make an asylum 

claim, we told them, fine, we’ll schedule you for an appointment, 

come back to the border, but we’re not going to admit you. 

Indeed, there is still a code section, 235(b)(2)(C) in the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorizes the return of arriving 

aliens to contiguous territory from which they arrived. So there is 

statutory authority for turning people around at the border, if we 

wanted to exercise it as we used to once upon a time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So do you think if we moved away from some of 

these loopholes, moved away from a more catch-and-release posture, obviously, people that would come could be apprehended, but 

then wouldn’t that be a deterrent for other people to realize that 

is probably not the best use of my time and money to try to go 

across the southern border, if they think there is a probability that 

the law is actually going to be enforced? 

Mr. TING. Yes, absolutely. I think it would help to have an administration that is really serious about defending the border and 

enforcing the laws enacted by Congress. But I also think there are 

things Congress can do to tighten up the laws: taking credible fear 

out; requiring asylum officer training for more immigration officers, 

so asylum officers are available in larger numbers so we can do 

processing on the border; and, as I mentioned, turning around people at the border and saying, if you want to make a claim, come 

back when we have time to interview you and we’ll interview you. 

There’s statutory authority for that already. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Great. My time is expired. 

I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you very much. 

I really appreciate your opening statements and testimony. I 

want to drill down. I do not want to spend a lot of time on this, 

but let’s talk about the credible fear standard. 

As I read the 1951 Geneva Convention for refugees, it says ‘‘wellfounded fear.’’ That is the standard, well-founded fear. When I see 

this standard, you are talking about credible fear. When you go to 

Webster’s or New Collegiate Dictionary, ‘‘well-founded’’ is ‘‘credible,’’ and ‘‘credible’’ is ‘‘well-founded.’’ 

I don’t understand what the dickering is all about. Isn’t it really 

the same standard as the Geneva Convention? 

Mr. TING. No, it is absolutely not the same standard. The Geneva 

Convention established what has become the international standard for asylum. 

Mr. LYNCH. Just the fear. We are talking about the fear. 

Mr. TING. A well-founded fear of persecution on account of one 

of five specific reasons—race, religion, nationality, social group, or 

political opinion. 

So first of all, what is persecution, right? And what is race, religion, nationality, social group, and political opinion? There is a 

whole body of law that’s developed around that standard in the 

United States and internationally. 

Mr. LYNCH. We are talking about the fear that that person has. 

Mr. TING. Credible fear is something that was, as I suggest, 

made up on-the-fly for administrative convenience. 


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Mr. LYNCH. It seems very close to the Geneva Convention standard, though. When you look it up, Webster’s Dictionary, credible 

versus well-founded, it is not totally made up if it means exactly 

the same thing. I know in application, it is different. I am not questioning that. 

Mr. TING. All I can say is that everyone on the ground who was 

dealing with that issue at the time, credible fear was a clearly different and lower standard. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. I hear you. You said that already. 

Ms. Acer, could you? 

Ms. ACER. Thank you. I just want to also caution that the United 

States has to—not only does it have obligations under the international Refugee Convention, but we also have to think about the 

example we set to other states. 

If we were to start turning away people at our border who apply 

for asylum, what message does that send to Jordan, to Lebanon? 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes, but can we talk about my question, though? 

Ms. ACER. Yes. I’m so sorry. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. 

Ms. ACER. In terms of the credible fear process, to answer your 

question, it was set up, the 1996 law, instead of allowing people to 

actually go into immigration court removal proceedings, allowed 

people to be deported on the order of a CBP officer, essentially. 

In order to make sure we were complying with our obligations, 

a screening process was set in, so that the U.S., the idea was, 

would not inadvertently deport someone who should have a shot at 

applying for asylum. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. 

Ms. ACER. We have found in our day-in-and-day-out practice, as 

I said, that actually many people who are legitimate refugees are 

not passing that process. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. 

Ms. ACER. And the immigration judge review that was mentioned 

happens in just a couple days, very quickly, and in rare cases. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. I have 2 minutes left, and I want to get to this 

other issues. 

There are pull factors and push factors. We did a couple codels. 

We went down to San Salvador. We went down to Tegucigalpa. 

And we went down to Guatemala City. 

And so we were at the airport when the people—largely, mostly 

kids, but a few parents—when the kids arrived back in 

Tegucigalpa, I think it was. 

So we had stopped them at the border and sent them back, and 

the plane arrived around 11 o’clock. By 1 o’clock in the afternoon, 

every kid had been picked up. Every child had been picked up and 

taken home by their families. 

The deal there, in talking to the immigrants, these families that 

are trying to get into the United States illegally, they said the 

range was $7,000 to $8,000 per person, and they get three tries. 

They get three tries to get into the United States. 

They call them ‘‘coyotes.’’ I don’t like using that term, because it 

has a romantic appeal to it. These are human traffickers, okay? 

And they are putting these kids at grave risk in this whole exercise 

here. 


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So what I am getting at is, there is a push factor. Actually, there 

is a pull factor by having low standards in this country for allowing 

immigrants to come in. But there is also a push factor, because 

there is an industry down there in Central America that it is much 

more profitable than smuggling drugs. And most of these countries 

don’t have human trafficking laws in place down there, so they can 

do this, and there are no real dire consequences as there would be 

if they were trafficking in drugs or guns. 

So I am asking my Border Patrol folks, is this the nature of the 

problem? What is a greater factor, the pull factor of the United 

States being lax or the push factor of the industry down there that 

is actually pushing people up to our border? 

Mr. Vitiello? 

Mr. VITIELLO. Thank you, Congressman. 

We found in our reporting that there’s a multitude of factors that 

drive folks away from their home country, and then, like you say, 

get pulled into the U.S. So smugglers have taken advantage of the 

situation wherein people believe that if they came to the United 

States, they would be able to stay. We have reports that smugglers 

are actually using that concept to draw more people that might 

otherwise not consider the trip. 

Mr. LYNCH. Right. Okay. 

Mr. McCraw? 

Mr. MCCRAW. Clearly, the Mexican cartels have adopted people 

as a commodity, and human trafficking clearly is a core business 

now of the Mexican cartels. 

The pull part is they want to encourage as many to come across, 

because unlike drugs, they don’t need precursor chemicals. They 

don’t have to grow it. They make an immediate profit, even when 

they get to the river. They don’t even have to get across the river 

to get a profit. 

Then they further compound it by when they move them across 

the river, often they will load them down in stash houses and continue to extort them for additional money, so it’s an ongoing process. 

Clearly, the cartels get a vote in terms of that push and that pull 

factors going into the United States. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay, Mr. Judd, do you have anything to add? 

Mr. JUDD. Absolutely. It comes down to risk-reward. 

There is very little risk when you are smuggling migrants. The 

laws of the United States, the accountability that we hold these 

human traffickers when we arrest them, it’s a very low standard. 

However, if we arrest a drug smuggler that’s smuggling cocaine, 

methamphetamine, or something like that, then the consequences 

are much greater. 

Mr. LYNCH. I spend a lot of time in the Middle East, and so do 

a lot of members on this committee. 

When Angela Merkel back last August said Germany welcomes 

the Syrian refugees, we will take them, she ended up with 1.3 million. She never expected it. Now they are sort of backing away from 

that. That was a pull factor. That was a pull factor. 

When you talk to the Syrians on the border, they all want to go 

to Germany, because they were beckoned to do so. 


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I am just wondering if we have a similar situation here because 

we didn’t see the surge when there was civil war in El Salvador, 

when there was civil war in Nicaragua. We did not see the huge— 

and those people could’ve legitimately said, I have a civil war back 

home, and I need to come to the United States. We didn’t see the 

requests at the border that we are seeing now. 

I don’t know. There is something else going on here. Maybe we 

are part of it up here creating this problem. 

I yield back. You have been very courteous. I appreciate it, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me follow up a little bit on what Mr. Lynch just talked about, 

because as we start to look at this particular issue, there is a big 

difference between refugees and asylum-seekers. 

Somehow we put those two together, assuming that they are one 

and the same. Indeed, they are not one and the same. We have different processes for those. 

I serve on the Global Health and Human Rights Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee. There is nothing that is more close to my heart, in 

terms of those who are truly in need. 

But what Mr. Lynch was talking about really comes to mind, 

what are the places that are most troubled from a standpoint of 

people needing asylum or refugee status? What countries come to 

mind as being the most horrific right now? 

Ms. Acer, what country would you put in the top two? 

Ms. ACER. I guess you could look at it in terms of numbers and 

then, of course, you have Syria. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So Syria would be number one. 

Ms. ACER. I am not going to rank them right now, but I would 

say certainly —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Is it in the top five? 

Ms. ACER. Yes, I would say so. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. The reason I come there is because 

what Mr. Lynch was talking about is, if indeed the worst place in 

the world is Syria, what we would see is coming across our southern border this mass infiltration from Syria. But really, when we 

start to look at the numbers, it is not bearing that out as much. 

So, Mr. Ting, I need to understand the process, because Ms. Acer 

had talked about the fact that these asylum-seekers come and they 

sit in jail. 

Now we have been led to believe that, since 2009, there was a 

different administration rule that would not actually put them in 

jail. Mr. Judd would apprehend them. They would go through and 

seek credible fear. And then they would be released and not sit in 

jail waiting for that. 

Is that correct, Mr. Ting? 

Mr. TING. Well, there are two distinct programs. You referred to 

refugees. We operate an overseas refugee program. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Right. 

Mr. TING. I think the most generous overseas refugee program 

in the world, taking well-over 55,000 a year —— 


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Mr. MEADOWS. The State Department is involved with that. A 

number of other —— 

Mr. TING. But that is a pick-and-choose program. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Right. 

Mr. TING. We get to pick which refugees are of special interest 

to the United States and bring them to the United States. 

The asylum program allows people who are already here to apply 

for asylum, and there is no numerical limit on asylum. 

So if you can claim that you’re a refugee and you’re already here, 

under our law and international law, we cannot return you to your 

home country. You qualify for discretionary asylum status in the 

United States, which can put you on a path to a green card and 

eventually becoming a U.S. citizen along with everybody else. No 

numerical limit. 

So it’s very tempting, I think, given the fact that you may be a 

refugee in a displaced persons camp in Jordan or Turkey, and if 

the U.S. doesn’t pick you, you are kind of stuck there. But if you 

can get yourself into the United States or at the border and make 

the claim, then you’re going to get processed sooner or later. 

I think that is a great temptation. As Mr. Lynch says, that is a 

pull factor, to the extent that people have a realistic expectation. 

And I think the administration, frankly, is trying to balance expectations and is deliberately, I think, trying to deter people by imposing some consequences on their coming to the United States and 

making claims. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So I can tell by the nonverbal gestures to your 

right from my standpoint, that she does not agree, so go ahead. I 

will give you very short—I have very limited time. 

Ms. ACER. Thank you. 

We are certainly protected from a large Syrian influx at our border by our geographical location, but the Northern Triangle countries are incredibly dangerous. As I mentioned before, asylum requests are up significantly in the region as well. 

I would just say, in our day in and day out, we represent asylumseekers who pass through the credible fear process and are held in 

very jail-like facilities, which the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom has said are —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So, Mr. Judd, you put them in jail? If they have 

credible fear claims, your Border Patrol puts them in jail? 

Mr. JUDD. It strictly depends upon where it’s at. If it’s in RGV, 

most likely not. We just don’t have the bed space. If it is in the 

Tucson sector, most likely not. We do not have the bed space. If it 

is in the Del Rio sector, I will tell you I drove by where we put 

them and it is anything but a jail. There’s no fences. There’s nothing around it. In fact, it’s been described to me more like a country 

club. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. So we either let them go, or we put them 

in what you would classify as a country club setting, is what you’re 

saying? 

Mr. JUDD. From what I saw, yes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So part of the testimony here is that we deny a 

whole lot. Let me ask you this. It appears, in 2013, that we approved 92 percent of the people coming across our border, in terms 

of fiscal year 2013. Ninety-two percent of the people who came 


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across and said there is a credible fear got approved. I guess in the 

first quarter of this year, it is actually 86 percent. 

So if we are looking at approving that many, everybody who 

comes across and says—it is almost everybody who comes across 

who says I have a credible fear, I want asylum. 

Is that the reason those numbers continue to go higher, Mr. 

Judd? 

Mr. JUDD. What I can tell you is what we see on the border. Unfortunately, I don’t go through the entire process. All I do is I arrest people, and then I —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So do they get a long interview? I guess when 

they —— 

Mr. JUDD. No. No. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So what is the interview like? 

Mr. JUDD. By Border Patrol agents, when we arrest them, if 

they’re from countries other than Mexico, it’s very quick. All they 

have to do is claim that they have a credible fear. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So if I am speaking Farsi, I can come across and 

say I have a credible fear, and I do not get a real interview? 

Mr. JUDD. No, you don’t. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So the very people that may be terrorists, and I 

don’t want to categorize one particular group as speaking a particular language, but those are higher threat areas to us based on 

their past history, they get a shorter interview? 

Mr. JUDD. Well, for special interest countries, we actually turn 

them—we notify the FBI immediately, if they are from a special interest country. We won’t even interview those individuals. 

For instance, in Sonoita, when we arrested the Afghanis and 

Pakistanis, the most recent that I am aware of, they were immediately turned over to the FBI. We didn’t even interview them. 

But from countries that are not considered special interest, from, 

say, China, Bangladesh would be the same, it’s a very short interview. As long as they tell us that they have a credible fear, the 

interview basically ends at that point for the Border Patrol. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. Thank you. 

I yield back. I appreciate the patience of the chair. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Illinois for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Welcome, witnesses. 

In today’s complex threat environment, effective counterterrorism 

and law enforcement efforts rely on sophisticated intelligence-gathering and sharing capabilities. Especially because of their exponential effects, we should focus our efforts to strengthen the border 

on these intelligence capabilities. 

Mr. Vitiello, your written testimony states, and I quote, ‘‘A 

whole-of-government approach that leverages interagency and 

international partnerships as a force multiplier has been and will 

continue to be the most effective way to keep our borders secure.’’ 

Which other agencies does Customs and Border Patrol share intelligence or information with to secure the border? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So all of the entities, State, local, tribal, that are 

at the immediate border, and then we have important relationships 


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in the contiguous countries, Canada and Mexico, with their federal 

police, with their immigration authorities, their customs group. 

And also CBP has the benefit of having a worldwide footprint. So 

in all the places where we’re active, either providing services for 

people who are coming to the country or a liaison relationship in 

places like Mexico and Canada to exchange important law enforcement information. 

So anybody that has the common interest of securing the border, 

gathering intelligence to aid in counterterrorism efforts, et cetera, 

those are all the people that we interact with. 

Ms. KELLY. Can you further explain how these partnerships act 

as a force multiplier? 

Mr. VITIELLO. As a simple example with Mexico’s immigration 

authorities, when the surge of unaccompanied minors started in 

2014, several requests through the liaison and then official government requests for Mexico to do more at their southern border and 

the INM group, their immigration authority group, stepped up and 

effectively shut down some of the more common routes of people 

coming to the United States and was seeking out to prosecute 

smugglers who were responsible for some of that activity. 

That led to an overall reduction in people who could use those 

routes. We are still challenged by that, but we were able to support 

their work with liaisons and mentors in Mexico to understand the 

challenges that they have and give them, where we could, tips and 

advice and mentorship so that they could do their work better. 

Ms. KELLY. That is a good example of how interagency and international partnerships can strengthen the border. Any other examples? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So we have also a very important relationship in 

Canada as well. We share information about threats that we perceive coming from the U.S. into Canada and vice versa, lots of information exchange. Then it is the responsibility of our leadership 

in the field to maintain good relationships with all law enforcement 

communities, so that we can identify and understand which of the 

threats are most important by community and then work together 

to abate them. 

Ms. KELLY. It seems as though, when you hear about threats to 

the border, it is always the southern border, not as much the 

northern border. What are the percentages? Or is that how you 

would describe it? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So overwhelmingly, our resources are dedicated to 

the southern border. That is where the activity is represented by 

the large numbers, volumes of people, volumes of things, because 

of the nature of the real estate and the differences in both economies, et cetera. 

But we also have important work that we do with Canada, and 

we do similar things as it relates to identifying where we need to 

be situationally aware on the border, technology to help us patrol 

and monitor. And then obviously the relationships are key in understanding the threats that are faced. 

Ms. KELLY. Okay. Your testimony continues, ‘‘DHS works with 

our Federal, State, local, tribal, and international partners, particularly Canada and Mexico, to address transnational threats.’’ 


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What types of helpful information does Canada and Mexico provide that the U.S. would not otherwise have access to? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So at CBP, and obviously this is true with other 

Federal law enforcement, is we help identify the criminal networks 

that are responsible for human trafficking, gun smuggling, illicit financing. 

So what we do is we try to understand amongst ourselves, with 

them and ourselves, what the threats are and how to combat them, 

and then help identify by network which are the most problematic 

criminal enterprises. 

Ms. KELLY. Do you feel these partnerships have improved over 

time, and you are getting more and more information, and there 

is more of a comfort level with these other agencies? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So it ebbs and flows, as it relates to the international engagement. I think in Canada, it has been stable and 

very well-used for quite some time. 

In Mexico, it sort of ebbs and flows with the changes of administration, et cetera. But they have been a strong partner with us, especially at the Federal police level and their immigration authorities. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Florida, Mr. Mica, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this joint hearing. I think there couldn’t be a better time, with incidents that we 

have seen most recently and around the world relating to terrorism 

and our border vulnerability. 

I guess you would probably conclude that our borders are porous, 

a sieve, and tens of thousands of illegals are coming across the border. 

Would that be appropriate, Mr. Judd? Do you think that is correct? 

Mr. JUDD. That is correct. Border Patrol agents, these are very 

motivated individuals. They want to do the best that they can. 

They do the best that they possibly can. 

Mr. MICA. You described the vehicle. They cut the wires and 

came through. You don’t know whether there were drugs, weapons, 

explosives. It could have carried great quantities of that across the 

border. 

Mr. JUDD. It could’ve been anything. 

Mr. MICA. Let me ask the DHS representative, I just heard that 

El Chapo, the noted drug kingpin and czar, crossed the border. He 

bragged about it, I guess after his capture, like he was coming on 

some regular vacation journey to the United States. Are you aware 

of that? 

Mr. VITIELLO. No, I had not heard that. 

Mr. MICA. Not only were we informed that he was crossing routinely, now we have evidence that some of the weapons, at least 

one of the weapons that was found when he was captured was from 

the Fast and Furious collection, which was provided by the U.S. 

Government. You are not aware of that either? 

Mr. VITIELLO. I did see that in media reports. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. 


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Most disturbing. Mr. Judd, you gave some excellent testimony. 

You described one of the issues, and you said the Border Patrol, 

due to DHS prosecutorial discretion guidelines, released more than 

3,800 illegal aliens who were in our custody and were subject to deportation proceedings. And you said they were released simply because they claimed to have been in the United States continuously 

since January 2014. 

This amnesty through policy of the administration, this is the 

President’s policy of amnesty? Is that what rules the proceedings? 

Mr. JUDD. If you ask Border Patrol agents, absolutely. 

Mr. MICA. So we have allowed tens of thousands—I saw an estimate of about 50,000 criminal illegals in the United States, a 

guesstimate. 

They are subject to deportation, aren’t they? 

Mr. JUDD. Yes. Anybody that’s here illegally is subject to deportation. 

Mr. MICA. But, again, we have allowed millions with a sort of 

waiver and tied your hands, which you put in your written testimony. 

Not only the borders but the airports are now our borders where 

people are flying in, whether it is from Europe, or Central or South 

America, around the world. 

And there is a Credential Screening Gateway System, which is 

outlined in an IG report, June 4, 2015. It says worker credentials, 

and these are workers at the airport that, in fact, we don’t have 

thousands of passport numbers. These are people with, for example, no alien registration number for immigrants working in our 

airports, 14,000; no passport number for immigrants, 75,000; first 

names with two characters or less, 1,500; what is this, 87 some 

thousand-some working—87,000 active and we don’t have those 

records. 

Are you aware of that, Mr. Vitiello? This is a DHS inspector general report. 

Mr. VITIELLO. It’s not particularly my area, but I am aware of 

the reporting on that subject. 

Mr. MICA. So the borders are a sieve. We have people working 

at our airports who are aliens who we don’t even know anything 

about. We don’t have confirmed their alien registration numbers or 

their passport numbers. Is that correct? 

Mr. Chairman, I would like this page to be made part of the 

record. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Without objection. 

Mr. MICA. Finally, if I may, in my local community, my police 

chiefs, who I have met with the last few weeks—we have a big 

drug epidemic in Florida and around the Nation—but we were 

talking about that. And we talked about illegal aliens. 

They say they arrest them. They detain them. They call the Border Patrol. And they advise them that they can’t help. And they 

are often just escorted to the county line. 

Are you aware that that is going on in our local communities, our 

local jurisdictions and borders? 

Mr. VITIELLO. I was not, Congressman. What area is this? 

Mr. MICA. Central Florida. 


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Mr. VITIELLO. We’re not particularly well-staffed in Florida at 

all. Central Florida is not —— 

Mr. MICA. But they are dumping them back into the community, 

and you all are refusing to do anything. 

Maybe some of it is what Mr. Judd described. We have let them 

through presidential edict stay here and not be accountable. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair, and I would ask unanimous 

consent that my statement be entered into the record in full. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Without objection. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Mr. Vitiello, in listening to this last line of questioning, gosh, I 

seemed to think some progress has been made, but maybe I am 

wrong. 

How many Border Patrol agents are there now on the southern 

border? 

Mr. VITIELLO. On the southern border, approximately 17,500 or 

so. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And how many would there have been 8 years 

ago? 

Mr. VITIELLO. Eight years ago, it would have been at least half 

that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. So we have doubled them. 

And the immigration reform bill that had been worked out on a 

bipartisan basis in the Senate would have doubled that again. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. VITIELLO. I believe so. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. So we doubled the Border Patrol agents. 

Deportations, they have fallen to record lows in that 8-year time 

period, Mr. Vitiello? 

Mr. VITIELLO. I think that our activity overall over the last several years has seen a reduction with the buildup of resources that 

we’ve had. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, but is it not true that in this last 8-year period, we actually had record deportations? 

Mr. VITIELLO. I’ve seen various reports of the numbers. I think 

there was a time that those numbers were higher, and now have 

dropped off commensurate with the reductions. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Because we more effective at deterring. 

At the height of deportations in the last 8 years, Ms. Acer, were 

they higher than in the previous 8 years? 

Ms. ACER. I believe they hit around 400,000, which was an alltime high. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. An all-time high. In this administration? 

Ms. ACER. Yes, that is my understanding. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. Not hiding by executive order and so 

forth. Sounds good. 

But actually there is another record to be told. 

Going back, Mr. Vitiello, to your point about secure borders, so 

you mean to say it is hard to get into the United States, the borVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:04 Mar 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\23641.TXT APRIL

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ders are less porous, because the measures that were put in place, 

including personnel, are in fact more effective? Is that correct? 

Mr. VITIELLO. We are certainly more capable than we were, as 

far as the number of agents, the levels of technology, the infrastructure that has now been in place, and the improvements that 

we made. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And all of that combined has allowed us to catch 

people if they try to cross the border? 

Mr. VITIELLO. Well, we certainly have gotten much more capability. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So we are deterring lots of people at the border? 

Mr. VITIELLO. It is hard to measure deterrence. I think we have 

seen, if you look back over the historic highs in the number of arrests we were making, we have seen a reduction in that. The panel 

has already talked about insufficient measure of apprehensions 

alone, but we have seen reductions in activity that are commensurate with the improvements that we have made not only in sort of 

the physical structures, more agents, et cetera, but in other things 

that we’re doing, post-arrest interviews, consequence delivery, et 

cetera. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Mica made the point, he used El Chapo as 

an example, but we hear it anecdotally, people who are deported, 

including bad actors, gang leaders, especially from El Salvador and 

Honduras, who multiple times they are deported and multiple 

times reenter the United States. Deportation is not, for them, some 

sort of penultimate punishment or deterrence, for that matter. 

Could you comment on that? What are we doing to try to make 

sure that repeat entrants, illegal entrants, are in fact permanently 

barred and deterred, and we are effective at it? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So we do track the number of arrests people have, 

both for criminal violations as well as their previous immigration 

history. Through things like the consequence delivery system, we 

target people who we know are going to be repeat offenders or recross multiple times, and then seek with the assistance of the U.S. 

Department of Justice, U.S. attorney offices locally, to prosecute 

those folks when we find them. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do you have a special division or a special targeting task force or a system with respect to gang activities? Certainly, in a lot of our communities, we are worried about people, 

bad actors, who are vicious gang members, often from Central 

America, and we don’t want them in our communities, and we don’t 

want them in this country, and we want them back home, although 

that causes problems, too, we understand. 

But are you targeting that particular subgroup in this context? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So in the context of consequence delivery system, 

anybody that is a repeat offender we seek to use the maximum effect of Federal prosecutions when they are re-encountered by our 

officers in the United States. And in all the cities and the towns 

that are represented, we work with our State, local, Federal partners in the task force environment, and some of those are specifically dedicated to gang activity. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow up? 


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Okay, that is good, but I am asking, can we target them and profile them as a likely repeat offender to reenter, and that is what 

we want to deter to begin with? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So what we do is we aggregate the data to understand that when that person is in front of us and the agent is doing 

the booking procedure, when they run the fingerprints, they’ll have 

a complete record of their previous criminal and immigration histories. And those that tip the scale, if you will, toward gang activity 

or known criminal offenses inside of that kind of criminal activity, 

then we’ll work with the local U.S. attorney’s office to get them 

prosecuted. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Judd, let me kind of go a little different direction here for 

a moment. You have noted in the past some of the challenges of 

securing the border on Federal lands. 

Specifically, what sort of obstacles do agents face when access is 

limited, say due to endangered species or wilderness designations? 

Mr. JUDD. I can tell you that I started my career in El Centro, 

California. In El Centro, California, if an illegal alien crossed the 

border, I could follow that illegal alien in my vehicle until I caught 

him forever. It didn’t matter how long. I could go forever until— 

I followed him. 

But if you go and look at Arizona, if an illegal alien crosses the 

border, I have to get out of my vehicle. I have to call somebody. 

They have to try to get ahead of me. And there are very, very few 

access roads, which then puts us behind the curve. And it’s very 

difficult to apprehend those individuals on protected lands. 

Mr. HICE. Mr. Vitiello, a similar type of thought with you regarding Federal lands. You are aware of the permitting delays on Federal lands, whether it is for road maintenance or forward-operating 

bases or mobile surveillance systems, what have you. What is an 

acceptable period of time for permitting to take place for your agency before you have lost your tactical advantage? 

Mr. VITIELLO. In the concept of when agents are in what we call 

hot pursuit, when they are actively following a trail, even in a wilderness area, they have the ability to continue on that traffic. As 

it relates to infrastructure and other improvements that are made 

in certain protected lands, we have a three-agency memorandum of 

understanding with the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior to work through things like permitting, environmental assessments, for improvements that we want to make to install surveillance equipment or access roads, et cetera. 

Mr. HICE. But at some point, your intel becomes irrelevant if permitting takes so long where you can’t—what kind of time frame is 

reasonable? 

Mr. VITIELLO. As soon as we can do it, as soon as possible, is the 

best time frame. 

Mr. HICE. Are you receiving cooperation from other agencies? 


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Mr. VITIELLO. The MOU provides a mechanism for us to start the 

conversation and then work through the expectations and milestones to get things accomplished that we need to have done. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Of course, we all know that ISIS is attempting 

to exploit any and all of our loopholes on our Nation’s national security and, in particular, our borders, from infiltrating the refugee 

program, and so forth. 

But when it comes to our borders, how high are the security 

risks? And how can we mitigate those? 

I will begin, Mr. Judd, with you quickly. 

Mr. JUDD. They are extremely high. The best way that we can 

mitigate these risks are resources in the field, giving us the resources that are necessary, so that we’re not leaving areas of the 

border just completely unmanned. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. 

Mr. Ting? 

Mr. TING. I think it is very much related to the volume of border 

crossers that have to be processed. I mean, we’re all aware that 

there was a tremendous border surge in Fiscal Year 2014, and preliminary statistics show that the border surge in the current fiscal 

year, 2016, may exceed that number. 

I think when you have a historic border surge, that obviously 

stresses whatever resources are available at the border, and it 

makes it more likely that security risks can take advantage of that 

situation and penetrate our border, simply riding the tide of the 

high volume of processing that has to occur. 

Looking at Fiscal Year 2016, I think a lot of us think we’re confronting that situation this year. 

Mr. HICE. Okay, let me ask you, Mr. McCraw, how high are the 

security risks? And how do we mitigate it? 

Mr. MCCRAW. They’re substantial. Until you secure it, you can’t 

mitigate it fully. 

I know Congressman Connolly was concerned about MS–13 and 

other criminal aliens that come across, and how do you keep them 

from coming back? The only way you do it is secure it. The way 

you secure it is you provide Border Patrol additional agents, detection technology, aviation assets, and unity of effort, and work the 

type of programs that will deter criminal activity. That’s the only 

way that you’re going to be able to actually mitigate the risks. 

Ms. ACER. Mr. Chairman, could I weigh in? 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We are going to have votes here, so I want to make sure that 

other members have a chance to ask their questions. 

So let me recognize the gentleman from Michigan for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to the panel for being here. 

Mr. Judd, a constituent of mine who is a DHS officer contacted 

me. He has been working on the border in California. He expressed 

concerns about a policy, as he puts it, with California and Mexico 

where individuals who cross the border illegally cannot be sent 

home but are processed through, and then released into the U.S. 

with court dates as long as 7 to 10 years down the road. Are you 

aware of that policy? 


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Mr. JUDD. Yes, I am. We dub it the catch-and-release policy. It’s 

extremely disconcerting to all Border Patrol agencies. If you ask 

Border Patrol agents, they believe that it’s one of those driving factors that invite individuals to try to break our —— 

Mr. WALBERG. Is it unique to California? 

Mr. JUDD. It is not. 

Mr. WALBERG. Are all the aliens who cross the border given notices to appear before the court? 

Mr. JUDD. No, they’re not. 

Let me take that back. I’m sorry. 

Not all illegal aliens that we arrest are given notices to appear. 

There are different factors that go into that. I would generally say 

that if we see somebody cross the border, that that individual 

would be given a notice to appear, but not all illegal aliens that we 

arrest are given notices to appear. 

Mr. WALBERG. What is the typical time frame for court hearings? 

Mr. JUDD. I don’t deal with the court hearings. From what I’m 

hearing from high-level DHS officials, I’m hearing anywhere between 5 to 7 years. 

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Vitiello? Did I get that right? 

Mr. VITIELLO. Vitiello, correct. 

Yes, I’ve heard the same thing. It varies by city, and it varies by 

the capacity that the Department of Justice has to schedule and 

notice those hearings. 

Ms. ACER. I’m sorry, can I weigh in on immigration courts, because we have been recommending—we’ve just issued a report on 

the need to adequately fund the immigration courts to bring down 

those backlogs and delays. 

Mr. WALBERG. So your contention is it is funding? 

Ms. ACER. Yes. That’s actually a major need, funding for the immigration courts. Thank you. 

Mr. WALBERG. Let me ask Mr. Judd, are there any efforts to 

keep track of the whereabouts of the individuals that are awaiting 

these lengthy time frame court hearings? 

Mr. JUDD. Not that I’m aware of. All they need to do is provide 

us an address, and it can be an obscure address. 

For instance, in the mid-2000s, we were arresting a large number of Brazilians in the Tucson sector. All Brazilians were giving 

us—a large number of these Brazilians were giving us the exact 

same address. 

Mr. WALBERG. Large buildings. 

Mr. JUDD. Exactly. And we were releasing those individuals 

based upon the addresses that they were giving us. 

Mr. WALBERG. I assume this is frustrating to your colleagues? 

Mr. JUDD. It is extremely frustrating, but what gets even more 

frustrating is when we have a CBP Commissioner that tells us, if 

we don’t like it, we can go find another job. That’s even more frustrating. 

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. McCraw, how are the administration’s efforts 

or enforcement priorities and release policies affecting your organization? 

Mr. MCCRAW. Clearly, we’re concerned. The Governor expressed 

his concern about the potential Syrian refugees coming to Texas. 


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There’s no adequate way to properly vet them. That’s a concern 

from a national security standpoint. He’s made it very clear. 

We’re concerned that we continue to see transnational gangs, 

criminal aliens, cartels, cartel operatives, and drugs, heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine infiltrate Texas, throughout 

Texas, really throughout the Nation. 

Those are the key concerns that we have, and some of the other 

related transnational crime that happens when you become a 

transshipment center for cartel drug and human smuggling, including home invasions, including high-speed pursuits, including stash 

house extortions, including kidnapping, all those things that occur 

and we’re having to address in Texas as a result of it. 

And at the end of the day, the border is not secure. 

Mr. WALBERG. I would assume you have ideas on how to secure 

that, and even policies that could be implemented rather rapidly. 

If you were allowed, as a State official responsible for securing your 

people’s safety and borders, could you do it? 

Mr. MCCRAW. I could tell you that this chief right next to me 

could do it, if provided the appropriate resources. If Border Patrol 

is given the sufficient Border Patrol agents, that detection technology and the aviation assets, they could do it today. There is no 

doubt in my mind they can do it. 

Mr. WALBERG. So this isn’t a problem but for the fact you are not 

allowed to do what you are able to do, and I would assume, Mr. 

Vitiello, as well. 

Mr. MCCRAW. Well, the problem is it hasn’t been properly 

resourced over the decades. The bottom line is border security has 

not been a priority, not been a concern as it relates to multiple administrations. 

And in today’s threat environment, you can’t afford not to be concerned about border security. It impacts Texas from a public safety 

standpoint. It impacts us from a national security standpoint, a 

homeland security standpoint, and not just Texas, but the rest of 

the Nation. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentlemen’s time has expired. 

We are going to go to Ken Buck for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BUCK. Mr. Judd, real quickly, 2014, as a result of the change 

in the President’s policy on immigration, in 2014, we saw a surge 

of minors crossing the borders. Is that true? 

Mr. JUDD. That is correct. 

Mr. BUCK. Do you know the percentage of those minors that are 

from contiguous countries, in other words, Canada and Mexico, 

versus noncontiguous countries? 

Mr. JUDD. Very few. The vast majority of those that are entering 

the country are from noncontiguous countries. 

Mr. BUCK. And how are they treated differently, if a juvenile 

from Mexico enters the country versus a juvenile from El Salvador? 

Mr. JUDD. If it’s a juvenile from Mexico, they’re going to be treated basically the exact same. It doesn’t matter what country you’re 

from. If you claim a credible fear, if you say that you’re seeking 

asylum, you’re going to be treated the same by the Border Patrol. 

How ICE treats them, I don’t know. But by the Border Patrol, 

they’re going to be treated the same. 


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Mr. BUCK. Okay, Mr. Vitiello, any different treatment or process 

that is used for contiguous versus noncontiguous individuals? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So in the case of Mexico and then others from Central America, both populations would be screened to make sure 

that they weren’t victims of human trafficking. In most cases along 

the border with Mexico, we can facilitate their return into Mexico 

with the assistance of their government. 

So the logistics and turning people over to ICE or to be placed 

with HHS doesn’t necessarily always occur with folks from Mexico 

because we have a friendly neighbor, and they’ll facilitate bringing 

their citizens back, repatriating them. 

Mr. BUCK. Okay, so there is a legal distinction, though, between 

how individuals are treated in contiguous countries versus noncontiguous? 

Mr. VITIELLO. The law requires that both—all the populations 

are screened, so that they are not victims of human trafficking, 

these juveniles. So if they are from noncontiguous countries, then 

the law allows for us to do that screening, to do the booking procedure. 

And once we recognize that they are unaccompanied children, 

then it’s the work of DHS to transfer them to another government 

department, the Department of Health and Human Services, which 

puts them in a setting to where they can either be reunited with 

family in the States or cared for appropriately given their age. 

Mr. BUCK. And that’s individuals in noncontiguous countries. 

Mr. VITIELLO. Correct. 

Mr. BUCK. But many of those noncontiguous countries, you use 

the term ‘‘friendly’’ in terms of our relationship with Mexico. Many 

of those noncontiguous countries we have a friendly relationship 

with also, don’t we? 

Mr. VITIELLO. We do. 

Mr. BUCK. If the law changed, we could arrange, in the situation 

where they are not victims of human smuggling or seeking asylum, 

we could arrange for those individuals to be returned to those countries without going through the 5- to 7-year hearing process that 

we now have. 

Mr. VITIELLO. That would require a change in the law, as far as 

I know. 

Mr. BUCK. Do you see any reason, any adverse effects in changing that law? 

Mr. VITIELLO. I’m not sure. I mean, I guess we’d have to look at 

exactly what—the contours of that. Certainly, in our relationship 

with Mexico, this is a smaller problem. 

Mr. BUCK. Ms. Acer indicated that all we need is more money. 

If we just printed more money, increased our national debt above 

the $19 trillion, we could take care of this problem. 

A much simpler solution, a much less costly and, frankly, much 

more humane to the individuals that are coming into this country, 

would be to change that law and allow those individuals to return 

to their homes and set a policy in this country, frankly, that doesn’t 

attract juveniles like magnets. 

I think it would be more humane, rather than putting someone 

in limbo for 5 years where they don’t know if they are in this country or not. 


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I thank the chairman, and I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields back. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. I may cover some territory you have already covered a little bit. But I want, in general, and this is a question 

maybe for Mr. Judd and Mr. Ting, in general, how effective do you 

believe the administration’s commitment to border security has 

been? And I also want you compare it, because I am not a partisan 

person. I am under the impression that we were not getting a lot 

in the past administration either. 

So I guess I would like to even change the question to say, how 

sincere has the commitment been both in this administration and 

the last administration to border security, which to me is just a 

basic part of being a country? 

Mr. TING. Well, I was going to yield to Mr. Judd, but how serious 

are they about border security? I think there’s a lack of concern for 

deterrence. I mean, I think deterrence is an important part of immigration policy. We will never have enough resources. We will 

never have enough Border Patrol agents on the line, if we don’t 

deter people from attempting to violate our laws. 

So I think deterrence is part of immigration policy, which has 

been abandoned by this administration and not been a high priority of previous administrations. 

One of my colleagues said the poor people of the world may be 

poor but they’re not stupid. They’re as good at doing cost-benefit 

analysis to determine what’s in their best interests as anyone in 

this room. 

They can figure that out, and they are going to figure it out. 

And if we don’t deter people, they’re going to figure out that, hey, 

you have a better life in the United States. Your kids go to school 

for free. There is better security. There are better job opportunities. 

You can compete with Americans for jobs in the United States. 

So that fits into the cost-benefit analysis. 

We can overwhelm whatever resources we are willing to put on 

the border by sending messages that we’re willing, like Angela 

Merkel, willing to accept unlimited numbers of people to come and 

live with us in the United States. 

We can do that, and it’s not going to matter how much money 

we spend on the border and how many Border Patrol agents we put 

up. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay, so I don’t mean to put words in your 

mouth, but it seems to me that at least under the last two administrations, maybe the past three administrations, while the average 

American knows we have a Border Patrol and thinks we have a 

Border Patrol because we want to have our immigration laws 

obeyed, there has not been a commitment for many years in this 

country by powerful people who presumably ran and said that they 

wanted to enforce immigration laws. 

For whatever reason, past administrations of both parties don’t 

really seem to care that much for enforcing our immigration laws. 

I do not know what is going on in their head, but do you think that 

is an accurate statement? 


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Mr. TING. This is the first election campaign that I can recall 

that immigration has been a major issue, that, historically, I think 

both political parties have not wanted to raise immigration because 

it is such an emotional and divisive issue. And really for the first 

time, this year, suddenly immigration has popped up as an issue. 

Now maybe it is the unusual situations we’ve seen at the border. 

Certainly, it’s the national security concerns that we’re all feeling. 

But I think the American people are focused on immigration and 

are asking why we are having such overwhelming problems at our 

borders, and wanting something to be done about it. 

But I think deterrence is part of it. The administration has to 

send a message that we’re serious about enforcing our laws, and 

that we’re going to do the best we can to enforce them efficiently. 

And people who are not entitled to be here ought to expect to be 

turned around at the border promptly, getting a prompt asylum 

interview on the spot, not a credible fear interview, but an asylum 

interview. And if they are denied asylum, they should be turned 

around immediately. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Mr. Judd? 

Mr. JUDD. Yes, if you will, what you have to have, Mr. 

Grothman, Congressman Grothman, is you have to have agency officials who are going to tell you the truth—not the truth. They 

have to be open. They have to tell you everything. 

I will tell you right now that you have a chief patrol agent right 

now who has been very open and has given you all candor. And I 

fear that because of that openness, because of that candor, our current acting chief patrol agent is not even going to be considered for 

the permanent chief patrol agent, because quote/unquote, ‘‘He can’t 

be controlled.’’ 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Thank you. 

Before my final 10 seconds, I want to correct Mr. Ting. 

I think there are a lot of Republicans who want to enforce the 

border, and I think a lot of us are very concerned about what happened under President Bush and don’t want another person that 

is anybody like Bush representing our party in the future. Thank 

you. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I want to thank the witnesses. I think that this hearing was important in fleshing out really some problematic aspects of our national policy here. We do not have a secured border. We are inviting threats to our country. And it goes from having more resources, 

more physical security, but as Professor Ting said, you have to 

have laws that are actually enforced, and people need to see that, 

and that will deter a lot of people coming as well. 

I will note, we are going to continue in this vein on this committee. And in particular, there was a recent report that ICE had 

in custody 124 different detainees who were here illegally that they 

later released, and that after ICE released them, they got charged 

with murder. 

So that is the type of thing that had ICE simply done its job 

properly, maybe those people would not have been killed in our 

country. I think that is an absolute tragedy that that has happened. 

With that, I will thank our witnesses again. 


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85 

If there is no further business, without objection, the subcommittees stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:44 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER

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(87) 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
88 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 49 here 23641.049

USBP Nationwide OTM Apprehensions 

FY2015- FY2016TD through January 

Data includes Deportable Aliens Only 

Data Source: EID (Unofficial) FY15 as of 10/7/15; FY16TD as of 3/3/16 

,iQJ. ·-"Ill AFGHANISTAN 5 18 

ALBANIA 41 50 

ALGERIA 2 

ANGOLA 1 1 

ANTIGUA-BARBUDA 2 

ARGENTINA 26 6 

ARMENIA 4 1 

AUSTRALIA 6 2 

AUSTRIA 1 

AZERBAIJAN 3 

BAHAMAS 41 19 

BANGLADESH 309 163 

BARBADOS 1 

BELARUS 1 1 

BELGIUM 3 1 

BELIZE 35 14 

BHUTAN 1 

BOLIVIA 47 18 

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 3 

BRAZIL 1,344 838 

BULGARIA 5 3 

BURKINA FASO 1 2 

BURMA 2 

CAMBODIA 2 2 

CAMEROON 2 

CANADA 296 34 

CHILE 10 6 

CHINA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF 1,327 619 

COLOMBIA 310 90 

CONGO 1 

COSTA RICA 95 23 

CROATIA 3 

CUBA 1,153 532 

CZECH REPUBLIC 1 1 

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1 

DENMARK 1 

DOMINICA 1 

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 660 293 

ECUADOR 2,593 847 

EGYPT 4 1 

ELSALVADOR 43,564 22,405 

ERITREA 4 2 

ESTONIA 1 

ETHIOPIA 3 4 

FIJI 2 

FRANCE 7 4 

GABON 1 

GAMBIA 1 

GEORGIA 10 5 

GERMANY 6 5 

Page 1 of 3 
89 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 50 here 23641.050

M < 

• 9 3 

1 

1 

GUATEMALA 57,160 26,152 

GUYANA 7 1 

HAITI 379 121 

HONDURAS 33,848 15,670 

HUNGARY 3 5 

INDIA 2,578 1,280 

INDONESIA 6 3 

IRAN 10 3 

IRAQ 7 2 

IRELAND 2 3 

ISRAEL 28 4 

ITALY 11 5 

IVORY COAST 1 1 

JAMAICA 59 16 

JAPAN 6 

JORDAN 8 3 

KAZAKHSTAN 4 1 

KENYA 10 3 

KOREA 10 2 

KOSOVO 3 6 

KUWAIT 5 1 

KYRGYZSTAN 3 1 

LAOS 2 

LATVIA 1 1 

If 4 1 

2 1 

NIA 2 1 

ONIA 8 3 

MALAYSIA 4 

MALl 1 2 

MOLDOVA 17 2 

MONGOLIA 6 

MONTENEGRO 1 1 

MOROCCO 1 1 

NAMIBIA 1 

NEPAL 409 105 

NETHERLANDS 7 

NEW ZEALAND 3 

NICARAGUA 1,034 383 

NIGERIA 29 11 

PAKISTAN 57 79 

PANAMA 15 3 

PARAGUAY 2 2 

PERU 426 160 

PHILIPPINES 24 7 

POLAND 15 8 

PORTUGAL 5 3 

ROMANIA 405 403 

RUSSIA 17 5 

SAUDI ARABIA 18 5 

SENEGAL 5 

SERBIA 5 

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 1 

SIERRA LEONE 1 

Page 2 of 3 
90 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 51 here 23641.051

SOMALIA 

SOUTH AFRICA 3 1 

SOUTH KOREA 31 8 

SPAIN 21 4 

SRI LANKA 109 20 

ST. LUCIA 4 

STATELESS 

SUDAN 

SWEDEN 1 2 

SWITZERLAND 2 1 

SYRIA 5 1 

TAIWAN 11 

TAJIKISTAN 9 

TANZANIA 1 1 

THAILAND 7 6 

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 8 1 

TUNISIA 3 2 

TURKEY 42 27 

TURKMENISTAN 2 

TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS 

UGANDA 

UKRAINE 13 3 

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 1 2 

UNITED KINGDOM 18 10 

UNKNOWN 7 1 

URUGUAY 5 1 

UZBEKISTAN 8 3 

VENEZUELA 28 21 

VIETNAM 18 4 

YEMEN 4 1 

YUGOSLAVIA 

ZIMBABWE 2 2 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) I LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE (LES) 

Page 3 of 3 
91 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 52 here 23641.052

Credible Fear Nationality Report 

FY2016Q1 

10/01/15-12/31/15 
92 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 53 here 23641.053

BURKINA FASO 8 

CONGO 8 

COTE D' IVORE 7 

IRAQ 7 

BOLIVIA 6 

BURUNDI 6 

TOGO 6 

ARGENTINA 5 

COSTA RICA 4 

GEORGIA 4 

THE GAMBIA 4 

UNKNOWN 4 

BURMA 3 

MACEDONIA 3 

VIETNAM 3 

ZIMBABWE 3 

BENIN 2 

CANADA 2 

CHILE 2 

DJIBOUTI 2 

ISRAEL 2 

KENYA 2 

PARAGUAY 2 

SIERRA LEONE 2 

TUNISIA 2 

UGANDA 2 

UZBEKISTAN 2 

YEMEN 2 

ALGERIA 1 

AUSTRALIA 1 

AZERBAIJAN 1 

BULGARIA 1 

CHAD 1 

EQUATORIAL GU 1 

GERMANY 1 

HONG KONG 1 

INDONESIA 1 

IRELAND 1 

KUWAIT 1 

LIBERIA 1 

MALAWI 1 

MAURITANIA 1 

MOLDOVA 1 

MONGOLIA 1 

MOROCCO 1 

PHILIPPINES 1 

POLAND 1 
93 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 54 here 23641.054

RWANDA 1 

SAUDI ARABIA 1 

SENEGAL 1 

SINGAPORE 1 

SPAIN 1 

STATELESS 1 

SUDAN 1 

TAJIKISTAN 1 

URUGUAY 1 

CUBA 0 

GUYANA 0 

KOSOVO 0 

TOTAL 21,481 
94 


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Credible Fear Nationality Report 

FY2015 

10/01/14-9/30/15 
95 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 56 here 23641.056

COSTA RICA 26 

UNKNOWN 26 

BURKINA FASO 25 

IRAN 24 

AFGHANISTAN 20 

TOGO 19 

ARGENTINA 16 

GEORGIA 15 

REP OF CONGO 13 

LEBANON 13 

THE GAMBIA 13 

BURMA 11 

CANADA 11 

SUDAN 10 

COTE D' IVORE 9 

BELARUS 8 

STATELESS 8 

TAJIKISTAN 8 

ANGOLA 7 

BENIN 7 

MACEDONIA 7 

SIERRA LEONE 7 

JORDAN 6 

RWANDA 6 

SPAIN 6 

UZBEKISTAN 6 

AUSTRALIA 5 

BAHAMAS 5 

BULGARIA 5 

BURUNDI 5 

KENYA 5 

MOLDOVA 5 

ZIMBABWE 5 

CUBA 4 

KUWAIT 4 

PANAMA 4 

PHILIPPINES 4 

UGANDA 4 

YEMEN 4 

OEM REP OF CONGO 3 

GUINEA-BISSAU 3 

LIBERIA 3 

MALl 3 

MOROCCO 3 

SAUDI ARABIA 3 

ST. LUCIA 3 

TRINIDAD AND TAB. 3 
96 


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CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. 2 

CHILE 2 

GUYANA 2 

INDONESIA 2 

ISRAEL 2 

KOSOVO 2 

MALAYSIA 2 

MONGOLIA 2 

NETHERLANDS 2 

SOUTH AFRICA 2 

SOUTH KOREA 2 

SWAZILAND 2 

TUNISIA 2 

VIETNAM 2 

ALGERIA 1 

AUSTRIA 1 

AZERBAIJAN 1 

BAHRAIN 1 

BHUTAN 1 

BOSNIA-HERZEGOV. 1 

CAMBODIA 1 

CHAD 1 

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1 

DENMARK 1 

GABON 1 

GERMANY 1 

ITALY 1 

KAZAKHSTAN 1 

KYRGYZSTAN 1 

LAOS 1 

MAURITANIA 1 

MONTENEGRO 1 

NAMIBIA 1 

NORWAY 1 

PARAGUAY 1 

POLAND 1 

TAIWAN 1 

TOTAL 47,966 
97 


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Credible Fear Nationality Report 

FY2014 

10/01/13-9/30/14 
98 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 59 here 23641.059

RWANDA 21 

UKRAINE 20 

JAMAICA 17 

IRAN 16 

BURMA 14 

AFGHANISTAN 11 

SUDAN 11 

CANADA 10 

LEBANON 10 

PHILIPPINES 10 

REP OF CONGO 9 

ARGENTINA 7 

OEM REP CONGO 7 

JORDAN 7 

TOGO 7 

GEORGIA 6 

MOROCCO 6 

UGANDA 6 

ANGOLA 5 

AZERBAIJAN 5 

BURKINA FASO 5 

CHILE 5 

COTE D' IVORE 5 

GUYANA 5 

KENYA 5 

LIBERIA 5 

TUNISIA 5 

BELARUS 4 

BENIN 4 

CHAD 4 

INDONESIA 4 

LIBYA 4 

MOLDOVA 4 

MONGOLIA 4 

SAUDI ARABIA 4 

SIERRA LEONE 4 

STATELESS 4 

AUSTRALIA 3 

BAHAMAS 3 

BULGARIA 3 

ITALY 3 

PARAGUAY 3 

SENEGAL 3 

SOUTH AFRICA 3 

SOUTH KOREA 3 

SPAIN 3 

THE GAMBIA 3 
99 


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UNITED KINGDOM 3 

URUGUAY 3 

VIETNAM 3 

YEMEN 3 

ZIMBABWE 3 

FRANCE 2 

MACEDONIA 2 

MALl 2 

OMAN 2 

POLAND 2 

TRINIDAD AND TAB. 2 

UZBEKISTAN 2 

ALGERIA 1 

BELGIUM 1 

BURUNDI 1 

CAMBODIA 1 

CENTRAL AFRICAN REP 1 

CUBA 1 

GUINEA-BISSAU 1 

IRELAND 1 

ISRAEL 1 

KAZAKHSTAN 1 

KOSOVO 1 

LITHUANIA 1 

MALAYSIA 1 

MAURITANIA 1 

MAURITIUS 1 

NETHERLANDS 1 

NORTH KOREA 1 

PANAMA 1 

SAMOA 1 

SINGAPORE 1 

SWAZILAND 1 

TAIWAN 1 

TAJIKISTAN 1 

THAILAND 1 

USSR 1 

YUGOSLAVIA 1 

ZAMBIA 1 

TOTAL 50,941 

Source: USCIS Asylum Pre-Screening System, APCNAT02 report 

Insert offset folio 61 here 23641.061KING-6430 with DISTILLER

:c: / l::l:iWillli\:Fti:ilfCaS.S ·: . 

••• 

·w;o:r RY:!lS: l':Nl!V ; ·.J?Y.f(j j;'y;.lf5 1'\'.12 . .QyctJ :c.l~'Y'll!'/ . :·.JrY:t;t• . Y

Sub'ect to Expedited Removal Ill 448 118 457 lll,394 120,075 123,180 183691 241442 240 908 unavailable 

Referrals from CBP or JCE 5 252 4,995 5,369 8959 11 217 13 880 36 035 51 001 48 052 

Completed 5 286 4,828 5 222 8,777 11,529 13,579 36,174 48,637 48,415 

CFFound 3,182 3,097 3 411 6 293 9,423 10,838 30,393 35,456 33,988 

CFNot Found I 062 816 1,004 1,404 1,054 1,187 2,587 8,977 8,097 

Closed 1,042 915 807 J 080 1,052 1,554 3,194 4,204 6,330 

Of cases decided on the merits % where CF was found 74.98% 79.15% 77.26% 81.76% 89.94% 90.13% 92.16% 79.80% 80.76% 

Of all referred cases, % where CF was found 60.20% 64.15% 65.32% 71.70% 81.73% 79.81% 84.34% 72.90% 70.20% 

Soot'l:e: t:SC!S Asylum Oivlsion. Asylum Pre-Screening Systan {APSS) 

.:::.:: l<unca.,Cli .Qy;(\7"i>" ·l'Y~QS/ '\:l'YAf/liT/; 1 ;RY-ta :ff4l :"py:J:z; PV'!~·:• RY•t:4/ 

Aoolieations Filed 33 348 30 385 27043 29972 36460 43.312 45 392 57 853 84,236 

Applications Received 25,674 25,505 24 553 28444 35,067 41,883 44,446 56,912 83,254 

Applications Re-opened 7,674 4,880 2,490 1,528 1,393 1,429 946 941 982 

Cases Completed 59 534 45 459 32 698 29580 33,500 36 958 28,381 28972 37,324 

Approved 10,191 9,796 9,614 9,174 10,700 12,991 10,981 10,811 14,344 

Denied 3 996 4,188 1,992 958 1,064 922 766 582 365 

Referred Interviewed) 22,712 17,374 15,291 15,784 17,305 17,948 12,308 12,034 17,106 

Referred Un-interviewed 4,535 3 227 1,721 1,871 2,807 3,714 3,293 3,506 2,380 

Administratively Closed 18,100 10,780 3,900 1677 1,529 1,318 1,001 2 008 3,107 

Approval Rate 28% 3Io/o 36% 35% 37% 41% 46% 46%. 45% 

Source; USCIS Asylum Divisioo, Refugees, Asylum andParcle Sysh:m (RAPS) 
101 


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Wednesday, March 23, 2016 

9 a.m. 2154 Rayburn 

Statement of Ranking Member Gerald E. Connolly (V A-ll'h) 

Joint hearing of the Oversight Subcommittees on National Security and Government Operations: 

"National Security, Threats at Our Borders" 

Mr. Chairman, I want to step back for a moment here at the outset to address what has become a 

disturbing undercurrent with respect to the national debate about immigration. Later today, I will be 

traveling to a naturalization ceremony in my district, where 453 new Americans representing 79 

countries will be taking their oath of U.S. citizenship. They will join generations of immigrants 

stretching back to the founding of our nation with the first settlement in the Commonwealth of Virginia 

at Jamestown in 1607. Like those first settlers, these individuals have come to America in search of 

better opportunities for themselves and their families. 

Perhaps the excitement surrounding this day will help mask the tragic irony that as they are reciting their 

oath to support and defend the Constitution, the frontrunners for the Republican Presidential nomination 

are actually talking about eroding the very rights conferred to them under the Constitution. The 

Republican candidates have talked of not only rounding up illegal immigrants for mass deportation but 

also of shutting the door to an entire class of immigrants based solely on their religion. Their religion, 

Mr. Chairman. I can recall my Catholic grandmother retelling stories of the discrimination and hardships 

she and our family endured from growing up in a Protestant community in Northern Ireland. Now, here I 

am, the third generation of my family in America, serving in Congress. Just think of the possibilities 

awaiting these new Americans here in my district and those of my colleagues. 

How have we fallen so far from the principles the Founders set forth? The very title oftoday's hearing, 

'Threats at Our Borders," is part of the problem. Are there enforcement challenges that must be 

addressed? Yes, absolutely, and that is a legitimate scope of oversight for this Committee. However, 

immigrants do not pose some shadowy threat to America. In fact, it's just the opposite. 

We are, after all, a nation of immigrants, and America, as it's been said before, truly has become the 

land of opportunity. In my Northern Virginia district, we have vibrant immigrant communities ftom 

across the globe, yet we share a common bond and commitment to our community and to one another. 

More than one-in-four residents are foreign born. More than 100 languages are spoken in our schools. 

We are home to more minority-owned technology companies than anywhere else in the nation. That 

success is directly linked to our embracing the rich tapestry of immigrant cultures and making them part 

of the fabric of our community. We have built a tremendous quality of life that has made ours one of the 

most sought after communities in which to live, work, and raise a family. 

Yet some on the other side would have you believe that immigration has weakened America, that 

immigration is somehow the source of people's frustration about jobs being lost to technology and 

automation or the root of people's fears about change. The fear mongering and dema~oguery in our 

politics right now is sadly reminiscent of some of the most painful chapters of the 201 century that we 

should hope to, and strive to, never repeat. 

I find it a bit odd that we're having this hearing just two days after the House adopted, through an 

overwhelming bipartisan vote, legislation that will accelerate the transfer of technology and best 

Pagelof2 
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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 63 here 23641.063

practices to our international partners to improve the screening of travelers bound for the U.S. or other 

destinations. This will help our foreign partners improve their own border security standards and also 

help crack down on the flow of foreign fighters and terrorists, such as those seeking to further fuel the 

conflict in Syria. 

Of course, the Counterterrorism Screening and Assistance Act builds on recent bipartisan action taken 

by Congress in the wake of the horrific attacks in San Bernardino, California, Paris, France, and now in 

Brussels, Belgium. The Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act, which 

passed as part of the omnibus spending bill for fiscal year 2016, enhances information-sharing 

requirements to better assess traveler risk. It requires travelers to use an £-passport with teclmology that 

stores prior travel information, a digital photograph, along with biographic and biometric information. 

That bill also tightens the eligibility restrictions for the Visa Waiver Program. For example, it prohibits 

participation in the waiver program by anyone who has traveled to Syria, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, and other 

designated areas of concern within the past five years and dual nationals of those countries. Such 

individuals may still apply to travel through the normal visa process and would be subject to even more 

rigorous screening. 

Mr. Chairman, when we have candidates for the highest office in the land talking about "taking our 

country back," I have to ask, "from whom?" We're all Americans; we're all in this together. Yes, we 

have different philosophies, different values, different experiences, but they are not to be despised or 

demonized. We need to respect each other even if we don't agree, yet, sadly the current debate is 

creating a breakdown in our polity. We must remember that each new wave of immigrants revitalizes 

the American spirit, making it and us stronger as a nation. These are our neighbors, our doctors, our 

teachers, our first responders, our community leaders, and they are striving each day, just like you and 

me, to provide for their families, to protect our freedoms, and to promote a better life here for all 

Americans. 

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