COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

March 10, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP2063 Cir. Ct. No. 2018CV1839

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

WILLIE P. WATKINS,

PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

V.

PENSION BOARD OF THE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM

OF THE COUNTY OF MILWAUKEE,

RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: 

STEPHANIE ROTHSTEIN, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Brash, P.J., Dugan and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

¶1 DUGAN, J. Willie P. Watkins appeals the trial court’s order 

affirming the decision of the Pension Board of the Employees’ Retirement System 

of the County of Milwaukee (Board) that upheld the denial of Watkins’ 
No. 2018AP2063

2

application to retire under the Rule of 75.1 Under the Milwaukee County

Employee Retirement System (ERS), the County affords certain county employees 

the option of early retirement with what is called the Rule of 75 enabling them to 

receive a full pension when the age of the member2 plus the member’s years of 

county service equal seventy-five. See § 4.1(2). 

¶2 Watkins argues that (1) the trial court failed to articulate and apply a 

proper standard of review; (2) the Board’s interpretation of § 11.4(c)3 of the 

county’s pension ordinance was unreasonable; and (3) the Board improperly 

reviewed and relied upon a confidential March 2017 fiscal analysis in denying his

retirement application. We disagree and, for the following reasons, affirm. 

 

1

 The Board issued two decisions denying Watkins’ appeal. A March 2017 decision 

denied the appeal. Watkins then filed an action for certiorari review with the Milwaukee County 

Circuit Court, which was assigned to the Honorable Rebecca F. Dallet and resulted in a remand of 

the matter to the Board. We refer to Judge Dallet as the circuit court. 

After further proceedings, the Board issued a February 2018 decision denying the appeal. 

Watkins then filed another action for certiorari review with the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 

which was assigned to the Honorable Stephanie Rothstein. Judge Rothstein issued an order 

affirming the Board’s February 2018 decision. Watkins appeals Judge Rothstein’s order. We 

refer to Judge Rothstein as the trial court. 

The ordinance provisions relevant to the pension issues in this case are found in the 

county’s pension ordinance, § 201.24 of the Milwaukee County General Ordinances (MCGO).

Throughout this opinion, we cite the sections within MCGO § 201.24 as “§” followed by the 

section number. For example, MCGO § 201.24(11.4) is simply cited as § 11.4.

2

 “Member” refers to an employee covered by ERS. See § 2.1, § 2.5. 

3

 Section 11.4 provides for benefit computations by allowing retirement system 

reciprocity. That section provides, in part, “[a]ny person who is a member of either the county or 

the City of Milwaukee retirement system who ... transfers from employment in either the county 

or city... shall be entitled to receive a retirement allowance which shall be computed in the 

following manner[.]” Section 11.4 does not make any reference to a specific start date.
No. 2018AP2063

3

BACKGROUND

¶3 Watkins began working for Milwaukee County as a Milwaukee 

County Deputy Sheriff on September 11, 1998, and became an ERS member on 

that date. Watkins states that he was previously employed by the City of 

Milwaukee as a special education teacher from December 11, 1989, through 

September 8, 1998.4 

¶4 As a deputy sheriff Watkins was covered by the 2014 collective 

bargaining agreement (CBA) between the County and the Milwaukee Deputy 

Sheriffs’ Association (Association). CBA § 3.20(9) sets forth the requirements for 

a deputy sheriff to be eligible for the Rule of 75. That section provides, in part,

that “[e]mployees who become Deputy Sheriffs I ... prior to January 1, 1994 shall 

be eligible to retire without penalty when the total of their age and years of 

creditable service equals or exceeds seventy-five (75).” 

¶5 The County’s pension ordinance works together with the CBA as 

described in CBA § 6.01: 

All existing ordinances and resolutions of the Milwaukee 

County Board of Supervisors affecting wages, hours and 

conditions of employment not inconsistent with this 

Agreement are incorporated herein by reference as though

fully set forth. To the extent that the provisions of this 

Agreement are in conflict with existing ordinances or 

resolutions, such ordinances and resolutions shall be 

modified to reflect the agreements herein contained. 

 

4

 The Board states that Watkins worked as an employee of the city in the Milwaukee 

Public Schools (MPS) as a teacher. We note that the parties do not make a distinction whether 

Watkins was an employee of the city or MPS as it may relate to any issues in the case. 
No. 2018AP2063

4

The pension ordinance and the CBA also work together for pension administration 

as stated in pension ordinance § 8.21(2) which provides, in part, “[a]ll provisions 

of such collective bargaining agreements as applicable to specific members and 

relating to the [ERS] are hereby incorporated by reference within this ordinance 

for the purpose of this delegation of authority.” Therefore, pursuant to both the 

ordinance and the CBA, to be eligible to retire under the Rule of 75 the individual 

had to be employed as a deputy sheriff with the County prior to January 1, 1994.

Retirement application and Retirement Plan Services (RPS) action

¶6 Some time prior to March 31, 2016, Watkins, who was then fiftyone years old, went to discuss his retirement with the RPS office, which is charged 

with the day-to-day operations of the ERS plan. Watkins informed RPS that he 

would soon qualify for retirement under the Rule of 75. 

¶7 By letter dated March 31, 2016, RPS denied Watkins’ retirement 

application under the Rule of 75. RPS informed Watkins that the CBA provided 

that a deputy sheriff, represented by the Association, who became a deputy sheriff 

prior to January 1, 1994, was eligible for the Rule of 75, and that the Board had 

recently determined eligibility for the Rule of 75 was based on the retiring 

deputy’s date of membership in ERS. Further, RPS explained that § 11.4 “does 

not allow a member to use his enrollment date with the City to adjust his ERS 

enrollment date to determine eligibility for a benefit with the County.”

5

 RPS also 

 

5

 The RPS letter also informed Watkins that he had earned 6.3571 retirement pension 

credits working for the City. Watkins has not disputed the RPS’s calculation of his city 

retirement pension credits. 
No. 2018AP2063

5

informed Watkins he was not eligible for the Rule of 75 because he had not 

enrolled in ERS until 1998.

6

 

Appeal to the Board

¶8 By letter dated July 15, 2016, Watkins appealed the RPS’s denial of 

the Rule of 75 retirement. The Board heard and voted on the appeal at its 

September 28, 2016 meeting. However, because the ordinance and rules required 

a five-member majority and there was no majority vote, the vote did not resolve 

the appeal. The hearing on Watkins’ appeal was then delayed while the Board 

waited for a fiscal analysis under § 8.17(c).

7

 The Board rescheduled Watkins’ 

appeal for March 22, 2017. The County comptroller prepared two fiscal analyses 

memoranda dated March 22, 2017, and Watkins was given a fiscal analysis 

memorandum prior to the March 22, 2017 hearing.

8

 

 

6

 Watkins also pursued the issue of his retirement under the Rule of 75 by filing a 

grievance. The County denied the grievance based on its determination that § 11.4(a) did not 

allow an ERS member to use his or her city enrollment date to adjust the member’s ERS 

enrollment date to determine eligibility for a benefit with the County. Watkins then arbitrated his 

grievance. The arbitrator concluded that Watkins did not have a contractual right to retire under 

the Rule of 75 and dismissed the grievance. 

7

 Section 8.17(c) provides in part:

In exercising [the Board’s] powers under section 

8.17(a)... [to construe and interpret the system, decide all 

questions of eligibility and determine the amount, manner and 

time of payment of any benefits] ... on any question potentially 

affecting the rights of two (2) or more current or future members, 

the board shall not take action before receiving and reviewing a 

fiscal analysis. 

8

 The second of the two March 22, 2017 fiscal memoranda was designated confidential 

and given to Board members prior to the hearing. 
No. 2018AP2063

6

¶9 Watkins, represented by counsel, appeared at the Board’s March 22, 

2017 meeting. He argued that ERS should use a member’s aggregate creditable 

service from both the city and county retirement systems to determine 

qualification for all retirement benefits. He cited the pension ordinance, 

particularly §11.4(c); the rules; the CBA; and the intrastate retirement reciprocity

statute, WIS. STAT. § 40.30 (2017-18).

9

 Watkins further argued that RPS told him 

that he could retire under the Rule of 75 and that he relied on that information. 

Watkins also requested a copy of the confidential March 22, 2017 fiscal 

memorandum. 

The Board’s March 2017 decision 

¶10 The Board issued a written decision in March 2017 denying 

Watkins’ appeal. Relying on the ordinance, the rules, and the CBA’s language as 

incorporated into the ordinance and the rules, the Board determined that Watkins 

was not eligible for the Rule of 75 because he was not an ERS member until after 

January 1, 1994. The Board further concluded that nothing in the CBA or in 

RPS’s past administration of the Rule of 75 suggested that Watkins’ enrollment 

date with the City could be used as his ERS enrollment date. The Board also 

addressed and rejected Watkins’ arguments under both § 11.4 and the intrastate 

retirement reciprocity statute. 

¶11 The Board also held that, even if RPS staff told Watkins that he was 

eligible to retire under the Rule of 75, the Board was bound to administer the ERS 

 

9

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 40.30 provides for intrastate retirement system reciprocity and 

addresses vesting, eligibility, and benefit computations. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes 

are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2018AP2063

7

according to the ordinance and rules, and it could not provide benefits to a 

member based on erroneous RPS representations that violated the ordinance and 

rules. 

Circuit court certiorari review

¶12 Watkins then filed a petition for certiorari review with the

Milwaukee County Circuit Court. After the circuit court heard the parties’ oral 

arguments, it issued an oral decision that ordered the Board to provide Watkins 

with a complete version of the March 22, 2017 confidential fiscal memorandum 

and remanded the matter for further proceedings, without addressing the merits of 

the Board’s decision. 

¶13 Following the remand, the Board provided Watkins with the 

confidential fiscal memorandum and, thereafter, Watkins appeared with counsel 

and presented his case at the Board’s January 24, 2018 meeting. The Board 

denied Watkins’ appeal in a decision dated February 19, 2018. It concluded that 

Watkins was not eligible to retire under the Rule of 75 because he had not been 

employed as a deputy sheriff prior to January 1, 1994. 

¶14 On March 2, 2018, Watkins filed his second petition for certiorari 

review in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court seeking review of the Board’s

February 2018 decision. After considering the parties’ briefs and oral arguments,

the trial court issued an oral decision denying the writ of certiorari. On 

September 19, 2018, the trial court entered a short final order denying the writ of 

certiorari and dismissing the action. This appeal follows. 
No. 2018AP2063

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DISCUSSION 

¶15 Watkins argues that (1) the trial court failed to articulate and apply a 

proper standard of review; (2) the Board’s interpretation of § 11.4(c) was 

unreasonable; and (3) the Board improperly reviewed and relied upon a 

confidential fiscal analysis in denying Watkins’ retirement application. 

I. The standard of review and applicable law

¶16 The parties are in agreement that this case comes before us as a 

common law certiorari review of the Board’s February 19, 2018 decision and that 

we therefore review the decision of the Board and not that of the trial court. See

State ex rel. Harris v. Annuity & Pension Bd., 87 Wis. 2d 646, 651, 275 N.W.2d 

668 (1979).10 However, the parties disagree on the standard of review that we 

should apply. Watkins argues that we should apply a de novo standard of review 

in considering the Board’s interpretation of the ordinance and statute and apply the 

rationale and holding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tetra 

Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶¶78-81, 83, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 

21, which limits the judicial deference afforded to decisions made by 

administrative agencies. With respect to the confidential memorandum, Watkins 

asserts that we should consider whether the Board failed to act according to the 

law and, instead, acted arbitrarily, oppressively, or unreasonably.11 

 

10

 As noted, Watkins argues that the trial court erred because it failed to identify and 

articulate the appropriate standard of review. However, the standard of review applied by the 

trial court is irrelevant, because, on certiorari review, we review the decision of the Board and not 

that of the trial court. See State ex rel. Harris v. Annuity & Pension Bd., 87 Wis. 2d 646, 651, 

275 N.W.2d 668 (1979). Therefore, we need not further address this issue. 

11

 Watkins cites State ex rel. Ruthenberg v. Annuity & Pension Board of the City of 

Milwaukee, 89 Wis. 2d 463, 472, 278 N.W.2d 835 (1979). 
No. 2018AP2063

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¶17 The Board argues that on review we should consider whether: 

(1) the Board kept within its jurisdiction; (2) the Board proceeded on a correct 

theory of law; (3) its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable, and 

represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) the evidence was such that the 

Board might reasonably make the determination in question. See Ottman v. Town 

of Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶35, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 796 N.W.2d 411. The Board 

acknowledges that this court will apply de novo review to questions of law. 

However, the Board argues that we should give deference to its interpretation of 

the ERS plan because of the Board’s familiarity and expertise with the plan. See 

id. The Board further argues Tetra Tech does not apply here because, unlike 

Tetra Tech, which was an appeal from an administrative agency’s decision, this 

appeal involves a municipal entity’s decision. 

¶18 As further explained, we conclude that, under either standard, 

§ 11.4(c); the CBA; and WIS. STAT. § 40.30 all support the Board’s conclusion 

that to qualify for the Rule of 75 Watkins had to be employed as a deputy sheriff 

with the County prior to January 1, 1994. Consequently, we need not resolve the 

question of the proper standard of review. See Maryland Arms Ltd. P’ship v. 

Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 (stating that 

“appellate court[s] should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds[,]” and 

that we need not address“[i]ssues that are not dispositive”). 

¶19 Courts apply the same rules to construe statutes and municipal 

ordinances. Bruno v. Milwaukee Cty., 2003 WI 28, ¶6, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 

N.W.2d 656. “[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the 

statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect.” State 

ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 

681 N.W.2d 110. “Statutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
No. 2018AP2063

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effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage.” Id., ¶46. Generally, the 

interpretation and application of an ordinance to an undisputed set of facts is a 

question of law that we review de novo. Ottman, 332 Wis. 2d 3, ¶55. 

¶20 Section 4.1(2) sets forth the Rule of 75 for seven different 

subcategories of employees of which deputy sheriffs are only one. As noted, 

pursuant to § 4.1(2)(f), a deputy sheriff had to be employed with the County as a 

deputy prior to January 1, 1994, and had to meet the combined creditable service 

and age requirements to be able to retire under the Rule of 75.

¶21 Section 11.4(c) of the pension ordinance provides service credit 

formulas for retirement system purposes for persons who are members of either 

the County or the City retirement system and who transfer from either 

employment with the County or City. The provision states that its “intention” is 

that any person transferring between the two entities “shall not suffer any 

diminution of the normal retirement benefit” that the person had accrued in the 

system from which the person transferred. See § 11.4(a)(1). 

II. The Board properly interpreted § 11.4(c) in determining

that the Rule of 75 did not apply to Watkins 

¶22 The Board denied Watkins’ application for retirement under the Rule 

of 75. The Board found that Watkins was not eligible to retire under the Rule of 

75 because the CBA is incorporated into the ordinance by § 8.21 and, under the 

ordinance and the CBA, a deputy is only eligible to retire under the Rule of 75 if 

that person was a deputy prior to January 1, 1994. The Board concluded that 

§ 4.1(2)(f) and the CBA “terminate[d] eligibility for the Rule of 75 [for persons 

hired as deputy sheriffs] after January 1, 1994.” It also concluded that there is no 
No. 2018AP2063

11

provision in the CBA, the ordinances, or the rules that would allow Watkins to use 

his city enrollment date to qualify for the Rule of 75. 

¶23 In response to Watkins’ argument that the Board’s interpretation is 

inconsistent with the policy of the reciprocity provisions, the Board stated it 

cannot make its decisions based on policy when the language in the ordinance is 

clear. Further, the Board concluded that Watkins had not established that his 

transfer from the City to the County caused him to lose a benefit earned at the 

City, because the Rule of 75 is a county, not a city, benefit. We agree. 

¶24 Watkins argues that § 11.4(c) states that “the aggregate creditable 

service including all service credit shall be the number of years or fraction of years 

of such service allowable under the respective provisions of both the county or 

[c]ity retirement system and be used to determine qualification for all retirement 

benefits.” He then argues that, when combining his city service credit and his 

county service credit, he qualifies for the Rule of 75. He asserts that, pursuant to 

§ 11.4(c) and WIS. STAT. § 40.30, his start date with the County gets pushed back 

to his start date with the city schools. 

¶25 By contrast, the Board argues that to be eligible for the Rule of 75, a 

deputy sheriff had to become a deputy sheriff prior to January 1, 1994, and had to

be a member of the Association. 

¶26 We agree with the Board. The effect of Watkins’ argument is to 

read out of both the ordinance and the CBA, the requirement that an individual 

had to become a deputy sheriff before January 1, 1994, for the individual to be 

eligible for the Rule of 75. Watkins’ interpretation would be contrary to the 

principle that statutory language is read “to give reasonable effect to every word,” 

where possible. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. Watkins was not a deputy 
No. 2018AP2063

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sheriff prior to January 1, 1994. Therefore, under the pension ordinance and the 

CBA, he may not retire under the Rule of 75. 

¶27 Watkins also premises his argument in part on WIS. STAT.

§ 40.30(1), the intrastate retirement reciprocity statute. The statute states in 

relevant part, “[t]his section shall be construed as an enactment of statewide 

concern to encourage career public service by employees of ... 1st class cities and 

counties having a population of 750,000 or more[.]” See id. Watkins argues the 

stated purpose of § 40.30(1) is to encourage career public service by employees of 

the State, first class cities, and counties. He argues that by allowing individuals 

like him to retain the benefits they earned as city employees after they go to work 

for the County, the statute is intended to attract and retain lifetime public 

employees. 

¶28 However, Watkins does not assert that one of the benefits that he 

earned as a city employee was the option to retire under a Rule of 75. He does not 

claim that the city retirement system includes a provision equivalent to the Rule of 

75. Therefore, he could not have earned that benefit as a city employee and did 

not lose any such benefit when he transferred his employment to the County—the 

Rule of 75 is a county benefit, not a city benefit.

¶29 Watkins further argues that the Board’s interpretation of §11.4(c) is 

contrary to the way that it has interpreted that provision in relation to vacation. He 

states that historically, when an individual moves from employment with the city 

to employment with the county, § 11.4(c) has been interpreted as combining the 

employee’s county and city years of service to “push back” the start date with the 

County. Watkins points out that vacation is determined under the CBA “based on 

years of continuous service.” Watkins then states that the only way that he is 
No. 2018AP2063

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entitled to 240 hours of vacation annually, even though he does not have twenty 

years of actual continuous service with the County, is by pushing back his start 

date with the County to include his years of service with the City. 

¶30 However, Watkins ignores CBA § 3.14 which relates to vacation. 

That CBA provision references “years of continuous service”—it does not identify 

a specific start date. Start date and years of continuous service are separate and 

distinct concepts. Watkins cannot read out of the pension ordinance and CBA the 

January 1, 1994 start date. 

¶31 The ordinance and the CBA clearly provide that to qualify for 

retirement under the Rule of 75, a deputy sheriff had to be employed as a deputy 

prior to January 1, 1994, and to be a member of the Association. Therefore, 

because Watkins was not employed as a deputy sheriff prior to the critical 

January 1, 1994 date, we conclude that Watkins does not qualify for retirement 

under the Rule of 75.12 

CONCLUSION

¶32 For the reasons stated, we conclude that the Board’s decision was

proper as a matter of law. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order. 

 

12

 As noted, Watkins further argues that the Board improperly reviewed and relied on the 

confidential March 2017 fiscal analysis which he asserts was irrelevant to the merits of his case. 

We note that the Board’s written decision states that the fiscal analysis did not affect its 

substantive decision. Moreover, based on our discussion above, the Board was bound by the 

language in the ordinance and the CBA. Therefore, the fiscal analysis could have no affect on the 

Board’s decision or on our decision to affirm the Board’s decision.
No. 2018AP2063

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By the Court.—Order affirmed.

Not recommended for publication in the official reports.