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Filed 9/4/20 In re B.G. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

In re B.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

C081515

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. No. JV136978)

A juvenile wardship petition alleged two counts against the minor B.G.: unlawful 

driving and taking of a motor vehicle and receiving a stolen motor vehicle. (Veh. Code,

§ 10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a).)1 Following a contested jurisdictional 

hearing, the court sustained the petition and reduced the counts to misdemeanors. The 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
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court adjudged the minor a ward of the court and committed him to juvenile hall. The 

minor appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and arguing the true findings

on both counts violate the proscription against dual conviction. We shall affirm the 

judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A juvenile wardship petition alleged the minor committed two crimes: count one, 

unlawful driving and taking of a motor vehicle and count two, receiving a stolen motor 

vehicle. The minor waived formal arraignment and the court ordered the minor detained.

A contested jurisdiction hearing followed. The following facts were presented at 

the hearing. 

In December 2015 Rigoberto Reyes was keeping watch over his brother-in-law 

Jose Ortega’s house. When Reyes went by the house on December 10, 2015, Ortega’s 

BMW and Honda were there. However, on December 13, 2015, both cars were gone. 

Reyes went into the house and discovered the car keys and other valuables were gone and 

the house had been ransacked. Ortega had not given anyone permission to take or drive 

his cars.

Two days later the minor was driving Ortega’s Honda in Sacramento. Officer 

Phillip Monelo ran the license plate and discovered the Honda had been reported stolen. 

Officer Monelo pulled the Honda over and requested the minor get out of the car.

The minor did not offer an explanation as to where he got the car and did not 

provide a bill of sale, pink slip, transfer of title, or registration for the car. Nor did he 

provide a driver’s license. The minor told Officer Monelo he used to live in Woodland, 

but had recently moved to Sacramento. Officer Monelo read the minor his Miranda2

warnings and the minor invoked his right to remain silent. No pink slip was found in the 

2

 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694].
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Honda and the minor did not have a driver’s license. The minor was arrested and taken 

to juvenile hall.

The Honda was towed to an impound lot. When Ortega retrieved the Honda, he 

noticed the hood was damaged, a taillight was broken, and one of the tires had been

changed. “Norte” or “N-O-R” was written on the dashboard and on the car’s ceiling. 

The Honda’s front license plate was in the car’s trunk.

The minor did not call any witnesses.

Following the hearing, the court sustained both counts in the juvenile petition and 

granted the minor’s motion to reduce the counts to misdemeanors. The court found the 

minor to be a person described within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 602. The court noted: “There’s very little evidence in the case showing what 

responsibility, if any, [the minor] had for the original theft of these vehicles. [¶] The 

Court is left with the bare record that he was found in possession of a stolen vehicle with 

what the Court found to be knowledge that the vehicles were stolen, but his conduct was 

appropriate when he was stopped by the officers. And I find no other aggravating 

circumstances, so I’ll sustain the petition on both counts as misdemeanors.”

The court adjudged the minor a ward of the juvenile court and committed him to 

juvenile hall to serve 69 days with credit for time served for 60 days and stayed the 

remaining nine days. The court ordered the minor to complete 35 hours of community 

service and to pay a restitution fine of $50. The minor filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I

The minor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he drove the Honda with 

the intent to deprive Ortega of possession of his Honda.
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Background

The court found the minor violated section 10851, subdivision (a) by driving 

Ortega’s Honda without consent and that the minor possessed the car knowing it was 

stolen.

The court stated: “I’m going to find that the allegations in both Count One and 

Count Two have been proven. I’m not required to state my reasons, but I will so that the 

reasoning is transparent.

“I understand your point, Mr. Hirsch [defense counsel], that possession alone is 

not enough to support these convictions. But it’s pretty clearly established law that 

possession of recently stolen property although in and of itself is not sufficient to warrant 

a conviction for receiving stolen property, it is a highly incriminating nature such that 

only slight corroborating evidence is necessary to support conviction. [¶] . . . [¶]

“The corroborating evidence, the additional basis for conviction can include the 

surrounding circumstances. And here in my mind, the additional corroboration is 

sufficient in and of itself based on the surrounding circumstances. The stolen property in 

question here is not -- it’s of significant value. In other words, it’s not a minor item. The 

character of that property is such that it would be unlikely to be given away or 

abandoned.

“Second unlike other property, even property of significant value, this is property 

that’s required by state law to be registered. The owner is required to be registered. And 

it must be insured. And it’s common knowledge that those documents must be kept in 

the vehicle when the vehicle is being operated. The fact that the evidence showed that 

none of these documents were in the vehicle, I think is some significance tending to show 

that your client had knowledge of the stolen nature of the property.

“So what I’ve said I think so far is enough to sustain the conviction. But there’s 

further corroboration in the lack of sufficient explanation under circumstances where a 
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reasonable person would be expected to present one. So here we have a situation where 

the minor has been pulled over, a vehicle stop and ultimately arrested for vehicle theft.

“Here I think People versus Miller is directly on point, and I’ll just quote from it. 

The possession of property shortly after the commission of the crime is, of course, an 

important circumstance. Appellant’s failure to offer any explanation when arrested could 

scarcely be of less significance in the minds of the jury than a confession of guilt. The 

jurors would naturally and reasonably conclude if he had purchased the property or 

acquired possession of it, honestly he would be swift to declare and explain the 

circumstances that vindicated his conduct which I think is the point that [the prosecutor] 

is making. And this is not a burden on his right of self-incrimination. That was 

established in the Barnes case and the other cases I cited. 

“So for those reasons, I find that beyond a reasonable doubt that the allegations in 

Counts One and Two have been proved.”

Discussion

In reviewing the minor’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review 

the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it 

discloses substantial evidence. Substantial evidence in criminal proceedings is evidence 

that is credible, reasonable, and of solid value such that a reasonable jury could find the 

accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 

11.)

We do not reassess the credibility of witnesses, and we draw all inferences from 

the evidence that supports the jury’s verdict. (People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 

1355, 1382.) Unless it is physically impossible or inherently improbable, the testimony 

of a single witness is sufficient to support the conviction. (People v. Young (2005) 

34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) As to circumstantial evidence, even if we find the evidence 

reasonably susceptible to a contrary finding, we reverse only if under no hypothesis 

whatsoever is there sufficient evidence to support the conviction. (People v. Kraft (2000) 
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23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We apply this 

sufficiency of the evidence standard in cases involving juvenile defendants. (In re Ryan 

N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.)

Section 10851

Section 10851 provides, in part: “Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his 

or her own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with the intent to permanently 

or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, 

whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, or any person who is a party or an 

accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or stealing, is guilty 

of a public offense . . . .” (§ 10851, subd. (a).)

A person can violate section 10851 either by taking a vehicle with the intent to 

steal it or by driving it with the intent only to temporarily deprive its owner of possession. 

Taking a vehicle requires that the vehicle be removed from the owner’s possession. 

(People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 876; People v. Frye (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 

1080, 1088.) Prior to the jurisdictional hearing, the prosecutor informed the court that the 

prosecution’s theory was based on the driving aspect of section 10851 rather than the 

taking aspect.

The driving aspect of section 10851 applies when the defendant either obtains 

unlawful possession of the vehicle and then forms the specific intent to deprive the owner 

of possession, or obtains the vehicle under circumstances that indicate knowledge, absent 

actual taking, that its use or operation deprives the owner of possession. (People v. 

Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 179-180.) 

The People must prove that the minor took or drove a vehicle belonging to another 

without the owner’s consent, and that the minor harbored the specific intent to 

temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of title or possession of the vehicle. The 

minor’s specific intent to deprive the owner of possession may be inferred from all the 

facts and circumstances of the particular case. Possession of recently stolen property 
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itself raises a strong inference that the minor knew the property was stolen. Only slight 

corroboration is required to allow for a finding of guilt. (People v. O’Dell (2007) 

153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574, 1577.) 

The minor concedes the People established that he drove Ortega’s Honda without 

the owner’s consent. However, the minor contends the prosecution presented no 

substantial evidence regarding his intent at the time he drove the vehicle. We disagree.

“Possession of recently stolen property is so incriminating that to warrant 

conviction there need only be, in addition to possession, slight corroboration in the form 

of statements or conduct of the defendant tending to show his guilt.” (People v. 

McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 754. The court in McFarland found a defendant’s 

failure to volunteer an explanation for his possession of stolen property provided 

sufficient evidence to convict him of theft when the circumstances reveal that a 

defendant’s silence or failure to explain indicates a consciousness of guilt. (Id. at p. 756.)

The minor argues he was “simply driving the car.” He was not driving in a 

reckless manner, didn’t remove the license plate, or attempt to evade the police. In 

addition, he did not make “fanciful or conflicting statements to police. His remark that 

he lived in Woodland and recently moved to Sacramento was not inculpatory, it was 

simply factual.”

However, as the trial court noted, the minor was driving Ortega’s Honda without 

the owner’s permission. It had recently been stolen. When officers searched the car, they 

found no registration or proof of insurance. The minor did not have a driver’s license. 

He failed to offer any explanation in a situation that called out for one. Substantial 

evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the minor drove the Honda with the intent 

to temporarily deprive Ortega of possession.

Penal Code Section 496d

Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a) provides, in part, “Every person who 

buys or receives any motor vehicle . . . that has been stolen or that has been obtained in 
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any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be stolen or obtained, 

or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any motor 

vehicle . . . from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be 

punished . . . .” 

Penal Code section 496d required the prosecution prove the property was stolen,

the minor knew it was stolen, and the minor had possession of the property. “The 

requisite possession of the stolen property may be either actual or constructive, and need 

not be exclusive. In fact, physical possession is not required, as it is sufficient if the 

defendant acquires a measure of control or dominion over the stolen property. However, 

mere presence near the stolen property in and of itself is insufficient evidence of 

possession to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property.” (In re Anthony J. 

(2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 728.) 

Proof of knowing possession by a minor of recently stolen property raises a strong 

inference of the minor’s knowledge of the provenance of the property. This inference is 

so substantial that only slight additional corroborating evidence is required to permit a 

finding of guilt. (People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 420-421.)

Again, the minor concedes the prosecution established he was in possession of the 

stolen Honda. However, the minor argues the prosecution failed to establish that he knew 

the vehicle was stolen. Again, we disagree.

The officers who pulled the minor over found no pink slip, bill of sale, or transfer 

of title in the Honda. The minor was not the registered owner and lacked a driver’s 

license. When Officer Monelo stopped him, the minor offered no explanation for his 

possession of the vehicle and did not ask why he was being stopped. The trial court 

found that “the fact that the evidence showed that none of these documents were in the 

vehicle, I think is some significance tending to show that [the minor] had knowledge of

the stolen nature of the property. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [T]here’s further corroboration in the 

lack of sufficient explanation under circumstances where a reasonable person would be 
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expected to present one.” We find sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s 

conclusion. 

Lesser Included Offense

Finally, the minor contends that if sufficient evidence supports true findings on 

both counts, this violates the proscription against dual conviction. According to the 

minor, Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a) is a lesser included offense of Vehicle 

Code section 10851.

Here, the prosecution sought to prove the minor guilty of the driving prong of 

section 10851 and the trial court found the minor guilty of driving the Honda, not stealing 

the car. “Subdivision (a) of Vehicle Code section 10851 . . . defines the crime of 

unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. Unlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to 

permanently deprive the owner of possession is a form of theft, and the taking may be 

accomplished by driving the vehicle away. For this reason, a defendant convicted under 

section 10851[, subdivision] (a) of unlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to 

permanently deprive the owner of possession has suffered a theft conviction and may not 

be convicted under [Penal Code] section 496[, subdivision] (a) of receiving the same 

vehicle as stolen property. On the other hand, unlawful driving of a vehicle is not a form 

of theft when the driving occurs or continues after the theft is complete (for convenience, 

we will refer to this as posttheft driving.)” (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 871 

(Garza).)

Here, the minor was convicted of driving the Honda with the intent to deprive 

Ortega of ownership and of possession of a stolen vehicle. Under Garza “[a] person who 

violates section 10851[, subdivision] (a) by taking a car with the intent to permanently 

deprive the owner of possession, and who is convicted of that offense on that basis, 

cannot also be convicted of receiving the same vehicle as stolen property. [Citation.] If, 

on the other hand, a section 10851[, subdivision] (a) conviction is based on posttheft 

driving, a separate conviction under [Penal Code] section 496[, subdivision] (a) for 
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receiving the same vehicle as stolen property is not precluded.” (Garza, supra, 

35 Cal.4th at p. 876.) We find no error.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 /s/

RAYE, P. J.

We concur:

 /s/

BLEASE, J.

 /s/

RENNER, J.