Audit of the Department of Justice's 


Use and Support of Unmanned Aircraft 


Systems 


Audit Division 15-11 March 2015 

 

AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S 

USE AND SUPPORT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), commonly referred to as “drones,” are 

remotely piloted aerial vehicles and their associated ground control stations that 

receive surveillance imagery. UAS may be equipped with cameras to obtain aerial 

surveillance and may operate up to several hours, depending on their design. 

Officials from multiple law enforcement agencies have stated that they believe UAS 

can be beneficial for reconnaissance, surveillance, and crime scene examinations, 

and that their use eliminates the risk to a pilot inherent in the manned aircraft used 

now. 

The objective of this audit was to assess Department of Justice (DOJ) 

component use and support of UAS. This report follows up on the findings of a 

September 2013 Office of the Inspector General (OIG) interim report that examined 

DOJ components’ domestic use of DOJ-owned UAS and grant funding for non-DOJ 

UAS. In addition, this audit also examines how DOJ components have used or 

relied on other agencies’ UAS to support DOJ law enforcement efforts. 

In our 2013 interim report, we found that DOJ components had only used 

small UAS aerial vehicles that weigh less than 55 pounds and we identified no 

evidence that these aerial vehicles were capable of being armed or carrying 

releasable projectiles. We also found that while the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) had used UAS and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF) had planned to use UAS to support their investigations, neither the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) nor the United States Marshals Service (USMS) 

had used or planned to use UAS. DOJ agreed with all eight interim report 

recommendations and subsequently instituted a DOJ-wide UAS working group to 

develop UAS-specific policies. 

This audit found that, as of August 2014, the FBI remained the only DOJ 

component that operationally deploys UAS. The FBI has deployed its UAS 

exclusively to provide targeted aerial surveillance in the context of 13 

investigations, such as search and rescue operations, kidnappings, fugitive 

manhunts, national security missions, and anti-drug trafficking interdictions. 

Moreover, we confirmed that the FBI obtained all required approvals from the 

Federal Aviation Administration to operate UAS in the field between 2010 and 2014. 

However, our audit identified discrete program management challenges with 

implications for the efficient use of UAS. Specifically, the FBI has centralized its 

UAS to one location, differing from the decentralized approach it has applied to 

manned aircraft. Moreover, at the time of our review, a single team of two pilots 

operated all FBI UAS. We believe these circumstances could limit the FBI’s ability 

to deploy UAS to distant locations quickly or to multiple locations simultaneously. 
 

 

 

 

 

In response to our concern, FBI officials emphasized that the FBI has a longstanding manned aircraft program capable of deploying to multiple locations 

quickly. However, they acknowledged that UAS can have operational advantages, 

such as the fact that small UAS are more difficult to detect at high altitudes. We 

found that the FBI has developed a goal to deploy UAS to more locations within the 

next 5 years. Yet we also found that the FBI had not fully developed plans to 

implement that goal. Considering that the FBI has already deployed UAS to 

address life-threatening situations requiring a quick response, we believe the FBI 

should implement a systematic process to reassess regularly UAS capabilities, 

technological developments, and resource and training needs, with the goal of 

ensuring that the FBI is positioned to deploy UAS efficiently and effectively. 

We also found that ATF spent approximately $600,000 to purchase three 

different types of rotary-wing UAS with a total of six UAS vehicles but never flew 

them operationally. ATF officials told us that they encountered a series of 

technological limitations – such as issues related to flight time and maneuverability 

– with these UAS and concluded that the systems were unsuitable to support 

operations. ATF subsequently suspended all UAS-related activities and disposed of 

these UAS.1

 However, we found that less than a week after ATF suspended its 

original UAS program, an ATF unit, the National Response Team (NRT), purchased 

five small commercial UAS for about $15,000. NRT officials told us that although 

they attempted one brief UAS flight in July 2014 with one of these units to 

document a fire scene, NRT did not coordinate either the purchase or the flight with 

ATF’s UAS program office. NRT officials told us that they have since contacted the 

program office regarding UAS requirements and grounded these UAS until they 

receive further guidance regarding their use. 

In addition to the FBI and ATF’s acquisitions of their own UAS, our audit 

confirmed that the FBI, ATF, DEA, and USMS received support from UAS operated 

by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). None of these components 

had an agency-wide recordkeeping policy or practice to document support provided 

by non-DOJ UAS. Similarly, components maintained little documentation of nonDOJ UAS flights in the field. However, DHS flight records indicate that it operated 

UAS at least 95 times between 2010 and 2013 for missions involving DOJ. These 

records identified 73 flights for missions involving DEA, 13 for the FBI, 4 for ATF, 

3 for the USMS, and 2 for multiple DOJ components. Our review of 50 of these 

flights found that the extent of DOJ involvement in these missions varied 

significantly, and most commonly, the cases receiving non-DOJ UAS support 

involved joint task forces whose members included other federal, state, and local 

agencies. When these non-DOJ UAS flights took place, components did not have 

policies that specifically required the tracking or documenting of non-DOJ UAS use.2 

Without such efforts, we believe that DOJ components may not be able to 

1

 Although the OIG did not audit ATF’s contracts for UAS, we are troubled that ATF spent 

approximately $600,000 on six UAS vehicles it subsequently determined to have mechanical and 

technical problems significant enough to render them unsuitable for deployment on ATF operations. 

2

 The FBI has since issued new procedures requiring approval for any non-FBI aviation use, 

including UAS. 

ii 
accurately assess their need for UAS support or how to use UAS most effectively 

and appropriately to support their operations. 

This report provides four recommendations to help DOJ continue to improve 

UAS management and oversight, including that the FBI regularly reassess its UAS 

needs and developments, that ATF conduct a UAS needs analysis and reconsider 

the best methods to procure UAS prior to acquiring any new UAS, and that the 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General ensure the DOJ UAS working group considers 

the need for components to track and document non-DOJ UAS support received on 

DOJ investigations. 

iii 
 

 

AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S 

USE AND SUPPORT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 

TABLE OF CONTENTS
 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1 

Prior Interim Report on DOJ Use and Support of UAS .................................... 1 

OIG Audit Approach.................................................................................. 2 

FINDING AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................ 3 

UAS Program at the FBI ............................................................................ 3 

 Program Management Challenges ............................................................... 4 

Expanding Regulatory Environment ............................................................ 5 

ATF UAS Efforts ....................................................................................... 6 

First UAS Program Suspended.................................................................... 6 

National Response Team UAS Acquisition..................................................... 7 

DHS UAS Support to DOJ .......................................................................... 7 

Follow-up of the September 2013 Interim Report .......................................... 9 

Recommendations.................................................................................. 10 

STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS........................................................... 11 

STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS ......................... 12 

APPENDIX 1: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY ................................ 13 

APPENDIX 2: OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONSE 

TO THE DRAFT REPORT ........................................................... 15 

APPENDIX 3: THE FBI’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT............................. 17 

APPENDIX 4: ATF’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT .................................. 18 

APPENDIX 5: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND 

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT ........ 21 
 

 

 

 

 

AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S 

USE AND SUPPORT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 

INTRODUCTION 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), commonly referred to as “drones,” are 

remotely piloted aerial vehicles and their associated ground control stations that 

receive surveillance imagery.1 UAS may be equipped with both visual and infrared 

spectrum cameras to obtain aerial surveillance and may operate on either electric 

or gasoline power for 20 minutes to several hours depending on the design. 

Officials from multiple law enforcement agencies have stated that they believe UAS 

can be beneficial for reconnaissance, surveillance, and crime scene examinations, 

and that by using UAS they can eliminate risk to a pilot, which is inherent in the use 

of manned aircraft. 

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for establishing the 

rules governing federal agencies’ operation of UAS. Agencies must first obtain a 

Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) from the FAA before operating a UAS in 

the United States. Because a COA generally limits UAS operations to a specific 

location, Department of Justice (DOJ) agencies may obtain an emergency COA from 

the FAA to operate in a different location provided they face a life-threatening 

circumstance and manned aviation is unavailable or unsuitable. 

Prior Interim Report on DOJ Use and Support of UAS 

A September 2013 Office of the Inspector General (OIG) interim report 

examined how DOJ components used UAS domestically and reviewed applicable 

UAS policies.2

 The report found that DOJ components had only used small UAS 

aerial vehicles that weigh less than 55 pounds and identified no evidence that these 

aerial vehicles were capable of being armed or carrying releasable projectiles. The 

interim report found that while the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had used 

UAS and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) had 

planned to use UAS to support their investigations, neither the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) nor the United States Marshals Service (USMS) had used or 

planned to use UAS for their operations. Our 2013 report also found that DOJ 

award-making agencies had provided $1.2 million in grants to educational 

institutions and local law enforcement agencies to support UAS research and 

deployment. 

Our 2013 interim report provided six recommendations to DOJ to enhance 

monitoring and coordination of UAS and UAS awards, and two recommendations 

that the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) coordinate UAS needs with 

1

 We note that one UAS usually includes multiple UAS vehicles. 

2

 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Interim Report on the 

Department of Justice’s Use and Support of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Report 13-37 (September 

2013) (Interim Report). 
 

 

 

other federal agencies and convene a working group of pertinent components to 

identify cross-cutting UAS issues and develop guidelines. The DOJ agreed with 

these recommendations and, since the time the report was issued, has addressed 

seven of eight recommendations. There remains one open recommendation 

regarding the DOJ working group, and ODAG officials told us that, as of December 

2014, it is waiting to finalize DOJ-wide UAS policies until a broader interagency 

taskforce addressing UAS use across the federal government issues guidance. 

OIG Audit Approach 

The objective of this audit was to assess DOJ component use and support of 

UAS. To accomplish this objective, we reviewed DOJ efforts to address interim 

report recommendations; interviewed officials responsible for establishing and 

enhancing UAS policies and procedures; and examined UAS policies, flight logs, and 

case documents. We also reviewed how DOJ components used and relied on UAS 

owned and operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which is 

part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to support their 

respective law enforcement efforts.3 

Unless otherwise stated in this report, the scope of this review focuses on 

DOJ activities from January 2010 to August 2014. 

3

 On September 27, 2013, the DHS publicly released information indicating that CBP operated 

UAS to support, coordinate, or collaborate with DOJ missions between 2010 and 2012. 

2
 
 

 

 

 

FINDING AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Within DOJ, the FBI is the only DOJ component that operationally 

deploys its own UAS, which it has deployed in support of 

13 investigations from September 2006 to August 2014. We found 

that by having one location for all FBI UAS and relying on a single UAS 

team, the FBI could be limiting its ability to deploy UAS quickly and 

effectively to distant or multiple locations. ATF had contracted for six 

small UAS costing approximately $600,000, but results from testing 

led ATF to suspend its UAS program and dispose of these systems. 

However, a separate ATF unit subsequently purchased five small UAS 

that, after one attempted flight, were also grounded. The FBI, ATF, 

DEA, and USMS have all received support from the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection Predator 

UAS, most commonly in the context of joint task force investigations 

with other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 

However, DOJ components do not specifically track the provision of 

UAS by DHS or other law enforcement agencies. Without better 

tracking and documentation, we believe that DOJ components may not 

be able to accurately assess their need for UAS support or how to use 

UAS most effectively and appropriately to support their operations. 

UAS Program at the FBI 

Our September 2013 interim report found that between 2004 and 2013, the 

FBI spent approximately $3 million to acquire small UAS it deployed to support its 

investigations. As of August 2014, the FBI had acquired 34 UAS vehicles and 

associated control stations, of which it considered 17 vehicles and a smaller number 

of control stations to be operational. 

The FBI reported that between September 2006 and August 2014, it 

deployed UAS to support 13 investigations by acquiring imagery for search and 

rescue operations, kidnapping investigations, fugitive manhunts, national security 

missions, and anti-drug trafficking interdictions.4

 Officials with the FBI’s UAS 

program told us that small UAS are valuable because they are difficult to detect at 

high altitudes and have a much lower operating cost than manned aircraft. Nine of 

the FBI’s 13 UAS-supported investigations occurred between January 2010 and 

August 2014, and we found that the FBI sought and obtained FAA approval to use 

UAS for each of these operations. The FBI told us that that it determined it did not 

need to obtain search warrants for any of its UAS operations. We also found that 

the FBI has deployed UAS exclusively to provide targeted aerial surveillance in the 

context of specific ongoing investigations. 

4

 We note that the FBI has flown its UAS operationally more than 13 times, because the 

support a UAS provides for a case may consist of multiple flights or deployments. 

3
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Program Management Challenges 

In October 2013, the FBI transferred its internal, day-to-day responsibility 

for UAS from its Operational Technology Division (OTD), which tests the law 

enforcement application of new tools and resources, to its Critical Incident 

Response Group’s Surveillance and Aviation Section (SAS), which maintains and 

deploys the FBI’s manned aviation fleet.5 We spoke with officials in both OTD and 

SAS during our review to verify the inventory of the FBI’s UAS vehicles and discuss 

the UAS program’s policies, procedures, and long-range goals. Our review found 

that OTD and SAS collaborated successfully to transition UAS responsibility between 

these divisions. For example, the FBI temporarily assigned an OTD program 

manager to SAS and directed OTD to continue identifying and testing new UAS 

platforms for operational suitability and potential referral to SAS. Nevertheless, we 

believe that the FBI’s UAS program faces significant challenges that affect 

deployment readiness relating to limited geographic dispersion of UAS to the field 

and pilot training. 

During the time of our review, the FBI maintained its UAS at one location in 

the United States and had only one team composed of two pilots on staff who were 

adequately trained to operate its UAS.6

 This approach differs from the 

decentralized deployment approach that FBI officials told us they employ for the 

FBI’s manned aircraft. As a result of the FBI’s centralized approach to UAS, the 

single team of UAS pilots has needed to travel up to thousands of miles to support 

FBI investigations across the United States. UAS pilots told us that when deploying 

they either drove or flew on commercial aircraft, and that such travel could take up 

to a day or more before they arrived at the scene. We believe that having a 

centralized location for all FBI UAS and relying on a single UAS pilot team could 

limit the FBI’s ability to deploy UAS quickly and effectively to distant or multiple 

locations. 

We determined that the FBI has begun taking steps to address these issues. 

For example, CIRG officials established a goal of deploying UAS to additional FBI 

field divisions over the next 5 years. We found, however, that the FBI had not fully 

developed plans to implement such a goal. Additionally, SAS officials told us that 

they began training four additional UAS pilots in November 2014. We note, 

however, that FBI officials also told us that there have been times in the past where 

they have had multiple UAS pilots trained, but these pilots transferred, retired, or 

otherwise did not keep current on training. 

5

 SAS serves as the FBI’s final approval authority for all its UAS operations. While a 

supervisor and an Assistant Special Agent in Charge must first approve all requests from FBI Special 

Agents for aerial surveillance support, including UAS, it is SAS that is responsible for ascertaining that 

no manned aircraft is available or that available aircraft would be unsuitable to meet mission needs. 

If SAS determines that UAS should be deployed, SAS is responsible for seeking FAA approval for UAS 

operations via a COA or emergency COA. 

6

 Since 2009, FBI aviation policies governing the operation of UAS have required that UAS 

pilots maintain what is referred to as “flight currency” by performing three successful launches and 

recoveries of a particular UAS model within the 90 days preceding an operation with that type of UAS. 

4
 
 

 

 

 

We discussed these concerns with CIRG and other FBI officials. FBI officials 

emphasized that they view UAS to be a specialized resource enhancement to the 

FBI’s manned aircraft program, which has a proven capability of quickly deploying 

to multiple locations. For this reason, these officials told us, the FBI strategically 

maintains a very limited operational reliance on still-maturing UAS technology. 

Since the transfer of the UAS program from OTD to CIRG, the FBI stated that it has 

deployed UAS in only the most specialized and unique circumstances, and always in 

tandem with manned aircraft. 

Considering that the FBI has already deployed UAS to address lifethreatening situations requiring a quick response, we recommend that the FBI 

implement a systematic process to reassess regularly UAS capabilities, 

technological developments, and resource and training needs. Such assessments 

should also consider the changing regulatory environment, which is discussed 

below, that specifies when and where the FBI may operate UAS and how highly 

specialized UAS capabilities align with other FBI emergency response resources to 

ensure that the FBI is positioned to deploy UAS efficiently and effectively. The FBI 

should also ensure that its UAS pilots receive the training and maintain the flight 

currency necessary to deploy operable UAS quickly. 

Expanding Regulatory Environment 

As stated previously, the FBI must obtain COAs from the FAA that specify 

when and where the FBI may use UAS. To operate a UAS outside an original COAapproved area, the FBI must either apply for a new COA or obtain an emergency 

COA by demonstrating that an imminent threat to life or safety exists and that 

manned aircraft are unavailable or unsuitable for the particular circumstance. The 

FBI stated that it has taken from as little as a few hours to up to 3 days to receive 

an emergency COA. 

In response to this concern, we found that the FBI and FAA were drafting 

rules that would expand the locations and times that the FBI could operate UAS 

without requesting an emergency COA. Under this “COA via Notification” 

framework, the FBI anticipates it will be able to deploy and operate UAS over lessdensely populated domestic airspace, referred to as Class G airspace, by notifying 

the FAA where FBI will be operating UAS. 

We believe that such an arrangement could have been useful in a recent FBI 

UAS deployment where ground-based tactical teams conducted surveillance on four 

houses in separate locations in conjunction with executing a search warrant related 

to a kidnapping investigation. According to FBI records, the FAA cleared UAS use 

under an emergency COA to provide surveillance on just one location, but when the 

ground team commander requested the UAS change locations, several hours 

elapsed before a new emergency COA could be obtained. 

Had this potential framework been in place, the FBI would have been able to 

operate the UAS over the other locations so long as: (1) the FBI notified the FAA 

and (2) the parameters of those locations matched the parameters of the location 

already approved in the original COA. Nevertheless, under the terms of the drafted 

5
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

framework, the FBI would still be required to comply with established COA safety 

requirements such as maintaining a line of sight with the UAS and restricting UAS 

operations to a defined type of area to mitigate the risk to other aircraft, persons, 

and property. 

ATF UAS Efforts 

Our September 2013 interim report found that ATF possessed UAS and 

planned to deploy them operationally. Specifically, between September 2011 and 

September 2012, ATF’s UAS program spent approximately $600,000 to purchase 

three different types of rotary-wing UAS with a total of six UAS vehicles.7 

First UAS Program Suspended 

ATF officials told us that they acquired these UAS to provide video 

surveillance that could integrate with other surveillance platforms and equipment 

already in use. During our fieldwork, ATF’s Special Operation Division, Technical 

Operations Branch (TOB) served as ATF’s UAS program office and was therefore 

responsible for coordinating aviation requests for ATF operations and developing 

UAS training and operational procedures.8 

ATF officials reported that ATF never flew its UAS in support its operations 

because TOB testing and pilot training revealed a series of technological limitations 

with the UAS models it had acquired. In particular, ATF determined the real-time 

battery capability for one UAS model lasted for only about 20 minutes even though 

the manufacturer specified its flight time was 45 minutes. ATF determined that the 

other two models of UAS acquired also were unreliable or unsuitable for 

surveillance. One UAS program manager told us ATF found that one of its smaller 

UAS models, which cost nearly $90,000, was too difficult to use reliably in 

operations. Furthermore, the TOB discovered that a gas-powered UAS model, 

which cost approximately $315,000 and was specified to fly for up to 2 hours, was 

never operable due to multiple technical defects. 

In June 2014, the Special Operations Division concluded that ATF’s UAS were 

unsuitable for operational use, suspended all ATF UAS-related activities, and 

reassigned all UAS staff until after DOJ issues and ATF reviews new UAS policy 

recommendations. In September 2014, the TOB transferred its six UAS vehicles 

and other related equipment purchased prior to June 2014 to the Naval Criminal 

Investigative Service at no cost. 

Although the OIG did not specifically audit ATF’s UAS contracts, we are 

troubled that the process ATF used to purchase these UAS resulted in ATF spending 

approximately $600,000 on UAS models it ultimately determined to have significant 

7

 ATF does not possess manned aviation assets and instead has largely relied on DEA for 

aviation surveillance support, subject to DEA aircraft availability. 

8

 In October 2014, the Special Operations Division transferred ATF aviation and UAS program 

office responsibilities from the TOB to the Enforcement Support Branch. 

6
 
 

mechanical and technical problems that rendered them unsuitable to deploy in 

support of ATF operations. Therefore, we recommend that ATF direct responsible 

officials to perform a thorough needs analysis regarding the potential UAS 

capabilities it requires that ensures the best approaches to procure UAS prior to 

restarting future UAS acquisition activity. 

National Response Team UAS Acquisition 

Less than a week after ATF’s Special Operations Division suspended its UAS 

program, ATF’s National Response Team (NRT) purchased five small, commercially 

available UAS at a total cost of about $15,000. The NRT acquired these UAS, which 

each weigh approximately three pounds, to help document fire and explosion crime 

scenes. NRT officials told us they used one of these units to conduct one brief UAS 

flight in July 2014 to document the aftermath of a Louisiana apartment fire that 

resulted in the deaths of three residents. However, NRT officials stated that after 

this use, they became aware that they were required to obtain an FAA COA before 

operating UAS. These officials told us they then contacted TOB regarding UAS 

requirements and subsequently grounded their UAS until they obtained further 

clarification and guidance on deployment requirements. 

The NRT’s use of UAS demonstrated at least two issues requiring improved 

coordination within ATF. First, because the Special Operations Division was 

responsible for ATF’s UAS program and its UAS responsibilities encompassed all of 

ATF, it should have communicated its decision to suspend UAS activities across the 

entire agency. However, we found that the decision to suspend UAS activity was 

not communicated outside of TOB, resulting in the NRT obtaining additional UAS 

less than a week after TOB’s decision to suspend ATF UAS activity. Second, ATF 

policy stated that all UAS operations in ATF fell under the purview of the Special 

Operations Division, and its TOB had developed a standard operating procedure for 

UAS governing both deployment and pilot training requirements. Yet NRT did not 

coordinate with TOB to acquire and operate UAS. Therefore, we recommend that 

ATF adequately communicate all UAS policy and guidance to its operational units 

and ensure that those units comply with such guidance. 

DHS UAS Support to DOJ 

While some DOJ components maintain aircraft to support their operations 

and the operations of other components, they may occasionally rely on aviation 

support from non-DOJ law enforcement agencies when they deem such support 

necessary or expedient. At times, this support has included the use of UAS. 

Specifically, four DOJ law enforcement components – the FBI, ATF, DEA, and USMS 

– have received UAS support from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 

part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which operates a fleet of 

Predator-B UAS. In response to our request, the CBP provided to us evidence 

indicating it operated UAS at least 95 times on missions that involved DOJ 

components in some way. Of these flights, the CBP identified that DEA was 

involved in 73, the FBI in 13, ATF in 4, the USMS in 3, and 2 for multiple DOJ 

components. 

7
 
 

 

 

The CBP UAS reports did not detail the level of DOJ involvement in each flight 

because the reports served only as technical summaries of UAS operations. 

However, through interviews with component officials, including field personnel who 

received non-DOJ UAS support, and based on a sample review of case files 

pertaining to 50 DHS UAS flights, we found that the extent of DOJ involvement in 

these flights varied significantly. For example, ATF specifically requested that the 

CBP conduct three UAS flights to help it prepare to serve a search warrant 

pertaining to a firearms trafficking investigation adjacent to the U.S.-Canadian 

border. In several other instances, DOJ components requested UAS assistance to 

assist local police emergencies. 

Most commonly, the cases receiving non-DOJ UAS support involved DOJ 

components serving on joint task forces with other federal, state, and local 

agencies. We identified 13 flights in our sample of 50 flights that involved DOJ-led 

domestic task forces, and 31 flights where DOJ was involved in international 

taskforces.9

 In those latter cases, the lead agency was not always clear because 

such operations fall under the purview of different law enforcement agencies.10 

We also reviewed how DOJ components tracked and approved non-DOJ UAS 

support of their investigations. We found that from 2010 through 2013, DOJ 

components had no central record of the approval for or instances of support 

provided by DHS UAS. This is because none of these DOJ components had a 

component-wide recordkeeping policy or consistent practice to document support 

provided by non-DOJ aviation assets. In addition, we found that few cases had 

corroborating records in the field specifically indicating UAS had been deployed. We 

could confirm DHS UAS use in our sampled flights mainly through the recollections 

of individuals involved in the cases supported. We note that prior to our audit, 

there was no requirement for field divisions to document specific instances of nonDOJ UAS support. However, in 2014 the FBI issued a new procedure requiring 

internal notification and approval for any non-FBI aviation use, specifically including 

UAS. 

As reported in the OIG’s previous audit reports on FBI and DEA Aviation 

Operations, information regarding the use of different kinds of aviation assets 

allows the components to manage better these assets and ensure the appropriate 

use of UAS in support of the highest-priority investigations.11 By not tracking or 

9

 Of the six remaining UAS flights in our sample, three supported the ATF case noted above 

and another supported a local police case with no DOJ involvement beyond a listing as point of 

contact. We were unable to confirm that the remaining two UAS flights actually occurred. 

10 The 31 international flights in our sample involved multi-agency, anti-trafficking taskforces; 

15 UAS flight records listed support for Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos from 2010 to 2012 and 

16 flights for operations elsewhere in the Caribbean during the summers of 2012 and 2013. In both 

operations, the DEA undertook some level of coordination responsibility, but did not necessarily or 

consistently assume a lead agency role for UAS operations. 

11 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Aviation Operations, Audit Report 12-21 (March 2012) and U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Aviation Operations, 

Audit Report 12-05 (December 2011). 

8
 
 

 

 

documenting non-DOJ UAS requests and support, DOJ components reduce their 

ability to accurately assess their need for UAS support or determine how to use UAS 

most effectively and appropriately to support their operations. We therefore 

recommend that the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) ensure the DOJ 

UAS working group considers the need for DOJ components to track or document 

non-DOJ UAS support received on DOJ investigations. 

Follow-up of the September 2013 Interim Report 

Our interim report found that while the DEA and USMS obtained UAS for 

testing, neither component has deployed them to support their operations. During 

this audit, we found both agencies had disposed of their UAS as of May 2014 and 

have no plans to acquire UAS in the future. The interim report also provided six 

recommendations to DOJ to enhance monitoring and coordination of UAS and UAS 

awards. We confirmed that the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) and Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) have taken actions to implement 

these recommendations and improve their ability to track UAS-related awards, 

enhance reporting of UAS information, and institute prerequisites for applicants to 

prove they can be authorized to operate a UAS. All of these recommendations to 

COPS and OJP are closed. 

In addition, the interim report recommended that the ODAG convene a 

working group of pertinent components to identify crosscutting UAS issues, develop 

guidelines, and coordinate UAS needs with other federal agencies. DOJ agreed with 

the recommendations and, since the report was issued, has progressed in 

implementing them. DOJ stated that the UAS working group began meeting in 

October 2013 and is continuing to meet periodically. We confirmed that officials 

from the FBI, ATF, USMS, DEA, OJP and COPS have participated in these meetings. 

The DOJ Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties has also participated. 

However, ODAG officials also told us that the working group would not 

finalize DOJ-wide UAS policies until a broader interagency taskforce, which includes 

DOJ participation, issues federal government-wide UAS guidance. On February 15, 

2015, the White House issued a Presidential Memorandum (Memorandum) directing 

federal agencies to take steps to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberty 

interests while promoting UAS accountability and transparency.12 In particular, the 

Memorandum requires that federal agencies adopt specific UAS policies and 

procedures regarding collecting, using, retaining, and disseminating UAS-acquired 

information. Such UAS policies must also apply Privacy Act protections and prohibit 

using UAS to discriminate against individuals or violate the First Amendment. With 

the issuance of this Memorandum on UAS, DOJ officials anticipate that the DOJ 

working group will soon release a draft UAS policy to DOJ components for 

comments. 

12 Presidential Memorandum: Promoting Economic Competitiveness and Innovation While 

Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems, February 15, 2015. This memorandum was issued outside the scope of our audit work, 

however, we will consider these requirements when assessing any policies recommended by the DOJ 

UAS working group pursuant to our recommendations in this report. 

9
 
 

 

 

 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the FBI: 

1. Implement a systematic process to reassess regularly UAS capabilities, 

technological developments, and resource and training needs, with the 

goal of ensuring that the FBI is positioned to deploy UAS efficiently and 

effectively. 

We recommend that ATF: 

2. Direct responsible officials to perform a thorough needs analysis regarding 

the potential UAS capabilities it requires that ensures the best approaches 

to procure UAS prior to restarting future UAS acquisition activity. 

3. Adequately communicate all UAS policy and guidance to its operational 

units and ensure that those units comply with such guidance. 

We recommend that the ODAG: 

4. Ensure the DOJ UAS working group considers the need for DOJ 

components to track or document non-DOJ UAS support received on DOJ 

investigations. 

10
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS 

As required by the Government Auditing Standards, we tested, as 

appropriate, internal controls significant within the context of our audit objectives. 

A deficiency in an internal control exists when the design or operation of a control 

does not allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing their 

assigned functions, to prevent or detect in a timely manner: (1) impairments to 

the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) misstatements in financial or 

performance information, or (3) violations of laws and regulations. Our evaluation 

of the internal controls of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), and the United States Marshals Service (USMS) was not 

made for the purpose of providing assurance on their internal control structures as 

a whole. Management at these components is responsible for the establishment 

and maintenance of internal controls. 

As discussed in our report, we identified an instance where an ATF unit 

purchased UAS without consulting the ATF’s designated UAS program office after 

that office had suspended ATF’s UAS program. This unit also operated at least one 

of these UAS without the required Certificate of Waiver or Authorization from the 

Federal Aviation Administration. Therefore, we have made recommendations above 

to help ensure that ATF improves its internal controls so that its units are uniformly 

aware of and comply with all rules, regulations, and guidelines related to Unmanned 

Aircraft Systems. 

Our review also found that DOJ components did not track or document nonDOJ UAS requests and reliance, thereby risking a reduction in their ability to assess 

current or future demand for UAS or other aviation support readily and accurately. 

Because we are not expressing an opinion on the internal control structure of 

these components as a whole, this statement is intended solely for the information 

and use of the auditees and is not intended to limit the distribution of this report, 

which is a matter of public record. 

11
 
STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS 

As required by the Government Auditing Standards, we tested, as 

appropriate given our audit scope and objectives, selected transactions, records, 

procedures, and practices to obtain reasonable assurance that the FBI, ATF, DEA, 

and USMS’s management complied with federal laws and regulations for which 

noncompliance, in our judgment, could have a material effect on the results of our 

audit. The management at these components is responsible for ensuring 

compliance with federal laws and regulations applicable to the Department of 

Justice. In planning our audit, we identified the following laws and regulations that 

concerned the operations of the auditee and that were significant within the context 

of the audit objectives: 

 49 U.S.C. §§ 40102(a)(41), 40125 

 41 C.F.R. Part 102-33 

 Rules prescribed by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration under 

14 C.F.R. § 91.903 

Our audit included examining the FBI and ATF’s compliance with the 

aforementioned laws and regulations, and whether non-compliance could have a 

material effect on their operations. We did so by interviewing aviation program 

personnel, requesting and reviewing FBI and ATF reports, assessing oversight 

procedures, and examining records. As neither the DEA nor USMS had active UAS 

programs, this examination was unnecessary for these auditees. 

12
 
 

APPENDIX 1 

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 

Objectives 

The objective of this audit was to assess DOJ component use and support of 

UAS. The interim report on this topic has already provided an overview of domestic 

DOJ component use of their own UAS programs as of May 2013 and reviewed DOJ 

awards supporting the provision of UAS to other law enforcement agencies and 

non-profit organizations and its findings are incorporated by reference. Therefore, 

this final audit report: (1) updates the status of DOJ components’ own UAS 

activities and (2) assesses DOJ components' use of or participation in law 

enforcement operations using non-DOJ owned or controlled UAS. 

Scope and Methodology 

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted 

Government Auditing Standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Our audit focused on the UAS activities conducted by the FBI, ATF, DEA, and 

USMS. The scope of our review primarily focused on UAS activities from September 

2013 to August 2014, but we considered the FBI’s use of its UAS from 2006 to 

August 2014 and non-DOJ UAS support to DOJ operations from 2010-2013. To 

accomplish the objectives of our audit, we interviewed more than 40 DOJ personnel 

with an interest in UAS operations at DOJ. We examined both DOJ and non-DOJ 

UAS flight and approval records, UAS procurement documents, and UAS imagery 

and related case information. 

Our audit work included interviewing officials from the Department of 

Homeland Security, Office of Air and Marine (OAM), which operates the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) fleet of Predator-B UAS. We interviewed 

OAM officials to discuss how the CBP generated the list of flights supporting nonDHS agencies and obtain un-redacted copies of the 2010 to 2013 daily OAM 

Assistant Commissioner’s Reports (CBP Daily Reports) to analyze. Additionally, we 

met with DHS Office of Inspector General officials to discuss the scope of their audit 

of DHS UAS operations. We also requested that DOJ components provide 

corroboration of any DHS UAS flights they requested or from which they received 

assistance between 2010 and 2013. 

Judgmental Sample Selection 

To test the accuracy of existing records of non-DOJ UAS use for DOJ 

operations, we judgmentally selected 50 of the possible non-DOJ UAS flights for 

13
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

further review from both DHS UAS records indicating DOJ component involvement 

and self-reported confirmation accounts of DHS UAS use from DOJ components.13 

We selected 38 of the possible 95 UAS flights referenced in the CBP Daily Reports. 

In addition, we selected 12 flights identified by DEA that were not in the CBP UAS 

Reports, or were from CBP Daily Reports associated with the 2 Caribbean 

operations but that did not reference DOJ. In total, we selected 50 non-DOJ UAS 

flights for further review. 

We conducted audit work at DOJ, the FBI, and ATF headquarters in 

Washington, D.C., and USMS and DEA headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. We also 

conducted in-person and telephone interviews with DOJ field office officials in 

Seattle, Washington (FBI); Minneapolis (FBI) and St. Paul, Minnesota (ATF); 

San Antonio (FBI) and Houston, Texas (ATF, DEA, and USMS); Phoenix, Arizona 

(USMS); Miami, Florida (DEA); and San Juan, Puerto Rico (DEA). In our 

discussions with field division personnel, we also verified, to the extent possible, 

other records reflecting the use of UAS. 

For purposes of this review only, if a DOJ component was aware of or 

facilitated UAS use then we included that case in our count. Of the 50 possible UAS 

flights we tested occurring between 2010 and 2013, we were unable to confirm the 

existence of 2 UAS flights. We also found one UAS flight listed by DHS records as 

supporting the FBI that only supported a local police department with no DOJ 

involvement. Therefore, we concluded 47 out of 50 showed evidence of DOJ 

component involvement or knowledge at some level. This judgmental sample is not 

projectable onto the universe of possible UAS flights. 

Further, concluding a level of awareness by DOJ components does not mean 

we can conclude that DOJ actually requested or even received non-DOJ UAS 

assistance on an actual DOJ case 47 times for this sample. In some cases, 

components had only a generalized knowledge that non-DOJ flights occurred but 

not the specific flight dates. In such cases, we aggregated as confirmed those UAS 

flights records listing support to DOJ if they had flight hours and occurred in the 

specified location (usually in or near either the Bahamas or Dominican Republic). 

We concluded that many of the variances between the records of DHS and the field 

divisions within DOJ components resulted from differences in attribution as to 

whether an actual DOJ operation was supported by the UAS flight or if a taskforce 

operation was involved. 

13 Because DHS officials told us their records were not kept for the purpose of tracking third 

party support and were maintained by a separate federal Department, we could not directly verify 

their accuracy. 

14
 
APPENDIX 2 

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONSE 

u.s. Department of Justice 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General 

March 19,2015 

ME MO RANDUM 

TO: Michael Horowitz 

Inspector General 

U.S. Department ofJustice 

FROM: Benjamin Fitzpatrick lP 

Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General 

SUBJECT: 	 Response: Audit of the Department of Justice's Use and Support of 

Unmaruled Aircraft Systems 

We appreciate the audit undertaken by the Office of the Inspector General regarding the 

Department's use and support of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Th is audit fo llows an 

interim report issued in September 2013, which contained eight recommendations, all of which 

the Department accepted. As a result of that report, the Department, al the direction of the Office 

of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG), convened a DOJ-wide UAS working group to addrcS!; 

policy issues relatcd 10 the Department's usc ofUAS. 

The final report of this audit makes four recommendations, one ofwhich is directed to 

ODAG: 

Recommendation to ODAG: Ensure the DOJ UAS working group considers the 

need for DOJ components to trock or document non-DOJ [JAS support received 

on DOJ investigations. 

Response: Concur. ODAG has already directed the Office of Legal Policy, 

which chairs the UAS working group, to consider thc need to troek or document 

non-DOJ VAS support that Department components receive on [)OJ 

investigations. 

The remaining three recommendations are directed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fireamls and Explosives, and will be addressed in those agencies' 

responscs. 

15 

Memorandum to Michael Horowitz Page 2 

Subject: Response: Audit of the Department of Justice's Usc and 

SlIP]Xlrt of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

ec: Mark Giuliano, Fedcral Burcau oflnvcstigation 

B. Todd Jones, Burc!lU of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fi earm~ and Explosives 


Stacia Hylton, United Slates Marshals Service 


Michele Leonhart, Drug Enforcement Administration 


16 

APPENDIX 3 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE14 

U.s. O"iWl n mr.nt or JUJ l icl' 

Frderal Oureau of hl\'CSlignlion 

Washington. D. C. 205J5~OO I 

March 18.2015 

The Honorable Michael E. HorowItz. 

Inspector General 

Office oflhe InsJX.~lor General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

950 I>c:nnsylvania Avenue, N. W. 

Washington . DC 20530 

Dear Mr. Honmitz: 

The Fcdcml Bureau of invcslig:lIion (FBI) appreciatC5 the opportunity 10 re\'icw Ilnd 

respond to your on1cc's report entilled, "'Audit afthe Depa"",tmr nfJuwice 's Us,- and S'IPPO'" 0/ 

UnllIWlfIl!li Aircraft S}':ul!ms. ,­

We arc plt'ascd you determined the FBI has dcplo}ed ils Unmanned Aircmt1 )slems 

(VAS) in accordance with all Federal Aviation Adminislrati n (FAA) appm\lals IlJld in 

furtherance- ofin\'cstigolions "exclusively to pro\i.dc Ulrgcted acriol sur ...cillance.­

As }OU aptly note, the FBI has already deployed UAS to address life-threatening 

simalions requirinK a quick response. We agree: with your thought'i on implementing n 

syslem!lIic process 10 ensure the FBI's AS are po itioned most efficiently and effectively. 

In thm re~ard. \\c eoncur \\ith )ouronc recommendation directed towards the FBI. 

Should you htl\·c any quc:stions. plcasc fccl free 10 contoct mc. We ~rcmly npprwil1tc the 

professionalism ofyour audit sl!lfT throughout this IJUlUf.... 

Sincerely. 

14 Attachments to t his response were not included in this fi nal report. 

17 
APPENDIX 4 

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS 

AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE 

tJ.S. bepl l1menl of J usli« 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobocco. 

Firearm! IUld Explosivcs 

Assislanr Dir-rClor 

_.....,.... 

6OWO:ADW 

1)10 

MAR 18 2Q1; 

MEMORANDUM TO: 	Assistant Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Officc of the Inspector General 

FROM: 	 Assistant Director 

Office of Professional Responsibility and Securily Oper1l1ions 

SUBJECT: ATF's response 10 the Office oflnspeetor General', Draft Repon of 


DOl's Use and Support of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 


This memonndum serve.s 10 transmit ATF', response 10 the: above..cited Draft Repo!1. Attached is It 

summary of the status of the actions taken relative to the cited rtCommendalions. 

Should you have any questions or need additional infonno.tion,plcase conlnel the Chief of ATF's Audit 

Liaison Branch, Adam Pallotta at (202) 648-8706. 

Michael Gleysleen 

Attachment 

cc; Director 

Assistant Director (OlTlCe of Field Operations) 

Chief Counsel 

ASslS1ant Direc.lor, Audit Liai50n Group, Dcpartmenl ofJustice 

18 

• 

u.s. Departmul of Justke 

Bureau ofAlcohol. Tobacco, 

Fi ....... and Explosl... 

AJJISlonl Director 

liAR I 0 lQil 

700000:MHW 

8300 

MEMORANDUM TO: AssiSlanl Director 

(Office cfProfessional Responsibility and Seeurity Operations) 

FR.OM: Assistant Director 


(Field <:>per.lions) 


SUBJECT: 	Review ofthe Dcputmcnl of Justicc's Use and Support 

of Unmanned Aircnft Systems 

jThe Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fireazms and Eltplosives (ATF) appreciates the opportunity to 

respond to the recommendations contained in the above cited report. We welcome the Office of 

tN!: l/upl!dor GenenJ.·s (OIG) cnnmudive comments and remnunendAtions on this matler. 

!Bs52ll!!J!l:a!l,!JIgUOO!l'1l:: Dlred rnpollslble ofl'lcUlls to perform a tllOI'Oulh aHCb analysis 

rqlrdbla the poteati.a UAS clpabWtfes It reqllira that msures the best apprGlldles to 

procure VAS prior to ",tartiDc future UAS IcqulslUGD activity. 

Response (Coacur): AlthouGh ATF bas no immediate plans 10 purcha$e UAS, the Deputy 

~istant Director (DAD) for Propams (Field Opc::aIions) will issue. manorandwn to the 

~f, Special Opemions Division (SOD), stallnK that 8 needs analysis should be conducted in 

the Ntln,hOUJd ATF consider pLlrChuiaa VAS. 

IRcw..m 1.1: Adequately commuak:lt. aU VAS polk)' and eulduce to its 

operatloaal units aad e.nsure. that tllose uaitJ comply wltb sudl euldaace. 

Rtspoase. (Concllr): I will issue a memonndwn to all special agents in charge clarifying policy 

to explain that any pwthase ofequipment requires DAD approyaJ and must be coordinated 

tIvough SOD, 

Additionally. in order to trick the use ofUAS and compliance with policy, the ATF cue 

manapnent .poem has been upcIa.cd with mandalory entry fields 10 cap... deploymCl14 DAD 

19 

-2­

Assistant Oiredor 


(Office ofProfessional Responsibility and Security Ope..-tionJ) 


Buthorization. and open!in, aaencies. Additionally, review oelhis data. will be iMOrporated into 


ATF', annual Sclflnspcction Progrwn. 


Again, thank you for the opportunity to work with you on these matten ud we hope we have 

been responsive to your recommendations. Ifyou have any questionl, please contact our Chief 

orSt_1f, Muy H. Wanea 11202·648-3410 . 

.......-I,!>:I-­

Ronald B. Turk 

20 

 

APPENDIX 5 

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS 

NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this audit report 

to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the 

United States Marshals Service (USMS); and the Office of the Deputy Attorney 

General (ODAG). The ODAG’s response is incorporated in Appendix 2 of this report. 

The FBI’s response is incorporated in Appendix 3, and ATF’s response is 

incorporated in Appendix 4. The DEA and USMS declined to provide a formal 

response. The following provides the OIG analysis of the responses and summary 

of actions necessary to close the audit report. 

Recommendation to the FBI: 

1. Implement a systematic process to reassess regularly UAS 

capabilities, technological developments, and resource and training 

needs, with the goal of ensuring that the FBI is positioned to deploy 

UAS efficiently and effectively. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. In addition to its 

response, the FBI provided us a document that the FBI considers to be law 

enforcement sensitive in nature, and therefore could not be publicly released. 

In this document, the FBI identified the steps it is already taking towards 

addressing training and resource needs. The FBI also stated that it is waiting 

for Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approval of the draft FBI-FAA 

framework before advancing its UAS program. 

This recommendation can be closed when the FBI provides us evidence that 

it has implemented a systematic process to ensure that the FBI is positioned 

to deploy UAS efficiently and effectively. Such assessments should consider 

the changing regulatory environment and how highly specialized UAS 

capabilities align with other FBI emergency response resources. The FBI 

should also ensure that its UAS pilots receive the training and maintain the 

flight currency necessary to deploy operable UAS quickly. 

21
 
 

 

Recommendations to ATF: 

2. Direct responsible officials to perform a thorough needs analysis 

regarding the potential UAS capabilities it requires that ensures the 

best approaches to procure UAS prior to restarting future UAS 

acquisition activity. 

Resolved. The ATF concurred with our recommendation. In its response, 

ATF stated that it has no immediate plans to purchase UAS, but the Deputy 

Assistant Director for Field Operations will issue a memorandum instructing 

Special Operations Division to conduct a needs analysis should ATF consider 

purchasing UAS in the future. This recommendation can be closed when we 

obtain evidence that ATF issued this memorandum. 

3. Adequately communicate all UAS policy and guidance to its 

operational units and ensure that those units comply with such 

guidance. 

Resolved. The ATF concurred with our recommendation. In its response, 

ATF stated that the Assistant Director for Field Operations will issue a 

memorandum to all ATF special agents clarifying ATF UAS policy, including 

that the purchase of any UAS equipment first requires the Deputy Assistant 

Director’s approval and must be coordinated through Special Operations 

Division. This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that 

ATF issued the memorandum to ensure that its operational units comply with 

ATF’s UAS guidance. 

Recommendation to the ODAG: 

4. Ensure the DOJ UAS working group considers the need for DOJ 

components to track or document non-DOJ UAS support received on 

DOJ investigations. 

Resolved. The ODAG concurred with our recommendation. In its response, 

the ODAG stated that it has directed the Office of Legal Policy, which chairs 

the DOJ’s UAS working group, to consider the need to track or document 

non-DOJ UAS support that components receive to support investigations. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the DOJ 

UAS working group has considered the need for DOJ components to track or 

document non-DOJ UAS support received on DOJ investigations, and formally 

communicate any decision to the FBI, ATF, DEA, and USMS. 

22
 
   

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General 

(DOJ OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity 

whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud, 

abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and 

to promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s 

operations. Information may be reported to the DOJ 

OIG’s hotline at www.justice.gov/oig/hotline or 

(800) 869-4499. 

Office of the Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

www.justice.gov/oig