S.': Research Note 85-69

Soldier Performance

in Continuous Operations:

Administrative Manual for a Briefing and

Seminar for Command and Staff Personnel

Felix Kopstein and Arthur Siegel

Applied Psychological Services, Inc.

Joseph Conn, James Caviness, and William Slifer

Soldier Support Center

, "Halim Ozkaptan and Fred Dyer

- Army Research Institute

'-"<U

Submitted by

ARI Field Unit at Fort Benning, Georgia

Seward Smith, Chief

Training Research Laboratory

Harold F. O'Neil, Jr., Director

U. S. Army

L Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

July 1985

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U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

L. NEALE COSBY

EDGAR M. J(f-INSON Colonel. IN

Technical Dircctor Commander

Research accomplished under contract

for the Department of the Army

Applied Psychological Services, Inc.

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should ni)t be construeJ, as an of caCepai tmenm of the Army position, poiy/rdcsouls odsgae

• • by othe ',icial documentation."

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UNCLASSIFIED

SECUIMlTY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGIE(W/hen Dtal )-nfeH-d-

"'R REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE - ^I-AD INSTRUTIUONS REPORT UMI1E R2 A-( S 0. .O H AT AL 0(o NIJNUtI

ARI Research Note 8T-hOT)

4....................... 4. TITLE (end SubtItle) F OF RFPORT A PrRI0O tOVERFD

SOLDIER PERFORMANCE IN CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS: Interim Report

ADMINISTRATIVE MANUAL FOR A BRIEFING AND May 1981-March 1983

SEMINAR FOR COMMAND AND STAFF PERSONNEL S. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHOR(e) F. Kopstein & A. Siegel (Applied Psycho- 6. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(@)

logical Services); J. Conn, J. Caviness, & W.

Slifer (Soldier Support Center); & H. Ozkaptan & MDA 903-81-C-0286

F. Dyer (ARI)

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT. TASK

Applied Psychological Services, Inc. AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

Science Center

Wayne, PA 19087 2QI63743A774

II. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE

U.S. Army Research Institute, Fort Benning Field July 1985

Unit, P.O. Box 2086 13. NUMBER OF PAGES

Fort Benning, GA 31905-0686 197

14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(iF different from Controlling Office) IS. SECURITY CLASS. (of chi& report)

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Unclassified

and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue IS*. OECLASSIFICATION/ DOWNGRADING

. Alexandria, VA 22333-5600 SC-EDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMEJ4T (of thle Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abetract entered In Block 20, If different from Report)

IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reerae olde If neceeeary and Identify by block number)

Stress Performance degradation Stress management

Continuous operations Unit effectiveness Human resources

Training Performance maintenance Endurance

Organizational development Work/rest planning

Human factors Stress control

* -20. ABSTRACT (CQ.a~ue aeverse ei* if ,,c**e, edw Identify by block number)

If any Army unit is to meet the demands of continuous operations, a systematic human resources conservation program must be planned and implemented.

The details of such a program are described. Without such a program, intolerable levels of performance degradation are projected during continuous

operations.

Strategies for countering the anticipated degradation during continuous

operations include: leadership training, confidence building, (Continued)

JM 3 1473 EDIT'OM OF I NOV 6S IS OBSOLETE UNCLASSIFIED

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AR1 R~e(Z~rCihrC Nte 0 8-h

20. (Continued)

-organizing for full communications, behavioral modeling, overtraining and

crosstraining, developing physical fitness, and development of performance

supports.

Tactics for countering performance degradation during continuous operations include task rotation, task sharing, use of performance supports,

. proper management of stress, and appropriate work/rest cycles.

The program for integrating these concepts into a unit developmental

" program includes systematic steps along a time frame. The strategies are

set in place during the preparatory stage, and these provide the foundation

for implementing the tactics during continuous operations.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The preparation of this Manual benefitted greatly from contributions

by a number of people. Drs. F. Dyer and H. Ozkaptan aided in many of

the fine points of technical presentation and orientation. M .ajors J. Giffin

and J. Plumley helped to specify objectives and organization, and contributed specific suggestions on many aspects of the information presentation. LTC L. Ritcey and SGM E. DeLong reviewed the discussion cases

for technical accuracy and relevance, and their many suggestions helped to

bring the issues into clearer focus. All of these contributions are

gratefully acknowledged.

iii

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 1

UNIT 1 Audio-Visual Presentation ....................................... 3

.- %UNIT 11 Oral Presentation ............................................... 9

UNIT III Case Discussions ................................................. 17

Section 1--General ............................................. 19

Section 2--Case Leader's Information ............................ 20

CASES ....................................................................... 29

Case 1: Getting Started ......................................... 31

Case 2: Ft. Zebra School ........................................ 43

Case 3: Policy Implementation and Evaluation .................... 55

Case 4: Continuous Operations Training ......................... 67

Case 5: Ft. Xray .............................................. 79

Case 6: Imminent Attack ........................................ 91

Case 7: Continuous Combat Operations ........................... 103

APPENDIX A Command and Staff Tasks Supported by Briefing/Seminar---...115

APPENTX'X B Adjunct Reading Material (Handouts) ....................... 123

iv

• S
INTRODUCTION

This manual contains directions for presenting instructions about

soldier performance in continuous operations. The manual provides a

self-contained package for acquainting senior officers, who have command

and staff responsibilities, with the projected degradation of soldier

performance in continuous operations, the available Counter Degradation

Measures (CDMs) for dealing with this problem, and the factors inherent

in appropriate continuous operation policy formulation.

The materials consist of three units:

Unit I - a 33 mm slide presentation, Soldier Performance in Continuous Operations: A Challenge,"

accompanied by a tape recorded narration.

The purpose of this Unit is to introduce

participants to the soldier performance degradation in continuous operations problem,

to present some techniques for dealing with

it, and to suggest some considerations for

preparing a continuous operations capability.

Unit II - a discussion leader's statement and elaboration of the meaning of the preceding briefing, and some of the requirements implied by

it. Unit II suggests broad requirements and

focuses on the issues for satisfying them.

Unit III- a set of seven discussion cases dealing with

soldier performance in continuous operations.

The cases provide a basis for a problem

solving seminar designed to stimulate participants into consideration of specific issues

and options for developing a continuous

operations capability.

Directions, as well as supporting guidance for the administration of each of

these units, are provided successively. Appendix A lists the specific command and staff tasks which the three units, taken as a whole, are designed to support.

Whenever feasible, all three units should be scheduled. Each Unit

rests on the foundation provided by prior Units. If sufficient time is not

available for administering all three Units, the case presentation and discussion can be curtailed or omitted. If available time is extremely restricted, the presentation can be confined to the briefing portion (Unit I).

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References

Discussion leaders should become familiar with, at least, the below

listed references. The information contained in them will help the leader

background information into the discussions. Items 2 and 3 of these

references as well as the present materials were developed under

supervision of the Soldier Developments Directorate, Fort Benjamin

Harrison, the TRADOC element with proponency for soldier performance.

Users are encouraged to comment on them, or on any issue of soldier

performance to the Soldier Developments Directorate.

1. Human performance in continuous operations:

I. Human performance guidelines (Research Product 80-4a)

I. Management guide (Research Product 80-4b)

III. Technical documentation (Research Product 80-4c)

U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue

Alexandria, VA 22333

2. FD122-26-2, Management of Stress in Army Operations

3. FM22-26-XX, Soldier Performance in Continuous Operations

Handouts

Some items of adjunct material appear in Appendix B. It is suggested

that sufficient copies of these handouts be reproduced in advance, and

that they then be made available to the Briefing/Seminar participants.

Whenever feasible, handouts should be distributed to participants

when they are first scheduled to attend the Briefing/Seminar. Ask participants to read and examine them prior to attending the Briefing/Seminar.

When prior distribution is not feasible, distribute handouts as participants

arrive.

Continuous Operations Training for Platoon and Squad Levels

A set of materials parallel to the present ones, but designed to meet

U requirements for Platoon and Squad level training have also been

prepared. These Platoon and Squad (P & S) materials are available from

the same source as the present ones (see p. 5).

The following materials are presented in sequential order in this

manual: Unit I--Audio-Visual Presentation, Units II-IV--Classroom Leetures, Unit V--Case Discussion. Then, six separate cases are presented.

Appendix A contains lists of the platoon and squad tasks supported by the

materials and Appendix B contains adjunct reading materials (handouts).

2

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1,

UNIT I

Audio-Visual Presentation

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*,p . . . .' . . . . . . .. . . . . . .l
UNIT I

(Approximate Duration: 60 Minutes)

General

Unit I, a slide/audio tape presentation, reviews expected conditions in

potential future warfare and shows how these conditions inevitably degrade

the performance of every soldier from commander to footsoldier. The

presentation considers the techniques that can be used for retarding the

pace of degradation and presents considerations for preparing a continuous

operations capability. The purpose is to advise participants about the

problems and some means for dealing with them.

While this Unit is intended to be used in combination with succeeding

Units, it can be used independently to brief a group of any size. When

scheduled for use in combination with the other Units, it is recommended

that the group be limited to no more than 18 participants.

The slide/audio tape presentation (35 mm slides and audio, single

track tape) is available from:

U.S. Army Soldier Support Center

ATTN: ATZI-NCR-SP

Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IND 46216

Materials

35 mm slide projector

Slide tray of sufficient capacity

77 slides (35 mm) "Soldier Performance in Continuous

Operations: A Challenge" (Plus title slides A and B)

Projection screen

Tape cassette player

Tape cassette: "Soldier Performance in Continuous

Operations: A Challenge"

Preparation

1. Load sequentially numbered slides into slide tray.

a. assure correct slide orientation:

(1) relate slide tray's geometry to

projector's

(2) in the projector, slide image must be

"upside down" and matte (emulsion) side

toward screen

2. Project loaded slides to assure that all are correctly oriented;

after corrections set tray hack to first slide (focus sharply).

5
3. Insert tape cassette into cassette player.

4. Preview the Unit in its entirety before presenting the Unit

for the first time.

Presentation Procedure

1. Welcome audience to the briefing (and subsequent seminar) on

soldier performance in continuous operations.

a

SAMPLE

My name is * lam _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

(state affiliation and role in parent organization)

Welcome to this briefing and seminar on soldier performance

in continuous operations. This briefing was prepared by the

Soldier Support Center in order to present the basic facts and

issues in regard to sustaining soldier combat performance effectiveness during continuous operations.

The material you are about to see reviews the conditions

expected in future massive ground warfare and shows how these

conditions inevitably degrade the performance of every soldier

from commander to foot soldier. It presents techniques for

retarding the pace of degradation and presents considerations

for preparing a cont.nuous operations capability. As the result

of this briefing, you will see the dimensions of the problem and

some avenues for approaching it.

6

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2. Turn off lights.

3. Start cassette player; turn on projector.

4. As each click is heard on tape, advance to next slide.

5. At end, turn off cassette player and projector; turn on

lights.

6. Announce:

~This completes the audio-visual presentation. Are there any

i') "questions or comments?

Discussion Guidance

1. Respond to specific questions factually (e.g., where can

I get access to the PERFECT model?--. Answer: ARRADCOM

UNIVAC 1108 facility at Aberdeen Proving Ground).

2. Elaborate on general points as requested.

3. Continue this discussion until most, if not all, questions

are answered. Some questions may be answered by a statement such as: "That is covered in Unit(s) II and (III)

which are scheduled to follow."

4. Propose a brief break period before continuing.

5. Introduce the break with a statement such as: "Let's

take a brief break. After that, I (we) have a 20 minute

presentation about major policy issues in developing the

capability for sustaining soldier performance during

continuous operations."

7

,". o° *
UNIT II

Oral Presentation

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UNIT 11

General

Unit II is designed for presentation immediately following the discussion period of Unit I. The intent of this Unit is to direct participants' attention to the major policy issues in developing an Army wide

capability for sustaining soldier performance during continuous operations.

The Unit alerts participants to major potential courses of action they and

their commands will need to consider. The objective is to summarize the

major implications of the preceding briefing and to set the stage for case

dis- cussions in the succeeding unit.

Materials and Procedure

A suggested script for Unit II is presented below. Unit II is a

lecture presentation. The discussion leader may read this script or he

; -may deliver his own version of it by relying on the topical cues that

accompany each paragraph (left column).

Two slides (Nos. 67 and 69) from the preceding Unit I briefing are

included in the Unit II presentation. Show these slides when reference to

them is made in the script. Hand out copies of the "chart" before starting.

11"11

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TEXT OF UNIT II

* Approach to readiness In the briefing, we presented. the continuous oper-

* Commands/levels responsi- ations problem and what can be done about it. Now,

we want to present an approach to achieving con- tinuous operations readiness, including the matter of

0 Support for policies/programs support for policies and programs.

• Counter Degradation Meas- Two important points were made in the preceding

ures (CDM) are integral presentation (Slide No. 67). The first is that the

* CDM fit into time frame available countermeasures to degradation, or CDMs,

are mutually reinforcing and interdependent; they are

* CDM effectiveness must be an integral remedy rather than a package of

developed band-aids. At least for maximum retardation of

performance degradation, this is an all-or-none

proposition. The second point is that the component

CDMs fit into a time frame (Slide No. 69). To be

available and to sustain the soldier in continuous

combat, the CDMs must have been developed and

practiced extensively long before continuous operations

are encountered.

e Logic of CDM introduction There is a time frame appropriate to the various

and development CDMs; there is also some order applicable to their

introduction and development. This order is suggested by the interdependence of the CDMs on each

other. For example, task rotation cannot be instituted

unless crosstraining has preceded it.

1. Leadership and commitment Begin by demonstrating leadership and guiding soldiers

provide the motivation for to develop their commitment. Good leadership and

preparation soldier commitment provide the motivation that drives a

conscientious program of preparation. Each is also a

CDM that must be developed to maximum effectiveness

during preparation. Leadership provides the basis for

sincere commitment.

2. Physical conditioning, stress Just as leadership and commitment supply the drive to

reduction techniques, and reach the goals of continuous operations training,

- leadership and commitment physical conditioning and stress reduction skills

. are the foundations for con- provide the stamina needed to endure the continuous

tinuous operations training, operations demands made on each soldier. In combination, leadership, commitment, physical conditioning, and stress reduction are the foundations for

effective performance during continuous operations

3. Identify special talent I think you'll agree that it makes sense to spot the

early and assign special soldier's with special abilities or talent in accurate

combat roles orientation, or detecting enemy infiltration at night.

Special roles can be assigned to these persons in

accordance with their abilities.

12
4. Plant and schedule: Each of the other CDMs that were enumerated in the

a. task restructuring briefing, that is, task restructuring, task rotation,

b. task rotation work/rest cycles, sleep discipline, and performance

c. work/rest cycles supports, depends on some prior development,

d. sleep discipline training, planning, and scheduling. For instance, task

e. performance restructuring is a response to a contingency, and the

supports specifics of the restructuring need to be planned so

that the reorganization of activity can be practiced

until it can be executed smoothly. This is true, also,

for work/rest cycles and sleep discipline. Task

rotation, as we have pointed out several times,

depends on prior crosstraining. Finally, performance

supports need to be determined, developed, and their

use integrated into training. All of these CDMs, in

well-developed form, must be "in place" for effective

continuous operations training, and they must be

repetitively honed to a fine edge within the training

experience.

5. The preceding must be Full scale training, under realistically simulated

"in place" for realistic continuous operations conditions, requires that each of

training in realistic the prior steps has been accomplished. Realistic

conditions training in realistic conditions must incorporate the

application of CDMs to the onset of degradation, and,

therefore, all of these CDMs must be ready and

available.

* Command responsibil- So far, we have described an orderly approach to

ities achieving continuous operations readiness. This brings

us to the considerations and responsibilities for

commands and command levels. The chart summarizes

these issues.

* MACOMS establish di- MACOMS have to take the lead in establishing

rections and set goals directions and setting goals for the continuous

operations readiness in their commands. As a

* beginning, the adverse factors associated with

continuous operations, their impacts on the

effectiveness of soldiers' combat performance, the rates

and degrees of performance degradation, and the rest

of what the briefing presentation could only sketch

broadly will need to be examined in detail. Readiness

requirements, priorities, and current status will have

to be considered. Directions developed from these

considerations will define the readiness objectives, set

mandatory training objectives, and, of course, the

corresponding evaluation requirements.

• MACOMS must direct MACOMS must direct that continuous operations and

mandatory training and thpir full implications be included in all considerations

evaluation when subordinate units develop their training policies

13

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and programs. Continuous operations should be considered a mandatory training subject, and progress toward achieving the objectives should be evaluated on

all ARTEPs and in Annual General Inspections conducted by the MACOM and its subordinate units.

- TRADOC schools must TRADOC schools must detail the impact of continuous

aevelop: operations on soldiers' ability to sustain effective

a. methods combat performance. Detailed data and technical

b. resources guidance for these purposes is available in reports of

c. facilities the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences and in manuals prepared by the

Soldier Support Center. This information will provide

substantial guidance on training content and practices. Specific training requirements need to be pinpointed,

technical guidance for this training must be developed and disseminated, and appropriate evaluation standards

need to be established. Consideration needs to be

given, also, to requirements for training resources and

facilities that continuous operations training will

generate.

0 TRADOC schools must TRADOC schools should integrate the implications of

integrate continuous human performance in continuous operations into all

operations considera- applicable training material. All training exercises

" tions into all training should be based on realistic scenarios, and they materials should include an evaluation of units' ability to

conduct sustained operations under adverse or exceedingly adverse conditions. ARTEPs must include

proper evaluation of the unit's ability to conduct

sustained operations under realistic conditions utilizing

only resources that are normally available.

" DIV/BDE must develop Within the framework of MACOM directions and the full

policy plus general range of applicable technical guidance, Division and guidelines Brigade will need to consider their particular and

specific conditions, their current capacity, and their

priorities in formulating their policy options. Division

and Brigade must develop a policy, supplemented by general guidelines, which provides battalions with a

method for achieving these mandatory tr-aining objectives as directed by r.ACOM.

o Train for "worst case" Training exercises and evaluations should be develbut only with normal oped, by policy, from a realistic scenario that

resources measures the unit's ability to conduct sustained . operations under the most adverse conditions, and with

only normally available resources. Published policy

must include a clear specification of the targeted i

capability, uated, criteria by which achievement will be eval- schedules, and all applicable constraints.

14

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o Bn must design programs Battalion, of course, must develop a detailed training

per technical guidance program faithful to the spirit as well as the letter of

received policy. The program must be designed to incorporate the constructive technical guidance regarding

sustained soldier effectiveness in continuous operations.

* Bn must schedule spe- Schedules must assure that specific blocks of training

cific blocks of training time are devoted to the various CDPIs, singly and in

time for CDM and CDM combination, and in concordance with an orderly

combinations implementation time line.

" Monitor program As we recognize, units do best the things that the

- Assess frequently boss checks most. While this applies to all levels, it

* Determine reasons for is most important at the Battalion level because it

shortfalls supervises implementation or program execution direct-

* Direct specific remedial ly. The implementation needs to be monitored, and

action progress needs to be assessed on an ongoing basis.

We know that this is not new to you. The point to

which we want to direct your attention is that assessments need to be made with high frequency, that

records need to be kept, that performance must be

assessed systematically, and that shortfalls need to be

treated diagnostically. Don't tell them that they're not

good enough; tell them how to do it better. Specify

the remedial actions to be taken and the refinements to

be introduced that will enable subordinate units to

reach or exceed the training goals. Give them thp

benefit of management analysis and guidance.

* Company/Platoon/Squad Whatever problems of policy and programs may beset

implement programs higher command levels, the day-to-day implementation

of a continuous operations training program is a

company, platoon, and squad level concern. This

presents a challenge to the leadership at each of these

levels.

' A realistic program en- If that leadership docs not step off on the right foot,

tails dedication if it does not inspire dedication by word and example,

if it does not demonstrate the highest order of professionalism, the genuine requirements for a continuous

operations capability will not be met.

, SUMMARY In summary, programs for developing a continuous

operations capability have a logic of their own. To

achieve a genuine capability, policies and programs

must be realistic so as to match the conditions to be

expected. Each level and type of command must

contribute to the achievement of a continuous

operations readiness. However, the toughest job is to

implement the program and make it work effectively.

This fact deserves clear recognition, and these efforts

need to be given the strongest support that can be

mustered.

16

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C- 'q,,

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UNIT III

Case Discussions

17

U

_- .- ,
UNIT III

Section 1--General

Unit III is composed of a set of cases which are designed to support

a case method of instruction about issues involved in developing and

implementing policy for sustaining soldier performance in continuous

operations. This Unit should be introduced only after participants have

been exposed to preceding Units

The case discussions which constitute this Unit provide a simulated

command and staff environment for exploring issues associated with the

development of a continuous operations capability. The objective is to

sensitize participants to the complex of factors that need to be considered

in developing policy at various levels of command and for various types of

combat arms units. Also, the cases are designed to introduce situations

representative of various stages within a time frame extending from peacetime through a transition period into actual continuous combat. Accordingly, the implications of soldiers' deteriorating combat performance

capabilities are developed with reference to various points in the time

frame.

Organization of Subsequent Text

Section 2 presents the information needed for implementing the case

method. Hints which will assist the case leader in the conduct of the case

discussions are also included.

Section 3 contains the actual case materials together with guidance for

the presentor or discussion leader.

19

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Section 2--Case Leader's Information

Unit III of the sequence is composed of seven cases which provide

practice in solving some of the problems inherent in implementing a

program devoted to achieving continuous operations -capability. The Unit

is based on the case method of instruction. Completion of the Unit will

provide a fuller perspective about the implications of soldier performance

degradation within the continuous operations doctrine and an opportunity

to exchange views about common problems and their solutions.

The Case Method

The case method of instruction is widely used in the advanced study

of medicine, business, public administration, international relations, and,

of course, military science. Often, formal instruction seeks to present

specific facts and/or procedures for achieving clearly specifiable

objectives. For some purposes, however, specific facts and procedures

cannot be delineated; even the objectives to be attained are highly

complex, abstract, and dependent on circumstances. Their unambiguous

formulation may not be possible. For this type of problem solving, also, a

"standard" solution cannot be defined. For example, in a military context,

the "optimal" solution will depend on the specific, local conditions (e.g.,

type of organization, nature, quantity, and availability of resources) and

on trade offs that cannot be precisely quantified. Solutions to such

problems cannot be taught. But, concepts and considerations important to

the analysis of such problems and to the synthesis of solutions can be

taught. The case method is an ideal way to achieve this goal.

The case method makes it possible to deal with problems which involve

complex information embedded in a realistic context. It permits the

consideration not only of facts in isolation, but in relation to each other

and to a host of surrounding conditions. In assessing each case, analysts

are forced to deal with these relationships, to judge their relative

importance, and to weigh the multiple consequences of any potential

solution. This constitutes practice in dealing effectively with an entire

class of problems of the given type.

In addition, during the discussion of a case by a group, the

discussants stimulate each other to achieve new insights. They prompt

each other, by their comments, to perceive salient problem features

through each other's eyes. Often, this serves to restructure or to

reorganize each discussant's own perceptions, and, ultimately, to stabilize

a definition of the best or optimal way to deal with the issues.

By nature of its goals, case discussions are informal. However, they

are more than casual speculations. For the present materials, there are a

.I number of specific points that should emerge during the discussion, and

each case is rooted to specific training objectives. The training objectives

: . for each case are included with the case. Moreover, "lead questions" are

provided to focus the discussion on the goals.

20

3J

. . . . . . . . * .
The Cases

rjN :There are seven cases in the Unit. All pertain to issues of soldier

performance in continuous operations. The cases are ordered in a

sequence which progresses from information evaluation and policy

formulation (three cases) through training plan development and

implementation (two cases) to combat applications (two cases). While each

case can be considered quite independently of all others, administration of

at least one case from each group is recommended.

An abstract of each case is presented below:

A. Information Evaluation and Policy Formulation

o Case 1: Getting Started

Content: A Division Commander in West Germany

designates a group to study continuous operations and

performance degradation concepts. The group reviews

relevant information and prepares appropriate policy.

0 Case 2: Ft. Zebra

Content: At Ft. Zebra, ARTEPs are to be specified

which incorporate aspects of continuous operations

combat. Emphasis is placed on performance degradation

countermeasures. Command staff members are to make

recommendations within their own areas of responsibility.

O Case 3: Policy Implementation and Evaluation

Content: A mechanized infantry division is to prepare

for transfer to Europe in 120 days. A policy to improve soldier resource conservation during continuous

operations is specified and the case raises issues regarding implementation and evaluation.

-, °

B. Training Plan Development and Implementation

O Case 4: Continuous Operations Training

Content: Policies regarding counter degradation

measures as a part of continuous operations preparedness training were developed at the Division

level. Problems (morale and equipment) with implementation arise and appropriate adjustments are made.

21

21 - - - 21

.. . .
0 Case 5: Ft. Xray

Content: One of two commands located at Ft. Xray is

undergoing counter degradation measure training but

not receiving cooperation from the second command.

A realistic, 120 hour field exercise is scheduled for

all personnel. Weaknesses are revealed during the

exercise.

C. Combat Application

O Case 6: Imminent Attack

Content: A mechanized infantry division is transferred to Europe on short notice. The troops are

deployed for a predicted breakthrough attack.

o Case 7: Continuous Combat Operations

Content: Threat forces have launched an attack.

Combat has been continuous for 68 hours. After

O an additional 40 hours, fresh troops are incorporated into the defending forces and a counterattack is planned.

Organization of Cases

The organization of the cases follows a consistent pattern. Each case

is divided into three parts. Each part represents a self-contained,

progressive stage of problem development. Following each of these parts,

two (sometimes overlapping) sets of issues are sketched. The total group

will be divided into halves and each half, in a "huddle session," will

develop responses to one of the sets of issues. Each group will report its

consensus back to the total group which will then critically discuss the

• -solution(s).

"Lead questions" are provided that are relevant for either or both

sets of issues. These questions represent salient points which have

*: implications for the problem at hand and may be introjected into the

discussion by the leader to: (1) keep the discussion on track and

continually progressing toward the objectives, and (2) stimulate discussion

if the discussion is lagging. The lead questions need not be used

verbatim. They may be paraphrased. Many of the points included in the

lead questions will emerge spontaneously during the discussion. In this

.3 case, the corresponding lead question(s) should be ignored.

Required Materials and Facilities

All the materials necessary for presenting the cases are included

within the cases themselves. However, the scenario (i.e., description of

Sg conditions) for each part of each case will need to be reproduced in as

many copies as there are participants in a session. Similarly, each member

of each group (A and B) will need a copy of the issues which his group is

22

U . . . .- . - . .. ,.,.. - .. -' . i • " i°. . .. : ., , .- - : -i :- ,- . , :-. "2

* *I * 
to discuss during their "huddle session."

The meeting room will need two conference type tables around which

the two huddle groups can meet, as well as facilities for the group to meet

as a whole. Availability of a chalk board will also be helpful.

Size

The total group size should not be greater than 18 persons. This

will allow nine persons per "huddle group."

Recommended Procedure

The sequence of procedures for presenting the case materials is:

1. Plan well in advance which cases are to be presented

and discussed.

2. When the group first meets, state the content of the

Unit, its purposes, how the sessions will be run, and

the organization of the cases. Emphasize the informal

nature of the session(s). Ask the attendees to introduce themselves and to say something about their current duty assignments.

3. Introduce the first case. Use either the text below or

paraphrase.

INTRODUCTION TO CASES

Earlier, information was presented about continuous operations and

soldier degradation. Now, let's get down to cases. (Distribute Part I of

your first case.) Part 1 of this first problem solving case is given in this

handout. Read Part 1 and try to fix the key points clearly in your mind.

*-- Next, we are going to divide the group into a right and a left half.

' ,If you are in the group to the right, you will be considering the "huddle

questions" for Group A; those on the left will work with questions for

Group B. (Divide the group.) Each group is to review the issues as in a

staff meeting. The objective at this point is to formulate views and

positions for later discussion. Someone in each group should be appointed

as group leader to record the group's consensus on the various points and

to report these to the total assembly.

* - Before you actually start, let me point out that this is a problem

solving seminar. The problem area is sustaining soldier's fighting

effectiveness in continuous operation. We know that certain factors must

be considered in deciding what needs to be done. The earlier briefings

discussed these factors. During your deliberations, be sure to consider

thc,-i and how they apply to the specific case under discussion. The

Vg object here is to familiarize you with the broad spectrum of issues

pertaining to soldier performance in continuous operations, and to afford

you an opportunity to exchange views.

23

i :i " .'-. . .- . , " 2 : -. . :- - . - . " : *-• ' -. ? - . . . .. • - . : . : "
4. Distribute, to the members of each group, the appropriate huddle questions.

5. If there are no questions, let each group designate a

leader and proceed to confer for about 15 minutes.

6. Call the two groups together and write each group's

question(s) on the chalk board.

7. Ask the leader of Group A to present the views developed in its huddle. Then, the entire group critically

evaluates the views that have been presented. Use the

lead questions, as appropriate, as topics for consideration. Next, apply a parallel procedure for Group B.

8. Encourage continuing discussion. If prompts are needed,

pose one of the lead questions for each case and part of

it. Do not inhibit discussion that is in full swing and

proceeding naturally. Occasionally suggest factors that

have not been considered (e.g., use further lead questions).

Terminate the discussion of the current Case or Part when

appropriate. Summarize what has taken place and the principle views that have emerged.

9. Introduce the next Case or Part.

24

S•. -............................... * .
'V __

Hints for Productive Case Discussion

Your role as the case leader is to assure productive discussions which

form the basis for achieving the objectives of the Unit. The following

hints may be useful for assuring the quality of the discussion:

1. If the group seems reluctant to sustain discussion, rephrase some key point that has been introduced (e.g.,

in Group A's or B's report), and ask for elaboration

relative to some key issue or training objective. Alternatively, pose a lead question. Address some one or

two specific participants directly.

2. Emphasize the problem solving nature of the session.

Stress that, at this time, no one has "the answers."

Rather, the search is for constructive approaches to

coping with the continuous operations issues, the factors

to be considered therein, and their application. The

Army needs to develop and evaluate many different

views.

3. No matter how absurd or irrelevant it may be, never

disagree with an openly stated view. Especially if that

view has been stated with some vehemence, avoid the

use of the negative. Instead, use the phrase "yes,

but...," and bring out the objection in this way.

4. If any participant seeks to monopolize the discussion,

praise his contributions, and suggest that "we want to

hear what (designate a person or persons) thinks."

5. Draw out the reluctant participa-it by addressing some

' !questions (perhaps a lead question) specifically to him.

6. Bring back a discussion that has drifted off by injecting

a lead question, or by asking how "all this" helps to

develop a continuous operations capability.

7. If you do not know the facts pertaining to a question,

admit that you do not know. Never bluff. Where appropriate, you might ask why the question is essential to

the point under consideration.

8. At all times, by your tone and bearing, show your own

interest in the topic and your enthusiasm for exploring

the best ways of developing a continuous operations capability.

25

.•,- . . .. . • .. .. . o - . .... . . "-t & .. . .ff-. . ° . .. -..... - A o 
Specific Objectives

The case discussions are intended to contribute to the attainment of

the following learning objectives:

1. Recall those features of the major future warfare challenges having particular relevance for human performance

capability and its endurance.

2. Recall conditions inherent in prospective combat environments and those generated by sustained continuous operations that operate so as to decrease (degrade) progressively the fighting performance of troops.

3. Judge the degrees and rates of performance degradation

resulting from continuous operations, and the variability

of degradation for different types of units, duty positions,

and tasks.

4. Relate performance degradation to a range of strategic,

tactical, and logistic considerations within participants'

spheres of responsibility.

5. Enumerate categories of potential counter degradation measures, their characteristics, and their applicability.

6. Apply degradation and counter degradation measures information to a determination of requisite courses of prudent action, their objectives, and the needs for establishment of

appropriate policy.

7. Apply degradation and counter degradation measures information, results of assessments of strategic (and other) implications, and prior determination of requisite courses of action, objectives, and policy to a formulation of appropriate

policy covering all salient points and issues.

8. Review and analyze policy in terms of technical and administrative factors requiring special attention and command/

management support for the effective implementation of the

policy.

9. Enumerate points or issues within the policy potentially requiring coordination with agencies outside the boundaries of

the immediate command authority.

A

Table 1 indexes each case by the command staff training objectives it

is designed to meet.

'i,. 

•

26

* 2 6 .. * *.'.. ....
Table 1

Training Objectives Met by Each Case

Case Training Objective

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

3 /V

4 VI I t

27

* '-".
CASES

29
(Objectives: 6, 7, 8)

Case 1: Getting Started

PART 1

The time is now, and the 54th Infantry Division (Mcch) is garrisoned

-: - at Xray Kaserne, Germany. Its commander has designated a task group to

study the continuous operations concept, to develop its implications for the

U.S. Army and, in particular, for the Division, and to present findings

and recommendations to the CG and his staff. Because this assignment is

viewed as a first examination, an overview of concepts and issues is

desired. A report is to be presented in six weeks, but it is understood

that further and more detailed studies will be ordered thereafter.

The primary mission of the Division is to counter any breakthrough

attempts by a mechanized, well-trained enemy force which possesses

sophisticated weaponry. As a result of a recent policy (prompted by

increasing East-West tensions), the Division is required to keep one-third

of its combat assets in a ready status and deployed in the field. Across

the Division, personnel strength is at approximately the 78% level. Spare

parts for all equipment are a problem so that, often, no more than 66% of

the equipment is in an operationallv ready status. While combat support

maintenance is improvising a good many solutions, and is working long

hours, the availability of major spare items imposes an absolute limit on

availability.

In order to facilitate their work, the task group breaks itself into a

set of subgroups. One subgroup is called the "soldier support subgroup."

This subgroup is to formulate "human factors" recommendations.

3

-" -. 31
Case 1: Getting Started

PART I

Group A Discussion

To start their work, the "Soldier Support Subgroup" decides to approach their task as an academic exercise. Formulate an approach to the

human factors analysis of the Soldier Support Subgroup. Discuss and

develop the concepts and considerations which are paramount; prioritize

these.

Purpose:

To recognize that the issues directly and significantlv affect the mission capability of the U.S. Army, and that the human factors need to be I

analyzed and assessed systematically.

Key Points:

1. Warsaw Pact continuous operations doctrine

2. Warsaw Pact continuous operations capabilities I

3. Inevitable decline in soldier resources for mission

accomplishment

4. Lack of policy and doctrine for slowingf erosion of

soldier resources in combat

Lead Questions:

What is the major evidence concerning the requirement for a continuous operations capability and what is the urgency of such a requirement?

* Soviet doctrine and capabilities

* Soviets determine character of initial

battles

Is a de facto, indefinite postponement of the

soldier performance decrement issue reasonable

and justifiable?

* Issue needs to be clearly defined

* Possible solutions or dispositions need

to be understood

* At least, contingency plans need to be

developed

32
Case 1: Getting Started

PART 1

Group B Discussion

Some members of the "Soldier Support Subgroup" believe that there is

no human factors problem. They believe that most of the units in the area

have a "can do" attitude. When required, they will exert extra effort and

meet the requirements of continuous operations. They argue that what is

really needed is better equipment, better maintenance, and NBC training.

Formulate the arguments supporting and opposing their point of view.

Purpose:

To achieve an appreciation of the fact that performance degradation in

continuous operations is inevitable, and that no degree of determination to

resist will effectively compensate for diminished effectiveness.

Key Points:

1. Overall, projected decline in effectiveness is serious

2. Projections are borne out by military studies

3. Slowing performance degradation requires a coherent,

integrated program

Lead Questions:

Can an effective, reliable Counter Degradation Measures

(CDM) program be developed in a piecemeal fashion?

* CDPIs are interdependent, not a menu

* Many CDr,.s must be practiced to become effective

* Training/preparation must be realistic and continuous

33

- . .. -

.4,. - - - - - - - -
Case 1: Getting Started

PART 2

The "soldier support subgroup" calls in a consultant to brief it on

soldier performance degradation variables and considerations. However,

the briefing only serves to introduce further confusion. It has suggested

problems of all sorts--training, stress control, force reconstitution, cohesion, morale, performance degradation, and so on. Now the "soldier

support subgroup" is considering the implications of the briefing for its

task.

35
a._'

Case 1: Getting Started

PART 2

Group A Discussion

Some members of the "Soldier Support Subgroup" argue that the

briefing content indicates that such problems and their solutions are

primarily relevant for CONUS and, especially TRADOC. The concept must

be introduced, initially, in CONUS training facilities and operations.

Only after its evolution and test by TRADOC can it be adapted for the

54th Division. Develop arguments supporting and opposing this point of

view.

Purpose:

To recognize that continuous operations preparation is an extension

of technical skills acquisition issues.

Key Points:

1. Principal requirement is acquiring skills for coping

with adverse conditions

2. Training requires realistic simulation of continuous

combat in adverse conditions

3. Some of training/preparation is unit specific

Lead Questions:

Is performance decrement preparedness a basic or an advanced training issue?

* Superimposed on advanced tactical and unit

training

Does continuous operations training mainly try to establish new combat skills, or to expand profivIency in "old"

skills under extremely adverse conditions?

* New coping skills, but essentially no new

combat skills

Where is the requirement for CDM training most acute?

* In OCONUS deployed units

Ts it more realistic to develop the capability from CONTIS

core units outward to forward deployed units, or the reverse?

* Start with forward, deployed units

36

U,:.
Case 1: Getting Started

PART 2

Group B Discussion

Some members of the "Soldier Support Subgroup" Contend that the

major problem is stress control and its effects on performance effectiveness. They think that the first emphasis should be on developing a policy

in this regard. Comment on and criticize this point of view. Suggest

both supporting and opposing arguments.

Purpose:

To distinguish stress from each of the other component factors producing performance degradation.

Key Points:

1. Stress is, itself, produced by many different factors

2. Performance decline is produced by many different

factors; stress is only one of them

3. Effective control must deal with all producing

factors

Lead Questions:

Can a patchwork policy support a genuine and effective

preparation effort to achieve a soldier CDM capability?

* A coherent, integrated program must address

all factors

An effective program employs mutually interdependent CD[.ls

37

• "( i I.., -- - . . " ".". ".. .. ". "-. . . .- "'.... . ,'- ...-. ." --. ,.-. -"-' - "
Case 1: Getting Started

PART 3

After reviewing the Division's status, resources, commitments, and

prospects, along with the technical guidance regarding soldier performance

degradation, the "soldier support subgroup" is ready to prepare its report. In the report, the perspectives of the individual members--in terms

of expertise and current role--will be integrated. The group has come together to develop an integrated set of recommendations from the individual

contributions of its various members.

39

U,.
Case 1: Getting Started

PART 3

Group A Discussion

Should separate reports and recommendations be prepared by different elements (e.g., armor, artillery, mechanized infantry) or is one integrated policy recommendation preferable? Why so?

* Purpose:

To develop a view of the general and the specific policy requirements for developing a continuous operations capability, and to examine

the required inputs from different elements.

Key Points:

1. Inevitability of some performance degradation in continuous operations

2. Different rates/degrees of performance degradation for

different units/duty positions/tasks

3. Interdependency of divisional units in combat

Lead Questions:

Should command policy be directed at all units, or

types of units, or could it treat units selectively?

Can the policy apply progressively to various elements?

* Combat versus combat support units

* Various command levels

Is the continuous operations capability purely a

ground forces problem, or are there implications

for Army Aviation elements as well?

* Aviation must support around-the-clock

capab;lity

.4

-- 40
Case I: Getting Started

-: PART 3

G-roup B Discussion

Derive, in a preliminary manner, an outline for the "Soldier Support

Subgroup's" report. Does this position hold only for the present or

should there be a reexamination at a later date?

Purpose:

To focus on the central, dominant issues that constitute a basic

* counter degradation policy, and to sort out secondary issues for later consideration.

Key Points:

1. Soviet doctrine and capabilities

2. Soviets determine character of initial battles

3. Hitherto, no U.S. continuous operations

Lead Questions:

Is it possible to develop a policy which depends on

contingencies? Which contingencies?

s International situation, intelligence,

alert status

* Preparation time for achieving capability

Must preparation be implemented on all levels, or can

it apply to selected leadership segments only? Perhaps initially?

*No

* * Capability is most critical for leadership

tasks

*For cn and highcr levels CPXs can simulate

What sort of coordination problems would an intensive

preparation effort entail?

* Within command elements

* Across commands in proximity

* Affected civilian community

* Soldiers' dependents! Army social support

agencies

41

tak
(Objectives: 1, 2, 5)

Case 2: Ft. Zebra School

PART 1

The Ft. Zebra TRADOC school is considering the incorporation of a

continuous operations phase into the combat readiness training exercise

ARTEPs for resident units. A group is designated to study the feasibility

of implementing realistic continuous operations scenarios, especially in view

of OPFORCE schedules, evaluation requirements, the uneven combat readiness status of various units, and soldier performance decrement issues. A

120 hour continuous mission is mentioned for planning purposes.

During initial meetings of the designated group, efforts are focused

on identifying the factors and issues that must be considered. The insufficiency of the TRADOC school's manpower resources seems to be one issue

on which the majority agrees and the group is tasked to work within this

problem. The need to develop appropriate training programs, schedules,

and materials is recognized. It is also acknowledged that new training exercises must be incorporated into existing training priorities and schedules. The current training priority is unit level training.

The group is concentrating its efforts on considerations of continuous

operations in a European-like environment (e.g., terrain, weather, force

ratios) and plans to generalize these to the present training situation.

The group has determined the major feature of such combat conditions and

is evaluating them against available resources at Ft. Zebra.

43

-- . 1%-n, .. 

, . .
Case 2: Ft. Zebra School

PART 1

Group A Discussion

What are the important soldier resource conservation features of continuous combat operations that are generally important for consideration

when attempting to develop "realistic" continuous operations training

scenarios? Is it possible to simulate such conditions? Why so, or not so?

Is the group missing any aspects of the problem? Which, if any?

Purpose:

To identify soldier resources (performance effectiveness) that diminish

in combat, and to examine implications for training.

Key Points:

1. Mental (decision making, etc.) abilities degrade

soonest and most

2. Leadership tasks depend most on mental abilities

3. Stress control and sleep discipline need training

guidance

4. Continuous, extended FTXs approximate but are not

equivalent to the continuous operations

Lead Questions:

How are various soldier combat abilities differentially

affected by continuous operations combat?

* Mental abilities degrade most and most rapidly

* Physical (motor) abilities degrade little

How necessary is it to have full exercise realism for

both combat and combat support units? What are the

benefits of realism? The disadvantages?

* Training must match expected combat conditions

* Produces learning to cope with conditions

* True realism overwhelms the unprepared

* Only gradually introduce the "worst" conditions

44

&A M
Case 2: Ft. Zebra School

PART 1

Group B Discussion

Computer projections and military studies predict soldier effectiveness degradation in continuous combat. What are the implications of anticipated quantitative and qualitative changes for training content and

methods? Will increased training and support manpower be necessary? Why

--. iso?

Purpose:

To examine training implications of performance degradation in continuous operations.

Key Points:

1. Types of units, duty positions, and tasks differentially affected

2. Provide realistic conditions in training environment

3. Assess training progressively in more and more

adverse conditions

4. Increased training/support manpower not needed;

but a new emphasis is indicated

Lead Questions:

Can anything positive be anticipated from a 120 hour

continuous exercise for which there has been no prior

preparatory training?

* Probably, no

* Soldiers discover they cannot cope

To what extent are current ARTEPs applicable to the continuous operations situation?

* Seriously adverse conditions not specified

in ARTEPS

How might ARTEPS be improved to incorporate the issues

arising from unreliability of soldier and unit performance during actual combat?

* Incorporate "worst" conditions in ARTEP

* Repeated observations (e.g., 2 out of 3)

" 455 
Case 2: Ft. Zebra School

PART 2

The soldier performance during continuous operations group at Ft.

Zebra determines the training priorities and the current state-of-readiness

vis-a-vis continuous operations. The members of the group think that

initial efforts should be directed at the development of increased emphasis

on Counter Degradation Measures (CDMs). With the resources at their

disposal, they undertake background work to formulate policy in this area.

- I.

47

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .*7- C.
5- TO 7

Case 2: Ft. Zebra School

PART 2

Group A Discussion

List and discuss the benefits and the relative cost of various CDMs.

Determine the prioritization of the CDMs in terms of this analysis.

Purpose:

To examine the relative trade-offs in incorporating CDM considerations

into training.

Key Points:

1. Some CDMs (e.g., leadership, commitment) entail no costs

and only minimal preparation

2. While some CDMs (e.g., realistic training, talent selection)

entail administrative burdens and costs, the ultimate payoff

could far outweigh the cost

3. For some CDMs (e.g., performance supports) benefits and/or

costs are variables

Lead Questions:

What is the time frame for implementation of various CDMs?

Does it differ for each CDM? How so?

* Strategic CDMs (pre D-day) and tactical

CDMs (post D-day)

* Some CDMs depend on existence of others

Crosstraining is a prerequisite for task rotation during

operations. Determine which other CDP:s entail prerequisite

preparations and consider the implications.

* Relaxation and individual stress control

practice * Specific sleep discipline(s): planning and

practice

* Performance supports and training (practice)

* Commitment, leadership, and morale/esprit

48
Case 2: Ft. Zebra School

PART 2

Group B Discussion

Prioritize the CDMs with regard to the abilities, skills, and tasks

they serve to "protect." Comment on how this prioritization impacts on

training requirements. Discuss possible differences in priority if a unit is

one week away from combat versus one year.

Purpose:

To point out how the CDMs protect abilities, skills, and task performance.

Key Points:

1. Mental ability deteriorates most and needs protection

most

2. Leadership tasks most dependent on mental abilities

3. Careful planning and implementation of CDMs can provide

substantial benefits.

Lead Questions:

Evaluate the limits of CDMs in the present context

* Cannot overcome psychophysiological limits

* Mostly require preparation and training

How might ARTEPs incorporate CDM implementation?

* ARTEPs adjusted for projected performance

degradation

* Further adjusted for CDM implementation

What policies should exist regarding the recuperation of

"i personnel following extensive, realistic continuous operations training? Would such policies be in conflict with

any existing Army policies?

• Allow rest commensurate with experienced sleep

loss

49

°1_7
Case 2: Ft. Zebra School

PART 3

The Commander of the Ft. Zebra TRADOC school receives the task

group's recommendations for the incorporation of CDP.s into the ongoing

training of all units at the Fort. The Commander directs his staff to

develop CDDM policies within each staff member's own area of responsibility.

The staff officers work independently on their individual policies.

Although all feel the "pinch" of manpower shortages, the mechanized infantry operations officer thinks that his units are especially taxed by the

personnel shortages and the added burden imposed by this new preparation requirement.

51
Case 2: Ft. Zebra School

PART 3

Group A Discussion

Specify how the consequences of continuous operations combat for

soldier resources and the applicability and feasibility of various potential

CDP.1s differ for the individual areas of staff responsibility. What are the

implications of these differences for effective, coordinated action of the

Army as a whole?

Purpose:

To demonstrate the implications of CDM implementation for different

staff responsibilities, combat arms specialties, and command levels.

Key Points:

1. CDMs represent a principal concern for G3 and similar

training planners

2. CDM implementation differs for different combat arms

3. Training required not only at platoon/squad level, but

also at company, battalion, and higher levels

Lead Questions: L ,

Considering the various areas of staff responsibility, how

would differential reductions in soldier effectiveness affect the combat effectiveness of the total unit?

* Tasks requiring mental abilities degrade most

* Leadership tasks affected most

Why might an officer "rationalize" a reluctance to implement this policy?

* Failure to appreciate reality and seriousness

of the requirements Relative priority of competing requirements

misjudged

What is the necessary content for policies regarding rotation and reconstitution of units in combat?

* Extensive crosstraining within units

* Some crosstraining across combat arms units

52
Case 2: Ft. Zebra School

4

4PART 3

Group B Discussion

Anticipate problems and inconsistencies that might arise among the

individual staff recommendations on performance decrement prevention

requirements and preparation. How can each of these inconsistencies be

resolved, both internally and within overall Army policy? Why might the

mechanized infantry officer's arguments be justified? Why not?

Purpose:

To point out how conflicts in requirements might be resolved.

Key Points:

1. Meeting CDM training requirements entails a coordinated set of activities

2. Realistic continuous combat training creates a need

for integrated scheduling

3. For some combat arms specialties (e.g., mechanized

infantry) some CDMs (e.g., selection, training) entail scenarios requiring specific OPFORCE roles

Lead Questions:

What, if anything, can be done at this level to encourage

procedural flexibility and initiative?

* Incentives for achieving continuous combat

capability

* Design realistic time frames and schedules

Discuss the importance for all staff areas to develop

policies fostering leadership, cohesion, and unit identity

* Leadership, cohesion, and unit identity are

foundations for a successful CD training

program

53

'"- • - - .U"" " '- ' .:- - .: .i: :< " : .": .:- " " ? '?': .? -. .. " :-
(Objectives: 6, 8, 9)

Case 3: Policy Implementation and Evaluation

PART 1

Recently, international tensions have increased steadily. The U. S.

has indicated that it intends to increase its forces in Europe. The 54th

Infantry Division (Mech) is alerted to expect transfer to Europe in about

120 days. The 54th is directed to attain peak combat effectiveness--including the capability for sustained effectiveness in continuous operation.

The 54th is at about 80% of its authorized complement. Equipment

readiness is currently "marginal." The 54th has received no training

specific for continuous operations but has had considerable training in

night operations. There has also been considerable emphasis on concealment and smoke screens in the recent training.

The Commander of the 54th wishes to develop a policy for Divisional

performance decrement preparedness. He anticipates some reluctance on

the part of various subordinate units because of the many other pressures

on them at this time. Accordingly, the Commander calls a meeting of

various subordinate unit leaders to describe the intent and content of the

policy. The unit leaders will then be expected to implement the policy.

The Commander's first priority is to determine the 54th's current

• state of readiness. He directs his staff and unit leaders to assess the

state of readiness and prepare reports. Counter Degradation Measures

(CDMs) are to be considered in this connection.

55

0 

.

. .
Case 3: Policy Implementation and Evaluation

PART 1

Group A Discussion

Assume that the Commander learns that there has been no CDPI

preparation. The Commander believes that such preparations are

necessary before the imminent deployment. Relative to other necessary

preparatory efforts, how should he prioritize the CDM requirements to

ensure the maximum return from preparations in the limited time available?

Purpose:

To identify CDMs promising to provide a maximum payoff in minimal

available time.

Key Points:

1. Leadership, cohesion, and esprit

2. Commitment

3. Physical conditioning

4. Identifying and selecting talent

5. Sleep/ rest discipline.

Lead Questions:

As part of the initial appraisal, enumerate methods of

collecting information on the current status of such

stress such CDMs as leadership, group cohesion, and esprit

* Reports from/review with unit leadership

* Interviews with sample of soldiers

What methods currently exist for the selection of special

talents as called for by the continuous operations battlefield?

* Soldier competition in selected tasks and

situations

* Systematic peer and supervisor task oriented

performance ratings

U1 56

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Case 3: Policy Implementation and Evaluation

PART 1

Group B Discussion

What are the most important issues that the Commander should know

concerning performance decrement preparedness? How should his unit leaders obtain the information? In assessing the capacity of the personnel of

the 54th for sustained operations, should the Commander assume a broad

implement,-*ion of training, looking for common elements between the requirements of CDPIs and the types of training his troops have already had,

or should he interpret the present training background more narrowly?

Purpose:

To provide insight into the major or critical issues and to formulate

approaches to their analysis.

Key Points:

1. Need for systematic, objective evaluation

2. Performance degradation rates, degrees, and variability

3. Available CDP.Is

4. Requirements of program for implementing CDPIs and time frame

Lead Questions:

To what extent can the Commander assume that his unit

leaders are aware of the special demands that continuous

operations place on soldiers? What are the implications

of this for the Commander?

* Can't assume, inform subordinates about continuous operations effects

How much background information about the continuous

operations concept do the various unit leaders need in ordder that they may assess fully their unit's preparedness?

Would special briefings be necessary for the unit leaders?

Leadership must be acquainted with key degradation

issues as they pertain to their level of concern .. * Probably "yes"

The training already received by different units (artillery,

armor, Fist, etc.) may hnve prepared them differentially for

the stresses of continuous operations, flow could this be

assessed?

* leet ARTEPS under progressively more adverse

conditions

57
Case 3. Policy Implementation and Evaluation

PART 2

The Commander receives from his subordinates reports on their units'

current state of readiness for continuous operations. He learns that other

than "marginal" within unit cross-training, his troops have completed no

CDM preparation. He also learns about other weaknesses. The operations

officer and the logistics officer inform the Commander that, due to the

54th's reduced complement, the ability to complete various standard operational procedures is reduced. These officers are reluctant to institute

new training requirements when they believe that they don't have some of

the "basics" covered.

The Commander reminds his officers of the limited time remaining

before deployment and of the severe stresses placed on troops during

continuous operations combat. lie directs his officers to prioritize CDM

training in relation to other requirements for inclusion in the regular

training routine. He further directs them to consider CDM training for

both officers and enlisted personnel.

593

*|,'-. -.. . .

| . . . . . . --.- - , -
Case 3. Policy Implementation and Evaluation

PART 2

Group A Discussion

What content should be included in the various policies in regard to

continuous operations soldier resources conservation? Is any current doctrine or policy in conflict with your recommendations? If so, how can

the conflict be resolved?

Purpose:

To recognize key elements needed for inclusion in the formulation of

an appropriate CDM policy.

Key Points:

1. Requirement for maintenance of performance effectiveness

under adverse conditions and for extended periods

2. Repetitive evaluation of progress toward targeted capability

3. Resolve "conflicts" in favor of continuous operations

requirements

Lead Questions:

To what extent should the policy specify prolonged-effectiveness-of-performance objectives?

* Cornerstone of policy

What consideration should be given to "critical" mission profiles and task categories?

* Highest training/preparation priority

Should performance targets be specified in terms of "acceptable" levels in critical continuous operations mission-task

categories?

* Only if related to some scale of elapsed mission

time and severity of adverse conditions present

How might the policy emphasize flexibility and initiative in

achieving accurate, speedy, and reliable performance in

critical mission-task categories?

* Rewards for progress rather than zero defects

U. 60 _._.i
Case 3. Policy Implementation and Evaluation

PART 2

Group B Discusssion

What special training and considerations should officers and staff

receive to prepare them for continuous operations? How might the policy

encourage procedural flexibility and initiative? What are the special responsibilities of officers and staff for fostering leadership, cohesion, and

• .' tunit identity?

7Purpose:

To provide perspective on the special leadership requirements, responsibilities, knowledges, and skills required for continuous operations.

Key Points:

1. Leadership (e.g., Command & Control) activity most severely

impacted by adverse factors in continuous operations

2. CDMs benefit all levels of leadership (including Command

& Staff)

3. Resource management, including self-management, especially

important for preserving effectiveness of higher leadership

level

4. Need for flexibility; change in leadership style

Lead Ouestions:

How important is it that policy specify that conditions and

patterns of training must match, as nearly as possible, the

worst expected combat conditions? The benefits of this?

* All must learn to cope with/compensate for adverse

factors to maintain combat effectiveness

* "Worst" conditions prepare for all others

What might the policy consider in regard to individual preparation, especially with respect to stress control and coping capability, and including every level of leadership?

M ission capability ultimately depends on individual

ability to endure and to keep performing effectively

• Stress coping techniques

61/

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Case 3. Policy Implementation and Evaluation

PART 3

The continuous operations preparation policies have now been

formulated and implemented divisionwide. Perhaps because of the

acknowledged threat in Europe, compliance with the policy has been wholehearted and thorough. Although a few problems remain, the Commander is pleased with the progress his units are making towards

resistance to performance decrement.

The Commander believes that an accurate evaluation of the various

'" stress coping techniques and CD s that have been incorporated into the

training regimen is necessary for strategic and tactical planning consid- erations. Therefore, his concern now centers on evaluation.

63

. * - -i

...... . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .
V" Case 3. Policy Implementation and Evaluation

PART 3

Group A Discussion

The Commander has directed that the policies be implemented. How

can progress towards goals be monitored? What should be checked and

what standards invoked? What problems can be anticipated at this juncture, and how can they be met? Are problems different for officers than

for enlisted personnel?

Purpose:

i

To realize the problems of assessing compliance with CDM policy and

progress toward its fulfillment.

Key Points:

1. Evaluation must be objective and relative to severity of

imposed conditions

2. Stress reduction training is individual, personal, and

success can only be approximately measured in training

3. Success must be assessed relative to tasks and mission goals I

4. Continuous CPXs, suitable training for senior command

and staff personnel

5. Formal inventory of progress vis-a-vis each CDM

6. Continuous FTX performance of subordinate units must

show trend of improvement

7. Permit flexibility to revise, refine, and improvise so

as to achieve a genuine continuous combat capability

Lead Question:

Describe how ARTEP standards can be used to evaluate incremental performance under these circumstances

* Degree to which ARTEP standards are maintained

under more and more adverse conditions

How are depth of crosstraining, rotation of units, and

function of reconstituted units (elements) important to

* judging progress towards goals?

* Flexibility of mission/soldier resources

To what extent should progress be evaluated in terms of

individual or unit progress towards goals? What are the

advantages/disadvantages of each?

* Progress rather than zero defects is what counts

* Significant CDM benefits develop only gradually

64
: =Case 3. Policy Implementation and Evaluation

PART 3

Group B Discussion

Now that the continuous operations policy is being implemented, what

other coordination might be required? Consider, also, any necessary

social support for soldiers' dependents.

Purpose:

To direct attention to various coordination requirements likely to be

generated by a continuous operations preparation policy.

Key Points:

1. Coordination within the command; across nearby commands

2. Coordination regarding training facilities

3. Coordination with affected civilian authorities

4. Coordination for social support of soldiers and their

dependents

Lead Questions:

How might the evaluation plan explicitly consider

the training and preparation impact on soldier morale and

their dependents?

* Determine problems due to demanding training

* Alleviate to reduce distractions from training

65

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• ... . -': . " _ ' ' ", '' ! - -.- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. n . n . * m - - - ~n m ~m ~ * - ' ' =- '
(Objectives: 5, 6, 7)

Case 4: Continuous Operations Training

PART 1

The 54th Infantry Division (M\ech) recently and suddenly published

a new policy to prepare the division for a continuous operations

capability. The division is at about 75% strength. It is experiencing

considerable problems in obtaining spare parts for much of its

equipment. In consequence, all of its maintenance resources, including

personnel, are hard pressed to support tactical training operations with

operable equipment. Additionally, a policy designed to develop a desert

,t operations capability was imposed recently and is straining subordinate

k* . units' resources and capabilities.

The new continuous operations policy has met with protests from

subordinate commanders and staffs. Indications are that compliance with

the policy is marginal, and just enough to satisfy its letter, but not its

spirit. "Informal channels" suggest that personnel at all levels are badmouthing the policy and its requirements. Enlisted personnel are especially critical of the increased physical conditioning and crosstraining requirements. Maintenance staff personnel state that unrealistic demands are

being placed on them.

The Commander wishes to attain continuous operations readiness but

believes he may need to scale back on his original policies and time tables.

,. He undertakes to determine the key elements of performance decrement

during continuous operations and to start CD.1 training as soon as reasonably possible.

67

. . . . .!.b.' . . .. -- . . .-
Case 4. Continuous Operations Training

PART 1

Group A Discussion

Should the Commander modify his policy, or should he order his units

to "exert more effort"? How might policy be altered to prevent the overtaxing of personnel and equipment resources? For example, in the case

described here, what CDMs could be developed that do not rely on the

availability of equipment?

Purpose:

To allow examination of the possibilities for flexibility in CDM policy

implementation.

Key Points:

1. CDMs such as leadership, commitment, physical conditioning,

and stress reduction require minimal "extra" effort and no

equipment

2. Detailed planning can be developed for other CDMis

3. Detailed full scale training plans can be tied to specified contingencies (e.g., more resources, international

situation)

4. At least an appreciation of continuous operations problems

can be developed in small scale/infrequent continuous exercises

5. The current situation of "overwork" is much less severe

than that which will be encountered during continuous operations. Some of the CDEI training might be incorporated immediately into the current situation

Lead Questions:

In what way might social support agencies be helpful to reduce the strains of soldier CDM training?

* Substitute somewhat for soldier's role in family

* Ease soldiers' family obligations

How might policies concerning procedural flexibility ease the

burden of the performance mintenance requirement?

* Permit "shortcuts" to achieving essential mission

objectives

68

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Case 4. Continuous Operations Training

PART 1

Group B Discussion

Is it possible that this is a morale/leadership/commitment problem

rather than an "overwork" problem? If so, what steps should have been

taken within the Division before the introduction of the new training requirements? Why is each step that you suggest important?

Purpose:

To provide awareness of the importance of securing a general commitment to CDM policy if it is to become effective.

Key Points:

1. All soldiers in a unit must share the commitment to

achieve a continuous combat capability

2. All personnel must be indoctrinated and become convinced of the necessity for making extraordinary efforts

Lead Questions:

The case makes reference to "informal channels." Do consistencies or inconsistencies among "formal" or "informal"

channels of information have any special implications visa-vis the present situation?

* Informal channels more reliable for information

discordant with policy? * Information permits assessment of degree of existing commitment to policy

69

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I. -

Case 4. Continuous Operations Training

PART 2

The unit commanders and staff officers favorably receive the new

timetables for CDM preparation. Although the timetables have been revised, attainment of performance decrement minimization remains a high

priority. However, maintenance demands remain strained. This has

severely hampered the Division's desert operations training with armored

equipment. Also, the eatire concept of continuous operations and its

attendant training requirements are not well received by enlisted personnel. They appear to be "just going through the motions" of the

training exercises.

The Commander is faced with the necessity of changing the uncooperative attitude of enlisted personnel and some junior officers. At a meeting with his staff and assistant division commanders, the Commander out- , lines the problems and asks for recommendations.

71

3 o
Case 4. Continuous Operations Training

PART 2

Group A Discussion

Can a determined "hard sell" effort change attitudes? Will a thorough

dissemination to all levels of expected continuous operations conditions and

their consequences constitute a workable solution? Why or why not?

Purpose:

To provide an opportunity for examining alternative approaches to

changing uncooperative attitudes about CD.I training.

Key Points:

1. Resistance to "hard sell"

2. Disbelief of the seriousness of the consequences from

continuous operations under the "worst" conditions

3. Belief in own ability to "tough it out'

4. Provide indoctrination on conditions of continuous

operations and emphasize advantages to individuals

of such training

Lead Questions:

What preparatory indoctrination, if any, should be given to

units before introducing a policy such as that involved here?

* Soviet doctrine and capabilities

* Full information about effects of adverse factors

. * Ability of CDMs to retard performance degradation

72.

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. - o - - .. . .
Case 4. Continuous Operations Training

PART 2

Group B Discussion

Might the best way to change reluctant cooperation be to let personnel experience the conditions with which they will have to cope?

Therefore, should a continuous FTX be scheduled with very little warning?

What problems might be raised by such an action?

Purpose:

To develop an appreciation of the need for preparation before engaging in continuous operations.

Key Points:

1. Moderate simulation, with safeguards, may serve to convince

2. Coping with adverse factors in continuous operations must

be learned; the ability does not exist at beginning of

training

3. Encountering continuous operations conditions when still

unprepared may traumatize participants and convince soldiers

that there is no hope

Lead Questions:

Should the Commander now exempt female soldiers from his

policy? Justify your answer.

* Training is most essential for combat personnel

* Training is also important for combat support personnel

* Training is desirable, but not essential for combat

service support personnel

In what ways might CD training necessitate changes in

standard training schedules?

o. I

* Recovery time required after continuous exercises

What incentives could be developed for active participation

in CDM training?

* Unit competition and overt recognition

* Special off-time during recovery period, or even

beyond

73

°°. . . . . .

.. a" *
Case 4. Continuous Operations Training

PART 3

The 54th is now two months into its new continuous operations

training. Compliance with the policy is greatly increased as a result of

a series of informational and unit recognition techniques, and through

increasing experience with continuous FTXs. The severity of the

maintenance problems is reduced as the result of an increased emphasis

on crosstraining in the maintenance area.

The improvements in the 54th's morale and combat readiness are

nothing short of remarkable. A "Special Group on Performance Decrement" from Corps headquarters visits the 54th to document these improvements and to determine which policies should be implemented

throughout the Command.

75

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}% _-. . . . . u . .. . .-, ! . . . .- . . r .r ' .. '- - . . . I

s-I

Case 4. Continuous Operations Training

PART 3

Group A Discussion

What criteria should be used to determine a Command's CDM capability? How might these criteria differ both within a Command (e.g., a

division) and between Commands?

Purpose:

To examine the varied, appropriate criteria for assessing continuous

operations readiness, and the factors that determine them.

Key Points:

1. Proportions of types of units (e.g., infantry,

armor) comprising the command

2. Expected critical missions, mission profiles, and

their critical segments

Lead Questions:

How might a policy regarding procedural flexibility be formulated and assessed?

* Performance, not procedure, is what counts (the

criterion) * Different time frames for different units

* Many CDMs (e.g., sleep discipline, performance

supports) are unit or even task specific

76

" -. ~* - - S.

.I- ---. ~S S -S
. . . . .. .. . .4 

Case 4. Continuous Operations Training

PART 3

Group B Discussion

How might performance degradation minimization policies differ for

various types of units within a division. What special considerations does

this impose on assessing policy compliance and command consistency?

Purpose:

To examine differences in continuous operations performance requirements and need for recognition of these differences in policy.

Key Points:

1. Tasks of combat unit types

2. Tasks of combat support unit types

3. Tasks of combat service support unit types

Lead Ouestions:

How might recognition of individual units' achievements be

used to encourage cooperation with CDI' training policies?

* Promote competition among units

* Provide rewards for high achievement

What policies may be required for elements of CDM preparedness that go beyond divisional boundaries?

* Coordination to assure uniform capability for maintaining performance across commands

* Forestall discontent due to unequal demands on personnel in nearby commands

How could/should current ARTEPs be altered to reflect the

requirements of continuous operations?

* Adjust ARTEPs for surrounding conditions of performance

77
(Objectives: 3, 4, 8)

Case 5: Ft. Xray

PART 1

Presently colocated at Ft. Xray with the 54th Infantry Division

(Mech) is the 27th FA BDE. The 54th has implemented a strong CDM

program to prepare the division for continuous operations in anticipation

of a transfer to Europe. Normally, the 27th FA BDE has provided GS

fire in tactical exercises conducted by the 54th.

On post, personnel of the 54th Infantry Division and the 27th FA

BDE mingle freely. Discrepancies in duty demands on 54th personnel as

opposed to others have been widely discussed. Also, a reluctance is in

evidence by the 27th FA BDE to participate in the 54th's tactical

continuous operations exercises to the extent desirable.

A

79

/I

- - . . .
Case 5: Ft. Xray

PART 1

Group A Discussion I

How necessary is it for the 54th in evaluating its progress toward

attaining its CDM goals to work with a FA unit which has instituted a

similar policy? Can a CDM program be expected to be useful if only part of a total force has such preparation?

Purpose:To I

To examine personnel (social) and organizational issues that can arise

in policy implementation. I

Key Points:

1. Continuous FTXs are reasonable only when participating

units have a similar degree of capability

2. Imbalance in abilities to maintain performance is likely

to disrupt training and may even be dangerous

Lead Questions:

Considering the performance decrement context, enumerate

the obstacles to cooperation among separate commands such

as those described. I

* Unreliability of support from less well-trained

unit (s)I * Inability of untrained unit(s) to endure until final L

period of exercise/mission

Does any current situation either hinder or facilitate the [

types of coordination among Commands that is necessary

during CDM training?

* Nonuniformity due to individual policies I

80

... .. ... . . . .. , .. -.. . . . . . .. . -... . . ... . . .
Case 5: Ft. Xray

PART 1

Group B Discussion

Coordination among separate units is a necessary element of any

successful program. In this case, how could the CDM plans of the

Commands be more effectively coordinated? What would be the expected

benefits resulting from such cooperation?

Purpose:

To demonstrate the necessities for coordination and cooperation among

Commands when developing a continuous operations capability.

Key Points:

1. Coordination of schedules or timing

2. Cooperation in training and simulated continuous

combat exercises

Lead Questions:

In what ways might the performance degradation resulting

from continuous combat create unexpected problems in Command coordination?

* Uneven performance of cooperating units/commands

* Decrement will be different for different unit types

Is it possible that preparations for performance decrement

during continuous operations might differ for armor, artillery, and infantry groups?

* Performance decrement depends on activity (tasks)

* Different activities degrade at different rates

From the point of view of CDM preparedness, devise methods

of improving the level of cooperation between the two

Commands mentioned

* Coordinate policies * Cooperative training/ preparation

81

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Case 5: Ft. Xray

PART 2

Although CDM preparation has not been undertaken by both Commands, the two Commands at Ft. Xray are directed to conduct field

exer- cises simulating action of extended duration. The Commanders

agree to a 120 hour continuous exercise. The 23rd Armored Division will

also parti- cipate in the exercise. The 23rd has had no performance

degradation countermeasure training. The Commanders of the 23rd and

the 27th believe that their units will "hack it" because the units have

"can do/will do" attitudes.

Three purposes of the exercise are: (1) to provide realistic combat

training, (2) to assess the CDM program of the 54th, and (3) to practice

coordination activities among Commands.

83

. . .
Case 5: Ft. Xray

PART 2

Group A Discussion

This is a case of soldiers going into a continuous operations exercise

with little preparation specific to continuous operations. To what extent

will "standard" Army training prepare soldiers for the new demands of

continuous operations? Can you anticipate any problems which might

emerge during the exercise and what can be done about them?

Purpose:

To define the differences between conventional tactical types of

training and continuous operations training.

Key Points:

1. Soldiers have not learned to cope with adverse factors

2. Unprepared units likely to be "traumatized" by severity

of experience

Lead Questions:

What do the results of various military studies on extended operations lead one to expect vis-a-vis degraded

performance effectiveness during the course of the exercise?

* Progressive decline of effectiveness

* Increasing variability (unreliability) of

performance

Which tasks will be most vulnerable to the effects of

sleep loss and stress? How will this impact on the

success of various missions?

* Mental tasks (decision making, etc.) degrade

first /most

8

:':::84

U
Case 5: Ft. Xray

PART 2

Group B Discussion

A number of "quick fix" CDMs will need to be implemented during the

exercise by the artillery and the armored units. Given their current

CDM preparedness status, what are they? How successful will they be?

Why so?

Purpose:

To examine the nature of the on-the-spot decisions for implementing

CDPIs in units which are untrained in CDMs.

Key Points:

1. Task restructuring and rotation (as feasible)

2. Sleep/rest discipline

3. Resource management

Lead Questions:

What methods are available or need to be developed to assess

. the effectiveness of CDMs?

* Compare before/after CDM implementation effectiveness

* Compare with performance of unprepared units

* Performance records over exercise/mission

4 .

85

°"I °" C 
Case 5: Ft. Xray

PART 3

The continuous operations field exercise is in its 100th hour. The

Commanders are frequently surprised during the exercise. In general, the

artillery and armored performance is poor--especially in regard to

maneuverability. The artillery and the armored Commanders are greatly

concerned about the ability of their troops to persist in the operation at

the required level of maneuverability and to react to changes in the

situation such as capitalizing on successes. The commanding officers and

staff feel greatly stressed themselves. The members of the 27th FA BDE

appear to be noticeably less affected by the operations than members of

the armored group.

The unit Commanders decide to continue the operation for the full 120

hours. A number of items are identified as deficiencies for inclusion in

the postexercise debriefings.

87

;

•V_ - ..- - * .
.,

Case 5: Ft. Xray

PART 3

Group A Discussion

Performance degradation during continuous operations will occur at

different rates for different tasks and different units. What are the

implications of this for matters such as strategic and tactical policy which

emphasizes maneuverability? Discuss how tactics may need to be changed

during the course of continuous operations as a result of shrinking soldier

*-." resources.

Purpose:

To provide experience in adapting plans and operations to available

soldier resources (degraded performance capability).

Key Points:

1. Judgment and decision making ability of subordinate

commanders will become unreliable

2. Ability to coordinate tactics and maneuvers will become

limited

Lead Questions:

What CDMs are available to troops not specifically trained

for continuous operations?

* Task restructuring/rotation

* Sleep/rest management

* Resource management

How can leaders anticipate the reduced effectiveness of their

troops and develop plans to make best use of whatever resources are available?

• Base plans on best available projections of effectiveness after given mission duration

U What strategic and tactical issues arise from unreliability

of mission performance and accomplishment?

* Estimate probabilities of mission success!ffihirp

* Plan back-up resources to accomplish mission

88

?.. .-.. .T: . , .- , . -. .-. . . .. ., : , ...- -.:, ..- .. ". ,.'.,.. .. ,, ... .-. ,.7.7.
Case 5: Ft. Xray

PART 3

Group B Discussion

Thinking, problem solving, and reacting to altered situations are

among the abilities most degraded by stress and lack of sleep. Consider

them in relation to the postexercises debriefing. Consider the importance

of CDMs for officers. What types of performance support techniques are

available for officers?

Purpose:

To examine effects of continuous operations on "mental" tasks and

the performance supports for leadership activities.

Key Points:

1. Degradation of "mental" task performance cannot be held

off voluntarily (by determination)

2. The lesson of mistakes made is a need to learn to cope

with and compensate for adverse conditions, not that basic

decision making skills need improvement

3. Consider: crosschecking, task rotation, sleep discipline

4. Predetermine major mission profiles, and develop "checklists" for general solution features

Lead Questions:

Formulate a policy regarding sleep, rest, and recuperation

discipline following an exercise such as that described. How

would this be altered by the demands of actual conflict?

* Recuperation (off-duty) in keeping with sleep

loss (per established guidelines) * Rotate units as best possible

A

89

-"1

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9* . . . . ..

.. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Objectives: 1, 2, 7)

Case 6: Imminent Attack

PART 1

Although such a move was anticipated, the 54th Infantry Division

(.ech) is airlifted from CONUS to Europe with less than two days

warning. Its heavy weapons and equipment are left behind in this move

and are to be replaced from European POMCUS stocks. On its departure

from CONUS, the Division is about 80% of authorized strength. The

Division is advised that it will be brought up to full strength from casual

elements in Europe. The sudden advance in the time for the shift is part

of a response to a rapid increase in international tensions. The move is

begun at 011500 July and completed at 031000 July. On arrival, the

Division's command and staff are briefed most specifically on the defense

of an area assigned to it. The Division's units are deployed in this area

as rapidly as possible after being reequipped and receiving new personnel. Reequipping furnishes the Division with only about 70% of its auth-

. orized heavy weapons and equipment, although more weapons and equipment are promised.

V-.

19

, 91

..............
Case 6: Imminent Attack

PART 1

Group A Discussion

What CDM considerations seem appropriate now? Prioritize these and

discuss them in relationship to other pressing issues.

Purpose:

To emphasize CDMs appropriate before and after airlift to an overseas

area in which hostilities are threatening.

Key Points:

1. Adaptation to new time zone

2. Work/rest schedules

3. Aspects of sleep discipline

Lead Questions:

How should policy recognize the recency of eastward

transmeridianal relocation?

* Adopt schedule of new time zone immediately

* Rest and sleep during flight

* Work immediately on arrival

Which facet(s) of work/sleep/rest discipline should be

emphasized at this stage?

• Work/rest schedules

92

U7

.* * . . . . . . . ..

"

.-.
Case 6: Imminent Attack

PART 1

Group B Discussion

Assume that the new personnel have not received the same CDM

training as the personnel of the 54th. What CDM training policy is required for the new personnel? Considering the differences between the

new personnel and the personnel of the 54th in CDM preparedness,

should the new personnel be distributed on an "as required" basis N throughout the 54th, or should they be formed into units and the units

integrated into the 54th? Consider the implications for total unit

effectiveness.

Purpose:

To emphasize the CDM related requirements for integrating new personnel into established units and some resulting options.

Key Points:

1. New personnel must be (socially) integrated into

established units and their organization

2. New personnel are "unknown quantities" to old personnel, and vice versa

3. New personnel have not been trained for a continuous

operations capability; they are deficient in coping

ability

4. Cohesiveness and team function probably best served by

forming units of new personnel; however, the opportunity

for peer (cross) training is lost

Lead Questions:

Should new personnel be integrated into a unit staffed with

long term assignees?

• Depends on time available for integration

In what way(s) can confidence in leadership be developed

in newly assigned personnel?

* Displays of authoritative leadership

* Demonstrations of competence

Do crosstraining and its techniques have any relevance

under the described conditions?

• Soldier-to-soldier instruction effective for tech-

- nical skills/knowledges, for some CD- indoctrination, and for integrating new personnel

93

................................ .............. o .... - -. . . . . . . . . . - . . . . -.
Case 6: Imminent Attack

PART 2

suggest Intelligence the 

advisories continue to arrive, and they continue to advent of hostilities. Opposing forces have been reinforced and deployed in tactically advantageous positions. As a result, the various elements of the 54th Infantry Division (Mech) occupy and strengthen a number of battle positions (BPs).

95

II
Case 6: Imminent Attack

PART 2

Group A Discussion

What is the most advisable policy for the 54th to implement now

considering the needs to: (1) prepare the strongest possible battle

positions, (2) prepare for all tactical contingencies, and (3) allow the

troops to enter battle in the most rested state possible?

*. Purpose:

To examine the factors in the dilemma between work (stronger BPs)

and rest (prolongation of effective performance).

Key Points:

1. Specific situational factors are the deciding ones

2. Specific situational factors are complex and unpredictable - 3. Relation of recency of sleep to battle endurance must not

be underestimated

Lead Questions:

Which facet(s) of work/sleep/rest discipline should be emphasized at this stage for lower ranks and enlisted personnel?

* Work/rest schedules

* Task rotation

How much of the information in the intelligence advisories

should be passed on down?

* All security-free aspects

What further measures should be taken to affirm leadership,

cement esprit, and renew commitment?

* Maintain frequent personal or communications

contact . * Appeal to esprit and commitment

Under the momentary circumstances, what might be the

proper balance between preparation (work) and rest?

* Assue, at least, 8 hours sleep per 24 hour day

96
Case 6 Imminent Attack

PART 2

Group B Discussion

What type of sleep discipline is necessary for officers at this junctLure? In what way, if any, should this discipline differ from that of other

personnel? Discuss the "pros and cons" of a special sleep discipline for

persons in key comnmand positions.

Purpose:

To advise about the special requirements for sleep imposed by significant thinking and decision making (mental task) responsibilities.

Key Points:

1. Thinking capability deteriorates most (and soonest)

2. Thinking capability must be protected

3. Clearheaded decisions are vital to mission accomplishment and unit survival

Lead Questions:

Is it wise or unwise, at this stage, for unit Commanders to

supervise personally all preparations? Why so?

* Commanders must preserve themselves for decision

making

* Delegate responsibilities, and rotate staff

97

U • .:_-:::: :::i ,:_: :: : .: -iii .:- : : :::: :> : :: i: }::::. ::::: : ! i: •-:i :}: :: : : - : :
Case 6: Imminent Attack

PART 3

r ,o

At 0523CC July, the 54th Infantry Division (Mech) is advised urgently

. and confidentially to expect an aggressor breakthrough attack within 48

hours. Intelligence estimates that this attack is to be mounted by the 19th

Combined Arms Army, elements of which are identified opposite the 54th

Infantry Division (Mech). This is the first unequivocal advisory that

hostilities are about to erupt.

Since no relief and resupply are foreseen for at least five days, the

54th Infantry Division (Mech) must sustain continuous operations over this

period with existing resources.

.9

99
Case 6: Imminent Attack

PART 3

Group A Discussion

Taking an extremely optimistic view of prospects for relief and

resupply, formulate a divisional policy designed to assure a maximal fighting effectiveness.

Purpose:

To examine methods for exploiting CDM capabilities established in

training for implementing the appropriate set of CDMs in the prospect of

immediate continuous operations.

Key Points:

1. Ideally, troops should wake as the battle begins

2. Continue CDM indoctrination for new personnel

3. Demonstrate leadership, commitment, and esprit

4. Implement all CDM related SOPs (e.g., passing information) previously developed

5. Plan for unit rotation

Lead Questions:

At this stage, what might be the proper balance between

preparation (work) and rest?

Balance heavily weighted in favor of rest/sleep

Which fact(s) of work/sleep/rest discipline should be emphasized at this stage for lower ranks and enlisted personnel? How will the recent eastward dislocation modify

normal work/sleep/rest discipline?

* Limit duty (work) to essentials only

* Practice relaxation, and sleep as much as possible

* Match waking time to "new" time zone

What sort of work/rest/sleep discipline should be impleA.v mented at command levels?

* Devote waking time to making plans and decisions

* Delegate execution on a rotating basis

* Practice relaxation, and sleep as much as possible

100

'. . .
Case 6: Imminent Attack

PART 3

Group B Discussion

Devise a "checklist" which can be employed at divisional level for a

last minute check that all soldier CDP.ls are in place.

Purpose:

To review plans for integrated CDM implementation in actual combat.

Key Points:

1. Assert leadership, and exploit commitment and esprit

2. Implement full scale sleep/rest discipline

3. Implement stress reduction (management) techniques

4. Ready task restructuring and rotation plans

5. Plan soldier resource management

Lead Questions:

What sort of work/sleep/rest discipline should be practiced

by combat support elements?

* Work/rest schedules

* Task rotation

Which soldier resource management issues deserve consideration at this stage?

* Assign special combat roles

* Recognize diminishing performance capability

in planning future operations

* Rotation and fair distribution of combat burdens

101
"'-, (Objectives: 3, 4, 7)

Case 7: Continuous Combat Operations

PART 1

It is 0430 h and 68 hours since aggressor forces hsve launched their first breakthrough attack. All U.S. forces in Europe have been in continuous combat during this time. The 54th Infantry Division (.lech) sustains heavy losses in relentless echeloned attacks against it. Southeast

of the 54th, the 16th Armored Division is largely shattered under these at- tacks. Now, the I U.S. Corps orders the remnants of the 16th Armored Division. to integrate with the 54th Infantry Division (Mech). Also, the

reconstituted 54th is ordered to fall back, regroup, and maintain a new

defense line.

Because of the ferocity of the fighting and the extreme damage to

equipment, maintenance is working unceasingly, but is not keeping up with

service requests. In consequence there is a substantial number of tracked vehicles (IFVs, tanks, howitzers) with reduced capabilities. Enemy electronic jamming is heavy, and communication of intelligence information is

fragmentary. Approximately 40% of the 54th's personnel are lost.

Elements of the aggressor's 96th Tank Division succeed in penetrating south of the 54th, and must be displaced or neutralized to accomplish the

assigned mission. The Commander of the 54th is ordered to defend both

its front and flank. le is concerned about his losses, the confusion of

the battle, and the diminished effectiveness of his troops. Other than the

troops from the 16th Armored Division, the Commander knows that he cannot expect reinforcements or replacements for at least 96 hours. The

Commander assembles his staff and unit leaders to give his orders. He also reminds his officers of ways of forestalling their units' shrinking

soldier resources.

U

103

-A.. . S
Case 7: Continuous Combat Operations

PART 1

Group A Discussion

Assume the troops of the 54th are extensively prepared for

continuous operations. Given this preparation, what aspects of their

performance can be expected to degrade most rapidly under combat

conditions? Which aspects can be expected to degrade least rapidly? What

are the implications of declining performance effectiveness for tactical

deployment?

Purpose:

To examine qualitative and quantitative aspects of performance

degradation and their implications.

Key Points:

1. Mental performance degrades first and most

2. Physical activity degrades least

3. Vigilance, recognition (e.g., of changing conditions),

and the like becomes unreliable (variable)

4. CDMs only retard progressive degradation It

Lead Questions:

How could the degree of retained combat effectiveness be

estimated?

* Consult existing projections for elapsed time

of continuous combat

* Implement PERFECT, if feasible

* Allow for benefits of CDM training and implementation

What factors in the operations (as described) are likely to

be most detrimental to soldier performance?

* Sleep loss

* Stress from confusion, uncertainty, and intensity

of combat

104
Case 7: Continuous Combat Operations

PART 1

Group B Discussion

Considering: (1) the personnel level of the 54th, (2) the unknown

condition of the personnel from the 16th, and (3) the time on continuous

battle of the 54th, what suggestions might the Commander make vis-a-vis

maintaining performance effectiveness?

Purpose:

To demonstrate potential issues of extreme complexity and constraints

of highly adverse circumstances in continuous combat.

Key Points:

1. Strongly emphasize leadership and commitment.

2. Maintain established, integral unit identities as

much as possible.

3. Pass on only "encouraging" information; offer hope.

4. Emphasize soldier resource management.

Lead Questions:

How would the various units benefit from early implementation

of sleep/rest discipline?

* Unquestioned benefits, but feasibility questionable

What problems might arise from the conbining of units that

have not trained together, as described in the case?

* Reciprocal lack of confidence in "strangers"

* Differences in coordination/cooperation (tactical

maneuvering)

* Uneven levels of performance (units, individuals) due

* to differences in CD.I' training

105

,'-'-'. -. =','-. -. -'.. .-. '......-.." .. '. ' . •.. .... ',. .. ". "..',.'.". -.-. •. .-. '
Case 7: Continuous Combat Operations

PART 2

Twenty hours pass (a total of 88 hours of continuous combat). Although suffering heavy personnel and equipment losses, the 54th denies

the aggressor any advances. The aggressor attacks continue although at

a lowered intensity. TACAIR strikes are especially effective. The 54th

loses an additional 10% of its personnel. With the inclusion of the few remaining elements of the 16th Armored Division, the 54th stands at approximately 60% of its initial strength (40% original personnel, 20% personnel from the 16th).

Reinforcements are being flown from CONUS to Europe. The Commander of the 54th is advised that fresh troops in sufficient numbers to

bring the Division to full strength will arrive within 24 hours. In the

meantime, he is ordered to hold his assigned defensive sector with the

combined elements of the 54th and the remnants of the 16th Armored. He

is attempting to assess the Division's true capabilities against demands

arising from likely tactical moves by the enemy.

.. 1-

.. ,.
Case 7: Continuous Combat Operations

PART 2

Group A Discussion

Over the next 24 hours, and in view of the prospect for receiving

replacements from CONUS, would it be advisable to retain original unit

(battalions, companies) identities for the 54th and 16th (although each is

extremely understrength) or should personnel be integrated at the company, platoon, and squad levels?

Purpose:

To review options and the factors governing choices in reconstituting

units decimated and degraded in continuous operations.

Key Points:

1. Unit cohesion and esprit are important factors that

sustain soldiers' fighting spirit

2. Established units (squads through battalions) have

established effective modes of coordinated operation

over time; integrating at platoon and squad level

mixes "strangers."

3. Personnel from both original units (54th and 16th) are

likely to be suffering high degrees of performance

degradation

4. If units are kept intact, all will be extremely understrength and with soldiers' performance capabilities

highly degraded

Lead Questions:

How important is unit identity likely to be for esprit of

troops at this stage?

* Very possibly a critical sustaining factor

flow might team performance be affected, at this stage, by

the introduction of new soldiers?

U * "New" soldiers are "strangers"

* Teams will not be practiced in coordinated operation

In view of expected unreliability of mission performance, does

a policy of units overwatching each other have merit?

|* * Task reallocation, sharing, and replication are applicable to teamsiunits as well as individual soldiers

108

-.. ... . . . . . . . . . .
Case 7: Continuous Combat Operations

PART 2

Group B Discussion

What are the likely true capabilities of the reconstituted 54th? What

reliance can be placed on the successful accomplishment of an assigned

mission by any component unit? How should these factors enter into

tactical planning for the next 24 hours?

Purpose:

To provide experience in estimating likely shrinkages of soldier

resources in continuous operations, and in assessing remaining mission

capabilities.

Key Points:

1. At best, performance capability of remaining personnel

(from 54th or 16th) will be marginal

2. Leadership, at all levels, is likely to perform its tasks

(especially "mental" tasks) only marginally

3. Ability to plan effectively and reliably and to execute

even moderately complex missions is now questionable

Lead Questions:

Is there a likely difference in reaction capabilities to a

brief attack as opposed to a massive, prolonged one?

* Each individual soldier may be able to muster resources and perform somewhat effectively for a brief

period

* In prolonged fighting, soldiers' remaining "personal"

resources are likely to become exhausted

' How should the information regarding prospective reinforcements be handled?

* Pass information on down as quickly as possible

* Consider phrasing; what if reinforcements are late, etc.

109

. -
Case 7: Continuous Combat Operations

PART 3

After a further 20 hours (a total of 108 hours of continuous combat)

fresh reinforcements, flown in from CONUS, arrive. They are elements

from a CONUS division that was formed only about two months ago, and

they bring the Division up to 90% of authorized strength (40% original

personnel, 20% personnel from the 16th, 30% new personnel). The unit

training of the new personnel was not complete, and their CDP.1 preparation

was rudimentary. Since debarking from their transatlantic flight, they

have been continuously on the move to join the 54th.

Opposite the 54th, the enemy seems to be slowed by logistics

problems, and this helped the 54th to hold over the preceding 20 hours.

Now, however, it appears that renewed determined attacks can be

expected. Again, the Division's Commander is seeking to improve his

capabilities for meeting the prospective demands.

4.N N
Case 7: Continuous Combat Operations

PART 3

Group A Discussion

What divisional reconstitution and replacement policy should be recommended now? Explain the considerations influencing your recommendations.

Purpose:

To provide additional practice in analyzing options and the factors

governing choices in reconstituting degraded units

Key Points:

1. CONUS reinforcements' tactical training not complete

2. At best, CONUS reinforcements have rudimentary continuous operations capability

3. "Jet lag" and time since disembarking make reinforcements

less than completely rested

4. CONUS and "old" personnel are, again, "strangers"; replacements have not yet had their first combat experience

Lead Questions:

How does the mixture of one-third fresh troops change any

advisable reconstitution policy, or does it?

* "New" soldiers are still "strangers"

* Normally, mixture of rested personnel does improve

overall unit performance capability

How much weight must be given to the relatively low training

status ("marginal" at best) of the replacements?

* Basic tactical skills may be marginal

* Guidance by, or direction from experienced "old"

personnel likely to be ineffective at this stage

What special roles might be assigned to fresh officers and

* senior NCOs so as to use best their capabilities?

* Use officers to do planning, also to crosschecR

all "thinking" of officers who have been conti: iously fighting

* New NCOs backstop their opposite numbers among

"old" personnel

112

--"

o- . -. 
Case 7: Continuous Combat Operations

PART 3

Group B Discussion

How much gain in true capability can the Commander expect as the

result of the receipt of fresh troops? To what extent might mission performance reliability change now? How should these factors enter into

tactical planning?

Purpose:

To provide practice in assessing actual mission capabilities in the

light of changed circumstances and changes in determining factors.

Key Points:

1. Unless rested (and, if possible, extensively) only minimal

performance capability remains with personnel who have experienced 108 hours of continuous, intense combat

2. CONUS replacements lack adequate training as well as battle

experience

3. For practical purposes, possibly pass leadership (temporarily)

to inexperienced, but more rested, officers and NCOs

Lead Questions:

In what ways are the Division's tactical capabilities changed

through infusion of new personnel?

* Mental (thinking, decision making) task capability

will be improved

* But, consider lack of battle experience and understanding of status of "old" personnel

Could a recommendation to the Commander for an offensive

action be justified now?

* Discount, largely, capabilities of 60% personnei

* Discount, somewhat, capabilities of 30% of personnel

113
APPENDIX A

Command and Staff Tasks Supported by

Briefing / Seminar

115
Command and Staff Tasks Sunported By Briefing/ Seminar

A. Interpret consequences of continuous operations and associated

conditions for human resources.

1. Interpret salient features of future warfare against

Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe.

2. Interpret key conditions inherent in such warfare; or

generated by it, that affect human performance.

3. Interpret concepts of human resource preservation.

4. Interpret categories of soldiers' combat effectiveness.

5. Interpret quantitative projections of human resource

shrinkages.

6. Realize comouter simulation advantages for predicting

performance decrement.

7. Interpret projected qualitative changes in soldiers'

performance.

8. Interpret projected decremental reliability of performance

or indixiduals, tasks, duty positions, and units.

9. Interpret military studies corraborating qualitative - and quantitative projections.

B. Project strategic consequences of performance degradation and tactical

implications of these consequences for mission(s) and unit(s) over

which command responsibility is exercised.

1. Project strategic considerations deriving from shrinking

human resources.

2. Project overall considerations for tactical deployment

of degraded units.

3. Resolve issues arising from unreliability of mission

performance and accomplishment.

4. Contrast differences in continuous operntions consequences

for combat and for combat support (or service support)

units.

5. Develop implicatins of troops' degraded performance relative to communications, situation reports (information),

maintenance, logistics.

C. Evaluate and appraise applicability and feasibility of various potential technical countermeasures to performance degradation within individual

Commands.

117
1. Evaluate limits of counter degradation measures as

determined by human psychophysiological limits.

2. Appraise role and task restructuring (rotation) techniques for individual command.

3. Appraise techniques for identifying and selecting special

talent in individual command.

4. Evaluate requirements for effective continuous operations

training--

a. practice in realistic conditions I

b. continuing practice to automaticity of

performance.

5. Evaluate rationale for crosstraining priorities.

6. Evaluate techniques for learning to cope with task

performance under adverse conditions.

7. Implement techniques for learning to cope with own

degradation (exhaustion).

8. Appraise system adjustment and performance support techniques.

9. Evaluate techniques for countering stress through leadership, unit cohesion, and esprit. |

10. Evaluate requirements for sleep, rest, and recuperation

discipline. [

11. Evaluate policy for building stamina through physical

conditioning in individual command. [

12. Implement time frame for application of the various

countermeasures. [

D. Formulate and assess policy concerning programs and practice

designed to prepare troops for sustained, effective performance in

continuous operations. I

1. Formulate and assess recommendations concerning ARTEP

standards.

2. Formulate and assess policy regarding a "learninR-frommistakes" policy.

3. Formulate and assess policy regarding procedural flexibility

and encouragement of initiative.

L

- 118

,, ' .." , ... , .. ..,. ... .,, ., .. -:, .. --. - - ... ., ,,-.. - - , - .. • ..- . , , • ..--. . - . .., - , . .,
P. i°. Y.. . V ' t ,r rr *~ v~rh*. - .*.- sG. Evaluate received reports on implementation of established policy and

progress toward attainment of specified objectives.

1. Assess compliance with policy.

2. Determine status of continuous operations capability of

units within command.

3. Compare progress with time frame of policy.

4. Determine deficiencies or deviations from policy evident in

reports and data.

5. Evaluate problems related to policy reported by subordinate

elements.

6. Revise policy, as necessary, to assure effective implementation.

7. Direct corrective actions, as necessary, to assure adherence

to established policy and successful attainment of specified

objectives.

H . Coordinate, as required, with other elements of U. S. Forces, or

civilian authority on matters relating to implementation of policy.

1. Assure coordination of continuous operations preparation

policy with potentially affected commands in area.

2. Assure cooperation of nearby civilian authorities potentailly affected by continuous operations policy.

3. Assure cooperation of social support agencies for soldiers'

dependents during periods of strenuous continuous operations

preparation.

X:.

J'-:.

. b ° I

J12
4. Formulate and assess policy regarding training exercises

reflecting continuous operations conditions: scope, duration,

frequency, and incentives for active participation.

5. Formulate and assess policy regarding stress coping practice

for all personnel.

6. Formulate and assess policy for integrated fostering of leadership, cohesion, and unit identity.

7. Assess recommendations for recognition of units' achievements.

8. Formulate and assess recommendations for sleep/rest/recovery

discipline.

9. Formulate and assess policy regarding rotation and reconstitution of units in combat.

10. Formulate and assess policy for assuring dependents' safety

and well being.

E. Assign staff to analysis of issues, and to formulation of

recommmendations for appropriate command policy.

1. Assess implications of A, B, C, and D for area(s) of special

staff responsibility.

2. Evaluate applicability and feasibility of counter degradation measures and technical recommendations.

3. Define requirements of subordinate command levels for

support and guidance.

4. Formulate policy recommendations from perspective of

specific staff responsibility.

5. Review policy recommendations for integration and consistency with other command policy.

6. Submit policy recommendations for integration with other

commands.

F. Review (evaluate, accept, reject, or revise) policy recommendations

submitted by staff.

1 . Compare policy recommendations submitted by each assigned

staff member.

2. Resolve inconsistencies or conflicts.

3. Assess consistency of policy with overall command resnonsibilities and policy.

119j
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4122
APPENDIX B

Adjunct Reading Material (Handouts)

1. Reprints of Articles:

a. Continuous operations

b. A debt that must be paid: Sleep loss

c. Continuous operations in Europe: Feasibility and the effects

of leadership and training

d. The human dimension

e. Health and high command: The pains of decision

f. A continuous operations perspective

2. Projected Effectiveness (E) for Critical Combat Tasks

3, Rules for Sleep Management

4. Advisable Work/Rest Schedules Under Stressful Battlefield Conditions

5. Effects of Prolonged Continuous Operations on Soldiers' Performance

6. Flow of Counter Degradation Measure Preparation

7. Counter Degradation Measures - Strategies and Tactics

8. Applicability of Counter Degradation Measures for Conserving Various

Abilities

123
L--

Continuous Operations

By Captain George R. Frank

"My men had been moving and fighting for 39 hours since A recent experiment in England (Exercise Early Call) tested

leaving L'in-Hotsev. Before we could enter the perimeter, the the effects of fatigue due to sleep-loss.' In this study, three pladropped battalion had to lift mines and roadblocks. These toons of infantrymen were tested. One platoon was given 3

jokers had posted a sign over the entrance: "International hours sleep per night. A second platoon was given I 1/ hours of

Boundary. Show Your Passports. "I noticed that no one with sleep each night, and the last platoon was deprived of all

me laughed and I took it as a sign that we were wearing fine. sleep.' Over a period of 9 days the platoons were required to

Some of myv officers had gone 3 nights without sleep-I hadn't develop and improve several battle positions, go on ambush

closed my eyes in 70 hours. and reconnaissance patrols, and defend their battle positions.

"At 2300 hours, after getting afill report on the local situa- The platoon that received 3 hours of sleep each night remained

tion. I called all commanders together to issue orders for the an effective combat force throughout the entire 9-day exercise

organization of the expanded camp and .for completing the with only unrelated medical problems causing the loss of percapture of Mitla Pass. I stillfelt fairly good-maYbe that was sonnel.)

because I had ridden near the front of the column where the The platoon that had received only 1 / hours of sleep each

dust, and consequently, the fatique had been less. What I night progressively lost energy, personal initiative, group

planned to do was tell them that we would again carry on at coherance, and organization, until after 4 days they were able

about 0400. That would get us to the Pass by first light, and I to rally only to immediate challenges. On the fifth day, they

figured that 5 hours sleep would be enough. lost 50 percent of their personnel due to extreme fatigue and

"But I didn't get the words out. As I started speaking, I exposure.

looked at the men facing me. Every man was sleeping. At that, No one from the third platoon, which was deprived of all

my words blurred and I toppled over. Nature simply took sleep, completed the test. From the end of the fourth day until

over. I slept for 4 hours and 15 minutes. I could have used the middle of the fifth (after a period of 90 to 104 hours of

more, but an air drop came in and one 600-pound bundle continuous wakefulness) the entire platoon was gradually

landed 3 feet from my head. That wakened me and recon venid withdrawn from the test because of extreme fatigue and the inthe conference. "w

Decision in Sinai, by Lieutenant Colonel Moshe Rose as told ability to stay awake. Even after three days, or 72 straight

to Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall. hours of wakefulness, most of the platoon had ceased to be an effective combat force.'

While advanced technology has developed weapons systems Another significant result of the test showed that about 9

that are able to operate with little "down time," man, on the percent of the "sleep-deprived" and "I 1/ hour-sleep" groups

other hand. remains the same fragile organism he has been reported unusual visual experiences or hallucinations after 3

since the beginning of time. Man then is the "weak days, they were unable to communicate verbally, their sight

link,"-the most vulnerable, but also the most vital com- was restricted, and their auditory senses virtually

ponenc of any of our weapons systems. unstimulated.

When discussing the factors that degrade crew performance Studies indicate that performance and efficiency begin to

it is desirable, for the sake of simplicity, to categorize these deteriorate after 14 to 18 hours of continuous work and reach

factors into two broad areas; physiological and psychological, a low point after 22 to 24 hours. Performance improve% somewhat during the next 8 to 10 hours but begins to decrease

Ph)siological Performance Degraders again thereafter.' After 24 hours of continuous duty at a new

Fatigue is probably the foremost degrader of performance. or a monotonous task, degradation of performance becomes

It can be easily understood that in a modern battlefield en- evident. Most tasks involving cognitive or perceptual skills,

vironment, with the capabilities of advanced weapons systems, such as planning or interpreting complex data, begin to show a

man will be the only part of the system unable to sustain long performance degradation after 36 to 48 hours of continuous

periods of operation. Very little research has been done in this wakefulness. Seventy-two hours of wakefulness is about the

area and nearly all the studies that have been done are based limit of endurance, after which personnel cease to be effective.

or naval crews performing technical tasks. There are however, mining the amount of sleep loss that will impair performance.

several recent studies on which the recommendations of this Twenty-four hours of wakefulness will impair performance

article are based. if it is imposed on a crew that has completed a week on a

125

ARMOR march-april 1982 19
- Four hours rest for each 24-hour period would probably stz -

tain personnel for several weeks if they did not have jobs that

- -- require complex decision making, but they would probably

begin to show signs of exhaustion after 2 weeks. For periods of

I to 2 weeks, a unit could possibly maintain combat effectiveness on 3 hours of sleep per 24-hours. This appears to be

about the limit, however.

For personnel in highly-technical jobs that require constant

monitoring or vigilance, a rest plan of 4 hours on and 4 hours

off would be best. Anything less than 4 hours would result in a

decrease in vigilance and perceptive abilities. • -- ,..*".Another aspect of sleep loss that must be considered is the

time required for recovery from the effects of sleep loss. If a

. " commander knows his unit will be undertaking a long period

of combat or prolonged work, it is recommended he give his

N. : personnel 12 hours of sleep or rest before the operation and

- " "'-' awaken them no more than 2 hours before the operation

- ,,...,- begins.

After an operation of 36 to 48 hours of continuous

wakefulness, 12 hours of sleep or rest is required to return perA sonnel to normal functioning: however, subjective fatigue may

.,--"linger for 3 days. If a high level of activity, such as combat, is

."- =undertaken during this period, personnel may need two

12-hour rest periods to attain complete recover." After 72 or

* .. more hours of continuous wakefulness, personnel may need as

-. , ,much as 2 or 3 days of rest for recovery of normal perform-

- ance.

. ."- " .To minimize the effects of sleep loss, the commander has

several options. Possibly the best solution for staff personnel is - o- Z periodic breaks and mild exercise. Some of the exercises

recommended are "Range of Motion" and "Strength and

Stamina" exercises involving stretching and tensing muscles

4-hour work-2-hour rest schedule.' The same 24-hour period without requiring a lot of space." Examples of these can be

of wakefulness will cause impairment to performance of crew found in, Biotonics, Stamina Through Six-Second Exercises

on a 4-hour work-4 hour rest schedule, after 2 weeks on the That Really Work. Among combat crews, the commander

schedule.' This indicates that crews on a "4-off-4-on" may rotate tasks if the crews are cross-trained. It must be

schedule are less affected by sleep loss than those on a noted, however, that varying tasks through job rotation works

4-on-2-off schedule. only if the jobs include tasks with different human reThe jobs that sleep loss affects most seem to be jobs that re- quirements, (gunner to loader or driver)." Job rotation also

quire monotonous tasks, jobs requiring continuous attention, requires a highly-trained crew if the jobs are complex. Prior to

tasks performed on a time-shared basis with other tasks that combat, effective training and experience will reduce the efare relatively unlearned.' fects of fatigue."

In order to minimize the effects of sleep loss, the com- The two categories of personnel who can be expected to

mander must be able to recognize the signs of sleep loss on per- show signs of fatigue first are: the young immature soldier who

formance. These effects are noticeable as: slower reaction is unsure of himself and the seasoned old soldier upon whom

time; increased time to perform a known task; short-term others have relied and who has sustained them at the cost of

memory decrement; impairment in learning speed, reasoning, his own fatigue." Commanders (leaders) often regard

and complex decision chain; errors of omission; lapses of at- themselves as being the least vulnerable to fatigue, but in fact,

tention; irritability; depression, and erratic performance.' tasks requiring the quick reaction, complex reasoning, and deIt has been demonstrated that the diurnal cycle (day/night tailed planning, that they perform, make leaders the most

cycle) has a significant effect on performance." When person- vulnerable to sleep deprivation. 0 "The display of sleep selfnel become used to a set pattern of work/rest periods, where denial as an example of self-control by leaders is extremely

rest periods occur at the same time each day, they become counterproductive. ' ,

adapted to this schedule. Any deviation to this schedule that Once the battle has started and there is contact with the

changes the rest period will result in performance decrements. enemy, sleep plans, job rotation, and rest periods may become

Biological adaptation to work/rest schedules may take from 20 impossible. However, under the "Division '86" concept with

to 30 days." four maneuver companies in each battalion, the commander

To employ a ssork/rest schedule during the heat of battle is may be able to rotate companies out of contact, enabling them

out of the question; however, a strictly-enforced sleep plan is to get at least a temporary break in which rest will be equally as

vital when possible, for example when occupying and pre- important as maintenance and resupply. Currently, this could

paring a battle position before enemy contact or during possibly be done at brigade level, pulling battalions out of conassembly area operations. A work/rest schedule of 4 hours tact for rest, rearming, and reconstitution. Care needs to be

work and 2 hours rest will not degrade performance over a taken not to rely exclusively on the performance of certain inperiod of a few days but will be less effective than a 4-hour dividuals, teams, or units so that each are rested in turn.

work and 4-hour rest schedule in the long run.'" Medicines provide another means for increasing performA recommended sleep plan would furnish each oldier with ance during periods of fatigue, but the use of medicines to ima minimum of 4 hours rest each 24 hour period. This would prove performance has largely been condemned in our society.

not, in all probability, be as effectike over long periods of time It also must be realized, that no performance improving drug

as a sleep plan %here personnel would receive 6 or more hours., is without side effects and that frequent repetition can lead to

20 ARMOR march-april 1982 126
serious, consequences. later the test was terminated for safety considerations. The test

Caffeine from coffee, theophylline from tea, and theo- demonstrated that a tank crew, fighting "buttoned up" in a

bromine from cocoa are purine derivatives. These substances, full MOPP ensemble, on a 100*F day will begin to show heat

especially caffeine, excite the central nervous system. "Con- stress in less than I hour and experience heat casualties in less

sciousness is brightened, thought association takes place faster than 2 hours."

and clearer, reaction time is shortened, motor actions are in- To lessen the effects of heat stress, leaders should closely

creased and feelings of tiredness and sleepiness disappear." 2' monitor NBC hazards and impose high MOPP levels only

Muscular performance capability is increased most by'caffeine when necessary. In some situations it might be appropriate to

and least by theobromine. "In cases where requirements exist wear NBC protective clothing over underwear, remove hoods,

for intensified performance capability for short-term opera- open hatches and turn on blower motors.

tions several large mocca cups of coffee, direct caffeine, caf- Dehydration creates the most ugrent problem in operating in

feine drinks, or cola preparations can achieve the desired goal a hot climate. At daily mean temperatures of 90'F, soldiers

although not without limitation. In cases where longer en- resting in the shade need 6 quarts of water per day." Moderate

durance periods are required, they show no improved work at this temperature raises the requirement to 8 quarts per

results."" day, while soldiers doing heavy work for 8 hours at this

Temperature is another performance degrader that has a temperature need 12 quarts of water per day. At a daily mean

profound physiological effect and a somewhat lesser temperature of 120'F, personnel resting in the shade need 17

psychological effect on soldiers during continuous operations. quarts of water per day, while personnel working moderately

Even though the human body is less adaptable to cold than hard will need 20 quarts, and soldiers working hard in the sun

to heat, cold has less of an impact when considering an ar- will need at least 25 quarts of water per day.'

mored vehicle crew's performance. Exposed infantrymen are The Israeli system of overdrinking is successful in combating

more susceptable to cold injuries than tank crews because dehydration. Each leader constantly insures that his personnel

body heat and equipment-generated heat within the vehicle drink water. Water is consumed once an hour for temperatures

- raise the ambient temperatures. Exposure to cold for 2 to 3 below 100°F and twice an hour for temperatures above

hours reduces hand strength 20 to 30 percent. If gloves are 100 0F." To insure proper water consumption a urine color

'. . worn, manual dexterity is diminished, and the combat effec- check is made. Dark urine color indicates a water deficiency. '

I

tiveness of the armored vehicle is reduced. For leaders, con- Soldiers should not be allowed to consume cold beverages that

tinuous operations in cold weather require extensive logistical could reduce sweating and cause overheating. Alcohol conplanning. Soldiers will need to be resupplied with additional sumption should be strictly forbidden as it requires extra water

clothing, fuel, and food, and, in extreme cold, they may re- for the body to process." Water loss can be reduced by the

* quire special equipment such as arctic parkas and mittens. For conserving sweat. This is done by wearing the complete

" well-protected, well-fed soldiers, cold is probably more of a uniform with the sleeves rolled down and the head covered.

psychological stressor than a physiological hazard." Clothing helps ration sweat by absorbing it and through

t Heat, however, is of much more concern than cold, and personnel in tanks or other armored vehicles suffer most from intense heat. As a general rule, any temperature above 900 F will - " -"

degrade crew performance, and a wet-bulb-globe temperature "

(WBGT) of 850 is the maximum for effective crew perform- owl

ance. A WBGT of 81.3 0 is considered ideal, 85 ' is the max- _ ... .

" imum acceptable temperature for working conditions, and 90'

to 950 will cause casualties.

Surface temperatures of areas with which the crew may %" - .2. '"

temperatures reached as high as 1550, while WBGT measured . ,"..,i, .-

106 '.2.8.-'

When anticipating operations in hot climates, commanders .- ., .

and staff should plan for a 3- to 12-day period for troops to " . A 

become acclimated." Acclimation is faster if soldiers perform '- i, '- work or mild exercise rather than rest during the acclimation ,,. ". ,,

period. Physically fit troops acclimatize at a dramatically

quicker rate than the unfit. f7

When a unit must operate "buttoned up" in missionoriented, protective posture (MOPP) the problems of heat

casualties are multiplied. Infantrymen are able to operate effi- -. ,

ciently for only about 20 minutes in temperatures of 750 to

90 'F where high energy expenditure levels are required." This "

creates an even greater problem for armor crewmen, operating 3

in an environment w here engine, radios, and weapons are pro- ducing heat. • -

* During a test of the At-I at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona v * " a in September 1980, crewmen were exposed to an inside WBGT

of 89F and an outside (dry-bulb) temperature of 102'F. ' ', .

They were clothed in full MOPP IV ensemble (protectise mask -

with hood, chemical protective overgarments, gloves and

boots) and conducted crew duties with blowers off and hatches t . •

closed. The crew simulated firing the main gun by loading and - ". " .', -

unloading a "dummy" round and traversing and elevating the *. 7 2 " .

turret. After I hour the crew lost effectiveness, and 20 minutes

t•'."127 127 ARMOR march-april 1982 21

.i

+

" . .. . - ,. . ",. .. . . . ..• . -. . ... - , ". -
V_1 justment is difficult or impossible to overcome but the motiva'-

ion to overcome the situation is strong."

The primary stress of the battlefield is the fear of disfigurement, mutilation, intense pain, death, or even fear of loosing

face within a peer group. Fear is universal in combat and it is

r"" accepted that everyone will experience fear. It becomes a prob-

- " " " lem, however, when it seriously degrades performance or leads

.. ;.. to bizarre behavior.

'.'" N_ ' • ',' , large In the numbers next war of 'psychological commanders must casualties be prepared within the to deal first with few

.. hours, due to the vast destructive potential of modern weapons

• systems and the extreme violence and speed of the modern bat-

'. There seems to be a close association between neuropsychi-

*, atric casualties and "wounding rates." Studies have also indicated that the intensity of the conflict as well as the time

, ",spent in combat are big factors. Lastly, the relative activity or

inactivity of the soldier is closely related to neuropsychiatric .. casualty rates.42 Stalemate, inability to retaliate, and idleness

cause a marked increase in the number of neuropsychiatric

A. J. Glass has stated that fear and exhaustion during in-

....tense -, combat will surface eventually and almost everyone has a

breaking point." A breakdown of pyschological defenses

against fear is evident in over 50 percent of nonbattle

• ,casualties. He divides these casualties into five groups. . -_. .In Group I individuals report to the aid station with minor

kill.. . .organic disease or injury that would result in little if any in-

, .

- -0 : .-. € 41 capacitation. Their medical condition thinly disguises a pyschological breakdown .4

In Group 11 individuals have subjective complaints but

X.- negative findings-backache, headache, diarrhea, or

weakness. Such symptoms represent an unconscious attempt

evaporation cools the body. Salt is also lost in sweat, but salt to withdraw from an intolerable situation."

should be given only when recommended by medical person- In Group III individuals appear with self-inflicted wounds

nel. or other nonbattle injuries that could have been avoided, inWhen operating in hot climates, soldiers require a minimum dicating either a conscious or unconscious attempt to flee the

of 6 hours rest per day and 15 to 20 minutes of rest per hour battlefield."

when performing hard work." It may be necessary to schedule Group IV contains the soldiers who have lost or broken

periods of heavy physical activities during the night or early eyeglasses or dentures, which will keep the men out of combat

morning hours when temperatures are lowest, only temporarily."

Other factors that physically degrade crew performance dur- Group V soldiers are those suffering complete psychiatric

ing continuous operations are noise and overpressure. These breakdowns, who have lost their ability to cope with the situafactors are significant degraders of performance. There is little tion of combat." This group of casualties is completely inefthat commanders can do to lessen the effects of either of these fective.

factors, however it is important to know the causes and effects Israeli experiences during the 1973 war have shown that elite

of each. units have fewer neuropsychiatric casualties." This would

Noise is an occupational hazard that especially affects armor seem to indicate the importance of unit cohesiveness, intercrewmen. Not only is noise an annoyance but it interferes with personal relationships and esprit-de-corps.

communication, and if the noise is experienced for long There are many ways in which positive leadership may also

periods it may cause temporary hearing loss." Therefore, play an important part in reducing the number of neurocommanders should enforce the wvearing of protective devices psychiatric casualties. The spirit of the offense is a practical

even though these devices restrict and inhibit communication, technique to reduce the impact of fatigue and fear. PurOverpressure caused by large explosions nearby is similar to poseful, aggressive action brings relief from combat tension."

noise and results from the pressure waves in the atmosphere. Furthermore, a soldier's attitude and performance in trainOverpressure may cause lung hemorrhage, eardrum rupture, ing is related to his performance in combat. Realism in training

and air bubbles in the blood stream." Personnel in armored improves a soldier's ability to withstand combat stress. Train-

. vehicles are somehat protected. In foxholes personnel may ing should emphasize the sights and sounds ot the baitlefield.

receive greater overpressure than in the open due to the reduc- It should produce fear provoking situations that develop the

tion in square area at the bottom as compared w ith the soldier's knowledge of himself, his enemy, and his %eapon%.

opening, creating a funnel effect. Nuclear bursts will likely Confinement is a potential stressor that may affect the

cause large numbers of casualties by overprcssure. Conven- behavior of the crew members when "buttoned up" for long

tional munitions create mainly an annoyance but may burst periods of time.

eardrums. Confinement may cause "status leveling." Because of the

lack of privacy and the inability to maintain social distance bePsychological Perforniance Degraders tween superiors and subordinates, atithority may be underl'sychotogical Stress is an important area of discussion when mined." Anger, scorn, and ridicule may be diiected at

considering factors which degrade performance. What causes superiors. "Status leveling" reduces authority and the Icader

stres? Simply put, stress is caused by a situation in which ad- becomes only another member of the crew. Conlinement may

22 ARMIR march-april 1982 128
also foster territorial behavior, with possessive feelings toward and thus, will require even more time, suggesting that crew

certain locations or items within the vehicle." The tank com- members should wear protective clothing if there is a possibilimander should allocate space with very explicit rules and use ty of chemical warfare.

of resources. Infantrymen are also affected by long confinement in arConfinement in a "buttoned up" tank also causes problems mored personnel carriers and fighting vehicles by

of crew performance due not only to psychological stress but temperatures, vibration, blast effects, acceleration and

also to the physical limitations imposed on vision. Crowding deceleration, high noise level, air pollution, sleep deprivation,

causes stress through a disruption of individual "personal and body restriction. ° The effects of body restriction impairs

space."" In a hostile or stressful environment such as combat, movement for only short intervals after dismounting.

the need for interpersonal distance between individuals in- It is essential that we begin training to combat physiological

creases. During daylight, target detection is degraded from 8 and psychological stressors by realistic, stressful training.

to 25 percent during closed hatch operation." Navigation is Leaders at every level of command must realize that a viable

degraded 8 to 26 percent and takes 11 to 40 percent more work/rest plan that includes commanders and staff must be

time," while obstacle neogtiation takes from 21 to 99 percent implemented. Additionally, simulated neuropyschiatric battle

more time." casualties should be incorporated into every field training exerAt night target detection is degraded 8 to 46 percent." cise and ARTEP to adequately train our personnel for conNavigation is degraded 14 to 39 percent and takes 19 to 54 per- tinuous operations.

cent more time." Whenever planning is being done by commanders and staff,

MOPP also increases the effects of confinement. A emphasis must be placed on the human factor of every

"buttoned-up" M-60A I allows only two crew members to don weapons system. Although training, proper planning, and

protective clothing at a time, one at the commanders station, 'other techniques may extend the amount of time a crew may

one at the loaders station, and it requires 16 minutes even with remain combat effective, the human being is still the most

practice." The 11-I Abrams has a smaller crew compartment, vulnerable and valuable asset in the Army inventory.

Footnotes

'%IAJ Gregory Lucas Belenky. "Unusual Visual Experiences Reported by Sub- "ibid. p. I-5. jects in the British Army Study of Sustained Operations. Early Call", (US Army "Kubala and Warnick. p. 3-8. Medical Reearch and Development Command, Fort Detrick, Frederick, M6 "Ibid.

October 1979) p. 695. "'Kubala and Warnick, p. 2-4.

:Ibid. "Ibid, pp. 2-10 - 2-12.

'Ibid. "A. J. Glass, "The Problem of Stress in a Combat Zone", (Symposium on 'Ibid. Stress. Waier Reed Army Medical Center. Washington, DC. March 1953).

'Albert L. Kubala and William L. Warnick. "A Review of Selected Literature on "Ibid.

Stresses Affecting Soldiers in Combat" (Human Resources Research Organiza- "Ibid.

lion. Alexandria. VA. Mav 1979), p. 3-13. "Ibid.

"Human Performance and Military Capability in Continuous Operations." "Ibid.

(The Technical Cooperation Program. W\ashington, DC. December 1974) p. "Ibid.

B-2. "NIAJ Larry H. Ingram and M.AJ Frederick J. Manning. "Pschtatric Battle Ibid. Casualties: The Slissing Column in a WVar W\ithout Replacements". .ituri

'Kubala and Warnick. p. 3-14 Reiiei. Ft Leasenorth, KS. L'S Ar vy Command atid Geneati Statt Col.ci-e.

"'Human Performance and Military Capability in Continuous Operations". p. Vol LX. Aug 1980. No. 8t. p. 27. B3-2. '*Kubala and \Sarnick. p. 2-12.

"Donald F. Haggard. "Human RRO Studies in Continuous Operations'' ' Kubala and Warnick. p. 3-18.

(Human Resources Research Organization. Alexandria, VA, March 1970). p. 3. 'Ibid.

Kubala and Warnick. p. 3-15. ''Kubala and Warnick, p. 3-20.

Ibid. "MAJ R. C. Barron et al.. "Degradation of Tank Effectiveness", (HQ.

"'Human Performance and Military Capabiuity in Continuous O'erations", p. TRADOC Combined Arms Test Actt,,y. Fort Hood. IX. September 19761, p.

B-3 1-3. 'Ibid. "Ibid. p. 1-4.

"Ibid. "Ibid.

*Rex E. Wiederanders. M.D. with Edmond G. Addeo. Bioronics. Stamrina "Ibid.

Tihroueh Sir-Second . ercitses That Really tiork. (Warner Books. Inc.. 75 "Ibid.

Rockfeller Plaza, New York. NY, 19771. pp. 119-187. "Kubala and \Varnick. p. 3-25. "Haggard, p- 3. "Samuel A. Hicks. "The Effects of Confinement on the Performance of Com-

"'Human Performance and Military Capability in Continuous Operations", p. bat Rolesant Skills: Sutmmary Report". (US Army Human Engineering

B-3 Laboratories. Aberdeen Prosing Uround. MD. Dec 19&c4). p. I.

'LTC Peter B. Peterson. "Fatigue in Sustained Tactical Operations", (US Arm'. War College. Carlisle Barracks. PA, 29 Jun 19721. p. 70.

:'Felix F. Kcpstem et al. "Human Performance in Continuous Operations:

Volume II. Management Guide" (Applied Psychological Services Inc., Wayne CAPTAIN GEORGE R.

PA Science Center. December 19791, p. xit. :tLTC \Solfeant Woll. 'Posibilities of Using Medicines to improve Perfor- FRANK enlisted in the Army

mance urinii Nliitar, Operations." (Translation of Triippendienir No 6bv US in 1971. and served as an

A'mrs Mcdical Intelligence and Information .Acenc., WVashngton, DC. 1970) p. NCO in the 7th Special,. I- 

:'If) id . Forces Group. He later

'Ih'd. 

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received 

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. HeHe

7

laik" it S. Arms, Pro.ine (,rounds. )'urma. AZ. Ni.embe 1974). p. 12. 'jas commissioned in Infanp'Ibd. 1 Itt try through OCS in 1976. 11 4

'hi~ .iand '\ arnikk. p 3 6 Captain Frank has served as - - "'k (,t iattalion ()pertion; sin a losic F n sironment Volume I of III O)pera- platoon leader. scout plaiu:'.., . .it.ii'ilts I s.er'ncnt. (CtCIIt). 3-4,. id DA- Combat Dcselopment p n r u

C m-nJ I xpeimrn,,niari.i ('enter. Ft. Ord, CA. IDecember 19631. p. 10i loon leader, and executive 4 \ XI klb. I)N( I) %1,1( I:rectorate. "Memorandum for C(i. StL tJ[CT: officer in the 82d Airborne

N urTla, \%t W/. I- wtpi'mnhcr in a ( h 1.-0). ;i.il I p nsironntent'. (U ;i. Army i'rostnv ('ritind. Division He is a graduate of 1.

'.,I ' the Armor Officers Ad- S'-ct i);pcratnii tath-," (G.2. SI RE Training Otfice, 92d Airbornc vanced Course arid In at

),.50,1,. I' Hrac. \C i. p I2-1 1tnendnq the Supply M',anaqe.

'lt',d mont Officers Course. Fort I'd. t1 1. . VA enroute to Panama

I 1 2IhJ. A M 

.. 129 ARMt/1,OR march-april 1982 23

- - . - . . .. .. . . .. ,. - . - . . .. • . . . .. " . , .. .. .. . . , .. . ...
o7

A Debt That Must Be Paid

SL EEP L OSS

14P

2i

•. •, ~ ~ ~ ':€."' ~ ~ ."':..7-...::_ ~ ~ ~ ~ ........ Y,, 

f- .... .. : .- .. .. . :

~w,

by Captain Richard P Geier

t is 0230 hours, the team is deployed in a night reveals that sleep loss is the most detrimental factor to ex- defensive position on the third night of a joint train- tended operations. The emphasis of their research is on *ing excercise. The team commander is in his tank slumped the effects of sleep loss onl sailor's work efficiency. The over the M-36 sight box.The radios are turned up. A results indicate thle following:

report from the scout platoon hhsts over the radio. A * The mean duration of sleep under normal conditions is

company-sized force is moving toward the team's posi- 7.5-8 hours.

*tion. The comimander attempts to alert his platoon 9 Younger individuals f20-39) require an average of 1

*leaders. One answers immnediatel ',v but the others do not hour more sleep than the older group (40-59). respond. Frantically, the commander sends his loader to 9 The human body is not equipped to anticipate shortenalert the platoons while he curses himself for dozing. the ed sleep cycles and to adapt accordingly.

company GP for not keeping the platoons on thle net, and 0 Failure to receive the required sleep results in a the platoon leaders for not monitoring the radio. For- backlog or sleep debt. Thle only way to eliminate this debt

tunatelv. the teamn commander is able to awaken his unit, is to allow an individual I hour of sleep in addition to his .3maneuver, and destroy the enemny force. After the exer- normal required amnount.

cise is terminated, the commzander wonders what happen- 0Performance degradation as pertains to vigilance does

ed to the sleep dliscipline that had been stressed dluring not disappear with less than 3 hours of sleep. ( tlie previous months training and ARlTlEP. iRecause of 0 A mninimumn of 5 hours of sleep is required to enable an - safety constraint-. night operations were linlited to static individual to maintain an acceptable level of consistent

dlefense, Trhe company's SOP called for 50 percent alert and reliable performance. d (uring a night defense, which %%ould require two people 0 The physical and psychological recovery fromn the ef- 3 u-leep in each tank at all times. So why were the troops so f Iet lloss is ac'complished by teaqiiino - ex hausted! What condlition would the unit be in after 4 the normal, uninterrupted sleep period. *diys and .3 nights condlucting an active defenseP against 0 HIigh stimulus or motivation will readil ' override tile hi.'Thruat in Europei! Could sleep loss lose the first battle detrimental effects of sleep loss on pierformnice for a of the next war'? short period of time. - Few studies are avalilable on the effects of continuous Many' studies on continuous work have been done byv operitions on soldiers. llesearch conducted liv the Navy civilian universities under Armiy cinitract. These studies

131 11 RM:Iw january-february 1979 37

........................... .... .". i . - -: 
were conducted in a laboratory using college students as 0 Insure that troops receive some sort of exercise., If

test personnel and because of this the results are not total- possible get them away from confinement, noise, vibraly valid for Army use. However, some data can be of use tion, and excessive heat or cold stress for a period of time.

to the Army in predicting effectiveness and perhaps Even stopping the tank, and walking around it to check

lessening the effects of sleep loss. These effects are: the track and suspension may help.

% The first work performance decrements occurred after 0 In a lull in the battle, give half of the unit 7 to 8 hours

approximately 18 hours of work. During the early morn- of uninterrupted sleep rather than split the watch and

ing hours of the first night, average performance decreas- give each half 4 hours.

ed to approximately 82 percent of the baseline perfor- 0 Realize that the younger the soldier, the more sleep he

-L",.' mance. During the first half of the second day, perfor- requires.

mance improved to about 90 percent of baseline, but 0 Accept as a natural law that the human body cannot

decreased again during the second night to approximately anticipate shortened sleep cycles or sleep loss. Neither

67 percent of baseline. Recovery of performance baseline through practice nor any other means can soldiers perwas complete after a 24-hour period of rest and recovery, form effectively with a sleep debt for an extended period

0 Following 36 hours of continuous work, 2, 3, and 4 of time.

hours of sleep yielded an immediate recovery in perfor- Most importantly. coitainnders must cope with the efmance of about 76 percent, 56 percent, and 75 percent, fects of sleep loss on their own performance as well as

respectively, whereas 4 hours of sleep following 44 hours their troops. They must train and trust their immediate

of continuous work produced only a 39-percent recovery, subordinate to command their unit while they sleep. Command decisions in future battles cannot be degraded by

"Commanders must cope with the effects of sleep loss. We can no longer afford to let our executive ofsleep loss on their own performance as well as ficers dedicate themselves to maintenance problems and run themselves into exhaustion doing a motor sergeant's their troops. They must train and trust subor- job. They must be aware of the tactical situation, receive

dinates to command their unit while they adequate rest, and be trained and capable of conducting

sleep." tactical operations while the commander sleeps. These . ps" may help reduce the effects of sleep loss

* A temporary improvement in job performance, for 48 hours or less, but what can be done if troops are respeed,and accuracy after sleep loss is common. However, quired to function for over 48 continuous hours? Drugs to

this improvement requires nearly three times the expen- prevent sleep are not the answer, since harmful side efditure of energy and over a period of time, work output fects and individual variation of dose rates seem to be an

drops alarmingly. insurmountable problem. Drugs or devices to induce sleep

0 Physical strength remains unimpaired until extreme and give an individual an equivalent 8 hours of sleep in I

levels of sleep starvation are realized. hour or less do not appear to be available in the near

0 Moderate exercise, especially of the large muscles of future because of harmful side effects.

the body, tends to increase alertness and helps sustain Will units conducting the active defense against the

good performance. Threat in Europe have lulls in the battle that will allow

0 The most difficult jobs for the sleep-deprived in- sleep recovery? It is not likely. Since 1954 the Threat has

dividual are ones which require sustained attention to made continuous combat operations the main principle of

h-.rief, intermediate signals and those that require com- their combat doctrine. Their doctrine states, "the offenplex, swift decisions or planning. sive...will be conducted night and day .. without letup un0 Sleep loss typically causes errors ot omission, not com- til the enemy is defeated."

mission. Four days after the battle begins the Threat will have

0 Continuous operations can increase an individual's rotated units i.to the battle. Will we be able to defeat

caloric needs to as much as 10,000 calories a day. There is these units or will the Threat forces find American some data to suggest that sleep loss leads to iron deficien- soldiers asleep in tanks, trucks, and foxholes?

cy, vitamin B deficiency, dehydration, and an impaired Unless our need for sleep is overcome or our force struccapability to fully utilize glucose as an energy source. ture is redesigned to rotate units in and out of the battle,

. Prolonged thermal exposure, confinement, noise and sleep loss could lose the first battle of the next war.

vibration stress (all present in armored vehicles) degrade

performance and ability to cope with sleep loss.

0 The degree of job training may affect continuous work - - CPT RICHARD P. GEIER

performance. Studies indicate that highly-trained in- .- -" . was commissioned in Infandividuals can be expected to work continuously at 50 per- ?I try nv trom Pittsburg State

- cent of their-maximum for a period of 8 hours, whereas un- University, Pittsburg, Kan.

trained individuals cannot be expected to work at much He served as platoon leader,

more than 25 percent of their maximum over the same ;3 company XO. BMO. S-4 and

period. S.3 air in the 1-37 Armor,

To minimize the effects of sleep loss, commanders Katterbach. Germany. He

should consider the following action: - was a platoon leader and

0 Insure that troops are motivated, trained, and proper- J\. CSC commander, 2-1 Int..

ly led. and company commander.

0 Provide increased rations, water. vitamin B, and iron - 2-7 Armor. A recent AOAC

supplements to sustain troop effectiveness under the - . graduate, he is assigned to

stress of sleep loss. the Battlelield Automation

- Increase supervision during the hours of 0100 to Management Directorate.

daybreak to offset the reduced vigilance during these CACDA, Ft. Leavenworth.

daybreakKan. hours.

d".-."132

38 A1I10t january-february 1979

I- -, - - - - - -.,...-, - - , -. .- - ~ -
"The offensive... will be conducted

night and day, in any weather, without letup

until the enemy is defeated." With these

words, Soviet author A. A. Sidorenko

summarizes an element of Soviet military

doctrine which has significance for the US,

although we have only recently begun to

appreciate it.' Our current "model" of the

next European war is based on conflict

between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces,

CON OUS with the latter waging a determined and

superior in personnel, armor, and artillery.

Strategy and tactics have been revised to OPERATIONS counter this numerical disparity,2 but seldom

has the issue of continuous operations been

addressed, beyond acknowledgement that

they may well be required. The NATO

IN EUROPE: approach still clings to the notion that there

are only a few operations suited for night.'

Approach marches, withdrawals, river

FEASIBILITY crossings, and reconnaissance are billed as

natural nighttime activities. Combat itself is

presented as a problem for technology, to be

AND THE EFFECTS solved by more and better night vision

devices. All this is true, of course, but it tends

to hide the issue. Night fighting capability is

unquestionably necessary for continuous

OF LEADERSHIP operations, but it alone is just as surely not

sufficient.

The extent of this oversight can be gauged

AND TRAINING by the three- to five-day boundary conditions

implicit or explicit in US discussions of

continuous operations. This sort of combat,

where the major problem lies only in evoking

by heroic efforts from the troops and equipment

on hand, is certainly not what the Soviets

FREDERICK J. MANNING mean by continuous operations. Further,

REFORGER's division-plus notwithstanding, there is little reason to expect

reinforcements in significant strength to

arrive from the US in less than three to five

weeks, much less three to five days."

To the extent that we look to night vision

devices, strategic warning systems, and bigger

and better weapons for solutions, we miss the

fundamental problem posed by continuous

operations: machines can be run without

letup; human beings cannot.

In a first effort to explore behavioral

implications of continuous operations, the

8 Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

133

"D TA
US Army Medical Research Unit, Europe laboratory and history-derived assomption

spent six months observing the day-to-day that psychological rather than physiological

operations and training of a field artillery exhaustion is the critical problem in any

battalion in Europe. It was clearly not within extended operation. That is, the question

the research unit's purview to arrange a concerns not sleeping on the job, but

continuous round-the-clock field exercise. persisting in a job until mental errors destroy

Instead, we observed the battalion as we the unit. In practice, the performance of

found it in a combat training environment, decisionmakers such as the commanders and

looking for "fault lines" along which such a the battery XOs, and those whose jobs

unit might crack under the stress of that first involve primarily cognitive skills, such as

long battle, battalion staff, Fire Direction Center

Direct observation was the primary means personnel, survey sections, chiefs of firing

of collecting data in this study. However, batteries, and communications equipment

observation was supplemented by informal operators, will very likely be more susceptible

interviews with troops during breaks, to the stress of continuous high-intensity

mealtimes, and after-duty hours, and, in combat than those with more labor-intensive

selected cases, by formal interviews and jobs. Our own observations, particularly

questionnaires, as well as analysis of during battalion and battery evaluations at

documents, records, and "third party" Grafenwoehr, and during REFORGER 78,

evaluations such as the Annual General suggest that a high proportion of artillery

Inspection (AGI). Important battalion events unit members can and will manage short naps

occurring during the period of our even in conditions which would, a priori, be

observations-May through November judged as extremely unfavorable in terms of

1978-were an AGI; a two-week period physical comfort and noise level. These naps

during which elements of the battalion were ought to be encouraged by and at all levels of

tasked to support a National Guard unit in command. They are, however, constantly

training at the Grafenwoehr Training Area; undermined by the common myth that

and the battalion's own annual two-week sleeping is unmanly or a manifestation of

training period at Grafenwoehr, culminating poor discipline. This myth is nowhere more

in a formal evaluation by group headquarters established than among commanders

in July. Also observed were the annual themselves. The latter, although often in

Nuclear Surety Evaluation, Exercise Certain enthusiastic agreement about the benefits of

Shield (REFORGER 78), a battalion sleep, quite often approach sleep like a monk

"ammunition upload," and the battalion's does sex: a harmless enough activity for lesser

annual Army Training and Evaluation men, and a good opportunity to exercise

Program (ARTEP) evaluation of its firing willpower and demonstrate superiority

batteries at Grafenwoehr. While at the latter through conspicuous self-denial. This

site, we were able to observe a National portrayal represents, of course, an

Guard 8-inch battery which was selected for oversimplification, but it must be emphasized

training in Europe by virtue of superior that, unlike physical laborers, whose work

performance in the United States, and a 155- quantity is decreased by fatigue,

mm howitzer battery specifically tasked to decisionmakers and other mental laborers

maintain high rates of fire for a 12-hour will have their work quality degraded. Such

period. This study also incorporates relevant degradation, particularly when unrecognized

information gained through visits and or unacknowledged, clearly places the unit in

correspondence with research colleagues in greater danger.

the US, Great Britain, Norway, Israel, and Data from a variety of other sources

the Federal Republic of Germany. support these conclusions. Biochemical

studies of a Special Forces "A" Team

FATIGUE AND PERFORMANCE conducted during the Vietnam conflict found

that with one exception, the officers showed

Nothing we have seen has undermined our higher levels of 17-hydroxycorticosteroid (a

Vol. IX. No. 3 9

134
classical indicator of stress) both at rest and many days they would remain in the field

in response to an enemy attack on the camp.I (subjects were free to withdraw from the

The Norwegian Defense Research experiment at any time). Military

Establishment has published several studies performance (shooting, weapons handling,

on the effects of a prolonged state of sleep digging, marching, and patrolling) was

deprivation and hard physical labor. A recent assessed throughout, as well as performance

study reported on a group of 44 cadets of the on a battery of pencil-and-paper tests of map

Royal Norwegian Military Academy plotting, coding and decoding, memory, and

participating in a ranger training course logical reasoning. Results showed that the

demanding the expenditure of 8000 to 10,000 platoons became militarily ineffective after

calories per day.' One group was given no approximately three, six, and nine-plus days,

organized sleep for the five days of the respectively. Well-learned and mainly

course, while other groups got three and six physical tasks were highly resistant to

hours of sleep, respectively, during the early deterioration from lack of sleep, but tasks

morning hours of the third day. Each with a cognitive or vigilance component were

morning from 0630 to 0830, formal markedly susceptible. For example, a platoon

laboratory testing was conducted, using a of sleep-deprived soldiers was able to

variety of tests of both physical and mental maintain its speed of march cross-country,

functioning. While all the tests showed but to its ultimate detriment, because the

substantial and progressive erosion, of platoon leader could no longer read his map

particular relevance are the findings that a properly. The formal testing basically

coding test and a command memory test were confirmed this selective sensitivity, though

far and away the most sensitive. The former map-plotting was affected far less adversely

required the subjects to substitute digits for than logical reasoning and encoding and

symbols for five minutes, using a code decoding. Follow-up studies have confirmed

unknown until the test. In the command this finding, showing reductions to less than

memory test, cadets were given two minutes 50 percent of normal performance levels on

. to memorize a standard military message. An these tests, with deterioration beginning after

hour later, after an especially strenuous only one night without sleep. In addition, the

physical task, they were asked to write the occurrence of visual illusions at night was so

message. The average scores on both these common that the study recommended posting

tasks dipped to 65 percent of pre-course sentries in pairs. On the positive side, as little

* levels, and coding was significantly impaired as three to four hours of unbroken sleep per

after only 24 hours into the five-day course night produced considerable improvement,

(command memory was not tested at 24 hours both in military effectiveness and on the test

for some reason). By way of contrast, batteries.

shooting (grouping at 25 meters) showed only Even more germane are the findings of a

.-' .a 10-percent impairment, and that not until joint study by the US Army Research

.4 the third day of the course.

Britain's Army Personnel Research Frederick J. Manning is Deputy Director of the US

Establishment has also conducted a number Army Medical Research Unit, Europe. A graduatc of

of experiments in the area of continuous Holy Cross. he received a Ph.D. in Psychology from Harvard in 1970. In previous assignments he served as

operations.7 These were nine-day tactical Chief of the Department of Experimental Psychology

defensive exercises carried out by experienced and Chief of the Physiology infantry platoons. They were observed and and Behavior Branch of the

n Division of Neuropsychiatry at

rated continuously by both military and the Walter Reed Army Institute

civilian scientists as well as infantry company of Research. His publications

research reports on the effects scheduled for one platoon, 90 minutes a night of stress on physiological and

for a second platoon, and three hours per psychological functions.

night for a third. The aim was to see how

10 Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

135

7.. .
Institute of Environmental Medicine and the physically demanding ones, who are most At

Walter Reed Army Institute of Research risk under conditions of acute sleep

employing the Fire Direction Center (FDC) as deprivation. Moreover, it is precisely these

a laboratory model for investigating effects individuals, particularly the commanders,

of continuous operations.' Briefly, five-man who most frequently believe they are the least

FDC teams from the 82d Airborne Division vulnerable, if not completely immune.

carried out an artillery combat scenario Another dangerous misconception

designed to simulate 86 hours of continuous regarding sleep deprivation is one we have

operations (sans actual movements). In fact, dubbed the "adrenalin theory." In brief,

no team persisted more than 48 hours before more than a few of our subjects have

opting to quit, though some were performing expressed the view that the increased

adequately at that time. In all cases, however, excitement of actual combat will increase

a striking division of effort appeared as time- motivation sufficiently to produce all

on-task increased. Forced-paced activities- manners of previously unheard-of

for example, fire requests from forward performances. Both laboratory studies and

observers and higher headquarters- our observations counter this line of thought.

consistently produced well-trained, orderly, First, although it is true that a moderate

and appropri- reactions, though multiple increase in arousal often facilitates

, simultaneous tire missions did cause some performance, it is also true that beyond some

difficulties as time wore on; however, it optimal level, arousal tends to degrade

became apparent that the "cost" of this performance. This optimal level depends

performance was increasing neglect of self- upon the nature of the task, being much

paced activities such as meteorological lower for cognitive skills and decisionmaking

corrections, replotting targets relocated by than heavy labor. A homely analogy exists in

survey or precision registrations, keeping the professional football, where linemen are

current tactical situation posted, plotting allegedly encouraged to raise their arousal

potential targets and no-fire zones, working level by chemical means, a technique so

up data for preplanned fires, updating patently disastrous for a quarterback that it is

records and logs, and so forth. not even considered. Second, even

This same distinction between forced- "continuous" operations will have some

paced and self-paced activities can, of course, lulls, at which time we can expect a

be applied to most other sections in a firing parasympathetic rebound. That is, the more

battery and to battalion headquarters as well; intense the arousal during performance, the

the ARTEP performance we observed more powerfully will relaxation and fatigue

revealed similar patterns. For example, gun dominate during lulls. Paratroopers and

sections continued to deliver timely and amphibious personnel often experience such

accurate fire when called upon, but security an overwhelming sense of relaxation upon

declined as fatigue set in (e.g. camouflage making a safe landing that falling asleep is

nets were set slowly or not at all; M60 not unheard-of.' Adrenalin is thus a mixed

machine guns were not set up or not manned; blessing.

wire sections got "hot lines" between FDC

and guns in rapidly, but lines to perimeter NEUROPSYCHIATRIC CASUALTIES

and the switchboard were omitted). The

potential impact of sleep deprivation upon Approximately a half million iien were

the headquarters and command sections will separated from the US Army between the

also be apparent, since good planning ought years 1942 and 1945 for "emotional or

to be self-paced rather than merely reactive to mental reasons," a rate of about 50 per

events. thousand enlisted males, despite the preThe foregoing data and observations leave induction rejection of nearly 1.7 million (94

us more convinced than ever that it is those in per 1000) for these same reasons.' 0 These

mentally demanding jobs, rather than statistics do not reflect the considerable

Vot. IX, No.3 1

136

-. .
k

improvement in prevention and treatment a natural experiment emerged, since only one

- that took place by the end of the war, but of the divisions participating made concerted

they also fail to reflect the considerably efforts, through its mental health specialists,

higher rates among troops actually in combat to seek out and help resolve troop concerns

with the enemy. J. W. Appel reported an about dependent problems (ranging from

annual neuropsychiatric hospitalization rate physical safety to paying the phone bill)

for divisions in combat in Europe of arising while the men were in the field. This

approximately 250 per 1000, with infantry division sent home for domestic problems

battalion rates going as high as 1600 to 2000 only one-tenth the number sent back by their

per 1000 troops per year, for short periods of "opponents," the 82d Airborne Division.

time." A good rule of thumb seems to be that Although the question of "sending people

psychiatric casualties will occur in a ratio of back" becomes academic in the event of war,

about one for every four wounded in action, concerns in soldiers' minds about dependent

In terms of traditional "combat fatigue," care can hardly be eliminated by fiat, as the

it might be assumed that 10 days is just too Republic of Vietnam learned in what turned

short a span to generate significant numbers. out to be the final massive invasion by North

On the contrary! Many of the factors Vietnam. The number of dependents in the

associated with high rates are present in potential "war zone" of Central Europe is

current scenarios: initial contact by green now greater than 350,000, and current plans

troops, intense fire, high casualty rates, for noncombatant evacuation operations

retrograde movements, poor were remarkable for their lack of credibility

communications, and physical fatigue. In even before the recent fiasco in Iran. Soldiers

fact, the Israeli Defense Forces found that 10 tend to be ambivalent toward the presence of

percent of their casualties in the 1973 war their wives and families in the theater. On one

(which, incidentally, has served as a model hand, they want their families there in

for much recent US planning) were what they peacetime; on the other, they recognize that

termed "combat reactions." These were men in the event of sudden hostilities the danger to

who were found wandering around in a daze their families would pose a severe

or sitting quietly doing nothing, unresponsive psychological distraction. The most common

to events and people around them. This is a response of soldiers asked was, "Are you

low percentage of neuropsychiatric kidding? I don't know what I'd do if it came

casualties, historically speaking, but this was to that!" We didn't find it hard to imagine

the first war in which the Israelis had any at what they might do after witnessing an E-6

all! Post hoc studies of such casualties found slip home from REFORGER because his wife

that, although there was no "combat reaction could not get to the commissary without him.

personality," those afflicted tended to be On the basis of the frequent difficulty we

older, married soldiers, and that close to 80 encountered convincing commanders and

percent had been undergoing family or social supervisors at all levels that dependents'

crises (40 percent having had difficulties with adjustment problems did, in fact, have

peers or chain of command, 50 percent baby something to do with continuous combat

or pregnancy problems, and 23 percent a operations, we suspect that data such as that

death in the family).'" How much higher presented above needs much wider

these figures might have been without the dissemination than it has received.

* mental health professionals the Israelis Psychiatric casualties are too important to be

routinely assign down through the company left to psychiatrists.

level is impossible to say, but observers from

the Army Medical Research and TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP

Development Command attending a large-

- .scale field exercise recently held at Fort Polk Despite the inherent limitation on live-fire

suggest it might be very much higher indeed, training imposed by the small number of

Though the observers collected no hard data, training sites suitable for field artillery in

12 Parameters. Journal of the US Army War College

137

.................................

'. --- ' ..'.+ '.-'-'N ' - ':- '. - . ".- . ..-.. .. . ..-. -... ..-.-.. -. '.. . .... ".'( ." -'. + i ) ) - , .) .
West Germany, the units observed showed a The answer lies in current evaluation

high level of proficiency in their basic tasks. philosophy and techniques under whicth 

a

This should not be construed to mean that commander is often well-advised to train one

training is currently optimal, however, or man to a high level of proficiency on a task

even adequate for continuous operations. rather than several men to a reasonably high

Apart from a need for improvements in a level, even though it is apparent to all that the

few specific areas, we were disturbed most by second course is more appropriate to the

the widespread tendency (unquestionably demands of combat. We witnessed, for

produced by pressures from above) of units example, the selection as leader of the special

to train for the next evaluation rather than weapons convoy for the battalion nuclear

for combat. While evaluation is a necessary surety evaluation the one officer in the

concomitant of training, the same strained battalion who had done it before. This

application of cost-effectiveness techniques selection took place over the protests of two

which enshrined the body count in Vietnam other battery commanders who argued that

now acts to stifle the very thing it is designed they should at least undergo the same training

to measure. An extreme example is the and rehearsal even if they did not formally

expectation that a unit's vehicles achieve represent the battalion for evaluation. The "zero defects." The only way to achieve such point here is not to hold up a particular

a goal is not to use them! Pressur2 for zero commander or his staff for criticism. On the

defects, in fact, produces a perverse sort of contrary, here and throughout the entire

cross-training in which an altogether natural period of our study, this commander and his

tendency of superiors to assume more and staff responded to the contingencies, the

more of the duties of those under them written and unwritten rules of the game, as

provides a superficially acceptable quick-fix, any sensible person would. The outcome was

but is actually destructive of team often not sensible, however, because the

: effectiveness. In addition, it soon leads to present system of rewards in the Army

"burn-out" of intelligent, caring leaders who focuses on short-term achievement to such an

cannot do the jobs of two or three men extent that it not only neglects long-term indefinitely, goals, but often encourages action directly

The importance of real cross-training to counter to them.

continuous operations, however, cannot be Consider, for example, the experience of 

a

overemphasized. We consider it likely that young executive officer from a corps 8-inch

entire batteries will be rendered ineffective by battery who chatted with me while serving as

the loss from wounds or exhaustion of only a a REFORGER umpire. During their most

handful of men because they have literally recent field training, he explained, they had

become indispensable by design or default. It undertaken an eight-day exercise of their own

will be impossible to survive extended devising in preparation for their battalion

operations if a unit insists upon maintaining ARTEP:

the best man for the job in that position at all

times. This tendency appears to us to be most Everyone knows you can make it in 36

common within the Fire Direction Center and hours. You may be screwed up by the time

on the gun crews. We observed a Field you finish, but you can do it. Eight days is

Artillery Digital Automatic Computer something else, though-so we knew we'd

(FADAC) operator, for example, drag his have to devise some sort of shift schedule. It

crutches and freshly cast leg into the back of was tough at first, but by the end, we had it

an armored personnel carrier with five other down pretty good. In fact, we were so

soldiers and struggle through a 36-hour pleased that when it came time for the

battalion ARTEP "because he's far and away ARTEP, which we knew would only be 36

the best FADAC operator in the battalion." hours at the most, we figured, 'Hell. why not

None of this is news to any commander, so do it the way we'd have to do it in real

why should cross-training ever be slighted? combat, since we've got a system?' What do

Vol. IX. No. 3 13

138

- %,Z
' - -L , - . ,- -a - ri t-.w - , -r .i : . . -. ' . .. .- - -. 

you suppose happens? We get gigged for formal leader. If he is the formal leader, he

'lack of enthusiasm,' 'not going all out,' and will be relied on more and more for advice

so forth when the evaluators see a bunch of and decisions.

people asleep. * Interpersonal conflict will decrease

(though positive interactions may not

As a start at reform, elimination of the increase).

adversary relationship between tester and e Attempts to briefly "leave the scene,"

tested, and the disproportionate importance physically or psychologically, will increase.

attached to very specific and highly It thus becomes clear that the challenges to

predictable tests, would allow for much more leaders in the prolonged high-pressure

imaginative and combat-relevant testing, environment of continuous operations are

leading in turn to more rounded, combat- considerable.

oriented, and morale-boosting training. Our observations have underlined several , In terms of actual leader behavior during aspects of the current leadership "climate"

continuous operations, both the classic that unquestionably impair the ability of

surveys of S. A. Stouffer" and the recent today's Army to perform not only in

experimental studies of the British point to continuous operations, but indeed in any

the need for a friendly and relaxed leadership kind of operations. Foremost among these is

style when dealing with tired soldiers. During the strongly ingrained and widely held belief

Operation Early Call, for example, NCOs that mistakes are neither expected nor

reported that quiet reminders and tolerated. The practical consequences of

exhortations were more effective than orders, believing that one's career is at stake every

particularly late in the exercise. Tired soldiers minute of every day are parallel to those of

tended toward passivity and docility rather the bodycount mentality referred to earlier.

than aggressiveness, toward resignation As managers, we find it difficult to measure

rather than resistance. This tendency held for "taking care of one's men," "esprit de leaders as well as followers, of course. In corps," "individual morale," and even perfect harmony with the distinction made "readiness," so instead we measure various

. earlier between self-paced and forced-paced quantifiable failings, on the assumption that

activities, a few of the junior NCOs abdicated lack of such failings implies health in the

their positions of leadership in favor of unmeasurable areas. This assumption is

personal survival and comfort." simply not true: having few deserters is not

Leaders of small groups during continuous having high morale, any more than lack of

operations may also find helpful several serious illness means being in good shape. findings from studies of civilian Junior officers and senior NCOs,

organizations performing under high task particularly, see their task as avoiding

load:" mistakes rather than learning and growing • There will be greater deviation from constantly by trial and error. Leadership

standard procedures and doctrine. cannot be learned merely by teaching our - There will be increased emphasis on officer corps to concentrate on avoiding priorities (cf. self- versus forced-paced tasks). easily measured mistakes. For example, it is

' Cross-checking and spot-checking will not "leadership" to cannibalize vehicles

decrease. awaiting parts to make sure that those to be

* Communications within the working inspected are letter perfect, or to assure that

group " will decrease, as will record keeping, the installation dining facility "belongs" to a

• Communications with "outside" groups unit not getting its AGI. In fact, this

.and individuals will increase, management philosophy, borrowed from

* Decisionmaking initially centered on the industry and commerce (where at least there

formal leader will tend to be transferred to is a clear-cut, dollar-and-cents product to

the group member with the greatest serve as a counter-balancing positive goal),

knowledge and experience if he is not the exerts great pressure to falsify reports, by

14 Parameters, Journal of the US Army War Corlege

139

.... ... ..... .. .. ., , . .. ... . . . .* .. . , *, _ . .. .) . . 'i
, ---

omission as well as commission, and stifles type of morale that history suggests is crucial

initiative, trust, and honest communication. to combat performance." Furthermore, it is

It intimidates commanders and leaders at all important for peacetime performance as well.

levels into usurping duties of subordinates (to As L. H. Ingraham puts it:

the consternation and long-term detriment of

both) or shunting more and more work to the Small group membership is crucial to the

ever-dwindling number of "reliable" day-to-day experience of the soldier. He is

• workers, who finally burn out. The forced to manage large blocks of time away

management approach, as opposed to from his home, family, and friends. That

% leadership, is also at least in part responsible time needs to be filled in the company of

for the flowering of what might be termed other people, as he does not thrive in

"the hardware store" approach to discipline isolation."

and training problems: "I get no reward for

the extra efforts involved in motivating or Experiences in past wars as well as in

training these guys, so why not send them industrial settings has made it obvious that

' back like any other defective part, and get a there is much to be gained if the young

brand new one?" barracks dweller can find social bonding

It is no wonder, in such a climate, that within his own military work group. There,

officers are ambivalent about that the young soldier can find a social support

traditionally and theoretically most honored group for himself, generated by interpersonal

of positions: commander. They see it as contacts and activities within the same limited

something to be endured for the sake of one's and diverse group of other transients who

career rather than a highlight of that career. comprise his work group. He does not have

Those who have no taste or talent for much time to achieve group identity, owing to

command feel they must accept it, even seek transfers and rotations, nor does he typically

' it, to "remain competitive," while those who possess sophisticated social skills or leisureare good at it feel they too must move on to time habits. Unfortunately, drug and alcohol

other jobs before suffering one fatal mistake use become strong temptations, offering a

and withering on the promotion vine. variety of distinct shared activites and a

unique group history that can create a sense

MORALE AND SOCIAL of comradeship literally overnight and

SUPPORT SYSTEMS effortlessly. Perhaps just as unfortunately,

the social networks thus formed almost never

The "Year of the Soldier" in Europe has include all members of a work group, and

quite properly called attention to a myriad of hardly ever include any significant mixture of

soldier personal problems and resulted in ranks. The attitude of distrust which comes to

many much-needed corrections. The pervade relations between users and noncontinued loss of first-term troops at the rate users is of course maladaptive, and the

of a battalion a month suggests, however, hypocrisy of often hard-drinking supervisors

that it is a difficult job indeed to raise soldier pursuing users of other drugs is not lost on

morale with the purely pragmatic problem- unit members. Also obvious to all is the

solving approach. One reason this is true may seeming impotence of the Army, defeated

be the lack of clarity about the sources of daily by its most junior personnel in efforts to

unhappiness, specifically, the failure to suppress illicit drug use. Thus, respect for

distinguish individual or personal morale, and confidence in the chain of command is

which does indeed depend on things like good not so subtly undermined.

chow, clean clothes, recreational facilities, What I am suggesting is that drug use has

and so forth, from group or unit morale, flourished in the vacuum created by the

. which is a product of membership in a Army's continuing transformation from

respected unit with confidence in and respect "total institution" to "just another job."

for comrades and leaders." It is the latter Very necessary for combat, and in garrison as

I Vol. IX. No. 3 15

140

"-~~~~~~~~~~ -. .""" -..' ". ' -+ '"'"..-.- . .'. .. '- .. -,.. ... .. "-". ."". ". . ...... . .
. , _ . ... .! ,

t .. t ., tJ ; , . : . . , , . ,, .  . . . . . 

well, is a sense of belonging, but belonging to which teammates cannot let a buddy down,

- 1 - a group that includes both single and married will be a crucial determinant of endurance.

soldiers, junior and senior enlisted men and Neither the problem of continuous combat

officers, and perhaps even families, operations nor its solutions are seriously

sweethearts, and friends, addressed within our Army's present doctrine

Such informal social bonding cannot be or training. It is time that we turn our best

accomplished by orders and directives. It thinking in this direction.

must be built as a by-product of activities

which fill large blocks of time, involve NOTES

minimal skill (so that anyone can

I. A. A. Sidorenko. The Offensive (a Soviet View) participate), and comprise intelligent mixes (Moscow: Military Publishing House. 1970). translated under

of work and play, duty and recreation. Such the auspices of the US Air Force (Washington: US Government

an enlarged "family" setting would provide Printing Office. 1973), p. vii.

2. US Department of the Army, Operations. Field Manual alternative social alliances for soldiers. These 10.5 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976),

activities must be seen not as a troop welfare pp. 3-1 to3-17.

program, but as an essential part of the unit's 3. 1. J. Emanski Jr., Continuous Land Combat, Technical

Report No. 4940 (Arlington, Va.: Defense Advanced Research mission, a part which may or may not Projects Agency, 1977), pp. 11.14.

improve readiness by cutting into drug and 4. REFORGER is the name for a series of exercises

alcohol abuse, but which will certainly conducted annualty to practice atsd demonstrate she ability of

the United States to airlift significant forces to Germany provide the unit with the strongest available should hostilities erupt in that area on short notice. The

insurance against the stress of prolonged acronym stands for Return of Forces toGenany. combat-loyalty to one another. 5. P. G. 0-ourne, Alen. Stress, and Vietnam (Boston: c t aLittle. Brown. 1970). pp. 95-115.

6. P. G. Opstad et al., "Performance, Mood and Clinical

CONCLUSIONS Symptoms in Men Exposed to Prolonged. Severe Physical

Work and Sleep Deprivation." Aviation, Space, and

Environnental Medicine, 49 (September 1978), 1065-73. Though this report does not cover all the 7. D. R. Haslam et al., "The Effect of Continuous

implications of continuous combat for US Operations upon the Military Performace of the tnfantryman

planners and policymakers, even for the (Exercise 'Early Call')." APRE Report No. 2/77

ha a o d d(Farnborough, England: Army Personnel Research human factors area alone, it does address Establishment. 1977).

four of the most important. We may 8. Director, Divis" n of Neuropsychiairy, Walter Reed

recapitulate these areas as first considerations Army Institute of Research, Joint USARIEM/WRAIR Force

for ny ommaderwishng o atackthe Director Center Teams Study, preliminary report. 1977. for any commander wishing to attack the 9. R. Bernstein, "Getting to the Fight-A Review of

problem: Physical and Emotional Problems Encountered in Moving

* Sleep for leaders is by far the most Troops to Combat," student thesis, US Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1964. critical factor, owing to the high sensitivity of 10. J. E. Ginzberg et al., The Ineffective Soldier, Vol. 1:

decisionmaking and other cognitive tasks to The Lost Division (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958), p.

fatigue. At present, this fact is simply 145.

unacepabe t th vst ajrit ofleder I1. J. W. Appel. "Preventive Psychiatry," in

Sunacceptable to the vast majority of leaders Neuropsychiatry in World War II. ed. R. S. Anderson. A. J.

at battalion and lower levels, at least with Glass. and J. Bernucci (Washington: US Government Printing

regard to themselves. Ofice, 1966), pp. 373-415.

Cg is essential at all levels, 12. S. Nay. "Stress and Personality as Factors in the

Cross-training Casualtyand PrognosisofCombat Reaction."presentedatthe command included, if any kind of shift work Second International Conference on Psychological Stress and

is going to be possible, or if the unit is going Adjustment in Time of War and Peace. Jerusalem. Israel.

1978.

to survive the inevitable losses of key 13. S, A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier (Princeton:

personnel. Neither cross-training nor combat Princeton Univ. Press. 1949). II, 112-30.

leader development is possible in a "zero 14. Haslam ct al., p. 59. defects" :] environment. 1s. J.E. Haas and T. E. Drabek, Complex Organization:A defects enirr om e tr w Sociological Perspective (Riverside. N.J.: Macmillan, 1972).

Worries about dependents' care will pp. 237-300.

play a large role in staying power. 16. F. M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit (London: Leo

w h Cooper Limited. 1978), pp. 171-74.

e Unit cohesion, the extent to which the 17. S. L. A. Marshall. Aen Against Fire (New York:

members see themselves as a unit or team in William Morrow. 1947). pp. 133-56.

16 Parameters. Journal of the US Army War College

141

-2 ...-- 2
18. L. H. Ingraham . "Thc Nccd for Drug and Alcohol Conference Proceedings No. 218 (Neuilly-sur-Scine. France: Programs that are Unique to Military Organi/aion," in The Advisory Group for Aerospace Rcearch and Dctclopr cf. K Use uadAbuse of Social Drugs, cd. H. C. Hollo,,ay. AGARD 1978). pp. CI-2.

CIL

Vol IX, No.3 17

142

3" .
. . . .. ....

'J A., A

By Liuenn Cooe Win fe *\.\i 

Te er goteU ie Sae niiptd hm ncaaiiyo ou sodir (i.. th-u a

tha in the 190-twudhv oc edns ieso) nln vt hsnefroe er

eqa to rsproio hto h oit te u~nDmninDvsoDcrn n Un-on Naioa poiis reouc cosrans Co ba Deeop et Dietrte ode

shfig pirte nd Sve ehooia upor Cetr has. been enaei.eelpn

1111roemens to avecreaed apeaneativ co preensie "eopl" dctrne. he umgap~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- o- epcie bcAe fre rti(.; ieso iiini tdigsm ftemr

cpibiites a eslt te A rmyha iitatd a imoranvaiabe vihaf.'u ancpblt

e oenzto scl rga ocoetegp ntchsocma tes l( u a

arv:lorig axim th r Arm efecivenss toits prfor anc in ontiuousopeatins- T s

;-!rto aur vitr on the batefed doctina I-trtr sbirg eeoe nah r

f;.c-).;de u co ne er ofbatl; int e ni c he i n s c itca c em ntofr adiness, .N

O jr F Of fcos ti m i th hu a beas itat sa)c.; v moiator inp actm

Th. rorr moenztu sgvn

an as aa forc mutpiri orb aafo

(,Nlhass o ri~tirn7.vthe-evius o th:- eed arsvaldat tht co esie u itsperor,

33 1 3 SodlerSupprl Jurna
-~~~~Z -- - T~~- 

botter than units wvith less cohesion. For example, assist them in assessing unit olhesion. The

battle casualty (lata from World War 11 shows that following is a saimple of thle questions:

combat stress (neuropschitric) casatei nt

which wvere not very cohiesive had a odevastating

effrect onl the ability of the units to sustain /

themselves in combat. In 44 days of heavy fightingon the Gothic line, the newly committed 88th and r.*

91st Divisions received approximately 3,GOO and\J / J

2,700 wvounded in action respectively. In addition, ~ .

they lost 817 and 919, respectively, as a result of

combat stress. The percentages of combat stress to -r-

*~~~W1 wonled in action casualties we-re 22.7 percent and ' ~.-

3.1 percent respectively.~-* ~ ~ "

TPhe above figures can be compared with even

heavier fighting encountered Luy two very cohesive

units. In d~(ay-s of combat at Normandy, the 82d ,

* Airborne Division lost 4,197 wvounded in action and

* 22-3 (onily 5.7 percent) as a result of combat

stt .;. The 101st Airborne Division Pt the Battle of z~

t1- ;nlge, in 43 days, lost 4,992 wounded in action - -,_

* a~ t02 (only 2.0 percent) to combat !-tress. These

hi:,:orical examples show that t: . .esive units .*

withstand the stress of combat much better than - ! 'c

* ~~units which are not as cohesive.'- . -

The Human Dimension Division has a two- :...

pronged effort underway in the area ofcohesion. One is to prdc a Department of Army .h

Pamphlet, "Leadership Go ' 'e to Assc; sing and L TC Wtin. I di art Slife r hais bren derclopi I comrn iehensive

Managing Unit Cohesion. " 'i foe other is to produce pi ie1)1e* docti (i t the Sodiet- Siijr C (enter l. husiirI,i x

a follow-on comprehensive doctrinal test field ~ .,

manual on unit cohesion.Dosteuitpovdfrstsacinofiemr

The lea-dership guidleis 3gear-ed tolhelpleader-sat *De h npodfraifcinfene

*rnpany level and below to make their uinits more fleeds?

;wsive. Itis ailso inteiyletl to l)e of tzssist; iice toall * Do unit niembers know wcho carcs about themn?

leaei~. te ''li~otghot gi~~, te rlevnceof* Do unit mnembers have yardsticks to mneasure

leadership to the entire processof bu ld ing cohesion their pefo ria nc?

*is emnphasize d. * Are unit miembers confident?

Contntsof he uid incude (a a eneal * Does each sub-unit have sufficient members and

intrducionto gupchaacteistcs ith other resources to accomnplish its mission? * . ntrducion o goupchaacteistcs ith* Is unit comniotication effect ive?

emphasis on the n~eedl for cohiesion; (b) differences *D ntmmesbln opo etitrs

betwe,,en formned and interest groups and their *D ntnebr eogt riietitrs

impicaionlffieneng fo ndiidul bhavor; sub-groups which support or detract from unit

(c) stages of unit dlevelopmnent and general cohesi? hir aml aet fe ato

ledeship roles for each stage; (d) knowing uI lieac odesfniyni ofe ato

personnelJ, not only as individuals, but also as

*members of a groulp (i.e., thle on it); (e) In March, 1980, a Human Dimension Working

underst'and [rig the unit socialization process and Group Conference was sponsored by the Soldier

thle significance of valus an tnad;(f) Support Center and was attended by sixteen

impli1cations of divergent un it and individual n-li iita ry anid civil i an behiav io ral science

obecivsand~ t ho necessity for. Conlgru11 ence; anld (g) exets. The conference particip~ants decided that

* the in port ance of i lent&irfi~ ugWith onie's uniiit and sufficient iniformn~ition and research wvas available

the nticd to k now tie p)ositive aspect:; of thle unit's to p ro0(1ucc a f i eld ma n ual o n u nit

fhistory. cohesion. P~roduction of a test field manual is now

A tiie fc~aturc of the leadersi ,ulide is a underway as a joint undetakn yteWle

Smm ary of qicstlonls for lead ers to ask whIiich vi II Reed Army Institute of Research, thle Arimy

*May/June 1381 144 39
7. 

R. le ,rch Institute, ODCSPI'"R and the Soldier (XVIA), the relationship may be graphically

Sn, pport Center's. illustrated as follows:

The field [anual is being developed from a total

S>.,tHIs perspec tive. It will delionistrate why

cohtilonf is irportait. wh'lt happens if you don't 10,01)0

-: ', e cohesion, actions that can be taken to get

ct)siOn, and why certain actions work to obtiin MYA

cohe-ion. The manual will include , chapter on

.r ,a no.is an dl assessm ent a,-s w eV' s a I i:t of n arkers

(c.g.. sick call rates, Article 15'a;/courts-tiartial) to

use in order to identify whether a unit is cohesive or

in rouble. The manual will also contain a list of 1.oO

coh;esion builders for the hhttalion commander

down l" to the squad leader. Each leadership level is /

dc >u. d in terms of the types of behavior that will I

enharre, cohesionoroperate againstit. Emphasis is I

placed on the idea that cohesion stems from I /

,mcaningful mission oriented experiences within / 1 \ / thL unit where the, quality of unit performance is fed 100 Al 1,,

hack to the group, is meanin;ful tothe group, and is/ V

a primary means to instill cohesion. MAR 86th INFANTRY DIVISION DEC

The two most important ingredients of combat 1944 194

- stress are physical fatigue and mental

stress. Combat stress is a result of prolonged

exposure to battle conditions, just as injury and

physical disease are results of battle

con~lti inensty rrs Boh nd draton dterineCombat stress casualties constitute a substantial conditiis. h ot intcnsity and (uration ldetermine part of the medical workload. In past wars, it was

how much stress builds p in thle -olier. Stress revealed that there was one combat stress casualty

casualties increase when eomI-.t intensity for every four wounded in action -- one for every increases. Stress casualties also increase the longer three wounded during lengthy periods of intense

troops stay in active combat. The greatest stress combat. In a war characterized by continuous

residts :'-" from very "operations intense combat that continues for on a high-intensity, integrated

ani ctended lriod, battlefield, the relationship of stress casualties to

wounded in action is expected to be at least one to three and conceivably even greater. Combat stress

is not solely a medical prob!em. It is also a

command problem -- both in terms of numbers lost

from duty and reduced performance of duty. It is a

command responsibility to take actions to increase

the individual soldier's resistance to combat stress

and to manage stress in units.

Test Field Manual

S" The Army Reserch Institute (AIl). is -.*l ('t ,BJ.\ lI I .5 I II' .i,' ;,Ii~ f N produeinllr a test ficl Inalmal, ".1'z ulJi'm:nt * Of

(',,inhat inte-rnsity, dlr:ation, and stress ic,'t.'. ...l ()l"'tUon ,' ill a joint ARI-III)D

e(.aiiua i .s. coopili.rat ye venture. In the past. leaders have not

paid sllfficint attention to mental strtss. The field

S-(Ii i t from \ II ar d -eoa Iroanial iliforlms ,l,'ad r. that aI)ropri vte nctlhinds ", r ,t a i ar t -nl :.i ae rl:itinqhi) of pingn with in t sres real)

r- i h a t t t I i it c ri s i ty a n s rc.;s divl tils ( rin 'orlr:d . Ar,ofe.ni hiasis retn

_ 'ln .. 1,,dll,, t is e:..t es-we in what the indiv,lial >(hi,'r ¢can do, .'hat the

145 Soldier Support Jutrnal * 45 . . . , -
7' -- 1

Poldotntet nphita.. . ahat th/indii dual soldier can dto and wthat the "buddy"cam do to recogniz,.

p t e e ad cop e w it hI co m h ot .4st t ( n% to #Y Dn. ,i.d R yderJ

to recognize, prevent, and cope with combat stress. explained. Differ ences in expected effectiveness

Victory on the battlefield is the ultimate goal of for var ious types of combat activity over 120

the Aimy. To achiev e victory with the lowest cost of continuous mission hours are illustrated.

health and lives, soldiers must be wvell trained for Principles for countering and slowing theerosionof

battle. A significant par-t of such training must be human resources are outlined. Suggestions are

learning to cope with stress. It cannot be given for programs to condition units for continuous

overemphasized that leaders, too, must learn to operations, and for preserving their fighting

cope with strcss and additionally to manage stress capabilities during continuous combat. F :

in their units. Utilization of stress coping and information wvill profit those possessing leadership

managing techniques in combat will help to responsibil ities for the planning and management

conserve the fighting strength. of human performance in combat missio.ns.

The Sold ier Support Center effor-ts represent a

modern (lay approach to modern arreTh

Human Performance in Continuous modern Army must integrate technological

Operaionsknowledge of soldier capability and potential. The humanion diesinfoc ultiplier is to enable the

The prospects of continuoi;. combat operations soldier to deal successfully with the stressors of the

in future, intensive wvarfari~.xdc infcn NBC battlefield and fit effectively.

chianges in Army operations. Unless carefully

managed, performance on successive (lays of

continuous operations wvill be degra!.' 1. The

degradation becomes more severe as miore and

more sleep is lost. For any mission involving

extendIed operations wvithout sleep, leaders must

-knowv the performance level wvhich can be

realistical ly expected, wvhat aspects of p~erformance

are most vulnerable to degradation, and how to

manage and control performance degradation.

'the March, 1980 Human Dimension Working

6roup Conference (determine(] that a three-volume

research stud cnilL,"ua efraaei ie't~tit Colutnd ina. Edward Slifer is a.it , Work

C'ontinnwus Operaitions," was capale of being R~ese'arch Stntff Ofier with the Lbottritle nit! comnb't

translated into a test field manual. Thei Army Afleetrsjn,nts Iirect'Pritte.,it~t finlea.sion IDiisiqoa Sobdeer

Researchi Instu te an(l the Hluman Di inension Ss'j'j'ls C'en,". fit I!ott I""'?jni I, rsa indiin,,.

D~ivision are engaged in a first-try attem pt to Pulic hAd ns t tr /wion)y, n anMatr iw~. n( .lctta4 I,- r in

trntislate the research stud~y (iectly into test litsqi4cliesia. fteUSAU itft.ii 

i n.Vi Stw il Wiml. eit dstinyts grvd/vyv'.f heUSI

'The test field manual will serve several IJC Slifer Pro; coin it! is.ai,~ Pien it, W5 aind hafs xercell in a

riev'rs. Factors 1PIATrn i ni'1rates a iid dcgrecs of '' 'if pjji,,,,* .-ill~a lI'.'ici Caasidlvlj.,vn, I/-Searc-4h

- - p rog rej;s ic pC irfo rin a ricIe deiradat ii)i are itPill Ssiff A, ''-qs mfnet i.

146

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- - - - -153
A CONTIN4UOUJS OPERATIONS PERSPECTIVE

The continuous operations battlefield may be highly mobile and impose

stresses on the soldier which were not inherent in earlier battles. One

point of view is presented in this regard which supports contentions

favoring full consideration of the psychological conditioning required for

enhancing soldier performance.

(Excerptcd from a study by J.J. Emanski, Jr.)

155

. .. ..
One Perspective About Continuous Land Operations

The Soviets have addressed the continuous land operation problem

and have made it the keystone of their doctrine. There are strong

indications that the equipment is in the hands of their operational forces to

implement the concept and that their procedures and doctrine consider

continuous operations (1) (2) (3).

The advantages to the Soviets of a continuous offensive are:

o disruption of mobilization of NATO allies

o weakening the resolve of uncommitted nations

o deep penetration and confusion makes the employment of

nuclear weapons by the defender more difficult

o reinforcements from the United States cannot arrive

in less than eight weeks

o only a relatively few light forces can be transported

by air

o the war may be over and done before a nuclear decision

is made.

One factor that obscures perception of the powerful combat leverage

implicit in continuous combat is the conviction that it is simply an

evolutionary step in the progression and difficulty beyond night combat

(4). Accordingly, it is reasoned that attention needs to be directed to

night operations and the capability for continuous operations will follow

(5). Consequently, even gaining the understanding of the enormous impact

that continuous land combat will have on every aspect of land combat and

support of land combat is deferred or discounted while attention is

directed to night operations.

Another factor that may contribute to minimizing the Soviet

mechanized combat doctrine of continuous land combat is the emphasis and

dependence on cost-effectiveness analysis. Largely, these become elaborate

models directed ultimately to a figure of merit that is black or white--and

exchange ratio, or attrition per dollar expended, or so many weapons of

this kind is equivalent to so many of that. Analytic models and even war

gaming are attrition dependent. Assumed equipment superiority as well as

numbers and doctrinal concepts such as force ratios for

breakthrough--six-to-one attacker to defender desired, three-to-one

U minimum (FI 100-5)--control the outcome. These analytic methods do not

and cannot incorporate military psychological effects. Such effects are

essentially ignored and mechanistic effects assumed to dominate. It is the

other way round.

157

.-U " "" ""' "" ," " " - - " . " "" "' ." ' -" -" "" -i ' ' ' - "- -" ' " . ' ".. -. "" .- " - - '' . " '
In the classic example of continuous land combat, the German

Blitzkrieg in May, 1940, none of these criteria were met. [lad these

analytic means and assumptions been applied, the French positional defense

(6) (which parallels the present day forward defense) would have stopped

the German forces without question. Instead of six-to-one or even

three-to-one, the German forces were numerically inferior. Instead of

being technically superior, as is commonly believed, the German equipment

was inferior. The German tanks were deficient in armor and in firepower

as compared to the French or the British.

What then was the difference? "The Battle of France is one of

history's most striking examples of the decisive effect of a new idea,

carried out by a dynamic executant (Guderian)" (7). The military

psychological impact of what Guderian recognized and implemented in his

continuous offensive to the channel ports was presented by Colonel Ardant

duPicq in his book "Battle Studies," regarded by students of warfare as a

classic (8). Ardant duPicq's fundamental theme was that the character and

the nature of man has not changed from ancient to modern times. He

wrote: "Battle is the final objective of armies and man is the fundamental

instrument in battle whose elements, character, energies, sentiments,

fears, desires, and instincts are stronger than all abstract rules and

foolish theories. War is still more an art than a science." Other advanced

military thinkers--Fuller, Guderian, Patton, Tukhachevsky, 'ahan--arrived

at the same conclusions and combat principles. These are embodied in and

become part of the definition of continuous land combat.

Ardant duPicq observed that the less mobile the troops, the deadlier

are the battles. This, of course, underscores the conclusions of the Soviet

study of battle and is the fundamental reason for their doctrine of the

continu~as offensive. This effect can also be seen in the World War II

Blitzkrieg where casualties and damage on both sides were light when

contrasted with the meat-grinder losses of World War I trench warfare. It

also puts to question the assumption of staggering losses and material

damage that would paralyze both sides in a NATO/Warsaw Pact war. The

doubtful and dangerious conclusion is reached that therefore, it, will not

happen.

J. F. C. Fuller characterized the objec' ve of the continuous

mechanized offensive as follows: "Not to kill but to move; not to move to

kill but to move to terrify, to bewilder, to perplex, to cause

consternation, doubt and confusion in the rear of the enemy, which rumor

would magnify until panic became monstrous. In short, its aim was to parahrse not only the enemy's command but his government and • paralvsation would be in direct proportion to velocity" (9).

Have the Soviets missed this point on the impact of mobility and main-

* taning" an unremitting attack pace? Marshal Savkin asserted that, based on studies of combat in World War II, "The rates of advance and troop

losses.. .were inversely proportional. An analysis of the size of losses and

expenditure of supplies in nine operations of the Great Patriotic War

attests that in attack with a tempo of 20-50km per dav the overall losses in

personnel were a little over three tines less and in tanks were

158 V * .* -

. .. .... .... : . ., .: . ...- . . .
uncertain about their flank"); insertion of heliborne troops behind the

enemy to capture choke points and prevent entry of a retreating force into

a city; and finally to underscore the Soviet emphasis on the offensive:

"WTith equal or inferior power of destruction, he will win who has the

resolution of advance, who by his formations and maneuvers can threaten

his adversary with a new phase of material action." In the context of

tomorrow's battlefield this is continuous land combat.

In reaching a definition or an understanding of the character of

continuous land combat there is, beyond the assumption of the viability of

a positional or static war of attrition, the assumption of the enemy as a

"mirror-image" of one's own capabilities and procedures. For example,

when informed by M. Renaud, the French Prime Minister, on May 15 that

Guderian's Panzer forces had crossed the Meuse and breached the defenses

at Sedan and that France was lost, Winston Churchill replied, "All

experience shows that the offensive will come to an end after awhile.

... After five or six days they have to halt for supplies, and the

opportunity for counter-attack is presented." Certainly, Churchill went

on, "this is what we had always seen in the past and what we ought to

have seen now" (11).

The mirror-image assumption was also made by General Douminc, the

French Army Chief of Staff: "Crediting the enemy with our own

procedure, we had imagined that they would not attempt the passage of

the Meuse until after they had brought up ample artillery: the five or six

days necessary for that would have easily given us time to reinforce."

"The issue (of the Panzer's stunningly effective continuous offensive)

turned on the time factor at stage after stage. The French counter

movements were too slow to catch up with the changing situation" (12). "It

is clear that Guderian and his tankmen pulled the German Army along after

them, and thereby produced the most sweeoing victory in modern history"

(13).

Continuous unremmitting pressure with no delay for natural or man

emplaced obstacles is the Soviet doctrine of continuous land combat. Soviet

river and obstacle crossing doctrine embodied in continuous combat is

stated this way: "Contemporary offensive operations hear a decisive

character and are developed to a great depth and at high tempos. A halt

by troops in the course of an attack is fraught with great danger. "An

assault crossing from the march meets to the fullest extent the character

of offensive operations conducted with a decisive goal to a great depth and

at high rates." The capability to do this was demonstrated in the 1967

Dnieper River exercise (as was the capability to lay pipe at the extremely

fast pace of the attack) (14). These operational procedures and equipments

were shown to NATO observers in the Soviet-Warsaw Pact exercises

KAVKAZ, SEVER, and STICHIT in 1976 (15). The river was in flood stage,

not a practice set-piece. It was crossed from the march in record time.

Guderian's continuous mechanized offensive was vulnerable because

the supporting German infantry, while categorized as motorized, filled in

behind the Panzer drive at a herioc forced march pace but largely on foot.

The Soviet armies no longer have foot soldiers. Their infantry moves at

the pace of the armor in combat vehicles. The B.1IP-76 P13 infantry fighting

159

............................................
almost 1.5 times less than with a tempo of advance of 4-10km per day." Ile

goes on to illustrate that rates of advance have an even greqter effect on

the specific consumption of supplies per 100 km of troop advance. "with

high rates of advance of tank armies the specific consumption of

ammunition was decreased by six times, and that of diesel fuel by three

times" (10).

Ardant duPicq observed that modern battle formations are spread out

and widely dispersed. Lost is the comfort and strength that man gained

when he was part of an infantry battle formation. Even though the combat

unit contains many men, relatively speaking, they feel isolated, and are

prey to the instincts of primitive man. This is likely to the the frame of

mind of separated tank-killing teams. He also concluded that "physical

exhaustion determined by the nervous tension of the soldier, increased in

surprising proportion according to the invisibility of the adversary."

Further he stated, "Collective man, a disciplined body of troops formed in

tactical battle order, is invincible against an undiciplined body of troops.

But against a similarly disciplined body he becomes again primitive man.

IHe flees before a greater force of destruction when he sees it or when he

foresees it. Nothing is changed in the heart of man. Discipline keeps

enemies face-to-face a little longer, but cannot supplant the instinct for

self-preservation that goes with it."

This is precisely what happened when the French positional concepts

of defense faced the German Blitzkrieg. The French defense was

predicated on small tank-killing teams. These were sited in depth in

advantageous terrain. The German tanks were to be channeled into killing

zones, then bled white by the infantry tank-killing teams. That doctrine

failed for the reasons that Ardant duPicq said that it would: "Plan could

not accept that much terror." It was not a weapon deficiency. The French

high velocity antitank gun was capable of killing the contemporary tank.

On paper and in theory the German Panzer formations should have been defeated. The mechanistic and attritional effects did not prevail; the

psychological impact on human performance of a war of maneuver did.

Ardant duPicq also established that small groups--even relatively

large combat units--that are separated and not under direct supervision

and control of high echelons will behave in accordance with the basic

instincts of man. Since Ardant duPicq established in his study of battle

that the nature of man in combat does not change, armor defense concepts

s- predicated on selfish courage on the part of infantry guided-missile teams

max- also fail should they have to face armor attacks and breakthroughs

exploiting shock, noise, chaos, and violent assault.

If all of the above is considered in the context of the continuous

offensive that is projected by the Soviets, the reasoning, behind the Soviet

doctrine of the continuous offensive aligns with the lessons taught by

duPicq in "Battle Studies:" Probing of weakness, then executing the

(lnring thrust; once penetration is achieved, maintain the momentum; avoid

frontal attack; exploit the meeting engagement; make maxirum use of

surprise (Ardant dePicq isserts that a combat unit surprised will flee);

prosecute the pursuit phase relentlessly and on a parallel axis (Ardant

. duPicq : "even a superior force in good position will be route(' 7i-thev feel

160

3'.
vehicle was fully operational in 1967 and an improved vcrsion is already in

inventory (16). It must be observed in this discussion of the definition of

' continuous land combat that the tank is not central to modern combat as it

has been conceived in Soviet military thought and tested in their

exercises which are as close to combat as you can get. The infantry

, :combat vehicle is. This is a most important factor in considering human

performance in continuous operations. W-lhile the strengths of the Soviet

"- .tank divisions have remained relativelv static, the strengths of the

Motorized Rifle Division has grown enormously and is now equal (or

* superior) in firepower to the strongest U. S. mechanized division deployed

in Europe. Since 1956, the Soviet Army has added 30 divisions to its

order of battle, 90 percent of them being motorized rifle.

161

S** * . . . . . .
r-tW-- ' ONrw-r R'r T"-. TO -. .P 7rX .f V.' 4 - '

Ui

FOOTNOTES

(1) To cite but a few "milestone" examples: A. A. Siderenko, "The

Offensive," Moscow, 1970; V. Ye. Savkin, "The Basic Principles of

Operational Art and Tactics," Moscow, 1971; V.G. Reznichenko,

"Tactics (The Officer's Library)," Moscow, 1967; V.D. Sokolovskiy,

"Soviet Military Strategy," Mloscow, 1968 (original publication now in

its third edition).

(2) The Soviet ribbon bridging equipment is second to none so there is

no delay at river crossings. The Soviet BrIP-76 PB is considered by

many authorities to be the best combat vehicle in the world. It allows

troops to fight mounted and survive in a nuclear and chemical

environment (Sokolovskiy). There is no counterpart in the U.S.

Army; Soviet logistics and support equipment is without

equal--semi-automatic pipe layers, tank transporters, forward repair,

and medical vans.

(3) Alistair Horne, "To Lose a Battle: France 1940," Little Brown,

Boston, 1969.

(4) Observation made by MG M'lorris Brady, Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations, REDCOM, September, 1978.

(5) A conclusion of the Night Operations Conference convened by

TRADOC as reported in "Concept Paper on Night Operations," ACN:

22722, United States Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas, August, 1975.

(6) Major Robert A. Doughty, "The French Antitank Doctrine, 1940: The

Antidote That Failed," Military Review, May 1976.

(7) B .H. Liddell Hart, "History of the Second World Wiar," Putnam, 1971.

(8) Colonel Ardant duPicq, "Battle Studies, Ancient and Modern Battle,"

MacMillan Company, 1921.

(9) J.F.C. Fuller, "The Conduct of War; 1789-1961," Rutgers University

Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1969, pp. 256-257.

(10) V. Ye Savkin, "The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics

(A Soviet View)," oscow, 1972, p. 136. I

(11) Winston S. Churchill, "Their Finest flour," Houghton Mifflin, Boston,

1949, p.42.

(12) op, cit, Liddell Hart, p. 73.

(13) ibid.

(14) A.A. Siderenko, "The Offensive," Moscow, 1970. L

162

U.-
I-

(15) Defense Intelligence Report DDI-1100-159-77, "Soviet-Warsaw Pact

S,: Exercise-1976 KAVKAZ-SEVER-SHCHIT-76," April, 1977, unclas.

(16) International Defense Review, September 19, 1978, p. 1375.

(17) FM 100-5 Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15

December, 1975, unclas.

(18) ibid.

I (19) John Keegan, "The Face of Battle," The Viking Press, New York,

1976, pp. 303-304.

(20) For an imaginative but no impossible scenario, see Lieutenant Colonel

Clayton A. Pratt, U.S. Army, "The Benelux and Northern German

Plains Avenue of Approach," Military Review, June, 1978.

. (21) Major Frederick I. Manning, U.S. Army Medical Research Unit

Europe, "Human Factors in Sustaining High Rates of Artillery Fire

(Final Report)."

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CRITICAL TASK LIST

1. Mechanized Infantry

Gunner/Carrier Team Leader

1. Fire from bounding vehicle

2. Overwatch bounding vehicle

3. Fire to protect bounding vehicle

4. Overwatch dismount

5. Fire .50 Cal at areas

6. Coordinate firing with other vehicles and dismounted elements

7. Maintain knowledge of the squad's location

8. Communicate with PL

9. Detect enemy movement

10. Determine need to relocate

11. Establish revised TRPs plus range cards

12. Direct relocation or repositioning

13. Reposition to allow other SWs to fire as needed

14. Cover disengaging squads

15. Maintain concealed disengagement

16. Fire to protect regrouping

17. Report vehicle readiness to SL

Maneuver Team Member

18. Check condition of weapons

19. Detect targets in extoosed position from bounding vehicle

20. Fire weapons from bounding vehicle

21. Plan fire effective positions

22. Coordinate weapons locations

23. Mark routes between possible positions

24. Identify TRPs

25. Plan fire cover for possible relocations

26. Fire on targets

27. Fire at areas

28. Fire with NVDs

29. Move rapidly to new positions via marked routes

30. Fire while relocating

, 31. Move to assembly area

32. Fire to cover move to assembly area

S

177

" ."".'.,'-'"" ,' "., ."". '" : '[" '" ""f , ". - '', .''-' '-''., .. '.',-'.': '..''.'.''.. :.,',.' , '- '- ' :"
Squad Leader

33. Observe terrain for enemy presence

34. Establish communication network

35. Identify TRPs

36. Prepare range cards

37. Establish routes to subsequent position

38. Supervise obstacle and camouflage construction

39. Adjust firing as necessary

40. Coordinate squad relocation if necessary

41. Direct relocation fire

42. Make new range cards as needed

43. Direct movement to assembly area

44. Direct cover fi"e while moving to assembly area

45. Assign exposed fire team as needed when mounted

46. Coordinate fire needs per PL instructions while mounted

47. Direct squad movement during disengagement

48. Communicate with PL during disengagement

49. Direct proper movement to regrouping

Platoon Leader

50. Conduct reconnaissance

.9 51. Check accuracy of terrain maps

52. Check on support fire availability

53. Decide to engage unexpected fire or not

54. Direct mounted defense

55. Communicate with OPs

. 56. Request possible support fire requirements 57. Select positions for cover, concealment, observation

58. Establish inter-squad communication network

59. Assign locations to SLs

60. Establish TRPs

61. Assign fire zones and targets

62. Communicate with company and/or artillery

63. Direct vehicle firing locations

64. Direct vehicle movement patterns

65. Communicate with OPs and company as necessary

66. Decide when (or if) to relocate

67. Order relocation

68. Direct relocation cover

- ""69. Coordinate changes in TRPs, etc., after relocation

70. Order move to assembly area

71. Direct protective fire for move to assembly

72. Direct squad fire zones while mounted

73. Direct squad fire requirements while mounted

74. Direct disengagement

75. Call indirect fire required for disengagement

76. Coordinate regrouping

178
2. Armor

Tank Platoon Leader

1. Coordinate with 81mm FO (Fire Planning)

2. Coordinate with ARTY FO (Fire Planning)

3. Select firing positions for tanks

4. Select observation posts

5. Select routes

6. Select alternate positions

7. Select supplementary positions

8. Communicate positioning of tanks to the tank CDRS

9. Operate intercom/ radio

10. Supervise defensive preparations

11. Inspect for readiness

12. Approve tank commanders' firing data

13. Approve FOs fire plan

14. Prepare PLT fire plan

15. Acquire targets

16. Determine when to commence engagement

17. Order FOs to adjust fires

18. Control employment of coordinated PLT tank fires

19. Operate laser range finder

20. Override gunner's traverse

21. Fire 50 CAL MG

22. Decide when to (if) relocate

23. Control formations on the move

24. Adjust indirect fires

25. Issue fragmentary orders

26. Issue spot reports

Tank Commander

27. Coordinate with gunner

28. Coordinate with driver

29. Occupy firing position

30. Plan fire control measures

31. Escort PL or TM CDR during inspection

32. Report enemy sightings

33. Acquire targets

34. Engage targets on order

35. Adjust indirect fires

36. Operate laser range finder

37. Issue crew fire commands

38. Fire 50 CAL MG

39. Decide when to (or if) relocate

40. Control driver actions when moving

41. Transmit spot reports to tank PL LDI

179

, ,

: a - % I' A , } ',, ,.. ,.- . . !, ... - . . . .... .. .. .. .. . .. . . . ,j. - ,- '
Tank Gunner

42. Acquire targets

43. Track targets

44. Receive fire commands from TK CDR

45. Fire main gun

46. Fire COAX MG

Tank Loader

47. Load COAX MG

* 48. Load 50 CAL MG

49. Handle main gun rounds

50. Load selected rounds

51. Conduct WPN safety checks

52. Conduct commo operation checks

53. Set head space and timing on 50

54. Operate breech mechanism

55. Operate fire/safety switch

56. Advise gunner when COAX and main gun can fire

57. Conduct immediate action to correct COAX malfunction

58. Unload unoperational main gun rounds

3. FIST

FIST Chief

1. Receive orders and plans from TM CDR

2. Coordinate with TM CDR

3. Coordinate with PLs

4. Coordinate with FSO

5. Select observation posts

6. Plan WPN SYS, round, FUZE, MOE, & MOC for each target

7. Operate laser locator-designator

8. Orient for direction

9. Determine exact position on the ground

10. Adjust corrective fires

. 11. Engage targets of onportunity

12. Adjust CLGP (laser)

13. Determine when to request end of mission

14. Adjust ICM mission

15. Adjust counterfire mission

16. Adjust immediate suppression

17. Approve FO calls for fire

18. Redirect FO calls for fire

180

~- - -- - - . - . . - .: -- . -*'.L " *" - "' ' " .* " . .. . . '- ' . . . , . W
e.y. 19. Request FSO provide GS artillery support

20. Adjust TACAIR

21. Adjust high burst

22. Adjust attack helicopters

23. Adjust mortars

24. Adjust illumination

25. Adjust danger close

26. Adjust multiple missions

27. Report target engagement results

28. Order relocation of FIST

29. Relay calls for fire

Forward Observer

30. Receive plans and orders from FIST Chief

31. Receive plans and orders from PL

32. Coordinate with FIST Chief

33. Coordinate with PL

34. Coordinate with FDC

35. Select observation posts

36. Operate laser locator-designator

t 37. Orient for direction

38. Determine exact location on the ground

39. Acquire targets

40. Determine range of target

41. Determine direction of target

42. Engage targets of opportunity

43. Adjust CLGP

44. Determine when to request end of mission

45. Adjust ICM missions

46. Adjust counterfire missions

47. Adjust immediate sunpressive fires

48. Adjust TACAIR

49. Adjust high burst missions

50. Adjust attack helicopters

51. Adjust mor-tars

52. Adjust illumination

53. Adjust danger close

54. Adjust multiple mission

55. Report target engagement results

56. Relay calls for fire

Fire Support NCO

57. Receive plans and orders from FIST Chief

58. Redirect FO calls for fir-e

i{a(dio Te lephone Operator

59. Operate field telephone

.. . . . .18 1

..-..
4. Artillery

Battery Executive Officer

1. Supervise battery when it occupies a firing position

2. Lay the battery when it occupies a firing position

3. Measure and report directions

4. Control fires of the battery

5. Insure sections store, segregate and protect ammo

6. Insure ammo is distributed IAW anticipated needs of FDC

-Howitzer Section Chief

7. Insure that weapon is properly emplaced

8. Insure weapon is ready for action

9. Lay the weapon

10. Select aiming points for gunner

11. Sight to the crest

12. Order when to boresight

13. Order azimuths marked

14. Order the prefire checks performed

15. Measure and report site to the crest

16. Determine piece to crest range

17. Supervise section during firing

155mm Gunner

18. Lay cannon on initial direction of fire with aiming circle

19. Lay cannon on initial direction of fire with compass

20. Lay cannon on initial direction of fire with distant aiming point

21. Lay cannon on initial direction of fire by reciprocal lay of

another cannon

22. Verify direction of fire with reciprocal check as control piece

23. Verify direction of fire with reciprocal check as adjacent piece

24. Verify direction of fire with reciprocal check using lighting device

25. Boresight the panoramic telescope with the MAO alignment device

26. Boresight the panoramic telescope with a distant aiming point

27. Boresight the panoramic telescope with the collimator

28. Boresight the panoramic telescope using the testing target

29. Set/lay cannon for deflection

30. Refer the piece

31. Orient a map with a compass

32. Orient a map by terrain association

33. Determine present location by terrain association

34. Locate a point on a map using the military grid-ref system

182

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, , . - . .. . ,, , - .... . .:,,,;. ,-.,:. ... ,. .: .,. -,,. .... ' .' ... .. . .. . - . ... . . .. .. .- . "-, ,. .
155mm Crew Member

35. Lay commo wire to FDC

36. Connect wire to telepost terminal on vehicle

37. Emplace/recover collimator

38. Emplacelrecover aiming posts

39. Store ammo at a cannon position

40. Monitor and relay fire commands

41. Prepare ammo for firing

42. Recognize ammo types by color coding

43. Identify fuzes and fuze wrenches by type

44. Fuze the projectile

45. Set the fuze using the proper fuze setter

46. Prepare propellant charge

47. Set/lay cannon for quadrant with the range quadrant

48. Operate Ml09AI Howitzer under unusual conditions

~1i

- I

~183

,. . . .

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Unit II

Rules For Sleep Management

Begin the work phase immediately after eastbound flights to assure that

the soldier will be sufficiently tired to sleep during off-duty phase.

Before starting continuous operations, allow 12 hours for rest and

sleep.

*'Provide 12 hours of sleep after 36 to 48 hours of continuous operations,

if a normal or light work load of eight or less hours per day preceded

the period of ontinuous operations.

* Allow soldiers at least 15 minutes after being awakened before involving

them in assignments.

" When extended sleep is not possible, "cat naps" will be beneficial.

Advisable Work-Rest Schedule Under

Stressful Battlefield Conditions

Hours On Hours Off

8 8

8 4

6 6 Up to 5 days continuous

4 4 operation

16 81 Up to 30 days continuous

4 4 operation

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Ability

Vision H H S M H H H M H - - -

Hearing H H S M H H H S M - - -

Strength H H M M H H M H M H S -

Impulsion H H M M H H M H S H S -

Motor Speed H H M M H H M M S H S -

Static Precision H H H M H H H H S H S -

Dynamic Precision H H H M H H H H S H S -

Numerical Facility H H H M M M H M M - S -

Verbal Facility H H M M M H H S S - - -

Memory H H H M H M H M S - - -

Orientation H M M M H M M S S - - -

Reasoning H H H H H M M M S - S -

Perceptual Speed H H H H H H H M S - - -

Social Coordination H M H M H S S - S - H H

Communication H M H S H S S S S M

S = Slight

M = Moderate

H = High

-193

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