Art of War Papers

 

 US Army Command and General Staff College Press

 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

 

Matthew D. Marfongelli

Major, US Army

 

The United States and the British Commonwealth

 in Korea, 1950-1953: 

A Critical Study of the Origins of 

Joint Publication 3-16, 

Multinational Operations
Cover images:

Patch of the Eight US Army from Army Quartermaster Museum, 

Fort Lee, VA. http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/korea/ (accessed 

20141216).

Patch of the 1st Commonwealth Division. Illustration by Robin Kern, 

Combat Studies Institute. 

United Nations Service Medal for Korea from US Naval History and 

Heritage Command. http://www.history.navy.mil/medals/korea.htm 

(accessed 20141216).
The United States and the British Commonwealth 

in Korea, 1950-1953: 

A Critical Study of the Origins of 

Joint Publication 3-16, 

Multinational Operations

Matthew D. Marfongelli, Major, US Army

M.A., Norwich University, Northfield, 

Vermont, 2011

US Army Command and General Staff College Press

An imprint of the Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Marfongelli, Matthew D.

 The United States and the British Commonwealth in Korea, 1950-1953 : a critical study of the origins of Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational operations / by 

Matthew D. Marfongelli, Major, US Army, M.A., Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont, 2011.

 pages cm. -- (Art of war papers)

 ISBN 978-0-9891372-7-0

 1. Korean War, 1950-1953--Great Britain. 2. Combined operations (Military 

science)--Case studies. 3. Korean War, 1950-1953--United States. 4. United 

States--Military relations--Great Britain. 5. Great Britain--Military relations-

-United States. 6. Military doctrine--United States--History--20th century. I. 

Title. II. Title: Critical study of the origins of Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational operations. 

 DS919.3.M37 2014

 951.904’240973--dc23

 2014023033

First Printing January 2015

Layout and Design by 

Elizabeth J. Brown

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Command and General Staff College Press 

publications cover a wide variety of military topics. 

The views expressed in this publication are those of 

the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. CGSC 

Press is an imprint of Combat Studies Institute Press. 

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The seal of the Command and General Staff College authenticates this document as an official publication of CGSC Press. It is prohibited to use CGSC’s official seal on any republication without the express written 

permission of the Commandant, CGSC.
iii

Abstract

Future American military operations, be they high-intensity combat, 

peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter-insurgency, or otherwise, are 

likely to require multinational contributions. This requirement is due to 

several possible considerations, to include limited American military resources or the need to demonstrate legitimacy for an operation through 

international participation. America’s first opportunity to lead a coalition 

as a superpower occurred during the 1950-1953 Korean War. Its coalition 

faced a war it did not want. Additionally, the coalition included multinational components that were not necessarily familiar with each other’s 

operational practices and tactics. Finally, the coalition made war by employing limited means to achieve limited ends. These criteria are likely 

to exist at the outset of future coalition operations. Joint Publication (JP) 

3-16, Multinational Operations is the United States military’s doctrinal 

foundation for the conduct of coalition operations. The Harry S. Truman 

administration did not have doctrine in 1950 to guide its conduct as a 

coalition leader. Therefore, this thesis seeks to identify the influence of 

the American experience in building and leading a coalition in Korea on 

current doctrine.
iv

Acknowledgements

I am deeply indebted to my wife, Sarah. Her patience, support, and 

understanding allowed me to feel slightly less guilty regarding the demands placed on my time by research and writing. I am incredibly thankful 

to Dr. Janet Valentine, my committee chair, for taking me on as a MMAS 

candidate and for her patience when I initially struggled to turn mounds of 

research into writing. Additional thanks go to COL Thomas Hanson, Ph.D. 

and Dr. Nicholas Murray. Their standards and guidance greatly improved 

my research and writing skills and turned this product into its current 

form. Regarding COL Hanson, thank you for helping me complete a circle 

began during my undergraduate years. I would also like to thank Dr. Dean 

Nowowiejski for selecting me as an Art of War Scholar. The Scholars program challenged me in more ways than I thought possible, and I remain 

grateful for the opportunities it afforded me. My fellow 13-02 Art of War 

Scholars never failed to set high standards for each other. They helped turn 

the Scholars program into my most valuable Army education experience. I 

would like to thank the staffs at Fort Leavenworth’s Combined Arms Research Library and the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum. 

Ms. Heather Turner provided invaluable assistance with the Inter-Library 

Loan program while Mr. Randy Sowell ensured that I always found carts 

fully stocked with requested archival material upon my arrivals. Finally, I 

would like to thank the Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, specifically 

those from Delta Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry that I have had the 

pleasure to serve with in my career. Any mistakes or omissions within this 

thesis are mine and mine alone.
v

Contents page

Abstract.......................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgements........................................................................ iv

Chapter 1 Introduction .....................................................................1

Chapter 2 Coalition Development .................................................27

Chapter 3 Coalition Sustainment Part I .........................................51

Chapter 4 Coalition Sustainment and the Military 

Coalition Integration, Combat, and Koje-Do.....................75

Chapter 5 Coalition Sustainment Part II........................................97

Chapter 6 Conclusions.................................................................119

Bibliography ................................................................................143

1

Chapter 1

Introduction

Joint Publication 3-16

But listening for the trumpet, they had received instead orders to 

Korea, telling them to go and serve, not saying why.

—T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War

Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations provides to the 

joint forces of the United States military a doctrinal foundation for the 

conduct of coalition warfare. JP 3-16 originated with the consideration 

that “no one nation–no matter how powerful–can meet global challenges 

alone.”1 Future American military operations, regardless of their nature, 

are therefore likely to operate within a coalition framework. This probability is due to considerations such as limited American military resources or 

the need to demonstrate legitimacy for an operation through international 

participation. The 1950-1953 Korean War provided American leaders with 

their first opportunity, absent doctrine, to develop and lead a coalition after 

the United States assumed status as a “superpower.”2 America subsequently developed and led several coalitions. This poses the question: to what 

extent does JP 3-16 reflect American experience in building and leading a 

coalition in Korea in 1950?

The Korean War had three characteristics that merit its use in a study 

of American doctrine for coalition operations. First, conflict in Korea created a war that President Harry Truman’s administration assumed would 

occur elsewhere, such as Europe. This fact is significant because current 

instability in the world can prompt unforeseen military actions in unanticipated areas. Second, the militaries from the various contributing nations were not necessarily familiar with each other’s operational practices 

and tactics. Specifically, pre-war military maneuvers did not involve all 

coalition participants. This fact is critical because coalitions are not always composed of allied nations. Furthermore, future coalition operations 

are likely to require a rapid military presence regardless of unfamiliarity 

between coalition partners. Finally, the coalition made war in Korea by 

employing limited means to achieve limited ends. This factor is significant 

because future coalition operations, heavily dependent on political will, 

are unlikely to employ unlimited means or seek unlimited ends.

The United States participated in several coalitions prior to Korea. It 

sought and received French military assistance through an alliance during 

the American War for Independence. The United States joined the An-
2

glo-French alliance during the First World War. Subsequently, the United 

States allied itself principally with Britain and the Soviet Union during 

World War II. In these examples, the United States was not a global superpower. Therefore, American leaders were not in positions of political or 

military dominance sufficient to make and enforce independent decisions. 

Additionally, these examples reflect partnerships that originated after their 

respective wars began.

The United States did not gain French assistance for the War for 

Independence until its army demonstrated enough battlefield competence 

to assure France that victory against Great Britain was possible. American 

government and military leaders then spent much of the remainder of the 

war disagreeing with the French on strategy. The United States did not 

enter World War I until three years after it began. Furthermore, the United 

States served as an associate power, rather than as an ally to France and 

Britain, and thus was a junior member of the coalition during the First 

World War.

The 1941-1945 war against Japan is not included in this study for 

three reasons. First, as in World War I, the United States did not immediately participate at the beginning of combat operations in the Pacific 

theater during World War II. Second, World War II’s Pacific theater grew 

into “an American show” after the United States declared war on Japan.3

American leaders, thus, did not attach significance to operations that did 

not include American forces.

Third, Soviet participation in the war against Japan was not immediately available. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945. 

Japan agreed to American surrender terms on 14 August1945.4 Therefore, 

the Soviet Union participated in the war against Japan for approximately 

six days. The United States, thus, independently planned and conducted 

the majority of Pacific operations without a partner of equal status after 

declaring war on Japan. America’s situation was different in the Second 

World War’s European and the Mediterranean theaters.

America’s partnership with Great Britain during World War II, specifically in the Mediterranean and European theaters of war, represents the 

closest example to America’s coalition leadership position in Korea. The 

United States entered World War II in the European and Mediterranean 

theaters as Britain’s junior partner in men, materiél, and combat experience. The United States quickly dominated its partner in war materiél production and supplied the majority of Allied personnel to Western Europe 

by January 1944.5 Contribution levels aside, Anglo-American operations 

in the Mediterranean and European theaters occurred within an “integrated 

command structure.” In this arrangement, one member nation provides the 
3

strategic commander while the deputy commanders and staff are soldiers 

from contributing nations.6

The United States and Great Britain shared responsibility for military 

operations in the Mediterranean and European theaters. This example’s 

similarities to Korea are related to America’s growing dominance in men 

and materiél. American leaders assumed a more authoritative leadership 

role as their nation’s contributions increased during the course of the Second World War. However, they still had to achieve common understanding 

and objectives with their British partners to sustain the coalition. Leaders 

such as President Franklin Roosevelt and General Dwight D. Eisenhower ensured that American personnel acted in a manner that sustained the 

Anglo-American coalition. The Anglo-American coalition, along with the 

Soviet Union, defeated their enemy. Thus, in coalition warfare, the art of 

sustaining the coalition is as significant as the conduct of military operations.

Several factors reduced the United States’ ability to lead the coalitions in which it served prior to the Korean War. During the American War 

for Independence, for example, the French were not immediate partners 

and subsequently attempted to assert themselves as coalition leaders. The 

United States did not possess primary responsibility for the conduct of 

operations during the First World War because it joined the coalition too 

late to earn a voice of leadership. Similarly, American-Soviet operations 

in the Pacific did not last long enough to call them coalition operations. 

Likewise, the Anglo-American coalition in the European and Mediterranean theaters shared responsibility for operations. It is for these reasons 

that America’s leadership in Korea, dominant and undeniable throughout 

the entire war, is relevant to this study.

The coalition in Korea followed a “lead nation command structure.” 

Under this structure, contributing nations place their military forces under 

the command and control of one nation.7 That America, as the world’s 

noncommunist superpower, would lead the coalition in Korea was undisputed. The United States, in contrast to its previous coalition experiences, not only entered the war with, but retained primary responsibility for 

decision-making, and thus, for the coalition’s conduct of the war. Compromising with partners, a critical component of JP 3-16, became critical 

to sustaining the coalition in Korea. Specifically, United States leaders 

needed to avoid abusing their dominant leadership position in Korea to 

sustain their coalition.

Joint Publication 3-16’s doctrine is not directive in nature. Its guidance is not definitive or uncompromising. However, the publication exists 

as the current joint American guide for coalition operations. Therefore, 
4

utilizing its guidance is necessary to the development of this study. JP 3-16 

defines coalition operations as military actions conducted by the armed 

forces of two or more nations.8 Coalitions, thus, are multinational in composition. Coalition partners are potentially already members of an existing 

alliance, a structure typically permanent in nature. Non-allied nations can 

also contribute military forces to coalitions. A coalition, thus, is an organization created by “ad hoc agreement...for common action.”9

 Such an 

organization, composed of members of the United Nations (UN), served 

under American leadership in the Korean War.

The 1950-1953 Korean War reflects a coalition formed on an ad hoc 

basis for common action. Of the 16 nations contributing forces to Korea, 

the most relevant to this study include the United States, Great Britain, 

Canada, and Australia. American relationships with other members of the 

“English-speaking world”10 before the Korean War are significant areas 

of focus in this study. Great Britain, Canada, and Australia were critical 

American partners during and after the Second World War. Great Britain 

shared a “special relationship” with the United States.11 Canada and Australia shared common histories with the United States as former British 

colonies. Furthermore, Canada’s proximity to the United States and Australia’s efforts to improve its diplomatic and military relations with the 

United States after 1945 merit these nations’ inclusion in this study.

JP 3-16 promotes four tenets for the conduct of coalition operations.12 They are respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, and patience. 

Respect advises American forces to acknowledge that a partner’s national 

prestige and honor are “as important...as combat capability” and the size 

of its contribution.13 Therefore, American political and military should respect multinational contributions regardless of size. Additionally, partners 

should be included in planning and decision-making regardless of contribution size or type. Including partners in these deliberations helps build 

the second tenet. Rapport recommends that leaders at all levels develop 

teamwork to achieve unity of effort with partners of various nationalities. 

Unity of effort means that all partners work together to achieve the same 

objective. Achieving unity of effort, therefore, is critical to sustaining a 

coalition until its mission is complete.

Knowledge of partners is JP 3-16’s third tenet. It encourages American military leaders to dedicate similar if not more time and effort to 

understand their coalition partners’ perspectives and histories as they do 

to understanding the enemy’s capabilities and tactics. This effort demonstrates appreciation for partner contributions and, thus, enhances unity of 

effort. Patience is JP 3-16’s fourth tenet. It is included to remind coalition leaders of their responsibility to understand considerations such as 
5

the reasons behind the restrictions a contributing nation may place on the 

employment of their forces. This tenet requires a significant investment of 

time to develop trust and cohesion with coalition partners.

In addition to the four tenets, JP 3-16 provides additional guidance 

for coalition development and leadership. First, it states that political considerations typically motivate a nation’s decision to contribute military 

forces to a coalition.14 States may decide to join an American led coalition 

for the mere purpose of showing their flag alongside that of the United 

States. Therefore, nations typically contribute forces to coalitions to support long-term national objectives. In American led coalitions, these objectives are likely to include stronger relations with the United States upon 

completion of the coalition’s mission.

This guidance aligns with the tenet of respect for national prestige. 

Nicaragua, for example, was the second member of the UN to announce 

its intention to provide ground forces to Korea.15 International expectations for Nicaragua to contribute substantial combat forces were minimal. 

However, Nicaragua’s announcement demonstrated its solidarity with the 

world’s noncommunist superpower. Therefore, American leaders had to 

respect its offer regardless of the reason behind it.

Joint Publication 3-16 also cautions against expecting automatic 

contributions from current allies. Its warning is relevant to the American 

military. JP 3-16 identifies the possibility that financial or political restrictions may prevent allies from contributing to an ad hoc force. For example, 

Great Britain was an American ally in June 1950. Britain had yet to offer 

specific contributions to Korea when Nicaragua announced its intentions 

on 19 July 1950. The deployment of substantial British military forces to 

areas such as Malaya and Greece caused this delay.16 Therefore, American 

leaders should have recognized Britain’s limitations and thereby avoid expectations of automatic British contributions.

Coalition leaders, therefore, must respect the fact that political objectives motivate a state’s decision to contribute or withhold forces from the 

coalition. Furthermore, political considerations are also likely to affect the 

timing behind a nation’s contribution of forces. For example, Australia’s 

government announced that it would contribute forces to Korea one hour 

before the British government announced similar intentions.17 The Australian government rushed its announcement to beat the British and demonstrate Australia’s reliability to the Truman administration. Australia’s haste 

supported its political goals.

Joint Publication 3-16’s guidance additionally emphasizes building “mutual confidence” between contributing nations to ensure coalition 

success.18 Mutual confidence represents a critical requirement to building 
6

unity of effort between coalition members. General of the Army Dwight 

D. Eisenhower highlighted mutual confidence as a concept basic in nature 

but critical to a coalition’s ability to accomplish its mission.19 For example, 

contributors to a coalition operating in a “lead nation” command structure 

should have confidence in the lead nation’s resolve to accomplish the coalition mission. Additionally, military personnel should have confidence 

in their partners’ ability to contribute militarily to the coalition’s mission. 

Coalition operations are unlikely to achieve success if contributing members cannot achieve unity of effort through mutual confidence.

Joint Publication 3-16 additionally recommends that the coalition 

commander account for capability differences between contributing nations. This concept parallels the tenet of knowing one’s partners. National 

laws, military doctrine and weapons, culture, religion, language, and political structures and ideologies are not necessarily military capabilities. 

However, they are but a few of the differences likely to exist between coalition partners. Significantly, they influence the means a nation’s military 

force pursues to make war. Coalition leaders, political or military, are thus 

obliged to account for those differences in their planning and decisionmaking.

American coalition doctrine also warns coalition leaders to recognize their limitations regarding areas such as command authority and operational employment. Related to the tenet of patience, leaders must respect 

and consider matters such as their partners’ national caveats. For example, 

an individual’s position as a coalition commander does not necessarily 

mean that they retain command authority over multinational troops in areas such as discipline. Additionally, contributing nations are likely to restrict their forces to specific operations. Nations apply these stipulations 

to support their respective policies or goals. Therefore, a coalition commander must ensure that all multinational forces exhibit sufficient respect 

and understanding for these multinational partner objectives.

JP 3-16 additionally provides two checklist-style principles to ensure 

reasonable interoperability at political and strategic levels to enhance the 

coalition’s ability to accomplish its mission. First, JP 3-16 emphasizes the 

lead nation’s responsibility to develop strategic guidance to the commander in conjunction with coalition partners.20 Strategic guidance includes defining clear political objectives and identifying likely military tasks. Outlining goals and tasks is significant. Operations with clear and achievable 

objectives are likely to receive multinational contributions. Conversely, 

operations with objectives perceived as unclear or unattainable are unlikely to receive coalition contributions. Furthermore, changing strategic 

guidance while an operation is ongoing increases confusion, reduces unity 
7

of effort, and dissuades states from keeping their military forces in the 

coalition.

The second principle found in JP 3-16 is its recommendation for the 

lead nation to define the coalition’s exit strategy and its desired military 

end state.21 These criteria are significant because they allow coalition partners to define military success to their domestic constituency. This opportunity thus increases a nation’s potential to contribute combat forces. 

Additionally, these criteria help reduce possibilities for domestic friction 

or dissatisfaction with United States policy to arise within a contributing 

nation over the course of an operation.

Guidance, principles, and tenets from JP 3-16 share many similarities with the Korean War. For example, UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel after achieving their initial objective by restoring stability in South Korea. The decision to move north of the 38th Parallel escalated the conflict 

by bringing China into the war. China’s invasion created a stalemate and, 

thus, prolonged the war. These events created conditions that challenged 

the responsibility of American leaders to sustain mutual confidence and 

unity of effort with their Commonwealth partners.

Background to the Korean War

The United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain agreed to 

divide the Korean peninsula at the 38th Parallel following the conclusion 

of World War II. These nations created the line as a temporary measure to 

begin “liquidating Japanese rule” from the Korean peninsula.22 The Soviet 

Union assumed administrative responsibility for Korea north of the 38th 

Parallel, while the United States assumed administrative responsibility for 

the nation south of that line. The Soviet Union and the United States thus 

administered the surrender, processing, and return of Japanese troops to 

Japan within their respective Korean zones of occupation. President Harry 

Truman’s administration identified Korea as a “peripheral concern” to 

strategically important areas such as Western Europe and Japan.23

The Truman administration’s perspective on Korea’s importance prior to 1950 is remarkable for three reasons. First, the Soviet Union maintained troops on the peninsula until 1948. This fact infers potential for a 

Soviet attack against Japan, a possibility Stalin considered likely “if the 

Americans continue their current policy” of Japanese economic development.24 Second, Korea is close in proximity to Japan. Therefore, a continuation of current American policy could induce Stalin to preemptively 

attack Japan and secure the Soviet Union’s eastern border.
8

American perspectives on Korea are also remarkable because of 

America’s growing antagonism with the Soviet Union. Disagreements on 

the occupation of Germany after 1945 helped to create the American—Soviet departure from a wartime alliance. Truman’s administration disagreed 

severely with the Soviets over the management of Korean affairs and Korea’s post-occupation future immediately after stationing American troops 

on the peninsula. Specifically, American and Soviet leaders wanted Korea 

to adopt their respective ideologies. If Korea truly presented a peripheral 

concern to American security, Truman’s administration should have removed American forces from the peninsula immediately after liquidating 

Japan’s forces. However, the Truman administration did not do this.

Soviet aggression in Europe prevented Truman’s administration from 

immediately removing American forces from Korea. The Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948 reflected Soviet intentions to use military force to 

achieve a favorable political solution.25 Overt evidence did not exist in the 

late 1940s to prove that the Soviets would not use their occupation zone in 

Korea as a staging location to attack Japan’s “economic, social, and political unrest.”26 Thus, it is conceivable with hindsight to conclude that Soviet 

aggression was likely to remain not isolated to Europe.

The Soviet Union did not invade Japan after 1945. However, American efforts to rebuild Japan worried Stalin. The Soviets, sharing a border 

with Korea, did not need to maintain permanently troops on the peninsula 

if Stalin chose to invade Japan. They could simply rely on the presence 

of a friendly communist government in northern Korea to position troops 

prior to an assault. It is likely that Truman’s preoccupation with Europe 

prevented him from recognizing this possibility. Regardless, United States 

troops continued to occupy the America’s zone in Korea until 1948. Given 

these considerations, it appears that American leaders were wrong to identify Korea as “strategically unimportant” to United States security.27

Dean Acheson, Truman’s Secretary of State, recommended that a simultaneous American-Soviet withdrawal from Korea occur in conjunction 

with UN sponsored Korean elections in 1948.28 Acheson’s recommendation supported Truman’s domestic and international goals. Domestically, 

reducing the American military presence and elections in Korea allowed 

Truman to demonstrate increasing global stability to the American public.

Internationally, Acheson’s recommendation benefitted the United 

States in three ways. First, a self-reliant Korea allowed the Truman administration to withdraw American troops from the peninsula without 

creating an international perception that the United States was retreating 

ideologically from the Soviet threat.29 Second, successful elections would 

depict Korea as a nation capable of self-government without reliance on 
9

foreign assistance. Thus, successful Korean elections, rather than an outright American withdrawal, presented the smallest possible risk to American prestige.30 Finally, successful elections supposedly would also remove 

Soviet forces and influence from Korea.

The Soviet Union accepted a mutual withdrawal from Korea, but 

opposed UN sponsored elections.31 Stalin argued that elections under UN 

supervision were not necessary because Koreans could achieve independence through the withdrawal of foreign forces and creating Korean solutions to Korean problems.32 Stalin likely knew that the Koreans, given 

their ideological divisions, were unlikely to achieve a Korean solution for 

a unified government. However, a divided Korea left a friendly communist 

government on Stalin’s border and, thus, ensured that potential aggressors 

could not invade the Soviet Union through Korea.33

Stalin’s willingness to withdraw from Korea, and opposition to supervised elections, demonstrated three considerations. First, Stalin knew 

his nation had to rebuild itself after World War II. The Soviet Union was, 

thus, unable to conduct major combat operations immediately after the 

war. Second, Stalin, concerned about Soviet security, did not want to 

risk the election of a noncommunist government on his border. He likely 

understood that the American zone, containing nearly two-thirds of the 

Korean population, would elect a noncommunist government under UN 

supervision for all of Korea by virtue of its majority.34 Third, he wanted to 

maintain influence in areas wherever possible for future exploitation. Retaining a communist government in northern Korea allowed Stalin to build 

a strong military force along his border and prevent the West from using 

the peninsula to act aggressively against the Soviet Union.

Truman’s administration recognized that the United States could not 

give an “unlimited guarantee” to Korean stability.35 It ignored Soviet objections and secured UN sponsorship for Korean elections. The American 

occupation zone elected Syngman Rhee and named itself the Republic of 

Korea (ROK). The Soviet zone did not participate in the UN elections. It 

selected Kim Il-sung to lead the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

(DPRK).36 The demarcation line at the 38th Parallel, created for temporary 

means, became permanent unless Rhee or Kim could unify Korea “on 

their respective terms.”37

“New responsibilities” helped to accelerate the withdrawal of American combat forces from Korea.38 Two conditions created the United States’ 

new responsibilities. First, its leaders identified the Soviet Union as a significant threat to global stability. Second, the United States was the only 

nation to emerge from World War II “stronger and richer at war’s end.”39

Therefore, it was the nation most capable of deterring Soviet aggression. 
10

From a security perspective, Truman’s administration decided that rehabilitating Western Europe’s military and financial crises provided the best 

means to prevent Soviet aggression.40 However, Truman’s administration 

quickly found its security options limited by domestic considerations.

America’s tradition of rapid military demobilization following wars 

occurred with perhaps more intensity after World War II than any postwar period in American history. Truman, after leaving office, claimed that 

the American public wanted to “scuttle their military might.”41 American 

demobilization after World War II reduced the army from 8.5 million personnel in 1945 to 591,487 on 26 June 1950.42 Clearly, demobilizing the 

United States Army reduced the Truman administration’s ability to meet 

American security commitments.

Neither Truman nor the American public effectively considered the 

reality of their nation’s new role in global affairs after the Second World 

War. The United States barely maintained adequate conventional strength 

to defend its territory. Its atomic bomb monopoly was not sufficient to 

deter the Soviet’s blockade against Berlin. Therefore, it is reasonable to 

conclude that the American nuclear monopoly would not suffice to deter 

aggressive Soviet actions elsewhere, particularly after the Soviets detonated an atomic bomb in 1949.43 Additionally, America’s rapid demobilization frightened allies that relied on United States protection.44 Therefore, 

America’s initial retreat to isolation after World War II encouraged instability in a global environment already swarming with uncertainty.

Instability in Greece and Turkey, regions of British influence prior to 

World War II, “decisively shattered” the Truman administration’s illusions 

of America’s isolation from world affairs.45 Britain’s inability to maintain 

sufficient “influence and power” to meet its traditional responsibilities 

forced Truman to acknowledge the United States’ post-1945 responsibilities to the world.46 Truman’s acknowledgement led to three critical decisions. First, he created the Truman Doctrine. Second, he initiated steps to 

begin rearming the United States military. Third, Truman’s administration 

developed National Security Council Document 68 (NSC-68).

Truman announced the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to refocus the nation to its worldwide commitments. His administration reversed its initial 

post-World War II belief that attempting to be militarily strong “everywhere runs the risk of being weak everywhere.”47 The Truman Doctrine, 

inspired by Truman’s decision to support Greece and Turkey, denied 

American diplomatic recognition for “any government imposed upon any 

nation by the force of any foreign power.” Additionally, Truman’s doctrine committed the United States to supporting democratic movements 

throughout the world. Furthermore, Truman called for a “modest” military 
11

rearmament program in 1948.49 His hope for modest rearmament did not 

hide the fact that he appeared to have recognized his military’s inability to 

meet America’s new commitment.

National Security Council Document 68 was significant to America’s 

foreign and domestic policy for four reasons. First, it turned “traditional 

U.S. foreign policy assumptions upside down” by reversing the policy of 

isolation America maintained from world affairs since the late eighteenth 

century. The United States, thus, would no longer remain idle towards 

regions threatened by communist influence. Second, NSC-68 identified a 

Soviet inclination for “proxy aggression” rather than direct military confrontation to destabilize the Western world. Truman’s administration realized that the United States needed conventional ground forces to defend 

international security. 

The third major policy recommendation of NSC-68 focused on national defense. America was technologically superior to the Soviet Union 

but inferior in military personnel.52 Therefore, Truman’s administration 

sought increased defense spending to increase America’s conventional and 

nuclear military forces, and to help Western Europe increase its defense 

capabilities.53 Finally, NSC-68 recommended that the United States eliminate previous security plans to defend select strongpoints, such as Japan in 

Asia, in favor of defending across a wide perimeter. Therefore, differences 

between “peripheral and vital interests” no longer existed.54

Truman’s staff presented him with NSC-68 in April 1950. North 

Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950. The Truman administration 

believed the invasion was Soviet sponsored. Truman felt the DPRK was 

“obviously testing” American resolve to contain communism by attacking South Korea.55 Thus, according to a majority of Truman’s administration, North Korea’s attack validated NSC-68’s assumption regarding the 

United States’ inability to rely solely on a nuclear deterrent against threats 

to global stability. Therefore, Truman’s administration needed to increase 

considerably the size of America’s conventional military forces to enforce 

the Truman Doctrine. However, Truman did not approve NSC-68’s “basic 

approach” until 30 September 1950.56 His delay was problematic. Specifically, his administration did not expect to create a credible offensive military capability through implementing NSC-68 until 1952.57

At the time of North Korea’s invasion, the United States owned 50 

percent of the world’s wealth but six percent of its population.58 The United States Army maintained only ten under strength divisions and eleven 

regimental combat teams on 25 June 1950.59 Additionally, the Department 

of Defense positioned this small force in piecemeal form to meet security commitments in Western Europe and Japan. The United States, thus, 
12

could supply immediately a substantial amount of military materiél to the 

conflict in Korea. However, its minimal supply of immediately available 

personnel limited the Truman administration’s ability to send land forces 

to Korea.

The United States Air Force was America’s only military arm immediately capable of responding to the invasion.60 However, ground forces 

were required to repel decisively the communist attack in Korea. The United States, if one combines its reduced state of readiness and the dispersal 

of its land forces, clearly could not “go it alone” in Korea in 1950, despite 

Truman’s contrary claim after the war.61 Seeking to avoid identification as 

“the greatest appeasers of all time,” Truman’s administration resolved to 

make “democracy work against its enemies” by requesting military support from members of the UN.62

The ROK was “a ward of the United Nations...morally and legally” 

after UN sponsored elections in 1948. Even if multinational contributions 

were “unimportant militarily,” as Dean Acheson later claimed, they were 

“politically and psychologically” significant to domestic American morale, and to a young UN organization still trying to establish its global 

credibility.64 Therefore, Truman’s decision to turn South Korea’s defense 

into a “decision for the United Nations itself” through the contribution of 

combat forces from UN member nations was his best option.65

It is at this point that the Truman administration’s leadership during 

the Korean War becomes comparable to JP 3-16. The Truman administration developed an ad hoc organization for common action in Korea. Truman’s leadership during the occupation of Japan provides an interesting 

precursor to its parallel in Korea. The occupation force in post-1945 Japan 

included American and Commonwealth forces.

The occupation force was an ad hoc organization. Truman used 

America’s majority of troops in the occupation force to reserve for the 

United States the “controlling voice” in Japan’s administration.66 His position on this matter contrasts with JP 3-16’s principles that advise coalition leaders to respect multinational contributions regardless of size and 

consider multinational perspectives when making decisions. Therefore, it 

is critical to analyze America’s pre-1950 relationships with three key partners: Great Britain, Canada, and Australia.

Anglo-American relations during and after World War II are significant to the Korean War because Great Britain was America’s most important partner during the Second World War. The nations’ “fraternal” 

relationship leads one to believe that the equal partnership shared during 

World War II continued after 1945 and into the Korean War.67 However, 

the United States assumed undisputable leadership of the Western world, 
13

and for military operations in Korea, between 1945 and 1950. Thus, both 

nations managed their Korean War relationship from different positions of 

power than during World War II.

The United States entered World War II with fresh troops, new equipment, and a homeland undamaged by war. Germany and Japan threatened 

American interests in Europe and in the Pacific. Therefore, the United 

States viewed the Second World War as a global struggle. Conversely, Japan threatened British interests in the Pacific. However, Germany threatened directly Britain’s “own life and survival” before Adolf Hitler declared 

war on the United States.68

Consequently, the British government prioritized operations against 

Germany over the “sideshow” in the Pacific.69 Therefore, the United States 

and Great Britain did not always agree on war strategy. These facts are 

critical because British leaders knew they would have to “rely increasingly 

on American material aid” to sustain their war effort.70 Although not publicly acknowledged by either nation, American entrance to the war almost 

immediately set the stage for a transition of power and seniority within the 

Anglo-American partnership. This altered relationship continued after the 

war.

Franklin Roosevelt served as the United States President for the 

majority of America’s participation in the Second World War. Winston 

Churchill served as Britain’s Prime Minister until Germany surrendered. 

Dwight D. Eisenhower served as the Anglo-American’s principle military 

commander. These three men brought the Anglo-American relationship as 

close as possible to “special” during World War II.

Churchill, for example, continually promoted Anglo-American unity 

as the only means to secure “the future of the whole world.”71 Neither 

Roosevelt nor Eisenhower outwardly utilized America’s growing power to 

dominate their British partners. It is reasonable to conclude that Churchill 

enthusiastically supported this relationship because he understood his nation’s growing dependence on the United States. Roosevelt appeared to 

understand the moral benefits of defeating Germany alongside Great Britain. Eisenhower also demonstrated an understanding of the positive effects inherent in an alliance.

However, Roosevelt died in 1945. Churchill, removed from office 

in 1945, was leader of the opposition in the House of Commons in 1950. 

He did not return to the Prime Minister’s office until 1951. Eisenhower 

commanded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) when North 

Korea invaded its southern neighbor. Therefore, a different set of personalities influenced Anglo-American relations from the end of World War II 

until June 1950. Similar and separate national interests influenced these 
14

personalities and shaped their relationship as the two nations transitioned 

into 1950. However, the nature of the relations, with American in a dominant role, did not change significantly during this period.

Harry Truman and Clement Attlee occupied their nations’ respective 

government leadership positions after World War II. Attlee was “anxious” 

to continue the “special relationship” into the post-war period.72 Truman, 

on the other hand, “did not share this enthusiasm” immediately after the 

war.73 Attlee found himself balancing efforts to gain Truman’s favor and 

American assistance without creating the perception that he sought such 

assistance to sustain the British Empire. Global events changed Truman’s 

opinions on Attlee, Great Britain, and America’s role in the world. Instability in Greece and Turkey, the development of the Marshall Plan, British 

colonial goals, and control of atomic energy became critical components 

of their pre-Korean War relationship.

Britain’s inability to reduce instability in Greece and Turkey forced 

Truman’s administration to acknowledge the reliance of American security 

on British and Western European stability. Specifically, an economically 

unstable Great Britain, unable to project military force, increased the vulnerability of pre-1945 British regions of influence to Soviet aggression.74

America would be required to fill all gaps left open by British limitations. 

However, Britain, along with post-war Western Europe, needed assistance 

to improve its ability to fulfill its role and obligations in defense of British 

and American security.

Truman reversed his previous position and identified Anglo-American unity as a “cornerstone” of global stability.75 His administration secured 

approval of the Marshall Plan to provide economic assistance to, and to 

reduce instability, in Western Europe. The Marshall Plan was successful. 

However, it recreated an American pattern began during the Second World 

War. Specifically, United States officials recognized Britain’s reliance on 

American support. Therefore, American representatives appeared to use 

this reality to secure British acceptance for American policies. Britain’s 

political leaders understood their reliance on American support. However, 

British government officials sought to retain some sense of equality to 

their American counterparts while maintaining independence in thought 

and action. These interactions produced tension that most commonly arose 

from the Attlee government’s efforts to retain a degree of Britain’s pre1945 influence in the world.

Truman’s decision to insure the stability of the British Commonwealth did not imply an American blank check in support of all British 

actions. Indian independence, for example, created a problem for AngloAmerican relations. Britain gained three specific benefits through its “en-
15

lightened” colonization of India. First, Indian troops increased Britain’s 

minimal supply of manpower times of war.76 Second, military bases in 

India allowed Britain to “shelter” its interests in the “oil-bearing Middle 

East.”77 Third, control of India provided an important market for British 

commerce.78 India’s significance to Britain’s stability after 1945 is obvious. Nevertheless, Attlee’s government understood that it could not retain 

India and granted independence in 1947.79

Truman did not present a united front with Attlee on India. Truman’s 

position in this example is confusing. He identified British stability as essential to American security. Britain’s control of India positively affected 

British stability. Truman’s stance on India reflected a growing assumption 

within his administration that American assistance programs allowed his 

administration to remain support selectively British interests. This knowledge continued to shape pre-1950 Anglo-American relations into the Korean War, perhaps nowhere as significantly as in control of atomic energy.

Anglo-American cooperation for atomic energy nearly stopped after 

the American Congress passed the 1946 McMahon Act. This act illegalized the sharing of classified atomic energy with foreign countries, including Great Britain.80 Unfortunately, the Act neglected several years of 

Anglo-American atomic development efforts and the combined TrumanChurchill decision to use atomic bombs against Japan.81 Therefore, the 

McMahon Act removed Britain’s co-equal status with the United States in 

an area of concern that was previously an equal Anglo-American effort. 

Furthermore, the McMahon Act inferred that Britain could not rely on 

America’s atomic deterrent to defend purely British interests. These new 

conditions did not appear to concern Truman’s administration until instability threatened Greece and Turkey.

Truman and his advisors nevertheless found it difficult to consider 

situations where “close contact with the British” on atomic diplomacy 

did not exist.82 Regardless, Attlee’s government, isolated from American 

atomic protection, decided to develop a British atomic bomb in 1946 to 

protect its nation’s security.83 This decision reflected the Attlee government’s desire to maintain independence in thought and diplomacy wherever possible. Thus, national interests dominated the Anglo-American relationship from 1945-1950.

The British Commonwealth represented America’s “most probable 

and most important allies” in a war with the Soviet Union.84 Perceptions of 

Commonwealth reliability suggests that Truman’s administration would 

seek Commonwealth support if major military operations occurred outside 

of Europe. North Korea’s invasion of the ROK presented a risk to American security interests in the Pacific. However, North Korea’s invasion did 
16

not directly threaten British interests in the region. Specifically, North Korea’s army could not immediately threaten British-controlled areas such as 

Hong Kong in June 1950.

Evidence suggests that Truman’s administration did not reciprocate 

entirely the Attlee government’s efforts to maintain the “special relationship” after 1945. Specifically, Anglo-American relations were not particularly “special” to Truman’s administration until June 1950. Truman, 

therefore, could not rely on previous American assistance to gain British support for military operations in Korea. However, Truman needed 

partners willing and able to provide any available means to defeat North 

Korean aggression. His administration eventually secured British contributions. Canada was another nation from which Truman’s administration 

pursued military contributions for Korea.

Three concerns highlighted the United States-Canadian relations 

after 1945. First, like Great Britain, security and economic development 

motivated Canada’s diplomacy with the United States. Second, successive 

Canadian Prime Ministers sought to remove at least some British influence 

from their political decisions and orient closer to the United States. Third, 

Attlee’s government attempted to maintain Britain’s political hierarchy 

over Canada. Truman’s administration appears to have pursued relations 

with Canada less from a position of superiority and more from a position 

of equality. This represents a difference to its relations with Great Britain. 

Economics and personalities appear to explain this difference.

William Lyon Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister during 

and after the Second World War, understood his nation could not remain 

dependent on Britain for military or economic support after 1945. Britain’s finances were in shambles after the war. This status inhibited Britain’s ability to trade or project military force in the world, and prompted 

Canada’s government to seek closer economic ties to the United States. 

For example, Canadian exports to Great Britain shrank from 36 percent in 

1939 to a mere 15 percent by 1946.85 Conversely, Canadian exports to the 

United States rose from 40 percent to 69 percent during the same period. 

Economically, Canada became America’s “best customer and foremost 

supplier.”86

Significantly, Truman seemed friendlier with King than he did with 

Attlee. This appearance is possibly due to Truman’s likely perception that 

King, unlike Attlee, was not seeking American financial assistance to revive a colonial empire. The Truman-King relationship thus presents itself 

as one built on mutual interests that equally supported the United States 

and Canada. Conversely, Attlee’s government appeared to beg Truman’s 

administration for assistance to support British interests. Several events 
17

and proposals between the King and Truman governments sought to enhance mutually their nations’ post-war economic growth.

Truman and King continued the 1941 Hyde Park Agreement that 

combined American and Canadian economic resources in support of North 

America’s continental defense.87 Extending this pact shows that both leaders understood their mutual economic dependence because of their neighboring geographic locations. The extension also shows that both leaders, 

specifically Truman, were initially more concerned with homeland defense 

immediately after 1945 than with European security.

Militarily, American-Canadian relations after 1945 appeared to 

benefit both nations. For example, the North American neighbors began 

a personnel exchange program whereby each nation exchanged military 

officers to “increase the familiarity of each country’s defense establishment with that of the other.”88 Additionally, the Canadian Parliament approved Recommendation 35 of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence, 

which “switched” Canada’s weapons models from Britain to the United 

States.89 This approval demonstrated the King government’s realization of 

Canada’s growing interdependence with the United States.

Canada was a nation with which the United States sustained a mutually supporting relationship after World War II. The two nations shared 

borders, were physically untouched by war, and maintained robust postwar economies. Interdependent economies, such as those shared between 

America and Canada, typically produce mutual security interests and, if 

required, military assistance. The proposals and events discussed reflect 

a united American-Canadian front for North American security. However, 

other conditions encouraged the Canadian governments to pursue greater 

ties to the United States.

Britain’s ability to secure the British Commonwealth contributed 

significantly to its dominant role within that organization until 1945. However, it could not meet its pre-1945 commitments after 1945. Specifically, 

it could not guarantee Canada’s security after World War II. Consequently, 

Britain lost its political dominance within the British Commonwealth after 

1945. Conversely, the United States, as a “superpower,” was capable of securing Canadian interests. Therefore, America’s post-1945 status made it 

“almost inevitable that Washington should...replace London in the minds 

of the Canadian people and their government.”90 However, Canada continued to share interests with the British government.

Attlee’s government created perhaps the greatest impediment to 

American-Canadian relations. It simultaneously sought to maintain its traditional authority within the Commonwealth and a high level of influence 

with Truman’s administration “while denying the dominions any such ad-
18

vantage.”91 Thus, as Truman’s administration moved to counter aggression throughout the world, the King and Louis St-Laurent governments of 

Canada found themselves still heavily pulled towards Great Britain. Additionally, Truman’s administration realized in 1947 that national defense 

“was best achieved as far away” from North America as possible.92 Its 

acknowledgement caused American-Canadian cooperation to suffer.

The purpose of discussing these events is to demonstrate America’s 

unintended isolation after 1947. It was not isolated in the traditional sense 

whereby it avoided involvement in world affairs. Conversely, America’s 

newfound ability and willingness to support democratic movements 

throughout the world, with or without capable international partners, 

explains its isolation in this example. Attlee’s government frequently attempted to influence American diplomacy involving nations with historical links to Britain, such as Canada. Economic development, Attlee’s priority after World War II, typically neglects military preparedness in favor 

of domestic stability. It appears that British decisions influenced Canadian 

thinking in this example. Thus, the Commonwealth’s minimal military 

preparedness unintentionally isolated the United States.

Attlee’s government clearly demonstrated that it considered itself the 

Truman administration’s senior partner in global affairs. It found its Commonwealth hegemony challenged soon after the Second World War by 

an Australia whose war experiences changed Australia’s perspective on 

Commonwealth membership.93 Britain’s military “weakness” in the Pacific during World War II provoked Australia’s government to seek greater 

independence within the British Commonwealth and closer relations with 

the United States.94 Specifically, the international security environment 

changed, and Australian politicians knew that the United States could assure Australian security “far more efficiently” than British or Australian 

defense forces.95 Thus, Australia’s post-1945 relationships with Great Britain and the United States are worthy of review.

Australia’s Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, did not want to remove 

Australia from the Commonwealth. However, he did want to prevent suggestions of Australian subordination to Great Britain.96 Therefore, Menzies pursued a major post-war role in the Pacific theater to increase its 

independence within the Commonwealth.97 He ensured that Australia 

represented the British Commonwealth on the Allied Council in Japan. 

Additionally, an Australian commanded the British Commonwealth Occupation Force area of responsibility in post-war Japan.98 Furthermore, 

Menzies pursued a system in which, for example, Australia “would speak 

for the Commonwealth in Pacific affairs.”99 Finally, Menzies’ government 
19

asserted itself as the “spokesman of the smaller and middle powers at the 

United Nations.”100

Menzies employed Australia’s tradition of designing its diplomatic 

and security policies “in relation to the great powers” and chased a global 

leadership role for Australia independent of Attlee’s government.101 His 

actions towards the Attlee government showed greater independence in 

action compared to his Canadian counterparts. He increased Australia’s 

autonomy within the Commonwealth, raising his nation to a near-equal 

status regarding Great Britain, through its role in Japan. His acknowledgement of Britain’s reduced capabilities spurred his pursuit of greater diplomatic and security relations with the Truman administration despite British 

efforts to remain America’s dominant partner. King and St-Laurent, on the 

other hand, appear content to uphold British positions on the international 

stage and assume that American protection was automatic, particularly after the creation of NATO.

Menzies displayed further independence in thought compared to 

King and St-Laurent regarding Australian relations with the United States. 

His government, for example, pursued a security agreement with the United States equal to the North Atlantic Treaty agreement during 1945-1950. 

Truman, for his part, was willing to engage with any peoples “whose way 

of life and whose political ideology is similar to our own [sic].”102 However, Menzies was not afraid to criticize American policies. His government 

feared a Japanese renewal of aggression in the Pacific.103 Therefore, it was 

publicly critical of American efforts to create a “U.S. bastion” against the 

Soviet Union’s eastern flank, and argued that Truman’s administration 

should rebuild Japan’s economy on Japanese merit and not for a purely 

political purpose.104

Truman’s administration found itself in an unenviable position. 

Many nations wanted closer economic, diplomatic, or security ties with 

the United States. However, nations seeking American support appeared 

unable or unwilling to provide something in return. Australia, for example, 

wanted a Pacific security pact. A Pacific security agreement without American participation, according to Australia’s Minister for External affairs, 

was “unreal and meaningless.”105 Furthermore, Australia’s pursuit of equal 

status with Great Britain within the Commonwealth likely increased the 

Attlee government’s paternalism towards its “obstreperous children” and 

its desire to maintain its status as the Truman administration’s senior partner.106 Thus, Truman’s administration received competing demands and 

requests without receiving much in return.

In comparison, Australian actions in pursuit of a Pacific security pact 

with America share similarities and differences with Canada’s percep-
20

tion of its economic interdependence with the United States. In Canada, 

King and St-Laurent understood that their national security was relatively 

safe given the American-Canadian border. If an attack occurred against 

American territory, for instance, the United States would likely assume a 

defensive posture that included Canadian borders. King and St-Laurent, 

therefore, did not have anything to lose by not bowing to American diplomatic pressures.

Conversely, the United States did not base its Pacific security plan 

on Australian stability or security. Menzies’ government, therefore, was in 

a position of having everything to gain by a security pact with the United 

States. However, it had much to lose if Truman’s administration chose not 

to tie itself to Australian defense. These realities shaped events as Truman’s administration developed a coalition for Korea. However, one example demonstrates mutual American-Commonwealth interests.

Truman’s administration united with the Commonwealth governments to pursue collectively “an international control system” for atomic 

energy.107 The Soviet Union put forth a proposal to the UN in 1948 that 

recommended international arms reductions. Additionally, the Soviets 

proposed that all nations reduce by one-third their military forces. Furthermore, they called for the prohibition of atomic weapons “as weapons 

intended for the aims of aggression and not for those of defense.”108 Soviet 

timing in this example is interesting because the United States remained 

the sole possessor of atomic weapons, and Soviet military forces surpassed 

in size the combined American, British, Canadian, and Australian forces.

The Western nations understood the hypocrisy of the Soviet’s suggestion. However, they had to respond to the proposal lest the Soviets 

achieve a moral high ground in Western public opinion.109 Great Britain, 

Canada, and Australia specifically waited for a “strong, blunt” speech 

from the United States before responding to the Soviet proposal. The 

Commonwealth’s collective inclination to wait on an American response 

in times of uncertainty and political volatility after 1945, in addition to its 

economic and security concerns, demonstrated a disposition that waited 

for Truman’s administration to take a lead position on important matters. 

The Commonwealth repeated this pattern of subordination to the United 

States after 25 June 1950.

Truman believed that the world was “closer to a permanent peace” 

in June 1950 than at any time since 1945.111 North Korea’s invasion of 

South Korea proved him incorrect. Truman and his advisors knew their 

military forces needed assistance to repel effectively North Korea’s aggression. Unfortunately, they found in their allies political, economic, and 

military limitations. Additionally, Truman’s administration perceived a 
21

strong Commonwealth willingness to let the United States assume “the 

lion’s share” of the burden.112 Therefore, Truman and Acheson required 

significant and insightful diplomatic measures to develop a coalition and 

meet the newest threat to world peace.
22

Notes

1. The President, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White 

House, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed 14 August 2013), 1.

2. Lawrence Freedman, “Introduction,” in British Foreign Policy, 1945-65, 

ed. Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 2.

3. M. L. Dockrill, “The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the 

Korean War, June 1950-June 1951,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944) 62, no. 3 (Summer 1986): 459.

4. Rufus E. Miles Jr., “Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million 

American Lives Saved,” International Security 10, no. 2 (Autumn 1985): 129.

5. M. A. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 1945-1951 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), 19.

6. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational 

Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), xii.

7. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16, xii.

8. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16, I-1.

9. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16.

10. Winston S. Churchill, Blood, Sweat, and Tears (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1941), 447.

11. Gordon A. Craig, “The Political Leader as Strategist,” in Makers of 

Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 

501.

12. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2007), I-3 – I-4.

13. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16, ix.

14. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16, I-1.

15. U.S. Department of State, World Reaction to Korean Developments, 

No. 22, July 19, 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

16. U.S. Department of State, Message from Mr. Attlee to the President, 6 

July 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

17. Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1988), 35.

18. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2007), I-3.

19. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2007), I-3.

20. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2007), A-1.

21. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2007), A-3.

22. Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 

1971), 1.

23. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 58.

24. John Lewis Gaddis, 72.

25. John Lewis Gaddis.

26. Thomas E. Hanson, Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve 

of the Korean War (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 16.

27. D. Clayton James with Anne Sharpe Wells, Refighting the Last War: 
23

Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953 (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 2.

28. Acheson, The Korean War, 2.

29. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume II: Years of 

Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1956), 326.

30. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs of the United States 1948, 

General; The United Nations, vol. 1, Part Two (Washington, DC: United States 

Government Printing Office, 1976), 536.

31. Acheson, The Korean War, 2.

32. Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korea War (New York: Longman, 1986), 

42.

33. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War. Liberation and the 

Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University 

Press, 1981), 121.

34. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948: 

The Far East and Australia, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: United States Government 

Printing Office, 1974), 1124.

35. Lowe, The Origins of the Korea War, 47.

36. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 

& Company, 1967), 8.

37. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, 71.

38. Freedman, “Introduction,” 3.

39. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 597.

40. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs of the United States 1948, 

vol. 1, Part Two, 549.

41. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume II: Years of Trial and 

Hope, 345.

42. Hanson, Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War, 13.

43. Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953 (New 

York: Anchor Press, 1989), 20.

44. Freedman, “Introduction,” 3.

45. Edward A. Koldziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963

(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), 19.

46. Michael Dockrill, British Defence since 1945 (Oxford, UK: Basil 

Blackwell, 1988), 31.

47. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs of the United States 1948, 

vol. 1, Part Two, 547.

48. Frank Tannenbaum, “The American Tradition in Foreign Relations,” 

Foreign Affairs 30, no. 1 (October 1951): 49.

49. Walter Millis, “Military Problems of the New Administration,” Foreign 

Affairs 31, no. 1 (January 1953): 217.

50. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 

1776, 595.

51. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of 
24

Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 

1982), 112.

52. John Lewis Gaddis, 82.

53. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 

1776, 638.

54. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar 

American National Security Policy, 92.

55. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume II: Years of Trial and 

Hope, 335.

56. S. Nelson Drew, “Part I: Introduction. Paul Nitze and the Legacy of 

NSC-68,” in NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment, ed. S. Nelson Drew 

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), 2.

57. U.S. National Security Council, A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, 15 April 1950, 32. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

58. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs of the United States 1948, 

vol. 1, Part Two, 524.

59. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United 

States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 

1973), 382.

60. Russell F. Weigley, 382.

61. Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman 

(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1974), 276.

62. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar 

American National Security Policy, 112.

 63. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1950 (New 

York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), 185.

 64. Acheson, The Korean War, 20.

 65. Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman, 279.

 66. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume I: Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1955), 455.

 67. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 

1945-1951, 121.

 68. Winston S. Churchill, Victory. War Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston 

S. Churchill, compiled by Charles Eade (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 

1946), 134.

 69. Dockrill, “The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean War, June 1950-June 1951,” 459.

 70. Anthony Eden, The Reckoning (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 

1965), 368.

 71. Churchill, Blood, Sweat, and Tears, 447.

 72. Dockrill, British Defence since 1945, 23.

 73. Dockrill.

 74. Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record. The Private Papers of Harry S. 

Truman (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 104.
25

 75. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume II: Years of Trial and 

Hope, 303.

 76. Sir Reader Bullard, Britain and the Middle East: From Earliest Times 

to 1963 (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1964), 162.

 76. Dockrill, British Defence since 1945, 28.

 77. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 

1945-1951, 66.

 77. Thomas B. Millar, “Australia and the American Alliance,” Pacific Affairs 37, no. 2 (Summer 1964): 149.

 78. John Kent, “Bevin’s Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa, 1945-

49,” in British Foreign Policy, 1945-65, ed. Michael Dockrill and John W. Young 

(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 53.

 79. Dockrill, British Defence since 1945, 22.

 80. Margaret Gowing, “Britain, America, and the Bomb,” in British Foreign Policy, 1945-65, ed. Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (New York: St. 

Martin’s Press, 1989), 41.

81. Churchill, Victory, 293.

 82. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs of the United States 1948, 

vol. 1, Part Two, 571.

 83. Dockrill, British Defence since 1945, 20-21.

 84. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 

The British Commonwealth, Europe, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 593.

 85. John A. Stevenson, “Canada, Free and Dependent,” Foreign Affairs 29, 

no. 3 (April 1951): 463.

 86. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947,

vol. 3, 110.

 87. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States.

 88. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 104.

 89. John C. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian 

and Canadian Military Experiences,” Canadian Military Journal (Winter 2003-

2004): 26.

 90. Stevenson, “Canada, Free and Dependent,” 460.

 91. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, 2.

 92. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Canadian Military Experiences,” 27.

 93. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948: 

The Far East and Australia, vol. 6 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 

1974), 6.

 94. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 

1945-1951, 19.

 95. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 

vol. 6, 709.

 96. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 2.

 97. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, 3.
26

 98. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 

vol. 6, 3.

 99. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 6.

 100. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 

1948, vol. 6, 7.

 101. Harry G. Gelber, “Australia and the Great Powers,” Asian Survey 15, 

no. 3 (March 1975): 191.

 102. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 

1948, vol. 6, 1.

 103. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 

1945-1951, 160.

 104. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 

1948, vol. 6, 4.

 105. Raymond Dennet and Robert K. Turner, ed., Documents on American 

Foreign Relations, Vol. XII, 1 January-31 December 1950 (Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1951), 510.

 106. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 

1948, vol. 6, 753.

 107. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs of the United States 1948: 

General, The United Nations, vol. 1, Part One (Washington: Government Printing 

Office, 1975), 417.

 108. IU.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs of the United States 1948: 

General, The United Nations, 431.

 109. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs of the United States 1948: 

General, The United Nations, 456-457.

 110. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs of the United States 1948: 

General, The United Nations, 457.

 111. National Archives and Records Service, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, 450.

 112. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1959 (New 

York: Viking, 1987), 452.
27

Chapter 2 

Coalition Development

Resolutions, Initial Actions, and Building a Coalition

Dealing with an enemy is a simple and straightforward matter 

when contrasted with securing close cooperation with an ally.

—Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War

Examining three series of events explains the international environment following the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s June 1950 

invasion of the Republic of Korea, and the appearance of British Commonwealth ground forces on the battlefield. First, UN resolutions in response 

to the invasion demonstrated nearly unanimous international support for 

South Korea’s defense. Second, Harry Truman’s efforts to regulate initial American operations in Korea exhibited his administration’s efforts to 

procure multinational contributions to the war. Finally, Truman’s administration successfully developed a coalition to repel the communist invasion.

According to General Douglas MacArthur, the DPRK invasion 

was the first communist “challenge to war against the free world.”1 MacArthur’s comment ignored activities, such as the Soviet Union’s Berlin 

Blockade in 1948, in Europe. However, North Korea’s invasion resulted 

in the first UN operation in support of collective security. The UN Security Council, absent the Soviet Union, unanimously passed an Americansponsored cease-fire resolution a mere fifteen hours after identifying the 

invasion as more than a simple cross-border raid.2 Two days later, the UN 

resolved to provide military assistance to the ROK. Only one member of 

the UN Security Council voted against this resolution. Six members of the 

UN General Assembly’s 60 nations withheld support for the mandate that 

resolved to assist the ROK in an Assembly-wide vote.3

Supporters of the resolutions needed the Soviet Union to remain absent for the resolutions to receive approval. However, the near-unanimous 

approval of these resolutions demonstrated overwhelming UN-wide support for the ROK. It also showed that the majority of the world understood, 

as did the Truman administration, that North Korea’s invasion was a “clear 

challenge” to UN principles.4 The speed at which the UN approved these 

resolutions, and the overwhelming consent their approval received, suggested that UN members were willing and able to repel North Korea’s invasion by providing immediate military assistance to South Korea. However, this was not true.
28

Members of the UN believed that the United States was the only 

nation capable of providing an immediate military response to defend the 

ROK. The British Commonwealth, for example, underwent a significant 

transformation between 1945 and 1950, whereby members such as Canada and Australia relied on American, rather than British, security assistance. Thus, the United States received informal responsibility to lead military operations in Korea. Additionally, non-communist nations assigned 

the United States “primary responsibility” to execute the UN resolution.5

America’s assignment provided Truman’s administration with formal responsibility from a majority of the international community to lead military operations in Korea.

This assignment is justifiable with respect to one condition. The 

United States emerged from the Second World War as the West’s superpower. Its military power, though reduced after World War II, still provided the West’s most credible deterrent to communist aggression. These 

facts certainly justified the Truman administration’s assignment to lead 

operations. However, the UN’s apparent readiness to yield all responsibility for operations in Korea to the Truman administration revealed two 

critical considerations.

First, it presented a perception that UN members, having voted to 

support the ROK’s defense, were unwilling to contribute their fair share 

of the forces necessary to accomplish the UN objective. It is reasonable 

to conclude that UN members preferred that the United States provide 

the majority of combat forces to Korea. One can also conclude that UN 

members hoped that the United States could accomplish quickly the mission in Korea before non-American troops, representing the UN, arrived. 

Second, it is logical to perceive that UN members were content to follow 

meekly the Truman administration’s lead in Korea. Therefore, the Truman 

administration, receiving overwhelming support for its leadership, could 

conceivably conclude that UN members would follow willingly its leadership examples and decisions.

The United States Congress authorized American combat troops for 

operations in Korea on 30 June 1950.6 This approval occurred within 24 

hours of the UN resolution in support of the ROK. Thomas E. Dewey, Truman’s main opponent in the 1948 American presidential race, was among 

those who supported the Congress’s authorization.7 Dewey’s nonpartisan 

support was representative of the substantial American domestic support 

for operations in Korea. Specifically, more than 80 percent of the United 

States supported operations in defense of South Korean sovereignty.8 

The speed and nonpartisan nature with which the United States government responded to North Korea’s invasion suggested that UN member 
29

nations merely had to follow the leader’s example and provide military 

forces to operations in Korea. UN members overwhelmingly favored 

American leadership for military operations in Korea. The United States 

responded effectively to its UN-assigned responsibility. Additionally, noncommunist members of the UN supported strongly the repelling of North 

Korean aggression. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that citizens of 

the British Commonwealth nations knew that the effort to save the ROK 

supported international, and not just American, interests. Thus, one can 

assume that these citizens, grateful for American military and economic 

assistance during and after World War II, would motivate their respective 

governments to return the favor.

The DPRK invasion presented a significant test to the Truman administration and the UN. Truman associated aggression in Korea with 

Greece’s instability in 1947.9 Specifically, Truman believed that a communist Korean peninsula threatened the security of American allies in the 

Pacific, such as Japan, and American credibility. Truman’s decision to support Greece increased America’s global commitments and, thus, its leadership and credibility in the non-communist world. Conversely, American 

inaction or incompetence in Korea, therefore, would reduce these distinctions.

American failures to respond effectively to the threat in Korea would 

also increase domestic criticism of the Truman administration’s perceived 

weakness against communism. The United States Congress, for example, 

affixed substantial blame to Truman’s administration for allowing communists to seize political power in China.10 Efforts to respond to domestic 

criticism inspired the Truman administration’s conduct as it developed a 

coalition for Korea. However, perhaps as important to Truman as American credibility, the UN needed military contributions from as many member nations as possible. Specifically, a successful military response would 

enhance the UN’s credibility.

Truman correctly assessed the situation. The UN was a young organization in 1950. North Korea’s invasion provided the UN with its first real 

opportunity to execute the role for which its founders intended. Therefore, 

immediate military support from member nations would enhance the organization’s credibility and ensure its longevity. A rapid military response 

that effectively repelled the DPRK invasion would only further enrich the 

UN’s authority.

Conversely, minimal UN participation in Korea would present the 

organization as reliant on words rather than decisive action. Minimal UN 

participation in Korea would cause the organization’s credibility to decline 

to the status its predecessor, the League of Nations, possessed during the 
30

1930s.11 Therefore, it is logical to assume that UN inaction in Korea would 

replicate the events that followed the League of Nations’ failure to act after 

Germany began its conquest of Europe in 1939. The League’s incompetence encouraged Adolf Hitler to act aggressively against his European 

neighbors and, therefore, created conditions that led to World War II.

Truman defined operations in Korea as a “police action.”12 Specifically, he defined the Korean War as something other than war. His explanation of operations in Korea was significant. A police action is comparable 

to limited war. In this form of warfare, political leaders establish objectives 

according to national interests, military capabilities, and a strong desire to 

avoid escalating the conflict.13 Truman used the term “police action” to 

demonstrate his desire to the international community that he wanted to 

keep the war localized to Korea. Specifically, Truman defined operations 

in Korea as a police action to avoid escalating the war into a conflict with 

the Soviet Union or China.

Truman’s desire to avoid escalation in Korea was evident. For example, he denied requests from his military leaders to conduct aerial reconnaissance over the DPRK if those missions risked flying over Soviet 

or Chinese territory.14 Reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union or 

China were provocative in nature. Therefore, conducting aerial flights 

over either nation would prompt Soviet or Chinese military involvement 

in Korea. Additionally, Truman wanted the DPRK Army destroyed “to the 

maximum extent possible” before UN forces reached the 38th Parallel.15

Achieving this goal would keep the war localized to Korea and reduce the 

potential for Soviet or Chinese intervention.

Truman’s guidance is justified for two reasons. First, the limitations 

he imposed acknowledged UN fears of operations in Korea escalating into 

a general war with the Soviet Union or China.16 Soviet military participation in Korea, for example, could prompt Soviet leaders to make war in 

Europe. Additionally, initial American forces sent to Korea were incapable 

of defeating either nation in Korea. Furthermore, Truman could not depend on his European allies to make war simultaneously in Korea and in 

Europe. Second, Truman’s guidance sufficiently reassured American allies 

that war in Korea would not distract America’s focus and military forces 

from Europe.17 Truman’s regulations enhanced the credibility of his stated 

goal to defend the UN charter and adhere to American security commitments.

Unfortunately, however, Truman’s guidance unintentionally inferred 

that he did not want to place sufficient priority on operations in Korea in 

June 1950. His initial response to the DPRK invasion was strong. Nevertheless, Truman’s guidance demonstrated the potential for his Europe-
31

first security strategy to reduce American contributions to Korea. One can 

logically conclude that the Commonwealth would willingly follow the 

American example in this instance. Specifically, it is reasonable to believe 

that Commonwealth governments would resist American or UN pressures 

to provide substantial forces for Korea when the United States provided 

a small force. Sadly, the initial performance of the Eighth United States 

Army (EUSA) failed to encourage UN military contributions.

Truman’s administration rushed EUSA units from Japan to repel 

North Korea’s invasion. EUSA faced conditions in Korea that resembled 

general war instead of a “police action.” Additionally, its leaders did not 

expect to complete an organizational combat readiness certification program until the end of July 1950.18 Therefore America’s initial forces in 

Korea were substantially unprepared for combat in June 1950, and found 

themselves almost immediately at severe risk for expulsion from the peninsula. Thus, the Truman administration’s best methods to accomplish the 

UN mandate included limiting the scope in Korea and increasing the size 

of the UN Command through multinational contributions.

The Truman administration’s prompt response in Korea demonstrated to its allies its intention to contain communism.19 However, EUSA’s 

poor performance increased the allies’ doubts about America’s ability to 

defend them.20 Specifically, America’s European allies questioned how the 

United States could effectively deter or defeat Soviet aggression in Europe 

if American forces could not defeat a smaller and less-capable army in 

Korea. Therefore, it is conceivable to conclude that EUSA’s initial incompetence forced Commonwealth governments to reconsider any thoughts of 

sending their own military forces to Korea.

Evidence supports this conclusion. The Commonwealth governments continuously received “grim news” of the UN Command’s predicament in July 1950.21 British, Canadian, and Australian governments 

wanted “some idea of the American plan” to change the circumstances in 

Korea.22 However, Commonwealth nations had their own combat limitations at this time.

The Commonwealth nations’ lack of preparation for combat paralleled the United States Army’s level of military unpreparedness. Nevertheless, domestic and international considerations motivated the Truman 

administration’s conduct after it decided to send military forces to Korea. 

Therefore, it wanted its UN partners to contribute land forces to Korea. 

UN contributions of ground forces, even if “just a company or two,” could 

accomplish two American goals.23

First, UN contributions of land forces to Korea would sustain American domestic support for the war by showing the American public that 
32

theirs was not the only nation supporting Korea. Additionally, UN contributions would demonstrate the Truman administration’s effective leadership to its domestic audience. Second, UN military contributions could 

enhance the UN Command’s ability to achieve the goals of the UN mandates. Forces from as many nations as possible created conditions for more 

aggressive military operations. Thus, the Truman administration pursued 

military contributions from the UN. Specifically, it sought contributions 

from Great Britain, Canada, and Australia.

The Truman administration identified Great Britain in 1950 as its 

“only really dependable ally.” 24 The Anglo-American partnership during 

the Second War likely created this perception. Yet, Britain’s government, 

led by Clement Attlee, decided to support its ally with the ground forces it 

desperately needed one full month after the DPRK invasion. However, one 

should not assume that Attlee’s government was merely content to let the 

United States shoulder the combat burden in Korea or lacked the political 

will to uphold UN mandates. Attlee’s government had valid reasons for 

delaying its decision to send forces to Korea.

Attlee’s government faced national security concerns other than upholding UN credibility in Korea in 1950. Chiefly, it was concerned about 

Western Europe’s security. Additionally, the vulnerability of British areas 

of responsibility such as Greece and Malaya to Soviet influence concerned 

Attlee’s government.25 Attlee’s government stationed a substantial number 

of soldiers in those areas to defeat communist threats to their stability. 

Additionally, it maintained a significant contingent of British infantry in 

Hong Kong to defend that possession.26

The ability of Attlee’s government to provide land forces to Korea 

was clearly limited. Additionally, Attlee’s government needed Britain’s 

military power to respond to direct threats to British interests. The Malayan Communist Party, for example, “sought to overthrow the British 

colonial administration” in Malaya.27 This outcome was unacceptable for 

any British government and, therefore, required military forces to negate 

the communist threat.

Furthermore, Attlee’s government still required significant economic 

assistance from external sources to recover from the Second World War. 

Attlee’s government, therefore, viewed Hong Kong as an asset to stimulate Britain’s economic recovery. Thus, the Attlee government needed to 

dedicate sufficient forces to secure that possession. British commitments, 

therefore, reflected a nation with minimal capability to send forces elsewhere. A large British commitment to Korea would further strain Britain’s 

poor economic situation. According to Attlee’s government, Britain could 

only make a small contribution to the UN command in 1950.
33

However, Dean Acheson wanted the British to “set a good pattern” 

for other nations by contributing ground forces.28 He strongly urged Sir 

Oliver Franks, Britain’s ambassador to the United States, to encourage his 

government to provide troops earlier than the two months Attlee’s government considered possible.29 Acheson did not understand or completely 

disregarded Britain’s limitations.

Acheson’s demands on Britain exhibited three considerations. First, 

they demonstrated his expectations for an automatic contribution of British ground forces to Korea. Second, Acheson’s demands suggested that 

he expected the British to contribute forces to Korea simply because they 

were an American ally in Europe. Third, Acheson’s demands reflected a 

belief that American economic and military assistance for Britain after 

1945 obligated Attlee’s government to contribute combat forces to Korea.

Acheson’s behavior towards Franks did not reflect knowledge or understanding of a potential coalition partner’s capabilities and limitations. 

Additionally, Acheson ignored the national economic effects on an ally’s 

contributions to the cause for which that alliance was established. Specifically, Acheson ignored Britain’s significant economic and military investments in the NATO. Finally, his demands made previous American assistance to its allies appear conditional to future American demands.

Acheson’s diplomacy, however one-sided, stimulated the British 

government to contribute military forces to Korea. Attlee knew that his 

nation depended on American security in Europe. Two British battalions 

arrived to Korea on 29 August 1950.30 These forces arrived within a month 

of Britain’s approval to send ground forces. Thus, they arrived ahead of 

the two-month timeline projected by Franks. Furthermore, Britain provided nine operational naval vessels and promised a Marine Commando unit 

for Korea by 1 September 1950. By 6 October 1950, 19 British naval ships 

supported operations in Korea. Additionally, Attlee’s government promised to place a brigade of 7700 troops, including the two battalions already 

in Korea, on the peninsula by the middle of November.31 The British 29th 

Infantry Brigade arrived to Korea on 3 November 1950 to complete Britain’s initial force contributions.32

Attlee anxiously sought to prove his nation’s “credentials as a close 

ally of the United States.”33 He supported this objective by making Britain 

the first UN member nation after the United States to place ground troops 

in Korea. Furthermore, Attlee’s commitment of naval support removed 

some responsibility from the Truman administration to allocate forces 

to naval operations. However, diverging interests between the two allies 

arose soon after Britain’s forces arrived in Korea.
34

Attlee understood that his nation’s responsibilities to Greece, Malaya, and Hong Kong limited its capabilities for Korea. Nevertheless, he told 

his nation to “gird itself for the necessary economic sacrifices” in response 

to Britain’s contributions to Korea.34 Attlee’s comment in the face of Britain’s substantial commitments demonstrated his solidarity with the Truman administration. However, Attlee’s government continuously warned 

the Truman administration about becoming too involved in Korea at the 

expense of its credible deterrent to Soviet aggression in Europe or the 

Middle East.35 Truman’s continuous emphasis on his goal to limit the war 

to Korea appears to have remained unnoticed. Additionally, Attlee’s efforts to use his self-perceived influence with Truman, in conjunction with 

Dean Acheson’s methods of diplomacy, created three problems in AngloAmerican diplomacy.

United Nations’ objectives in Korea constituted the first difficulty. 

Attlee’s government frequently expressed its desire for the war to remain 

localized to Korea.36 “Localized” meant that UN forces fought only DPRK 

forces in Korea. Attlee’s government appeared to reverse this position by 

proposing a UN resolution, approved on 7 October 1950, that sought a 

“unified, independent and democratic Government in the Sovereign State 

of Korea.”37

The UN’s objective on 25 June 1950 was to restore the ROK government. Attempting to unify all of Korea changed this objective. China’s 

Premier, Zhou Enlai, was already warning by 1 October that China “would 

not stand aside” if UN forces advanced into North Korea.38 Attlee’s proposed resolution, thus, made war with China expected rather than possible.

Attlee’s proposal to unify Korea deviated from Truman’s goal to 

keep the war localized and avoid a larger war in Korea with either the 

Soviet Union or China. Attlee’s suggestion was particularly unsound if 

one considers that Acheson’s belief that the size of a coalition partner’s 

contribution regulated its ability to recommend policy changes. Attlee’s 

government, in Acheson’s perspective, did not contribute sufficient forces 

to Korea to warrant a significant voice in determining policy. Acheson’s 

perspective, thus, contributed to the second difficulty between the allies 

and coalition partners.

Acheson constantly referred to American majorities in personnel and 

materiél to justify his nation’s retention of decision-making responsibility. 

American dominance in these areas led officials like Acheson to consider 

compromise as unnecessary to coalition development or sustainment. For 

example, UN forces clearly needed multinational troops to enhance the 

organization’s credibility and sustain domestic American support for the 

war. However, Acheson used American preponderance to demand more 
35

ground forces from coalition partners without considering those partners’ 

limitations.

Acheson’s demands were especially frequent in the war’s early 

months. Sir Oliver Franks particularly disliked Acheson’s use of a percentage-based system to define the size and significance of a nation’s 

contribution levels. Specifically, Franks believed this method “did not do 

justice” to Britain’s contributions.39 Therefore, Franks’ argument suggests 

Acheson’s lack of understanding of, and patience for, partner limitations.

The United States provided 95 percent of the UN’s military and financial burdens in Korea.40 Therefore, Acheson’s viewpoint is understandable from an American perspective. However, coalitions do not revolve 

around the wishes of one nation. Political leaders develop coalitions for 

specific reasons. Such reasons include, but are not limited to, desires for an 

operation to gain legitimacy from the international community.

International legitimacy encourages conditions for a politician’s 

electorate to support the operation. George H.W. Bush’s administration, 

for example, developed a coalition to conduct Operation Desert Shield/

Desert Storm to legitimize operations in Iraq to the American public and 

the international community. However, Bush’s administration did not use 

American military dominance to demand its coalition partners’ blind adherence to American desires. Acheson acted in the opposite manner. His 

percentage-based method of determining contribution significance and 

unremitting insistence for additional ground forces created the coalition 

partners’ third difficulty.

In 1950, Attlee wanted to reestablish the level of influence his nation 

held with the United States during the Second World War.41 He sought to 

establish an Anglo-American military committee to determine operations 

for Korea as a means to accomplish this goal. United States leaders such as 

General Omar Bradley rejected Attlee’s proposal.42 Bradley, for example, 

argued that committees could not run wars.43 Interestingly, Bradley and 

his counterparts ignored the American experience in Europe during World 

War II. Specifically, General Dwight D. Eisenhower received orders for 

the European theater from the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff 

throughout the Second World War. Therefore, the United States and Great 

Britain utilized a committee approach to make war in Europe.

Truman’s administration clearly felt that its men and materiél dominance justified their retaining undisputed leadership in Korea. However, 

the UN sanctioned the United States’ lead in Korean operations. The coalition in Korea, therefore, operated within a “lead nation” command structure. Under this structure, one nation retains command and control over all 

coalition forces.44 Lead nation command structures are unfeasible if two 
36

or more nations share command and control responsibilities. Therefore, 

it is reasonable to forgive Truman’s administration for refusing Attlee’s 

committee-based approach because the UN assigned to the United States, 

and no other nation, primary responsibility for the Korean War.

Command structures in Attlee’s desired form are either integrated 

structures, as seen in the Second World War, or a parallel structure. A parallel command structure operates without a designated force commander.45 Constitutionally, the Truman administration could not allow American forces to operate without a designated commander. However, United 

States dominance in men and materiél, which created part of its disinterest 

in an integrated structure, could have encouraged Attlee and other allies to 

increase British contributions to operations in Korea.

It appears that Truman’s administration did not consider the possible effects of its effort to retain its lead-nation status in Korea on AngloAmerican relations during or after the Korean War. This inconsideration is 

problematic because it created tension between Truman’s administration 

and the Commonwealth governments that affected post-war diplomacy. 

Furthermore, Attlee increased this tension by seeking a high level of influence with the Truman administration while denying “any such advantage” 

to British Commonwealth nations such as Canada and Australia.46

Attlee’s efforts to restrict Commonwealth influence with the Truman 

administration appear not to have affected initially Canada’s Louis StLaurent government. St-Laurent wanted any Canadian force sent to Korea 

to fight as part of a Commonwealth organization. St-Laurent desired this 

status so that Canada could use British supply lines and reduce its war-related expenses.47 Furthermore, he wanted the UN’s “formal involvement” 

for all combat-related decisions.48

St-Laurent’s general aims aligned with specific American and British 

objectives for Korea. He understood that multinational participation enhanced the UN’s credibility. Furthermore, St-Laurent supported Truman’s 

goal to limit the war to Korea. He believed that a limited war in Korea 

would “pay an insurance premium that will be far less costly than the 

losses we would face if a new conflagration devastated the world.”49

St-Laurent, like Truman and Attlee, correctly understood that a war 

to contain communism in Korea would likely be less costly in terms of casualties and finances than a general war with the Soviet Union in Europe. 

St-Laurent’s nation shared an interdependent economy with the United 

States. Additionally, Canada’s homeland security relied heavily on American assistance. Given the commonalities in war and peace, and a direct 

reliance on American support, it is reasonable to expect that St-Laurent’s 
37

government immediately offered to contribute available military forces to 

the American-led coalition in Korea. However, this did not happen.

Interestingly, St-Laurent’s government wanted requests for Canadian 

ground forces to come from the UN rather than the United States.50 Three 

possible reasons explain this wish. First, St-Laurent genuinely wanted the 

UN organization to succeed. This reason sensibly explains his wish. The 

UN could succeed by demonstrating leadership in Korea. UN requests for 

combat troops would portray an organization that accepted its responsibilities and exhibited leadership. Furthermore, greater UN ownership of 

the coalition, demonstrated through UN-based requests for combat forces, 

would enhance the organization’s overall credibility. However, St-Laurent’s second possible reason for wanting contribution requests to come 

from the UN is perhaps more practical.

Canada had “no troops available” for Korea in June or July of 1950.51

Additionally, St-Laurent’s government had yet to station Canada’s “obligatory Brigade” in Europe as part of NATO by June 1950.52 St-Laurent likely knew of Acheson’s treatment of Franks. Therefore, it is conceivable that 

he did not want his diplomats to receive similar treatment. It is reasonable 

to conclude that St-Laurent believed that American requests were likely 

to be more confrontational and less understanding of Canadian limitations 

than UN requests. Furthermore, given to Canada’s inability to meet its 

NATO obligations and its reliance on American security assistance, American-based requests for would likely be less easy for St-Laurent to refuse.

Canada’s contributions to the world at large paled in comparison to 

Great Britain’s efforts. Therefore, Acheson’s treatment of Franks makes 

it feasible to believe that Acheson would use Canada’s non-adherence to 

its NATO obligations to demand Canadian ground forces for Korea. One 

can easily see Acheson demand that Canada fulfill its obligations somewhere regardless of location. The initial priority that Truman’s administration placed on Korea over other commitments, such as NATO, indicated 

that Acheson preferred that Canadian forces join the UN coalition in Korea. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Canada’s lack of available troops was St-Laurent’s primary reason for wanting troop requests to 

come from the UN.

Widespread popular Canadian support for the UN’ Korean resolutions also likely affected the Truman administration’s diplomacy with StLaurent’s government. Canada’s Globe and Mail newspaper, for example, 

recommended an immediate contribution of Canadian troops to demonstrate that St-Laurent’s government “at last acknowledges this country’s 

duty” to the international community beyond NATO and peacekeeping 

operations.53 Furthermore, public opinion polls showed that Canadians 
38

strongly supported the Truman administration’s quick and decisive response to the DPRK invasion.54

Strong Canadian support for operations in Korea, thus, likely prompted Dean Acheson to treat claims by St-Laurent’s government that it could 

not provide immediate ground forces to Korea with perhaps more contempt than that with which he treated similar claims from Great Britain. 

For example, Acheson told Lester Pearson, Canada’s Minister for External 

Affairs, “quite forcibly” that the UN mission in Korea was of such importance that it required all nations “contribute as much as they could to the 

United Nations effort.”55 Regardless of domestic support, this manner of 

diplomacy is unlikely to gain a potential partner’s commitment of forces.

Acheson’s desire for multiple UN member nations to contribute 

ground forces is understandable. Contributions from a significant number of member nations would validate the UN’s resolutions for Korea and 

increase its credibility. A coalition comprised of American and ROK soldiers, on the other hand, would not enhance UN credibility. Operations in 

this circumstance would support communist claims of the United States’ 

responsibility for the aggression in Korea.

Acheson’s expectations for Canadian contributions to Korea is understandable given Canada’s, compared to America’s or Great Britain’s, 

limited worldwide commitments. The United States and Great Britain supplied troops to NATO and met numerous security commitments throughout the world. Canada did not perform either of these tasks. Acheson’s 

condescending tone, however, leads one to question why other nations 

would willingly submit their forces to American leadership in Korea if 

their diplomats, and possibly their soldiers, were to receive Acheson’s 

harsh approach to diplomacy. Furthermore, Acheson’s diplomatic methods 

lead one to question his mental state.

Dean Acheson’s actions presented three considerations. First, it 

is possible that Acheson lacked an accurate understanding of Canada’s 

limitations. Second, Acheson appeared to exhibit a belief that Truman’s 

administration could dictate terms and policies to its potential coalition 

partners and its allies. Third, it is likely that Acheson’s tactics created 

a Commonwealth perception that believed the Truman administration 

would continue its harsh diplomacy after the Korean War. These possibilities were critical. Specifically, they threatened American diplomacy with 

its allies and coalition partners after the Korean War. Furthermore, they 

may possibly have reduced America’s position of moral leadership in the 

non-communist world.

Speaking “forcibly” is not a manner to engender contributions from 

a potential coalition partner. Furthermore, it is a poor manner with which 
39

to engage allies. St-Laurent’s government was primarily responsible for 

ensuring the safety and welfare of all Canadians. It never signed an agreement to provide military forces to participate in UN military operations. 

Canada’s limitations, whether or not Acheson perceived them as real, were 

valid to St-Laurent’s government. Therefore, Acheson’s tactics stimulated 

resentment from the St-Laurent government for Truman’s administration.

St-Laurent announced on 19 July 1950 that the “dispatch of Canadian Army units to the Far East was not warranted.”56 William Lyon Mackenzie King, St-Laurent’s predecessor, died soon after this announcement, 

and St-Laurent’s entire cabinet attended King’s funeral. While returning to 

Ottawa from the funeral, St-Laurent and his cabinet decided to send military forces to Korea.57 St-Laurent announced that Canadian military forces 

would participate in Korea on 7 August 1950.58 St-Laurent overturned his 

initial inclination less than three weeks after his first announcement. Four 

possible reasons exist to explain why St-Laurent’s government reversed 

its original position.

First, King’s close relationship with Truman likely assisted the cabinet’s decision to provide forces to Korea. King and Truman pursued several avenues of mutual interest after World War II until St-Laurent became 

Canada’s Prime Minister. For example, Truman and King extended the 

1941 Hyde Park Agreement to combine their nations’ resources in support 

of North America’s continental defense.59 They also implemented methods to improve their respective military’s familiarity with each other.60

Sources on deliberations within St-Laurent’s government do not identify 

King’s close relationship with Truman as a primary source of its turnaround. However, the cabinet decided to send forces after attending King’s 

funeral. Therefore, it is feasible to conclude that St-Laurent’s government 

wanted to avoid damaging its relationship with the United States by an inability or unwillingness to send forces to Korea.

Clement Attlee’s announcement of British force contributions occurred before St-Laurent announced that Canadian forces would participate in Korea.61 Therefore, Attlee’s timing provides a second possible 

cause behind the Canadian government’s reversal. Britain’s limited ability to support operations in Korea did not stop Attlee’s government from 

supporting its American ally. St-Laurent could not hope to maintain favor 

with the American or British governments by failing to contribute Canadian forces.

Acheson’s harsh diplomacy likely helped remind St-Laurent’s government of this consideration. Tactics from the American Secretary of 

State, thus, constitute the third possible reason behind St-Laurent’s decision to provide Canadian forces to the UN Command. Finally, domestic 
40

Canadian support for the ROK’s defense provides the fourth possible reason for St-Laurent’s shift. Canadian newspapers and opinion polls showed 

support for the Truman administration and the UN mandate. Therefore, StLaurent, who likely wanted to continue serving as Canada’s Prime Minister, had to consider his constituents’ opinions.

Naval forces and an air capability, however, remained the only contributions Canada could immediately provide to a UN coalition that still 

“urgently needed” land forces during August and September 1950.62 By 

1 September 1950, Canada placed three naval destroyers under the UN 

command. Additionally, it provided a squadron of the Royal Canadian Air 

Force to transport American soldiers from North America to Korea.63 StLaurent’s government formally offered an infantry brigade of 6500 soldiers on 14 August.

St-Laurent formally offered land forces one week after his announcement that Canada would support Korean operations. Pressure from people 

like Acheson continued to remind St-Laurent’s government that its contributions were insufficient. Therefore, St-Laurent’s government hastened 

the deployment timeline of the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian 

Light Infantry (2 PPCLI) to Korea to answer its critics. However, factors 

other than international criticism also appear to have motivated St-Laurent’s decision to rush this deployment.

Canadian ground forces had yet to reach Korea when the Inchon 

landings occurred. The post-Inchon offensive was successful enough to 

suggest that the war could soon be over.64 Canada could not claim any of 

the credit for victory if this occurred. As a result, the Canadian government would not have a voice in a post-war occupation administration, and 

Canada would likely lose credibility and respect as a NATO ally. Moreover, St-Laurent would find his government’s influence within the British Commonwealth diminished. Furthermore, failure to contribute ground 

troops would likely harm Canada’s security reliance on the United States. 

Therefore, one can reasonably conclude that political reasons motivated 

the accelerated deployment of Canadian land forces to Korea

Canada’s air squadron did not meet Truman or Acheson’s demands 

for ground forces, but they were ignoring the critical fact that the Canadians were transporting American soldiers to Korea. Air transportation is a 

seemingly insignificant and easy task; however, its importance to combat 

operations is significant because it gets soldiers to the battlefield. Therefore, air transportation became a mission that did not require American 

personnel or equipment. Thus, Canada’s air contribution enabled the Truman administration to concentrate American air power on combat operations rather than ancillary tasks. Nevertheless, Acheson continued his ef-
41

fort to force on St-Laurent’s government a realization that it “ought to do 

what Australia...had done.”65

Australia was perhaps even more limited from a manpower perspective in 1950 than Canada. Its army, for example, maintained a mere 

14,651 troops on active duty in June 1950.66 Furthermore, the Australian 

Army was the “main Commonwealth prop” in the Middle East and still 

had occupation forces in Japan.67 Therefore, it was more occupied than 

the Canadian Army with international commitments. However, Australia 

contributed forces to Korea almost immediately. Consequently, Australian 

contributions were more “well-publicized” in the United States than Canadian contributions.68 Australia’s assistance took time to materialize but 

had “a positive diplomatic effect” on its relations with the United States.69

Truman’s administration did not treat Menzies’ government with the 

harsh diplomacy it employed against the Attlee and St-Laurent governments. Two possible reasons explain this difference. First, Truman’s administration likely believed that Australia’s limitations were legitimate. 

Acheson, for example, offered to provide Australia’s government with an 

aid package to develop its infrastructure without an Australian request for 

such an offer.70 Acheson’s offer, therefore, supports this possibility.

Second, it is rational to consider that Menzies’ government received 

less “forceful” language than its Commonwealth counterparts did because 

Truman’s administration identified greater commonality with Australia 

and its government. Neither Truman nor Acheson mentioned this consideration in their memoirs. However, the United States and Australia shared 

several security concerns in the Pacific. It is possible that Truman’s administration saw Australia as a potential bulwark in that region and, thus, 

wanted to ensure good relations with it.

Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies fretted about the effects of 

his nation’s legislative restrictions on his government’s ability to commit 

forces to Korea. However, government leaders such as Sir Percy Spender, 

Minister for External Affairs and External Territories in 1950, knew that 

Australia had to find a way to contribute forces to Korea. Spender, seeking 

a Pacific security pact with the United States, understood that Australian 

forces in Korea enhanced prospects for this pact, and he thus forced Menzies to act.

Menzies announced that Australia would contribute forces to Korea one hour before Attlee’s government announced similar intentions.71

His timing was significant for two reasons. First, Menzies’ announcement 

prompted the British to rush forces from the garrison in Hong Kong to 

Korea.72 This event, though it led to British forces arriving in Korea before 

Australian forces, provided additional multinational land forces to the UN 
42

Command. Therefore, Menzies’ announcement helped American ground 

forces on the Korean peninsula while legitimizing UN credibility. Second, 

Menzies’ timing showed immediate solidarity with the Truman administration. However, Menzies could not immediately contribute Australian 

forces to the UN Command.

The Australian Army “was not permitted to oblige regular servicemen to serve outside Australia.”73 Troops had to volunteer for overseas service. Menzies’ government, for example, could not order Australian troops 

to serve on occupation duty in Japan. Thus, Australian soldiers serving occupation duty in Japan were all volunteers. Furthermore, Australians were 

required to be at least 22 years of age to volunteer for overseas service.74

Menzies demonstrated Australian credibility and reliability to Truman’s administration in two other ways. First, he pursued legislative action to increase the size of the Australian Army to 29,104.75 He announced 

Australian contributions to Korea, for example, specifically to encourage 

his government to remove its legislative restrictions on military service.76

Second, Menzies cancelled plans to remove Australian occupation forces 

from Japan.77

Menzies’ actions clearly demonstrated his desire for his nation to 

play its part “in the defense of the free world” despite its limitations. His 

actions represented his goal to contribute significantly to operations in Korea.78 This is significant when one considers that St-Laurent’s government 

required substantial prodding from American officials to provide military 

forces. Additionally, his decision to maintain Australian troops in Japan 

revealed his willingness to meet Australia’s obligations to international security. This decision is significant when one considers Canada’s inability 

to meet a task obligated by the North Atlantic Treaty. Importantly, Menzies’ demonstrations of Australian credibility and reliability occurred at a 

time when Truman felt his nation was “receiving little direct support from 

allies.”79

One Australian destroyer, one frigate, and a Royal Australian Air 

Force squadron were operational in Korea by 1 September 1950.80 Additionally, Australia had another destroyer en route to Korea and was already 

forming two battalions of infantry. One infantry battalion was operating in 

Korea by 6 October1950.81

Australian’s timeline was very quick if one considers its manpower 

and deployment restrictions. Furthermore, Australia’s timeline far surpassed Canada’s pace. Australia’s “prompt assistance” received Acheson’s 

expressions of the American State Department’s pleasure and thanks.82

Menzies’ desire for a Pacific security agreement with the United States 
43

motivated his government to seek measures that negated its national restrictions and supported its participation in Korea.

Menzies’ actions increased his nation’s chances for an AmericanAustralian security pact in the Pacific. Acheson’s expressions of gratitude 

for Australian assistance reflected the Truman administration’s developing 

awareness of Australia’s contributions. American recognition of Australian assistance, thus, increased the Truman administration’s likelihood to 

agree to a Pacific security agreement. The signing of an American-Australian security pact in 1952 confirms this conclusion.

Australian air and naval forces arrived nearly in conjunction with 

British and Canadian air and naval forces. Australia’s ground force was 

smaller than were its Canadian counterpart. However, this critical resource 

arrived just over one month after British forces and five weeks prior to 

Canadian forces.83 Australia’s rapid mobilization and deployment reflected a political desire to show solidarity with the Truman administration. 

Furthermore, Australian forces aided this cause almost immediately by 

distinguishing themselves in combat.

Australian forces distinguished themselves in three ways. First, the 

Royal Australian Air Force’s 77th Squadron was the first British Commonwealth unit to see combat in Korea, and the first Commonwealth organization to sustain casualties.84 Third, ROK President Rhee praised the 

effects of Australian airpower on the DPRK Army.85

Australian forces distinguished themselves in three critical areas. 

First, Australia immediately provided available forces. This fact reduced 

pressure on the Truman administration to bear the entire burden in Korea. Second, by not retreating or withdrawing forces after sustaining the 

first British Commonwealth casualty, Menzies’ government sustained the 

Truman administration’s perception of Australian reliability and credibility. Third, Rhee’s written recognition of forces from a nation other than 

the United States is incredibly significant. Rhee’s gratitude for Australian 

military capabilities likely enhanced Australia’s credibility throughout the 

UN and, specifically, with Truman’s administration.

Truman’s administration pursued Australian contributions with tactics that diverged from its discussions with British and Canadian officials. 

It is conceivable to argue that American perceptions of Australia’s limitations created this difference. Regardless, Menzies’ government announced 

swiftly its intentions to support operations in Korea. Australia’s rapid mobilization and deployment of forces to Korea validated Menzies’ intentions. One may conclude that Australia’s haste to reduce its limitations 

and support Korean operations increased American perceptions of Australian credibility and reliability. Therefore, rapid Australian actions likely 
44

prevented Truman’s administration from requesting forcefully immediate 

Australian contributions.

The North Atlantic Treaty obligated the United States to support allies in Western Europe, such as Great Britain, in the event of war with 

the Soviet Union. Conversely, Australia was not an American ally in June 

1950, but merely a potential coalition partner. A treaty did not exist between the United States and Australia that obligated either to support the 

other’s national defense. The Truman administration’s reduced patience 

and poor knowledge with Great Britain and Canada reflected American 

expectations of immediate contributions from those nations because of 

pre-existing alliances. Therefore, it is possible that Truman’s administration applied different expectations to Australia than it did to Great Britain 

or Canada. Equally, one may conclude that Truman’s administration was 

simply grateful for any Australian assistance.

Australian contributions, battlefield performance, and an American 

reassessment of its security interests after 25 June 1950 persuaded the Truman administration to negotiate a security pact with Australia. The United 

States Senate ratified the security agreement in 1952. It did not contain 

NATO characteristics such as dedicated staffs, troops, or automatic commitments “in times of crisis.86 However, the Australia, New Zealand, 

United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) gave Menzies’ government what 

it sought since the Second World War. Additionally, ANZUS negated Australia’s former security reliance on Great Britain and, thus, provided Australia with greater independence within the British Commonwealth. ANZUS also heightened Australia’s status to a near-equal diplomatic position 

with the United States in relation to Great Britain. Politically, the actions 

of Menzies’ government in Korea delivered its desired results.

Logic guided Truman’s intent for operations in Korea. He did not 

want a general war with the Soviet Union or China. Truman’s intent, based 

on realistic expectations, appears to have encouraged nations such as Britain and Canada to contribute military forces to a coalition in Korea. Conversely, emotions provoked by American majorities in men and materiél 

and American assistance to its allies between 1945 and 1950 appeared to 

guide American efforts to develop that coalition. Thus, American officials 

demonstrated that they expected contributions from traditional allies such 

as Britain and Canada and acted forcefully when those nations professed 

their inabilities to meet American demands.

The Australian government presented itself as a reliable American 

partner that did not need encouragement to contribute forces. The Truman administration’s conduct gained coalition contributions from Britain 

and Canada; however, these contributions occurred at significant expense 
45

to overall diplomatic relations with these nations. Eventually, considerations such as crossing the 38th Parallel, China’s intervention in the war, 

and Douglas MacArthur’s influence increased the tension created by the 

Truman administration’s efforts to develop a coalition with its Commonwealth partners.
46

Notes

1. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: Da Capo Press, 1964), 330. 2. Building the Peace, Foreign Affairs Outlines no. 24, Autumn 1950, 1. Files of Charles Murphy, President’s Secretary’s Files, Papers of Harry 

S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

3. Building the Peace, 2.

4. U.S. Department of State, “The Conflict in Korea,” Far East- ern Series 45, Pub. 4266 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 12. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. 5. U.S. Department of State, World Reaction to Korean Develop- ments, Special Supplement, July 18, 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, In- dependence, MO. 6. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chro- nology of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, June-July 

1950, 5. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. 7. National Archives and Records Service, Public Papers of the 

Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, 496.

8. Gerald Astor, Presidents at War: From Truman to Bush, the Gath- ering of Military Power to Our Commanders in Chief (Hoboken, NJ: Wi- ley & Sons, 2006), 41.

9. President Truman’s Conversation with George M. Elsey, June 26, 1950, Papers of George M. Elsey, Harry S. Truman Library, Indepen- dence, MO.

10. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume II: Years of Trial 

and Hope, 430.

11. United Nations–Major Developments, April-June, July 5, 1950, 

1. Papers of George M. Elsey, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, 

MO.

12. U.S. Department of State, White House Press and Radio News 

Conference, President Harry S. Truman, June 29, 1950, Harry S. Truman 

Library, Independence, MO.

13. Ridgway, The Korean War, 245.

14. U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Dean Rusk (Assistant Secretary of State) and Brigadier General P. Hamilton, 

U.S. Air Force, July 6, 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. 15. Memorandum of Conversation, U.S./U.K. Discussions on Pres- ent World Situation, 20-24 July 1950, General Omar Bradley, Ambassador 

Phillip C. Jessup and Sir Oliver Franks, Lord Tedder, Harry S. Truman 

Library, Independence, MO. 16. James with Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis 

in Korea, 1950-1953, 1.

17. Dockrill, British Defence since 1945, 42.

18. Hanson, Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the 

Korean War, 18.

19. Memorandum of Conversation, Cabinet Meeting, July 14, 1950, 

Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. 20. U.S. Department of State, World Reaction to Korean Develop- ments, Special Supplement, July 18, 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, In- dependence, MO. 21. William Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations 

in Korea (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 23. 22. Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, 

Volume I: A Distant Obligation (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
47

1990), 53.

23. President’s Meeting with Congressional Leaders, July 30, 1950, 

9. Papers of George M. Elsey, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, 

MO.

24. Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume 

I: Strategy and Diplomacy (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981), 69. 25. Message from Mr. Attlee to the President, July 6, 1950, Harry S. 

Truman Library, Independence, MO. 26. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Govern- ment 1945-1951, 136.

27. Richard Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 1948-60,” in Counterinsur- gency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Ox- ford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 101. 28. Memorandum of Conversation: Proposed UK Note Relating to Increased Military Effort; China, Dean Acheson and Sir Oliver Franks, 

August 3, 1950, 2. Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, 

Independence, MO. 29. U.S. Department of State, World Reaction to Korean Develop- ments, No. 30, July 27, 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, 

MO.

30. Status of United Nations Military Assistance Offers, September 1, 1950, 1. President’s Secretary’s Files, Harry S. Truman Library, Inde- pendence, MO. 31. Status of United Nations Military Assistance Offers” October 6, 1950, 1. President’s Secretary’s Files, Harry S. Truman Library, Indepen- dence, MO.

32. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chro- nology of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, November 

1950, iv. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

33. Dockrill, British Defence since 1945, 43.

34. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 

1950, vol. 3, 1386.

35. U.S. Department of State, World Reaction to Korean Develop- ments, No. 28, July 25, 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, 

MO.

36. U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, U.S.- U.K. Discussions on Present World Situation, 20-24 July 1950, General 

Omar Bradley, Ambassador Phillip C. Jessup and Sir Oliver Franks, Lord 

Tedder, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. 37. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Govern- ment 1945-1951, 136.

38. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chro- nology of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, September, 

1950, ii.

39. U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation: Pro- posed UK Note Relating to Increased Military Effort; China, Dean Ache- son and Sir Oliver Franks, August 3, 1950, 1. Papers of Dean Acheson, 

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. 40. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I: Strat- egy and Diplomacy, 343.

41. Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth armies and the Korean War 

(Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1988), 2.
48

42. U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Gen- eral Omar Bradley, Ambassador Phillip C. Jessup, 12 July 1950. 43. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 

1950, vol. 3, 1760.

44. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2007), 

xii.

45. Chairman, xii.

46. Grey, The Commonwealth armies and the Korean War, 2.

47. Brent Byron Watson, Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry 

in Korea, 1950-1953 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 

33.

48. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian 

and Canadian Military Experiences,” 27.

49. James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied (To- ronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 62. 50. U.S. Department of State, World Reaction to President’s State- ment, No. 2, June 29, 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. 51. Memorandum of Conversation: Formosa; Contribution of Troops 

by Canada, Dean Acheson and Lester B. Pearson, July 29, 1950, Papers of 

Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

52. Grey, The Commonwealth armies and the Korean War, 31.

53. Watson, Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea,

1950-1953, 6.

 Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and 

Canadian Military Experiences,” 25.

54. John Melady, Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War (Toronto: Mac- Millan of Canada, 1983), 29. 55. Memorandum of Conversation: Formosa; Contribution of Troops 

by Canada, Dean Acheson and Lester B. Pearson, July 29, 1950, Papers of 

Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

56. Watson, Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea,

1950-1953, 6.

57. Melady, Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, 37.

58. Watson, Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 

1950-1953, 6.

59. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 

1947, vol. 3, 110.

60. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 

104.

61. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53, Volume I: Strat- egy and Diplomacy, 93.

62. U.S. Department of State, Report of the United Nations Com- mand Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 August 1950, transmit- ted by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative to the United 

Nations, to the President of the Security Council, September 18, 1950, 8. 

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. 63. Status of United Nations Military Assistance Offers, September 

1, 1950, 1.

64. Melady, Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, 47.

65. Memorandum of Conversation: Formosa; Contribution of Troops 

by Canada, Dean Acheson and Lester B. Pearson, July 29, 1950, Papers of 

Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. 66. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian 

and Canadian Military Experiences,” 27.
49

67. Geoffrey Berridge, “Britain, South African and African Defence, 1949-55,” in British Foreign Policy, 1945-56, ed. Michael Dockrill and 

John W. Young (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 104. Blaxland, “The 

Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Canadian Military Ex- periences,” 27. 68. Glenn St. John Barclay, Friends in High Places: AustralianAmerican Diplomatic Relations since 1945 (Melbourne: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1985), 45. 69. Albert Palazzo, The Australian Army: A History of its Organisa- tion (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 218.

70. Memorandum of Conversation: Korea; Migration Program; Re- quirement for Funds, between Dean Acheson and Robert Menzies, July 

31, 1950, Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, Indepen- dence, MO.

71. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, 35.

72. Grey, 57.

73. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53, Volume I: Strat- egy and Diplomacy, 33.

74. Grey, The Commonwealth armies and the Korean War, 36.

75. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian 

and Canadian Military Experiences,” 27. 76. Blaxland, 26.

77. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy in the Korean Crisis (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950), 33. 78. Memorandum of Conversation: Aid to Korea, Truman, Menzies, 

Acheson, July 28, 1950, Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Li- brary, Independence, MO. 79. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53, Volume I: Strat- egy and Diplomacy, 111. 80. Status of United Nations Military Assistance Offers, 1 September 

1950, 1.

81. Status of United Nations Military Assistance Offers, October 6, 

1950, 1.

82. Memorandum of Conversation: Military Support for Southern 

Korea, June 29, 1950, Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, 

Independence, MO.

83. Barclay, Friends in High Places: Australian-American Diplo- matic Relations since 1945, 45.

84. George Odgers, Across the Parallel: The Australian 77th Squad- ron with the United States Air Force in the Korean War (Melbourne: Wil- liam Heinemann, 1953), 28.

85. Syngman Rhee, letter to Harry S. Truman, July 17, 1950, Presi- dent’s Secretary’s Files, 2. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. 86. Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-

1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 120-121.

51

Chapter 3 

Coalition Sustainment Part I

Inchon, Crossing the 38th Parallel, China, and MacArthur

In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory.

—Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences

President Harry S. Truman’s administration, having built a coalition 

for Korea, now needed to sustain that ad hoc organization. Sustaining a coalition is more critical than developing a coalition. Three series of events 

shaped operations in Korea following Commonwealth decisions to contribute forces to combat operations. The UN landings at Inchon and subsequent drive to and beyond the 38th Parallel represent the first series of 

events. China’s entrance into the Korean War constitutes the second series 

of events. Harry Truman’s subsequent dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur represents the third series of events. Identified episodes increased 

dissension between Truman’s administration and its coalition partners.

The Inchon landings occurred on 15 September 1950.1 UN forces 

quickly gained the strategic advantage following the landings. Political 

considerations that required swift decisions rapidly arose. The subsequent 

UN offensive brought American-led forces closer to the border at the 38th 

Parallel between North and South Korea. The UN operations that continued across the 38th Parallel increased the risk of a wider war because they 

were likely to encourage Soviet or Chinese intervention. Chinese forces 

entered Korea in late October 1950.

Chinese intervention was avoidable before October 1950. The original UN mandate resolved to defend the ROK’s sovereignty. The UN Command’s strategic objective sought to control militarily South Korean territory. Controlling ROK territory created conditions that prevented North 

Korean forces from operating in that territory. Reaching the 38th Parallel 

ensured the defeat of North Korea’s military. Therefore, the UN Command accomplished the UN objective by reaching the 38th Parallel. This 

does not insinuate that China would not have eventually invaded Korea to 

restore a friendly government on its border. However, China likely would 

not have sent military forces into Korea had the UN Command remained 

at the 38th Parallel, specifically if the UN Command retained its troops in 

South Korea to develop the ROK army and establish a formidable defensive line near the 38th Parallel.

Commonwealth nations contributed forces to the American-led coalition in Korea to protect the ROK’s sovereignty. Great Britain, Canada, 
52

and Australia did not join the UN Command to unify all of Korea under 

one government. They wanted to accomplish the UN mandate and legitimize the UN organization. Therefore, Truman, changing the strategic objective by seeking to unify the Korean Peninsula, unnecessarily created 

conditions that reduced his administration’s ability to sustain the coalition 

it laboriously built.

By 12 July 1950, the Truman administration remained undecided 

regarding the UN’s military courses of action “after the North Koreans 

have been driven” across the 38th Parallel.2 Truman’s Administrative Assistant wrote the memorandum containing this quote nearly two months 

before the Inchon landings. Thus, Truman’s assistant wrote this memo 

while American land forces maintained a perilous situation in Korea. The 

UN Command remained incapable of protecting the ROK’s sovereignty 

at that time.

American indecision provides two considerations. First, it exhibited 

an American assumption that the UN Command would eventually drive 

the DPRK Army back across the 38th Parallel. Truman’s assumption, 

therefore, reflected either his total confidence in the UN Command’s ultimate success or a racist attitude against the DPRK. It is certainly wise 

for strategists and decision-makers to ponder future operations. To ignore 

future contingencies is irresponsible leadership. However, political and 

military leaders cannot afford to assume success, as Truman’s assistant’s 

memo suggests, if their forces are at risk for expulsion from the battleground. The EUSA faced this situation in July 1950.

The second consideration Truman’s indecision portrays is his failure 

to consider coalition partner thoughts and concerns regarding his decision. 

Truman cannot receive fault completely for this failure. The United States 

contributed the majority of land forces to Korea. The Truman administration’s position of leadership in Korea provided it with sole responsibility 

for the war’s outcome. Thus, one can reasonably conclude that Truman 

identified multinational contributions, such as Britain’s two battalions, as 

insufficient to warrant those nations’ wishes to influence his administration’s decisions.

Truman’s administration received “primary responsibility” to lead 

operations in Korea from the UN.3 However, the British and Australian 

governments had already announced intentions to send military forces 

to Korea by 12 July 1950. Great Britain and Australia became members 

of the UN Command by way of their military contributions. Therefore, 

Truman’s administration should have included immediately its Commonwealth partners’ opinions once it began pondering the decision to cross the 

38th Parallel. Inclusion of this sort would ensure that American decision-
53

making considered the concerns of nations that contributed forces. Furthermore, inclusion of other nations’ considerations would confirm that 

those nations possessed sufficient political will and domestic support to 

continue contributing forces to operations in Korea, even if the military 

situation changed.

Truman’s administration did receive British input on the decision to 

cross the 38th Parallel in late July 1950. The participants in these meetings determined that responsibility for operations beyond the 38th Parallel 

rested with the UN.4 However, Commonwealth members such as Canada 

wanted assurance that operations in Korea were not “merely an endorsement by the United Nations of unilateral action by the United States.”5

Specifically, these nations wanted to ensure that Truman’s decisions created conditions that supported the coalition’s ability to accomplish the UN 

mission. Thus, Commonwealth governments did not want Truman’s administration to pursue courses of action likely to serve purely American 

interests and risked escalating the war.

Louis St-Laurent, Canada’s Prime Minister, correctly pursued such 

assurances. Commonwealth nations contributed military forces to the UN 

Command to restore the ROK government. Commonwealth populations 

supported this cause. The potential for Truman’s administration to act unilaterally in Korea risked the goal for which Commonwealth leaders contributed forces to Korea. Extending operations beyond the 38th Parallel 

risked a wider war with China or the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Commonwealth political leaders could not guarantee that their constituents 

would support a UN advance into the DPRK.

A resolution sanctioned by the UN determined that defending the 

ROK was a vital interest to global stability. In the Korean War example, 

crossing the 38th Parallel meant changing the UN’s objective. Changing 

a coalition objective, or considering changing it, is problematic. A change 

of objectives is likely to reduce coalition unity. Additionally, changing the 

objective lessens the potential for non-participating nations to contribute 

forces. Furthermore, changing objectives is likely to reduce the willingness of current contributors to continue providing military forces for purposes beyond the initial objective.

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) felt that crossing the 

38th Parallel was legally consistent with the UN mission to “restore peace 

and unity to Korea.”6 The JCS used its perception of the resolution to justify its recommendation to allow UN forces to invade the DPRK. Therefore, 

Truman authorized Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall to advise 

MacArthur that he should “feel unhampered tactically and strategically 
54

to proceed north of the 38th Parallel.”7 MacArthur willingly followed his 

commander-in-chief’s order.

The JCS recommendation is sensible from a military perspective. 

The DPRK government’s existence posed a permanent threat to peace 

on the Korean peninsula. Thus, destroying the DPRK’s army reduced the 

risks the DPRK presented to Korean and global stability. Furthermore, the 

UN Command maintained the military advantage and appeared capable 

of destroying the DPRK army. Additionally, denying the UN Command 

authority to cross the 38th Parallel prevented any hope of unifying Korea 

according to the UN resolution.

The JCS ignored the political consequences of its recommendation. 

It is conceivable that the Commonwealth governments did not share the 

Joint Chief’s interpretation of the UN’s resolution. Therefore, the JCS recommendation ignored the likely Commonwealth perspective that restoring peace to Korea meant merely the restoration of the ROK government. 

America’s senior military leaders forgot that they represented a nation that 

was one of many conducting operations in Korea.

Truman’s administration could not depend on the Commonwealth to 

follow blindly American policies. The UN Command was going to face 

difficulty in northern Korea, with or without Chinese interference, due to 

the region’s restrictive terrain and winter weather. Eventually, Commonwealth war weariness would increase through these military difficulties 

and force Commonwealth governments to reconsider their contributions. 

Thus, the JCS recommendation created potential for American forces to 

find themselves fighting in Korea with only ROK forces.

Truman’s decision to cross the 38th Parallel created two problems. 

Syngman Rhee, the ROK President, represented Truman’s first concern. 

Truman’s second difficulty centered on the imprecise guidance he provided to MacArthur. Truman’s guidance was vulnerable to MacArthur’s 

misinterpretation and, therefore, made difficult Truman’s ability to sustain 

the UN coalition after its military forces crossed the 38th Parallel.

Rhee’s government had a poor reputation internationally prior to 25 

June 1950. Clement Attlee’s government, for example, identified the ROK 

as a “totalitarian police state” for Rhee’s indifference to constitutional processes.8

 Regardless, Rhee wanted to unify all of Korea under his control. 

The ROK President’s goal, thus, turned him into an even more difficult 

ally for Truman and the Commonwealth governments. Rhee, for example, 

personally rejected peace proposals from the DPRK after the Inchon landings to accomplish his goal to unify the Korean peninsula.9

Rhee did not consult with his coalition partners when he rejected 

North Korean peace proposals. Two reasons justify his actions. First, Kim 
55

Il-Sung, North Korea’s Prime Minster, shared Rhee’s goal to unify Korea under his “respective terms.”10 Therefore, it is likely to conclude that 

North Korea’s proposals were merely ploys to buy time to reconstitute its 

military forces and resume operations to unify Korea under a communist 

government.

Second, the ROK elected Rhee democratically to serve as its first 

President. Rhee’s election occurred under UN sponsorship. Sanctioned 

democratic elections enabled Rhee to operate from a credible position 

of power. Therefore, Rhee’s situation permitted him to choose political 

and military courses of action, independent of wishes from Truman, the 

Commonwealth governments, or the UN Command, to satisfy South Korea’s national interests. Rhee’s actions likely affected Truman’s decision 

to cross the 38th Parallel. However, his conduct increased tension between 

the UN Command’s participating governments.

The UN resolved to defend the ROK from aggression and restore the 

Rhee government to power. Members of the UN overwhelmingly voted 

in support of the organization’s resolution. However, it is reasonable to 

accept that members of the UN favored the resolution regardless of their 

perceptions of Rhee’s regime. Furthermore, it is feasible to believe that 

nations that disliked Rhee’s practices contributed forces to the UN Command to enhance UN credibility. Therefore, it is conceivable to conclude 

that nations such as Great Britain did not contribute forces to Korea simply to protect Rhee’s personal leadership. Conversely, it is also logical to 

conclude that UN members supported Rhee simply because he was anticommunist.

Rhee, however, did not have authority to gain political control of 

Korea north of the 38th Parallel through military force. UN sponsored 

elections did not occur in that region. Moreover, Commonwealth governments, specifically Attlee’s, were unwilling to support Rhee’s leadership 

of northern Korea without peninsula-wide elections.11 Thus, Rhee’s rejection of DPRK peace proposals risked alienating the coalition that supported him. However, Rhee possessed one significant advantage against 

the Commonwealth’s perceptions of his harsh style of government.

Politically, Truman could not abandon Rhee. Rhee was an American 

ally. Truman, by deserting Rhee in war, would reduce American credibility 

in the eyes of nations that depended on American support. Furthermore, 

forsaking Rhee in war would cause nations dependent on American assistance to lose trust in the United States in times of peace. Additionally, 

an American desertion of an ally against a communist threat would likely 

encourage additional communist uprisings around the world. Therefore, 

Truman probably did not decide independently to cross the 38th Parallel 
56

to achieve American aims. Rhee’s effect on Truman’s decision appears 

obvious. Unfortunately, Rhee’s determination to unify Korea created conditions that resulted in China’s military intervention.

Truman never stopped hoping to prevent Chinese involvement in 

Korea. To negate China’s potential interference in Korea, Truman initially ordered MacArthur to cross the 38th Parallel with only ROK forces.12

Therefore, Truman could claim that ROK forces were attempting independently to achieve Korean aims and unify their peninsula. ROK forces 

crossed the 38th Parallel on 1 October1950.13 However, Truman soon authorized MacArthur to use non-Korean forces to enter the DPRK and advance north under three stipulations.

First, Truman allowed MacArthur to continue advancing beyond 

the 38th Parallel so long as MacArthur felt that operations presented “a 

reasonable chance of success.”14 Second, operations were to cease immediately if “imminent danger” of Soviet or Chinese intervention arose.15

Third, Truman denied MacArthur permission to deploy non-Korean forces 

near Korea’s immediate borders with the Soviet Union and China.16 From 

an American perspective, Truman did everything conceivably possible to 

prevent China from entering the war.

However, Truman’s efforts to restrict MacArthur ignored reality in 

three areas. First, Truman’s restrictions contrasted with Marshall’s initial instructions that allowed MacArthur to feel “unhampered” as the UN 

Command crossed the 38th Parallel. Truman’s subsequent restrictions to 

his initial guidance could confuse any military commander’s understanding of their commander-in-chief’s true intent. However, MacArthur was 

not a typical military commander. MacArthur was a commander likely to 

remain content to operate with the guidance provided in Marshall’s note. 

Unfortunately, no one could truly stop MacArthur from operating according to his personal whims and desires once non-Korean forces crossed the 

38th Parallel.

Second, Truman’s subsequent guidance to continue operations that 

offered “reasonable” chances for success was not sufficiently restrictive. 

Therefore, Truman’s guidance allowed MacArthur to interpret orders as 

he preferred. MacArthur’s reputation as a self-serving commander makes 

concerning Truman’s guidance regarding “reasonable” success. Truman, a 

politician seeking to maintain a coalition and domestic American support 

for the war in Korea, was likely to define “reasonable” in one manner. 

Conversely, MacArthur, with vast experience as a military commander, 

was likely to define “reasonable” in a manner different from Truman.

Third, Truman’s restrictions ignored China’s obvious warnings. Zhou 

Enlai, China’s Premier, called the United States China’s “most dangerous 
57

enemy” in September 1950.17 Zhou’s intention to protect the DPRK is unmistakable with hindsight. However, Zhou’s warnings to the UN Command clearly exhibited in 1950 the “imminent danger” Truman wanted to 

avoid after authorizing MacArthur to cross the 38th Parallel. Additionally, 

crossing the 38th Parallel with non-ROK military forces supported communist claims that the United States was the war’s aggressor. Unfortunately, Truman and the UN Command ignored Zhou’s warnings.

Three possible reasons exist to explain the West’s ignorance regarding Zhou’s warnings. First, Truman possibly maintained total confidence 

in MacArthur’s decision-making. Truman appointed MacArthur to command all UN forces. MacArthur’s appointment infers Truman’s trust in 

the general’s leadership. This inference represents any time a commanderin-chief appoints someone to a command position. However, Truman believed that MacArthur “wasn’t right in his head.”18 Truman’s perception, 

therefore, rejects this first possible reason for the West’s ignorance of Chinese intentions.

Second, Truman’s administration faced substantial criticism from 

Republicans in the United States Congress for perceptions of the administration’s lack of toughness against communism. The Congress, for example, charged Truman’s administration with responsibility for the “Communist victory” in China in 1949.19 Additionally, American politicians 

continuously called throughout the Korean War for Truman to fire his 

Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, for incompetence and softness against 

communism.20 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that intense domestic pressure within the United States preempted Truman’s inclination to 

prevent non-ROK forces from crossing the 38th Parallel.

Third, UN multinational forces achieved rapid success against the 

DPRK’s army after the Inchon landings in September 1950. Therefore, 

it is reasonable to conclude that Truman’s administration and its Commonwealth counterparts perceived the Chinese army as just slightly more 

capable militarily than North Korea. One can reasonably identify China’s 

numerical superiority and, possibly, its relationship with the Soviet Union 

as the Truman administration’s primary concerns regarding Chinese intervention in Korea. Truman’s administration likely perceived American 

firepower as capable of negating China’s numerical superiority. Moreover, 

restricting the UN Command’s access to the Soviet-Korean border and 

relying on the Soviets to maintain a Europe-first strategy could prevent the 

appearance of Soviet forces on the Korean battlefield. Thus, it is logical to 

conclude that Truman’s administration felt that crossing the 38th Parallel 

was justified under these conditions. However, Truman ignored a critical 

obligation.
58

Coalition leaders own the responsibility to maintain unity of effort 

until the coalition’s mission is complete. Truman was the coalition’s political leader. He received this authority from the UN Security Council.21

Therefore, Truman retains primary responsibility for the decision to allow 

non-ROK forces to cross the 38th Parallel. However, Truman’s decision 

appeared to disregard his obligation to maintain unity of effort with the 

Commonwealth governments and within the UN Command.

Domestic charges of his administration’s weakness likely affected 

Truman’s decision. However, it is rational to believe that Truman did not 

make decisions from an American-only perspective. Rhee’s ultimate goals 

likely played as significant a role as domestic considerations in Truman’s 

decision-making process. Evidence, demonstrated through Truman’s guidance to MacArthur, suggests that Truman accounted for Commonwealth 

concerns regarding Chinese intervention but ignored them to satisfy Rhee. 

Regardless, Truman’s decision to cross the 38th Parallel enhanced the 

likelihood of a “new war” that he wanted to prevent.22

Truman’s well-intentioned guidance ignored credible Chinese 

threats. Additionally, his guidance was sufficiently vulnerable to MacArthur misinterpretations and, thus, likely to provoke Chinese involvement. 

Furthermore, Truman’s coalition, created through substantial effort, was 

unprepared for and in some cases unwilling to participate in this new war. 

Truman’s decision to extend the war, therefore, increased friction in a coalition that his administration built under strenuous effort. Tension with 

Truman’s decision was evident within the British Commonwealth nations 

that contributed forces to Korea.

Attlee’s government noted three primary concerns with crossing the 

38th Parallel and invading the DPRK with non-ROK forces. First, Attlee’s 

government, in contrast to the United States JCS, doubted the legality of 

crossing the 38th Parallel.23 Specifically, the original UN resolution resolved to repel the DPRK attack. The resolution did not support Korean 

unification through military force.

Negative effects on coalition unity represent the second Attlee government concern regarding operations into the DPRK. Specifically, Attlee 

wanted Truman to ensure that all decisions were capable of maintaining 

the UN’s “impressive degree of unanimity over Korea.”24 Attlee’s government understood that the UN, minus dissension from nations in the Soviet 

bloc, supported the defense of the ROK. Attlee did not want to disrupt 

that unity. He correctly interpreted the risks inherent in crossing the 38th 

Parallel.

UN resolutions for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm parallel 

the British government’s concern for crossing the 38th Parallel. Specifi-
59

cally, the UN resolved to conduct Desert Shield/Desert Storm to repel Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army from Kuwait. This commitment did not include 

a mandate to remove Hussein from power. United States President George 

H.W. Bush wisely followed the legal spirit and letter of the UN resolution. 

Bush’s decision preserved his coalition’s unity and prevented possibilities 

for a wider war in the Middle East. The same example, with a different 

result, occurred in Korea.

Attlee’s third concern revolved around the effect of Soviet or Chinese 

involvement on UN unity. An invasion by either country would expand the 

war and, thus, reverse the Attlee-Truman goal of keeping the war localized to Korea. Attlee initially felt that the new Communist Chinese government was a Soviet satellite state. He perceived that the Soviet Union 

would identify UN operations north of the 38th Parallel as a UN effort to 

remove the new Chinese government.25 Attlee, thus, felt the Soviets would 

intervene in Korea to deter the UN advance across the 38th Parallel from 

planning to invade China. Attlee’s hopes to maintain the coalition’s unity 

motivated his concern. However, British interests also inspired Attlee to 

seek all means possible to keep China out of the Korean War.

Attlee wanted his nation to maintain “the friendliest possible relationship” with whatever was the government of China at any given moment.26 Attlee’s government recognized China’s communist government 

in January 1950.27 British leaders pursued this diplomatic path to ensure 

protection for British commercial interests in China after the Communist 

government assumed control.28 Chinese belligerency in Korea posed risk 

to British commercial interests in China. Therefore, Attlee took China’s 

warnings literally and correctly assumed that crossing the 38th Parallel 

would invite Chinese intervention and thereby expand the war.

Attlee cannot receive blame for seeking to protect his nation’s interests. He supported Truman’s decision despite his concerns for Britain’s 

welfare. However, coalitions typically conduct operations for the greater 

welfare of the world. Coalitions do not conduct operations specifically for 

the benefit of one nation. A free and independent Republic of Korea served 

the West’s collective interests. Attlee’s concerns represented a significant 

separation between American and British goals in Korea, and the means 

these nations sought to achieve those goals. This divide existed throughout the remainder of the Korean War. A similar concern arose between the 

United States and Canada.

Canada’s St-Laurent government found itself unwelcome to participate in the Truman administration’s deliberations on crossing the 38th Parallel. Canada’s air forces were transporting United States troops to Korea. 

Canadian naval vessels participated in the Inchon landings.29 It is conceiv-
60

able to assume that St-Laurent’s government was providing all resources 

possible within its constraints. Regardless, Canada’s promised ground 

forces had yet to reach Korea when Truman made his decision. Therefore, 

Truman’s administration appeared to disregard Canadian opinions in its 

deliberations on crossing the 38th Parallel.

American officials such as Acheson complained about Canada’s 

inability to provide “significant forces” to Korea.30 However, this complaint ignored the fact that Canada was contributing to the UN Command. 

American ignorance in this example is problematic. It supports the argument that Truman’s administration determined a coalition partner’s ability 

to influence or participate in planning and decision-making according to 

the size, type, and timing of that nation’s contributions. Therefore, American ignorance to Canadian contributions created tension with a permanent 

United States ally.

American ignorance to Canadian contributions did not stop St-Laurent’s government from declaring its thoughts publicly to the UN General 

Assembly and “confidentially” to the Truman Administration.31 St-Laurent’s perspective of post-Inchon operations represents two critical points. 

First, the Canadian approach to Korea appeared to complement British 

objectives of limiting the war to the accomplishment of the original UN 

mandate. Second, Canada did not share the American objective to unify 

the Korean peninsula. American-Canadian differences on the future of 

Korea put Canada’s military forces into a situation for which they did not 

expect. However, St-Laurent’s government did not follow the American 

lead with Attlee’s level of acceptance.

St-Laurent’s government shared four mutual perspectives with the 

British. First, Canadian leaders shared the Attlee government’s perspective on the legality of crossing the 38th Parallel. Therefore, St-Laurent’s 

government argued for a cautious approach to extending the UN’s mandate in Korea.32 Furthermore, Britain and Canada shared a goal to create a 

buffer zone between Korea and China. A buffer zone could limit the war 

and thereby reduce the likelihood of Chinese or Soviet intervention after 

UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel.33 Third, both nations suggested that 

the DPRK receive an opportunity to agree to a cease-fire.34 Fourth, both 

nations protested the attention Truman’s administration paid to Korea at 

the expense of their top security priority, Europe.35

Truman never opposed the premise that Europe was his primary 

security interest. Nonetheless, he likely understood that the situation in 

Korea needed to be resolved for European security to receive his full attention and military support. Following Inchon, St-Laurent protested that 

Canada’s obligation to Korea ended with the “restoration of peace and the 
61

defeat of aggression in Korea.”36 However, the UN objective for Korea 

changed on 7 October 1950. The UN approved a new mandate that resolved to create a “unified, independent, and democratic” Korean government.37 Thus, the situation in Korea could only conclude through Korean 

unification.

St-Laurent’s quote regarding the “restoration of peace” reflected his 

clear support for the original UN mandate. However, his quote regarding the “defeat of aggression” is vague. It did not clearly define his position. “Defeating aggression” could simply refer to St-Laurent’s support 

for repelling the DPRK military from South Korea. Conversely, “defeating aggression” could imply that St-Laurent wanted to remove communist influence from Korea to prevent another DPRK invasion of the ROK. 

Given his previous speeches, it is reasonable to conclude that St-Laurent’s 

statement implied his unwillingness to provide Canadian ground forces in 

support of Korean unification. This implication, therefore, indicated that 

substantial differences existed between the Canada and the United States.

Rhee also contributed to these differences. The ROK President argued that stopping at the 38th Parallel after the Inchon landings was unacceptable to Koreans. His statement placed Truman in a significant predicament. Truman’s unwillingness or inability to support his ally would reduce 

America’s international credibility as a deterrent to communist aggression. 

Robert Menzies’ government, on the other hand, presented an appearance 

of enthusiastic compliance with the new UN mandate and the Truman administration’s goals.

After the Inchon landings, Menzies’ government, compared to other 

British Commonwealth partners, presented its nation as the Truman administration’s most trustworthy coalition partner. Menzies, like his fellow 

Commonwealth leaders, feared an escalation of the war with the Soviet 

Union.38 However, he appeared to share Truman’s understanding of the 

effects that operations in Korea had on the international community. Specifically, Menzies seemed to understand that failing to support an ally and 

accomplish UN mandates would negatively affect UN credibility and encourage future communist aggression.

Australian commercial interests and military limitations do not 

appear to have affected Menzies’ perspective. Three political reasons 

prompted Menzies to recommend crossing the 38th Parallel to defeat the 

DPRK Army. First, he wanted to maintain the positive relations his government developed with Truman’s administration in the early months of 

the war. Second, he understood that failing to defeat the DPRK Army by 

not crossing the 38th Parallel “would merely mean that we should have 

another aggression the next day.”39 Third, he knew that North Korean ag-
62

gression against South Korea “was a signal to encourage Communist risings throughout Asia.”40 

Clearly, Menzies understood that North Korea’s army would remain 

capable of future aggression against the ROK if it were not decisively 

defeated. From an Australian perspective, decisively defeating the DPRK 

favored Australian security because it would dissuade potential future 

communist aggression in Asia. Additionally, North Korea’s probability of 

acting aggressively against its southern neighbor in the future would force 

the UN to respond with a new series of resolutions. This would inadvertently affect public support within UN member nations for such a situation 

and indirectly reduce the organization’s credibility.

Truman’s administration struggled in 1950 to secure contributions 

from nations such as Canada. American abilities to repeat this effort would 

find increased difficulty if North Korea conducted another invasion of 

South Korea. UN members and, specifically, their domestic constituents 

would wonder why the coalition failed to accomplish its mission the first 

time and question a coalition’s ability to accomplish the new mission. Additionally, an organization’s failure to achieve an objective, regardless of 

its restrictions, reduces that organization’s credibility. Therefore, the UN 

Command needed to defeat North Korea’s army.

The United States-led coalition that fought in Operation Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm did not topple Saddam Hussein’s government. UN 

mandates did not require Hussein’s removal. The United States returned to 

Iraq 12 years later to depose Hussein’s government. Criticism for America’s 

inability to “get the job done” the first time was in abundance. Therefore, 

among other reasons, American leaders faced resistance to their efforts to 

build a new coalition in 2002-2003. Therefore, failure to defeat decisively 

North Korea’s army when the opportunity presented itself would repeat 

history in a manner that Menzies found unnecessary.

Militarily, Menzies argued, advancing forces should maintain their 

initiative and not abandon their advantage after reaching “a certain parallel of latitude.”41 His argument made military sense and supported his 

political perspective. It did not stop Menzies from joining his Commonwealth counterparts to recommend an operational pause at Korea’s “narrow waist” to deter Chinese intervention.42 However, Menzies’ primary 

recommendations exhibited a desire to accomplish a mission, Korean unification, which Truman’s administration felt bound to accomplish according to the new UN resolution. Crossing the 38th Parallel produced initial 

success for the United Nations Command. Unfortunately, it also created 

several negative conditions that reduced the coalition’s unity of effort.

It is worth mentioning a ROK general’s identification of Chinese sol-
63

diers in Korea by the end of October 1950.43 This occurred roughly two 

weeks after non-Korean UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel. UN forces 

identified China’s 124th Division in Korea two days later.44 Chinese intervention, in opposition to Winston Churchill’s claim, was clearly not a 

simple attempt to divert attention away from Western Europe.45 It was an 

invasion designed to remove UN forces from the DPRK and the Korean 

peninsula. UN forces initiated a retreat and evacuated Pyongyang, North 

Korea’s capital, on 4 December 1950.46

During the war’s first several months, Truman did not hide his desire 

for the war to remain localized to Korea.47 Primarily, he sought a limited 

conflict because he knew an escalation of the war would reduce America’s 

capacity to defend Western Europe. Furthermore, unlimited war in Korea 

would induce Chinese or Soviet participation. This objective explains the 

logic behind Truman’s referring to the war in Korea as a “police action.”48

Truman, thus, continually emphasized his intention to limit operations in 

Korea to reassure his European allies of America’s commitments to their 

security.

Comments by Truman’s advisors forced the Commonwealth governments to question his sincerity. Dean Acheson, for example, claimed that 

it would be “sheer madness” for the Chinese to enter the war.49 Acheson’s comment dared the Chinese government to enter the war and prove 

its military mettle. Furthermore, it demonstrated his ignorance to China’s 

warnings.

Acheson reversed his perspective after the Chinese invasion. He admitted that UN forces could not defeat the People’s Volunteer Army and 

unify the Korean peninsula because of China’s overwhelming numerical 

superiority. He recommended that UN forces “find a line that we can hold, 

and hold it” soon after China’s numerical superiority forced the UN retreats.50 The UN coalition, thus, found itself unable to retain the military 

initiative.

The Commonwealth nations felt the blame for this situation rested 

primarily with MacArthur. Jointly, they claimed he “went beyond” the objectives established by the UN resolution.51 Canada’s Minister for External 

Affairs, Lester Pearson, urged negotiations with the Chinese government 

immediately after its invasion.52 Menzies’ government, “rattled” by China’s invasion, recognized quickly the dangers Chinese involvement posed 

to the UN Command’s mission in Korea.53 Attlee’s government, motivated 

to protect British commercial interests in China, reverted to its “original 

caution” and pursued efforts to keep the war contained to Korea.54 Truman’s administration did not appreciate the Commonwealth’s claims, sug-
64

gestions, or its perceived loss of willpower to accomplish the UN resolution.

Truman and his advisors were also not pleased with MacArthur’s 

inflated projections of a quick victory or his dismissal of Chinese military capabilities. However, they found the timing behind Commonwealth 

criticism of MacArthur interesting. Specifically, Truman’s administration 

did not identify Commonwealth criticism for American decisions until 

the Chinese invasion.55 Therefore, Commonwealth support for American 

decisions, according to Truman’s administration, required successful operations to continue. This American perception created discontent for the 

Commonwealth within the Truman administration. General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the United States JCS, went so far as to suggest that 

coalition members should leave the coalition if they were unhappy with 

American leadership.56

American patience for coalition concerns, as demonstrated by Bradley, was nearly negligible. Respect from the Truman administration for coalition contributions was rapidly declining as the United States continued 

to bear financially and militarily the majority of the war effort. Conversely, 

British Commonwealth confidence in American leadership was deteriorating. China’s negative effects on coalition unity would never have happened if the UN objective to preserve South Korea’s government remained 

consistent. Additionally, coalition dissension and American public support 

for the war began adversely to affect each other.

Eighty-one percent of the American population supported the Korean War in June 1950. Conversely, greater than two-thirds of the American 

population supported a withdrawal of United States forces from Korea 

soon after China’s invasion.57 Reduced American popular support for the 

war started because of MacArthur, who had a distinguished reputation in 

the United States. The UN commander publicly identified Commonwealth 

criticism of operations in Korea after China’s intervention as a “somewhat 

selfish though most short-sighted viewpoint.”58

American citizens already felt their nation bore a greater share than 

necessary of the burden for Korea. MacArthur made other public comments after the Chinese invasion until his dismissal that demonstrated contempt for his perception of the Commonwealth’s unwillingness to unify 

Korea. Additionally, MacArthur’s comments during the United States 

Congress’s investigation of his dismissal increased popular American perceptions that the Commonwealth was not providing sufficient forces to the 

UN Command.59 Domestic critics of Truman’s administration supported 

MacArthur’s claims against the Commonwealth nations and, thus, further 

reduced American popular support for the Korean War.
65

Former President Herbert Hoover, for example, argued in December 

1950 that coalition nations were “not doing their share” in Korea.60 He 

later affixed blame for the coalition’s faltering unity of effort to coalition 

partners that he identified as appeasers to China.61 Senator Robert Taft 

claimed after Chinese intervention that the United States was “sucked” 

into the Korean War, and soon called for an immediate withdrawal from 

the Korean peninsula.62 Senator Richard Nixon publicly complained about 

America’s majority of combat forces in Korea in comparison to its coalition partners’ limited contributions.63

These statements and their effects on American popular support for 

the war in Korea exemplify the effect of domestic opinions on a coalition’s 

unity of effort. Unity of effort depends on a shared understanding of the 

coalition’s objectives and an appreciation for multinational contributions 

regardless of their size. Domestic audiences must understand the coalition’s objective as well as the coalition’s political and military leaders. 

Comprehension of this nature, specifically within the lead nation’s domestic audience, is likely to ensure that audience’s appreciation for multinational military contributions. Therefore, understanding the coalition’s mission and its potential struggles is likely to develop a domestic appreciation 

for the fact that multiple nations share the coalition’s burden.

Political leaders possess the responsibility to ensure their audiences 

understand the coalition mission and, therefore, appreciate multinational 

contributions. Lester Pearson’s suggestion to negotiate with the Chinese 

immediately after their intervention appeared to validate Hoover’s claim 

that coalition members sought to appease China. However, Pearson wanted to prevent a full-scale war with China. Thus, Pearson shared Truman’s 

goal to limit the war to Korea. Truman’s administration retained responsibility to ensure that the American public understood firmly this common 

objective. The Truman administration failed to do so effectively. Thus, 

Truman’s administration created conditions that permitted statements by 

political figures to affect negatively American popular support for the war 

and Commonwealth contributions.

Attlee’s government felt that American comments represented a lack 

of American appreciation for the Commonwealth’s contributions and limitations.64 Comments from American political leaders inflamed American 

domestic opinion towards the Commonwealth. Therefore, it is logical 

to conclude that Attlee’s perception of American comments reduced the 

coalition’s unity. Furthermore, Taft’s comment likely created Commonwealth confusion regarding Truman’s statements that outlined his intent to 

limit the war to Korea and concern regarding American will to secure its 
66

allies in Europe. However, American political leaders needed something 

to support their claims. MacArthur provided sufficient evidence.

MacArthur’s comments before and after his dismissal inspired the 

negative remarks from American political leaders. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that MacArthur’s public statements did more to inflame 

American domestic opinion to the Commonwealth and harm coalition unity than comments by American politicians and former presidents. Combined, these separate statements reduced American popular support for the 

war and, according to Attlee’s perception, damaged coalition unity. MacArthur, as the military commander, retains the majority of blame for this.

The seven months between Chinese intervention and MacArthur’s 

dismissal exemplify the military commander’s critical role in a coalition 

operation. The commander’s responsibility is to accomplish the coalition 

mission. However, commanders also have a responsibility to sustain coalition unity. It is logical to believe that the military commander plays a more 

important role in sustaining coalition than the political leader. Therefore, 

a coalition’s unity of effort heavily depends on more than the military 

commander’s operational or strategic acumen. It also relies on that commander’s political awareness and, thus, the commander’s willingness and 

ability to sustain the coalition through their public statements.

MacArthur’s claim that Europe’s demise was “inevitable” if Asia fell 

to communism appears to present an understanding of coalition member 

concerns.65 The Attlee government, for example, was worried about Western Europe’s security. It shared Truman’s goal of localizing the war in 

Korea to defend better Western Europe. However, MacArthur’s statement 

indicated his lack of consideration for his partners’ apprehensions and, 

thus, increased Commonwealth “misgivings” about his true intentions in 

Korea.66 His subsequent statements did not soothe these Commonwealth 

fears.

For example, MacArthur, as the coalition’s military commander, 

publicly identified Acheson’s goal to “hold a line” and force the Chinese 

to negotiate as an unacceptable stalemate. Conversely, Matthew Ridgway, 

commanding all ground forces, felt this course of action represented a 

“tremendous victory.”67 MacArthur’s comment revealed an inclination to 

make decisions on his own without consideration for the coalition’s political goals or unity. It increased his untrustworthiness within the coalition. A 

coalition commander considered untrustworthy by a coalition will hurt the 

coalition’s unity of effort and prompt contributing nations to reconsider 

their assistance. Unfortunately, a Truman comment in November 1950 

nearly created similar consequences.
67

Truman remarked that he was considering all possible means to stop 

the Chinese, “including the atomic bomb,” during a 30 November 30, 

1950 press conference.68 Truman’s statement brought his Commonwealth 

partners’ “anxiety to a climax.”69 His advisors quickly sought to reverse 

the damage caused by his statement. They announced that the use of an 

atomic bomb was a presidential decision, and that Truman did not delegate 

responsibility for this decision to MacArthur for operations in Korea.70

Truman’s advisors made these statements to soothe Commonwealth fears 

that “MacArthur was running the show” in Korea without presidential restrictions.71 Unfortunately, Truman’s comment created a Commonwealth 

perception that he wanted to use atomic weapons in Korea regardless of 

that decision’s potential negative consequences, such as Soviet interference in Korea.

The Commonwealth nations, already fearful of a wider war, felt that 

using atomic bombs in Korea would induce a Soviet atomic retaliation 

against Western Europe.72 Truman’s statement, thus, appeared to confirm Commonwealth concerns that the war would escalate into a wider 

conflict.73 Attlee demonstrated the Commonwealth’s anxiety by rushing 

almost immediately to the United States in December 1950 to conduct 

“intimate discussions” with the American President and ensure that the 

coalition did not reach a “point of no return” in Korea.74 Furthermore, Attlee revealed Commonwealth anxiety by informing Truman that over one 

hundred members of the British Parliament protested his statement that 

suggested the use of atomic bombs in Korea.75

St-Laurent’s government also protested Truman’s statement. St-Laurent argued that the use of atomic bombs, regardless of the location, was 

a matter of world concern. Therefore, according to St-Laurent’s government, Truman could not reserve for the United States the authority to use 

atomic bombs in Korea.76 Truman’s “categorical statement” appeared to 

ignore his partners’ perspectives and aggravated the coalition’s decreasing 

unity of effort.77

Coalition partners need to understand the coalition’s objective. Furthermore, they need to achieve common understanding concerning the 

ways and means to achieve those objectives. This understanding was evident when the UN resolved to repel North Korea’s invasion of the ROK. 

However, the coalition did not establish a common understanding of the 

ways and means to achieve the subsequent UN mandate to unify all of Korea. Truman’s comment gave the impression that he felt his nation’s “lead 

nation” status for UN operations in Korea allowed his administration to 

make decisions without consulting its coalition partners. Truman’s state-
68

ment did not cause the UN coalition to dissolve. However, it created additional tension between the United States and its Commonwealth partners.

Partners such as Attlee continued efforts to show their nation’s solidarity with the United States “in fair or foul weather.”78 As previously 

stated, Britain recognized the Communist Chinese government to protect 

its economic interests on mainland China. However, Attlee’s government 

employed economic means to limit China’s military capabilities when its 

intervention became likely. First, it stopped shipping oil to China.79 Later, 

Attlee’s government only shipped oil to China that was “clearly marked 

for civilian use” in an effort to prevent its use by the Chinese military 

while sustaining Britain’s commercial interests in China.80

Attlee clearly wanted to prove Britain’s friendship with the United 

States. His sanctions against China hurt an American enemy but presented a significant risk to Britain’s economic stability. Therefore, one can 

reasonably conceive that Attlee did everything in his power to prove his 

nation’s camaraderie with the United States. However, factors outside of 

the war in Korea motivated Attlee to ensure that Truman’s administration 

recognized British dependability.

Attlee needed American support to protect Britain and Western Europe from Soviet aggression. Acheson informed Attlee that this would be 

impossible “unless America’s allies gave full support to American policy 

in East Asia.”81 This statement reflected the Truman administration’s perception, identified when it was developing a coalition, that it could use its 

preponderance of forces and materiél to subjugate its coalition partners 

to American will. Therefore, Attlee found himself in a situation where, in 

seeking an ally’s critical support for his national defense, he felt compelled 

to reduce his own nation’s capacity for self-defense to support that same 

ally in a theater of war that did not directly threaten British security.

MacArthur’s character and statements eventually appeared to represent the worst component of that partnership to the Commonwealth governments. The Commonwealth nations felt MacArthur’s “unrivalled experience” made him in June 1950 the best choice for Supreme Commander 

of UN forces in Korea.82 However, admiration developed into hesitancy. 

Commonwealth leaders likely did not contribute forces to Korea to expose 

their personnel to MacArthur’s conceited personality. Furthermore, Commonwealth leaders likely did not contribute forces to Korea to achieve an 

objective that they did not support.

MacArthur, as discussed, noticeably increased Commonwealth apprehensions of his personal goals. Specifically, MacArthur’s comments 

indicated that he wanted to expand the war in Korea to “dispose of the 

‘Chinese Communist question’ once and for all.”83 Therefore, the Com-
69

monwealth governments eventually came to realize that their military 

forces were fighting under a commander who did not share the coalition’s 

goals to localize the war to Korea and preserve South Korea’s government. 

Truman dismissed MacArthur in April 1951 to ensure that Commonwealth 

leaders did not have “doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of 

our policy.”84

The Commonwealth governments “favorably received” news of 

MacArthur’s dismissal.85 The St-Laurent government’s reaction, for example, was one of simple relief that MacArthur was now incapable of 

escalating the war in Korea.86 Menzies demonstrated “evident relief” that 

Ridgway, a commander more disposed to enhancing coalition unity, was 

now in command.87 Menzies continued to promise Australia’s full support and cooperation for whomever Truman selected to command the UN 

coalition.

These examples highlight the military commander’s important responsibilities within a coalition. A coalition commander cannot, as MacArthur did, develop a “fuehrer complex” and think their understanding 

of the military situation warrants their dictating policy or defining objectives.88 The military commander is a critical asset for maintaining a 

coalition’s unity of effort. This asset becomes even more significant if a 

coalition’s objective changes, as it did in Korea. The commander cannot, 

as MacArthur did, become “isolated from representatives” of contributing nations.89 Specific to changes in strategic goals, coalition commanders must engage and reengage their multinational partners to sustain unity 

and, thus, prompt contributing nations to continue providing assets to 

accomplish the mission. MacArthur’s actions in Korea, therefore, reflect 

what should not occur within a coalition framework.

Amongst the Commonwealth nations, American relations with Canada suffered the most from the Korean War. Attlee understood his nation’s 

reliance on American assistance in Europe. He never lost sight of that reality. Menzies’ government conducted its relationship with the Truman administration with the primary goal of signing a Pacific security agreement 

with the United States. However, according to Lester Pearson, Canada’s 

“relatively easy and automatic political relations” with the United States 

were finished.90 Outside of MacArthur’s comments, American disparagement of Canadian force contributions created the St-Laurent government’s 

critical point of contention with the United States. Specifically, St-Laurent’s government disliked American references to Canada as a “reluctant 

friend.”91

Diplomacy by Truman’s administration from the Inchon landings 

until MacArthur’s relief increased Commonwealth apprehensions and, 
70

therefore, fractured coalition unity. The haughty attitude of Truman’s administration after the Inchon landings guided its efforts to procure further 

military contributions from the Commonwealth nations. Truman’s administration tended to base its opinions of, and conduct towards, its partners 

on the respective size and timing of each nation’s contributions.

The coalition commander could have reduced the effects of the Truman administration’s conduct. MacArthur could have used his prestige 

and influence to engender American public and political appreciation for 

Commonwealth contributions. However, he did not. Coalition unity, as a 

result, continued to dissolve under his leadership. The Truman administration’s decisiveness after North Korea’s invasion of South Korea demonstrated an American intent to contain communism. Unfortunately, the Truman administration’s self-important conduct forced its Commonwealth 

partners to obsess over not if, but how, the United States would respond 

to international security concerns and the roles it would expect its Commonwealth partners to perform.92
71

Notes

1. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology of 

Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, September 1950, 10.

2. Memo from George M. Elsey to the National Security Council, 12 July 

1950, Papers of George M. Elsey, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

3. U.S. Department of State, World Reaction to Korean Developments, Special Supplement, 18 July 1950, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum.

4. U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, U.S.-U.K. 

Discussions on Present World Situation, 20-24 July 1950, General Omar Bradley, 

Ambassador Phillip C. Jessup and Sir Oliver Franks, Lord Tedder,” Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

5. Melady, Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, 28.

6. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959, 455.

7. Pogue, 457.

8. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1950, 186.

9. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology of 

Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, September 1950, 13.

10. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, 71.

11. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 

1945-1951, 137.

12. Jack Gallaway, The Last Call of the Bugle: The Long Road to Kapyong

(Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1999), 59.

13. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, October 1950, i.

14. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume II: Years of Trial and 

Hope, 383.

15. Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, 36.

16. Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, 

and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 133.

17. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, September 1950, 30.

18. Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman, 291.

19. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume II: Years of Trial and 

Hope, 430.

20. Truman, 428-431.

21. Statement by the President, July 8, 1950, Papers of George M. Elsey, 

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

22. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 368.

23. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1950, 

vol. 3, 1157.

24. Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, Volume I: A Distant 

Obligation, 191.

25. Farrar-Hockley, 193.

26. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 

1945-1951, 133.
72

27. Dockrill, “The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean War, June 1950-June 1951,” 459.

28. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 

1945-1951, 134.

29. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Canadian Military Experiences,” 28.

30. Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, 37.

31. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the 

United States, 132.

32. Melady, Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, 60.

33. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the 

United States, 132.

34. Melady, Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, 60-61.

35. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the 

United States, 149.

36. Stairs, 116.

37. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 

1945-1951, 136.

38. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I: Strategy and 

Diplomacy, 130.

39. O’Neill, 122.

40. Henry S. Albinski, “Australia Faces China,” Asian Survey 2, no. 2 (April 

1962): 17.

41. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I: Strategy and 

Diplomacy, 122.

42. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the 

United States, 132.

43. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, October 1950, 33.

44. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, November 1950, ii.

45. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 

1945-1951, 137.

46. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, December 1950, ii.

47. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1950, 

vol. 3, 1662.

48. U.S. Department of State, White House Press and Radio News Conference, President Harry S. Truman, 29 June 1950.

49. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, September 1950, 7-8.

50. Memorandum of Conversation: Notes on National Security Council 

Meeting, 28 November 1950, 5. Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

51. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 
73

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, December 1950, 10.

52. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, December 1950, 13.

53. Richard Trembath, A Different Sort of War: Australians in Korea, 1950-

53 (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2005), 12. O’Neill, Australia in 

the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I: Strategy and Diplomacy, 99.

54. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 

1945-1951, 137.

55. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, November 1950, vi.

56. Peter Lowe, “The Significance of the Korean War in Anglo-American 

Relations, 1950-53,” in British Foreign Policy, 1945-56, ed. Michael Dockrill and 

John W. Young (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 130.

57. Astor, Presidents at War: From Truman to Bush, the Gathering of Military Power to Our Commanders in Chief, 41.

58. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, December 1950, 2.

59. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53, 249.

60. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, December 1950, iv.

61. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, February 1951, 15.

62. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, January 1951, 9, 11.

63. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, , 54.

64. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1950, 

vol. 3, 1700.

65. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, March 1951, 33.

66. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the 

United States, 132.

67. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, March 1951, iv.

68. Ferrell ed., Off the Record. The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, 202.

69. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 

1945-1951, 138.

70. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume II: Years of Trial and 

Hope, 396.

71. Lowe, “The Korean war in Anglo-US Relations, 1950-53,” 130.

72. Dockrill, British Defence since 1945, 43.

73. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I: Strategy and 

Diplomacy, 145.

74. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1950, 

vol. 3, 1698-99.

75. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 
74

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, December 1950, 5.

76. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, December 1950, 13.

77. Memo for the Files, Papers of George M. Elsey, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

78. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, December 1950, 15.

79. Memorandum of Conversation: Oil to China, with Sir Oliver Franks, 

16 July 1950, Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, 

MO.

80. U.S. Department of State, World Reaction to President’s Statement, No. 

12, July 9, 1950.

81. Lowe, “The Significance of the Korean War in Anglo-American Relations, 1950-53,” 129.

82. Lowe, 128.

83. Melady, Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, 87.

84. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, April 1951, 15.

85. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch,, 24.

86. Melady, Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, 88.

87. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I: Strategy and 

Diplomacy, 208.

88. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, April 1951, 44.

89. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, 116.

90. John W. Holmes, “Canada and the United States in World Politics,” 

Foreign Affairs 40, no. 1 (October 1961): 105.

91. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, April 1951, 19.

92. Melady, Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, 88.
75

Chapter 4 

Coalition Sustainment and the Military 

Coalition Integration, Combat, and Koje-Do

The Americans were paying most of the piper’s bill. It followed 

that they were calling most of the piper’s tunes.

—Denis Stairs, “Canada and the Korean War Fifty Years On”

Jeffrey Grey stated that military alliances or coalitions are likely to 

lose unity if the organization’s internal balance of power “shifts decisively” towards one member nation.1

 Evidence suggests that the United Statesled coalition in Korea validates Grey’s argument. At the political level, 

previous chapters demonstrated that President Harry Truman’s administration did not always understand its coalition partners’ limitations and, thus, 

failed to treat them with patience or respect. From a military perspective, 

American leaders appeared to use their nation’s dominance in personnel 

and materiél to dictate operations and expect coalition compliance for 

these tasks without regard for coalition partner perspectives. American 

behavior and the Commonwealth’s perceptions of American battlefield 

incompetence, therefore, increased the tensions developed through diplomatic activities.

A “military superiority complex” explained the conduct of American military leaders and soldiers towards their Commonwealth partners 

in Korea.2 This mindset of superiority is understandable under two conditions. First, it is reasonable if one is discussing military operations prior 

to the Chinese invasion of Korea in November 1950. A coalition predominantly comprised of American forces rapidly landed at Inchon, captured 

Seoul, crossed the 38th Parallel, and appeared unstoppable in its effort to 

unify the Korean peninsula. Second, this perspective is fathomable if one 

considers that the United States provided over seventy percent of the UN 

coalition’s combat forces by July 1951. Conversely, all foreign nations, 

excluding the Republic of Korea, provided just over six percent of the UN 

combat forces.3

The general viewpoints of the United States military commanders 

in Korea were negligible by July 1951. China’s military successes should 

have sufficed to remove perceptions of American invincibility. During 

the Chinese invasion, Commonwealth forces observed American military 

units retreating “in jeeps and trucks from an overwhelming horde of poorly 

equipped Chinese...following on mules, ponies and camels.”4 Therefore, 
76

the Chinese invasion destroyed notions of America’s military invincibility to its Commonwealth partners. However, Commonwealth perceptions 

of American incompetence did not stop American military leaders from 

showing a “penchant for senior commanders to play squad leader.”5 This 

tendency alienated their Commonwealth partners.

Coalition members expect the lead nation to possess sufficient “will 

and capability, competence, and influence” to lead coalition operations.6

Traits such as these engender support for the lead nation from its coalition 

partners. Coalition unity and resolve, thus, depend partially on the lead nation’s military competence. Therefore, military incompetence or failures 

from the lead nation are likely to affect negatively coalition unity and the 

lead nation’s ability to lead the coalition.

The military forces a state contributes to a coalition represent its government and population. This fact is even more critical regarding the lead 

nation’s forces. The lead nation government expects its military’s actions 

to represent its resolve and competence to lead the coalition to accomplish 

its mission. Military competence from the lead nation’s forces indirectly 

reflects the significance that nation places upon the coalition’s mission to 

its coalition partners. Furthermore, lead nation military competence indirectly demonstrates to coalition partners that the lead nation is politically 

and militarily capable of leading the coalition to accomplish its mission. 

Conversely, military incompetence from the lead nation’s military forces 

encourages the likely development of three negative perceptions within 

the coalition’s other members.

First, military incompetence is likely to raise coalition concerns 

about the lead nation’s willingness to accomplish the coalition’s mission. 

Lead nations that contribute other than their best forces appear less than 

fully committed to mission accomplishment. Second, operational or tactical failures are likely to force contributing nations’ governments to reconsider their perspective of the mission. Therefore, these nations may 

be motivated to withdraw their force contributions due to perceptions of 

lead nation military incompetence. Third, lead nation military failures or 

incompetence are likely to heighten anxiety in the soldiers committed by 

contributing nations. These soldiers are likely to question the lead nation’s 

military leadership, decision-making and, therefore, their role within the 

coalition if the lead nation’s military leadership exhibits incompetence. All 

of these conditions negatively affect a coalition’s unity of effort. Operations in Korea demonstrated these conditions.

Militarily, three additional areas of concern contributed to a declining unity of effort within the UN coalition in Korea. United States policy 

for Korea created the first concern. American integration of Common-
77

wealth forces upon their arrival to Korea, specifically Canada’s, created 

the second concern. Finally, different approaches to tactics created the 

third concern.

The Truman administration reversed its policy of “rollback,” whereby it sought to unify the Korean peninsula under one noncommunist government, to a defense of the “status quo antebellum” in November 1951.7 

The administration’s new goal sought to inflict maximum Chinese losses 

in personnel and materiél “to create conditions favourable [sic] to a settlement of the Korean conflict.”8

 Therefore, Truman’s administration reverted to the original UN mandate of retaining South Korea’s sovereignty. The 

third chapter of this thesis provided details and analysis on the administration’s decision to cross the 38th Parallel and the effects of that decision 

on coalition unity. The Truman administration’s reversal, consequently, 

created a similar effect on coalition unity.

Truman’s administration decided to seek a settlement in Korea in 

November 1951. Its decision constituted the administration’s second major policy change for operations on the peninsula. However, it decided 

on this verdict after “many American units had performed badly” while 

retreating from the Chinese advance.9 This is problematic for two reasons.

First, Truman’s administration allowed military events to dictate its 

decision-making methodology and policies. For example, successful postInchon operations encouraged Truman’s administration to seek Korean 

unification. Additionally, failures following the Chinese landings motivated the Truman administration’s decision to seek a negotiated settlement. 

Therefore, Truman’s administration created Commonwealth perceptions 

of American uncertainty and hesitancy rather than American resolve and 

decisiveness. The coalition objective for Korea, a political goal, should 

never have changed. At minimum, military circumstances should not dictate the political objective. Maintaining one objective typically leads to a 

quicker conclusion of events and, thus, encourages retention of coalition 

unity.

Second, the Truman administration’s decision to maintain the status 

quo in Korea negatively affected the morale of Commonwealth soldiers. 

Australian soldiers, for example, volunteered to serve in Korea “to fight.”10

They did not volunteer to maintain a status quo that “appeared to be a 

waste of lives” while diplomats pursued a negotiated settlement. General 

Matthew Ridgway, upon assuming command of the EUSA in December 

1950, felt that American soldiers were unprepared “mentally and spiritually” to seek a decisive victory in Korea.11 Politically, Truman’s decision 

to seek a negotiated settlement demonstrated his mental and spiritual unwillingness in 1951 to unify Korea.
78

Soldiers, regardless of the era, are uninterested in conducting military operations to allow political leaders to “save face.”12 Conscripted 

soldiers must fight regardless of the circumstances. However, volunteers 

typically offer to fight because they believe in the war’s purpose. They 

will not provide their unquestioned allegiance to the lead nation’s military 

commander or to the coalition’s mission if they perceive the war as futile. Regardless, Commonwealth soldiers found their unity with the United 

States government and the UN Command tested almost immediately after 

arriving in Korea.

Commonwealth soldiers characterized their initial employment 

in Korea as a great deal of “ad hocery [sic].”13 The combat situation the 

Commonwealth soldiers faced upon their arrival to the Korean peninsula 

likely created this depiction. British forces, for example, arrived before the 

Inchon landings. The coalition’s situation remained perilous at this time. 

The attitude of American military leaders was that “a little got in fast was 

better than a lot later on.”14 Therefore, coalition commanders frequently 

rushed Commonwealth soldiers into combat without sufficient preparation. Specifically, leaders such as General Douglas MacArthur wanted all 

Commonwealth troops sent to Korea to engage immediately in combat 

without conducting pre-combat training or terrain familiarization.

It is standard for incoming units and personnel to conduct training 

before entering combat. United States Army units deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, for example, did not immediately undertake combat missions 

upon arriving to their respective theater. They verified the accuracy of 

their weapons, received intelligence and threat briefings, and conducted 

other training as required before taking on their mission. This method of 

introducing soldiers to combat is typical throughout American history.

However, the American-led coalition in Korea faced dire military 

situations prior to the Inchon landings and after the Chinese invasion. 

MacArthur’s policy of assigning troops to combat positions immediately 

after arriving to Korea presented clear risk to those soldiers’ lives and to 

the good of the mission. However, MacArthur’s strategy in this example 

is understandable. Military necessity required as many troops as possible 

from the UN Command engaging the DPRK’s army in combat. Furthermore, Commonwealth governments should have ensured that their forces 

were prepared sufficiently before deploying to Korea to allay concerns 

regarding MacArthur’s approach. Canadian forces deploying to Korea illustrated this responsibility.

The 2 PPCLI departed for Korea on 25 November.15 2 PPCLI expected to complete collective training in Korea and subsequently to perform 

occupation duties. The UN Command’s favorable military circumstances 
79

from the Inchon landings until late November 1950 justified the battalion’s expectations. However, the Chinese invaded Korea on the same day 

2 PPCLI departed for Korea.16 China’s invasion delayed hopes for a quick 

UN victory. Therefore, 2 PPCLI, having conducted minimal collective 

training prior to its departure for Korea, faced unexpected tasks for which 

it was unprepared upon arriving to the peninsula.17

The 2 PPCLI’s unanticipated situation did not deter the EUSA Commander, Lieutenant General Walton Walker, from seeking its immediate 

employment in battle. Walker wanted 2 PPCLI to occupy a “reserve position not far from the battleline [sic]” upon its arrival. Walker died before 

writing a memoir. His personal thoughts regarding the employment of Canadian or other Commonwealth forces, therefore, are unrecorded.

It is likely that Walker felt his placement of 2 PPCLI in a reserve 

location, rather than a front-line position, was sufficient compromise for 

2 PPCLI’s unpreparedness. Regardless, 2 PPCLI’s leadership perceived 

that Walker wanted the battalion engaged without sufficient preparation. 

Walker’s alleged spirit of “defeatism” in the aftermath of China’s invasion 

likely clouded his judgment regarding the employment of incoming Commonwealth forces.19 The Canadians appeared to reach this conclusion.

Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Stone served as the 2 PPCLI commander 

when the battalion arrived to Korea. Stone’s orders from the Canadian 

government directed him to conduct an eight-week training period after 

arriving to Korea. Additionally, Louis St-Laurent’s government ordered 

Stone to avoid combat operations except for cases of self-defense and until he felt satisfied that 2 PPCLI was “fit for operations.”20 These orders, 

therefore, created a conflict of interest between Stone and American commanders such as Walker. This conflict was avoidable.

As stated, 2 PPCLI believed that it would conduct occupation duties 

after arriving to Korea. This understanding came from the combat situation that existed when 2 PPCLI departed North America and from the StLaurent government’s expectations. Stone cannot receive fault for being 

unfamiliar with the combat situation upon his arrival to Korea. The Chinese did not invade until his unit was seaborne. Stone, thus, logically believed that current operations would reach a successful conclusion while 

his unit was in transit to Korea.

Conversely, Truman’s administration and St-Laurent’s government 

failed to achieve a shared understanding of expectations. Dean Acheson 

continually emphasized the “importance that everyone contribute as much 

as they could,” during his conversations with Lester Pearson, Canada’s 

Minister for External Affairs, from June until November 1950.21 Therefore, it is logical to conclude that Truman’s administration felt it reached 
a common understanding of expectations with St-Laurent’s government 

after that government announced its intention to provide land forces to 

Korea. Canadian troops were clearly unprepared for combat. Regardless, 

political necessities forced St-Laurent’s government to rush Canadian land 

forces to Korea.

The St-Laurent government’s expectations of an eight-week training 

period for 2 PPCLI after its arrival to Korea demonstrates the haste with 

which it decided to contribute land forces to Korea. Canadian expectations 

also portray a government that did not share common understanding with 

Truman’s administration. St-Laurent’s government should have expected 

that its land forces would face some form of combat regardless of the positive situation that existed when they departed for Korea. Unfortunately, 

this lack of understanding adversely contributed to poor relations between 

American and Canadian military leaders.

Stone had to negotiate with Walker to ensure 2 PPCLI conducted 

its government-mandated training period upon arrival. At times, Stone 

felt forced to present Walker with his government’s specific orders “to 

substantiate his negotiating position” and thereby meet his government’s 

expectations.22 The fact that Stone felt required to resort to such measures, 

despite the perilous combat situation, demonstrates a lack of American 

patience and poor knowledge of partners at the military level. Additionally, Walker’s impatience and minimal knowledge regarding a coalition 

partner reflected a lack of respect for that partner’s national concerns and 

limitations.

Walker’s command finally agreed to Stone’s training timeline for 

two reasons. The first was political: Walker could not completely disregard the orders of a coalition partner’s government. Second, Walker recognized that, by giving Stone what he wanted, a training period would 

“hasten” 2 PPCLI’s “arrival to the front.”23 Walker demonstrated less than 

mere patience or respect for a coalition partner’s contributions. His command ignored the “moral flavor” that multinational contributions, regardless of type or size, provided to a UN coalition operating under United 

States leadership.24 Furthermore, Walker’s impatience and lack of respect 

appeared to permeate through most American units and their tactical expectations for Commonwealth forces.

Jeffrey Grey argued that the EUSA placed Commonwealth forces 

in situations “above and beyond that which they should’ve been called 

to face.”25 Specifically, American commanders typically employed Commonwealth forces as a “rearguard” force for American units.26 According 

to Grey, these situations were “above and beyond” because the Commonwealth forces were “smaller” than American units and, thus, lacked suffi-
81

cient personnel and materiél to conform to United States Army doctrine.27

Therefore, according to Grey, EUSA expected too much from the Commonwealth forces’ minimal capabilities. Regardless, Commonwealth units 

believed that their American partners lacked combat skills and willpower 

to fight.

Some Commonwealth soldiers, such as Anthony Farrar-Hockley, 

felt this American problem resided at the highest echelons of command. 

Specifically, Farrar-Hockley argued that MacArthur’s desire to replicate 

the “brilliance” he demonstrated during and immediately after the Inchon 

landing created poor methods of American strategic and tactical planning.28 Other Commonwealth personnel felt the issue lay at the military’s 

lower levels, specifically after the Chinese invasion and the “poor American combat performance” during that period.29

Bluntly, the British and Australian militaries’ confidence in United 

States land forces “declined considerably” after the Chinese invasion. 

Canadian land forces had yet to engage in combat during this time.30

However, British and Australian soldiers identified “widespread panic” 

in their American counterparts and felt that American reports on the Chinese advance were “fabrications...to gain permission for premature and 

quite unjustifiable withdrawals.”31 Ridgway, replacing Walker as EUSA 

commander, appeared to support these conclusions in The Korean War. 

Ridgway believed that his soldiers’ “infantry ancestors would roll over 

in their graves” if they could see their offspring’s poor terrain utilization, 

reluctance to “put shoe leather to earth,” and failure, or perhaps unwillingness, to gain and maintain contact with enemy forces.32 Commonwealth 

opinions of American military ineptitude, therefore, were not baseless.

Guidance provided by American military commanders further eroded Commonwealth trust and confidence in American military competence. 

Two examples explain the Commonwealth’s reduced trust and confidence. 

Patrol guidance, issued in May 1952, is the first example. The second example is the decision to remove forces after the battle near Kap’yong. 

These examples, from a Commonwealth perspective, demonstrated an 

American inclination to command through “impulsive judgments” and an 

American reluctance to “stand and fight.”33

Patrol guidance issued in May 1952 dictated that battalions on the 

front line conduct at least “one strong fighting patrol per week against 

recognized enemy positions” and capture at least one prisoner every three 

days.34 This policy was unpopular within the Commonwealth formations 

for various reasons. A primary reason for this policy’s unpopularity within 

the Commonwealth forces was its origination from American staff officers 

who preferred to remain in their headquarters rather than visit subordi-
82

nate formations.35 These staff officers, according to Commonwealth soldiers, were unfamiliar with realities faced by lower echelons of command. 

Therefore, Commonwealth commanders argued for guidance to conduct 

patrols “according to the tactical situation at hand, rather than adhering to 

a rigid timetable.”36 Their frustration with this decision-making methodology increased after Kap’yong.

The Commonwealth’s critical contention regarding Kap’yong originated with the American willingness to abandon the UN position in that 

area after fighting concluded. The Commonwealth’s military commanders considered the withdrawal unnecessary, specifically because it surrendered “hard-won territory without a fight.”37 Furthermore, the battle and 

subsequent withdrawal of UN forces reflected differences between American and Commonwealth approaches to combat and EUSA’s “continuing 

reliance” on Commonwealth brigades.38

It is common for military formations to complain about their higher 

headquarters’ lack of understanding for their respective situation. Complaints of this nature reflect one of two realities. First, the lower command 

fails to understand the higher command’s objectives and perspectives. The 

higher command, for example, worries about more than one subordinate 

formation. Conversely, Ridgway himself lamented several staffs’ “unwillingness...to forgo certain creature comforts” after he arrived to Korea.39

Therefore, Commonwealth complaints of American staff officers were not 

baseless.

American patrolling guidance showed a lack of knowledge, patience 

and respect for coalition partners. Furthermore, the decision to withdraw 

forces from Kap’yong reflects a poor decision-making methodology. Importantly, these examples reflect a United States military command that 

was not coordinated or unified with its coalition partners. Canadians, for 

example, did not patrol with vigor.40 Conversely, Australian forces “patrolled too aggressively.”41 Patrol guidance, thus, did not consider each 

nation’s capabilities, intentions, or limitations.

Australian forces patrolled aggressively because their commanders felt that method provided the “only means to detect China’s hidden 

forces” and engage them in combat.42 Australian commanders, therefore, 

could interpret American guidance in one of two ways. First, they could 

consider the guidance as an American effort to contain Australian forces 

from opportunities to achieve battlefield “glory” for Australia. Conversely, 

the American command possibly applied specific patrolling guidance with 

Australian forces in mind. The Australian proclivity to become “dangerously overextended” explains this possibility.43
83

Nevertheless, the American military represented the coalition’s lead 

nation and, thus, made the decisions on operations. American military 

commanders also controlled access to the press and, thus, controlled press 

releases to nations throughout the world regarding the situation in Korea. 

The possible Australian interpretation that American commanders felt the 

United States should receive all credit for positive battlefield activities 

is understandable. The interpretation is logical when one considers Australia’s 1st and 3rd Battalions, Royal Australian Regiment’s (1/3 RAR) 

competent performances as one of EUSA’s “more reliable rearguards.”44 

Therefore, an Australian interpretation of doing the “dirty work” for the 

American military is plausible.

The RAR’s leaders and soldiers could also interpret American patrolling guidance as an implication that senior American commanders felt 

Australians were not sufficiently aggressive and, therefore, not supporting 

their “numerical weight” of the coalition’s combat burden.45 Given the 

American military’s poor performance during its retreat from the Chinese 

invasion, the majority of 1 and 3 RAR soldiers felt their forces were superior to American military units “in matters of field craft, tactics, or organization [sic].”46 3 RAR could define either interpretation as an insult from 

its American commanders. 2 PPCLI, on the other hand, viewed American 

patrolling guidance from a different perspective.

American commanders viewed 2 PPCLI’s leadership as excessively 

concerned with a “spit and polish” garrison mentality and less concerned 

with fighting and patrolling.47 In September 1952, for example, 2 PPCLI 

conducted two fighting patrols and ten ambush patrols. Conversely, 1 

RAR conducted twenty-seven fighting patrols and twenty-eight ambush 

patrols within the first three weeks of September 1952.48 Therefore, this 

data makes understandable an American military perception of Canadian 

military inactivity. The data also presents as logical the American establishment of patrolling guidance specifically directed towards Canadian 

forces. However, this sentiment neglects an important aspect of Canadian 

policy.

St-Laurent’s government sent Canadian forces to Korea to operate 

under the “control and authority of the United Nations.”49 Canadian forces, thus, did not go to Korea to serve as an American puppet. Therefore, 

St-Laurent’s government sought “to preserve a distinctly Canadian position” by maintaining its military’s independence in Korea.50 Therefore, 

2 PPCLI and other Canadian forces barely coordinated their actions and 

operations with their adjacent Commonwealth units. Those forces were 

“less than amused” by their perceptions of Canadian military ineptitude.51
84

2 PPCLI and subsequent Canadian forces likely did not want, and appeared to accept barely, patrolling guidance from American commanders. 

Two reasons explain this perception. First, Canadian military leaders knew 

the Chinese were “specially trained and equipped...while they themselves 

performed what amounted to a routine task with routine equipment.”52

Canadian forces, thus, did not find logic in operations that offered minimal gains for an objective that sought the status quo antebellum. Second, 

Canadian leaders understood that American patrolling guidance reduced 

their forces’ independence. Reduced Canadian independence negated StLaurent’s perceived “entitlement to join in the policy-making game” after 

the conflict in Korea concluded.53

St-Laurent’s example of a national government seeking to maintain 

an independent military within a coalition is not new. President Woodrow 

Wilson pursued this status after providing American forces to the AngloFrench coalition during the First World War. Specifically, Wilson wanted 

his armed forces to be “an instrument of the policy of the United States,” 

independent of British or French command.54 He expected this independence to combine with a quality battlefield performance that would create 

for him a strong role “in the peace negotiations that followed the war.”55

St-Laurent’s government simply followed a pattern established by its 

American cousins 35 years prior to Korea.

However, American commanders in Korea reacted to Canadian desires in a manner similar to British and French military leaders in World 

War I. American military leaders continued to insist on Canadian adherence to American policy and frequently complained of receiving “insufficient information” from Canadian patrols.56 Unfortunately, “attitudes, 

tactics, and style,” rather than substance, appear to explain AmericanCanadian military interactions in Korea.57 Thus, American-Canadian disagreements appeared to be less about actual tactics and employment and 

more about the struggle between a coalition member seeking to retain its 

independence from a coalition leader that wanted to dominate its partners.

American commanders, by employing this method of leadership, 

forgot that war is “a continuation of political activity by other means.”58

Carl von Clausewitz’s definition of war applies to one’s interactions with 

coalition partners as much as it does to one’s enemy. American commanders appeared to interact with their Commonwealth partners by following a behavioral precedent established by Dean Acheson. The American 

military’s behavior, thus, appears based on the reputation of military excellence earned after Inchon. The only difference between Acheson and 

American military leaders was that Acheson demonstrated self-righteous 

behavior prior to Inchon. American commanders failed to realize that their 
85

current situation, created after the Chinese invasion, negated Commonwealth perceptions of American military excellence. The American decision to withdraw UN forces from Kap’yong supports this conclusion.

Truman’s administration wanted multinational forces to fight in Korea for two reasons. First, it wanted to ensure that as many UN members 

as possible represented the coalition. Substantial UN representation enhanced the organization’s credibility. Second, the United States could not 

sustain the manpower burden in Korea by itself. Thus, the American decision to surrender unnecessarily the terrain earned by the UN Command 

confused the Commonwealth’s military forces. This surrender occurred 

following the battle at Kap’yong.

Commonwealth personnel losses constituted the primary reason for 

this confusion and concern. The Commonwealth’s confusion is specifically understandable if one considers that 3 RAR and 2 PPCLI received 

a United States Presidential Unit Citation for their efforts at Kap’yong.59

Thus, they received a significant American military award for actions that 

did not contribute to the UN Command’s long-term success. Therefore, it 

is rather easy to comprehend Commonwealth confusion and concern with 

American decision-making.

Minimal personnel limited the Commonwealth’s ability to provide 

military forces for combat operations in Korea. Global commitments, such 

as the British in Malaya, or Australian and Canadian legislative restrictions 

to national military sizes created the Commonwealth’s limitations. Commonwealth military leaders logically felt that battles that created “equal 

casualties on both sides” provided an advantage to the Chinese.60 Their 

conviction is sensible given China’s overwhelming numerical superiority. Additionally, China was more capable than UN forces of getting land 

forces to the Korean battlefield. Therefore, Commonwealth commanders 

sought to minimize casualties wherever possible. Thus, the Commonwealth’s military leaders, having lost substantial manpower at Kap’yong, 

logically identified the UN withdrawal as an act that did not serve a military purpose.61

Commonwealth nations could not afford to sustain “continuous heavy 

casualties” for military and political reasons.62 Therefore, Commonwealth 

disagreements with the withdrawal from Kap’yong are reasonable. Aside 

from the Commonwealth’s personnel constraints, heavy casualties negatively affect a nation’s morale. This is true for a nation whether it serves in 

a coalition as the lead nation or as a subordinate partner. Reduced national 

morale will affect a nation’s policy by demanding a reduction of forces, a 

removal of all forces, or a change in the command structure. Thus, military commanders within a coalition must always remain cognizant of the 
86

effects their operations and decisions will have on popular, political, and 

military opinions within all contributing nations. Coalition commanders 

cannot remain concerned with only their nation’s morale or willpower.

The majority of American military leaders in Korea appear to have 

not recognized these facts. MacArthur’s autobiography did not comment 

on the domestic morale of Commonwealth nations when discussing his 

time in command of UN forces in Korea. He appeared to have been unconcerned about the effects of his operations on domestic Commonwealth 

morale or politics. Ridgway appeared to be a leader Commonwealth soldiers respected for the simple fact that he did not typically order advances 

unless he was reasonably certain of gaining ground.63 Thus, evidence suggests that Ridgway remained cognizant of sustaining his personnel as a 

means to preserve politically and militarily his coalition’s unity and morale.

However, the commander’s command climate must reflect his command style and considerations. The Chinese invasion in November 1950 

created a war that pitted two armies “of approximately equal strength and 

determination” against each other.64 Thus, conservation of resources, specifically troops, and military and national morale grew more crucial as 

the Korean War continued without an identifiable end in sight. Ridgway 

understood this reality. Evidence suggests that Commonwealth forces believed a majority of American commanders did not adhere to Ridgway’s 

methodology.

British commanders in Korea appeared to understand best this reality. 

The British held a reputation of being “slow on offense but unshakable on 

defense.”65 Their reputation did not stop British commanders from questioning the “why,” or the purpose and necessity, for American-decided operations.66 These concepts were not new to British military doctrine. Field 

Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, for example, continuously sought to 

“nurture the morale” of his forces during the Second World War by remaining cautious and thereby avoid unnecessary casualties.67 Fortunately, 

British traits appear to have not bothered American commanders, other 

than MacArthur, as much as their other Commonwealth partners.68

American commanders and soldiers held a high opinion of their British counterparts because they were reliable in combat, could sustain themselves, and used American-provided equipment in a “highly professional” 

manner.69 British military leaders, and their Commonwealth partners, held 

United States Marines in high regard. Unfortunately, they maintained a 

considerably negative opinion of soldiers in the American army.70 Two examples created British contempt for American soldiers. American actions 

in combat represent the first example. Second, American soldiers behaved 
87

poorly when captured by enemy forces.

American commanders exhibited a habit of relying on British forces 

if American units were in a “sticky situation.”71 This practice likely began after British forces, along with Turkish formations, stood their ground 

against the initial Chinese invasion while EUSA formations retreated en 

masse.72 Thus, according to the British, American perceptions of military 

superiority appeared rooted less in substance and more in style. The main 

problem with these actions was that American soldiers represented the coalition’s lead nation and, therefore, the coalition’s credibility.

Soldiers sent to combat in distant lands want to know their senior 

commanders, and the soldiers that represent those commanders, are capable of accomplishing their respective missions. The Commonwealth, as 

stated, provided just greater than six percent of the UN coalition’s combat power compared to America’s share of seventy percent. Surely, the 

British understood the overall limitations preventing the Commonwealth 

from affecting significantly the course of the war. However, lead nation 

incompetence in combat, real or perceived, will disrupt the morale of the 

soldiers contributed by other nations. By extension, reduced morale will 

affect negatively the national policies within those contributing nations.

The behavior of American prisoners of war (POW) did not increase 

British or Commonwealth opinions of American military competence. 

Richard Trembath argued that American soldiers suffered a “total collapse 

of morale” when captured.73 That statement does not cite Trembath to infer 

that all American soldiers acted poorly or without courage when captured. 

However, British and other Commonwealth soldiers shared this perception of American POWs. British POWs actually requested separation from 

American POWs for their negative effects on British morale.74 

This chapter does not argue that all American leaders, soldiers, and 

organizations performed poorly in Korea. However, statements throughout this chapter discussing Commonwealth criticism of American forces 

represent Commonwealth perceptions. It is traditional for perceptions to 

be mistaken for reality. As stated, soldiers representing a coalition’s lead 

nation symbolize that nation’s and, thus, the coalition’s credibility. Commonwealth perceptions of American combat skill demonstrate minimal 

credibility for the coalition in Korea.

Evidence indicates that the Commonwealth forces perceived American military ineptness in Korea. In the absence of numerous autobiographies or personal interviews, one can only believe that a substantial number of Commonwealth soldiers, with their perceptions of their American 

partners, felt concern for their counterparts and, thus, their role in Korea. 

Specifically, one must believe that those soldiers, perceiving American 
88

military leadership and capabilities as inept, questioned their governments’ decisions to send them to Korea. This curiosity will never fail to 

damage coalition unity and, thus, negatively affect the coalition’s ability 

to accomplish its assigned mission. Communication is a critical skill to 

alleviate these concerns.

Events at Koje-Do represent an incident that would have benefitted from greater communication. Koje-Do was a location responsible 

for maintaining enemy POWs. The camp held over 160,000 Chinese and 

North Korean prisoners. 60,000 Koje-Do POWs identified themselves as 

“anti-communist.”75 The communist majority subjected the non-communist minority to numerous beatings and other intimidation tactics.

The United States was the only nation providing security forces 

at Koje-Do when harsh communist tactics first occurred. General Mark 

Wayne Clarke, Ridgway’s replacement as commander of all UN forces, 

wanted to integrate Koje-Do’s American security forces with multinational forces to alleviate international pressure on the United States for these 

actions. Clarke selected Canadian forces, among others, to provide security at Koje-Do. However, Clarke did not consult St-Laurent’s government 

prior to this selection.76

Clarke was not required to consult with respective governments 

whose soldiers he assigned to Koje-Do. UN members provided military 

forces to an American-led coalition to accomplish a mission. Clarke was 

the military commander of all UN forces. Clarke’s responsibility, therefore, was to array his forces in a manner that allowed him to accomplish 

his assigned mission. This fact applies to any military commander in any 

combat scenario. Furthermore, prisoner security existed as one of Clarke’s 

essential tasks. His responsibility, again, is a typical obligation for any 

military commander.

St-Laurent’s government objected to Clarke’s “menial and ignominious” employment of its troops.77 St-Laurent’s government registered this 

protest specifically because Clarke, or another American official, did not 

consult it beforehand. Canada’s official historian, Herbert Fairlie Wood, 

eventually admitted that St-Laurent’s government “made too much fuss 

over the affair.”78 Regardless, Truman’s administration identified St-Laurent’s government as excessively willing to oppose diplomatically the 

United States for simple “political propaganda.”79 Therefore, Canadian 

protests damaged relations with the Truman administration.

According to Wood, “the vital necessity for prior consultation...

when unusual activity of any sort is being contemplated” establishes the 

main lesson from Clarke’s actions.80 Wood’s argument is not completely 

erroneous. Had Clarke understood St-Laurent’s position, specifically re-
89

garding the independence of Canadian formations within the UN Command, this problem likely would not have occurred. However, circumstances that represent “unusual activity” always occur in war. Regardless, 

Wood’s standards for “unusual activity” do not apply to prisoner of war 

security.

Prisoner of war security is a standard military task. All soldiers, and 

the governments that send them to war, should expect to conduct prisoner 

security at some point during combat operations. POW security occurs in 

permanent areas, such as Koje-Do, or in ad hoc situations while engaging 

the enemy. International laws such as the Geneva Convention require sustenance, medical care, and security for POWs.81

Coalition commanders must consider POW security among their 

most significant priorities. Military forces gain a moral advantage through 

adherence to international law. This is particularly true if their opposing 

forces do not obey international law. Furthermore, complying with international law encourages a coalition’s multinational governments and the 

populations they represent to continue their support for the coalition to 

continue military operations. From a Western perspective of morality, caring for POWs is simply the humane thing to do.

Perhaps the greatest lesson to be learned from Clarke’s mishap is 

a reminder that personalities are “as important as policies” to retaining 

coalition unity.82 Dwight D. Eisenhower’s personality, rather than his military acumen, likely motivated his appointment as Supreme Commander 

of Anglo-American forces during World War II. Eisenhower’s personality engendered trust from his colleagues. Conversely, Dean Acheson’s 

personality provoked a response opposite from Eisenhower’s personality. 

Acheson’s efforts to secure Commonwealth contributions to Korea were 

frequently harsh. His conduct created conditions, demonstrated by Canadian protests over the employment of its troops in a POW camp, which 

appeared to utilize personality differences to justify policy disagreements.

Previous chapters referenced Commonwealth governments’ discomfort with MacArthur’s public statements and their subsequently positive 

attitudes towards Ridgway. Political uncertainty towards MacArthur also 

applied to Commonwealth soldiers. Jack Gallaway, for example, revealed 

this parallel between soldier and government. Gallaway fought with the 

RAR as a platoon sergeant. He cynically questioned if anyone would challenge MacArthur while the “living legend” remained in command of UN 

forces.83 Gallaway subsequently professed great faith in Ridgway after his 

assumption of command of EUSA, arguing that Ridgway turned the entire 

UN Command into a truly “cohesive force.”84 However, the commander 

cannot retain this burden alone.
90

All military members that represent a coalition’s lead nation are 

required to gain the trust and confidence of their multinational partners. 

Lead nation military forces stimulate trust and confidence from their coalition partners through battlefield competence and a sensible decision-making methodology. Unfortunately, that which makes sense to an American, 

specifically in the Korean War example, is not always sensible to a nonAmerican. Thus, Commonwealth leaders felt that American commanders 

in Korea failed to identify Commonwealth forces “as other than American 

forces.”85 America’s Commonwealth partners resisted this identification 

and sought means to employ their forces in a manner more suitable to their 

capabilities than those of their “big uncle’s.”86

Commonwealth soldiers understood that the nature of combat in the 

Korean War changed in 1951-1952. Furthermore, following the Truman 

administration’s policy change in search of a negotiated settlement, Commonwealth soldiers recognized that the UN Command shared parity with 

its Chinese enemy. With this perspective in mind, Commonwealth soldiers 

also assumed that the UN command could not overcome China’s ability 

to provide personnel to its military forces. Thus, Commonwealth soldiers 

came to believe that China could not be defeated in Korea’s Northern 

provinces.87

The UN Command needed “substantial reinforcement” at the selected point of attack and a “willingness to accept very heavy casualties” to 

achieve battlefield success after the Chinese invasion.88 Commonwealth 

formations felt that tactics of this nature were the only means possible 

to break the Korean stalemate and achieve favorable conditions for an 

armistice. Commonwealth leaders clearly did not believe in the UN Command’s potential to achieve a decisive victory or unify Korea. Evidence 

suggests that the Commonwealth, specifically the British and Australians, 

were prepared to do their part to maintain the status quo antebellum as 

long as American commanders avoided acts that were “in defiance of all 

common sense.”89

From a military perspective, the Korean War provides five strong 

lessons. First, coalition forces should not engage in combat unless they are 

prepared for combat. General Walker, for example, wanted to establish 2 

PPCLI near the front line immediately after it arrived to Korea. 2 PPCLI’s 

minimal preparation for combat forced its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Stone, to utilize his government’s orders mandating a period of collective training to justify his request for such a training period to Walker. 

Stone’s actions undoubtedly saved Canadian, and other coalition, lives.

Secondly, military organizations must be thoroughly prepared prior 

to deploying to the combat theater. Subordinate commanders cannot ex-
91

pect understanding and compromise from the coalition commander in a 

manner similar to Walker if they already arrived to the combat area. Military commanders continuously seek to increase their available resources, 

specifically personnel, to accomplish their mission. An unprepared military organization that arrives to the combat theater is of no use to the coalition commander. This situation will breed contempt between the coalition commander and their subordinate multinational commander. This 

contempt is likely to spread to political levels, specifically to respective 

national governments. Unity amongst military echelons is hard to achieve 

if political leaders are not united.

Third, commanders are likely to prioritize their national policies over 

the coalition commander’s directives. Commanders will always work to 

accomplish their assigned missions. However, they will perform this task 

under restrictions placed on them by their respective national government. 

Coalition commanders must understand their partners, remain patient, and 

respect individual nations’ caveats. St-Laurent’s government, for example, 

wanted Canadian military forces sent to Korea to retain as much independence as possible to ensure Canada’s position at the negotiating table. 

Canada’s military commanders, therefore, pursued means to retain their 

independence from American and other Commonwealth commanders in 

Korea.

Fourth, national governments contributing forces must achieve 

shared understanding of the coalition’s timeline, tasks, and purpose with 

the lead nation. 2 PPCLI, for example, left North America believing that 

it would perform occupation duties after arriving to Korea. Combat circumstances in Korea clearly favored the UN Command when 2 PPCLI 

departed for Korea in November 1950. The Chinese invasion changed the 

circumstances. Unfortunately, Acheson’s demands for land forces hastened Canada’s deployment of untrained forces to Korea.

Canadian haste created 2 PPCLI’s poor level of preparation at its departure. However, Acheson and his Canadian counterpart, Lester Pearson, 

should have reached an understanding of expectations for the employment of Canadian forces before their deployment. Subsequently, Acheson 

and Pearson should have reached an understanding of when those forces 

would actually be prepared to engage enemy forces in combat. Acheson’s 

lack of patience and respect forced 2 PPCLI’s hasty deployment to Korea 

and, therefore, negatively affected political and military relations between 

the United States and Canada.

Finally, coalition forces must gain and maintain trust and confidence 

in each other and, specifically, in the lead nation’s military forces. Com-
92

monwealth perceptions of American military units “bugging out” when 

faced with Chinese assaults did not provoke Commonwealth trust or confidence in their American partners.90 Additionally, lead nation military actions such as unorganized retreats prompt coalition partners to question 

the lead nation’s competence and overall resolve to accomplish the coalition’s mission. Furthermore, “fool-hardy stunts” are not a means to gain a 

subordinate’s trust and confidence.91

In conclusion, a coalition’s military component affects the organization’s ability to achieve unity of effort with greater influence than its political component. Political leaders determine the coalition’s purpose and end 

state, decide to contribute forces, and apply respective national caveats to 

their forces to achieve respective national goals. However, military leaders are required to turn political guidance into battlefield success. Military 

considerations vis-à-vis the Korean War demonstrated that unity of effort 

is a critical element that supports a coalition’s efforts to accomplish its 

mission. Specifically, the Korean War’s military considerations demonstrated the important weight that personalities and relationships hold on 

coalition unity. Dominance in personnel and materiél does not justify attempts by a lead nation’s military representative to enforce their will on a 

coalition partner. One must ensure their forces are sufficiently credible to 

support their demands of coalition partners if they find it necessary to act 

in such a manner. Otherwise, perceptions of military ineptitude by the lead 

nation will reduce coalition unity.
93

Notes

1. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester, UK: 

Manchester University Press, 1988), 6.

2. Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953, 78.

3. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies, 30.

4. Gallaway, The Last Call of the Bugle: The Long Road to Kapyong, 170.

5. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Canadian Military Experiences,” 31.

6. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational 

Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), C-3.

7. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies, 46.

8. Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, 127.

9. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies, 85.

10. Gallaway, The Last Call of the Bugle, 52.

11 Trembath, A Different Sort of War: Australians in Korea 1950-53, 143.

Ridgway, The Korean War, 86.

12 Trembath, A Different Sort of War, 143.

13. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies, 46.

14. Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, Volume I: A Distant 

Obligation, 119.

15. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the 

United States, 206.

16. Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, 55.

17. Watson, Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953, 

177.

18. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, 206.

19. Johnston, A War of Patrols, 55.

20. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, 206.

21. Memorandum of Conversation: Formosa, Contribution of Troops by 

Canada, between Dean Acheson and Lester B. Pearson, July 29, 1950, Papers of 

Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

22. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the 

United States, 206.

23. Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, 55.

24. Ridgway, The Korean War, 148.

25. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, 8.

26. Grey, A Military History of Australia, 205.

27. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Canadian Military Experiences,” 30.

28. Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, Volume I: A Distant 

Obligation, 206.

29. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies, 87.

30. Jeffrey Grey, “The Regiment’s First War: Korea, 1950-56,” in Duty 

First. A History of the Royal Australian Regiment, eds. David Horner and Jean 

Bou (New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 2008), 66.
94

31. Johnston, A War of Patrols, 56.

32. Ridgway, The Korean War, 88-89.

33. Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, Volume I: A Distant 

Obligation, 336. Grey, “The Regiment’s First War: Korea, 1950-56,” 66.

34. Watson, Far Eastern Tour, 1950-1953, 80.

35. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies, 70.

36. Watson, Far Eastern Tour, 1950-1953, 80.

37. Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, 107.

38. Grey, The Commonwealth armies and the Korean War, 81.

39. Ridgway, The Korean War, 88.

40. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, 151.

41. Grey, 153.

42. Gallaway, The Last Call of the Bugle, 145.

43. Watson, Far Eastern Tour, 1950-1953, 93.

44. Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, 56.

45. Trembath, A Different Sort of War: Australians in Korea 1950-53, 137.

46. Trembath.

47. Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, 255.

48. Johnston, 303.

49. Melady, Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, 72.

50. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, 131.

51. Johnston, A War of Patrols, 316.

52. Watson, Far Eastern Tour, 1950-1953, 95.

53. Denis Stairs, “Canada and the Korean War Fifty Years On,” Canadian 

Military History 9, no. 3 (Summer, 2000): 50.

54. Mitchell A. Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans under British 

Command, 1918 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 10.

55. Mitchell, xi.

56. Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, 238.

57. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the 

United States, 287.

58. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and eds. Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

59. Melady, Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, 78.

60. Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 232.

61. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Canadian Military Experiences,” 30.

62. Blaxland.

63. Gallaway, The Last Call of the Bugle, 203.

64. Weigley, The American Way of War, 393.

65. Blair, The Forgotten War. America in Korea 1950-1953, 825.

66. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, 138.

67. Stephen Hart, Montgomery and Colossal Cracks: the 21st Army Group 

in Northwest Europe, 1944-45 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2000), 114.
95

68. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1959, 460.

69. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, 85.

70. Trembath, A Different Sort of War: Australians in Korea 1950-53, 136.

71. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, 85.

71. Gallaway, The Last Call of the Bugle: The Long Road to Kapyong, 282.

73. Trembath, A Different Sort of War, 83.

74. Trembath, 84.

75. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the 

United States, 246.

76. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Canadian Military Experiences,” 31.

77. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, 252.

78. Wood, Strange Battleground: Official History of the Canadian Army in 

Korea, 196.

79. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, 252.

80. Wood, Strange Battleground, 196.

81. Peace Pledge Union, “Geneva Convention: An Introduction,” http://

www.ppu.org.uk/learn/texts/doc_geneva_con.html (accessed 8 October 2013).

82. Blaxland, “The Korean War,” 31.

83. Gallaway, The Last Call of the Bugle, 170.

84. Gallaway, 171.

85. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, 205.

86. Blaxland, “The Korean War,” 32-33.

87. Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, Volume I: A Distant 

Obligation, 350.

88. Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, 162.

89. Gallaway, The Last Call of the Bugle, 169.

90. Trembath, A Different Sort of War: Australians in Korea 1950-53, 136.

91. Blaxland, “The Korean War,” 30.

97

Chapter 5

Coalition Sustainment Part II

Negotiations, Repatriation, a Fixated Ally, and the Korean 

Armistice 

The Canadian view, shared by Great Britain and to a lesser 

extent Australia, was that the United Nations lacked the means 

of imposing any solution upon the Communist representatives 

which they were unwilling to accept voluntarily.

—Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the 

Korean War, and the United States

Armistice negotiations, POW repatriation, and UN difficulties with 

ROK President Syngman Rhee are the Korean War’s predominant themes 

from late 1951 until 1953. Negotiations for an armistice to the Korean War 

consumed nearly two years. United States President Harry S. Truman received substantial blame for the negotiations’ longevity for his insistence 

on voluntary POW repatriation. However, representatives from China, the 

DPRK, and Syngman Rhee must also receive their share of blame. Relations between the United States and its British Commonwealth partners 

continued to decline, regardless of blame ownership, in the course of negotiations to end the Korean War.

Negotiations to end the Korean War began on 8 July 1951.1 General 

Matthew Ridgway, the commander of UN forces, announced his command’s intentions to meet with Chinese and DPRK military leaders for 

“talks concerning cessation of military activities and establishment of 

peace.”2 The Truman administration selected Ridgway to initiate negotiations for two reasons. First, the United States did not diplomatically 

recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or the DPRK. Second, 

the Truman administration wanted a UN military representative to negotiate with enemy military leaders because those leaders were supposedly 

“volunteers.”3

The Truman administration’s position on negotiating with China’s 

political leadership is sensible from a solely American perspective. United 

States negotiators could not discuss armistice points with agents from regimes unrecognized by their own government. Additionally, Chinese soldiers in Korea could not officially represent the PRC if they fought in Korea as an unsanctioned, or “volunteer,” force. Therefore, it was sensible for 
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American military leaders to negotiate with military leaders from China’s 

volunteer force.

However, the Truman administration’s position ignored three critical 

facts. First, the administration ignored the fact that negotiations to end a 

war are an extension of that conflict rather than a separate entity. Thus, 

political representatives should have been included in the UN Command’s 

negotiating team. Second, the Truman administration’s initial position on 

armistice negotiations discounted the perspectives of its coalition partners. 

Specifically, some of its partners maintained diplomatic relations with 

China and, therefore, maintained more than a passing interest in armistice 

discussions. Finally, the Truman administration’s desire to negotiate an 

armistice for the Korean War with military personnel ignored the PRC 

government’s new status as an Asian power.

Britain, a critical United States partner in Korea, was an American 

partner that recognized China’s communist government.4 This thesis previously cited the desire of Clement Attlee’s government to protect Britain’s commercial interests in China and Hong Kong as its justification 

for this recognition. Evidence does not suggest that subsequent operations 

in Korea, specifically after the Chinese invasion, reduced Attlee’s desire. 

Conversely, it is likely that his desire to protect Britain’s commerce increased, particularly after China invaded Korea and made war against a 

coalition that included British military units. The Truman administration 

wrongly overlooked this consideration.

Truman’s administration also disregarded reality. Zhou Enlai, China’s 

Premier, publicly identified the United States as China’s “most dangerous enemy” in September 1950.5

 Additionally, Zhou sent messages to the 

Truman administration through intermediaries to warn that China would 

not remain idle if the UN Command advanced into the DPRK with nonROK forces.6

 Therefore, the Chinese government, recently established in 

1949, could not appear weak domestically or internationally by allowing 

the UN Command to move unimpeded to its borders. The Chinese government’s position and intent appeared clear to everyone except Truman’s 

administration. The PRC unquestionably sanctioned the “volunteer” force 

to engage the UN Command in combat operations. Militaries in communist nations do not initiate activity independently without receiving orders 

from their government. China’s volunteer force forced a complete UN 

withdrawal from North Korea. This withdrawal initially caused Truman’s 

administration to consider a total withdrawal of all UN force from Korea.7

Subsequently, China presented itself as America’s military equal by battling to a stalemate in Korea. Therefore, the PRC’s political leaders rightly 
99

deserved to participate in armistice negotiations. Truman’s administration 

was wrong to pursue an armistice through military negotiators alone.

Three possible reasons exist to suggest the Truman administration’s 

reasons for ignoring China’s political leaders as it pursued an armistice. 

First, Truman and his administration maintained a severe hatred of communism. Second, Truman’s administration believed that the Chinese government was a mere satellite of the Soviet Union. Racist attitudes towards 

the Chinese also exist as a possible third reason. All three reasons exist as 

credible explanations for the Truman administration’s refusal to negotiate 

with the Chinese government.

The first two reasons are related. Truman’s personal view that communism represented “the outrage of brainwashing” likely slanted his 

view of China’s government.8 Therefore, it is unlikely that Truman would 

want to negotiate with a government that did not respect human dignity. 

Similarly, the Soviet Union was American’s primary enemy. The Truman 

administration already believed that Soviets authorized and sponsored 

the DPRK’s invasion of the ROK. Therefore, it was logical, though misguided, for the Truman administration to believe that China’s government 

blindly operated under the orders of the Soviet government.

Conversely, the Truman administration appeared to disregard the 

Chinese because of their ethnicity. Dean Acheson, for example, considered the Chinese incompetent at civil administration simply because of 

their race. Specifically, he believed that China’s political leaders would 

meet the same fate as their predecessors and fail to retain control of their 

government.9 Therefore, it is possible that Truman’s administration did not 

want to negotiate with the Chinese government because it did not believe 

that China’s current government would retain power for a substantial period. Additionally, Truman’s administration conceivably doubted the Chinese government’s trustworthiness, particularly regarding its willingness 

to honor the armistice’s agreements.

China’s communist government sought two specific results from the 

armistice negotiations. First, it wanted all Western nations, including the 

United States, to recognize its position as China’s legitimate government. 

Second, the Communist Chinese government wanted to occupy China’s 

seat in the United Nations Security Council.10 The Chinese government’s 

goals are understandable, logical, and, from a distant perspective, reasonable.

Every state wants to receive diplomatic recognition from the world’s 

nations. This recognition aids that respective nation’s economy and, furthermore, provides validation of that nation’s government to its population. However, representing China in the UN Security Council was per-
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haps the Chinese government’s greater goal. Its control of mainland China 

and its massive population far outweighed the Nationalist Chinese government’s claim to represent all of China. Thus, from a viewpoint developed 

roughly sixty years after the Korean War ended, the Truman administration’s refusal to allow the PRC government to represent China in the UN 

Security Council appears to be a wasteful effort that produced nothing but 

increased Sino-American antagonism.

Attlee found the Chinese government’s requests reasonable given 

the circumstances. He identified recognition of Communist China as an 

“unwelcome” but necessary policy and continually sought to persuade 

Truman to accept this reality.11 Attlee’s efforts met continuous resistance 

from Truman’s administration.12 The Truman administration’s pursuit of 

an armistice through military means rendered China’s goals unobtainable 

in American-led negotiations. The administration’s efforts to apply a “one 

size fits all” approach to negotiations and negotiate solely from a perspective of American considerations ignored the wishes of a foe that proved 

itself America’s equal in war.

The Truman administration’s efforts also ignored the UN Command’s 

collective combat exhaustion. Soldiers of democratic nations will fight for 

an identifiable cause. However, the absence of such a cause reduces their 

willingness to make war. Thus, the Truman administration’s unwavering 

negotiating position, by ignoring its adversary’s desires, affected the UN 

coalition in two ways. First, its position created conditions that would prolong the war. Importantly, American and Commonwealth soldiers identified their cause as simply to return home alive. This condition continued 

to reduce unity within the UN Command.

Ridgway, for his part, felt that peace “might be just around the next 

corner” when he extended an offer near the war’s first anniversary to negotiate a settlement to end the Korean War.13 Unfortunately, the UN Command and Chinese forces consumed five months after Ridgway’s initial 

offer to negotiate a truce line, or a demarcation zone to remain uncrossed 

by any force, in Korea before commencing negotiations.14 The delay in beginning negotiations forecasted the struggles to arise during their conduct.

Ridgway and Chinese military representatives initially agreed to 

negotiate at Kaesong. This location existed in a zone identified by both 

parties as neutral. UN representatives arrived at the location and found 

it surrounded by Chinese forces. According to Truman’s administration, 

Chinese forces, attempting to intimidate UN negotiators, violated the 

site’s neutrality.15 Conversely, Chinese representatives argued that the UN 

Command violated the site’s neutrality and suspended negotiations on 23 

August 1951.16
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UN-Chinese disputes regarding Kaesong’s neutrality violations 

demonstrated that armistice negotiations would be neither seamless nor 

fast. The fault for the negotiation delays, however, is debatable. China’s 

justification for surrounding the negotiating site is unknown. It is probable 

that its military leaders wanted to intimidate UN negotiators. It is also believable that China’s leadership, either political or military, felt frustrated 

by American inflexibility and blamed the United States for the five months 

required to determine the negotiating site. Certainly, the Chinese scheme 

did not improve the Truman administration’s perspective of China’s culture or its soldiers. Unfortunately, this action likely only increased Truman’s resolve to concede nothing to the Chinese.

Truman strongly believed in the UN’s negotiating strength. He felt 

the UN Command unquestionably defeated the communist threat when 

negotiations began.17 This belief persuaded UN negotiators to negotiate 

from a position that identified compromise with the communist enemy 

as unacceptable.18 Ridgway supported this approach. He argued that any 

UN concession to the enemy signaled weakness that would encourage further communist military operations and delays at the negotiating table.19

Ridgway reinforced this conclusion by observing that UN forces stopped 

armed aggression and removed the invader from the ROK.20

Unfortunately, Truman and Ridgway’s observations only applied to 

North Korea’s army. The UN Command militarily dominated North Korean forces. UN forces did not militarily dominate Chinese forces. From 

a Commonwealth perspective, China was a “deadly opponent” that definitively proved its nation’s resolve to defend its borders.21 Clearly, Truman and Ridgway did not share the Commonwealth viewpoint. American 

attitudes, therefore, appear to represent the primary reason for the five 

months consumed to initiate armistice negotiations. However, the Communist negotiators cannot remain completely innocent.

Ridgway argued that Communist mediators negotiated by trying 

to wear down UN representatives through “endless and pointless argument.”22 Truman felt an “expert chess player” was necessary to comprehend communist negotiating tactics.23 Australian historian Robert O’Neill 

supports these arguments. O’Neill identified the Communist Chinese as 

“exasperating negotiators.”24 However, O’Neill also argued that communist negotiating tactics were never sufficient to allow the UN Command to 

suspend armistice negotiations without incurring a moral blow.

This reality presented UN negotiators with two problems. First, they 

had to achieve a negotiated settlement. Suspending negotiations would 

allow the communist propaganda machine to portray UN culpability for 

prolonged negotiations to the world. This image, therefore, would increase 
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tensions within the coalition and depict the United States as unfairly attempting to enforce its will.

Secondly, the UN Command maintained one alternative to negotiating an armistice. That option was to continue combat operations. Unfortunately, the UN Command could not unify Korea. Protracted combat operations would merely increase casualties while both sides sought to achieve 

meager advantages. Furthermore, domestic American opinion would not 

accept an increasing casualty rate because its negotiators refused to negotiate due to simple frustration. Similarly, the Commonwealth governments 

rightfully expected the UN coalition’s lead nation to do everything in its 

power to negotiate an end to the Korean War while keeping casualty levels 

to a reasonable level. American negotiators, thus, had to negotiate regardless of Communist negotiating tactics.

Truman, Ridgway, O’Neill, and American envoys ignored Chinese culture during the armistice negotiations. Historically, the Chinese 

placed “heavy emphasis on strategy and stratagems.”25 Therefore, utilizing 

schemes and ploys, rather than specific and direct points, is a traditional 

component of Chinese military action and diplomacy. Furthermore, China 

traditionally views all aspects of war, including its aftermath, “as integral 

parts of the art of war.”26 Therefore, Chinese negotiators seeking to end 

the Korean War viewed armistice negotiations as an extension of the war 

rather than as a separate entity. United States negotiators, in their cultural 

tradition, viewed negotiations as separate from war and utilized a direct 

approach to discussions. Their mistakes, caused by an ignorance of Chinese culture, increased their frustration with their Chinese counterparts.

The enemy’s perspectives and desires cannot remain ignored in war. 

American military personnel received substantial presentations on national, local, and tribal cultures to support their deployments in support of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. They received these presentations to gain a greater understanding of 

the people they were to secure and support. However, these briefings only 

discussed the host nation’s population. The host nation’s population is not 

the enemy.

Respect for the enemy’s culture is critical when a coalition’s political or military leaders seek to negotiate an end to a conflict. At minimum, 

one must understand that the enemy has a culture and will act according 

to its maxims. One must understand their opponent’s goals for the conflict and for post-conflict negotiations. These understandings help identify 

the opposition’s negotiating tactics and style. A greater comprehension of 

Chinese culture, which links war and negotiations, could have prepared 

American negotiators to respond to their adversary’s tactics. This compre-
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hension could have reduced the protracted nature of the negotiations and 

saved lives while more quickly ending the war. Unfortunately, American 

ignorance added to the tension produced by each side’s demands and prolonged efforts to reach an armistice.

Casualty levels represented the significance of these misunderstandings to the UN soldiers fighting on the ground. The five months spent haggling over a truce line, for example, produced 60,000 UN Command casualties. Americans comprised 20,000 of those casualties.27 This fact should 

not infer that Americans fought with less intellect or greater ferocity than 

their Commonwealth counterparts did. The United States contributed more 

personnel to the war in Korea than its Commonwealth partners. Therefore, 

one can reasonably assume that the United States incurred more casualties 

in comparison to the Commonwealth.

Regardless, one can reasonably conclude that all soldiers in Korea 

felt frustrated by a perceived lack of negotiating progress as their counterparts died or were injured while delegates sought to “save face” for 

their respective governments.28 This perception likely affected their competence on the battlefield.

A small number of Canadian soldiers became “psychological casualties” due to the war’s unforeseeable conclusion.29 Psychological casualties 

sought means to extricate themselves from the battlefield for reasons other 

than enemy-inflicted wounds. It is debatable if this concern existed, as 

well as the determination to continue fighting, throughout the entire Commonwealth formation. Anthony Farrar-Hockley, a British officer in Korea, 

argued that soldier support for the war and, thus, their desire to make war 

reduced as negotiations continued.30 Conversely, Jeffrey Grey, an Australian historian, considers Farrar-Hockley’s observation to be a “blanket 

characterization.”31

Psychological casualties are not atypical in war. Eventually, some 

soldiers will reach a point when they believe a trip to the hospital is more 

acceptable than life on the front line. This is true even when the war supports an identifiable cause. General George S. Patton, for example, famously slapped two soldiers for becoming psychological casualties during 

the Second World War. It is the military leader’s responsibility to negate 

these possibilities.

Grey’s assessment of the general nature of Farrar-Hockley’s observation appears correct. However, prolonged armistice negotiations that did 

not appear to accomplish anything created conditions that made further 

psychological casualties in the Korean War almost understandable. Therefore, Korean War negotiations increased military leaders’ responsibilities 

to reduce the potential for their soldiers to become psychological casual-
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ties to a degree greater than that which is considered normal. Furthermore, 

aggressive Chinese tactics increased these strains.

Chinese military forces appear more aggressive tactically than their 

UN counterparts after armistice negotiations commenced. This perception may exist because Chinese “volunteers” believed they fought in “in 

‘defense’ of the Fatherland.”32 Conversely, UN soldiers found themselves 

several thousand miles away from their homes in a “primitive and brutal” 

society whose soldiers appeared “more than happy” to leave the fighting 

to others.”33 Therefore, Chinese forces, fighting for a cause in which they 

seemed to believe, possessed mental and moral advantages over their enemy. They used this advantage to maintain strong pressure on American 

and Commonwealth formations as armistice negotiations continued.

Canadian formations, on the other hand, found their efforts to respond strongly to Chinese operations almost negligible. Major W.H. Pope, 

a 25th Canadian Brigade staff officer, felt his organization too frequently withdrew its patrols to static positions. Furthermore, Pope found that 

his organization’s patrol orders sent formations that were “never strong 

enough to defeat the enemy” into battle.34 Conversely, Chinese formations 

exhibited psychological and tactical preferences for night attacks to “instill terror” on their enemy.35

Chinese tactics reflected the Chinese view of negotiations as an extension of war rather than as an entity separate from war. Thus, the Chinese continued aggressive operations while officials pursued an armistice. 

Prolonged negotiations, at least partially caused by American ignorance 

of Chinese culture, increased casualties and affected the UN Command’s 

morale and battlefield performance. This became severely problematic 

because Commonwealth formations logically felt that American efforts 

to dominate armistice negotiations were useless given their perceptions 

of China’s military strength. Such perspectives do not help soldiers accomplish their mission, let alone routine tasks. Conversely, this perception 

tempts soldiers and leaders to remain in stationary positions and rarely 

attempt to seek out and destroy the enemy.

The tendency to avoid combat is understandable given the circumstances the Commonwealth soldiers faced in Korea. Commonwealth soldiers understood that the Chinese could not be defeated. Their perspective, 

thus, inferred Commonwealth suppositions that the UN Command could 

not unify Korea. Ridgway went so far as to delay major operations to 

“wait and see how armistice negotiations turned out.”36 Therefore, from 

a Commonwealth perspective, attempts to seize a few feet or yards of 

ground meant nothing to armistice negotiations. These actions would only 

increase casualties. This perspective becomes more understandable if one 
105

considers that armistice terms were likely to force leaders to surrender 

battlefield gains. Unfortunately, this battlefield stalemate affected domestic American opinion and further decreased the UN coalition’s unity.

Domestic American criticism of Commonwealth contributions and 

capabilities increased around the time initial negotiations began. The stalemate in Korea partially explains this increase. However, the MacArthur 

hearings more fully explain this rise in American criticism of the Commonwealth. The United States Congress held the hearings after Truman 

dismissed General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from command of UN 

forces. MacArthur’s comments during the hearings encouraged American 

public opinion to believe that the Commonwealth’s military contributions 

to Korea were ineffective and insufficient.37

Combined, the Korean stalemate and MacArthur’s comments stimulated a popular American opinion that the United States was operating independently in Korea. Thus, according to American domestic opinion, the 

Commonwealth nations needed to contribute more land forces to the UN 

Command. This increase, therefore, could break the Korean stalemate and 

win the war. The Commonwealth, according to American opinion, simply 

needed to fulfill its obligations.

American opinion ignored the Commonwealth’s limitations. Britain, for example, had its meager military resources dispersed in Korea, 

Hong Kong, Malaya, the Middle East, Austria, and Germany.38 Australia’s 

commitments to Middle Eastern security reduced its ability to send more 

than two battalions to Korea.39 American public comments, therefore, developed within the Commonwealth governments and military formations 

confusion as to why their contributions and limitations remained unappreciated in the United States. Thus, the MacArthur hearings, the military 

stalemate, and protracted negotiations further divided the UN coalition’s 

overall unity. Unfortunately, the subject of POW repatriation increased the 

protracted nature of the armistice negotiations and, thus, further diminished coalition unity.

The UN Command proposed in January 1952 that every prisoner of 

war retain the choice to determine whether they would return to their home 

country after the Korean War.40 This proposal initially received significant support from the Commonwealth nations. Winston Churchill, elected 

as Britain’s Prime Minister in 1952, felt that repatriation should remain 

voluntary.41 Lester Pearson, Canada’s Minister for External Affairs, went 

further by suggesting that to force communist POW to return to China or 

the DPRK was “unthinkable.”42

Initial coalition reactions to the UN Command’s proposal indicate 

levels of agreement and unity not seen within the Command, politically 
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or militarily, since the UN first resolved to defend South Korea. Truman, 

Churchill, and Pearson may have disagreed on the conduct of the Korean 

War and other matters of world affairs. However, they all shared a similar 

contempt for communism and communist governments. Unfortunately, repatriation became a topic that splintered coalition unity. It is necessary to 

understand why this occurred if the topic received such substantial support 

after its initial introduction. The responsibility for this rests with Chinese 

and North Korean negotiators and Harry Truman.

Negotiators from China and North Korea were initially responsive 

to the suggestion of voluntary repatriation.43 This is logical. The communists believed in their system. Political commissars attached to military 

units ensured that those units’ soldiers remained loyal to their communist 

governments. Therefore, one can reasonably assume that the Chinese and 

North Korean governments believed their POW would readily agree to 

return voluntarily to their homelands. However, these nations found themselves in an unpredicted situation.

The UN Command announced that 60 percent of its enemy prisoners wished to return to China or the DPRK.44 Thus, roughly 70,000 out of 

approximately 116,000 Communist POW wanted to return home.45 These 

figures indicated that communist propaganda was not as effective as the 

Chinese and North Korean governments assumed. Additionally, these figures inferred that the new regimes in China and North Korea had yet to 

consolidate fully their power within their respective countries.

These figures undoubtedly shocked Chinese and North Korean negotiators. One can assume that both governments wanted to expand their 

communist regimes, China throughout Asia and North Korea throughout 

the Korean peninsula. However, the preponderance of communist POW 

desiring voluntary repatriation indicated that the communist “struggle” to 

spread its ideology in the world would be harder than Chinese or North 

Korean leaders initially assumed. Furthermore, the number of communist 

POW that did not wish to return to their native lands justified Truman’s 

proposal in support of voluntary repatriation. Regardless, the subject of 

repatriation became a significant obstacle to armistice negotiations.

Truman did not help reduce this obstacle. He insisted that voluntary 

repatriation was a topic on which the UN Command could not surrender. 

Evidence suggests that Truman would rather concede everything, even 

an independent North Korea, than “buy an armistice” by forcibly requiring human beings to return to communist governments.46 Unfortunately, 

Truman’s persistence on this issue, partially inspired by the communist’s 

refusal to accept it, caused the UN Command to move from an initial position that advocated voluntary repatriation to a position of “no forced 
107

repatriation.”47 Specifically, this new stance sought to avoid repatriating 

POW with armed force. This change caused armistice negotiations to continue from January 1952, when UN negotiators first proposed the topic of 

repatriation, until negotiators signed the armistice. Negotiations dragged 

on for nearly two years because of this point.

It is necessary, before placing the majority of blame on Truman, to 

comment on the recent history of prisoner of war repatriation prior to the 

Korean War. This history shaped Truman’s position on the subject. The 

Hague Convention of 1907 concluded that repatriation “shall be carried 

out as rapidly as possible” after a war’s conclusion.48 Truman’s administration adhered to this policy after World War II. However, Truman soon 

regretted this observance.

The Soviet Union insisted on the return of all of its POW after the 

Second World War. A substantial number of Soviet POW attempted to 

avoid forced repatriation. Some attempted suicide as a means to avoid returning to the Soviet Union.49 Additionally, American soldiers frequently 

had to use tear gas or other forcible means to put Soviet prisoners of war, 

typically captured in German military uniforms, onto trains headed for the 

Soviet Union. Those personnel did not wish to return to a life of “slaughter or slavery” in their home country.50 Thus, Truman came to believe that 

American adherence to forced repatriation during World War II violated 

“the fundamental humanitarian principles we espoused.”51 Truman’s administration, therefore, firmly opposed the policy of forced repatriation 

by 1947.52

Truman used experience to guide his thoughts in Korea. He likely 

believed that a substantial number of Chinese or North Korean prisoners wished to avoid the same fate as their Soviet predecessors. The data 

provided by the UN Command regarding POW who wished to return to 

China or North Korea demonstrated that his belief was not pure speculation. Thus, Truman’s firm stance on the issue of repatriation was logical 

on humanitarian grounds. In this example, he correctly remained steadfast 

in arguing that Korean War POW should choose their final location after 

the war.

Unfortunately, international laws presented a legitimate roadblock to 

Truman’s goals. Article 118 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention 

of 1949 mandated prisoner of war repatriation “without delay after the 

cessation of active hostilities.”53 Therefore, Truman’s dogged insistence 

on voluntary repatriation portrayed him as attempting to “score Cold War 

debating points.”54 It also forced Winston Churchill, a strong promoter of 

Anglo-American unity, to criticize Truman’s policy.55
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The perception that Truman, or any political leader, wanted to achieve 

an insignificant ideological victory will not convince the governments and 

soldiers that represent his coalition partners to follow blindly their coalition’s leadership. This idea is true regardless of the era. Governments and 

soldiers from democratic societies will make war for a just cause. They 

can maintain that unity as long as the cause remains just. However, one 

can easily interpret a perception as reality.

One can infer that Commonwealth soldiers perceived that Truman 

sought a psychological victory through his stance on repatriation. Furthermore, one can conclude that Commonwealth soldiers found this goal 

pointless and, thus, put their lives at risk. This soldier-based perspective 

is concerning because it likely increased Commonwealth soldiers’ resentment towards the United States.

Specifically, Truman’s position on repatriation raised questions from 

the UN Command’s soldiers that wondered why they should die or suffer 

to give their enemies “freedom of choice over repatriation.”56 Churchill’s 

criticism demonstrates that this perspective increased dissension throughout the entire UN Command, at political and military levels, and reduced 

the coalition’s unity. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that this perception increased the Chinese and DPRK negotiators’ desire to obtain their 

critical points in the armistice negotiations and their willingness to prolong armistice negotiations to achieve those demands.

Humanitarian concerns rather than a psychological victory appear to 

have dominated Truman’s thinking on POW repatriation. This conclusion 

derives from American experiences with Soviet POWs after the Second 

World War. However, soldiers do not want to place themselves in harm’s 

way for a perceived moral victory. The UN Command’s leadership felt its 

primary mission, restoring the ROK’s sovereignty, was completed. Nonetheless, it still needed its forces to continue combat operations as necessary. At minimum, military forces needed to conduct short-range patrols to 

protect their static positions from enemy artillery and direct fires.

A coalition without unity is a coalition that cannot accomplish its mission. Truman’s position on POW repatriation reduced the UN Command’s 

unity of effort. It reduced the willingness and ability of the Command’s 

soldiers to continue combat operations. Therefore, the UN Command became a force that simply maintained a defensive line and “hesitated to 

fight for ground.”57 This line was critical to the conduct of armistice negotiations. It prevented enemy forces from invading South Korea. However, 

this defensive posture will not encourage soldier morale when conducted 

for an inconceivable cause. Unfortunately, Truman faced other struggles 

in addition to criticism for his stance on repatriation.
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Syngman Rhee perhaps did more to prolong armistice negotiations 

than Truman’s position on POW repatriation. Rhee could not accept anything less than a unified Korea under his rule.58 Acheson felt Rhee’s “mania for reunification” equaled Douglas MacArthur’s previous desires to 

unify the Korean peninsula and take the war into China.59 Rhee’s desires 

did not conform to the goals of the UN Command in Korea and, therefore, 

the goals of the Truman administration. However, the Truman administration could not simply force Rhee to adhere blindly to its policies.

Rhee was South Korea’s president. Therefore, Truman’s administration and the UN Command could not ignore outright Rhee’s objectives. 

His status as a difficult ally finds a parallel in America’s frustration with 

Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai during Operation Enduring Freedom. As the political leaders of their respective states, Rhee and Karzai 

possessed the option to act independent of United States wishes. Rhee 

obstructed the progress of armistice negotiations during the Korean War. 

Karzai’s refusal to include the Taliban in negotiations to end the war in 

Afghanistan presented American officials with similar frustrations.

Rhee and Karzai understood that their nations relied on the United 

States to protect their young regimes. Regardless, each man’s reliance on 

American financial and military support did not prevent him from publicly 

stating personal opinions that contrasted with American policy. However, 

perceptions of the relationship between Korean or Afghan reliance on 

American assistance and their subservience to American goals neglect a 

critical point. Specifically, they ignore the support Rhee and Karzai maintained within their respective countries and the process that brought them 

to their positions.

Rhee controlled a strong army, was relatively popular in the ROK, 

and, specifically, maintained the loyalty of key personnel within his police 

and civil administration.60 Furthermore, his election occurred under the 

supervision of the UN. Therefore, the Truman administration could not 

arbitrarily remove him from power in favor of a person more agreeable to 

its wishes. The United States did create a plan at one point to mount a coup 

against Rhee.61 Fortunately, it never executed this plan. To do so would 

alienate the ROK population and encourage international condemnation 

of the United States. Additionally, it would justify communist propaganda 

regarding Western concepts of superiority over Asians. American knowledge and acceptance of the South Vietnamese coup against Ngo Dinh 

Diem in 1963 reflected this concept.

Similarly, Karzai maintains generally strong tribal support in Afghanistan. Agreements, even discussions, with the Taliban cannot occur 

without his approval. Thus, Karzai’s position, like Rhee’s, allowed him to 
110

command the Afghan National Security Forces independent of American 

plans or wishes. Furthermore, both men reached their respective offices 

through democratic means.

A forced removal of Karzai as President of Afghanistan, regardless 

of its potential desirability, cannot occur without severe backlash from 

the international community and tribes within Afghanistan that support 

him. This fact also applied to Rhee. The United States, therefore, could 

not simply remove the links that bound it to Rhee or Karzai and conduct 

independent negotiations with its respective enemies. This fact frustrated 

the Truman administration and its successor.

The United States elected Dwight D. Eisenhower President in 1952. 

More than two-thirds of the United States elected him specifically to take 

“strong steps” to end the Korean War.62 This fact demonstrates the frustrations that Truman’s position on prisoner repatriation produced in the 

United States and the Commonwealth. Eisenhower contributed to the end 

of the Korean War in two major areas. First, his administration suggested 

that it might use atomic weapons to motivate the Chinese and DPRK negotiators to agree to armistice terms.63 Second, Eisenhower convinced Rhee 

to accept an armistice.

The effects of the Eisenhower administration’s suggestions regarding the use of atomic bombs against China are debatable. John Foster 

Dulles, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, argued in 1956 that the speed at 

which the Chinese and DPRK negotiators agreed to an armistice after the 

suggested use of atomic bombs was a “pretty fair inference” that the threat 

worked.64 Dulles’ comment may be correct. However, it did not consider 

China’s perspectives.

Three possibilities exist to explain China’s eventual agreement to 

an armistice. First, it is likely that the Korean War sufficiently damaged 

China’s economy to persuade Mao Zedong’s government to agree to a solution acceptable to China. This possibility is feasible because Mao did not 

inherit an economic powerhouse. Given his regime’s youth, it is reasonable to assume that Mao understood his requirement to consolidate fully 

his government and economically move China forward.

Conversely, it is conceivable that Mao’s government agreed to the 

armistice because it felt it received “maximum political value” from the 

war.65 This logic is also reasonable. The Chinese military represented itself 

as equal to that of the UN Command. Therefore, military success against 

the United States turned a young Chinese government into a world power. 

Extending the war beyond achieving this objective meant would cost China substantial workers necessary to invigorate its economy.
111

Finally, the DPRK lost some of its “territorial integrity” due to the 

war.66 However, one again must consider Chinese history to understand 

the importance behind the DPRK’s continued existence after 1953. Hostile 

nations historically used the Korean peninsula as an invasion route into 

China. Japan, for example, invaded Korea in 1592 with intentions to conquer subsequently China.67 Therefore, given that precedent, the existence 

of a friendly DPRK on China’s border provided Mao’s government with a 

buffer against potential invaders.

Evidence suggests that the Commonwealth governments did not 

strongly protest the Eisenhower administration’s suggested use of atomic 

bombs. This is interesting when one considers the Commonwealth’s collective concern after Truman suggested the possibility of using atomic 

bombs after the initial Chinese invasion in December 1950. The Commonwealth governments roundly criticized Truman’s statement. His remark 

caused Attlee, concerned about Truman’s intentions, to fly to Washington 

to confer with his coalition partner to receive Truman’s assurance that he 

did not intend to utilize atomic weapons in Korea.

Truman and the Commonwealth’s government leaders wanted 

to avoid an escalation of the Korean War in 1950. The Commonwealth 

governments felt Truman’s remark threatened this goal. One can logically conclude that all governments wanted to contain the war to Korea in 

1953. However, Korea’s situation in 1953 was different from its situation 

in 1950. The war in Korea exhausted politically and militarily the United States and its Commonwealth partners. Nearly two years of armistice 

negotiations, prolonged by communist negotiating tactics and Truman’s 

position on POW repatriation, appear to have forced the Commonwealth 

governments to accept any alternative to ending the war that Eisenhower 

might suggest.

Eisenhower’s other major contribution to ending the Korean War, 

more important than his threats of atomic war, was to convince Rhee to 

accept an armistice to end the Korean War. Rhee, seeking a unified Korea under his government, economic assistance, and ROK inclusion in 

an American Pacific security agreement, tried to sway Eisenhower to his 

goals.68 Eisenhower, seeking any means to end the war, wrote Rhee in June 

1953 to recommend that they pursue Korean unification through “political 

and other methods” that did not involve military forces.69 Rhee, replying 

in July 1953, promised to “cease his obstruction” of the armistice negotiations.70 All concerned parties signed the armistice to end the Korean War 

on 27 July 1953.71

The armistice, primarily delayed by disagreements on POW repatriation, was signed three years and one month after the DPRK invaded the 
112

ROK. More than 20,000 POWs from China and the DPRK elected not to 

return to their homelands.72 Nearly seventy percent of the UN Command’s 

Chinese prisoners refused repatriation. Communist forces took prisoner 

7,140 Americans. 2,701 Americans died in captivity.73 Twenty-one American prisoners out of the 4,418 still living elected to remain in China or 

North Korea.74 Therefore, of those still living, less than one-half of one 

percent of American POW refused repatriation to the United States. Furthermore, only one British officer refused repatriation to Great Britain.75

All Canadian and Australian prisoners elected to return home.76 

These numbers are significant for two reasons. First, the small number of UN soldiers that refused repatriation demonstrates a major preference for life in Western society. Therefore, the extensive number of 

communist POWs refusing repatriation validated Truman’s position supporting voluntary repatriation. Thus, one can perceive that the length of 

the Korean War, though tragic and costly, did more than score “points” 

for the United States and the UN. These numbers invalidated Communist 

claims to their form of government’s superiority over capitalist societies. 

Furthermore, Truman’s position on repatriation undoubtedly saved many 

Chinese and Korean lives. Unfortunately, the war consumed thousands of 

casualties to confirm Truman’s opinion.

The Korean War produced more casualties than any war in the twentieth century except for the two world wars.77 The war cost the United 

States more than 142,000 killed, wounded, missing, or captured.78 Its 

33,000 killed in action occurred in a period of three years. In comparison, 

the United States suffered 58,000 casualties over a longer period during 

the Vietnam War.

Canadian soldiers suffered 516 deaths, of which 312 occurred on 

the battlefield.79 Britain lost nearly one thousand troops to combat-related 

deaths. More than 300 Australian soldiers died in Korea.80 Casualties from 

China and the DPRK were “likely more than a million” while the ROK 

lost more than 66,000 soldiers.81

These casualty numbers reflect a government’s responsibility to determine its political goals before sending military forces into combat. This 

thesis does not negatively judge Truman for sending American soldiers to 

Korea. However, he made two critical decisions that created these high 

casualty numbers. First, he decided to cross the 38th Parallel to unify the 

Korean peninsula. Second, Truman insisted, however well intentioned, 

on voluntary POW repatriation. His position on POW repatriation would 

have held more credibility with his coalition partners and their enemy if 

he ordered the UN Command to stop at the 38th Parallel in October 1950.

The UN Command, at that time, was undoubtedly victorious. It de-
113

feated the North Korean army and protected South Korea. Unfortunately, Truman’s ensuing decisions created a chain of events that extended 

the war and increased casualties on all sides. The war could have ended 

when the UN Command first reached the 38th Parallel. The UN Command 

could have demanded and received anything it wanted at that time. Truman’s Commonwealth partners likely did not plan on this extension and 

its subsequent effects when they decided to commit military forces to the 

American-led coalition.

Therefore, the Korean War ended the “relatively easy and automatic 

political relations” the United States and the Commonwealth nations enjoyed before the war.82 Eisenhower, upon assuming the presidency, identified that Anglo-American relations were worse “than at any time since the 

Second World War.”83 Australia, having gained the Pacific security pact 

it pursued at the start of the Korean War, appears to be the only Commonwealth member that maintained a truly positive relationship with the 

United States after the war.

Several factors explain the breakdown in American-Commonwealth 

relations. Unfortunately, this breakdown began when the DPRK invaded 

the ROK. Truman’s administration understood that each Commonwealth 

nation maintained a particular reliance on the United States. Truman administration officials, therefore, typically acted in a haughty manner towards their Commonwealth counterparts when the Korean War began. 

Evidence suggests that the Truman administration used its position of influence to stimulate Commonwealth governments to contribute forces to 

the UN coalition. The Truman administration was not wrong to seek assistance from the Commonwealth. Participation from as many UN members 

as possible in Korea legitimized the UN’s mandate for the ROK. However, 

American coalition development tactics merely foreshadowed the Truman 

administration’s conduct for the duration of the war.

The Korean War did not end the West’s struggle against communism. 

The Cold War lasted nearly 40 years after the Korean War ended. Thus, 

America’s post-1953 relationships with its coalition partners present the 

appearance that the Truman administration from 1950-1953 risked its enduring global goals to achieve short-term successes in Korea. Therefore, 

the Truman administration’s decisions and behaviors during the Korean 

War established a precedent for future American presidents.

Several of Truman’s successors sent the United States military to 

various countries during their respective terms in office. His decision to 

stop the expansion of communism into the ROK established a precedent 

for these decisions. Lyndon Johnson, for example, increased American 

contributions to Vietnam. Johnson, like Truman, wanted to stop the expan-
114

sion of communism. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the attitude of 

George W. Bush’s administration towards its allies and potential coalition 

partners followed the Truman administration’s Korean example. This temperament arose after the Bush administration initiated the War on Terror. 

The administration’s “with or against us” philosophy created conditions 

that sent American military forces to distant locations and offended several American allies.

Such was the case in Korea. Truman does not possess sole ownership 

for the war’s longevity. He had to deal with an inflexible, albeit legitimate 

ally in Syngman Rhee. His communist enemies proved themselves wily 

and inflexible negotiators. However, Truman’s decisions, specifically regarding his position on POW repatriation, created conditions that encouraged that longevity. His decisions created higher casualties in a war that 

remained heavily unsupported in its final two years. Truman’s decisions 

increased tensions within a coalition that was already fragmented. This reduced unity in Korea affected American relations with its Commonwealth 

partners in all other areas of diplomacy after the war ended.
115

Notes

1. Jonathan M. House, A Military History of the Cold War, 1944-1962 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 206.

2. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Volume Two: Years of Trial and 

Hope, 459.

3. Acheson, The Korean War, 121.

4. Dockrill, “The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean War, June 1950-June 1951,” 459.

5. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology of 

Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, September 1950, 30.

6. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology of 

Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, October 1950, ii.

7. Morton H. Halperin, “The Limiting Process of the Korean War,” Political 

Science Quarterly 78, no. 1 (March 1963): 19.

8. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Volume Two: Years of Trial and 

Hope, 269.

9. David S. McClellan, “Dean Acheson and the Korean War,” Political Science Quarterly 83, no. 1 (March 1968): 18.

10. Acheson, The Korean War, 121.

11. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 

1945-1951, 139.

12. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, December 1950, iv.

13. Ridgway, The Korean War, 183.

14. Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-53, 960.

15. Acheson, The Korean War, 125.

16. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I: Strategy and 

Diplomacy, 509.

17. Astor, Presidents at War: From Truman to Bush, the Gathering of Military Power to Our Commanders in Chief, 47.

18. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the 

United States, 287.

19. Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-53, 950.

20. Ridgway, The Korean War, 238.

21. Watson, Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953, 

93.

22. Ridgway, The Korean War, 182.

23. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Volume Two: Years of Trial and 

Hope, 89.

24. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I: Strategy and 

Diplomacy, 266.

25. David Lai, “Learning from the Stones: A GO Approach To Mastering 

China’s Strategic Concept, Shi” (Monograph, U.S. Army War College, Strategic 

Studies Institute Carlisle PA, 2004), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.
116

mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=378 (accessed 15 October 2013), 3.

26. David Lai, “Learning from the Stones”.

27. Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-53, 960.

28. Trembath, A Different Sort of War: Australians in Korea 1950-53, 143.

29. Watson, Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953, 

93.

30. Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, Volume I: A Distant 

Obligation, 366.

31. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War. An Alliance 

Study, 153.

32. Hanson W. Baldwin, “China as a Military Power,” Foreign Affairs 30, 

no. 1 (October 1951): 51.

33. Watson, Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953, 

60-61.

34. Watson, Far Eastern Tour, 94.

35. Baldwin, “China as a Military Power,” 59.

36. Ridgway, The Korean War, 187.

37. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53, 249.

38. Anthony Eden, “Britain in World Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 29, no. 3 

(April 1951): 342.

39. Jeffrey Grey, “The Formation of the Commonwealth Division, 1950-

1951,” Military Affairs 51, no. 1 (January 1987): 12.

40. House, A Military History of the Cold War, 1944-1962, 206.

41. Lowe, “The Significance of the Korean War in Anglo-American Relations, 1950-53,” 135.

42. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the 

United States, 245.

43. Burton I. Kaufman, review of A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of 

Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks, by Rosemary Foot, Reviews in American History 20, no. 4 (December 1992): 565.

44. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I: Strategy and 

Diplomacy, 511.

45. Kaufman, review of A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks, 565.

46. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Volume Two: Years of Trial and 

Hope, 460.

47. Jan P. Charmatz and Harold M. Wit, “Repatriation of Prisoners of War 

and the 1949 Geneva Convention,” The Yale Law Journal 62, no. 3 (February 

1953): 391.

48. Waldemar A. Sof, review of Release and Repatriation of Prisoners 

of War at the End of Active Hostilities. A Study of Article 118, Paragraph 1 of 

the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,” 

by Christian S. Delessert, The American Journal of International Law 72, no. 2 

(April 1978): 429.

49. Mark Elliott, “The United States and Forced Repatriation of Soviet Citi-
117

zens, 1944-47,” Political Science Quarterly 88, no. 2 (June 1973): 253.

50. Blair, The Forgotten War: American in Korea 1950-53, 963.

51. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday & 

Company, 1948), 439.

52. Elliott, “The United States and Forced Repatriation of Soviet Citizens, 

1944-47,” 271.

53. Sof, review of Release and Repatriation of Prisoners of War at the End 

of Active Hostilities, 430.

54. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 

1776, 644-45.

55. Lowe, “The Significance of the Korean War in Anglo-American Relations, 1950-53,” 133.

56. Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-53, 964.

57. Ridgway, The Korean War, 187.

58. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Volume Two: Years of Trial and 

Hope, 462.

59. Acheson, The Korean War, 125.

60. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I: Strategy and 

Diplomacy, 358.

61. Robert F. Futtrell, review of The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, 

Credibility, and Command, by Burton I. Kaufman, The Journal of American History 73, no. 3 (December 1986): 810.

62. Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,” International Security 13, no. 3 (Winter 1988-1989): 81.

63. House, A Military History of the Cold War, 1944-1962, 207.

64. Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,” 50.

65. House, A Military History of the Cold War, 1944-1962, 208.

66. Halperin, “The Limiting Process of the Korean War,” 19.

67. Kenneth M. Swope, “Turning the Tide: The Strategic and Psychological 

Significance of the Liberation of Pyongyang in 1593,” War and Society 21, no. 2 

(October 2003): 4.

68. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I: Strategy and 

Diplomacy, 323.

69. Ridgway, The Korean War, 269.

70. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I: Strategy and 

Diplomacy, 359.

71. House, A Military History of the Cold War, 1944-1962, 208.

72. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War. An Alliance 

Study, 183.

73. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, “Former American Prisoners of 

War (POWs),” April, 2005, http://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/SpecialReports/

POWCY04Final 4-7-05forweb.pdf (accessed 8 November 2013), 3.

74. House, A Military History of the Cold War, 1944-1962, 208.

75. House, A Military Historry of the Cold War.

76. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Ca-
118

nadian Military Experiences,” 31.

77. Allan R. Millett, “Introduction to the Korean War,” The Journal of Military History 65, no. 4 (October 2001): 924.

78. James R. Arnold, Presidents Under Fire. Commanders in Chief in Victory and Defeat (New York: Orion Books, 1994), 205.

79. Melady, Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1983), 178.

80. Trembath, A Different Sort of War: Australians in Korea 1950-53, 1.

81. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Canadian Military Experiences,” 31.

82. Holmes, “Canada and the United States in World Politics,” 105.

83. Lowe, “The Significance of the Korean War in Anglo-American Relations, 1950-53,” 145.
119

Chapter 6

Conclusions

Much time and effort is expended in learning about the 

enemy; a similar effort is required to understand the doctrine, 

capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, customs, history, 

and values of each partner.

—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16, 

Multinational Operations

This study focused on the Truman administration’s coalition development efforts concerning Great Britain, Canada, and Australia during the 

1950-1953 Korean War. The study selected these members of the British 

Commonwealth because they were America’s most critical partners prior 

to 1950. The United States and Great Britain held a “special relationship”1

that dated back to the Second World War. Canada and Australia maintained 

common Anglo-Saxon heritage with the United States. Furthermore, 

Canada and the United States shared national borders and interdependent 

economies. Additionally, the United States and Australia shared several 

strategic interests in the Pacific.

Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations provides several 

recommendations that are critical to this study. First, it recommends that 

American military forces utilize tenets such as respect and patience when 

interacting with their multinational partners. American military forces 

should apply these tenets while improving their knowledge of their partners’ history, culture, and values. Additionally, JP 3-16 reminds its audience that political goals motivate a nation’s decision to contribute forces to 

a coalition. It advises American forces to refrain from expecting automatic 

contributions from allies. Furthermore, JP 3-16 cautions American commanders to recognize their limitations with multinational forces. Finally, 

JP 3-16 recommends that American leaders provide clear strategic direction to guide the coalition’s operations.

Joint Publication 3-16 rightfully exists as the American military’s 

doctrinal foundation for the conduct of coalition operations. It does not 

identify the 1950-1953 Korean War as a source of its content. Sixteen nations contributed to a coalition that accomplished its objective. However, 

JP 3-16 did not exist when President Harry S. Truman’s administration 

developed a coalition to defend the Republic of Korea in 1950. Therefore, 

Truman’s administration built and led its coalition with some questionable methods. Evidence demonstrates that JP 3-16 captures a majority of 
120

important lessons from the Truman administration’s conduct during the 

Korean War. Correct applications of JP 3-16’s doctrine engender multinational support for American policies and are likely to remove from the 

United States the burden to conduct unilateral military operations.

Joint Publication 3-16 fails to discuss five critical lessons from the 

Truman administration’s leadership during the Korean War. First, JP 3-16 

does not specifically address operations conducted to defend another 

country. Second, JP 3-16 does not provide guidance for situations such 

as a coalition member’s proposal to change the coalition mission. Third, 

JP 3-16 does not identify the fact that soldiers from the lead nation, under 

whose command and control coalition members place their forces, represent their nation’s capability and credibility. Fourth, it does not discuss 

respect for enemy culture.2 Finally, JP 3-16 fails to review the negative 

effects of heavy casualties on morale.

The publication’s omissions are relevant to future coalition operations. Specifically, JP 3-16’s guidance and exclusions apply as much to political leaders as they do to military personnel. To ignore these omissions, 

therefore, is to risk a coalition’s unity of effort at political and military 

levels. Truman’s administration would have benefitted by having a manual 

such as JP 3-16 in 1950.

At the political level, the Truman administration did not always treat 

its Commonwealth partners with respect and patience. Minimal American 

knowledge of Commonwealth limitations or, more likely, a refusal to recognize them contributed to the Truman administration’s harsh tactics. The 

Truman administration’s behavior is somewhat understandable if one considers that it received “primary responsibility” from the UN to execute the 

UN mission for Korea. However, the Truman administration’s methods 

caused the Commonwealth nations to contribute forces for purely political, rather than moral, reasons.3

Joint Publication 3-16 provides an initial source from which the 

United States military can learn and apply to avoid replicating American 

behavior during the Korean War. However, additional measures are required to ensure that American military personnel are capable of applying 

JP 3-16’s recommendations to future operations. For example, American 

military personnel receive numerous, albeit insufficient, presentations on 

foreign cultures during their careers. Personal experience with foreign cultures is the best means for the United States military to achieve a greater 

understanding of American allies and potential coalition partners. The 

United States military already conducts personnel exchange programs 

with numerous countries. It needs to increase the scope of such programs 
121

to diversify further its personnel and create conditions that generate multinational support for United States objectives.

Increased foreign language training is another method with which to 

develop a military member’s understanding of foreign cultures and history. 

Education in this form broadens the military representative and enhances 

their ability to apply JP 3-16’s suggestions. This skill enables American 

personnel to provide the best representation of the United States to foreign 

partners. However, failure to broaden military personnel in peace will diminish their ability to interact with foreign personnel in war. Actions by 

the Truman administration and its military personnel within the UN Command demonstrated this argument.

Marginal respect was most evident in American interactions with 

British and Canadian officials. Dean Acheson, Truman’s Secretary of 

State, and Sir Oliver Franks, Britain’s ambassador to the United States, 

enjoyed a “close friendship” before June 1950.4 Similarly, Truman’s administration maintained good relations with Canada’s Louis St-Laurent 

government prior to June 1950. However, Acheson demanded repeatedly 

that Britain contribute forces to “set a good pattern” for other nations.5 Additionally, Acheson used language more “forceful” with Canada’s Minister 

for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, to gain Canadian contributions.6

According to JP 3-16, the tenet of respect applies to a nation’s national honor and prestige.7

 Furthermore, JP 3-16 identifies that a nation’s 

prestige is as important as its military capabilities and contributions. Acheson’s tactics did not exhibit these considerations. Therefore, his actions 

created problems in American relations with Great Britain and Canada. 

American diplomatic problems with these Commonwealth members existed for the remainder of the Korean War and into the post-war years.

This thesis does not apply present-day standards of personal diplomacy to the standards that existed in 1950. However, Acheson’s tactics 

were thoughtless and disrespectful. JP 3-16’s tenet of respect goes beyond merely respecting a potential contributing nation’s concerns for its 

national prestige. It includes respect for representatives of coalition partners, and potential partners, as people that are responsible for their respective nations’ welfare. Acheson ignored such basic facts of diplomacy. As 

the United States Secretary of State, he had a responsibility to support 

American interests. He did everything possible to meet his responsibilities. However, Acheson should also have realized that Franks and Pearson 

held similar responsibilities for Great Britain and Canada.

The United States was the superpower of the non-communist world 

in 1950.8 Therefore, defending South Korea against communist aggression 

benefitted American interests because it demonstrated American credibil-
122

ity to non-communist states. Successfully defending the ROK aided Australian interests because it would deter future communist aggression in 

Asia.

Aside from enhancing UN credibility, defending the ROK did not 

directly support British or Canadian interests. Winston Churchill, for example, argued that defending Western Europe, “not Korea,” mattered to 

British interests.9 Thus, Truman’s administration should have employed 

more civil diplomacy to gain support for a cause with international implications.

Domestic American politics also explains the behavior of American 

officials such as Acheson. The Soviet Union and the communist ideology 

were in 1950 the United States’ primary enemies. The Republican-dominated United States Congress argued that Truman’s Democrat-led administration was incompetent against the communist threat. Specifically, the 

Congress blamed Truman and his administration for allowing communists 

to seize political power in China.10 Such charges, given the United States’ 

previous support for China’s non-communist faction, were politically damaging to Truman. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Acheson sought 

to appear tough on communism, and thereby reduce domestic pressure on 

Truman’s administration, through harsh diplomacy with American allies.

Truman maintained primary responsibility for the actions of his administration as it developed a coalition. He was the United States President. Like military commanders, Truman was responsible for everything, 

good or bad, that his administration accomplished or failed to achieve. It 

is likely that the 1950 Congressional election and the 1952 Presidential 

election affected the Truman administration’s efforts to satisfy domestic 

complaints for its softness against communism.

Importantly, the United States Constitution in 1950 did not impose 

term limits on the American president. Therefore, Truman could run for 

office again in 1952 if he wanted. Responding effectively to North Korean 

aggression could aid Truman’s goals for the Democratic Party and for his 

potential reelection. In his memoirs, Truman claimed that he decided in 

April 1950 against seeking reelection.11 He later claimed that he did not 

want another presidential term because he no longer wanted the responsibility.12 Nevertheless, his administration’s conduct demonstrated clear 

signs that it wanted the Korean War to affect positively its domestic standing.

Efforts by George W. Bush’s administration to develop a coalition 

for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are comparable to the Truman administration’s similar efforts for Korea. Bush’s administration developed a 

coalition to invade Iraq with a “with us or against us” outlook. Terrorist 
123

attacks on 11 September 2001 framed the Bush administration’s pre-OIF 

mentality.13 Bush likely felt that toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime supported international security. However, it is also logical to conclude that 

several of the nations from which Bush’s administration pursued military 

contributions viewed its efforts as motivated to support purely American 

interests.

The Bush administration’s “with or against” approach created diplomatic tactics that a majority of the international community considered uncivil. Bush’s administration alienated nations that may have supported an 

invasion of Iraq with military forces under different circumstances. Importantly, Bush’s administration pursued a coalition from a position of influence dissimilar to the Truman administration. America’s global leadership 

position constitutes the primary difference between the Truman and Bush 

administrations regarding coalition development. Specifically, nations did 

not rely on American support in 2003 in a manner similar to 1950. This 

fact is critical as a lesson for current and future American leaders.

The United States does not possess undisputed leadership against an 

identifiable enemy, such as the Soviet Union, in present times. Furthermore, the United States does not have the loyalty of many nations that rely 

on American assistance to deter that enemy as it did in 1950. Terrorism is 

an international threat. However, it does not affect equally every nation. 

Therefore, future United States government efforts to benefit American or 

international interests through military operations will have to show more 

respect than Acheson did to potential nations to receive their contributions 

of military forces.

Two examples reflect an American lack of patience with its Commonwealth partners in Korea. British and Canadian naval support for operations in Korea constitutes the first example. The reception of Canadian 

land forces to Korea constitutes the second example. In these examples, 

American political and military leaders forgot that contributions in any 

form are better than no contributions.

Ten British and three Canadian naval vessels were operating under 

the UN Command by 1 September 1950.14 British and Canadian vessels 

also participated in the Inchon landings.15 Additional Commonwealth naval support was forthcoming. Regardless, Truman’s administration continued to insist that its coalition partners contribute land forces.

Truman’s administration was not wrong to pursue land force contributions. The UN Command “urgently needed” land forces during AugustSeptember 1950 if it expected to preserve South Korea’s sovereignty.16

The UN Command could not rely on only American and South Korean 

land forces. Regardless, the Truman administration’s lack of patience cre-
124

ated adverse effects for Commonwealth soldiers and for the coalition’s 

unity.

Joint Publication 3-16 identifies “even-handed patience” as important for alliances but “equally necessary” regarding prospective coalition 

partners.17 According to JP 3-16, coalition partners should receive appreciation for their contributions regardless of type or size. Therefore, British 

and Canadian naval support should have received some appreciation from 

Truman’s administration. American gratitude should have been abundant 

given the Commonwealth’s, specifically Canada’s, inability to provide 

immediate ground forces. As stated, Truman’s administration was under 

considerable domestic pressure to respond effectively to North Korea’s 

invasion. However, impatience prevented Truman’s administration from 

commending its partners for their contributions.

Coalition leaders must remain patient with a potential contributing 

nation’s limitations, even if those limitations appear disingenuous. Franks 

and Pearson claimed that global commitments or other considerations limited their ability to contribute land forces. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that British and Canadian contributions in September 1950 were 

all those nations could provide at that time. Truman’s administration forgot that Commonwealth naval contributions reduced the United States’ 

responsibility to allocate additional American naval power to the Korean 

War. Furthermore, General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the United States 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, fretted over the effects of the Korean War on his 

military’s ability to defend the continental United States.18 Therefore, the 

Commonwealth’s naval contributions enabled Truman’s administration to 

fulfill other American obligations, to include homeland security. However, 

Truman’s administration appeared to ignore this reality.

The Truman administration’s negligence was problematic. It is rational to believe that the United States will provide a preponderance of personnel and materiél to future coalition operations. However, aside from legitimizing an operation with multinational participation, the United States 

military simply cannot accomplish independently every task involved 

with coalition operations. Non-American soldiers, for example, eventually 

provided security at base camps that housed American troops during OIF 

and Operation Enduring Freedom. These foreign soldiers guarded base 

entry points and operated perimeter security points.

Foreign soldier contributions enabled American military personnel 

to focus on their tactical missions in OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom. This statement does not suggest that American soldiers should avoid 

tasks such as securing base entry control points. Furthermore, this statement does not recommend that foreign soldiers only perform tasks that do 
125

not include operations on the battlefield. However, it is likely that valid 

restrictions limited the size of non-American forces contributed to OIF 

and Operation Enduring Freedom. Therefore, by applying patience and 

recognizing that the United States is not acting alone, American soldiers 

should appreciate foreign soldier participation in future operations regardless of size or type. Appreciation in this form would have simplified the 

reception of Canadian land forces in Korea.

Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Stone commanded the first organization of 

Canadian land forces to arrive in Korea. The 2 PPCLI departed for Korea on the same day that Chinese forces invaded the peninsula.19 Lieutenant General Walton Walker, the EUSA commander, wanted to position 2 

PPCLI at a forward location immediately after its arrival. However, StLaurent’s government ordered Stone to conduct an eight-week training 

period and avoid combat except in cases of self-defense after his battalion 

arrived in Korea. Furthermore, the Canadian government allowed Stone to 

determine when 2 PPCLI was “fit for operations.”20 Different perspectives 

created a conflict. Stone had to produce his government’s orders to prevent 

Walker from committing Canada’s unprepared forces to battle.

From a JP 3-16 perspective, the conflict between Stone and Walker 

was avoidable. Walker needed patience for Stone’s predicament. Walker’s 

position was justifiable in one regard. He needed to employ all available 

land forces to thwart the Chinese advance. However, Walker did not care 

to remember, did not know, or forgot that nations that contribute military 

forces to a coalition are likely to apply specific restrictions to the employment of their forces. Such restrictions typically include the conditions under which their forces operate. For example, a national government may 

not want its forces to operate in periods of darkness. Additionally, national 

governments may want their forces to conduct only tasks that are unrelated to direct combat.

Joint Publication 3-16 specifically identifies the fact that military 

commanders will prioritize their national government’s policies over the 

coalition commander’s directives. National constitutions obligate commanders to do so. An American commander, for example, will always 

command American forces because the United States Constitution identifies the American President as the Commander-in-Chief of the United 

States military. Foreign military officers, thus, cannot legally command 

all American military personnel in a combat environment. This example 

demonstrates restrictions on the employment of American military forces. 

Therefore, it is only logical to assume that foreign nations will restrict the 

employment of their military forces in a coalition.
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A nation’s reasons for restricting its military forces are legal and 

non-negotiable. Nations provide forces to a coalition for specific reasons. 

Therefore, it is only natural that contributing nations will restrict the employment of their military forces to support those aims. Woodrow Wilson, 

for example did not want American forces to fight under British or French 

commanders during the First World War. Constitutionality aside, Wilson 

applied this restriction to the American Expeditionary Forces to ensure 

his place at the post-war peace conference.21 National restrictions to the 

employment of military forces do not require official explanation. Rather, 

the coalition commander and their subordinates should be thankful for the 

fact that such military forces are available at all.

Stone’s position, thus, was justified. His impulse to utilize his government’s orders to justify his arguments with Walker depicted a total lack 

of American patience at the military level. Walker’s behavior reflected 

Acheson’s initial diplomacy. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s identification of war as “a continuation of political activity by other 

means,” therefore, applies to an American commander’s interactions with 

their coalition partners as much as it does to their enemy.22 Specifically, 

Walker’s military negotiations with Stone affected American diplomacy 

with the Canadian government.

The employment of Canadian forces was a concern that required involvement from Canada’s national government. For that reason, it is critical for a coalition’s military commander to understand their limitations 

regarding the employment of foreign soldiers. Coalition commanders cannot expect to give orders to foreign forces with the same authority they retain over soldiers from their respective nation. Commanders must remain 

patient with their coalition partners and utilize their partners’ available 

capabilities to accomplish the mission. Failing to do so is likely to force 

the national government that contributed such soldiers to reconsider its 

assistance. Therefore, JP 3-16 correctly identifies patience as important 

to coalition relationships. A greater American knowledge of its Commonwealth partners and their limitations likely could have prevented the Truman administration’s general impatience and events such as the WalkerStone interactions from affecting coalition unity during the Korean War.

Great Britain’s ability to provide land forces to Korea with the speed 

at which Acheson demanded was clearly limited. Great Britain was involved in a “minor war” in Malaya in June 1950.23 At the same time, 

Clement Attlee’s government assigned Britain’s military forces to Hong 

Kong, the Middle East, Austria, Trieste, and Germany.24 Economically, 

British citizens were still recovering from the Second World War. Britain’s 

political leaders understood the financial burdens of a new war in Korea on 
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their citizens. Therefore, Attlee’s government could not merely tell British 

citizens to expect “no easement whatsoever” on their economic condition 

for the near future.25 Truman’s administration did not understand Britain’s 

limitations.

Truman’s administration also did not understand Canada’s constraints. 42,000 Canadian soldiers served on active duty in June 1950.26

However, St-Laurent’s government had yet to station troops in Europe 

as part of the NATO by 1950.27 Therefore, it had yet to meet an alliancebased obligation. It is illogical to assume that St-Laurent’s government 

was capable of providing forces to an “ad hoc organization” such as the 

coalition in Korea. Consequently, the Truman administration’s beliefs in 

Canada’s ability to contribute to a temporary organization were misguided.28 Knowledge of partners could have moderated the Truman administration’s thought process and actions vis-à-vis Britain and Canada.

Global commitments and legislative restrictions limited Australia’s 

ability to commit immediately its land forces. In 1950, Australia’s Robert 

Menzies government assumed that any war requiring Australian military 

forces would occur in the Middle East under the umbrella of the British Commonwealth.29 Constitutionally, Menzies could not force military 

personnel to serve outside of Australia.30 Therefore, Menzies’ government needed a substantial number of volunteers for operations in Korea 

to increase the size of its 14,651-person army.31 Truman’s administration 

appeared to acknowledge Australia’s limitations, and interacted with Australian representatives from this position of understanding. Acheson, for 

example, offered Menzies an aid package to develop Australia’s infrastructure without a formal Australian request for such an offer.32 It is possible that Menzies’ government received less “forceful” language than its 

Commonwealth counterparts did because Truman’s administration identified greater commonality with Australia and its government. Regardless, 

JP 3-16 reflects the positive experience of American-Australian diplomacy 

after 25 June 1950.

The purpose of discussing American impatience with British Commonwealth governments in 1950 is to identify the fact that military assistance can appear from unexpected sources. Australia was not a United 

States ally in June 1950. However, Australian troops were among the best 

forces within the UN Command. El Salvador and the Republic of Georgia, 

among other nations, were not necessarily American allies in 2003. However, they committed troops to the American-led coalition for OIF.33 El 

Salvadorian and Georgian contributions to OIF demonstrated that military 

support for coalitions is available from unexpected sources.
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The United States government likely did not expect El Salvador or 

Georgia to contribute anything to OIF. El Salvador limited its troops to 

civil-military operations.34 Among other tasks, Georgian forces provided 

security to the UN compound in Iraq.35 El Salvadorian and Georgian contributions did not affect significantly operations in Iraq. However, they 

reduced American responsibilities to perform those missions.

Governments that seek to build a coalition must demonstrate sufficient knowledge of potential partners to gain such contributions. Coalition 

developers must first understand that unrequested assistance will not produce contributions. Second, coalition developers must acknowledge the 

limitations of the nations from which they seek support and show thanks 

for any contributions those nations make. Third, coalition developers, and 

the forces they contribute, should be grateful for such contributions regardless of the motive behind them. Finally, coalition developers should 

recognize that there are times when potential coalition partners, such as 

Canada in 1950, simply cannot contribute materially to military operations. Therefore, JP 3-16 correctly recommends that coalition leaders understand their partners’ limitations and capabilities as they develop and 

sustain a coalition.

Joint Publication 3-16 identifies political goals as the decisive factor of a nation’s decision to contribute or refrain from contributing forces 

to a coalition. Thailand, Bolivia, and Turkey announced their intentions 

by 26 July 1950 to send ground forces to Korea.36 Menzies’ government 

announced that Australia would provide military forces to Korea one 

hour prior to the Attlee government’s announcement.37 Menzies’ timing 

prompted Attlee’s government to deploy immediately forces from its garrison in Hong Kong to Korea.38 St-Laurent’s government passed legislation to increase the size of its army.39 Additionally, it deployed an unprepared battalion to Korea and suspended participation in a European naval 

exercise so that it could send immediately naval forces to Korea.40

The examples mentioned specifically demonstrate JP 3-16’s identification of the primacy nations affix to political goals and interests when 

committing military forces to a coalition. Thai, Bolivian, and Turkish 

announcements followed immediately Truman’s announcement that he 

planned to send American forces to Korea. Therefore, Thailand, Bolivia, 

and Turkey demonstrated their solidarity with Truman’s administration. 

The timing of Australia’s announcement created a perception that it was 

a more reliable American partner than Great Britain. Attlee attempted to 

negate this perception by rushing forces to Korea. St-Laurent understood 

that his nation needed to contribute forces in some form to maintain Can-
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ada’s national prestige, credibility, and influence with the United States 

and the UN.

National objectives clearly inspired each nation’s decision to participate in the Korean War. However, Canadian and Australian governments 

had additional reason to provide forces. Specifically, they understood that 

they could no longer rely on Britain for their national security. World War 

II changed the foundation of the British Commonwealth. Great Britain 

was not in 1950 the dominant political, military, and economic power that 

it was prior to 1945. Therefore, its “obstreperous children” understood in 

1950 that the United States alone was capable of securing their interests.41

Supporting the United States in Korea was a critical means for these nations to ensure American assistance for their national security interests. 

Security concerns, therefore, prompted Australian and Canadian representatives to withstand the worst of the Truman administration’s tactics.

The United States and Canada share a long border. Potential Soviet 

attacks against the continental United States threatened Canadian security. 

Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Louis St-Laurent contributed 

Canadian forces to Korea to ensure American protection for his country if 

such an event occurred. Robert Menzies contributed Australian forces to 

Korea because his government wanted a Pacific-region security agreement 

with the United States. Specifically, Menzies’ government believed that 

American military strength could guarantee Australian security by negating a “possible resurgence of Japanese or Communist militarism” in the 

Pacific and thereby guarantee Australia’s security.42

Gavan McCormack argued that Australia’s contributions to Korea 

were a Menzies government attempt to “cash in on American good will.”43

Regardless of McCormack’s intent, his argument clearly identified that 

political goals, and Commonwealth reliance on American protection, motivated Canadian and Australian decision to contribute forces to the Korean War. Thus, JP 3-16 correctly identified the heavy influence that political 

objectives have on a nation’s decision to contribute to a coalition. United 

States political and military leaders would be remiss to ignore this reality.

Nations contribute forces to coalitions with the expectation that they 

will gain a political advantage. They do not necessarily contribute forces 

to coalitions for purely moral purposes. The Republic of Georgia, for example, contributed forces to OIF to enhance its prospects for membership 

in NATO.44 Therefore, United States leaders should not consider multinational contribution offers as a sign of benevolence. Additionally, United 

States political and military leaders have another reason for caution. Specifically, JP 3-16 advises American leaders to avoid expectations of automatic contributions from nations that are American allies. Its admonition 
130

in this case applies to American political leaders as well as military personnel. Truman’s administration likely created the reason for the inclusion 

of this guidance in JP 3-16.

Dean Acheson threatened his Commonwealth allies with “a wave 

of isolationism in the United States” to gain their contributions for Korea. Specifically, his warnings proposed to withhold American military 

and financial support for his Commonwealth allies if they did not assist 

the United States in Korea.45 Therefore, Acheson’s demands of Sir Oliver 

Franks and Lester Pearson revealed his expectations for automatic contributions from American allies. Acheson should have avoided these expectations.

Clement Attlee’s government, for example, assigned its military 

forces to numerous locations throughout the world. British military commitments in 1950 included a contribution of forces to NATO. Acheson’s 

expectations of an ally ignored that ally’s contributions to the cause for 

which the alliance was established. This thesis previously discussed Canada’s inability to contribute to NATO. However, Attlee had to remove British troops from Hong Kong, a critical British possession, to provide an 

immediate British presence in Korea. Therefore, it is entirely logical to 

conclude that Great Britain, in addition to Canada, did not have available 

the land forces demanded by Truman’s administration. Attlee’s desire to 

prove his nation’s credibility as a reliable American partner was impressive given Britain’s military and economic limitations.

Truman’s administration clearly did not understand, or otherwise ignored, British and Canadian limitations. American expectations for automatic contributions from allies were problematic for coalition and NATO 

unity. George W. Bush’s administration repeated Acheson’s tactics while 

pursuing French military assistance for Operation Iraqi Freedom. France 

was an American ally in NATO. Economic and military limitations did not 

affect France’s ability to contribute forces to support OIF. However, it did 

not share American political goals for Iraq. France, thus, did not contribute 

military forces to OIF.

American proposals to rename French Fries as “Freedom Fries” in 

2003 demonstrated the reduction of popular unity between the United 

States and France. The Bush administration’s expectations of automatic 

support from an ally for a coalition operation provoked this reduction. 

Therefore, it is critical for American political and military leaders to 

remember that allies do not always share mutual goals with the United 

States. JP 3-16’s discussion of this fact gains more importance when coalition commanders employ foreign military forces.
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Aside from Walton Walker’s initial interactions with Canadian forces, one critical example from the Korean War demonstrated a coalition 

commander’s limitations regarding the employment of foreign forces. Initially, only American personnel provided security at Koje-Do. Koje-Do 

was a prisoner of war camp. Subsequently General Mark Clarke assigned 

non-American forces, including Canadian personnel, to conduct security 

operations at Koje-Do. Clarke assigned multinational forces to Koje-Do 

to reduce international pressure on the United States after communist prisoners subjected anti-communist prisoners to beatings and other methods 

of intimidation.46 However, Clarke did not consult Canada’s St-Laurent 

government prior to assigning Canadian personnel to Koje-Do.47

Canada’s official historian for the Korean War, Herbert Fairlie Wood, 

admitted that St-Laurent’s government “made too much fuss over the affair.”48 Wood’s admission is irrelevant. His admission occurred more than 

a decade after the Korean War ended. Admissions after the fact, such as 

Wood’s, do not change the fact that Canadian stubbornness damaged relations with the Truman administration. However, Wood’s admission demonstrated three of JP 3-16’s relevant ideas.

First, foreign nations are likely to restrict the forces they provide for 

coalitions to specific operations. Such restrictions support national goals. 

Second, contributing nations validly expect to remain informed regarding 

the employment of their forces in a coalition structure. The United States 

government, for example, has to satisfy its domestic audience. Western 

nations share the same responsibility. Third, coalition commanders must 

understand their partners’ goals. Understanding a partner’s goals supports 

a coalition commander’s acknowledgement and application of the first two 

points.

Military necessity may require a commander to utilize foreign forces 

in conditions for which they are unprepared. Clarke, as the coalition commander, was not legally required to inform St-Laurent’s government of 

his decision. However, St-Laurent’s government deserved inclusion in the 

decision-making process that prompted Clark to assign Canadian forces 

to Koje-Do. Furthermore, employment of this nature should remain an 

option of last resort. Future American commanders would be wise to heed 

such lessons. Identifying strategic goals is a method to avoid situations 

that employ foreign forces in operations unsanctioned by their respective 

governments.

Joint Publication 3-16 accurately identifies strategic objectives as 

a cornerstone of coalition development.49 Strategic objectives define the 

goals that a political leader wants to achieve through military operations. 

Additionally, it sustains a coalition until its mission is complete. There-
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fore, positive coalition relationships rely as heavily on the strategic objective as they do on operational successes or failures.

According to JP 3-16, the importance of the strategic objective demands that coalition developers determine the strategic objective prior to 

committing military forces. Moreover, coalition developers should establish the strategic objective as a means to help nations determine if they 

will contribute forces to the coalition. Two Korean War examples demonstrated the effects of identifying strategic objectives on efforts to build 

and sustain coalitions. Harry Truman’s initial guidance for operations in 

Korea, provided in July 1950, constitutes the first example. Second, Truman decided to cross the 38th Parallel in October 1950.

Truman’s initial guidance for operations in Korea was critical to 

coalition development. He identified the conflict as a “police action” to 

limit the conflict.50 Furthermore, he directed his military commanders to 

achieve only the UN mandate of defending South Korea’s sovereignty. 

Additionally, Truman wanted to keep the war localized to Korea to avoid 

an escalation of the war through Chinese or Soviet participation. Truman 

applied specific restrictions to his military commanders to ensure that they 

did not violate his guidance while accomplishing the UN objective.

Potential coalition partners, such as the Commonwealth governments, feared an escalation of the war. Truman’s regulations created 

conditions that were favorable for potential coalition partners to provide 

military forces. Truman’s restrictions, such as denying his military commanders’ requests to conduct aerial reconnaissance near Korea’s borders 

with the Soviet Union and China, prevented the likelihood of war in Korea with the communist nations.51 Truman, in this example, demonstrated 

knowledge of his partners and engendered their contributions. Unfortunately, Truman’s decision to cross the 38th Parallel reversed his initial 

success.

All American and British political parties appeared to support crossing the 38th Parallel.52 However, non-partisan support for this matter was 

irrelevant. Political leaders allowed military success to influence their 

decision-making. Therefore, crossing the 38th Parallel to unify Korea was 

a critical mistake. It prompted China to invade Korea. More importantly, 

however, crossing the 38th Parallel created conditions that diminished the 

political and military unity between Truman’s administration and its Commonwealth coalition partners.

American and Commonwealth perceptions of the “uselessness” of 

the Korean War did not begin until after the Chinese invaded Korea.53

American citizens lost confidence in the Truman administration’s leadership in Korea and, thus, in the coalition, once the war appeared unwin-
133

nable.54 Changing the strategic objective and crossing the 38th Parallel 

prompted these events. Therefore, future coalition developers would be 

wise to heed the lessons of the Truman administration’s decision to change 

its strategic objective for Korea.

President George H.W. Bush appeared to learn from Truman’s mistakes when he sent American military forces to Saudi Arabia in 1990. 

Bush, through UN approval, built a coalition to defend Saudi Arabia and 

expel the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. Bush correctly decided to halt the coalition’s advance after it accomplished its mission. He did not let military 

success, achieved in a period of 100 hours, dictate the coalition’s political objective. Coalition members contributed forces to expel Iraq from 

Kuwait. They did not contribute military forces to topple the Iraqi government. Therefore, the coalition’s unity would have crumbled had Bush 

decided to conquer Iraq. Bush’s thoughtfulness and thoroughness demonstrated characteristics from which future coalition leaders would be wise 

to learn and replicate.

Five lessons from the Truman administration’s leadership in Korea 

do not appear in JP 3-16. First, Truman’s administration developed a coalition to defend another country. Second, a subordinate coalition partner 

proposed to change the coalition’s objective. Third, poor performance by 

some American units in Korea reduced Commonwealth opinions of the 

United States’ credibility. Fourth, American representatives negotiated an 

armistice with the Chinese without a real understanding of Chinese culture. Finally, American commanders appeared to disregard the negative 

effects of heavy casualties on Commonwealth support for the Korean War.

Syngman Rhee was the Truman administration’s most important ally 

during the Korean War. Rhee did not gain this status through his nation’s 

military contributions to the Korean War. He was the Republic of Korea’s 

President. His earned his position through a democratic election that validated by the UN. Therefore, Truman’s decisions had to consider Rhee’s 

objectives as much, if not more, than Commonwealth objectives.

Rhee would not accept anything less than a united Korea under his 

authority until President Dwight D. Eisenhower convinced him in 1953 

to pursue Korean unification through non-military means.55 It is logical 

to conclude that Rhee influenced significantly Truman’s decision to cross 

the 38th Parallel. Additionally, the armistice for Korea required Rhee’s 

approval. His boycott of the negotiations in May 1953 prolonged their 

conduct, thereby extending the war and creating more casualties on both 

sides.56 Regardless, Rhee’s position as South Korea’s president justified 

his goals and influence.
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Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan, replicated Rhee’s actions more than fifty years after the Korean War. Karzai, for example, 

refused to negotiate with the Taliban to end the war in his country. His 

refusal prolonged American efforts to end the war in Afghanistan. Additionally, Rhee and Karzai depended heavily on American economic and 

military assistance to sustain their governments. Therefore, Rhee’s effects 

on the Korean War are important to the present and future.

Rhee and Karzai’s reliance on American support does not mean that 

they would, or should, bow meekly to American whims. Any criticism of 

Karzai’s public disapproval for American policies ignores his legal status 

as the sovereign leader of Afghanistan. Politically, neither Truman’s administration nor the George W. Bush or Barack Obama administrations 

could afford to abandon their respective allies. To do so would reduce 

United States credibility in the world. JP 3-16 pays no attention to these 

facts.

Joint Publication 3-16 also does not discuss the possibility that a coalition member may recommend changes to the strategic objective. Clement Attlee’s government made such a recommendation. It proposed a resolution that would pursue a “unified, independent and democratic” Korean 

government.57 The UN approved this resolution on October 7, 1950. The 

resolution extended the war in time for the UN Command. Specifically, 

the war could have ended in October 1950 after all North Korean forces 

were expelled from South Korea.

Concerns of this nature should not affect coalition operations. Nations should understand and accept a coalition’s strategic objective prior 

to contributing forces. Britain’s proposal, apparently suggested without 

consultation with Truman’s administration, created conditions that led to 

the Chinese invasion in Korea. China’s involvement prolonged the war 

and created more casualties. Unfortunately, the UN Command was close 

to achieving its original objective when Britain proposed to unify Korea.

Extending the war in October 1950 threatened the UN Command’s 

ability to negotiate from a position of strength. JP 3-16 stresses the importance of the strategic objective to developing and sustaining a coalition. 

The publication should also stress the objective’s permanence as a means 

to sustain a coalition. Otherwise, circumstances that arose in Korea are 

likely to arise in future coalition operations.

Poor American combat performance after the initial Chinese invasion was one such circumstance of the war’s extension. The United States 

was clearly the lead nation in Korea. JP 3-16 defines a coalition’s “lead 

nation” as the nation with sufficient “will and capability, competence, and 

influence” to lead coalition operations.58 It mentions the terms “compe-
135

tence” and “performance” sparingly. It briefly discusses the coalition commander’s responsibility to determine a military organization’s “traininglevel competence” before committing that force to combat.59 JP 3-16 uses 

the term “performance” only to mention that military forces are likely to 

receive orders directing them to conduct tasks, such as advising government officials, which ordinarily are civilian tasks.

The EUSA defeated North Korean forces in South Korea. However, 

the Chinese invasion caused EUSA to retreat hastily “in jeeps and trucks 

from an overwhelming horde . . . following on mules, ponies, and camels.60 British and Australian confidence in American land forces “declined 

considerably” after observing EUSA’s retreat.61 Poor Commonwealth 

opinions of American combat capabilities reduced the United States’ credibility and, thus, the Truman administration’s ability to lead effectively the 

coalition in Korea.

Joint Publication 3-16 neglects to advise the United States military 

that its actions in combat reflect American political will, capability, competence, influence, credibility, and, therefore the United States’ ability 

to lead a coalition. This omission is problematic because it is critical for 

American military personnel to remember continuously that they represent America’s government and citizens in peace and war. They must also 

remember that their actions when interacting with foreigners also affect 

foreign perceptions of the United States.

American military personnel deployed to Operations Enduring and 

Iraqi Freedom received substantial briefings on the cultures with which 

they would interact. Presenters continually emphasized the importance of 

respecting those cultures. However, JP 3-16 fails to review respect for the 

enemy’s culture. Its oversight is glaring. It is also problematic because 

future coalition operations are unlikely to replicate the conditions in Iraq 

or Afghanistan. Specifically, except for the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003, 

coalitions that deployed to those nations did not make war against an 

enemy government. Rather, coalitions conducted operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan to support and develop new governments. However, making 

war against an enemy government is not necessarily outdated as a form of 

warfare.

Government against government warfare occurred in Korea. It can 

occur again. Americans negotiators ignored Chinese culture in their pursuit of an armistice to end the Korean War. Indirect Chinese language and 

negotiating feints and ploys frustrated the American negotiators’ preference for direct language. Furthermore, American negotiators forgot that 

China’s government, like Truman’s administration, wanted to attain goals 

that benefitted its interests. Unfortunately, American ignorance of Chinese 
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culture contributed to protracted negotiations and, thus, more casualties in 

Korea.

Joint Publication 3-16 advises American military personnel to show 

respect and patience for multinational contributions in detail. Additionally, 

JP 3-16 cautions its readers to remain respectful and patient toward the 

reason why multinational forces are committed and the justification behind any restrictions under which they operate. Critically, American military personnel demonstrate these traits by developing their knowledge of 

their partners. However, JP 3-16 needs to discuss respect for the enemy’s 

culture and perspectives at the highest levels of the United States government and military. Furthermore, American leaders need to understand, as 

Truman’s administration failed to, that impatience with enemy negotiators 

adversely affects battlefield operations. Such impatience creates negative 

effects on domestic morale within the coalition’s contributing nations.

The Commonwealth nations could not afford substantial casualties 

for political and military reasons.62 Politically, nations such as Great Britain were still recovering from World War II in 1950. Additionally, the Korean War threatened directly neither British nor Canadian vital interests. 

Therefore, the Attlee and St-Laurent governments would find themselves 

hard-pressed to justify heavy casualties to their constituents in a conflict 

that did not threaten their national livelihoods. The United States military 

seeks to minimize its casualties when conducting military operations. It 

does this to retain public support for its efforts. Thus, American leaders 

should instantaneously assume that coalition partners share the same perspective.

Militarily, Commonwealth units in Korea were smaller than were 

their American counterparts.63 Commonwealth formations were not suited 

for the “meat grinder” tactics that General Matthew Ridgway adopted after the war grew into a stalemate.64 Furthermore, Chinese and North Korean forces were “of approximately equal strength and determination” to 

the UN Command.65 Therefore, battles incurring equal casualties on both 

sides put the Commonwealth forces at a disadvantage. These concerns 

became problematic after the Korean War stalemated and representatives 

negotiated armistice terms.

Effective coalitions rely on the morale and willpower of all contributing nations. American generals commanded the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The 

International Security Assistance Force commander also served as the 

commander of all American forces. Therefore, future coalition commanders cannot concern themselves with only their respective nation’s morale 

or willpower. They command the entire coalition and, thus, must include 
137

multinational considerations and perspectives in their decision-making. 

Unfortunately, JP 3-16 does not discuss the negative effects that heavy 

casualties in the course of coalition operations have on a nation’s morale 

and, thus, coalition unity.

American military leaders published JP 3-16 for American military 

personnel. United States military leaders are unlikely to demand that their 

civilian leaders read and apply JP 3-16. To do so would likely create a perception that military personnel are attempting to enforce their will on their 

civilian leaders. However, JP 3-16’s tenets, principles, and guidance apply 

to American political leaders as much as they do to members of the United 

States military. Truman’s administration provided sufficient evidence to 

confirm the relationship between JP 3-16’s content and American political 

leaders.

Joint Publication 3-16 promotes coalition unity as something gained 

through patience, knowledge of partners, and “genuine respect.”66 It is inconceivable to believe that tenets describing the ethics of basic human 

interaction apply to military but not political personnel. Furthermore, it is 

highly probable that military leaders will follow their political leaders’ example in their treatment of coalition partners. Dean Acheson, for example, 

utilized a percentage-based system to determine the significance of his 

coalition partners’ contribution levels.67

The Truman administration’s approach to coalition development was 

not patient. It certainly was not respectful. Specifically, its poor knowledge, 

or ignorance, of its partners’ limitations provoked its behavior. American 

military personnel were likely to replicate the administration’s behavior 

with their Commonwealth counterparts. Lieutenant General Walton Walker’s initial interactions with Canada’s Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Stone, for 

example, demonstrates that Walker imitated Acheson’s behavior.

Military coalitions are comparable to the institution of marriage. Human thoughts, emotions, limitations, capabilities, and character influence 

the conduct of either organization. The only difference between the two 

is that partners expect marriage to last forever. In contrast, coalitions last 

only until they achieve their political objective. Regardless, partners hope 

to gain something by entering a coalition or marriage. Such goals vary by 

individual. Goals upon entering a marriage include, among others, considerations such as creating a family or improving one’s financial status. 

Goals upon contributing military forces to a coalition include, among others, economic assistance, military aid, or a greater diplomatic position in 

the world.

Arguments that utilize the size of a nation’s military contribution, 
138

such as Acheson’s percentage-based approach, or the wealth an individual 

brings to a marriage to define significance are irrelevant. Such arguments 

are harmful to a marriage or coalition’s unity and success. Truman, Attlee, St-Laurent, and Menzies united their nations to achieve a common 

purpose. Different goals motivated each man to include his nation in the 

Korean War. Additionally, different objectives inspired the public and private comments, thoughts, and behaviors of each man, and their respective 

governments, until an armistice ended the cause for which they created 

their coalition.

Unfortunately, the Truman administration’s interactions with its 

Commonwealth partners created problems that extended beyond the Korean War. Truman’s administration and Britain’s Clement Attlee government, for example, “bequeathed” their diplomatic problems to their replacements.68 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Truman’s successor as United States 

President, believed that Anglo-American relations in 1953 were at their 

worst point since 1945.69 In 1918, Canada’s government informed Britain’s government that it would not agree to British policies that threatened 

Canada’s relationship with the United States.70 However, Dean Acheson 

and Lester Pearson, Canada’s Minister for External Affairs, disagreed on 

the size and significance of Canada’s contributions and, thus, the Louis 

St-Laurent government’s ability to influence vital decisions regarding the 

war.71 Therefore, the Korean War ended the “easy and automatic” relations 

enjoyed between the United States and Canada.72

The critical lesson from this example is the effect of personalities on 

coalition sustainment. The personalities of Franklin Roosevelt, Winston 

Churchill, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, for example, sustained the AngloAmerican coalition during the Second World War. Each man maintained 

personal and national interests. However, their personal and national interests frequently differed. Roosevelt’s interests, for example, did not always align with Churchill’s goals. Regardless, each man set aside their 

individual interests for the benefit of their partnership.

Different personalities managed Anglo-American relations during 

the Korean War. American personalities in particular appeared unable to set 

aside their national interests in a manner similar to Roosevelt, Churchill, 

and Eisenhower. Unfortunately, such personalities did not appear to consider the long-term effects of their actions. Specifically, Truman’s administration demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice long-term diplomatic relations with the British Commonwealth to achieve a short-term objective in 

Korea. Future American leaders would be wise to replicate George H.W. 

Bush’s example rather than Truman’s example if they determine that a 
139

coalition operation is necessary to achieve American goals.

American-Australian relations appear as the only American-Commonwealth relationship that improved during the Korean War. For example, the United States government agreed to a Pacific security pact that included Australia and New Zealand in 1952. The ANZUS did not attach the 

United States to Australian security in a manner similar to Western Europe 

and the NATO. However, ANZUS allowed Australia conduct diplomacy 

with the United States on an equal basis while both nations pursued mutual 

interests in the Pacific. Australia’s “early participation” in the Korean War 

persuaded Truman’s administration to agree to ANZUS.73

Joint Publication 3-16 does not identify the source of its content. It is 

possible that recent coalition operations, such as Operations Enduring and 

Iraqi Freedom, prompted the document’s production. However, strong evidence exists to suggest that efforts by Harry S. Truman’s administration to 

develop and sustain a coalition for the Korean War created JP 3-16’s content. Truman’s administration included nations with which it maintained 

friendly relations prior to 1950 in its coalition. Its coalition development 

methods, specifically with its allies, were often questionable and, therefore, unsupportive of its coalition development efforts. The Truman administration’s methods were often harsh, demanding, and, in some cases, 

unforgiving. Truman’s administration continued these tactics throughout 

the duration of the Korean War.

Domestic political concerns and the pressure of war in Korea likely 

prompted the Truman administration’s behavior. However, its conduct created negative long-term effects on American diplomacy. This is significant 

to the United States because its political and military personnel are likely 

to work with multinational partners to negate international security threats 

in the future. Therefore, current and future American political and military 

leaders, and the subordinates that follow them, would be wise to heed the 

Truman administration’s Korean War example and learn from JP 3-16. 

Replicating the Truman administration’s diplomatic examples will only 

damage United States credibility and diplomatic relations. Furthermore, it 

will reduce the willingness of foreign nations to contribute forces to future 

coalition operations that the United States government considers essential 

to American interests and international security.
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Notes

1. Craig, “The Political Leader as Strategist,” 501.

2. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2007), xii.

3. U.S. Department of State, World Reaction to Korean Developments, Special Supplement, July 18, 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

4. Dockrill, “The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean War, June 1950-June 1951,” 476.

5. Memorandum of Conversation: Proposed UK Note Relating to Increased 

Military Effort; China, Dean Acheson and Sir Oliver Franks, August 3, 1950, 2. 

Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

6. Memorandum of Conversation: Formosa; Contribution of Troops by 

Canada, Dean Acheson and Lester B. Pearson, July 29, 1950, Papers of Dean 

Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

7. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2007), I-3.

8. Freedman, “Introduction,” 2.

9. Lord Moran (Sir Charles Watson), Churchill: The Struggle for Survival 

1945-60 (London: Sphere, 1968), 446-47.

10. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume II: Years of Trial and 

Hope, 430.

11. Truman, Memoirs, 488.

12. Margaret Truman, ed. Where the Buck Stops: The Personal and Private 

Writings of Harry S. Truman (New York: Warner Books, 1989), 111.

13. George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, November 6, 2001,” http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/

news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (accessed November 6, 2013).

14. Status of United Nations Military Assistance Offers, 1 September 1950.

15. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Canadian Military Experiences,” 28.

16. Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the 

period 16-31 August 1950, transmitted by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. 

Representative to the United Nations, to the President of the Security Council, 

September 18, 1950, 8.

17. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2007), x.

18. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Chronology 

of Principle Events Relating to the Korean Conflict, November 1950, 21.

19. Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, 55.

20. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the 

United States, 206.

21. Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans under British Command, 

1918, xi.

22. von Clausewitz, On War, 87.

23. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, “The Free World and the United Nations,” Foreign 

Affairs 31, no. 3 (April 1953): 389.

24. Anthony Eden, “Britain in World Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 29, no. 3 

(April 1951): 342.
141

25. Roy Harrod, “Hands and Fists Across the Sea,” Foreign Affairs 30, no. 

1 (October 1951): 68.

26. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied, 62.

27. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, 31.

28. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2007), I-1.

29. Grey, “The Formation of the Commonwealth Division, 1950-51,” 12.

30. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I: Strategy and 

Diplomacy, 33.

31. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Canadian Military Experiences,” 27.

32. Memorandum of Conversation: Korea; Migration Program; Requirement for Funds, between Dean Acheson and Robert Menzies, July 31, 1950, Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

33. Stephan A. Carney, CMH Pub 59-3-1, Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Washington, DC: Center of Military History), 3. http://www.

history.army.mil/html/books/059/59-3-1/CMH_59-3-1.pdf (accessed November 

7, 2013).

34. Stephan A. Carney, CMH Pub 59-3-1, 4.

35. Stephen A. Carney, CMH Pub 59-3, 63.

36. U.S. Department of State, World Reaction to Korean Developments, 

No. 27, July 24, 1950; No. 29, 26 July 1950.

37. Grey, The Commonwealth armies and the Korean War, 35.

38. Grey, The Commonwealth armies, 57.

39. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied, 62.

40. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy in the Korean Crisis, 33.

41. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 

vol. 6, 753.

42. Robert Gordon Menzies, “The Pacific Settlement Seen from Australia,” 

Foreign Affairs 31, no. 2 (January 1952): 195.

43. Colin Mackerras, review of Cold War, Hot War, An Australian Perspective on the Korean War, by Gavan McCormack, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs no. 11 (January 1984): 189.

44. Jim Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 4.

45. Dockrill, “The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean War, June 1950-June 1951,” 468.

46. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the 

United States, 246.

47. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Canadian Military Experiences,” 31.

48. Wood, Strange Battleground: Official History of the Canadian Army in 

Korea, 196.

49. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2007), III-3.

50. U.S. Department of State, White House Press and Radio News Conference, President Harry S. Truman, 29 June 1950.
142

51. U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Dean Rusk 

(Assistant Secretary of State) and Brigadier General P. Hamilton, U.S. Air Force, 

July 6, 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

52. Peter Lowe, “An Ally and a Recalcitrant General: Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950-51,” The English Historical Review 

105, no. 416 (July 1990): 652.

53. Adlai Stevenson, “Korea in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 30, no. 3 

(April 1952): 354.

54. Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” 70.

55. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Volume Two: Years of Trial and 

Hope, 462.

65. Acheson, The Korean War, 150.

57. Fitzsimmons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 

1945-1951, 136.

58. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2013), C-3.

59. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2007), III-5.

60. Gallaway, The Last Call of the Bugle: The Long Road to Kapyong, 170.

61. Grey, “The Regiment’s First War: Korea, 1950-56,” 66.

62. Blaxland, “The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Canadian Military Experiences,” 30.

63. Blaxland,” The Korean War”.

64. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 

1776, 644.

65. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military 

Strategy and Policy, 393.

66. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 (2007), I-3.

67. Memorandum of Conversation: Proposed UK Note Relating to Increased Military Effort; China, Dean Acheson and Sir Oliver Franks, August 3, 

1950, 1. Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

68. Lowe, “An Ally and a Recalcitrant General: Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950-51,” 652.

69. Lowe, “The Significance of the Korean War in Anglo-American Relations, 1950-53,” 145.

70. Stevenson, “Canada, Free and Dependent,” 458.

71. Lester B. Pearson, “The Development of Canadian Foreign Policy,” 

Foreign Affairs 30, no. 1 (October 1951): 29.

72. Holmes, “Canada and the United States in World Politics,” 105.

73. Millar, “Australia and the American Alliance,” 149.
143

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