[Cite as State v. Stevenson, 2023-Ohio-1541.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- vs -

RICHARD D. STEVENSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NO. 2022-T-0100

Criminal Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas

Trial Court No. 2021 CR 00750

O P I N I O N

Decided: May 8, 2023

Judgment: Affirmed

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ryan J. Sanders, Assistant 

Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH 

44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Gregory T. Stralka, 6509 Brecksville Road, P.O. Box 31776, Cleveland, OH 44131 (For 

Defendant-Appellant).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Richard D. Stevenson, appeals the judgment imposing sentence 

following his plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter and an attendant gun specification.

We affirm. 

{¶2} In December 2021, an indictment was filed charging Stevenson with the 

following two counts: (1) felony murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) and (D); and (2)

second-degree felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and (D)(1)(a). Both 

charges included attendant firearm specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.145. 
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{¶3} Stevenson originally pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, pursuant to a plea 

agreement, Stevenson pleaded guilty to an amended first count of voluntary 

manslaughter with an attendant firearm specification, and the state agreed to dismiss the 

second count. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation and report and set the 

matter for sentencing. At sentencing, the court imposed an indefinite term of 8 to 12 years

of imprisonment on the voluntary manslaughter charge and 3 years of imprisonment on 

the gun specification, to be served prior and consecutive to the voluntary manslaughter

sentence. 

{¶4} In Stevenson’s sole assigned error, he maintains:

{¶5} “The Appellant’s guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligent[l]y made 

because whether the Appellant could hear the trial court at the plea was in question.”

{¶6} “‘When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders 

enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and 

the Ohio Constitution.’” State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 

621, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). “The 

United States Supreme Court has held that a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right 

to jury trial, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, and the right to confront one’s 

accusers cannot be inferred from a silent record.” Veney at ¶ 7, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 

395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). “Crim.R. 11 was adopted in 

1973, giving detailed instruction to trial courts on the procedure to follow when accepting 

pleas.” Veney at ¶ 7.
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{¶7} Here, at the change of plea hearing, the trial court engaged in a plea 

colloquy pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C), which pertains to guilty pleas entered in felony cases. 

Stevenson does not challenge the trial court’s advisements during the plea colloquy. 

However, he maintains that, at the subsequent sentencing hearing, it was apparent he 

was having difficulty hearing, and, once he obtained a hearing device, he began to argue 

with the trial court regarding the facts of the case. Stevenson maintains that this series 

of events raises sufficient doubt regarding whether he heard the original plea agreement 

and knowingly and intelligently understood what occurred at the change of plea hearing. 

{¶8} However, at the commencement of the change of plea hearing, the court 

asked Stevenson, “Can you hear me okay?” and Stevenson responded, “Yes, sir.” 

Thereafter, there are only two instances which may suggest that Stevenson was having 

difficulty hearing during the change of plea hearing. The first instance occurred when the 

trial court inquired if Stevenson has suffered from any kind of mental illness or disease, 

to which Stevenson responded, “Pardon?” The court then repeated the question,

Stevenson answered, and the hearing proceeded. The second instance occurred after 

the plea colloquy. At that point, the court asked Stevenson if he was ready to change his 

plea, to which Stevenson responded, “No, sir.” It is not clear if Stevenson responded in 

this manner due to his inability to hear the question, but, after speaking with his attorney, 

the court repeated the question, and Stevenson responded, “Yes.” The change of plea 

hearing then proceeded without further issue. Accordingly, the transcript does not 

indicate that Stevenson had any difficulty hearing the trial court at the change of plea 

hearing, aside from instances that were immediately addressed by the trial court. 
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{¶9} At the sentencing hearing, Stevenson had difficulty hearing the court at the 

beginning of the hearing, and the court provided him with a hearing device. During 

allocution, Stevenson made statements regarding the facts of the case that the trial court 

apparently found to lack credibility. 

{¶10} We cannot say that because Stevenson was unable to hear the court at 

the commencement of the sentencing hearing and because he disagreed with the court 

on the facts of the case at that time, it necessarily follows that he was also unable to hear 

the court during portions of the plea hearing that were not addressed by the trial court as 

set forth above. To the contrary, Stevenson affirmatively acknowledged his ability to hear 

the trial court at the plea hearing and specifically indicated an instance when he did not 

hear the court, resulting in the court repeating the question. Stevenson did not indicate 

at the plea hearing, as he did at the sentencing hearing, that he was having any difficulty 

hearing the trial court.

{¶11} Therefore, the premise underlying Stevenson’s argument that his plea was 

unintelligently or unknowingly made is unavailing, and Stevenson’s sole assigned error 

lacks merit. 

{¶12} The judgment is affirmed.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.