ELECTRICITY

Federal Efforts to 

Enhance Grid 

Resilience

Report to the Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee 

on Science, Space, and Technology, 

House of Representatives

January 2017

GAO-17-153

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-153, a report to the 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 

Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology, House of Representatives

January 2017

ELECTRICITY

Federal Efforts to Enhance Grid Resilience

What GAO Found

The Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reported implementing 

27 grid resiliency efforts since 2013 and identified a variety of results from these 

efforts. The efforts addressed a range of threats and hazards—including 

cyberattacks, physical attacks, and natural disasters—and supported different

types of activities (see table). These efforts also addressed each of the three 

federal priorities for enhancing the security and resilience of the electricity grid: 

(1) developing and deploying tools and technologies to enhance awareness of 

potential disruptions, (2) planning and exercising coordinated responses to 

disruptive events, and (3) ensuring actionable intelligence on threats is 

communicated between government and industry in a time-sensitive manner.

Agency officials reported a variety of results from these efforts, including the 

development of new technologies—such as a rapidly-deployable large, highpower transformer—and improved coordination and information sharing between 

the federal government and industry related to potential cyberattacks.

Types of Activities Supported by 27 Federal Grid Resiliency Efforts

Activity type Number of federal efforts

Emergency preparedness and response 19

Research and development 15

Modeling, analytics, and risk assessment 12

Standard setting 12

Information sharing 10

Institutional support and technical assistance 10

Regulatory guidance 1

Source: GAO analysis of DOE, DHS, and FERC questionnaire responses. | GAO-17-153

Note: Because agency efforts often supported more than one type of activity, the number of efforts 

across the types of activities exceeds 27, the number of federal efforts GAOidentified in this review .

Federal grid resiliency efforts were fragmented across DOE, DHS, and FERC 

and overlapped to some degree but were not duplicative. GAO found that the 27 

efforts were fragmented in that they were implemented by three agencies and 

addressed the same broad area of national need: enhancing the resilience of the 

electricity grid. However, DOE, DHS, and FERC generally tailored their efforts to 

contribute to their specific missions. For example, DOE’s 11 efforts related to its 

strategic goal to support a more secure and resilient U.S. energy infrastructure. 

GAO also found that the federal efforts overlapped to some degree but were not 

duplicative because none had the same goals or engaged in the same activities. 

For example, three DOE and DHS efforts addressed resiliency issues related to 

large, high-power transformers, but the goals were distinct—one effort focused 

on developing a rapidly deployable transformer to use in the event of multiple 

large, high-power transformer failures; another focused on developing nextgeneration transformer components with more resilient features; and a third 

focused on developing a plan for a national transformer reserve. Moreover, 

officials from all three agencies reported taking actions to coordinate federal grid 

resiliency efforts, such as serving on formal coordinating bodies that bring 

together federal, state, and industry stakeholders to discuss resiliency issues on 

a regular basis, and contributing to the development of federal plans that address 

grid resiliency gaps and priorities. GAO found that these actions were consistent 

with key practices for enhancing and sustaining federal agency coordination.

View GAO-17-153. For more information, 

contact Frank Rusco, (202) 512-3841, 

ruscof@gao.gov

Why GAO Did This Study

In light of increasing threats to the 

nation’s electricity grid, national 

policies have stressed the importance 

of enhancing the grid’s resilience—its 

ability to adapt to changing conditions;

withstand potentially disruptive events, 

such as the loss of power lines; and, if 

disrupted, to rapidly recover. Most of 

the electricity grid is owned and 

operated by private industry, but the 

federal government has a significant 

role in promoting the grid’s resilience. 

DOE is the lead agency for federal grid 

resiliency efforts and is responsible for 

coordinating with DHS and other 

relevant federal agencies on these 

efforts.

GAO was asked to review federal 

efforts to enhance the resilience of the 

electricity grid. This report (1) identifies 

grid resiliency efforts implemented by 

federal agencies since 2013 and the 

results of these efforts and (2) 

examines the extent to which these 

efforts were fragmented, overlapping, 

or duplicative, and the extent to which 

agencies had coordinated the efforts. 

GAO reviewed relevant laws and 

guidance; identified a list of federal grid 

resiliency efforts; sent a questionnaire 

to officials at DOE, DHS, and FERC to 

collect information on each effort and 

its results; analyzed questionnaire

responses and agency documents to 

assess whether federal efforts were 

fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative 

and how agencies coordinated those 

efforts; and interviewed agency

officials and industry group 

representatives.

This report contains no 

recommendations. DOE, DHS, and 

FERC provided technical comments, 

which GAO incorporated as 

appropriate.
Page i GAO-17-153 Electricity

Letter 1

Background 7

Three Federal Agencies Implemented 27 Grid Resiliency Efforts 

since 2013 and Reported a Variety of Results 9

Federal Efforts Were Fragmented with Some Overlap but Were 

Not Duplicative, and Agencies Have Taken Actions to 

Coordinate Their Efforts 15

Agency Comments 23

Appendix I GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal Agencies with Efforts Aimed at 

Enhancing the Resilience of the Electricity Grid 24

Appendix II Characteristics of Efforts to Enhance the Resilience of the Electricity 

Grid at Three Federal Agencies 41

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 48

Tables

Table 1: Selected Federal Roles and Responsibilities Related to 

Enhancing Electricity Grid Resilience 8

Table 2: Types of Activities Supported by Federal Grid Resiliency 

Efforts 11

Table 3: Types of Threats or Hazards Addressed by Federal Grid 

Resiliency Efforts 13

Table 4: Federal Priorities for Enhancing the Security and 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid Addressed by Federal 

Grid Resiliency Efforts 14

Table 5: Selected Examples of Results from Federal Grid 

Resiliency Efforts 15

Table 6: Department of Energy (DOE) Reported Grid Resiliency 

Efforts 41

Table 7: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Reported Grid 

Resiliency Efforts 44

Table 8: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 

Reported Grid Resiliency Efforts 45

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-153 Electricity

Figure

Figure 1: Overlap in Type of Activities Supported by Federal Grid 

Resiliency Efforts 18

Abbreviations

CEDS Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems

CRISP Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DHS Department of Homeland Security

ES-C2M2 Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity 

 Model

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

GRIDS Grid-Scale Rampable Intermittent Dispatchable Storage

ISER Infrastructure Security and Restoration Program

NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation

RecX Recovery Transformer

TRAC Transformer Resilience and Advanced Components

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Page 1 GAO-17-153 Electricity

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

January 25, 2017

The Honorable Don Beyer

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Oversight

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Beyer:

The electricity grid delivers the electricity essential to modern life. As a 

result, the reliability of the grid—its ability to meet consumers’ electricity 

demand at all times—has been a long-standing area of national interest. 

According to the 2015 Quadrennial Energy Review, natural and humanmade threats to the grid are increasing and are expected to continue to 

grow in frequency and magnitude.1 In light of these increasing threats and 

with recognition that it is not possible to prevent all disruptions to the 

electricity grid, government and industry have focused on enhancing the 

grid’s resilience. This focus on resilience complements the long-standing 

focus on reliability. Resilience represents the grid’s ability to adapt to 

changing conditions and withstand potentially disruptive events—such as 

the loss of power plants or power lines—and, if disrupted, to rapidly 

recover.2 In particular, government and industry recently have 

emphasized efforts to improve the grid’s resilience to high-consequence, 

low-probability events, including severe natural disasters such as

Hurricane Sandy; major geomagnetic disturbances; significant 

cyberattacks on computer systems that control parts of the system; and

coordinated terrorist attacks on specific facilities.

 1The White House, Quadrennial Energy Review: Energy Transmission, Storage, and 

Distribution Infrastructure (Washington, D.C.: April 2015). This interagency review focused 

on the challenges facing the nation’s energy infrastructures, including the electricity grid, 

and made recommendations for federal energy policy.

2For the purposes of this report, we use the definition of resilience in Presidential Policy 

Directive 21, which establishes national policy for critical infrastructure security and 

resilience. Specifically, Presidential Policy Directive 21 defines resilience as the ability to 

prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from 

disruptions, including deliberate attacks, accidents, and naturally occurring threats or 

incidents.The White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure 

Security and Resilience (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2013).

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-153 Electricity

The private sector and the government share responsibility for the 

resilience of the electricity grid. Most of the electricity grid—the 

commercial electric power transmission and distribution system 

comprising power lines and other infrastructure—is owned and operated 

by private industry. However, federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial 

governments also have significant roles in enhancing the resilience of the 

electricity grid. In 2013, the President directed federal agencies to work 

with owners and operators of critical infrastructure and state, local, tribal, 

and territorial governments to take proactive steps to manage risk and 

strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure from all 

hazards, including natural disasters, cyberattacks, and acts of terrorism.3

The Department of Energy (DOE) was designated as the lead agency for 

federal resiliency efforts in the energy sector, which includes the 

electricity grid. In this role, DOE is responsible for coordinating with the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), itself responsible for 

coordinating the overall federal effort to promote the security and 

resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure. DOE is also responsible for

coordinating with other relevant federal agencies and for collaborating

with critical infrastructure owners and operators to prioritize and 

coordinate federal resiliency efforts. In addition, the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC), which regulates the interstate 

transmission of electricity, is responsible for reviewing and approving 

standards developed by the North American Electric Reliability 

Corporation (NERC) to provide for the reliable operation of the bulk power 

system.4 These standards include requirements for planning and 

operating the bulk power system to provide for its reliable operation.5 For 

example, one reliability standard requires that system planners plan and 

develop their systems to meet the demand for electricity even if 

equipment on the bulk power system, such as a single generating unit or 

transformer, is damaged or otherwise unable to operate. According to 

 3Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21. 

4The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the federally designated 

U.S. electric reliability organization, is overseen by FERC. NERC is responsible for 

conducting reliability assessments and developing and enforcing mandatory standards to 

provide for the reliable operation of the bulk power system. The bulk power system 

includes the facilities and control systems necessary for operating the interconnected 

electricity transmission network and the electric energy from certain generation facilities 

needed for reliability. 

5Federal efforts to enhance resilience are similar to efforts focused on ensuring that 

electricity supplies are reliable, i.e. that consumers have access to sufficient quantities of 

electricity. 
Page 3 GAO-17-153 Electricity

FERC officials, these reliability standards can lead to actions that 

enhance the resilience of the electricity grid by improving the grids’ ability 

to withstand potentially disruptive events and, if disrupted, to rapidly 

recover.

The fact that multiple agencies have roles in enhancing the resilience of 

the electricity grid raises questions about the potential for fragmentation, 

overlap, or duplication in federal efforts. As we have previously reported, 

federal programs can be inefficient or ineffective if they are fragmented, 

overlapping, or duplicative.6 We have routinely reviewed federal programs 

to identify any that may pose these problems; each year since 2011, we 

have reported on programs that do pose these problems.7 Fragmentation 

occurs when more than one federal agency—or more than one 

organization within an agency—is involved in the same broad area of 

national need. Overlap occurs when multiple agencies or programs have 

similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve these 

goals, or target similar beneficiaries. Duplication occurs when two or more 

agencies or programs have the same goals, are engaged in the same 

activities, or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries. We 

have previously reported that coordination across programs may help 

address fragmentation, overlap, and duplication.8 We also have reported 

that, in some cases, it may be appropriate or beneficial for multiple 

agencies or entities to be involved in the same programmatic or policy 

area because of the complex nature or magnitude of the federal effort.9

 6GAO, Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication: An Evaluation and Management Guide, 

GAO-15-49SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2015). 

7See GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save 

Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011); 

2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, 

Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 

2012); 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and 

Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits, GAO-13-279SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 9, 2013); 2014 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, 

Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits, GAO-14-343SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2014); 2015 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce

Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits, 

GAO-15-404SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2015); and 2016 Annual Report: Additional 

Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other 

Financial Benefits, GAO-16-375SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2016). 

8GAO-11-318SP. 

9GAO-15-49SP. 
Page 4 GAO-17-153 Electricity

In this context, you asked us to review federal efforts to enhance the 

resilience of the electricity grid. Our objectives were to identify (1) grid 

resiliency efforts implemented by federal agencies since 2013 and their 

known results and (2) the extent to which these federal grid resiliency 

efforts were fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative, if at all, and the 

extent to which agencies have coordinated these efforts.

To conduct this work, we reviewed relevant laws, orders, and guidance 

and interviewed agency officials and industry group representatives.10 To 

identify grid resiliency efforts implemented by federal agencies since 2013 

and their known results, we first reviewed agency documents and 

interviewed DOE, DHS, and FERC officials to develop an initial list of 

potentially relevant federal efforts to enhance grid resilience.11 Next, we 

provided each of the three agencies with a list of its potentially relevant 

grid resiliency efforts, along with our definitions and criteria, and asked 

the agencies to confirm that the listed efforts were relevant, to add any 

relevant grid resiliency efforts that were not on the list, and to identify any 

other federal agencies that might have implemented relevant grid 

resiliency efforts from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2016.12 If 

officials wanted to remove an effort from our list, we requested additional 

information to support the removal. Using this process, we determined

 10Specifically, we interviewed representatives from the American Public Power 

Association, the Edison Electric Institute, and the National Rural Electric Cooperative 

Association. We selected these three industry groups because together they represent the 

owners of most of the electricity grid. 

11For the purposes of this report, we defined federal efforts to enhance grid resilience as 

programs or groups of activities that aimed to enhance the resilience of the electricity grid 

through a specific emphasis or focus, even if enhancing the resilience of the electricity grid 

was only one aim of a broader effort. We did not consider individual projects within a 

broader effort—such as specific grant awards, agreements, or contracts—to be efforts in 

themselves. We excluded federal efforts that could indirectly enhance grid resilience but 

did not have that outcome as a specific emphasis or focus, as well as efforts aimed solely 

at enhancing the resilience of an agency’s own electricity infrastructure assets.

12We considered an effort to have been implemented from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal 

year 2016 if it was planned, funded, executed, or authorized at some point during that time 

frame, even if the effort had ended or was completed by the end of fiscal year 2016. 
Page 5 GAO-17-153 Electricity

that there were 27 federal grid resiliency efforts across the three agencies 

that met our criteria.13

After identifying these 27 efforts, we developed a questionnaire to collect 

additional information from officials at the three agencies about each 

effort. This questionnaire included questions to collect information on an 

effort’s key characteristics; funding; actions to coordinate internally and 

with other federal agencies, states, and industry; and results. We 

conducted pretests with officials involved in three different efforts at three 

different agencies to check that (1) the questions were clear and 

unambiguous, (2) terminology was used correctly, (3) the questionnaire 

did not place an undue burden on agency officials, (4) the information 

could feasibly be obtained, and (5) the questionnaire was comprehensive 

and unbiased. An independent GAO reviewer also reviewed a draft of the 

questionnaire prior to its administration. Based on feedback from these 

pretests and independent review, we revised the questionnaire to improve 

its clarity. We administered the questionnaire and received responses for 

each effort, resulting in a response rate of 100 percent.14 After we 

reviewed the responses, we conducted follow-up e-mail exchanges or 

telephone discussions with agency officials as needed. Because this was 

 13DHS officials identified the Department of Defense (DOD) as another federal agency 

with potentially relevant grid resiliency efforts. In response, we provided our definitions 

and criteria to DOD and asked the agency to identify any relevant grid resiliency efforts it 

had implemented from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2016 and to identify any other 

federal agencies that might have implemented relevant grid resiliency efforts. After 

interviewing DOD officials and reviewing their written response to our list, we determined 

that none of the department’s efforts fell within the scope of our work because those 

efforts were aimed solely at enhancing the resilience of DOD’s own electricity 

infrastructure assets rather than enhancing the resilience of the commercial electricity 

grid. For information on DOD efforts related to the resilience of its own electricity 

infrastructure assets, see GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Improvements in DOD Reporting 

and Cybersecurity Implementation Needed to Enhance Utility Resilience Planning, 

GAO-15-749 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2015); Defense Infrastructure: Improvement 

Needed in Energy Reporting and Security Funding at Installations with Limited 

Connectivity, GAO-16-164 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27, 2016); and DOD Renewable 

Energy Projects: Improved Guidance Needed for Analyzing and Documenting Costs and 

Benefits, GAO-16-487 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 2016). 

14We sent questionnaires to the appropriate agency liaisons in an attached Microsoft 

Word form, and the agency liaisons sent the questionnaires to the appropriate officials. 
Page 6 GAO-17-153 Electricity

not a sample questionnaire, it has no sampling errors.15 To determine 

funding levels for the 27 efforts, we asked the agencies about their 

obligations for each effort.16 To assess the reliability of obligations data, 

we included questions about the data systems used to generate those 

data. Based on the responses we received, we determined that the data 

used in this report were of sufficient quality for the purposes of our 

reporting objectives. To identify the extent of any fragmentation, overlap, 

and duplication among federal grid resiliency efforts, as well as the extent 

to which agencies have coordinated those efforts, we analyzed the 

information we collected from our questionnaire to determine the extent of 

fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in the goals and activities of 

federal grid resiliency efforts. We then interviewed agency officials 

responsible for federal grid resiliency efforts for follow-up information as 

needed. In addition, we used agency documents, questionnaire 

responses, and interviews to identify coordination activities within and 

among the three agencies and with states and industry. For a copy of our 

questionnaire, see appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2016 to January 2017 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 15The practical difficulties of conducting any questionnaire may introduce errors, 

commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in interpreting a 

particular question, the sources of information available to respondents, or entering data 

into a database or analyzing them can introduce unwanted variability into the results. 

However, we took steps to minimize such nonsampling errors while developing the 

questionnaire—including using a social science survey specialist for designing and 

pretesting the questionnaire. We also minimized the nonsampling errors when collecting 

and analyzing the data, including using a computer program for analysis, and verifying the 

accuracy of keypunched records by comparing them with their corresponding 

questionnaires. 

16For the purposes of this report, we refer to federal obligations as federal funding. An 

obligation is a definite commitment that creates a legal liability of the government for the 

payment of goods and services ordered or received, or a legal duty on the part of the 

United States that could mature into a legal liability. Payment may be made immediately 

or in the future. An agency incurs an obligation, for example, when it places an order, 

signs a contract, awards a grant, purchases a service, or takes other actions that require 

the government to make payments to the public or from one government account to 

another. 
Page 7 GAO-17-153 Electricity

Recent national policies and federal preparedness efforts have 

highlighted the importance of enhancing the resilience of the nation’s 

critical infrastructure, including the electricity grid. Presidential Policy 

Directive 21, issued in February 2013, established national policy on 

critical infrastructure security and resilience. The directive expanded the 

nation’s focus from protecting critical infrastructure against terrorism to 

protecting critical infrastructure and increasing its resilience against all 

hazards, including natural disasters, terrorism, and cyber incidents.17 In 

addition, the directive recognizes that proactive and coordinated efforts 

are necessary to strengthen and maintain critical infrastructure that is 

secure and resilient. It also identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors, 

including the energy sector—which encompasses the electricity grid—and 

designates lead federal agencies to coordinate and prioritize security and 

resiliency activities in each sector. DOE was designated as the lead 

federal agency for the energy sector. Reflecting the shift in focus in 

Presidential Policy Directive 21, the December 2013 update to the 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan elevated security and resilience to 

be the primary aim of federal critical infrastructure planning efforts.18 The 

update established a set of broad national goals for critical infrastructure 

security and resilience and directed that each of the 16 critical 

infrastructure sectors update its sector-specific plan—a planning 

document that complements and tailors the application of the National 

Infrastructure Protection Plan to the specific characteristics and risks of 

each critical infrastructure sector. In response, DOE in 2015 led the 

development of an updated Energy Sector-Specific Plan to help guide 

and integrate efforts to improve the security and resilience of the energy 

sector’s critical infrastructure, including the electricity grid.19 The plan 

identified three federal priorities for enhancing the security and resilience 

of the grid: (1) developing and deploying tools and technologies to 

enhance awareness of potential disruptions, (2) planning and exercising 

coordinated responses to disruptive events, and (3) ensuring actionable 

intelligence on threats is communicated between government and 

 17Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21.

18Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Partnering for 

Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Washington, D.C.: December 2013). The 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan is a comprehensive national plan for securing the 

key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States. DHS leads the plan’s 

development in collaboration with relevant stakeholders, including other federal agencies, 

states, and industry. 

19Department of Energy and Department of Homeland Security, Energy Sector-Specific 

Plan, 2015 (Washington, D.C.: 2015). 

Background
Page 8 GAO-17-153 Electricity

industry in a time-sensitive manner. In addition, in 2016 the United States 

developed an action plan and issued a joint strategy with Canada for 

strengthening the security and resilience of the North American electricity 

grid.20

As table 1 shows, federal roles and responsibilities related to enhancing 

the resilience of the electricity grid are defined in policy and law, including 

Presidential Policy Directive 21 and certain provisions of the Fixing 

America’s Surface Transportation Act of 2015.21

Table 1: Selected Federal Roles and Responsibilities Related to Enhancing Electricity Grid Resilience

Source Federal roles and responsibilities 

Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical 

Infrastructure Security and Resilience

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for providing strategic 

guidance, promoting a national unity of effort, and coordinating the overall federal effort 

to promote the security and resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure.

As the lead federal agency for the energy sector, the Department of Energy (DOE) is 

responsible for, among other things:

• coordinating with DHS and other relevant federal agencies and collaborating with 

critical energy infrastructure owners and operators; independent regulatory 

agencies; and state, local, tribal, and territorial entities;

• serving as a day-to-day federal interface for the prioritization and coordination of 

energy-sector security and resiliency activities;

• carrying out incident management responsibilities consistent with statutory authority 

and other appropriate policies, directives, or regulations; and

• providing, supporting, or facilitating technical assistance and consultations for the 

energy sector to identify vulnerabilities and help mitigate incidents, as appropriate. 

Fixing America’s Surface Transportation 

Act of 2015

The Secretary of Energy is authorized to issue emergency orders to protect or restore 

the reliability of critical electric infrastructure to entities,including critical electric

infrastructure owners and operators,if the President provides a written directive or 

determination identifying a grid security emergency.

DOE is the lead federal agency for cybersecurity for the energy sector.

DOE is required to submit a plan to Congress on establishing a strategic transformer 

reserve to store, in strategically located facilities, spare large power transformers and 

emergency mobile substations in sufficient numbers to temporarily replace critically 

damaged large power transformers and substations. 

Source: GAO analysis of Presidential Policy Directive 21 and selected provisions of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act. | GAO-17-153

 20Executive Office of the President, National Electric Grid Security and Resilience Action 

Plan (Washington, D.C.: December 2016) and the Executive Office of the President and 

the Government of Canada, Joint United States-Canada Electric Grid Security and 

Resilience Strategy (Washington, D.C.: December 2016). 

21Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, §§ 61002- 61004 129 

Stat. 1312, 1772-82 (2015) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824, 824a, and 824o-1 (2016)).
Page 9 GAO-17-153 Electricity

States and industry also play key roles in enhancing the resilience of the 

electricity grid. States, through their public utility commissions, regulate 

retail electricity service and facility planning and siting. States also enact 

policies that can affect the resilience of the portion of the electricity grid 

that is within their borders. Industry owns and operates most of the 

electricity grid, so the actions that owners and operators take to protect 

and maintain their assets can contribute to grid resilience.22 In addition, 

owners and operators of the electricity grid are responsible for complying 

with mandatory reliability standards that can contribute to grid resilience.

DOE, DHS, and FERC reported implementing 27 grid resiliency efforts 

since 2013 that supported a range of activities and that addressed 

multiple hazards and federal priorities for enhancing the resilience of the 

electricity grid. Agency officials reported a variety of results stemming 

from these efforts.

In response to our questionnaire, DOE, DHS, and FERC officials reported 

implementing 27 efforts since 2013 that aimed at enhancing the resilience 

of the electricity grid. Of these 27 efforts, 12 were FERC regulatory efforts 

tied to the agency’s role in reviewing and approving mandatory reliability 

standards for the bulk power system. FERC officials also reported that the 

agency oversaw another effort in which it acted on a petition by a private 

company to provide regulatory findings related to the company’s plan to 

establish a subscription service for spare critical transmission equipment, 

including transformers. The remaining 14 efforts—11 implemented by 

 22Publicly owned utilities and electric cooperatives also own and operate portions of the 

electricity grid. Similar to industry, the actions that publiclyowned utilities and electric 

cooperatives take to protect and maintain their assets can contribute to grid resilience.

Three Federal 

Agencies 

Implemented 27 Grid 

Resiliency Efforts 

since 2013 and 

Reported a Variety of 

Results

DOE, DHS, and FERC 

Efforts Addressed a 

Range of Activities, 

Hazards, and Federal 

Priorities
Page 10 GAO-17-153 Electricity

DOE and 3 by DHS—were programmatic in nature.23 Federal funding for 

the DOE and DHS grid resiliency activities from fiscal year 2013 through 

fiscal year 2015 totaled approximately $240 million.24 The 27 efforts that 

DOE, DHS, and FERC officials reported implementing supported a range 

of activities, addressed a variety of potential threats and hazards, and 

addressed federal priorities for enhancing the resilience of the electricity 

grid (see app. II for more information on each effort).

As table 2 shows, the reported federal grid resiliency efforts supported a 

range of activities, with the most prevalent being:

• emergency preparedness and response activities (e.g. providing 

coordination, planning, training, and exercise programs to prepare for 

potential disaster operations; providing situational awareness during 

an event; coordinating response efforts; and helping facilitate system 

restoration);

• research and development activities (e.g. pursuing tools, 

technologies, and demonstrations aimed at bringing new and 

innovative technologies to maturity and helping them transition to 

industry);

• modeling, analytics, and risk assessment activities (e.g. modeling, 

simulation, and analysis of electricity grid risks and vulnerabilities); 

and

• standard-setting activities (e.g. the development or approval of 

standards for industry).

For example, DOE reported that its Strategic Transformer Reserve effort 

supported emergency preparedness and response activities through 

planning for the potential loss of large, high-power transformers by 

evaluating the feasibility of establishing a reserve of those transformers 

 23For example, DOE’s Transformer Resilience and Advanced Components Program aims 

to ensure the resilience of aging assets; identify new requirements for future grid 

components; and accelerate the development, demonstration, and deployment of nextgeneration components to enhance the resilience of the electricity grid. Also, DHS’s Solar 

Storm Mitigation effort aims to provide owners and operators of the electricity grid with 

advanced and actionable information about anticipated geomagneticallyinduced current 

levels in the event of a solar storm. 

24FERC officials told us that the agency could not provide information on the federal 

funding for its grid resiliency efforts related to reviewing and approving reliability standards 

because FERC could not break down by individual standard the costs associated with 

reviewing and approving reliability standards. 

Types of Activities
Page 11 GAO-17-153 Electricity

for use during an emergency. Similarly, FERC reported that its efforts 

supported emergency preparedness and response activities as well as 

activities to set standards by approving a reliability standard that requires

owners and operators of the electricity grid to develop and implement 

procedures to mitigate the potential effects of geomagnetic disturbances 

on the bulk power system.25 In addition, DHS reported that its Recovery 

Transformer Program supported research and development activities by 

designing and demonstrating a type of rapidly deployable large, highpower transformer for use in the event of the unexpected loss of multiple 

large, high-power transformers.

Table 2: Types of Activities Supported by Federal Grid Resiliency Efforts

Agency

Federal grid 

resiliency effort

Type of Activity

Emergency 

preparedness 

and response

Research 

and 

development

Modeling, 

analytics, 

and risk 

assessment

Standard 

setting

Information 

sharing

Institutional 

support and 

technical 

assistance

Regulatory 

Guidance

DOE Cybersecurity for 

Energy Delivery 

Systems Program

Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No

DOE Cybersecurity Risk 

Information Sharing 

Program 

No Yes No No Yes Yes No

DOE Electric Distribution 

Grid Resilience 

Research and 

Development Program

No Yes Yes No No No No

DOE Electricity Subsector 

Cybersecurity 

Capability Maturity 

Model 

Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No

DOE Energy Storage 

Program 

Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No

DOE Grid-Scale Rampable 

Intermittent 

Dispatchable Storage 

Program

No Yes No No No No No

 25Geomagnetic disturbances occur when the sun ejects charged particles that interact 

with and cause changes in the earth’s magnetic fields. These charged particles can cause 

currents to enter the electricity grid through long conductors, such as transmission lines. 

These currents can disrupt the normal operation of the grid and, in some cases, damage 

equipment such as transformers.
Page 12 GAO-17-153 Electricity

Agency

Federal grid 

resiliency effort

Type of Activity

Emergency 

preparedness 

and response

Research 

and 

development

Modeling, 

analytics, 

and risk 

assessment

Standard 

setting

Information 

sharing

Institutional 

support and 

technical 

assistance

Regulatory 

Guidance

DOE Infrastructure Security 

and Energy 

Restoration Program

Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No

DOE Microgrid Research 

and Development 

Programa

Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No

DOE State and Regional 

Energy Risk 

Assessment Initiative 

Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No

DOE Strategic Transformer 

Reserve

Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No

DOE Transformer 

Resilience and 

Advanced 

Components Program

No Yes Yes No No No No

DHS Recovery Transformer 

Program

No Yes No No No No No

DHS Resilient Electric Grid 

Program

No Yes No No No No No

DHS Solar Storm Mitigation No Yes Yes No No No No

FERC Reliability Standards

(12 Individual 

Standards)b

Yes (12) Yes (2) Yes (2) Yes (12) Yes (3) Yes (2) No

FERC Grid Assurance, LLC 

Spare Transmission 

Equipment Service 

Petition

No No No No No No Yes

Totalc 19 15 12 12 10 10 1

Source: GAO analysis of questionnaire responses from the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). | 

GAO-17-153

a

According to a DOE document, a microgrid is a local energy grid w ith control capability, w hich means 

it can disconnect from the grid and operate autonomously. A microgrid generally operates w hile 

connected to the grid, but it can break off and operate on its ow n using local energy generation in 

times of crisis, such as storms or pow er outages or for other reasons.

b

The 12 individual reliability standards are consolidated.

c

Because agency efforts often supported more than one type of activity, the total number of efforts 

across the types of activities exceeds 27, the number of federal efforts we identified in our review .

As table 3 shows, the agencies reported that their federal grid resiliency 

efforts addressed a range of threats and hazards, including cyberattacks 

(i.e. computer-related attacks); physical attacks (e.g. attacks on physical 

infrastructure such as targeted shooting of transformers or intentional 

Types of Threats and Hazards
Page 13 GAO-17-153 Electricity

downing of power lines); natural disasters (e.g. extreme weather events 

and geomagnetic disturbances); and operational accidents (e.g. 

unintentional equipment failures or operator error). For example, DOE 

and FERC reported implementing several grid resiliency efforts to 

address the threat of cyberattacks. DOE’s Electricity Subsector 

Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model effort was a public-private 

partnership that developed a tool kit modeled on a common set of 

industry-vetted cybersecurity practices; the effort made this tool kit 

available to the electricity industry to help owners and operators evaluate, 

prioritize, and improve their cybersecurity capabilities. Similarly, of the 12 

reliability standards FERC approved, several require owners and 

operators of the electricity grid to take actions to mitigate the threat posed 

by cyberattacks on the bulk power system.

Table 3: Types of Threats or Hazards Addressed by Federal Grid Resiliency Efforts

Threat or hazard Number of federal efforts addressing

Cyberattack 15

Physical attack 12

Natural disaster 12

Operational accident 5

Source: GAO analysis of questionnaire responses from the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). | GAO-17-153

Note: Because agency efforts often addressed more than one type of threat or hazard, the total 

number of efforts across the types of threats or hazards addressed exceeds 27, the number of federal 

efforts we identified in our review.

As table 4 shows, the reported federal grid resiliency efforts collectively 

addressed each of the three federal priorities for enhancing the security 

and resilience of the electricity grid that were identified in the 2015 Energy 

Sector-Specific Plan.26 For example, DHS’s Solar Storm Mitigation effort 

addressed the federal priority of developing and deploying tools and 

technologies to enhance awareness of potential disruptions; the effort 

addressed this priority by providing owners and operators of the electricity 

grid with advanced and actionable information about anticipated impacts 

of a solar storm. Similarly, DOE’s Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing 

Program addressed the federal priority to ensure actionable intelligence 

on threats is communicated between government and industry in a timesensitive manner; the effort addressed this priority by facilitating the 

timely sharing of unclassified and classified cybersecurity threat 

 26Energy Sector-Specific Plan, 2015. 

Federal Priorities for 

Enhancing Grid Resilience
Page 14 GAO-17-153 Electricity

information and developing situational awareness tools to better identify, 

prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical electricity infrastructure.

Table 4: Federal Priorities for Enhancing the Security and Resilience of the 

Electricity Grid Addressed by Federal Grid Resiliency Efforts

Federal priority

Number of federal 

efforts addressing

Tools and technology

Developing and deploying tools and technologies to enhance 

awareness of potential disruptions 24

Incident response

Planning and exercising coordinated responses to disruptive 

events 18

Information flow

Ensuring actionable intelligence on threats is communicated 

between government and industry in a time-sensitive manner 10

Source: GAO analysis of questionnaire responses from the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). | GAO-17-153

Note: Because agency efforts often addressed more than one federal priority for enhancing the 

resilience of the electricity grid, the total number of efforts across the federal priorities exceeds 27, the 

number of federal efforts we identified in our review .

In their questionnaire responses, agency officials reported a variety of 

results from both ongoing and completed federal grid resiliency efforts. As 

shown in the selected examples in table 5, these results included the 

development, and in some cases the deployment, of new technologies 

and analytical tools; the planning and exercising of coordinated 

responses to disruptive events; and improved coordination and 

information sharing between the federal government and industry related 

to potential cyberattacks and other threats or hazards to the electricity 

grid.

Agencies Reported a 

Variety of Results from 

Their Efforts
Page 15 GAO-17-153 Electricity

Table 5: Selected Examples of Results from Federal Grid Resiliency Efforts

Type of Results Examples

Development and deployment of new 

technologies and analytical tools

• The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Resilient Electric Grid Program 

developed a new superconductor cable that can connect several urban substations 

and in so doing mitigate or prevent disruptions by enabling multiple paths for electricity 

to flow if a single substation loses power.

• DHS’s Recovery Transformer Program developed a rapidly deployable large, highpower transformer and demonstrated that it was capable of being transported, 

installed, and energized in less than 1 week if a large, high-power transformer on the 

grid is unexpectedly damaged.

Planning and exercising coordinated 

responses to disruptive events

• The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration 

program developed lessons learned from an annual exercise program that tests 

government and industry’s ability to restore energy services in the aftermath of 

catastrophic incidents. Those lessons were summarized and reported to energy sector 

stakeholders to improve their policies, plans, and procedures for energy emergencies.

• The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved two reliability 

standards (Reliability Standards EOP-010-1 and TPL-007-1) that required industry to 

develop and implement plans and procedures to mitigate the effects of geomagnetic 

disturbances on the bulk power system. Geomagnetic disturbances occur when the 

sun ejects charged particles that interact with and cause changes in the earth’s 

magnetic fields. These charged particles can cause currents to enter the electricity grid 

through long conductors, such as transmission lines, and in so doing disrupt the 

normal operation of the grid and, in some cases, damage equipment.

Improved coordination and information 

sharing between the federal government 

and industry

• DOE’s Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model effort developed 

a tool kit modeled on a common set of industry-vetted cybersecurity practices and 

made it available to industry to help owners and operators of the electricity grid 

evaluate, prioritize, and improve their cybersecurity capabilities.

• DOE’s Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program facilitated the timely sharing of 

unclassified and classified information on cybersecurity threats with companies that 

cover about 60 percent of continental U.S. customers.

Source: GAO analysis of questionnaire responses from the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). | 

GAO-17-153

We found that the 27 federal efforts to enhance the resilience of the 

electricity grid were fragmented across DOE, DHS, and FERC and 

overlapped to some degree, but we did not find any instances of 

duplication among these efforts. In their questionnaire responses, agency 

officials reported engaging in a number of activities and mechanisms to 

coordinate their efforts and avoid duplication. These activities and 

mechanisms include serving as members on formal coordinating bodies 

that bring together federal, state, and industry stakeholders in the energy 

sector to discuss resiliency issues on a regular basis; contributing to the 

development of federal plans and reviews that address grid resiliency 

gaps and priorities; and participating in direct coordination activities at the 

program level.

Federal Efforts Were 

Fragmented with 

Some Overlap but 

Were Not Duplicative, 

and Agencies Have 

Taken Actions to 

Coordinate Their 

Efforts
Page 16 GAO-17-153 Electricity

According to our analysis of agency questionnaire responses, federal grid 

resiliency efforts were fragmented and overlapped to some degree, but 

none were duplicative. In addition, industry group representatives we 

interviewed did not identify any instances of duplication among federal 

grid resiliency efforts.

Fragmentation. The 27 federal efforts to enhance the resilience of the 

electricity grid were fragmented in that they were implemented by three 

different agencies—DOE, DHS, and FERC—and addressed the same 

broad area of national need: enhancing the resilience of the electricity 

grid. We have previously reported that fragmentation has the potential to 

result in duplication of resources.27 For example, fragmentation can lead 

to technical or administrative functions being managed separately by 

individual agencies, when these functions could be shared among 

programs. However, we also have reported that fragmentation, by itself, is 

not an indication that unnecessary duplication of efforts or activities 

exists.28 There can be advantages to having multiple federal agencies 

involved in a broad area of national need; for example, agencies can 

tailor initiatives to suit their specific missions and needs, among other 

things. In the case of federal grid resiliency efforts, we found that DOE, 

DHS, and FERC generally have tailored their efforts to contribute to their 

specific missions and needs. For example, DOE’s 11 efforts related to its 

strategic goal to support a more secure and resilient U.S. energy 

infrastructure; DHS’s 3 efforts addressed its strategic priority to enhance 

critical infrastructure security and resilience by, among other things, 

promoting resilient critical infrastructure design; and FERC’s 13 efforts 

related to the agency’s roles in reviewing and approving reliability 

standards and regulating the interstate transmission of electricity. 

Moreover, fragmentation of federal grid resiliency efforts within agencies 

is limited—10 of the 11 DOE efforts, all 13 FERC efforts, and all 3 DHS 

efforts were implemented by one organization within each respective 

agency.

Overlap. We found that 23 of the 27 federal grid resiliency efforts 

overlapped to some degree with at least one other effort in that they 

addressed similar goals. These overlaps included:

 27GAO-11-318SP.

28GAO-11-318SP.

Efforts Were Fragmented 

Across Agencies with 

Some Overlap but Were 

Not Duplicative
Page 17 GAO-17-153 Electricity

• 12 efforts with similar goals related to enhancing the cybersecurity of 

the electricity grid;

• 4 with similar goals related to enhancing the resilience and availability 

of large, high-power transformers;29

• 3 with similar goals related to enhancing the grid’s resilience to 

geomagnetic disturbances;

• 2 with similar goals related to enhancing energy storage technology; 

and

• 2 with similar goals related to enhancing the resilience of the grid’s 

distribution system.

As figure 1 illustrates, we also found that all but one federal grid resiliency 

effort overlapped to some degree with at least one other effort by 

supporting similar types of activities to achieve their goals.

 29According to a DOE document, large, high-power transformers carry more than 90 

percent of the nation’s electricity and face a number of challenges that make them one of 

the most vulnerable components of the electricity grid. According to the 2015 Quadrennial 

Energy Review, the loss of multiple critical large, high-power transformers could disrupt 

electricity service over a large area of the country. 
Page 18 GAO-17-153 Electricity

Figure 1: Overlap in Type of Activities Supported by Federal Grid Resiliency Efforts

Note: Because agency efforts often supported more than one type of activity, the total number of 

efforts across the types of activities exceeds 27, the number of federal efforts we identified in our 

review .

Duplication. We did not find any instances of duplication among the 27 

federal grid resiliency efforts because none of the efforts had the same 

goals or engaged in the same activities. For example, although 4 efforts 

overlapped in that they had similar goals related to enhancing the 

resilience of large, high-power transformers and improving their 

availability, those efforts were not duplicative because their goals were 

not the same. Specifically, DHS’s Recovery Transformer Program, begun 

in 2008 and completed in 2014, aimed to design and demonstrate a 

rapidly deployable large, high-power transformer that could be used to 

enable rapid recovery of the grid in the event of multiple large, high-power 

transformer failures. In contrast, DOE’s Transformer Resilience and 

Advanced Components Program, launched in 2016, is focused on 
Page 19 GAO-17-153 Electricity

ensuring the resilience of aging transformers and accelerating the 

development, demonstration, and deployment of next-generation 

transformer components. Furthermore, DOE’s Strategic Transformer 

Reserve effort is an analytical and planning activity with a goal of 

developing a plan for Congress related to establishing a strategic 

transformer reserve. Similarly, a fourth effort led by FERC was distinct 

from the other three efforts in that its goal was to act on a petition from a 

private company for regulatory findings related to the company’s plan to 

establish a subscription service for spare critical transmission equipment, 

including transformers.

In their questionnaire responses, DOE, DHS, and FERC reported 

coordinating with each other on their federal grid resiliency efforts through 

a variety of activities and mechanisms. In particular, agency officials 

associated with all of the programmatic efforts that we identified as having 

overlapping characteristics (in that they supported similar goals and types 

of activities) reported coordinating with other federal agencies. 

Furthermore, many reported coordinating their efforts with states, and 

most also reported coordinating their efforts with industry. Coordination is 

important because, as we have previously reported, it can preserve 

scarce funds and enhance the overall effectiveness of federal efforts.30

We also have previously reported that coordination across programs may 

help address fragmentation, overlap, and duplication.31 We found that 

coordination activities and mechanisms among DOE, DHS, and FERC 

were consistent with key practices we have previously identified that can 

help enhance and sustain federal agency coordination, such as (1) 

defining and articulating a common outcome; (2) establishing joint 

strategies, which helps align activities, core processes, and resources to 

accomplish a common outcome; (3) leveraging resources, which helps 

obtain additional benefits that would not be available if agencies or offices 

were working separately; and (4) developing mechanisms to monitor, 

evaluate, and report on results. We analyzed and grouped into seven 

categories the various coordination activities and mechanisms that 

 30GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

31GAO-11-318SP and GAO, Employment for People with Disabilities: Little Is Known 

about the Effectiveness of Fragmented and Overlapping Programs, GAO-12-677 

(Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012). 

Agencies Reported 

Coordinating Efforts 

through Formal 

Coordinating Bodies, Joint 

Planning, and Other 

Activities
Page 20 GAO-17-153 Electricity

agency officials reported in their questionnaire responses. These 

categories and examples of specific activities are:

• Participating in formal coordinating bodies. Agency officials 

reported participating in several formally established coordinating 

bodies. In particular, DOE and DHS officials identified the Electricity 

Subsector Coordinating Council and the Energy Sector Government 

Coordinating Council as key mechanisms that help coordinate grid 

resiliency efforts across federal agencies and with states and industry 

stakeholders. According to the Electricity Subsector Coordinating 

Council’s charter, the council’s purpose includes coordinating 

activities and initiatives designed to improve the reliability and 

resilience of the electricity subsector, including the electricity grid, and 

serving as the principal liaison between the council’s membership and 

the Energy Sector Government Coordinating Council.32 The Energy 

Sector Government Coordinating Council is the government 

counterpart of the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council, and its 

purpose is to enable interagency and cross-jurisdictional coordination 

on planning, implementing, and executing resilience programs for the 

nation’s critical energy infrastructure.33 Agency officials told us that 

federal grid resiliency efforts and their results are discussed at 

meetings of these two councils as a way to share information, 

coordinate efforts, and avoid duplication. We have previously found 

that federal programs that contribute to the same or similar results 

should collaborate to ensure that goals are consistent and, as 

appropriate, program efforts are mutually reinforcing.34

 32Among other things, the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council is meant to facilitate 

the identification and sharing of tools and technologies to improve electricity subsector 

security and resilience, and to collaborate with the federal government on coordinated 

government-industry preparedness and response planning for events of national 

significance. The council includes utility chief executive officers and trade association 

leaders representing all segments of the electric power industry. The council’s charter 

calls for it to meet at least once each year. 

33Among other things, the Energy Sector Government Coordinating Council is meant to

identify energy sector resiliency issues that need interagency and public-private 

coordination; identify strategies to correct or eliminate gaps or overlaps in plans, 

programs, and policies; facilitate the sharing of approaches and results of successful 

resiliency programs; and leverage complementary resources within and between federal 

agencies and industry. The council includes representatives from various levels of

government (federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal) and is co-chaired by 

representatives from DOE and DHS. The council’s charter calls for it to meet at least three 

times each year.

34GAO-06-15.
Page 21 GAO-17-153 Electricity

• Contributing to federal planning efforts. Agency officials reported 

contributing to federal plans and reviews that addressed grid 

resiliency gaps and priorities. For example, DOE and DHS officials 

said they contributed to the development of the 2015 Quadrennial 

Energy Review, which, among other things, assessed the 

vulnerabilities of the electricity grid and recommended ways to 

enhance its resilience.35 Agency officials also told us that they 

collaborated on the development of the 2015 Energy Sector-Specific 

Plan, which identified three federal priorities for enhancing the security 

and resilience of the electricity grid.36 We have previously reported 

that it is important for collaborating agencies to establish strategies 

that work in concert with those of their partners or that are joint in 

nature, because such strategies help align the agencies’ activities to 

accomplish a common outcome.37

• Maintaining a record of federal, state, and industry efforts. DOE 

officials reported that the agency maintains a record of federal-, state-, 

and industry-critical energy sector infrastructure programs and 

initiatives; this record includes federal grid resiliency efforts. Officials

told us that they update the record, which was created in 2013, as 

new programs and initiatives are identified at meetings of the 

Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council and the Energy Sector 

Government Coordinating Council. DOE officials said that they use 

the record as an internal tool for tracking energy-sector programs and 

initiatives and as a means to share information about those efforts 

with federal, state, and industry stakeholders, as needed. We have 

previously found that it is important for federal agencies engaged in 

collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and evaluate their 

efforts.38 Furthermore, we have concluded that developing and 

maintaining a record of federal efforts with similar goals can improve 

visibility over the full range of those efforts and reduce the potential for 

duplication.39

 35Quadrennial Energy Review.

36Energy Sector-Specific Plan, 2015. 

37GAO-06-15.

38GAO-06-15.

39GAO, Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and Coordination of 

DOD’s Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts, GAO-10-95 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 

29, 2009). 
Page 22 GAO-17-153 Electricity

• Participating in formal joint efforts. Some agency officials reported 

that their grid resiliency efforts were joint efforts with other federal 

agencies or industry partners. For example, DHS officials reported 

that both the Resilient Electric Grid Program and the Recovery 

Transformer Program were jointly funded by DHS and industry under 

formal agreements. Similarly, DOE officials reported that the 

Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program was a formal joint 

effort of DOE, the federal intelligence community, and NERC. We 

have previously found that by leveraging partner resources, agencies 

can obtain additional benefits that would not be available if they 

worked separately.40

• Soliciting input from stakeholders. Some agency officials reported 

formally soliciting input on their grid resiliency efforts from federal, 

state, and industry stakeholders. For example, FERC officials 

reported that they formally seek comments on proposed reliability 

standards and routinely receive comments from federal, state, and 

industry stakeholders. FERC officials said that the agency considers 

these comments when determining whether to approve a reliability 

standard and, as a result of these comments, in some cases directs 

NERC to make changes in proposed standards. Similarly, DOE 

officials responsible for the Strategic Transformer Reserve effort 

reported seeking input from relevant federal agencies—including 

DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), and FERC—states, industry, 

and others as they developed their analysis.

• Sponsoring and participating in conferences, webinars, and 

workshops. Agency officials reported sponsoring and participating in 

conferences, webinars, and workshops that included discussions 

about grid resiliency priorities and how to address those priorities 

among federal, state, and industry stakeholders. For example, officials 

who implement DOE’s Electric Distribution Grid Resilience Research 

and Development Program reported that they held a workshop with 

stakeholders to define in greater detail research and development 

needs related to the distribution grid’s resilience. We have previously 

found that collaboration can help agencies define and articulate the 

common federal outcome.41

• Coordinating directly through agency staff. Agency officials also 

reported that agency staff responsible for grid resiliency efforts 

 40GAO-06-15.

41GAO-06-15.
Page 23 GAO-17-153 Electricity

pursued a number of informal activities to directly coordinate these 

efforts with related federal and industry efforts; these activities 

included periodic meetings, telephone calls, and e-mails to coordinate 

and share information. We have previously reported that frequent 

communication among collaborating agencies is a means to facilitate 

working across agency boundaries.42

We provided a draft copy of this report to DOD, DOE, DHS, and FERC for 

review and comment. DOE, DHS, and FERC provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD indicated it had 

no comments on the report.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate 

congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and 

Homeland Security; the Chairman of FERC; and other interested parties. 

In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website 

at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs are on the last page

of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Rusco

Director, Natural Resources and Environment

 42GAO-06-15.

Agency Comments
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 24 GAO-17-153 Electricity

Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing 

the Resilience of the Electricity Grid
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 25 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 26 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 27 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 28 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 29 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 30 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 31 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 32 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 33 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 34 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 35 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 36 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 37 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 38 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 39 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal 

Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the 

Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Page 40 GAO-17-153 Electricity
Appendix II: Characteristics of Efforts to 

Enhance the Resilience of the Electricity Grid 

at Three Federal Agencies

Page 41 GAO-17-153 Electricity

We identified 27 efforts across three agencies—the Department of 

Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)—that aimed to enhance 

the resilience of the electricity grid. Tables 6, 7, and 8 provide 

descriptions of the efforts at each agency as agency officials reported in 

their responses to our questionnaire and as we identified in agency 

documents.

Table 6: Department of Energy (DOE) Reported Grid Resiliency Efforts

Effort name and 

implementing office Description Results

Total obligations for 

grid resiliency 

activities, fiscal years 

2013-2015 (dollars) 

Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy 

Grid-Scale Rampable 

Intermittent Dispatchable 

Storage (GRIDS) 

Program

According to DOE officials, the GRIDS 

Program focuses on developing new gridscale energy storage technologies—such 

as batteries, flow batteries, and 

flywheels—to balance short-duration 

variability in renewable generation. The 

GRIDS Program aims to develop new, lowcost storage technologies that will allow 

the electricity grid to adapt to changing 

conditions created by renewable 

generation

According to DOE officials, the 

GRIDS Program has led to the 

development of several batteries 

that have been turned into 

products and deployed on the 

electricity grid. The program also 

has led to the formation of new 

U.S.-based companies that 

produce and market advanced 

energy storage devices, which are 

expected to better ensure that 

replacement equipment is 

available if needed.

2,980,705

Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability

Cybersecurity for Energy 

Delivery Systems (CEDS) 

Program

According to DOE officials, the CEDS 

Program helps the energy sector by 

developing cybersecurity solutions for 

energy delivery systems through 

integrated planning and a focused 

research and development effort.

According to DOE officials, the 

CEDS Program has supported 

more than 30 research and 

development projects that have led 

to the deployment of tools and 

advanced technologies that 

enhance the security of the 

nation’s energy delivery systems.

114,866,205

Cybersecurity Risk 

Information Sharing 

Program (CRISP)

According to DOE officials, CRISP uses 

advanced technologies and innovative 

analytical capabilities to facilitate 

collaboration within the energy sector 

through robust two-way information 

sharing that provides energy sector 

partners with targeted, actionable 

information to facilitate requirement 

setting, detection, prevention, mitigation, 

and rapid response to emerging cyber 

threats.

According to DOE officials, energy 

sector participation in CRISP has 

increased, which has led to greater 

information sharing and enhanced 

resilience of the electricity grid.

38,742,000

Appendix II: Characteristics of Efforts to 

Enhance the Resilience of the Electricity 

Grid at Three Federal Agencies
Appendix II: Characteristics of Efforts to 

Enhance the Resilience of the Electricity Grid 

at Three Federal Agencies

Page 42 GAO-17-153 Electricity

Effort name and 

implementing office Description Results

Total obligations for 

grid resiliency 

activities, fiscal years 

2013-2015 (dollars) 

Electric Distribution Grid 

Resilience Research and 

Development Program

According to DOE officials, the Electric 

Distribution Grid Resilience Research and 

Development Program aims to meet the 

research and development needs for a 

resilient electric distribution grid, with the 

goal of contributing to a 10 percent 

reduction in the economic costs of power 

outages by 2025.

According to DOE officials, the 

program has demonstrated a grid 

design decision support tool that is 

intended to enhance the resilience 

of a distribution feeder against 

wind and flood hazards.

4,150,000

Electricity Subsector 

Cybersecurity Capability 

Maturity Model (ESC2M2)

According to DOE officials, the ES-C2M2 

effort is a public-private partnership that is 

designed to facilitate improvements in the 

cybersecurity capabilities of the electricity 

subsector and to enhance understanding 

of the cybersecurity posture of the 

electricity grid. The effort helps 

organizations evaluate, prioritize, and 

improve their own cybersecurity 

capabilities. 

According to DOE officials, DOE 

has provided ES-C2M2 tool kits to 

companies since 2012. Owners 

and operators of the electricity grid 

are using ES-C2M2 assessments 

to prioritize security actions and 

investments, monitor their 

progress, and quantify cyber risks 

for insurance purposes.

3,602,346

Energy Storage Program According to DOE officials, the Energy 

Storage Program has a number of projects 

that are relevant to grid resilience, 

including analyses to enhance the stability 

and resilience of island grids; improve 

dynamic instabilities in large area grids; 

improve the security and resilience of 

military microgrids; and improve the 

stability, reliability, and resilience of 

networks to accommodate increasing 

renewable portfolio standards.

According to DOE officials, the 

Energy Storage Program has 

supported the deployment of 

energy storage technologies that 

provide enhanced grid stability and 

resilience.

6,691,000

Infrastructure Security 

and Restoration Program 

(ISER)

According to DOE officials, ISER 

implements DOE’s efforts to enhance 

energy sector preparedness, response, 

and recovery. ISER serves as a point of 

entry for energy sector security and 

resiliency stakeholders, including other 

federal agencies, state, local, tribal, and 

territorial partners, and the private sector. 

Through the ISER programs, stakeholders 

are able to develop a common 

understanding of threats and hazards, 

enhance mitigation strategies, build and 

validate response capabilities, and 

improve access to recovery capabilities.

According to DOE officials, ISER 

provides continuous monitoring of 

the nation’s energy infrastructure 

and analysis of historical and realtime situations affecting the

infrastructure; ISER conducts this 

monitoring through the 

development and use of 

capabilities such as a real-time 

monitoring system, a collaboration 

tool, developing analysis reports, 

and publishing an annual energy 

incident report.

18,924,408
Appendix II: Characteristics of Efforts to 

Enhance the Resilience of the Electricity Grid 

at Three Federal Agencies

Page 43 GAO-17-153 Electricity

Effort name and 

implementing office Description Results

Total obligations for 

grid resiliency 

activities, fiscal years 

2013-2015 (dollars) 

Microgrid Research and 

Development Program

According to DOE officials, the Microgrid 

Research and Development Program aims 

to develop commercial-scale microgrid

systems capable of reducing outage time 

of required loads at a cost comparable to 

non-integrated baseline solutions while 

reducing emissions and improving system 

energy efficiencies by 2020.

According to DOE officials, 

simulated and/or emulated testing 

of microgrid system designs with 

advanced controllers will be 

completed in fiscal year 2017. 

Field demonstrations of microgrid 

system designs with advanced 

controllers will begin in fiscal year 

2017. In addition, a design support 

tool for off-grid microgrids will be 

transferred for use by at least one 

microgrid designer for a remote 

community application in fiscal 

year 2017.

26,853,350

State and Regional 

Energy Risk Assessment 

Initiative

According to DOE officials, the State and 

Regional Energy Risk Assessment 

Initiative aims to help states better 

understand risks to their energy 

infrastructure so they can make informed 

decisions about their investments, 

resilience and hardening strategies, and 

asset management.The initiative is a 

collaborative effort with the National 

Association of State Energy Officials, the 

National Association of Regulatory Utility 

Commissioners, the National Conference 

of State Legislatures, and the National 

Governors Association.

According to DOE officials, DOE 

has collaborated with Argonne 

National Laboratory to create 

energy risk profiles for each state. 

These profiles address the 

electricity, petroleum, and natural 

gas sectors and highlight the most 

common threats to energy 

infrastructure. Fifty state energy 

risk assessments and 5 regional 

energy risk assessments have 

been produced and are currently in 

use by states and other partners, 

as well as the general public.

225,000

Strategic Transformer 

Reserve

According to DOE officials, the Strategic 

Transformer Reserve effort aims to assess 

the adequacy of the current inventory of 

spare large, high-power transformers and 

alternative approaches to increasing the 

availability of spare transformers, and to 

develop a plan for Congress on 

establishing a strategic transformer

reserve.

According to DOE officials, DOE 

has convened meetings with 

stakeholders to solicit their input 

and has increased stakeholder 

understanding of the challenges 

related to large, high-power 

transformers. DOE officials told us 

in January 2017 that they 

expected to submit their report to 

Congress in the near future. 

750,000
Appendix II: Characteristics of Efforts to 

Enhance the Resilience of the Electricity Grid 

at Three Federal Agencies

Page 44 GAO-17-153 Electricity

Effort name and 

implementing office Description Results

Total obligations for 

grid resiliency 

activities, fiscal years 

2013-2015 (dollars) 

Transformer Resilience 

and Advanced 

Components (TRAC) 

Program 

According to DOE officials, the TRAC 

Program aims to ensure the resilience of 

aging assets;identify new requirements for 

future grid components; and accelerate the 

development, demonstration, and 

deployment of next-generation 

components to enhance the resilience of 

the electricity grid.

According to DOE officials, the 

TRAC Program started in January 

2016 and has made technical 

progress. Several projects have 

been awarded to national 

laboratories and a funding 

opportunity announcement was 

released in June 2016. These 

activities are aligned with the goals 

of the TRAC Program and will 

produce insights and technical 

advances that can be used to 

increase grid resilience.

0a

Total 217,785,014

Source: GAO analysis of DOE-reported data. | GAO-17-153

a

The Transformer Resilience and Advanced Components Program did not start until fiscal year 2016 

and therefore had no obligations from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2015.

Table 7: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Reported Grid Resiliency Efforts

Effort name and 

implementing office Description Results

Total obligations for 

grid resiliency 

activities, fiscal years 

2013-2015 (dollars)

Science and Technology Directorate 

Recovery Transformer 

(RecX) Program 

According to DHS officials, the goal of 

the RecX Program was to design and 

demonstrate a rapidly deployable large, 

high-power transformer that could be 

used to enable rapid recovery of the grid 

in the event of multiple transformer 

failures. 

According to a DHS document, the 

RecX transformer was successfully 

field tested in March 2012. The field 

test demonstrated RecX’s rapid 

deployment speed by reducing from 

the typical 8 to 12 weeks to less than 

6 days the time needed to transport, 

install, and energize the transformer.

0a

Resilient Electric Grid 

Program

According to DHS officials, the Resilient 

Electric Grid Program uses advanced 

technologies to increase the reliability, 

flexibility, and resilience of the nation’s 

grid. For example, officials are 

developing a new cable that will allow 

distribution networks to interconnect and 

share power while eliminating the risk of 

cascading fault currents.

According to DHS officials, the effort 

has proven the technology and its 

capabilities in a laboratory setting and 

is currently working to install the 

solution within a host utility’s grid for 

an operational demonstration.

19,594,457
Appendix II: Characteristics of Efforts to 

Enhance the Resilience of the Electricity Grid 

at Three Federal Agencies

Page 45 GAO-17-153 Electricity

Effort name and 

implementing office Description Results

Total obligations for 

grid resiliency 

activities, fiscal years 

2013-2015 (dollars)

Solar Storm Mitigation According to DHS officials, the Solar 

Storm Mitigation effort aims to provide 

owners and operators of the electricity 

grid with advanced and actionable 

information about anticipated 

geomagneticallyinduced current levels in 

the event of a solar storm.

According to DHS officials, the effort 

has developed a forecasting capability 

that is currently undergoing 

verification and validation testing. 

Lack of significant solar storms 

creates a lack of data against which to 

test the forecasting capability; 

historical data is being used where 

applicable.

2,217,089

Total 21,811,546

Source: GAO analysis of DHS-reported data. | GAO-17-153

a

DHS reported that no funds were obligated for the Recovery Transformer program from fiscal year 

2013 through fiscal year 2015. How ever, the agency also reported that a total of $6,794,050 had 

been obligated for the program in fiscal years prior to fiscal year 2013.

Table 8: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Reported Grid Resiliency Efforts

Effort name Description Results

Grid Assurance LLC, Spare 

Transmission Equipment 

Service Petition

According to FERC officials and documents, the 

effort’s goal was to act on a private company’s 

petition for regulatory findings related to the 

company’s plan to establish a subscription service for 

spare critical transmission equipment, including 

transformers.

FERC acted on Grid Assurance’s petition 

related to the company’s proposed spare 

critical transmission equipment service.

Reliability Standard CIP-003-

6 (Security Management 

Control)

According to FERC officials, the purpose of the CIP003-6 reliability standard is to specify consistent and 

sustainable security management controls that 

establish responsibility and accountability to protect 

bulk electric system cybersystems against 

compromise that could lead to the misoperation of or 

instability in the bulk electric system.

FERC has approved the proposed reliability 

standard so that it is mandatory and 

enforceable. 

Reliability Standard CIP-004-

6 (Personnel and Training)

According to FERC officials, the purpose of the CIP004-6 reliability standard is to minimize the risk 

against compromise that could lead to the 

misoperation ofor instability in the bulk electric 

system from individuals accessing bulk electric 

system cybersystems; this standard aims to do so by 

requiring an appropriate level of personnel risk 

assessment, training, and security awareness in 

support of protecting bulk electric system 

cybersystems. 

FERC has approved the proposed reliability 

standard so that it is mandatory and 

enforceable. 
Appendix II: Characteristics of Efforts to 

Enhance the Resilience of the Electricity Grid 

at Three Federal Agencies

Page 46 GAO-17-153 Electricity

Effort name Description Results

Reliability Standard CIP-005-

5 (Electronic Security 

Perimeters)

According to FERC officials, the purpose of the CIP005-5 reliability standard is to manage electronic 

access to bulk electric system cybersystems by 

specifying a controlled electronic security perimeter in 

support of protecting these cybersystems against 

compromise that could lead to the misoperation of or 

instability in the bulk electric system. 

FERC has approved the proposed reliability 

standard so that it is mandatory and 

enforceable. 

Reliability Standard CIP-006-

6 (Physical Security of Bulk 

Electric System Cyber 

Systems)

According to FERC officials, the purpose of the CIP006-6 reliability standard is to manage physical 

access to bulk electric system cybersystems by 

specifying a physical security plan in support of 

protecting these cybersystems against compromise 

that could lead to the misoperation of or instability in 

the bulk electric system. 

FERC has approved the proposed reliability 

standard so that it is mandatory and 

enforceable. 

Reliability Standard CIP-007-

6 (Systems Security 

Management) 

According to FERC officials, the purpose of the CIP007-6 reliability standard is to manage system 

security by specifying select technical, operational, 

and procedural requirements in support of protecting 

bulk electric system cybersystems against 

compromise that could lead to the misoperation of or 

instability in the bulk electric system.

FERC has approved the proposed reliability 

standard so that it is mandatory and 

enforceable. 

Reliability Standard CIP-008-

5 (Incident Reporting and 

Response Planning)

According to FERC officials, the purpose of the CIP008-5 reliability standard is to mitigate the risk to the 

reliable operation of the bulk electric system as a 

result of a cybersecurity incident; this standard aims 

to do so by specifying incident response 

requirements.

FERC has approved the proposed reliability 

standard so that it is mandatory and 

enforceable. 

Reliability Standard CIP-009-

6 (Recovery Plans for Bulk 

Electric System Cyber 

Systems)

According to FERC officials, the purpose of the CIP009-6 reliability standard is to recover reliability 

functions performed by bulk electric system 

cybersystems by specifying recovery plan 

requirements in support of the continued stability, 

operability, and reliability of the bulk electric system.

FERC has approved the proposed reliability 

standard so that it is mandatory and 

enforceable. 

Reliability Standard CIP-010-

2 (Configuration Change 

Management and 

Vulnerability Assessments)

According to FERC officials, the purpose of the CIP010-2 reliability standard is to prevent and detect 

unauthorized changes to bulk electric system 

cybersystems by specifying configuration change 

management and vulnerability assessment 

requirements in support of protecting bulk electric 

system cybersystems from compromise that could 

lead to the misoperation of or instability in the bulk 

electric system. 

FERC has approved the proposed reliability 

standard so that it is mandatory and 

enforceable. 

Reliability Standard CIP-011-

2 (Information Protection)

According to FERC officials, the purpose of the CIP011-2 reliability standard is to prevent unauthorized 

access to bulk electric system cybersystem 

information by specifying information protection 

requirements in support of protecting bulk electric 

system cybersystems against compromise that could 

lead to the misoperation of or instability in the bulk 

electric system. 

FERC has approved the proposed reliability 

standard so that it is mandatory and 

enforceable. 
Appendix II: Characteristics of Efforts to 

Enhance the Resilience of the Electricity Grid 

at Three Federal Agencies

Page 47 GAO-17-153 Electricity

Effort name Description Results

Reliability Standard CIP-014-

2 (Physical Security)

According to a FERC document, the purpose of the 

CIP-014-2 reliability standard is to identify and protect 

transmission stations and transmission substations, 

and their associated primary control centers that, if 

rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a 

physical attack, could result in instability, uncontrolled 

separation, or cascading within an interconnection.

FERC has approved the proposed reliability 

standard so that it is mandatory and 

enforceable. 

Reliability Standard EOP010-1 (Geomagnetic 

Disturbance Operations)

According to a FERC document, the purpose of the 

EOP-010-1 reliability standard is to mitigate the 

effects of geomagnetic disturbance events by 

implementing operating plans, processes, and 

procedures.

FERC has approved the proposed reliability 

standard so that it is mandatory and 

enforceable. 

ReliabilityStandard TPL-007-

1 (Transmission System 

Planned Performance for 

Geomagnetic Disturbance 

Events)

According to a FERC document, the purpose of the 

TPL-007-1 reliability standard is to establish 

requirements for transmission system planned 

performance during geomagnetic disturbance events.

FERC has approved the proposed reliability 

standard, but it is not yet being enforced. 

Source: GAO analysis of FERC-reported data. | GAO-17-153

Note: FERC officials reported that the agency could not provide obligation data for its grid resiliency 

efforts because FERC could not break dow n by individual reliability standard the costs associated 

w ith reviewing and approving reliability standards.
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 48 GAO-17-153 Electricity

Frank Rusco, (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov

Other key contributors to this report were Jon Ludwigson, Assistant 

Director; Stephanie Gaines; and David Marroni. Important contributions 

were also made by Ben Atwater, Antoinette Capaccio, Nancy Crothers, 

Laura Durland, Philip Farah, Cindy Gilbert, Brian Lepore, Dan Royer, 

Stephen Sanford, Marylynn Sergent, Maria Stattel, Barbara Timmerman, 

and Greg Wilshusen.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100539)
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