******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
MARIA F. MCKEON v. WILLIAM P. LENNON

(AC 34078)

(AC 34710)

(AC 35204)

Gruendel, Lavine and Mullins, Js.

Argued December 8, 2014—officially released February 17, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
Tolland, Suarez, J.)

Maria F. McKeon, self-represented, the appellant

(plaintiff).

Proloy K. Das, with whom was Debra C. Ruel, for

the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

GRUENDEL, J. In these consolidated appeals, the

plaintiff, Maria F. McKeon, appeals from several judgments of the trial court rendered in relation to the

judgment dissolving her marriage to the defendant, William P. Lennon. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the

court improperly (1) granted the defendant’s motion

for modification of child support, (2) denied her motion

for modification of child support, (3) modified the

defendant’s child support obligation (AC 34078), (4)

denied her motion for a finding of contempt (AC 35204),

and (5) denied her motion for attorney’s fees (AC

34710). We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

These appeals arise from of a series of postjudgment

motions related to the parties’ 2007 dissolution of marriage. The plaintiff and defendant were married on

August 29, 1981. During their twenty-six year marriage,

the parties had three children. In 2005, the plaintiff

initiated an action for dissolution of marriage. On

December 31, 2007, the court rendered judgment dissolving the marriage (dissolution judgment) and

entered various orders.

In the dissolution judgment, the court made several

relevant factual findings. The court found that the

defendant was a vice president at Electric Boat, earning

a base salary of $225,420, an annual bonus, stock

options, restricted stock awards, and a pension. The

court found that the plaintiff was a highly skilled and

capable corporate attorney, who in the past had sometimes earned in excess of the defendant’s salary. In the

years leading up to the divorce, the plaintiff had worked

part-time in order to be the primary caregiver to their

three children. Despite working part-time, she had been

able to earn gross income of $78,500 from mid-July,

2007 through December 12, 2007.

The court issued various orders in connection with

the dissolution judgment, including: child custody, division of assets of the marriage, and alimony and child

support. First, the dissolution judgment set out a parenting plan regarding the parties’ two minor children. The

parties were to share joint legal custody of the children,

but the plaintiff’s home would serve as the children’s

primary residence. Next, the dissolution judgment

ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $439 per week

in child support for the parties’ two minor children.

The dissolution judgment also ordered the parties to

each pay 50 percent of the cost of the children’s child

care, their after school care and transportation, and

their private school tuition. The judgment ordered the

parties to share all costs over $150 for the children’s

extracurricular activities, while the plaintiff was

ordered to pay for all costs under $150.

The dissolution judgment also awarded alimony to
the plaintiff in the amount of $900 per week for a period

of fourteen years. This order was modifiable, but not

terminable, upon the plaintiff’s remarriage or cohabitation. The court awarded the plaintiff additional alimony

in the form of an irrevocable interest in the defendant’s

future annual employment bonuses, executive stock

options, and awards of restricted stock. The plaintiff

was to receive 50 percent of the defendant’s bonuses,

stock options, and restricted stock awarded in 2008,

2009, and 2010. The plaintiff was to then receive 40

percent of the defendant’s bonuses earned in 2011, 2012,

and 2013, and receive 30 percent awarded to him in

each year from 2014 through 2021.

In May, 2008, fewer than six months after the dissolution judgment was rendered, the plaintiff filed a motion

for modification in which she requested, inter alia, that

child support be raised from $439 per week to $1700

per week. On June 10, 2008, the court denied the motion

without a hearing. From that judgment, the plaintiff

appealed to this court, which heard argument on the

matter on November 18, 2010.1 McKeon v. Lennon, 131

Conn. App. 585, 27 A.3d 436, cert. denied, 303 Conn.

901, 31 A.3d 1178 (2011). On appeal, this court concluded that the trial court improperly denied the plaintiff’s motion without first conducting a hearing, and,

therefore, we reversed the judgment and remanded the

matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Id.,

599–600, 614–15. That opinion was released on September 27, 2011.

While the appeal of the 2008 motion for modification

was pending before this court, the plaintiff filed another

motion for modification of child support with the trial

court on April 22, 2010. The plaintiff’s motion requested

the court to increase the defendant’s child support obligation in light of the plaintiff’s increased expenses, her

decreased net income, and the defendant’s increased

income since the dissolution judgment. On July 14, 2010,

the defendant filed his own motion for modification of

child support on the basis that one of their two minor

children had turned eighteen years old and had graduated high school. The court scheduled a hearing on both

motions in May, 2011.

On May 25, May 26, and June 1, 2011, the trial court

held a contested hearing on the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s motions for modification. On October 20, 2011,

the court issued a memorandum of decision granting

the defendant’s 2010 motion for modification and denying the plaintiff’s 2010 motion for modification. The

court ordered the defendant’s child support obligation

to be reduced from $439 per week to $400 per week.

This modification reflected the change from support

for two minor children, to support for only one minor

child. From this judgment, the plaintiff appealed (AC

34078).

On April 25, 2012, pursuant to this court’s remand,
the trial court held a contested hearing on the plaintiff’s

2008 motion for modification. Prior to the hearing, the

plaintiff had also filed a motion for attorney’s fees and

a motion for contempt. At the hearing, the parties presented evidence on all three motions. As a result of the

complicated procedural history of this case, the court

was required to determine whether it could consider

all changes in circumstances since the 2007 dissolution

judgment, or whether it was limited to looking back to

only 2011, when the court ruled on the 2010 motions

for modification.

In November, 2012, the court issued its memorandum

of decision, denying the plaintiff’s motion for modification of child support, motion for attorney’s fees, and

motion for contempt. In doing so, the court considered

the circumstances of the parties going back to the 2007

dissolution judgment. Further, the court found that the

2011 child support modification order was in accordance with the child support guidelines and remained

equitable and appropriate given the circumstances of

the case. From these judgments, the plaintiff also

appealed (AC 34710 and AC 35204).

We now consider each of the plaintiff’s three consolidated appeals (AC 34078, AC 34710, and AC 35204).

Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth

as necessary.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court erred in concluding that there had been a substantial change of

circumstances with regard to the defendant’s motion

for modification and that there had been no substantial

change with regard to the plaintiff’s motion. We

disagree.

We begin by setting forth the appropriate standard

of review. ‘‘The scope of our review of a trial court’s

exercise of its broad discretion in domestic relations

cases is limited to the questions of whether the [trial]

court correctly applied the law and could reasonably

have concluded as it did. . . . In determining whether

a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic

relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Nevertheless, we may reverse a trial court’s ruling on a

modification motion if the trial court applied the wrong

standard of law. . . .’’

‘‘[General Statutes §] 46b-86 (a) governs the modification or termination of an alimony or support order after

the date of a dissolution judgment.2 When . . . the disputed issue is [child support], the applicable provision

of the statute is § 46b-86 (a), which provides that a final

order . . . may be modified by the trial court upon a

showing of a substantial change in the circumstances

of either party. . . . Under that statutory provision, the

party seeking the modification bears the burden of dem-
onstrating that such a change has occurred. . . . To

obtain a modification, the moving party must demonstrate that circumstances have changed since the last

court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable

to hold either party to it. Because the establishment of

changed circumstances is a condition precedent to a

party’s relief, it is pertinent for the trial court to inquire

as to what, if any, new circumstance warrants a modification of the existing order.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Olson

v. Mohammadu, 310 Conn. 665, 671–72, 81 A.3d 215

(2013). We now review the court’s conclusions as to

whether there was a substantial change in circumstances.

A

The plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied

her motion for modification of child support, pursuant

to § 46b-86 (a), when it concluded that she had failed

to meet her burden of establishing a substantial change

of circumstances. We disagree.

‘‘A party moving for a modification of a child support

order must clearly and definitely establish the occurrence of a substantial change . . . .’’ Weinstein v.

Weinstein, 104 Conn. App. 482, 492, 934 A.2d 306 (2007),

cert. denied, 285 Conn. 911, 943 A.2d 372 (2008). As the

power to modify is limited to adapting the order to

changes in circumstances, the court must limit its

inquiry to a comparison between the current conditions

and the conditions at the time of the last order. Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 738, 638 A.2d 1060

(1994).

At the May, 2011 hearing, the plaintiff presented evidence seeking to establish her claim of a change in

circumstances. She provided financial affidavits indicating her inability to earn income consistent with her

earning capacity. She also testified and presented exhibits showing an increase in her expenses. Finally, she

presented evidence demonstrating that the defendant

had a sharp increase in his income since the dissolution

judgment. In an October, 2011 memorandum of decision, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not

established a substantial change in circumstances and

supported its conclusion with several factual findings.

First, the court found that the plaintiff’s earning

capacity had remained the same since the dissolution

judgment. In 2007, the court found that the plaintiff was

an experienced corporate attorney who, at the time,

was able to earn gross income of $78,500 over part of

the year while recovering from a fractured pelvis and

spending time attending to the divorce litigation.

Accordingly, the dissolution court assigned her a

$100,000 earning capacity on the basis of her ability to

work ten hours per week at a rate of $200 per hour.

See Elia v. Elia, 99 Conn. App. 829, 833, 916 A.2d 845
(2007) (in certain circumstances, court may base financial awards on earning capacity rather than actual

income earned). At the May, 2011 hearing, the plaintiff

claimed that in the years after the dissolution judgment,

her actual earnings had fallen well short of her assigned

earning capacity. As the court aptly noted, however,

there had been no change in the plaintiff’s skill, education, or ability to justify a change to her earning capacity. The court found that the plaintiff continued to work

on a part-time basis as a freelance attorney. As earning

capacity is ‘‘an amount which a person can realistically

be expected to earn considering such things as his [or

her] vocational skills, employability, age and health’’;

(internal quotation marks omitted) Weinstein v.

Weinstein, 280 Conn. 772, 764, 911 A.3d 1077 (2007);

the plaintiff had the burden of demonstrating a change

to one or more of those factors. See Angle v. Angle, 100

Conn. App. 763, 773–74, 920 A.2d 1018 (2007) (affirming

trial court’s determination that defendant’s postdivorce

incarceration was not substantial change to his earning

capacity); see also Wanatowicz v. Wanatowicz, 12

Conn. App. 616, 619, 533 A.2d 239 (1987) (reversing trial

court’s order because defendant’s postdivorce alcoholic

condition was not substantial change affecting his earning capacity). As the plaintiff’s ability to earn remained

largely the same since the dissolution judgment, the

court properly found no substantial change in the plaintiff’s earning capacity.

The court next found that the plaintiff had failed to

establish a significant increase in her expenses. At the

May, 2011 hearing, the plaintiff submitted evidence indicating that she incurred weekly transportation costs

of $275.55, while the defendant incurred costs of only

$71.55. The plaintiff also submitted a summary of

expenses for the parties’ youngest child, which totaled

$63,401.31. The plaintiff, however, failed to submit any

evidence to support her claim that these expenses represented a change in conditions since the dissolution

judgment. Simply submitting the actual expenses to the

court does not, by itself, support the claim that she has

incurred costs greater than were originally contemplated in the dissolution judgment. See Borkowski v.

Borkowski, supra, 228 Conn. 738 (‘‘moving party must

demonstrate circumstances have change since the last

court order’’). In fact, the 2007 dissolution judgment

did order the plaintiff to bear a significant share of the

maintenance costs of the minor children. The dissolution judgment stated that ‘‘[t]he costs of extracurricular

activities and books . . . over $150 shall be shared

equally between the parents with the [plaintiff] paying

for anything less than $150.’’ The dissolution judgment

also ordered the parties to share equally the cost of their

younger son’s private high school tuition. The tuition

represented $34,200, or more than half of the plaintiff’s

claimed 2011 expenses. As these costs were properly

considered in the dissolution judgment, the court cor-
rectly concluded that they did not constitute a change

in circumstances.

Finally, the court found that although the defendant’s

base salary and bonuses had increased since the dissolution judgment, the increase was not substantial. The

court found that the defendant’s salary had increased

from $225,000 on the date of the dissolution judgment

to $260,000. The court also found that the defendant’s

annual bonus had increased from $115,000, on the date

of the dissolution judgment, to $175,000. Recently, in

Dan v. Dan, 315 Conn. 1, 10, A.3d (2014), our

Supreme Court concluded that ‘‘an increase in the supporting spouse’s income, standing alone, ordinarily will

not justify the granting of a motion to modify an alimony

award.’’ In support of this conclusion, the court noted

that the purpose of alimony is to ‘‘ensure the continued

enjoyment of the standard of living that he or she

enjoyed during the marriage . . . .’’ Id., 11. Similarly, in

the context of support obligations, our appellate courts

have acknowledged that children ‘‘should receive the

same proportion of parental income as he or she would

have received if the parents lived together.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Jenkins v. Jenkins, 243

Conn. 584, 594, 704 A.2d 231 (1998), citing Child Support

and Arrearage Guidelines, Preamble, § (c), p. ii. As both

alimony and child support orders are subject to the

same modification requirements under § 46b-86 (a), we

conclude that, under Dan, the plaintiff must show additional circumstances, beyond the defendant’s increased

income, to establish a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification of child support.

‘‘[T]he purpose of a child support order is to provide

for the care and well-being of minor children, and not

to equalize the available income of divorced parents

. . . .’’ Battersby v. Battersby, 218 Conn. 467, 473, 590

A.2d 427 (1991). As a result, we conclude that the court

did not abuse its discretion when it determined that

the plaintiff had not established a substantial change

in circumstances in regard to her 2010 motion for modification of child support.3

In April 25, 2012, the court held a contested hearing

on the plaintiff’s 2008 motion for modification. At this

hearing, the plaintiff again argued that she had been

unable to earn income consistent with her earning

capacity, that her living expenses had increased, and

that the defendant’s income had increased substantially. In November, 2012, the court denied her motion

because she had failed to show a substantial change

in circumstances. In its memorandum of decision, the

court followed the same analysis used in its October,

2011 decision. In addition, the court found that, due to

inconsistencies, the plaintiff’s financial affidavit was

not credible.4 As it is the exclusive province of the trier

of fact to resolve credibility determinations, the court

properly determined that the plaintiff’s financial affidavit should be given little weight, given the various incon-
sistencies it found. See State v. Ortiz, 95 Conn. App.

69, 81, 895 A.2d 834, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 903, 907

A.2d 94 (2006). We conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion when it determined that the plaintiff

had not established a substantial change in circumstances in regard to her 2008 motion for modification

of child support.

B

We now turn to the defendant’s motion for modification. In July, 2010, the defendant filed a motion for

modification of child support on ground that one of the

parties’ two sons had turned eighteen years old and

had graduated from high school. In October, 2011, the

court granted this motion on the basis that a child

reaching the age of majority constituted a substantial

change in circumstances. On appeal, the plaintiff argues

that the court had no legal basis for its conclusion.5

We disagree.

‘‘[T]he purpose of a child support order is to provide

for the care and well-being of minor children.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Rostad v. Hirsch, 148 Conn.

App. 441, 460, 85 A.3d 1212, 1225, cert. granted on other

grounds, 311 Conn. 948, 949, 91 A.3d 463 (2014). ‘‘It is

. . . axiomatic that support for a minor child extends

to age eighteen only . . . .’’ Lowe v. Lowe, 47 Conn.

App. 354, 357, 704 A.2d 236 (1997); see also General

Statutes § 1-1d. Finally, it is well established that a child

attaining the age of majority constitutes a substantial

change in circumstances, justifying the modification of

a support order. Irizzary v. Irizzary, 29 Conn. App.

368, 614 A.2d 868 (1992).

Here, the court found that the parties’ older son, had

reached the age of majority on November 19, 2009.

This finding was properly supported by the dissolution

judgment, in which the court found, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that the parties’ older son was born

on November 19, 1991. Therefore, the court did not

abuse its discretion in concluding that the defendant

had established a substantial change in circumstances.6

II

Upon concluding that the court did not abuse its

discretion in reaching the threshold determination that

a substantial change in circumstances had occurred,

we now turn to the court’s decision to reduce the defendant’s support order from $439 per week to $400 per

week. Specifically on appeal, the plaintiff claims that

the court improperly excluded various components of

the defendant’s income, improperly relied on the defendant’s child support guidelines worksheet, and improperly deviated from the child support guidelines.

‘‘Once a trial court determines that there has been a

substantial change in the financial circumstances of

one of the parties, the same criteria that determine an

initial award of alimony and support are relevant to the
question of modification. . . . These require the court

to consider, without limitation, the needs and financial

resources of each of the parties and their children, as

well as such factors as health, age and station in life.

. . . In making its determination of the applicability of

these criteria, the trial court has broad discretion; the

test is whether the court could reasonably conclude

as it did. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Hardisty v. Hardisty, 183 Conn. 253, 258–60,

439 A.2d 307 (1981). Under this standard of review, we

now consider the plaintiff’s various claims.

A

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly

excluded restricted stock and stock options when calculating the defendant’s gross income. We disagree.

The following procedural history is relevant to this

claim. The 2007 dissolution judgment allocated both

the defendant’s current and future restricted stock and

stock options as part of the property distribution. The

plaintiff received an irrevocable 50 percent interest in

all stock options and restricted stock that had been

awarded, granted, or credited to the defendant prior

to the dissolution judgment. In addition, the judgment

stated that the stock options and restricted stock would

be ‘‘divided as part of the property settlement and shall

not be alimony or child support.’’ The dissolution judgment also awarded the plaintiff a 50 percent interest

in any restricted stock or stock option awarded to the

defendant in 2008, 2009, 2010, or 2011.

In its October 2011 memorandum of decision, the

court found that, since the dissolution, the defendant

had exercised stock options in the amount of $190,361.

The court excluded this amount from the defendant’s

income because it already was subject to the court’s

property distribution orders.

Once property is distributed in accordance with a

dissolution decree, the court ceases to have jurisdiction

over that property. Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 276,

752 A.2d 1023 (1999). Furthermore, courts may not consider the liquidation of awarded property as income.

Simms v. Simms, 25 Conn. App. 231, 234, 593 A.2d 161,

cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911, 597 A.2d 335 (1991). When

the conversion of property reflects gains or profit, this

increase in value is also not considered income unless

it is shown to reflect a steady stream of income. Id.;

see Gay v. Gay, 266 Conn. 641, 647, 835 A.2d 1 (2003)

(sale of capital asset in particular year not considered income).

The plaintiff argues that restricted stock and stock

options are a form of deferred compensation that must

be included as income under the child support guidelines. This argument, however, fails because the plaintiff did not present evidence showing which, if any, of

the restricted stock or stock options were awarded to
the defendant postdissolution. As we have held, stock

options awarded atthe time of dissolution do not constitute income when they are later exercised; see Denley

v. Denley, 38 Conn. App. 349, 353–54, 661 A.2d 628

(1995); therefore, it was the plaintiff’s burden to distinguish between stock awarded prejudgment and stock

awarded postjudgment. There was no evidence that the

stock options exercised by the defendant were awarded

after the dissolution and, therefore, not a part of the

property distribution. With regard to the restricted

stock, there was evidence before the court indicating

that it was part of the property distribution. At the May,

2011 hearing, the defendant testified that his employer

awards him restricted stock each year, but that the

stock does not vest and transfer to him until four years

later. As that hearing was held fewer than four years

after the 2007 dissolution judgment, it was reasonable

for the court to conclude that all restricted stock had

been part of the original property distribution. Because

our review is limited to whether the court’s conclusions

are reasonable; Hardisty v. Hardisty, supra, 183 Conn.

260; we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding stock options and restricted stock

from the defendant’s income calculation.

B

The plaintiff next claims that the court erred when

it failed to include dividend and interest income in

determining the defendant’s gross income. We decline

to address the merits of this claim because the plaintiff

has inadequately briefed it.

‘‘We are not obligated to consider issues that are

not adequately briefed.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57, 87, 942 A.2d 345

(2008). The plaintiff’s brief provides minimal citation

to authority and no analysis as applied to the facts of

this case. See O’Connell, Flaherty & Attmore, LLC v.

Doody, 124 Conn. App. 1, 8, 3 A.3d 969 (2010). Furthermore, the plaintiff’s brief makes no reference as to the

amount of dividend orinterest income, or whetherthere

had been a material change in that income source since

2007. Accordingly, we decline to address this claim

on appeal.

C

The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly

deviated from the child support guidelines when it

imputed to her a $100,000 earning capacity. We

disagree.

In the 2007 dissolution judgment, the court found

that the plaintiff had an earning capacity of $100,000.

The court explained its findings by stating that ‘‘[d]uring

the course of the marriage, the [plaintiff] worked fulltime as a corporate attorney, sometimes earning in

excess of the [defendant’s] salary. . . . She is highly
skilled and capable. She is presently working as a freelance corporate attorney . . . at $200 per hour . . . .

From mid-July, 2007 to Dec[ember] 12, 2007, she earned

$78,500 [in] gross [income], while undergoing recovery

from a fractured pelvis and spending many days and

hours attending to this ongoing litigation. . . . If she

billed 500 hours per year over fifty weeks or ten hours

per week, she would gross $100,000.’’

In denying the plaintiff’s motion for modification, the

court found that the plaintiff had failed to show that

her earning capacity had changed substantially since

the dissolution judgment. The court stated in its memorandum of decision that she reported $177,400 in gross

income from 2008, $95,550 in gross income from 2009,

and $115,412 in gross income from 2010. The court

also stated that these ‘‘gross income levels have been

achieved since the date of judgment by working parttime.’’ Because the plaintiff had not established a substantial change in her earning capacity, the court

imputed this income in calculating the modified child

support order.

Upon concluding that the plaintiff remained capable

of earning $100,000 by working full-time, the court correctly applied the earning capacity from the original

dissolution judgment. See Borkowski v. Borkowski,

supra, 228 Conn. 738. The court found that the plaintiff

continued to be a highly skilled corporate attorney,

capable of working on a full-time basis. As a result, the

court did not abuse its discretion when it imputed an

earning capacity to the plaintiff.

D

The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly

excluded from its financial calculations certain

employee perquisites and recurring gifts received by

the defendant. We disagree.

With respect to the factual predicates for modification of a child support order, our standard of review is

clear. ‘‘This court may reject a factual finding if it is

clearly erroneous, in that as a matter of law it is unsupported by the record, incorrect, or otherwise mistaken.

. . . This court, of course, may not retry a case. . . .

The factfinding function is vested in the trial court with

its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented

in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses

and parties, which is not fully reflected in the cold,

printed record which is available to us. Appellate review

of a factual finding, therefore, is limited both as a practical matter and as a matter of the fundamental difference

between the role of the trial court and an appellate

court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doody v.

Doody, 99 Conn. App. 512, 516–17, 914 A.2d 1058 (2007).

At the May, 2011 hearing, the plaintiff sought to prove

that the defendant had received $59,484 in perquisites
from his employer and $27,972 in recurring gifts in the

form of free rent from his sister. The court found that

in each instance, the plaintiff had not met her burden

of proof. In its October 20, 2011 memorandum of decision, the court explained its reasoning for excluding

both sources from the calculation of the defendant’s

income. First, the court explained that, under § 46b215a-1 (11) (A) (vi) of the Regulations of Connecticut

State Agencies, employment perquisites are to be considered income for the purposes of child support to

the extent that they represent ‘‘basic maintenance or

special need such as food, shelter or transportation

provided on a recurrent basis in lieu of or in addition

to salary or wages.’’ The court then noted that although

the plaintiff had submitted an exhibit showing that the

defendant had received $59,484 in employer contributions, there was no evidence showing how much of

those contributions constituted food, shelter, transportation, or other basic needs. Second, the court found

that the defendant was currently residing, rent free, at

his sister’s home in Hartford during the winter months,

while residing at his cottage in Stonington, which was

awarded to him in the dissolution judgment, during the

summer months.

At the May, 2011 hearing, the plaintiff presented evidence that in 2007, the defendant had rent and utility

expenses of $27,972 from an apartment that he had

rented at that time. On that basis, the plaintiff argued

that a rent free apartment constituted a regularly recurring gift, valued at $27,972 per year. The court disagreed

and made several findings in support of its conclusion.

The court found that the defendant’s $27,972 in

expenses included not only rental fees for an apartment,

but also maintenance expenses related to the upkeep

of the Stonington cottage, which he had been awarded

in the dissolution judgment. The court also found that

the $27,972 in expenses were incurred over the entire

year, while the defendant only lived with his sister during the winter months. Finally, the court found that the

plaintiff had presented no evidence indicating the rental

value of an apartment in the defendant’s sister’s neighborhood in Hartford. Upon our review, we find nothing

in the record to undermine our confidence in the court’s

factual findings, and defer to its sound judgment in

reaching its conclusions.

E

The plaintiff next claims that the court, in modifying

the defendant’s child support obligation, improperly

relied upon the defendant’s child support guidelines

worksheet (worksheet). Specifically, the plaintiff

asserts that the courtrelied on an ‘‘unsworn’’ worksheet

and that the financial information on the defendant’s

worksheet was unsupported by the evidence. We find

both of these arguments unpersuasive.

Practice Book § 25-30 (e) requires parties with minor
children to ‘‘file a completed child support and arrearage guidelines worksheet at the time of any hearing

concerning child support . . . .’’ In addition to this

requirement, the parties are also required to submit to

the court certain sworn statements concerning income,

expenses, assets and liabilities. See Practice Book § 25-

30 (e); Gentile v. Carneiro, 107 Conn. App. 630, 654,

946 A.2d 871 (2008). The plaintiff incorrectly argues on

appeal that our rules of practice require all worksheets

to be sworn. We do not construe § 25-30 to be so restrictive. The defendant correctly filed a completed worksheet, as well as a sworn financial affidavit and other

documentation, in compliance with our rules of

practice.

The plaintiff’s next claim is that the defendant’s worksheet was not supported by the evidence. A court may

not rely on a worksheet unless it is based on some

underlying evidence. See Aley v. Aley, 101 Conn. App.

220, 229, 922 A.2d 184 (2007). InAley, this courtreversed

a child support order based exclusively on a worksheet

that had no evidentiary basis. Id., 229–30. In that case,

the defendant did not attend the dissolution proceedings and had failed to submit a financial affidavit. Id.,

228–29. Further, the plaintiff provided no testimony,

nor did she submit any documentary evidence regarding

the defendant’s income. Id. As a result, this court concluded that the worksheet was the only basis for the

trial court’s determination of the defendant’s income.

Id., 229. In contrast to Aley, the defendant in the present

case provided testimony regarding his income, a financial affidavit, and other documentary evidence in support of his child support worksheet. Because the

worksheet was based on underlying evidence, it was

reasonable for the court to rely on it when determining

the financial position of the parties.

Finally, the plaintiff makes two additional claims

regarding the use of the defendant’s worksheet. First,

the plaintiff argues that the court should not have

excluded certain sources of the defendant’s income on

the one hand, while also allowing him to deduct federal

taxes paid on those sources in determining his net

income. This argument, however, is inconsistent with

the plain language of the worksheet, which explicitly

instructed the defendant to deduct ‘‘Federal income tax

(based on all allowable exemptions, deductions and

credits).’’ As there is no distinction made between federal taxes paid on gross cash income and other forms

of income, we decline to follow the plaintiff’s logic.

Second, the plaintiff argues that the court incorrectly

deducted $73 per week for health insurance even

though she testified that her actual insurance costs were

$153 per week. Even if we agreed with the plaintiff, the

$153 deduction would have no impact on the presumptive child support amount as the combined net income

of the parties would still be greater than $4000 per

week. See part II F of this opinion. Although the record
is void of any support for court’s finding that the plaintiff’s health insurance cost was $73, we conclude that

this error is harmless because it is evident that the

court’s analysis would reach the same result.7 See Taylor v. Taylor, 17 Conn. App. 291, 293, 551 A.2d 1285

(1989).

F

Having concluded that the court did not abuse its

discretion in determining the financial standing of the

parties, we now consider whether the court properly

modified the child support order from $439 per week

to $400 per week. The plaintiff argues that this modification amounted to an improper deviation from the child

support guidelines (guidelines). The defendant argues

that the modification was well within the guidelines

and, therefore, did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

We agree with the defendant.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. In its October, 2011 memorandum of decision,

the court found that the parties had a combined net

weekly income of $6440, with the defendant earning

$5175 per week, and the plaintiff having imputed earnings of $1260 per week. The court also found that one

of the parties’ children had reached the age of majority,

and that the defendant was obligated to provide support

for only one child under the age of majority. After considering all of the relevant factors set forth in General

Statutes §§ 46b-84 and 46b-86, and the guidelines, the

court then ordered a reduction of child support from

$439 per week to $400 per week.

In determining the appropriate amount of child support, courts are provided with state guidelines and an

accompanying schedule. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-2b (f). ‘‘[T]he schedule sets forth a presumptive percentage and resultant amount

corresponding to specific levels of combined net weekly

income; the schedule begins at $50 and continues in

progressively higher $10 increments, terminating at

$4000. . . . [Our Supreme Court] has recognized that

the guidelines nonetheless apply to combined net

weekly income in excess of that maximum amount. See

Maturo v. Maturo, [296 Conn. 80, 94–95, 995 A.2d 1

(2010)] ([the guidelines] provide that all child support

awards must be made in accordance with the principles

established therein to ensure that such awards promote

equity, uniformity and consistency for children at all

income levels . . .); see also Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, [297 Conn. 358, 367, 999 A.2d 721 (2010)] (relying on Maturo forthis principle); Tuckman v. Tuckman,

[308 Conn. 194, 205–206, 61 A.3d 449 (2013)] (same).

Indeed, the regulations direct that, [w]hen the parents’

combined net weekly income exceeds $4,000, child support awards shall be determined on a case-by-case

basis, and the current support prescribed at the $4,000

net weekly income level shall be the minimum presump-
tive amount. Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-2b

(a) (2).

‘‘While the regulations clearly demarcate the presumptive minimum amount of the award in high

income cases, they do not address the maximum permissible amount that may be assigned under a proper

exercise of the court’s discretion. In order to provide

some guidance to the trial courts on this matter without

unduly encroaching on the purposeful decision of the

legislative branch not to prescribe an amount or method

for calculating that maximum amount, this court has

remained mindful that the guidelines . . . indicate that

such awards should follow the principle expressly

acknowledged in the preamble [to the guidelines] and

reflected in the schedule that the child support obligation as a percentage of the combined net weekly income

should decline as the income level rises. . . . Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, supra, 297 Conn. 368. We therefore have determined that child support payments . . .

should presumptively not exceed the [maximum] percent [set forth in the schedule] when the combined net

weekly income of the family exceeds $4000, and, in

most cases, should reflect less than that amount. See

Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 96.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Szymczak, 309 Conn. 390, 400–401, 72

A.3d 1 (2013).

In the present case, the court properly applied the

guidelines consistent with ourregulations and case law.

The parties earned a combined weekly income of over

$4000. This meant that, pursuant to the guidelines, the

presumptive floor of child support for one child was

$473 per week. The presumptive ceiling, consistent with

the holding of Dowling, was to be no more than 11.83

percent of the parties’ combined net weekly income.

As the court found that the parties had a combined

income of $6440 per week, the presumptive ceiling was

determined to be $761 per week. The court then determined that the defendant’s income represented 80 percent of the combined income, and, therefore, his

obligation should be limited to 80 percent of the total

amount of child support. Thus, the court reduced the

defendant’s child supportrange by 20 percent to a ‘‘floor

of $378 and a ceiling of $608.’’ We must conclude then,

that the court’s decision to modify the support order

to $400 per week was well within the guidelines and,

therefore, was not an abuse of discretion.

III

The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly

failed to find the defendant in contempt for wilfully

violating its order. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of this claim. In 2011, this court remanded

the plaintiff’s 2008 motion for modification of child
support for an evidentiary hearing. See McKeon v. Lennon, supra, 131 Conn. App. 599–600. The trial court

scheduled the hearing for April 25, 2012. On April 13,

2012, the plaintiff served notice on the defendant,

requiring him to attend a deposition scheduled for April

20, 2012. On April 19, 2012, at 2 p.m., the court held a

discovery hearing where, at its conclusion, the defendant was ordered to bring his tax returns, bank records,

and financial affidavits to the deposition. At the time,

the defendant was traveling for business and did not

return until late that night. On April 20, 2012, the defendant attended the deposition, but did not produce the

ordered documents. On April 25, 2012, the plaintiff filed

a motion for contempt against the defendant alleging

that his failure to produce court-ordered financial documents prejudiced her ability to prepare for the hearing.

At the April 25, 2012 hearing, the court heard argument on the plaintiff’s motion for contempt. The defendant admitted that he had not produced the required

documents at the deposition, but stated that he was

unable to produce the documents because of the short

period of time between the order and the deposition.

After hearing from both sides, the court asked the plaintiff if she was ‘‘claiming that [she was] somewhat prejudiced because [she did not have] enough time to prepare

with all that information that [she] requested [and if

she was] asking for more time?’’ The plaintiff did not

request a continuance and stated that she would like

to proceed with the hearing on the 2008 motion for modification.

On November 20, 2012, the court denied the plaintiff’s

motion for contempt. In its memorandum of decision,

the court found that although the defendant had not

complied with the court’s order, his noncompliance was

not wilful.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the appropriate

legal standard. ‘‘A finding of contempt is a question of

fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gil v. Gil, 94

Conn. App. 306, 311, 892 A.2d 318 (2006). ‘‘We review

the court’s factual findings in the context of a motion

for contempt to determine whether they are clearly

erroneous.’’ Dionne v. Dionne, 115 Conn. App. 488, 494,

972 A.2d 791 (2009). ‘‘For the court to properly find a

party in contempt, that party’s noncompliance with the

court’s order must be willful.’’ Brody v. Brody, 145

Conn. App. 654, 665, 77 A.3d 156 (2013). A finding of

noncompliance alone will not support a judgment of

contempt. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 92 Conn. App. 212,

214, 883 A.2d 1260 (2005).

In the present case, the court found that although the

defendant had been noncompliant with the discovery

order, he had not been wilfully noncompliant. In support of this conclusion, the court found that the discovery order had been issued on the afternoon before the

scheduled deposition. On the day prior to the deposi-
tion, the defendant had been traveling for business and

did not arrive at home until late that night. The court

found that on the day of the deposition, the defendant

went to work and then went directly to the deposition.

As a result, the court reasonably concluded that ‘‘[i]t

was not possible for the defendant to produce the

ordered documents in such short notice.’’ As the court’s

findings were clearly supported by the evidence, we

conclude that the court properly denied the plaintiff’s

motion for contempt.

IV

The plaintiff’s final claim is that the court erred when

it denied her motion for appellate attorney’s fees. The

plaintiff argues that because of errors in calculating

the defendant’s income, the court based its denial on

inaccurate financial information. We disagree.

In support of her claim, the plaintiff reasserts the

same arguments that we addressed in part II of this

opinion. The plaintiff does not allege any other independent basis for reversal; she only argues that if her other

claims are remanded for further consideration, then her

motion for attorney’s fees should also be remanded.

This argument might have merit if we agreed with the

plaintiff on her earlier claims. Earlier in this opinion,

however, we concluded that the court properly calculated the financial positions of the parties. Consequently, we reject the plaintiff’s claim that the court

improperly denied her motion for attorney’s fees.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 That appeal, AC 30068, was consolidated with four other appeals filed

by the plaintiff, AC 30067, AC 30069, AC 30070, and AC 30636.

2 General Statutes § 46b-86 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Unless and to

the extent that the decree precludes modification, any final order for the

periodic payment of permanent alimony or support . . . may, at any time

thereafter, be continued, set aside, altered or modified by the court upon

a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party or

upon a showing that the final order for child support substantially deviates

from the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a,

unless there was a specific finding on the record that the application of the

guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate. There shall be a rebuttable

presumption that any deviation of less than fifteen per cent from the child

support guidelines is not substantial and any deviation of fifteen per cent

or more from the guidelines is substantial. Modification may be made of

such support order without regard to whether the order was issued before,

on or after May 9, 1991. In determining whether to modify a child support

order based on a substantial deviation from such child support guidelines

the court shall consider the division of real and personal property between

the parties set forth in the final decree and the benefits accruing to the

child as the result of such division. After the date of judgment, modification

of any child support order issued before, on or after July 1, 1990, may be

made upon a showing of such substantial change of circumstances, whether

or not such change of circumstances was contemplated at the time of

dissolution. By written agreement, stipulation or decision of the court, those

items or circumstances that were contemplated and are not to be changed

may be specified in the written agreement, stipulation or decision of the

court. . . . If a court, after hearing, finds that a substantial change in circumstances of either party has occurred,the court shall determine what modification of alimony, if any, is appropriate, considering the criteria set forth in

section 46b-82.’’
3 The plaintiff cites several cases in which our appellate courts have upheld

findings of a substantial change in circumstances on the basis of an increase

in the defendant’s income. See, e.g., Schwarz v. Schwarz, 124 Conn. App.

472, 478–79, 5 A.3d 548 (upholding trial court’s finding that 20 percent

increase in gross income was a substantial change), cert denied, 299 Conn.

909, 10 A.3d 525 (2010); Serby v. Serby, 4 Conn. App. 398, 401, 494 A.2d

617 (1985) (upholding 20 percent increase in gross income was substantial

change). We disagree, however, with the plaintiff’s conclusion that these

cases require us to reverse the court’s denial of her motion. The cited cases

considered the question of whether to uphold the court’s conclusion of a

substantial change in circumstances, while in the present case we are asked

to review the court’s determination that the plaintiff had failed to establish

a substantial change. ‘‘An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s

orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion

or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the

facts presented. . . . In determining whether a trial court has abused its

broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable

presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Cleary v. Cleary, 103 Conn. App. 798, 800, 930 A.2d 811

(2007).

4 The court found several inconsistencies between the plaintiff’s financial

affidavit and her supporting documents. First, the plaintiff estimated her

weekly income using only income she had been paid and omitted $10,000

in income that was earned, but not yet received. Next, she claimed weekly

expenses of $9684. In support of this claim, she submitted exhibits claiming

that she had paid a total of $219,515 in credit card bills from May, 2011

through April, 2012. After reviewing the documents, however, the court

concluded that the credit card bills were from November, 2010 through

May, 2012. The court also found that the plaintiff’s affidavit overestimated

her monthly credit card debt payment by $7441.63. Finally, the court noted

that the 2007 dissolution judgment found that the parties’ marital home had

$85,000 worth of furnishings. The plaintiff’s most recent financial affidavit

claimed only $3000 worth of furnishings.

5 We note that the plaintiff previously had argued before the trial court

that ‘‘Connecticut law does not permit the court to order support for a child

over the age of majority except through education support orders or medical

insurance.’’ At that time, she was challenging an order from the dissolution

judgment that required her to pay maintenance costs for her adult daughter’s

car. On appeal, she now takes the opposite position that the court has no

authority to reduce child support on the basis that their older son had

reached the age of majority.

6 The plaintiff additionally argues that the court abused its discretion

when it found a substantial change in circumstances without requiring the

defendant to rebut the presumption that reductions in child support of less

than 15 percent are not substantial. She bases this argument on § 46b-86

(a), which provides in relevant part that any deviation of less than 15 percent

from the child support guidelines is not substantial. The plaintiff’s reliance

on § 46b-86 (a), however, is misplaced. The reference to a 15 percent presumption does not apply to a substantial change in circumstances but,

rather, applies to situations where the final order deviated substantially

from the child support guidelines. See Schwarz v. Schwarz, 124 Conn. App.

472, 477, 5 A.3d 548, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 909, 10 A.3d 525 (2010).

7 Under the plaintiff’s argument, her net income would be reduced by

$153 in health insurance costs, rather than by $73. This reduction would

leave her with a net income of $1180 per week, while the defendant’s income

would remain at $5175 per week. The parties would then have a total weekly

income of $6355, with the defendant earning 81.43 percent and the plaintiff

earning 18.57 percent. Applying these percentages to the child support guidelines, we calculate the presumptive range of support to be between $385

and $612 per week. Following the plaintiff’s argument results in a range

that is substantially the same as the range calculated by the court in its

October, 2011 memorandum of decision ($378 to $608). Thus, even if we

adopted the plaintiff’s argument, we would still conclude that the court’s

order of $400 per week in child support was squarely within the presumptive

range of the child support guidelines.