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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND 

OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 9, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Staff Director

JODI B. HERMAN, Democratic Staff Director

CHRIS FORD, Majority Chief Counsel

MARGARET TAYLOR, Minority Chief Counsel

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland ................................... 2 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee ................................................. 1 

Jones, Dr. Bruce, vice president and director, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. ...................................................................... 48 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50 

Negroponte, Hon. John, vice chairman, Mclarty Associates, Washington, DC. . 46 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47 

Power, Hon. Samantha, United States Permanent Representative to the 

United Nations, New York, NY. ......................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions for the record submitted to Ambassador Samantha 

Power by Senator Bob Corker ............................................................................. 60 

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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

(1) 

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 

AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM 

Wednesday, December 9, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Johnson, Flake, Gardner, 

Perdue, Isakson, Barrasso, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, 

Udall, Murphy, Kaine, and Markey. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will 

come to order. 

I want to thank our witness. I know she has significant responsibilities right now at the U.N. Security Council. Ben and I had a 

chance this week to meet with her and all the members. Quite educational, I hope on both sides. But we certainly appreciate you 

being here, and I will introduce you in just a moment. 

Today’s hearing will review the United Nations peacekeeping operations and explore opportunities for reform to make U.N. peacekeeping work better in U.S. national interests. 

As a permanent member of the Security Council and the largest 

contributor by far to the U.N. peacekeeping budget, the U.S. has 

a particular interest in how U.N. peacekeeping mandates are set 

and operations are carried out. The United States cannot be everywhere all the time. There is an important role for U.N. peacekeeping in supporting U.S. interests for security and stability 

around the world. 

Today’s U.N. peacekeeping is evolving in many ways. Traditionally, missions have focused primarily on negotiating peace agreements, inserting blue helmets to separate conflicting parties to implement these agreements, and generally monitoring and keeping 

the peace. 

U.N. peacekeepers now are being asked to take on new and difficult responsibilities, such as civilian protection, disarming active 

combatants, or developing the capacity to engage on the 

antiterrorism front. These new missions and mandates raise many 

questions, which we certainly will be exploring today. 

What are the risks when U.N. peacekeepers actively engage combatants in a warzone? Do U.N. peacekeepers forgo their neutrality 

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in these instances? And if so, what are the implications for our interests? 

If U.N. peacekeepers are asked to provide logistics support in humanitarian crises such as the Ebola fight in West Africa, what 

challenges does that raise? 

I am particularly concerned with recent disturbing reports of sexual exploitation and abuse by certain U.N. peacekeeping troops. 

The current U.N. policy is zero tolerance, but such abuses continue 

with disturbing regularity. 

So it is our hope to find some common sense ways to address 

these issues and explore these and other topics, such as the U.S. 

peacekeeping assessment. 

We again want to thank our distinguished witness for being 

here, and I will turn it over to our ranking member for his comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Chairman Corker. I very much 

appreciate you convening this hearing on an important topic, and 

I want to thank all of our distinguished panelists today, extraordinary individuals who have given so much to our country. We 

thank you all for your participation and your continued service to 

our country, particularly Ambassador Powers. 

It is good to see you here. 

I have long believed the United Nations at its best can be a powerful partner of the United States, advancing global peace and security for far less cost and more effectively than if we act alone. 

When you add the U.N. presence, it is a global presence, and that 

is far preferable than having a U.S. or sole, one-country presence. 

The U.N. does many things right. They assist more than 60 million refugees and displaced people fleeing conflict, famine, and persecution with lifesaving assistance. It provides food to 90 million 

people in 80 countries. It vaccinates 58 percent of the world’s children, saving no less than 3 million lives. 

Recently, it launched the sustainable development goals, which 

it fully embraced. It could have a powerful impact globally on reducing corruption and poor governance. 

In short, the U.N. is capable of and has already done a great deal 

of good in the world. But I believe that the U.N. could be stronger 

and much more effective, if there were greater transparency and 

accountability across the entire organization. 

The U.N.’s continuing anti-Israel bias is deeply unhelpful to our 

shared interests in a peaceful, stable Middle East. 

In the case of Syria, the Assad regime continues its indiscriminate barrel-bombing and slaughter of civilians. And those responsible for war crimes have yet to be held accountable. 

But let us be clear. The United States could not ensure international security alone nor should it have to. The United Nations 

and specifically the U.N. peacekeeping remains one of the best burden-sharing tools we have to help end war, protect civilian population, and secure territory. 

By drawing upon the financial and human capacities of all U.N. 

member states, the U.N. peacekeeping helps the United States 

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share the responsibility of promoting global stability and reduces 

the need for unilateral intervention. 

United Nations peacekeeping has managed to protect hundreds 

of thousands of innocent civilians. With more than 120,000 military 

and police personnel currently serving as part of 16 missions on 

four continents, U.N. peacekeepers now represent the largest deployed military force in the world. 

There are more U.N. peacekeeping missions today because peacekeepers are being asked to do more in increasingly dangerous, remote, and deadly operational environments. We need to recognize 

this and make sure that the United Nations and the troop-contributing countries are given peacekeepers who are placed in harm’s 

way the protective equipment, training, and support that they deserve. 

Peacekeepers themselves are often seen as legitimate targets for 

attack by extremist groups and others. We saw that recently in the 

horrific attacks in Mali, where terrorists linked to al Qaeda killed 

20 people, including an American from Maryland. The U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali has suffered 42 fatalities at the hands of 

the militants since January 2013. 

We know that the U.N. peacekeeping is a cost-effective tool when 

compared to other military options. The U.N. annual peacekeeping 

budget only makes up about 0.5 percent of the world’s total military expenditures. 

I think this is a particularly important moment, considering that 

we are debating the omnibus and dealing with the fiscal issues of 

our country and trying balance our budgets, so let me bring it closer to home. The U.N. mission, the cost per peacekeeper per year, 

is about $16,000. In 2014, each U.S. soldier in Afghanistan cost 

$2.1 million. Moreover, according to the study by the GAO, U.N. 

peacekeeping operations are eight times less expensive than funding a comparable U.S. force. 

This is not to say the U.S. share of peacekeeping dues should 

continue unchanged. I think the chairman has raised a good point 

about reform in the United Nations in the way they do their budget. The scaled assessment should be reworked, and I am confident 

that Ambassador Power and the U.N. team are focused on that 

goal as well. 

Maintaining the legitimacy of the U.N. peacekeeping is essential. 

Nothing will erode it faster than the horrific reports that we received on sexual abuse by peacekeepers in certain missions. 

I have long been concerned about these disturbing reports of sexual exploitation and abuse. As the largest contributor to the United 

Nations and as the permanent member on the U.N. Security Council, the United States has a responsibility to ensure that the United 

Nations uphold the highest standards of professionalism in peacekeeping operations. The failure by the United Nations to hold individual peacekeepers, their commanders, and troop-contributing 

countries accountable for verifiable allegations of abuse is unacceptable. 

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon recently announced a series of proposals to combat sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping at a meeting of the representatives from over 100 troopcontributing countries. That is only a start. More must be done by 

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both the United Nations and the member states. And I look forward to hearing about how the United States can continue to push 

for these effective reforms. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and having a robust 

discussion. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

We have two distinguished panels today, and we want to thank 

all who are here to share their wisdom. 

Our first witness is the Permanent Representative to the U.S. 

Mission to the United Nations, Samantha Power. We thank you for 

being here today with a very tight schedule. 

We also thank you for bringing Haley back, who served so well 

with Senator Coons here and was one of the bright people we had 

here on the committee amongst many. 

But we thank you both for being here. If you could keep your 

comments to about 5 minutes or so, we would appreciate it, and 

then we look forward to Q&A. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SAMANTHA POWER, UNITED STATES 

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW 

YORK, NEW YORK 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, for convening this hearing. And thank you all, 

distinguished members of the committee, for making time to be 

here to discuss peacekeeping. 

This committee is acutely aware of the extent to which conflicts 

on the other side of the globe can come back and threaten American security. We have seen time and again how conflicts can displace millions of people, upend markets, and destabilize entire regions. 

All too recently and all too frequently, we have seen how such 

instability can attract and enable violent extremist groups, who exploit the vacuum of authority to terrorize civilians; recruit new 

members; and plan, launch, or inspire attacks. 

U.N. peacekeepers play a vital role in the international community’s efforts to address war, violence, and instability. As President 

Obama said in September, ‘‘We know that peace operations are not 

the solution to every problem, but they do remain one of the 

world’s most important tools to address armed conflict.’’ 

Peacekeepers can help resolve conflict, shore up stability, deny 

safe harbor to extremists, and protect civilians from atrocities, all 

of which serve core American interests and reflect deep American 

values, while ensuring greater burden-sharing by the international 

community. 

This administration has consequently been working aggressively 

to ensure that U.N. peacekeeping operations are better able to 

meet the demands of international peace and security, which, as 

has been noted by both the chairman and the ranking member, 

those requirements have changed considerably over just the last 20 

years. 

Peacekeepers today are undertaking more missions. The number 

of uniformed personnel has risen from fewer than 20,000 15 years 

ago to over 100,000 today. 

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They are assuming greater risk. Two-thirds of peacekeepers are 

operating in active conflicts, the highest percentage in history. 

And they are assigned broad and increasingly complex responsibilities, ranging from disarming armed groups to facilitating the 

safe delivery of humanitarian aid to protecting civilians from those 

who wish them harm. 

Today, 98 percent of uniformed personnel in U.N. missions 

around the world are under orders to protect civilians as part of 

their mandate. This is not your mother’s peacekeeping, your father’s peacekeeping, your grandfather’s peacekeeping. It has 

evolved significantly. 

While peacekeeping has never been more important to American 

interests, it has also never been more demanding. And that is why, 

in September, President Obama issued the first presidential memorandum on multilateral peace operations in more than 20 years, directing a wide range of actions to strengthen and modernize U.N. 

operations, including by building partner capacity, providing U.S. 

support, and leading reform of U.N. peacekeeping. 

I just want to briefly, Mr. Chairman, touch on a few key lines 

of effort that we have pursued. These are described in greater detail in my written submission. 

First, we are working to ensure that countries with the will to 

perform 21st century peacekeeping, that they have the capacity to 

do so. One way we are doing this is through the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership, or APRRP, which President 

Obama announced in August 2014. 

Through APRRP, the United States is investing in the capacity 

of six African countries that have proven themselves leaders in 

peacekeeping. In exchange, these countries have committed to 

maintain the forces and equipment necessary to deploy rapidly. 

This initiative builds upon the Global Peace Operations Initiative 

launched under President George W. Bush, which is our primary 

tool for building partner-nation peacekeeping capacity, and it will 

help ensure that more soldiers deployed for peacekeeping missions 

will be fully prepared. 

I hope that the Senate and House will fully fund this important 

initiative in future years. 

Second, we are expanding the pool of troop- and police-contributing countries, and bringing advanced militaries back into peacekeeping. In September, President Obama convened a historic highlevel summit, the first of its kind, at the U.N. to rally new commitments to peacekeeping, marking the culmination of a yearlong effort initiated by Vice President Biden at the previous U.N. General 

Assembly. Forty-nine countries participated and pledged nearly 

50,000 additional troops and police. 

Not only that, more of these troops will now come from advanced 

militaries, who bring with them equipment and expertise that is 

critically needed on the ground. We saw this in Mali in January 

this year, when Dutch attack helicopters helped Bangladeshi infantry repel rebels who had opened fire on their camp, where civilians 

were taking refuge. 

The United States is making contributions in this respect as well 

as one part of our unrivaled contribution to global peace and security, looking specifically for ways to leverage our military’s unique 

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capabilities to support peacekeeping operations, including by enabling faster deployment by others. 

Third, we are working to ensure a higher standard of performance and conduct once peacekeeping contingents are deployed, specifically in two critical areas: the complete fulfillment of their mandates and the combating of sexual exploitation and abuse. 

The additional troops generated by the President’s September 

summit will prove invaluable to both goals, by allowing the U.N. 

to be more selective as to which troops it deploys, and now giving 

it the leverage to repatriate poorly performing troops and police 

when necessary, and especially, of course, in instances where there 

are credible allegations of sexual abuse. 

With respect to mandate, when peacekeepers deploy in volatile 

situations, they have to be prepared to use force to defend themselves, to protect civilians, and to otherwise carry out their mandated tasks. 

Too often in the past, peacekeepers have shied away, even when 

atrocities are being perpetrated. A report by the U.N.’s internal 

oversight office in March last year found that in 507 attacks 

against civilians from 2010 to 2013, peacekeepers virtually never 

used force to protect those coming under attack. Thousands of civilians likely lost their lives as a result. This cannot continue, and a 

growing number of leading troop contributors agree. The 50,000 additional troops and police should enable more capable, more willing 

troops and police to staff these missions. 

The same is true on sexual exploitation and violence. And let me 

just state the obvious here. We share the outrage of everyone on 

this committee, all the American people who are focused on this 

issue. Peacekeepers must not abuse civilians. Sexual abuse and exploitation have no place, it goes without saying, again, in any society. It is especially abhorrent when committed by those who take 

advantage of the trust that communities are placing in the United 

Nations, and those responsible must be held accountable. 

Addressing this scourge will require continuing the important efforts begun by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to strengthen the 

implementation of a zero-tolerance policy, including bolstering reporting and accountability measures, and pledging to set up an immediate response team to investigate certain cases. It will also require more vigilance and follow-through from troop-contributing 

countries. 

There must also be far more transparency in these investigations, to track cases and ensure that justice is served. 

The U.N. should be able to take advantage now of its newly expanded pool of soldiers and police by suspending from peacekeeping 

any country that does not take seriously the responsibility to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute credible allegations. 

The fourth and final priority, Mr. Chairman, is to press for bold 

institutional reforms within the U.N. itself. We have seen the U.N. 

secretariat make profound changes to peacekeeping, from improved 

logistics and sustainment to a more comprehensive approach to crisis situations that integrates military, police, and civilian tools. But 

much, much more needs to be done, and we have spearheaded efforts to enact further reforms, including longer troop rotations to 

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preserve institutional memory, penalties for troops who show up 

without the necessary equipment to perform their duties. 

And we will continue to work aggressively to cut costs. The U.N. 

has already, thanks to U.S. leadership, cut the per-peacekeeper 

costs by roughly 17 percent since 2008. We are also working to advance the reforms proposed by the Secretary General’s High-Level 

Independent Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, which are intended 

to address inadequate planning, slow troop deployment, uneven 

mission leadership, breakdowns in command-and-control, and a 

current set of rules around human resources and procurement designed for the conference rooms of New York and not the streets 

of Bangui. 

Let me conclude. In all of the areas I have just described, we 

have seen improvements, and the United States has played an instrumental role in making them possible. But there is much more 

to be done. 

We are not satisfied with peacekeepers fulfilling only parts, but 

not all, of their mandates; with peacekeepers standing up to protect 

civilians in some, but not all, situations; or with soldiers being held 

accountable for crimes or misconduct some, but not all, of the time. 

The role played by peacekeepers today is too important. For the 

sake of our own interests and security, as well as the millions of 

innocent people around the world whose lives may depend on 

peacekeepers, we will continue working to strengthen peacekeeping 

so that it is tailored for the 21st century threats peacekeepers face. 

We appreciate your interest and support and continued dialogue 

on these matters. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Power follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SAMANTHA POWER

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to testify today. I am grateful for this panel’s 

enduring commitment to American leadership at the United Nations and in the 

world. And I appreciate the rigor that your members bring to ensuring the oversight 

and effective use of our contributions to the United Nations—a goal we share. I am 

grateful for the opportunity to discuss why the United States has such a strong interest in the success of U.N. peacekeeping and the Administration’s strategy for 

strengthening this critical national security instrument. 

First, I will discuss the growth and evolution of U.N. peacekeeping over the last 

decade, including the changing nature of these missions. Second, I will summarize 

the Administration’s vision for strengthening U.N. peace operations, including by 

ensuring that troops and police in U.N. operations perform professionally and effectively. Third, I will describe U.S. support for peacekeeping, including the pledges 

made in the recently-issued Presidential Memorandum on U.S. Support to U.N. 

Peace Operations and at the recent Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping at the U.N. 

Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping 

The United States has a vital interest in strengthening peacekeeping to respond 

to demands that peacekeepers are currently struggling to meet. We do not want to 

live in a world where more than 9,000 children worldwide have been recruited in 

less than a year to become child soldiers, as happened in South Sudan. We do not 

want to live in a world where religious or ethnic communities who lived together 

for decades in harmony, such as the Muslims and Christians in the Central African 

Republic, are induced to hate and fear one another. We do not want to live in a 

world where violent extremists exploit weak governments and commit acts of terrorism, as we have seen in Somalia and recently witnessed in Mali. Nor, of course, 

do America’s foreign policy leaders, including the distinguished members of this 

Committee. 

Recognizing that our security and our values prevent us from ignoring these conflicts, the question remains: what can America do to stop them? Even if the United 

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States has an interest in seeing conflict abate or civilians protected, that does not 

mean that U.S. forces should be doing all of the abating or the protecting. As President Obama said at West Point last year, ‘‘America must always lead on the world 

stage,’’ but ‘‘we should not go it alone.’’ It should go without saying that we cannot 

and we should not send the U.S. military into all of the places conflict is burning, 

civilians are hurting, or extremists are lurking. Just because we have far and away 

the most capable military in the world does not mean we should assume risks and 

burdens that should be shared by the international community. 

This is where peacekeeping comes in. As President Obama affirmed at the U.N. 

Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping on September 28, 2015, ‘‘We know that peace operations are not the solution to every problem, but they do remain one of the world’s 

most important tools to address armed conflict.’’ When boots on the ground are 

needed to defuse conflict in Congo or Mali, peacekeeping is often the best instrument we have. Peacekeeping operations ensure that other countries help shoulder 

the burden, both by contributing uniformed personnel and by sharing the financial 

costs of the operations. Provided that peacekeepers actually deliver on their mandate, multilateral peacekeeping also brings a greater degree of legitimacy in the 

eyes of the local population and the world. Because missions are made up of troops 

from multiple countries, with strong representation from the global South, spoilers 

and militants have a harder time cynically branding them as having imperialist designs. 

The U.N. has been there at critical junctures to consolidate peace and security 

and provide much needed stability after U.S. forces or our allies have been deployed 

for peace enforcement or stabilization operations, as in Haiti, Kosovo and TimorLeste. 

We have a compelling interest in curbing violent conflicts and preventing suffering—and we need peacekeeping to work. But precisely at this moment, when we 

recognize the crucial role peacekeeping can play in shoring up international security 

interests, our demands on peacekeeping are outstripping what it can deliver. Today, 

we are asking peacekeepers to do more, in more places, and in more complex conflicts than at any time in history. 

The United States, during both Republican and Democratic administrations, has 

turned to peacekeeping operations to advance our national security interests. There 

are currently sixteen U.N. peacekeeping missions worldwide, made up of over 

100,000 uniformed personnel, not to mention the 20,000 troops that the African 

Union currently deploys in Somalia. This is up from fewer than 20,000 fifteen years 

ago and 50,000 ten years ago. 

To stress, this is by far the largest number of peacekeepers deployed in history. 

But the numbers only tell a small part of the story. Today, two-thirds of peacekeepers are operating in active conflicts, the highest percentage ever. Peacekeepers 

often deploy to areas where myriad rebel groups and militias have made clear their 

intention to keep fighting. And the warring parties in modern conflicts increasingly 

include violent extremist groups, who terrorize civilians and attack peacekeepers. 

We are also asking peacekeepers to take on more responsibilities in support of 

sustainable political solutions. We ask U.N. peacekeeping missions to help with 

peace processes, assist with re-establishing state authority and stabilizing states 

amid deadly attacks by violent extremists, such as in Mali. We ask them to support 

the safe delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance, such as escorting emergency shipments of food and medicine to civilians, as peacekeepers have done in 

South Sudan. We ask them to protect civilians from atrocities, as in the Central African Republic (CAR). We ask them to bolster security in countries emerging from 

brutal civil wars, such as in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire, and to bolster regional stability from the Levant to the Great Lakes of Africa. 

Precisely at this moment—when we are asking more of peacekeeping than ever 

before and as we recognize the crucial role it can play in protecting U.S. interests 

in just about every mission around the world—we see both the promise and the pitfalls of contemporary peacekeeping. We see life-saving impact when peacekeepers 

are willing and able to fulfill their mandates and the devastating consequences 

when they are not. 

In the 21st century, the challenges to U.N. peacekeeping have changed, and so 

the international community’s response must change with it. The United Nations 

is increasingly central to efforts to bring stability to the world’s conflict zones, but 

too many U.N. peacekeeping operations are struggling to meet the demands placed 

upon them. Missions suffer from operational challenges, including long and overly 

complicated mandates, inadequate planning, obstacles to force generation, slow deployments, weak leadership, lack of critical enablers, competing chains of command, 

uneven commitments among troop—and police—contributing countries to mandate 

implementation, and political and administrative obstacles to operations created by 

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the governments hosting peacekeepers. Additionally, each mission needs a strong 

political dialogue and agreement underpinning its efforts, a premise of their success. 

U.S. Strategy for Strengthening Peacekeeping 

On September 28, the day of the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping, President 

Obama issued a new policy Memorandum on U.S. Support to Peace Operations, the 

first presidential guidance to address U.S. support to peace operations in over twenty years. The policy reaffirms the strong support of the United States for U.N. peace 

operations and directs the interagency to take on a wide range of actions to 

strengthen and modernize U.N. operations for a new era. Our strategy prioritizes 

three lines of effort: building partner capacity and strengthening partner accountability; providing U.S. support; and leading reform of U.N. peacekeeping. I will now 

outline these efforts in detail. 

First, we need to expand and deepen the pool of troop—and police—contributing 

countries, and bring advanced militaries back into peacekeeping. At the U.N. Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping hosted by President Obama, the Secretary-General 

and eight other Member States, high-level leaders from 49 countries and three 

international organizations made pledges that far exceeded our expectations. 

Twenty-one European countries made pledges, marking a welcome return of Europe to U.N. peacekeeping. Malaysia announced significant infantry, police, and engineering capabilities. Finland pledged multiple military units, including special 

forces. Chile—helicopters, hospitals, and engineering units. Colombia declared its 

intent to deploy multiple infantry battalions over the next few years. And China announced that it will establish a significant standby force that will be ready to deploy 

immediately in times of crises. 

Leaders from every part of the world pledged approximately 12 field hospitals, 15 

engineering companies, and 40 helicopters, as well as approximately 20 formed police units and over two-dozen infantry battalions. At the summit, and in the days 

that followed, countries committed to providing nearly 50,000 additional troops and 

police to U.N. peacekeeping. If countries deliver on these contributions—and we will 

join the U.N. in ensuring that they do—UN peacekeeping will be positioned to improve significantly its performance. The U.N. will have the capacity to fill longstanding gaps in operations—from attack helicopters to intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance units. If a new mission is created or an existing one significantly expanded, as sadly is sometimes the case, the U.N. will be able to put troops 

and police more quickly into the field. 

Second, we need to ensure that countries with the will to perform 21st century 

peacekeeping have the capacity they need to do so. Because African leaders see firsthand the consequences of unchecked conflicts, several have been at the forefront of 

embracing a new approach to peacekeeping, one that seeks to more effectively execute the tasks assigned to peacekeepers and in particular the responsibility to protect civilians. The African Union has demonstrated a commitment to building rapid 

response capability on the continent, and the United States is leading a coalition 

of international partners in support of these efforts. Last year, President Obama announced a new initiative at the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit: the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). The United States is investing in the 

capacity of a core group of six countries—Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda. 

The idea is to deepen our investment in those militaries that have a track record 

of deploying troops to peacekeeping operations and that are committed to protecting 

civilians from violence. To give just one example, Rwanda’s troops were among the 

first boots on the ground when conflicts erupted in the Central Africa Republic. 

Rwandans understand the importance of getting peacekeeping right, having experienced the catastrophic consequences of it going terribly wrong. And because 

Rwandans robustly carry out their mission mandates, the people in countries where 

they serve trust them; troops from other countries who serve alongside them see 

what robust peacekeeping looks like; and aggressors who would attack civilians fear 

them. 

The United States remains the largest trainer and equipper of military and police 

contingents deploying to peacekeeping operations. We have trained hundreds of 

thousands of peacekeepers in the past decade through the Global Peace Operations 

Initiative (GPOI), launched under President Bush. While we must ensure the GPOI 

program remains robust and responsive, as it serves as our primary tool for building 

partner nations’ peacekeeping capacities, APRRP is an important supplement. Our 

military experts will work alongside partners like Rwanda to strengthen their institutions and capabilities so they can rapidly deploy troops when crises emerge, and 

supply and sustain their forces in hostile environments. In exchange for this support, these countries have committed to maintain the forces and equipment necFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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essary to undertake those rapid deployments. I strongly encourage the Senate and 

House to fully fund this important initiative in future years. 

Third, we need to ensure that peacekeepers perform what is asked of them. Some 

troop-contributors disagree with the scope of responsibilities that the Security Council has assigned their troops. These countries sometimes cite the basic principles of 

U.N. peacekeeping, and hearken back to the earliest peacekeeping missions—in 

which blue helmets were deployed at the invitation of warring parties to observe 

a ceasefire along a demarcated line, such as one between Israel and Syria, or India 

and Pakistan. In that context, it was absolutely vital that peacekeepers had the 

states parties’ consent, that they behaved impartially, and that they observed and 

reported infractions. 

These missions are still critical, but for more than twenty years, peacekeeping has 

been evolving. The Security Council first tasked a peacekeeping mission with the 

responsibility to protect civilians in Sierra Leone in 1999—in the face of the brutal 

civil war in that country. While it is national governments’ responsibility to take 

care of their own people, peacekeeping operations have a vital obligation to step in 

when they fail to do so. This duty is not theoretical. Today, 10 missions—constituting almost 98 percent of U.N. uniformed personnel across the world—are charged 

with protecting civilians. If peacekeeping is to be effective in the 21st century, we 

must close the gap between the mandates the international community asks peacekeepers to undertake, and the willingness and ability of peacekeepers to successfully 

execute them. If we do not, it not only puts the lives of civilians and peacekeepers 

at risk, but undermines the credibility and legitimacy of peacekeeping everywhere. 

This is one of the most important efforts underway today. 

The good news is that there is a growing consensus around what modern peacekeeping looks like. In May, drawing on its direct knowledge of what it means when 

U.N. peacekeepers do not protect civilians, Rwanda channeled its lessons learned 

from the field into a set of best practices for the protection of civilians by peacekeeping missions. These ‘‘Kigali Principles’’ call, for example, for troop-contributing 

countries to ensure that the military commander of a peacekeeping contingent has 

prior authority to use force as needed. When a commander has to radio back to capital to seek permission, it may mean not being able to react in time to repel a fastapproaching attack on a nearby village. 

In the span of just a few months, a diverse group of major troop-contributing 

countries have endorsed the ‘‘Kigali Principles,’’ including Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda, Senegal, Uruguay, the Netherlands, Italy, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Already, 

one-third of all troops currently serving in U.N. and AU peacekeeping operations 

come from countries that have endorsed the ‘‘Kigali Principles’’—and that proportion 

is rising. These principles are a new blueprint for peacekeepers—and especially infantry—deploying into volatile situations. 

This growing clarity, together with the significant new contributions announced 

at the September summit, can change the impact that peacekeepers have in the 

field. In the past, the scant supply of troops and police meant that neither the U.N. 

nor the countries contributing the lion’s share of peacekeepers could afford to be selective without leaving significant gaps in missions. However, the summit pledges 

of nearly 50,000 troops and police should enable more capable, more willing troops 

and police to staff peacekeeping missions. Troop- and police-contributing countries 

that have qualms with particular mandates, or doubts about their capacity to do 

what is asked of them, no longer need to deploy to missions simply because nobody 

else will. 

For its part, the U.N. must demonstrate leadership by strengthening its monitoring and evaluation of troops and police in the field. When underperformance results from a lack of appropriate training and equipping, we must help to build those 

capabilities over time. When it is a matter of misconduct, refusal to follow commands, or implement mandated tasks, or take seriously the imperative to root out 

misconduct, particularly sexual exploitation and abuse, the U.N. must repatriate 

those responsible. For the first time in two decades, the surplus of troops and police 

allows the U.N. to do just that. 

Fourth, we need to press the U.N. to make bold institutional reforms. Last year, 

the U.N. Secretary-General appointed a High-Level Independent Panel on U.N. 

Peace Operations to undertake a thorough review of U.N. peacekeeping and political 

missions. The Panel released an in-depth report that included reform recommendations, many of which align with long-standing U.S. priorities. In September, the Secretary-General released his report outlining his intentions to implement the Panel’s 

recommendations ranging from improved logistics and sustainment through its Department of Field Support, to a more comprehensive approach to crisis situations 

that integrates military, police, and civilian tools. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

11 

The Administration is currently focused on several key areas of institutional reform. 

We are working to strengthen the U.N.’s assessment and planning work, which 

includes: supporting the use of sequenced mandates; encouraging the review and revision of conflict analysis tools across the system; and, supporting improved assessment analysis and planning capabilities. Better analysis and planning and the sequencing of mandates not only help to tailor peace operations to better suit often 

dynamic contexts, but we predict could also result in cost savings. For example, 

more tailored peace operations could help ensure that the U.N. isn’t being asked to 

deploy expensive state-capacity building components before a host-state government 

has the credibility or ability to absorb such support. 

We are supporting efforts to enhance the U.N.’s ability to undertake strategic 

force generation and deploy rapidly. This is an area in dire need of improvement, 

as we have seen in the long lead times getting troops into Mali, CAR and South 

Sudan. Rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions can be critical to stabilizing crisis situations, yet we have seen continued shortfalls in staffing-up missions such as 

in the emergency surge the Security Council authorized for the mission in South 

Sudan. We must look at what structures and arrangements the U.N. needs to best 

support the rapid deployment of peacekeepers and equipment. 

We are encouraging the Secretary-General and appropriate heads of U.N. departments and divisions to undertake administrative reform and cultural shifts that will 

empower the field and allow for flexibility and responsiveness. The U.N.’s ability to 

respond to needs in the field is hamstrung by burdensome policies and procedures 

and a culture overly concerned with compliance on paper versus outcomes in practice. Getting the right leadership is also critical for mission success. The U.N. can 

improve its selection process for senior mission leaders, including by prioritizing 

leadership and management skills, increasing commitments to gender diversity 

among qualified leaders, and developing meaningful mandatory training for senior 

leaders. The U.N. should also rigorously assess the performance of senior mission 

leaders and remove ineffective leaders when warranted. We are encouraging these 

efforts at the U.N. and working with the U.N. to enhance its training of senior mission leadership. 

We also continue to support vigorously the Secretary-General’s implementation of 

his zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). We have been particularly outraged at those especially egregious cases of SEA that have been reported in CAR, for example. Those who prey on the vulnerable communities they 

are sent to protect undermine the very foundation of peacekeeping. There is no excuse for inaction, and we must all do more to ensure those responsible for these heinous acts are held accountable. 

I greatly appreciate the leadership you’ve shown on this issue, Mr. Chairman, and 

am fully aware of how important this issue is to the Committee. Like you, I believe 

that even a single case of SEA is one too many. The United States has long been 

a leader in pushing for stronger prevention measures, and concrete steps to ensure 

accountability for those responsible for SEA. 

Despite the horrific incidents that have been recently reported, the U.N. has come 

a long way in recent years in responding to the scourge of SEA with strong support 

from the United States. However, there is a lot of work that still remains in preventing and addressing SEA. We remain concerned that many SEA perpetrators 

commit these acts, which are often crimes, with impunity and that many SEA victims never report such to the U.N. 

In order to address this accountability gap, and to improve prevention measures 

and assistance to victims, the U.S. government is instituting a ‘‘full court press.’’ 

We are working with our partners to ensure that the Secretary-General remains 

fully committed and empowered to implement this policy. At the President’s Peacekeeping Summit at the U.N. in September, for example, 42 countries signed onto 

the Summit Declaration, which affirmed support for the Secretary-General’s zero 

tolerance policy, and confirmed commitments to rigorous vetting and training of uniformed personnel, swift and thorough investigations, and appropriate accountability 

measures and timely reporting to the U.N. on all allegations. 

Because we know that SEA is an issue that affects all member states, we are developing a whole-of-government strategy to improve prevention of SEA and enhance 

transparency and accountability for perpetrators. President Obama’s recent memorandum on U.N. peacekeeping highlighted the importance of combatting SEA, and 

some of the initiatives that the U.S. government is undertaking. 

To effectively combat SEA, we are working to track individual cases where there 

is information available, following up with the appropriate authorities, analyzing 

the strengths and weakness of current policies, and providing support or applying 

pressure as appropriate to the U.N. We are further exploring setting a requirement 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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for rigorous pre-deployment training in the Secretary-General’s zero tolerance policy 

on SEA. And, we will be highlighting instances of SEA in the annual human rights 

report. In addition to elevating incidents of SEA, these acts will pressure, 

incentivize, and enable troop- and police-contributing countries to better handle 

SEA. 

Perhaps the greatest challenge in our efforts to eliminate SEA has been the lack 

of transparency on allegations. Although we need to ensure the appropriate procedures are followed and that privacy is respected for all those accused of SEA, the 

U.N. and Member States should know the nationality of alleged perpetrators, the 

status of investigations, and the outcome of disciplinary or prosecutorial action, or 

of sanctions imposed by the U.N. Unfortunately, we rarely have access to this type 

of information. Our initiatives with the U.N. have been largely focused on increasing 

transparency in this regard, specifically to ensure accountability. The lack of data 

has been very problematic, because it prevents us from following-up with governments and fully analyzing the factors that most contribute to SEA: whether it is 

a lack of discipline, cultures of tolerance within missions, or lack of training, as 

these all differ across troop- and police-contributing countries and across U.N. 

peacekeeping operations. It has also been difficult to track the U.N.’s follow up on 

specific cases, since in the past we have not known for sure what country is responsible. 

We applaud the Secretary-General’s commitment to publicizing the nationality of 

individuals against whom credible allegations of SEA have been made in his next 

annual report on this issue. This idea originated in the Secretary-General’s 2012 report on SEA, where he noted his intention to ‘‘provide country-specific information 

on the number of credible allegations being investigated by Member States in reports to the General Assembly.’’ 

This information will better enable us to use our own diplomatic efforts to ensure 

accountability. Once we know which country’s personnel have been accused of misconduct, we will have a much better understanding of the nature of the problem, 

the actual size of the accountability gap, and how to better target our response. In 

cases where countries have repeated SEA violations, we will be able to work bilaterally to address capacity issues and to encourage countries to take appropriate action. 

We are also working with the U.N. to improve standard operating procedures for 

SEA prevention, reporting, and investigations. The Secretary-General has taken a 

strong stance and very decisive action on SEA. In response to repeated allegations 

of SEA in MINUSCA, the U.N.’s peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic, he requested and accepted the resignation of his Special Representative 

Babacar Gaye in August of this year. His recent reports on SEA in peacekeeping 

outline very detailed steps he is taking under his own authority to address SEA. 

These include: community outreach strategies to increase awareness about SEA and 

reporting mechanisms; establishing Immediate Response Teams to preserve evidence following allegations; tighter timelines for SEA investigations; and, suspending payments to troop and police contributing countries in connection with individuals alleged to have committed SEA. We welcome the Secretary-General’s leadership on SEA. 

Finally, the United States continues to explore ways to support a more predictable 

and flexible funding mechanism to support AU peace operations, conditioned on increased AU financing and operational capacities, and compliance with U.N. regulations, rules, and policies, including financial rules, as well as with international humanitarian and human rights law, as applicable. These operations provide a creative and oftentimes cost-effective alternative to U.N. peacekeeping when environments are particularly volatile such as Somalia or early on in CAR. 

U.S. Support for U.N. Peacekeeping 

In order to fulfill the first goal outlined above—building partner capacity—the 

United States must continue to show leadership in supporting peacekeeping operations. Not only is this support good for peacekeeping, it also positions us to be 

maximally effective in driving changes that will strengthen peacekeeping, and deliver greater results from our investments. 

As President Obama said in his remarks at the Summit, ‘‘We are here today, together, to strengthen and reform U.N. peacekeeping because our common security 

demands it. This is not something that we do for others; this is something that we 

do collectively because our collective security depends on it.’’ In concert with the 

other Summit participants’ pledges, President Obama announced his intention to 

significantly increase the number of U.S. personnel serving under the U.N. flag by 

working to double our contribution of military staff officers serving as individuals 

or teams in U.N. missions. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Additional U.S. commitments announced at the Summit are aimed at supporting 

U.N. peacekeeping in three key areas. First, to reduce response time and support 

rapid response, the United States is prepared to offer access to our unparalleled 

strategic air- and sealift capabilities to support U.N. deployments in crisis situations. Second, the United States is prepared to provide engineering support, an important enabler of U.N. operations and another comparative U.S. strength, which 

could include technical expertise and making available military engineers for specific projects on a project-by-project basis, where there is an urgent need that the 

United States is uniquely positioned to address. These units would remain under 

existing policies on U.S. command and control. Third, the United States plans to 

pre-position defense equipment to accelerate equipping and deployment of personnel 

to U.N. and regional peacekeeping operations, essential in crises. The United States 

will also factor U.N. and regional peacekeeping needs as a priority in determining 

which countries receive appropriate U.S. surplus defense equipment. 

The United States will endeavor to increase its already substantial contributions 

to building the capacity of the U.N. and partner nations that contribute to peace 

operations in the following areas: in-mission training and mentoring, technology, 

leadership training, police pre-deployment training and counter-IED training and 

assessment. 

For example, the United States is committing to make available mobile training 

teams on a case-by-case basis for deployment alongside partners who are contributing forces and deploying into a peace operation. U.S. personnel plan to work directly with U.N. experts to identify cost-effective technology solutions for needs in 

countering IEDs, force protection, protection of civilians, collaborative planning, information-led operations, rapid deployment of vanguard forces, and expeditionary logistics. The United States intends to increase its already significant contributions 

to U.N. police in peacekeeping by allocating another $2 million—subject to congressional notification—to develop and expand the capability of African partners deploying police personnel, specifically to enhance their ability to meet the challenges of 

violent extremism in missions such as the one in Mali. The United States is also 

contributing $2 million specifically for counter-IED training and intends to offer to 

deploy U.S. military counter-IED specialists to conduct strategic and operationallevel assessments alongside select U.N. peacekeeping operations. Importantly, these 

commitments will not require the budgeting of additional funds, as they are all either reimbursable by the U.N. or funded within existing programs. 

In addition, through the GPOI program, the United States is currently helping 

50 partner countries and three regional organizations build the capacity to deploy 

to and effectively perform in U.N. peacekeeping missions. The GPOI model builds 

partner countries’ training self-sufficiency and supports the development of critically 

needed enabling capabilities—such as lift, logistics, and medical units. Program activities not only address the short-term requirement of providing capable troops to 

missions but also provide a lasting foundation to support the peacekeeping needs 

of the future. 

Conclusion 

Although we remain focused on the unique opportunity for reform in 2016 and 

beyond, we should not forget that U.N. peacekeeping is stronger than it was two 

decades ago. The U.N. has improved logistics and sustainment through its Department of Field Support by modernizing its supply chain and asset management systems; it has strengthened lines of communication with headquarters; it has created 

an inspector-general function to evaluate candidly the U.N.’s performance; it has introduced a capabilities-based reimbursement system for troops; and it has developed 

a far more integrated approach to crisis situations, drawing on military, police, and 

civilian tools. 

In closing, let me reflect on the budget. The lines of effort I have just described 

are all critical to ensuring peacekeeping better addresses 21st century challenges. 

They demonstrate the need for U.S. leadership. And to exercise that leadership, the 

United States must pay our U.N. dues in full and on time. 

I understand the frustration that many Americans feel with the United States 

paying a substantial share of the U.N.’s peacekeeping and regular budgets. We 

agree that the formula should be changed to reflect the realities of today’s world. 

But, until that happens, if we suggest we should pay less and withhold our full dues 

at this critical moment, we will not only go against our commitments, but we will 

also dramatically undercut our ability to achieve needed reforms, undermine our 

leadership and erode our credibility with partners. 

This does not mean we should simply sign over a large check and look the other 

way. On the contrary, as diligent stewards of taxpayer funds, over the last six years, 

we have pressed hard to improve the cost-efficiency of peacekeeping and to prevent 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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significant new costs. Through U.S.-led reform efforts, the U.N. has cut the cost perpeacekeeper by roughly 17 percent—that’s one-sixth of the cost reduced through efficiencies and streamlining. We have also aggressively fought cost increases, saving 

hundreds of millions of dollars per year by prevailing on other countries for a more 

modest increase in the long-frozen reimbursement rate for U.N. peacekeepers. And 

we have pressed to streamline and right-size missions where warranted by changing 

conditions on the ground. In the Ivory Coast, we have cut the number of mandated 

troops in half, from around 10,000 to 5,000. In Haiti, we have reduced the number 

of mandated troops from nearly 9,000 after the 2010 earthquake to just over 2,000 

today. We were on course to do the same in Liberia prior to the outbreak of Ebola. 

These efforts ensure governments do not use peacekeepers as an excuse not to take 

responsibility for their citizens’ own security. And streamlining missions frees up 

troops and resources that are needed elsewhere. 

When the stakes are as high as they are in these conflicts—when shortfalls can 

result in atrocities committed, communities uprooted, and entire societies split along 

ethnic or religious lines—getting it right some of the time is not good enough. Peacekeeping must be consistently outstanding. We will keep working with our partners 

to bring about the kind of reforms upon which the security of millions of people 

around the world may depend. And we will continue to work relentlessly to make 

peacekeeping as efficient as possible without undermining its effectiveness, in close 

coordination with the Congress and especially this critically important Committee. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much for those comments. 

Senator Isakson and I were in Darfur years ago and just infuriated by the caveats that the U.N. peacekeepers had. They could 

only fire at people when they were fired upon. You had women 

going out and collecting wood from their villages being raped, 

abused, people being murdered by the Janjaweed. Yet those caveats remained. 

So we have evolved, as you mentioned. This is not our father’s 

peacekeeping mission anymore. 

As we have evolved these missions, though, and people now are 

placing themselves as peacekeepers more in the center of conflicts, 

in some cases taking sides, how has this changed the way the U.N. 

is viewed in these peacekeeping missions? I assume you believe 

this is in our national interests for us to be in these missions certainly, I do. But how has this changed the way these blue hats are 

viewed in these areas? 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Senator Corker. It is an excellent question. 

I think one of the lines that the U.N. struggles to walk is that 

it has, on the one hand, peacekeepers that are charged with an aggressive enforcement of mandates, which entail protecting civilians, 

not just protecting peacekeepers themselves, as was once the case. 

You have that on one hand. Then you have U.N. country programs 

that often look indistinguishable. They are all driving around in 

white vehicles, unarmed, passing out food, providing shelter, trying 

to provide counseling to those who have been victimized by sexual 

abuse. 

So it has been challenging, the blurring of functions across these 

missions. But the only thing worse than confronting that challenge 

of having people in society distinguish who does what, is actually 

people in these societies rely on peacekeepers, know that the mandate says protect civilians, and have those peacekeepers bunkered 

and more interested, again, in collecting a paycheck and then going 

home than actually being out and about and delivering on the 

promise of that blue flag. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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So, again, it varies per conflict area. I think we have come a long 

way. But as I noted, the statistics are not inspiring. I mean, there 

are still many troop-contributing countries who send their troops in 

without the very strict guidance that you will be sent home if you 

do not enforce the mandate you are given. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I appreciate the comment Senator Cardin 

made about the cost. But, as I understand it, for some of these 

countries, even though the cost to us is far less than having U.S. 

soldiers there, the pay for these soldiers is far greater than they 

would otherwise receive in their own countries. And, actually, if I 

understand correctly, that money goes to the national governments 

of those countries. And so these countries are benefiting financially 

in sending troops there. 

Is that correct, in some cases, in some of the lower income countries? And is that feeding this situation of actually having troops 

there that are not, if you will, carrying out their mandates in an 

appropriate way, with soldiers not qualified or trained and not 

properly equipped? Talk to us a little bit about what is driving having folks within the peacekeeping missions that are that are certainly not conducting themselves in a professional manner. 

Ambassador POWER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, again. It 

reflects a real understanding of the dynamics in some of these missions. 

Again, the performance is uneven. The motivation is uneven. The 

incentive for troops is uneven. If you take, for instance, Rwandan 

peacekeepers, who do get a more substantial stipend by serving in 

peacekeeping missions than they might if they were at home, but 

they are totally driven by what happened in their country 21 years 

ago and actually view protecting civilians as a way of showing the 

world what should have been done when the genocide unfolded in 

Rwanda. 

Contrast that with other troops, again, who institutionally are 

not given the guidance from capital that they need to be out and 

about, that, yes, there are risks entailed with patrolling, but there 

are risks also that are entailed by being bunkered. 

I think on the question, the very specific question of the stipend, 

as Senator Cardin said, this is a very good deal for the American 

taxpayer. These are extremely difficult environments, not only because of the risks of militia and government forces targeting peacekeepers as they are out and about, but also just the conditions in 

terms of logistics, access to water. I mean, these are missions that 

are not expending resources in the manner that our missions do 

when they deploy internationally. The logistic tail is not nearly as 

fulsome. 

So I think it is important to incentivize their participation. Some 

countries are doing it because they are able, again, to secure additional resources that they are investing in ways that sometimes we 

do not have full visibility into, sometimes in professionalizing their 

militaries, sometimes in other parts of their government. 

But I think Senator Cardin’s point is very, very important. We 

are getting a lot out of the 100,000-plus troops who are active in 

these conflict areas. These are places where, in some instances, if 

you look at Mali or Lebanon, places that are really cutting-edge 

theaters in terms of terrorism and extremism, and if it weren’t for 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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U.N. peacekeepers who were there putting their lives at risk, it 

may come to the United States at some point in order for us to advance our security. 

The CHAIRMAN. As it relates to the issues of the abuse that has 

taken place that is, obviously, abhorrent, in fairness, I think people 

on both sides of the aisle have concerns about the U.N.’s ability to 

actually put reforms in place. And we understand how the U.N. operates, and I know you talked about the leader’s desire to create 

reforms. We sent a letter suggesting that we have onsite court marshals by the countries to handle peacekeeping soldiers accused of 

crimes be tried, by the way, under their own country military 

preocedures to reduce impunity. We also made some other suggestions. 

What is your sense that those types of reforms can be implemented, relative to peacekeeping? 

Ambassador POWER. Well, as Ambassador Negroponte behind me 

I think will attest, through the life of the U.N. you have a challenge, always, on reform, in the sense that there are two places you 

have to secure—will and follow-through. 

The first is with the countries that comprise the U.N. So every 

troop-contributing country to peacekeeping has to be prepared to 

look at the kinds of ideas that you put in your letter that we have 

been pushing in new York and implement in their own military 

changes to ensure follow-though, oversight in the first instance, follow-through on investigation, and accountability, whether a court 

martial or some kind of prosecution in civilian court. 

And again, there is probably no one-size-fits-all solution, because 

every country has its own set of procedures, again, for following up 

on abuse of any kind. 

Then there is the U.N. itself, which has to be much aggressive 

in shining a spotlight on those countries that are not taking the 

steps that are needed. 

I think that we have seen improvements. This is, again, not 

something one should cite as an improvement. It should never have 

been the case that it was otherwise. But those individuals who 

were alleged to be involved in sexual abuse now are not being paid 

by the U.N. They are being recalled to their capital. Training and 

vetting now is changing, so that there is training on preventing 

sexual abuse and exploitation. 

You had an idea, I believe, in your letter about a claims kind of 

commission. I think the U.N. is looking at creating a victim support 

trust fund, which is something, of course, we would wish to support 

as well. It is going to require going back to member states and getting resources to put into that, but maybe some of the docked pay 

of those against whom there are allegations could be used in service of such a fund. And then I think having more aggressive onsite 

investigative capacity, so that less time passes between an allegation and an actual follow-through. 

Lastly, the two aspects of reform come together. In order to secure meaningful reform that actually matters for potential victims 

or people who have already been victimized, there has to be more 

transparency between what is actually going on in the field and 

then what we are made aware of in New York. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Too often, we hear from NGOs or from journalists about sexual 

abuse and exploitation, rather than from the U.N. itself. And if we 

are to go to a developing country and try to enhance their capacity, 

their training on the front end, their capacity to investigate on the 

backend of an allegation, we have to know who has been accused 

of doing what at what period, and be in a position to offer support. 

If there are countries who are shirking their obligation to carry 

out investigations, we have to know so that we can look at our bilateral leverage and whether we might suspend some forms of assistance, if, in fact, there is a recurrent pattern of not actually taking seriously the zero-tolerance policy. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you. My time is up. And as a courtesy, I want to move on. 

I do hope through questioning at some point and—I know the 

President has made additional pledges to the U.N. beyond our normal peacekeeping budgeting. I hope at some point it will come to 

light as to where those resources are planned to come from. But 

thank you again for being here. 

Senator Cardin? 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Ambassador Power, for your service to our country. 

As I said in my opening statement, I am a strong supporter of 

the mission of the United Nations and the incredible progress it 

has made in global issues. I want to talk about transparency and 

accountability. It has come up quite a bit on several subjects. 

One of the, I think, clearest ways to try to help the safety of civilians is to hold President Assad of Syria accountable for violating 

international war-crime-type activities. So do we have your commitment, as our Ambassador in the United Nations, that we will 

seek full accountability by President Assad for the war crimes that 

he has committed in any of these negotiations that take place in 

regard to the resolution of Syria? 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Senator. 

Well, let me say that one of my more unsuccessful days in my 

office, since this body was good enough to confirm me for my job, 

was pursuing a referral of the war crimes and crimes against humanity carried out in Syria to the International Criminal Court. 

That was a resolution we brought to the U.N. Security Council. 

Notwithstanding our own nonparticipation in the ICC, we believe 

that is a venue that should be looking at chemical weapons attacks 

and barrel-bomb attacks and systematic torture. And, of course, 

that effort at a referral was vetoed by Russia, a veto supported by 

China. 

Senator CARDIN. I do understand there are going to be negotiations that will involve the United States. And the United States is 

going to have to sign off on those negotiations. Do I have your commitment that your position at the United Nations will be to hold 

President Assad accountable for the type of activities you just described? 

Ambassador POWER. The ultimate settlement in Syria is going to 

be between the opposition and the Syrian Government. The United 

States position on accountability I hope is well-known. We are absolutely supportive and have been aggressively supportive in buildFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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ing an evidentiary base so as to ensure that Assad and other people responsible for war crimes are held accountable. 

Senator CARDIN. It is not up to the government and opposition 

to determine whether a person has violated international standards 

on conduct of war. War crimes are global. It is global accountability. 

Ambassador POWER. I think there are two separate issues. One 

is what is the standard or the threshold question for where accountability should be provided or whether prosecution or a truth 

commission, the whole set of tactical question about how accountability should be pursued. 

There is a related, overlapping question of what the terms of a 

political settlement would be. I mean, this is not something that is 

on the verge of happening, so I think the details on accountability 

have not yet been fleshed out, and it is something we should consult on. 

But I want to underscore that the final agreement has to be 

something that both the opposition and the government can get behind. 

Senator CARDIN. I understand that. It does not quite answer my 

question. 

Let me make my position clear, and I think the members of this 

committee. If President Assad is not held accountable, there will 

not be support for any solution in regard to Syria. I will just make 

that pretty clear from the beginning. 

Let me talk to issue number two on transparency and accountability. The chairman has already talked about that, the abuse allegations. If this is not done in an open manner, where there is 

complete understanding and disclosure of what is taking place, the 

confidence factor of those responsible for these abuses being held 

accountable will not be there. 

Ambassador POWER. I agree completely. I mean, I am not sure 

what to add. 

As I said, there has been insufficient reporting back to the Security Council. We have now taken sexual abuse and exploitation and 

made it an issue to be discussed in the Security Council. The Secretary General has now committed to reporting back. 

Senator CARDIN. And I have seen the specific recommendations, 

and they are good. But you have to follow through on it, and it has 

to be done in a way that the international community, the activists, 

those who are following this, can be confident that those who are 

responsible have truly been held accountable, so that this will not 

happen in the future, will not be tolerated in the future. You said 

zero tolerance, which we agree. 

That is, I think, the important point, that it is not just a closed 

investigation, but that we have an open closure of this issue and 

a commitment on how to go forward on how these matters will be 

handled. 

Ambassador POWER. I think right now, Senator, it is very fair to 

say that victims who come forward do so at their own peril, and 

do not do so with confidence that having taken that risk, having 

potentially ostracized themselves in their own communities, that 

there is even going to be accountability on the backend. That has 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

19 

to change entirely. I suspect if it does change, you may well see 

more people coming forward. 

Senator CARDIN. So let me get to my third point on transparency 

and accountability, and that is the budget system at the United 

Nations. It is anything but open and clear and transparent. That 

is nothing new. It has been that way for a long time. 

It is hard for me to understand why our assessment on the 

peacekeeping is 28.36 percent, if I am correct, which is almost 

three times higher than the next country and is significantly higher than our general allocation for the U.N. budget. 

That does not seem to me to be a transparent way to budget. So 

can you just briefly inform us as to the U.S. position in regard to 

a fair allocation of the U.N. budget in an open and transparent 

manner? 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Senator. 

The formula on the U.S. share of the peacekeeping budget is a 

very complex formula. Let me say in brief that it is some combination of our share of the global economy plus a premium that we pay 

by being a permanent member of the Security Council and, particularly with the veto, getting to dictate whether a mission comes into 

existence or whether it does not, along with the other permanent 

members as a whole, along with the rest of the Security Council. 

So we pay a premium for being a permanent member. 

We were able to secure the cap on our regular budget. The formula would actually have us pay at a higher rate if not for the 22 

percent cap that Ambassador Holbrooke secured now going on 15 

years ago. 

The one thing I want to stress is that our emphasis is on ensuring that countries that are contributing more and more to the global economy are paying more of their share. We are in the midst of 

scales negotiations now on our share of the peacekeeping budget. 

Our emphasis, again, has been on ensuring countries, you can see 

their economic growth, but you do not see a correlation in terms 

of their contribution. 

The Chinese contribution to peacekeeping has more than doubled 

in the last 10 years. And I think we can anticipate that the Chinese share is going to be up around 10 percent, which would be a 

tripling of its share. Similarly, the Russian contribution has doubled. Again, China and Russia being two of the five permanent 

members on the council. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, we should point out that China is still 

about one-fourth of the United States, less than one-fourth. And 

Russia is about one-eighth of the United States. 

It just seems to us that that 22 percent cap, we understand that 

and that was well-deserved, the way that came out. It looks like 

the United Nations is equalizing through the peacekeeping percentage and that the 22 percent cap is being violated because of our 

higher contributions to the peacekeeping efforts. 

I just urge you that the more transparent this process, the better 

it is going to be, I think, received politically in our country. And 

we do think the 22 percent is a fair number. We think it should 

be honored and be honored in the peacekeeping. 

Ambassador POWER. I just want to underscore that when the 

agreement was secured on the 22 percent cap, no similar agreeFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

20 

ment was secured as it related to peacekeeping. In fact, having the 

22 percent cap actually helps us in the peacekeeping realm because 

22 percent becomes the baseline on which these premiums are 

agreed to. 

I want to stress, we share the same objective. We want to get 

other countries to step up and pay their share. We still believe that 

if you look, again, at what this means for U.S. national security— 

I think this is, again, a version of the argument you made at the 

beginning—that even when you compare it to NATO, where the 

United States bears the lion’s share of defense investments, that 

having the rest of the world paying 72 percent of the peacekeeping 

budget is a good deal for the American taxpayer. 

Senator CARDIN. And my last point and I hope this will be covered, as the chairman said, by others, the safety of civilians is critically important. You stressed the increased number commitment 

made in the meeting in September. 

It seems to me it is not a matter of numbers of personnel. Do 

they have the will to go in and stand in front of civilians to protect 

them? We have not seen that. 

So I am not sure I was comforted by your reply that we have 

greater capacity by number. If we do not have greater capacity by 

will, the civilian population is going to be at great risk. 

Ambassador POWER. If I may, Senator, just respond briefly. 

The point that I emphasized in my testimony was that we have 

succeeded now in getting contributions, or commitments, I should 

say, not yet contributions, from advanced militaries. 

Europe had gotten out of peacekeeping, by and large, over the 

course of the last 20 years, and we think it is really important that 

they get back in. There is no necessary correlation always between 

being an advanced military and having the political will to put 

yourself in harm’s way to protect civilians. 

But we think that, again, giving the U.N. the choice—now it has 

a pool from which it can choose. And if there are people who show 

insufficient will and want to spend more time in their bases than 

out and about protecting civilians, we think having this pool of 

forces, which include, again, more professional and advanced militaries and better aviation and engineering and infantry capabilities, giving the U.N. that selectivity is going to mean over time 

that the performance of these peacekeepers is going to improve. 

So numbers alone do not mean anything, if you have 50,000 commitments of people who do not have political will. But we see in 

that pool, actually, substantial commitments from those we think 

do have that will. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before turning to Senator Perdue, I just want to 

thank the ranking member for bringing up an issue that is brought 

up consistently, certainly, on our side of the aisle. I want to thank 

him for that. 

I do want to just emphasize that with NATO, which I know is 

not in your jurisdiction, we have become the provider of security 

services. Our NATO allies, generally speaking, are the consumer of 

security services. 

And the same thing is happening with peacekeeping at the U.N. 

I know it is a different set of actors. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

21 

But the very people that stymie our efforts to pursue our interests—China, for instance—are taking advantage of us with respect 

to sharing the peacekeeping costs. So yes, it is in our U.S. national 

interests that we have peacekeeping missions and that we have 

stability and security around the world. But I think we continue 

to be not as good as we should be at forcing other nations to also 

be responsible. 

So I want to thank Senator Cardin for bringing this important 

issue up. It is infuriating—infuriating—to have the lack of transparency that exists at the U.N. I think, over time, it will erode support. Such support is already not particularly high because of the 

many issues we see going unattended, like not dealing with the 

ballistic missiles that are being fired by Iran in violation of UNSCR 

1929. 

So I would just say, I am glad there is bipartisan concern. I hope 

that you can address it. 

With that, Senator Perdue. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me also echo that. I want to compliment the ranking member 

for continuing to bring this up. I wanted to talk about that just in 

a second. 

Right now, we are spending about $2 billion just in the peacekeeping force for the United States. I think that is our contribution. Because of the assessment disagreement, we are some $345 

million in arrears, I think, in terms of what the U.N. says we owe 

them. 

I would like to point out also, Mr. Chairman, that it is not just 

the percentages here in relation to the size of the GDP. Also, I 

think, it should be taken into account the percentage of GDPs in 

these countries that are spent on their own military. That also 

bears to the global security situation. 

So I think given the situation we have the in the U.S., Madam 

Ambassador, in the last few years, 35 percent to 40 percent of what 

we have been spending is borrowed, I think this is a very timely 

time to have that really serious conversation in the U.N. I applaud 

you guys for doing that. 

I have two quick questions. 

First, I want to thank you for what you are doing. Given your 

high school years in Georgia, we claim you and we are proud of 

what you are doing. 

So I want to talk about Hezbollah, and I want to talk about Lebanon in just a minute. 

You know, in 1978, UNIFIL was created there as the interim 

force in Lebanon. Some 12,000 troops are there from the U.N. Resolution 1701 in 2006 strengthened the mandate there to monitor 

and to preclude the illegal transport of weapons into Lebanon. And 

yet we know today they have an estimated 120,000, 150,000 rockets, some of these very sophisticated guided weapons. It is very 

troubling. 

So it looks to me like, if that mandate was directed to keep weapons out of Lebanon, they are failing against that mandate. 

Can you talk a little bit about their current role there? And what 

is their role against 1701? And then we have had reports that there 

have been threats around reprisals if they report violations and so 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

22 

forth. What can we do to strengthen UNIFIL there and to preclude 

Lebanon from the illegal transport of these dangerous weapons? 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you. 

UNIFIL has, I think, played an ameliorative role since 2006 in 

calming the situation, but there is no question that Hezbollah has 

been able to maintain and expand an arsenal. And we have and 

continue to urge UNIFIL to be more aggressive in patrolling, in 

monitoring, in speaking out about violations of the UNIFIL mandate. 

And I think that what you have seen, actually, in recent months 

is at least more transparency on the part of UNIFIL. I mean, part 

of the challenge here is, as we know from confronting terrorist organizations in other parts of the world, when you are not at war 

with those terrorist organizations, you are using political pressure, 

particularly by Lebanon’s own sovereign institutions, which are 

themselves very weak, as we know from the current paralysis in 

Lebanon. You are shining a spotlight. You are trying to ensure 

interdiction of weapons before they even get into the theater in 

question. 

So UNIFIL is not a perfect fix for everything that ails Lebanon 

or for the threat posed by Hezbollah. But it has a responsibility to 

be vocal and to take very seriously its reporting mandate, also so 

countries in the region, including our friends, know what is happening in an area from which threats have come routinely in recent 

decades. 

Senator PERDUE. Also, let me just ask you to add a comment or 

two about Syria. The U.N. Disengagement Observer Force, 

UNDOF, has actually withdrawn from the Golan on the Syrian 

side, because of the fighting there. Can you speak to their role 

now? And how are they interacting with IDF in that? 

And I have one last question. 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you. 

I mean, you are right that there has been a reconfiguration. This 

is something UNDOF has done in close consultation with the Government of Israel. Given the stakes here, it is a response to the fact 

that al-Nusra made advances on one side of the line. And right now 

this is—— 

Senator PERDUE. They actually kidnapped some of the U.N. 

forces. 

Ambassador POWER. Exactly, Senator, they did. And the release 

of those forces had to be negotiated. 

And I will say, even that incident showed, it is not the same as 

civilian protection, but an unevenness in how the different units responded, which again is life in the U.N. Some holding onto their 

weapons, refusing to be cowed. Others handing over their weapons 

and, unfortunately, in a manner that left UNDOF weaker and 

where those weapons had to be replenished. 

But we again view this as a temporary relocation. We still believe the prior configuration is the stabilizing configuration. But I 

think the Israelis are well-aware as well that the circumstances do 

not lend themselves to putting the observers on the other side of 

the line. 

Senator PERDUE. The last question I have with the time remaining, Ambassador, the chairman mentioned it, is on the violations 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

23 

of Iran. We have been concerned since the JCPOA that Iran would 

violate our agreement incrementally. They are violating the U.N. 

agreement not incrementally, but in a major way—these are Resolutions 1929 and 2231—with the launch in October. And then we 

have reports in the last week or so of a second launch. 

What is the U.N. doing in relation to those violations and the 

sanctions that back those up? 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Senator. Yes, this is something 

that I have had occasion to talk to the chairman about. And it is 

music to a U.N. Ambassador’s ears when Resolution 1929, Resolution 2231 just roll off the tongue of Members of Congress. 

Resolution 1929 has been an incredibly important foundation to 

the international sanctions regime. The ballistic missile launch 

from October is a violation of 1929. As soon as we confirmed the 

launch, we brought it to the Security Council. We now are going 

to be discussing it on Tuesday. The U.N. machinery always works 

slowly. 

The panel of experts is looking at it. We have provided all the 

information that we have on it. 

And, in a way, the Security Council is an important venue for increasing the political costs on Iran when they violate Resolution 

1929. 

I would note, of course, that the JCPOA is aimed at dismantling 

Iran’s nuclear weapons program, so that the threat that Iran poses 

in any aspect of its military is much diminished. 

The Security Council sanctions body operates by consensus. This 

is something that over time benefits the United States. But on 

something like that, it means we have to convince all members of 

the committee also to support our desired designations or any further form of accountability. 

Senator PERDUE. So what is the U.S. trying to move forward in 

terms of strengthening the sanctions? 

Ambassador POWER. Well, it is the U.N. machinery. We have to 

get the report back from the panel of experts. We will discuss it 

in the committee. And then we will look at what the right tool is. 

I think it is very important, also, to look at the bilateral tools we 

have. We maintain sanctions, as you know, and will, even after implementation day, on ballistic missiles, on counterterrorism, on 

human rights. And I think we many of the individuals involved in 

their ballistic missile program have already been sanctioned, as 

you well know, over the years. So trying to secure a nexus between 

this launch and any particular individual entity is a challenge that 

we need to take on. 

But I think looking at the Security Council and our bilateral 

tools as complementary is very important in this regard. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. Thank you again for your service. 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Cardin and I both emphasized with the Security Council 

2 days ago that, look, let us face it. The possible military dimensions piece, we thought they might get a D-. They got an F. A total 

hoax. A total hoax. 

Non-action here is just going to empower them to continue to violate. And I think what the Ambassador just said is the U.N. is 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

24 

going to do nothing—nothing—because China and Russia will block 

that from occurring. 

So I do hope they are preparing their bilateral efforts. 

It is disappointing that, again, we provide the resources that we 

do, and yet we have countries that will not cause other countries 

to live up to their obligations and block that. So it is very disappointing. 

Senator Coons? 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Corker and Ranking 

Member Cardin. 

And thank you, Ambassador Power, for your tireless and dedicated service, your advocacy for human rights, your leadership in 

representing us at the United Nations, and your passion for the 

difficult and demanding mission that you are carrying out on behalf of our Nation. 

I share the concerns expressed by many colleagues about the active enforcement of the JCPOA and ongoing work to enforce U.N. 

Security Council resolutions. 

I was pleased to hear there is an upcoming meeting of finance 

ministers around the U.N. Security Council and look forward to 

continuing to work closely with you and Secretary Lew and others 

in the administration to make sure that we are using all the tools 

we can to enforce the sanctions that remain in place and to re-impose sanctions, should Iranian behavior demonstrate the necessity 

of doing so. 

I have had the opportunity to visit U.N. peacekeepers in the field 

in a number countries, and have seen both the positive that they 

can accomplish in countries like Liberia and the DRC, and some of 

the very real challenges, particularly where, as you noted in your 

opening testimony, there is a disconnect between the mission to 

protect civilians and the training equipment, leadership, and inclination or will to do so. 

So start, if you would, by just focusing on whether there is a mismatch between U.N. Security Council mandates and what troopcontributor countries are really trained and prepared to do. 

I was very encouraged by the President’s leadership in renewing 

a call to more advanced militaries to deliver not just logistics and 

intelligence and supplies, but trainers and troops. 

How do we connect the mandates, the mission, and the capacity 

to deliver in the field? 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Senator. 

Let me come back, maybe if I could, just by way of response to 

something Senator Corker mentioned before, which is the contrast 

with NATO. I mean, I just want to underscore this really is an example where we have national security interests in peacekeepers, 

in troops from other countries, performing ably. This is not a 

NATO situation where we are carrying a disproportionate share of 

the troop burden. We are carrying a large share of the financial 

burden. And that is something, again, we are working to ensure is 

allocated more fairly. 

I think on the mandate troop-contributor disconnect, which is 

real, and I think it is real across the board, the first thing you have 

to do is get more quality troops. It has been, as you know well, a 

supply-driven market insofar as the U.N. basically goes begging 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

25 

bowl in hand to different countries. There is no standing army that 

exists in New York. The Secretary General does not have anything 

at his disposal beyond what he can extract from U.N. member 

states. 

That process had yielded a very uneven set of troops and police 

to participate in these missions, some who have extensive military 

experience at home and we know are capable troops, but once they 

get in a peacekeeping setting, they do not fundamentally believe in 

a civilian protection mandate. They want to go back to traditional 

principles of peacekeeping, the way peacekeeping was done back in 

the 1970s and 1980s. And that is just not the world we are in. 

So I think the first answer is you increase the sophistication, the 

training, the professionalization of the troops, and there is going to 

be an effect on the ability to perform the mandates. 

But the second answer is on us, as a permanent member of the 

Security Council, which is, there needs to be more prioritization in 

the way that these mandates are put in place. It is hard in the real 

world to prioritize, because you look at a situation like that in 

South Sudan or that in Congo, and what of the tasks that those 

peacekeepers are slated to perform would you give up? Would you 

give up demobilization? Would you give up security sector reform? 

Would you give up human rights monitoring? Would you give up 

attention to child soldiers or sexual violence? Of course not. 

So you need to make sure that the missions are right-sized. You 

need, maybe, to do some sequencing in terms of building out some 

of those capabilities over time. And the U.N. country team and our 

bilateral assistance also needs to be involved in strengthening state 

institutions, because fundamentally whether it is the Central African Republic or eastern Congo or South Sudan, U.N. peacekeepers 

de facto are having to perform the work of states, because the 

states themselves are so weak. 

And so, again, there is no panacea. And for all of the complaints 

that we have about U.N. peacekeeping, I would challenge all of us 

to imagine what any one of those countries would be like without 

this somewhat stabilizing presence. But it is not going to be a cureall for as long as you have state institutions that do not function, 

or leaders that are corrupt, or militia on the loose who are interested in carrying out horrors against their civilians. 

Senator COONS. I have seen exactly those challenges in the countries I referenced, among others. So I continue as an appropriator 

to advocate for funding peacekeeping and for dealing with some of 

these challenges. So it is very encouraging for me to see your engagement and hard work on reform, because for this to be cost-effective and yet reflect our values, we need to make some real 

progress in the areas around accountability and protection of civilians that you have referenced. 

Let me just ask sort of a last question and then take what time 

you have left to answer. I am concerned about sort of growing the 

universe of capable peacekeepers, both in Africa and globally. 

China made a pledge of a standby force of 8,000 peacekeepers, and 

I am interested in what you think is the future, where they will 

or will not be deployed, what this commitment means. And I am 

concerned about the African Union and A–Prep, and would love to 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

26 

hear how you see that playing out going forward, and how we can 

sustain that investment in a continent-wide force. 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you. 

Well, again, I just want to stress how unusual President Obama’s 

personal leadership on this has been. And he has basically told us 

that anything he can do to ensure that these commitments are followed through on, he is prepared to invest his own time, and the 

Vice President the same. 

So we are dealing with a set of challenges at a level that I do 

not think we have seen before, and with a degree of aggressiveness 

that we have not seen before from the United States, notwithstanding the fact that, again, on a bipartisan basis I think successive administrations have seen the value of this tool in the American and multilateral toolbox. 

I think that the A–Prep and the China question kind of come together a little bit. We have a major issue in terms of the delay between the time a mandate is given a U.N. peacekeeping force and 

the time in which troops and police are deployed into theater. 

Now again, some of this just goes back to the troop-contributing 

countries and their ability to turn on a dime, and train, and get 

configured, and get their equipment all lined up. 

A–Prep is designed to take the six militaries, all of whom are 

have a good record within peacekeeping of being aggressive in protecting civilians and having the political will to go to dangerous 

places, and we aim to then ensure through deepening our provision 

of equipment and the particular forms of training we offer, that 

they can get into the theater more quickly than they have been up 

to this point. A lot of them lack their own ability to lift themselves, 

so sometimes we have to be involved, as we were in the Central 

African Republic for the Burundians and Rwandans, to swoop in 

and actually carry people into harm’s way. But they need to acquire, over time, the lift and the self-sustainment, and, again, this 

ability to if not be formally on standby, to be ready to go when the 

911 comes. 

China’s commitment of 8,000 troops is a very large piece of business and was a very significant announcement out of President 

Obama’s summit. I do not think we, yet, have a sense, nor does the 

U.N., of how they imagine allocating that set of forces over time. 

Right now, they have just deployed their first infantry battalion 

ever, and that is in South Sudan. The reports are quite promising 

in terms of how active those troops are, out and about, but also 

protecting civilians in the displaced person camps. 

So we need to look and see how the U.N. chooses to use that 

commitment. 

Rapid response, if that were something that China could put on 

offer, where you could actually lose less time between the time the 

international community comes together with a consensus that a 

mission is needed and the time when troops show up. I mean, in 

South Sudan we are 2 years after the original deployment, and 

they are still not at full troop strength. And that is a recurring pattern. So we would welcome rapid response. 

Of course, we also need to make sure that any peacekeeper that 

deploys has the mindset where they are willing to protect civilians 

and put themselves at risk for the sake of the mandate. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

27 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Gardner? 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Madam Ambassador, for your time and testimony today. And, of course, thank you as well for your service to 

this country. 

I want to follow up a little bit on what Chairman Corker and 

Senator Perdue were asking about, and that is Security Council 

Resolutions 1929 and 2231. Of course, we know there was a second 

ballistic missile test from Iran, which was a clear violation of these 

resolutions. 

After the first launch in October, we referred, as you said, the 

matter to the United Nations, and called on it to ‘‘review this matter quickly and recommend appropriate action.’’ On October 22, I 

believe you stated, and I quote, ‘‘The United States will continue 

to press the Security Council to respond effectively to any future 

violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Full and robust enforcement of all relevant U.N. measures is and will remain critical.’’ 

So as of today, has the United Nations Security Council or sanctions committee taken any actions in response to the Iranian missile test? And I believe the answer is, no, they are meeting Tuesday. Is that correct? 

Ambassador POWER. Yes. Beyond having Security Council discussions of the matter, there has been no follow-on action. Discussions 

are a form of U.N. action. It is a little bit like hearing is a form 

of congressional action. So we have had multiple discussions. 

Senator GARDNER. The Tuesday meeting, can you describe the 

actions that will be taken in that Tuesday meeting? 

Ambassador POWER. We will hear back. Well, we will actually 

probably not yet hear back from the panel of experts. But if we are 

in a position to confirm the recent launch, this is something that 

we would bring to the council. We are not yet in a position to confirm, but are looking to confirm those reports, if warranted. 

And again, we will get an update from the U.N. in terms of when 

the panel of experts’ report is going to come back. 

Senator GARDNER. And so this launch needs to be confirmed, but 

the last launch, we still have not taken any action on the last 

launch? 

Ambassador POWER. Again, we have taken action. 

Senator GARDNER. What are those actions? 

Ambassador POWER. We confirmed the violation. We brought it 

to the U.N. Security Council, and the panel of experts is investigating the matter and will report back. 

Senator GARDNER. So what other actions has the administration 

taken in response to the missile test, other than taking it to the 

panel, talking about it, and having a meeting? 

Ambassador POWER. We are looking also, as I mentioned earlier, 

at the bilateral sanctions tools that we have at our disposal. So 

that is something, again, that the Treasury Department is following up on. 

Senator GARDNER. What unilateral measures are we considering? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

28 

Ambassador POWER. I believe sanctions designations, bearing in 

mind that that most actors—I shouldn’t say ‘‘most’’—many of the 

actors involved in ballistic missile launches in the program itself 

are already sanctioned under U.S. law. 

Senator GARDNER. And are we considering stopping sanctions relief from proceeding or rescinded any previous relief, as a result of 

these actions? 

Ambassador POWER. The JCPOA, as you know, the sanctions relief associated with the JCPOA, will not occur until after the initial 

steps have been taken and the IAEA has verified that those initial 

nuclear-related steps are taken. 

But I want to underscore, again, that the point of the JCPOA is 

to dismantle Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and that is a really 

important area of emphasis for us. 

Senator GARDNER. So more important than the ballistic missile 

concerns? 

Ambassador POWER. I do not want to talk about relative importance, but taking away Iran’s—I think this is something all of us 

can agree upon—actually ensuring that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon is a huge priority. 

Senator GARDNER. You mentioned in your opening statement, 

you said, and I quote, ‘‘exploit vacuum of authority.’’ I think you 

were referring to actors in the Middle East and other terrorists, 

that they were maybe trying to exploit a vacuum of authority. 

By not imposing sanctions, by not designating individuals, by not 

doing anything other than talking, are we not allowing exploitation 

of a vacuum of authority? 

Ambassador POWER. This administration has put in place, in the 

case of the Iran sanctions regime, as you know, this body, the Congress, in the first instance, and then amplified and extended by 

what we have done at the U.N., the most devastating sanctions regime in the 70-year history of the United Nations. 

So I do not think there is a void or a vacuum. Iran has seen the 

consequences of violating international norms. We also have a 

sanction snapback provision that I think few around the world 

would have thought we could have secured as part of this deal, 

which would allow any single country to snap back in the event of 

significant noncompliance with the deal. 

So sanctions are a really important tool. The sanctions that this 

Congress has put in place is one reason we are in the position we 

are now to ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon. 

Senator GARDNER. But nothing has been done, other than a 

meeting coming up on Tuesday with a panel of experts on a ballistic missile violation. 

Ambassador POWER. We have increased, and will continue to increase, the political cost to Iran when it violates U.N. Security 

Council resolutions. 

Senator GARDNER. Could you give me an example of that? 

Ambassador POWER. The work that Iran does to try to ensure 

that the U.N. Security Council does not even discuss ballistic missile launches, I assure you, is a testament to actually the stigma 

that they still associate with our bringing these issues before the 

Security Council, the same with the panel of experts actually discussing this and documenting any violation. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

29 

This is something that Iran, which, of course, wants to become 

a nation like any other nation within the U.N., they find it very 

frustrating that they continue to be scrutinized. They have never 

recognized, as you know, the U.N. Security Council resolutions, so 

the fact that the council keeps functioning, keeps oversight, keeps 

the spotlight on, increases the political cost, is an important step. 

Senator GARDNER. In October, many members of this committee 

sent a letter to the Secretary of State talking about Iran’s October 

10 ballistic missile. The letter talks about a range of unilateral, 

multilateral tools available to counter Iran’s missile-related activities on past occasions, imposed penalties under domestic authorities on foreign persons and entities engaged in proliferation activities. 

But we have done nothing. We have imposed no penalties under 

domestic authorities or on foreign persons and entities, as a result 

of these two launches. Is that correct? 

Ambassador POWER. I want to just underscore the importance of 

the broader ballistic missile defense efforts that we make. I feel 

like I have answered the question you have just posed several 

times, so let me try a different broadening approach, which is our 

response to Iranian ballistic missile launches is also a defense response. It is also the Proliferation Security Initiative. It is everything that has come out of Camp David and our engagement with 

the Gulf countries to ensure interoperability. It is the Iron Dome 

and all of the other bilateral defense arrangements that we have 

with the country of Israel, many of which are getting deepened, as 

you know, in consultations. 

Senator GARDNER. They have launched twice. Is that working? If 

they have had two launches now, one in October, one recently, is 

it—— 

Ambassador POWER. I mean, if one is thinking in terms of regional defense, one has to take measures in order to try to ensure 

that our partners in the region have the tools to defend themselves. 

Even if you had a designation against someone involved in the 

ballistic missiles program, the number one deterrent and preventive measure is going to be regional defense. That is where our emphasis was. 

If I were here and we had designated another actor bilaterally— 

let us say we find one that has not already been designated and 

designate, I do not think that that would address your concern 

about Iran’s ballistic missile program, nor should it. 

So again, Iran has systematically ignored U.N. Security Council 

resolutions over the life of the entire international Security Council 

regime. The sanctions themselves were so crippling and brought us 

to the place where we could secure this deal because the other 

countries in the international system would be sanctioned if they 

were engaging with Iran in prohibited behavior. 

Senator GARDNER. This systematic ignoring of the resolutions, 

does that not give you concern about their willingness to comply, 

going forward? 

Ambassador POWER. That is why we have snapback. That is why 

we have verification monitoring on the ground. As the President 

said from the beginning, this is not an agreement predicated on 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

30 

trust, particularly in light of Iran’s past behavior, past behavior, 

again, confirmed by the IAEA PMD report. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before going on to Senator Kaine, I just want to 

reiterate, I think what Ben and I did the other day with you and 

the other members. I think regardless of how people may have 

voted on the Iran agreement, we understand that it is what is governing our actions right now with Iran. And I think on both sides 

of the aisle, regardless of how people voted, we want to make sure 

the agreement is implemented in the way that it was laid out. 

And I think there has been a concern on both sides of the aisle 

that there is an air of permissiveness that is developing that will 

cause the likelihood of any pushback on Iranian violations over 

time to become less real. And I think that is what he’s getting at 

and I think what people on both sides of aisle have been concerned 

about. 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 says they shall not undertake any ballistic activity. Unfortunately, JPOA says ‘‘is called 

upon.’’ I do not know whether Iran views that as permissive language. 

But this is an issue that I think many people on both sides of 

the aisle are concerned about. I cannot speak for everyone. 

And what we are seeing is, again, not very vigilant steps being 

taken, and it is setting a precedent for the future. 

With that, Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And thank you, Ambassador Power. 

You gave an interview to the PBS NewsHour on December 4, and 

you noted that more progress needs to be made in uniting the antiISIL coalition. Would our unified resolve against ISIL be clearer to 

our allies, to our troops, and to ISIL if Congress was willing to finally debate and vote on this matter after 16 months of war? 

Ambassador POWER. Yes, Senator. Thank you for your leadership 

on this issue from the very start. 

I think people are puzzled as to why—people that I work with, 

I should say, day-to-day up at the U.N.—are puzzled, given the priority that the American people and, on a bipartisan basis, both 

houses of Congress attach to the anti-ISIL struggle and all of the 

attention to it that has come over the course of the last 2 years as 

to how we cannot arrive at some consensus in order to be able to 

enshrine in legislation that which we say is true, which is, again, 

that this has the bipartisan backing of the American people and of 

the Congress. 

So I think it would be a really important signal if we could get 

that AUMF done. 

Senator KAINE. I have not done the research on this, but just 

from headlines and my memory, it strikes me that at least three 

of the U.N. Security Council nations—Britain, France, and, I am 

sad to say, Russia—have had their legislative bodies vote to confirm and approve after a debate their military activity against terrorism in Syria and Iraq. Is that correct? 

Ambassador POWER. That is my understanding, as well, and I 

think other countries who are part of the coalition, but not on the 

Security Council, also, we could add to that list. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

31 

Senator KAINE. Germany, for example. 

Ambassador POWER. Denmark, et cetera. 

Senator KAINE. Bundestag acted last week. 

Ambassador POWER. Yes. 

Senator MARKEY. Last week, the chairman of the Senate Armed 

Services Committee, Senator McCain, said this, he did not say this 

approvingly, so I do not want to suggest that he was saying it approvingly, but when he was asked when an authorization vote 

would occur in Congress, he said, ‘‘It may require an attack on the 

United States of America.’’ 

In terms of you being able to do your job well, would it be a good 

idea for Congress to wait that long? 

Ambassador POWER. No, it would not be a good idea for Congress 

to wait that long. I think this should be one issue that everyone 

in this country can agree upon, even those who have differences 

over tactics, over the number of trainers, or different aspects of the 

operations as they are unfolding. Everyone should agree that defeating and degrading ISIL and showing the world that this is 

something that is backed by the Congress, rendering these operations sustainable and enduring over what is a long struggle, 

would just be invaluable. 

Senator KAINE. The President started this war against ISIL on 

August 8, which was 16 months ago yesterday. A year ago Friday, 

the only vote that has happened in Congress, in terms of an authorization, occurred in this committee on December 11, 2014, an 

authorization that was reported to the Senate floor where no action 

was taken on it. 

The RAND Corporation issued a report to the Pentagon this 

week that said relying upon the 2001 and 2002 authorizations at 

a minimum involved legal gymnastics that were not helpful, and 

urged Congress to take action. It is just my hope that we will do 

that, and it is my hope that it will not take a kind of cataclysm 

that was suggested, again, disapprovingly by Senator McCain. I 

think Senator McCain views it the way that I do, that he thinks 

Congress should act. 

Let me ask you this, moving to peacekeeping, a good news story, 

you talked about European nations having scaled back peacekeeping operations. A good news story for this committee and for 

this Congress is Colombia stepping up in September and saying 

they wanted to devote 5,000 troops to the U.N. peacekeeping mission. Colombia is also a peacekeeping participant in the multinational force and observers in the Sinai, as of relatively recently. 

We sometimes wonder whether U.S. engagement on a diplomatic 

way can make a difference. Colombia is an example of failed state 

to international security partner in a way that I think this committee in a bipartisan way can be proud. And, also, three administrations, the Clinton administration, the Bush administration, and 

the Obama administration, have had a dedication to that. 

Talk about nations like Colombia who are coming into providing 

peacekeeping forces for the first time and the degree to which we 

can encourage them. 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Senator. 

We view that commitment in very much the same way. It seemed 

also a real reflection of, however difficult the peace process is, and 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

32 

there is a lot of work left to do, but their confidence they are going 

to get where they need to get to be in a position to free up resources to be part of international peace and security. 

Latin America has a huge contribution to make. One of the significant features of the President’s summit was a number of Latin 

American countries announcing that they were prepared to do 

peacekeeping out of hemisphere, because a lot of Latin American 

countries had been dedicating their forces in Haiti. 

I want to particularly commend Uruguay, because they have actually been taking lead within the region at mobilizing different 

contributions, working with the Colombians, saying this is how it 

worked for us, this is how it will work for you. 

I also want to commend Mexico, which I visited recently, which 

has announced that it will break new ground and be involved in 

peacekeeping for the first time. It is in the midst of discussions 

now with the U.N. as to what form that will take. 

If I could just touch upon, because I think it is such an important 

point, the larger point, the pulling up from Latin America, which 

is the dividend for us when a country makes progress domestically, 

whether in terms of democratization or in terms of conflict resolution. 

I just am back from Sri Lanka, a place that, in the wake of its 

defeat of the LTTE, the people who, in effect, coined the suicide 

bomb, really regressed in terms of creeping authoritarianism, horrible atrocities carried out at the tail end of the war and no accountability for that. 

Now there has been a change in government. Not only do we see 

them domestically taking on issues of accountability, trying to work 

on reconciliation with the Tamil population, but we also see their 

behavior within international institutions transformed, also making a very substantial commitment to peacekeeping, the stand they 

take on human rights resolutions, on Syria, on North Korea, et 

cetera, shifting. 

So I want to just dwell on this point because sometimes one looks 

at the U.N. and it is just this black box where we are not getting 

the returns that we want, we are not getting the votes that we 

want. The way the U.N. changes over time is countries that comprise it change, and they become more at peace within themselves. 

They democratize. Their institutions get stronger. And we see a 

payoff, again, in terms of the critical mass of countries then that 

we have as partners in New York to work with. 

Right now, it is still the case, though, that more than half the 

countries in the U.N. are not democratic. That affects the extent 

to which the U.N. is going to be a tool on democracy promotion or 

human rights enforcement, et cetera. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The vote has gone off, and Senator 

Isakson is next. After him is Senator Menendez. 

I would ask you, if you would, to chair the meeting while you are 

asking questions. 

Senator ISAKSON. I am going to be very brief, because I have to 

go to the floor, too. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

33 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, then Senator Murphy is next after Senator 

Menendez. If we would just keep it going, and I am going to bolt 

and come back. And thank you both very much. I know it will be 

orderly, regardless. 

Senator ISAKSON. So you want me to yield to Senator Murphy 

after I finish? 

The CHAIRMAN. If Menendez is not back. Thank you. 

Senator ISAKSON. [Presiding] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you for calling this hearing. I am going to be very brief, because I have to do a part of this in just a minute on the floor. 

But required reading of every Member of Congress and of every 

Ambassador to the United Nations ought to be Samantha Power’s 

book ‘‘A Problem from U.N. .’’ If that book had been read, a lot of 

the problems we are talking about today in peacekeeping missions 

and rape being used as a military tactic and things like that, we 

would be a lot further along than we are today. That is a great 

book and everybody should read it. 

Senator Corker and I went to Rwanda. We know about the Kigali 

Principles, and that is my first question to you. 

As a country, have we adopted the Kigali Principles? Has the 

United States of America done that? 

Ambassador POWER. As you know, we are not a substantial contributor to peacekeeping. So these principals so far have been embraced by the big countries that are putting thousands of troops in 

harm’s way. We have 40 police officer and 40 military officers, all 

of whom we are incredibly grateful for. 

So we have not yet, but more for that reason than any substantive objection. If you support our joining, I can convey that 

back. 

Senator ISAKSON. Let me make my point. When I read your 

speech last night, you did not include this part in the speech, but 

it is in the printed speech, you talked the Kigali Principles and 

what they were developed from, which was a learning lesson, I 

think, from what you pointed out in ‘‘A Problem from U.N. ,’’ your 

book. 

The Kigali Principles, as I understand it, is that peacekeepers, 

their countries need to affirm that their troops will have the authorization to use force when necessary and do not have to radio 

back to headquarters to get approval. Is that correct? 

Ambassador POWER. Correct, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. That is our problem in the Middle East right 

now, in terms of the United States. I do not think we have enough 

of that type of authorization for the rules of engagement of our own 

troops. I commend you for raising it on this question. But I think 

it is a bigger question, in terms of our being able to be effective, 

and that is to have the troops in the field that you have deployed, 

either for peacekeeping or for war, if you are at war, to have the 

actual authority for use of force they need to carry out their mission. 

It kind of struck me that we were congratulating Sri Lanka and 

Korea and a lot of people who provide peacekeeping troops. Yet we 

as a country have very limited rules of engagement authorization 

right now as a practice in our own country. So that is my reason 

for bringing the point up. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

34 

Ambassador POWER. If I may just respond briefly, Senator, while 

you are here. You know, my impression is not that. I think that 

what President Obama has conveyed to the Secretary of Defense 

and to the chairman and to his commander, General Austin and 

the commanders on the ground, is a desire to offer strategic guidance, discuss any big shifts in the strategy at a senior level to 

make sure everybody is on the same page. 

But there is a huge amount of tactical and operational flexibility 

that these commanders have. And I think you have seen, certainly, 

the President say publically what he has also conveyed many times 

privately in the Situation Room, which is, if there are ideas for how 

we can pursue this campaign more expeditiously in ways that increase the security dividend for the American people sooner, I want 

to see those ideas. 

And so I am in these meetings where we are discussing the way 

ahead in our anti-ISIL strategy, and I, again, have not heard the 

commanders not getting the flexibility that they seek. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you for your answer, and thank you for 

your service. 

My last question is not a question but a statement, and that is 

to thank you. Your wagon is loaded and gets a new load every day, 

and I think you are doing a terrific job. But I would underscore, 

as I leave, Senator Cardin’s remarks, and those of Senator Perdue 

and the chairman, the more transparency, the better for the U.N. 

There is a lot of suspicion, a lot of misunderstandings. And there 

is a lot of lack of trust out there in the general public. The more 

transparency we can have, particularly on who is paying what and 

how they are paying their share, would be helpful to the U.N. mission in having the support it really needs to carry out its intent 

from the beginning. 

Ambassador POWER. Well, Senator, that gives me the chance to 

invite you to New York so you can get immersed in those budget 

numbers firsthand. But we would really welcome visits by members of this body, and we would give you a good and deep tour of 

the U.N. and so many of the Africa-related issues that you have 

worked so hard on. 

As you know, the U.N. is on the frontlines. 

Senator ISAKSON. Invitation accepted. 

Ambassador POWER. Okay, great. Thank you. 

Senator ISAKSON. Senator Murphy? 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

Good morning, Ambassador Power. 

The evening of the President’s Sunday night speech, there was 

a series of social media postings by a really wonderful reporter 

from the New York Times, Rukmini Callimachi. She wrote a piece 

based on those observations the next day and the title was ‘‘U.S. 

Strategy Seeks to Avoid ISIS Prophecy.’’ And the idea is that, if 

you really understand the fundamentals, the building blocks, of the 

religious perversion of ISIS, it is built upon a prophecy, a hope, a 

belief, that ultimately they are going to be in a military contest on 

the ground with the United States and with Western powers. I suspect that that acknowledgement is part of what made the President 

in that speech talk about not only the things we should do but the 

things we shouldn’t do. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

35 

I understand that we are not going to be putting U.N. peacekeepers on the ground inside a complicated, violent civil war any 

time soon, but from a broader perspective, can you talk about, as 

we try to confront organizations that are in countries like Mali that 

have peacekeeping forces, that are trying to goad the West and, in 

particular, the United States into a military confrontation, why 

multinational and multiethnic forces are going to be perhaps best 

positioned, much better positioned than a majority U.S. force, to try 

to preserve peace and order? And maybe as part of that answer, 

talk about the contributions that majority-Muslim nations make to 

peacekeeping or could or should make in the future, if that is 

amongst the reasons why we should be paying more attention to 

investment in peacekeeping. 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Senator Murphy. It is a complex 

question and set of ideas within it. 

I think a key to effective deployments is legitimacy. And one of 

the things that multinational deployments can offer, but can also 

forfeit, as we have been talking about in the context of sexual 

abuse, is a perception of legitimacy, a perception that the whole 

world is behind a peacekeeping mission. 

In truth, I think have a 65-nation coalition also enhances legitimacy. And the fact that countries from the region are part of that 

against ISIL is very important. It was something that was very important to the President to secure that kind of regional support. 

The one thing that I would note in areas where terrorists are active, and Mali now with 44 deaths of peacekeepers just over the life 

of a mission that has been in place only a few years underscores, 

is that there can be a mismatch between U.N. peacekeeping and 

even robust U.N. peacekeeping, which we support, and the Kigali 

Principles show that a lot of other troop-contributing countries support, and these kinds of environments where extremists and terrorists, yes, they may make the United States their number one target, if they have that opportunity, but if there are no Americans 

around, they are also perfectly prepared to target Chadians and 

Dutch peacekeepers and Burkina Faso peacekeepers. 

So I want to stress that I agree very much, I think, with the logic 

of the article that you have described and found it a very powerful 

look at ISIL’s ideology. 

I will use the question as an occasion to alert the committee to 

the extent to which peacekeeping is being increasingly seen as a 

soft target for terrorists and extremists in those environments that 

they inhabit. And we have a really significant national interest in 

hardening these missions, in ensuring that they have the training 

they need to operate in these evermore not only complex environments because conflict is still going on, but complex because you 

combine conflict and the actual fact that the peacekeepers themselves are a target. 

And just to give you one example of how I think the Defense Department has been responsive in this regard, we are now doing 

more and more counter-IED training for peacekeepers. I mean, talk 

about not your mother’s peacekeeping. If anybody would have 

imagined at the outset of peacekeeping that people would have to 

train against IEDs that were presumably targeting the peaceFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

36 

keepers themselves, I am not sure peacekeeping would have ever 

gotten off the ground. 

So I think your larger point is right. Having countries who know 

the language, I think that is a critical component, that have cultural overlap with those countries in which they are operating is 

really important. 

The only other challenge is that sometimes countries can be too 

familiar with a country. One of the reasons the international community went to U.N. peacekeeping in the first place is to try to inject actually more distance so there would be a greater perception 

of independence and one would not be seen as being a stakeholder 

on one side or the other. 

So all of these factors, I think, need to be taken into account. 

Senator MURPHY. [Presiding] Well, thank you. And let me add 

my thanks to Senator Isakson for the number of heavy lifts that 

you undertake for us every day in New York. Thank you for your 

time. 

And I will turn it over to Senator Menendez. 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

And in appreciation of the chairman’s courtesies, I am not going 

to ask for unanimous consent for anything I want right now, since 

I am here alone. [Laughter.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. So let me let me, first of all, Ambassador, 

say I appreciate your service to our country, and I have a high regard for you. 

And my own personal view is that, left to your own devices, on 

some issues, you might be more forward-leaning. You do not need 

to respond to that. It is just my observation. 

Having said that, however, let me enlarge this conversation 

about peacekeeping. I know some of my colleagues have broached 

this subject already. 

Peacekeeping is, yes, very important in the sense of what the 

core of this hearing is about, but part of the way in which you keep 

the peace is to make sure that the will of the international community is observed and that it is not violated, and if it is violated, that 

there are consequences so that, hopefully, a continuation of that 

breach does not lead to the outbreak of war and, therefore, what 

flows from that. 

So I want to come to the issue of Iran. I know several of my colleagues have pursued the core of the missile test. But first of all, 

I would like to ask you, would you agree with me that for well over 

a decade, Iran, as you have said in response to some of my colleagues’ questions, did not recognize U.N. Security Council resolutions and moved their nuclear program forward to a point in which 

it got so big—too-big-to-fail, in the bank context? Well, this was too 

big to actually end. 

So they violated the international will purposely, and in doing so 

were able to get to a point that they largely wanted to. Would that 

be a fair observation? 

Ambassador POWER. Yes, they violated international resolutions 

and built up their program. Again, I think this is probably not the 

venue to get into the extent of the program. 

Senator MENENDEZ. No. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Ambassador POWER. But such that—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. That is pretty well-documented. 

Ambassador POWER. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But in any event, and in plenty of public discourse, as well. 

But the point is they violated international resolutions for—— 

Ambassador POWER. Absolutely. 

Senator MENENDEZ.—the better part of a decade. 

Ambassador POWER. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And during those violations, they progressed, for a good period of time without the type of sanctions regime that was largely generated by the Congress, not by the executive branch. 

And so I look at that, and I look at your acknowledgement that 

they have not recognized Security Council resolutions, and I say to 

myself, there is a history here and a pattern. If you go visit the 

Archives building with me, over its mantel it says, ‘‘What is past 

is prologue.’’ 

And I have a real concern that what we have here is a lack of 

will by the United States and as a leader in this regard by our 

partners in going ahead and making sure that Iran understands 

that you cannot violate the international will without consequence, 

which I consider, even as I did not support the agreement, that to 

the extent that the agreement is going to produce any benefits, 

Iran must clearly understand that there will be consequences for 

not following that agreement. 

And the message it seems to me that we are sending and that 

we have sent as a country in various iterations is quite the contrary. 

So we, basically, have no real action. I heard your responses 

about referring it to the committee and having discussions. I get 

the U.N. process. But the bottom line is there have been no real 

actions, no consequence. 

Now they have a second test, and we are talking about verifying. 

But at the end of the day, it took place and there will be no real 

consequence. 

We would like to see the Security Council be the venue for a 

multilateral consequence, but we hear nothing in the interim about 

an individual consequence. 

We see a set of circumstances in which I predicted as well as a 

whole host of others that on the question of Parchin, we were going 

to basically sweep this under the rug and ultimately dismiss it, 

which is now the resolution that is presently being circulated at 

the IAEA to close this chapter, because we want something bad 

enough we are willing to go ahead and overlook. In doing so, I 

think we make a grave mistake. 

We did that with Cuba, because we wanted to create relations 

with Cuba even though they violated Security Council resolutions 

and shipped missiles and MiGs under tons of sugar to North Korea. 

Nothing happened to them. 

So when we want something bad enough—when I say ‘‘we,’’ the 

administration wants something bad enough—they are willing to 

overlook. And that is a dangerous proposition, a dangerous proposition. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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So what is it that we are going to do to send a real, clear, unequivocal, unambiguous message to the Iranians, because we were 

all assured here that notwithstanding the nuclear portfolio, that we 

could be robustly active and take actions on nonnuclear issues. 

Well, this is a nonnuclear issue. And conversation is not an action. 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Senator. 

So let me use this also as an occasion, since Senator Corker is 

back, to address a comment he made earlier, which is in keeping 

with what you are saying, which is his impression of a kind of 

greater permissiveness and your statement that somehow if you 

want it bad enough, you are willing to overlook, et cetera. 

The way that this administration and our predecessors responded in New York to prior recurrent, as it happens over the life 

of the regime, violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions has 

not changed. There is no difference in the way that we go through 

this procedure, what we seek to do in New York at the U.N. Security Council. And, frankly, there is not even much difference in 

terms of the kinds of resistance we face from predictable quarters. 

The Security Council regime, as you well know, built out and 

force multiplied on the sanctions that Congress put in place. And 

it is that regime that caused Iran to make a series of concessions 

that for I think the three of you here were not deemed satisfactory, 

but went well beyond what would have been achievable without the 

sanctions regime, and gives us the confidence, again, that this is 

a good deal and one that will dismantle Iran’s nuclear weapons 

program. 

The objective we have—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. With all due respect, I am not talking about 

the deal anymore. We are past that. 

Ambassador POWER. No, we are talking about implementation of 

the deal. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I am talking about making sure that we 

have enforcement of Security Council resolutions that are meaningful. 

Ambassador POWER. Agreed. Agreed. 

But, again, sort of the accusation is that we are seeing things differently than you, because we have a vested interest in seeing this 

deal implemented. We have a collective, as I think all of you agree, 

vested interest in seeing this deal implemented, because we do not 

want Iran to ever obtain a nuclear weapon. That is our objective. 

And we have put in place measures. It is the expanded 

verification and monitoring, and even the PMD. For all of the dissatisfaction that has been expressed about the report and our approach to it, fundamentally, the IAEA was able to get access to 

Parchin in a way that it had not been able to in the past. 

The snapback of the sanctions regime is an incredibly important 

tool in our arsenal, and it is leverage. Senator Corker said the 

other day to the Security Council that we will have given up all 

our leverage on the frontend. That is just not true. We will have 

that hanging over implementation, reporting of violations, going 

forward. And we will have in our toolbox the bilateral sanctions 

measures as a way of responding to lesser incidents of noncompliance and lesser violations. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

39 

So, again, the U.N. Security Council is one venue, and we will 

do as we have been doing for a decade, which is call a spade a 

spade, bring forward violations, increase the political cost, ensure 

that Iran is isolated for its violations of 1929 now and 2231, once 

the implementation day progresses. 

But we also have a set of other tools aimed at getting at Iranian 

bad behavior, including ones on this body. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may, since my time has 

expired, let me just make a comment. 

You know, I appreciate your answer. You are very good at answering, but not answering. 

So let me just say that you talk about snapback, those sanctions 

that you admit and the administration has increasingly admitted 

brought Iran to the table, they expire this coming year. And you 

all negotiated away, at least as I read the agreement, the ability 

for the administration to support a reauthorization of it, which I 

intend push for, because the snapback means nothing if cannot 

snap back to something that is meaningful. And the administration 

just will not talk about that reauthorization, because, as I read the 

agreement, they do not have the wherewithal to agree to a reauthorization. They gave it away. 

And then the last point, another example, enforcing Resolution 

1701, the transfer of arms to Hezbollah. During the review of Iran 

nuclear agreement and defending the lifting of the U.N. arms embargo, the administration repeatedly emphasized that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 remains in place, and that prevents 

the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, and we are going to make 

sure that that is the case. 

Well, since the announcement of the JCPOA, Hezbollah has continued to receive arms from outside of Lebanon. So what steps have 

UNIFIL taken to stop the transfer of arms to Hezbollah? What 

steps have we taken to stop those transfers? 

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Senator. I addressed this question earlier for Senator Perdue, but it is a very important question. 

I think the point that was made over the course of the discussion 

about the JCPOA is that authorities, that this body and we were 

understandably concerned, were going away or could go away at 

some point under the JCPOA. Many of those authorities were elsewhere in other Security Council resolutions. So I think that was 

the implication of 1701, in that context. 

Look, as I said earlier, Hezbollah is a terrorist organization, and 

UNIFIL is a peacekeeping mission. UNIFIL’s job is to do everything in its power to deter Hezbollah from amassing weapons, to 

call a spade a spade, and to call them out when they are, to alert 

us and other stakeholders to anything that comes to their attention 

that, again, is alarming in this regard. 

As you know, over the life of UNIFIL, I think it has had a constructive effect on events on the ground. I do not think the Government of Israel would support its perpetuation if it had not. But is 

it a panacea for Hezbollah? No, it is not. And, no, it will not be. 

I think that we have really pressed the U.N. to step up its reporting and to sound the alarm and to shine the spotlight and to 

do the things that it can do. But in terms of armed confrontation 

with Hezbollah, that is not something UNIFIL is perusing. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

40 

We are also trying to enhance the capabilities of troops who comprise UNIFIL, which is one of the stronger missions, because of the 

European presence. And we are hopeful, again, that the peacekeeping summit that the President chaired will give us a broader 

pool of troops to draw from, so as to make sure that that mission 

is right-sized. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just 

say that no consequences is a green light to violations. And that 

is what I see us doing. 

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding] Thank you. 

Before I turn to Senator Markey, while Senator Menendez is 

here, it is true that it is highly unlikely that the U.N. Security 

Council will take any actions relative to the violations of UNSCR 

1929. Is that correct? 

Ambassador POWER. Again, we have already taken action. 

The CHAIRMAN. The answer is yes. 

Ambassador POWER. We have already taken action. 

The CHAIRMAN. But—— 

Ambassador POWER. We have brought the issue to the Council. 

This is what we did—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But I am talking about as far as sanctions, penalties. 

Ambassador POWER. I would not assess that—— 

The CHAIRMAN. It is not likely that Russia or China will go along 

with—— 

Ambassador POWER. I share your assessment on Russia and 

China. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, so let me just say this. 

Ambassador POWER. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. When you say that it is untrue what I said, relative to—— 

Ambassador POWER. That the administration was being more 

permissive in terms of sanctions violations. That was what I heard 

you say. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will see. Nothing has happened yet. 

What I said was that the leverage shifts to Iran. They are at 

breakneck speed dismantling so that they get the sanctions relief 

they are after, which we would expect. Now people believe that in 

January or February, they will get all of the sanctions relief they 

are after. 

And for you to say that snapback is a real tool when it is contingent upon the countries that are participating implementing back 

those sanctions, and we have countries like Russia and China, 

which probably, likely, we know, are not going to push back 

against this issue. 

If there are incremental violations, all of the leverage is with 

Iran. That is a fact. It is not incorrect. It is with Iran because there 

is no way that this administration is going to consider challenging 

an incremental violation because they know all Iran has to do is 

step out. And they know that Russia and China and, candidly, 

probably our Western friends in Europe are not really going to 

force them to comply. 

So it is a true statement, not an untrue statement, that the leverage ends up with Iran because they have what they want. We 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

41 

have given it up, and we have partners at the U.N. Security Council that are not going to cooperate with us. 

Senator Markey? 

Senator CARDIN. Let me just interject for one second. I apologize 

to Senator Markey. 

I think a lot of us share that frustration. I would just urge us 

to work with our European allies on the timing of a response to the 

violation of the ballistic missiles. 

We all share the frustration that there is unlikely to be sanction 

action by the Security Council, but if we demonstrate action with 

our European partners, particularly in the P5, I think it would be 

a signal to Iran that these types of activities are not going to go 

unchallenged. 

Ambassador POWER. Senator Markey, would you mind if I just 

respond very briefly? I am so sorry. 

But I want to underscore that when we went to the council once 

we confirmed the violation on October 10, we did so with the 

United Kingdom, with France, and with Germany. And I think 

doing something like that irrespective of what further tangible outcome we were able to secure from the council is going to be very 

important in perhaps even broadening that. 

Mr. Chairman, the one thing I feel compelled to say is that when 

you say they are going with breakneck speed to dismantle, it is 

very important to remember that that is a good thing. That is what 

we want, that breakneck speed, the dismantlement. 

So understanding again that there is pay for performance as part 

of the deal, that is the way that we have incentivized them moving 

forward and allowing the inspectors in. 

But sometimes in the way that this is discussed, you would think 

that that is not a good thing. That is a good thing. That is the 

point of the deal, to get them to dismantle their program. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, I understand that. I understand they are dismantling antique centrifuges, and we are allowing them to continue development of IR–2s, IR–4s, IR-6s, IR–8s. I understand that. 

And look, again, I do not want to re-debate the agreement. What 

I think we are focused on right now is that the international community knows that they violated UNSCR 1929, and in essence, 

they are violating the spirit of JPOA, where they are called upon 

not to do this. And we all know that the U.N. Security Council is 

not going to take action. 

That is what is important to us, because we believe that after 

they get the sanctions relief, after they dismantle these antiques 

that they are using right now, these IR–1s, that they are going to 

push the envelope. 

And we believe that you and others there, by not taking even bilateral action yet, are helping create an air of permissiveness. 

Even though we like you and respect you, we have a policy difference here. This is not directed at you. It is directed at the U.N. 

Security Council. 

Senator Markey? 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Thank you for all your great work, Ambassador. I know it is 

global and complex, but you just serve our country so well. Thank 

you. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

42 

Could we come back, if we could for a second, to Syria? When I 

look at Assad, when I look at all of his supporters inside of the 

country, he has upwards of 30 percent of the army as Sunni soldiers who will not be viewed well when there is a peace agreement 

by the other Sunni soldiers that have been trying to depose Assad 

for all these years—similarly, the Alawite soldiers who are fighting 

for him. 

So they will be looking for protection, if there is a peace agreement. And I think Secretary Kerry and his entire team are doing 

a great job in moving us toward that. But there will have to be protection for these people to avoid—and I think they would be foolish 

not to anticipate this—what happened in Iraq, what happened in 

Libya, what happened in Egypt. 

So they are going to be looking for protection, and that kind of 

looks to the U.N. It looks to these blue-helmeted soldiers to come 

in and to give some level of guarantee that there will protection for 

them if they lay down their guns. 

Otherwise, I do not see a resolution of it. I just see a protracted 

war where no matter how hard you try to negotiate a peaceful settlement, you just wind up with an ever-continuing conflict. 

So could you talk about that a little bit and what role U.N. 

peacekeepers could play in a post-peace agreement, understanding 

that we are far from that, but just looking at, anticipating, a potential role for the U.N. or some other multinational force to move in 

and to give some guarantees? 

Otherwise, I do not think Assad is ever leaving. You just look at 

it from a perspective of human nature and looking at what has 

happened in all these other countries, they will be dead. They will 

be killed. I mean, the revenge motivation is just going to be so 

high, given the tragedy that has affected these other families. And 

then we have yet another cycle that we have participated in. 

So how could the U.N. or another multinational force play a constructive role? 

Ambassador POWER. Well, there is no shortage of very complex 

dimensions to imagining a political settlement for Syria. But you 

put your finger on I think one the hardest issues of all, which 

would be any notional reintegration of Syrian moderate opposition 

forces with Syrian Government troops, whether the air force, which 

have been involved in barrel-bombing and chemical weapons use, 

or the infantry. I mean, it is going to be extremely difficult. And 

as you say, we are not at this point of the discussions. 

But in order for there to be an agreement on a political transition by mutual consent, which is the catchphrase from Geneva and 

is the operative principle for Vienna, that is going to be one of the 

questions that both sides are asking, because it cuts in the other 

direction as well. When moderate opposition forces go back to their 

home communities from which they have been purged, what happens to them if the forces in control remain, in large, government 

forces? 

So where that confidence-building comes from, who the guarantors are of any kind of reintegration—and this gets back to Senator 

Cardin’s question earlier—what the accountability mechanism is 

whereby there can be some healing or truth telling and punishFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

43 

ment for those who committed the worst violations, all of those modalities have to be worked through. 

Senator MARKEY. On both sides. 

Ambassador POWER. On both sides, again, yes, absolutely. 

Now in terms of the near term, we have ISIL with a very extensive presence in Syria that is shrinking but nonetheless would be 

a significant consideration for any outside country thinking about 

deploying troops to Syria. We have al Qaeda’s affiliate al-Nusra as 

well. Part of what is being worked through in Vienna, as you know, 

are definitions of who is a terrorist and who is not, so that there 

can be, at a strategic level at least, an idea that everybody can go 

against these forces together. 

But I think what you would need, if one was going with a troop 

presence from the outside, would you would have to make a judgment that a troop presence would do more good than harm, that 

it would invite and create more confidence. To have that confidence, those Alawites and Sunni soldiers on the government side 

and then Sunni moderates on the other side are going to have to 

believe that those troops are going to protect them, if they get attacked. 

If you look at U.N. peacekeeping missions as the first part of the 

hearing, that is not always the case around the world, right? Some 

troop contributors, that is not a role they play eagerly, even if that 

is part of the mandate. 

So then you could look at a regional force or a green-hatted force 

of some kind. You would still ask that question: Are troop contributors ready to invest themselves in enforcing this agreement? Is that 

something that some of our allies would be a part of? 

And the only caution I would give in terms of a regional force, 

which is something I think that is being looked at—again, all the 

costs and benefits of all of these permutations have to be thought 

through. On the one hand, you would have the language. You 

would have the cultural affinities. But in the case of many of the 

regional players, they have been stakeholders in this conflict, so 

the idea is that they would then be seen as impartial. 

So finding a confidence-building mechanism that does not run 

afoul of being seen to be a party to the conflict, and where they 

would be willing to put their troops in harm’s way on behalf of this 

agreement, is going to be one of the challenges we have to think 

through if the parties deem an outside force a necessary part of 

this political agreement. 

Senator MARKEY. I do not see how you can avoid it. I just think 

that the recrimination coefficient is going to be historically high. 

The carnage has just been so great on both sides. And the bitterness, the acrimony will not settle out for decades. And we need 

some mechanism as an intervention that allows for a period of reconciliation, of healing. 

And I think in the absence of a very well thought out plan that 

is put together, and I think it should be put together sooner rather 

than later just a concept that could move in to assuage the concerns that all parties are going to have, that the removal of Assad 

does not ultimately lead to a repetition syndrome breaking out inside of the country in yet a different cycle that seeks to extract a 

revenge against those with whom they have grievances. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

44 

So I just think the sooner we kind of think that through and 

what we are going to put in there, I think the better the conversations that we can have to give some assurances to the more responsible parties who might want to end this war that the death toll 

is not just going to continue to mount. 

So removing Assad is just one step. I think that it has to be accompanied by a set of guarantees that it is just not going to be 

mass carnage afterward. 

But I think I feel very good knowing that you are there and Secretary Kerry is there and thinking all these issues through. Thank 

you so much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you for being with us. I think you 

can see that that we are getting close to the end here. 

I do want to chase just for a moment, if I could, the conversation 

you had with Senator Kaine. 

Do your colleagues at the United Nations think that somehow 

Congress and the American people do not want to defeat ISIS? 

Ambassador POWER. I do not think they would have that impression. My response was that they are puzzled as to why we cannot 

come up with an authorization here together—— 

The CHAIRMAN. And are they puzzled by the fact that the administration has told us over and over and over again here at this committee—Secretary Kerry, Secretary Carter, the White House sending over notes—that they have all the authorities they need to continue the fight against terrorism that was authorized in 2001? Is 

that confusing to them? 

Ambassador POWER. I think, again, I was not speaking—— 

The CHAIRMAN. That is your—— 

Ambassador POWER. If I may, I was not speaking to the legal authorities question. I do not think anybody questions whether or not 

the United States has the authority to carry out the campaign that 

we are carrying out. 

I think the question is, as a political symbol and as reinforcement of the effort that we are making, that there should be an ability to get consensus here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there is consensus. I mean, the President 

has the authority—— 

Ambassador POWER. I am sorry. My response was on an AUMF, 

consensus on an AUMF. 

The CHAIRMAN. It is a little game that is being played. It is difficult for me to understand. I mean, on one hand, witness after witness after witness comes up here and tells us they have all the authorities they need. And then people like you and others come up 

and talk about how it would be nice. 

I guess I do not get it. I voted for an authorization in 2013. I 

helped craft it to go against Assad. And we turned away from that. 

So certainly, this committee is willing to take up tough issues 

when a declaration of war is occurring. 

And has the President declared war on ISIS? Has he declared 

war on ISIS? Has he laid out a strategy publicly to defeat ISIS? 

So I just want to say, I am sorry this cutesy thing that has been 

occurring recently, especially over the last 2 weeks. I am having 

difficulty understanding when I agree with the administration. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

45 

They have every authority that they need to defeat and destroy 

ISIS. 

So I do not know what is up. Maybe the President is receiving 

criticism, and he is trying to deflect that to Congress somehow. I 

do not know what is occurring. 

But all I can say with you, I am in full agreement with the administration that the 2001 authorization, while certainly on the 

edges, gives them the authority to do everything they could possibly want to do to destroy ISIS. And I believe that everyone in the 

world, everyone in the world, understands that Congress wants to 

see that happen. 

Ambassador POWER. Let me be clear. The President has himself, 

as you know, made clear that he has the authority to prosecute this 

campaign effectively. I was responding to Senator Kaine’s comment 

that a number of the other countries in the coalition have gone 

through a domestic legislative process of—— 

The CHAIRMAN. They did not have the authorities to do what 

they were doing. They did not have the authorities. Is that correct? 

Ambassador POWER. I would have to go case by case, and I am 

not familiar with the domestic legal machinations in these countries. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, certainly, Great Britain’s or U.K.’s unwillingness—— 

Ambassador POWER. Yes, I think in parliamentary systems, they 

need to go through the exercise that they have gone through. 

I think this is a reason though that the question is a little bit 

more in the air than it has been over the last 6 months up in New 

York. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is in the air for—— 

Ambassador POWER. But the President has said he has the authorities he needs. There is no resurrecting or surfacing this issue 

for any other reason. 

The CHAIRMAN. So you agree 100 percent that the President has 

the authority. 

Ambassador POWER. Absolutely. 

The CHAIRMAN. Has the President declared war on ISIS, by the 

way? 

Ambassador POWER. I believe he has said we are going to defeat 

and destroy ISIS, ISIL. 

The CHAIRMAN. Look, we thank you for being here today and certainly respect the job that you have. You are very bright and intelligent. Sometimes I take issue with you when I feel like you are 

carrying too much the administration’s line. But I understand 

sometimes you feel compelled to do so. 

I thank you for being here, and we wish you well as you take 

demonstrative action against UNSCR 1929 being violated over the 

next week or so. Thank you. 

So our next panel will consist of two more outstanding witnesses. 

The first witness is the Honorable John Negroponte, vice chairman 

of McLarty and Associates and former United States Permanent 

Representative to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the same 

job our former witness is occupying. 

Our second witness will be Dr. Bruce Jones, vice president of the 

Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institute. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

46 

Again, we thank Ambassador Power for being here. Both of you 

have witnessed what just happened. We hope you can summarize 

your thoughts in about 5 minutes. And we look forward to questions. 

Again, thank you for being here. 

John, why don’t you start? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN NEGROPONTE, VICE CHAIRMAN, 

MCLARTY ASSOCIATES, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Yes, sir. Thank you, Chairman 

Corker, Ranking Member Cardin. It is a pleasure to appear before 

you this morning to discuss United Nations peacekeeping, a subject 

of importance to United States security. 

When I was Ambassador to the United Nations, this subject was 

frequently on the agenda of the U.N. Security Council. During my 

tenure there, peacekeeping operations were stood up in Sierra 

Leone and Liberia, among other countries. And, of course, we also 

renewed a number of operations that continue to this day, such as 

in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Western Sahara, and soforth. 

I want to state categorically at the outset my conviction that 

United States’ support for U.N. peacekeeping operations is in the 

overwhelming national security interests of our country. There are 

three major reasons for, which I hold this view. I call these three 

arguments, first, cost; second, the boots-on-the-ground argument; 

and three, legitimacy. I will explain each of these thoughts further. 

First, with respect to cost, the United Nations has more than 

100,000 troops deployed in peacekeeping operations around the 

world today. The approximate cost of deploying these forces is $8 

billion per year, which, of course, is a small fraction of what we 

spend in our own national defense budget. 

Our share of these costs is less than $3 billion, a small fraction, 

again, and some illustrative figures were cited by Senator Cardin, 

a small fraction of what it would cost to deploy United States forces 

on similar missions. 

This is not a trivial argument. In today’s world and with the high 

cost of deploying U.S. forces to overseas missions, clearly it is an 

important advantage for us to know that we have considerably less 

expensive options available to us regarding whose forces might be 

available to carry out an intervention we deem to be in our interests. 

Second, the boots-on-the-ground argument, this, of course, is an 

argument related to financial costs. Just as we benefit from the 

lower cost of U.N. peacekeeping budgets as compared to our own 

defense spending, we also do not deploy our own combat forces to 

these situations. 

This is a huge benefit. It is hard to imagine sustained public support for a hypothetical situation wherein U.S. combat units were 

deployed to five or 10 peacekeeping operations abroad. The costs in 

U.S. blood and treasure would be unacceptably high. And the spotlight on the situations in which U.S. forces were involved could undermine the kind of support and patience required in some of these 

very difficult situations. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

47 

So support for U.N. PKOs saves us from having to contemplate 

these possibilities. It also enables us to think about choices other 

than a stark selection between U.S. boots on the ground, on the one 

hand, or nothing at all. 

Third, legitimacy. How many times have we undertaken or contemplated intervention without the legitimating imprimatur of a 

United Nations Security Council resolution? 

In early 2003, I was in the well of the Security Council arguing 

for a Chapter VII Security Council resolution permitting the use of 

force against Iraq. We failed to achieve that resolution and soon 

thereafter intervened in Iraq with a coalition of the willing. 

I am not saying that a PKO would have been appropriate at that 

point in time in Iraq. But what I do want to highlight is that we 

subsequently paid a high domestic and international price for intervening in Iraq without the support and blessing of a U.N. Security 

Council resolution. 

By definition, a U.N. peacekeeping operation has consensus support within the P5 and the blessing of a Security Council resolution. 

This is an important political and legal advantage, which should 

not be dismissed lightly. 

Senator Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, I know there are 

issues regarding the effectiveness, comportment, and leadership of 

some PKOs, and these are issues that will require continued attention and effort from troop-contributing and other U.N. members 

alike. And given our leadership role in the world and our status as 

the U.N.’s largest single financial contributor, we have a special responsibility in this regard. But whatever imperfections or blemishes might exist in the U.N. peacekeeping setup, it is our responsibility to help address these issues in a constructive way. 

With steady engagement from the U.S. and others, I foresee continued improvement in the performance and utility of PKOs and 

even their more creative use in addressing some of the very difficult security challenges around the globe. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee on 

such an important topic. I would be pleased to try to answer any 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Negroponte follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you this morning to discuss 

United Nations Peacekeeping, a subject of importance to United States security. 

When I was Ambassador to the United Nations, this subject was frequently on 

the agenda of the U.N. Security Council. During my tenure there peacekeeping operations were stood up in Sierra Leone and Liberia, among other countries and, of 

course, we also renewed a number of operations that continue to this day, such as 

in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Western Sahara and so-forth. 

I want to state categorically at the outset my conviction that United States support for U.N. peacekeeping operations is in the overwhelming national security interest of our country. There are three major reasons for which I hold this view. I 

call these three arguments: 1) Cost; 2) ‘‘Boots on the Ground’’; and 3) Legitimacy. 

I will explain each of these three thoughts further. But before I do, let me mention 

what I consider to be the fundamental rationale for PKO’s in the first place. Situations arise around the world, either because of state-to-state conflict, civil strife or 

state failure that require outside forces to maintain peace and order. And these 

forces are frequently required in substantial numbers because numbers matter 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

48 

when it comes to keeping the peace. Send peacekeepers in adequate numbers to deal 

with a situation and their presence can have a rapid calming effect. Send them in 

insufficient numbers and their deterrent effect can be degraded, thereby inviting 

trouble from those opposed to the peace we are trying to uphold. More and more, 

U.N. peacekeepers have been called upon to maintain the peace in situations of civil 

strife, especially in Africa. And protecting endangered civilians has increasingly 

been included in their mandates. Though the record of U.N. PKO’s has been mixed, 

their efforts over the years have resulted in some important successes. 

Let me return to the three factors I alluded to earlier: 1) First, cost: The U.N. 

has more than 100,000 troops deployed in PKO’s around the world today. The approximate cost of deploying these forces is $8 billion per year. Our share of these 

costs is less than $3 billion, a small fraction of what it would cost to deploy US 

forces on similar missions. This not a trivial argument. In today’s world and with 

the high cost of deploying US forces to overseas missions, clearly it is an important 

advantage for us to know that we have considerably less expensive options available 

to us regarding whose forces might be available to carry out an intervention we 

deem to be in our interest; 

2) Second: The ‘‘Boots on the Ground’’ argument: This of course is an argument 

related to financial costs. Just as we benefit from the lower cost of U.N. peacekeeping budgets as compared to our own defense spending, we also do not deploy 

our own combat forces to these situations. This is a huge benefit. It is hard to imagine sustained public support for a hypothetical situation wherein US combat units 

were deployed to five or ten PKO’s abroad. The costs in US blood and treasure 

would be unacceptably high and the spotlight on the situations in which US forces 

were involved could undermine the kind of public support and patience required in 

some of these very difficult situations. So, support for U.N. PKO’s saves us from 

having to contemplate these possibilities. It also enables us to think about choices 

other than US boots on the ground or nothing at all; 

3) Third, Legitimacy: How many times have we undertaken or contemplated intervention without the legitimating imprimatur of a U.N. Security Council Resolution? 

In early 2003 I was in the well of the Security Council arguing for a Chapter VII 

UNSC resolution permitting the use of force against Iraq. We failed to achieve that 

resolution and soon thereafter intervened in Iraq with a coalition of the willing. I 

am not saying that a PKO would have been appropriate at that point in time in 

Iraq. But what I do want to highlight is that we subsequently paid a high domestic 

and international price for intervening in Iraq without the support and blessing of 

a UNSC resolution. By definition, a U.N. PKO has consensus support within the P5 and the blessing of a Security Council Resolution. This is an important political 

and legal advantage which should not be dismissed lightly. 

Senator Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, Members of the Committee: I know 

there are issues regarding the effectiveness, comportment and leadership of some 

PKO’s; and these are issues that will require continued attention and effort from 

troop contributing and other U.N. members alike. And given our leadership role in 

the world and our status as the U.N.’s largest single financial contributor, we have 

a special responsibility in this regard. But whatever imperfections or blemishes 

might exist in the U.N. Peacekeeping setup, it is our responsibility to help address 

these issues in a constructive way. With steady engagement from the US and others, I foresee continued improvement in the performance and utility of PKO’s and 

even their more creative use in addressing some of the very difficult security challenges around the globe. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee on such an important topic. I would be pleased to try to answer any questions you might have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

Dr. Jones? 

STATEMENT OF DR. BRUCE JONES, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Dr. JONES. Thank you very much. Chairman Corker, Ranking 

Member Cardin, thank you for having me appear before this body, 

and thank you for your leadership in sustaining attention to this 

issue. 

We have covered a lot of ground, so I will be brief and just try 

to reinforce a couple of points and raise a couple of additional ones. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

49 

I think this body well understands the purpose of peacekeeping 

is to give the United States a tool for what I have described as 

manning the outer perimeter, for burden-sharing in conflicts where 

we have an interest but we do not want to have to deploy U.S. 

forces or tackle the issue ourselves. I think that is well-understood 

in this body. 

I think it is important to remember that in the majority of the 

cases where the U.N. is deployed, it is not deployed alone. It is 

often a regional organization and the U.N. co-deployed in a hybrid 

operation. I think we do not focus on that enough. The U.N. is an 

important part of the equation, but it is not the only part of the 

equation. And we need to sustain attention to the way that regional organizations expand the reach of the U.N. and reinforce 

what the U.N. can do. 

That being said, of course, the U.N., as you as you both highlighted, as a burden-sharing tool, as a global burden-sharing tool, 

gives us the capacity to reach across the globe, to get Indian troops 

to work with us in Central Africa, or Brazilian troops to work with 

us in East Timor as they did, or European forces working with us 

in Haiti, that regional organizations cannot perform. 

And so for all its flaws and weaknesses, the U.N. is the only 

genuinely global burden-sharing tool we have. And I think it is extremely important at a time when—Senator Murphy I think mentioned Colombia, but there are others like Korea and Indonesia and 

Brazil, rising democracies who want to do more on the international stage. The U.N. is the only tool that they have to do that. 

So how do we improve the U.N.’s performance? I think of this as 

having four dimensions: effectiveness, efficiency, legitimacy, and 

leadership. 

Effectiveness, I want to reinforce something that Ambassador 

Power said that I think is important, which is bringing countries 

with advanced military capabilities back into the U.N. A number 

of you stressed the complexity of the challenges that the U.N. confronts. I think we have to be clear eyed about the fact in a number 

of cases, the U.N. is operating in theaters where transnational terrorist organizations also are operating. Those are not challenges 

that can be met by troops with low-order capabilities. 

When we look at the situation in Mali, when we look at the situation in different contexts, we are going to have to see peacekeeping have within it countries with advanced military capabilities to perform the functions of protection of civilians and implementation of mandates. So I am very supportive of the administration efforts to bring European and rising states back into peacekeeping. 

An additional point that I would make, and again, Senator Murphy touched on it, is that there are different ways that the U.N. 

can structure its missions. We tend to focus on blue helmet operations, which are commanded by the Secretary. There is actually 

an alternative, which are multinational force operations, where a 

single member state takes the command. And that is sometimes an 

effective tool, because there are member states like Canada and 

Australia and others who have a far higher degree of capability in 

command and control and intelligence than the U.N. Secretary has 

at his disposal. That variation of using an U.N.-authorized multiFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

50 

national force is something I think we should be thinking about 

more than we sometimes do. 

Quickly, on efficiency, nobody would accuse the U.N. of being an 

efficient organization. But it has made an important step forward 

with the creation of the Department of Field Support, which is a 

separate tool to structure and manage the U.N. field operations. 

The absurdity is that the politics of the General Assembly means 

that the Department of Field Support still has to run all of its decisions past the Department of Management, which is the headquarters tool. So the same tool that manages workshops and conferences in New York has to approve all the decisions of a more 

nimble tool, the Department of Field Support. 

I think one of the things the United States could do is work in 

a coalition to change that, so that the Department of Field Support 

has more direct authority to oversee and implement peacekeeping 

operations without that kind of extra layer of a dual-key system, 

which is inefficient. And, of course, we have to keep working on 

this scale assessment issue. 

Third, I would just reiterate the things that are being said on 

sexual exploitation. I think the U.N. makes a fundamental mistake 

when it does not recognize that even though this is an issue of a 

minority of troops and a minority of missions, it severely erodes the 

legitimacy of the U.N. on the ground and in capitals. 

You have all said a number of things already about the United 

States putting the right kind of pressure on the U.N. to live up to 

a zero-tolerance policy, which, rather belatedly, Ban Ki-Moon came 

to. 

And that goes to my last point, and I will end here, which is that 

this is also about leadership. We are coming to the end of Ban KiMoon’s term, and I think it should be a matter of priority for the 

United States, when they get into the business of selecting a new 

Secretary General, to be paying attention to the question of whether they are focused on the effectiveness and efficiency of the U.N. 

in contributing to international peace and security and to work 

closely with the Secretary General when she or he is selected and 

other members of the P5 to make sure that she has available to 

her a deep roster of political organizational talent on which to draw 

in selecting top officials for the management of political peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. 

I will end there. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Jones follows:] 

PREPARED STATMENT OF DR. BRUCE JONES

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and Members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to address this body on the timely and consequential 

subject of peacekeeping and the U.S. national interest. 

I’d like to start with four main points, and then suggest some key areas for reform. 

First, when we address the subject of international peacekeeping, we have to start 

with an essential question: does the United States want to have at its disposal a 

tool for burden-sharing for far-flung crises, or does it want to do the job itself? 

That’s the fundamental issue. 

The right way to think about international peacekeeping is as a tool for sharing 

the burden of ‘‘manning the outer perimeter.’’ We’re never going to rely on international peacekeeping for core security tasks, but when we move beyond those matters of primary national security, we have three choices: do nothing, and live with 

the consequences—in the form of refugees, in the form of spreading instability, in 

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1For the comprehensive study behind these figures, see Virginia Page Fortna’s 2008 book: 

‘‘Does Peacekeeping Work?’’, specifically chapter five. See: Fortna, V. P. (2008). Does Peacekeeping Work? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 

the form of safe havens for terror networks; tackle these problems ourselves—even 

when they arise in places like the Central African Republic or northern Uganda or 

Yemen or northern Mali; or build and manage multilateral tools for maintaining 

stability and security in non-vital regions that distribute the commitment among 

many nations. It seems evident that the third of these is the only credible option— 

building tools for burden-sharing in the mission to uphold stability. The existence 

of such tools doesn’t preclude U.S. engagement, but it gives us options. 

Second, then, we have to look at the tools at our disposal, including but not limited to the U.N. It’s rarely the case that the U.N. is the sole tool we are going to 

use to tackle a problem of civil war or humanitarian crisis. There are regional organizations, NATO, the African Union, and coalitions of the willing; as well as tools 

for the development of economic and governance institutions, such as the World 

Bank. In the vast majority of cases today, two or more of these entities are involved 

in producing solutions or tamping down problems. One of the weaknesses of current 

U.S. policy is that we treat these institutions or tools as if they are stand-alone entities; in actuality, they almost always work in concert, albeit in imperfect ways. This 

is all the more important given that we now confront a U.N. Security Council in 

which Russia is inclined to block unified action, at least in cases where it is directly 

involved. 

Third, that being said, we should take the signal from the reality that in the vast 

majority of those cases, the U.N. does play an important role—in the humanitarian 

response; in the political response; and in the security response—all of which are 

supported through the peacekeeping tool. The reason the U.N. shows up in so many 

cases arises from a very basic but very important fact: The United Nations is a global institution, rather than a regional one, making it’s tools global in scope. U.N. 

peacekeeping is the only mechanism we have at our disposal that allows us to combine forces from every region in the world to tackle crises or conflicts wherever they 

occur. Regional organizations can’t produce Indian troops working with us in central 

Africa; or Brazilian troops working with us in East Timor, as they did; or European 

forces working with us in Haiti. Thus, for all its flaws and weaknesses, the U.N. 

is the only tool available to us for genuinely global burden-sharing. And that’s all 

the more important at a point in time when rising democracies like Korea, Indonesia, and Brazil want to do more, not less, on the international stage, and don’t 

have any alternatives to the U.N. 

Fourth, and critically, when we hear about peacekeeping, we hear most about failures and setbacks. Even the most optimistic literature about U.N. and international 

peacekeeping suggests that it fails approximately 40% of the time. But that should 

not obscure the 60% of the time when it succeeds, or succeeds in part—either helping to end a war, securing a part of territory, or protecting a portion of a population.1 Success is not categorized by the building, or rebuilding, of secure democracies overnight—we have to have maintain reasonable expectations of peacekeeping. 

So how do we improve the ratio between success and failure? We have to work 

on four fronts: 

• This is about effectiveness—and first and foremost that means getting better 

quality troops into the U.N. 

• It’s about efficiency, especially cost efficiency. 

• It’s about putting an end to sexual exploitation and abuse—actions that erode 

the local and international legitimacy of peacekeeping. 

• And it’s about leadership. 

The most important issue is effectiveness—if the U.N. isn’t helping to create a solution, then the question of whether its operations are efficient or legitimate is 

moot. The most important determinant of effectiveness is the quality of troops that 

participate in operations—that is to say, their capacity to undertake complex stabilization operations. When conflicts are relatively easy, i.e. when the state or the 

rebels in question are of low capacity, then the U.N. can draw troops from whichever nation is willing, gathering a coalition for action that can keep the lid on 

things. But, as we confront more resilient actors in tougher settings—especially as 

the geography of intra-state and proxy conflict shifts from sub-Saharan Africa to the 

Middle East and North Africa—we need the participation of both the European allies and the rising powers if we’re going to have the capable troops needed to 

produce security outcomes required on the ground. This is all the more true as we 

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2For an overview of the Biden initiative, see: Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. 

(2014, September 26). Summit on U.N. Peacekeeping [Fact sheet]. Retrieved December 6, 2015, 

from Whitehouse.gov website: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/26/fact-sheetsummit-un-peacekeeping. 3The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations was convened on 31 October 2014 

‘‘to undertake a thorough review of United Nations peace operations today and the emerging 

needs of the future.’’ See: ‘‘Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on 

Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People’’ [PDF]. (2015, June). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO—Report—1—June—2015.pdf. 4The U.N.’s figures for fiscal year 2016 have the United States contributing 28.38% of total 

peacekeeping dues. See: ‘‘Financing Peacekeeping.’’ (n.d.). Retrieved December 6, 2015, from 

U.N.org website: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml. 5For a 2004 statement from Secretary General Kofi Annan, see: Annan, K. (2004, November 

19). Statement by the Secretary-General on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the 

deal with the reality that in a growing portion of wars, at least one actor is engaged 

in terrorist activities, often with a transnational link. 

I am therefore very supportive of the Obama Administration’s efforts— 

colloquially, the Biden initiative—to bring European actors back into the fold and 

engage rising states in U.N. peacekeeping efforts for the provision of both troops 

and enabling capacities.2

Effectiveness also means being flexible about how we structure these forces. We 

tend to focus on the traditional ‘‘blue helmet’’ operations, that is, operations controlled centrally by the U.N. Secretariat. There’s a powerful alternative in the U.N.’s 

toolkit, namely U.N.-mandated multi-national forces. These are operations that fly 

under a U.N. banner but are led and commanded by an individual state, rather 

than the U.N. Secretariat. Australia has led such multinational forces (in East 

Timor), as has Canada (in the Congo). The United States commands such a force 

in the Sinai (MFO Sinai). We should put more emphasis on using this option, and 

some of its variants. 

It would be worth the effort for the United States to do a detailed examination 

of the range of alternatives available to the U.N.—from blue helmet operations to 

multi-national forces to so-called hybrid operations (where the U.N. and a regional 

organization fuse their forces into a single structure); such a study would enable the 

United States to better support and more firmly encourage the U.N. to explore a 

variety of options when confronted with an emerging conflict. 

Then let’s turn to efficiency. Nobody would accuse the U.N. of being an efficient 

organization. However, to be fair, during Ban Ki-Moon’s term, two dynamic women, 

Susanna Malcorra and Ameerah Haq, effectively built the U.N.’s Department of 

Field Support into a more robust tool for undertaking complex field operations. 

Unfortunately, the U.N.’s rules still mean that decisions made in the Department 

of Field Support are subject to the arcane and cumbersome tools of the Department 

of Management, which oversees headquarters operations. This dual key system introduces major inefficiencies and unnecessary redundancy. The United States could 

lead, or at a minimum offer support for, a political coalition to build on the new 

proposals from Ban Ki-Moon’s high-level panel to increase the flexibility and efficiency of the U.N.’s field support tools.3 This set of ideas is similar in spirit to a 

proposal made by former U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations Ambassador John Bolton for stand-alone management arrangements for U.N. peacekeeping. 

Over time, of course, the United States will also have to secure a better arrangement for U.N. peacekeeping dues: a situation where the U.S. share of the global 

economy has shrunk from approximately 25% to 21%, and its share of U.N. peacekeeping dues has grown to 28%, is obviously unsustainable.4 China has shown that 

it is willing to do more in voluntary funding of the U.N.’s operations, and its own 

rates continue to rise; but eventually this scale of assessment will have to be reworked. But the United States also has to recognize that, contra the ‘‘American decline’’ narrative, it is still the only global power, the only power with the capability 

to act in every theater, and thus the actor that most profits in real terms from burden-sharing. 

The U.N. also has to address a problem that eats away at its legitimacy—sexual 

exploitation and abuse. No other issue so profoundly erodes the trust of local populations, or the confidence of the international community, in U.N. operations than 

incidences of sexual misconduct or abuse by U.N. peacekeepers. Let’s be clear: this 

is a problem of a very small number of troops in a minority of operations. But the 

U.N. leadership makes a grave mistake when it doesn’t recognize that it’s a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of U.N. operations. Kofi Annan eventually recognized this, and adopted a zero tolerance strategy; and, rather belatedly, Ban Kimoon has recognized this, and has adopted a new, tougher policy.5 The United 

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U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) [Press release]. Retrieved from 

http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=1189. For Secretary-General Ban’s recent statements on 

sexual assault in the Central African Republic, Ban, K.-M. (2015, August 12). Opening remarks 

to press on the Central African Republic [Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/ 

news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments—full.asp?statID=2714#.VmTuiIv45UQ 6For a comprehensive account of these factors, see: Jones, B. (2014). ‘‘Still Ours to Lead: 

America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry and Restraint.’’ Washington, DC: 

Brookings Institution Press. 

States should be vigilant in maintaining the necessary oversight to ensure that the 

Secretary-General fulfills the promise of this new policy. 

Finally, this is about leadership—at headquarters, and in the field. There’s no 

percentage in commenting here on personalities. And we’re coming to the end of 

Ban Ki-moon’s term, so soon there will be a new leadership team at the U.N. In 

preparation for this new window of opportunity, the United States should elevate 

the prioritization of the identification and the selection of a Secretary-General committed to effective and efficient U.N. contributions to international security; and we 

should work closely with the incoming Secretary-General and the other members of 

the P5 to make sure that she has available to her a deep roster of political and organizational talent from which to draw in selecting top officials for the management 

of political, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. 

It has become fashionable to describe the United States as a power in decline. I 

disagree. The United States is the only power with political, economic, and military 

clout both at a global level and in every region of the world. America is the only 

power capable of convening states (and actors beyond states) of every stripe, of every 

income level, and from every region. It has an extraordinary suite of allies. The dynamism of the American private sector has been on vivid display in the energy renaissance and the economic recovery from the 2009 global financial crisis.6 China, 

India, and other actors have rising capacity to be sure, and with it, spreading interests. But for now, only the United States has a global responsibility, and only the 

United States can build the coalitions and the multilateral instruments for global 

security. A peacekeeping tool that is adequately manned, resourced, and supported 

is an important tool in upholding that security. 

Thus, only with sustained U.S. attention will it be possible to ensure that we have 

available to us a sufficient suite of tools for stabilization and peacekeeping, at the 

U.N. and beyond, to meet the American interests of supporting stability without 

over taxing U.S. treasure and overextending U.S. forces. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to address this committee. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you both. I know we got off on a lot 

of different topics in the last panel that were a little different than 

the main subject, but it is rare we have the opportunity to talk to 

the Ambassador. 

We thank you both. We know you are both friends. And obviously, with just Ben and I here, even though this will all be part 

of the record, which is appreciated, this is more of a conversation. 

You both have experienced the frustration of seeing peacekeeping 

operations where people were being abused and brutalized, and yet 

the caveats that existed kept peacekeepers from really being able 

to intervene. So we have moved in a more forward manner, which 

from my standpoint is welcomed as we have seen helpless people 

be brutalized in certain areas. 

What are, though, some of the challenges that, from your perspective, we most need to think about relative to that? I mean, in 

essence, it is an extension in some cases of actually carrying out 

semi-kinetic activities, right? So what are some of the things that 

we as a body ought to be thinking about as we progress down that 

path? 

Dr. JONES. Thank you very much. That is an excellent question, 

and I think it is extremely well-put. 

It is interesting to observe. At the U.N., I think you face two 

challenges. One, over time, as countries with more advanced capabilities, Europeans and others, have not been participating in 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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peacekeeping, the practice has sort of lowered to the capability of 

the troops. So the willingness to go out and undertake kinetic activities, to protect civilians, to defeat rebel forces, et cetera, has diminished, and that is a challenge. 

So getting more capable troops back into peacekeeping is the first 

necessary step. 

I think an important question is what can the United States do 

to stiffen their will or to ensure that they are going to have will 

or support. One of the things I would put on the table—by the way, 

I would say, I am not among those who think that the United 

States has to put troops into peacekeeping. I do not think that that 

is the correct approach. I think that the United States has unique 

capabilities in airlift and intelligence and other kinds of things that 

are more important. 

I would add to it over-the-horizon extraction. If we are going to 

ask countries to put troops on the line and take risks, first of all, 

it is helpful if they are more capable troops, because they are undertaking that mission. But if we are willing to provide over-thehorizon extraction and support and defense capabilities, the risks 

that they are taking is lessened. So I think we can be in a stronger 

position in encouraging people to take those risks and to take those 

flights if we are willing to help them if they get stuck. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. If I could add, first of all, I would 

definitely agree with Dr. Jones that capacity-building, and I think 

that is what he was talking about in the instance, is really one of 

the most important challenges, if not the most important challenge 

we face with respect to U.N. peacekeeping. 

There was also mentioned earlier in the testimony this morning 

about the time it takes sometimes to mobilize some of these missions. I think the Security Council and the peacekeeping department has become more effective at that. 

I would add, with respect to capacity-building, the challenge we 

have in ensuring that there is sort of uniform level of capacity 

amongst the officers that are leading these different missions 

around the world. 

I am not aware that the U.N. has any kind of peacekeeping academy. It would seem to me, if you have military deployments in excess of 100,000 people around the world, I mean, we have an academy for each of our four uniformed services in the United States. 

And I wonder if some kind of training institution, where you would 

cycle current and potential leaders of future peacekeeping missions, 

whether that would not be an idea worth consideration. I mean, 

you would have to sit down at the drawing boards and think about 

how you do that, but anyway, that is one idea I would like to leave 

for your consideration. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Jones, you mentioned that you do not think 

it is appropriate for the U.S. to have ground troops, if you will, involved. As it relates to our NATO efforts, we obviously have everything involved, money, equipment, personnel. Again, we are the 

provider of security services. Unfortunately, most of the members 

of NATO are consumers of security services. 

Here, we are the largest provider of monetary resources, and, as 

I understand it, we have committed 42 officers to be part of peacekeeping. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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But just for the record, could you tease out why it is you said 

what you just said? You say we should not be involved with ground 

troops because? 

Dr. JONES. Thank you. It comes up a lot. It has come up a lot 

in the last year as the administration has been pushing the Europeans and other states to do more. One of the responses has been, 

‘‘Well, are you going to? Are you going to put troops in?’’ As I said, 

I think the things that only the United States can do include airlift, signals intelligence, and some of the command and control 

functions that you just referred to. 

I would not be doctrinaire about it. I do not think there is no circumstance where the United States should put troops in. I would 

recall that we have actually, historically. In 1995, the United 

States had troops under the command of a Canadian-led multinational force in eastern Zaire. We have done it. It is not impossible to do. 

But by and large, it seems to me that we are better off when 

other troops are willing to be on the frontlines of this. Senator 

Murphy talked about the notion of having multiethnic and multinational forces. 

The simple reality is that the United States is going to attract 

attention. There are going to be a lot of people who want to fight 

the United States. I think we are simply raising a red flag to a bull 

when we put U.S. forces on the ground in a number of these situations. We are much better off performing those functions that only 

we can provide, as well, as I mentioned, over-the-horizon rescue 

and support operations, and ask others to be on the frontlines. 

The CHAIRMAN. It is generally the same approach, as has been 

discussed by most, and that is in Syria we would like to have Arab 

faces on the ground more predominantly than Western faces, right? 

It just helps ensure that there is a more cohesive nature, if you 

will, relative to what is happening on the ground. 

Typically, we have had a policy, have we not, that U.S. troops 

are not going to be commanded by people other than U.S. officers, 

too? Is that correct? 

Dr. JONES. We have had that policy. As I said, we have occasionally violated it. U.S. forces were under Canadian command in multinational force operations in Zaire very briefly. But I think as a 

general rule, it is the right policy. 

And more to the point, as I said, there are simply too many occasions in which participation by the United States would change the 

political texture of the force in ways that I think would amplify the 

resistance to the force rather than the opposite. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Whereas the enablers do not necessarily have that same kind of a profile, and yet there is no other 

country as capable as we are of producing these vital enablers to 

these missions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador, you have had this role. You have 

been at the United Nations. Senator Cardin, which I appreciate 

deeply, raised the issue of just our payments. We have 22 percent 

of the world’s gross domestic product and yet we contribute 28.5 

percent of the budget here. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Our other ‘‘associates,’’ if you will, at the United Nations obviously are not doing their part, otherwise our amount would not be 

28.5 percent. 

We find this same to be the case—I have referred to it now three 

times—at NATO. It is where we desire for things to happen, it 

seems more so than others, and, therefore, we end up being financially exposed more than others. 

You have been in this role. Tell us from your perspective what 

we as a country can do to seek equilibrium and to cause other 

countries to play their appropriate roles. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, it is frustrating. And I think 

you are right, Senator, to talk about kind of the mysterious ways 

in which the budget is negotiated, and very often right at the end 

of the year just before Christmas, when everyone is in a rush to 

get out of there. Somehow at 3 o’clock in the morning, the U.N. 

budget gets agreed upon. So sometimes you get some rather anomalous situations that will arise. 

But I think we just have to keep working on that. I recognize 

that we have not been as successful as we ought to have been in 

keeping the peacekeeping assessments down. 

But again, in proportion to what it would cost to field other kinds 

of forces or our own military expenditures for our own defense establishment, we are talking about relatively small amounts of 

money. Therefore, I think we just need to do our best but recognize 

that we may not achieve everything that we hope to achieve in 

those negotiations. 

But I am also reassured that some countries now are putting up 

more resources than they had before. I am glad to hear that China 

is going to be assessed something on the order of 10 percent for 

peacekeeping, which, if I recall correctly, is a significant departure 

from 10 or 15 years ago when their contribution was a fraction of 

that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin? 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Ambassador, as you were describing the 

U.N. budget process, I thought you were describing the U.S. budget 

process. [Laughter.] 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I do not know where they learned 

those lessons. 

Senator CARDIN. Dr. Jones, thank you very much for your service. And you come here with a great deal of expertise on the United 

Nations, having worked as adviser to Secretary General. 

Ambassador Negroponte, you served in that position as Ambassador, and you have served in so many other positions of foreign 

policy. 

I want to follow up on the reform issues, and I will tell you why. 

But first, let me suggest to the chairman, your suggestion on 

training is a very important suggestion. I serve on the Board of 

Visitors of the U.S. Naval Academy, and I see firsthand the availability of training at the U.S. Naval Academy for some of our allied 

countries. We do train at our service academies foreign students. 

I think an arrangement with the United Nations in regards to 

their peacekeeping command may very well be a viable option to 

get greater capacity. And I would ask our staff to take a look at 

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that, to see whether we can look at how our service academies 

could assist in this regard. 

It also helps us, because having a more diversified student body 

at our academies prepares us for the global missions that our military command needs to be aware of. 

So I thought that was a very good suggestion, and I would ask 

if our staffs could perhaps follow up on that and see whether that 

is a viable option. 

But I want to talk about the scale of assessments and the how 

these numbers come about. But I put it in context of a Senator who 

strongly supports the United Nations and its mission and its budget. 

But if we were to put it a U.N. reform bill on the floor of the 

United States Senate, the type of amendments that would be offered and the types of potential restrictions on U.S. participation 

in the United Nations, getting a majority vote, perhaps even a 60- 

vote threshold, is real. The reason for that is because of the lack 

of transparency in the United Nations and the illogical way that 

they go about their budgeting. 

We talk about burden-sharing, and we recognize that it is disproportionate, that the U.S. taxpayers have been asked to take on 

a much stronger commitment than the developed countries, those 

who have the capacity to do a lot more. It is true in NATO. It is 

true in our coalitions. It is true in individual participation globally. 

And it is certainly true in the United Nations. 

So I understand that we are getting a good value for our contributions to the U.N. I never doubt that. I agree with you completely. And the peacekeeping missions are critically important to 

the U.S. 

But it seems to me that we have not been as effective as we need 

to in the transparency and reform within the United Nations process. And if we do not deal with it in a way that is understandable 

to the U.S. political system, then there could be negative consequences to the U.S. participation at the United Nations. 

So it is for that reason that I cannot justify a 22 percent budget 

allocation and then 28.5 percent on peacekeeping, particularly in 

light of all the other commitments that U.S. taxpayers are making 

to international security issues. I would just like to get your advice 

as to the most effective way for this Senator and for the Congress 

to weigh in, in a constructive way, so that we can get the type of 

reforms we need in the United Nations. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I am not as current on these 

issues as I was when I was serving in that position, but I was the 

beneficiary of Richard Holbrooke’s successful negotiation with respect to the last big arrears situation. It took incredible work on 

his part, the kind of work that only Richard Holbrooke was capable 

of. It was jawboning with membership, with the secretariat, working hard with Congress, like Ms. Power, bringing the Security 

Council down to visit the Senate, which I think was a very, very 

good idea. I am sure you imparted this message to them when you 

met with them. Those are the right people to pass that message to. 

I think it just requires an intensive diplomatic effort with these 

countries to try and correct that situation. I am pleased we have 

a 22 percent assessment for the general assessment for the U.N. 

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Holbrooke left that issue somewhat unresolved. If I remember correctly, it was 26-point-something-or-other, and now it has gone up 

a percentage point or 2 since he reached his agreement. 

But I think we just have to work that one really hard. And what 

I would hate to see happen is that the arrears become so large that 

then it becomes some kind of a crisis situation with regard to 

whether or not we are going to continue our support, which would 

undermine our support for the United Nations. That is the danger 

that I think you are describing. 

Dr. JONES. I do not have much to add. I would just add one point 

of context, which is sort of ironical. 

We spent a lot of the last few years hearing countries talk about 

how the United States is in a decline, a relative decline in the 

United States, all this kind of stuff. I profoundly disagree with that 

underlying notion. The reason I mention it in this case is, when 

you look at the scale of assessments, it was about 30 percent in the 

height of the post-Cold War period. It declined to about 25 percent 

as we made continual progress to bring the scale of assessment in 

line with our share of world GDP. And it has gone back up over 

the last 3 years. It has gone back up to 28 percent since the global 

financial crisis because we have done much better in recovering 

from the global financial crisis than a number of our allies and 

partners in Europe and others. 

And so it is a kind of irony of the moment that whereas people 

talk about U.S. decline—— 

Senator CARDIN. It is my understanding that the difference between 22 percent and 28 percent is not our share in the global 

economy. It is justified by our seat on the Security Council, which 

many of us interpret it is to bust the 22 percent cap. 

Dr. JONES. It is both, because the formula starts with what is the 

share of GDP. You pay a premium by being rich, so rich countries 

pay more per share of GDP than poor countries. And then we pay 

an additional premium by virtue of being a permanent member. So 

it was going down as our global share of GDP went down, and it 

has gone back up a little bit. So it is just a worth remembering the 

irony. 

But I do not disagree with anything that Ambassador 

Negroponte said in terms of the need to keep pushing on this. 

And it is an issue that is going to have to be made an important 

priority with the incoming Secretary General. They are going to 

have to make it clear to the incoming Secretary General that to 

sustain support for the United Nations, it is impossible to explain 

to the American public why we pay an outsized share of this bill. 

It is true that we have an outsized interest—an outsized interest—in the performance. We are the only power that has interests 

in every region of the world and at the global level. So we have an 

outsized interest here as well. 

And to a certain extent, in all honesty, that reduces our leverage. 

Everybody knows that we have an outsized interest in these things. 

Senator CARDIN. Because we have assumed greater burdens, we 

have even greater burdens. 

Dr. JONES. Correct. 

Senator CARDIN. That is an interesting way of looking at it. 

Let me ask one last question, if I might. 

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59 

Ambassador Power was pretty firm and optimistic about the September 28 meeting of the countries that are contributing resources 

to the U.N. peacekeeping. The commitments, she continues to 

state, are just that—commitments. They have not been delivered 

yet. 

Have you had a chance to review the September 28 results? And 

are you optimistic that, in fact, this will have greater participation 

by the countries that are capable of doing more? What is your prognosis on this? 

Dr. JONES. Well, I had the honor of being invited to that meeting 

by the administration, so I was there for that. And I have been involved in helping the U.N. and the administration think through 

the preparation for it. I am semi-optimistic. 

I think that the Europeans, in particular, as they have drawn 

down in Afghanistan, they have capabilities that they are not 

using. In that context, they can contribute. The Dutch in Mali I 

think are the most important example of what we have seen so far. 

I think they recognize they have a deep interest that if they are 

going to come to terms with their migration problem and their refugee problem, they have to go and solve it in the places where it 

originates. So they have an interest in helping to stabilize conflicts 

in Africa and beyond. So I am somewhat optimistic. 

I would be very optimistic were it not for a very different reality, 

which is Russia and Ukraine, which is causing European governments, fully understandably, to reprioritize back to some older 

kinds of concerns about NATO, about the containment of Russia, 

et cetera. That is going to put pressure on European defense budgets, and it is going to put pressure on European militaries to be 

worried about things other than conflicts in Africa. 

And so the two things are, unfortunately, happening at the same 

time. I think there is a genuine will from Europeans and from the 

other countries like Korea that I mentioned to participate in U.N. 

peacekeeping. But at the same time, we are facing new challenges 

from China, from Russia, et cetera. Those are going to put different 

kinds of pressures. 

So I think she is very right to push the argument. I think the 

administration is right to pursue that initiative. But there are 

going to be other challenges we confront at the same time that will 

I think diminish the full impact that it might have had otherwise, 

unfortunately. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think we need to keep the spotlight 

on it. I think that was a great initiative by the President and has 

to be followed up. 

The other thing I might add with respect to contributing countries is one encouraging region of the world in that regard is the 

willingness of certain Latin American countries to contribute to 

peacekeeping, global peacekeeping, which they have been reluctant 

to do in the past. I mean, the mention of Colombia, for example, 

and Brazil, too. 

I thought that was encouraging, and I think it is something the 

U.N. needs to avail itself of. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. Thank you both for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

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60 

One of the great privileges that we have around here is the access to people like you who are so respected and have the ability 

to share wisdom with us and experiences. We know that every day 

when we come to work, so we want to thank you for your continued 

involvement in issues of importance to our country. Thank you for 

being here today. 

As you will see, a lot of our members make themselves present 

by asking questions later. So without objection, first of all, the 

record will be open until the close of business Friday. But if you 

could respond in a fairly timely manner, that would also be appreciated. 

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your service to our country, 

and we thank you for being here today. 

And with that, the meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO AMBASSADOR

SAMANTHA POWER BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. During the September U.N. Peacekeeping Summit, the United States, 

as well as other member states, made significant commitments to enhancing peacekeeping capabilities. The administration has stated that funding for this will not 

come from U.S. assessed contributions to international peacekeeping (CIPA account) 

but from elsewhere. 

• What is the approximate funding figure the President will be requesting in his 

budget to fund these commitments? 

• From what agencies and accounts will this funding be drawn? 

Answer. The Leaders’ Summit on September 28 generated commitments by 49 

countries plus the EU, NATO, and African Union to contribute aviation, infantry, 

police, and other critical support to U.N. peacekeeping operations. The Summit demonstrated the multiplier effect that can occur when countries come together to address some of the world’s most pressing problems. 

The Department of State is participating in an interagency discussion about steps 

the United States can take to continue to ensure that the United Nations has the 

means to fulfill its role in preventing the outbreak, escalation, and spread of conflicts. The Department of Defense is an important partner in this discussion. 

Currently we do not foresee new activities having any significant impact on FY 

2016 funding requirements. There may be minor changes as we refocus some of our 

efforts, and we look forward to working with you on any adjustments going forward. 

We are currently formulating the FY 2017 President’s Budget, which will be presented to Congress in early February 2017, and we will consult with you regarding 

any resource requirements for FY 2017 at that time. 

Question. I recently wrote to Secretary Kerry regarding steps to reduce the risk 

of peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse. This appears to be a chronic problem 

for the U.N. I understand that the U.S. Mission to the United Nations created an 

internal task force to address this issue and that an action plan exists. 

• What policy proposals are being considered as part of the action plan and what 

steps will you take to implement them? 

• Do you think this is a priority for the current U.N. leadership? If so, what 

makes you believe that this time is different? 

• How will the U.S. Mission at the United Nations press the next Secretary General to maintain the momentum on addressing sexual exploitation and abuse? 

Answer. The U.S. Mission to the U.N. created an internal task force on sexual 

exploitation and abuse (SEA) to take a serious look at the causes of and solutions 

to SEA in U.N. peacekeeping, a reflection of our government-wide commitment to 

preventing SEA. The measures the task force is reviewing include how best to support and/or put pressure on the U.N. and its member states as appropriate. The 

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task force is examining how best to engage member states, both bilaterally and 

through multilateral fora, on both better policy and practice. 

The U.N. Secretary-General has expressed deep commitment to the initiatives he 

championed regarding SEA, as seen outlined in his latest reports involving SEA, including his own implementation report on the recommendations of the High Level 

Independent Panel on Peace Operations. Next, we expect that his February 2016 annual report on SEA will provide country-specific information on those troop and police contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) whose uniformed personnel face credible allegations of SEA. 

More broadly, the U.N. is in the process of implementing more than 40 proposals 

from the Secretary-General’s February 2015 report. The most significant measures 

include: establishing immediate response teams in peacekeeping missions to gather 

and preserve evidence for use in investigations; adopting a six-month timeline for 

completion of investigations of SEA and calling on member states to adhere to the 

same timeline; strengthening its complaint reception framework to ensure mechanisms are in place within communities where people can come forward, in confidence, to raise complaints regarding U.N. personnel; strengthening administrative 

measures against civilian staff members found to have committed SEA, including 

withholding entitlements; suspending pay to TCCs/PCCs for personnel accused of 

SEA on the basis of credible allegations; and, setting out the framework for a trust 

fund to provide support and assistance to survivors and children born as a result 

of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers. 

We will begin discussions on the issue of sexual misconduct with the next Secretary-General from the beginning of his or her tenure, to ensure that reforms set 

in motion by the current Secretary-General are strengthened and institutionalized, 

and to urge the next Secretary-General’s continued engagement. We will continue 

to press at all levels, in New York, in the field, and with troop and police contributing countries on this serious issue. 

Question. With respect to peacekeeping operations, generally speaking, the U.N. 

Security Council authorizes the mission while the U.N. Secretary General, through 

the office of peacekeeping operations, runs the mission. 

• How actively involved is the U.N. Security Council in oversight of the mission? 

How often does the Council travel to review a mission’s operations and progress, 

firsthand? • What are your thoughts on having the U.N. Security Council establish, for each 

mission, its own ombudsman with full authority to review and conduct oversight 

of the peacekeeping mission and who would report directly to the Security 

Council when mission mandates are renewed? 

Answer. As the body responsible for authorizing U.N. peacekeeping operations, 

the Security Council (UNSC) actively seeks and receives through several different 

channels reporting, briefings, and other information to oversee each mission’s performance. Such information is critically important in helping the UNSC to determine what each mission’s mandate should be, the size and composition of the force 

needed, the duration of the mandate, as well as any other needed changes or adjustments. 

The UNSC makes trips, as needed and as possible, throughout the year to peacekeeping missions and trouble spots. For example, during 2015, Security Council 

members visited Haiti, the Central African Republic, and Burundi, as well as the 

headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa. However, the UNSC’s primary 

oversight is conducted in New York. The formal channels for UNSC oversight include written reports by the Secretary-General to the UNSC, which the Council generally requests on a quarterly or semi-annual basis; regular oral briefings to the 

UNSC by U.N. officials, as well as by the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral (SRSG) responsible for a particular peacekeeping mission; and consultations in the UNSC on mandate renewal resolutions in which UNSC members discuss any changes needed to a mission’s mandate. Such changes may include updates 

to the mandated tasks, associated increases or reductions in the number of uniformed personnel, and modifications in the composition of the force. The Council can 

also request additional assessments of missions when it is considering reconfiguration, drawdown, or transition. The Council often asks the Secretary-General to identify benchmarks for progress and to incorporate an evaluation of the mission against 

those benchmarks in his regular reports. 

Council members also have access to a number of other oversight materials produced by various U.N. mechanisms, such as the U.N.’s Office of Internal Oversight 

Services (OIOS), which provides oversight for the larger U.N. system; its audits and 

evaluation reports are available online. The Secretary-General also releases annual 

budget performance reports on each peacekeeping operation. 

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The United States continues to press the U.N. for greater oversight of its peacekeeping missions, particularly in the areas of financial controls and conduct and discipline. We believe the conduct and discipline units in missions must be stronger 

and better staffed. The United States was instrumental in the creation of, and supports the strengthening of, the Office of the Director for Peacekeeping Strategic 

Partnership, which is intended to provide services akin to an inspector general to 

identify gaps that affect the delivery of mandates by U.N. peacekeeping missions 

and make recommendations on systemic issues related to U.N. peacekeeping operations. We also believe that more comprehensive reporting by the Secretary-General 

on performance would improve the Council’s ability to exercise its oversight responsibilities. We have called for and support the U.N.’s evaluation of the impact of specific mandated tasks, such as the U.N.’s current revamping of its indicators to 

evaluate the impact of protection of civilians tasks. 

The idea of the UNSC directly appointing an ombudsperson for each U.N. peacekeeping mission raises a number of issues that require careful consideration, including: 

• Scope of Mandate: The Council would need to determine the issues appropriately addressed by an ombudsperson to avoid conflicting with the oversight 

responsibilities of the SRSG for the management of his/her mission’s personnel 

and resources or the existing auditing, conduct and discipline, performance, and 

evaluation mechanisms in the U.N. system, including those mentioned above. • Relationship vis-a-vis the SRSG: Currently, the SRSG is responsible for overseeing the overall effectiveness of the mission under his or her charge. The appointment of an ombudsperson raises the potential for conflicting signals between SRSGs and Force Commanders and ombudspersons, which could be counterproductive to the mission’s performance if such dynamics undermine the authority of the SRSG or the Force Commander to direct and manage the mission 

or their strategies for achieving the mission’s mandate. • Selection Process and Funding Issues: The Council would need to determine 

how it would select ombudspersons and their staffs, if not through the Secretary-General. It would also have to determine how to fund ombudspersons positions and staffs if the positions were not established through the UNGA Fifth 

Committee process. We would welcome further staff-level discussions on this 

idea. 

Question. Unfortunately, peacekeepers sometimes commit acts of violence against 

the people they have been sent to protect. The Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (Article VIII, Section 29) states that the U.N. ′′shall 

make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement′′ with respect to disputes. This 

would include claims by civilians hurt by the negligence or intentional acts of U.N. 

personnel or those under their authority. 

• It is my understanding that since 1990, the United Nations has not once created a standing claims commission despite 32 Status of Forces Agreements providing for the creation of one in the event of damages. If true, why has the U.N. 

not taken steps to address this problem? • With respect to establishing such modes of settlement or claims commissions, 

do you support the principle that the TCCs responsible for misconduct should 

pay any damages for harm caused by the officers and soldiers who serve under 

its flag? 

Answer. It is also our understanding that the U.N. has generally settled claims 

through local claims review boards, and that neither the U.N. nor the host countries 

have created standing claims commissions referenced in status of forces agreements 

(SOFAs) between the U.N. and host countries. A local claims review board is an internal board established within a U.N. Mission, responsible for settling third party 

claims in country. A local claims review board can also refer a claim to U.N. Headquarters for approval or disapproval if the settlement amount exceeds the authorized limit of the board. Local claims review boards have generally been effective in 

resolving instances of negligence. 

We support the idea that the U.N. should provide appropriate victims’ assistance 

related to misconduct by U.N. peacekeepers, and understand that the U.N. is currently working on a policy to devise such a system of assistance in the context of 

sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) cases. 

Abuses and violations committed by peacekeepers are unacceptable, undermine a 

peacekeeping mission’s ability to carry out its mandate, and damage a mission’s relationship with the community. 

Question. Does the U.N. system have in place protocols to disbar contractors who 

have been found by a competent authority to be guilty of negligence or intentional 

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acts which have led to injuries or deaths among a host country population? If not, 

should the U.N. establish such a system of debarment? 

Answer. Chapter 7 of the United Nations Procurement Manual provides for suspension or removal from the U.N.’s Register of Vendors of any vendor under formal 

investigation or sanctioned by a national authority for engaging in proscribed practices that include, but are not limited to, corruption, fraud, coercion, collusion, obstruction, and other unethical practices. 

Chapter 7 of the Procurement Manual also provides for suspension or removal of 

a vendor for actions that create financial, operational, reputational and other undue 

risks to the United Nations. Negligent or intentional acts that were harmful to a 

host country population would fall within the realm of proscribed activities for 

which a contractor would be removed the U.N.’s list of eligible vendors. 

Æ 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER