JSOU Report 06-6 One Valley at a Time Adrian T. Bogart III
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about 

joint special operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and 

recommendations of national security professionals and the Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) students and leaders for consideration by the 

SOF community and defense leadership. 

JSOU is a subordinate organization of the United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. 

The JSOU mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security 

decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. 

JSOU provides education to the men and women of SOF and to those 

who enable the SOF mission in a joint environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department 

where effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and these operational 

priorities: 

• Preempting global terrorist and CBRNE threats

• Enhancing homeland security

• Performing unconventional warfare and serving as a conven-

	 tional force multiplier in conflict against state adversaries

• Conducting proactive stability operations

• Executing small-scale contingencies. 

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency, and United States military communities.

The JSOU portal is https://jsou.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem, President

Editorial Advisory Board

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education

The Apollinaire Group and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Institutional 

Integration Division Chief

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution Stanford 

Univ. and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of the Jebsen Center for 

Counter-Terrorism Studies, The 

Fletcher School, Tufts University 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

George Emile Irani

Ph.D., International Relations

Toledo International Center for 

Peace and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force

USAFSOS Commandant

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies and JSOU Associate Fellow

Brian A. Maher

Ed.D., Education

JSOU Vice President

Michael C. McMahon

Lt Colonel, U.S. Air Force

JSOU Strategic Studies 

Department Director

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

Kenneth H. Poole

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Director of Homeland Security, 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU

Associate Fellow

Joseph A. Stuart

Ph.D., Educational Leadership

JSOU Dean of Academics

J. Paul de B. Taillon

Ph.D., International Affairs

Royal Military College of Canada 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History

Courage Services, LLC and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

William S. Wildrick

Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow
JSOU Report 07-2

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2007

Educating for 

Strategic Thinking

in the SOF

Community:

Considerations 

and a Proposal

Harry R. Yarger
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 

32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 

850-884-2764; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of 

Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-17-2
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy

or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, 

United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint 

Special Operations University.
Publications of the JSOU Press

2004–2005 JSOU/NDIA Essays, April 2005

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, June 2005

Russian Special Forces, August 2005, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

The Evolving Requirements of the Canadian Special 

Operations Forces, September 2005, J. Paul de B. Taillon

Operationalizing COIN, September 2005, Joseph D. Celeski

Theoretical Perspectives of Terrorist Enemies as Networks, 

October 2005, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. and Jessica Glicken Turnley

Logistic Support and Insurgency, October 2005, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Dividing Our Enemies, November 2005, Thomas H. Henriksen

The War on Terrorism, December 2005, James A. Bates

Coast Guard SOF, February 2006, Gary R. Bowen

Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, March 2006, 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Narcoterrorism in Latin America, April 2006, 

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future 

Conflict, and Implications for SOF, April 2006, John B. Alexander

Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education, 

May 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, 

James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006

Executive Report, JSOU First Annual Symposium (2–5 May 2006)

One Valley at a Time, August 2006, Adrian T. Bogart III 

Special Operations Aviation in NATO, September 2006, 

Richard D. Newton

Beyond Draining the Swamp: Urban Development and Counterterrorism in Morocco, October 2006, Stephen R. Dalzell

Filling Special Operations Gaps with Civilian Expertise,

December 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 


Foreword

I

n the author’s view the 21st century is proving to be more chaotic 

and challenging than many policymakers anticipated at the end 

of the Cold War. As a result, the military element of power will 

be even more critical to ensuring the security of the United States 

and the achievement of national interests. While all the service capabilities are essential and joint warfare will remain at the heart of 

American military strategy, the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

operational and strategic roles will continue to expand and evolve 

because SOF personnel and SOF-centric strategies will bridge the 

gap in conventional force shortfalls as well as overcome nontraditional challenges. The changing strategic responsibilities require a 

greater emphasis on SOF strategic thinking at all levels of war and a 

reconsideration of the development of senior leaders and strategists 

within the SOF community.

Adapting to the requirements of the new strategic environment is 

problematic at best. If the past is predictive of the future, the author 

warns, operational requirements will tend to pull the prospective 

candidates for the strategic roles toward the tactical fight and away

from educational and developmental assignments necessary to build 

strategic competence. As it is, current education in strategy and strategic thinking is dependent on service institutions where the SOF 

component is often limited. Furthermore, he argues a SOF school of 

strategic thought is not fully developed or well articulated. As a consequence, education is curtailed and an essential SOF perspective 

may not be sufficiently represented in the national debate.

The author praises United States Special Operations Command’s 

recent examination of the competency of strategic thinking and urges 

acting now to ensure the SOF leaders and performance required

by the 21st century. To that end he lays out concrete steps in SOF 

education leading to the development of the appropriate strategic 

thinking at the different levels of war.

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
vi

About the Author

Rich Yarger received his Ph.D. in 

History from Temple University. 

His prior degrees were a B.A. in 

History from Cameron College and 

an M.A. in Human Relations from the 

University of Oklahoma. He is the professor of National Security Policy in 

the Department of National Security

and Strategy at the U.S. Army War

College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Dr. 

Yarger also serves as an associate 

fellow with the JSOU Strategic Studies Department. He teaches various 

courses—Fundamentals of Strategic 

Thinking, Theory of War and Strategy, National Security Policy and 

Strategy, and Grand Strategy. 

Dr. Yarger’s research focuses on national security policy, strategic theory, and the education and development of strategic level 

leaders. In addition to teaching positions, he served for 5 years

as the U.S. Army War College Department of Distance Education 

chair. Dr. Yarger has also taught at the undergraduate level at 

several civilian institutions. A retired Army colonel, he is a Vietnam 

veteran and served in both Germany and Korea. 


Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

Educating for Strategic Thinking

in the SOF Community:

Considerations and a Proposal

Introduction

I

n 2002, then Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld challenged 

the Special Operations Forces (SOF) world by giving United States 

Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) the lead in planning for 

the war on terrorism. In the 2005 Unified Command Plan, USSOCOM

completed the transition from a supporting command, with the 

responsibility to provide forces to other regional United States (U.S.) 

commanders, to that of a supported command.1 Former Secretary 

Rumsfeld clearly saw that the 21st century strategic environment 

presented significant challenges for a conventionally oriented military. With his directives USSOCOM became a full fledged strategic

military actor, but the change raised questions about the SOF 

community’s preparation for its new strategic responsibilities.2

The image of tactical “snake eaters” and individual and small unit 

tactical focus appear to be in direct contrast to the increasing strategic role of SOF senior leaders and staff members. Equally important, 

increasingly SOF will be placed in situations where poor tactical 

decisions can have significant negative strategic consequences or the

fleeting opportunity for positive strategic effect is revealed. How well

are SOF personnel prepared for these roles and how best can the 

SOF “operator” acquire strategic awareness and appreciation and 

develop strategic thinking abilities for his level? The objective of this 

monograph is to examine the issue of “strategic thinking” in SOF—

what is the future need and how should the community develop and 

better inculcate strategic thinking in its members.

A 21st Century Special Operations World View

The first quarter of the 21st century is a promising time, but will

place increasing demands on all of the U.S. military and the 

SOF community in particular. Globalization and the intertwining of 


JSOU Report 07-2

American interests with the stability and success of the rest of the 

world will continue and accelerate. Shared and often disparate interests will require the coordinated use of all the socially determinant 

elements of U.S. power—economic, informational, diplomatic, and 

military. Technology, information systems, and knowledge profusion 

will continue to advance and spread at an exponential rate, allowing 

significant enhancements to U.S. military capabilities while at the

same time providing new opportunities for mischief to be exploited 

by a range of adversaries and lesser friends. U.S. democratic ideology, culture, and material wealth will inspire both emulation and 

hatred as other societies and cultures measure the value of their 

achievements against those of the U.S. Some will seek to leverage or 

aggressively imitate and exceed U.S. success. Others will try to protect their own interests and cultural uniqueness while decrying real 

or perceived U.S. excesses. 

Few groups—nations or non-state actors—will be totally impartial 

to U.S. interests and U.S. efforts to protect them, some will be openly 

hostile to U.S. power, and fewer still will align with the U.S. on every 

issue. The overall quality of life of the peoples of the world will continue to improve, but not as quickly or in the forms that many would 

wish, making the laggard and failing nations even more obvious and 

problematic. As a result of the media and information revolutions, 

this dichotomy will be more apparent than ever to them. Their own 

leaders and others will exploit their fears and dissatisfaction. 

The military world of 2025 will differ radically from that of most 

of the last half of the 20th century. In this world the U.S. will remain 

the single most dominant economic and military power, exercising 

world leadership through loose and often fleeting coalitions of other

like-minded nations who share in or seek to share in the riches and 

advantages of globalization. Peer or near-peer regional competitors 

will arise in different areas of the world and will cooperate, align, or 

distance themselves from the U.S. as they perceive their national 

interests or view individual issues. No true global peer competitor will 

be able to confront the U.S. until 2020 or after, regional competitors 

will have the ability to directly threaten the U.S. homeland with strategic forces; and others may have capabilities such as cruise missiles 

that pose a discrete but limited threat. Non-state actors may resort 

to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons to threaten 

or openly attack the U.S. homeland or allies. The existence of peer 


Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

or near-peer regional competitors and non-state adversaries, combined with the wide dispersion of military-related and dual-use technologies and dispersed knowledge of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD), will create a continuous backdrop of tension and threats.

One way to conceptualize the threats confronting the U.S is to see 

them as a global insurgency against the emerging 21st century world 

order for which the U.S. is the primary architect. The war on terrorism is but one manifestation of the emerging challenges.3 Others 

may react against this new world order also. The U.S. military will 

provide crucial stability for the transformation to this 21st century 

world order. The multiple challenges of the security environment are 

expressed in Figure 1.

The Security Environment

Likelihood

Irregular

Higher

Catastrophic

Vulnerability

Irregular challenges from the 

adoption or employment of 

unconventional methods by nonstate and state actors to counter 

stronger state opponents—e.g., 

terrorism, insurgency, civil war.

Seeking to erode U.S. power

Catastrophic challenges involving the surreptitious acquisition, 

possession, and possible terrorist 

or rogue employ­ment of WMD 

or methods producing WMD-like 

effects.

Seeking to paralyze U.S. power

Ethnic War, Guerilla, 

Insurgency, Terror

WDM: Rogue, Terrorist; 

Homeland Missile Attacks

Lower Higher

Traditional Disruptive

Traditional challenges posed 

by states employing legacy and 

advanced military capabilities 

and recognizable military forces, 

in long-established, well-known 

forms of military competition 

and conflict.

Seeking to challenge U.S. power

Lower

Disruptive future challenges 

emanating from competitors 

developing, possess­ing, and 

employing break-through technological capabilities intended 

to supplant our advantages in 

particular operational demands.

Seeking to marginalize U.S. power

Legacy Nuclear Forces, 

Uniformed Militaries

Cyber-War, Directed 

Energy, Genetic Weapons, 

Nano Weapons

Figure 1. Security Environment Matrix 4


JSOU Report 07-2

In addition, the presence of real-time and global news media, 

combined with an increasing global expectation that U.S. power can 

and will mitigate many crises, will lead to increasing use of U.S. military forces in noncombat operations in such areas as natural disaster 

relief, political unrest, or government collapses that place peoples 

of the world or global interests in jeopardy. U.S. policy makers will 

find their success or failure to address these operations judged by

an interested—and perhaps critical—domestic voting population. 

Similarly, an increasing international population will force their own 

leaders to align with U.S. interests and policies based on their perception of the U.S. success in meeting global needs in these areas. While 

these noncombat operations pose no direct threat to U.S. survival, 

they do affect world and domestic opinion, impact on U.S. interests, 

and create opportunities or breeding grounds for our adversaries. 

Thus in the first quarter of the 21st century, the U.S. military

will find itself challenged across the whole spectrum of operations.

Judging from history, the military will have only minimal force structure to address these multiple challenges. At the same time, funding priorities must continue to focus on research and development 

to maintain a diminishing technological advantage over the proliferation of missile and other threatening technologies employed by 

real and potential adversaries. Overall, U.S. military spending will 

be characterized by smaller forces and more technology as policy 

makers seek to counter new vulnerabilities even as they wrestle with 

the probabilities of conflict. Joint, interagency, and multinational

cooperation will characterize most operations because the best resolutions suggest it and fiscal constraints demand it.

The incessant and longer-duration mission requirements of the 

21st century will require land power and be manpower intense—

land war, regional hegemonic war, small wars, unconventional war, 

homeland security, forced intervention, occupation, military operations other than war—particularly stability and support operations, 

and sustained humanitarian relief operations. But success on land 

will be dependent on effective air and maritime power. In this very 

complex environment, the mission requirements for all U.S. forces 

will increase; SOF missions will grow exponentially. However, SOF 

will not compete with the transforming conventional forces as in the 

past, but will function as an integrated force in strategy development and execution—sometimes in the supported and sometimes in 


Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

a supporting role. SOF capabilities will bridge the force structure gap 

in conventional forces and play a pivotal role in preventing, preempting, and fighting wars; countering the activities or potential activities

of emerging adversaries; and leveraging humanitarian operations for 

strategic gain. Mission success will be contingent on integrating SOF 

early with conventional, interagency, and multinational capabilities 

into innovative, and sometimes unorthodox, strategies and plans.

Some may argue this assessment is too pessimistic. Others may 

speculate that the challenges will be even greater. Few future scenarios now paint a picture of a globalizing world with the relative stability 

and predictability of the Cold War era.5 Any realistic scenario suggests 

that the world now emerging, and the role SOF will play, requires 

greater strategic astuteness in SOF personnel at all levels—a SOF 

strategic competency. To build this strategic proficiency the community must overcome the major strategy dilemma confronting them.

The SOF Strategy Dilemma

The cornerstones for SOF success are its culture, quality personnel 

and training, and understanding of the missions. Former Secretary Rumsfeld’s directive and the critical role of SOF in the emerging 

security environment pose challenges and changes for each of these. 

USSOCOM’s new strategic responsibilities, in particular, ask what 

must USSOCOM do to ensure proper strategic thinking within the 

community at each level of war. The USSOCOM and SOF dilemma is 

how to bridge from a successful past to a different future while fully 

engaged in the emergence of that future—it begs questions for which 

the answers are neither easy nor always pleasing.

SOF Culture Challenges. SOF culture is an issue. The USSOCOM vision 

focuses on two missions: 1) “...plan, direct [synchronize], and execute the Global War on Terrorism” in its role as the lead combatant 

command and “train and equip” SOF for the current and future fight

and 2) “...be the premier team of special warriors, thoroughly prepared, properly equipped, and highly motivated at the right place, at 

the right time, facing the right adversary, leading the Global War on 

Terrorism, accomplishing strategic objectives of the U.S.” 6 In tasking 

itself to accomplish the strategic objectives of the U.S., USSOCOM 

retains the warrior image and the tactical focus of a team physically 

present at the right place and time to engage the enemy. Herein is 


JSOU Report 07-2

illustrated the duality of the SOF mindset—one that sees tactics and 

strategy as the same when in fact they are interrelated and interdependent, not the same things at all.

Another version of the cultural perspective is the mantra “all 

SOF is strategic.” There are good reasons for this mindset. A large 

part of SOF experience links tactical operations directly to national 

objectives, but that is not to say tactical planning is strategy development. The needed 21st century strategic thinking will be problematic across the SOF community until the members understand and 

accept the distinctness of the levels of war and learn to appreciate 

their role as strategic thinkers in each. With an appreciation of these 

levels, as it applies individually and collectively, the SOF community 

can educate SOF personnel to function more effectively at all levels 

in anticipating and countering the increasing challenges of the 21st 

century; but in particular, it can advance SOF senior leaders, strategists, and planners who can best contribute to achieving the nation’s 

interests. SOF adaptability is already evident in the individuals 

who have been thrust into new roles, but the issue is how to better

prepare the whole community. 

How well prepared are SOF personnel for strategic thinking? To 

effectively address this question, we must first examine what strategic 

thinking means; and the community may not have given this aspect 

of SOF professionalism sufficient consideration. Testifying before the

House Committee on Armed Services in October 2005, Michael G. 

Vickers noted that SOF needed to develop strategists to improve SOF 

strategic performance.7 In his more 

detailed full report, “Transforming 

U.S. Special Operations Forces,” 

published in August 2005, Mr. Vickers analyzed SOF transformation 

and concluded the SOF community 

has not done a good job of developing strategists and that to do so will require changes in military 

education and career progression patterns within the community.8

While Mr. Vickers’ assessment may be debated, he is not alone in his 

criticism or concern.9 Historically, the SOF community has relied on 

service schools to teach strategy and it can be argued SOF personnel 

are as well trained as anyone. Additionally, the SOF selection criteria 

and the nature of SOF training and missions yield greater individual 

... Mr. Vickers analyzed SOF 

transformation and concluded 

the SOF community has

not done a good job of

developing strategists ...


Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

adaptability and perhaps strategic exposure than most conventional 

service. These two observations, however, miss the essential point. 

The question confronting the SOF community is whether the current levels of strategic thinking are sufficient for the new responsibilities in the emerging environment. The answer is no, and the issue 

needs to be addressed now.10 As suggested, future success requires a 

cultural change. It also requires SOF leadership to invest the people 

and resources to create the required strategic thinking. At the same 

time, all-time high operational requirements, lack of a well-known 

and unifying SOF school of strategy, and failure to adopt a common 

theory of strategy pose significant challenges to enhancing strategic

thinking within the community. To fulfill its 21st century role, SOF

must recognize and overcome these challenges and properly develop 

and educate its population.

The Operational and Personnel Management Challenges. SOF will continue to experience personnel management issues in the foreseeable 

future that affect the community’s ability to appropriately develop 

strategic thinking and produce SOF strategists. Just as the SOF 

community most needs proactive strategic thinking to confront new 

and daunting challenges, a personnel scenario is developing that 

is very unfavorable to enhancing strategic thinking and producing 

strategists. The personnel management issues are driven by extreme 

operational requirements and fall into three major categories—

accessions, retention, and development.

SOF recruit exceptional individuals from within the services—each 

individual meets higher, and often different, standards and skills and 

competencies than the typical service recruit.11 These requirements 

have been validated over time and appear to place practical limits on 

the availability of new accessions for both the officer corps and the

enlisted ranks, even if standards are modified. As the need for more

SOF personnel escalates, the personnel system is unlikely to meet 

the recruiting demand in a timely fashion. In addition, the emerging 

security environment will continue to make SOF personnel attractive 

to civil enterprises—such as defense contractors—where the pay can 

be much better. Consequently, the operating tempo for serving members will probably increase, which will decrease the time available for 

schooling or other professional developmental opportunities. 


JSOU Report 07-2

As SOF requirements increase and operational shortages develop, 

personnel managers will prioritize assignments in favor of the operational requirements with predictable results. They will look for 

efficiencies within the system to maximize officers’ and noncommissioned officers’ time in operational units. The time available for institutional training and education will decrease. Initially they will look 

for more efficient ways to train and educate, and some genuine efficiency may be realized.12 Ultimately, however, personnel managers 

will be forced to look for “unnecessary” or “not fully justified” training and education programs—training and education that cannot 

be directly linked to the next operational assignment. Next, a period 

of denial of developmental training and education with appropriate 

“constructive” credit for individuals will follow. Even opportunities 

for SOF personnel to attend strategic education at service schools 

will most likely decrease. Consequently, at a time when SOF strategic thinking and perspective at all levels of war is most critical, the 

community will likely not be preparing its personnel through appropriate training and education programs. 

Learning can occur in other than an academic environment. 

Strategic knowledge can be acquired through experience, but the 

fundamental purpose of military training and education is to prepare 

individuals for increased responsibilities and shorten the learning 

curve on the job, whether at peace or in war. Experience is a great 

teacher but it invariably costs more in effort, treasure, and blood. 

At the higher levels of staff and command, even strategic experience 

may be denied SOF personnel.

As the community is dragged deeper into the tactical world as a 

result of operational needs, SOF-coded positions on various strategic 

level staffs will go unfilled. Vacant positions or positions filled with

non-SOF personnel create two significant strategic consequences.

First, experienced SOF perspective and expertise is lessened in the 

strategy formulation and decision processes. In the forecasted strategic environment, this situation poses a potential catastrophic problem since proper use of SOF is instrumental in the future security 

environment. Second, SOF personnel are denied essential development opportunities to enable them to best compete for and effectively 

perform in strategic leadership positions. With neither educational 

nor adequate developmental assignments to foster an appropriate 


Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

strategic perspective, the community is left with a promotion and 

leadership quandary. Who should be promoted to fill the key strategic level staff and leadership positions that require strategic thinking 

competencies? Competitive promotion of the best of the unprepared 

is not a satisfactory solution. Over time these detriments to development in strategic thinking will increasingly affect the quality and 

success of SOF contributions to national defense—risking making 

these contributions less influential and more reactive at a time when

innovative and proactive solutions are most needed. If this is allowed 

to occur, the nation is largely deprived of the key strategic advantage 

of SOF.

The solutions to these challenges require good strategic thinking 

and appropriate action by today’s SOF leadership. The fundamental 

problem of increasing demands for SOF personnel in the emerging 

strategic environment has already been recognized, and initial steps 

to build a larger force have been undertaken.13 These steps should 

be re-examined to ensure that any potential long-term second- and 

third-order effects are mitigated as much as possible and expediency 

does not lead to counter-productive long-term effects. It is also clear 

that confronted with the strategic 

responsibilities assigned by the 

Secretary of Defense, SOF leaders recognize a need to build an 

increased strategic competency—

SOF strategic practitioners and 

strategists—within the community. What needs clarifying is, What constitutes strategic competency 

and how will it be accomplished long term? SOF leadership must 

apply effective strategic thinking to get this right.

Any solution must have both an experiential and an educational 

component. An effective career progression model addresses the 

experiential component, routing noncommissioned officers and officers through appropriate operational, command, and staff positions 

of increasing challenges and responsibility based on their observed 

performance and potential. For the talented, such a pattern should 

include positions on both SOF and conventional staffs that allow for 

development of strategic perspective and practice of strategic competencies. These positions are generally well known within the personnel system, and issues are primarily centered on identifying the 

... SOF leaders recognize a need

to build an increased strategic

competency—SOF strategic

practitioners and strategists

—within the community.
10

JSOU Report 07-2

right individuals and making them available for the assignment. The 

educational component is addressed in some detail here. 

Levels of Understanding. Requirements for strategic thinking differ 

among SOF personnel. In the broadest sense, the focus is the quality

of the specific thinking that SOF personnel require at the level and

in the role at which they are functioning. (See Figure 2 for levels 

of thinking.) The term strategist is avoided here because it implies 

a unique role and special competencies and skills that are neither 

required by nor can be taught to all SOF personnel. What is required 

and what currently exists in strategic thinking within the community 

is open to debate, but the need is clear. The issues can be clarified

and the debate can be moved forward by postulating requirements 

at the respective levels and how to best develop it. In that regard, 

SOF strategic thinking can be classified in terms of the levels of war

as they are currently defined with some modest, but key differences.

The levels of war require different levels of understanding and imply 

different levels of education and development, which poses the what, 

who, when, and how to teach questions. These levels can then be 

somewhat equated to ranks performing at that level and related back 

to career progression and educational models. Understanding and 

articulating the strategic thinking required at each level is crucial to 

determining what SOF strategic competency needs to be and how to 

build and sustain it.

 Action Tactical Plans for and executes through direct action a single 

engagement or undertaking.

Campaign 

Planning Operational

Plans synchronized multiple engagements or undertakings and bridges the “gap” between tactics and 

strategy in a more complex modern world.

Purpose

Objectives

Guidance

Strategic Develops unifying objectives and the guidance for 

pursuing them that bounds both planning and action.

Good policy, strategy, operational planning, and 

tactics share the paradigm of ends, ways, means;

but each requires its own level of thinking.

All strategy is “actioned” by tactics—

someone doing something!

Figure 2. Relationship Among Levels of Thinking

Policy
11

Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

Tactical Level. Strategy is not tactics, and tactics is not strategy. 

Tactics are the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in

relation to each other to accomplish a specific task.14 Tactics ultimately implement strategy, providing the detailed actions and 

maneuvers that lead cumulatively to the achievement of the strategic objectives. Tactics are the actual engagements or operations 

at the point of the strategic spear. When the tactics are appropriately designed and executed, they create positive strategic effects 

that contribute to or achieve the strategic objectives. When the tactics are inappropriately selected or executed, they may also create 

strategic effects that are negative—that is, have undesired strategic 

consequences. Effects and consequences may be multi-ordered (e.g., 

first order, second order, and third order) and can occur from action

taken, action not taken, chance action, and the reaction of other 

actors. Good tactics seek to create desired strategic effect and avoid 

undesirable strategic consequences. 

A popular misconception in military thought is that the tactical and 

strategic levels have been compressed 

by globalization, and particularly the 

almost instantaneous availability of 

information through modern media 

and the Internet. The appeal of this 

argument is that it provides an alibi for the inability or unwillingness 

of strategic and tactical practitioners to adapt to the emerging strategic environment. However, the argument is wrong. Most examples 

of so-called “compression” are really illustrations of woefully inadequate information operations strategies and capabilities or unwillingness to act, not compression of levels. Modern communications 

rapidly expand access to information and compressed response time, 

not the levels of war. Bad tactics have always had strategic consequences. Modernization may magnify or complicate tactics, but it 

does not change the distinctness or the fundamental relationship 

among the levels. Modernization does beg the question of how to 

train and educate tactical leaders for the emerging environment—

that is, it suggests a greater need for a degree of strategic awareness 

or appreciation at the tactical level to inform tactical initiative.

A popular misconception in 

military thought is that the 

tactical and strategic levels 

have been compressed by 

globalization ...
12

JSOU Report 07-2

A SOF version of the compression of levels of war is the mantra 

“all SOF actions are strategic.” This misconception stems from specialized SOF missions generated at the strategic decision level where 

the strategic and tactical objectives have been virtually identical. 

But there are fundamental differences in the thought processes. 

The tactical operation has its own level of planning that is distinct 

from the ends, ways, and means of the strategy. Strategy selects 

objectives to create strategic effect. Tactics normally selects subordinate objectives to contribute to the accomplishment of the larger 

strategic objectives. The strategic concept identifies SOF as the best

instrument to achieve the objective. Tactics plans the mission and 

the specific actions to be taken on the ground in employing SOF.

Strategic resources identify what will be made available to support 

accomplishment of the objective. Tactics identifies the specific forces,

equipment, and supplies that are to be used for the mission. On 

those occasions when the strategic and tactical objectives coincide, 

strategic thinking has defined the objective, and tactical thinking

accepts it as a direct action. Tactical planning may be elevated for 

important missions, but the thought process is separate and subordinate to strategy.

Historically, military doctrine has been used to bridge the gap 

between the dynamic nature of the strategic environment and the 

tactical plan. Doctrine answered the tactical planning questions and 

once engaged, adaptability was achieved through reference back to 

existing doctrine. Nondoctrinal innovation was rewarded in war when 

it was right and punished when it proved wrong. For conventional 

forces, a doctrinal model remains the most effective and efficient

concept for training and employing large forces for most missions. 

Doctrine will continue to play a key role for SOF, but for SOF tactical 

operators on the ground and dealing directly with other nationalities, 

it is increasingly important that they develop an even higher appreciation of strategy and strategic thinking—captains and sergeants 

with enhanced strategic appreciation and awareness.

Such tactical operators will not be developing strategies for 

USSOCOM, but they will be in a position to better execute strategies 

through tactical action and initiative and to recognize potential strategic opportunities and issues. SOF operators at this level are at the 

point of the strategic spear and are directly engaged in the special 

operations core tasks of direct action (DA), counterterrorism (CT), 
13

Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

foreign internal defense (FID), unconventional warfare (UW), special 

reconnaissance (SR), psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs 

operations (CAO), information operations (IO), or counter­proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction (CP). In the 21st century environment, these warriors increasingly will be placed in situations that 

are not doctrinally clear and will not always have the time to refer 

to a higher headquarters. Indeed, in much of the SOF environment, 

the layering of leadership and support found in conventional units is 

absent and adaptability and innovation are heavily relied on today—

a strength of the community that will be increasingly relied on in 

the future. Because of the uniqueness of 

the SOF missions, any SOF individual 

is likely to be placed in situations where 

poor tactical decisions can have significant strategic consequences, or a fleeting

opportunity for positive strategic effect can 

go unrecognized and thus be lost. Hence a 

level of strategic awareness and ability to 

think strategically sufficient to evaluate the purpose and methods of

a strategy and determine what tactical actions are appropriate must 

be developed in all SOF operators. Such expertise would consist of a 

basic understanding of strategic theory and the relationship between 

strategy and tactical actions. Its primary purpose is to frame initiative on the part of the tactical operator in a manner that serves strategic ends, limits unintentional harm, and takes proper advantage of 

unanticipated opportunities.

Such logic suggests that SOF operators should be introduced to 

strategic theory and sufficiently educated to evaluate their role in

and intelligently execute their part of a strategy. Where their direct 

tactical action accomplishes the strategic objective and when their 

tactical role is part of an integrated effort may have greater implications for strategic success than in the past. This means they must 

comprehend the strategic effects sought and what tactical actions 

contribute or detract from those effects. Such education should 

inform tactical initiative, teach how to recognize a potential strategic opportunity, and seize or report it as appropriate. Obviously, a 

proper approach would also apprise of how to anticipate and avoid 

negative strategic consequences. 

... any SOF individual 

is likely to be placed in 

situations where poor 

tactical decisions can 

have significant strategic 

consequences ...
14

JSOU Report 07-2

Operational Level. This level of war is the echelon between tactics and 

strategy. Operational art bridges the gap between the strategic objectives and specific tactical actions—that is, when the strategic objectives require the accomplishment of multiple and interrelated tactical 

actions. Through the campaign plan with its subordinate objectives 

and concepts, operational art sequences and synchronizes tactical 

actions by various agencies and organizations so that the integrated 

and cumulative effects lead to accomplishment of the strategic objectives.15 While SOF tactical actions in many circumstances may have 

a direct correlation to strategic objectives, the new strategic responsibilities and missions the Secretary of Defense assigned to USSOCOM 

suggest a greater planning role for SOF personnel. Understanding 

the relationships among tactics, operational art, and strategy is 

important to the SOF professional planning of any core task.

SOF planners at the operational level must develop campaign 

plans that reflect complete understanding of the purpose and intent

of strategy and the ability and limitations of capabilities to support 

them. They must be able to evaluate, and sometimes challenge, strategies in order to properly plan for their execution. Planning makes 

strategy actionable. It adapts strategy to a concrete world with facts, 

figures, and interrelated and sequenced actions calculated to achieve

the objectives of the strategy. Planning must create strategic effects 

that support and are not counterproductive to the stated policy goals 

or national interests. Such planning expertise requires a comprehensive understanding of strategic theory and the nature of the strategic 

environment. Its purpose is to make strategy actionable by imposing linearity and certainty onto the inherently chaotic nature of the 

strategic environment so that it can be positively influenced to favor

national policy.16

SOF officers and noncommissioned officers need to understand

the operational level of war and the relationship among operational 

art and strategy and tactics and will be called on to use this knowledge at the appropriate time in their careers. Such professionals may 

find themselves assigned at USSOCOM, other combatant commands,

the Joint Staff or Department of Defense, Theater Special Operations 

Commands, Joint Task Forces, or a Joint Special Operations Task 

Force. In these positions they may be planning any of the nine activities designated as special operations core tasks, integrating these 
15

Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

SOF capabilities into the supported command’s overall campaign, 

or planning future force capabilities. Bridging the gap between tactics and strategy requires a high level of strategic thinking in order 

to evaluate and plan for the execution of a strategy. Today, under 

the current delegation of authority from the Secretary of Defense, 

USSOCOM staff officers and noncommissioned officers are deeply

engaged in campaign planning and coordination. USSOCOM’s 

responsibilities involve not only planning for SOF-centric campaigns 

but also campaign planning for integrated efforts among conventional 

forces, SOF, and nonmilitary agencies and organizations. Such planning requires them to be able to understand and evaluate strategy in 

order to do effective campaign analysis and planning.

Strategic Level. At the highest level, strategy is the art and science 

of developing and employing instruments of national power in a 

synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/

or multinational objectives. A subset of this level is military strategy, 

which is the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation 

to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or 

the threat of force.17 Yet even at the military strategy level the senior 

leader, senior staff officer, or strategist must have an understanding

and appreciation of the systemic and comprehensive nature of strategy—military strategy cannot be developed without consideration of 

and integration with the other instruments of power and other strategies. SOF leaders, strategists, and SOF staff officers and noncommissioned officers working at the strategic level must be competent at the

tactical and operational levels and grasp the relationship among the 

levels of war. While they sometimes work at the same levels as those 

involved in operational art, their focus is on strategy proper.

At the highest levels of strategic thinking, the U.S. Army War College places the individual in one of the three roles:

a. Strategic leader provides vision, inspiration, organizational 

skills, direction, and personal leadership at the highest levels. 

b. Strategic practitioner develops strategy, translating broad 

policy guidance into integrated specific strategies that lead to

policy success. 

c. Strategic theorist develops theories and concepts through 

study and thought and teaches and mentors others regarding the strategy and strategic thinking. 
16

JSOU Report 07-2

Each role requires a distinct set of skills and competencies that 

are developed through experience and study. A master of the strategic art is proficient in all three of these areas and may approach

Clausewitz’s genius in the truest sense.18 Strategists proper—strategic 

practitioners—must be well founded in the understanding and application of strategic theory and its assumptions and premises, experienced in the strategic appraisal process, and able to develop and 

write strategy. Obviously the SOF community needs to develop and 

grow strategists proper who can develop proper strategies using both 

SOF and other capabilities, military and civilian. Other SOF personnel 

fall into roles where they must evaluate and execute strategy.19

Ultimately, SOF as a community should be seeking to develop 

SOF personnel who can function in all the realms of strategy as well 

as articulate to non-SOF personnel the SOF perspective in strategy. 

(See Figure 3 for a depiction of the realms of strategy and strategic 

thinking.) SOF requires personnel who can develop or play a role in 

the development of strategy proper at various levels and in various 

environments; execute strategy in the conduct of military operations, 

force development, and organizational undertakings; develop and 

articulate theory; and mentor and educate to sustain an effective

Figure 3. Realms of Strategy

Grand Strategy

National Strategy

Military Strategy

Theater Strategy

Strategic

Theory

Organizational 

Strategy

Strategic

Schools / 

Culture

Force

Development

Strategy

Environment(s)

 • tactical

 • operational

 • strategic

 • regional

 • international

 • domestic

 • natural

 • bureaucratic

 • academic

S t r a t e g i c T h i n k i n g

Strategic thinking occurs in all realms and there is a 

relationship among the realms and among the environments 

and between the realms and the environments. 
17

Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

SOF strategic culture. In addition, the SOF community should be 

concerned about providing an opportunity for non-SOF personnel to 

become knowledgeable in regard to the SOF orientation in strategy. 

Such knowledge facilitates understanding, integration, and support 

of SOF needs and initiatives in any of the realms of strategy.

Educating for Strategic Thinking

Educating SOF personnel is complicated by the inherently joint 

nature of SOF and the bifurcated responsibilities of USSOCOM 

and the services in regard to the professional development and career 

progression of personnel. It is also complicated by the lack of a wellarticulated special operations school of strategy and a shared SOF 

theoretical construct for strategy. The SOF community has begun 

to make a concerted effort to intellectually move strategic thought 

beyond a cliché of “all SOF is strategic,” but current and future 

operational requirements remain a threat to progress.20 All of these 

situations make an educational approach difficult, but USSOCOM’s

role as a supported combatant command in the war on terrorism 

provides the impetus; and the Joint Special Operations University 

(JSOU), as a subordinate institution of USSOCOM, provides a logical proponent for the development of and education in SOF strategic 

thinking. JSOU should be able to research and design a school of 

strategy, develop an appropriate curriculum, and design a program 

to make learning available to those who require it. The outlines of 

such an approach are developed here. 

The lack of a well-articulated, publicized, and generally accepted 

special operations strategic school of thought is problematic for SOF 

education. Without a Clausewitz (land power), Mahan (maritime 

power), or Douhet (airpower), SOF has no intellectual basis for a 

debate about what constitutes special operations strategic thought 

and how it must be modified for the current period.21 Such works, 

even though they are dated, provide a tradition from which current 

discussion can move forward. A SOF work would provide a common 

basis for communication within the community and a venue for 

those outside the community to understand special operations and 

its strategic role. This is not the same as saying those in the current 

community, or in the past, have not thought about or even articulated 

a school in some manner. It is merely pointing out that such intellec-
18

JSOU Report 07-2

tual work is not readily available or generally recognized. It suggests 

that educators might need to identify such resources or, better still, 

research and publish a composite work that captures the essence 

of an American special operations school. Some of the thought is 

integrated in recent doctrine, but a coherent “school” provides the 

intellectual basis for thinking critically about SOF strategic thinking 

and its evolution. The essence or thesis might be “small numbers 

of highly talented and trained specialists, thinking innovatively and 

properly employed, can have positive strategic effects vastly disproportionate to their numbers and resources.” Such a school might 

also incorporate elements of the SOF truths, which represent a part 

of the foundation of SOF thinking. A composite work on a special 

operations school would prove this thesis and illustrate how, when, 

and why it works. Such a composite book is not a theoretical construct for understanding strategy in general, but a foundation for 

understanding the strategic role of special operations. 

What to teach SOF personnel about strategy in general should 

be based on a shared SOF strategy theoretical construct. Such constructs already exist, but USSOCOM 

should pick a construct and modify it 

appropriately for the SOF world view, 

embellishing or modifying it with SOF 

vocabulary, concepts, and illustrations 

where appropriate, while recognizing 

SOF exists in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. Its 

primary purpose is to educate SOF personnel in strategic thinking, 

allowing the community to communicate intelligently about strategy 

and its relationship to campaign planning and tactical operations, 

and to evaluate the merits of a particular strategy in the existing 

environment. Its secondary purpose is to inform others about SOF 

strategic thinking. Such a construct gives SOF both recognition and 

ownership—validating and reinforcing strategic thought within the 

community. The Army War College uses such a construct, and this 

author’s recent monograph, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: 

The Little Book on Big Strategy illustrates this approach. A SOF “little 

book” would cover much of the same ground, perhaps with more 

examples and a significant emphasis on the SOF strategic thinking

at the tactical and operational levels. 

... USSOCOM should pick 

a construct and modify it 

appropriately for the SOF 

world view ...
19

Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

Once a common construct is adopted, what is taught at the different points in an individual’s career is a function of the comprehension required for positions at that level and the amount of time 

and resources made available to develop the requisite competency—

curricula are functions of need, resources, and student availability. While major curriculum components are broadly outlined in 

this monograph, they would need to be developed in much greater 

detail for specific courses. Other institutions have already addressed

the curriculum requirements at the strategic and operational levels

(e.g., Army War College and Command and General Staff College) and 

provide a logical point of departure for JSOU. Less has been done at 

the basic course levels of instruction for officers and noncommissioned officers because the typical service school sees little need.

Yet this can be easily determined since the “little book” approach 

and the level of assignment projected for typical graduates allows 

definition of a logical effort of study from introductory to mastery.

Existing literature, such as the monograph Educating International 

Security Practitioners: Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Security Environment, provide data and models for 

also considering the levels of effort.22 Thus JSOU can develop SOF 

strategic thinking curricula for SOF personnel who will serve at the 

tactical, operational, or strategic levels; and these curriculums can 

be designed so that they can be integrated into a progressive professional development program. Delivery of the curriculums may well 

pose the larger obstacle.

SOF is by definition a joint force, composed of different service

elements. Training and education of this force is accomplished by a 

combination of service institutions, service-specific special operations

institutions, JSOU, and other joint institutions. The services largely 

control career progression and decide when service members attend 

service schools. SOF’s unique organizational structure astride the 

services as a combatant command with Title 10 responsibilities (and 

a “community” as opposed to a service) is inherently problematic. 

SOF strategic thinking education requirements may not align with 

the service education models. Individuals may not attend intermediate- or senior-level education until after SOF assignments requiring 

the education. This issue can be overcome by the simple expedient 

of visualizing SOF strategic education as having its own basic, intermediate, senior, and strategist levels of education. (See Figure 4.)
20

JSOU Report 07-2

In such a model SOF personnel can access the learning under career 

parameters that allow them earlier access than the normal service 

model might facilitate. Flexibility and redundancy of learning can be 

addressed by course design.

How are common curriculums to be delivered across different service systems and institutions that provide varying degrees of similar 

content at different times? This question suggests that JSOU will 

need to produce a variety of strategic study products for resident 

and nonresident use by JSOU and by an array of other training and 

educational institutions. This challenge can be confronted effectively 

by conceptualizing any level of course as being developed in several 

modes: stand-alone resident instruction, stand-alone distance learning, SOF supplement to existing resident strategy curriculum, and 

SOF supplement to existing distance-learning strategy curriculum. 

Adhering to this conceptual mode, an instructional designer can 

analyze guidance such as the “Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)” and review service courses in order to design 

with consideration to essential first knowledge, reinforcement, and

redundancy of content.23 Such an array also gives options to individuals and institutions for their use. Understanding the complexity 

Figure 4. Army Active Component Officer Education System
21

Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

of strategic studies is eased by multiple approaches to the subject; 

reinforcement is essential, making some degree of redundancy with 

service schools a positive attribute of the model. In this regard, attendance later at service professional military education (PME) or specialized strategy courses adds depth and context to the education of 

SOF personnel who have completed JSOU courses, and earlier attendance at such courses enhances JSOU instruction. In the former 

case it also offers an opportunity for SOF officers to better “educate”

their contemporaries at service schools on SOF strategic thinking. 

Another approach that facilitates or makes use of service PME 

programs is to use a modular design where “common knowledge” 

content is in modules that the student can test out of for credit. JSOU 

courses would be SOF centric, but not in an exclusive sense because 

USSOCOM responsibilities in the war on terrorism synergize conventional, SOF, multinational, and interagency capabilities—a requirement that will continue and expand. In addition, given the role and 

quality of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the SOF community,

there probably is little need for content or design differences in officer and NCO courses. The community simply needs to determine 

which NCOs are required to take what levels and when—functions of 

a selection process, in which all are not selected at the higher levels. 

JSOU enjoys an excellent reputation for innovation in course design 

and methodologies, and the development and implementation issues 

are more apt to be resource and culturally focused as opposed to a 

lack of JSOU talent or inflexibility.

Using the levels of war, OPMEP, services’ experience and courses, 

and ideas advanced above, the course objectives and the desired graduate behavior of a SOF strategy education model can be described 

via the basic, intermediate, and senior levels.24 Lesson objectives and 

content flow from the course objectives and desired behaviors. To

clarify, the objectives are cumulative as a student passes through the 

levels over time—that is, the senior-level student is assumed to have 

mastered the basic and intermediate levels, and the junior courses 

are prerequisites to more senior ones. In reality, mastery of previous 

objectives is subordinated in the higher level of learning and always 

will have to be reviewed in order to proceed to new learning.

Basic Level. “SOF Strategic Thinking at the Tactical Level” would 

be a mandatory basic course in strategic thinking for SOF junior 
22

JSOU Report 07-2

officers and mid-level NCOs. Such a course introduces students to

strategic theory and the concept of strategic thinking. It focuses on 

the relationship of tactics, operational art, and strategy and builds 

strategic awareness and appreciation by teaching students to consider multi-ordered effects of their actions and to recognize possible 

strategic opportunities. It does not seek to teach strategic appraisal 

or strategy formulation. The curriculum is offered in resident and 

nonresident formats. It would be taught at JSOU, exported for resident instruction at service-specific special operations schools, and

offered online. All versions would include an evaluation module. Its 

anticipated duration is approximately 9 to 15 classroom hours or a 

distance-learning equivalent.25

Intermediate Level. “Strategic Thinking at the Operational Level” 

would be an intermediate course in strategic thinking for majors, 

lieutenant colonels, and senior staff NCOs. At this level the course 

requires students to understand strategic theory and the concept of 

strategic thinking. It examines the relationship between campaign 

planning and strategy and builds strategic awareness by requiring 

students to plan for multi-ordered effects and provide for adaptability and flexibility in planning to account for adverse effects and to

take advantage of strategic opportunities. It should also introduce 

the strategic appraisal and strategy formulation processes. The curriculum is offered in resident and nonresident formats. It should be 

taught at JSOU, exported for resident instruction at service-specific

Course Objectives Behaviors

Understand the relationship 

among the levels of war and 

the role of tactics.

Understand the SOF school(s) 

of strategy.

Understand the concepts of 

strategy theory and strategic 

thinking.

Distinguish the strategic 

role of SOF.

Appreciate the strategic roles 

of joint forces and the services.

Demonstrates strategic appreciation and 

awareness.

Plans and conducts tactical operations 

within the boundaries and in support 

of stated plans and strategy.

Understands strategic effects and strategic 

consequences and reports or applies initiative 

appropriately in conditions of uncertainty.

Recognizes and reports potential 

strategic opportunities at his level.

Identifies the impact of the tactical environment 

on capability and makes recommendations.
23

Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

special operations schools, exported to service intermediate schools 

as an elective, and offered online. All versions would include an evaluation module. Its duration is anticipated to be approximately 30 

classroom hours or a distance-learning equivalent.

Senior Level. “SOF Strategic Thinking at the Strategic Level” would be 

a comprehensive course in strategic thinking for lieutenant colonels 

and colonels. Such a course requires students to analyze and evaluate strategic theory and the concept of strategic thinking. It examines the relationship among policy, strategy, and operations and the 

roles of SOF, military forces, and other agencies and actors. Students 

study the strategic appraisal and strategy formulation processes. The 

curriculum is offered in resident and nonresident formats. It would 

be taught at JSOU, exported for resident instruction at service-specific special operations schools, exported to service senior schools as

an elective, and offered online. All versions would include an evaluation module. Its anticipated duration is approximately 30 classroom 

hours or a distance-learning equivalent.

Course Objectives Behaviors

Examine the SOF school(s) 

of strategy and its (their) 

relationship to other 

schools of strategy.

Examine strategy theory and 

the relationship of strategy to 

planning.

Understand the strategic 

appraisal process.

Understand the strategy 

formu­lation process.

Create effective campaign 

and organizational plans 

based on a given strategy.

Compare and contrast the 

current and future strategic 

role of SOF with the strategic 

roles of joint forces and 

the services.

Demonstrates the ability to analyze and evaluate strategy in the different realms and develop 

detailed plans in support of a given strategy.

Evaluates strategy for objectives, desired 

strategic effects, and planning guidance and 

boundaries relative to use of SOF and 

other forces.

Plans SOF-specific operations or integrates SOF 

and other capabilities into operational plans.

Creates campaign, contingency, and complex 

organizational plans.

Assesses the probably and merit of strategic 

effects, strategic consequences, and strategic 

opportunity in planning and adapts planning as 

appropriate under conditions of uncertainty.

Recommends allocation of resources.

Develops and recommends measures of 

effectiveness and monitors accordingly.

Identifies future force and capability needs 

and makes recommendations accordingly.
24

JSOU Report 07-2

Strategist Level. “The SOF Strategist Course” would be a comprehensive 

curriculum in strategic appraisal and the strategy formulation process offered to majors and lieutenant colonels. This course requires 

students to master strategic theory and the strategic appraisal and 

strategy formulation processes. The curriculum is offered in a resident or blended learning format. It contains a practical application 

and/or an internship. It would be taught only by JSOU and includes 

a certification process. Its duration would be approximately 120

classroom hours or an appropriate blended learning equivalent.

Course Objectives Behaviors

Assess the SOF school(s) of 

strategy and its (their) relationship to other schools of strategy for the current and future 

environments.

Evaluate the SOF strategy 

theory construct and its value 

in assessing current strategies 

and formulating new strategies.

Apply the strategic appraisal 

process.

Apply the strategy formulation 

process.

Assess policy and higher level 

strategy and guidance and 

construct strategy and planning guidance for the national 

military and theater levels of 

strategy.

Evaluate the current and future 

strategic role of SOF relative 

to the strategic roles of joint 

forces and the services.

Demonstrates the ability to apply senior-level 

strategic thinking in periods of uncertainty and 

in the different realms of strategy and derive 

appropriate questions and guidance for development of strategy and supportive planning:

• Scans the strategic environment.

• Evaluates national and higher strategies 

for appropriateness and institutional or 

organizational implications and critiques

or applies appropriately.

• Integrates SOF, conventional military, 

interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental components, and other aspects 

of power in service of national interests, 

policy, and strategy.

• Provides strategy formulation and 

planning guidance.

• Approves strategies and plans and 

supporting resources.

• Approves and evaluates measures 

of effectiveness.

• Decides future force and capability needs 

and priorities and promotes accordingly.
25

Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

Conclusion

In the end, this monograph makes a simple argument. The future is 

more chaotic and challenging than the past, and SOF must adapt 

for a greater strategic role. As globalization continues to change the 

nature of the international and domestic environments around the 

world, the U.S. will be confronted with a wide array of challenges 

to its national interests. While the services and conventional joint 

forces are still essential to the advancement of these interests, 

USSOCOM and the special operations community are more critical 

than ever to successful U.S. policy. SOF personnel at the tactical 

level will increasingly be on the forward edge of the strategic spear 

all around the world, and particularly at the points most threatening to U.S. interests in this new century. Most importantly, a SOF 

perspective in campaign planning and strategy formulation will be 

a significant strategic advantage in the 21st century. No longer can

SOF focus on direct action or simply provide forces to the supported 

Course Objectives Behaviors

Appraise the SOF school(s) of 

strategy and its (their) relationship to other schools of strategy for the current and future 

environments.

Evaluate the SOF strategy 

theory construct and its value 

in assessing current strategies 

and formulating new strategies.

Evaluate the strategic appraisal 

process.

Evaluate the U.S. strategy formulation process.

Construct SOF specific and 

joint and multi-national strategies in support of U.S. grand or 

national strategy.

Defend the current and future 

strategic role of SOF relative 

to the strategic roles of joint 

forces and the services.

Demonstrates the ability to construct viable 

SOF specific, U.S., and coalition military and 

organizational strategies: 

• Scans the strategic environment.

• Evaluates national and higher strategies for 

appropriateness and institutional or organizational implications and makes appropriate 

recommendations.

• Constructs or participates in construction of effective military and organizational 

strategies at national, coalition, interagency 

and military organization levels.

• Integrates SOF capabilities in conventional 

strategies and integrates conventional, 

multi-national, and interagency capabilities 

into SOF proponent strategies.

• Contributes to the SOF vision for the 

future.

• Recommends future force and capability 

needs and priorities.

• Recommends measures of effectiveness.
26

JSOU Report 07-2

combatant commander. USSOCOM, as a supported combatant command, develops strategy in support of national policy involving SOF, 

conventional U.S. military capabilities, and interagency and multinational resources. Equally important, a SOF perspective in strategy 

debates will help bridge the force structure issues with proactive and 

innovative concepts for policy success.

The educational proposal advanced in this paper can define

what strategic thinking is within SOF and improve near-term individual and collective performance within the community. Over time, 

as SOF personnel move through the education system and apply 

strategic thinking in appropriate assignments, the cumulative effect 

will create greater depth and perspective in the special operations 

community’s strategic competency, building a corps of effective leaders for the future and improving strategic performance in both SOF 

and conventional forces. As daunting as this task may appear on the 

front end, it can be accomplished relatively expeditiously and inexpensively. Now more than ever, USSOCOM must take the long-war 

view and use JSOU to inculcate and sustain a new strategic thinking 

into the SOF culture at all levels.
27

Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

Endnotes

1. General Bryan D. “Doug” Brown, “Meeting the Challenges of the 21st 

Century,” Joint Force Quarterly 40 (1st Quarter 2006):39.

2. Bradley Graham, “Shortfalls of Special Operations Command Are 

Cited,” Washington Post, 17 November 2005, A02.

3. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of 

America (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006), i-ii. President Bush’s introductory letter states this explicitly and it is integrated 

throughout this national security strategy and the ones that preceded 

it. Seeing the war on terrorism as one manifestation of a global reaction to U.S. power is an interesting framework drawn from dialogue at 

the Joint Special Operations University First Annual Strategic Symposium, “Countering Global Insurgency” (2-4 May 2006).

4. Lieutenant Colonel Christopher P. Gehler, Agile Leaders, Agile Institutions: Educating and Adaptive and Innovative Leaders for Today and 

Tomorrow (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army 

War College, August 2005) 3. This diagram is one commonly used in 

the DoD and also appears in the United States Army 2006 Posture 

Statement, 10 February 2006. 

5. Steven Metz and Raymond A. Millen, Future War/Future Battlespace: 

The Strategic Role of American Landpower (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, March 2003). See also Robert D. Kaplan, “Supremacy by Stealth,” Atlantic Monthly, July/August 2003. See also Colonel 

Thomas X. Hamas, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2004). Abundant sources for 

deriving a future world view exist, and these represent a few used for 

this synthesis of the emerging challenges for the U.S. military during 

the period of transformation. 

6. USSOCOM Internet home page, available from www.ussocom.mil/; 

accessed 23 April 2006. The actual language of the directive is

“synchronize.”

7. Michael G. Vickers, director of Strategic Studies, Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments, “Special Operations Forces Capability, 

Capacity, and Posture Gaps for the Global War on Terrorism, Testimony before Committee on Armed Services Panel on Gaps—Terrorism 

and Radical Islam, United States House of Representatives (Washington, DC, 26 October 2005), 3-4. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is a nonprofit think tank. The testimony is drawn

from Michael G. Vickers, Transforming U.S. Special Operations Forces

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 

August 2005).

8. Michael G. Vickers, Transforming U.S. Special Operations Forces, OSD 

Net Assessment (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments, 26 October 2005), 35. 
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JSOU Report 07-2

9. Linda Robinson, “Men on a Mission,” U.S. News & World Report, 11 

September 2006, 36-38. Ms. Robinson chronicles a part of the continuing debate, characterizing it as both a cultural and policy debate.

10. In the author’s view any arguments about the relative merits of service versus SOF competency is somewhat a red herring. All need to 

improve, and the focus of this paper is what are the SOF issues and 

what can the community do to meet the needs of the 21st century.

11. Brown, 40.

12. John D. Gresham, “Transformation at the John F. Kennedy Special 

Warfare Center and School,” The Year in Special Operations (Tampa, 

FL: Fairmont LLC, 2005), 107-110. This article illustrates one current 

change in training and education to more rapidly train special operations personnel. 

13. Brown, 40-41.

14. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 

available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/t/05292.html; 

accessed 22 April 2006.

15. Ibid.

16. Harry R. Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book 

on Big Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 

2006), 47-48.

17. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

18. MG Richard A. Chilcoat, Strategic Art: The New Discipline for the 21st 

Century (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 6-9.

19. Yarger, 3.

20. The commander, USSOCOM, has focused on this point, and it is 

reflected in such efforts as the SOF Leadership Competencies Study,

2006.

21. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard 

and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). A.T. 

Mahan, The Influence of Seapower upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: 

Little and Brown, 1890). Giulo Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. 

Dino Ferarri, 1927 ed. (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History,

1983). Such works help define even today’s debates.

22. James M. Smith, et al., Educating International Security Practitioners: 

Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Security Environment (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2001).

	 23.	 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP),” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 

(CJCSI) 1800.01C (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 22 December 2005).

24. The author participated in the 5th Annual SOF Education Conference, 

27-29 June 2006, as a member of the Vision and Strategy Competency Working Group as JSOU explored the educational implications 

of the SOF Leadership Competency Model. This monograph considers 

and incorporates as the author sees appropriate the draft results of 
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Yarger: Educating for Strategic Thinking 

the conference, but does not represent or accurately reflect a JSOU

position.

25. Classroom hours are supported by adequate periods of study before 

the class, thus the time is greater than portrayed here. Actual hours 

would be determined through an instructional design process based 

on what USSOCOM wanted to achieve. Here, as an instructor in strategy, the author determined what time he would allocate to “teach” to 

the objectives.