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Approved for public release, distribution

unlimited

FROM

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.

agencies only; Administrative/Operational

Use; 02 MAR 1987. Other requests shall be

referred to ARI, PERI-POT-I, 5001

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AUTHORITY

ARI PERI-ST [70-1n] memo dtd 27 feb 1996

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
ART Research Note 85-15

U,

CREW PERPORI\NCE OF AN H2 SP.UNDLEY UiNDER ,-

0 SIULATED LASER ATTACK: A PILOT STUDY

Gary C. Bayer

Meloncs Sysemz Development Div~sion

Litton Systems, Inc.

and

Thomas J. Thompson Army Research Institute

t.

for

* ARX Field Unit at Fort Benn~ng, Georgia

Seward Smith, ChiefD ft EIECrTEq~ T Id

TRAINING RESEARC1 LA1ORATORY MAY 1 9 1986

Harold F. O'Neil,. Jr., Director

UA

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

FEBRUARY 1985

86 5 19 015

oo!. -97 .t . . 01 -4 
U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

r, FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the t9.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

L. NEALE COSBY

ED G A R N1. JO IN l SO N C olon el, IN

Tchiical flirector Commander

* This report, as submitted by the contractor, No& be-en cleared lc' release to Defense Technical Information Center

(DTIC) to comply with regulatory requirements. It has been given no primary distvibution other thian to DTIC and will be available only thrugh DTIC ncef Ti

1 r II i The .iws. epin .n, andlo r .ndings contained in thi .... ,. t .. .. ... th . author(s) and

thould not be construed as an officia, Depaitmesit of the Army position, policy; or decision, unless so designated *by other official documentation.

,--.- i.**'. - i-- l
Unclnssi fied

'CUflITY CI.fA$IrICATION or TOI$ PAGC ( l t0 .. sr-f J _ __r_ _ _

{ READ INSTRlUCTIONl REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE i ODEFORE "o, I ^D COMPI.XTING , 'rucTtos, FORM *'

1. t04 OSIT NImI|C I2. GOVT ACCC $I NO 1|C IICNT*j CATA .Or ,

ARI Research Note 85-15 Il I U 'to, OC

4. TITL (ond Sv$ueuet.) TyPE or IIcOo"T A PC14IO0 COVencO

CRrI4 PERFOR ANCE OF AN M2 BRADLEY UNDER August 1983 - August 1984

SIIULATED LASER ATTACK: A PILOT STUDY s. Cincrormmim OR G. REPORT Ru'4Ocn

7. AUTHORM.) N. CONTRACT Ott GRANT NUMUCII(s)

Gary C. Bayer and Thomas J. Thompson MDA903-80-C-0545

9. PCHFOMMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND AODRI.S 10. PROGRAM ARECA £t wOR, CLcMENT. UNIT NUutIflS POJlCT. TA$R'

Litton-Mellonics W U

P.O. Box 2089 2Q263743A794

Ft. Benning, GA 31905

I1. CONTROLLING OrFiz' MR AHO ADORES 12. REPORT DATE

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral February 1985

and Social Sciences si. Nu,,r.t or PAGES

5001 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333-5600 18 14- MONITORING AGENCY NAME A AOoRrss(If dlI*mIl Irom C*Afr*;;:A 01 ) IS. SCURITY CtLASS. (o .hi foft* ' )

ARI Field Unit UNCLASSIFIED

P.O. Box 2086

Fort Benning, GA 31905-0686 "S C uCCTIcON/°NGRA°'N.

1. DIST!URUTION STATEMENT (of sh | R.ooel

Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (administrative and

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referred to ARI, PERI-POT, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333-5600.

I1. DISTRIOUTION STATEMCNT (of Oto £*€ltoc aoilotd It 11leck '*. II dllt,,e I rom H.poef)

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I. SUPPLE NTARY NOTES C

Contract moniLored by Seward Smith

12. KIEY ORDS (Continu, on rovoto. aid. il noc.*.er and Identli by block numb.I)

Bradley Fighting Vehicle Directed energy drills *'Reaction dri"'

Bradley Training Crew coordination, develop,-aL,

'-ICrew Training (Mechanized), Pilot test of crew drill, Response time,

Crew Drill Simulated blinding, "

20. ABST7IACT f Confhu. o- ir t &IlA It noc...ef mnd Id*nilt br black nu.b-f)

-.A series of limited experlments to determine the effects of, and response to,

simulated laser blinding of Bradley Fighting Vehicle Crews was conducted to

determine future training requirements. It was found that crew response times

could be reduced greatly with simple crew drills and that training appeared to

contribute to the reduction of observed crew anxiety regarding directed

energy weapons. -

.I 1jA,47) 1473 JAM COTITON Of I NOV 65 IS OSOLETE Unclassified n s

SECU 6i7 Y CLASSIFICATION OF T $IS PA "C g -?.. D)I. F.nt,,d)
The advest of directed snergy waopons (.Ws) haa brought a host of new

tactical sad training chalcnitr.. one potentta 1v isi a low lruwer 1a4ier whieh

could Joe elacto-optlcal systems at tactical raseas and flashblind or

* ponsnently blind soldiers at cluiter ranges. A leWnr weapon coult bil,.d an

Individual looking through a direct view optic, atchi is a Tew sight, with

virtually so damage to the cusomat iutentlial ,f the vehilcvo This Is a rail er

ufisq4e phceneena of DEUs. Prior to b1.: otly repital v.#,uns wer capable of

Inflicting casualties with little. or no d.a.,. Lt ths vuhilcl. otlier wt4pons

would have had to destroy or s51nilicantly dapj,.tv a vhlcit wu*roite to injuring

ti.t perasnnel inside* howwaer, a m.lor itifters.i ot.'.. chcoi6c4l V -.ponh A.

|sacra Is that chemical weapons aflect all .r. rutettei 11lt.1vidtil ; . .110

vehicle equally .hlle lasers Injoire only tlw civu -imtbra directly 'zae-sd to

It*

Thus, in laser combat there will be a nuubr of fully functirsplni vviticles

%ith Injured personnel filling critical positiun, while at th rane time there

r i be uninjured personnel In the vehicle.

Another aspect of a laser injury which it ii-i.nV t iJ vi, sils .lz !L. 1;; Olat

it will be relativrly painless and sensory di-1ltaties,. tonly; t a ui,. , Lt- o

ie. d for lmmediate first aid beyonJ rcunvlaiw tlI.a siidividuiAi f rua t h. '.7areoot,

pubition and maklnK till coemfurtatli . 1I'lis ll i.. s. i,-ii.Ju}ie't ,'.l 111l111%1

iwevdiateiy to assume the combt po.sitiun a) LIe utundtJ bfldJi.r. 'I* z..,,t

signtficant danger of a laser Injury would be thtt tie uQtJtlr 2mgl.t panir and

,t counterproductively in the midst of a cri.Jis, thus enlt|,nl'tLrin. himzsclf and

his claemates.

This Implies tie nced fur heveral Lr'-iiJ.% e.,Ja'r.nt i. rt'.ar !laa ..,.*.r

1
combat. First is the need for more cronstraining of crew menbers. Crew members

usually assigned tn lover priority tasks will havn to be trained in higher

priority tasks, e.g. loader-runner, iniantryuav-driver to allow the vehicle crew

to maintain its combat effeetivenes. Secondly, soldiers will have to learn to

exchange places with one anothur quickly in order to *ini=mic their

vulnerability in combat and enfance their mission capability. Finally, there is

a need to desensitize troops to 1;- W and DEW-type injuries to prevent panic.

The pupose of this pilot study v4. ca: (a. ascertain the approximate

downtime of the X2 Bradley Infantry Fight, e.'hicle (BIXV) when critical crew

*cnbers are injured; (b) determine if practice in exchangits, places Vith

simulated crew injuries can reduce the downtime; (c) monitor the psychol',gi~al

* reactions of the troops to DEWs; (d) determine whether chis direction of

training research and development holds protise of meaningful performance

payoffs given additional time and resources.

Method

A Bradley squad consisicng of the M2 vechicle and nine crew members: a

Bradley co=ander (EC) and gunner in the turret, a driver, and :ix infantry men

sitting in the troop compartment who would serve as test subjects. Two such

squads were tested individually.

For the purposes of this study the f1C, gunner, and the driver were

designated as critical crew menbers who would have to be replaced if they becae

DE casualities. There are seven different possible combinacions of casunlities,

given the three critical crew positions, which nre:

1. Driver only

2. BC only

3. Gunner only

4. Driver, BC, and gunner.

5. Driver and HC

2

M _tl _.C
6. BC and gunner

7. Driv,'r snd gunner

COMMANDERS SEAT

GUNNER'S SEAT SEAT NO. 9

/j SEATEANOO 5 SCAT tO.

CR1VER'S SEAT

SCAT INO. 4

Figure 1. Seating in BIFV.

The experiment used eight soldiers in PO P aear In a fully loaded Bradley

moving at combat speeds over a field. One experimener rode in the vehicle in

the number eight position as an observer. A second experimenter, stationed at a

radio In the field, acted as a timekeepper and experiment controller. The BC,

driver, and gunner were allowed to remove their protective masks to enable them

to hear the controller.

Twuo different squads were utilized on subsequent days. The first day's

squad w:as instructed not to discuns the purpose or nature of the exercise in

order to limit any inadvertent (learning) by the other squad. Both squads were

from Ft. Benning's resident Bradley support company and were experienced .with

the BIFV but none of the troops had any previous exposure to DEWs.

Experiment I Procedure:

The driving course to be traversed during the experiment was on the

perimeter of a relatively flat field with one sharp slope of approximately 30

3

A e.
dearees and five feet in height. Thare was one straightaway of approxioately

246 a and another of approximately 187 a. Figure 2 is a map of the course.

This course allowed acceleration to combat speeds during the straightaways

followed by braking for violent left turns. The slope of the field, the

* { constantly changing speeds, and the frequent sharp turns produced a rough ride

uhich simulated a combat assuait.

,70

3' drop at W b

5 M

potential effects of a laser attack on a Bradley crew's performance. The crews

44

I were informed thot in the future lasers could be used as weapons against them in

combat. Injury from such a laser weapon would not cause pain but its blinding

effects could be anything from an Intnaeu flashblinding to a peunn
blinding and everything in-between. 'or the purpose of this drill they were

Instructed to assumo that once they were tuld they were hit, they were to

pretend they were blinded but thvy would fe . rt' pain. Also they were not to

recover until the end of each trial. To ensure complian.e each victim was

issued a pilloi: ease anl as soon n he wan declared "blinded" he i=ediately

covered his head. Finally, crewv were inforzed that although such lacer

injuries could occur to just one crew member or a combination of crew members,

for this exercise only the driver, BC, and gunner would be casualties. Before

testing began the crews were encouraged to make preliminary contingency plans

regarding replacing the three potential casualties.

For each trial these procedures were followed:

1. The crew wzs informed in advanced, in part av a safety preraution, of

the intended victim. Noninjured personnel were Instructed to ignore the radio

transmission when the controller informed the victim he was blinded. The crew

was to carry-on with its duties until advised by the victim of his injury.

2. The vehicle accelerated to combat speed and the turret was put in the

three or ine o'clock position in relationship to the front of the vehicle being

in the 12 o'clock position;

3. The external controller announced on the radio to the victim that he was

injured.

4. The victim immediately pulled the pillow case over his head and

attempted to co==unicatc to others that he was blinded.

5. As soon ar there was any external evidence of an injury timing began.

Time started for the BS or the gunner as soon as the turret began to swing to

the 12 o'clock position to exit the injured party. In a Bradley the main gun

tube must be oriented forward to align the turret with the exit doors to the

troop compartment interior. In the case of the driver, time started as soon as

the vehicle began to slow down. When there was a combination of injuries to the

5

.4

* ". " " "-; . .- .". , ", .' , * ' ' - " "" -/ ', "-' " . ," "; / : '",-,"" . "'" .'".*_'*, ,'" . -'-.-" .. ".. -.. 
driver and turret personnel, which4ver of the above two occured first was the

signal to start timing.

6. Timing stopped when the vehicle began to regain speed or when the un

turret %As reoriented to the orglnal position with the appropriate ncw crew

member(s) in place. With An injury to the driver and one other, the times of

both events ware noted. Such timing rules were used because these actions are

what would be evident to an enemy who has lased a Bradley. The enemy would not

know if he had been successful until there was some outside evidence of it.

Expericent II Procedure:

Experiment 1I was a stationary exercise designed to ascertain the relative

contribution of vehicle movemet.t on IC and Punner replacement times. If

exchanging places while the vehicle wa stopped was signifcantly faster than

while it was moving, it might be expedient to completely stop the vehicle to

replace injured personnel rather than to attempt to do it while the vehicle is

moving.

The same procedures were used in Experiment I except that the vehicle

remained stationary and therefore the driver did not participate.

Experiment III Procedure:

In combat there may be times when it would be better to verbally guide a

blinded driver to drive to a defilade position instead of bringing the vehicle

to a halt while exposed to hostile fire in order to replace the injured driver.

This expericent ,ias designed to asertain how well a UC could guide a blinded

driver through a course to a defilade position. The findings from this

experiment could help determine the relative vulnerability between an immediate

switch of drivers (in an exposed location) as opposed to the EC attempting to

guide an injured driver to move the vehicle to defilade.

Figure 3 is a diagram of the Drive to Defilade Course. The vehicle was

accelerated through the straightaway and the driver was "blinded", lie

6 5

or or o i
immediately pulled A pillow case over his head anda timing as ated. Timing

etoppnd ulie" the vehicle reached the defi ade position.

0 -

T V

Figure 3. Drive to Defilade Course (approximate distance).

Experim. nt IV Procedure:

As the driver space was the most cramped position, physical size of the

soldiers may have been a significant factor influencing the speed of exchange.

This experiment attempted to ascertain the effects of the size of the drivers on

the speed of the exchange.

'I

Thee different sets of drivers were used: (a) experienced drivers, those

who participated in Experinent I (these were of -verare size); (b) large size,

inexperienced drivers, (6'8"/268 lbs and 501"1170 Is); and (c) average size,

inexperienced drivers, (5011"/146 lbs and 5'9"/160 Ibs).

In this experiment the vehicle retained stationary and the driver's hatch

was open to allow the experimenter to observe and time the exchange. Th.

drivers were instructed to make exchanges as quickly as they could.

7 permift fl I r 

t.P
Results of Expertrents I-IV:

Table I shows the results of Experiment 1, downtime of the test DIV.

Table I

[II

TInes of critical rosition Exchance While Vehicle is Xovin'i

_______ - squad I Squ~d 2

]S

c surlty Trial I Trial 2 Trial 1 Trial 2

(in xetonds)

Driver 20 13 30 22

IC 2 j42 16

Gunner 50 9b 37 23

Driver, UC & Gunner 11c/ 51d 10/42 27/52 e

Driver, BC 16/38 15/28 23/23 4

BC, Gunner 77 50 49 e

Driver, Gunner a 13/23 12/18 e

5Lost data

bTemporary loss of turret power

CVehicle began to regain speed

dTurret was reoriented

evehicle deadlined

It was orginally planned to have the squads complete three iterations of the

drills. Unfortunately, due to scheduling and vehicle maintenance difficulties,

all iterations were not collected. One crew participated in two iterations

before the vehicle broke down and the one crew completed 1-1/2 iterations before

8
Urn Veehcle W" deedimed due to a faulty turret &Iaield door.

Table I @bow the prellmlmary indications of Improved pertoroamce Urs the

firt to seAd trial to both squads. Also it pIpould hie noted that the

drlver-OCVY pettrtSOINCe or& RVOCeAIy slutir thant Oica the driver was injured

to Cebimetiom With aviother critical crew t.tb. It This Is due to Lte fact that

* Usng started inmditoly when thm driver uj~ biruha4 4.'.,., In, tht

-sbluation conditloneg however, tb,. sirivr ua% atir t. re early becaust

tteSa~ woosomt beaus until thle turrot beurdn us. rt tce

Table 2 abet. the results of Ia'perlmeaL 11. 'ItlO1MrY 6%IrdNMF 4 tUrret

Perssmal

Table 2

Times of C 4 Gunner U0c4020 Mir vChIcite Is -;it so.~v

PCI; 4 unner 5

:#iTL: Squad 2 did not do Exaperiment 11 uei to n deadilnt'd vehitle..

Ah ewpected tarret personnel racharge was .'e.n-ralI7 tastrs whn tit( vLhlrle

was st.tonary compared to when It was movitiv (it. l? Int1 %#. lah'/ tti

diIIfetence was not great.

ldhle 3 shows the results at I.xpttrltvett I I I, di lv. tu i!II.

t.unerally. drivers were able to e,ver LIhV ~ :14-1 cosirsc K:%Iigs . i~t. 1 .11

tit t~i ie it requlired them when t i,.j we~re 'I 9 n ~I~ .p'1~ o! vcr e*n.:t.

as~i wl to P'IC 'do"S

U.S U~Uflq ~f.A t~l U.f'~kW~rW~~ W .. ~ t~ W m,~ - ~ .,p odu-ctic*
111 lile trial With O set oI to.w k an tols ul the dir mound. I the

follovlg eo trials he yas very cautl',us and tharefore ioad much slower tie"

t.A the Squad 2 driver.

Table 3

Drive to Defileds Course Coiler ltn Ti ,

Tralrst blinie 2Mi 31d bCC6'fl#5 lo1t 2 rd

f in &rconI,.)

Squad I 6? 123 45 42 35

Squad 2 62 4 3 24S

a5quAd I driver was excessively cautious on Trait 4 k 3 Lecad.j ,,ided or dirt

witint on Trail 1

fable A shows the results at Experluent IV, Lliv afseLt Co driver Size.

The site of the drivers appears to m3ke little differwnce after otw

practice in the speed of driver replacocutin. Tim- inexportencvA divtrj'e O1ae

drivers took much longer on trolls I and 3 thj, Uise largce bLg. divers tbcanse

their clothing or equipment durlsng those trisis L-tcia anagvoe .

fr eVumWbit = TC do" ad

#-"A 'v tS , .Ord.I%1

1o '
Table 4

Times of Driver Exchanne While Vehicle is Stationary3

Trial

Drivers 1 2 3 4

(in seconds)

Practicedb 16 t5.. ..

Inexpeiienced

Large Size 21 21

Inex~perienced

Average Siz 118 21 26 19

aSquad 2 only

bDrivers who participated in Experiment 1

Discussion

N'o quantitative anyalysis of the above data was attempted because this was

a pilot study and stringent experimental controls were not possible.

These times should be considered the lower limit of the performance

potential for such exercises. These drills were held under optimal conditions

and despite instructions to ignore the radio transmissions from the controller,

other crew members could hear the controller. Thus they could prepare to cake

action before they were advke.d by the victim to do so. In additon, there was

no competition for the crew's attention. They did not have other comuat-related

tasks to perform while participating in the experiment. Further, the noise

level in the vehicle did not simulate combat conditions. There was litLle radio

traffic no concern about potential threats, and no weapons fHrnrig. All of these

1k .

-,.',,-,,,- ; .,;, .., ...-, \. , ., / ,,'.., '. ... . , ,
fact.ors would make it vore difficult for a victi= under r ,al combat conditions

to comunicate the fact that he was injured. Neverthe.css, some preliminary

periormant differenzcs trend may be too strong given 2 data points can

legitmately be noted and there were a number of lessons leariwd.

The results suggest that improvemencs in crew perforn ,ic as can be expected

after juot a few practice trials. A simple training program with ,otentialy

few sessions could priduce usympcotic performance. This approach to training is

low cost and might reasonably provide high payoff in terms of sustained crall

com at :rformance.

There was a]so a qtialitative improvement of the techniques used by che crew

members to assist injured personnel during the drills. For example, when the

injured turret parsonnel initi.lly exited the vehicle, they felt around to

orient themselves, This sometimes involved hitting their heads against

obstacles and tripping over items as the vehicle moved. By the end of the

exercise, one squad developed a technique where an uininjured crew member .ould

place one hand on top of the victim's helmet, and grip the front of his shirt,

and guide the victim directly to hia seat. All the casualty had to do was relax

and follow the lead of his fellow crew member. In the case of an injured BC,

the guide connected the commanders CVC intercom immediately so the wounded BC

could communicate with the assistant squad leader. Such procedures were

spontaneous and proved very efficient.

An unexpected finding was that tha driver exchange was faster than the

turret personnel exchange. It was orginally hypothesized that since the

driver's area was so cramped it would take longer for this casualty evacuation,

but this was not the case. The turret evacuation tims were !ong-er in part

because the turret had to be reoriented for personnel to exit. This was

especially difficult when both the gunner and the BC were blinded because othen

cr'ew members had to yell through the turret shield door and instruct those

12
A--

inside to rotate the turret to the correct exit position. This proved difficult

on occasion because there are no markings on the interior of the troop

coopartment of the Bradley to indicate the current turrvt orientation to the

crew compartment members. Consequently, on a few zz.itlb, crew members -ave

instructions to rotate the turret the "long way around". Some distinctive

markings which can be seen from the crew compartment would alleviate the turret

orientation problem.

Victims also used several phrases to indicate they were wounded: "I have

been blinded", "I have been hit", "I can't see", "I've been lased", "I have been

zapped". Of all of these, the term "=apped" appeared to have the most utility.

Zapped unambiguously and succinctly denotes a particular type of injury. All

soldiers in this experiment appeared to instantly know what is meant by this

term. It is important to differentiate between laser blinding and a blinding

caused by conventional weapons because different counteractions are indicated

for each type of injury. Statements such as, "I can't see" could be interpreted

to mean a person's vision was blocked by an obstacle or that the casualty was

wounded by a conventional munition. In such cases other crew members may be

tempted to offer assistance by looking in the same direction. This would not be

the appropriate action in a laser environment because it would put the uninjured

crew member in jeopardy. Secondly, the word "zapped" has a very distinctive

sound which ic not likely to be misunderstood for other words over the intercom.

This is important because frequently there is a high blocking noise to sound

ratio in the Bradley intercom system.

The results from Experiment I and Experiment ii tentatively suggest that

vehicle movement only slightly lengthens the time it takes to evacuate tile

turret cai16alties, Thn times of the turret pcrsonnei exchanges in Table 1 are

little longer than the times in Table 2. Therefore if an injury occurs, it

would appear to be better to continue movement while ma',ing an exchange. This

13

.-. ,¢ -. -: -..... '?'..... -.- , . - . .. ., .. . • , ., .. . .. .# .- . .'...-.*..-. . , .* . . -.. . .-
would cost a few extra ceconds but the vehicle could remain moving, therefore

decreasing its vulnerability. it would also give less feedback to enemy DEW

gunners because they would not know if they had completed a successful attack.

The data from Tabla 3 indicates tha It took almost twice as long for a

blinded driver to be guided to a defilade position than for a sighted driver to

• travel the same distance with sight. This cuggests that if a driver was

wounded, it protably would put the crew in less jeopardy If he were immedi,, tely

replaced by another driver than to atteupt to verbally guide him to a defilade

position.

Another issue arises from this recom-mendation which requires further

consideration. When the drivers cake an i=mediate exchange, the BC is taken out

of the decision loop. There may be some circumstances when thb. commander way

not want do this. However, bringing the HC it o the decision process will also

increase the downtime of the vechicle. Additional research is needed to

determine the relative cost/benefits of introducing the BC in the decision loop.

An observation not reflected in the data is the difficulty of the IBC to

verbally guide the blinded driver. This was especially obvious after about 30

seconds into the exercise as the BC got increasingly excited and gave the driver

ambiguous instructions, e.g. "Turn now!, Turn nowi" without indicating which

direction to turn or how large of a turn was needed. Coordination between the

driver and BC could certainly improve with some practice.

The findings from Experiment IV suggest that the driver's sizes and his

replacement do not appear to have a significant effect on the speed of a driver

exchange. There was only a small difference between the large and small driver

exchange in this pilot test. The longest delays in the exchange of positions

were due to articles of clothing getting snagged on equipment.

Some comments about the soldier's reactions to this experiment are

appropriate at this point. Most had never participated in any crew extraction

14
17 Jr ir

 v~o 7 F 7 ,; .7 -~ 7;- N :V J -7 7-V.. X A-,VZ Ii

drills previously and all agreed such drills should be part of tralnin3 even

independent of a laser threat.

Secondly, there appeared to be A shift iti their attitude rouards DEWs.

This is a subjective observation that should t, verified by more detaild

emrirical research. llowover, when both crews were initially briefed as to the

purpose of the experiment and to the posribility of confronting a threat laser

ueapn in combat, t,.y appeared to be quite serious. They listened very

attcndively, mnade few jokes, and a:nked few questions. When the experiment began

they also had some difficulty announcing that they were 'blinded". There was

some hesitatiop in their voices and a struggle to choose the right words.

However by the time rhe exercise was completed the soldiers appcared to be much

more comfortable with the reality of laser weapons. The troops were freely

talking about lasers and laser capabilities. Occasion.-ly there were some jokes

about lasers, but they no longer struggled to announce they were "blinded".

They were able to participate in this exercise as they would in other

conventional weapon exercises. It is the author's opinion that thf free talkinS

and jokes about lasers are evidence that the soldiers were psychologically

assimilatin4 the reality of DEWs.

Certainly, much of the above could be explained by non-DEW factors, such as

this was an experiment with "scientific" observers and the troops were initially

uncofortabla in that situation. Still it is hard to believe that some

psychological desensitization did not occur as well. This assertion will have

to be verified by additional empirical research. Lasers are shocking weapons

and the thought of being blinded can be terrifying, but so are many other

weapons and related battlefield injuries. Soldiers have been trained to fight

against machineguns, tanks, and chemical weapons without panic. There is no

reason to believe the same would not be true of lasers given a proper training

program. Drills such as these could go a long way in psychologically preparing

15
soldiers to respond efficiently in a DE eonbat environment.

Conclusions

This research suggests that practicinj extraction procedures could reduce

the down time of a .12 crew under laser attack. It also suggests the term

zapped" ha utility and can communicate a very spocific type of injury

requiring a specific crew response; that is, injured crew members would be

extracted while the remaining sighted members would exercise caution regarding

sights and viewing ports. Further, this reaearch indicates some decision rules

can be developed regarding the most appropriate response to a laser attack.

Finally, there appeared to be some reduction in the Anxiety level of the troops

regarding DEWs after they participated in this study.

Much additional research needs to be conducted regarding the training of

tactical responses to DLEW attacks. First of all, the same study with a larger

ipie siz and botr orhon controls is needed to verify the lImited

findings noted in th : =,A--y. . Secondly, crew drills for other vehicles need to

be developed and specific decision matrices established. The findings from this

study -ay not generalize beyond the H2. For example, based on the results of

this pilot study it appears better to immediately remove an injured driver

rather than to verbally guide him to defilade in an M2; the same may not be true

in an Ml tank. Also this research involved one squad in almost ideal conditions

of isolation. There may be other tactics at the platoon or company level that

should be explored. Another question that needs investigation is the effects of

, having the BC introduced into the decision loop before driver exchange is

exec4ted. Further, only a few of the crew members were injured in this drill

and there are other potential casualty combinations which should be tested as

well. There is the need to explore what happens while the Bradley fights in a

defensive position, during an attack, and when the infantry element dismounts.

Different ways to generate dust clouds as a countermeasure against lasers would

16

.i . . . .
I I

also be fruitful research.

DEWs have brought a new d1ension to the codern battlefield and have

necessitated a complete review of how the Amy wilJ.l fight the next war. ThiV

of

involves all levels of Army preparation fron Amy 21 to how troops should

.. disc=ount a vehicle in combat. Certainly some of the solutions to this new

" challenge will come from the materiel development co~unity in the form of

i ¢iunzerceasure devices. H~owever, the contributions of the rateriel developers

will not be total; the remainder of the challenge must be placed on the user

community (TRADOC and FORSCOM) to develop tactics and training to maximize the

contributions of the materiel developers and to adjust conventional tactics and

*', training to fight a DEW war. Research regarding DEWs affecting weapon systems

under different tactical conditions needs to be completed to identify the bcst

possible tactical countermeasures. As these countermeausres are identified they

should be incorporated into soldier training as soon as possible. The matcriel

dev-,lopers have already been working on these issues and it is now tine for the

user community to get involved as well.

17

*1
SUPIPLEMIENTAiRY 1

4 M.TO S 

40
UtFAh I Mtr% 3 r t n. ^novs

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

i1 IS1NHOWEN AVENUe

AIIXANORIA. VA 227

Of , 2 7 FEB 195

MEMORANDUM FOR Defense Technical Information Center

ATTN: DTIC-OCC

8725 John J. Kingman Rd.

STE 0944

Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

SUBJECT: ART Research Note 85-15

1. U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) Research Note (RN) 85-15

(AD B101 765) is now approved for public release. S

DAVID W. Wl'VP'L':R

Chief, Scientific and Technical

Information Office

I

4D

To', I W:(I t~n'oNZl:I 9,10