NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 29, 2014*

Decided September 30, 2014

Before

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 13‐3554

LASHAWN N. LOFTON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

SP PLUS CORPORATION, f/k/a

STANDARD PARKING

CORPORATION, and TEAMSTERS

LOCAL UNION NO. 727,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 12‐cv‐5716

John W. Darrah,

Judge.

O R D E R

LaShawn Lofton was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this

lawsuit. But when the district court learned that Lofton had failed to disclose several

assets on her IFP application, the court concluded that she had committed a fraud on

*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See

FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 13‐3554 Page 2

the court and dismissed the case with prejudice as a sanction. We conclude that the

district court properly exercised its discretion, and thus we affirm the judgment.

When Lofton filed her federal complaint she sought to proceed IFP. In her sworn

application she acknowledges receiving unemployment benefits but avers that she has

no assets and no other source of funds. The district court granted Lofton pauper status,

waived the filing fee, and later recruited counsel. Lofton’s lawyer filed an amended

complaint raising several claims, including that former employer SP Plus Corporation

fired her because of a disability, see 42 U.S.C. § 12188, and that her union, Teamsters

Local Union No. 727, breached its duty of fair representation, see 29 U.S.C. § 159(A).

The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting in part that Lofton had falsified her

IFP application. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A) (mandating dismissal if allegation of

poverty is untrue). A year earlier Lofton had petitioned for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and

disclosed then that she owns a house, a $7,000 car, and a $2,600 fur coat. She also

disclosed that family was providing some financial assistance. In response Lofton

conceded that she had failed to disclose these items but asserted that she had

misunderstood the form. She did not realize, she explained, that a house qualifies as

“real estate” or that she “owned” her car if a creditor retained title. Lofton added that

she had omitted the fur coat because it had depreciated in value (and has since been

stolen) and that her family has stopped sending money. She attributed her

misrepresentations to the fact that she had prepared the IFP application herself, unlike

the bankruptcy paperwork completed by lawyers.

The district court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice—not explicitly under

§ 1915(e)(2)(A), as the defendants had requested—but apparently as a sanction for filing

a fraudulent document with the court. The court disbelieved Lofton’s assertion of

confusion in light of the documents she had filed in the bankruptcy case. Thus, the court

concluded, Lofton had committed a fraud on the court that allowed her to avoid the

filing fee and receive pro bono counsel.

Lofton argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by

dismissing her case with prejudice as a sanction. She maintains that the omissions from

her IFP application were inadvertent, and thus she did not intentionally deceive the

court. Lofton explains that her medical conditions (high blood pressure, diabetes, and a

history of strokes) impeded her ability to complete the IFP application, but this

contention is waived because Lofton makes it for the first time on appeal. See Cnty. of

McHenry v. Ins. Co. of the West, 438 F.3d 813, 819–20 (7th Cir. 2006).
No. 13‐3554 Page 3

Underlying the dismissal is the district court’s factual finding that Lofton

intentionally falsified her IFP application, and we review that finding only for clear

error. See Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 308 (7th Cir. 2002). The

district court rejected Lofton’s assertion that she had misunderstood the questions on

the IFP application. The application includes pointed questions about houses and cars,

including the current value and equity held in those items. The question about real

estate, in particular, makes plain that a home “with or without a mortgage” must be

divulged. Lofton had disclosed her house, car, and fur coat on her bankruptcy

schedules, and when she modified her Chapter 13 payment plan just two months before

seeking pauper status, she also acknowledged receiving financial assistance from her

family. And previously in 2009, during her divorce proceedings, Lofton had completed

a similar financial affidavit and disclosed that she owned a house. The district court’s

finding that Lofton lied on her IFP application is amply supported, and with that

finding intact, we turn to whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing

the case with prejudice as a sanction.

Dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate sanction when a plaintiff tries to

deceive the district court by falsifying an IFP application. Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306–07;

Mathis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 546, 547 (7th Cir. 1998). Proceeding in forma

pauperis is a privilege, and courts depend on the plaintiff’s honesty in assessing her

ability to pay. Abusing this privilege warrants dismissal with prejudice as a sanction for

lying, and we therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

See Greviskes v. Univs. Research Ass’n, Inc., 417 F.3d 752, 754–59 (7th Cir. 2005)

(upholding dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff had assumed identity of former

coworker and faxed to former employer a fraudulent request for coworker’s payroll

records); Dotson v. Bravo, 321 F.3d 663, 668–69 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing district

court’s inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process);

Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306–07 (upholding sanction of dismissal with prejudice where

plaintiff had omitted from IFP application that he would be receiving more than $50,000

from retirement account); Mathis, 133 F.3d at 547 (upholding dismissal with prejudice

where plaintiff failed to disclose $14,000 of equity in house and falsely stated that he

was not represented by appointed counsel in other litigation).

AFFIRMED.