HILL OF ANGELS

U.S. MARINES AND THE BATTLE FOR CON THIEN

1967 TO 1968

COLONEL JOSEPH C. LONG, U.S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE (RETIRED)

MARINES IN THE VIETNAM WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
This pamphlet history, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the Vietnam War, is published for the education and training 

of Marines by the History Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, as part of the U.S. Department of Defense 

observance of the fiftieth anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have been defrayed in part by contributions from members of 

the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.

Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Director of Marine Corps History

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Senior Editor

Angela J. Anderson

Vietnam War Commemorative Series Editor

Shawn H. Vreeland

Visual Information Specialist

Robert A. Kocher

2016

PCN 2016950472

F as ro el t yb eh S epu ir tn e edn tn fo D co mu e tn G .S.U ,s evo r emn tn P eciff O

I tn re en :t tskoob ro e enohP vog.opg. : lot l f eer ( ;0081-215 )668 D C a er ( a 0081-215 )202

aF :x ( aM 4012-215 )202 :li I potS CCD W , ihsa notgn D , C 1000-20402 

ublishing

ISBN 978-0-16-093463-6

8-0-16-093463-6

60 934636

90000
Hill of Angels | 1

This monograph examines U.S. Marine and North 

Vietnamese Army (NVA) actions throughout much 

of the northern half of a region that became known 

as “Leatherneck Square,” an area bounded by Con Thien and 

Gio Linh to the north—just below the demilitarized zone 

(DMZ)—and Cam Lo and Dong Ha to the south. The Battle 

of Con Thien also included activities within the DMZ north 

and west of Con Thien as far as the Ben Hai River. More 

than a dozen Marine operations were involved in varying 

degrees with the Battle of Con Thien. This account deals with 

the battle’s most significant and costly operations: Operation 

Hickory (18–28 May 1967), Operation Buffalo (2–14 July 

1967), Operation Kingfisher (16 July–31 October 1967), and 

Operation Kentucky (1 November 1967–28 February 1968).

The Battle for Con Thien was therefore not a single event. 

Rather, it was an amalgamation of unit actions that can arguably be said to have lasted for years, the result of the strategies and attitudes of senior leadership generally far removed 

from the battlefield. This study focuses first on the planning 

and building of the controversial obstacle system of which 

Con Thien was an anchor. It then examines the period of the 

battle’s most intense combat—beginning in May 1967, when 

Marines first occupied the hill, and continuing until the early 

part of the following year. 

Background to the Battle

To establish context, this commemorative begins with an 

overview of events that led up to the battle. Prior to World 

War II, Vietnam was part of the French colonial empire. 

France’s defeat by the Germans in 1940 left a power vacuum 

in Vietnam, and an aggressive Vietnamese political leader 

named Ho Chi Minh seized the opportunity to move the 

country toward independence. To this end, he formed a political/military organization called the Viet Minh and ruthlessly 

installed a Communist government. 

 In 1946, following World War II, France sent troops to 

Vietnam in an effort to reestablish its dominance. The result 

was the nearly eight-year-long First Indochina War, fought 

between the Viet Minh, relying primarily on guerilla tactics, 

and the conventional French army. 

In 1950, the world’s Communist countries, led by the 

People’s Republic of China, gave formal recognition to the 

Viet Minh’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam as the country’s legitimate government. This recognition opened the 

door for China to send massive numbers of weapons, trainers, and laborers to be used against the French. The French 

suffered their most dramatic and final defeat of the war on 7 

May 1954 at Dien Bien Phu, after which France withdrew its 

forces, never to return. During their fight for independence, 
NORTH VIETNAM

LAOS

SOUTH VIETNAM

LANG VEI

KHE SAHN

CA LU

ROCK PILE

CAMP CARROLL

CAM LO DONG HA

GIO LINH

QUANG TRI

KHE SAHN

COMBAT

BASE

CAM LO R.

QUANG TRI R.

BEN HAI R.

17th PARALLEL

(Mountains and Jungle)

DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ)

CUA

VIET R.

Miles (approx)

CAMP EVANS, PHU BAI.

DA NANG

CON 

THIEN

N

SOUTH

 CHINA

 SEA

9

1

5 10

the Viet Minh brutally slaughtered hundreds of thousands 

of their countrymen. Communist Party Chairman Ho Chi 

Minh realized that he must disband the bloody Viet Minh in 

order to build support from the citizenry, and the Viet Minh 

faded away.

Although Chairman Ho and his Viet Minh forces had 

won the war with France, the struggle was far from over. The 

majority of their countrymen in the south wanted a Westernstyle, democratic form of government, a sentiment that, of 

course, America and the European democracies supported. 

So, in July 1954, the Geneva Agreement divided Vietnam 

into two countries along the 17th parallel: the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north and the 

Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in the south. 

In an effort to stem military aggression between the 

North and the South, a DMZ was created near the 17th parallel, roughly three miles on either side of the Ben Hai River, 

and extending from the South China Sea to Vietnam’s border 

with Laos. Until the Battle of Con Thien, American forces 

and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) adhered 

to the Geneva Agreement’s intent and stayed out of the 

DMZ. The NVA, however, under the command of General 

Vo Nguyen Giap, used it as a safe haven and a staging area for 

manpower and materiel moving south. A sizeable percentage 

of South Vietnamese citizens armed themselves with these 

North Vietnamese supplied weapons. They were organized 

into military units and fought for North Vietnamese victory 

in the south using the National Front for the Liberation of 

South Vietnam as their name. Non-Communists called them 

the Viet Cong.

The United States first supported the RVN by diplomatic means, then by sending military advisors, and eventually 

by committing combat forces. By the time the 9th Marines 

landed in Vietnam in 1965, the NVA had established a labyrinth of trails across the DMZ, around South Vietnam’s 

western border, and through Laos and Cambodia. Americans 

Map by author 

2 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
dubbed the supply route the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The U.S. 

Air Force was tasked with bombing the trail complex in 

Laos and Cambodia while U.S. and ARVN ground forces 

were assigned responsibility for interdicting NVA infiltration 

across the DMZ. The Marine Corps was given the primary 

role in the ground effort.

The Strong Point Obstacle System

To stop—or at least to inhibit—the flow of men and materiel 

from North to South Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, USA, the American commander in Vietnam, directed 

General Lewis W. Walt, commanding general of III Marine 

Amphibious Force (III MAF), to plan for the construction of 

a Strong Point Obstacle System (SPOS) below the DMZ. It 

was an idea that had been under discussion in Washington, 

DC, for months. 

Although military leaders showed little enthusiasm for the 

barrier scheme, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 

believed that the idea had merit. On 15 September 1966, he 

appointed Lieutenant General Alfred D. Starbird, USA, director 

of the Defense Communications Agency, to head a joint task 

force within the Department of Defense with the mission of 

devising the anti-infiltration system. The original plan envisioned 

wide usage of air-dropped munitions and electronic sensors 

to establish the barrier. This directive formally established the 

program that was to become known as Project Practice Nine.

The following month, General Westmoreland suggested to 

Secretary McNamara that a conventional barrier utilizing the 

strongpoint system could be constructed across all of northern 

South Vietnam. General Walt ordered Major General Wood 

B. Kyle, commanding general of the 3d Marine Division, to 

prepare the Marine portion of the concept since any implementation of the idea would directly affect that command. 

General Walt’s only guidance was that he wanted the report 

to begin with a statement that III MAF disagreed with the 

barrier idea and preferred the mobile defense currently being 

employed. General Kyle also indicated his own preference for 

the mobile concept, stating, “A mobile defense by the size of 

the force envisioned for manning the barrier system (one and 

one-third divisions) would in itself provide an effective block 

to infiltration south of the DMZ, and in the process negate 

the necessity for construction of the barrier.”

When General Walt forwarded General Kyle’s proposed 

plan to Westmoreland, his cover letter made III MAF’s view 

quite clear, stating that the plan was being submitted in 

response to a directive and that it was the opinion of the commanding general of III MAF that such a barrier, in effect, was 

not going to be worth the time and the effort it would require.

Kyle’s submission called for a linear barrier immediately 

south of the DMZ, extending from the South China Sea to a 

point near Dong Ha Mountain, a distance of approximately 

30 kilometers. This portion of the barrier was to be 600–1,000 

meters wide, consisting of wire obstacles, minefields, sensors, 

watchtowers, and a series of strongpoints. The line was to be 

supported by an armored unit. The plan required the construction of artillery positions along Route 9 to provide fire 

support for the system. These positions also were to house 

the reaction forces needed to support the strongpoints. Other 

construction projects included in the plan were the improvement of Routes 1 and 9, expansion of the Cua Viet port facility, and the establishment of a major airfield near Hue, about 

60 miles south of the DMZ.

After reviewing the proposal, McNamara directed that a 

procurement program be created to provide the materials for 

the linear section of the barrier. The materials were to be in 

South Vietnam by July 1967, and at least a part of the system 

was to be operational by 1 November 1967. 

On 26 January 1967, the final plan was completed. The 

SPOS was to consist of a series of strongpoints and fortified base areas. Barbed wire and minefield obstacles were to 

be emplaced forward of the strongpoints to deny the enemy 

likely avenues of approach and to restrict movement, while 

sensors, detector devices, night observation devices, searchlights, and radar were to be used to locate the enemy. The 

strongpoints and base areas occupying key terrain features 

were to be constructed by tactical units under the supervision of engineers. These positions were to serve as both patrol 

and fire support bases. On-call, preplanned artillery support 

was to cover the entire area, and tactical aircraft were to be 

available on short notice. Reaction forces were to be stationed 

behind the system in positions from which they could deploy 

rapidly. All civilians were to be relocated south of the system. 

The study group responsible for drafting the plan reckoned the minimum essential additional force required to man 

Hill of Angels | 3
THAILAND LAOS

CAMBODIA

SAIGON

CAM RANH

SOUTH

VIETNAM

DA NANG

HUE

HO CHI MINH TRAIL

N

SOUTH

 CHINA

 SEA

NORTH 

 VIETNAM

DMZ

Map by author

The DMZ was established as a result of the Geneva Agreement in July 1954 to serve as a buffer between the 

Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the north and the democratic Republic of Vietnam to the south. 

Although the United States and South Vietnam adhered to the agreement, the North Vietnamese used the DMZ 

as a staging area and supply route for manpower and materiel moving south. It was 1967 before U.S. forces 

physically entered the DMZ.

4 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
the eastern portion of the system to be one infantry brigade 

or Marine regiment, augmented with supply, maintenance, 

construction, transportation, and other support units. 

The Marines’ opinions of the concept remained 

unchanged. In January, at a 3d Marine Division headquarters 

briefing held for Under Secretary of the Navy Robert H. B. 

Baldwin, the briefing officer reiterated the III MAF view of 

the barrier concept: “To sum it all up, we’re not enthusiastic 

over any barrier defense approach to the infiltration problem. 

. . . We believe that a mobile defense by an adequate force, 

say one division, give or take a battalion, would be a much 

more flexible and economical approach to the problem.”

Despite opposition from concerned Marine and Navy 

commanders, Secretary McNamara ordered General Starbird on 8 March to procure the materials for strongpoints 

and base camps, and enough sensors and surveillance devices 

to service a 10-kilometer section of the obstacle system. The 

ARVN representatives warmly endorsed the idea and suggested that an early start should be made on the project to 

take advantage of the weather. They did not believe that land 

procurement or civilian relocation would pose any problem.

As a result, General Westmoreland ordered General 

Walt, in coordination with Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan 

Lam, the commanding general of ARVN forces, to prepare 

a plan to implement the location, construction, organization, and occupation of a SPOS. Walt, in turn, ordered his 

chief G-3 Plans Division and III MAF Practice Nine officer, Lieutenant Colonel Marvin D. Volkert, to meet with his 

ARVN counterpart and begin the preparation of a combined 

barrier plan. By early April, although no written document 

was in existence (nor was one expected for at least 30 days), 

combined planning had progressed sufficiently to permit 

ground clearing between Con Thien and Gio Linh to begin.

Although the number of Marine units involved in the 

initial clearing effort was small, it precipitated the basic 

problem that III MAF had feared would result from the 

barrier project: the loss of flexibility. General Walt expressed 

his concern in a 26 April message to General Westmoreland, 

stating that the assignment committed his entire 3d Marine 

Division to the Practice Nine Project. He emphasized that 

the manpower required to construct and man even that 

portion of the system would not only use up all of the division’s personnel, it would also fix all available division units 

in place. He further observed that this was contrary to all 

previous positions. Walt maintained that unless he received 

the additional forces required to install and man the Practice 

Nine system, his capability to conduct offensive actions in 

the vicinity of the DMZ would cease almost immediately. 

There were, however, no additional forces available. 

By 2 May, the 11th Engineer Battalion had cleared a 

200-meter trace between Con Thien and Gio Linh and 

was beginning to clear a 500-meter perimeter around each 

position. While the engineers cleared the land, at least one 

infantry battalion, but normally two, provided security and 

screening for the engineering effort. One of the major problems encountered by the engineers during the initial clearing work was the large number of civilians living in the 

area. Although the government had begun the removal of 

the population in this region, it appeared that this would 

be an extremely difficult, extended task. But the inception of Operation Hickory on 18 May changed the picture 

completely. One of the objectives of Hickory was to clear 

the entire SPOS area of civilians. By 23 May, Vietnamese 

authorities reported that there were 6,000 people already 

at the Cam Lo temporary resettlement site. By the end of 

Operation Hickory on 29 May, the population at Cam Lo 

had grown to more than 11,000; the construction zone was 

virtually free of civilians. 

On 1 June 1967, Lieutenant General Walt, who had led 

III MAF since June 1965, relinquished his command to 

Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman Jr., who was well 

aware of the problems involved in the construction of the 

anti-infiltration system. Unlike his predecessor, he believed 

that, once completed, the system would free his forces for 

missions elsewhere.* On 14 July, the Marine portion of the 

system came to be known as the Dye Marker Project.

During McNamara’s visit to the 3d Marine Division in 

July, the division briefed him on the status of Dye Marker 

and flew him over the construction sites. The Marines had 

cleared the strongpoints at Con Thien and Gio Linh to a 

500-meter radius and had begun building bunkers in both 

positions. They had cleared a 600-meter-wide strip between 

*Gen Cushman apparently was making the best of a bad situation. In a 1981 

communication with the Marine Corps History and Museums Division, he 

called the barrier concept and operation “stupid.”

Hill of Angels | 5
the two strongpoints and extended it to the floodplain east 

of Gio Linh. To the Marines on the ground, the seven-milelong clearing was called the “Trace.”

By mid-August, the enemy situation in the DMZ area 

was becoming critical. The enemy threat in the DMZ had 

increased progressively to the degree that Marine units were 

fully occupied with holding back the Communists in the Con 

Thien–Gio Linh region. Allied forces along the Trace were 

unable to defend their front and at the same time construct, 

man, and operate the SPOS in the rear. In a 16 August message to General Westmoreland, General Cushman stated 

that, although he had increased his own troop strength in the 

area, he had received none of the forces considered as the 

minimum essential augmentation by the plan. Westmoreland 

promised to send two additional U.S. Army brigades.

By the end of the year, the Marine command’s opinion 

of the barrier concept had not changed. One Marine officer 

stated, “With these bastards, you’d have to build the zone all 

the way to India and it would take the whole Marine Corps 

and half the Army to guard it; even then they’d probably 

burrow under it.” Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee 

on Preparedness in August 1967, General Wallace M. Green 

Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps, declared, “From 

the very beginning I have been opposed to this project.”

Photo courtesy of Vernon L. “Les” Stevenson 

As a gesture of goodwill, appropriately talented Marines entertain some of the relocated South Vietnamese at Cam Lo. 

Right: The author sang old Elvis songs for the show. When a 

teenage Vietnamese girl asked him to sing “(I Can’t Get No) 

Satisfaction,” he had to admit to having very limited talent.

Photo courtesy of the author

6 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Why Con Thien?

Marines along the DMZ began construction of the SPOS 

south of the DMZ in the spring of 1967 in compliance with 

orders from U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

(USMACV) and Washington, DC. The system, nicknamed 

the “McNamara Line” by the Marines, proved to be a major 

burden to the 3d Marine Division. Security of the troops 

building the line, coupled with the demands on Marine units 

to fill sandbags, creosote bunker timbers, install wire, and perform other associated tasks, severely restricted the division’s 

combat activities. 

While the construction of the SPOS limited the flexibility of III MAF, higher headquarters expected its speedy 

completion to force southbound NVA regiments to move 

westward into the mountains, thereby complicating the enemy’s logistical problems. The Marines’ combined-arms firepower from strongpoints would then confront the anticipated 

enemy attacks. Smaller enemy patrols and infiltration groups 

would face the challenge of the extensive obstacle system. 

The Communists, however, chose to attack before the system 

became too strong.

The enemy decided to concentrate on the Marine strongpoint at Con Thien, located 14 miles inland and 2 miles south 

of the DMZ. This outpost was crucial to Marine efforts in 

the area. It occupied what would be the northwest corner of 

the SPOS, which enclosed the area that became known as 

Leatherneck Square. Con Thien also overlooked Route 561, 

one of the principal enemy avenues of communication into 

South Vietnam. Capture of the outpost would open the way 

for a major enemy invasion of Quang Tri Province by 35,000 

NVA troops massed north of the DMZ, a victory of immense 

propaganda value.*

*Quang Tri was South Vietnam’s northernmost province, extending south 

from the Ben Hai River to the city of Quang Tri. The province contains 

about 1,800 square miles, stretching some 45 miles north and south and 

40 miles east and west. Its rugged interior rises to the west, with junglecanopied peaks reaching heights of 1,700 meters near the Laotian border. 

Eastern Quang Tri is characterized by a narrow coastal plain and a piedmont 

sector of rolling hills.

Photo courtesy of Joe Valento 

Marines of Company F, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, set in on the edge of the “Trace,” just east of Con Thien during Operation 

Kingfisher. Note the B-52 bombing strike in the background, in or near the DMZ. 

Hill of Angels | 7
Colonel Richard B. Smith, who commanded the 9th 

Marines, later described the outpost’s importance: “Con 

Thien was clearly visible from the 9th Marines Headquarters 

on the high ground at Dong Ha 10 miles away, so good lineof-sight communications were enjoyed. Although Con Thien 

was only 160 meters high, its tenants had dominant observation over the entire area. Visitors to Con Thien could look 

back at the vast logistics complex of Dong Ha and know 

instantly why the Marines had to hold the hill. If the enemy 

occupied it, he would be looking down our throats.”

The Communists made repeated offensive efforts to take 

the Con Thien region during the summer and fall of 1967. 

Although reinforced by heavy artillery, rockets, and mortars 

north of the Ben Hai River in the DMZ, each thrust collapsed under a combination of Marine ground and heliborne 

maneuvers coupled with supporting artillery, naval gunfire, 

and attack aircraft.

The first NVA offensive aimed at Con Thien occurred 

during May, shortly after Marines occupied the hill. The 

enemy exacted severe casualties on the Marine defenders but 

suffered more themselves as a result of the Marines’ Operation Hickory, initiated to counter the NVA offensive. The 

second major effort, which was the NVA’s largest in terms 

of troops committed, occurred in July. For the first time, 

the Communists employed extensive artillery to support its 

infantry, but the Marine counterattack, Operation Buffalo, 

beat back the enemy, netting more than 1,200 NVA dead. 

The final major Communist attempt came in September 

during the Marines’ lengthy Operation Kingfisher. A heavy 

weapons attack of greater volume and duration supported a multipronged infantry assault on Con Thien, but this 

endeavor too ended in failure for the enemy. 

In reviewing the enemy invasion attempts across the 

DMZ during 1967, analysts found the Communists used 

?

?

? CAM LO

DONG HA

GIO LINH Cleared Trace

CUA 

 VIET

A-3

A-4

A-5

A-6

C-3

C-1

A-2

A-1

US ARVN

N

The Plan for the Strong

Point Obstacle System

(III MAF OPLAN 11-67)

CON 

 THIEN

?

Kilometers

0 1 2 3 4

C-2

CUA VIET R.

SOUTH

 CHINA

 SEA

x

x

Map adapted by Marine Corps History Division 

This November 1967 plan called for construction of all the strongpoints and cleared traces shown on this map. Neither the western leg of the Trace from Con Thien to A-5 nor some of the strongpoints were ever constructed.

8 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
fewer troops as the year progressed but greatly increased 

their attacks by fire. The enemy sanctuary in the northern half of the DMZ, protected by U.S. policy, was always 

available for regrouping and employment of heavy artillery. 

This unique situation caused considerable frustration for the 

allied commanders. Even so, Communist plans for a significant victory in the DMZ area remained unfulfilled at the 

year’s end, and construction of the allied SPOS continued 

as planned.

Marines’ First Action: “Hill of Angels”

Since late 1966, Marines had been fighting the enemy in the 

area around Con Thien (the English translation of the name is 

“Hill of Angels”). Prior to 1 May 1967, however, the hill itself 

was defended by ARVN troops. Not realizing two Marine 

companies from 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, had replaced the 

ARVN soldiers, enemy planners executed a well-rehearsed 

attack to wrest Con Thien for their own use on 8 May, one day 

past the thirteenth anniversary of the fall of Dien Bien Phu. 

GIO

CON LINH

 THIEN

DMZ

BEN HAI

RIVER

CAM LO

RIVER

CUA VIET

RIVER

THE TRACE

DONG HA

CAM LO

Miles (approx)

C-2

C-3

C-2

LEATHERNECK

SQUARE

BRIDGE

9

1

N

2 4

606

561

Map by author 

Hill of Angels | 9
At the time of the attack, the outpost contained a small 

command group of 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, reinforced 

Companies A and D of the battalion, and a Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group unit. The Marines were there to 

provide security for the engineers, who, having completed the 

Trace on 1 May, were busy clearing a 500-meter-wide strip 

around the perimeter of the outpost. At 0255 that morning, a 

green flare lit the sky south of the hill, followed immediately 

by a savage 300-round mortar and artillery attack. 

Enemy units maneuvering under cover of the barrage 

breached Con Thien’s wire with Bangalore torpedoes, and 

small elements moved inside the perimeter. At approximately 

0400, two NVA battalions, armed with flamethrowers, rocketpropelled grenades (RPGs), and automatic weapons, attacked 

through the breach in the wire. The brunt of this assault fell 

on the right flank of Company D. The Marines engaged the 

enemy force in bitter hand-to-hand fighting. Proving the 

adage “Every Marine a rifleman,” an engineer platoon moved 

to reinforce Company D. The situation became serious when 

the Marines ran out of 81mm mortar illumination rounds. 

Illumination from the nearest artillery support position at 

Gio Linh could not reach Con Thien. A Douglas AC-47 flare 

plane and gunship the Marines called “Puff the Magic Dragon” 

finally arrived and provided much-needed illumination until 

daylight.*

Meanwhile, Company A sent a platoon to help Company 

D, as well as to protect an ammunition resupply convoy composed of an attached Army M42 “Duster,” two tracked landing 

vehicles mounted with howitzers (the LVTH6 version of the 

LVT5), and two 1/4-ton trucks. As these elements moved 

up to support the hard-pressed Marines of Company D, the 

relief vehicles came under enemy fire. The Army M42, which 

was the lead vehicle, stopped and burst into flames after being 

hit by an enemy RPG antitank projectile. A satchel charge 

exploded under the following LVTH6. It began to burn, but 

its crew managed to get out. The trailing LVTH6, trying to 

get around the burning vehicles that now included one of the 

1/4-ton trucks, became entangled by barbed wire around its 

left rear sprocket and was stuck. 

*The U.S. Air Force’s Puff the Magic Dragon (or simply “Puff ”) was outfitted with illumination-dropping and 6,000-round-per-minute Gatling gun 

capabilities.

Despite their losses, the reinforcing Marines continued 

to Company D’s position. With these reinforcements, 

Company D halted the enemy penetration and sealed off 

the break in the wire just before daylight. By 0900, enemy 

soldiers still within the perimeter were either dead or captured. The brush clearance around the perimeter paid early 

dividends. It permitted the Marines to catch the retreating 

North Vietnamese in the open as they crossed the cleared 

strip. Tanks and LVTH6s firing both conventional and 

“beehive” ammunition were particularly effective.** Supporting fires from Major Alfred M. Gray’s Composite Artillery 

Battalion at Gio Linh ripped into the enemy as it withdrew 

north to the DMZ.

The defending Marines lost 44 killed and 110 wounded, 

as well as had two LVTH6s and one 1/4-ton truck destroyed, 

but the hard and bloody battle cost the enemy 197 killed and 

8 captured. The Communists left behind 72 weapons, including 19 antitank weapons, 3 light machine guns, and 3 flamethrowers. The NVA displayed an inherent inability to adapt. 

They attacked the strongest point of the defensive perimeter 

and continued to press that attack, even when it was clear 

that it had encountered heavier resistance than anticipated. 

Operation Hickory

Units from the 3d Marine Division launched Operation 

Hickory on the morning of 18 May. The 2d Battalion, 26th 

Marines—commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. 

Figard—and the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines—commanded 

by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Peeler and supported by M48 

Patton tanks and M50 Ontos—advanced northward from 

positions near Con Thien.*** Concurrently, 3d Battalion, 4th 

Marines, moved by helicopters into a landing zone within the 

DMZ near the Ben Hai River, northwest of Con Thien. The 

heliborne battalion was to act as a blocking force to prevent the 

enemy from escaping to the north or to stop the movement of 

reinforcements into the area from the north.

Shortly after 1100, the lead element of 2d Battalion, 26th 

Marines, made contact with a force that intelligence officers 

later determined to have been two battalions. All elements of 

**“Beehive” rounds are large-caliber antipersonnel shells containing thousands 

of sharp, dart-shaped metal fléchettes.

***The Ontos is a lightly armored, tracked vehicle carrying six 106mm recoilless rifles.

10 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
the Marine battalion quickly became engaged in the battle; the 

enemy defended from well-prepared bunkers and trenches. As 

the battalion moved against the NVA positions, the right flank 

came under concentrated automatic weapons and mortar fire. 

Casualties were heavy. Among them were Lieutenant Colonel Figard and his operations officer, both of whom required 

evacuation. Despite the heavy enemy fire, the Navy hospital 

corpsmen continued their treatment of the wounded. By 1600, 

2d Battalion, 9th Marines, had moved up on the right of 2d 

Battalion, 26th Marines, and was also in close contact. Fighting continued until nightfall when the Marines broke contact 

and pulled back to evacuate casualties. During the day, enemy 

fire killed 5 Marines and wounded 142. Thirty-one enemy 

soldiers were known to have been killed.

The 3d Marine Division already had replaced the wounded 

Lieutenant Colonel Figard with a new battalion commander. As soon as it learned of Figard’s condition, the division 

immediately ordered Lieutenant Colonel William J. Masterpool, who had just joined the division staff after commanding 

3d Battalion, 4th Marines, to assume command of 2d Battalion, 26th Marines. That night, 75 radar-controlled air strikes 

hit the NVA positions in front of the two Marine battalions. 

At 0500 on 19 May, heavy artillery fire fell on the enemy 

defenses, and both battalions commenced the attack at 0700. 

During the preparatory fires, several short rounds landed 

on Company F, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, killing three and 

wounding two Marines. Within minutes, 2d Battalion, 26th 

Marines, again checked its advance because of savage fire 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A370551 

A Marine patrol approaching the outpost at Con Thien, seen on the horizon of this photograph. Con Thien occupied a low hill, 

but one which provided excellent observation of the surrounding area as well as the key installations at Dong Ha. 

Hill of Angels | 11
from its front and right, while 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 

encountered light small-arms fire and pushed rapidly ahead 

to relieve the pressure on 2d Battalion, 26th Marines’ flank. 

By 1030, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, had overrun the enemy 

bunker complex, accounting for 34 North Vietnamese killed 

and 9 wounded.

During the rest of the morning, both battalions continued 

to advance against negligible resistance. At 1330, Company H, 

2d Battalion, 26th Marines—commanded by Captain Robert J. 

Thompson and on the easternmost flank of the advance—met 

heavy automatic weapon and mortar fire from the east. The 

company returned fire but then received additional enemy fire 

from a tree line 60 meters to their front. Again the Marines 

returned fire, and a tank moved up in support. It silenced the 

enemy with canister fire.* A squad sent forward to reconnoiter 

the area also came under heavy automatic weapons fire. The tank, 

moving to support the squad, halted, having been hit by RPG 

rounds, and began to burn. A second tank maneuvered forward 

to help; RPGs disabled it also. Captain Thompson, unable to use 

other supporting arms because there were wounded Marines 

to his front, moved the entire company forward to retrieve the 

dead and wounded. After moving the wounded to the rear, the 

company pulled back and called in supporting arms fire on the 

evacuated area. The action cost the Marines 7 killed and 12 

wounded; enemy casualties were unknown.

In the meantime 3d Battalion, 4th Marines—after the 

heavy action involving 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, and 2d 

Battalion, 9th Marines—swept to the southeast to block the 

NVA withdrawal. On 18 May, the battalion made little contact, but discovered a large, abandoned, fortified position, well 

stocked with food and equipment. For the next two days, 3d 

Battalion, 26th Marines, maneuvered toward the other Marine 

battalions that were moving north. Contact was light, but 

the battalion encountered intermittent mortar and artillery 

fire. The battalion continued to uncover large caches of rice 

and ammunition—more than 30 tons of rice and 10 tons of 

ammunition—but because of the effect of the intense heat on 

helicopter lift capability and the distance to the landing zones, 

much of the rice could not be moved and had to be destroyed. 

*Canister is large-caliber antipersonnel ammunition filled with thousands of 

small metal balls; it is particularly effective against a concentrated enemy or 

in jungle combat.

To the southwest, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines—commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James S. Wilson and screening the 

western or left flank of the operation—saw little action during 

the first two days. Then, on 20 May, Company K, point for the 

battalion, made contact with what it initially estimated to be 

an enemy platoon deployed in mutually supporting bunkers 

in a draw. The enemy company opened fired on Company K. 

To relieve pressure on Company K, Company L maneuvered 

to the flank of the enemy position but was unable to link up 

with Company K because of heavy enemy fire. Both companies spent the night on opposite sides of the draw with the 

enemy force between them while supporting arms pounded 

the enemy position all night. 

On the twenty-first, Company M moved forward and 

joined with K and L, and the three companies were able to 

clear the area. The clearing operation was costly: 26 Marines 

were killed and 59 wounded. The Marines counted only 36 

enemy bodies, but the lingering smell in the draw indicated 

that many others were in the destroyed fortifications. 

Meanwhile, the division reserve; Special Landing Force 

Bravo’s (SLF Bravo’s) Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 

3d Marines (BLT 2/3), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel 

Earl R. Delong; and Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 

164 (HMM-164), under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Rodney D. McKitrick, joined Operation Hickory on the 

twentieth. The employment of SLF Bravo involved a unique 

departure from the norm for amphibious operations in that the 

heliborne force passed to the control of the 3d Marine Division 

as it went ashore. This procedure ensured positive control of all 

supporting arms covering the battalion’s approach to its inland 

tactical area of responsibility. 

The squadron helilifted the battalion into the DMZ 

northwest of Gio Linh to block possible withdrawal routes 

of NVA units then engaged with ARVN airborne formations 

to the east. By noon, all elements of the battalion were ashore 

and sweeping north toward the DMZ.** The Marines of BLT 

2/3 made short work of eliminating the light resistance they 

encountered from small NVA units apparently left there to 

provide security for several large ordnance caches and bunker 

**Operation Belt Tight was the name given to BLT 2/3’s movement from the 

amphibious ready group ships to its inland tactical area of responsibility in 

support of Operation Hickory on 18 May 1967.

12 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
complexes. One of the bunkers was exceptionally sophisticated, 

constructed of steel overhead and walls. The Marines captured 

more than 1,000 60mm mortar rounds, in addition to large 

quantities of small-arms ammunition and medical supplies in 

the same complex.

After sweeping the southern bank of the Ben Hai River, 

Delong’s Marines wheeled south and began a deliberate search 

in that direction. Although the battalion met no resistance, it 

did uncover and destroy two extensive subterranean bunker 

complexes filled with supplies and ordnance. On 23 May, the 

advance halted temporarily because of the declaration of a 

cease-fire to be observed throughout Vietnam in honor of 

Buddha’s birthday.

After the brief stand down, two battalions—3d Battalion, 

4th Marines, and 2d Battalion, 26th Marines—began sweeping 

the DMZ to the southwest toward the mountains west of Con 

Thien. A third battalion—3d Battalion, 9th Marines—continued to move northwest as the other two battalions moved 

south. To the east, the remaining Operation Hickory battalions 

resumed search-and-destroy operations in the southern half of 

the DMZ, as well as within Leatherneck Square.

Early on the morning of 25 May, Company H, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, commanded by Captain John J. Rozman, 

made contact with a large NVA company in a mutually supporting bunker complex near Hill 117, three miles west of Con 

Thien. The action was extremely close and lasted for more than 

an hour before the company managed to gain fire superiority 

and disengaged to evacuate their casualties. Air and artillery 

then hit the enemy positions. When relieved of its casualties, 

Company H maneuvered north of the hill mass where, at 1345, 

it met Company K, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, commanded 

by Captain John H. Flathman and under temporary operational control of 2d Battalion, 26th Marines. Both companies 

moved against the hill. At 1500, savage fighting developed; the 

Marines estimated the enemy force holding the position to be 

at least several companies.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A801287 

A log and dirt bunker—part of an enemy fortified complex found unoccupied by 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, on 18 May 1967 

during Operation Hickory—illustrates the type of well-constructed and camouflaged NVA fortifications often encountered by the 

3d Marine Division in operations in and below the DMZ. 

Hill of Angels | 13
When the Marines could not break through the strongly 

fortified position, Lieutenant Colonel Masterpool ordered 

them to disengage so that supporting arms could again 

attack the enemy positions. The two Marine companies again 

attacked but broke off the action at 1730 and established 

night positions north and west of the hill. Results of the 

day’s fighting were 14 Marines killed and 92 wounded; the 

Marines counted 41 NVA bodies.

Marine air and artillery pounded the enemy positions all 

night in preparation for the next attack, which was scheduled for the next day. At 0915 on the twenty-sixth, enemy 

automatic weapons fire forced down a Bell UH-1E Iroquois 

helicopter (nicknamed the “Huey”) on a reconnaissance flight 

over the area. Among the wounded in the helicopter were 

Lieutenant Colonel Masterpool, his executive officer, and the 

commanders of Companies H and K. Masterpool and Captain Flathman had to be evacuated. Consequently, the battalion delayed the attack for another day to allow time for 

further bombardment of the hill and command adjustments. 

On the twenty-seventh, Companies E and F, 2d Battalion, 

26th Marines—which were under operational control of 3d 

Battalion, 4th Marines—moved against the objective behind 

covering artillery fire. They met no resistance and secured the 

hill by 1600. Then 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, passed through 

Companies E and F and consolidated on the ridges leading 

up to the higher ground west of Hill 117. In the meantime, 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A188886 

Marines team up with M48 tanks of the 3d Tank Battalion for a sweep near Con Thien during Operation Hickory. 

14 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Lieutenant Colonel Duncan D. Chaplin III arrived by helicopter to assume command of 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, 

which was temporarily under its executive officer, Major 

James H. Landers. 

During the night, Colonel James R. Stockman, the commander of the 3d Marines, initiated artillery fire support from 

Con Thien and Gio Linh and used the 175mm guns of the 

Army’s 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery, to heavily bombard the 

enemy-held high ground. The following morning, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, continued its westward movement onto 

the high ground without opposition, encountering only the 

extensive destruction of numerous fortified positions apparently abandoned by the NVA early in the artillery attack. 

Colonel Stockman then ordered 3d Battalion to move toward 

Con Thien. 

With the exception of the Hill 117 battle, contact diminished during the last days of Operation Hickory and the artillery operations to the east. Nevertheless, the Marines found 

and destroyed numerous well-fortified areas before the operation terminated on 28 May. In addition, they captured or 

destroyed more than 50 tons of rice and 10 tons of ordnance. 

Total enemy casualties for the combined Marine/ARVN 

operation were 789 killed (the equivalent of two NVA battalions) and 37 captured, with 187 weapons taken. Of this total, 

447 were killed by Marines: 143 in supporting special landing 

force Operations Beau Charger and Belt Tight, and 304 in 

Operation Hickory.* Allied losses for the operation were by 

no means light; the Marines lost 142 killed and 896 wounded, while ARVN losses were 22 killed and 122 wounded. 

The first large-scale allied entry into the southern half 

of the DMZ signified that the rules had changed. The area 

was no longer a guaranteed Communist sanctuary from 

which the NVA could launch attacks. More immediately, the 

operation had upset, at least temporarily, the NVA organizational structure in the DMZ. The Marines, however, realized that this initial search-and-destroy operation would not 

permanently deny the enemy’s use of the area. Nevertheless, 

while total friendly control had not been established over the 

region, the removal of the civilian population from the area 

*Operation Beau Charger was the name given to BLT 1/3’s movement from 

the special landing force ships to its inland area of responsibility in support 

of Operation Hickory on 18 May 1967.

now permitted the Marines complete freedom to use supporting arms.

Operation Buffalo

Operation Buffalo began on 2 July, using 1st Battalion, 9th 

Marines—commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. 

Schening—in and around Con Thien. Companies A and B 

operated north-northeast of the strongpoint near a former 

market place on Route 561, while Company D, Headquarters and Service Company, and the battalion command group 

remained within the outpost perimeter. Company C was 

at Dong Ha at the 9th Marines’ command post. The commanding officer of the 9th Marines, Colonel George E. Jerue, 

described the origins of the operation in the following way: 

The [tactical area of responsibility] assigned to the 9th 

Marine Regiment was so large that the regiment could 

not enjoy the advantage of patrolling any particular 

sector on a continuing basis. As a result, an area would 

be swept for a few days and then it would be another 

week or so before the area would be swept again. Consequently, it became evident that the NVA, realizing 

this limitation, would move back into an area as soon 

as a sweep was concluded. In an attempt to counter this 

NVA maneuver, it was decided to send two companies 

of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (Companies A and B) 

into the area (1,200 yards east of Con Thien and north 

of the Trace) which had just been swept during the last 

few days in June. 

This was the reason the two companies were there on 2 July.

That morning, Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines—

commanded by Captain Sterling K. Coates and a unit that 

gained a reputation for finding the enemy during earlier 

actions at Khe Sanh—walked into the heaviest combat of its 

Vietnam assignment. In order to conduct a sweep north of 

the Trace, it, along with Company A, commanded by Captain 

Albert C. Slater Jr., had moved a mile east of Con Thien the 

day before. At 0800 on 2 July, both units began moving north. 

Company A was on the left. Company B moved along Route 

561, an old 8- to 10 foot-wide cart road bordered by waisthigh hedgerows. The road led to trouble; two NVA battalions 

waited in prepared positions.

Company B’s movement started smoothly, and by 0900 the 

2d Platoon had secured its first objective, a small crossroads 

Hill of Angels | 15
Defense Department (Marine Corps) A188699 

Pfc R. L. Crumrine bows his head in anguish after learning one of his closest friends was killed by the North Vietnamese. 

Crumrine was participating in Operation Hickory in the DMZ with the 9th Marines in the fierce fighting of 27 May 1967. 

16 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
1,200 meters north of the Trace. There was no enemy contact. 

As the 3d Platoon and Company B’s command group moved 

up the trail, enemy sniper fire started. The 3d Platoon and the 

command group moved to the left to suppress the enemy’s 

fire, but as they pushed north the NVA fire intensified, halting the platoon. Captain Coates directed his 2d Platoon to 

shift to the right in a second attempt to outflank the Communist position. At the same time, he ordered the 1st Platoon forward to provide rear security for the company. The 2d 

Platoon tried to move, but enemy fire forced it back onto the 

road. The number of wounded and dead mounted as NVA fire 

hit the unit from the front and both flanks. To worsen matters, the enemy began pounding the Marines with artillery 

and mortars.

Shortly after the sweep began, Company A tripped two 

antipersonnel mines, and the need for casualty evacuation 

delayed its movement. Afterward, Company A moved eastward to help Company B but could not link up because of 

heavy small-arms fire. Soon the company had so many casualties that it was unable to fight and move simultaneously.

Company B’s position deteriorated. Enemy artillery and 

mortar fire cut off the 3d Platoon and the command group 

from the 2d Platoon. The NVA troops then used flamethrowers to ignite the hedgerows on both sides of Company B, as 

well as massed artillery in close coordination with a ground 

attack. Many of the Marines, forced into the open by the 

flamethrowers, died under the enemy fire. The Communist artillery and mortar fire shifted to the 2d Platoon as it 

attacked to help the 3d Platoon and the command group. This 

fire killed Captain Coates, his radio operator, two platoon 

commanders, and the artillery forward observer. The attached 

forward air controller, Captain Warren O. Keneipp Jr., took 

CON THIEN

LZ CANARY

LZ HAWK

NORTH

VIETNAM

Action

8 July

Action

8 July

(SLF ALPHA)

From ARG

3 July

NVA

From Dong Ha

2 July

From Dong Ha

2 July

Ambushes NVA

6 July

F 3

G 3

1 3 3 9

A 9

A 9

90

B 9

(SLF BRAVO)

From Cam Lo

4 July DONG HA CAM LO

Cam Lo River 2 3

Ambushed By NVA 2 July

1 9

Operation Bualo

Action Near Con Thien

0 1 2 3 4 5 Kilometers

N

Map adapted by Marine Corps History Division 

Hill of Angels | 17
command of the company, but he soon lost radio contact with 

the platoons. Only the company executive officer, at the rear 

of the 2d Platoon, managed to maintain radio contact with 

the battalion command post, but the heavy enemy fire kept 

him from influencing the situation. 

Down the road, the 1st Platoon also took heavy punishment as it tried to push its way up to the lead elements of 

the company. North Vietnamese troops swarmed against 

the platoon’s flanks, but air support arrived and the platoon 

commander, Staff Sergeant Leon R. Burns, directed strikes 

against the enemy. Burns said later: “I asked for napalm as 

close as 50 yards from us, some of it came in only 20 yards 

away. But I’m not complaining.” The air strikes disrupted the 

enemy assault, and the 1st Platoon reached what was left of 

the 2d Platoon. Burns quickly established a hasty defense and 

began treating the wounded.

The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines’ command group at Con 

Thien heard the crackle of small-arms fire from the 0930 

action, followed by a radio report that Company B had 

encountered a dug-in NVA unit. The first assessment of 

enemy strength was a platoon, then a battalion, and ultimately 

a multibattalion force. When the firing increased, Lieutenant 

Colonel Schening alerted 1st Battalion, 9th Marines’ Company C at Dong Ha to stand by to be helilifted into Company B’s area. Since these reinforcements would not arrive 

for some time, Schening dispatched a rescue force composed 

of four tanks and a platoon from Company D. The assistant 

operations officer, Captain Henry J. M. Radcliffe, went with 

the small force to take command of Company B if a linkup 

could be made. First Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell, the battalion intelligence officer, went also because he was familiar with 

the area where the enemy engaged Company B. The remainder of the battalion command group remained at Con Thien.

The small rescue force moved down the Trace from Con 

Thien to the junction of Route 561 without incident, but as it 

turned north up the road, it came under fire. A North Vietnamese unit, trying to encircle Company B, had moved south 

and was opposite Captain Radcliffe’s small force. Helicopter gunships and the fire from the four tanks dispersed the 

enemy. Company C began arriving by helicopter, and Radcliffe ordered the Company D platoon to secure the landing zone and to evacuate casualties. As the lead elements of 

Company C came into the zone, they met a heavy artillery 

barrage that wounded 11 Marines. Despite enemy fire, the 

platoon of tanks and the lead unit of Company C continued 

to push north toward Company B. Half a mile up the road, 

the advancing Marines found the 1st Platoon. Captain Radcliffe told Staff Sergeant Burns that he was the acting commanding officer and asked where the rest of the company was. 

Burns replied, “Sir, this is the company, or what’s left of it.”

After organizing the withdrawal of the 1st Platoon’s 

wounded, Captain Radcliffe and the relief force, accompanied by Staff Sergeant Burns, continued to push forward to 

Company B’s furthest point of advance to recover the company’s casualties. The Marines set up a hasty defense, making 

maximum use of the tanks’ firepower, and brought the dead 

and wounded into the perimeter. For Lieutenant Howell, the 

scene had a particular impact. He had commanded Company 

B’s 3d Platoon for more than eight months before becoming 

the battalion’s intelligence officer. He was seemingly everywhere as he searched for the wounded. Radcliffe estimated 

that Howell and Corporal Charles A. Thompson of Company 

D were instrumental in the evacuation of at least 25 Marines. 

The Marines then loaded their casualties on the tanks. Lacking space on the vehicles for the arms and equipment of the 

wounded, Radcliffe ordered them destroyed to prevent capture. The rescue force found it impossible to recover all the 

bodies immediately; some bodies remained along the road.

Company B came under heavy enemy artillery fire as it 

began to pull back. Two of the tanks hit mines, further slowing the withdrawal. When the company reached the landing zone, it came under devastating artillery and mortar fire 

again, hitting many of the wounded awaiting evacuation. 

Litter bearers and corpsmen became casualties as well. Casualties increased in the landing zone, among them were the 

platoon commander and platoon sergeant from Company 

D who had been directing the defense of the zone. In the 

resulting confusion, someone passed the word to move the 

casualties back to Con Thien. A group of almost 50 started 

making their way back until Marines at Con Thien spotted 

them in the Trace. Lieutenant Colonel Schening sent out a 

rescue party, headed by his executive officer, Major Darrell C. 

Danielson, in a truck, jeep and ambulance. Upon reaching the 

wounded Marines, Danielson saw that many were in a state 

of shock; some seemed in danger of bleeding to death. Fortunately, two helicopters landed in the area, and the Marines 

18 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
loaded the more serious casualties on board. Enemy artillery 

fire delayed the evacuation of the remainder, but, despite the 

fire, Major Danielson and his party managed to get everyone 

into the vehicles and back to Con Thien for treatment and 

further evacuation.

During the battle, friendly and enemy supporting arms 

engaged in a furious duel. In the first few hours of the engagement, Marine aircraft dropped 90 tons of ordnance during 

28 sorties. Artillery fired 453 missions, while Navy destroyers 

fired 142 five-inch rounds into enemy positions. The NVA 

force fired 1,065 artillery and mortar rounds during the day 

at Gio Linh and Con Thien; more than 700 rounds fell on the 

1st Battalion, 9th Marines, alone.

Company A remained heavily engaged. When the necessity of caring for the increasing numbers of wounded brought 

the company to a halt, Captain Slater had his 3d Platoon 

establish a hasty landing zone in the rear of the company. 

After the first flight of medevac helicopters departed the zone, 

the enemy hit the 3d Platoon with mortars then assaulted 

the position. Slater moved his 2d Platoon and company command group to reinforce the 3d Platoon.*

 The enemy advanced 

to within 50 meters of Company A’s lines before small-arms 

and artillery fire broke up their attack. Enemy pressure and 

the remaining casualties kept Company A in their defensive 

position until the NVA force withdrew later in the evening. 

At 1500, Lieutenant Colonel Schening at Con Thien notified the regimental commander that all of 1st Battalion, 9th 

Marines’ companies were hard pressed, that he had no more 

units to commit, and that the situation was critical. Colonel 

Jerue ordered 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, now commanded 

by Major Willard J. Woodring, to move by helicopter to 1st 

Battalion, 9th Marines’ assistance. Three companies and the 

command group of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, were in position north of the Trace by 1800. 

After landing, Major Woodring assumed operational control of Companies A and C of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. 

The combined force made a twilight attack on the enemy’s 

left flank, while elements of Company B and the platoon 

from Company D holding the landing zone pulled back to 

the Con Thien perimeter in expectation of an attack on the 

*In the confused fighting, the 1st Platoon of Company A broke through 

the surrounding enemy and joined the relief force under Capt Radcliffe’s 

command.

outpost. The increased pressure provided by 3d Battalion, 9th 

Marines, caused the enemy to break contact.

When the worn and exhausted survivors of the morning’s 

encounter mustered for a head count, the Marines found the 

total casualty figure shocking. Staff Sergeant Burns, who was 

subsequently awarded the Navy Cross, stated that only 27 

Company B Marines walked out of the action. Not until 5 

July were the recovery efforts completed. The executive officer 

of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, Major John C. Studt, supervised the recovery of Company B’s dead, a grisly task after 

three days in the hot sun. In all, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 

had 84 dead and 9 missing. The battalion established no accurate count of enemy killed.

During the next three days, from 3 to 5 July, enemy 

contact continued. At 0930 on the third, an Air Force air 

observer reported more than 100 NVA soldiers advancing 

from positions north of Con Thien. Battery E, 3d Battalion, 

12th Marines, fired on them and killed 75. To the east, Major 

Woodring called in continuous air strikes for 12 hours to prepare for an attack the following day. The same day, 3 July, 

BLT 1/3 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. 

Wickwire from SLF Alpha joined the 9th Marines and tied 

in with Major Woodring’s right flank. The regiment planned 

a drive north to recover missing bodies and to push the NVA 

out of the Lang Son area, about 4,000 meters northeast of the 

Con Thien perimeter.

The attack started early the morning of the fourth. Third 

Battalion, 9th Marines, encountered heavy resistance from 

concealed enemy positions southwest of the site of Company 

B’s engagement on 2 July. A prolonged fight followed, involving tanks, artillery, and close air support. By 1830, when the 

final Marine assault ended, the battalion had lost 15 dead and 

33 wounded. BLT 1/3 suffered 11 wounded during the same 

action. The same day, BLT 2/3, under the command of Major 

Wendell O. Beard, joined the operation; the battalion landed 

by helicopter north of Cam Lo at Landing Zone Canary and 

moved west then northward on the western edge of the battle 

area toward Con Thien.

During daylight on 5 July, all units northeast of Con Thien 

came under enemy mortar and artillery fire, but there was relatively little ground contact while the Marines completed the 

grim task of recovering Company B’s dead. That afternoon 

an air observer spotted a large concentration of enemy troops 

Hill of Angels | 19
3,000 meters northeast of Con Thien. He called in artillery 

and tactical air strikes and reported seeing 200 dead NVA 

soldiers.

Following preparatory artillery fires on the morning of 6 

July, all battalions continued moving north. BLT 2/3 ran into 

an enemy force supported by mortars less than three kilometers south of Con Thien. In the brief engagement that followed, the battalion killed 35 Communist soldiers, suffering 

5 Marines killed and 25 wounded. Northeast of the outpost, 

BLT 1/3 and 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, advanced under 

intermittent NVA artillery and mortar fire. Major Woodring 

decided to move a reinforced company 1,500 meters to the 

north-northwest to cover his left flank. He chose attached 

Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, which now included the survivors of Company C, and a detachment from 3d 

Reconnaissance Battalion. Company A moved into position 

without opposition and established a strong combat outpost. 

Captain Slater’s composite force dug concealed fighting positions and sent reconnaissance patrols north in an attempt to 

discover where the enemy crossed the Ben Hai River.

While the movement of Captain Slater’s composite company went unnoticed, the same was not true for the advance 

of the main elements of the two battalions. As they advanced, 

they encountered increasingly heavy artillery fire, and by 1600 

they could go no further. BLT 1/3 had lost a tank and, because 

of the enemy fire, had pulled back without recovering it. Captain Burrell H. Landes Jr., the commander of Company B, 

climbed a tree to spot for air strikes and artillery fire in front 

of his position. An air observer radioed that a large enemy 

force was approaching his position. When Landes asked how 

big the force was, the reply was, “I’d hate to tell you, I’d hate 

to tell you.” The air observer had spotted a 400-man force 

crossing the Ben Hai River in approach march formation; it 

was heading directly for the two battalions. 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A188874 

Marines of Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and tanks of the 3d Tank Battalion operating one mile northeast of Con Thien 

during Operation Buffalo.

20 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
After the sightings, both battalions—minus composite Company A—came under heavy, accurate artillery fire. 

Between 500 and 600 rounds hit 3d Battalion, 9th Marines’ 

position, and about 1,000 landed on BLT 1/3’s position. 

During the Communist bombardment, one of Company A’s 

reconnaissance patrols also spotted the 400-man NVA force 

and reported that it was moving toward the 3d Battalion. 

The enemy, still in column formation, was unaware that it 

was heading directly into Company A’s concealed unit. The 

Marines opened fire at less than 150 meters distance. Captain 

Slater recalled: “When the point of the enemy column was 

brought under fire, the NVA alerted their unit with a bugle 

call. Their initial reaction was [one] of confusion and they 

scattered, some of them toward Marine lines. They quickly 

organized and probed at every flank of the 360-degree perimeter. Concealed prepared positions and fire discipline never 

allowed the NVA to determine what size unit they were dealing with. When the enemy formed and attacked, heavy accurate artillery was walked to within 75 meters of the perimeter. 

The few NVA that penetrated the perimeter were killed and 

all lines held.”

Heavy enemy probes, mortar fire, and small-arms fire continued through the early evening. Some NVA soldiers crept 

close enough to hurl hand grenades into the Marine lines. 

One of the attached Company C fireteam leaders, Lance 

Corporal James L. Stuckey, responded by picking up the grenades and throwing them back toward their source. He was 

wounded when the third grenade exploded as it left his hand. 

He continued to lead his fireteam for the rest of the night 

without medical assistance, however, an action for which he 

later received the Navy Cross.

Despite heavy Marine artillery fire that effectively boxed 

in Company A’s position, the NVA maintained pressure on 

the Marines until 2200. For the rest of the night, enemy 

small-arms and mortar fire harassed the company, but the 

NVA units were withdrawing. First light revealed 154 enemy 

bodies strewn around Company A’s perimeter; the defenders 

had 12 casualties. Among the wounded Marines was Lance 

Corporal Stuckey; only tattered flesh remained where his 

hand had been. 

While the attack on Company A continued, the rest of 

what intelligence officers later determined to have been the 

90th NVA Regiment assaulted the two Marine battalions. 

To add to the effect of their preparatory fires, the attacking 

North Vietnamese threw fuzzed blocks of explosives into the 

Marine positions to keep the Marines down as the assaulting troops moved in. The Marines countered with supporting 

arms. Flare ships, attack aircraft, helicopter gunships, naval 

gunfire, and all available artillery concentrated their fire on 

the attacking enemy. By 2130, the Marines had repelled the 

assault, and the Communist forces began withdrawing to the 

north.

At 0520 the next morning, Major Woodring ordered Captain Slater to pull Company A back into the battalion perimeter. The decision was most opportune. Immediately after the 

company cleared its night position, a 30-minute NVA artillery concentration landed within its old lines. Company A 

returned to the battalion’s perimeter without incident. Both 

battalions spent the rest of 7 July trying to determine the 

extent of the damage inflicted on the 90th NVA Regiment. 

By 8 July, the Marines raised the NVA casualty count 

to more than 800. Counting enemy bodies proved to be a 

most difficult task because of the indescribably grisly carnage. 

Hundreds of bodies covered the scarred battleground, some 

half buried, others in pieces, all surrounded by a carpet of 

battered equipment and ammunition. Counting enemy canteens was one method used to try to establish realistic figures. 

The vast area that the bodies covered further complicated the 

morbid undertaking. As late as the afternoon of the eighth, 

Company C of BLT 1/3 found about 200 enemy bodies more 

than 600 meters east of Route 561. 

The scattering of bodies to the north occurred when 

air and artillery hit groups of North Vietnamese that were 

moving toward or away from the main battle area. The lateral 

scattering from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines’ position eastward 

across the front of BLT 1/3 was the result of the NVA attempt 

to outflank 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, without realizing that 

the battalion landing team was on line. Trying to move farther east, the enemy lost even more men to the guns of BLT 

1/3. The Marines found it impossible to compute an accurate 

total of Communist losses to supporting arms because of the 

inability of allied forces to continue the count on the north 

side of the Ben Hai River.

The last significant engagements of Operation Buffalo 

took place on 8 July, southwest of Con Thien. After BLT 2/3 

closed on Con Thien during its northward sweep, it turned 

Hill of Angels | 21
west, then headed south toward the Cam Lo River. At 1030, 

Company G, commanded by Captain James P. Sheehan, discovered a bunker complex. When small-arms fire and grenades interrupted further investigation, Captain Sheehan 

backed off and called in air and artillery. At 1300, Company G moved in, but some NVA soldiers continued to fight. 

Later that afternoon, after clearing the complex, Company 

G reported 39 dead Communists and 2 Marines killed with 

29 wounded. One of the wounded was the company commander, Captain Sheehan.

At 1430, while Company G cleared the bunkers, a squadsized patrol from Company F, located some 1,200 meters 

southwest of Company G, engaged another enemy force. 

When the Communists counterattacked, the company commander, First Lieutenant Richard D. Koehler Jr., sent in the 

rest of his Marines. When 82mm mortar rounds began falling, Koehler called in artillery and air strikes. The concentration of supporting arms cracked the enemy position, and 

when Company F moved in, it counted 118 enemy bodies. 

The Marines estimated the Communist unit to have numbered between 200 and 250. Marine losses totaled 14 killed 

and 43 wounded. Apparently the NVA had had enough. For 

the next five days, BLT 2/3 encountered only mines and 

harassing fires.

One ominous development that accompanied the Operation Buffalo fighting was the accurate employment of largecaliber, long-range NVA artillery. On 7 July, enemy artillery 

scored a direct hit on the command bunker of 1st Battalion, 

9th Marines, at Con Thien, killing 11, including First Lieutenant Gatlin Howell, the intelligence officer who had gone 

to the aid of Company B on 2 July. Eighteen others sustained 

wounds; one was the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Schening.*

 The cause of the damage was a 152mm howitzer round, which penetrated five feet of sandbags, loose dirt, 

and 12 x 12-inch timbers. The same day, at Dong Ha, a delayfuzed 130mm round landed at the base of the north wall of 

the 9th Marines’ command post, exploding six feet below the 

bunker floor. Luckily, there were no injuries.

On 4 July, an NVA round landed on the road adjacent 

to the chapel at Dong Ha during Catholic services. The 

*LtCol Schening also suffered wounds at Cape Gloucester and Peleliu in 

World War II, as well as in Korea. He thus survived wounds in three wars.

chaplain’s assistant, Corporal George A. Pace, was at the chapel’s altar; he was the only person killed.** Dong Ha’s storage areas, helicopter maintenance areas, and medical facilities 

were among the targets of the long-range weapons. The frequency and accuracy of the enemy fire contributed to Colonel 

Jerue’s decision to move the 9th Marines command post to a 

location northeast of Cam Lo. There, relative quiet prevailed 

for the remainder of Operation Buffalo. 

Another indication of the Communist buildup along the 

DMZ and around Con Thien during this period was the 

increased employment of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). 

While an Douglas A-4 Skyhawk aircraft was attacking the 

NVA in front of BLT 1/3 on 6 July, the enemy launched 

eight SAMs from sites north of the Ben Hai River. One hit 

Major Ralph E. Brubaker’s Marine Attack Squadron 311 jet, 

causing the aircraft to crash in enemy territory. Only slightly 

wounded, Brubaker remained in enemy territory until picked 

up the next morning by a U.S. Air Force rescue helicopter. 

Operation Buffalo closed on 14 July 1967. The Marines 

reported enemy losses of 1,290 dead and 2 captured. Marine 

losses, in contrast, totaled 159 killed and 345 wounded. The 

Marines found the enemy’s large-scale July offensive against 

Con Thien a short one, but considerably more vicious than 

most Communist operations conducted in I Corps.*** The 

most savage aspect was the heavy employment of supporting arms by both sides. Of the known enemy killed, more 

than 500 were the result of air, artillery, and naval gunfire. In 

addition, supporting arms destroyed 164 enemy bunkers and 

15 artillery and rocket positions, and caused 46 secondary 

explosions. To accomplish this, Marine aviation used 1,066 

tons of ordnance; Marine and Army artillery consumed more 

than 40,000 rounds; and ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet fired 

1,500 rounds from their 5- and 8-inch naval guns. 

Enemy artillery was effective as well, accounting for half of 

the Marine casualties during the operation and posing a constant threat to the Marine logistical support installations. The 

July fighting around Con Thien reaffirmed the Marines’ faith 

in supporting arms. In spite of the appearance of SAMs and 

the presence of excellent, long-range Communist artillery, 

**Cpl Pace was a friend of the author’s.

***I Corps was the northernmost of four military divisions within South Vietnam. It extended from the DMZ to south of Da Nang.

22 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
the Marines could prove that the latest enemy offensive had 

failed. Con Thien had held, and at least one first-line enemy 

regiment was in shambles. The Operation Buffalo victory did 

not breed overconfidence, but the body-strewn wasteland 

along the DMZ provided graphic evidence of the effectiveness of III MAF’s defenses. The summer was far from over; 

they would be challenged again.

Operation Kingfisher

At the conclusion of Operation Buffalo, III MAF initiated 

Operation Hickory II, a short-term, two-battalion sweep of 

the southern half of the DMZ. Its mission was to destroy 

enemy fortifications and mortar and artillery positions. 

Marine casualties for the operation were 4 killed and 90 

wounded. Total NVA losses were 39 killed and 19 weapons 

captured.

At the close of Hickory II, the two special landing force 

battalions (BLTs 1/3 and 2/3) were released by III MAF to 

return to amphibious ready status off the coast. On 16 July, 

the five battalions that remained near the DMZ, comprising 

the 3d and 9th Marine regiments, began a new operation in 

the same general area. Called Operation Kingfisher, its mission, as in previous operations along the DMZ, was to block 

NVA entry into Quang Tri Province.

On 28 July, the 3d Marine Division sent 2d Battalion, 

9th Marines—now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William D. Kent and reinforced with a platoon of tanks, three 

Ontos, three LVTE1s (LVT5s configured for engineering), 

and engineers—on a spoiling attack into the DMZ. The main 

body, including the tracked vehicles, moved north on Provincial Route 606, with Companies E and G providing security on the flanks. Company F remained in a landing zone 

south of Con Thien, ready to board helicopters and exploit 

any heavy contact with the enemy. At 1400, Company F was 

helilifted to Hill 37 overlooking the deserted hamlet of Thon 

Cam Son, located a stone’s throw from the Ben Hai River and 

near where the rest of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, would spend 

the night of 28 July. 

The armored column moved north without incident. 

The terrain, however, restricted the tracked vehicles to the 

road, and thick vegetation made movement difficult for the 

flanking companies. Furthermore, the terrain channeled the 

column into a relatively narrow “V” of land bounded by the 

Ben Hai River on the west and north and a tributary stream 

to the east. The reinforced battalion would have to return by 

the same route by which it entered the DMZ.* The North 

Vietnamese were already moving units into previously prepared positions covering Route 606.

The battalion set in for the night in a defensive position so 

strong that Lieutenant Colonel Kent was confident an enemy 

division could not crack them. Company G formed a perimeter on the slopes of a low knoll overlooking the river. Company F manned Hill 37, located 600 meters to the southwest. 

Between these two well-defendable points, on the outskirts 

of Thon Cam Son, Kent formed a tight, tank-studded perimeter with the rest of the battalion. 

The North Vietnamese did not molest the Marines in their 

night defensive positions near the Ben Hai River. Receiving 

no incoming enemy fire that night, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines’ 

leaders were worried about the send-off they might receive 

when they left the next morning. Only the men of Company 

F heard anything that positively strengthened that suspicion. 

Shortly after midnight, the sound of truck engines reached 

their perimeter from across the river. Of this they were positive, and they radioed a report to the S-3 operations section 

of the battalion. An artillery mission of a few rounds was fired 

into the area generally northwest of the company, and no 

more attention was given to the incident. An hour after sunrise the following morning, 29 July, a Company F fireteam, 

which was holed up halfway down the south slope of Hill 37, 

radioed the S-3 that they could hear digging on the road; still, 

no action was taken.** At 0930, another fireteam on the south 

slope said they could hear Vietnamese calling to one another 

in the gully below them. A nearby 60mm mortar crew sent a 

few rounds into the bushes near the source of the sound, and 

the voices stopped. 

The NVA had almost certainly been observing the two 

days of air and artillery attacks on one small sector of the 

DMZ, the increased radio traffic, an unusual amount of 

helicopter activity, and major troop and vehicle movements. 

*Maj Willard Woodring, commanding the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, raised 

these objections at a division briefing prior to the operation, according to 

Col John Studt.

**A full-strength fireteam consists of four Marines led by a corporal. Three 

fireteams and a squad leader (sergeant) constitute a squad; three squads plus 

a platoon leader (second lieutenant), a platoon sergeant (staff sergeant), a 

radioman, and a corpsman make up a rifle platoon.

Hill of Angels | 23
The enemy therefore had plenty of warning that Marines 

were coming to Than Cam Son. A review of the map and a 

knowledge of Marine tactics sufficed to fill in the blanks. The 

Marines would be going out the same way they came in.

Company E Marines scouted the objective area and 

destroyed several small, abandoned fortification complexes. 

About 1030, the battalion began its movement south out of 

the DMZ. It set out in a column led by Company E, followed 

by Command Group A with Headquarters and Service 

Company, Company H, Company F, Command Group B, 

and finally Company G.* An airborne forward air controller 

circled overhead; he would soon be extremely busy.

*This order of march reflects a change from the source document (U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967 by Maj Gary L. Telfer, 

LtCol Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming Jr.); it is based on the author’s 

memory and was verified by an interview with William Southard, who was 

commanding officer of Company H at the time.

24 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Company E was arranged with mine-clearing teams of 

engineers and infantry to the front, their eyes searching the 

bushes and the dust of the trail. It was a long column: 1st 

Platoon took the point, followed by the company commander and the battalion commander, then 3d Platoon with four 

M48 tanks and two flame-throwing tanks, and the 2d Platoon taking up the rear. The first platoon had scarcely started 

down the road when the leader of the point squad, Corporal Richard L. Laflair, was blown up by a 250-pound bomb 

buried in the road.* Nearby, engineers found a similar bomb, 

rigged as a command-detonated mine, and destroyed it.**

Shortly after the second explosion, North Vietnamese soldiers near the road opened fire on the column with machine 

guns, rifles, and 60mm and 82mm mortars, initiating a running battle that did not end until dark. The NVA units, using 

heavy fire from prepared positions combined with the maneuver of other units, quickly fragmented the Marines’ armored 

*Francis J. “Bing” West agrees with the author and is at variance with the 

primary source, which states that five Marines were wounded but does not 

mention that any were killed.

**The author’s memory is that the second explosion killed one Marine and 

wounded two.

Photo courtesy of Vernon L. “Les” Stevenson 

Marines of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, moving north from Con 

Thien along Provincial Route 606 on 28 July 1967. 

Map provided by Frank Southard; used by permission of West and Southard 

Positions of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, the night of 28 July 

1967, drawn by Francis J. “Bing” West shortly after this action 

took place. Command Group B was colocated on the northern 

hilltop with Company G. 

Hill of Angels | 25
column into roughly company-size segments. Each isolated 

segment fought its own way through the gauntlet of enemy 

fire. The tracked vehicles became more of a liability than a 

tactical asset. They were restricted to the road because the 

thick brush provided excellent cover for NVA soldiers armed 

with antitank weapons. Instead of providing support to the 

infantry Marines, the tracked vehicles themselves required 

infantry protection. Heavy enemy fire made medical evacuation of the dead and wounded impossible, so casualties were 

loaded onto tanks. Some of those wounded were killed when 

the tank drew enemy RPG fire. One such case was 2d Battalion, 9th Marines’ communications chief, Gunnery Sergeant 

David S. Prentice. Using the tanks as ambulances to transport the wounded further reduced the tanks’ ability to fight. 

Tracked vehicles suffered all along the column.

An RPG round penetrated both sides of an LVT5 moving 

with Company E.* Another RPG explosion disabled the 

turret of a tank with Company F, wounding three crewmen. 

When Company H brought up an Ontos to suppress NVA 

fire that was holding up its movement, an RPG gunner hit 

that vehicle and wounded three crewmen. A second Ontos 

came forward, beat down the enemy fire with its machine 

gun, and permitted the company to move again. 

Later that afternoon, the lieutenant in charge of the Ontos 

platoon (who was wounded and using a tree branch as a cane) 

approached Major Dennis J. Murphy—the 2d Battalion, 9th 

Marines’ executive officer who was in charge of Command 

Group B—and explained that his vehicles had been hit by 

*The author recalls that this LVT5 carried ammunition, which fortunately 

did not explode as the RPG round passed through it.

Photo courtesy of Joe Valento 

Forward air control radioman LCpl Joseph L. Valento holds two pieces of shrapnel as he stands in a bomb crater near Hill 37 in 

the DMZ on 28 July 1967. The sandbags visible at the top of the crater illustrate a common practice of digging foxholes at the 

crest and reinforcing them with sandbags to make a smaller target for enemy artillery. Valento joined 2d Battalion, 9th Marines’ 

Bravo Command Group the following morning and was responsible for calling in numerous close air support missions. His superior service earned him a meritorious promotion to the rank of corporal.

26 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
RPGs. He indicated that they could still run and that he had 

enough of a crew remaining to drive them out of the DMZ. 

He asked if the major would allow him to seek volunteers to 

man the machine guns. He received no volunteers but was 

able to drive his vehicles to safety before night fell.

The infantry’s primary fire support came from the air 

controllers from Marine Observation Squadron 6; these men 

remained on station throughout the day, airborne in their tiny 

Cessna O-1 Bird Dog aircraft (a particularly helpful controller was Captain Thomas D. Redmon, call sign “Dream Hour 

38”). The controller maintained contact with air representatives from each company and with the battalion air liaison 

officer. The airborne forward air controller directed bombing 

missions, usually from Marine-piloted McDonnell Douglas 

F-4 Phantom jets, whenever needed. The Marine infantrymen needed them often. 

The Marines of Company F were sitting on Hill 37 when 

the day began and at first were more spectators than participants. Lance Corporal Joseph L. Valento, air controller for the 

company, had watched Company E start down the road and 

heard the two mines as they exploded. As the enemy began 

firing mortar rounds at Company E, Valento found that he 

was in an excellent location to take a compass bearing on the 

NVA mortar position. Company G was able to take a similar 

reading from a different angle. The aerial observer crossed the 

lines on his map and called for bombing missions on the “X.” 

The first attack plane to come in took fire from an antiaircraft battery across the river in North Vietnam. It was hit 

squarely on its nose and barely pulled out. Lance Corporal 

Valento’s vantage point enabled him to locate the enemy battery on his map and convey the coordinates to a second aerial 

observer. From their ringside seats, the Marines of Company 

F watched the jets demolish the antiaircraft guns.

When the pilots turned their attention back to the mortars, their bombs were just as accurate, and Valento thought 

the job was finished. He was wrong. Twenty minutes later, 

NVA mortars were fired from a different gully. The same procedure with the jets followed and gained a respite of half an 

hour before more mortar shells were lobbed into the perimeter still occupied by Company G and Command Group 

B, commanded by Major Dennis Murphy. Lance Corporal 

Valento moved his forward air control operation from Company F to Command Group B’s position, a location from 

which he was able to continue more efficiently coordinating 

air strikes against the enemy. The pattern repeated itself all 

day over distances too wide for a single or a few mortar crews 

to cover in short time spans, a fact which led many to conclude that the road was ringed by at least 10 crews, each firing 

from several sites.*

North Vietnamese units knew the danger from American 

supporting arms and attempted to stay close to the Marine 

column. Company F had hardly cleared its night defensive 

position when it realized an NVA unit had immediately occupied the same terrain. At another point, Marine engineers 

with Company E spotted a 12.7mm antiaircraft machine gun 

just off the road. They attacked, killed seven NVA soldiers, 

*The author remembers lying in a ditch next to LCpl Valento and Maj Murphy as enemy mortars showered them with debris from nearby explosions. Valento radioed directions to the airborne controller who relayed them to an F-4 

Phantom that was circling above, awaiting a specific mission. The Phantom 

came screaming down, almost perpendicular to the ground, and released all 

its bombs at one time. The bombs impacted on the nearby hillside from which 

the mortars were being fired, silencing that NVA mortar crew and resulting 

in substantial cheering by Marines of Command Group B and Company G.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A186027 

The M50 Ontos was developed in the 1950s as a lightly 

armored, tracked antitank vehicle. In Vietnam, it proved to 

be a valuable asset, particularly efficient when firing its six 

106mm recoilless rifles loaded with “beehive” antipersonnel 

rounds. It also mounted a .30-caliber machine gun. Its weaknesses included the requirement that the crew had to exit the 

armor-plated compartment to reload, the machine gunner was 

exposed, and the relatively thin armor plating, while effective 

against small arms, was vulnerable to RPGs. 

Hill of Angels | 27
The M14 was adopted in 1957, the culmination of a long line of experimental weapons 

based upon the M1 Garand. Chambered for 

the powerful 7.62 x 51mm round, it was the 

primary infantry weapon in Vietnam until it 

was replaced by the M16.

Length Weight Cartridge Magazine

Capacity

Type of 

Action

Effective

Range

Cyclical

Rate

Velocity

44.3 in 8.2 lb 7.62 x 51 20 rounds Gas operated 

semi/auto 450 meters 750 rpm 2,800 ft/s

Length Weight Cartridge Magazine

Capacity

Type of 

Action

Effective

Range

Cyclical

Rate

Velocity

39.6 in 6.6 lb 5.56 x 45 20–30 

rounds

Gas operated 

semi/auto 500 meters 800 rpm 3,250 ft/s

Marines traded in their M14 for the 5.56mm 

M16 in mid-1967. The stock was made of 

a plastic composite material, and it was 

considerably lighter than the M14. Since 

the early model was notorious for jamming 

during use, many Marines dubbed it the 

“Mattel toy.”

Length Weight Cartridge Magazine

Capacity

Type of 

Action

Effective

Range

Velocity

28.9 in 6 lb 40 x 46 

grenade Single shot Break open 350 meters 247 ft/s

The M79, a 40mm, indirect-fire grenade launcher, 

was called the “Bloop Gun” by Marines because 

of the sound it made when fired and the slow 

speed and high trajectory at which the projectile 

traveled.

Length Weight Cartridge Magazine

Capacity

Type of 

Action

Effective

Range

Cyclical

Rate

Velocity

42.4 in 18.75 lb 7.62 x 51 Belt fed Gas operated 

full auto 1,100 meters 550 rpm 2,800 ft/s

The M60 machine gun, a 7.62mm weapon 

in service since 1957, is considered by 

many to be the workhorse of small arms. It 

ideally uses a team of three: a gunner, an 

assistant gunner, and an ammunition bearer. 

It can be fired from the shoulder or from 

a bipod, or mounted in a helicopter or a 

ground vehicle.

The M1911A1 .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol 

was one of the most enduring weapons in the 

Marine Corps arsenal. Adopted in 1911, it was 

carried throughout the World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, and into the 1980s before it was replaced by 

the 9mm Beretta.

Length Weight Cartridge Magazine

Capacity

Type of 

Action

Effective

Range

Velocity

8.6 in 2.5 lb .45 7 rounds Single action 

semiauto 25 meters 830 ft/s

Small Arms of U. S. Forces in Vietnam

M14

M16

M79

M60

M1911A1

28 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Photographs are from the small-arms collection of the National Museum of the Marine Corps 

The Soviet-designed AK47 was the primary 

weapon of choice for many armies (the 

Chinese version was called the Type 56, for 

instance). It is a durable 7.62mm rifle with 

fully automatic capabilities and comes in 

a variety of stock variants, from standard 

(shown) to a swing-out, collapsible shoulder stock, to a pistol-grip-only model.

Length Weight Cartridge Magazine

Capacity

Type of 

Action

Effective

Range

Cyclical

Rate

Velocity

35 in 6.8 lb 7.62 x 39 30 rounds Gas operated 

semi/auto 350 meters 600 rpm 2,350 ft/s

Length Weight Cartridge Magazine

Capacity

Type of 

Action

Effective

Range

Velocity

40.2 in 8.5 lb 7.62 x 39 10 rounds Gas operated 

semi/auto 400 meters 2,410 ft/s

The SKS is a 7.62mm semiautomatic rifle 

designed in 1943 for the Soviet Union. In the 

early 1950s, the Soviets replaced it with the 

AK47. The Communists used it extensively in 

Vietnam

Length Weight Cartridge Magazine

Capacity

Type of 

Action

Effective

Range

Velocity

39.9 in 9 lb 7.62 x 54 5 rounds Bolt operated 500 meters 2,838 ft/s

The M44 Mosin-Nagant is a bolt-action 

rifle developed in the late 1800s by Russian and Belgian inventors. It was used 

extensively by the Communists in Vietnam. It has a unique fluted bayonet that 

folds against the forestock when not in use.

Length Weight Cartridge Magazine

Capacity

Type of 

Action

Effective

Range

Velocity

37.4 in 7.9 lb 40mm antitank 

antipersonnel Single shot Manual 200 meters 360 ft/s

The RPG7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher is an antiarmor weapon similar to the 3.5 

Rocket (“Bazooka”) of U.S. forces. It is still 

widely used throughout the world

Small Arms of the NVA and Viet Cong

AK47

SKS

M44

RPG7

Hill of Angels | 29
Navy 

and destroyed the weapon and its ammunition. At the rear 

of the column, Company G had problems with enemy units 

following in its trace and maneuvering back and forth across 

the road. Company G killed 12 and wounded 10 of these 

soldiers. An attached scout-sniper team killed another 15. 

Shortly afterward, an enemy assault from the flank almost 

divided the company in two, but the attack failed.

Soon after Company F took its place in the column, it 

received instructions to establish a helicopter landing zone 

for evacuating casualties from Company E and Headquarters and Service Company. When the tanks carrying the dead 

and wounded reached the zone, the enemy opened fire with 

RPGs, machine guns, and 60mm and 82mm mortars. The 

mortar fire walked across the entire landing zone. In addition 

to the earlier casualties, the Marines now had another 7 men 

killed and 31 more Marines and Navy corpsmen wounded. 

A gap then developed between the rear of Headquarters 

and Service Company and Company H. The latter company 

loaded the casualties in the zone on the tanks and attacked 

to close the gap. It did so at the cost of 2 more dead and 12 

wounded by NVA mortar fire. 

Late in the afternoon, Company E and Command Group 

A managed to break through the enemy to safety, although 

they had to leave behind two Company E squads that were 

unable to move because of intense enemy automatic weapons 

and rifle fire that ultimately killed two and wounded nine 

Marines. Company E and Command Group A continued 

until they linked up at 1830 with Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, which had moved up from Con Thien. By 

this time, the other companies of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 

were no longer able to continue south. There were too many 

casualties to move through the intense enemy fire. At 1930, 

Company H drew back and established a defensive position on high ground at the edge of a clearing through which 

Route 606 passed. Joining Company H were two squads from 

Company E, two squads from Company F, and that portion 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A188379 

The lightweight O-1 Bird Dog aircraft (Marine variant OE-1) was used extensively in Vietnam by aircrews for calling in air and 

artillery missions. The Marine Corps only lost seven Bird Dogs throughout the war. The enemy clearly learned that just shooting 

at one would result in catastrophic consequences from heavier Marine aircraft. 

30 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
 Cross Citation

of Headquarters and Service Company that had not made it 

out. Company F and Command Group B consolidated into 

a hasty defense on the road north of Company H. Company 

G was farther north still, having moved only a short distance 

south from their position of the night of the twenty-eighth 

before being segmented due to strong enemy activity. It was 

an all-infantry force. The tracked vehicles, carrying some of 

the wounded, had broken through to join the lead elements 

at the position of Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, 

near Con Thien.

Company G’s movement essentially came to an end when 

it could no longer both fight and transport its wounded. By 

2100, the company was in a defensive position for the night.*

The two isolated squads from Company E were rescued early 

in the evening. Lieutenant Colonel Kent had taken operational control of Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, and 

accompanied that unit back to the two squads. They accomplished the mission by 1930, and Company M moved into a 

good defensive position for the night. 

To the south, the bulk of Company E organized its 

defenses and called in medical evacuation helicopters for the 

casualties. The remainder of the night was relatively quiet; 

many of the NVA units were pulling back. Companies G and 

F both heard much NVA shouting to their west as they called 

in artillery missions on those positions.** The final event of the 

fight occurred at 0330 when a lone NVA soldier crept up to 

Company F’s perimeter and killed one Marine and wounded 

three with a burst of automatic weapons fire. No Marines 

returned fire, and the NVA soldier withdrew.***

*As night fell, a group of about 15 Marines from Company G, including 

several casualties, was cutoff, alone, and unable to establish radio communication with the main body of the company. The author had radio communication with both elements and was able to pass conversations back and forth 

that led the small group through the darkness to the safety of the majority 

of the company. It was an exciting moment when, after about an hour of 

movement, the Marine in charge of the small group radioed the author to 

excitedly whisper, “We made it! By God, we made it!”

**The author recalls that a Sgt Houser, an artillery forward observer situated in 

the ditch with Command Group B, called in artillery missions “danger close” 

throughout the night. Many Marines said they heard the enemy screaming 

during these unusually pinpoint, accurate artillery missions. 

***This is at variance with a statement in the source document that says fire 

was returned. The author was nearby, heard the enemy fire, and found it interesting that no fire was returned. This was confirmed by an interview with 

Vernon L. “Les” Stevenson, who was in the foxhole adjacent to that of the 

Marine who was killed.

The following morning, helicopters evacuated all casualties located at Company G’s position. Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, moved north to link up with the rest of 

2d Battalion, 9th Marines. Behind a screen provided by the 

3d Battalion, Marines were able to evacuate the remaining 

casualties by 0900; all units were out of the DMZ by 1150. 

The gauntlet had been costly for 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. 

A total of 23 Marines died, and the wounded totaled 251, of 

which 191 required evacuation. Thirty-two NVA were confirmed dead, but the battalion estimated another 175 likely 

died. 

The 30th of July was a Sunday, but 2d Battalion, 9th 

Marines, had no chapel services; the battalion chaplain, Lieutenant Nelson D. Chasteen, USN, had been wounded and 

evacuated. The battalion spent the day consolidating near 

Con Thien and dealing with casualties. But the next day, a 

service was held by a lay Marine, using a Bible always carried by battalion radioman Lance Corporal R. W. Johnson. 

The service was well attended. The 2d Battalion, 9th Marines’ 

battle quickly entered the division’s lore as the “armored thrust 

Photo courtesy of Vernon L. “Les” Stevenson 

Late in the morning of 29 July 1967, LCpl Vernon L. “Les” Stevenson awaits word to move out from his overnight position 

near the deserted village of Thon Cam Son. He remains close 

to his foxhole, having already endured three mortar barrages 

and anticipating more. 

Hill of Angels | 31
into the DMZ.” Concerning the purpose for this excursion, 

Brigadier General Louis Metzger, the assistant division commander of 3d Marine Division, stated, “We wanted to prove 

to the North Vietnamese that we could enter the DMZ anytime we liked.”

For the next few weeks, only scattered, small-scale fighting took place, although intelligence analysts reported the 

probability of a major enemy offensive in the region. Division 

G-2 Intelligence observed a large buildup of supplies north of 

the DMZ and estimated at least five Communist battalions 

were preparing for offensive operations. Sighting reports of 

vehicles north of the Ben Hai increased substantially, including, for the first time, reports of armored vehicles.

The first outburst of renewed NVA ground activity in the 

Kingfisher area happened in the southwestern portion of the 

tactical area on the morning of 21 August. A North Vietnamese battalion ambushed a small Marine convoy traveling 

south on Route 9 from the Rockpile to Ca Lu. Confirmed 

Communist losses were light, but 3 Marines and 3 U.S. Army 

artillerymen died, with another 35 wounded. 

G 9

F 9

M 4

H 9

E/H&S 9

NVA

NVA

Cmd Grp B

Cmd Grp A

NVA

37+

DMZ

CON

THIEN THE TRACE

All Tracked

Vehicles

606

BEN HAI RIVER

NORTH VIETNAM

2dBattalion, 9th Marines

on Route 606 the Night of

29-30 July 1967

Miles (approx) 1 2 3

Map by author 

32 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
The North Vietnamese tried again on 7 September at 

almost the same location, but again the enemy commander miscalculated the location of Marine forces, their ability 

to maneuver, and the speed with which the Marines could 

bring supporting arms to bear. In eight hours of fighting, the 

Marines killed 92 of the enemy. American casualties totaled 

5 killed and 56 wounded.

Additional indications that the Communists remained 

determined to achieve a victory at Con Thien became evident 

during late August. To gain maximum propaganda effect, the 

North Vietnamese timed their new offensive to coincide with 

the South Vietnamese elections scheduled for 3 September. 

As the date for the elections approached, the NVA fired an 

increasing volume of artillery and rockets across the DMZ at 

Marine installations at Cua Viet, Gio Linh, and Con Thien. 

On 26 August, these also hit the large base at Dong Ha in 

three separate attacks. Some 150 rocket and artillery rounds 

destroyed 2 helicopters and damaged 24 others. The most 

effective and spectacular of these attacks took place on election day. Forty-one artillery rounds slammed into the Dong 

Ha base that morning, destroying the ammunition storage 

area and bulk fuel farm, and damaging 17 helicopters of 

HMM-361, commanded by Major Horace A. Bruce. 

During September, the North Vietnamese subjected the 

Marines on Con Thien to one of the heaviest shellings of the 

war. The hill itself was only large enough to accommodate 

a reinforced battalion. Almost daily, Con Thien’s defenders could expect at least 200 rounds of enemy artillery fire, 

and on 25 September more than 1,200 shells rained down 

upon the position. Nevertheless, the completed engineerconstructed bunkers at Con Thien provided some cover as the 

NVA artillery and rocket attacks escalated and enemy ground 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A188938 

Men of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, returning down Route 606 and through the perimeter of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, on 30 

July 1967 after fierce fighting with NVA troops within the DMZ. The vehicle in this photograph is an M274 “Mechanical Mule.” 

Mules carried everything from ammunition to casualties and were even sometimes mounted with a 106mm recoilless rifle. 

Hill of Angels | 33
activity increased. The main NVA thrust was to the south and 

southeast of Con Thien. Since the beginning of Operation 

Kingfisher, the 9th Marines had been operating in that area 

with a force varying between three and six battalions. After 

the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines’ battle in the DMZ on 29 July 

and during most of August, the level of combat was light, 

but enemy resistance began to stiffen toward the end of that 

month. 

On 4 September, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines—now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Lee R. Bendell—met strong 

opposition. At 1100 that morning, the battalion’s Company 

I, commanded by Captain Richard K. Young, engaged an 

enemy force 1,500 meters south of Con Thien. The company pressed the enemy unit, but by 1400 its advance halted 

because of the heavy volume of enemy fire. Company M and 

the battalion command group moved to the left of Company 

I and, after extensive artillery preparatory fires, struck the 

NVA flank. Moving slowly, with two tanks in support, Company M pushed through the Communist position, relieving 

the pressure on Company I. The maneuver trapped a group of 

enemy soldiers between the two Marine units, and Company 

I assaulted and overran the entrapped NVA force. The count 

of the enemy casualties at the end of the fight was 38 killed 

and 1 captured. As the battalion’s units returned to their 

perimeters near Con Thien, they endured harassing fires from 

NVA mortars and artillery. Six Marines died and 47 suffered 

wounds in the day’s action.

Three days later, Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, 

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harry L. Alderman, 

found the enemy again three miles south of Con Thien.* The 

fight lasted for five hours and resembled the battle of the 

*The 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, participated in Operation Kingfisher from 

7 to 11 September.

Photo courtesy of Joe Valento 

An 81mm mortar position near Con Thien in August 1967. These were considered to be an infantry battalion’s “hip pocket 

artillery.” 

34 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
fourth, except this time Marine tanks reinforced the infantrymen. Fifty-one NVA and 14 Marines died in this encounter.

On 10 September, Alderman’s Marines engaged what 

seemed to be the entire 812th NVA Regiment. The fight 

began in the early evening four miles southwest of Con 

Thien. Patrolling Marines spoiled a major enemy attack in 

the making. The battalion’s command chronology reflects the 

feeling and intensity of this four-hour battle:

1615H—Co [Company] M and Co K received estimated 60 rounds of 140mm rockets followed by a coordinated attack by NVA (reportedly) wearing USMC 

[U.S. Marine Corps] flak jackets and helmets. . . . 

1655H—Co I and Co L came under an extremely 

heavy assault from the north and west sides of their 

perimeter by an estimated NVA battalion. Fixed-wing 

air, which was on station, began making strikes immediately, and napalm consistently fell 50 to 75 meters 

from the friendly lines. The flame tank and gun took 

direct hits from RPGs fired from approximately 75 

meters. The flame tank was destroyed and burned the 

remainder of the night, and the gun tank was rendered 

useless and rolled into a draw. . . . The crews of both 

tanks withdrew into the perimeter. 1825H . . . the 

NVA appeared to be massing for an attack. 1905H—

An emergency resupply was attempted to Co I and Co 

L and although suppressive fires were delivered, the 

enemy fire was too intense and the helicopter could 

not land. 1905H—A flareship arrived on station. 

2030H—The enemy ground attack ceased although 

60mm mortar [rounds] were still being received by Co 

I and Co L.

The next morning, the companies searched the battlefield 

for casualties and abandoned equipment and by 1000 had 

evacuated all casualties. The Marines captured a large quantity of enemy material, including cartridge belts, packs, ammunition, and weapons. One hundred and forty enemy bodies 

lay scattered throughout the area. The 3d Battalion, 26th 

Marines’ losses totaled 34 killed and 192 wounded. Alderman called it “the hardest fighting [the battalion] encountered since arriving in Vietnam.” 

Following this fight, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, moved 

near Phu Bai to refit. As its replacement in the DMZ area, 

the division pulled 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, under the 

Photos courtesy of David Douglas Duncan 

In this series of photos, Marines on Con Thien run for cover 

from the fire of North Vietnamese 152mm guns. September 

1967 was especially brutal for Con Thien’s Marines, with at 

least 200 enemy rounds falling almost daily.

Hill of Angels | 35
command of Lieutenant Colonel James W. Hammond Jr., off 

an operation near Camp Evans and sent it north. Hammond 

later wrote: “We stopped overnight at Cam Lo and then 

went north to take the place of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 

which had been [severely] mortared in their position northwest of Con Thien.*

 We then became the roving battalion 

outside Con Thien. . . . The battalion moved every day but 

still was shelled as much, if not more than, Con Thien. The 

difference was that we had to dig new holes in every position. 

. . . We were hit pretty hard during our month-plus along the 

DMZ.”

Both sides were to shed more blood around Con Thien 

before the month ended. At 0325 on 13 September, a North 

Vietnamese company attacked the north-northeast sector of 

the perimeter of the Con Thien outpost. Even though artillery, mortars, and heavy machine guns supported the attacking force, the Communists failed to penetrate the concertina 

wire surrounding the base. They gave up and withdrew after a 

heavy pounding from the Marines’ supporting arms. 

Shortly after the attack of the thirteenth, Colonel 

Richard B. Smith, the new commanding officer of the 9th 

Marines, moved two battalions to positions near Con Thien 

from which they could react if the enemy attacked in force.**

The 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, again commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Peeler, occupied the area southeast of 

Con Thien while 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, moved to a 

position southwest of the hill. At the same time, Colonel 

Smith ordered 3d Battalion, 9th Marines—now commanded 

by Major Gorton C. Cook—to move inside the main Con 

Thien perimeter. The anticipated assault did not materialize. 

Instead, the NVA bombarded all three battalions with savage 

artillery and mortar attacks for the next seven days. Casualties were heavy. Four of them were the result of a single 

round that struck the foxhole containing Captain Frank L. 

Southard, commanding officer of Company H, 2d Battalion, 

*Enemy mortar fragments severely wounded 2d Battalion, 9th Marines’ 

commanding officer, LtCol Kent, and his executive officer, Maj Murphy. 

The author was in Maj Murphy’s foxhole with him but was not wounded 

at this time. As a result, LtCol John Peeler took over command of the battalion, having served twice as the commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 9th 

Marines, during 1967—from 1 January to 4 July and from 12 September to 

28 October.

**Col Smith, an experienced combat commander and veteran of two wars, 

assumed command of the 9th Marines from Col Jerue on 13 September, the 

day of the attack on the Con Thien outpost.

Foxhole Humor

After Lieutenant Colonel William Kent, commanding 

officer of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, and his executive 

officer, Major Dennis Murphy, were wounded on 12 September 1967, the author was detailed to operate his radio 

for 2d Battalion, 9th Marines’ replacement commanding 

officer, Lieutenant Colonel John Peeler. It was about a 

week later that the battalion was instructed to occupy 

the defensive location just southeast of Con Thien. As 

2d Battalion, 9th Marines, crossed the concertina wire 

surrounding their new position, they first noticed pieces 

of a UH-34 helicopter lying about. It was clear that the 

enemy had the position on their programmed target list. 

For seven days, the battalion remained static within that 

small perimeter and absorbed NVA rocket and artillery 

barrages. The unit’s many casualties were moved for helicopter extraction to a new landing zone that was established outside the wire. 

The evening after the enemy round landed in Captain Southard’s foxhole, Lieutenant Colonel Peeler and 

the author sat side by side, legs dangling into a foxhole, 

looking toward the north and listening for the telltale 

“bmp” sound that indicated incoming rounds were on 

their way. The author was only about three weeks from 

the date that would send him back to the states, so he was 

quite nervous. Sensing his discomfort, Lieutenant Colonel Peeler said, “Just relax, Long. If you get killed, I’ll sign 

the letter to your wife with my first name.” Peeler’s wisecrack might seem inappropriate to the uninitiated, but 

at that time and place, and under those circumstances, 

it provided comic relief that made the author feel much 

better. Such instances of finding and using the appropriate words and actions at just the right time were common 

traits of those Marines in leadership positions throughout the Battle of Con Thien. 

36 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
9th Marines; his radioman; company gunnery sergeant; and 

corpsman. The corpsman had jumped into the hole with the 

others just before the round hit. All but Southard were killed, 

and he was severely wounded.

After the immediate threat to Con Thien passed, the 

Marines there went on the offensive. On 21 September, 2d 

Battalion, 4th Marines, started a search-and-destroy operation 1,800 meters east of Con Thien. The battalion front, 

Companies E and F, moved out on line. Movement was cautious but steady, but maintaining alignment proved difficult 

in terraced terrain interspersed with hedgerows. The command group and Companies G and H were forced to stop, 

waiting for the rear elements to clear their previous position. 

As the lead elements advanced through the thick underbrush, 

maintaining visual contact became impossible. 

At 0750, Company E encountered fire from snipers. Then, 

when the company pushed forward, it came under heavy automatic weapons fire from the front and left, killing one Marine 

and wounding four. As the tempo of the battle increased, the 

Communists opened up with mortars. The Marines, now 

close to the NVA force, heard shouted orders and directions 

for a mortar crew, and the two sides soon became involved in 

a deadly grenade duel. The battalion could not call in artillery 

because of the close contact, and Company F was in no position to help. Company E slowly withdrew to a position that 

offered better cover and established a landing zone to evacuate casualties. Shortly after the engagement began, Lieutenant Colonel Hammond ordered Company G to envelop 

the left flank of the NVA position, but 150 meters of open 

ground faced the assaulting troops. The company advanced 

to within 30 meters of the objective, but withdrew in the face 

of nearby NVA small-arms, automatic weapons, and mortar 

fire. Meanwhile, Companies E and F linked up and covered 

Company G by fire as it disengaged.

It was during this action that one of Company F’s squads 

was suddenly hit by enemy small-arms and automatic weapons fire. Machine-gunner Lance Corporal Jedh C. Barker 

was among the squad’s numerous casualties. Though seriously 

Photo courtesy of Vernon L. “Les” Stevenson 

These Marines from 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, are in a defensive position southeast of Con Thien in mid-September 1967. These 

are hasty rather than prepared positions with overhead cover. Con Thien is the hilly area on the horizon of this picture.

Hill of Angels | 37
wounded, Barker continued to fight until sacrificing his life to 

save his fellow Marines by absorbing a grenade blast. Barker 

received the Medal of Honor posthumously.

The battle turned into a stalemate. The battalion needed 

tanks, but after 96 hours of rain, the approaches to the area were 

impassable. At dusk, the fighting died down, and the Marines 

pulled back to the main battalion perimeter. The NVA force 

had killed 16 Marines and wounded 118; 15 of the bodies 

remained on the battlefield until 10 October when the 2d 

Battalion, 4th Marines, returned and picked up its dead in 

a later operation in the same area. The battalion could not 

determine the total Communist casualties but reported at least 

39 NVA soldiers killed.* Intelligence officers later identified 

the enemy force as part of the 90th NVA Regiment. After the 

action of 21 September, the Communists withdrew across the 

Ben Hai River.

Persistent enemy attacks during September appeared to 

be a desperate bid for military victory, with its attendant propaganda value, before the fall monsoon hit. Failing in attacks 

from three different directions, the NVA resorted to a massive 

attack by fire against Con Thien. From 19 to 27 September, 

more than 3,000 mortar, artillery, and rocket rounds blasted the 

position. The Americans retaliated by massing one of the greatest concentrations of firepower in support of a single division in 

the history of the Vietnam War. III MAF artillery units fired 

12,577 rounds at known and suspected enemy positions in the 

region, while ships of the Seventh Fleet fired 6,148 rounds at 

the same area. Marine and Air Force fighter pilots flew more 

than 5,200 close air support sorties, and Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers of the Strategic Air Command dropped tons 

of ordnance on the enemy in and north of the DMZ. The Con 

Thien garrison praised the results. North Vietnamese pressure 

on the outpost subsided as September drew to a close. 

Although enemy activity gradually diminished at Con 

Thien, defense of the base remained a continuing ordeal. 

Marine searching and patrolling activity discovered a multitude 

of bunker and trench complexes around the hill mass, most of 

which were about 1,500 meters from the main perimeter. The 

Marines destroyed the bunkers, but they often found them 

rebuilt during subsequent patrols.

*Col Hammond remembered that MajGen Bruno A. Hochmuth said that 

G-2 put the number of enemy casualties at 350.

During early October, the Marines continued to find 

bunkers, but these were usually unoccupied. The experiences 

of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, during October typified the 

trend of activity around Con Thien during the fall of 1967. 

On 4 October, the battalion, still under the command of 

Lieutenant Colonel Hammond, conducted a sweep southwest of Con Thien in conjunction with BLT 2/3, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Englisch from SLF 

Bravo. Leaving the line of departure at 0645, the battalion 

found three NVA shelters by 0830. An hour later and 1,000 

meters farther, the Marines found several more ambush sites 

and 16 bunkers. Shortly thereafter, while skirting the southwest side of the Con Thien slope, Company H came upon 13 

additional bunkers. Similarly, Company G found abandoned 

mortar positions, loose 82mm mortar rounds, and powdercharge increments. 

Just before 1500, the unmistakable odor of decaying 

human flesh led the Marines to the partially covered graves of 

20 North Vietnamese. Backtracking, Company G discovered 

fresh enemy footprints around the previously destroyed bunkers. Tension heightened. The three companies moved back 

to the perimeter west of Con Thien, but while pulling back, 

Company G heard movement and called in artillery to cover 

their return march. The Marines observed no NVA casualties 

but had no doubt the Communists were still active. 

Several days later, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, relieved 

Englisch’s Marines as the defense force for the recently built 

bridge north of Strong Point C-2. The construction of the 

bridge, shown on military maps as “C-2A,” permitted the 

reopening of the vital road to Con Thien that the heavy September rains had washed out as Marines were crossing. At 

one spot, an M76 Otter all-terrain vehicle capsized, and a 

U.S. Navy corpsman was washed away as a result. The location 

became known as the “Washout.”** The 3d Marine Division 

was concerned that if the enemy destroyed the bridge, they 

would cut the only supply line to the Marines at Con Thien. 

**The author stood at this site with LtCol Peeler shortly after the washout 

occurred. The new road had been constructed over two large-diameter corrugated steel culverts. When the monsoon rains rushed from the western high 

ground down the dry wash, the impact was so severe that the earth holding 

the culverts was washed out and the culverts were moved from their original 

places. The author, serving as the battalion commander’s radioman at the 

time, recalls holding Peeler’s web gear as he swam to a debris-laden tree in 

the middle of the rapidly flowing river in search of the Navy corpsman who 

had washed away. The corpsman’s body was not found.

38 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Jedh Barker, who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism in Vietnam, 

was born 20 June 1945 in Franklin, New Hampshire. At the age of six, he moved with his 

parents to Park Ridge, New Jersey, where he graduated from high school in 1964. After 

graduation, he attended Fairleigh Dickinson University and then Missouri State College 

until May 1966.

On 20 June 1966, he enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. He was a member 

of the Special Volunteer Reserve, 1st Marine Corps District, New York, New York, until 

discharged to enlist in the regular Marine Corps on 5 October 1966.

After completion of recruit training at Parris Island, South Carolina, in December 1966, 

he underwent individual combat training and weapons special training with the 2d Infantry 

Training Battalion, 1st Infantry Training Regiment, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. He 

was promoted to private first class on 1 December 1966.

In March 1967, Barker joined Marine Air Base Squadron 21, Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, in San 

Francisco, California, and served as group guard until the following June.

Reassigned as a machine gunner to Company F, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, 3d Marine Division, in South Vietnam, he was 

killed in action 21 September 1967, while on patrol near Con Thien. He had been promoted to lance corporal on 1 September 1967.

Lance Corporal Jedh C. Barker

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his 

life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a 

machine gunner with Company F, Second Battalion, Fourth 

Marines, Third Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam on 21 September 1967. During a reconnaissance operation near Con Thien, Corporal Barker’s squad was suddenly 

hit by enemy sniper fire. The squad immediately deployed 

to a combat formation and advanced to a strongly fortified 

enemy position, when it was again struck by small arms 

and automatic weapons fire, sustaining numerous casualties. Although wounded by the initial burst of fire, Corporal 

Barker boldly remained in the open, delivering a devastating 

volume of accurate fire on the numerically superior force. 

The enemy was intent upon annihilating the small Marine 

force and, realizing that Corporal Barker was a threat to 

their position, directed the preponderance of their fire on 

his position. He was again wounded, this time in the right 

hand, which prevented him from operating his vitally needed 

machine gun. Suddenly, and without warning, an enemy 

grenade landed in the midst of the few surviving Marines. 

Unhesitatingly and with complete disregard for his own 

personal safety, Corporal Barker threw himself upon the 

deadly grenade, absorbing with his own body the full and 

tremendous force of the explosion. In a final act of bravery, 

he crawled to the side of a wounded comrade and administered first aid before succumbing to his grievous wounds. His 

bold initiative, intrepid fighting spirit, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of almost certain death undoubtedly 

saved his comrades from further injury or possible death and 

reflected great credit upon himself, the Marine Corps, and 

the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life 

for his country.

Medal of Honor Citation

Hill of Angels | 39
The defense of the bridge was no easy task for 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. Constant combat around Con Thien since 

2d Battalion, 4th Marines, moved north from Camp Evans 

on 11 September had worn the battalion down from a “foxhole strength” of 952 to about 462. The battalion had great 

difficulty in manning all the defensive positions prepared by 

the departed full-strength battalion landing team. The defensive position around the bridge was divided into quadrants by 

virtue of the road, which ran roughly north and south, and the 

stream, which ran east and west. Company G had the northwest quadrant. Company H was on the same side of the road 

but across the stream in the southwest quadrant. Company F 

was in the northeast, and Company E was in the southeast. 

The battalion command group set up beside the stream in 

Company G’s area and near the center of the position.*

At 0125 on 14 October, 25 artillery and rocket rounds 

and 135–150 mortar rounds hit Company H. An ambush 

squad posted in front of the company reported an enemy 

force moving toward it and immediately took the advancing 

enemy under fire. The squad leader notified his company that 

he had three casualties and that the enemy seriously outnumbered his squad. The company commander, Captain Arthur 

P. Brill Jr., ordered the squad to pull back and, at the same 

time, called for night defensive fires to block the avenues of 

approach to his position. The battalion requested an AC-47 

Puff the Magic Dragon to illuminate the area. Using starlight scopes, sniper teams watched the enemy as they massed 

only 50 meters in front of the company. The snipers and two 

tanks attached to the company opened fire, forcing the North 

Vietnamese to start their assault prematurely. The remainder of the company held fire until the NVA troops reached 

a clearing 20 meters from the perimeter wire. Of the entire 

attacking unit, only two NVA soldiers reached the wire, and 

Marines killed both as they tried to breach that obstacle. The 

enemy withdrew, leaving bodies behind, but they were far 

from finished. 

At 0230, enemy mortars shelled Company G. Direct hits 

by RPGs destroyed a machine gun emplacement and several 

backup positions on the primary avenue of approach into 

the company position. The NVA force attacked through this 

*LtGen Metzger described the defense of this bridge as an “illustration of 

how our forces were tied to defending terrain and not free to operate.”

break, overran the company command post, and killed the 

company commander—Captain Jack W. Phillips—and his 

forward observer. Three platoon leaders, two of whom had just 

arrived in Vietnam that morning, also died in the attack. The 

battalion sent its assistant operations officer, Captain James 

W. McCarter Jr., to replace Captain Phillips, but enemy fire 

killed him before he reached Company G. 

During this confused, hand-to-hand combat, some of the 

North Vietnamese fought their way within grenade range of 

the battalion command post in the center of the position. In 

the command post, Sergeant Paul H. Foster, a member of the 

fire support coordination center, continued to direct mortar 

and artillery fire upon the enemy even though he had been 

wounded by a grenade. When another grenade landed among 

a group of Marines, Sergeant Foster threw his flak jacket over 

the grenade and jumped on top of the jacket. The grenade 

blast mortally wounded him, but this action saved his fellow 

Marines. Sergeant Foster subsequently received a posthumous Medal of Honor. 

Before the melee ended, the North Vietnamese killed or 

wounded the entire forward air control team. The enemy also 

killed the battalion medical chief and wounded the fire support coordinator, headquarters commandant, and battalion 

sergeant major. Lieutenant Colonel Hammond moved what 

was left of his command group to a better location within 

Company H’s position. He ordered Company F to move 

to Company G’s right flank and counterattack to push the 

NVA forces out of the perimeter. Illumination and automatic 

weapons fire from the AC-47, requested at the beginning of 

the fight, arrived about 0330 and aided the counterattack. By 

0430, the enemy, pursued by Company E, began retreating 

from the position.

The next morning the battalion reconsolidated and evacuated casualties. A total of 21 dead, including 5 officers, and 23 

wounded were the night’s toll. The NVA lost at least 24 killed. 

That afternoon, Lieutenant General Robert Cushman and 

Major General Bruno A. Hochmuth visited the bridge site. 

They granted a request from Lieutenant Colonel Hammond 

that the new bridge be named “Bastard’s Bridge” to honor the 

21 Marines of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, the “Magnificent 

40 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Bastards,” who gave their lives in its defense.*

 At 1400, Hammond’s battalion turned over the bridge to Lieutenant Colonel Needham’s 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, and then moved to 

Dong Ha, where it assumed the mission of regimental reserve 

after 42 days of close combat.

The last major action of Operation Kingfisher took place 

during a 9th Marines operation on 25–28 October. By this 

time 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (minus Company G, which 

was attached to 3d Battalion, 4th Marines), had moved to 

Cam Lo to take part in the operation. The 1st Battalion, 9th 

Marines, was on Con Thien, and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 

was at the C-2 Bridge. The regimental order directed 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, to sweep north on the west side of Route 

561 while the other two battalions provided blocking forces. 

At 0600 on the twenty-fifth, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, 

began its sweep. Lieutenant Colonel Hammond planned to 

move his understrength battalion all day to reach the objective before dark. There was no enemy contact, but heavy brush 

slowed the move. 

As darkness approached, the battalion was still about 

1,000 meters from the objective. Hammond decided to halt 

the battalion and request additional ammunition before darkness. His decision was prudent, given the nature of the enemy 

in the DMZ region and the recent combat losses that had 

reduced his entire battalion to just over 400 men. Additional 

ammunition could partially compensate for the loss of firepower resulting from personnel shortages and the absence of 

Company G. In actuality, his battalion was only a little larger 

than a standard reinforced rifle company. The resupply helicopters would give away the battalion’s location, of course, but 

he took the risk that his command could receive its additional 

ammunition and move on to the objective before the enemy 

responded.

Helicopters were in short supply at this time, following the grounding of all Boeing CH-46 Sea Knights after a 

series of accidents. III MAF by necessity reserved the available helicopters for meeting emergency requests from units 

*The nickname “Magnificent Bastards” has been claimed by 2d Battalion, 4th 

Marines, for many years. Tradition traces the nickname to World War II; 

however, the Marine Corps History Division has no evidence to substantiate 

the claim. It appears likely that the battalion borrowed the phrase from The 

Magnificent Bastards by Lucy Herndon Crockett (1953), which is a fictionalized account of Marines in the South Pacific in World War II.

in the field. Hammond ordered an “emergency resupply” of 

ammunition. His calculated risk failed. The resupply helicopters did not bring everything he ordered but, worse, delivered 

significant quantities and types of ammunition that the battalion had not ordered, including three pallets of barbed wire. 

There was more materiel than 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, 

could use or move. The battalion would have to spend the 

night in place and try to get the excess ammunition flown out 

the next morning. 

Unfortunately, the helicopters had revealed the Marines’ 

position to the enemy. The North Vietnamese hit the battalion’s perimeter about 2330 with 10 rocket or artillery rounds. 

The battalion executive officer, Major John J. Lawendowski, 

died, and Lieutenant Colonel Hammond and two others 

required evacuation for wounds. Lieutenant Colonel Frankie 

E. Allgood, the newly promoted executive officer of HMM363, landed his Sikorsky UH-34D Seahorse at the battalion 

command post and flew the casualties to Dong Ha. Captain 

Arthur P. Brill Jr., who had moved up the previous day from 

commanding Company H to become the battalion operations officer, took command of the battalion.

Upon learning that Lieutenant Colonel Hammond and 

Major Lawendowski were casualties, Colonel Smith, commanding the 9th Marines, decided to send an officer to take 

temporary command of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. The obvious choice was right at hand. Lieutenant Colonel John Studt, 

the regimental operations officer, knew the details of the current operation; he had drafted the regimental order implementing the division’s directive for the operation. Smith sent 

Studt to the Dong Ha airfield to catch a helicopter to 2d 

Battalion, 4th Marines’ position.

Lieutenant Colonel Studt reached the airfield shortly 

after medical personnel removed 2d Battalion, 4th Marines’ 

casualties from Lieutenant Colonel Allgood’s helicopter. 

Studt explained his mission, and the two officers discussed 

the chances of success in reaching the battalion safely. Having 

had great difficulty in evacuating the four casualties, Allgood 

advised Studt that he was not sure he could make it into the 

battalion’s position. He also pointed out that fog was increasing throughout the whole area. Both officers decided, however, that the situation required that the flight be attempted. 

Studt climbed into the passenger compartment of the helicopter, which, he noted, still had fresh blood on the floor. 

Hill of Angels | 41
Paul Foster, who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism in Vietnam, was born 17 April 1939 in San Mateo, California. He attended elementary and high 

schools there and was a member of the varsity football and track teams. After graduating 

from high school in 1957, he went to work as an automobile mechanic helper.

He enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve on 4 November 1961, in San Francisco, 

California, and received recruit training in San Diego, California, and individual combat 

training with the 2d Infantry Training Regiment at Camp Pendleton, California.

After completion of combat training in March 1962, he joined the 5th 105mm Howitzer Battery (later redesignated Headquarters Battery, 14th Marines, 4th Marine Division), 

a Reserve unit, at Treasure Island near San Francisco. While on inactive duty, he was promoted to private first class in March 1963, to lance corporal in August 1963, to corporal in 

April 1964, and to sergeant on 1 February 1966.

Called to active duty in November 1966, Sergeant Foster embarked for Vietnam and joined Company H, 3d Battalion, 

12th Marines, 3d Marine Division, in December. While serving as an artillery liaison operations chief with the 2d Battalion, 

4th Marines, 3d Marine Division, near Con Thien, Sergeant Foster was mortally wounded on 14 October 1967 when he threw 

himself upon a hand grenade to save the lives of his five comrades.

Sergeant Paul H. Foster

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his 

life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as an 

Artillery Liaison Operations Chief with the Second Battalion, 

Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division, near Con Thien in 

the Republic of Vietnam. In the early morning hours of 14 

October 1967, the Second Battalion was occupying a defensive 

position which protected a bridge on the road leading from 

Con Thien to Cam Lo. Suddenly, the Marines’ position came 

under a heavy volume of mortar and artillery fire, followed by 

an aggressive enemy ground assault. In the ensuing engagement, the hostile force penetrated the perimeter and brought 

a heavy concentration of small arms, automatic weapons, and 

rocket fire to bear on the Battalion Command Post. Although 

his position in the Fire Support Coordination Center was 

dangerously exposed to enemy fire and he was wounded when 

an enemy hand grenade exploded near his position, Sergeant 

Foster resolutely continued to direct accurate mortar and artillery fire on the advancing North Vietnamese troops. As the 

attack continued, a hand grenade landed in the midst of Sergeant Foster and his five companions. Realizing the danger, he 

shouted a warning, threw his armored vest over the grenade, 

and unhesitatingly placed his own body over the armored vest. 

When the grenade exploded, Sergeant Foster absorbed the 

entire blast with his own body and was mortally wounded. His 

heroic actions undoubtedly saved his comrades from further 

injury or possible death. Sergeant Foster’s courage, extraordinary heroism, and unfaltering devotion to duty reflected 

great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld 

the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He 

gallantly gave his life for his country. 

Medal of Honor Citation

42 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Allgood lifted off from the airfield and managed to land the 

UH-34D inside the battalion perimeter around 0300 on the 

twenty-sixth.

Lieutenant Colonel Studt immediately climbed into 

Captain Brill’s foxhole to get an appraisal of 2d Battalion, 

4th Marines’ situation. The first thing that struck him was 

the gaps in the battalion staff. Each time he asked about a 

key staff position, Brill reported that the respective officer 

was either a casualty in some hospital or that a new officer 

was filling the position. The battalion had been ground down 

during a month and a half of heavy fighting.

Released back to the battalion’s control, Company G 

arrived at the defensive perimeter the following morning. The 

additional strength was welcome since Studt had learned he 

would have to leave one company behind to guard the pile 

of excess ammunition. Due to other commitments, the regiment reported, there were no helicopters available to move 

it. “I could not help but note,” wrote Studt, “that this, shortsighted policy resulted in [III MAF] providing a number of 

helicopters for emergency medevacs, which might not have 

been necessary had they been a little more flexible and appreciative of the tactical situation on this operation.”

Leaving Company F to guard the ammunition, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, moved toward its objective and occupied 

it by 1300. Shortly afterward, enemy 60mm mortars hit the 

battalion as it organized its defenses. One hour later, the NVA 

struck with a heavy mortar barrage, followed by small-arms 

fire from the west and northwest. The Marines began taking 

casualties and requested a helicopter medevac. In an effort to 

pick up some of the casualties, Captain Ronald D. Bennett of 

HMM-363 attempted to land his UH-34D within the battalion perimeter. Those on the ground waved him off because 

of intense enemy fire. 

As Bennett pulled away, enemy fire hit the rear of the helicopter, separating the tail pylon. The aircraft crashed, rolled 

and began burning about 150 meters outside the Marine 

lines. Captain Bennett and a gunner, Corporal Edward Clem, 

died in the crash. Second Lieutenant Vernon J. Sharpless and 

Lance Corporal Howard J. Cones, both seriously injured, 

managed to crawl from the burning wreckage. A second helicopter from HMM-363, piloted by Captain Frank T. Grassi, 

tried to land to pick up the survivors, but could not. Enemy 

fire hit Grassi in the leg and arm, damaged the helicopter, and 

slightly wounded one of the gunners and a hospital corpsman. The aircraft limped away as far as Strong Point C-2, 

where it made a forced landing.

Captain James E. Murphy—the air liaison officer for 2d 

Battalion, 4th Marines, who had been calling in air strikes 

Photo courtesy of Vernon L. “Les” Stevenson 

The CH-46 Sea Knight (often called a “Frog” because of its appearance) is one of the most durable aircraft in the Marine Corps 

inventory. It can lift 10,000 pounds or carry a squad of fully equipped troops. 

Hill of Angels | 43
in front of Company E—saw Bennett’s helicopter go down. 

With his radio still on his back, Murphy crawled out to the 

downed Seahorse, moving past NVA soldiers in his path. 

He found the two survivors near the burning helicopter. The 

three Marines were surrounded, and there was no way Captain Murphy could get them back to Marine lines. Fortunately, the enemy soldiers in the area either did not know the 

three men were there or simply did not care. 

Murphy, however, could hear NVA soldiers nearby and 

could see some movement. He called in air strikes within 50 

meters of the crashed helicopter with the aid of an airborne 

observer in an O-1C Bird Dog overhead. Working together, 

the two eventually managed to direct a Marine A-4 attack 

aircraft to deliver a line of smoke so that a helicopter could 

land and rescue the three Marines. The rescue helicopter was 

a UH-1C from the U.S. Army’s 190th Helicopter Assault 

Company whose pilot volunteered to make the pickup. 

Enemy fire hit the aircraft twice during the rescue, and the 

pilot suffered a minor wound in the arm. The helicopter also 

managed to reach Strong Point C-2 where it, too, made a 

forced landing.

Lieutenant Colonel Studt’s observation during his short 

period of command convinced him of the need for reinforcements. At his request, the 9th Marines ordered 3d Battalion, 

3d Marines, at C-2 Bridge to send two companies and a small 

command group to 2d Battalion, 4th Marines’ position. Company F still occupied its exposed position, and Studt decided 

to move it within the battalion perimeter. He directed the 

company to have its attached engineers blow up the excess 

ammunition, but they were unable to do so for unknown reasons. After several hours of fruitless attempts by the engineers, he told the company to leave the ammunition and join 

the rest of the battalion. The battalion had direct observation 

of the ammunition pile and would cover it by fire. 

Company F reached the perimeter near dusk. The two 

companies from 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, arrived at about 

the same time. With these reinforcements, 2d Battalion, 4th 

Marines, was ready that evening for any NVA attacks. In a 

later interview, Studt recounted the night’s subsequent events: 

From before dusk . . . until almost 0200 in the morning, we were under almost continuous attacks by both 

direct and indirect fire, and our perimeter was hit 

Photo courtesy of Vernon L. “Les” Stevenson 

This UH-34D Seahorse prepares to lift off from Camp Evans for a resupply mission to Marines in the field in May 1967. Throughout the Vietnam War, Marine pilots flying “34s” delivered troops and equipment to the field and retrieved casualties, often under 

the most difficult and dangerous of conditions. 

44 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
again and again by ground attacks. . . . The wounded 

were being accumulated in the vicinity of my [command post], which consisted of foxholes, and their suffering was a cause of anguish. After several attempts 

to medevac them by helicopter were aborted due to 

intense enemy fire, we came up with the plan that on 

signal every man on the perimeter would open fire on 

known or suspected enemy positions . . . for a few minutes with an intense volume of fire. During this brief 

period, a volunteer pilot . . . succeeded in zipping into 

the zone and removing our emergency medevacs. 

The trick probably would not have worked again.

Ground attacks ceased around 0200 on the twentyseventh, but the Marines heard enemy movement for the rest 

of the night as the North Vietnamese removed their dead and 

wounded. Dawn revealed 19 enemy bodies within, or in sight 

of, the Marine positions. Lieutenant Colonel Studt decided 

not to send anyone to sweep the area since any movement still 

drew enemy artillery and mortar fire. The enemy completed 

its departure by dawn. On orders from the 9th Marines, the 

battalion made a tactical withdrawal. Still harassed by enemy 

rocket and mortar fire and carrying the remainder of its dead 

and wounded, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, moved by echelon 

to Strong Point C-2 and then to Cam Lo. 

During the period 25–27 October, 2d Battalion, 4th 

Marines, lost 8 dead and 45 wounded, giving the battalion 

an effective strength of around 300 Marines. Known NVA 

casualties were the 19 bodies counted by the battalion on 

27 October. The battalion moved back to Dong Ha on the 

twenty-eighth and resumed its role as the regimental reserve. 

Lieutenant Colonel William Wiese took command of the 

battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel Studt returned to his 

duties at the 9th Marines’ command post. That day a message from Lieutenant General Cushman arrived, the last line 

of which read, “2/4 [2d Battalion, 4th Marines] has met and 

beaten the best the enemy had to offer. Well done.” Kingfisher resulted in 1,117 enemy killed and 5 captured. Marine 

casualties totaled 340 killed and 1,461 wounded. General 

Westmoreland described the operation as a “crushing defeat” 

of the enemy.

The Con Thien area remained a grim place. The constant 

danger of artillery, rocket, and mortar fire; the massed infantry assaults; and the depressing, ever-present drizzle and mud 

combined to make life miserable for the Marines there. Neuropsychiatric or “shell shock” casualties, relatively unheard of 

elsewhere in South Vietnam, were not unusual. Duty on and 

around the ravaged hill mass was referred to by all Marines as 

their “turn in the barrel” or the “Meat Grinder.” 

By the end of 1967, the DMZ front symbolized the 

frustrations of the American war in Vietnam. The bloody 

battle for the outlying hills surrounding Khe Sanh in April, 

and later the struggle for Con Thien, highlighted the fighting for the year. As casualty figures mounted on both sides, 

senior commanders voiced their concern. At the height of the 

fierce contest for Con Thien, Lieutenant General Victor H. 

“Brute” Krulak—the commanding general of Fleet Marine 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A193030 

Men of the 9th Marines wait out a North Vietnamese rocket 

and artillery attack against the outpost at Con Thien in late 

1967.

Hill of Angels | 45
Force, Pacific—observed that the Marines had suffered 956 

casualties in September, and for the year, nearly 5,000 dead 

and wounded in the DMZ alone. Both General Krulak and 

Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, USN—the commander in chief 

of Pacific Command—concluded that such a rate could not 

be sustained and that “the operational benefits now being 

achieved in the area . . . are not consistent with the losses 

incurred.”

As early as July, General Krulak had warned about the 

disadvantages of waging the war in the DMZ sector. He 

told American commanders that they must face “the brutal 

facts” that the Marines were “under the enemy’s guns.” Krulak 

believed the enemy’s purpose was “to get us as near to his 

weapons and to his forces as possible, drench us with high 

angle fire weapons, engage us in close and violent combat, 

accept willingly a substantial loss of life for the opportunity 

to kill a lesser number of our men, and to withdraw into his 

North Vietnam sanctuary to refurbish.” At III MAF headquarters, General Cushman made adjustments to reinforce 

the northern battlefield. 

Kentucky

Kentucky was the name given to one of five geographical 

areas of responsibility designated within northern I Corps on 

1 November 1967, the day after Operation Kingfisher ended. 

Kentucky encompassed the eastern portion of the old Kingfisher tactical area of responsibility and incorporated most of 

the eastern strongpoint system. Assigned to the 9th Marines, 

Kentucky’s tactical area included the strongpoint at Con 

Thien and the C-2 and C-3 Combat Operating Bases, along 

with the C-2A Bridge at the Washout and C-3A Bridge 

over the Cam Lo River. Other operational areas were named 

Napoleon, Osceola, Lancaster, and Scotland. The artillery of 

the 12th Marines supported all of these operational areas.*

The 9th Marines was no stranger to the Kentucky area 

of operations. For all practical purposes, the change of designation served only to provide a convenient dividing line to 

measure the relative progress of the DMZ campaign with 

the body-count yardstick. The identical concept of operations 

*LtGen Metzger noted that the operational names had little significance for 

the Marines who were there: “It was all one big battle. For most of us, one 

so-called operation looked just like another.”

continued in effect: the 9th Marines was to hold on to Leatherneck Square, protect Dong Ha, build the barrier, and throw 

back any North Vietnamese forces attempting to infiltrate 

through the Con Thien area into the I Corps coastal plain.

On 10 November 1967, BLT 1/3 celebrated the 192d 

birthday of the Marine Corps with an early morning move 

northward from Cam Lo to attack positions less than two 

kilometers east of Con Thien. With the 1st Battalion, 1st 

Marines—comprising only two companies and a command 

group—on its right, they moved out the next morning. The 

battalion landing team’s mission involved making a sweep 

from east to west around the northern face of the Con Thien 

base. The 9th Marines conceived the operation as a spoiling attack to disrupt suspected Communist concentrations 

around Con Thien.

The Kentucky planners were right; at 0830 on the eleventh, Company D hit an enemy platoon from the east, the 

blind side of the well-dug-in and concealed Communist position. The Marines forced the surprised NVA to fight; seven 

NVA died. That afternoon, Company D hit another dug-in 

enemy unit. This one suffered a similar fate; six more NVA 

soldiers died. One survivor, a squad leader, told his captors 

that his battalion had been in the Con Thien area for about 

a month. Apparently, operations in Kentucky, with excellent 

timing, upset Communist plans for Con Thien.

Although the action in the DMZ sector abated somewhat 

during October and November 1967, the situation was again 

tense by the end of the year. Just before Thanksgiving, General 

Krulak alerted General Cushman that the enemy was once 

more moving men and materiel into the DMZ, improving 

NVA artillery, and “preparing the battlefield.” At USMACV 

headquarters, General Westmoreland expressed his concern 

in early December about the enemy buildup. He believed that 

the next enemy move would be in the northern provinces of 

Quang Tri and Thua Thien. Therefore, on 16 December, he 

directed that I Corps receive priority on the B-52 bombing 

strikes for the next 30 days. At the same time, he ordered 

the immediate preparation of contingency plans to reinforce 

III MAF with Army troops and the development of logistic 

facilities to accommodate the forces.

In January 1968, Colonel Richard B. Smith, who had 

assumed command of the 9th Marines the previous September, controlled four infantry battalions and two companies 

46 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
from 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, from his command post 

at Dong Ha. Except for the companies of 2d Battalion, 

9th Marines, all of the other battalions belonged administratively to other regiments: the 1st, 3d, and 4th Marines. 

The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines—commanded by Lieutenant 

Colonel Evan L. Parker Jr.—moved to Con Thien in midDecember and took over its defense. A 1st Marine Division 

unit—2d Battalion, 1st Marines—quickly learned the differences between the DMZ war and the pacification campaign 

in which the 1st Marine Division had been involved farther 

south. In contrast to the lightly armed and elusive Viet Cong 

guerrillas, the North Vietnamese often stood their ground, 

supported by heavy machine guns, mortars, and artillery. By 

the time 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, occupied Con Thien, it 

had adjusted to the DMZ environment.

The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, worked on Con Thien’s 

SPOS fortifications with three companies; 3d Battalion, 

4th Marines, screened Con Thien from positions on Hill 28, 

north of the Trace; and 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, occupied 

the C-2 Combat Operating Base and C-2A Bridge at the 

Washout on Route 561. In December, just before Christmas, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, had moved from positions 

GIO

LINH

DMZ

BEN HAI

RIVER

CAM LO

RIVER

CUA VIET

RIVER

DONG HA

Miles (approx)

C-2

C-3

C-2A

KENTUCKY

9

1

LANCASTER

NAPOLEON

A-1

A-3

CAM LO

C-3A

2 4

606

561

N

CON 

THIEN

THE TRACE

Map by author 

The Kentucky area of operations from 1 November 1967 to late February 1968.

Hill of Angels | 47
north of A-3 in the Kentucky area to Camp Carroll in the 3d 

Marines’ Lancaster area of operations. A few days later, executive officer Major Dennis Murphy took Companies F and 

G back to Kentucky and relieved 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 

at Cam Lo. Company F occupied the C-3 Cam Lo artillery 

position 1,000 meters above the Cam Lo River on Route 561, 

while Company G protected the Cam Lo Bridge (C-3A) at 

the river near Route 9. 

A seagoing Marine during World War II and an infantry company commander during the Korean War, Colonel 

Smith had definite ideas about the war in the DMZ. He later 

observed that the Marines were “sitting in defensive positions 

up there playing strictly defensive combat.” Smith believed 

that the troops required training in defensive warfare. He 

claimed that was an unpopular viewpoint because “Marines 

are always supposed to be in an assault over a beach, but this 

just isn’t the name of the game out there.” The emphasis was 

on good defensive positions and clear lines of fire.*

With the command interest in the SPOS at the beginning of the year, the strongpoints and combat operating bases 

in the 9th Marines’ sector took on even more importance. 

Anchoring the western segment of the cleared Trace, the 

strongpoint at Con Thien continued to play a major role in 

the regiment’s defensive plan.** Major General Rathvon M. 

Tompkins, commanding the 3d Marine Division, concluded: 

“Dye Marker was a bete noire that influenced almost everything we did and they wouldn’t let us off the hook. . . . The 

3d Division was responsible for Dye Marker and if we were 

responsible for Dye Marker . . . then we had to have Carroll, 

we had to have Ca Lu, we had to have Con Thien, we had 

to have Khe Sanh. These are all part of this bloody thing. . . . 

It had a great deal to do with the 3d Division being tied to 

static posts.”

*Some officers who served with the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, attached to the 

9th Marines dispute whether there were standing operating procedures that 

restricted patrolling. A former company executive officer recalled that there 

were definite limitations on how far platoons and companies could move 

from their parent unit: 250 yards for platoons and 500 yards for companies. 

On the other hand, a former battalion commander and company commander 

with the 3d Battalion recalled no such limitations. No listing of such restrictions was found in the 9th Marines’ command chronology for January 1968. 

The consensus seems to be that if there were such restrictions, they were not 

always enforced and perhaps not even known.

**LtGen Metzger observed that Con Thien and Gio Linh had been French 

forts, which indicated that both sites were recognized very early as key terrain.

Throughout December, the Marines of 2d Battalion, 1st 

Marines, worked feverishly on Con Thien’s SPOS defenses. 

During the Christmas truce period, the battalion added 

11 bunkers and dug a new trench along the forward slope. 

Troops then sandbagged the bunkers with a “burster” layer 

in the roofs, usually consisting of airfield matting “to burst 

delayed fuse rounds.” They then covered the positions with 

rubberized tarps to keep the water out. By the end of the 

year, all of the new bunkers had been sandbagged and wired 

in with the new razor-sharp concertina wire. Protected by a 

minefield to its front, surrounded by wire, and supported by 

air, artillery, and tanks, the battalion lay relatively secure in its 

defenses at the exposed Con Thien outpost.

Over the 1968 New Year’s night, the Marines of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, on Con Thien enjoyed a small reprieve 

from the shooting war as both sides more or less adhered to 

the terms of a shaky New Year holiday truce, despite a small 

enemy probe of a Marine listening post on the perimeter. 

According to a Marine reporter, on New Year’s Day a Marine 

forward artillery observer at Con Thien, looking through his 

binoculars at enemy forward positions across the Ben Hai 

River, suddenly spotted a large NVA flag with its single 

star emblazoned on a bright red background waving “in the 

breeze atop a rather crude flagpole.” Other Marines, mostly 

young infantrymen, crowded around to take their turn to see 

for what most of them was their first tangible symbol of the 

enemy. Secure in their conviction that the Marines would 

adhere to the cease-fire, the NVA deliberately taunted the 

American troops. 

Impatiently, the Marine gunners waited the few hours for 

the “false peace” to come to an end. As the time for the truce 

expired, the Con Thien guns opened up on the approaches 

to the defensive perimeter. The defenders then plotted a fire 

mission to take out the flag. Minutes before the artillerymen 

fired the first round, the NVA hauled down their colors. In 

a way, this incident mirrored many of the frustrations of the 

Marines in the DMZ. The average 19-year-old manning the 

defenses at Con Thien and his commanders had difficulty 

understanding the validity of such artificialities as DMZs 

that were militarized and cease-fires that appeared only to 

benefit the enemy. 

The war soon resumed for 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. 

Although the intensity of combat around Con Thien never 

48 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
reached the level of September and October 1967, the North 

Vietnamese persisted in their probes and occasional bombardment of the Marine outpost. The battalion’s monthly 

report said that “[the] . . . incoming was more harassing than 

destructive in nature.” On 5 January 1968, the NVA gunners 

shelled Con Thien in groups of three to five bursts between 

0945 and 1015. A total of 37 rounds, including five 120mm 

shells, fell on the Marine positions, with a direct hit on the 

battalion command post. This act resulted in one Marine 

killed, and eight wounded, including Lieutenant Colonel 

Parker, the battalion commander. Both Marine air and artillery attacked the suspected enemy firing positions, but the 

Marine command had no way of knowing the effectiveness of 

these efforts. After Parker’s medical evacuation, Major James 

T. Harrell III, the executive officer, was named acting commander of the battalion. On 9 January, Lieutenant Colonel 

Billy R. Duncan officially relieved Lieutenant Colonel Parker 

as battalion commander, and Major Harrell resumed his 

duties as executive officer. The enemy shelling of Con Thien 

remained sporadic, averaging about 30 rounds on those days 

the NVA chose to fire.*

On the ground, the North Vietnamese had taken advantage of the holiday truce period to bring up fresh units and 

to continue the pressure on the Marine outpost. The 803d 

NVA Regiment relieved the 90th NVA in the positions facing 

Con Thien. Almost daily, small patrols from the 803d tested 

Marine defenses. For example, on 10 January, Company H 

reported in the early morning hours that “it had spotted three 

men, by starlight scope, moving in a westerly direction.” The 

Marines fired three M79 grenade rounds and later checked 

the area “with negative results.” Later, about 2100, a Marine 

squad from Company F on the northeastern perimeter picked 

up enemy movement on its radar scope and called in a mortar 

mission. A platoon-size Marine patrol that went to investigate the results of the action blundered into a minefield and 

sustained three casualties—one dead and two wounded.

A few days after this incident, on the night of 14 January, Con Thien Marines heard an explosion in the minefield 

directly to the north of their defenses. The Marines fired illumination rounds and saw a wounded NVA soldier lying in 

the minefield and other North Vietnamese troops withdrawing. A Marine squad equipped with a starlight scope then 

attempted to recover the wounded man. By the time it reached 

the area, the Marines found no one there. Shortly afterward, a 

Marine outpost sighted four or five NVA entering the battalion’s perimeter, apparently to retrieve their injured comrade. 

Another mine went off. Lieutenant Colonel Duncan sent a 

platoon out to check for any enemy casualties. About 0120 on 

the fifteenth, the Marine patrol “heard whistling and a great 

deal of noise,” evidence of a large enemy force nearby. Both 

sides withdrew under covering fires. The NVA used recoilless rifles, small arms, and 60mm mortars to make good their 

retreat while Marine artillery and mortars targeted the enemy 

escape routes. Two Marines received minor wounds. About 

1000, another Marine patrol returned to the area where the 

enemy was last seen and found a pick, a wrench, and a poncho 

with shrapnel holes and large bloodstains.

*During January, the enemy fired on Con Thien 22 of the 31 days in the month.

Illustration by LtCol H. Avery Chenoweth, USMCR 

Charlie Company’s Command Post at Con Thien, Quang Tri 

Province, South Vietnam. 

Hill of Angels | 49
Defense Department (Marine Corps) A421910

Artillerymen of 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, at Con Thien fire a 105mm howitzer mission of high explosive and white 

phosporous rounds into the DMZ. The ammunition, used around the clock by Con Thien Marines, was airlifted in by 

helicopters of the 1st MAW. 

50 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Like the units before them, the Marines of 2d Battalion, 

1st Marines, had their time “in the barrel” during their tour 

at Con Thien. As Lieutenant Colonel Duncan recalled many 

years later, the North Vietnamese artillery had destroyed 

much of the northwest minefield protecting the Marine outpost “as well as the forward trenches and bunkers in that area. 

Casualties were mounting. The hospital bunkers exceeded 

capacity with wounded on stretchers.” The battalion commander remembered that one of the chaplains “broke under 

stress and attempted suicide.”

In January 1968, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Deptula, occupied 

both the C-2 and C-2A positions, having just relieved 3d 

Battalion, 4th Marines, in the sector. Deptula established his 

command post at C-2 with Companies A and B. His executive officer, Major John I. Hopkins, formed a second command group and with Companies C and D held the C-2A 

Bridge over the Washout. 

Throughout the first weeks of the month, the battalion 

ran numerous squad- and platoon-size combat patrols from 

both C-2 and C-2A for distances of 1,500 meters from each 

of the bases and from Route 561. The most significant action 

in the battalion’s area of operations involved a small patrol 

from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, which came across 

three NVA in a palm-covered harbor site, about 3,000 meters 

east of C-2, on 10 January. The reconnaissance Marines killed 

two of the enemy, took one prisoner, and captured all three of 

their weapons.

As part of the barrier system, the central effort at C-2 

in early January was the completion of the bunker defenses. 

Several support units, including engineers, artillery, tank, and 

antitank detachments, shared the base area with 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. Although the engineers ran daily mine 

sweeps along Routes 561and 606 to Con Thien to keep the 

road open, they, along with all the tenant units, assisted with 

the construction effort. On 10 January, a Dye Marker team 

visited the C-2 site to inspect the defenses. According to the 

battalion’s monthly chronology, “None of the bunkers could 

be considered complete. Maximum effort was later directed 

at bunker completion in keeping with the tactical situation.” Colonel Smith later explained some of the handicaps 

under which the Marine units worked in getting the barrier 

completed. Few of the units had “backhoes” to assist in digging foxholes or bunker foundations. He observed that the 

machines could “do in two hours what it takes a whole battalion to do in two days.” Despite scarcity of equipment, Smith 

also partially blamed Marine training for not teaching the 

troops “proper bunkering procedures-sandbagging.” He compared sandbagging technique to laying out bricks “with headers and stretchers.” He remarked that he saw more wasted 

effort with the sandbags “because the man doesn’t know what 

he is doing and the [noncommissioned officer] supervising 

him doesn’t know any more about it than he does, so the wall 

gets to be six-feet high and collapses . . . and there goes three 

days’ work gone to hell.” Overcoming limitations imposed 

by its own inexperience in constructing bunkers and the lack 

of heavy earthmoving equipment, they would complete 47 of 

the scheduled 81 bunkers in the C-2 base site by the end of 

January. 

In the Cam Lo sector, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, ran 

patrols to keep the main supply route open to the farming 

villages above the Cam Lo River and Con Thien. At the C-3 

base, Company F, together with supporting artillery and 

engineers, worked on the improvement of the Dye Marker 

defenses. On 15 January, the Marines at C-3 completed the 

Photo courtesy of John Holguin 

C-2A Bridge in December 1967 when defended by 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. The road toward the horizon led to Con 

Thien.

Hill of Angels | 51
bunker requirements on schedule. During this period, Marine 

patrols encountered few enemy troops.

Meanwhile, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines—under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Lee R. Bendell—moved from 

C-2 to Hill 28 near Strong Point A-3, about three miles east 

of Con Thien and adjacent to the Trace, just inside the eastern boundary of the Kentucky area of operations. Bendell 

expanded his battalion’s perimeter and moved his companies 

off the top of the hill to new positions lower down. Marine 

engineers bulldozed the growth and trees immediately to 

the west, an action that provided the battalion with better 

observation of the surrounding terrain and improved fields of 

fire. Low rolling hills with secondary scrub and thick brush, 

broken by flat, wet rice paddies of 75 to 150 meters, lay to 

the north and east. Wide rice paddies also were interspersed 

with the woods to the west. To the south, the Marines had a 

clear line of sight to Strong Point A-3 and the Trace, which 

marked the battalion’s southern boundary. The northern 

boundary extended to the southern edge of the DMZ, less 

than 1,000 meters from Hill 28.

Close to the DMZ and with elements of the 90th NVA 

Regiment believed to be in his sector, Lieutenant Colonel 

Bendell insisted on particular alertness. He deployed his unit 

into a three-company perimeter, leaving one company in 

reserve. He used the reserve company for night ambushes and 

listening posts and as a reaction force during the day. According to the battalion commander, he maintained four to six 

ambushes and listening posts on any particular night. During 

the day, the battalion patrolled constantly with as many as 

two companies out at a time. Bendell reinforced the infantry 

companies with four 106mm recoilless rifles, two .50-caliber 

machine guns, and six of the battalion’s 81mm mortars. He 

had left the two remaining mortars back in the base camp 

so that the extra men from the 81mm mortar platoon could 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A421698 

This F-4 Phantom II took off from Da Nang fully loaded with high explosive bombs. Marines engaged in ground combat greatly 

appreciated the expertise F-4 pilots showed in providing close air support when called. 

52 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
“hump . . . additional ammo, if we had to move out.” The 

2d Battalion, 12th Marines, provided direct artillery support, 

and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing supplied close air support.

The “Thundering Third,” as 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, 

called itself, was no stranger to the DMZ war. It had been at 

Con Thien from July through early September 1967 during 

some of the heaviest fighting and bombardment around 

that strongpoint. Lieutenant Colonel Bendell, who had 

assumed command that July, remembered that the battalion 

“had actively patrolled the surrounding area” that summer 

and helped establish the strongpoints at C-2 and the C-2A 

Bridge and C-3 and the Cam Lo Bridge (C-3A), and also 

deployed a detachment to Gio Linh.

Soon after 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, arrived on Hill 28, 

it found itself again engaged with the enemy. On the morning of 30 December, Company M—commanded by Captain 

Raymond W. Kalm Jr.—was on patrol to the southwest of 

the battalion perimeter and came across six empty NVA 

bunkers facing east, at a distance of about 2,000 meters from 

Hill 28. After destroying the enemy bunkers, the company 

advanced toward the northwest. About 1330 that afternoon, 

the Marines ran into an enemy rear guard of approximately 

4–10 men near a small stream some 1,500 meters west of Hill 

28. In the resulting exchange of fire, Company M sustained 

one Marine killed and four wounded. Captain Kalm called in 

artillery and 81mm mortar missions. After the skirmish, the 

Marines found the body of one North Vietnamese soldier.

The following morning, the last day of 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell sent out Company I, commanded by 

Captain John L. Prichard, into roughly the same area that 

Company M had met the NVA. Company I moved out from 

Hill 28 in platoon columns. As Bendell explained, this formation discouraged troops from stringing out and permitted 

the company commander “to deploy fire power immediately 

to the front.” Following a trail near the destroyed village 

of Xuan Hai 1,800 meters northwest of Hill 28, Prichard’s 

point, Staff Sergeant Charlie L. Colley, spotted four to five 

North Vietnamese troops to his front. The company commander ordered two platoons forward to a slight rise in the 

ground and brought his third platoon in behind the command post group to protect the rear. In the initial exchange, 

the North Vietnamese had the advantage, but the Marine 

company soon took the upper hand. Moving rapidly back 

and forth across the Marine line, Captain Prichard, his officers, and his noncommissioned officers rallied their troops, 

and Company I soon gained fire superiority.

At that point, around noon, the Marines observed a 

second group of NVA maneuvering to reinforce the first. The 

company brought reinforcements supported by 60mm mortar 

and small-arms fire, and forced the enemy to lie low. A halfhour later the Marines themselves, came under heavy enemy 

82mm-mortar bombardment from their right flank, generally to the northeast. By this time, it was apparent that the 

enemy was in “strong bunkered positions all across the front 

and right front of Company I.”

Despite marginal flying conditions because of 500–

1,000-foot cloud ceilings and reduced visibility, an aerial 

observer arrived over the scene. Giving his call sign as “Smitty 

Tango,” the air observer made radio contact with Captain 

Prichard and adjusted the company’s 60mm countermortar 

fire. Marine mortars knocked out one of the enemy tubes and 

“caused the others to cease fire.” With this success to his 

credit, the observation aircraft pulled away, and the company 

called in an artillery mission, hitting the enemy positions 

with mixed caliber rounds. Marine shelling “threw [NVA] 

bodies in the air as India [Company I] walked 155mm [fire] 

towards friendly lines.”

Four Marines were wounded when the company began to 

take fire from its right front. One of the wounded was one of 

the company’s snipers who had moved too far forward and lay 

exposed to enemy fire. A corpsman attempted to rescue the 

man but was hit himself and forced to turn back. With his 

gunnery sergeant laying down a base of fire, Captain Prichard rushed forward and carried back the seriously wounded 

Marine to the company positions. A Marine helicopter from 

HMM-163, in a medical evacuation (medevac) mission, flew 

the wounded out from an improvised landing zone in a defilade area just to the company’s rear.

Although the enemy attempted to jam the Marine radio 

net, Smitty Tango remained in communication with Captain 

Prichard and Second Lieutenant Albert B. Doyle, the company’s attached forward artillery observer. At 1350, the air 

observer ceased the artillery fire and called in two Marine 

Huey gunships from Marine Observation Squadron 6 that 

had covered the landing of the medevac helicopter. The gunships made several passes at the enemy mortar positions in 

Hill of Angels | 53
open bomb craters near the Marine positions. When the air 

support arrived, several NVA soldiers stood up in their holes, 

only 100 to 150 meters away from Company I, and fired at 

both UH-1s as they conducted strikes upon them. As the lead 

Huey, piloted by Major Curtis D. McRaney, came in on its 

first run, its guns jammed. According to McRaney’s copilot, 

Major David L. Steele, “One of the NVA must have noticed 

this because he stepped out of his hole and began firing at us 

with his automatic weapon on our next pass.” This was a mistake. As Steele observed, “On successive passes . . . we were 

able to cover the crater area with rockets and machine gun 

fire, killing most of the enemy.” The air observer reported that 

he saw the North Vietnamese “dragging eight bodies into a 

tunnel.”

After the air strikes, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell, who 

had been monitoring the radio traffic, decided to pull Company I back to Hill 28. By this time, the North Vietnamese 

had brought up further reinforcements, and Bendell decided 

there was no need to assault the enemy position. Marine supporting arms, both artillery and gunships, would have the 

desired effect.

As Company I broke contact and started to withdraw, the 

troops saw a large NVA unit, reportedly dressed in Marine 

uniforms, closing in.* The Hueys laid down extensive covering fire; then the artillery took over. By 1530, the company 

had returned to Hill 28. Colonel Smith, the 9th Marines 

commander, personally greeted “the men of the Hungry I” 

with a deserved “well done.” The company, while sustaining 

casualties of only 4 wounded, had accounted for 27 enemy 

dead, not including the 8 NVA taken out by the helicopters or 

the unknown number of enemy killed by the artillery. Lieutenant Colonel Bendell recommended Captain Prichard for 

the Navy Cross; he received the Silver Star.

After a few brief quiet days, the DMZ war in the western 

Kentucky sector flared again. The 9th Marines confirmed the 

presence of a screening force made up of the 320th NVA Division, which had replaced the 324B Division in the fighting 

*Maj Gary E. Todd, a former 3d Marine Division intelligence officer, wrote 

that he doubted that the NVA were dressed in Marine uniforms: “There were 

several instances when Marines mistook NVA for other Marines, due to the 

similarity of uniforms. They [the NVA] wore utilities of almost the identical 

color to ours and often wore Russian-style steel helmets, frequently with a 

camouflage net. . . . We, of course, had cloth camouflage covers on our helmets. . . . From a distance. . . the helmets were hard to distinguish.”

south of the DMZ. On 16 February, Marines on Con Thien 

observed three North Vietnamese tanks north of their position and called in air support. According to intelligence 

reports, the North Vietnamese division had two armored 

regiments, the 202d and 203d, each with 80 tanks (T-34 

medium tanks and PT-76 light amphibious tanks). Without 

knowing the location of the two armored regiments, Americans acknowledged the capability of the enemy to use tanks 

in the areas where they could secretly mass his forces and 

overrun friendly outposts with little opposition. The Marines 

prepared antimechanized plans. 

Leaving Hill 28, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, uncovered an 

enemy base area and then took up new positions at An Dinh 

between A-3 and Con Thien to investigate recent probes at 

the latter base. On 18 January, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell 

sent out a two-company patrol near an abandoned hamlet 

just north of the Trace about two miles northeast of Con 

Thien. Company M was the blocking force while Company 

L was the sweeping force. The previous evening, Captain 

John D. Carr, Company L’s commander, had held a meeting 

of his platoon commanders. Second Lieutenant Kenneth L. 

Christy, who headed the 3d Platoon, remembered that Carr 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A422890 

The UH-1E was the Marine Corps’ variant of the UH-1 

“Huey.” When equipped with rocket pods and certain other 

rapid-fire weaponry, it was called a “gunship” by the Marines. 

This photograph shows a Marine Huey gunship on a searchand-destroy mission. For close-in fire support, this helicopter 

was superb. 

54 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
briefed them on the next day’s planned patrol. According to 

Christy, he noticed that the route of advance “took us through 

a bombed out ville that we all referred to as the ‘Meat Market,’ 

because it was ‘Charlie’s’ [the enemy’s] area, and almost every 

time we went there either us or them, somebody got hammered.” Christy’s platoon had run a patrol in that area very 

recently, but there had been no sign of the enemy. Captain 

Carr assigned the point position to his 1st Platoon. 

As planned, with the 1st Platoon on point, followed by 

the 2d Platoon with the command group, and the 3d Platoon 

bringing up the rear, Company L departed the battalion lines 

at An Dien in predawn darkness. Suddenly at 0945, from 

well-camouflaged bunkers and spider holes near the Meat 

Market, the NVA sprang their ambush on the Marine company. The 1st Platoon on the point engaged what it thought 

was an NVA platoon only to find itself divided into separate 

groups, with the forward element cut off from the rest of the 

company. Captain Carr brought up the 2d Platoon and his 

command group and joined the rear element of the 1st Platoon in a large bomb crater.

In the company rear, Lieutenant Christy recalled that 

when the ambush occurred, “it sounded like a few sporadic gunshots and then all hell broke loose.” The men of his 

platoon hit the ground “facing outward as we usually did.” 

Christy took cover in a 105mm shell crater with his platoon 

sergeant and radioman. At that point, Captain Carr ordered 

the 3d Platoon to join him about 180 meters to the platoon’s 

front. Under heavy automatic fire, the 3d Platoon joined Carr 

in a series of rushes, taking shelter in shell and bomb craters along the way. Miraculously, the platoon made the dash 

without sustaining any casualties, closing off the back of the 

company’s perimeter.

As Company L more or less consolidated its position, the 

North Vietnamese continued to direct automatic weapons fire 

from all sides upon the embattled Marines, including mortars 

and even large-caliber artillery. More urgently, the enemy was 

using the cutoff squad-size remnant of the 1st Platoon, about 

100 meters in front of the rest of the company, as “bait” in an 

“NVA killing zone.” Lieutenant Christy remembered Captain Carr told him that there were “dead and wounded up 

front and needed 3d Platoon to go up there and collect them 

up so we could get the wounded and dead medevaced and the 

hell out of the area.”

By this time, the North Vietnamese fires had somewhat 

diminished. Captain Carr and a forward artillery observer 

who was with the cutoff troops, Sergeant Michael J. Madden, 

called in supporting U.S. artillery. Sergeant Madden also made 

radio contact with an air observer in a Huey who brought 

in helicopter gunships to keep the enemy at bay. Under this 

protective cover, Lieutenant Christy took one of his squads 

and, joined by Captain Carr, reached the 1st Platoon. Christy 

then deployed his men and crawled forward to another crater 

where Sergeant Madden, although wounded, was still calling in artillery strikes. There were four other wounded men 

with Madden. Christy remembered Carr covering him 

with a shotgun while he went forward again to reach some 

Marine bodies, including that of the 1st Platoon commander, 

some 50 meters to the front. With the supporting artillery 

fires, a squad from 3d Platoon brought back the wounded 

and dead of the 1st Platoon. Lieutenant Christy remembers 

A Belated Medal

For the action on 18 January 1968, Captain John Carr, 

the Company L commander, was awarded the Silver 

Star and Purple Heart; Captain Raymond Kalm, the 

Company M commander, received the Bronze Star with 

“V”; Sergeant Michael Madden also received the Bronze 

Star with “V”; and one of the helicopter pilots received 

the Distinguished Flying Cross. On 25 March 1994 

at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Colonel Kenneth 

Christy was awarded the Navy Cross for his heroism 

on 18 January 1968, more than 26 years after the event. 

Sergeant Madden, who credited Christy for saving his 

life and the others with him, had submitted an award 

recommendation. Somehow the paperwork got lost, and 

Madden in 1988 was surprised to learn that Christy had 

not received any medal for his actions that day. Madden 

then launched a successful one-man campaign to rectify the situation. The Navy Cross is second only to the 

Medal of Honor in awards for heroism in the Marine 

Corps and Navy. 

Hill of Angels | 55
admonishing some of his men for being too gentle and that 

the bodies were not going to be hurt: “Let’s get these people 

policed up and get out of here before Charlie starts firing us 

up again.”

In the meantime, upon hearing of Company L’s predicament, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines’ commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell, replaced Company M with another 

unit in the blocking position, then, with a skeleton command group, accompanied Company M to relieve Company 

L. After the linkup, the two companies overran at least three 

enemy mortar positions, several machine guns, and some 

individual fighting holes. With continuing helicopter gunship support and covering artillery, Marine helicopters evacuated the most seriously wounded. The two companies then 

“crossed the Trace in good order” late that afternoon, carrying their remaining casualties. In the action, the two companies sustained 9 Marines killed and 22 wounded, including 

Captain Carr, who was evacuated by helicopter. According 

to the 9th Marines, the enemy sustained over 100 casualties.

For the most part, the ground action in Kentucky slackened after the first two weeks of February. In one of the 

sharpest encounters, however, a sweep of the southern DMZ 

by two companies of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, encountered NVA infantrymen in bunkers on 16 February. With 

the assistance of air, Marines killed approximately 20 of the 

enemy at the cost of 6 wounded. While the enemy mounted 

no major offensive against Marine positions in Kentucky 

during the latter part of the month, the NVA continued to 

deploy forces in and through the DMZ. In the Kentucky 

area of operations during the month of February 1968, the 

Marines sustained casualties of 89 dead and 267 wounded. 

During the same period, they reported killing nearly 400 of 

the enemy and capturing 39 prisoners.

The End of the Marine Mission at Con Thien 

On 20 January 1968, Generals Cushman and Westmoreland agreed to suspend the installation along the Trace of the 

linear obstacle system “pending clarification of the enemy 

situation in Quang Tri Province.” For all practical purposes, 

this ended the command emphasis on the barrier. As General Cushman later admitted, he “just quit” building what 

he termed the “fence,” and “Tet came along and people had 

something else to think about.” 

Photos courtesy of John Holguin 

Top: Sign at the entrance to Con Thien, February 1968. 

Bottom: Reverse of the sign at the entrance to Con Thien. 

56 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
The U.S. Army’s 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized), assumed control of the Leatherneck Square 

and Kentucky area of operations, and the Marines left in 

July 1968. The brigade had been reorganized at Fort Carson, 

Colorado, in late March for movement to Vietnam. After 

months of training, their main body began moving on 22 

July, and by the thirty-first, the brigade had completed the 

movement of personnel from Fort Carson to Da Nang and 

then to Quang Tri.

As with all combat situations, the mettle of Marines in 

leadership positions was often tested throughout the Battle 

for Con Thien, from the lance corporal in charge of his 

understrength fireteam to the lieutenant colonel responsible 

for a battalion. Though usually tired, frequently frightened, 

and always conscious of the weight of responsibility, the 

high preponderance of these leaders performed admirably. 

From time to time, fine leadership was recognized with an 

award. Far more often, it went unnoticed by any but those 

nearby. The stated mission of disrupting the NVA infiltration of manpower and materiel from the north in the vicinity 

of Con Thien was considered to have been successful; many 

believe it was because of effective small unit Marine leadership, and in spite of the SPOS.

Illustration by 1stLt Leonard H. Dermott, USMCR 

Con Thien C.O.C. Artist’s dedication: “In memory of the Marine casualties at Con Thien under the command of 1st Battalion, 

1st Marines.” The two Marines in the painting became casualties 20 minutes after the artist made the sketch for later painting.

Hill of Angels | 57
Sources

The primary sources of information for this commemorative 

were the official Marine Corps publications by Maj Gary L. 

Telfer, LtCol Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming Jr., U.S. 

Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967

(Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984); and Jack Shulimson, 

LtCol Leonard A. Blaisol, Charles R. Smith, and Capt David 

A. Dawson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968

(Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997). Descriptions of some of 

the events in which the author was personally involved are 

from memory.

58 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Acronyms and Abbreviations

ARVN ...................................................................................................................................Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

BLT ..................................................................................................................................................... Battalion Landing Team 

DMZ .............................................................................................................................................................demilitarized zone 

HMM ........................................................................................................................... Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

LVTE...........................................................................................................tracked landing vehicle configured for engineering

LVTH ..............................................................................................tracked landing vehicle mounted with a 105mm howitzer 

MAF ................................................................................................................................................Marine Amphibious Force 

medevac ........................................................................................................................................................ medical evacuation 

NVA ....................................................................................................................................................North Vietnamese Army 

RPG .....................................................................................................................................................rocket-propelled grenade

RVN ..........................................................................................................................................................Republic of Vietnam 

SAM...........................................................................................................................................................surface-to-air missile

SLF ..........................................................................................................................................................Special Landing Force

SPOS........................................................................................................................................... Strong Point Obstacle System 

USMACV ...........................................................................................................U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

Hill of Angels | 59
Acknowledgments

I would like to recognize the Marine Corps History Division for its assistance with this monograph and to thank the 

Marine Corps Heritage Foundation for the research grant it 

provided to support the project. Special thanks to the following staff of the National Museum of the Marine Corps: 

Joan Thomas, art curator; Alfred Houde; ordnance curator; 

and Ben Kristy, aviation curator. Artwork is courtesy of the 

Combat Art Collection at the National Museum of the 

Marine Corps in Triangle, Virginia. 

60 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Joseph C. Long enlisted in the Marine Corps in February 1966. 

Following recruit training at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San 

Diego, then infantry training and Field Radio Operator’s School at 

Camp Pendleton, he joined 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, at Phu Bai, 

Republic of Vietnam, in mid-September of that year. Long was 

awarded the Purple Heart for a wound received at Dong Ha on 18 

May 1967. Spending 13 months with 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 

he experienced many of the events described in this monograph. 

Upon being commissioned in 1974, Long served first as an 

infantry officer and later as a planner. His final Marine Corps 

assignment was as project manager for the creation of the National 

Museum of the Marine Corps. He retired after 37 years of active 

and Reserve military service. As of this writing, Joe Long is the 

director of the Veterans Business Outreach Center for the state of 

New Mexico’s Department of Veteran Services.

Joseph C. Long

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)

Photograph courtesy of the author 

The author as a lance corporal during Operation 

Kingfisher near Con Thien, August 1967. 

Hill of Angels | 61