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Director

James D. Anderson

Director of Research


JSOU Report 06-3

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2006

Implications

for

Network-Centric

Warfare

Jessica Glicken Turnley
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the U.S. 

Government, Department of Defense, USSOCOM, or the Joint Special 

Operations University. 

*******

Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. 

Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-

2763; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written 

works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more 

information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.

af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-02-4


vii

Foreword

As US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) develops 

strategic concepts for synchronizing the military dimensions 

of the Global War on Terrorism it will need to address a full 

range of factors that describe the strategic environment, centers of 

gravity, and operational approaches for pressing the counterterrorism fight. One key factor is the construct of a global terrorist network 

and what that implies for the ways that US joint forces must organize and operate. In this paper, Dr. Jessica Glicken Turnley helps 

the planner to consider the challenge of how a bureaucratically organized force might assess a network-centric enemy and develop appropriate strategies.

Implications drawn here by Dr. Turnley relate to USSOCOM strategic priorities for winning the war on terror and ensuring a competitive advantage in the future. These priorities include leading the 

planning for the DoD Global War on Terrorism as well as commandspecific counterterrorism operations. The paper also implies considerations for force readiness and developing USSOCOM’s next-generation capabilities.

Dr. Turnley advises that we are 

facing the challenge of responding 

at once with force structures appropriate for geographically based 

adversaries and network based adversaries. The US military must develop the ability to quickly change 

and redefine force structure, force 

development, and force management techniques, and Dr. Turnley 

believes that this may be one of the key enablers of the future force. 

This is essential for success because the threats confronting SOF 

in the mid term will be transnational and asymmetric in nature, and 

there are regional dangers and security issues that SOF will confront 

as well. Threats include issues of terrorism, homeland defense, institutional dysfunction and instability, drug and arms trafficking, and 

information war. In addition SOF are concerned with operational 

... we are facing the 

challenge of responding at 

once with force structures 

appropriate for geographically 

based adversaries and network based adversaries.
viii

issues concerning the military potential of regional state actors opposed to US interests. Our ability to identify the kind of threat we are 

facing, communicate rapidly and respond to threat elements with the 

appropriate force structure will define strategic success.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon

Director, Strategic Studies Department

Joint Special Operations University 
1

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

Executive Summary

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism has 

as one of its elements the need to “disrupt terrorist networks.” 

The same language is used in operational planning exercises 

when developing constructs to fight that adversary. The differences 

between network- or relationship-based groups (social networks) and 

rule-based groups (bureaucracies) are more than academic. There are 

implications for command and control, for planning and schedules, 

for training, and for many other aspects of operations. This study explores the theoretical differences between networks and rule-based 

organizations. It then discusses the operational implications of these 

differences, and finally suggests some implications for the military as 

it plans for and executes the Global War on Terrorism.

Social Networks

Social networks are composed of two primary elements: actors and 

the relationships or linkages among them. Understanding a social 

network means developing an understanding of the patterns or structure of these relationships, and the influence of these structures on 

the actors in the networks. This assumes that actors are interdependent—not independent, autonomous units. It also implies that the 

researcher can achieve full understanding of a given actor’s actions 

if the researcher can map all of that actor’s relationships with other 

actors. This also implies that actors are understood as functions of 

their relationships. 

Identity is described in terms of the strength of the links among 

actors, and means that actors do not define themselves independent 

of others. This means that a network can be described without reference to geography, as the defining features of the network—the 

relationships—are not geospatially located. Finally, this means that 

any description of a network is a snapshot at a point in time of an 

ever-changing pattern—and that the dynamics of change are not 

contained in the network description. 

Bureaucracies

Bureaucracies or rule-driven organizations are at the other end of 

the organizational spectrum. Bureaucracies are systems of rules. 

These rules define offices or positions that are occupied by persons, 

and their associated activities. Persons exist separate from the structure, and are interchangeable from the perspective of the various 

offices. The criteria for occupying an office are based on merit or 

performance. Rules exist over time, and ensure that the performance 
2

 JSOU Report 06-3

of any person in the office will be the same as that of his predecessor and successor. Stability and routine have become well-known 

hallmarks of bureaucracies. The purpose for an office is defined by 

the rule set, as is the organizational purpose. Any person’s accountability is to the rule set for his office, to his job—not to the organizational purpose. In this way, authority and legitimacy are objectively 

defined, and exist independent of individuals.

Networks vs. Bureaucracies

The key distinguishing difference between bureaucracies and social 

networks is the relationship of the actor to the structure. In a network, any given actor is a function of the intersection of relationships and so is unique. In a bureaucracy, actors are methodologically equal, and move in and out of differently defined functions. 

Actors thus are differentiated by factors outside the organizational 

structure, which allows analytic place for ideological frames such as 

religion and politics. 

Relationship-based groups—groups that are defined by the ties 

among individuals—are very effective in environments where conditions external to the group are changing rapidly and variable responses at the tactical level are necessary. They also are effective 

recruiting structures, and work well in social spaces that are geography-independent (such as the World Wide Web). Bureaucracies, on 

the other hand, are very effective in developing and implementing a 

consistency of response over time and space and in moving organizations toward strategic goals. Bureaucracies also are well suited for 

functionally complicated tasks that require a high division of labor, 

such as the logistics associated with moving large amounts of materiel or personnel over long distances. Bureaucracies also are effective 

at assigning accountability to individuals, rather than locating it at 

the group level. This is important where outcomes like security or 

safety are valued.

Bureaucracies and social networks as described here are examples of “pure” types. No organization in the real world functions 

as such. All exhibit some characteristics of both, falling somewhere 

along a spectrum. The challenge for those of us involved in organizational development, management, or change is to understand the 

appropriate point on the spectrum of organizational types for a particular organization. “Appropriate” is a function of task and environment, both of which are functions of time.

Moving Toward Network-Centric Warfare

The adversary in the Global War on Terrorism is understood primarily in network terms. As such, the US military has instituted its 
3

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

own move toward network-centric warfare and has instituted an Office of Force Transformation to move the military from a bureaucratic 

to a network-structured organization. There are certain implications 

of this transformation that are worth spelling out. 

Issues of command and control are of central concern in a military environment. In a bureaucracy, any occupant of any office will 

have some reasonable confidence in the way in which individuals in 

other offices will respond to incoming information. One thus can task 

other offices to do certain things and have some reasonable level of 

confidence that important ethical boundaries will not be violated. In 

a network, the response to a piece of incoming information depends 

upon the nature of the relationship of the individual person who is 

the sender with the individual person who is the receiver. One cannot 

task a network in the narrow sense of the term. One must persuade 

individuals who make up the network, based on the personal relationship one has with each of them.

The changes in command and control required by immersion in 

a network-based rather than a rule-based structure will necessitate 

significant changes in attitude and values for the US military. These 

will be reflected in changes in the language used to discuss activities, 

allies, and the adversary. US personnel must recognize the existence 

and legitimacy of the multiple agendas of the players in the network. 

They must be able to develop an approach that emphasizes leveraging points of commonality, rather than one which assumes the obedience to orders that would result from the engagement with a common rule set for behavior. This will require a willingness to discuss 

with other players the need for action, and avoid the assumption that 

there is a universal sense of urgency based upon a common goal. 

US military participants must develop the flexibility and creativity 

required to simultaneously attain their own ends while demonstrating the value of those activities to others who have different goals. 

This means an equal emphasis must be placed on listening as is on 

telling.

Since networks are based on the ties among people, not offices, 

it is important that individuals develop longevity within the network. 

Trust in another person (vice trust in an office) is an attribute essential to the effective functioning of relationship-based organizations. 

Trust in people develops over time. The investment of time in developing personal relationships that can later be used to attain desired 

ends may be one of the most difficult attitudinal changes required for 

results-oriented Americans. 

These attitudinal changes and consequent changes in language 

use will require new training programs and modification of exist-
4

 JSOU Report 06-3

ing regimes. A related needed skill will be the ability to recognize 

the basis on which key relationships are formed. The operator must 

be trained to recognize the clues that identify these relationships of 

interest, understand how they fit together into networks of relationships, and how he (or she) fits into that network. 

Ideology plays a role in developing efforts to counter terrorism in 

a way it did not in the Cold War. Purely network-based approaches 

do not directly address ideology. With their focus on descriptions 

of relationships and their methodological insistence that relationships define the individual, pure network approaches do not give us 

insight into the dynamics that lead to the creation or development 

of those relationships. An important part of the training of troops 

on the ground, military planners, and leaders will be background 

on the complex interaction of cultural dimensions that underlie and 

shape relationships, keeping in mind that no relationship between 

individuals is uni-dimensional. 

Ideology can also be an important weapon in the Global War on 

Terrorism. If our goal is to undo a set of relationships, we must realize that there will be a new set constructed in its place. The new 

set proposed must support US strategic interests while not directly 

countering the core values of the target populations. Training US 

forces to recognize the core cultural values of others and to express 

targeted US values in an inoffensive fashion is a non-trivial and difficult exercise.

Several of the issues we discussed above will have impacts on 

planning. There will be impacts on time scales, on the types of people 

who need to be engaged, and on the types of activities to include. This 

includes issues of geography. Most of the clues to relationship identification discussed above are culturally based, and so are locationspecific. However, the relationships themselves do not exist in space. 

The hard assets or network enablers which help to create them may 

have geographic coordinates, as do the individuals who engage with 

these enablers and who compose the nodes of the network. The tension between a geography-free network and the important local and 

cultural components of the nodes (individuals or network enablers) 

is one that will need to be managed in a planning exercise. This will 

intersect with the tension between organizing US forces as networks 

and as more strategically oriented, rule-driven structures. 

The incorporation of networks into planning considerations will 

have significant impacts on schedule, as it will both stretch and 

compress time horizons. Developing the relationships on which social networks are built takes time. At the same time, networks can 

be mobilized very quickly and can change direction much faster than 
5

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

rule-based organizations. Any planning process we develop must be 

highly flexible and able to accommodate change. This may require 

that authority in certain areas devolve to lower levels than it currently resides. This is another significant attitudinal change required.

The key for the military is to recognize the complexity of the adversary and to respond with a complex force. Clearly, new skill requirements will have ramifications through recruitment and promotion 

strategies, as well as on training regimes. If the military is seeking 

individuals who can lead through persuasion rather than tasking, it 

will need to look for and develop individuals with skill sets different 

than those required in a Cold War force. The importance of the role 

trust plays in networks also means changes in personnel rotation 

policies and the role they play in promotion. The military will need to 

be able to foster and support the development of networks without 

co-opting them—and without seeing them as a threat to formal lines 

of command. A look at innovation in the private sector, including 

skunkworks and more recently proposed models of ambidextrous 

organizations1 which incorporate both networks and formal management structures, might provide insight into managing this tension 

for the military community.

 The ability to quickly change and redefine force structure, force 

deployment, and force management techniques may be one of the 

key enablers of the military of the future. The challenge, therefore, 

is not to identify the right force structure, but to be able to identify, 

communicate, and respond to those elements of time and space that 

define the appropriate force structure.

7

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

Implications for 

Network-Centric Warfare 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Introduction

This study explores the theoretical differences between networks and 

rule-based organizations. It then discusses the operational implications of these differences, and finally suggests some implications for 

the military as it plans for and executes the Global War on Terrorism. 

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism 

(NMSP-WOT) has as one of its elements the need to “disrupt terrorist networks.” 2 The same language is used in operational planning 

exercises based on the NMSP-WOT when referencing the adversary 

as well as when developing US national constructs to fight that adversary. This paper suggests that if the military is to truly engage in 

network-centric warfare, it must recognize the nature of a network 

and the implications of such an approach on military operations. 

The differences between network- or relationship-based groups 

and rule-based groups or bureaucracies are more than academic. 

These differences begin with the ways in which actors relate to the 

collectivity and ways in which they can be controlled, managed, or 

directed by the group. The differences extend as far as definitions of 

ethical behavior and ways in which new ideas and innovations are 

introduced. As a consequence, organizational structure has implications for command and control, for planning and schedules, for 

training, and for many other aspects of operations. 

It is important to keep in mind as we discuss these two different 

organizational types that they are just that—pure types that we can 

use to understand how groups work. But these pure types do not appear in the real world—any real organization will exhibit characteristics of both network- and bureaucratically-based interaction. 

Social Networks

Social networks are composed of two primary elements: actors and 

the relationships or linkages among them. Actors can be individuals 

or collections of individuals such as a military service (e.g., Army or 

Navy) or a public agency (e.g., the Department of Defense). Understanding a social network means developing an understanding of 
8

 JSOU Report 06-3

the patterns or structure of these relationships, and the influence of 

these structures on the actors in the networks.3

There are several important assumptions that shape a social network perspective. First among them is the assumption of the importance of relationships in human dynamics. A second assumption is 

that actors are interdependent, not independent, autonomous units. 

It also implies that the researcher can achieve full understanding of 

a given actor’s actions if the researcher can map all of that actor’s relationships with other actors—that is, its relationships with all other 

actors in its universe, and all of its relationships with each of the actors in its universe. This also implies that actors are understood as 

functions of their relationships. 

In social network analysis, the observed attributes of social actors (such as race or ethnicity of people, or size or productivity 

of collective bodies such as corporations or nation-states) are 

understood in terms of patterns or structures of ties among the 

units. Relational ties among actors are primary and attributes 

of actors are secondary.4

The emphasis on relationships has important implications in 

questions of agency and the related dimensions of individual belief. 

As it defines actors in terms of—and only in terms of—the network of 

relationships within which they are embedded, a network approach 

denies a role for purposive action on the part of individuals. This 

eliminates from consideration any exploration of culture or other ideological structures,5 constructs that have been determined to be of 

high import in the War on Terrorism. As Burt—a proponent of social 

networks—put it, network theory “bypass[es] the spuriously significant attributes of people temporarily occupying particular positions 

in social structure.” 6

 The focus on relationships also means that there “must be two 

to tango.” The identity of any actor is negotiated and is a function of 

both actors in the dyad. As Rapoport pointed out, some of Spain’s 

success in dealing with ETA, the Basque separatist group, may be 

that Spain does not see itself as a colonial power, so the relationship 

that ETA posits (colonial power subjugating ethnic group) is not a 

recognized one in conversations between the two actors.7 Authority 

and legitimacy thus is situational, and dependent upon the nature 

and personality of the players in the dyad.

A third assumption is that we can do more than simply identify 

these relational ties or links. We also can illustrate, in some way, the 

strength or intensity of the connection among actors. However, as 

social networks increasingly are modeled computationally, the thing 

that connects must be not just measurable (for example, strong or 
9

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

weak) but quantifiable. This usually defines the connectors or links 

through the observables that are transmitted along the links, such 

as money transferred or telephone calls made. If the conceptual 

model defines the link as an intangible, such as friendship or affect, 

the computational modeler must find a quantifiable surrogate, such 

as (in this case) telephone calls. Note, however, that the user of the 

model or its output must be careful that the surrogate is a legitimate 

substitute or, at the very least, recognize the limitations of the surrogate. A high number of telephone calls may or may not be equivalent 

to a high level of affect or emotional investment.8

Social networks per se are not geospatially located. The actors in 

the network may be, but the relationships among them—the defining 

elements of the network—are not. A network can maintain its integrity as the actors move through space. Location may be relevant to 

an actor’s ability to transmit something across a link, but not to the 

description of what is transmitted. Geospatial location of actors also 

is not relevant to the ways in which the tie between them constructs 

the identity of the sender and receiver.

Finally, it is critical to remember that a description of a social 

network is a snapshot of a set of dynamic relationships. That is, it is 

a static picture of a constantly changing organizational configuration 

at some specific point in time. Network change can be measured by 

changes in the identity of the actors in the network; through variation in the number of connections of a particular type a given actor 

has with others; and by changes in the intensity of those connections. A set of network descriptions (a time elapsed[?] series) will illustrate the consequences of dynamic properties, but does not itself 

describe these dynamics.9 They must be inferred or imputed from 

the illustrated consequences. In research work, network models are 

often used to test theories about the dynamics of relational structures by comparing posited outcomes against actual data. For our 

purposes, it is important to remember that networks do not tell us 

anything about why relationships change, although they do illustrate the consequences of those changes.

Bureaucracies (a.k.a. Rule-Driven Organizations)

At the other end of the organizational spectrum from networks are 

bureaucracies, or rule-driven organizations. The primary elements 

of a bureaucracy are a rule-defined structure that endures over time 

(i.e. a stable structure), and the actors who populate that structure. 

Bureaucracies operate according to “...the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that 

is, by laws or administrative regulations.” 10
10

 JSOU Report 06-3

Bureaucracies have several defining characteristics: they exhibit 

a strong division of labor which is codified in rules defining a structure specialized by function; each function has standardized procedures which govern behavior, no matter which individual occupies 

the position; and an individual’s movement through the organization 

is governed by demonstrated competency which are often codified as 

rules of a profession. It is worth quoting Talcott Parsons at length 

here, for he succinctly sets out the key characteristics of bureaucracies. 

...an organization devoted to what is from the point of view of 

the participants an impersonal end. It is based on a type of division of labor which involves specialization in terms of clearly 

differentiated functions, divided according to technical criteria, 

with a corresponding division of authority hierarchically organized, heading up to a central organ, and specialized technical 

qualifications on the part of the participants. The role of each 

participant is conceived as an office where he acts by virtue of 

the authority vested in the office and not of his personal influence. This involves a clear-cut distinction in many different respects between his acts and relationships in his official and his 

personal capacity. It in general involves separation of office and 

home, of business funds and property from personal property, 

above all of authority in official matters from personal influence 

outside the official sphere.11

Networks vs. Bureaucracies

Many contrast networks with hierarchies, particularly in recent 

popular usage.12 However, both networks and bureaucracies can be 

described in terms of hierarchies, although it is much easier to describe bureaucracies in this fashion. A hierarchy is a description of 

an unequal relationship between two elements of a like kind (e.g. 

two relationships or two functions), a ranking of those elements. In 

a bureaucracy, each office (which would be occupied by a person) 

would have a rank relative to all other offices. Persons would be described in terms of rank only as they are described by their offices. 

In a network, since all persons are described by the same type of 

relationship in any given network, what varies is the intensity of 

the tie. The confluence of a set of ties of some measurable strength 

would establish the relative standing of the individuals. In this way, 

we can say that bureaucracies are inherently hierarchical in nature. 

Networks may describe hierarchical relationships, but are not inherently hierarchical. 
11

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

I argue that the key distinguishing difference between social networks and bureaucracies lies in the relationship of the actor to the 

structure. In networks, actors are defined as 

functions of the relationships that connect 

them. The relationships are primary. Any 

given actor is a function of the intersection of 

a set of relationships. In this way, all actors 

are particular—each is unique. In bureaucracies, on the other hand, rules define functions that can be filled 

by interchangeable actors. “The objective discharge of business [in 

a bureaucracy] primarily means a discharge of business according 

to calculable rules and without regard for persons.” 13 The primary 

focus is on the rule structure, and actors can and do exist separate 

from the structure. 

In this approach, actors are defined by activities independent of 

that rule structure (e.g. education, experience). Agency exists—and, 

in fact, is a key element of the model. Actors can choose to enter into 

social contracts of various types, and act according to ideological 

frames. In this way, a bureaucratic theory of the organization is a 

logical extension of a long Western European tradition of individualism.14 This also allows for consideration of the role of ideology and 

other cultural frames such as religion in social action.

There are several social consequences of the organizational characteristics of bureaucracies. 

First is a commitment to equality of persons. (Note that this is 

in contrast to a hierarchy or inequality of offices.) This results, 

as Weber points out, from “the characteristic principle of bureaucracy: the abstract regularity of the execution of authority, 

which is the result of the demand for equality before the law in 

the personal and functional sense.” 15 Individual participants 

are not differentiated by ascribed characteristics such as rank 

achieved by birth or race or inherent qualities of personality, 

but must achieve position through performance (merit). In an 

ideal bureaucracy, each individual enters the system defined 

only by achieved characteristics. In this way, any particular 

individual is replaceable by any other who has similar achieved 

characteristics.

A second consequence is the importance of the rule set for 

organizational coherence. Participants’ commitment is not to 

each other through the development of personal relationships 

and loyalty but to the rule set. This organizational commitment to the rule set yields the oft-repeated observation that 

a primary function of bureaucracies is self-perpetuation.16 It 

•

•

In networks, actors are 

defined as functions of 

the relationships that 

connect them. 
12

 JSOU Report 06-3

also means that power and authority reside in an office not in 

a person. One commands because one occupies a position of 

command, not because one is a commanding personality. The 

flip side of this is that one obeys as a condition of the position 

one occupies, not by virtue of a relationship with a particular 

individual. The American President and the American presidency are good examples of this. “In American constitutional 

theory, elections do not confer power on anyone. They merely 

determine who will occupy a particular office that the Constitution has already endowed with certain powers.” 17 (That it does 

matter to some degree who occupies the Presidency simply underscores the statement made in the introduction—and to be 

explored further later—that no organization is a pure representation of one type or another.) The legal argument over the 

status of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay is another example 

of the power of the rule set. If the detainees are defined as prisoners of war, one rule set applies. If they are not, another rule 

set is used.

A third social consequence of the organizational characteristics of bureaucracies is the strong separation of the personal 

from the professional persona. In a pure bureaucracy, relationships to other actors are mediated by the rule set and become 

relationships to functions not to the persons performing the 

functions. One can respect the office without respecting the 

person who occupies it. Motivation is through tasking and assignment, and tasks must be congruent with the activity space 

defined for the position by the rule set. There has been a recent 

spate of corporate ethics violations which ultimately reduce 

to a question of the line defining the personal and the professional.18 The ultimate effect is to reduce the abuse of personal 

power.

This leads us to a fourth social consequence. Participants in 

a bureaucracy are responsible only for completion of the jobs 

to which they are assigned. They are not accountable for organizational success. (One of the most well-known bureaucratic 

sayings is “it’s not my job...”) Some scholars of bureaucracy go 

so far as to say that bureaucratic organizations are organized 

around tasks, not missions or goals. Missions may emerge 

from a collection of tasks, but goals, particularly in public sector bureaucracies, are often so vague that they cannot provide 

the basis for any realistic action.19

It has become fashionable to malign bureaucracies.20 In the national security community, this has been particularly true in the 

•

•
13

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

post- 9/11 world. However, it is important to remember that bureaucracies are good for certain types of work. They are extremely well 

suited for highly complicated, functionally differentiated activities, 

where critical path completion is an important part of work success. 

They are particularly effective for the conduct of routine or repetitive activities that can readily be codified into rules for behavior. Although it may seem counterintuitive, bureaucracy also is one of the 

most efficient means of mobilizing large amounts of people and materiel to accomplish clearly defined ends.21 Bureaucracies also locate 

accountability at the level of the individual. Each individual is responsible for accomplishing his task according to the rules and procedures defined for that function. The organization will succeed if all 

actors succeed. In this model, organizational failure should be able 

to be traced back to the failure of some individual to follow the rules. 

Finally, bureaucracies convey stability over time. The enduring rule 

set and the principles of meritocracy (based on demonstrated competency) ensure consistent behavior in the face of personnel changes 

and changing external circumstances. 

This discussion of bureaucratic or rule-based structures can be 

summarized as follows. 

Bureaucracies are systems of rules. 

These rules define offices or positions that are occupied by persons, and their associated activities. 

Persons exist separate from the structure, and are interchangeable from the perspective of the various offices. 

The criteria for occupying an office are based on merit or performance. 

Rules exist over time, and ensure that the performance of any 

person in the office will be the same as that of his predecessor 

and successor. 

Stability and routine have become one of the well-known hallmarks of bureaucracies. 

The purpose for an office is defined by the rule set, as is the 

organizational purpose. 

Any person’s accountability is to the rule set for his office, to 

his job—not to the organizational purpose. 

In this way, authority and legitimacy are objectively defined, 

and exist independent of individuals.

Operational Implications

Bureaucracies and social networks as we have described them here 

are examples of pure types. No organization in the real world functions as such. All exhibit some characteristics of both, falling some-

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
14

 JSOU Report 06-3

where along a spectrum. The challenge for those of us involved in organizational development, management, or change is to understand 

the appropriate point on the spectrum of organizational types for a 

particular organization. Appropriate is a function of task and environment, both of which are functions of time.22 This negates the 

legitimacy of debates about the goodness of networks or bureaucracies in any abstract sense. It shifts the dialogue to a goal- or task-oriented frame and highlights the fact that an organization’s preferred 

dominant structural type may change over time. Therefore, before 

moving into a discussion of a specific example (i.e. the US military 

and the Global War on Terrorism), it will be helpful to outline positive 

and negative aspects of each organizational type.

Relationship-based groups—groups that are defined by the ties 

among individuals—are very effective in environments where conditions external to the group are changing rapidly. Because individual 

actors are not constrained by strong behavioral rule sets, they can 

vary behavior as external conditions change. 

Thus, they are excellent in situations requiring variable, tactical responses. They also are 

well-suited for developing commitment to a 

cause or goal, usually as embodied in a charismatic individual. The affective ties members 

of the network can develop with that individual as an individual allow for the emergence of this type of leadership. (Recall that in a 

bureaucracy, a participant develops ties with an office, not an individual.) That said, using a network approach to understand terrorist 

organizations does not leave room for an analysis of or response to 

their ideological base.

Networks also can serve as effective recruiting tools. Every person is a member of many networks. As Mische says, “Since most participants belong to a variety of social networks at once, they engage 

in myriad, complex negotiations among the multiple dimensions of 

their ongoing involvements, which are often embedded in overlapping network formations.” 23 Organizations in their early or growing 

stages of development are well-served by social networks.24

Social networks work well in social spaces that are geographyindependent. Technologies such as wireless telephony and the World 

Wide Web have allowed communication to occur in space-free zones. 

We do not need to know where the caller or email sender is physically located in order to respond to him, and wireless technology 

allows him to be anywhere. As the strength of the organization is in 

the relationship not the end points, the geography-free nature of the 

relationship frees the organization from geospatial ties. 

... [networks] are excellent in situations 

requiring variable, 

tactical responses. 
15

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

Bureaucracies are much more tied to spatial location than are 

social networks. In a bureaucracy, the focus is on the activity of 

the office as defined by the rule set. Activity is located in time and 

space. 

Bureaucracies are very effective in developing and implementing 

a consistency of response over time and space. Thus, while they are 

not terribly effective in situations requiring tactical agility, they are 

very good in moving organizations toward strategic ends. Bureaucracies’ enduring rule sets also allow for effective operation in environments where individual persons move in and out of the organization. 

Adams uses a description of the social networks developed among 

members of Congress, participants in the military procurement bureaucracy, and senior executives in certain portions of the industrial 

sector to give a compelling counterexample of how these networks 

allow service to unintended organizational ends emerge.25

Social networks, on the other hand, are effective structures for 

innovation. The weak ties that networks can encourage have been 

shown to be key in introducing new ideas and frames for action to 

groups.26 Bureaucracies, with their investment in stability as embodied in rule sets, do not foster innovative behavior.

Bureaucracies manage the division of labor very well. Hence, 

they are well suited for functionally complicated tasks,27 such as the 

logistics associated with moving large amounts of materiel or personnel over long distances. Bureaucracies also are effective at assigning 

accountability to individuals, rather than locating it at the group 

level. This is important where outcomes like security or safety are 

valued. 

Implications for the Military in the War on Terrorism

Most of the intelligence on the terrorist groups we face in the current 

war on terrorism tells us that they are network-based organizations. 

We describe the adversary as a “transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals” where the link among 

them is a “common ideology” (NMSP-WOT). This is a very different 

characterization of the adversary than the state- and office-centric 

descriptions of the former Soviet Union prevalent during the Cold 

War. 

In response to the emergence of what has been characterized as 

a new type of adversary, the Department of Defense has established 

its own force transformation effort to lead the institution of networkcentric operations.28 Network-centric warfare is defined as “an information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and 
16

 JSOU Report 06-3

shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, 

higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, 

and a degree of self-synchronization.” 29 This is another language for 

the ability to exploit the tactical advantage that networks provide by 

allowing local actors to respond to local situations, relying on commitment to a core ideology for operational coherence. However, we 

must keep in mind that the network structure assumes the ideology—it does not analyze, address, or attack it directly.

As the US military prepares to fight this new type of adversary by 

redefining its own structure, it needs to recognize implications inherent in the differences between a bureaucratic and a networked organization. The purpose here is not to provide a roadmap for tackling 

the transformation, but to raise awareness of key areas that need to 

be considered.

Command and control

Issues of command and control are of central concern in a military environment. As we noted earlier, bureaucratic structures have strong 

hierarchical dimensions. Offices or positions are ranked relative to 

the dimensions of power important to that organization. Some of the 

behavioral rules associated with each office describe response patterns to incoming orders or directives. In this way, any occupant of 

any office will have some reasonable confidence in the way in which 

individuals in other offices will respond to incoming information. 

One thus can task other offices to do certain things, and have some 

reasonable level of confidence that important ethical boundaries will 

not be violated. In a network, the response to a piece of incoming 

information is NOT dependent upon the definition or organizational 

location of the originating office or the relative definition or location of the receiving office. Rather, it depends upon the nature of 

the relationship of the individual person who is the sender with the 

individual person who is the receiver.30 As Cronin points out when 

talking of the intelligence community, “there is a fine line between 

progressive devolution of authority (to, for instance, permit covert 

or black operations of one kind or another) and loss of institutional 

control such as when mavericks within the organization take the law 

into their own hands.” 31 As all persons simultaneously participate 

in many social networks, the behavioral response to a given piece of 

information will only partially depend upon the targeted institutional 

relationship. In this environment, one cannot task a network in the 

narrow sense of the term. One must persuade individuals based on 

the personal relationship one has with them.
17

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

As an example, we can look at the Global Counterterrorism Network (GCTN) proposed under the NMSP-WOT. This network would 

be made up of private sector organizations, public sector entities 

(including elements of the US military), non-governmental organizations, church groups, and the like. The integrating premise of this 

network is the interest all would have in eliminating terrorism either 

locally or worldwide. However, this network is actually the confluence of other groups that could be either network- or bureaucratically structured (think of a Venn diagram), each with its own internal 

logic and structure. Mobilizing this network will require activation of 

several sets of personal relationships. Consequently, control by the 

initiator over the actions of any one of the nodes will be much lower 

than it is in a bureaucratic structure.

Changes in Attitudes and Values

The changes in command and control required by immersion in a 

network-based rather than a rule-based structure will necessitate 

significant changes in attitude and values for the US military. These 

will be reflected in changes in the language used to discuss activities, 

allies, and the adversary.

Attitudinal changes may be the most important and the most difficult. US personnel must 

recognize the existence and legitimacy of the 

multiple agendas of the players in the network. 

They must be able to develop an approach that 

emphasizes leveraging points of commonality, 

rather than one which assumes the obedience to orders that would 

result from the engagement with a common rule set for behavior. 

This will require a willingness to discuss with other players the need 

for action, and avoid the assumption that there is a universal sense 

of urgency based upon a common goal. For example, while elimination of terrorism and terrorist groups is a primary goal for the military, it is a means to an end for the business community and many 

non-governmental organizations. As a consequence, involvement in 

a network means recognition and exploitation of bi-directional communication. US military participants must develop the flexibility and 

creativity required to simultaneously attain their own ends while 

demonstrating the value of those activities to others who have different goals. This means an equal emphasis must be placed on listening 

as is on telling.

The attitudinal changes will be evidenced in changes in language. 

Clearly, the military will need to learn the language of other communities involved in activities if the military is to be able to demonAttitudinal changes 

may be the most 

important and the 

most difficult.
18

 JSOU Report 06-3

strate how activities can serve multiple ends. Also, internal planning 

language will have to shift. One cannot task members of a network; 

rather, one can persuade them. There are no orders given, but suggestions are made. Network members can be convinced to engage in 

certain types of activities, not required. 

Since networks are based on the ties among people, not offices, 

it is important that individuals develop longevity within the network. 

Trust in another person (vice trust in an office) is an attribute essential to the effective functioning of relationship-based organizations. 

Trust in people develops over time. Trust in one individual cannot 

easily be transferred to another individual. The American business 

community learned this in the 1980s and 1990s as it was trying 

to build relationships with the Japanese. Shared experiences and 

the integration of the personal and business in a single relationship 

often were key to good business arrangements in the Japanese environment. American business practices of quick deal-making and the 

separation of the personal and professional worked against the development of meaningful relationships with Japanese counterparts. 

The investment of time in developing personal relationships that can 

later be used to attain desired ends may be one of the most difficult 

attitudinal changes required for results-oriented Americans. 

Training

These attitudinal changes and consequent changes in language use 

will require new training programs and modification of existing regimes.

The most obvious new additions will be training in negotiation 

skills. This may not be important for all personnel, but will be critical for those occupying points of intersection with other networks, 

whether that be personnel on the ground in combat areas trying to 

develop the support of local populations, or those working in the 

GCTN to engage the cooperation and participation of others in counter-terrorist activities.

A related needed skill will be the ability to recognize the basis on 

which key relationships are formed. If kinship is the key, the operator must understand how strangers or outsiders are fit into a kin 

network, and the behavioral implications of the assigned kin role.32 If 

primary relationships are based on other criteria, such as geography 

(proximity of village of origin, for example), the operator must understand how those from very far away are treated. In the non-governmental organization community, the (implicit) criterion may be 

longevity in the community, or the number of countries in which one 

lived. In all cases, the operator must be trained to recognize the clues 
19

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

that identify these relationships of interest, understand how they fit 

together into networks of relationships, and how he (or she) fits into 

that network. Most of these clues will be implicit or covert. They will 

lie in such areas as rituals of introduction (what questions are asked 

at a first meeting?) or in terms of address. Training in listening for 

and manipulating these cues will be very important.

The Role of Ideology

Ideology plays a role in developing efforts to counter terrorism in a 

way it did not in the Cold War. In the Cold War, the adversary was a 

state-defined apparatus in which the roles and offices were defined 

by (some version of) communism. We were, for the most part, fighting 

the states and the offices, not fighting persons. If we could destroy 

the state, we destroyed the adversary.

This fight is different. We are profoundly concerned with ideology 

for we assume that it is what motivates individuals to adopt terrorism as a means to an end. Purely network-based approaches do not 

directly address ideology. With their focus on descriptions of relationships and their methodological insistence that relationships define 

the individual, pure network approaches do not give us insight into 

the dynamics that lead to the creation or development of those relationships. An important part of the training of troops on the ground, 

military planners, and leaders will be background on the complex 

interaction of cultural dimensions that underlie and shape relationships. Religion is certainly one. However, no relationship between 

individuals is uni-dimensional. While religion may be an important 

part of a relationship, other factors such as kinship, gender, common language, place of origin, relative wealth, and the like, also play 

a part. To emphasize a point made earlier, training in understanding 

how to recognize the factors that make up a relationship of interest 

will help us define the network of interest and effectively engage with 

it or destroy it as determined by strategic and tactical objectives.

Ideology can also be an important weapon in the War on Terrorism. If our goal is to undo a set of relationships, we must realize 

that there will be a new set constructed in its place. If we want that 

new set to be favorable to US strategic interests, we must work to 

ensure that its defining criteria are in accordance with those interests. However, the new set proposed cannot be directly counter to the 

core values of the target populations. An ability to hear the values 

of target populations as they engage with them can be a key service 

operators can provide to military and political planners. These same 

operators must then be trained to express core US values in ways 

that are not offensive to local populations. This may seem trivial at 
20

 JSOU Report 06-3

first glance—but the communication of such values in both directions is a rather unexamined dimension of military presence. Training US forces to recognize the core cultural values of others and to 

express targeted US values in an inoffensive fashion is a non-trivial 

and difficult exercise.

Planning

Several of the issues we discussed above will have impacts on planning. There will be impacts on time scales, on the types of people who 

need to be engaged, and on the types of activities to include.

This begs the question of geography. To a large extent, just as all 

politics are local so is all combat local. It is fought on the ground at 

a particular place at a particular point in time. Most of the clues to 

relationship identification discussed above are culturally based, and 

so are location-specific. However, as discussed earlier, the relationships themselves do not exist in space. The hard assets which help to 

create them may have geographic coordinates (computers, transmitters, wires – let’s call these network enablers). The individuals who 

engage with these enablers and who compose the nodes of the network also exist in space. The assumption of theater-based warfare 

and geographically defined combatant commands is that attacking 

some geographic portion of the enablers, eliminating individuals who 

comprise the nodes or engage with the enablers, or eliminating some 

large portion of network or of a subnetwork which is geographically 

collocated will weaken the entire network to the point of collapse. 

There are some assumptions here that are important for planning. Eliminating an individual is not a job for the conventional 

military, for it does not require a force large in size and scope. It is 

best accomplished by small, specially trained groups such as special 

operators who have tactical agility and can develop a high level of 

situational knowledge. At this level particularly, the cultural cues 

discussed above will become critical. Network enablers may or may 

not be neutralized by a large force, depending upon the nature of the 

enablers. Disabling a national power grid can be accomplished either 

by small, strategically targeted operations or through large-scale destruction. Completely disabling the World Wide Web is not a size and 

scope of force problem. On the other hand, quelling an insurgency 

(which can be defined as local or geospatial as it is an attack against 

a state government which is perceived to be illegitimate) is clearly a 

job for a geospatially targeted force. As is argued by many regarding 

our presence in Iraq, that quelling insurgencies can take away one 

of the intersecting network structures of the international terrorist 
21

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

network. This eliminates recruitment opportunities and eliminates 

opportunities for the perpetuation of terrorist acts.

The tension between a geography-free network and the important 

local and cultural components of the nodes (individuals or network 

enablers) is one that will need to be managed. This will intersect with 

the tension between organizing US forces as networks and as ruledriven structures. Integrating into local communities or participating 

in global networks such as the GCTN will require the development of 

relationships by specific individuals who are trained for that particular job in that particular location. This is theater-based warfare writ 

small and writ large. A globally defined command, such as US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), will need to be able to deploy 

and infiltrate in different areas of the world for which operators will 

need cultural (i.e. local) knowledge. The geographic commands also 

will need to have cultural knowledge of the theaters in which they are 

deployed. In addition, there must be some geography-free perspective that can manage the global nature of the adversary network; 

work with a comparable international network, such as the GCTN, 

to counter it; and coordinate the geographic efforts into a single international thrust.

The incorporation of networks into planning considerations will 

have significant impacts on schedule. It will both stretch and compress time horizons. As the US endeavors to engage itself in different 

types of networks, we must recognize that developing relationships 

takes time. Personnel will need to remain in position for some period 

of time to develop the trust upon which networks are based, and 

must believe they can do this without damage to their own career. 

At the same time networks can be mobilized very quickly and can 

change direction much faster than rule-based organizations. Any 

planning process we develop must be highly flexible and able to accommodate change. This may require that authority in certain areas 

devolve to lower levels than it currently resides. This is another significant attitudinal change required.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The new adversary is not a monolithic organization. The NMSP-GWOT 

characterizes it as a “self-organizing dispersed formal and informal” 

association of like-minded individuals and organizations. As such, it 

has characteristics (and associated strengths and vulnerabilities) of 

social networks. As a network that leverages other organizations, it 

has aspects of bureaucracies and state-like entities. 

As an international network, the terrorist adversary can be attacked through removal of critical nodes or enablers. In order to do 
22

 JSOU Report 06-3

this, we must understand how networks work and be organized ourselves for tasks of this level of complexity. This means, among other 

things, freeing ourselves, our thinking, and our organizing principles 

from geography; keeping individuals in place for periods of time long 

enough for them to develop trust-based personal relationships with 

others; and recognizing and accepting the diversity of action that 

will happen at the individual level. We also must be ready to adopt 

new methods of motivating our own allies. We cannot task but must 

persuade. Our own ideology or belief structure must be clearly articulated in a manner that is attractive to others.

The terrorist adversary still retains elements that can be attacked 

through bureaucratic structures. Network enablers are geographically based and can be attacked in this way. Large forces could be 

effective here. Insurgencies and other locally-based activities that 

could be leveraged by the larger terrorist network also are good targets for a conventionally sized and structured force.

The key is to recognize the complexity of the adversary and to 

respond with a complex force. This will involve several new elements 

for the US military to consider.

Clearly, the changed skill requirements will have ramifications 

through recruitment and promotion strategies, as well as on training 

regimes. If the military is seeking individuals who can lead through 

persuasion rather than tasking, it will need to look for and develop 

individuals with skill sets different than those required in a Cold 

War force. The importance of the role trust plays in networks also 

means changes personnel rotation policies and the role they play in 

promotion. 

The military will need to be able to foster and support the development of networks without co-opting them – and without seeing 

them as a threat to formal lines of command. The emergence of the 

real-time, unofficial communication networks among operators on 

the ground in Iraq is a good example of the effectiveness of these 

types of networks, and of what can happen if they become incorporated into a formal bureaucracy. A look at innovation in the private 

sector, including skunkworks and more recently proposed models of 

ambidextrous organizations33 which incorporate both networks and 

formal management structures, might provide insight into managing 

this tension for the military community.

 The ability to quickly change and redefine force structure, force 

deployment, and force management techniques may be one of the 

key enablers of the military of the future. The challenge, therefore, 

is not to identify the right force structure, but to be able to identify, 
23

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

communicate, and respond to those elements of time and space that 

define the appropriate force structure.

Endnotes

 1. O’Reilly III, Charles A, and Michael L. Tushman. 2004. “The Ambidextrous Organization”. Harvard Business Review Pp.74-81.

 2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan 

for the War on Terrorism, 4 March 2005. All quotations and references 

to the NMSP-WOT are from sections marked “unclassified”. 

 3, See Scott, John. 2000. Social Network Analysis: A Handbook. Sage 

Publications, Ltd. Thousand Oaks, CA. 

 4. Wasserman, Stanley and Katherine Faust. 1999. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge University Press. New 

York, NY. p.8

 5. Emirbayer, Mustafa and Jeff Goodwin. 1994. “Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency” American Journal of Sociology Vol 

99:6 Pp. 1411-1454

 6. Burt, Ronald. 1986. “Comment.” In Approaches to Social Theory. Edited by S. Lindenberg, J.S. Coleman, and S. Nowak. Russell Sage. New 

York, NY p.106

 7. Rapoport, David. 2005. Personal communication in discussion at Sandia National Laboratories, 15 July 2005

 8. Turnley, Jessica. 2005. “Validation issues in Computational Social 

Simulation” A working paper presented at the Human Complex Systems Conference, Lake Arrowhead, CA, 18-22 May 2005. http://www.

hcs.ucla.edu/lake-arrowhead-2005/HCS2005_JessicaTurnley2.pdf

 9. Emirbayer, op. cit. p.1413

 10. Gerth, H.H. and C. Wright Mills 1946.( translators and editors) From 

Max Weber: Essays in Sociology Oxford University Press. New York, 

NY. P.196

 11. Parsons, Talcott. 1949 [1937]. The Structure of Social Action. The Free 

Press. Glencoe, NJ. 2nd Edition P.506. See also Pinchot, Gifford and 

Elizabeth Pinchot. 1993. The End of Bureaucracy and the Rise of the 

Intelligent Organization Berrett-Koehler Publishers. San Francisco, 

CA

 12. See, for example, Arquilla, Joh and Ronfeldt, David. 1996. The Advent 

of Netwar. RAND. Santa Monica, CA.

 13. Gerth and Mills, op.cit. P.215

 14. Udehn, Lars. 2002. “The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism” in Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 28 Pp. 479-507

 15. Gerth and Mills, op. cit. P.224

 16. Cronin, Blaise. 2005. “Intelligence, Terrorism, and National Security” 

in Annual Review of Information Science and Technology Blaise Cronin, ed. Vol 39. Information Today, Inc. Medford, NJ Pp. 395-432. 

P.403. See also, Castells, Manuel. 1996. The Information Age: Econo-
24

 JSOU Report 06-3

my, Society and Culture. Vol.I. The Rise of the Network Society. Blackwell Publ. Cambridge, MA. P.171

 17. Rohr, J. 1996. “Founding Republics in France and America: A Study 

in Constitutional Governance University of Kansas Press (Lawrence, 

KS) 

 18. The recent indictment of the President of American University and his 

wife provides a good example. “Lawyers for the Ladners have responded to the charges with a blanket denial of wrongdoing and extensive 

explanations for each expenditure [which include purchases of linens, 

electronics, and vitamins], according to documents before the investigators. The lawyers asserted that all the spending was consistent with 

the terms of Dr. Ladner’s employment contract, signed in 1997, and 

with a recognition that his wife, as American’s first lady, represented 

the university at all times.” NY Times 23 Sept 05

 19. See Wilson, James Q. 2000 [1989] Bureaucracy Basic Books, Inc. New 

Edition

 20. See the extensive review in Cronin, op. cit.

 21. In instances where bureaucracies appear to be inefficient, it is because the task against which efficiency is measured is not that around 

which the existing rule set is designed. The procurement office of an 

organization have as its ostensible function the acquisition of materiel 

for the organization. However, its rule set may be designed to maximize 

transparency of procedures and to minimize cost. Its tasks may be defined as designing requests for proposals for specified items, disseminating them equitably to the target population, evaluating responses 

to the requests in the fairest, most transparent manner, and so on. If 

efficiency is measured against these tasks, a bureaucratic structure 

can be much more efficient than a network.

 22. Du Gay, Paul. 2000. In Praise of Bureaucracy. Sage Publications. 

Thousand Oaks, CA. See also, Elcock, H. 1995. “The fallacies of management” Public Policy and Administration Vol 10:1 Pp.34-48; Self, P. 

1997. “What’s happened to administrative theories?” Public Policy and 

Administration Vol.12:1 Pp.8-20; and Rohr, op. cit.

 23. Mische, Ann. 2003. “Cross-talk in Movements: Reconceiving the Culture-Network Link.” In Social Movements and Networks: Relational 

Approaches to Collective Action Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (eds). 

Oxford University Press. New York, NY. Pp.258-281. P.258

 24. Passy, Florence. 2003. “Social Networks Matter: But How?” in Social 

Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action 

Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (eds). Oxford University Press. New 

York, NY. Pp. 21-48.

 25. Adams, Gordon. 1984. “The Department of Defense and the MilitaryIndustrial Establishment: The Politics of the Iron Triangle” in Critical 

Studies in Organizaion and Bureaucracy Frank Fischer and Carmen 

Sirianni, eds. Revised and expanded edition. Temple University Press. 

Philadelphia, PA. Pp. 371-385.
25

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

 26. Amabile, Teresa M. Regina Conti Heather Coon Jeffrey Lazenby and 

Michael Herron. 1966 “Assessing the Work Environment for Creativity.” Academy of Management Journal. Vol 39:5: Pp.1154-84

 27. Note that a functionally complicated task is different from a complex 

task. A functionally complicated task is one that can be disaggregated 

into many separate parts, each of which can function and be described 

independent of the other. A complex task can be described as one with 

many interdependent, simultaneously operative activities (see Baryam 2004). In the case of a complex task, a network organization may 

be a more effective management structure as effective organizational 

functioning requires rapid, ever-changing low-level tactical responses

 28. Note that in accordance with its current bureaucratic structure, the 

Department of Defense has identified a new function it must perform 

(transformation) and established an office staffed by professionals to 

do that. This is a classic bureaucratic response. The point of interest 

here is that the intended outcome is the transformation or abolition 

of the bureaucracy. It is an open question whether that can be done 

from within. The literature on skunkworks suggests that these types 

of transformative organizations must be established and allowed to 

mature outside the traditional bureaucratic infrastructure. See Albers, David S., John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein. 2000. Network Centric Warfare Washington, D.C.: C4ISR Cooperative Research 

Program.

 29 Ibid, p. 2.

 30. We saw some of the potential negative consequences of this intermingling of the personal with the professional in Pfc. Lyndie England’s 

trial regarding the Abu Ghraib prison abuses, where her personal relationship with her superior officer surfaced.

 31. Cronin, op. cit. P.419

 32. During my 18-month stay in West Java, I was assigned the Dutch kin 

term Tante or aunt. As we were speaking Indonesian, others could not 

refer to me without a kin term. However, as an unmarried female in 

my late 20’s I did not fit into any of the local kin categories. ‘Tante’, 

a Dutch term, marked my foreignness. ‘Aunt’ labeled me as an adult 

and elicited a certain level of respect, even from those older than me 

– respect required by my education level and my comparative wealth. 

 33. O’Reilly III, Charles A, and Michael L. Tushman. 2004. “The Ambidextrous Organization”. Harvard Business Review Pp.74-81.

27

Turnley: Implications for Network-Centric Warfare 

About the Author

Jessica Glicken Turnley serves as President of Galisteo Consulting Group, Inc., a consulting firm in Albuquerque, NM. She also holds an appointment on the Defense Intelligence Agency 

Advisory Board and is an Associate Senior Fellow with Joint Special 

Operations University, a subordinate organization of the US Special 

Operations Command. 

Through her work with Galisteo Consulting Group, Dr. Turnley 

provides services in the national security arena, in strategic business 

planning, organizational development, corporate culture change, 

policy analysis, and economic development to a wide variety of clients in the public and private sector. She worked with Sandia National Laboratories on a range of projects, including the development 

of computational models of social organization and their possible 

relevance to the national war on terrorism, and the creation of bi-national research programs with Mexico. Other projects through Sandia include work with the intelligence community, projects on various aspects of weapons development, and explorations of the ways in 

which organizational structures and management approaches affect 

the practice of science. 

Dr. Turnley has a B.A. in Anthropology and English Literature 

from University of California Santa Cruz, an M.A. in Social Anthropology from University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and a Ph.D. in Cultural Anthropology/Southeast Asian Studies from Cornell University. She was a Fulbright Scholar in Indonesia, and has published 

as both Jessica Glicken and Jessica Turnley. She sits on several 

community and advisory boards. A full resume can be found at the 

Galisteo website at www.galisteoconsulting.com.