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DEFEATING TERRORISM IN SYRIA:

A NEW WAY FORWARD

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 14, 2017

Serial No. 115–3

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Hassan Hassan, senior fellow, The Tahrir Institute for Middle East 

Policy ..................................................................................................................... 6

The Honorable Frederic C. Hof, director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle 

East, Atlantic Council .......................................................................................... 13

Ms. Melissa Dalton, senior fellow, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies .................................................................................................................. 19

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Hassan Hassan: Prepared statement .............................................................. 9

The Honorable Frederic C. Hof: Prepared statement ........................................... 15

Ms. Melissa Dalton: Prepared statement .............................................................. 21

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 46

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 47

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade: Material submitted for the record .......................................................... 48

(1)

DEFEATING TERRORISM IN SYRIA:

A NEW WAY FORWARD 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to 

the length limitation in the rules. 

I will make my opening statement at this time. 

The Syrian war has raged for nearly 6 years. Syria is in chaos. 

Terrorists, foreign fighters, rebels, foreign governments, all are engaged in battle for territory and control of different aspects of 

Syria. 

On the screen—let’s go back to the previous screen—you will see 

different areas of Syria. And the different areas that are controlled 

by ISIS is in the dark section. 

Let’s flip to the next screen quickly. I don’t know if you can read 

that or not. There should be—for at least the panel in front of you, 

you should have the different actors, the state actors on one side 

and then the nonstate actors on the other. 

The state actors are divided into pro-Assad and actors that are 

opposed to Assad, with the Middle Eastern countries at the top of 

each list, and then you have non-Middle Eastern countries at the 

bottom of each list. And you can see that there are numerous countries aligned on both sides. 

And then there are nonstate actors that are involved, and those 

are a multitude of groups. They call themselves different things at 

different times. Some are terrorist groups. Some claim not to be 

terrorist groups that are terrorist groups. 

One of the biggest things that I think we should know is that we 

have terrorist groups on both sides. We have Hezbollah on one 

side, which is obviously a terrorist group fighting for Assad; and we 

have ISIS on the other side that is a terrorist group. Al-Qaeda is 

a terrorist group, and they are also somewhat aligned with the 

anti-Assad group. 

You have a multitude of actors all seeking their own self-interest 

in Syria. And this hearing is about really what do we see hapVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:54 Mar 02, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\021417\24241 SHIRL
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pening not only now but, hopefully, what is the end game after 6 

years of war. 

The losers in this have been the Syrian people, and I think they 

will continue to be the losers because, as the war rages, the war 

affects them more than anyone else. Half a million Syrian people 

have died, at least, in this war. And I don’t call it a conflict; I call 

it a war. When you start dropping bombs on people, that is not a 

conflict, that is a war. Fifty thousand of those people, by all estimates, have been children. Five million Syrians have become refugees; 6 million are internally displaced. So that has been about 11 

percent of the Syrian population killed or injured since the start of 

the violence. 

The perpetrator of all of this sits directly at the regime of Bashar 

Assad and his backers in Moscow and Tehran. Assad has pursued 

a policy of murdering anybody that expresses criticism of his 

power. He uses barrel bombs, and it doesn’t make any difference 

who those barrel bombs fall on as long as he thinks they are opposed to his regime. 

Russia intervened in Syria in September 2015 and began air 

strikes against what it called terrorist targets. The Russians apparently are not very good in their targeting because it seems as 

though they have killed thousands of people in Syria and they 

haven’t all been terrorists. The Syrian Network for Human Rights 

suggested last year that Russian strikes killed more Syrians than 

ISIS members. 

Iran’s terrorist proxy, Hezbollah, has also bloodied its hands in 

Syria. Since 2013, Hezbollah has operated openly in Syria, killing 

on behalf of the Assad regime. It has also created in Syria a perfect 

environment for out-of-towners, as I call them, who show up with 

their own self-interest, including terrorist groups. ISIS is there, 

and while ISIS no longer controls as much territory as they did in 

2014, they still control major aspects of the Syrian population centers. 

I have furnished each of our panelists a map, and there is also 

a map on the wall. Due to time constraints, I can’t go into all of 

the details. But the thin black line in the middle of Syria and in 

the southern part of Syria is what is controlled by ISIS. The Kurds 

control the northern purple area. The yellow area is controlled by 

al-Qaeda and so-called Syrian dissidents and rebel groups. And 

then Assad controls the pink area to the west. 

The questions to be asked today are: What is going to happen in 

the end game? What is the end game? And, also, I would like to 

know from our panelists, what is the national security interest of 

the United States? Should we ratchet it up? Should we do what we 

are doing now, which is kind of the Vietnam syndrome? Or should 

we leave it to the Middle East to resolve this conflict themselves? 

I would like the opinion of all three panelists to those three questions. 

And I will turn it over to the gentleman from Massachusetts, 

who has fled to Washington to get out of the snow, for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Chairman Poe. And thank you for 

holding this hearing today. 

3

The situation we have watched unfold in Syria the last 6 years 

has been wrought with complexities and, the chairman and I agree, 

with chaos and atrocities under the Assad government. Today, the 

war and the resulting humanitarian crisis is nothing short of a 

global tragedy. 

So I am grateful for the attendance of our witnesses—Mr. Hassan, Ambassador Hof, Ms. Dalton—for their valuable insight into 

the ongoing political strife and challenges that the international 

community as well as the new administration faces in the months 

and years ahead. 

If we are going to be smart about terrorism and specifically the 

rising role of ISIL, then we must first come to terms with the reality that their model of terrorism is built on a foundation of 

radicalization. To continue fighting ISIL in the battlefield requires 

that we recognize this pattern of recruitment and evolution in 

fighting tactics. 

As we make progress in diminishing their territory, we must be 

mindful of their shifts in strategy to prioritize covert radicalization 

rather than maintain geographic strongholds. It becomes essential 

that we engage in this war of ideas by providing potential recruits 

with a choice of narratives. Those choices should include a path forward other than terrorism. 

But, even more importantly, we must recognize that strengthening the resiliency and stability of communities is necessary for 

eradicating terrorism. And when families live in fear and when no 

one is accountable for keeping them safe and protecting their freedom, we will never be able to eliminate the conditions that produce 

these terrorists. 

Countering ISIL in Syria, however, cannot be viewed as a onedimensional prospect. Preventing attacks and limiting ISIL’s capacity to operate within its network caliphates are also crucial to 

eliminating the terrorist threat there. 

The U.S. cannot do this alone, nor should we. But we should also 

be wary of the compromises we are being asked to make, allegedly 

in the name of securing peace and combating terrorism. 

I have grave concerns about the role of Russia and Iran and 

what they intend to play in countering ISIL and preventing future 

terrorists. Left without proper oversight or debate, this same Congress may 5, 10, or 15 years from now preside over a hearing of 

the same subject, examining how a Russian- and Iranian-led resolution to this crisis allowed ISIL to survive and become embedded 

in the region, like other terrorist groups which continue to pose a 

threat to the U.S. today. 

For the time being, I believe we still have strong allies in Europe 

and the Middle East whose interests align with ours and who can 

make valuable contributions, along with our own, to tackle this 

threat. Our existing partnerships on intelligence-sharing, security, 

military strategy are robust, and we are united with our allies 

along a common goal for a peaceful resolution to this gruesome conflict and a stable political outcome for the people of Syria. 

Even with close partnerships, there is still room for even stronger, more effective cooperation to close some of the gaps and inconsistencies that ISIL continues to exploit. With all the progress in 

the past decades to cement effective security partnerships among 

4

the U.S. and our allies, there is now a sound foundation to build 

upon that, together, we can isolate and destroy these terrorist 

threats. Neglecting these partnerships and incredible assets in the 

fight against terrorism would be a costly mistake. 

Countering terrorism in Syria is a complex, multifaceted issue. 

If we fail to craft a comprehensive plan to address it, aspects of our 

national security will be compromised. 

I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony today and hearing 

from you on how to balance these diverse and sometimes seemingly 

divergent considerations when attempting to combat ISIL in Syria. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

The Chair will recognize members for 1-minute opening statements, and the Chair will follow the 60-minute—60-second rule, 

not 60 minutes. 

The gentleman from South Carolina is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Judge Poe. 

And he and I worked together very closely on the 60-second rule, 

I can assure you. 

But I want to thank the chairman for having such distinguished 

witnesses. And, already, this has been a helpful hearing to me, the 

map showing the level of control, how narrow it is, Damascus, west 

and north, but also to see the success of the Kurdish regional efforts from Iraq. 

It is very important to me that we support the people of the 

Kurdish region, with the understanding that they are working to 

maintain and build a stable Iraq, and by doing that, by not indicating—expanding beyond the borders. But they are very successful. And that was very instructive to me, so I am very, very hopeful. 

Additionally, I look forward to hearing of your efforts regarding 

counterpropaganda. 

Thank you. And I, within the 60 seconds, hereby yield the balance of my time. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member 

Keating, for convening this important hearing. 

And thank you to the witnesses for providing your expertise to 

inform this incredibly important discussion. 

I hope that we all came here today with the recognition that 

Syria must be a priority for the new administration. With 5 million 

refugees and 6 million internally displaced people and more than 

500,000 mostly civilians killed, the 6-year civil war is the greatest 

humanitarian crisis of the new century. 

Syria borders key American allies, namely Israel, Jordan, and 

Turkey. The civil war is putting extreme pressure on the bordering 

states as well as the European nations. For 6 years, the situation 

has only gotten worse. 

I hope our witnesses can shed light on how to neutralize and defeat the terrorist groups ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, while at 

the same time working toward a political solution for the country 

that does not include Bashar al-Assad or cede control of Syria to 

5

Iran and its proxy Hezbollah nor lead to further instability and the 

consequent return of terrorist groups. 

As you have all shared in your testimony, there are no easy solutions or even mostly good choices, but walking away is clearly not 

an option. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think this is 

a great hearing. 

The problem that I have always with this is that every 6 months, 

a year, the players, the situation changes. And for us to get a grasp 

on this, it is almost impossible. We just had a similar hearing in 

the House Armed Services Committee, a different approach. 

And I did want to thank Ambassador Hof for his service in Vietnam, where you were awarded the Purple Heart. I understand that 

you were involved in the 1983 investigation of the bombing of the 

Marine barracks, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines. That was my—I was 

not with them. That was my former battalion. And what happened 

then still lingers, and I hope we can go back to some of the causes 

as they relate to today. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Rohrabacher from California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

When we talk about 1⁄2 million people who are dead and have 

been killed in this, let’s just admit this isn’t just Assad. We keep 

saying Assad killed all these people. The fact is, if you look at our 

allies, whether it be Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, even the UAE, 

and certainly Iran, who is not an ally but in that region, any of 

those countries, any of those governments that faced an insurgency 

that kept on being financed over and over again would kill that 

many people. Assad is no different than the other dictators, yet we 

have insisted that he has to go. And, thus, the conflict goes on, and 

more and more people are made refugees and killed. 

Who is at fault? I think we should stick our nose out of this and 

let them have, yes, Assad and their dictators in all the rest of these 

countries, and the United States shouldn’t keep these conflicts 

going on and on and on. 

Thank you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

Anybody else wish to make an opening statement? 

The Chair recognizes Ms. Titus. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member. 

You know, throughout the campaign, we heard from candidate 

Trump that he knew more than the generals and he had a secret 

plan for fighting ISIS. Now, apparently, he has gone to the Pentagon to ask for some assistance. 

As we go through this hearing, I would be curious to know what 

you all think about his willingness or ability to stick with a plan 

if we come up with it or if our policy is just going to jump from 

tweet to tweet. 

Thank you. 

6

Mr. POE. The Chair will now introduce all three witnesses and 

then——

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. POE. Yes. 

Mr. GARRETT. If I might? I had not originally not intended to 

make introductory remarks. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes for 1 minute. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member. 

The comments by the gentleman from California sort of stir 

where I am on this. I think that this Nation would be well-advised 

never to arm any entity without having an easily articulable plan 

for an end state that is preferable to the current status quo. 

And while Assad certainly has blood on his hands, I can’t find, 

nor could former Secretary of State John Kerry, the Free Syrian 

Army. I couldn’t tell you who leads it, which leaves us with two alternative solutions to the Assad problem, that being Jabhat alNusra or Jabhat Fateh al-Sham or ISIS, neither of which, I think, 

are a preferable option to a dictator in Assad, who has provided 

some level of stability, created a circumstance wherein 51 percent 

of college graduates in Syria are women and a safe zone for individuals of ethnic and religious minorities. 

I would yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair will now introduce the witnesses. 

Mr. Hassan is a senior fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle 

East Policy. He is co-author of ‘‘ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror,’’ 

a New York Times bestseller. 

Ambassador Frederic Hof is the director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council. Previously, Ambassador Hof served as Special Coordinator for the State Department’s 

Office of the Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. 

Ms. Melissa Dalton is a senior fellow and the deputy director of 

the International Security Program at CSIS. Her research focuses 

on U.S. defense policy in the Middle East, global U.S. defense strategy, and security cooperation with U.S. allies. 

Mr. Hassan, we will start with you. 

Each of you have 5 minutes. When you see the red light, stop 

talking. 

Mr. Hassan. 

STATEMENT OF MR. HASSAN HASSAN, SENIOR FELLOW, THE 

TAHRIR INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY 

Mr. HASSAN. Thank you very much, Chairman Poe and members 

of the subcommittee. It is a privilege to present today here my 

views on Syria and terrorism. 

I want to basically give, like, an optimistic view first. Despite the 

grim situation inside Syria, I think the U.S. Government has an 

opportunity to stem the challenges presented by the two international terrorist organizations operating in Syria, the Islamic 

State and al-Qaeda. 

In fact, I would argue that the United States has more options 

or options it didn’t necessarily have 2 years ago, including a way 

to prevent not only the Islamic State and al-Qaeda from operating 

in Syria or weakening both of them but also other radical groups 

7

from operating in at least 50 to 60 percent of Syria. The territory 

I am talking about includes areas that the Islamic State controls 

or once controlled since 2014. 

You know, the way ISIS does things is, when they take an area, 

they act as a washing powder, I would say, which is basically to 

eradicate any Islamist and jihadist cells operating in the areas 

where they operate, because they want to prevent any support system for their rivals. 

So they have done that in 50 to 60 percent of Syria—or 50 percent of Syria, to be more precise. So for al-Qaeda now to go back 

and fill the vacuum left by ISIS, it has to revive dormant cells or 

rebuild influence almost from scratch. So there is an opportunity 

there to shape the communities in which ISIS operates today. 

So the expulsion of the Islamic State offers a rare opportunity, 

I would say, to implement a strategy to build an alternative to 

jihadist organizations, more so than you were able in 2014 when 

dozens of different armed groups operated in these areas. 

So the liberation of these areas by the U.S.-led coalition creates 

a de facto American sphere of influence, which both Russia and the 

regime have accepted for now, at least. This counterterrorism strategy involves a more foresighted or farsighted policy of establishing 

de facto safe zones in part of Syria where inhabitants can be protected from jihadists and from the regime and where the international community can also ensure that al-Qaeda, which now operates in only 1 to 2 percent of Syria, at least in a dominant manner, from rolling back into areas from which the Islamic State is 

expelled or is being expelled. 

Those safe zones can be established in the areas where the U.S. 

and allies have fought ISIS, as I said. The strategy I am proposing 

is basically a baseline, meaning it requires minimal American commitment. It builds on what the Americans are already doing inside 

Syria against the Islamic State and without which any fight 

against jihadism is doomed to fail. So this is the baseline. 

The war against the Islamic State has reached the point, in my 

opinion, where the Americans cannot—or the U.S. forces or the 

U.S.-led coalition cannot just pull out from Syria, because of, obviously, the ongoing fight against ISIS. It can choose, though—the 

U.S. can choose to continue with the current strategy, which I consider disastrous, and allow various forces to fill the ensuing vacuum after ISIS is defeated in some areas. 

Instead, I would propose that the U.S. must use its pre-existing 

leverage to build a sound policy, a sound strategy that breaks away 

from the current strategy, which overlooks the political environment that enabled the rise of ISIS and other jihadists in the first 

place. 

What is lacking in the current policy is a real kind of strategy 

that utilizes this leverage to ensure the removal of jihadists, to prevent their return, to protect local communities from indiscriminate 

bombardments by the Assad regime, and minimize the conflict that 

is emerging among the various allies in northern Syria, namely the 

Kurds on one hand and the rebels and Turkey on the other hand. 

This strategy, obviously, is not an invitation for an American occupation of Syria or long-term nation-building that President Donald Trump has explicitly criticized. Instead, it is both realistic, esVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:54 Mar 02, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\021417\24241 SHIRL
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sential, and expands on battlefield victories already scored over the 

past 21⁄2 years in Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic 

State in northern Syria. 

The strategy, again, in my opinion, I think should acknowledge 

the fractured nature of the Syrian conflict today. To get a sense of 

this fracture, you have to look at kind of the map that Chairman 

Poe just presented, which basically divides Syria into four quadrants. 

One is the caliphate terrain, which extends from eastern Aleppo 

all the way to Iraq, Iraqi border, all the way to Palmyra in central 

Syria. 

And then you have the second one, the second quadrant, which 

is rebel-held areas in the north and the south. This is where the 

Americans and their allies—the Israelis, the Jordanians, and others—have actually done very well in ensuring that jihadists don’t 

have dominance in that area and that there is, like, a relatively reliable moderate rebel coalition there and where al-Qaeda and Islamic State have some presence but they don’t dominate. 

And the problem there, though, is that the rebel presence there 

is fragile and requires a policy to ensure that they would withstand 

the pressure from jihadists. And, actually, today is a good example 

of that, because Jabhat al-Nusra/al-Qaeda has started to challenge 

that dynamic in southern Syria. 

The third quadrant, very quickly, is the more fragmented northwest——

Mr. POE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hassan follows:]

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Mr. POE. And the subcommittee will be in recess for votes. We 

will start 5 minutes after the last vote has ended. The subcommittee is in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Ambassador Hof, we will hear your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FREDERIC C. HOF, DIRECTOR, RAFIK HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Ambassador HOF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Keating, members of the committee, I would summarize the key points of my testimony for the 

record as follows: First, both the Obama and the Trump administrations have defined defeating terror in Syria largely in terms of 

neutralizing two rival descendants of al-Qaeda in Iraq, namely the 

so-called Islamic State, ISIL, and the Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, JFS, 

formerly known as the Nusrah Front. 

ISIL has had mainly a live and let live arrangement with the 

Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. JFS has fought the regime while 

at the same time trying to dominate nationalist Syria First armed 

rebel units. 

Second, terminating the military capabilities of both of these organizations is critically important. But if our goal in Syria is to kill 

terror and keep it dead, ultimately, a political system reflecting legitimacy has to take hold. Absent a political system that virtually 

all Syrians see as satisfactory with no superior alternative, absent 

that, extremists will seek to rise again to fill the vacuum created 

by gross corruption, incompetence, and brutality. 

Third, the main obstacle to political legitimacy in Syria is the 

survival of a regime headed by Bashar al-Assad and supported by 

Iran and Russia. The collective punishment and mass homicide 

survival strategy of this regime has been the main factor behind 

a humanitarian abomination and a political catastrophe. 

Yesterday, the Atlantic Council released a report entitled, 

‘‘Breaking Aleppo.’’ This report details and documents the campaign of terror inflicted by the Assad regime and Russia on the civilians of Aleppo. It adds to the enormous body of evidence of war 

crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Syria over the 

past 6 years, the overwhelming majority of which have been committed by the regime and its allies. These crimes have helped ISIL 

and JFS enormously in their recruiting. 

Fourth, even if the diplomatic pursuit of political legitimacy in 

Syria is a long-term project, neutralizing ISIL and JFS militarily 

are urgent priorities. Two successive Presidents have defined both 

organizations as threats to American national security. ISIL in 

Syria, which has planned and executed major atrocities in Europe, 

is currently under attack by a U.S.-led air coalition and a U.S.-advise ground force, largely Kurdish in composition. 

I understand the administration is reviewing this military approach in light of Turkish objections to the Kurdish role and the 

objective desirability of liberating densely populated areas with 

highly skilled military professionals. 

14

JFS is under attack by U.S. and Russian air assets independently with Syrian nationalist rebel forces seeking ways and means 

to defeat it. These nationalists will need a tight Russian leash on 

Assad and on Iranian-led foreign militias in order to move effectively against JFS. It is not yet clear that they will get Russian cooperation. 

Fifth and finally, thanks to Russian and Iranian military intervention, Assad seems secure in at least part of Syria. Iran, in particular, needs Assad to bind Syria to Lebanon’s Hezbollah, another 

important Islamist terrorist group. But Assad’s political well-being 

means the indefinite continuation of state terror in Syria. 

As the United States and its partners move ideally with dispatch 

against ISIL and JFS, any temptation to make common cause with 

or improve the political prospects of Syria’s premier practitioner of 

terror, Bashar al-Assad, must be resisted. Reports of Russian disaffection with Assad and with Iranian-led militias should be explored. 

Killing terror in Syria and keeping it dead will, I am afraid, be 

a long-term endeavor for the United States and its partners, one 

extending far beyond the defeats of ISIL and JFS. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Hof follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Ambassador Hof. 

Ms. Dalton. 

STATEMENT OF MS. MELISSA DALTON, SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. DALTON. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to testify 

before you today with my excellent colleagues Ambassador Frederic 

Hof and Hassan Hassan. 

Syria stands today at the epicenter of a regional conflict with 

global consequences for U.S. interests. Countering terrorism is one 

aspect of a deeper problem set. The Trump administration and the 

Congress have the opportunity to change the course of U.S. policy 

toward Syria by nesting short-term operations into a strategy. 

Americans have no interest in perennial military interventions in 

the Middle East. We have demands for resources at home and competing geostrategic objectives in Europe and Asia. However, the 

United States has compelling reasons to counter terrorism and to 

address the broader factors that have enabled the rise of the socalled Islamic State and al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Fatah 

al-Sham. The growth of Iranian proxy groups and a battle-hardened Lebanese Hezbollah in Syria also pose counterterrorism challenges. 

Additionally, the United States has to contend with intertwined 

realities that could challenge its ability to influence outcomes to its 

advantage. Among these reasons are: Countering terrorists and the 

roots of terrorism, which threaten the U.S. homeland and our allies 

and partners; preventing military confrontation with Russia and 

Iran while limiting the long-term subversive influence they could 

have in the region; and stemming conflict emanating from Syria 

from further destabilizing neighboring states in Europe. 

Achieving U.S. objectives in Syria will require inherent tradeoffs 

in the policy choices the Trump administration could pursue. Complicating matters, 6 years of war have torn Syria apart. It no 

longer exists a unitary whole, requiring different approaches in the 

north, south, east, and west. Woven throughout the options in 

Syria are geopolitical choices with which the United States will 

have to grapple, including how to manage tensions with Russia in 

a way that secures U.S. interests and contests Russian aggression 

globally while cooperating where it is advantageous and feasible; 

how to calibrate pressure on Iran’s destabilizing activities without 

provoking blowback to U.S. Forces operating in the area and while 

attaining an enduring political outcome in Syria; and how to manage deeply fraught relations with NATO ally Turkey while 

leveraging the highly capable YPG to fight ISIS in northern Syria. 

The Trump administration and Congress should work together to 

forge a coordinated U.S. strategy for Syria with allies and partners. 

The goals of this strategy should be to degrade ISIS and JFS, 

achieve a nationwide cessation of hostilities and a negotiated transition of power in Damascus, and consolidate counterterrorism 

gains by knitting together local security and governance in the four 

segments of Syria. 

Such an approach will require leveraging multiple tools of U.S. 

statecraft, including: Registering strong concerns with Russia and 

20

Iran about their support for Assad’s brutal tactics and their longterm ambitions in Syria and being prepared to back up those concerns with sanctions and coercion; rebuilding communication and 

trust with Turkey. While pressing on human rights concerns, we 

should emphasize the criticality of working through differences as 

NATO allies. Bolstering support to Iraqi Prime Minister Haider alAbadi and his efforts to restore security and stability in Iraq. If 

Iraq falters, ISIS and other terrorist groups will regrow in western 

Iraq and push back into Syria. Working with the U.N. to leverage 

and integrate the Astana process into a U.N.-mediated negotiations, calibrating sanctions pressure on Putin to convince Assad to 

accede to the negotiating table, requiring Russian action before alleviating sanctions. Ukraine should not be a quid pro quo for Syria. 

Synchronizing operations for Raqqa and Mosul to squeeze ISIS, 

and aligning covert and noncovert approaches versus ISIS and JFS. 

Letting operational conditions on the ground inform strategic adjustments and withdrawal timelines. Countering ISIS and JFS will 

be a multiyear effort. Increasing both special operations forces and 

conventional ground forces in Syria and Iraq, based on commanders’ assessed requirements, conducting training and combat 

operations with local partners. Consolidating gains from operations, knitting connections among local security forces and governance structures so that terrorist groups cannot grow back. Being 

strategic about deploying the local partner forces that will be the 

most credible, accounting for ethno-sectarian differences, even if it 

requires a slower pace for operations. 

If the United States commits resources to establishing a safe 

zone, I recommend constructing one in southern Syria where operational dynamics are clearer than in the north and to ensure that 

it ties to political negotiations to end the civil war so as to avoid 

an open-ended commitment. 

We should also enhance intelligence sharing and improved coordination among military intelligence and law enforcement entities and continue to provide humanitarian assistance to besieged 

civilian areas with clear and immediate repercussions in the case 

of outside interference. 

Finally, we should seek a new authorization for the use of force 

for the U.S. intervention in Syria and Iraq providing for operational flexibility to U.S. commanders. The presence of ISIS and alQaeda in Syria demands our immediate attention. However, the 

United States must anchor its counterterrorism approach in a 

broader strategy if it is to prevail. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton follows:]

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Mr. POE. I thank all of you all for your testimony. I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

First of all, I gave each of you a list of the participants as I know 

them as of today. Ambassador Hof, I will just ask you quickly, is 

this a fair statement of the lineup of the players? 

Ambassador HOF. I think, broadly speaking, Mr. Chairman, it is 

a fair lineup. The only—the only thing off the top of my head I 

might take issue with here is listing ISIS under the roster of antiAssad forces. There has been, for the past 3 years, a live and let 

live relationship between the regime and ISIS. The regime’s military effort, the military effort of Russia has been directed at elements other than ISIS with rare exception. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Thank you. And it is a fair statement that there 

is an ebb and flow of the anti-Assad forces as to who they are 

today, whether they are anti-Assad or whether they are just working for their own self-interest in particular areas of the country. Is 

that a fair statement? 

Ambassador HOF. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. There is probably an 

example of just about everything in Syria today. 

Mr. POE. You have the bona fide rebel forces who want to overthrow Assad; you have out-of-towners who are criminals that are 

looking to loot, pillage the area; you have people coming in to take 

over territory. You just have everybody there in the anti-Assad 

group. Is that a fair statement? 

Ambassador HOF. You have got local elements that, for criminal 

purposes, have taken full advantage of local situations. You also—

you also have an ebb and flow of people depending on resource 

availability. 

One of the great successes of the al-Qaeda elements in Syria is 

that they have been pretty well resourced and have been able to 

pull away young Syrian men who are anti-Assad, originally lined 

up with the Free Syrian Army and so forth, but who have gone to 

work for an organization where they know—where breakfast is 

going to come from, they know they have got a serviceable weapon, 

they know they have got plenty of ammunition, so that has been 

a factor as well. 

Mr. POE. Are any of the Middle Eastern countries, Saudi Arabia, 

Qatar, UAE, are they funding any of these groups like al-Qaeda, 

quasi-terrorist groups? 

Ambassador HOF. I think, Mr. Chairman, the bulk of the evidence suggests that at an official level, no. These governments are 

not funding al-Qaeda or ISIS or any of those. 

Mr. POE. But it would be a fair statement that money is coming 

from those countries? 

Ambassador HOF. You bet, you bet. It would be a totally fair 

statement. There is money coming, I think in recent reports, Qatar 

and Kuwait have earned honorable or dishonorable mentions in 

this regard. 

Mr. POE. Dishonorable mentions. So you have at least three terrorist groups. You have ISIS, you have al-Qaeda, and you have 

Hezbollah, three terrorist groups, questionable whose side they are 

on on any given day. 

Let me ask you this. The U.S.—let’s talk about the United 

States’ role. In the past, we decided we would fund 5,000 so-called 

33

moderate rebels. That turned out to be a disaster. It cost us $1⁄2

billion. Armed 60 of them and they surrendered after the first day. 

I say that to say it is difficult to know who we are dealing with 

as a country when we turn over American equipment and American money. 

What should the United States do? Should we just stay the 

course, give a little money, a little weapon here and there? Should 

we go all in with the, you know, with the B-52s? So I say that, not 

facetiously, but all in all should we just say this is not our battle? 

Which of those three options, and I am going to ask each of you 

to give me which option the United States should take from this 

point on. 

Mr. Hassan, which position should the U.S. take? 

Mr. HASSAN. I think what the U.S. should be doing and what 

should——

Mr. POE. Which of those three options? 

Mr. HASSAN. I think they have to be more—they have to go all—

politically all in, and I think that is where the U.S. has been lagging behind. They haven’t pegged a political track to the military 

track as necessary. 

Mr. POE. All right. Ambassador Hof. 

Ambassador HOF. I would say all in using a whole-of-government 

approach to this. It is not entirely a military issue. Against ISIL 

it is, for sure, but there are—you know, the security of Americans 

is what is at stake and what is——

Mr. POE. Sure, political solution. 

Ambassador HOF [continuing]. Bubbling up out of Syria. 

Mr. POE. And Ms. Dalton. 

Ms. DALTON. I think we have to go in with a multifaceted approach that pushes hard politically, that creates leverage with Russia and Iran to pressure Assad to come to the negotiating table, 

and to change the military balance on the ground by continuing to 

support the groups that we have been working with. 

Mr. POE. I thank all three of you. 

And I recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, ranking 

member, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Dalton, you mentioned in your opening remarks, ‘‘Ukraine 

should not be a quid pro quo for Syria.’’ What prompted those 

statements from you? 

Ms. DALTON. Thank you, Ranking Member Keating. There have 

been reports of late that as the new administration is examining 

the policy options before it, which are, of course, global in scale 

given where the United States sits in the world, that they might 

take a different approach to Russia and that perhaps there is some 

transactional trade space to be had in areas where Russia and the 

United States are conflicting or have been conflicting. And there is 

a notion that perhaps an agreement could be reached with the Russians such that the United States would turn a blind eye to Russia’s activities in Ukraine in Crimea in exchange for Russian cooperation against ISIS in Syria and working with Assad. 

The reality is that that would be strategically foolhardy for the 

United States, in my opinion, to go down that pathway. Russia responds to strength, and rewarding Russia for bad behavior by enVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:54 Mar 02, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\021417\24241 SHIRL
34

couraging more bad behavior doesn’t seem to be a recipe for success. 

Mr. KEATING. Let me follow that up, if I could. 

Ms. DALTON. Yeah. 

Mr. KEATING. The Trump administration has repeatedly embraced the idea that the U.S. should cooperate with Russia on 

counter-ISIS or ISIL operations in Syria. How possible is that engagement in security in cooperating with Russia without working 

with Iran and its affiliates? Any of you. 

Ms. DALTON. Yes. I think—before turning to the Iran bit of that 

question, I think it is important to note that the vast majority, up 

to 80 percent of Russia’s air strikes in Syria have not been on ISIS 

targets. They have been on other Syrian opposition groups, some 

of which have been supported by the United States and our partners, and against civilian targets in Syria. So the idea—in a very 

sort of objective way of looking at this, our objectives are not 

aligned with Russia in terms of——

Mr. KEATING. Professor Hof, same question. 

Ambassador HOF. Yes, sir. I would certainly not begrudge the administration the ability to conduct its due diligence about the possibility of some kind of diplomatic and even, eventually, military cooperation with Russia. I have—I have my doubts as to whether 

there is any there there, but doing the diplomatic due diligence, 

look, there is no doubt whatsoever that the leadership in Russia 

has no affection, much less respect for Bashar al-Assad. Bashar alAssad has served a political purpose, to date, for President Putin. 

For our Government to explore whether there is a possibility of 

Russia using some leverage to push Assad into meaningful negotiations, I think it is worth a try. 

Mr. KEATING. Yeah. Mr. Hassan, how—could you—Mr. Hassan, 

I mean, could you follow up, but also talk about the ability of the 

U.S. and Russia sharing information, vital information in that 

quest. 

Mr. HASSAN. Absolutely. I think it is possible to cleave away Russia from Iran but only under one condition, which is that the U.S. 

pursues the right policy inside Syria, regardless of how Russia perceives that, which is basically a change in Syria that has seen legitimate—like as a legitimate change inside Syria, and the defeat—

and focus on the political environment inside Syria as much as the 

military challenge that ISIS and al-Qaeda pose. 

Only then would Russia start to maybe work with Americans in 

the right way against the interest of Iran. We know that the priorities of the two countries are different. They are long-term priorities at least. 

Mr. KEATING. Perhaps, if I could interrupt just to put this on the 

table, we are running out of time, but I think other people will follow up. I haven’t heard you talk about safe zones. If you could comment on some of the drawbacks of safe—and dangers of safe zones, 

what we should be looking out for, what is possible. 

Ambassador HOF. I think the main—the main thing to try to understand about safe zones is that it requires very strong protection 

not only from 30,000 feet, not just a no-fly zone, it requires decisive 

military power on the ground. This is what distinguishes a safe 

zone from a killing zone where people are inadvertently drawn in 

35

to a situation where they are not protected on the ground and as 

a result, slaughter takes place. 

Mr. KEATING. Yeah. And infiltration from terrorists. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

One of the countries that is not listed right on this list or your 

list is Israel, and a lot of the foreign policy that we have in the 

United States is very sensitive to Israel’s position. 

Do you have any comments in regards to how Israel views this 

situation? I know the relations with Russia isn’t bad, but their position against Hezbollah and Iran, I think, is well known, and they 

consider them a, you know, a major threat to the country. Anyone? 

Ms. DALTON. Thank you, Congressman. I believe that, from a security perspective, Israel is very concerned about the growth and 

development of IRGC-backed groups, not just Lebanese Hezbollah 

but the up to 115,000 Iranian-backed groups that are present in 

Syria and bolstering the Assad regime, and what that portends for 

the long-term presence of those groups in Syria and how that could 

potentially serve as a beachhead for IRGC activities that could 

threaten Israel and its interest. 

On top of that, the fact that Lebanese Hezbollah has acquired 

further operational refinement and capability development through 

its activities in Syria that could then be taken back to Lebanon and 

threaten Israel, I think is also something that the Israelis are very 

concerned about from a security perspective. 

Mr. COOK. I noticed Hamas was not listed on there. Do you have 

any comments about Hamas? Anybody? No? They are a nonplayer? 

Ambassador HOF. I think, Congressman, Hamas has been essentially a nonplayer in Syria for—there used to be an office in Damascus. It left, and I believe it has been a nonplayer for awhile in 

the Syrian context. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. Going back to Assad. I still—being a history 

major, and the history of Hezbollah and in Iran and their conduct 

there, it is very hard for me to accept the Russian position in Syria 

and some of the other countries there. The pro-Assad forces, I think 

they are very accurate there. Pro-Assad, obviously Iran, North 

Korea, China, and Hezbollah. And so I am still very, very nervous 

about any Russian affiliation with Assad and because of his conduct, both the present ruler and his father, which has been going 

on for years, and the number of people that have been killed in 

that country. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. 

Titus. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would just like to ask you about the perception of the United 

States in the region within Syria. You know, with the travel ban, 

with our unwillingness to do our part to help refugees, the recent 

announcement, perhaps, that they are going to continue to go down 

this path, what kind of perception will we have to overcome to be 

successful in the area? And is this working in the hands of some 

36

of the terrorist groups to use as propaganda against us in making 

the situation worse? Anybody, or all of you? 

Mr. HASSAN. Sure. I think many people, especially people who 

are in charge of the campaign against ISIS and al-Qaeda, recognize 

that the framing of the fight against these organizations is as important as the military challenge. So if your—if you have like 60 

countries fighting ISIS and ISIS is telling everyone that these are 

crusaders, these are not fighting us because we are terrorists but 

fighting the Sunnis, look at the devastation in Mosul but also look 

at the devastation at Aleppo. These are two separate powers doing 

work in two countries against Sunnis. 

So I think the framing of the fight against ISIS is as crucial as 

the military challenge. The ban itself is not as much discussed in 

the region as here, obviously, but I think there is a—perception 

matters a lot in Syria and Iraq. And that is why there is a danger 

in working with the Russians without really working out the political formula in the two countries. 

Ms. TITUS. Ms. Dalton, or Ambassador? 

Ambassador HOF. I would say, Congresswoman, there is—the 

United States does have a—definitely an image and a perception 

problem in Syria. It was not born with the executive order. Okay? 

It goes back. It goes back a few years. Expectations that the 

Obama administration, for example, would do something short of 

invading and occupying the country to protect Syrian civilians from 

mass murder. The fact that that never happened, unintended consequence for sure, but it does bear on our reputation in the country. 

My organization, the Atlantic Council, recently published what I 

consider to be a very, very important nonpartisan bipartisan effort. 

Steve Hadley and former secretary Madeleine Albright have published a Middle East Strategy Task Force report. And what comes 

through clearly in this report is the absolute need we and our 

transatlantic partners have for partnerships within the region. 

Ultimately, if terror is going to be killed and kept dead in the 

Middle East, it is going to be Muslims in the lead. All right? And 

again, nobody begrudges the President of the United States, his authorities, his views about the national security of the United 

States, but when we do these things, I think—I think we have to 

keep in mind the imperative of partnership in the region, who our 

partners need to be. And I suspect the administration will be doing 

a better job in that respect. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. Ms. Dalton. 

Ms. DALTON. I would completely align myself with Ambassador 

Hof’s remarks in terms of the necessity of reaching out, not only 

to our traditional partners, but also civil society organizations on 

the ground. The best messenger of countering violent extremism is 

local actors, local religious leaders, community activists. They are 

credible in the eyes of the people that we are trying to reach. And 

I think bolstering resourcings for those efforts through third-party 

means is exceptionally important. And really creating a coalition of 

not just government to government but also public-private partnerships also must be part of the equation. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

37

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlelady. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Hof, thanks for your service. In 2015, ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, reported through their intelligence 

sources that ISIS had been able to co-opt or to obtain passport information data, biometric data, facilities, equipment, et cetera, in 

Syria, and they were able to falsify or manufacture passports in 

that regard with that information. 

I am just wondering, since that time, this is the end of 2015, as 

I understand it and as I recall it, did we ever verify that? And does 

ISIS or al-Qaeda, for that matter, currently maintain access to Syrian Government facilities, equipment, biometric data, passport information, et cetera, that would allow either one of those groups to 

forge passports and/or falsify identities? Anybody? 

Mr. HASSAN. Sure. Just quickly. I think the only place that, you 

know, people inside Syria talked about with little evidence was 

Aleppo, but ISIS did not go to Aleppo. So if there was another—

if there was one group that took the—you know, seized these ones, 

it wouldn’t be ISIS. It would be Free Syrian Army groups. 

Mr. PERRY. But involved in the Free Syrian Army—I mean, we 

have a hard time, I think, distinguishing who’s who, and it 

changes, in some respects, seems to be month to month or if you 

want to say year to year. Could those—that information have fallen 

into the hands of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda operatives, even if they 

weren’t particularly ISIS operatives? 

Mr. HASSAN. I can’t say, to be honest. 

Mr. PERRY. Based on that, I mean, and maybe in conjunction 

with that, I mean, what confidence should the United States Government have in the Government of Syria and the actors in Syria 

to accurately confirm the identities of immigrants or refugees from 

Syria? 

Ambassador HOF. Congressman, my sense, and I am certainly 

not an expert in consular affairs, my sense is that there is a very 

intensive and very long vetting process for Syrian refugees to come 

to the United States. My suspicion is that the administration will 

probably find some tweaks, if you will, to improve that on the margins, but my—again, not being a consular specialist, you know, my 

sense from people who are in this business is that Syrian refugees 

considered to come to the United States get a pretty thorough 

scrubbing. 

Mr. PERRY. I am not doubting at all the capabilities, the diligence, et cetera, of the people in the United States doing the vetting. What I am questioning or trying to determine is the validity 

of the information that they compare against, who is giving it to 

them, what their interests may be, those who are giving the information, and the validity and the competence in the validity of that 

information coming from—does all that information come from the 

Assad Government or is there anybody else providing information? 

If you don’t know, you don’t know, but I am just—you know, looking at the map, I mean, obviously there is a lot of different players, 

right? 

38

So when a refugee comes from here, are they getting the information from Damascus, they being the United States, to vet this 

person, or is somebody in this region or any of these other regions 

providing some form of governance or tyranny or whatever you 

want to call it—where is that information coming from? Do we 

know? Do you know? 

Ambassador HOF. Congressman, speaking for myself, I don’t 

know. Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, elsewhere in 

Europe who apply to come to the United States have, in most 

cases, documentation from the Syrian Government: Passport, I.D., 

and so forth. That, I think, is where the investigation starts. 

There are numerous, numerous agencies of the United States 

Government involved in this, numerous international organizations 

as well. And I, although I don’t know, I strongly suspect that the 

kinds of questions that you are putting your finger on as to the validity of basic identity documents probably rates high in these investigations. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Dalton, I understand that you need to leave. There may be 

questions that members of the committee have not been able to ask 

you and they may turn those in in writing, which will be forwarded 

to you, and we would expect you to answer those questions within 

a week of when you received them. With that understanding, then 

you can leave. 

Ms. DALTON. Thank you so much, Chairman. And I beg the subcommittee’s forgiveness. I have a flight to catch today, but thank 

you so much for the opportunity to testify, and I would be glad to 

answer any followup questions. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Ms. Dalton. 

Mrs. Torres, you probably had all your questions for Ms. Dalton, 

but you are recognized. 

Mrs. TORRES. Absolutely, but that is okay. Thank you so much, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Terrorism, in many ways, is fueled by poverty and poor governance. In the long run, if Syria doesn’t see better governance and 

prosperity, then even if ISIS is defeated, something else will take 

its place. 

Getting back, Ambassador Hof, to, you know, what you were trying to get at earlier when you said, you know, who should our partners in the region be, who should we be working with there, I wonder if you can sort of look at your crystal ball, 5 years from now, 

down the road, you know, what are the prospects for the Syrian 

economy and Government? Will the Syrian economy and Government be better off if Russia and Iran are in the main outside powers shaping events in Syria, or should—what would that look like 

if the U.S. and Europe are the main outside powers shaping events 

in Syria? 

Ambassador HOF. Thank you for your—thank you for your question, Congresswoman. I would say off the top of my head that if 

Iran, in particular, is playing a decisive role 5 years from now in 

Syria, Syria will be basically a smoking pit, and it will be hemorrhaging human beings in all directions. 

39

Iran—Iran needs Bashar al-Assad for one thing and one thing 

only. He is—he and his entourage are the only people in a very nationalistic country willing to subordinate Syria 100 percent to Iran 

on the issue of Hezbollah. Iran knows there is nobody else in the 

country willing to go that far. So from Iran’s point of view, it is 

Bashar or nothing. 

Now, there are estimates out there that the rebuilding of Syria 

is going to take something on the order of $350 billion worth of investment, in some cases aid, grants. We are not even talking about 

humanitarian assistance here. Reconstruction. Okay? And there is 

a practical problem here, and I think the Russians get this, okay, 

because the Russians know the Assad regime probably better than 

any of us. 

Mrs. TORRES. But do they understand the rule of law? 

Ambassador HOF. I don’t think that is a—I don’t think that is 

a high priority. I think—I think what the Russians do understand 

is it is going to be very difficult for international financial institutions, for the United States, for Japan, for Western Europe to make 

the kinds of investment, make the kinds of grants and loans if you 

have got Bashar al-Assad and his entourage sitting there with 

their hands cupped ready to take a piece of this. 

Now, you know, as an American, like everybody else here, I am—

I guess I am basically an optimist. Yes, 5 years from now I do see 

Syria in a much better place, but that—that is going to require 

very, very, very strong efforts for all of us. There is a formula out 

there for moving toward a national unity governing scheme. It was 

agreed in June 2012 by Russia, China, the United States, Great 

Britain, and France. Our diplomatic challenge right now, I think, 

is to try to convince the Russians to get that back on track. 

Mrs. TORRES. But meanwhile, you know, we have thousands of 

people that are—continue to be slaughtered in the region and with 

very little control. You, yourself, stated that there is very little protection in some of these camps for folks. What more can be done 

to get our regional partners involved, if not Russia? 

Ambassador HOF. I think—I think for all of our regional partners 

there is a—there is an obligation that needs to be met in terms of 

providing sufficient funds for the humanitarian assistance that 

needs to take place. Thanks to you ladies and gentlemen and your 

colleagues in the appropriations process, the American taxpayer 

has been very generous in this respect. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlelady. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Garrett. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hassan, I want to clear up the record based on some questions asked by my colleague from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry. He 

queried you whether or not there might have been access to equipment in Aleppo that might allow individuals to forge Syrian passports, official documents, and your response, as I recall, was that 

ISIS was not in Aleppo, that that was the Free Syrian Army. Is 

it not also true, however, that a significant faction in Aleppo was 

Jabhat al-Nusrah or Jabhat Fatah al-Sham? 

40

Mr. HASSAN. Inside Aleppo, Jabhat al-Nusrah Arpar was never 

dominant. That was true until it was expelled—until the Russians 

and the regime expelled the rebels from Aleppo. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. But there were factions of Jabhat al-Nusrah 

and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in Aleppo, correct? 

Mr. HASSAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. GARRETT. And Aleppo was, prior to this upheaval, the largest 

city in the nation and a seat for a significant amount of government activity, correct? 

Mr. HASSAN. Yes. Remember, this was in 2012, and the jihadists 

were not yet there in that sense. 

Mr. GARRETT. Well, Mr. Hassan, the people who I have spoken 

with who were there on the ground indicated that when the Arab 

Spring occurred, the uprising was of individuals who had dissatisfaction with the regime but not necessarily an intent to overthrow. Ultimately, that leadership was co-opted or even killed and 

replaced by elements affiliated with al-Qaeda, originally known as 

al-Nusrah, right, and then an evolution of names. 

I guess what I am driving at is, the answer to Mr. Perry’s question was, if they controlled the proper parts of Aleppo, al-Qaedaaffiliated elements may have had access to equipment that could 

be used to forge government documents. And they were in Aleppo, 

were they not? 

Mr. HASSAN. In all honesty, I can’t tell, because I have no—I 

have not—I have no evidence to that or the contrary. But it is all 

possible. The regime still had presence inside Aleppo, so the equipment would have been taken very quickly to the west side of Aleppo where the regime was there. There was rumors that—there 

were rumors that some biometrics machines were still there. 

Mr. GARRETT. And we know that there were elements of what 

was originally al-Nusrah, which is morphed into an al-Qaeda affiliate, that were in control of portions of Aleppo over periods of time. 

Mr. HASSAN. Yes, lately. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. I wished that Ms. Dalton didn’t have to 

leave. We have talked a lot, and her comment was, ‘‘our objectives 

are not aligned with those of Russia.’’ What would either of you 

gentlemen or both articulate as our objectives? 

Ambassador HOF. I would say, Congressman, our principal objective is to defeat terror in Syria and keep it dead. This is—this is 

a national security objective, okay. Part of that involves going after 

ISIL directly militarily as quickly as possible. This organization 

has been sitting in its Syrian capital of Raqqa for a few years now. 

It has planned and executed some major atrocities in Europe. I 

mean, I have been asking myself, you know, for quite some time 

now how lucky do we think we are, okay. But killing that organization is one thing. Ultimately, there has to be something resembling 

decent, responsive, legitimate governance in Syria to keep it dead, 

and this is going to be the work of several years. 

Mr. GARRETT. So I don’t want to be disrespectful, and I appreciate your time, but I have limited time. So our objective is decent, 

responsible government in Syria that will protect Syrians. Okay. 

And right now, there—you can see that the vast bulk of, quote, 

anti-Assad military power on the ground is Kurdish in nature if 

you extract ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated elements. Combat power 

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on the ground, we both served, that aside from ISIS and al-Qaedaaffiliated elements, the most powerful player that is ‘‘anti-Assad is 

the Kurds.’’

Ambassador HOF. I would say, Congressman, the Kurdish military power on the ground in Syria, the YPG, this is predominantly 

our ground combat component against ISIL. They are not—they 

are not fighting—they are not fighting the regime. 

Mr. GARRETT. I agree, and that is why I used quotes when I said 

anti-Assad, because they are included on this form as anti-Assad. 

They are really pro-protecting themselves. And we have had wonderful success working with Kurdish minorities, but one thing we 

have learned is the Kurdish minorities protect Kurdish regions and 

then say why are we going this direction, right. And so the question becomes, and I know I am almost out of time, who is the viable 

entity to replace the Assad regime, because it is not ISIS or alQaeda? So who is there that can do it? 

Ambassador HOF. Congressman, there is—there is—there is a 

process, again, that was agreed to by the permanent five members 

of the Security Council on June 30, 2012. I was there as part of 

the American delegation when this agreement was reached. 

If we can somehow get back to that process in forming a national 

unity entity that will include, inevitably, members of the Syrian 

Government, you know, who are not—who are not covered in blood 

over the past few years, if we can get that way, that is—that is the 

beginning of the end for terrorism in Syria. 

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Chairman, I respect that my time is up. 

Mr. POE. All right. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Frankel. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be quick. I have 

to go to another meeting. 

Thank you both for your testimony, and I just wanted to make 

two points. I think it was Ms. Dalton, but maybe somebody else, 

that talking about the necessity, perhaps, of making some type of 

deal or cooperative arrangement or using sanctions against Russia 

in order to influence Assad. And I think this paper we were given 

just shows there is such a complicated web of players, 

andunraveling it is a phenomenal exercise. 

But I want to say that if we are going to have any hope of working with Russia, then I want to respectfully suggest that this Congress needs to know the relationship of Russia to the folks currently in the White House. And the resignation today of General 

Flynn, I think, calls in serious question as to what exactly who 

knew what, what did they know, when did they know it, and what 

is the real relationship between the White House and Russia. That 

is number one. 

Number two, I think it was the Ambassador that said—called 

what was going on in Syria a humanitarian abomination. And was 

that you, sir? Yes. I agree with you. I think everybody here agrees 

with you. I think our chairman laid out initially in his remarks the 

horrors of what is going on. And I can just say this, I heard the 

sadness in your heart of what is going on. What is it, 1⁄2 million 

people probably killed, 50,000 children, the President bombing his 

own people. 

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And so I wanted to say what I think is another abomination, and 

that is the position of the United States of America that we do not 

want to take any of these Syrian refugees into this country. I think 

that is an abomination. And I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlelady. 

And the Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me get to the nitty-gritty. First of all, this is a hearing that 

is represented by think tanks. One of the think tanks, she had to 

leave, but let me ask this: Do either of your think tanks receive 

contributions from Gulf State countries? 

Ambassador HOF. Sir, the case of the Hariri Center for the Middle East, we receive no government funding at all. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Or from private sector people from the Middle East? 

Ambassador HOF. Our principal donor is of Lebanese citizenship 

residing in Europe. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. A Lebanese citizen? 

Ambassador HOF. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And what about from your think tank? 

Mr. HASSAN. No government money. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No Arab money comes from——

Mr. HASSAN. Not that I am aware of, no. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And where does your money come 

from? 

Mr. HASSAN. Oh, Arab, sorry, and Egypt, yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But Arab money, yes. 

Mr. HASSAN. Egyptian businessman, the principal——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And what Arab money goes into your——

Mr. HASSAN. Just Egypt. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Who? 

Mr. HASSAN. Egypt. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, Egypt. I didn’t know Egypt had enough 

money to send over here. We just got back from there. 

Mr. HASSAN. Not the government. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Not the government. All right. 

Well, thank you. Let me just note that I have just got some specific questions for you. If Assad—if we are going to compare Assad, 

this brutal horrible man, to the other countries in the Gulf, Qatar, 

Saudi Arabia, even UAE, or now we are finding maybe Erdogan in 

Turkey. We know the Iranians are very brutal. But if, let’s say, 

with Qatar, let’s use that as an example, if there was an uprising 

against the royal family in Qatar and it was financed by people 

from the outside trying to overthrow, basically, an insurgency to 

overthrow the royal family and replace it with, of course, let’s say 

you have all of those nine out of ten people in Qatar are guest 

workers, let’s say they are declaring themselves for ISIL, and they 

get some support from the outside like that, basically, do you think 

that the Government of Qatar or these other governments would 

be less bloody than Assad when Assad was faced with an insurgency movement in his country? Either one of you. These are more 

benevolent than Assad? 

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Ambassador HOF. I would say—I would say, Congressman, that 

I would find it very, very hard to imagine anyone else in the region 

adopting a political survival strategy that focuses almost exclusively on civilians——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. On what? 

Ambassador HOF. On civilians and on civilian terror. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Uh-huh. 

Ambassador HOF. Okay. I think, you know, whether we look at 

the Independent International Commission of Inquiry and its work, 

if we—if we—if we look at the work of major American NGOs——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I cut what you—reclaiming my time. 

Ambassador HOF [continuing]. I think the record is clear. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I have got 5 minutes. How about you? Do you 

think these other countries are more benevolent than Assad? 

Mr. HASSAN. To be honest, I don’t think they would do the same. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. They wouldn’t do the same. 

Mr. HASSAN. What happened in Syria never happened. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am sorry, but I have got a limited number 

of time. You both think that these powerful forces that have—that 

are armed to the teeth would permit an insurrection to succeed in 

their countries and not utilize their weapons to destroy and obliterate anyone who is supporting the insurgency. I think you are 

wrong. We will leave that to whoever is listening to this and reading the transcript. 

We have 1⁄2 million people who have been dead. Many of them 

are refugees, there is no doubt about that. There are, of course, a 

lot of people who are dead who became refugees and survived who 

are leaving and fleeing ISIL, wasn’t it? I mean, didn’t we have the 

ISIL people at the same time murdering Christians by lining them 

up, and in the grossest fashion, cutting off their heads and engaged 

in—yes, bombing people from the air is brutal and kills children, 

et cetera. Cutting people’s heads off is a way to frighten large numbers of people and turn them into refugees. We know that happened. 

I don’t have to tell you, I do not see—I do not believe that this 

regime and Assad’s regime is any different than the rest of the regimes that I have seen for the last 28 years. And there is no reason 

why—you stated when we asked what our objective is. Our objective is to eliminate these terrorists? No, terrorism and the terrorist 

forces there. What we have done is our major focus is getting rid 

of Assad when, in fact, it should be eliminating the ability of the 

terrorist forces in that region to commit acts that threaten our security, and we have not done that. 

Instead, by focusing instead on one dictatorial regime as compared to all the rest of those authoritarian and brutal regimes that 

exist in that area of the woods, one regime has to go, and our focus 

is on getting rid of that regime. That makes no sense to me. It is 

not in our interest any more than it would be in our interest if another regime was under attack by an insurgency from its own people. 

And in this case, let us not forget this insurgency has gone on 

and on and on. The amount of death that has happened has happened because we and others have given the Assad—insurgents 

against Assad the idea that we are going to give them the means 

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to succeed. And I will have to say that you are repeating. We have 

to go back to agreement made by outsiders, outside powers way 

back in 2012. I am sure that gives all of those people who are fighting Assad a reason to keep on going rather than ending this struggle. And if it ends with Assad still in power, I don’t think it is 

going to be any different than having the royal family in Qatar or 

UAE or Iran or Saudi Arabia or now even Erdogan in Turkey remain in power. 

So with that said, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

And the subcommittee is adjourned. I thank the witnesses for 

being here. 

[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

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