IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2003-IA-01504-SCT

LISSA SNYDER

v.

JULIUS STEPHEN LOGAN d/b/a LOGAN

INSURANCE AGENCY AND NATIONWIDE

ASSURANCE COMPANY

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/09/2003

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LAMAR PICKARD

COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CARROLL RHODES

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: DORRANCE AULTMAN

WILLIAM HEATH HILLMAN

NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - INSURANCE

DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 01/06/2005

MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE COBB, P.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ.

RANDOLPH, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Lissa Snyder (“Snyder”) filed a c omplaint in the Jefferson County Circuit Court against

Julius Stephen Logan d/b/a/ Logan Insurance Agency and Nationwide Assurance Company.

The causes of action included fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, simple and gross

negligence, brea ch of contract and bad faith. The complaint followed Nationwide’s denial of

coverage after she was in a one-vehicle accident.2

¶2. The trial court ruled that proper ve nue only lay in Adams, Warren, and Rankin Counties

and granted the defendants’ motion for change of venue. Snyder filed a motion to alter or

amend and a

motion to reconsider or enter an order granting interlocutory appeal. The trial

court denied her motions, but deferred entry of i ts order transferring venue pending a ruling

on her petition for interlocutory appeal. This Court granted permission to proceed with her

interlocutory appeal. See M.R.A.P. 5.

FACTS

¶3. Sn

yder, a Jefferson County resident, purchased Nationwide auto insurance from the

Logan Agency, located in Natch ez (Adams County), in December 2000. Nationwide is a

foreign insurance comp any (Wisconsin) with a registered agent for process in Rankin County.

The owner of the Logan Agency, Julius Stephen Logan, a resident of Jefferson County, passed

away on December 2 8, 2001. As a result, on January 2, 2002, Logan’s book of insurance and

agency were transferred

to Dan E. Muirhead, a Nationwide agent in Vicksburg (Warren

County).

¶4. It is undisputed that her poli cy was cancelled on December 16, 2001, by Nationwide

due to her failure to pay premiums. Subsequently, Snyder received a bill from Nationwide

stating that Snyder owed an additional $64 for past coverage. On January 3, 2002, Snyder

traveled to the agency in Natchez and paid the outstanding $64. Snyder claims that shortly

afterwards she cal

l ed Nationwide’s toll-free number to inquire as to why she had to pay the

$64. She claims that she was informed that the payment was for reinstatement of the policy

and that the agency in Natchez needed to first verify payment before reinstatement.3

¶5. On January 7, 2002, Snyder returned to the Natchez agency and informed the employee

there about the telephone conversation with Nationwide. The employee contacted Nationwide

and subse quently issued Snyder an insurance card indicating that she was covered from January

7, 2002, through February 7, 2002.

¶6. On January 8, 2002, Snyder and h er brother were involved in a single-car accident in

Jefferson County. Subsequently, Nationwide denied her claim, and she filed the instant case

on February 19, 2002. After the case was removed to and remanded from the federal court,

the defendants filed a motion for change of venue and to dismiss Julius Stephen Logan. The

trial court granted the change of venue but deferred consideration o f the motion to dismiss.

ANALYSIS

¶7. The trial court ruled that Jefferson County was not a proper v enue because the

underlying accident is not part of the claims on which the complai nt is based and that all claims

pertain to alleged misrepresentations made by Nationwide and the Muirhead Agency.

¶8. On appeal, Snyder argues that the trial court abused its discretion and that venue was

proper i n Jefferson County for several reasons. First, her loss occurred there. Second, Logan

was domiciled there. Third, the alleged misrepresentations were made to her over the phone

while she w as at her home there. Snyder agrees with the trial court that venue would also be

proper in Adams, Warren and Rankin Counties and not es that “[o]f right, the plaintiff selects

among the permissible venues, and [her] choice must be sustained unless in the end there is no

credible evidence supporting the factual basis for the claim of venue.” F light Line, Inc. v.

Tanksley

, 608 So.2d 1149, 1155 (Miss. 1992). Snyder also relies on S tubbs v. Mississippi

Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. , 825 So.2d 8 (Miss. 2002), for her choice of venue.1 Repealed by H.B. 19, 2002 Miss. Laws, 3 rd Extra Sess., effective January 1, 2003.

4 ¶9. “An application for change o f venue is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge, and

his ruling thereon will not be disturbed on appeal unles s it clearly appears that there has been

an abu se of discretion or that the discretion has not been justly and properly exercised under

the circumstances.” G uice v. Miss. Life Ins. Co. , 836 So.2d 756, 758 (Miss. 2003) (citations

omitted).

Is Venue Proper in Jefferson County?

¶10. At the time this lawsuit was commenced, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-7 1 provided that

actions against insurance companies may be brought in any county in which a loss may occur.

Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3 was amended in 2002. (See 2002 Miss. Laws, 3 r d Extra Sess., ch.

2, § 1, eff. January 1, 2003; 2002 Miss. Laws, 3 rd Extra Sess., ch. 4 § 1, eff. Janua ry 1, 2003.)

However, at the time this lawsuit was commenced, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3 stated:

Civil actions of which the circuit court has origi nal jurisdiction shall be

commenced in the county in which the defendant or an y of them may be found

or in the county where the cause of action may occur or accrue and, if the

defendant is a domestic corporation, in the cou n ty in which said corporation is

domiciled or in the county where the cause of action may occur or accrue.

¶11. In Capital City Insurance Co. v. G.B. “Boots” Smith Corp. , No. 2002-CA-01896-SCT,

2004 WL 2403939 (Miss. Oct. 28, 2004), we recently examined both statutes and held the

general venue statute, M iss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3, to be mandatory, while the insurance venue

st atute, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-7, is permissive. 2004 WL 2403939 at *12 (¶35). Capital

City further held that, “[t]hus, where there is a resident defendant, the gen eral venue statute

‘shall’ apply; and where there is no resident defend ant, the insurance company venue statute5

offers the pla intiff other options.” I d. Because there is a resident defendant (Logan Insurance

Agency) in the case sub judice, the general venue statute, Miss. Cod e Ann. § 11-11-3, shall

apply.

¶12. This Court considered both § 11-11-7 and § 11-11-3 in Stubbs. In S tubbs

, this Court

held that the Circuit Court of Smith County abused its discretion in granting a chan ge of venue

to Simpson County. 825 So. 2d at 9. The Stubbses filed suit in the Smith County Circuit Court

against Welc h, Welch’s dealership, Trustmark, and Farm Bureau alleging several causes of

action including breach of contr act and negligence. I d

. The wreck occurred in Smith County

but John was hospitalized in Simpson County. I d

. The Stubbses and Welch were residents of

Simpson County. Trustmark’s principal place of business was in Hinds County, but its branch

in Simpson County handled the transaction. I d

. 11. Farm Bureau’s principal place of business

was in Hinds County, but A.W. spoke to and conducted business with the Smith County office.

¶13. The Stubbses claimed that Farm Bureau’s refusal to cover p roperty damage was bad

faith. I d

. at 13. Because coverage was limited to liability, this Court held that there could not

be a bad faith claim for failure to pay an uncovered claim. Id . Accordingly, this Court

dismissed Farm Bureau and held venue could not be established under § 11-11-7. However,

this Court went on to declare that venue was proper in Smith County, under §11-11-3, because

the wreck occurred there.

¶14. In holding that venue was proper in Smith County, this Court s tated in S tubbs that, “the

actions of [the defendants] Welch

, Auto Plex, and Trustmark, we re relatively harmless until

the accident occurred, which necessitated reliance on the defendants’ alleged guarantee, as6

averred by the Stubbses, that the Stubbses’ vehicle would be insured until they were covered

by their own insurance.” Id. at 15.

¶15. Following this Court’s preced ent, venue in the case sub judice is also proper where the

accident occurred; i.e. Jefferson County. Here, as in Stubbs , the actions of the defendants

were also harmless until the accident occurred in Jefferson County. “[T]here is nothing in the

phrase ‘where the cause of action may occur ...’ that limits the judicial search for but a single

co unty... [I]t is common experience that breach and causation and impact do not all always

happen at once. At the very least, the word occur connotes each county in which a substantial

component of the claim takes place...” Earwood v. Reeves

, 798 So. 2d 508, 513 (Miss. 2001),

quoting Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley , 608 So. 2d at 1157.

¶16. The trial court was correct in holding tha t venue was proper in Adams, Warren, and

Rankin Count ies but erred in finding that venue was not proper in Jefferson County. But for

the accident, which occurred in Jefferson County, no injury would have occurred and no suit

would ha ve been filed. Venue is proper in Jefferson County because a substantial component

of the c laim; personal injury and property damage, occurred there. “It is well established that

the plaintiff is entitled to choose between any of the p ermissible venue options where credible

evidence o r factual basis supports the venue selected.” W al-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson

, 807

So. 382, 387 (Miss. 2001). Therefore, the plaintiff’s choice of venue in Jefferson County

must be sustained. Because this issue is determinative, the other issues raised by Snyder are

not discussed.

CONCLUSION7

¶17. For these reasons, we reverse the change o f venue order and remand this case to the

Circuit Court of Jefferson County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶18. REVERSED AND REMANDED

.

WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., EASLEY, C ARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ.,

CONCUR. SMITH, C.J., DIAZ AND GRAVES, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.