JSOU Report 06-6 One Valley at a Time Adrian T. Bogart III
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JSOU Report 06-6

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2006

One Valley

at a Time

Adrian T. Bogart III

with Introduction by Walter M. Herd
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 

32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 

850-884-2763; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written 

works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more 

information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, 

at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-12-1
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy 

or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, 

USSOCOM, or the Joint Special Operations University.
Previous Publications of the JSOU Press

2004–2005 JSOU/NDIA Essays, April 2005

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, June 2005

Russian Special Forces, August 2005, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

The Evolving Requirements of the Canadian Special 

Operations Forces, September 2005, J. Paul de B. Taillon

Operationalizing COIN, September 2005, Joseph D. Celeski

Theoretical Perspectives of Terrorist Enemies as Networks, 

October 2005, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. and Jessica Glicken Turnley

Logistic Support and Insurgency, October 2005, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Dividing Our Enemies, November 2005, Thomas H. Henriksen

The War on Terrorism, December 2005, James A. Bates

Coast Guard SOF, February 2006, Gary R. Bowen

Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, March 2006, 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Narcoterrorism in Latin America, April 2006, 

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future 

Conflict, and Implications for SOF, April 2006, John B. Alexander

Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education, 

May 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, 

James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006

Executive Report, JSOU First Annual Symposium (2–5 May 2006)
The 2004 counterinsurgency campaign in 

Afghanistan was historic. Service personnel of 

general purpose, special operations, coalition,

and irregular forces worked in unison to defeat 

the insurgency in a country stricken by war. 

Their unwavering trust, cooperation, close 

integration, collaborative planning, and nested 

execution were in many cases, textbook. In recognition of their professional effort, this case 

study captures many of the lessons learned 

in their planning and operations. Success in 

Afghanistan also came from the determination 

of millions of Afghans who were supported by 

these gallant sailors, soldiers, marines, and 

airmen. 

To Major Cole Hogan, U.S. Army Special Forces; 

battalion chief Jack Fanning; Fire Department 

of New York; and all our fellow warriors whose 

selfless service gained victory in Afghanistan.

“One Team” 1

Contents

Foreword .............................................................................. xi

About the Author ................................................................. xii

Acknowledgements ............................................................ xiii

1. Introduction ...................................................................... 1

2. The True Believer, the Enemy At Large ............................... 7

3. Tenets of War in Afghanistan and 

 the Afghan Resistance ..................................................... 13

4. Historic Paralleling and 

 Principles of COIN Campaigning .................................... 29

5. Optimizing Command, Control, and 

 Coordination in a COIN Environment ............................. 39

6. Combat Operations in Afghanistan: Find, Fix, and 

 Finish the Enemy and Remove the Causes of Instability ... 53

7. Civil-Military Operations (CMO) in COIN ....................... 71

8. Results Achieved, Key Lessons 

 Learned, and the Next Level ........................................... 77

Endnotes ............................................................................. 83

References .......................................................................... 87

ix

Foreword

Lieutenant Colonel Bogart, with the help of other Army

Special Forces members, has authored an insightful monograph 

about conducting a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in 

Afghanistan. Through the operational lens of Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) in their 2004 campaign against the Taliban and their Al Qaeda 

supporters, “One Valley” details the accomplishments of Combined 

Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) 76. 

Bogart’s work shares the experiences and perspectives of SOF

planners as they developed their COIN strategy and organized to 

conduct the campaign. 

This planners’ viewpoint—a slice of perspective in the ongoing 

Long War—provides valuable insight. This work describes the operational and tactical successes of brave SOF warriors working with 

their Afghan and other coalition partners. With the advantage of 

hindsight, one hopes the work of CJSOTF-A 76 will stand the test of 

time as the recent resurgence of Taliban operations in the summer of 

2006 indicates clearly the need to continue the fight.

LTC Bogart’s work is extremely valuable. “One Valley” enumerates the thought processes and the challenges for conducting a COIN 

campaign in Afghanistan. As Lieutenant General David Barno wrote 

in his summer 2006 Parameters article, “The Taliban often reminded 

villagers: ‘The Americans may have all the wristwatches, we have 

all the time.’” The Taliban and LTC Bogart have arrived at the same 

conclusion—the Afghan people are the ultimate decision makers in 

the conflict. Whomever they choose to support and follow will rule 

Afghanistan. While it is not possible to defeat an insurgency in a 

year’s time, this monograph demonstrates that we can establish an 

operational foundation upon which to achieve strategic victory.

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

xi
xii

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Adrian Bogart is a Special Forces (SF) officer 

who has served in U.S. Army, joint, and combined command and 

staff assignments with 

special operations and 

general purpose forces. 

He started as an infantry officer serving in 

a mechanized infantry 

battalion in Germany, 

transferring over to SF 

thereafter with assignments as a SF detachment commander, SF 

company executive officer, and SF company 

commander. He served 

as a SF staff officer on 

the Army Staff and 

was one of the founders of the Department of Defense domestic consequence management capability, building the Civil Support teams and establishing 

the United States (U.S.) Northern Command.

After his assignments in the Pentagon, LTC Bogart was the 

deputy C9 chief of operations for the Combined Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC), Operation Iraqi Freedom in Kuwait and 

Iraq (2002 and 2003), later moving to 3d SF Group where he served 

as the J5 and chief of staff/executive officer for the Combined Joint 

Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), Operation 

Enduring Freedom (2003 and 2004). LTC Bogart currently serves as 

the G9 of the 4th Infantry Division deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07, responsible for Special Operations Forces (SOF) integration, counterinsurgency, and civil affairs. He is a graduate of Virginia Military Institute (civil engineering), U.S. Army Command and 

Staff College, Army Force Management School, and Defense Strategy 

Course.
xiii

Acknowledgements

This paper was edited by Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) 

and abridged from a longer manuscript of the same title. U.S. Army 

officers who contributed to that version were Colonel Walter M. 

Herd, Colonel Patrick M. Higgins, Major Mark A. Davey, and Captain 

Daudshah S. Andish. 

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 76 campaign in Afghanistan led to successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations under 

the leadership of Major General Eric T. Olson, Brigadier General 

Charles H. Jacoby Jr., and Brigadier General Bernard S. Champoux. 

Colonel Herd and Colonel Higgins were the two Combined Joint 

Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) commanders who directed the special operations supporting plan to the 

CJTF-A campaign plan for COIN operations in the Afghanistan theater of operations. The foundation of the COIN campaign strategy 

was developed in a 1.5-day March 2004 commander’s planning 

conference. The guidance from the previous commander, Colonel 

Joseph D. Celeski, was the basis for this victory, and his views on 

COIN can be found in the JSOU publication Operationalizing COIN, 

September 2005.

A large number of junior leaders who were responsible for 

the operational functions of the campaign—for example, planning, 

operations, psychological operations, civil affairs, logistics, and 

communications—deserve great credit for their technical expertise, timely decisions, and dedication to the mission and as fighting 

comrades. They are not mentioned by name here as some have 

returned to the battlefield to continue the fight. 

***

Photographs used by permission from Steve Herbert 

and CJSOTF-A members.

***
xiv

Afghanistan
1

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

1. Introduction

“I want you to move into that province, oust the Al Qaeda, 

co-opt the locals, and bring security to the region. Take as many 

Afghan forces as you can muster and be ready to move as soon 

as you can. What are your questions?” Those were basically 

the orders I gave the Special Forces A-Team commander as he 

moved into the Lware District in Afghanistan. In short, I tasked 

him to conduct unconventional warfare in that region by fighting the terrorists by, with, and through the indigenous forces 

rather than by using primarily U.S. military might.

— Colonel Walter M. Herd, commander, Combined Joint 

Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), 2004

I

n One Valley at a Time, Lieutenant Colonel Adrian Bogart provides the reader with a case study of how one group of Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) conducted their form of unconventional 

warfare in the 2004 timeframe. It recognized the uniqueness of the 

situation in Afghanistan, while drawing upon historical examples for 

designing an unconventional warfare campaign. As commander of 

the CJSOTF-A for almost a year, it is my good fortune to introduce 

LTC Bogart’s story. One Valley draws from the successes and sacrifices of the Task Force troops to tell a story of our campaign in 

Afghanistan, and I am pleased to offer my thoughts here about operational leadership in an unconventional warfare environment.

While I argue that unconventional warfare (UW) is the primary 

means for winning our current war on terror and that all other military efforts can support this primary UW focus, the definition of UW 

is unclear in the minds of many. Most of the professional soldiers, 

military academics, historians, and armchair generals would agree 

that UW is an ambiguous and broad type of warfare that the American military has seldom executed on a large scale. 

When defining UW, most professional soldiers and military academics would quote Joint Publication 1-02: 

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, 

normally of long duration, predominately conducted by 

indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, 

equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by 
2

JSOU Report 06-6

an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other 

direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations as well as the indirect activation of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also 

called UW. 

These military students would break down the specific caveats listed 

and create a checklist of operations that fall into the category of “UW.” 

Many would then argue, wrongly, that this type of warfare is at best 

only a supporting effort to the decisive blow provided by large-scale 

maneuver forces or, even worse, that UW is an unrealistic option 

in future war. In contrast, historians studying UW would focus on 

the days of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies 

and Observation Group (MACV-SOG) or the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II. They would discuss the crucial ability of 

these UW operators to mingle with the local forces in order to gain 

both popular support and ground truth intelligence. 

I have a very direct and personal view of UW, based largely on my 

command experiences in Afghanistan. While the study of joint publications, Army manuals, and American military history is certainly 

worthwhile, I believe the crux of what we need to know about UW can 

be found in a book we all read back in the 8th grade—Mark Twain’s 

Tom Sawyer. Early in that book, as you may recall, Tom was tasked 

to whitewash a fence in front of his aunt’s home. In order to accomplish this task, Tom co-opted his friends and neighborhood pals to 

paint the fence for him. He painted just enough himself to inspire 

and instruct his surrogates. In the end, the fence got painted, the 

whole community had bought into the project, and Tom did not get 

paint splashed all over himself. 

It is often thought (wrongly) that UW is just training and combatadvising indigenous forces on the battlefield. In fact, that is only a 

part of UW, certainly not the whole. If you are operating by, with, 

and through indigenous people, you are conducting UW. If you are 

fighting by, with, and through or collecting intelligence and conducting operational preparation of the environment by, with, and through

others, you are conducting UW. 

Whether the job is direct action, special reconnaissance, or sabotage and subversion, if the focus is on doing it by, with, and through

the indigenous population, consider it UW. In an unconventional war 
3

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

the default force of choice should always be the indigenous force. Unilateral force is only used as a last resort. Even if tactically successful, 

a unilateral operation may ultimately lead to failure by unseating the 

very indigenous capability you are trying to build. 

What does this academic discussion have to do with the ongoing 

war? The first thing leaders must do in any situation is to grasp and 

define the problem. This problem—the war on terror—has unconventional aspects to its nature. It is a war that is best fought using the 

indirect approach. The hard cold facts are that if we, the U.S. military, try too hard to win this war single-handedly, we’ll lose it. The 

only way to win our current war is by, with, and through others. The 

very definition of victory in this war is when others, other nations and 

other cultures, police their societies properly so that those same societies aren’t terrorist-breeding grounds or safe havens from which terrorists can attack our homeland again. That alone dictates that this 

war is not a traditional maneuver war, but a global unconventional 

war. This type of unconventional war requires an unconventional 

strategic concept combined with strategic patience (perseverance) 

by the American government as 

well as its people. There is no 

Blitzkrieg in UW; only a longterm approach will help deliver 

victory. 

Some armchair generals, 

legacy-thinking academics, and 

poorly informed professionals 

may say that we will not conduct UW in modern times. They 

think that if you don’t parachute 

into occupied territory, link up 

with a partisan group, and overthrow an occupying army like 

the OSS did six decades ago, it 

is not UW. In fact, we are conducting UW every day in this war. We 

have over a dozen Special Forces (SF) A-camps in Afghanistan alone 

tasked to do UW. The vast majority of the actionable and reliable 

intelligence we have in that region comes from SF troopers working by, with, and through others. In more cases than not, it is the 

Figure 1. CJSOTF-A motto: “by, with, and 

through” others.
4

JSOU Report 06-6

SF-recruited, trained, and advised Afghan Security apparatus that is 

providing security, not the coalition forces. 

An illustrative example of our UW concept is the operations conducted in the Lware Province of Afghanistan. The CJSOTF-A tasked 

an SF Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) commander to build an 

A-camp and conduct UW by, with, and through the indigenous population. He took his A-team in consort with one company of Afghan 

National Army soldiers and their old Soviet 82-mm mortars, about a 

dozen Afghan border guards, and an equal number of Afghan custom 

police. Within 1 week of their arrival, after preempting several enemy 

attacks, this small UW force had denied that area as a safe haven 

for the enemy. A few months later, a small investment of only their 

time, expertise, and about $50,000 resulted in the area participating 

in the national elections and moving down the road to stability. We 

are enjoying success in countless other dusty valleys in the region by 

operating by, with, and through the indigenous peoples. 

Another great example of unconventional by, with, and through

operations was in southern Afghanistan when one of our indigenous forces brought us nearly 20 Taliban insurgents. Over about a 

2-month period, he literally bound and gagged these terrorists and 

delivered them to one of our A-camps in the back of his Toyota station 

wagon. By following this Tom Sawyer example, American SF working 

by, with, and through both indigenous individuals and indigenous 

military units were able to change the environmental conditions and 

thus deny sanctuary to any leftover guerrillas. One valley at a time, 

stability can spread. This persistent spreading of influence into formally controlled Taliban areas, one valley at a time, is achieved by a 

UW strategy. 

We used the combination of strike operations and civic action 

with great success by following one simple rule: co-opt those that 

you can, then destroy the rest. The sequence counts. While not the 

focus of the conventional military, the key to this kind of war is to 

attack the enemy’s popular support as well as his combat forces. In 

order to do that, we must separate the guerrilla from his support 

base (auxiliary and underground). This must be done kinetically, fiscally, physically, socially, or even emotionally. When we introduce 

security to most of the local inhabitants, they eventually buy into the 

overall plan. Thus the insurgent is left alone in the cold (literally). 

His choices are only to fight or convert. Co-opt as many as possible 
5

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

by introducing a better option, and then you are left with only the 

unredeemable to fight. It is a simple truth with insurgencies: contented people don’t revolt. So we must attack the source of the anger, 

the causes of the instability, with the same vigor that we attack the 

armed insurgent. 

Some may think that any quality unit can remake themselves 

into UW experts. Our nation has a large kitbag full of organizations with different capabilities and cultures. Most of those capabilities in the conventional forces as well as most of the special 

operations units are strike-focused. Each force package can bring 

different capabilities to the fight. Only 

SF soldiers are recruited, assessed, 

trained, equipped, and organized primarily to fight the UW mission—by, 

with, and through others. They have 

been specifically bred to operate in 

this ambiguous and unconventional 

environment. Per capita, these unconventional warriors are disproportionately responsible for the overthrow of the Taliban and the 

continued counterinsurgency (COIN) successes in Afghanistan. In 

Iraq, it was the unconventional warriors of 10th and 5th SF Groups 

that marginalized over a dozen Iraqi mechanized divisions and thus 

controlled the northern and western portions (approximately two 

thirds) of the nation. 

America has transformed the SF units at the tactical level to the 

most effective UW force on earth. A question for further study is how 

can we continue to transform at the strategic level: who is fighting the 

strategic unconventional war? Clearly, our way of life is at stake. We 

are currently fighting a global unconventional war on terror. Victory 

in this UW war is defined when others are capable and motivated 

to secure their own lands from becoming a terrorist sanctuary. As 

such, our main effort must focus on facilitating by, with, and through

success. The focus of the bombers, the tankers, and the commandos 

is to ultimately support those fighting this global war by, with, and 

through indigenous peoples. If we do it alone now, we’ll be doing it 

alone forever. 

One Valley at a Time advises the reader how UW can be successfully conducted. While it is a case study about a specific location in 

a time now past, I believe it offers strategic insight and counsel for 

Only SF soldiers are recruited, 

assessed, trained, equipped, 

and organized primarily to 

fight the UW mission—by, 

with, and through others. 
6

JSOU Report 06-6

those who will continue in the future to advance the causes of liberty 

and justice—and live up to the SF’s motto, de oppresso liber (“to free 

the oppressed”). 

Walter M. Herd

Colonel, U.S. Army SF

Figure 2. 

Face to face with 

Afghan, Pakistan, 

and American 

leaders to discuss 

border security, 

9 March 2004.
7

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

2. The True Believer, 

 the Enemy At Large

Somewhere a true believer is training to kill you. He is training 

with minimum food or water, in austere conditions, day and 

night. The only thing clean on him is his weapon. He doesn’t 

worry about what workout to do; his rucksack weighs what it 

weighs, and he runs until the enemy stops chasing him. The true 

believer doesn’t care “how hard it is”; he knows he either wins 

or he dies. He doesn’t go home at 1700; he is home. He knows 

only the cause. Now, who wants to quit? 

— Unknown source, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

The true believer is a father, a brother, a nephew, a cousin, 

or a son who has become the revolutionary, the emir, the 

foot soldier in the war against the U.S. and the West. The 

true believer is at war with what the U.S. stands for in the world. 

His blackened eyes are consumed with hate. He is undaunted in his 

cause. His terms are unconditional, and he does not seek parley. The 

true believer is acknowledged to be radical Islamic fundamentalists 

generally organized, supported, or aligned with the Al Qaeda network.2 The true believer is who we fought in Afghanistan.

Al Qaeda Goals, Motivations, and Objectives

Al Qaeda goals, motivations, and objectives are straightforward and 

very much advertised through the teaching of their leaders. They are 

clearly detailed in the U.S. Federal Grand Jury indictment against 

Osama bin Laden issued in New York on 5 November 1994 for the 

East Africa bombings.3 The indictment states that Al Qaeda went 

to war against the U.S. for several reasons. The organization views 

the U.S. as an “infidel” because it was not governed in a manner 

consistent with the group’s extremist interpretation of Islam. The 

U.S. is also viewed as providing essential support for other “infidel” 

governments and institutions, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 

the nation of Israel, and the United Nations organization, which were 

regarded as enemies of the group. 
8

JSOU Report 06-6

The indictment went on to state that Al Qaeda opposed the 

involvement of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Gulf War in 1991 and 

in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992 and 1993, which 

were viewed by Al Qaeda as pretextual preparations for an American 

occupation of Islamic countries. In particular, Al Qaeda opposed the 

continued presence of American military forces in Saudi Arabia 

(and elsewhere on the Saudi Arabian peninsula) following the Gulf 

War. Of course today we see Al Qaeda conducting active combat 

operations against the U.S. and the coalition and allied partners in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, perhaps in the Philippines, and of course targeting 

the U.S. mainland. 

The Grand Jury indictment further stated that one of the 

principal goals of Al Qaeda is to drive the U.S. military out of Saudi 

Arabia (and elsewhere in the 

Middle East) through violence. 

Al Qaeda builds on its perceived 

success in forcing Russia out of 

Afghanistan, and the subsequent 

collapse of the Soviet Union, and 

defeating the U.S. in Somalia. 

Members of Al Qaeda issued 

fatwahs (rulings on Islamic law) indicating that such attacks were 

both proper and necessary. From 1993 until December 1999, Ayman 

Al Zawahiri led the Egyptian Islamic jihad (“holy war”), which was 

dedicated to the forceful overthrow of the Egyptian government 

and to violent opposition of the U.S., in part, for its support of the 

government in Egypt. 

The Al Qaeda Operation

Al Qaeda operates around a core nucleus of individuals who lead a 

series of operations, logistics, finance, training, and command cells 

populated by surrogates and line or foot soldiers. Al Qaeda is distinguished from other terrorist organizations due to its non-state status, 

transnational reach, and unconstrained “military” operations against 

the U.S. Al Qaeda is the principal external sponsor supporting internal insurgencies throughout the world. Understanding Al Qaeda 

is key to understanding how it supported the Afghan insurgency. 

Al Qaeda builds on its perceived 

success in forcing Russia out of 

Afghanistan, and the subsequent 

collapse of the Soviet Union, and 

defeating the U.S. in Somalia. 
9

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

Organization and Infrastructure. Al Qaeda functions both on its own 

and through some of the terrorist organizations that operate in areas 

such as the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, 

Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria, 

Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, the Kashmir region of India, and the Chechnya region of Russia. Al Qaeda 

maintains cells and personnel in a number of countries to facilitate its activities, including in Kenya, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, 

Canada, and the U.S. 

Command Structure. Al Qaeda’s command and control structure 

includes a Majlis al Shura (or consultation council), which approves 

major undertakings including terrorist operations, a “military committee” that considers and approves “military” matters, and alliances 

with the national Islamic front in the Sudan, representatives of the 

Government of Iran, and its associated terrorist group Hizballah.

Support Activities. In 1994, Al Qaeda established a media information 

office in London, England to provide a cover for activity in support of 

Al Qaeda’s “military” activities, including the recruitment of military 

trainees, disbursement of funds, equipment procurement, and conduit for messages.

Training Base. The organization had provisioned guest houses and 

training camps at various times (from at least as early as 1989) and 

areas, including Afghanistan, United Kingdom, Pakistan, the Sudan, 

Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, and the 

Philippines.

Financial and Business Dealings. Since 1989, Al Qaeda has been 

engaged in financial and business transactions, including purchasing land for training camps; purchasing warehouses for storage of 

items, including explosives; purchasing communications and electronics equipment; transferring funds between corporate accounts; 

and transporting currency and weapons to members of Al Qaeda and 

its associated terrorist organizations in various countries throughout the world. To carry out some of these transactions, Al Qaeda 

operates in Malaysia, China, the Philippines, and Germany.
10

JSOU Report 06-6

History of the Organization and the Road to War

The Al Qaeda “base” was developed by bin Laden and others in the 

early 1980s to support the war effort in Afghanistan against the Soviets. He established a recruiting and charity drive to support the Mujahedin fighters in Afghanistan. The resulting “victory” in Afghanistan 

gave rise to the overall jihad movement. Trained Mujahedin fighters 

from Afghanistan began returning to such countries as Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia with extensive jihad experience and the desire 

to continue the jihad. This antagonism began to be refocused against 

the U.S. and its allies.4

From 1989 until the present, Al Qaeda serves as an international 

terrorist group dedicated to opposing non-Islamic governments with 

force and violence. This organization grew out of the mekhtab al 

khidemat (the “services office”) organization, which had maintained 

offices in various parts of the world, including Afghanistan, Pakistan 

(particularly in Peshawar), and the U.S., particularly at the Alkifah 

Refugee Center in Brooklyn, New York. 

In 1989 the group began to call itself Al Qaeda and headquartered in Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan. In 1991 the leadership 

of Al Qaeda, including its emir (prince) bin Laden, relocated to the 

Sudan. Al Qaeda was headquartered in the Sudan from approximately 1991 to 1996 but still maintained offices in various parts of 

the world. In 1996 bin Laden, Muhammad Atef, and other members 

of Al Qaeda relocated to Afghanistan. 

In an address to Congress on 7 February 2001, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director George Tenet identified bin Laden as one 

of the leading threats to U.S. national security. 

Bin Laden and his organization have been actively opposing 

the U.S in a series of “battles” and “campaigns” to achieve 

their goals and objectives. The Al Qaeda has an extensive 

worldwide network, which has demonstrated agility in striking U.S. targets both domestically and abroad. Al Qaeda 

represents the most sophisticated terrorist threat against 

the U.S.5

Activities connected to bin Laden and the Al Qaeda are outlined 

in the following table.
11

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

Al Qaeda’s alliance with the 

Taliban and the state support 

provided to Al Qaeda brought 

the U.S. to war in Afghanistan, 

commencing combat operations 

on October 2001. To prosecute 

our part of the war, the leaders 

of CJSOTF-A considered three 

essential concepts, or tenets of 

our COIN efforts, that guided 

planning. These involved considering the land, the mindset of the 

people, and the problem of outside support. The next section 

discusses these issues and their 

relationship to the nature of the 

enemy as we found it—the guerrilla, the underground, and the 

auxiliary. 

Year Activity

1993 Mogadishu ambush of U.S. Army forces

World Trade Center bombing in Lower Manhattan, New York

1995 Manila Air bombing, (test for 11 U.S. Flag Carriers over the Pacific)

1996 Khobar Tower bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya

Bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

1999 Failed attack of Los Angeles International Airport

2000 Seaborne attack against the USS Cole, in Aden, Yemen

2001 Coordinated attack against New York and Washington D.C.

Fronts of resistance established in Afghanistan

2003 Fronts of resistance established in Iraq

Fronts of resistance established in Europe (Madrid and Russia)

2004 Fronts of resistance established in Sudan and Central Africa

2005 Fronts of Resistance established in Australia? Lebanon?

Figure 3. Afghan civil leader, 

22 October 2004—the operational 

center of gravity.

13

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

3. Tenets of War in Afghanistan 

 and the Afghan Resistance

Afghanistan is a pastoral landscape. Except for the slight 

marks of the 21st century, the grazing livestock, mud-walled 

villages, and dress of the men, women, and children seem 

closer to the time of Mohammed than the world the western observer 

knows today. 

Afghans are purely tribal people whose societal foundation 

encompasses the nuclear, immediate, and greater family. They are 

tied to their land, which by western standards is bleak, barren, and 

desolate, but to the Afghan is their heaven on earth. Afghans are a 

mountainous people who are bound by the influences of nature and 

their surroundings. In this harsh land, life is a struggle, and their 

struggle is their religion. 

Their reverent belief in God is stalwart because as an agrarian 

culture, they are victims to nature. If there is a drought, it is God’s 

will. If there is a famine, God has made it so. If their crops are bountiful, God has blessed the season. An agrarian society embraces religion, more so than an industrial society who to a greater degree 

manipulates nature and the environment more than the rural society is capable of doing.

I am a Pashtun for 5,000 years, I am a Muslim for 1,400 years, 

I am a Pakistani for 40 years. 

— Pashtun politician in Pakistan

The majority population of Afghanistan consists of the Pashtuns. 

Tribal and family identities are strong and well represented in this 

group. Their tribal culture and unwritten laws, which comprises the 

geographic area they dominate—Pashtunwali, reveal a strong set 

of traditions that are meant to maintain and repair relationships 

between families, tribes, and clans through extension of blood relations (intermarriages) and a systematic way of resolving disputes 

between these groups. In addition to the Pashtun-dominated area, 

Pashtunistan, that stretches across the international border, there 

is an officially recognized “Pashtunistan Day” celebrated annually on 

19 August.6
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JSOU Report 06-6

The Pashtun are not at peace unless they are at war. 

— Pashtun proverb

Pashtuns, as a tribe, have been a dominant force in this region 

for 5,000 years, and the Taliban movement has its base and only 

stronghold among the Pashtun. The Taliban movement has its roots 

in Deobandism, which originated in northern India under the British and in the Pashtun-Islamic culture of this region. However, the 

Taliban’s fundamentalist-militant ideology is more common in the 

Muslim world than many people (especially westerners) realize. For 

example, the Taliban is of the Wahhabi sect of Islam, which is the 

same sect of Islam widely practiced in Saudi Arabia. In most parts of 

Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabi religious police (Al-Mutawwayeen) strictly 

enforce Sharia (a body of Islamic law), to include the following: 

a. Preventing the building of churches or any religious structure other than a mosque

b. Arresting people who practice any religion other than Islam

c. Beating women who are not covered properly or attempt to 

protest injustices

d. Forcing businesses to close during prayer time

e. Enforcing harsh penalties for the violations of certain Islamic 

laws. 

This type of fundamentalist enforcement also occurs in many other 

countries and areas in the Islamic world. 

The Land

The first tenet in understanding waging war in Afghanistan is that 

the Afghan people are knitted to their land. The greater family, their 

beliefs in God, the agrarian nature of their existence, the harshness 

of the climate, and their isolation bind them to it rather than tie 

them to an industrial society. The impassable mountains and rugged 

plains, which envelope this country, makes Afghanistan a pastoral 

watercolor whose very nature defies modernization. 

It is here, in this context, where the first part of our understanding of the Afghanistan battlespace forms. The second part comes 

from the more immediate past. 
15

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

Allah loves those who fight for his cause in ranks as firm as a 

mighty edifice. 

— Qur’an Surah 61:4, Al-Saff (Battle Array)7

During the “Great Game” the British Empire struggled with the Russian czars over control of Central Asia. Afghanistan was the prize, 

for this land was the centerpiece between Russia’s longing for direct 

access to a warm water port and England’s determination to keep 

the land route to India open, at all costs. For as Great Britain knew, 

without India, there was no British Empire. 

The British made several incursions into Afghanistan and succeeded in checking the Russian advance to the south. The British 

involvement was long and difficult, but the British ascertained the 

methodologies to manage the Afghan battlespace.

History of Insurgency in Afghanistan

There are countless stories of British valor with charges up icy cliffs to 

attack Pathans (Pashtuns) firing down on British forces from mountain crags with their long barreled muskets. There are great stories of 

British troops taking the Khyber Pass to ensure free passage between 

British India and beyond, and there is one story in particular when a 

British major ordered his Vickers machine gun team to open fire on 

an Afghan funeral procession moving through the valley below. They 

did fire, and what the soldiers found were men under the burkas, and 

in the coffins were arms and ammunition. No one could figure out 

how the British major knew that the funeral procession was a cover 

for hostiles, but as the story goes, he thought like an Afghan. The 

second tenet in understanding the waging war in Afghanistan is that 

in order to defeat the insurgent, you must think like him. It is here, 

in this context, where the second part of our understanding of the 

Afghanistan battlespace forms. The third part is more recent. 

Outside Support

On 25 December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The 

initial campaign was successful. They controlled the country by land 

and air. They held the upper hand against the Mujahideen and forced 

Russia’s will across the nation. In 1980 bin Laden joined the jihad 

against the Soviets by recruiting fighters from across the Muslim 
16

JSOU Report 06-6

world and establishing charity organizations to fund the cause. In 

1983 he left the Middle East and came to Afghanistan to join the 

fight. His outside intervention greatly assisted anti-Soviet Afghan 

forces with the manpower to sustain an in-depth fight against 

Russian forces. Complicating the anti-Soviet fight was the use of 

surface-to-air missiles. 

Both factors lent towards the systematic entrenchment of Soviet 

forces in Afghanistan with mainstay aerial platforms under constant 

engagement, and ground forces under great pressure. As a result, 

the last Soviet soldiers left Afghanistan on 15 February 1989. The 

third factor in understanding waging war in Afghanistan is that 

an insurgency gains success when outside intervention allows the 

insurgent to defeat government forces by using outside means on the 

guerrilla’s own terms.

Insurgent Leaders and Resistance Fronts

As the Taliban government lost power and became unseated by coalition forces, remnants of the Taliban regime dispersed to sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Reduced to a remnant force, the 

Afghan resistance objective became to oppose the establishment of a 

free and democratic Afghanistan through terrorism and subversion. 

During the 2004 COIN campaign, the specific insurgent forces operating in Afghanistan were the Taliban in the south, the Al Qaeda in the 

east, and the Hezb-i-Islami (HiG) in the northeast. The Taliban and 

HiG were the indigenous resistance force, with Al Qaeda constituting the external source of the insurgency, powering the subversion.8

As a point of reference, during the American War of Independence, 

Lord Howe may have looked upon George Washington as the guerrilla

chief. King George III and his Cabinet could have seen John Adams 

and Thomas Jefferson as leading underground members, and certainly Betsy Ross and the other great colonial dames were probably 

viewed by the average British officer in the field as the auxiliary.

Afghanistan is not an isolated resistance. The Afghan insurgency 

is in fact a regional resistance front in the global insurgency, which 

Al Qaeda promulgates. Other resistance fronts involve Iraq, Saudi 

Arabia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Europe, and the U.S. By 2004 

the resistance front in Afghanistan was organized into a northern, 

center, and southern subresistance fronts with area commands constituted in each front.
17

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

Northern Resistance Front. This area is from Kabul to the Panshir Valley, 

westward along the Kabul River and northeast along the Afghan/

Pakistan border. The front commander is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. He 

studied at Kabul University and entered politics, serving at one time 

in the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Soviet-backed 

Afghanistan government. Hekmatyar was imprisoned for killing a 

Maoist student and fled to Pakistan where he founded Hezbi Islami. 

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, he received millions 

of dollars worth of military and financial aid from the U.S. to fight 

the communists. When the Soviet-backed government fell in Kabul, 

Hekmatyar and his party were invited by the new Mujahideen government to help build an Islamic government in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar was offered the Prime Minister position and refused. He opposed 

the Mujahideen leaders and launched several unsuccessful efforts to 

seize power in Kabul. In the beginning of 1993 Hekmatyar again was 

offered the seat of Prime Minister and accepted, serving from March 

1993 until January 1994. In early 1994 he became dissatisfied and 

tried to topple the Islamic government, but failed. In June 1996 Hekmatyar again accepted the position of Prime Minister, but was forced 

out by the Taliban in late 1996. As the Taliban fell from power, Hekmatyar and the HiG party joined the Afghan resistance allying with 

the Taliban remnants and Al Qaeda.

Central Resistance Front. This area spans south of the Tora Bora Mountains along the Afghan/Pakistan border and south to Spin Boldak. It 

spreads west to the Ring Road and the cities of Ghazni and Gardez. 

The front commander was Jalaluddin Haqqani, a distinguished 

Mujahideen commander from the Soviet war who later allied with 

the Taliban. Haqqani rose to prominence as a military leader of the 

Pashtun resistance to the communist government in Kabul and had 

allied with the U.S. during the war. After the war, he aligned with the 

Taliban as they gained power and assisted them in securing control 

of Nangarhar Province in 1996. The defection was a key factor in 

securing territorial advantage for the emerging Taliban. At the time, 

bin Laden was living in the Jalalabad area as a guest of Haqqani. 

Haqqani led the Taliban’s military campaign north of Kabul during 

the winter of 1996/97, purging the Tajik minority in that area. In 

1998 he switched posts, being appointed as the Taliban Minister of 

Tribal and Border Affairs. Due to his friendship with bin Laden, sev-
18

JSOU Report 06-6

eral training camps were built in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar 

and Paktia.9 As the Taliban fell from power, Haqqani fled from Kabul, 

commenting to local reporters:

We will retreat to the mountains and begin a long guerrilla 

war to reclaim our pure land from infidels and free our country like we did against the Soviets....We are eagerly awaiting 

the American troops to land on our soil, where we will deal 

with them in our own way....The Americans are creatures of 

comfort. They will not be able to sustain the harsh conditions that await them.10

Haqqani serves as the Afghan proxy of Al Qaeda in the central 

front. 

Southern Resistance Front. This area included Kandahar north to Qalat, 

west to the Oruzgan province, and south to the Helmand province. 

The front commander, Mullah Mohammed Omar, was born in 1959 

as the son of a farmer, growing up in the village of Singesar, near 

Kandahar. Omar reportedly stated that he started the Taliban after a 

dream in which Allah came to him in the shape of a man, asking him 

to lead the faithful. There were also practical reasons. 

A devout son of Islam, Omar was a mullah in a village madrassah near Kandahar. He had fought alongside the Mujahideen from 

1989 to 1992, but began to oppose them as they turned on fellow 

Afghans and international aid workers. Omar organized fellow ethnic 

Pashtun followers to stop the Mujahideen from terrorizing women 

near his village and later to bring law and order to an entire country. 

His core belief was to create a Muslim state that would practice a 

strict interpretation of the Koran, one taught in the fundamentalist madrassahs of Pakistan, where Omar went to school. Hence, the 

Taliban movement was born, backed by the Pakistani secret service, 

and which gained control over most of the country by 1998. 

In 1996 as the Taliban movement gained momentum, Omar 

accepted the title of amirul momineen (“commander of the faithful”) in 

Kandahar, wrapping himself in a cloak said to belong to the prophet 

Mohammad, a very powerful symbol to the believers. Omar is the first 

Muslim since the Fourth Caliph, a nephew of Mohammad, to publicly accept the amirul title, a ranking in Islam nearly second to the 

prophet. Muslims outside Afghanistan did not accept his title. Omar 

allied with bin Laden and Dr. Zawahiri and supported the Al Qaeda 
19

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

operation in Afghanistan, but did not condone the exportation of the 

jihad. As the Taliban government fell, Mullah Omar retreated into 

the southern reaches of Afghanistan to conduct operations against 

coalition forces.11

The Enemy Order of Battle

In its simplest terms, the enemy in Afghanistan is codified as the 

insurgent. By definition, an insurgency is an organized movement 

aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through 

use of subversion and armed 

conflict (JP 1-02). Members of 

the insurgent force are organized along political lines to 

support political, economic, 

social, military, psychological, 

and covert operations. 

The Afghan insurgency is 

organized along a traditional 

insurgent order of battle. 

The Order of Battle in 2004 

included the guerrilla, who 

is the armed insurgent, the 

underground, which is the 

political and financial wing of 

the insurgency, and the auxiliary, which provides the civilian support to the insurgent. 

A great appreciation of the 

enemy’s structure came from 

reading U.S. Army doctrine 

from the 1950s, 1960s, and 

1980s. Surprisingly, these 

earlier writings were near exact in the enemy’s organizational construct and tactics. Hence, looking at the Afghan insurgency of 2004, 

the following detail was derived.

Figure 4. On the Afghan border with 

Pakistan, 23 October 2004, Afghan 

Security Forces soldier supporting 

SF COIN operation.
20

JSOU Report 06-6

The Guerrilla

Guerrilla—combat element of the insurgency. 

Guerrilla warfare—military and paramilitary operations conducted 

in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly 

indigenous forces. 

— JP 1-02

In U.S. Army doctrine, the guerrilla is the overt combat element of 

the insurgency. The members of the guerrilla force organize under 

military concepts to conduct military and paramilitary operations. 

Their duties usually include all the overt actions that are conducted 

by the insurgent organization but may include covert and clandestine operations. They are usually most active in insurgent-controlled 

or contested areas. However, when the insurgency calls for operations in government-controlled areas, the guerrilla may conduct 

these operations. 

The guerrilla force tries to gain support for the insurgency 

through propaganda, coercion, and terror. Terrorism is a “weapons 

system” or technique that the guerrilla applies to achieve his goal. If 

he cannot gain active support, he will seek passive support: 

A population that has become submissive to the guerrilla 

and neutral, siding neither with the insurgency or the government, is an unacceptable state to COIN operations. A 

people’s neutrality is dangerous, and the silence on the part 

of the populace concerning insurgent activities is considered passive support for the insurgent.

One of the greatest advantages of the Afghan guerrilla was his 

ability to hide in the open, well within the sight of counter-guerrilla 

forces. His invisible stance is due to his early warning network. In 

the majority of cases, the Afghan guerrilla had established an early 

warning network that was found to be miles in depth. Generally, the 

early warning network was oriented along main approach lines that 

the guerrilla had determined posed the greatest threat to his security 

and that of the guerrilla base. When any intruder entered the network, the guerrilla was alerted to the entry in time to prepare for the 

intrusion. It was common to see a huddle of men, crouching down in 

a cluster watching the movement of coalition forces, with either a cell 

phone or remote control in their possession to alert others or engage 

the coalition forces. 
21

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

The Afghan guerrilla was found 

to also be extremely familiar with 

the coalition forces rules of engagement (ROE) and used these rules 

against the counter guerrilla force. 

If the ROE prohibit aerial engagement of a target that may produce collateral damage to a house or 

building, the guerrilla had been known to stand within inches of the 

structure or in fact be leaning on it. If the ROE stated that unless 

positive identification is made, and if that positive identification can 

only be determined if the guerrilla is armed, by the time the counter 

guerrilla force arrived at the guerrilla’s location, he had hidden his 

arms and joined the waving crowds in the street. Hence, the Afghan 

guerrilla’s advantage was to blend with the local populace. In many 

cases they were the local populace, for in Afghanistan, as in many 

other guerrilla wars, the resident guerrilla may only work on a parttime basis. 

The Afghan guerrilla’s ability to chameleon in front of coalition 

forces also enhanced their capability to operate with secrecy in a 

given area. In order to achieve success, a core element for coalition 

forces became to identify the guerrilla and remove him from the civilian populace. This was best accomplished through the effective use 

of population and resources control and turning the people against 

the guerrilla. Care was taken to ensure that civilians were not injured 

or mistreated as a result of COIN guerrilla operations because during 

the 2004 campaign, it became pinnacle to use the people as a “weapons system” against the insurgency. 

Again, as U.S. Army doctrine noted the guerrilla has advantages, 

doctrine also states that he has vulnerabilities. The guerrilla normally 

lacks the personnel and the logistics to intentionally become decisively engaged with COIN guerrilla forces. In many circumstances, 

as we found in post-World War II doctrine, the proportionality of the 

COIN guerrilla campaign will force the guerrilla’s potential recruiting 

base to diminish. Effective COIN guerrilla operations will not regenerate follow-on guerrilla insurgent forces. Hence, the guerrilla’s vulnerability, open to exploitation, is his source of supply and recruitment. 

Convince the potential recruit not to join the guerrilla, protect the 

shopkeeper so he is not forced into supplying the guerrilla, inflict 

combat losses, force the guerrilla deep into untenable sanctuary, or 

The Afghan guerrilla was found 

to also be extremely familiar 

with the coalition forces rules 

of engagement (ROE) ...
22

JSOU Report 06-6

interdict their supply lines leads to degrading the guerrilla’s ability 

to sustain. 

Additionally, exploit the guerrilla’s fear of capture. This vulnerability is paramount to a successful COIN guerrilla campaign. First 

disseminate, through multiple means and sources, the outcome of 

capture. Reinforce that the guerrilla is a criminal; internment will 

mean long (unknown) separation from his family—that is, if he is 

captured, the family will be disgraced publicly and all which the 

guerrilla is fighting for will be lost. Any retribution by the guerrilla 

force against the family of a captured guerrilla is also a key vulnerability and subject to exploitation. 

The guerrilla’s operational weaknesses often includes security, 

which requires extensive resources and slows down his responsiveness; bases that are difficult to acquire and operate; and the lack of 

technology or the ability to maintain captured high-technology items. 

Another operational weakness may be the lack of sophisticated communications, which could require the guerrilla to spend an excessive 

amount of time preparing to launch an operation. The guerrilla’s 

dependence on popular support suggests a potential vulnerability 

because if that support wavers or is withdrawn, the guerrilla will not 

be able to operate effectively. 

These weaknesses and vulnerabilities had great viability in 

Afghanistan. The Afghan guerrilla avoided direct engagement with 

coalition forces, so when coalition forces made contact with the guerrilla, contact was maintained. Such was the case with Forward Operating Base (FOB) 31’s engagement in the Oruzugan province, at the 

village of Day Chopan in March of 2004. An SF company team fought 

a pitched battle with Taliban guerrillas and Al Qaeda revolutionaries 

as the SF were moving northwest toward Day Chopan. In the second 

battle of Day Chopan, initial contact had been made with a skirmish 

line of Taliban who became very clever in judging when to attack the 

SF and when to disengage when close air support became available. 

At one point during the battle, SF moved south in what appeared 

to be a movement out of the area. This feint worked, deceiving the 

guerrilla into believing a retreat. Instead, the SF company team built 

combat power and received conventional forces as reinforcement 

and turned to pursuit operations against the Taliban skirmish line, 

then into fixed Al Qaeda positions. As the coalition force pressed 

the attack, the guerrilla force vanished into the countryside avoiding 
23

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

further contact and trading space for survival. Later, in order to deny 

the guerrilla insurgent from using this key area for an operations 

base, an SF base camp was established in the area, effectively occupying the insurgent’s zone of action and making it impossible for the 

insurgency to conduct operations. 

As coalition forces continued to expand throughout the insurgent’s backyard, other SF base camps like the one at Day Chopan 

would serve as an outpost that 

fostered security and ushered 

in peace. Guerrilla activity 

was discovered up the Konar 

River valley. An SF base camp 

was established in Bari Kowt. 

The night after the first Chinook dropped off Green Berets 

and Afghan Security Forces, a 

convoy of guerrillas in 15 HiLux 

trucks was spotted heading east 

towards the Pakistan border. 

Local villagers joined the effort 

to construct the base camp, 

and that region of Afghanistan 

went from neutral to coalition 

friendly, effectively removing a 

potential recruiting base from 

access by the Afghan guerrilla 

and his base of support.

The Afghan guerrilla was 

petrified of capture. When captured, once “gallant” Afghan guerrilla fighters appeared nothing 

more than sniveling cowards. Such was the case with the guerrilla 

leader who was captured one morning in a strike operation. He was 

building a car bomb for a target in Kabul, perhaps the American 

Embassy. A strike package was launched and placed under U.S. 

control against the guerrilla leader. His entire demeanor changed 

when he was brought back to the coalition base. However, what did 

not change was his pure unadulterated hatred for the coalition.

Figure 5. On guard: Afghan Security 

Force trooper, 22 October 2004.
24

JSOU Report 06-6

The Underground

The underground of an insurgency can be defined as combat support of the insurgency and a covert unconventional warfare organization established to operate in areas denied to the guerrilla 

forces or conduct operations not suitable for guerrilla forces. 

— AR 310-25, Dictionary of U.S. Army Terms

The underground organizes into compartmented cells. Cells are 

formed within various political subdivisions, sectors or areas, such 

as the U.S. equivalents of counties, towns, and neighborhoods. The 

underground environment may be urban or rural. Underground 

members commit sabotage, intelligence gathering, and acts of deception. They are the political and financial wing of the insurgency and 

are the main element focused on subverting the government. The 

underground supports the guerrilla and the auxiliary at the direction 

of the area commander or resistance front commander. They operate in small cells and are linked to other cells through key leaders, 

intermediaries, or facilitators. The underground operates covertly or 

overtly, uses safe houses to hide insurgents and will move people 

and supplies along routes and in vehicles to avoid detection.

In Afghanistan, the underground is mainly the defunct Taliban 

government. As the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan and 

became allied with bin Laden, the infrastructure used to support Al 

Qaeda became the safe houses and sanctuary areas for the underground. The Afghan underground’s purpose is to subvert the emerging democratic government of Afghanistan and return Afghanistan to 

a fundamentalist Islam state. 

The Afghan underground during the 2004 COIN campaign 

seemed to be at a peak of power during this time, directly connected 

to the Taliban remnants in Pakistan, tied to the Al Qaeda network 

worldwide, and loosely allied with the HiG in the north. The purpose 

of their loose alliance was to oppose the coalition. The underground’s 

main purpose was to subvert the emerging Afghan government, to 

stop it from gaining any recognizable footing, and perpetuate instability in Afghanistan. Instability was the goal for the Taliban who 

could manage to survive in a semblance of power and simply attrit 

the coalition over time. Al Qaeda wanted an unstable Afghanistan 

to continue to fix the U.S., drain American national power, and pull 
25

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

profit from the drug trade. Finally, the HiG wanted what the Taliban wanted, instability to continue to survive to outlive the coalition 

intervention in their homeland. 

The Auxiliary

The auxiliary is the organized civilian support to the tactical action arm of the insurgents. In UW, that element of the 

resistance force established to provide the organized civilian 

support of the resistance movement. 

— AR 310-25

The success or failure of the guerrilla force depends on its ability to 

maintain logistic and intelligence support. The auxiliary fills support functions by organizing civilians and conducting coordinated 

support efforts. The assistance of the civilian population is critical 

to the success of the resistance movement and provides security, 

intelligence, and logistic support for the guerrilla force by using civilian supporters of the resistance. The auxiliary conducts clandestine support functions by organizing people on a regional, district, or 

Figure 6. A SF base camp, northeast Afghanistan, 9 March 2004. 
26

JSOU Report 06-6

sector basis depending on the guerrilla force formation. To sustain 

guerrilla operations, the guerrilla force has numerous needs:

a. Movement support

b. Acquisition of supplies

c. Operational information and intelligence

d. Medical facilities

e. Counterintelligence to establish an outer zone security early 

warning network to detect, if not deter, enemy penetration 

attempts

f. Recruiting support

g. Compartmented communication systems

h. Current information on terrain, weather, civilians, and local 

resources

i. Deception operations support

j. Manufacture and maintenance of equipment. 

The Afghan auxiliary provided the insurgents with all the above 

support. Auxiliary operations in Afghanistan were centered in the 

major cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, Qalat, Kandahar, 

and Herat. Auxiliary lines of communications were organized along 

old trade routes and way stations and connected the cities to Pakistan and Iran. Predominantly, the routes followed the old Silk Road 

and its branches, specifically the Tehran, Herat, Bamina, Kabul, 

Bagram and China route, as well as the Pepper Route that branched 

off from Kabul to Jadalak, onward to Jalalabad, and into Pakistan/

India though Peshawar.12

The main auxiliary line of communication in the north was found 

to be between Kabul and Peshawar, through the Khyber Pass, while 

in the south the auxiliary line of communication was from Kandahar 

to Quetta, crossing through Spin Boldak. A third line of communication was found to originate in Spin Boldak, move through the 

Sami Gahr mountains, into Qalat, then onward into the Oruzugan 

bowl. This road was named the Underground Railroad, while the Spin 

Boldak route was named the New Silk Road. Supplies of all types 

were imported for the insurgency; however, the main arms dumps 

were preexistent from the Soviet occupation and cached throughout 

the insurgents areas of operation. 
27

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

After gaining some understanding of the enemy, the approach 

used was a conceptual development of our campaign plan by drawing upon the lessons of history and the available doctrinal resources. 

Section 4 discusses the process of “historic paralleling” and the guidance we found useful in the joint and Army publications. 

29

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

4. Historic Paralleling and 

 Principles of COIN Campaigning

The struggle against the guerrilla is not, as one might suppose, 

a war of lieutenants and captains. The number of troops that 

must be put in action, the vast areas over which they will be 

led to do battle, the necessity of coordinating diverse actions 

over these vast areas, the politico-military measures to be taken 

regarding the populace, the necessarily close cooperation with 

various branches of the civil administration—all this requires 

that operations against the guerrilla be conducted according to 

a plan, established at a very high command level, capable at 

any moment of making quick, direct intercession effectively felt 

in the wide areas affected by modern warfare. 

— Roger Trinquier, 

Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency

I

n the autumn of 2003 the CJSOTF-A entered into a formal 

planning process to effectively reshape the conduct of war in 

Afghanistan. The J5 Plans section, in conjunction with J2 Intelligence and J3 Operations, began a series of analyses to determine 

how to fi ght and win not only against the Afghan insurgent but also 

the insurgency. The strategy centered on depicting the enemy order 

of battle and developing succinct plans to remove or reduce each 

enemy element.

Historic Paralleling 

This initial step built an important frame of reference for the future, 

which was based upon successes in the past. The objective of the 

historic paralleling was to map out the condition of the battlespace, 

determine to some level of certainty where the insurgency would be 

heading, and reach back into previous wars to lay out a strategy for 

the future. 

The fi rst part of CJSOTF-A COIN campaign planning was to conduct a 

review of previous COIN campaigns and fi nd historic parallels. 
30

JSOU Report 06-6

Conduct a review. Afghanistan, as well as the rest of Central Asia 

and the Middle East, is a land tightly bound to its past. The forming, shaping, and reforming of the country are tied to many fathers, 

and those fathers have seen trials and tribulations that become a 

library of lessons for the future. The Afghan is very predictable in 

their habits. What was done in the past seems to be the norm for the 

future. The familiarity and expertise that the Afghan has with the 

terrain proved to be the same ground he would fight war after war. 

The way the Afghan fought was equally replicated war after war. As 

attempts were made to compare previous wars to the Global War on 

Terrorism, the initial consensus was the Afghans were fighting coalition forces as they fought during the Soviet War. The actuality was 

that the Soviet comparison was limited. The Afghan was not fighting 

the coalition like they fought the last war. There were more historic 

parallels found to the British era than to the Russians. The general reasoning for this was that the British understood the Afghan 

culture and did attempt to coexist with them. The Russians, however, went to force Russian culture and ways on the Afghans and 

that of course was unacceptable to the Afghan. Russian tactics were 

destructive, bombing and shelling villages into rumble and forcing a 

million person refugee flight into neighboring countries. 

An understanding of Afghan tactics became imperative to historic 

paralleling. Delineating their tactical conduct became essential in 

understanding how to counter insurgent operations. Afghan insurgent tactics against the coalition were similar to how the Afghans 

fought the British. Insurgent tactics involved the following:

a. Yielding the population centers

b. Operating from the rural areas

c. Passive and active espionage against coalition forces

d. Infiltration into the coalition allied government structure

e. Ambushes, long-range sniping, and harassment fires (typically with rockets)

f. Frontal assaults against coalition bases (very rare)

g. Terrorism, especially propaganda, threats, intimidation, and 

subjugation. 

The Afghan insurgent would hide in the open, with no distinguishing 

insignia or uniform, and avoid contact with coalition forces electing 
31

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

to engage with remotely controlled improvised explosive devices or 

with harassment rocket fire. 

The Afghan insurgent, like his father and grandfather, was, in 

many cases, a part-time fighter. During the day, he would tend his 

fields or his store in the market 

and take care of his family, but at 

night or off hours, he would attack. 

In general, the Afghan insurgent’s 

tactic would move into attack positions before evening prayer, attack 

after the evening prayer, then 

retreat after the attack. Attacks 

generally occurred on Fridays because Saturday was a day off, and 

the insurgent did not have to work the next day. Attacks occurred 

during periods of lunar illumination, so the insurgent could maneuver at night with some semblance of natural light, and the insurgent 

would attack towards the end of the month so he could add to the 

final tally of attacks that month for which he would get paid. When all 

these factors lined up—that is, a full moon, on a Friday, at the end of 

the month—it was obvious that an insurgent attack was pending. 

Supporting the Afghan insurgent were the front-line professionals from Al Qaeda. Assessments revealed that Al Qaeda “revolutionaries” had taken to the field in support of Taliban and HiG fighters. 

Reports of foreign fighters were rampant in the late part of 2003 and 

early 2004, which were later proved with the capture of several foreign fighters inside Afghanistan. When the revolutionaries arrived, it 

was indicative that an Al Qaeda key event was about to occur. These 

fighters were better equipped than the Afghan insurgent and were 

full-time professionals. They acted as trainers, shock troops, and 

surrogate leaders. Their tactics were essentially guerrilla tactics, but 

their objectives satisfied Al Qaeda goals, which were complimentary 

to that of the Afghan insurgent. Specifically, the Taliban and HiG 

were essentially political parties of Afghanistan who had lost power 

and now through force of arms were trying to regain power. Impeding their ability to do so were coalition forces, such as the American Joint Task Force. Victory for the Afghan insurgent would come 

by forcing the coalition out of Afghanistan. Consequentially, the Al 

Qaeda faction wanted the coalition, especially the U.S., out of the 

During the day, [the Afghan 

insurgent] would tend his fields 

or store in the market and take 

care of his family, but at night or 

off hours, he would attack. 
32

JSOU Report 06-6

Muslim world, making the western presence in Afghanistan a lucrative target. 

In the beginning of 2004 the Afghan battlespace had matured 

with three enemy formations operating in subresistance fronts. 

Looming on the horizon were the first elections since the fall of the 

Taliban. Initially scheduled for June 2004 the presidential election 

was moved to October 2004 for logistics in conducting the election. In 

the lead for the elections was the United Nations assistance mission 

to Afghanistan, with the coalition in general support. Additionally, 

towards the spring of 2004, the opium crop was coming to market 

Initial estimates were that the opium crop would come in at about 

$750 million. Placed on the open market at a conservative estimate of 

10 fold, the wholesale value meant that when the crop reached retail 

in overseas markets, the overall yield could be estimated at $7.5 billion. Considering a 5 percent profit factor for the Afghan insurgency, 

their total would tally to $375 million. At $30 million per year to 

operate Al Qaeda, even a third of the profit ($125 million) going to Al 

Qaeda would fund the organization for more than 4 years. Correct in 

our assumptions or not, the illegal drug trade was a very important 

factor in understanding the insurgency. 

Finally, constant reports from various sources that bin Laden and 

Dr. Zawahiri were hiding in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 

or the old British northwest frontier completed the outlay of a very 

cluttered environment, which involved enemy senior leadership in 

hiding, three enemy subfronts conducting full spectrum subversion 

and insurgency operations in cooperation, the opium trade, multinational coalition and allied forces collaboration, and birthing of a 

new and very unstable democracy. Against this backdrop emerged 

the historic parallels that developed the strategy to defeat the Afghan 

insurgency.

Find historic parallels. Historically, there are two types of insurgencies: 

a. Mass populace involves the mass mobilization of the people 

against the reigning government. A textbook example of this 

is Mao Zedong. Confronted with the goal of overthrowing the 

Nationalist government, Mao saw that he needed to mobilize 

the people and place the peasant against the government. 

Through cadre elements, mass mobilization of the populace, 
33

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

and direct and indirect pressures, he was able to defeat the 

government. 

b. Minority revolt involves a small faction taking on the government and, through political subversion and if necessary 

force of arms, defeating the government. The people remain 

neutral, but over time are swayed to support the insurgency. 

Fidel Castro’s overthrow of the Batista government is a clear 

example of the minority revolt. 

The assessment for Afghanistan recognized that a minority revolt 

was in place. Hence, from the initial analysis that Afghanistan was a 

complex environment, in a congested battlespace of allied, coalition, 

indigenous and joint forces, with a minority revolt in full motion, 

against a multi-party insurgent force that was mimicking past practices and alliances, and the existence of an external source powering 

the minority revolt, a COIN strategy was developed that employed 

specifi c historic parallels. 

Defi ning the enemy order of battle and their tactics became key 

elements in fi ghting the insurgency. Who were we fi ghting? Why were 

they fi ghting us? How were they fi ghting us? How do we fi ght them? 

The historic parallels that answered these questions came from U.S. 

Army doctrine, especially UW, counter guerrilla, and guerrilla warfare doctrine from the 1950s and 1960s, which was based on World 

War II. These manuals (see References) described the enemy order 

of battle as the guerrilla, underground, and auxiliary; demonstrated 

how guerrillas conducted ambushes; and portrayed how to conduct 

counter guerrilla operations to strike at the guerrilla and fi nd, fi x, 

and fi nish enemy forces. 

It is not enough to eliminate the guerrilla force, which is simply treating the symptom. What becomes necessary is to remove the causes 

of instability that perpetuate the insurgency, which then allows for 

the development of a strategy to systematically reduce or remove the 

instability, which in turn deprives the fuel that propels the fi re, in 

fact curing the disease. 

The second part of the COIN strategy was understanding what caused and 

continued to power the insurgency.
34

JSOU Report 06-6

The success in El Salvador became the historic parallel for removing causes of instability. As history shows, the Government of El Salvador defeated the insurgency under the Farabundo Marti National 

Liberation (FMLN) by addressing the demands by the guerrillas. Of 

predominance to the insurgency was land reform. Once the Government of El Salvador initiated a program of granting the peasants 

ownership of the land, the insurgency lost power. The government’s 

further drive was to reduce the guerrilla problem to criminal activity 

and offer the FMLN an opportunity to compete for power in a political 

arena, which led to the defeat of the insurgent and the insurgency.

As the insurgents were defeated by applying U.S. Army doctrine, and 

the causes of instability were removed through a historic parallel to 

El Salvador experience, the British COIN campaign in Malaya proved 

to be a useful analogue. A key element to the Malayan campaign was 

the ability to have local forces secure the country after allied forces 

found and fi nished infi ltrators. The British developed a self-securing policy where areas that were cleared of insurgent activity were 

turned into “white areas” that were secured by indigenous security 

forces assisted by the British. Hence, the Malayan COIN campaign 

demonstrated the third-step concept.

No one knows the people and the terrain better than the local populace. As the Viet Minh and Vietnam wars demonstrated, employment 

of indigenous forces to conduct COIN operations is the mandate. The 

local populace know their communities—they know who lives there 

and who is transient. 

The French and Indian War was the fi fth historic parallel that 

suggested how to organize the multitude of friendly forces in Afghanistan. During that campaign, both the British and French employed 

combined, joint, indigenous, and reserve forces as a unifi ed force. 

The third part was that once the insurgency was on the decline, security 

responsibility was transitioned to local forces so that allied forces could 

move to strategic over watch.

The fourth part of the COIN strategy was that using indigenous forces is 

an essential technique in fi nding the enemy. 
35

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

The forces available to combat the insurgency in Afghanistan also 

were varied and numbered. Not only were there indigenous forces 

on the battlefield but also allied, coalition, and multiservice forces 

involved in Afghanistan. 

Algeria became the sixth model that informed our COIN planning 

for operations in Afghanistan. Colonel Roger Trinquier, in Modern 

Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, delineated the following principles for COIN operations: 

...separate the guerrilla from the population that supports 

him; occupy the zones that the guerrillas previously operated from, making them dangerous for him and turning 

the people against the guerrilla movement; and coordinate 

actions over a wide area and for a long enough time that 

the guerrilla is denied access to the population centers that 

could support him.13

This Trinquier formulation provided the central operating concept 

for our operations.

The seventh historic parallel, the American Revolution of 1776, 

suggested the overall concept of the COIN campaign. As then, the 

people of Afghanistan were fighting against a tyranny—terrorism. 

As will be discussed in subsequent sections, the American Revolution also became the overall theme of the SOF support plan to the 

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 76 COIN campaign, with several 

operations named after American Revolution battles.

Principles of COIN Applicable to Afghanistan

With the seven historic parallels analyzed, COIN operations in 

Afghanistan coalesced around these traditional COIN principles:

a. Separate the guerrilla from the populace.

b. Occupy the underground’s zone(s) of action so they are unable 

to conduct political and financial operations.

c. Protect the population centers so civilian support is unavailable to the insurgency.

Separate the guerrilla from the populace. In a COIN campaign, the guerrilla is the leading cause of instability. Clearing the guerrilla from the 

battlefield is an essential task. The purpose is to be able to remove or 

reduce the guerrilla threat from an organized combat force to crimi-
36

JSOU Report 06-6

nal activity. Once that end state is achieved, indigenous security 

forces can manage the reduced threat, and allied and coalition forces 

can move to strategic over watch. In order to clear the guerrilla from 

the battlefield, the guerrilla must be separated from the populace. 

The guerrilla has sanctuary among the people, and it becomes very 

difficult to isolate them. Techniques to separate the guerrilla from 

the populace are as follows:

a. Use local sources to identify the guerrilla.

b. Conduct cordon-and-search operations and collect biometric 

data on all males of fighting age who are cordoned for later 

reference.

c. Enter the enemy’s information systems and ascertain their 

location, disposition, and intent.

d. Conduct checkpoint (fixed and mobile) to search for guerrillas moving along primary and secondary lines of communication, which in turn forces the guerrilla to travel along back 

roads and footpaths, making it more difficult to move in and 

around the battlespace.

e. Conduct company level and below strike operations. (Operations above the company level fail due to the size of the force 

and the effectiveness of the enemy’s early warning network.)

Occupy the underground’s zone(s) of action. The main element of the 

insurgency, the underground, conducts political and financial operations to subvert the government and instill within the populace the 

people’s lack of confidence in the government’s ability to protect them. 

The objective in this principle is to occupy the underground’s area of 

operation so they cannot come out in the open and conduct subversion operations. Two techniques for occupying the underground’s 

zone of action follow:

a. Occupy by presence entails establishing base camps in the 

areas where the underground operates and along main/

known lines of enemy communications. This involves moving 

to the location of the enemy, a substantial and incredibly 

important effort. In general, once friendly forces occupy an 

area, they settle in and remain in place. This in turn becomes 

a rock in a stream, and the water simply flows around or 

over it. In order to be successful in COIN operations, friendly 

forces must find the enemy and maintain contact. 
37

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

b. Occupy without presence relies on aggressive short- and 

long-range patrolling, where friendly forces project combat 

power from their bases throughout the underground’s zone of 

action and conduct patrols to interview the population on the 

location and activities of the underground. Another idea is 

to establish neighborhood watches and routine contact with 

local police forces. For neighborhood watches, the technique 

is for the friendly force to have town meetings with local leaders and the populace, discussing the security situation and 

offering solutions to their problems. The real goal is for the 

locals to identify underground leaders and facilitators so they 

can be killed or captured. With local police, friendly forces can 

equip the police with radios and construct/renovate police 

stations. By staying in touch with the police, civil information 

is provided that can be analyzed and enemy trends developed 

in order to delineate enemy intent.

Figure 7. Jingle trucks heading into Afghanistan from Pakistan in October signal 

improvement for the legitimate economy. 
38

JSOU Report 06-6

Protect the population centers. The insurgency gains its support, shelter, food, and supplies from the auxiliary. If the civilian support is 

unavailable to the insurgency, then the insurgency withers. The aim 

of this principle is to secure the auxiliary from providing support to 

the insurgency. Techniques for accomplishing this task are to make 

it more lucrative for the auxiliary to work for the coalition than to 

work for the insurgency. Hence, reconstruction projects that employ 

large swaths of people not only put money into the economy but also 

employ the insurgent. Using the local main supply points to sustain 

the coalition buys out supplies that were available to the insurgent, 

but are now being consumed by friendly forces. Employing local 

transport for delivery of coalition supplies means that the enemy 

fighters, weapons, and supplies cannot be transported. Building or 

repairing damage roads not only employs the auxiliary on behalf of 

the coalition but also allows the insurgent to travel these roads, subjecting them to interdiction. Of course, whenever local supplies and 

transport are used, coalition forces must have systems in place to 

ensure that the enemy does not use transport, services, and goods 

against the coalition.

After selection of the appropriate COIN principals to apply in 

Afghanistan, the campaign plan was put into production. Planners, 

operators, intelligence, and specialists crafted the defeat plan for the 

Afghan insurgency. However, the execution of the plan is dependent 

on the command and control mechanism that provides for maximum 

flexibility, adaptability, and speedy execution, all in decentralized 

operations while keeping unity of effort. The next section discusses 

the issues of command and control during the 2004 campaign, to 

include key functions of command and control and the intelligence, 

plans, and operations cycle.
39

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

5. Optimizing Command, 

 Control, and Coordination 

 in a COIN Environment

The CJSOTF-A as a Joint Task Force has theater-wide responsibilities for the conduct of special operations in the joint operations area. Typically the CJSOTF is commanded by an 

SF group commander and constituted with SF battalions. SF has this 

predominate role due to its training, organizational structure, equipment, doctrine, leadership, and agility to deploy on a short timeline 

and successfully effect UW, combating terrorism, special reconnaissance, direct action, or foreign internal defense.14

Orchestrating the conduct of special operations, especially during 

a COIN campaign, requires expertise in SOF operational art. Organization is the key to military success, and command and control 

nodes are the mechanism for organizing it. Disorganized military 

command and control nodes are ineffective in conducting combat 

operations. Any new commander must ensure that he has a trained, 

organized, and equipped command and support node prior to entering into the fight. Successful succession of combat activities cannot 

be sustained without forward thinking, responsive, and disciplined 

officers and noncommissioned officers to manage and sustain the 

campaign. Hence prior to combat, command, control, and support 

nodes must be in place, exercised, resourced, and immersed in the 

operational environment prior to the first combat unit crossing the 

line of departure. Once that is completed, operations can be initiated, for once a force is committed, it is very difficult to recover from 

failure or loss of control. 

The span of control of the CJSOTF-A in 2004 was over a 4,000 

man force consisting of SF battalion task forces with subordinate 

SF company teams, a U.S. naval special warfare task unit, tactical 

psychological teams, a civil affairs company team (foreign internal 

defense/UW), joint tactical air control parties, and irregular forces 

consisting of Afghan Security Forces. 

The expanse of the area controlled was accomplished with 17 

remote SF base camps positioned along the eastern and southern 
40

JSOU Report 06-6

parts of the country. The SF base camps varied in combat power, but 

generally consisted of an SF detachment(s), U.S. infantry, irregular 

indigenous forces (Afghan Security Forces), a mortar section, and a 

variety of crew-served weapons positions. Each base was a defendable location from which SF task-organized formations conducted 

COIN operations in their joint special operations area. 

In order to apply the COIN campaign principles, we had to codify 

the command, control, and coordination functions of the CJSOTF-A. 

The methodology to do so was organizing the command along functional lines. Specifically, the CJSOTF-A was organized along six 

operational functions: operational command and control, operational maneuver, operational intelligence, operational fires, operational sustainment, and operational force protection.

Operational command and control. How the command executed operations was the primary responsibility of the command group, which 

included the commander, deputy commander, executive officer, and 

command sergeant major. This group managed the functions of the 

command in an interactive construct that empowered leaders to 

lead and work within the set of priorities, parameters, and resources 

available for combat operations. 

The commander established the command and control mechanisms, such as reports he required for situational awareness; battle 

rhythm to set the pace of the command; the plans, operations, and 

intelligence (POI) cycle; and the placement of key officers to concepFigure 8. 

On patrol in 

Afghanistan, 

23 September 2004.
41

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

tualize, plan, execute, and sustain COIN operations. The commander 

and the command sergeant major, accompanied by selected special 

staff, embarked on weekly battlefield circulation to visit every SF 

base camp, assessing first hand the execution of the COIN operation 

and validating what was planned, executable, and sustainable. 

The deputy commander led in the absence of the commander, 

performed as chief of staff, and interfaced with the CJTF 76. As chief 

of staff, he placed himself at key points on the battlefield during sensitive or main effort operations and reinforced the staff management 

process. 

The command sergeant major, as the senior enlisted advisor, 

played a key role in the command. In an organization where the preponderance of the force consists of noncommissioned officers, the 

command sergeant major worked with the senior enlisted of the subordinate commands to ensure compliance with directives, sustain 

morale, and maintain battlefield discipline.

Operational maneuver. This function involves positioning forces on the 

battlefield in a manner that will give the tactical units a positional 

advantage or a mobility differential over the adversary. The objective 

for operational maneuver was usually a center of gravity or decisive 

point. The operational maneuver cycle involved action, reaction, and 

counteraction management by the operations order. 

Figure 10. 

Commander’s 

strategy 

meeting with 

principal staff, 

1 February 2004.
42

JSOU Report 06-6

Functionally, the epicenter for operational maneuver is the Joint 

Operations Center (JOC), managed by the J3. The CJSOTF operated a digital command post arrayed in a theatre configuration with 

secure automation for principal and special staff battle captains, 

liaison officers, the command group, and coalition commanders. 

Adjoining the JOC were the J3’s office and a J3 conference room, 

which was used for commander conferences, staff huddles, crisis 

action planning (responsibility of the J3, not the J5), and sensitive 

discussions. The J3 shop was organized with a current operations 

section that covered a period from 0 to 96 hours out, with a primary 

responsibility to track the battle, look ahead 24 hours to 96 hours to 

adjust resources to support the fight, and provide situational awareness and reporting one layer of command up and down. Under the 

J3 was the J33, who was the battle captain responsible for battle 

tracking during his shifts and covering a 0 to 24-hour period. The 

J35 translated the operations plan into an operations order once the 

date and time of the operation was determined. 

Operational intelligence. Essential to conducting COIN operations is 

operational intelligence. Successful use of intelligence can be realized 

when the command is able to enter into the enemy’s decision-making 

process and exploit it in favor of the command. The CJSOTF-A organized operational intelligence under J2 Intelligence. The J2 acted 

as the focal point for intelligence, high value and mid-value target 

(HVT and MVT), target development, and battle damage assessment. The J2 was the lead in ensuring intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) support was available to the command, functional components, and subordinate forces. The J2 published the 

command’s intelligence requirements, conducted the joint targeting 

board for sensitive targeting, served on the Combined Effects Board, 

synchronized human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence 

(CI) efforts, and integrated multisource information and multiechelon intelligence into all-source intelligence products.

The J2 organized a Joint Analysis and Control Element, a section of the J2 composed of analytical experts who were instrumental 

in assisting the commander to understand how the adversary plans, 

operates, and reacts to coalition operations. The J2 also supervised HUMINT collection and CI activities. Also nested under the J2 

structure was a National Intelligence Support Team, which provided 
43

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

mission tailored national intelligence reach-back capability to supporting national agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, 

CIA, National Security Agency, and National Imagery and Mapping 

Agency. A Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC) provided technical assistance in the management of recovery, exploitation, and disposal of captured enemy equipment. Additionally, a 

Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) was available for initial screening 

and interrogation of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), translation and 

exploitation of captured adversary documents, and debriefing of captured or detained U.S. personnel released or escaped from adversary 

control.

Operational fires. This function can support maneuver, isolate parts 

of the battlefield, and attack key enemy functions or targets. Initially, 

the main fire support mechanism provided to the CJSOTF was air 

support. Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) published by the Combined Air 

Operations Center (CAOC) aligned the type of air support available 

to the command. Whether it was A-10s, B-1, or other fixed-wing aircraft, an ATO placed the air support on station for the command. The 

ATO was the primary means of shaping the operational level fight 

and provided rapid response to the SF base camps across the theatre of operations. Conducted on a daily basis, the ATO reviewed the 

nominated targets and missions, deconflicted targeting and support, 

and published the ATO book that contained information pertaining 

to the next day’s ATO, such as supported target list, ATO, divert list, 

critical target list, battlespace shaping matrix, and special instructions. 

Further into the campaign, close combat attack—consisting of 

AH-64s and AH-1s—came on station with 105-mm and 155-mm 

artillery coming online as an extension of other indirect fire systems 

such as 60-mm, 81-mm, 82-mm, and 102-mm mortars.

Operational sustainment. These functions were those that the command administered (including personnel, pay input, religion, and 

legal support services), supplied, and maintained, including health 

services, transportation, and general engineering. The J4 led this 

function, which managed joint special operations area wide common 

user logistics (CUL) support, logistics planning and served on/interfaced with the Joint Logistics Center, Joint Civil-Military Engineering 

Board, Joint Facilities Utilization Board, Theater Patient Movement 
44

JSOU Report 06-6

Requirements Center, Joint Blood Program Office, and the Joint 

Mortuary Affairs Office. 

Functionally, operational sustainment was organized as follows:

a. Support Center, which housed the J4, but had two annexes, 

one for the staff judge advocate, mail room, and J1

b. Medical Center, which housed the surgeon and dentist. 

The Motor Pool area was not only the maintenance section but served 

as a retrofit center for vehicles.

Operational force protection. Functions that protect the force and its 

base(s) of operation against enemy attack constituted operational 

force protection. As previously mentioned, the command operated 

across up to 17 SF base camps, all of which had the same force protection requirements. Additionally, with SF operating across the theater of operations, a missing or captured special operator was a great 

concern. The staff engineer (J8) was responsible for the construction 

of SF base camps, including stand-off, fighting positions, and defensive measures. The J3 assumed responsibility for joint personnel 

recovery, organizing battle drills, establishing standing procedures, 

and obtaining equipment to conduct personnel recovery.

Battle Rhythm

With the command organized along operational functions, command 

and control mechanisms in place, and coordination ongoing, all 

that remained prior to conducting COIN operations was to establish 

the cycle of command and control actions within the JOC, or battle 

rhythm. It was an extension of the familiar military decision-making 

process found in Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 (Staff Organization 

and Operations), and it integrated other doctrinal concepts such as 

the SOF planning and targeting cycle described in Joint Pub 3-05.1 

(Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations) and the joint targeting cycle phases 

in Joint Pub 3-60 (Joint Doctrine for Targeting). The battle rhythm 

cycle of operations and planning described here was appropriate for 

our operations in Afghanistan in 2004, but each command develops 

its own battle rhythm to contend with an ever-changing operational 

environment.

The command’s battle rhythm drove the operational cycle for 

over 4,000 special operations and indigenous irregular forces per-
45

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

sonnel engaged in continuous, active combat. The battle rhythm was 

a formal process that allowed the CJSOTF commander and staff to 

organize reporting, coordination, planning, sustainment, and mission execution. The battle rhythm was how the commander organized the information he received in order to make the necessary 

decisions to fight and win. 

The battle rhythm was developed to maximize command, control, and coordination, yet avoid meetings. In general, as leaders 

find themselves entombed in a series of meetings, they are unable 

(unavailable) to develop and implement direction and guidance. 

Hence, the focus of the CJSOTF-A was to compress the meetings 

in the morning and evening, which resulted in allowing for work 

between the morning and evening synchronization blocks. Additionally, when meetings occurred, they were either for coordination or for 

information exchange. Coordination meetings did not adjourn until 

coordination was enacted. Information meetings were succinct providing the information and recommendations that the commander 

would need to either make a decision, provide additional guidance, 

receive the guidance, or provide assistance. 

The battle rhythm was designed to exchange information, build 

dialogue, and disseminate information across the week, so that it was 

not all presented at once and thereby become overwhelming. Over 

the course of any given week, the leadership of the CJSOTF-A would 

focus upon the state of the command, the day-to-day management 

of COIN operations, mid- and long-term plans and planning, primary 

and special staff updates and assessments, intelligence preparation 

of the battlespace, trends analysis, joint targeting boards, and command reviews. Every function and responsibility of the command 

was reviewed and updated over the course of the week. What follows 

is a description of the key meetings and activities that, in the aggregate, influence the battle rhythm. 

The morning update. Each morning the command would convene in a 

series of updates to inform the commanders and their staffs of the 

friendly and enemy situations. The first item of business was the 

intelligence update, Monday through Friday. The commander and 

the battle staff would meet and discuss the enemy situation as it 

occurred in the past 24 hours. With this intelligence backdrop, the 

command would thereafter reconvene in the JOC for the commander’s update briefing (CUB), Monday through Sunday. During the 
46

JSOU Report 06-6

CUB, the commander and staff would receive information from the 

staff and subordinate commanders on the status of current operations and operations within the next 24 hours. The CUB served as 

a mechanism to adjust current operations to maintain contact with 

the enemy. 

Battlefield circulation. The commander must always see the battlefield 

for himself. He needs to understand how his command can dominant 

the fight and defeat the enemy. To do so, he must be away from the 

headquarters and be among the soldiers. A commander isolated by 

his staff and subordinate commanders fails to command because 

he has relegated his responsibilities to others, in turn leading from 

behind, not from the front. Every Monday after the CUB, the commander, command sergeant major, and selected staff would fly to 

visit an SF unit (battalion, company, and/or detachment) at one of 

the SF base camps. The purpose of such visits was to see first hand 

the operational effectiveness of the unit(s), conduct face-to-face coordination with key leaders, observe the interaction between the officers and the noncommissioned officers, assess the living conditions 

of the base camps, ensure combat readiness, and understand the 

Figure10. CJSOTF-A command visit to SOF unit in Afghanistan, 14 June 2004.
47

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

operational environment. The command group would rest overnight 

at a base camp, returning the following day. Generally, the battlefield circulation effort would transit the battalion forward operating 

bases, and the commander could visit with the battalion commander 

prior to transiting to an SF base camp. Optimally, a member of the 

staff accompanying the commander would compile a list of notes 

from the commander’s visit and transmit that back to the executive 

officer for action. 

The evening update. In the evening, Monday through Sunday, the 

commander would participate in the CJTF 76 battle or commander’s update briefing. Using Microsoft NetMeeting, the commander 

would remotely participate with the other commands under the JTF 

and update the commanding general on the key activities that the 

CJSOTF conducted that day. This process proved to be an effective 

means for the commanding general to deliver commander’s intent, 

gain an appreciation of the various commands’ success, and stay on 

plan. The CJSOTF-A commander would also conduct a NetMeeting 

on Tuesday and Friday with the subordinate commanders to share 

information and provide direction. On Wednesdays the commander 

would conduct a video teleconference (VTC) with the rear detachment at Fort Bragg to exchange information, provide direction, and 

receive updates on rear detachment operations. This VTC became 

important to coordinate disciplinary actions, disposition of wounded 

and killed in action, and family support matters.

Synchronization Boards and Meetings

Intelligence, plans, operations (IPO) cycle. The task force executive officer, in his capacity as chief of staff, ran the IPO cycle. On Monday 

mornings the executive officer would convene a Joint Planning Group 

where the J2, J3, and J5 and executive officer would analyze the 

intelligence preparation of the battlespace, trend analysis, and significant activities and ascertain enemy intent. Based upon these discussions, the Joint Planning Group would develop a concept of COIN 

operations for review by the staff. Note that during COIN operations, 

the military decision-making process is ongoing. There is no convenient start and end point to mission planning in a COIN campaign; 

it is a rolling planning process, in fact a continuous planning group. 

Likewise, intelligence preparation of the battlespace is also continu-
48

JSOU Report 06-6

ous. An intelligence estimate changes daily, an appraisal of enemy 

intent evolves weekly, and the enemy situation evolves monthly. In 

order to keep pace with the fluidity of the COIN, rolling staff estimates became the normal course for mission planning. 

The staff would prepare an estimate from the intelligence, plans, 

and operations concept and ascertain the level of feasibility of the 

concept. On Wednesdays the entire staff would convene and brief 

staff estimates that could support the concept, now evolving the 

concept into a plan. On Friday the plans chief would conduct the 

commander’s plans update and provide a status to the commander 

on the plans under development. During this update, the staff would 

provide information to the commander, seek his guidance, get a decision, and ask for assistance. Based upon the outcome of the update, 

the cycle would continue until the J5 published an operations plan 

and the J35 translated it to an operations order. Once a date and 

time group was affixed to the plan, the J3 implemented and managed it. 

In order to coordinate plans with our higher and adjacent headquarters, the J5 would participate in joint planning groups at the 

CJTF 76, visit the J35 section of the Joint Task Force, and on Fridays, host an informal planners forum over or after dinner, at the 

CJSOTF to discuss planning intent, progress, and synchronization.

Combined effects board (CEB). Combining the effects of kinetic and 

nonkinetic fires into achieved designated results is the core purpose 

of the CEB. Convening on Tuesday, from 0530 to 0630 (Zulu time), 

the CEB worked through a monthly process that determined enemy 

vulnerabilities, developed targets, presented targets for decision, and 

assessed the effectiveness of the targeting. 

Battle update assessment (BUA). The BUA was actually the main meeting for the commander because it gave him the status of the operational responsibilities of the command for priorities (what to do first, 

what to do last), parameters (the limits—constraints and restraints), 

and the resources (what is available to conduct COIN operations). 

Convened on Thursday, the BUA involved the entire staff.

A BUA was the most important of all the meetings or boards 

that the command conducted. At the Joint Task Force or divisional 

level, a BUA was constructed along operational functions, starting 

with the communications status of the command delineating who 
49

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

NOTIONAL AGENDA

BATTLE UPDATE ASSESSMENT FOR DDMMMYY

COMMUNICATIONS STATUS15 G/J/C6

COMBAT POWER16 G/J/C3 CHOPS

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (G/J/C2 LEAD)

 WEATHER SWO

 GUA TEMPLATE G/J/C2

 ENEMY INTENT G/J/C2

 ISR COVERAGE G/J/C2

OPERATIONAL MANEUVER (G/J/C3 LEAD)

 SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES G/J/C3

 EXECUTION STATUS FOR STRIKE OPERATIONS G/J/C3

 EXECUTION STATUS OF CIVIC ACTION17 ENGINEER

 FACE TO FACE ENGAGEMENTS POLAD

 FUTURE OPERATIONS/PLANS G/J/C5 PLANS

OPERATIONAL FIRES (ECOORD LEAD)

 EFFECTS AND JOINT TARGETING BOARDS EFFECTS COORD

STATUS OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ALO

 STATUS OF CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK AVIATION

 INFORMATION OPERATIONS18 IO COORD

 PUBLIC AFFAIRS PAO

OPERATIONAL SUSTAINMENT (G/J/C4 LEAD)

 PERSONNEL STATUS AND POSTAL OPNS G/J/C1

 LOGISTICS G/J/C4

 MOVEMENT CONTROL JMCC

 BASE OPERATIONS ENGINEER

 STATUS OF FUNDING G/J/C8

LEGAL ACTIONS SJA

STATUS OF MEDICAL CARE AND INJURED SURGEON

RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES CHAPLAIN

OPERATIONAL FORCE PROTECTION PMO

 STATUS OF BASE SECURITY PMO

 STATUS OF MSR SECURITY PMO

 PERSONNEL RECOVERY JPRC

 SAFETY SAFETY OFFICER

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL (CHIEF OF STAFF)

COMMANDING GENERAL/DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL

 – SUPPORT, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL

 – OPERATIONS, AND CHIEF OF STAFF

Figure 11. BUA Sample
50

JSOU Report 06-6

the command could speak to and who could listen, followed by the 

combat power available to conduct the COIN operation. Next, the 

BUA would continue with operational intelligence, which delineated 

the disposition and intent of the enemy and the factors affecting 

operations such as weather, ISR coverage, and status of collection 

assets. Operational maneuver followed with a briefing on how the 

command was conducting operations against the enemy. In a COIN 

operation, maneuver includes kinetic and nonkinetic operations, 

specifically the strike operations to kill or capture the insurgent and 

the status of civic actions to remove the causes of the insurgency. 

Maneuver requires decisions on prioritization, parameters, and 

resourcing. Cross military boundary operations with other units was 

always discussed. Operational sustainment followed with a status 

on the level of support to the maneuver forces. The BUA closed with 

operational force protection issues concerning how we were protecting our bases and command, control, and support nodes. 

The focus of the presentation was on an assessment of the level 

of success in achieving campaign goals and objectives for fighting 

the insurgency. Hence during a BUA, the command and the commander gained an appreciation of the fight, with a full picture on 

how effective the organization is in conducting operations. The BUAs 

ended with commander comments, specifically focused on providing 

direction to the command, especially as it related to prioritization 

and resourcing. After general officers departed the BUA, the chief 

of staff would cover the due outs and suspense dates for the newly 

assigned tasks. What follows is an example of a battle update assessment agenda. 

Joint targeting board (JTB). The JTB convened Monday, Wednesday, 

and Friday from 0830 to 0930Z or when required. The JTB consisted 

of the commander, J2, J5, J9, and other Joint Task Forces and 

agencies operating in Afghanistan. This was a collaborative process, 

which generated agreed actions that were synchronized across the 

joint operations area. The process was initiated with an intelligence 

summary and followed by a discussion of which targets should be 

actuated. Once each organization agreed to their target set, the organizations would adjourn to place the target(s) in their own targeting process. Hence the JTB acted as an executive committee where 
51

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

empowered leaders from each organization would agree to develop 

and deconflict target sets for action.

Weekly intelligence update (WIU). The WIU was critical to understanding the enemy and entering into his decision-making process. Held 

on Saturday, the WIU was a presentation on the current or updated 

intelligence preparation of the battlespace, trends analysis, and 

predicative analysis. The update started with a roll-up of significant 

intelligence reports, key enemy activities, and outside influences or 

items of significance in the area of interest. Discussions would take 

place with an end result of building an appreciation of the enemy 

situation and intent that would feed the Monday morning Joint Planning Group. 

Choir practice. The battle rhythm, as a weekly battle tempo, ended on 

Saturday with the officers and the command sergeant major adjourning to the Green Beret Club West for an informal discussion on the 

conduct of operations. The commander would cover key events and 

discussions with the command group at CJTF 76 and enter into 

an in-depth analysis with the staff on the progress and direction of 

the COIN campaign. Choir Practice offered a unique opportunity for 

unfettered opinions to be presented in order for the commanders and 

his staff to gain different perspectives on the conduct of the war in 

Afghanistan. Choir Practice was a means whereby the commander 

could apply a barometer to current and future operations and personally determine successes or failures, based on the comments of 

his SOF leaders. 

The battle rhythm organized the command’s functions, and it 

forced synchronization by requiring attendance at a series of meetings and updates that placed the right people in the right place to 

make the right, informed decisions. The battle rhythm also included 

times to rest. A command consumed with the minute-by-minute 

management of operations is reactive. When the command is reacting, the enemy is winning. When the enemy is reacting to us, we are 

winning and that is what battle rhythm does—organizes the command to fight and win the COIN campaign. 

The command and staff planning activities described above were 

translated into combat operations on the ground. What follows is a 

view of the strategy, objectives, and combat operations conducted 

from 2002 to 2004. 

53

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

6. Combat Operations in Afghanistan: 

 Find, Fix, and Finish the Enemy and 

 Remove the Causes of Instability

On 19 October 2001, the U.S. commenced a counterterrorist 

campaign to deny use of Afghanistan territory as a terrorist 

base of operations. The counterterrorism campaign ended 

in May 2002 and moved immediately to the next level of UW, those 

operations ending in June 2004. 

The goals achieved during the UW campaign were to assist the 

people of Afghanistan in building a free and democratic nation, build 

the institutions of national government, and replace the elements of 

the oppressive Taliban government. However, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, 

and HiG, though dislodged from power, had moved to a war of subversion and terror. Their goal was to destroy the emerging democracy 

in Afghanistan. On 1 June 2004, a combined, indigenous, joint, and 

special operations team dispersed across Afghanistan in extremely 

austere and arduous conditions to bring the campaign to the next 

level.19

A major milestone of the COIN campaign came on 9 October 

2004, as the people of Afghanistan went to the polling stations and 

voted. This development was an unparalleled success because of the 

secure environment provided by the CJTF 76 intensive operations 

against the core elements of the Afghan insurgency. 

The Enemy’s Strategy

The J2 intelligence staff assessed that the enemy’s long-term strategy 

was to outlast the coalition. The several enemy groups shared shortto mid-term objectives, which were cooperative, even though their 

final objectives may have been in conflict. The enemy was assessed 

to have the will to relentlessly pursue their objectives using resources 

and capabilities possessed or gained. One of the enemy’s strengths 

was that he understood the strengths and weaknesses of his forces 

relative to coalition forces and would adapt their behavior accordingly. The assessment was that the enemy leadership had coherent 

objectives and had organized into fronts of resistance. 
54

JSOU Report 06-6

Indications and reporting validated the enemy’s intent to attrit 

coalition forces, embarrass the participating nations due to the 

lack of results and high costs, and out-compete the pro-Western 

government of Afghanistan in the election. They would negate the 

central government’s efforts to rebuild war-torn Afghanistan, and 

with offensive action against coalition strong points, they would sever 

the lifeline into Afghanistan from the west. Based on the success of 

these attacks, the enemy believed that the coalition’s contributing 

nations would be pressured by internal dissent to reexamine their 

participation in supporting a new Afghanistan.

Enemy Disposition: the GUA Template

Find the enemy. How? The essential question at the beginning and 

end of every day was, Where was the enemy? His intent was known, 

his disposition recognized, but his location required the application 

of the art of war. 

The enemy order of battle consisted of the guerrilla (armed 

insurgent), the underground (political and fi nancial arm of the 

insurgency), and the auxiliary (civilian support to the insurgency), 

otherwise known as the GUA. Depicting that information was a 

challenge, but it was portrayed in the “GUA template,” wherein the 

estimated locations of each were portrayed on an overlay of the 

current battlefi eld area of operations.

Enemy Intent: the Worse Case

• Disrupt the establishment of a central government, (subvert the central 

government’s authority).

• Counter efforts to improve the country’s infrastructure (attacks on the 

road projects).

• Re-isolate Afghanistan from the world community (targeting international and nongovernmental organizations).

• Subvert provincial and district governments through the infi ltration of 

key government positions by individuals sympathetic to anti-coalition 

forces (shadow governments).

• Allow the pastoral people of Afghanistan to retain their normalcy of a 

mountain, agrarian society, undisturbed by modern encroachment.
55

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

Forces Available

Forces operating in Afghanistan operated as a combined, joint, and 

special operations team. During the 2004 COIN campaign there were 

various forces committed to the effort:

a. Conventional ground (e.g., infantry, artillery, engineers, and 

military police)

b. Support (e.g., supply, civil affairs, and transportation)

c. Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft (including strategic and tactical bombers, close air support aircraft, cargo transport aircraft, utility and attack helicopters)

d. Combined or coalition (a dozen countries participated in the 

CJTF, Combined Forces Command, and the NATO International Security Assistance Force organization)

e. Afghan National Army units, Afghan National Police, and 

Afghan Border Police

f. Joint forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines)

g. Special operations (SF, SEALs, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations personnel). 

The COIN Strategy

In actuality, to fight and win in Afghanistan was more than a plan 

of execution. It was more of understanding how to conduct COIN 

operations in a holistic campaign. The winning formula involved 

strike operations to kill or capture the insurgent and civic actions 

to remove the causes of instability that fostered the insurgency. The 

exit strategy was centered on Afghans defending Afghanistan.

Of course, it may appear to be simpler said or written, rather than 

done, but the strategy was succinct. Ending the war in Afghanistan 

only would come as Combined Forces concentrated military power 

to force the defeat of the insurgency and transition responsibility for 

the security of the country to the Government of Afghanistan. Securing the peace would come with international and interagency efforts 

to unify the hope of millions of Afghans for a better tomorrow. 

Additionally, the external support that fueled the insurgency had 

to be suppressed. Hence the assessment was that the greatest threat 

to victory in Afghanistan was Al Qaeda; destroying them became the 
56

JSOU Report 06-6

first and foremost military objective during the 2004 COIN campaign, 

and that was done by defeating the Taliban. 

To achieve success, we focused on three strategic goals for the 

campaign, which we called “lines of operation.” These lines focused 

our efforts to protect the populace and coalition, engage the underground, and prevent the auxiliary from supporting the insurgency:

a. Voter registration and elections security—prevent the disruptions to the electoral process.

b. Reconstruction—build Afghan institutions in order to remove 

the causes of instability.

c. COIN operations—conduct UW and foreign internal defense 

to separate the guerrilla from the populace.

Campaign Objectives

In support of the broadly delineated goals, or lines of operation, subordinate objectives were put into play:

a. Disrupt Taliban and HiG re-emergence and deny Al Qaeda 

external influence.

b. Expand the span of control of the Afghan Ministry of Defense 

and as applicable Ministry of the Interior forces.

c. Provide discreet mutual support to the international and host 

nation political, economic, and informational efforts.

d. Remove causes of instability through civic action with an economic and educational focus.

e. Employ a self-sustaining Afghan security infrastructure.

f. Foster Afghan/Pakistan border security cooperation.

To achieve these objectives the CJSOTF-A applied the following 

concepts:

a. Dominate the battlespace. The SF Operational DetachmentA, the infantry platoon, and the Afghan National Army company became the units of action in the COIN campaign and 

conducted area development to master their assigned joint 

special operations areas. Once mastered, find, fix, and finish 

operations targeted enemy forces.

b. Synchronize military successes with diplomatic, economic, 

and informational elements of national power. Military commanders balanced strike operations to kill/capture the enemy 
57

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

with civic action to remove the causes of instability. The five 

primary causes of instability were (and are) lack of security; 

lack of structured national, provincial, and district governments; lack of infrastructure; widespread illiteracy; and illegal 

commerce. Commanders fostered relations with tribal elders, 

company level military leaders, and international/relief organizations’ efforts to work quality of life efforts for the Afghan 

people.

c. Foster a national identity and unity. Applying the basic tenets 

of “good governance,” SOF conducted shuras (tribal or village 

councils) to instill with tribal leaders the essentials of governing. What does it mean to be a nation of many? How does a 

pluralistic society work? What is our national symbol?

d. Transition the military mission. To achieve this objective, the 

CJSOTF-A embarked on a fundamental shift in combat operations toward systematically dismembering the insurgency; 

and a step-by-step process to destroy the underground, 

annihilate the guerrilla, and force the auxiliary to abandon 

the insurgency. The force utilized was a joint and company 

Figure 12. Strategy meeting: Operational Detachment-A working by, with, and 

through others, 26 September 2004.
58

JSOU Report 06-6

team applying predominantly U.S. and coalition forces first to 

establish a “white area,” then transition the security responsibility for that area to indigenous security forces. Coalition 

forces were then able to transition to the next area, and continue on—one valley at a time.

The Battles for Afghanistan

The 2004 Afghan COIN campaign was orchestrated as a supporting plan to the overall CJTF 76, the higher headquarters of the 

CJSOTF-A. Five named operations were conducted with most of the 

effort oriented all the way down to the SF Operational Detachment-A. 

These were a series of major operations conducted across Afghanistan employing small units in large areas of operation:

a. Operation Princess, the battle of Baghran Valley

b. Operation Independence, the battle for freedom of information

c. Operation Ticonderoga, the battle for Afghan independence

d. Operation Trenton, the battle to secure the Afghan election

e. Operation Saratoga, the battle to secure the border.

What follows is a brief description of these events.

Operation Princess. On 15 February 2004, coalition SOF commenced 

a deliberate special reconnaissance mission of central Afghanistan. 

Configured into an eight ground mobility vehicle formation, the coalition force departed from staging bases in Bagram and Kandahar and 

swept through the Oruzugan, Bahgran, and Arjestan Valleys. Additionally, the coalition force traversed the Day Kindi and Gizab areas. The 

mission was to prove enemy concentrations and transit corridors.

By mid-June 2004, the news was in. The coalition force had 

discovered enemy concentrations throughout the Baghran Valley. 

Enemy transit corridors ran through the Oruzugan Valley and in 

the Tarin Kowt bowl, ending in the Baghran Valley. The enemy organization in the area was established with guerrilla operations and 

underground activities ongoing since the Soviet War. The enemy 

was seasoned veterans, illusive and intermixed with the population. 

However, the reality was that the enemy was vulnerable. 

Mission orders were simple: conduct strike operations to kill or 

capture the enemy leadership in the Baghran Valley. Interestingly 
59

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

enough, we found repeatedly during the Afghan campaign that the 

best intelligence and the most effective operations were developed 

from the tactical units themselves. This observation is a very key 

point in conducting COIN operations—COIN is bottoms up, not top 

driven. Oddly enough, in our military system, plans and orders 

are developed at the higher echelon and delivered to the executing 

unit. The difference in Afghanistan was that subordinate commands 

developed and proposed operations to the CJTF headquarters and 

once approved by the commanding general, the approved concept of 

operations were executed. This was the case for Operation Princess, 

and in fact the other operations during the campaign. The concept 

of operations came from the executing unit, which was received by 

the J5, codified into an overall operations plan, then published as an 

operations order back to the executing command once the CJSOTF-A 

commander approved the plan.

On 28 June 2004, Operation Princess was on. Prior to dawn, two 

simultaneous strike operations occurred, distanced by 100 plus kilometers to find the Baghran Valley area commander and his second 

in command. In a classic ground assault, the northern objective was 

Figure 13. Soldier from Afghan Security Forces on patrol in Nuristan, Afghanistan, 

10 May 2004.
60

JSOU Report 06-6

seized by the coalition assault force and follow-on exploitation operations revealed the identity of the area commander.20

In the south, four Chinook helicopters dropped off another 

assault force who conducted a perfect encirclement of the southern 

objective. Landing at the main points of the compass, the assault 

force disembarked the aircraft and encircled the enemy’s compound. 

In the ensuing cordon and search, the second in command was captured, and based on the information discovered in the assault on the 

northern objective, the area commander was also captured. 

The results were that the enemy area commander and his second 

in command, the underground leaders in the heart of the Taliban’s 

main operating base, were placed under coalition control. This area 

command, which had been in existence since the Soviet era, was 

eliminated within 4 hours, never to surface again. The Taliban leaders were identified as Abdul Hafiz Mageed and Mohammed Dawood. 

They were involved in supplying arms, conducting ambushes, disrupting nongovernment organizations’ aid efforts, and running 

opium networks. 

The next day, an adjacent unit action involved a sweep with about 

2,000 coalition and Afghan National Army forces in a two-pronged 

converging movement to contact. The enemy early warning networks 

signaled the alarm, and the enemy forces took cover as the large 

force swept the area. The results were the recovery of two AK-47 

assault rifles and one Enfield rifle. The basic point is that small unit 

action works in a COIN, where battalion movements do not. 

The capture of Mageed and Dawood was released by the Public 

Affairs Office of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan to the 

media. The capture was retorted by the Taliban spokesman in exile 

in Pakistan, who claimed that though the two individuals were Taliban, they were in Pakistan and could not have been captured by 

the Americans. We knew differently of course, but now it was confirmed.

Operation Independence.21 To exploit the success of Operation Princess, a follow-on operation was executed; the objective of Independence was to build on the success achieved during Princess in the 

vicinity of Musa Qaleh and Baghran Valley on 1 July 2004. Two SF 

operational detachments were to move on the east and west sides 

of the Baghran Valley to find, fix, and finish any guerrilla pockets 
61

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

(strike operation). There was also a second part of the operation, 

which was to emplace an exploitation package (civic action).22

The fi rst part of the 

operation, a pursuit, ended 

slightly different than envisioned. Instead of searching 

for guerrilla forces, a villager 

approached one of the SF 

teams and brought them to 

a cache. The contents of the 

cache took 3 days to process, to include the destruction of the ammunition that 

was not useful and hauling 

off the arms and ammunition that could be recovered. 

What had occurred was that 

a local, who had heard of 

the capture of the area commander, divulged the location of one of the Taliban’s 

main ammunition storage 

points. 

The second part of the operation consisted of exploiting the capture of the two Taliban leaders by continuing to provide security 

while delivering humanitarian assistance supplies from SOF MC-130 

Talon aircraft. Coalition soldiers gathered school supplies, water, 

Afghan fl ags and fl ag tickers, and radios and dropped them to the 

Afghan people. The airdrop provided over 500 hand-cranked radios 

to keep the local people informed about news items, especially the 

local elections that were forthcoming.23

Operation Ticonderoga. This operation was the CJSOTF-A main effort 

for the second half of 2004. This one broke the Taliban’s back, 

severely degraded the enemy’s ability to supply itself, and removed a 

large group of Taliban and Al Qaeda guerrillas from the fi eld. 

The naming of the operation took some care. After looking at 

some of the historic parallels, Ticonderoga was selected. Ticonderoga

is derived from the Iroquois word for between two waters, adopted 

Cache recovery:

4 ZSU 23s

2 105-mm howitzers

2 T-62 tanks

12 cases of T-62 tank rounds

75,000 DShK rounds

210 30-mm rounds

300 82-mm mortar rounds

500 23-mm rounds

1,338 107-mm rockets

250 82-mm recoilless rifl e HE rounds

200 82-mm mortar rounds

5 120-mm mortar rounds

1,750 cans 82-mm mortar rounds

631 cans 23-mm ZSU rounds

1,407 cans 12.7 DShK ammo

30,000 rounds of loose 12.7- and 

23-mm ammunition

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
62

JSOU Report 06-6

to epitomize the CJSOTF-A’s effort to separate the people of Afghanistan striving for their independence from terror and the enemies 

of Afghanistan who are pressing to perpetuate terrorism. The name 

also impresses the historic connotation to Fort Ticonderoga, which 

was a strong point separating the warring French and British armies 

and their indigenous/provincial allies during the French and Indian 

War, as well as between the English, and American armies during 

the American war of independence.

The concept of operations supported coalition goals to enable 

the voter registration and the election process, as well as support 

reconstruction. To do so required a shift in the conduct of special 

operations in Afghanistan, a reordering of the alignment of forces, a 

decisive move against the enemy, and a refocus of special operations 

in three areas:

a. Eastern region to separate the guerrilla from the populace 

and secure the auxiliary from supplying the insurgency 

b. Southeastern region to deny/degrade the guerrilla sanctuary by conducting aggressive counter guerrilla operations to 

impede cross border movement and kill the guerrillas where 

they were found

c. Southern region to disrupt the underground from conducting 

political and fi nancial activities by occupying the battlespace 

and supporting a combined arms action against the Taliban.

The HiG was the predominant enemy force in the eastern region 

of Afghanistan. Under the leadership of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the 

HiG threatened stability in the Konar, Nuristan, and Kabul River 

Valley and was assessed to be the main insurgent threat to the elections process in the eastern part of the country. From their bases in 

the northeast, the 

HiG was capable of 

launching attacks 

against Kabul and 

Jalalabad (largest 

and second largest 

cities in Afghanistan), which would severely degrade the elections 

process. A viable combat force, the HiG, supported by Al Qaeda 

and the Taliban, appeared to be the route security force of the main 

enemy line of communications into Afghanistan. 

cities in Afghanistan), which would severely degrade the elections 

Insurgent component: The auxiliary

Component location: Eastern Afghanistan

COIN strategy: Secure from supplying

Enemy affected: HiG (lead)/Taliban (support)

Results achieved: Supplies degraded
63

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

To understand the core of the strategy to conduct special operations in the eastern region, a historic parallel was made. In summary, anything that goes through Afghanistan goes through the 

Khyber Pass. To get to the Khyber Pass, the old Silk Road (actually 

the Pepper Route) is followed from Kabul to Jalalabad and onward to 

Peshawar. Alexander the Great traveled this passage; it was the main 

land route for Britain, connecting Europe to the East, in fact dubbing 

the Khyber Pass as the gateway to Europe; and the Americans used 

this area to infi ltrate arms, ammunition, and supplies in support of 

the Afghan freedom fi ghters during the Soviet war. Sixty percent of 

all commerce between Afghanistan and Pakistan came (and comes) 

through the Khyber Pass along Route 1 (the Pepper Route) and into 

Afghanistan.24 Hence the epicenter for the auxiliary’s logistics support to the Afghan insurgency came through the Khyber Pass and 

Route 1. By degrading and denying enemy logistic activities along 

Route 1, the insurgent’s umbilical cord would be cut or withered. 

In the summer of 2004 an SF base camp was placed along Route 1, 

2.2 kilometers from the Khyber Pass. The mission was to degrade, 

destroy, and impede enemy supply activities along Afghanistan’s “Ho 

Chi Minh” trail. They did, and the enemy choked. 

The assessment 

for the southeastern 

region of Afghanistan 

was that the guerrillas were using the 

Khowst area to transit into Afghanistan. There were other points along the border that 

ratlines were rampant, and these areas were the focus of special 

operations. The strategy for the southeastern region was to kill or 

capture the guerrilla. More so, the kill part, because unlike enemies 

of past, this enemy had no drive to negotiate with the coalition. Their 

job was to kill as many Americans as they could, and their reward 

was eternal happiness. 

A series of SF base camps were placed along the border. Their 

presence was a magnet for guerrilla action. The base camps were 

reinforced with direct and indirect fi res as well as air support. The 

CJTF 76 moved 105-mm howitzers in direct support of SF, later 

fl ying in 155-mm howitzers. The range fans on both systems were 

expansive, the fi repower highly lethal. When enemy forces were spotsit into Afghanistan. There were other points along the border that 

Insurgent component: The guerrilla

Component location: Southeastern Afghanistan

COIN strategy: Clear—kill/capture

Enemy affected: Al Qaeda/Taliban 

Results achieved: Movement degraded
64

JSOU Report 06-6

ted, fi re missions leveled them. When enemy rocket attacks were 

launched, so did A-10s. When ground assaults were attempted by 

Taliban and Al Qaeda, they were repulsed by SF, Afghan Security 

Forces, infantry, and mortar men. 

This activity went on for months and only wore down the enemy. 

Hence, over a 12-month period, through a series of attacks and 

counterattacks, the guerrilla force attempts to transit the southeastern region of Afghanistan to strike targets in Kabul and Kandahar 

failed. 

In the south, the 

Taliban was the problem. The former government of Afghanistan, 

who yielded great power 

and had a very succinct 

support base in Pakistan and a tribal base amongst the Pashtu, were in hiding and conducting subversive activities to try to dislodge the growing democratic 

government. The Taliban’s strategy was to undermine the election 

by terrorizing the people, scaring off international and nongovernmental organizations, attacking coalition bases, and supporting Al 

Qaeda and HiG anti-government activities. The Taliban was based 

predominantly west and northwest of Kandahar and had overt and 

covert followers. The Taliban occupied about a sixth of Afghanistan 

and was a very viable and determined threat. 

There were three ways whereby the Taliban were defeated. First, 

in order to break the stronghold occupation that the Al Qaeda had 

on the south, the strategy became to occupy the occupied. By being 

among the Taliban and constantly on the offensive, the Taliban and 

the underground had to stay low or be exposed to being killed or captured. Operation Princess had destroyed the Taliban’s capability in a 

large portion of their area. Subsequent operations by the SF forward 

operating base and base camps in the south constantly pressured 

the Taliban into force-on-force actions or to remain in hiding. As the 

Taliban hid, it enabled the democracy to grow.

Another aspect of special operations in the south consisted of a 

series of strike operations, and in one of these a powerful Taliban 

commander in the southern region was killed by a Navy SEAL team 

as he tried to escape a cordoned village. The Taliban leader, Rozi 

Insurgent component: The underground

Component location: Southern Afghanistan

COIN strategy: Occupy

Enemy affected: Taliban 

Results achieved: People turned against 

Taliban
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Bogart: One Valley at a Time

Khan, had been recruiting Taliban fighters from Pakistan and 

financing Al Qaeda activities. 

A search of his body revealed 

$10,000 (U.S.) and a large 

number of Pakistani rupees. 

The action placed Khan out 

of action and crippled Taliban 

operations in the south.25

The results of Operation 

Ticonderoga were securing the 

auxiliary from providing logistics support to the insurgency. 

Guerrillas were cleared from 

the battlespace and could not 

make it to launching points in 

Afghanistan because they were 

reduced as they attempted to 

transit the border regions, and 

the underground was occupied 

and forced to stay underground. 

The end result of Operation Ticonderoga was to separate the guerrillas from the people, so the people could vote, and they did on 9 October 2004, the first time in the 5,000-year-old history of the country.

Operation Trenton. Named with reference to General Washington’s 

surprise attacks against the Hessians at Trenton, Operation Trenton 

was a series of spoiling attacks to attack the enemy before he attacked 

the elections of 9 October 2004. Operation Trenton supported an 

Afghan government security concept for three successive security 

rings around voting stations. The Afghan National Police patrolled 

areas up to 500 meters from polling places providing local security; 

the Afghan National Army provided security in a wider circle around 

the police. CJSOTF-A working with various tribal forces and other 

coalition forces conducted aggressive regional operations to disrupt 

enemy activities before they could impact the elections.26

Employing the fundamental principle of counter guerrilla operations, the CJSOTF-A conducted a series of JTBs, identified the enemy 

sanctuaries, estimated their timeline to attack the major population 

Figure 14. Ballots printed and ready to 

vote, 6 October 2004.
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JSOU Report 06-6

centers, and placed forces in motion to destroy enemy concentrations. The results were as follows:

a. Planned enemy attacks in eastern Afghanistan were 

stopped.

b. Enemy infiltration in the southeast was severely disrupted.

c. Guerrilla operations in south were disrupted, including Rozi 

Khan’s death; and a number of mid-level guerrillas actively 

operating in Zabol province were killed or captured. Planned 

enemy attacks against voting sites in the south were stopped. 

Nine SF base camps were placed on alert to respond to any 

enemy attack or intelligence indicating an attack. Four additional base camps conducted active patrolling along known 

enemy lines of communications. 

At the SF base camp in Deh Rawood, a U.S. Army captain and 

his SF Operational Detachment-A and the rest of the SF base came 

under attack by a 200 plus contingent of Taliban. The Deh Rawood 

base camp had always been a focus of Taliban operations, due to its 

dominance in the Oruzugan Valley. On the day before the election, 

and in the early morning hours, the 200 Taliban force commenced an 

onslaught on the base camp to overwhelm the U.S. force. Using a mixture of air support and the Detachment-A firepower, approximately 

70 Taliban were killed. The enemy attack was defeated, and the election progressed in this area that was formerly ruled by the Taliban.

Meanwhile, across Afghanistan, two other engagements occurred. 

Enemy fighters were detected attempting to rocket SF positions along 

the border with Pakistan and were engaged with 155-mm fire, killing 

approximately 100 enemy dead. A group of 20 guerrillas, who crossed 

from Pakistan into Afghanistan to link up with the killed guerrilla 

leader Rozi Khan, turned back towards Pakistan after local villagers 

told them of Khan’s death. As they retreated along their communications line, an SF team discovered them, conducted a pursuit operation, and with close combat attack aircraft, mowed them down. 

Though seemingly an impressive number of enemy killed in 

action were recorded in the days prior to the election, the number 

was never a measurement of effectiveness or an indicator of the success of special operations, but rather a metric of war that has little 

meaning. What is meaningful was that the election was held; only a 
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handful of enemy attacks were attempted with approximately 160 

planned attacks preempted. 

The epitome of the enemy defeat was disclosed in a combat patrol 

report from the Jalalabad patrol that witnessed truck after truck of 

fighting-age men with rice, cooking oil, and other supplies, heading 

along the old Kabul to Jalabad road, to Tora Bora. The guerrillas 

were heading for the mountains.

Operation Saratoga. Internal legitimacy, external recognition, and 

legitimate borders are the three elements that define a nation. In the 

summer of 2001, Afghanistan had none of these. By the fall of 2004, 

all three had been obtained. One of the CJSOTF-A contributions was 

to help legitimize the troubled and highly disputed Afghanistan and 

Pakistan border. The operation conducted to address border security 

was Operation Saratoga.27 Like Operation Trenton, Saratoga was a 

component of Ticonderoga, which involved reordering coalition forces 

along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border in order to improve unity 

of effort, command and control, and capability to deny enemy freedom of movement.

Commencing in September 2003, the CJSOTF-A commander 

and his SF battalion commanders conducted a series of face-toface meetings between Pakistan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of 

Interior officials responsible for sectors along the Afghanistan and 

Pakistan border, accompanied by local and national Afghan leaders. 

The purpose of these meetings was to start the long and deliberate 

process to codify the border and place responsibility for the management of the border with the appropriate authority. Up to this time, 

the border had been a point of friction and conflict between the two 

governments, complicating the ability of coalition forces to reduce 

or destroy the external source of support that was propelling the 

insurgency. 

Border meetings from the Chitral District all the way down to 

Skhin became routine, allowing for Pakistan and Afghanistan officials to determine how they would work locally to stem the insurgency. In March of 2005, as the success of the CJSOTF-A produced 

tactical success, the deputy commanding general of the CJTF 76 

entered the process to move to the next level of operational and strategic success. The border meetings continued, but with the deputy 

commanding general. His active participation also brought in the 
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JSOU Report 06-6

emerging government of Afghanistan, which achieved the results 

desired: a recognized government of Afghanistan involved in cohesive 

conversations with the Government of Pakistan in recognizing and 

respecting the border. The means to do so was by military discussions on interdicting guerrilla cross border movement. 

Operation Saratoga had great political-military success at the 

operational level, while the SF battalion responsible for the border 

mission had success in the tactical mission. The critical aspect of 

Operation Saratoga became the availability of forces. In a number 

of ways, the CJTF 76 and the CJSOTF-A attempted to improve the 

border mission. At first, Afghan Security Forces augmented existing 

SF operating along the border by protecting the SF base camps, freeing up the coalition force to conduct operations. Next, the CJSOTF-A 

presented a series of plans to train, organize, and equip a border 

force, unilaterally or with the Government of Afghanistan and the 

Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan assistance, which the 

CJSOTF-A was to combat advise. Resourcing issues halted the full 

implementation of an effective Afghan border force. The CJTF 76 

Figure 15. Afghan, Pakistani, and U.S. civil and military leaders conclude a tripartite 

meeting at Torkham Gate, Afghanistan, 8 April 2004.
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Bogart: One Valley at a Time

worked to reallocate Afghan Border Police to the CJSOTF-A for Operation Saratoga; however, that force was redirected to other security 

missions. Finally, a requirement for Afghan National Army battalions 

was put forward, but by December 2004, not filled. 

By December 2004, the Operation Saratoga results were as 

follows:

a. Enemy infiltration along Afghan-Pakistan border curtailed 

due to the relocation of four SF base camps along the border, 

creation of six border checkpoints, and the refocusing of half 

of the CJSOTF-A combat power to the border mission.

b. Cooperation between the Governments of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan increased face-to-face cooperation and the establishment of the Tripartite Commission on border matters.

c. Introduction of Afghan Ministry participation provided the 

first step in solidifying government of Afghanistan control of 

its border, replacing warlord dominance.

d. Direct communications at the checkpoint, sector, regional, 

and national levels (accomplished by a CJTF 76) installed a 

communications backbone.28

It is easy to focus on combat operations, but our strategic objectives 

were two-fold: establishing security while helping the nation and its 

people. The next section discusses the nature of the planning and 

operations for civil-military COIN operations. 

Figure 16. 

Operational 

Detachment-A 

on patrol in 

Afghanistan, 

26 September 2004.

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Bogart: One Valley at a Time

7. Civil-Military Operations 

 (CMO) in COIN

During the 2004 COIN campaign in Afghanistan, the 

CJSOTF-A employed approximately 50 Civil Affairs specialists who executed approximately $2 million in conditional 

CMO, encompassing scores of high impact projects from school 

renovations; medical, dental, and veterinarian assistance projects; 

economic impact programs; shuras; and road repair. 

An example of a combination conditional CMO project involved 

the widows of Geresk and Operation Betsy Ross. In Afghanistan, the 

symbol of a person’s loyalty or allegiance was the flag. In complexes 

across the country, flags that indicate a family’s affiliation are flown. 

During the Taliban era, the black flag flew as a symbol of the people’s 

loyalty to the Taliban. Flying over Afghanistan in November 2003, 

one could find a sea of black flags. 

In Geresk during the war, several wives were widowed when their 

husbands were executed by the Taliban. In the weeks leading up to 

Operation Independence at the end of June/4 July 2005, the Civil 

Affairs company (special operations units) assigned to the command 

worked with this small group of widows from the town of Geresk and 

bought them sewing machines. During Operation Betsy Ross, the 

widows of Geresk formed a sewing factory and produced the tri-color 

flags of Afghanistan. Operation Betsy Ross expanded to the city of 

Asadabad in the north and production continued. The flags were 

bought and distributed across southern and northeast Afghanistan 

and began to replace the black flags of the Taliban. In September 

2004, as one flew through the Kabul and Konar River valleys, what 

was seen were the red, green, and black tri-color flags with the seal 

of Afghanistan in the middle. The result was not only a symbol of 

loyalty to the new nation/national unity and of declining Taliban and 

HiG rule but also a measurement of the effectiveness of civil affairs 

in COIN operations. 

Army FM 41-10 states that Civil Affairs activities are performed 

or supported by Civil Affairs forces that embrace the relationship 

between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military 

forces are present and involve the application of Civil Affairs func-
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JSOU Report 06-6

tional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil 

government, to enhance the conduct of CMO. 

The field manual also states that CMO are the activities of a 

commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government and nongovernmental 

civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order

to facilitate military 

operations and consolidate and achieve 

U.S. objectives. CMO 

may include performance by military 

forces of activities and 

functions normally 

the responsibility of 

local, regional, or national government. 

These activities may

occur before, during, 

or after other military actions. They 

may also occur, if 

directed, in the absence of other military operations. CMO 

may be performed by 

designated Civil Affairs forces, by other 

military forces, or 

by a combination of 

Civil Affairs forces 

and other forces. 

The conduct of Civil Affairs activities is dependent upon the

level of war:

a. In a high- or mid-intensity conflict, Civil Affairs operations 

consist of civil affairs activities involving nation assistance, 

usually specialized advice and support to foreign nation officials, and CMO involving support for combat operations by 

Figure 17. Getting the ballots out for the October 

2004 presidential election.
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Bogart: One Valley at a Time

minimizing civilian interference and mobilizing human and 

natural resources for combat support. 

b. In a low-intensity conflict, especially in a COIN campaign or 

operation, Civil Affairs operations consist of conditional CMO 

that entails military assistance to the populace to build and 

sustain civil cooperation and focused CMO involving military 

assistance to the populace to remove or reduce the causes of 

instability that support the insurgency.

CMO are focused on the civil side of the COIN campaign. The 

strategy is tailored against the enemy’s order of battle—the guerrilla, 

insurgency, and auxiliary. The overarching construct of CMO is to 

separate the guerrilla from the populace (turn the populace against 

him and clear the guerrilla), occupy and reduce the underground 

(the democratic process), and employ the auxiliary (reconstruction 

projects). To support this focus, CMO are centrally planned with 

decentralized execution. Specifically, CMO concept of operations will 

focus on these actions:

a. Identify the causes of instability, which promulgate the insurgency and high impact and/or sustainable plans to counter it 

(focused CMO).

b. Develop protection plans for the local population (curfews, local 

security force support, neighborhood watch, and protected 

zones) and organize strategies to turn hostile locals friendly 

(black to white), neutral populations to supportive (gray to 

white), and retain positive support (conditional CMO). 

Additionally, CMO must develop an executable plan of action to reconcile lower level guerrillas and separate the foot soldier from the 

insurgent’s leadership.

The CJSOTF-A had a Civil Affairs company (special operations) 

assigned to the command. The company consisted of one Civil Affairs 

Team (CAT)-B (company headquarters) and five CAT-As. The B team 

established a CMO center to accomplish these tasks: 

a. Act as an operations center serving as the primary interface 

between the CJSOTF-A, local population, and organizations 

conducting humanitarian assistance within the joint special 

operations area. The primary effort was to document, track, 

and report resources provided for humanitarian assistance.
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JSOU Report 06-6

b. Nominate CMO projects and monitor the level of progress 

towards completion. 

c. Establish and maintain a central CMO database for the 

CJSOTF-A. 

d. Measure CMO effectiveness in rejection of enemy activity by 

the populace. Increase government capabilities at the district 

level independent of coalition support. The populace presents problems to district leaders, not to coalition forces. The 

population influenced by CMO activities provides unsolicited 

information to coalition forces.

e. Synchronize and deconflict CMO operations across the 

joint special operations areas and provide direct support as 

required.

f. Support the CJSOTF-A in providing information on the sense 

of the populace towards the coalition and host nation government, progress of CMO projects, and other reportable data 

received at the CMO center.

Figure 18. Establishing stability: U.S. officers meet with Afghan officials prior 

to an Afghan-Pakistani border security meeting in Chitral Province, Pakistan, 

18 May 2004.
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Bogart: One Valley at a Time

The CAT-A provided direct CMO support to the battalions as

follows:

a. Coordinate CMO projects and Commander Emergency Report 

Program (CERP) project nomination, funding, and execution.

b. Maintain a database of CMO projects conducted and their 

associated contractors and funding provided; also maintain 

projects still in proposal with estimate costs and keep the 

CAT-B informed of these projects.

c. Conduct CMO that transitions to military civic action.

d. Establish an environment conducive to operations and set 

conditions for long-term stability in sector.

Typically throughout the campaign across Afghanistan, the CATs 

were tasked to conduct the kinds of activities shown in the next 

table, which summarize the nature of their employment.

Activity Description and Purpose

CERP Conditional CMO to support those districts/population 

sectors who divulge insurgent location and disposition. 

Purpose is to exploit insurgent leadership and fighter’s 

vulnerabilities.

Reconstruction 

project nomination

Focused CMO to remove or reduce causes of instability. 

Purpose is to reduce the insurgency.

Neighborhood 

watches

Self secure at the district/community level with coalition 

forces responding as a 911 force. Purpose is to deny sanctuary and make the insurgent vulnerable to interdiction.

Military civic 

action

Local and national government as well as coalition and 

international organizations work together to elevate the 

standard of living, offering a better future affecting strategic, 

operational, and tactical centers of gravity. Purpose is to 

reduce local support to the insurgency.

Democratic 

process

Secure the political process towards democracy, which 

defeats the underground’s political influence of the population. Purpose is to turn the populace against the underground.

Reconciliation 

program

Allow the foot soldier to lay down his arms and stay with 

his family. Reconciled fighters register with local police and 

coalition forces/violators prosecuted. Purpose is to neutralize the guerrilla.
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JSOU Report 06-6

The combat operations in Afghanistan to find, fix, and finish the 

enemy were conducted primarily to establish a modicum of security 

for internal defense and development activities to flourish. The CATs 

operated at the very heart of our strategy, seeking to remove the 

causes of instability and help to establish a viable Afghan government down to the local level. The next section will take a look at the 

results of the campaign and offer some lessons learned. 
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8. Results Achieved, Key Lessons 

 Learned, and the Next Level

A COIN campaign is a marathon. Unfortunately, there is no 

magic dust that can be sprinkled on an insurgency to defeat 

it. Commands conducting COIN operations must avoid 

treating their role in the campaign as just another rotation through 

a combat training center. That would only perpetuate the campaign, 

allowing the enemy enough time and space to regenerate from any 

defeat or loss that previous commands may have inflicted. 

If the enemy is allowed to regenerate, it has the ability to defeat 

the U.S.; for inevitably, he will get through the homeland defenses 

with another catastrophic terrorist attack, attrit the American people’s will and support for the COIN, and open other fronts of resistance to continue to purge the East of the West. It is evident that 

Al Qaeda has studied America’s near defeat in Vietnam and is applying some of those defeat strategies to the U.S. The stakes are high in 

the global war. 

Since a COIN campaign can be protracted, the command must 

focus on bringing their time in the fight to the next level, which 

means that the command must produce results. The results that the 

CJSOTF-A achieved were in support of the CJTF 76 who succeeded 

as follows:

a. Helped liberate the oppressed so that the first election since 

the fall of the Taliban was held. 

b. Supported voter registration and the presidential election—

10.2 million people registered, 90 percent voted (of which 35 

percent were women).

c. Attacked the enemy so that it was unable to affect the election; scores of attacks against the election were preempted.

d. Fostered an environment whereby the local population was 

willing to give the coalition and Afghan forces information 

that lead to killing, capturing, or disrupting the enemy.

e. Advised and mentored the Afghan National Army to achieve a 

higher level of combat competency and effectiveness.
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Lessons Learned

Throughout the campaign a number of ideas came to the forefront as 

especially useful lessons learned for conducting a COIN campaign. 

Here are the key lessons learned: 

a. Define the enemy order of battle—for example, insurgency 

(guerrilla, auxiliary, and underground).

b. Develop cohesive campaign plans, which are executable to 

defeat the enemy order of battle.

c. Synchronize general purpose, special, and indigenous operations.

d. Empower operations at the lowest levels. 

e. Ensure main effort is offensive operations—no backwards 

step in an insurgency.

f. Focus on the center of gravity—the Afghan people.

g. Fight the enemy, move to where the enemy is, gain contact, 

and maintain it.

h. Focus CMO to remove the causes of instability and afford 

assistance on a conditional basis.

i. Inform the people and keep them informed.

j. Maintain focus on completing the defeat of the insurgency—

that is, the guerrilla.

k. Conduct pursuit operations to enhance the success of the 

assault and exploitation force.

The tenets of the COIN campaign listed above guided the CJSOTF-A 

through five major combat operations. About 1,500 combat patrols 

were conducted, supported by over 400 close air support missions. 

During the campaign, some 50 enemy leaders were captured or killed, 

and one third of the guerrilla force was killed or placed under coalition control. The gallant troops CJSOTF-A labored in close combat, 

earning numerous decorations: three Silver Stars, 28 Bronze Star 

Medal with V device for valor, 44 Army Commendation Medals with 

V device for valor, 524 Bronze Star Medals for meritorious service in 

combat, and 24 Purple Hearts.
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Leadership Insights

Conducting a COIN campaign or operation is a thinking person’s 

game that requires leadership, from the private to the general. The 

notion that the “enemy has a vote” implies that the U.S. military’s 

dominance on the battlefield is not always effective against an insurgency. Insurgent elements can outmaneuver the U.S. military ability 

to manage the fight and place friendly forces in a reactionary mode. 

Defeating an insurgency becomes more likely when the COIN 

force can enter into the insurgent’s decision-making process. Once 

that is achieved, the road to the insurgent’s defeat is cleared. However, to achieve that operational capability requires a leader that 

adapts his mindset and his unit to the insurgency environment and 

maximizes the strengths of all units in the fight. He molds the team 

all into one focused effort. CJSOTF-A experiences suggest that the 

successful leader was one who could direct as follows:

a. Get all leaders out on the battlefield.

b. Synchronize and deconflict CMO across the joint special 

operations areas and provide direct support as required.

c. Go on the offense, move to the enemy, stay in the fight until 

the job is done.

d. Focus on the basics—shoot, move, and communicate.

e. Understand that the key leaders are the junior leaders. 

f. Think like the enemy.

g. Evolve the COIN campaign as success is obtained.

h. Define the enemy order of battle and systematically attack its 

components.

i. Maintain focus on the people of Afghanistan.

j. Flatten command and control structure and condense reporting requirements.

k. Find the thoroughbreds in the force and let them run.

l. Teach soldiers how to think, not what to think.

m. Coordinate with diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power.

n. Master cultural astuteness, then go beyond and master the 

human dimension of war.

o. Stay ahead of the COIN as it constantly evolves.
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JSOU Report 06-6

p. Integrate the military campaign with diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of power.

q. Ask for the resources needed and operate within the resources 

available.

r. Stay out of the papers and off the wire.

s. Maintain a sense of humor.

Leaders must record what was done and learned and how it was 

done, then give that document to other COIN warriors so they will 

know how to fight and win against the guerrilla, the underground, 

and the auxiliary. In addition, effective leaders understand that warriors die in combat and that true warriors respect death, embrace 

the survivors, but are not subsumed by the horror of war. Leaders 

keep focused on the strategic objectives of the campaign and move 

combat to the next level.

Achieving Strategic Objectives—the Next Level

The next level means melding political, military, economic, and informational elements of national power to one focus. Up to this point in 

combat operations in Afghanistan, the military has been the leading 

element of national power. The 2004 COIN campaign largely defeated 

the insurgency. With the military securing Afghanistan, diplomacy 

and the political and economics elements of national power can 

assume the lead to assist the Afghan people with their future. The 

military will be able to lift and shift its efforts to pursue the enemy 

wherever they are. It is the Army’s future to continue the fight in this 

global war on terrorism in other regions.

In Afghanistan, it is essential to continue a systematic progression from removing the terrorist base to providing a safe and secure 

environment so the people of Afghanistan can chart their own future. 

International organizations and contributing countries will assist 

the newly formed government of Afghanistan in overcoming security 

challenges, lack of governance, poor or no infrastructure, illiteracy, 

and the illegal commerce (especially the drug trade) that undermines 

economic progress.

There is a famous quote from Mao Zedong on how to conduct 

guerrilla warfare; he said: “the guerrilla must move amongst the 

people as a fish swims in the sea.” The Russians tried to drain the 
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sea. The CJSOTF-A simply changed the temperature of the water to 

bring the fish to the surface and catch them in a net. 

In December 2004 as the campaign concluded, the incumbent 

CJSOTF-A transferred authority from the 3rd Special Forces Group 

(Airborne) to the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Its charge 

was to execute Operation Yorktown and bring combat operations in 

Afghanistan to the next level. 

Figure 19. Success came one valley at a time; here an Afghan 

irregular participates in offensive combat operations with 

coalition forces 13 May 2004.

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Bogart: One Valley at a Time

Endnotes

 1. Major General Eric T. Olson, U.S. Army, adopted the expression “One 

Team” as he commanded the CJTF 76.

 2. In 1992 and 1996, fatwahs, an interpretation of Islamic law by a 

respected Islamic authority, were issued against American troops in 

Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Again in 1992 to 1993, fatwahs were issued 

against American troops in Somalia and in the February 1998 fatwah, 

against American civilians.

 3. The Grand Jury indictment, though published in November 1994, not 

only captures the history of Al Qaeda as an organization but delineates 

the reasons why it wars against the U.S. The indictment also contains 

an in-depth cataloging of Al Qaeda leaders, organizational constructs, 

and operational techniques. The information in the indictment is very 

relevant to today. Though not contained in quotes, the excerpt is a 

direct extract.

 4. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Al Qaeda International,” testimony 

of J.T. Caruso (acting assistant director of Counter Terrorism Division) 

before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism, 

Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 18 December 2001; available from www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/caruso121801.html. 

 5. Central Intelligence Agency, “Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World,” statement by Director of Central Intelligence 

George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

(SSCI), 7 February 2001; available from www.cia.gov/terrorism/pub_

statements_terrorism.html.

 6. Contributed by 1LT Tony Alvarez.

 7. The preceding paragraphs were contributed by SGM George Johnson.

 8. History demonstrates that no insurgency has ever been successful 

without external support.

 9. Some details on Haqqani are from Sukumar Muralidharan, “America’s 

War, Into a Crucial Phase,” Frontline 18, 22 October to 9 November 

2001.

 10. Scott MacDonald, “Minister’s Visit Hints at Taliban Split,” Reuters 

(Islamabad), 20 October 2001. Also “Taliban Official in Talks Over New 

Leadership,” The Orange County Register, 21 October 2001; available 

from www.cursor.org/stories/jalaluddin.htm or www.hinduonnet.

com/fline/fl1903/19030560.htm. 

 11. Robert Marquand, “The reclusive ruler who runs the Taliban,” Christian Science Monitor, 10 October 2001; available from www.csmonitor.

com/2001/1010/p1s4-wosc.html.

 12. Route goes from Baghdad northeast to Khanaqin on Iran’s border; 

over pass to Kermanshah, past Behistun to Hamadan, to Kazvan, then 

Tehran. Silk Route would usually go from Tehran, Chalus, Behshahr, 

Meshed, Herat. Bamian Valley is west northwest of Kabul, to Kabul. 
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The modern road cuts south at Herat to Farah, across Helman River to 

Kandahar on its south bank, Ghazni, Kabul. At Kabul the Silk Route 

heads northeast over Hindu Kush Mountains. Another route [Pepper 

Route] goes to Pakistan and India over Khyber Pass, eventually ending 

in Delhi. From Kabul the route also heads northeast into the Panjshir 

Valley; Kabul to Charjkar [Begram], and along the Panjshir River. It 

follows the narrow strip of Afghanistan, along the Oxus River to Sinkiang Province, China.

 13. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1964; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1985), 64-5.

 14. The U.S. Joint Forces Command references to establishing a Joint 

Special Operations Task Force provided in-depth organizational expertise for codifying the CJSOTF-A’s command and staff functions as referenced in this section 5.

 15. Status of radio, computer networks, and Web page.

 16. Use standard graphics to display major subordinate unit’s combat 

power by major weapon system, personnel, logistics, and location.

 17. Conditional and focused CMO missions, CERP status, and populace 

sensing.

 18. Information Operations (IO) coordinates psychological operations 

(PSYOP), military deception, computer network attack/defense, and 

electronic warfare.

 19. The 2004 COIN campaign began the transition from a UW campaign 

commencing in September 2003. By 1 June 2004, the planning and 

repositioning of forces, as well as the change in CJTF commanders 

and headquarters, set the conditions for the most effective COIN campaign in the past 40 years, which was launched to defeat the insurgency and remove threats to a new Afghanistan.

 20. At this point in the operation, the identity of the second in command 

had been known, and the base of the area commander determined.

 21. Release No. 040715-01, date posted, 15 July 2004 by Sergeant Major 

Keith Butler, CJSOTF-A Public Affairs; available from www.soc.mil/

news/releases/04JUL/040715-01.htm.

 22. Operation Independence was named for two reasons: a) conducted 

on 4 July and b) illustrated the first step of many that the CJSOTF-A 

would take to assist the people of Afghanistan in achieving their independence from the tyranny of terrorism.

 23. USASOC News Service, 15 July 2004; available from http://news.soc.

mil/releases/04jul/040715-01.htm. 

 24. During America’s support to the Mujihheddin, arms and ammunition were smuggled from bases in Peshawar and Parichinar across 

the mountains by mules. Mistakenly assessed to the case during the 

Afghan campaign, military planners were convinced that the enemy 

lines of communication followed past routes. In fact, over a 13-month 

period, only a handful of reports cited enemy supply activity being 
85

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

transported by mule. The enemy simply was driving supplies in, 

hidden inside cargo shipments.

 25. Lara Logan, CBS correspondent, reported this story for 60 Minutes, © 

MMIV, CBS Worldwide Inc. All rights reserved. Logan spent 3.5 weeks 

in Afghanistan with the U.S. Navy SEALs, the first time a journalist 

has been allowed to go with them into combat. She followed them on 

the hunt for one of the most sought-after members of the Taliban.

 26. Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: U.S., Afghan Officials Say Security Efforts 

Ensured Smooth Elections,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 12 

October 2004; available from www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/10/

2009b822-2110-4490-8941-2fadcde39606.html

 27. Again, another revolutionary war theme referencing the colonial army’s 

victory in defeating the British attempt to spilt the colonies and divide 

and conquer.

 28. Headquarters United States Central Command, “Triparte Commission 

8th Meeting,” News Release No. 04-09-60, Kabul and Islamabad, 18 

September 2004. This commission was composed of senior military 

and diplomatic representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the 

U.S. They exchanged views on the security situation and mutual cooperation among the commission members. 

87

Bogart: One Valley at a Time

References

One Valley at a Time is a case study of a COIN campaign based on the 

author’s notes and experiences. What follows are the articles, books, 

and manuals that he found helpful in developing the narrative.

Afghanistan Online. “Biography of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.” Available from 

www.afghan-web.com/bios/today/ghekmatyar.html.

Baird, Rodney R. “The Silk Road.” Ancient Routes, 2001. Available from www.

ancientroute.com/SilkRoad.htm.

Coll, Steve. “Anatomy of a Victory: CIA’s Covert Afghan War,” Washington 

Post, 19 July 1992.

Department of the Army. Washington DC:

FM 3-31, Joint Force Land Component Commander Handbook (JFLCC).

13 December 2001.

FM 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces. 20 September 1994.

FM 31-20-5, Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces. 23 March 1993.

FM 31-23, Special Forces Mounted Operations Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures. 5 May 1999.

FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations. 29 August 1986.

FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997.

Eqbal, Ahmad and Richard Barnett. “The Bloody Games,” The New Yorker, 

1989.

French, Shannon E. The Code of the Warrior. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & 

Littlefileld Publishers, Inc., February 2003.

Fry, Maxwell J. The Afghan Economy: Money, Finance, and the Critical Constraints to Economic Development. Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1 

January 1974.

Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice. New York: 

Frederick A Praeger, 1968.

Garnett, David ed. The Essential T.E. Lawrence. London: Jonathan Cape; 

New York: Dutton, 1951.

Herold, Marc W. “The Failing Campaign to Kill Jalaluddin Haqqani.” Cursor, 

18 January 2002. Available from www.cursor.org/stories/jalaluddin.

htm.

Lawrence, Thomas Edward. Sevens Pillars of Wisdom. Reissue. New York: 

Anchor, 1 June 1991.

Le Carre, John. Little Drummer Girl. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983.

Laqueur, Walter. Guerrilla, A Historical and Critical Study. Boulder: Westview 

Press, 1984. 
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JSOU Report 06-6

Marquand, Robert “The reclusive ruler who runs the Taliban.” The Christian 

Science Monitor, 10 October 2001. Available from www.csmonitor.

com/2001/1010/p1s4-wosc.html.

Masters, John. Bugles and a Tiger. London: Cassell & Co, 1956. 

Rashid, Ahmad. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central 

Asia. New Haven, CT: New Haven Press, 2000. 

Sawyer, Jon. “Past Policies Got U.S. Here, Provide Cautionary Tale.” St. Luis 

Post Dispatch, 22 September 2001.

Sheer, Robert. “CIA’s Tracks Lead in Disastrous Circle,” Los Angeles Times, 

17 September 2001.

The Holy Qur’an. Hockessin, Denmark: Noor Foundation, 2002.

The Joint Staff. Washington, DC:

Joint Pub 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint 

Special Operations Task Force Operations. 19 December 2001.

Joint Pub 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special 

Operations Targeting and Mission Planning.

Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

16 June 1995.

Joint Pub 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign 

Internal Defense (FID). 30 April 2004.

Joint Pub 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting. 17 January 2002.

Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. 

London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1964; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 

Combat Studies Institute, 1985.

United Nations, Security Council. Resolution 1333, 19 December 2000. 

Available from http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/

N00/806/62/PDF/N0080662.pdf?OpenElement.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on 

International Operations and Terrorism. Al-Qaeda International. Statement by FBI Counterterrorism Division Acting Assistant Director J. T. 

Caruso. Washington, DC, 18 December 2001. Available from www.fbi.

gov/congress/congress01/caruso121801.htm.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Worldwide Threat 

2001: National Security in a Changing World. Statement by Central 

Intelligence Director George Tenet. Washington, DC, 7 February 2001. 

Available from www.cia.gov/terrorism/pub_statements_terrorism.

html.

U.S. District Court Southern District of New York. U.S. Grand Jury indictment against bin Laden, New York, 6 November 1998. Available from 

www.fas.org/irp/news/1998/11/98110602_nlt.html.

U.S. President. “Afghanistan Day, 1983, Proclamation 5034, by the President of the United States of America, 21 March 1983.” Ronald 

Reagan Presidential Library, Available from www.hartford-hwp.com/

archives/45/278.html.