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PITFALLS OF UNILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 

AT THE PARIS CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

December 1, 2015 

Serial No. 114–52 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan 

STEVE KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

DARIN LAHOOD, Illinois 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts 

DON S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

MARK TAKANO, California 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

December 1, 2015 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 5 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7 

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .... 9 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 11 

Witnesses: 

Mr. Oren Cass, Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 13 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 16 

Mr. Andrew Grossman, Associate, Baker & Hostetler LLP 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 33 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 36 

Dr. Andrew Steer, President and CEO, World Resources Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 53 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 55 

Dr. Bjorn Lomborg, President, Copenhagen Consensus Center 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 98 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 100 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 119

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Dr. Andrew Steer, President and CEO, World Resources Institute .................... 152 

Dr. Bjorn Lomborg, President, Copenhagen Consensus Center .......................... 158 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Document submitted by Representative Gary Palmer, Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .................................... 162 

Statement submitted by Representative Suzanne Bonamici, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 170 

Statement submitted by Representative Elizabeth H. Esty, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 175 

(1) 

PITFALLS OF UNILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 

AT THE PARIS CLIMATE CHANGE 

CONFERENCE 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in Room 

2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lamar Smith [Chairman of the Committee] presiding. 
2 

LAMAR S. SMITH, TexasCHAIRMAN 

Q:ongress of the tinitcd ~Hites 

'!A.ousc of Rcprrscntatiucs 

COMMITIEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

2321 RAYBUBN HOUSE OFFICE 8U!LD!NG 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6301 

225-6371 

Full Committee 

Piifalls of Unilateral Negotiations at the Paris Climate Change 

Conference 

Tuesday, December 1, 2015 

10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Buildiug 

Witnesses 

Mr. Oren Cass, Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research 

Mr. Andrew Grossman, Associate, Baker & Hostetler LLP 

Dr. Andrew Steer, President and CEO, World Resources Institute 

Dr. B.iom Lomborg, President, Copenhagen Consensus Center 
3 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HEARING CHARTER 

Pitfalls of Unilateral Negotiations at the Paris Climate Change Conference 

PURPOSE 

Tuesday, December I, 2015 

I 0:00a.m. 12:00 p.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

The Committee on Science, Space and Technology will hold a hearing entitled Pitfalls of 

Unilateral Negotiations at the Paris Climate Change Conference on Tuesday, December L 

2015, in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building. The hearing will examine the 

various scientific and policy issues surrounding the United States commitment to a United 

Nations-led effort to limit greenhouse gas emissions. 

WITNESS LIST 

• Mr. Oren Cass, Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research 

• Mr. Andrew Grossman, Associate, Baker & Hostetler LLP 

• Dr. Andrew Steer, President and CEO, World Resources Institute 

• Dr. Bjorn Lomborg. President, Copenhagen Consensus Center 

BACKGROUND 

The United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21) is meeting in Paris from 

November 30 to December II. COP21 's objective is to achieve a legally binding agreement on 

greenhouse gas emissions from all nations of the world. 1 In November 2014, the Obama 

Administration announced that the U.S. would reduce its economy-wide greenhouse gas 

emissions by 26%-28% by 2025 compared to a 2005 baseline, and re-iterated this pledge this 

past March to the international community through the "Intended Nationally Detennined 

Contribution (INDC).''2 So far the Administration has not released an analysis on how it 

developed this pledge compared to other levels of commitment to reduce greenhouse gases. In 

addition to a pledge to reduce such emissions, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2009 

pledged to raise $100 billion annually for a Green Climate Fund to aid developing countries 

coping with climate change. 3 It is unclear how the Administration intends to fund any public 

financial support without Congressional approval through the authorization and appropriations 

1 http://www.cop21paris.org/about/cop21 

2 https: 1/www. whitehouse .gov /the-press-office /2015/03/31/fact ·sheet -us-reports-its-202 5-e missions· targetunfccc 

3 http://www. nytimes. com/cwire/2009/12/17 /17climatewire·hillary-clinton-pledges-100b-for-developing96794.html 
4 

process. 4 The Green Climate Fund faces considerable uncertainty with a lack of financial 

commitments from developed nations. 5 

An important policy debate lies in how the Obama Administration intends for the United 

States to meet its proposed commitments to the United Nations on greenhouse gas emissions (the 

INDC) and financial aid (Green Climate Fund) that will bind future Administrations and 

Congresses for the next decade. In addition, the Obama Administration expects the EPA's Clean 

Power Plan (announced last August, but not published as final until October) to play a central 

role towards achieving this pledge, while the Plan appears to have little effect on global 

warming. Furthermore, at least twenty-six states have sued EPA over the Clean Power Plan, 

citing an oven·each of the agency's authority under the Clean Air Act and an unlawful attempt to 

usurp states' ability to regulate electrical generation systems as the basis for their challenge. 

These legal challenges, in addition to the complicated implementation schedules associated with 

regulations, make it unlikely that the Plan will be actually implemented, and thus call into 

question the Administration's ability to make commitments to limit greenhouse gases to the 

United Nations without suppmt from the majority of states or the U.S. Congress. 7 

4 http: 1/www. nyti mes.co m/20 15/09 /30/business/g etti ng · to·lOO-b ill ion-in -eli mate-change-aid. htm I? r=O 5 http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/green-climate-fund-faces-uncertainty115111300600 l.html 6 http :1/www. rpc.senate .gov /policy-papers/ avalanche-of-opposition-hi ts-epas-co2 -rule 7 tilln:J./www. epw. senate.gov /p ubi ic/ cache/fil es/21 ffe3 7 a-8052 -44 98-ba 78 -18395db0fc42/hol mstead. pdf 

2 
5 

Chairman SMITH. The Committee on Science, Space, and technology will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of the Committee at any time. 

Welcome to today’s hearing entitled ‘‘Pitfalls of Unilateral Negotiations at the Paris Climate Change Conference.’’ I’ll recognize myself for an opening statement and then the Ranking Member. 

The Obama Administration’s new electricity regulations will increase the control of the federal government over the lives of Americans and will burden American families. President Obama intends 

to submit these costly new requirements as the cornerstone of his 

proposal at the Paris U.N. climate conference. These severe measures will adversely affect our economy and have no significant impact on climate change. 

The President has pledged that the United States will cut its 

greenhouse gas emissions by as much as 28 percent over the next 

decade and by 80 percent or more by 2050. The pledge was made 

in preparation for the U.N. meeting now underway in Paris, which 

seeks to produce an international agreement that would impose legally binding requirements on the United States for decades to 

come. 

However, the Committee learned from last month’s hearing that 

the cornerstone of this Administration’s climate pledge reduction, 

the so-called Clean Power Plan, will do nothing to meet the President’s pledge. 

Moreover, this regulation will cost billions of dollars, cause financial hardship for American families, and diminish the competitiveness of American employers, all with no significant benefit to climate change. In other words, it’s all pain and no gain. 

It is well-documented that the EPA’s Power Plan will shut down 

power plants across the country, increase electricity prices and cost 

thousands of Americans their jobs. 

The U.S. pledge to the U.N. is estimated to prevent only one-fiftieth of one degree Celsius temperature rise over the next 85 years. 

Incredible. This would be laughable if it weren’t for the tremendous 

costs it imposes on the American people. EPA’s own data shows 

that this regulation would reduce sea level rise by only 1/100 of an 

inch, the thickness of three sheets of paper. 

The President’s Power Plan is nothing more than a power grab. 

It disregards the opposition of the majority in Congress and the 

governors of most states. The President attempts to justify his actions by scaring people with worst-case scenarios and biased data. 

An example of how this administration promotes its suspect climate agenda can be seen at the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. Its employees altered historical climate 

data to get politically correct results in an attempt to disprove the 

18-year lack of global temperature increases. 

NOAA further perpetuates the administration’s agenda by dismissing accurate and calibrated satellite data. This data, considered by many to be the most objective, has clearly showed no 

warming for the past two decades. So NOAA and this Administration simply chose to ignore the satellite data in its recent report. 

NOAA conveniently issued its news release promoting this report 

just as the Obama administration was about to announce its extensive climate change regulations. 
6 

When the Science Committee raised concerns about NOAA’s report, the agency refused to explain its findings and provide documents to the Committee. The American people have a right to see 

the data and know the motivations behind the study. The American people should be suspicious of this Administration when it 

continually impedes Congressional oversight of its extreme climate 

agenda. 

Furthermore, statements by President Obama and others that 

attempt to link extreme weather events to climate change are completely unfounded. The lack of evidence is clear: no increased tornadoes, no increased hurricanes, no increased droughts or floods. The 

Administration’s claims are contradicted by the United Nation’s 

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change itself. 

For instance, the IPCC found that there is ‘‘low confidence on a 

global scale,’’ that drought has increased in intensity or duration. 

The same lack of evidence can be found in the IPCC reports for almost every type of extreme weather. 

The administration’s alarmism and exaggeration is not good 

science and intentionally misleads the American people. Congress 

has repeatedly rejected the President’s extreme climate agenda. So 

the administration instead attempts to create laws on its own and 

to twist environmental regulations in ways Congress never intended. Now the administration has packaged up all these regulations and promised their implementation to the U.N. 

The President’s pledge to the U.N. would increase electricity 

costs, ration energy and slow economic growth. The President’s 

plan ignores good science and only seeks to advance a partisan political agenda. The President should come back to Congress with 

any agreement that is made in Paris. He won’t because he knows 

the Senate will not ratify it. 

Today’s hearing will demonstrate that the President’s U.N. climate pledge is destructive to the American economy and would 

produce no substantive environmental benefits. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Smith follows:] 
7 

For Immediate Release 

December L 2015 

s Media Contact: 

(202) 

Statement of Chairman Lamar Smith (R-Texas) 

Pil(illls of Unilateral Negotiations at the Poris Climate Change Conference 

Chairman Smith: The Obama administration's new electricity regulations will increase the control of 

the federal government over the lives of Americans and will burden American families. 

President Obama intends to submit these costly new requirements as the cornerstone of his proposal at 

the Paris U.N. climate conference. These severe measures will adversely atiect our economy and have 

no significant impact on climate change. 

The president has pledged that the United States will cut its greenhouse gas emissions by as much as 28 

percent over the next decade and by 80 percent or more by 2050. 

was made in preparation for the U.N. meeting now underway in Paris. which seeks to 

an international agreement that would impose legally binding requirements on the United Stales 

decades to come. 

However, the Committee learned from last month·s hearing that the cornerstone of this administration·s 

climate pledge reduction, the so-called Clean Power Plan, will do nothing to meet the President"s 

pledge. 

Moreover, this regulation will cost billions of dollars. cause financial hardship for American families. 

and diminish the competitiveness of American employers, all with no significant benefit to climate 

change. In other words, iCs all pain and no gain. 

It is well-documented that the EPA's Power Plan will shut down power plants across the country, 

increase electricity prices and cost thousands of Americans their jobs. 

The U.S. pledge to the U.N. is estimated to prevent only one-fiftieth of one degree Celsius temperature 

rise over the next 85 Incredible! This would be laughable if it weren •t for the tremendous costs it 

imposes on the people. 

EPA's own data shows that this regulation would reduce sea level rise by only l!IOOth of an inch, the 

thickness of three sheets of paper. 

"Power Plan'· is nothing more than a power grab. It disregards the oppo:;ttton of the 

and the governors of most states. The president attempts 

worst-case scenarios and hiased data. 

An example of how this administration its suspect climate agenda can be seen at the National 

Oceanographic and Atmospheric cJm,inistn'llicm (NOAA). Its employees altered historical climate data 
8 

to get politically correct results in an attempt to disprove the eighteen year lack of global temperature 

increases. 

NOAA further perpetrates the administration's agenda by dismissing accurate and calibrated satellite 

data, This data, considered by many to be the most objective, has clearly showed no warming for the 

past two decades. So NOAA and this administration simply choose to ignore the satellite data in its 

recent report. 

NOAA conveniently issued its news release promoting this report just as the Obama administration was 

about to announce its extensive climate change regulations. 

When the Science Committee raised concerns about NOAA's report, the agency refused to explain its 

findings and provide documents to the Committee. The American people have a right to see the data 

and know the motivations behind this study. 

The American people should be suspicious of this administration when it continually impedes 

Congressional oversight of its extreme climate agenda. 

Furthermore, statements by President Obama and others that attempt to link extreme weather events to 

climate change are completely unfounded. The lack of evidence is clear: no increased tornadoes, no 

increased hurricanes, no increased droughts or floods. 

The administration's claims are contradicted by the United Nation's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 

Change (IPCC) itself. For instance, the IPCC found that there is "low confidence on a global scale,'' 

that drought bas increased in intensity or duration. The same lack of evidence can be found in the TPCC 

reports for almost every type of extreme weather. 

The administration's alarmism and exaggeration is not good science and intentionally misleads the 

American people. Congress has repeatedly rejected the President's extreme climate agenda. So the 

administration instead attempts to create laws on its own-and to twist environmental regulations in 

ways Congress never intended. Now the administration has packaged up all these regulations and 

promised their implementation to the U.N. 

The president's pledge to the U.N. would increase electricity costs, ration energy and slow economic 

growth. The president's plan ignores good science and only seeks to advance a partisan political agenda. 

The President should come back to Congress with any agreement that is made in Paris. He won't, 

because he knows the Senate would not ratify it. 

Today's hearing will demonstrate that the President's U.N. climate pledge is destructive to the American 

economy and would produce no substantive environmental benefits. 

### 
9 

Chairman SMITH. That concludes my opening statement, and the 

Ranking Member, the gentlewoman from Texas, Eddie Bernice 

Johnson, is recognized for hers. 

Ms. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me welcome our witnesses. I’d like to especially thank Dr. 

Steer for his testimony today. I understand that he’s changed his 

flight to Paris at the last minute to accommodate this committee’s 

invitation, and we need your expertise and opinions. And they will 

be appreciated as much here as in Paris. 

As we speak, representatives from more than 190 countries are 

meeting in Paris to reach a historic agreement to achieve reductions in global carbon emissions. I am pleased and proud to support 

the efforts of this Administration, and now the rest of the world, 

in taking meaningful steps to change—to address climate change. 

Every day, more and more people are waking up to the reality 

that climate is changing. Over the weekend, my constituents in 

Dallas, Texas, woke up from the Thanksgiving holiday to find 

streets submerged and homes flooded due to extreme rainfall that 

is only now showing signs of subsiding, cars being overrun. Sadly, 

eight people lost their lives in North Texas as a result of these 

floods. These same circumstances played out 6 months ago with 

equally tragic consequences. 

These kinds of extreme precipitation events are predicted to become more common with a changing climate, and they serve as a 

reminder that we must not forget how high the stakes truly are 

and what the true cost of inaction will be. The United States has 

been a leader on the world stage before and should be again. When 

faced with a difficult task, our nation has historically risen to the 

challenge. Our efforts to reduce carbon emissions through the 

Clean Power Plan and the Climate Action Plan have helped to motivate other nations to act in a similar manner. 

Climate change is not the problem of any one country. It is a 

problem facing all nations. And only through a combined effort can 

we be successful. Climate plans submitted ahead of the Paris talks 

are a clear indication that we are not alone in our commitment to 

reducing carbon emissions and to finding solutions to the impacts 

of climate change. These plans are already expected to reduce emissions substantially and reduce the average rise in global temperature to around 2.7 degrees Celsius. 

Ideally, the final agreement should have mechanisms in place to 

allow nations greater flexibility to change emission goals over time 

that will ultimately bring the average global temperature rise 

down to 2 degrees Celsius or less. 

Support for this kind of international agreement can only be 

found domestically among U.S. companies and leaders of industry. 

Eighty one companies, including Coca-Cola, AT&T, and the Walt 

Disney Company signed on to the American Business Act on Climate Pledge. 

Despite what some of my colleagues have been fond of saying, 

the long-recognized reality of good environmental regulation is that 

it helps, not hinders, the growth of economies. Further evidence of 

that fact was on display yesterday as leaders in China, India, 

Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and more than a dozen other nations joined 
10 

the United States in launching Mission Innovation, a pledge to 

double investments in clean energy R&D over the next 5 years. 

At the same time, a group of 28 influential investors from 10 

countries led by Bill Gates has formed the Breakthrough Energy 

Coalition. These business leaders are committing billions of dollars 

of their own money to commercialize promising early-stage technologies developed in countries that are part of the Mission Innovation initiative. This powerful public-private partnership is just the 

most recent sign that the entire world is prepared to act accordingly and meaningfully to address climate change. 

The global climate system is complex. Solutions to address these 

problems are equally complex. However, I am confident that the 

enthusiasm for change going into the Paris conference will lead to 

a meaningful agreement to reduce carbon emissions. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you and yield back. And I have to excuse 

myself to go to a conference committee. And I will try to return. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson of Texas follows:] 
11 

Opening Statement 

Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Pitfalls of Unilateral Negotiations at the Paris Climate Change Conference 

December l, 2015 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and welcome to our witnesses. I would first like to thank Dr. 

Steer for his testimony today. I understand that he changed his flight to Paris at the last minute to 

accommodate the Committee's invitation. Your expertise and opinions are as appreciated here as 

they will be in Paris. 

As we speak, representatives from more than 190 countries are meeting in Paris to reach 

a historic agreement to achieve reductions in global carbon emissions. 1 am pleased and proud to 

support the efforts of this Administration, and now the rest of the world, in taking meaningful 

steps to address climate change. 

Every day, more and more people are waking up to the reality that the climate is 

changing. Over the weekend, my constituents in Dallas woke up from the Thanksgiving holiday 

to find streets submerged and homes flooded, due to extreme rainfall that is only now showing 

signs of subsiding. Sadly, eight people lost their lives in North Texas as a result of these floods. 

These same circumstances played out six months ago, with equally tragic consequences. 

These kinds of extreme precipitation events are predicted to become more common with 

a changing cJ imate, and they serve as a reminder that we must not forget how high the stakes 

truly arc, and what the true costs of inaction will be. 

The United States has been a leader on the world stage before and should be again. When 

faced with a difficult task, our nation has historically risen to the challenge. Our efforts to reduce 

carbon emissions through the Clean Power Plan and the Climate Action Plan have helped to 

motivate other nations to act in a similar manner. Climate change is not the problem of any one 

country; it is a problem facing all nations and only through a combined effort can we be 

successful. 

Climate plans submitted ahead of the Paris talks are a clear indication that we are not 

alone in our commitment to reducing carbon emissions and to finding solutions to the impacts of 

climate change. These plans are already expected to reduce emissions substantially and reduce 

the average rise in global temperature to around 2. 7 degrees Celsius. 

Ideally, the final agreement should have mechanisms in place to allow nations greater 

flexibility to change emission goals over time that will ultimately bring the average global 

temperature rise down to 2 degrees Celsius or Jess. 

1 
12 

Support for this kind of international agreement can also be found domestically. among 

U.S. companies and leaders of industry. 81 companies, including Coca-Cola, AT&T, and the 

Walt Disney Company signed on to the ''American Business Act on Climate Pledge." 

Despite what some of my colleagues have been fond of saying, the long-recognized 

reality of good environmental regulation is that it helps not hinders the growth of economies. 

Further evidence of that fact was on display yesterday, as leaders of China, India, Saudi 

Arabia, Brazil, and more than a dozen other nations joined the United States in launching 

''Mission Innovation,'' a pledge to double investments in clean energy R&D over the next five 

years. At the same time, a group of28 influential investors from I 0 countries led by Bill Gates 

has formed "The Breakthrough Energy Coalition." These business leaders are committing 

billions of dollars of their own money to commercialize promising early-stage technologies 

developed in countries that are part of the Mission Innovation initiative. 

This powerful public-private partnership is just the most recent sign that the entire world 

is prepared to act meaningfully to address climate change. 

The global climate system is complex. Solutions to address these problems are equally 

complex. However, I am confident that the enthusiasm tor change going into the Paris 

Conference will lead to a meaningful agreement to reduce carbon emissions. 

Thank you and I yield back. 

2 
13 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. 

Ms. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Thank you. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Johnson. 

Our first witness today is Mr. Oren Cass, Senior Fellow for the 

Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. Mr. Cass focuses on energy, environmental, and antipoverty policy. He was the Domestic 

Policy Director of Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign. Prior to 

joining the Manhattan Institute, Mr. Cass was a Management Consultant for Bain & Company. There he advised global companies 

across a range of industries on how to implement growth strategies 

in performance improvement programs. Mr. Cass received his bachelor’s degree in political economy from Williams College and his 

law degree from Harvard University. 

Our second witness is Mr. Andrew Grossman, an associate at 

Baker & Hostetler. He has served as counsel in many prominent 

cases that raise significant issues of federal authority, the constitutional separation of powers, and individual rights. As a scholar, Mr. 

Grossman has written on administrative law, national security law, 

and the constitutional separation of powers. Mr. Grossman is a 

graduate of Dartmouth College and of University of Pennsylvania’s 

Fels Institute of Government. He received his law degree from 

George Mason. 

Our third witness is Dr. Andrew Steer, President and CEO of 

World Resources Institute. Dr. Steer joined WRI from the World 

Bank where he served as Special Envoy for Climate Change since 

2010. Prior to this position, Dr. Steer was Director General and 

member of the Management Board at the United Kingdom Department of International Development. Dr. Steer served with the 

World Bank for over 20 years and has held a number of positions 

that include Country Director for Indonesia and Vietnam, and Director of the Environment Department. Dr. Steer received his 

Ph.D. in economics from the University of Pennsylvania. 

Our final witness today, and this is unusual, joins us from Paris 

via Google Hangout, and he is Dr. Bjorn Lomborg, President of the 

Copenhagen Consensus Center. The Copenhagen Consensus Center 

brings together many of the world’s top economists, which include 

several—excuse me—seven Nobel laureates, to seek priorities for 

the world. Dr. Lomborg is an academic and the author of the bestselling books ‘‘The Skeptical Environmentalist’’ and ‘‘Cool It.’’ In 

addition, he is a visiting professor at Copenhagen Business School. 

Dr. Lomborg received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Copenhagen. 

Now, Dr. Lomborg will actually be testifying last today because 

the videoconference that we have set up. And we’ll begin now with 

the testimony from Mr. Cass. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. OREN CASS, SENIOR FELLOW, 

MANHATTAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH 

Mr. CASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the Committee for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing. 

My name is Oren Cass. I’m a Senior Fellow at the Manhattan 

Institute for Policy Research. My primary message to the committee is this: the climate policies pursued by this country under 
14 

President Obama are a bad deal for the climate and a bad deal for 

the country. 

Globally, climate negotiations no longer bear a substantial relationship to the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The 

commitments known as INDCs made by various countries are voluntary, and those made by developing nations do not depart from 

their existing emissions trajectories. 

Ms. Johnson in her opening statement suggested that pledges 

will lower warming by 2100 to 2.7 degrees Celsius, but that analysis assumes other better actions will be taken at some point in the 

future and does not reflect what is actually included in the INDC 

commitments. 

The sum of all INDCs will likely affect the global temperature 

by the end of this century by 0 to 0.2 degrees Celsius. Indeed, the 

only likely achievement of the Paris conference is an agreement by 

developed nations, including the United States, to transfer enormous sums of—excuse me—enormous sums of wealth to poorer 

countries. 

This outcome is not surprising to those skeptical that U.S. leadership on climate policy could persuade the developing world to 

make economic sacrifices for the sake of reducing emissions. However, it differs dramatically from the popular narrative in which 

Paris represents the historic combination of an effective process to 

bring the world together and act on climate. 

And it deals the harshest blow to anyone concerned about rising 

greenhouse gas emissions or interested in holding nations accountable for action. If progress under this process is supposed to come 

from peer pressure and so-called naming and shaming, then countries failing to take substantial and costly action should be named, 

shamed, and pressured. Instead, they are being applauded by the 

United Nations, the White House, the media, and nongovernmental 

organizations committed to climate action. This fatally undermines 

the entire enterprise for the sake of photo ops and political pointscoring. 

Domestically, even the Obama Administration acknowledges that 

its policies make sense only if they influence international action. 

For instance, EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy testifying before 

this committee in July did not argue that the Clean Power Plan 

will have a detectable impact on global temperatures. Rather, she 

suggested ‘‘the value of this rule is not measured in that way. It 

is measured in showing strong domestic action which can actually 

trigger global action.’’ 

If the objective of this nation’s climate policy is to spur international action, the empty commitments of Paris make clear that 

the policy has failed. Yet proponents, including Ms. McCarthy, continue to argue that new regulations, subsidies, and mandates are 

ends unto themselves, that even if the mitigation of carbon dioxide 

emissions will not itself produce meaningful benefits, we should 

regulate anyway because the impositions on the nation’s energy 

sector will be good for the economy. 

This argument defies both common sense and empirical evidence. 

Honest discussion of the costs and benefits of environmental regulation must begin from the acknowledgement that regulation does 

in fact have costs. 
15 

In the absence of climate benefits, carbon dioxide regulations 

cannot be justified by claiming that the economic costs are themselves the benefits. Climate policy that does not help the climate 

is not good policy. Europe has gone down this path, suffered the 

consequences, and is turning back, yet American policymakers in 

the White House seem determined to charge forward anyway. 

In summary, President Obama is placing the United States in a 

disastrous long-term position for the sake of securing a short-term 

political victory. In future years when the world revisits commitments made today, countries that we applauded for promising 

nothing will be able to show that they are on track because indeed 

they have promised to do what they are on track to do. 

Yet the United States, having put forward an aggressive commitment that even the President’s Clean Power Plan cannot achieve, 

will likely find ourselves off track. Americans will incur the expense to take costly domestic action. We will potentially send billions of dollars overseas to countries that take no such action themselves, and yet as those countries’ emissions grow unabated, we 

will be the ones facing scrutiny and criticism for violating the 

agreement that President Obama signs. This will be the President’s 

climate legacy, and it is not a good one for the country. 

My written testimony provides additional detail on these points 

with respect to the INDC targets and commitments, as well as the 

analyses by economists and other scholars showing that environmental regulation does in fact have costs. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Committee, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cass follows:] 
16 

Testimony of Oren M. Cass 

before the House Committee 

on Science, Space, and Technology 

December 1, 2015 

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Johnson, and distinguished members 

of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing. 

My name is Oren Cass. I am a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy 

Research where my work addresses both domestic environmental policy and 

international climate negotiations. 

My primary message to the committee is this: the climate policies pursued by this 

country under President Obama are a bad deal for the climate and a bad deal for this 

country. 

Globally, international negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention 

on Climate Change (UNFCCC) no longer bear a substantial relationship to the goal of 

sharply reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. Commitments made by developing 

nations amount to a continuation of their existing emissions trajectories. The only likely 

achievement of the upcoming Paris conference (COP21) is a commitment by developed 

nations including the United States to transfer large sums of wealth to poorer nations. 

This outcome is not surprising to those skeptical that U.S. "leadership" on climate 

policy could persuade the developing world to make economic sacrifices for the sake of 

reducing emissions. However, it differs dramatically from the popular narrative in 

which COP21 represents the historic culmination of an effective process to bring the 

world together and act on climate. And it deals a blow to anyone concerned about 

rising greenhouse-gas emissions and interested in holding all nations accountable for 

action. 

If progress is to come from "peer pressure" and "naming and shaming," then countries 

failing to take substantial and costly action should be named, shamed, and pressured. 

Instead, they are being applauded by the United Nations, the White House, the media, 

and NGOs committed to climate action-an approach that fatally undermines the entire 

enterprise for the sake of political point-scoring. 

Domestically, even the originators of the Obama administration's climate-related policies 

acknowledge they make sense only to the degree they influence international action. 

EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy, testifying before this committee in July, did not 

deny that the Clean Power Plan will have no detectable impact on global temperatures; 
17 

rather, she suggested: "The value of this rule is not measured in that way, it is measured 

in showing strong domestic action which can actually trigger global action." 1 

The State Department, in rejecting the Keystone XL pipeline, stated: "A key 

consideration at this time is that granting a Presidential Permit for this proposed Project 

would undermine U.S. climate leadership and thereby have an adverse impact on 

encouraging other States to combat climate change and work to achieve and implement 

a robust and meaningful global climate agreement."2 

If successfully spurring robust international action is the sine qua non of this nation's 

climate policy, and !:hat is failing, then we have non. 

Yet proponents continue to argue that new regulations, subsidies, and mandates are 

ends unto themselves-that even if the mitigation of carbon-dioxide emissions will not 

itself produce meaningful benefits, we should regulate anyway because the impositions 

on the nation's energy sector will be good for l:he economy. This argument defies bol:h 

common sense and empirical evidence. Climate policy that does not help the climate is 

not good policy. 

In summary, the Obarna administration is placing the United States in a disastrous 

long-term position for the sake of securing a short-term political victory. In future years, 

when the world revisits commitment.~ made today, countries that we applauded for 

promising nothing will be able to say they are well on their way to meeting their 

"goals." Yet l:he United States, having put forward an aggressive commitment that even 

the president's Clean Power Plan cannot achieve, will likely find itself off track. 

Americans will incur the expense to take costly domestic action. We will potentially 

send billions of dollars overseas to countries taking no such action themselves. And yet 

as their emission grow unabated, we will be the ones facing scrutiny and criticism for 

violating the agreement. This will be President Obama' s climate legacy. 

This testimony first addresses tl1e status of fue international negotiations in detail and 

then turns to an assessment of domestic policy in l:he absence of international progress. 

before the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee. July 9, 2015, 

h!ti2i!_l'-'l:').S;:Ollli!1ill:&..!:l!ksL!J1l!.~lif.l!!!::l!SimillL'1G!ill::!lilli!c:llli:£J!llill::.t0'illlli~:Jl!l:'l'!t£\l:=J.!;!1Ll!illi (attime 

2 U.S. Department of State. Record of Decision and National lntcrest Determination. '"TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline," 

November 3. 2015, http:; l<;vs!OtKpipdinc-\l.~tnt~.gn\ 'documcnh.,onzanilation,2-l9.l50J2b.LC 

2 
18 

I. THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: WHAT ARE CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS ACHIEVING? 

Three points illustrate that political posturing and legacy building have replaced the 

mitigation of greenhouse-gas emissions as the objective of climate negotiations: First, 

the negotiating process is designed to produce an easy consensus while excusing 

inaction. Second, the much-celebrated developing-nation commitments in fact reflect 

only a promise to continue with business as usual. Third, the emphasis on so-called 

"climate finance" is unjustified and unproductive. 

A. The UNFCCC Negotiating Process 

After the collapse of the Copenhagen talks in 2009, the world appears to have 

abandoned the prospect of achieving a binding agreement to reduce greenhouse-gas 

emissions. Certainly, no global cap-and-trade program, carbon tax, or other "price on 

carbon" is under discussion. 

Instead, negotiators have adopted a "pledge-and-review" process whereby each 

country announces an "Intended Nationally Determined Contribution" (INDC) that 

represents its proposed actions and emissions reductions. The contents of these INDCs 

are at the discretion of the individual countries. At the insistence of developing nations, 

there is no requirement that INDCs achieve cuts of certain levels or that they even use 

consistent formats, metrics, or baselines.3 Developing nations also oppose" any 

obligatory review mechanism for increasing individual efforts of developing 

countries."4 No consequences have been established for missing a plan's goals. 

The hope is that, to quote from a preliminary negotiating text, this approach will 

produce an "upward spiral of ambition over time"3-or, as the New York Times 

headlined it," A Climate Accord Based on Global Peer Pressure." 6 But as David J.C. 

Mackay and his colleagues noted in a recent commentary for Nature: "History and the 

science of cooperation predict that quite the opposite will happen." 7 A process that 

ignores the collective-action problems associated with climate change and provides no 

concrete incentives to act is ill-suited to the purported objectives of climate negotiators . 

.. i\'ew York Times. December !4. 2014. 

4 Press Release, "Meeting ofNegotiators of Like-Minded Developing Countries Concludes: Javadekar Lauds Work Done hy 

LMDC," Press Infom1ation Bureau. Government offndia, Septemb~r 15. 2015. 

http:' 'pib.nic.in 'ncn "ik/PrintReka~..: .a.;;r\. '.1n:lid·-126913. 

0 Supra note 3. 

7 David J.C. MacKay et al. "Price Carbon-I \Vill If You WilL'' Nature. October 12,2015, http: 1\\"\\\\.!1~\HJrc.t.:OmJK'''"' prl<:..:-

carhnn-i-\\ il!-if-, ou-\\ i 11-1. I 8:538. 

3 
19 

Boosters of the negotiations have highlighted the agreement to move forward with an 

INDC-driven structure, followed by the parade of submitted INDCs, as proof that the 

world can in fact come together and take meaningful action on climate change. That 

view is precisely backward. Negotiations have followed this course of discretionary, 

unenforceable pledges only because the positions and interests of countries were so 

plainly incompatible that a substantive agreement was not possible. 

Of course, one should not exclude the possibility of progress on the basis of theory 

alone. Unfortunately, the poor quality of the submitted INDCs only confirms what 

rational analysis of the process would have predicted: significant obfuscation and 

posturing, but insignificant results. 

B. Estimated Impact of INDCs 

Because creation of INDCs was left entirely to the discretion of individual countries, 

with no common baseline or metrics, measuring the cumulative impact of submissions 

is not a straightforward process. INDCs must be standardized and then translated into 

a plausible emissions trajectory. A realistic baseline for emissions absent the INDCs 

must be established, against which progress can be measured. 

If INDCs slow emissions growth relative to the past, but only by the amount emissions 

were already likely to slow given economic and technological progress, then countries 

are" committing" only to proceeding with business as usual (BAU). Conversely, 

choosing an implausibly high baseline and then comparing it to BAU can make simply 

proceeding with BAU appear significant. 

Most efforts at quantification show the INDCs achieving significant progress, however 

that progress is the illusory result of poorly chosen baselines and unwarranted inferences. 

B.1. "Top-Down" Assessments 

Aggregations of INDCs have produced confusing and s<~emingly inconsistent results: 

Climate Interactive, a Washington-based non-profit that has partnered with the U.S. 

State Departrnent,8 reports that temperatures by 2100 would rise 4.5°C above preindustrial levels in a BAU case but only 3.5°C based on INDCs.9 However, it uses the 

UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)'s RCP 8.5 reference case as 

its BAU, even though the IPCC specifies that: "The RCP 8.5 pathway has higher 

emissions than all but a few published baseline scenarios." 10 

8 '·About'' Climate Interactive. http~:/1\w, wxlimateint.:ractl\t:.oro nbnut/ (accessed November 1 L 2015). 

Q "Climate Scoreboard," Climate Interactive, httn-;:t/\\" \\.t:!imatcintcracti\c.on! 1

tno!s.s.:orchoard· (accessed Novemhcr 11, 

2015). 

4 
20 

• Climate Action Tracker (a partnership of Climate Analytics, Ecofys, NewClimate 

Institute, and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research) reports that 

temperatures by 2100 would rise 3.6°C based on current policy action but only 2.7°C 

based on lNDCs.n However, that 2.TC figure is reached only by assuming that all 

countries will make additional commitments to further reduce emissions after the 

end of the period covered by the INDCsi2 

• The International Energy Agency also estimates that with INDCs the global 

temperature will rise 2.TC, but it achieves such a result by simply choosing a 

forecast through 2100 "judged as the long-term emissions trajectory most closely 

aligned with [its] INDC analysis." 13 It is not a reflection of countries' actual 

commitments. 

• The Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Joint Program on the Science and Policy 

of Global Change reports that temperatures by 2100 would rise 3.9°C without 

INDCs and 3.7°C with them_11 The MIT study uses an apples-to-apples comparison 

of its own projections before and after incorporating the INDCs. Unfortunately, 

much of the progress thus disappears. 

• The UN has conducted its own analysis, concluding that INDCs will reduce global 

carbon-dioxide-equivalent emissions in 2030 from 60.3 to 56.7 gigatons, with a 

twentieth percentile estimate of no improvement and an eightieth percentile 

estimate of a 7.5 gigaton improvement.15 The UN emphasizes that this reduction 

equates to growth of "11-23 per cent in the 2010-2030 period compared with 24 per 

cent in the 1990-2010 period,"16 implying that continuation of the prior growth rate 

would represent a baseline and any slowing of growth an improvement (see Figure 

1). But as the IPCC observed only two years earlier in its Fifth Assessment Report: 

"most baseline scenarios project a deceleration in emissions growth, especially 

compared to the rapid rate observed in the past decade." 17 

11 --GlobaL'" Climate Action Tracker, http:i !...'limah:at·tiontrackcr.om, g!Phal.html (accessed November ll, 2015), 

12 ··GJobal 

November 11, 

10/d. 

17 Supra note 10. 

,. Climate Action Tracker. h!Jp://climatcactiontrackcr-on::imdhodolo\.!\"/1 R'tJit)halMpat!ma\ -;.html (accessed 

5 
21 

Figure 1. UNFCCC Assessment of INDC Impact from Constant-Grawth Baseline. 18 

In aggregate, the best estimate for temperature rise with INDCs appears to be 3.5°C 

(Climate Interactive) to 3.7°C (MIT), while the best estimate of the world's trajectory 

absent them is 3.6°C (Climate Action Tracker current policy) to 3.9°C (MIT). In other 

words, the actual improvement if all countries follow through with their voluntary 

contributions, is 0.1 to 0.2°C. 

However, even this estimate may overstate the impact of the INDCs. 

B.2. A Better Baseline 

None of the assessments described above uses the set of baseline scenarios developed 

by the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) in 2000 to describe the likely 

emissions associated with various future trajectories of economic growth and 

technological progress. 19 Of these, the "AlB" scenario provides a particularly useful and 

widely-used baseline. According to the IPCC: 

The A1 ston;line and scenario family describes a future world of venr rcwid economic &rowth. 

&lobal population that peak.< in mid-century and declines tlzerea{ter, and the rapid introduction of 

new and more efficient teclmolo&ies. Major uuderltrinz themes are convergerzce among regions, 

capacihr building and increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in 

regional differences in per capita income. The Al scenario family develops into three groups that 

describe alternative directions of technological change in the energJJ system. TILe three Al groups 

are distinguished btj their technological emphasis: fossil-intensive (A1FI), non-fossil energy 

sources (Al'I) or a balance across all sources (AlB) (where balanced is defined as not relving too 

heavilv on one particular ener/[1! source. on the assumption that similar improvement rates apply 

to all energv supplv and end use technologies)20 

UNFCCC, 

20 !d (emphasis added). 

6 
22 

The AlB scenario has been used as a baseline in recent years by both the U.S. 

government21 and European researchers22 Climatologists Michael Mann and Richard 

Alley of Penn State University call it" a 'middle of the road' emission scenario that is 

often used as a baseline for comparisons." '~ Its emissions trajectory falls in between 

those of the RCP 6.0 and RCP 8.5 pathways,24 consistent with the IPCC' s observation 

that: "Although most baseline scenarios project a deceleration in emissions growth, 

especially compared to the rapid rate observed in the past decade, none is consistent in 

the long run with the pathways in the two most stringent RCP scenarios [2.6 and 4.5], 

with the majority falling between the 6.0 and 8.5 pathways."25 

One possible reason that INDC analyses have avoided using the A 1B baseline is that 

using it eliminates any sign of progress. According to the Model for the Assessment of 

Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC), developed through support of 

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,26 the projected climate change by 2100 

under the AlB scenario is 3.4°C.27 This result is consistent with the IPCC's own estimate 

for the scenario of 3.3°C warming. 28 Either figure is already below the best estimate for 

what the INDCs achieve. In its report, MIT also shows the AlB trajectory of emissions 

as virtually indistinguishable from the INDC-driven projection.29 

A "bottoms-up" assessment of individual INDCs confirms the view that countries have 

promised only what was already likely to happen. 

Melillo et al, cds .. ·'Climate Change Impacts in the United States: Tl1e Third National Climate Assessment,'" U.S. 

Research October 2014. 

24 IPCC. Fifth Assessment Report. Working Group 2. Chapter I. httn:r,.,,,,,L]pcc.r.:hLlliJ!/ns.~cssmcnt-rcportar5·\\Q::U\\"(ifiAR5-

Chap! Fl~ALruif(tigurc l-4). 

15 Supra note lO (and figure 6.4). 

26 "MAG[CC/SCENGEN: About,'' httn:/.\\\'r\~g!:Lw:ar.ctll,L,ca"\\i!l.lc\/mall.icc/about.lUml (accessed November 11. 2015). 

27 M. Meinshausen et al. "'Emulating coupled atmosphere-ocean and carbon cycle models \Vith a simpler modeL MAGlCC6: Part 

I- Model Description and Calibration," Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics. 2011, hllp://li\e.nw~ . .dcc.or\1 (accessed November 

II. 20I5). 

SPM.I provides warming since l980-1999; note (d) 

7 
23 

It is the major developing nations whose aggressive emissions trajectories will dictate 

the world's total emissions this century-four-fifths of carbon-dioxide emissions in the 

AlB scenario. But those are the same nations whose desperate need for economic 

growth precludes a willingness to focus on emissions reductions. They are committing 

only to doing what they believed their economies would do anyway, rather than 

making sacrifices or incurring costs. 

Two, China and India, are reviewed in detail here. 

B.3. Country Assessment: China 

China has committed to reaching peak emissions "around 2030" but offered no 

commitment regarding the level of that peak or the subsequent rate of emission decline. 

It has also committed to reducing carbon-dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 60 to 65 

percent in 2030 as compared to 2005.30 

But four years ago, in 2011, a study by the U.S. government's own Lawrence Berkeley 

National Laboratory had already concluded that Chinese emissions would peak around 

2030_31 An analysis by Bloomberg New Energy Finance further concludes that the 

commitment with respect to emissions intensity is actually less ambitious than BAU.o2 

China's recent announcement that its coal consumption is up to 17 percent higher than 

previously estimated makes the commitment even weaker and more easily achievable, 

as its officials acknowledge.33 Because its commitments include no absolute emissions 

targets, starting from a higher baseline simply means it can consume and emit more 

while still meeting its goaL Especially insofar as Chinese leaders may have been aware 

their official statistics underreported coal consumption and emissions, they have played 

the INDC game masterfully. 

Climate Action Tracker, one of the organizations attempting to calculate INDC impacts, 

provides a China-specific view and projects the country's commitments to fall squarely 

in the middle of the projection for current policy (i.e., absent the INDC). Notably, the 

analysis disregards the emissions intensity target entirely because "the weak INDC 

carbon intensity targets, if taken literally, would only be reached at the expense of 

30 .. Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of China." UNFCCC. June 30, 2015, 

Talks:' New York Times, November 3, 

8 
24 

important national policies and actions, including in relation to reduced air pollution. 

This appears unlikely in our judgment."''1 The analysis acknowledges that the 

commitment is meaningless but therefore dismisses it as implausible and substitutes a 

more climate-friendly estimate. 

B.4. Country Assessment: India 

Nonetheless, China's INDC is a model of climate ambition when compared to India's. 

While the Nen' York Times headlined India's announcement with "India Announces Plan 

to Lower Rate of Greenhouse Gas Emissions,"35 the country offered no commitment 

with respect to its emissions-even a potential future peak-and only a 33 to 35 percent 

reduction in emissions per unit of GDP in 2030 as compared to 2005.36 

Analyses from multiple perspectives demonstrate the emptiness of this commitment. In 

April, India's Centre for Policy Research estimated an emissions trajectory for the 

country absent further policy action37 and the INDC commitment falls squarely in the 

middle of the established range. Bloomberg finds it significantly worse than BAU38 and 

researcher Glen Peters has shown the proposed progress is slower than historical 

trend.39 Indeed, the most obvious reference point is in the INDC itself: India reports that 

its energy efficiency has already improved more than 17 percent between 2005 and 

2012. Assuming no change in its carbon intensity of energy, India could improve only 

half as fast going forward and still achieve its "goal." 

Climate Action Tracker also concedes that India's target is less ambitious than BAU, but 

nevertheless awards the country a rating of "Medium."40 The only countries in the 

world to receive better ratings are Morocco, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, and Bhutan. 

Looking beyond China and India, Indonesia has submitted a plan41 so vague that the 

World Resources Institute could not assess it; Taryn Fransen, project director of the 

34 ·'China,'' Climate Action Tracker, Jillp://dimm.:u;:,;.~.bl!l!J:i1(,;1'5:~ .. t.or!!~~ountriY.~'\::hinallunl (accessed November II. 20! 5). 

35 Ellen 

October L 

Jw "Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of India,'' UNFCCC October 1, 2015, 

JlW2.;[_\\ \\\\ -t .upt'ccc.inL':>ubmi:-;:-ion~/I-:\D( '/Pubii:>11.£.~!'! o20l )ocum~nt:/lndia/ 1/IN D!A0 ()201'\"DC0 o20 I 0~ o20U;\F( 'CC.pdf. 

37 Navroz K. Dubash ct al. "lntbrming India's Energy and Climate Debate: Policy Lessons tfom Modelling Studies,'' Centre fOr 

Research. 2015 . 

. ls Supra note 32. 

39 Glen Peters, "Is the Indian #INDC ambitious?" f'wittcr. October 12, 2015. 

http~://t\\ ittt:f.Cl1lll/l\.·t.:rs Gl~nis!atu:-./653-!-9791761 :18:10J.f.f nhoto/1 (accessed November l L 20 15). 

40 "India." .hnp:-'idimatcncti.ontrack~L.QfQ./countrics/Ludia.html (accessed November 11, 2015). 

9 
25 

Institute's Open Climate Network concluded it "does not allow for any 

accountability."42 Even Climate Action Tracker rates the plan "Inadequate" and finds it 

less aggressive than current policy projections.43 

Brazil, the most ambitious of the large developing countries, may actually have 

proposed an improvement on current policy. However, its carbon footprint has 

historically been driven by deforestation, which has slowed dramatically in recent years 

leading to significantly lower emissions. In its INDC, Brazil reports a 41 percent decline 

in emissions between 2005 and 2012 but commits to only a 37 percent reduction 

between 2005 and 2025.44 As professor Timmons Roberts and research fellow Guy 

Edwards of Brown University observed at the Brookings Institution, this is" seeking 

credit for work done" and "the new targets mean only tepid steps forward." 45 

In mid-November, long after all deadlines had passed, Pakistan submitted a one-page 

INDC making no commitments and offering the tautological observation that "Pakistan 

is committed to reduce its emissions after reaching peak levels to the extent possible."46 

Nigeria submitted its own plan less than 48 hours before the start of talks, leaving no 

opportunity for an assessment.47 A cursory review would seem to indicate that it 

worked from an implausible "business-as-usual" defined as emissions growing at least 

as quickly as the economic output (economic growth of 5% per year, emissions growth 

of 114% over the 2015-2030 period or 5.2% per year)-"8 

In summary, claims of progress for the INDC-driven approach are incorrect and 

depend on the use of inappropriate baselines or an assumption of action not even 

pledged. But if actual discussions over emissions reductions have been reduced to the 

submission of voluntary, unenforceable, and often empty INDCs, what is the point of 

even meeting in Paris? 

46 .. Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of Pakistan." lJNFCCC. November 12, 2015 . 

.h.UJ): f/\\ \\\\ -l.!lll flTtj n t '-.:u bnti '>:-ion~/!]\; I )C!Pul'! i:::h~d 0 n20 Documcnt..;/Paki:::tan/ 1 ,'Pak i:>.tan° o20! ;\DC .doc. 

10 
26 

C. An Emphasis on "Climate Finance" 

Negotiations in Paris will focus little on greenhouse-gas emissions and almost entirely 

on the more mundane subject of cash. Specifically, the developing world expects 

developed countries to offer more than $100 billion per year in what is called "climate 

finance." 

Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first announced a developed-world 

commitment to such enormous wealth transfers in a bid to save the Copenhagen talks 

in 2009.49 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon now insists" credible climate financing is 

essential" to success in Paris50 while Miguel Caiiete, the EU's Commissioner for Climate 

Action, has reportedly promised not only $100 billion per year by 2020 but increasing 

amounts thereafter.51 Christiana Figueres, the Executive Secretary of the UN 

Framework Convention on Climate Change, wrote in an op-ed published October 30: 

Crucial to t!rat success [in Paris] and to fostering the current and future ambitions of countries 

will be finance and, more specifically, support from developed countries to the aspirations of 

developing ones. Six years ago, rich countries pledged to provide $100 billion to poorer countries 

by 2020, the date when the new agreement will come into force. Paris needs to provide certainh;, 

clarity and confidence that this promise will be met, not least to support the climate action plans -

Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) - of the most vulnerable nations, 

including the least developed co11ntries and tlze small island developing states." 

What remains unclear is not only the source of this finance, but also its rationale. 

Figueres notes that one purpose might be to support the implementation of INDCs 

(though, as discussed above, those INDCs do not generally represent new action). As 

her phrasing implies, many justifications have been floated: 

First, developing nations suggest that developed nations owe them an 

"ecological debt" for the latter's disproportionate share of past emissions. Pope 

Francis endorsed this argument in his encyclical on the environment. 53 This 

argument holds that because scientific estimates place an upper limit on the 

amount of carbon dioxide that humanity can ever emit, nations like the U.S. that 

have already emitted more than their fair share are accumulating debt payable to 

ll 
27 

nations using less than their fair share. In America's case, the monetary value of 

the debt could reach trillions of dollars. 54 

• Second, developing nations suggest that developed nations should pay them 

"reparations" for natural disasters caused by the climate change for which past 

developed-nation emissions are purportedly responsible. While many western 

politicians are eager in the domestic context to attribute natural disasters and 

their severity to climate change, they are reluctant to do so in an international 

context where accepting such causation could trigger enormous and 

unpredictable liability.S5 

• Third, developing nations suggest that the funding will help them to pursue lowcarbon development, deploy more renewable energy, and adapt to whatever 

climate changes occur. This rationale is the only one that U.S. negotiators have 

acknowledged as valid.56 However, in the current negotiating framework, it 

remains unclear what developed nations would be receiving for their money. 

India, for instance, has suggested it will require $2.5 trillion between now and 

2030-to pursue its business-as-usual INDC.57 

As should be clear, it makes little sense under any rationale for the developed world to 

offer h·illions of dollars in wealth transfers as part of an agreement not likely to produce 

emissions reductions. But increasingly, those payments are considered the price of the 

agreement. Developed-world climate negotiators are pursuing a transaction in which 

leaders in the developed world, having staked their political capital and legacies on 

achieving an" agreement," must pay developing nations to sign on the dotted line. 

This dynamic-where the objective of an agreement is the agreement itself- explains 

why a process was embraced that prioritizes empty consensus over any prospect of 

substantive action, why the empty commihnents that followed have been celebrated as 

important achievements rather than condemned as inadequate, and why negotiations 

now center on wealth transfers. 

"~Oren Cass. 

for Climate:' 1\'ew York Times. December 9. 

57 Supra note 36. 

12 
28 

The current climate negotiations obscure rather than advance the objective of reducing 

greenhouse-gas emissions. Vocal supporters, by crediting developing nations for 

proceeding on their current course, ensure that the required "naming and shaming" 

will not occur. Yet somehow, it is the critics who stand accused of blocking progress. 

Policymakers and activists from all points on the political spectrum should be united in 

condemning as unhelpful the Paris talks now underway. Congress should reject and 

refuse to appropriate funds for any agreement emphasizing wealth transfers over 

emissions reductions. 

II. THE DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVE: WHAT Is U.S. POLICY ACCOMPLISHING? 

U.S. leadership is not spurring developing nations to sacrifice economic growth for 

emissions reductions. 

But without such an effect, there is no justification for the costly domestic actions 

undertaken by the Obama administration. Still, supporters argue that aggressive 

carbon-dioxide regulations like the Clean Power Plan are good economic policy even if 

they offer no carbon-dioxide-related benefits. These claims are disingenuous, post hoc 

rationalizations that are unsupported by economic analysis. 

Environmental Regulation and Economic Growth 

One claim made in favor of additional regulation is that forcing investment in 

pollution-control technology or alternative energy sources will" create jobs."58 This is 

tautologically true. Similarly, an EPA "Large Holes Plan" that required each state to dig 

a certain number of large holes would create new hole-digging jobs and likely some 

shovel-related innovation. Neither plan necessarily contributes to the economy's health 

or the nation's prosperity. 

Solar provides a helpful example. The Solar Energy Industries Association reports, 

based on a study it commissioned from Bloomberg New Energy Finance, that 

expiration of the current federal subsidy for solar investments would produce a loss of 

80,000 solar jobs in 2017 -approximately two-thirds of the projected 2016 total. 59 In 

other words, even after a long period of aggressive government support, the majority of 

jobs in the industry are not economically viable without further taxpayer largesse. 

59 ··solar lTC " Solar Energy Industries Association. September 2015. bJ..lo:/:'\\~: \\ .:-.cia.ori.u'r£_2c-an:h-

!3 
29 

More broadly, the claim is made that regulation must be good for the economy because 

the economy has grown when past regulations were implemented. To quote an August 

speech by EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy: "They'll say that our transition to cleaner 

energy system [sic] will kill jobs. Well, I'm not sure they've been following the 

economics as well as they should, because the solar industry is creating jobs 10 times 

faster than the rest of the economy. And, by the way, over the last40 years, we've cut 

air pollution by 70 percent-while our economy has tripled."60 

Senator Ed Markey observed at a recent Senate hearing on the Clean Power Plan: "In 

New England, New York, Delaware, Maryland, we implemented a Regional 

Greenhouse Gas Initiative [RGGl]. From 2007 until today, we've reduced our 

greenhouse gases across those nine states by 40 percent. In Massachusetts, we saw an 

increase in our gross domestic product by 29 percent at the same time. We can do it. We 

can do it."61 

In real terms, total GDP growth in Massachusetts from 2007 to 2014 was 8.7 percent 

according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis.62 But that says nothing about what 

growth would have been without RGGI. In the seven year period from 1999 to 2006, 

Massachusetts GDP grew 18.2 percent-surely it would be unfair to suggest that RGGI 

cut growth by more than half. 

This analytical principle obviously extends beyond Massachusetts. While there is no 

question that the economy has continued to grow even as laws like the Clean Air Act 

have made extraordinary gains in the nation's environmental quality, this does not 

suggest that environmental regulation is therefore a cause of this growth or even a net 

positive for the economy. To the contrary, careful economic studies consistently 

demonstrate that regulation has slowed economic growth and harmed workers, 

particularly in those industries most heavily regulated: 

• "[I]n the first 15 years after the CAAAs became law (1972-1987), nonattainment 

counties (relative to attainment ones) lost approximately 590,000 jobs, $37 billion 

in capital stock, and $75 billion (1987$) of output in polluting industries." (NBER, 

University of Chicago)63 

60 Supra note 58. 

8. 2015. 

hill?h'-lli=~~Jb!i:ll.Lll\!J!fuil!.\h~fu!Ll!.£c!i!l!::{'i[?=:!2[1illlll\.:ill!dl.:lli>l:!!cli2;~l,l[lli'.ill.llli2 (at time 1 :35:00). 

63 Michael Greenstone, "The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Industrial Activity: Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 

Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of Manufactures:· NBER \Vorking Paper 8484, September 200 L 

h!J~ \\ \\·.nbcr.orntp;.w(:r_-.,.\, s .. HH.pd!~ 

14 
30 

• After the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, "the average worker in a regulated 

sector experienced a total earnings loss equivalent to 20% of their preregulatory 

earnings." (Quarterly Journal of Economics, University of California-Berkeley)64 

• The stricter regulations applied by the Clean Air Act to "nonattainment" 

counties favors others, "reducing [plant] births for polluting industries in 

nonattainment areas by 26-45 percent." (Journal of Political Economy, U.S. 

Census Bureau, Brown University)6S 

• Losses in total factor productivity from the Clean Air Act "correspond to annual 

lost output in the manufacturing sector of about $20.8 billion in 2010 dollars. 111is 

is roughly 8.8 percent of average manufacturing sector profits over this period. " 

(MIT, University of Chicago)66 

Honest discussions of the cost and benefits of environmental regulation must begin 

from the acknowledgment that there are costs and benefits. In the absence of climate 

benefits, carbon-dioxide regulations cannot be justified by claiming that the economic 

costs are benefits themselves. 

The European Experience 

The EPA need not experiment on the American economy to discover that the proposed 

policies are costly ones. Europe has conducted the experiment already. Since 2006, 

thanks to aggressive government mandates and subsidies, European investment in 

clean energy has dramatically outpaced U.S. investment according to Bloomberg New 

Energy FinanceP In 2010, near its peak, European investment more than b·ipled U.S. 

investment. 

What happened? Last year, the U.S. Energy Information Administration reported that 

since 2006 European residential electricity prices have skyrocketed-increasing by 43 

64 W. Reed Walker, "The Transitional Costs of Sectoral Reallocation: EYidcnce from the Clean Air Act and the Workforce," 

QuarterZv Journal of Economics, 2013. http://Etcu!h .hans.h>:rkt:k'\ .s;du/n\alkcrlrescan:h/\\alkcr transitimwl cosb C:\:\.rdL 

65 Randy Becker and Vernon Henderson, "Effects of Air Quality Regulations on Polluting Industries." Journal (!f Political 

Economy, 2000. 

the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing," MIT 

15 
31 

percent compared to a 17 percent increase in the United States.68Jndustrial electricity 

prices in Germany are up 60 percent in five years.69 

In an article titled "Worse Than Useless," The Economist reported that major utility 

companies have lost more than $500 billion in market value and that the continent's 

largest source of renewable energy is now wood.?O Germany spent $20 billion on 

subsidies in 2013 alone, yet German coal consumption and carbon-dioxide emissions 

were actually rising.71 

Europe is reversing course quickly. Counh·ies are slashing subsidies.72 Since 2011, 

inveshnent has plunged nearly 70 percent and in Q3 of 2015 reached its lowest level 

since 2004.73 In 2015, for the first time, U.S. inveshnent will exceed Europe's. 

While those celebrating green inveshnent as an end unto itself will undoubtedly 

celebrate this American "victory," anyone concerned with economic growth and 

competitiveness should hope this country avoids a repeat of the European experience. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Committee. I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

68 •·European Resid~ntial Electricity Prices Faster Than Prices in United States." U.S. Energy Information 

Administration. November 18. 2014, h!!J!lil~UL!iih&'lC:!l!l!lill:illi:J!l£!li.YiikWili:Jln:l!t'llilli 

70 .. Worse than Useless," Economist. January 15. 2014, http:··\\~\~12.Qnomist.~illll.'l1.~"''i:1~ad~J:.d.~.L~~51l02:~..!JIG11!:12~.?.fu::i~.i-... m:s. nh.~~YhLTt:"~ hm\-!i ...:-th~rn- \\M:-c-u:-;t-kss. 

n Supra note 67. 

16 
32 

Biography for Oren M. Cass 

Oren Cassis a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, where he focuses on energy, the 

environment, and antipoverty policy. He was domestic policy director of Mitt 

Romney's presidential campaign in 2011-12. In that role, Cass shaped campaign policy 

and communication on issues from health care to energy to trade. He spoke regularly 

on behalf of the campaign, including in debates at Harvard University on health care 

policy and at MIT on energy and environmental policy. Since then, Cass has outlined 

conservative policy approaches on poverty, climate change, environmental regulation, 

and international trade. Cass has briefed members of Congress and congressional staff 

in both the House and Senate and his essays and columns have been published in the 

vVall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, National Affairs, City Journal, 

National Review, Investor's Business Daily, and Washington Examiner. 

Prior to joining MI, Cass was a management consultant for Bain & Company in the 

firm's Boston and New Delhi offices, where he advised global companies across a range 

of industries on implementing growth sh·ategies and performance-improvement 

programs. He holds a B.A. in political economy from Williams College and a J.D. from 

Harvard University, where he was an editor and the vice president of volume 125 of the 

Harvard Law Review. 

17 
33 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Cass. 

Mr. Grossman. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. ANDREW GROSSMAN, 

ASSOCIATE, BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP 

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Committee. Thank you for holding this hearing today and inviting 

me to testify. 

The Committee has requested that I assess the legal aspects of 

the climate agreement being negotiated in Paris, and my conclusion is that, as a legal matter, Paris is a farce. The point of the 

Paris negotiations is to create new obligations in international law, 

but it is our constitutional separation of powers that will effectively 

determine the parameters of that agreement because of a decision 

that the President made. 

The President decided that he would not seek the advice and consent of the Senate to ratify the Paris agreement as a treaty, and 

he decided that he would not seek the legislative support of the 

House and Senate to implement the Paris agreement as a Congressional executive agreement. Instead, the President made the decision to do what he has done so many times in recent years: attempt 

to circumvent Congress and proceed on his own. Well, he’s got his 

pen and he’s got his phone, but what he doesn’t have is the legislative power. And that means he is extremely constrained in terms 

of what he can lawfully accomplish through an executive agreement made on his sole authority. 

Let me concede that the President’s authority to conclude executive agreements is a controversial subject with many legal scholars 

having differing views about the scope of that authority. But the 

law in this area is often uncertain. But it’s not the uncertain parts 

that we’re talking about today. The issues at play here are ones 

where there is broad agreement about what the President can and 

cannot do. That means we can review the likely components of a 

Paris deal and determine with great confidence where they stand 

under U.S. law. 

The two central objectives of the negotiations are financial commitments to foreign aid and emission reduction targets. These 

things cannot be implemented in any binding fashion consistent 

with U.S. law. The idea of the financial commitments, as I understand it, is for the United States and other developed nations to 

make transfer payments to the governments of poorer nations to 

coax them to forgo cheap energy from traditional high emission 

sources. 

There is an insurmountable legal issue here. The U.S. Constitution provides that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but 

in consequence of appropriations made by law—in other words, a 

law enacted by Congress. For that reason, commitments of funds 

are often cited as the quintessential example of measures that the 

President cannot undertake on his sole authority. 

Now, I’m not aware of any serious disagreement on that point, 

so that is our legal conclusion. An agreement containing binding financial commitments cannot be executed on the President’s sole 

authority. 
34 

Binding emission reduction targets are likewise off the table. In 

assessing the President’s authority to enter into an executive 

agreement, we look to historical practice and Congressional consents. The leading legal authorities echo Justice Jackson’s formula 

from the Steel Seizure case. The President’s authority to enter into 

executive agreements is secure where he draws on consistent support and historical practice and Congressional acquiescence. His 

power is at its lowest ebb where he lacks those things. 

The President lacks both of those things here. The historical 

practice is that international agreements concerning environmental 

protection have traditionally been entered as treaties in all or nearly every instance. And now that’s according to an exhaustive survey by the Congressional Research Service. 

And that consistent practice includes the last major agreement 

concerning climate change to which the United States was a party: 

the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 

The ratification history of that treaty rebuts any claim that Congress has acquiesced in allowing the President to bind the Nation 

to emissions targets. 

When the Senate ratified the Framework Convention, it sought 

and extracted a pledge from the Bush Administration that any future protocol containing targets and timetables would be subject to 

Senate ratification. Subsequently, President Clinton signed the 

Kyoto Protocol, which did contain binding targets, but it was never 

sent to the Senate for ratification. It was never implemented. It 

was ultimately abandoned. 

In other words, the Kyoto Protocol, which concerns the very same 

subject matter as the Paris talks, was regarded by both political 

branches as a treaty subject to Senate ratification. And due to the 

inability to secure Senate ratification, the United States never deposited an instrument of ratification binding it to Kyoto’s terms. In 

foreign relations law, that series of events constitutes incredibly 

strong precedent. 

I therefore agree with the CRS’s conclusion that any court weighing the claim that the President may adopt and implement quantitative emissions reductions would most likely deem the executive’s action an unconstitutional usurpation of Congressional 

power. This is why Paris is a farce. The two central planks of any 

agreement have already been ruled out due to the President’s decision to go it alone. 

So where does that leave the President? I see two possible outcomes. The first is the solution proposed by the Administration, a 

so-called hybrid agreement. This would consist of legally binding 

and non-legally binding components. Foreign-aided emission target—foreign aid and emissions targets would be what the diplomats call political commitments, which means that they aren’t 

legal commitments at all. In other words, they’re nonbinding. 

The other possibility is more objectionable. There’s a real risk, I 

fear, the Administration may view the red lines of U.S. law the 

same way it has viewed red lines in international affairs, as basically meaningless. What if the President purports on his sole authority to join a Paris protocol containing binding financial commitments and emissions limitations? 
35 

I think that Congress can and should guard against this risk, 

and the way to do it is to make clear the limits on presidential 

legal authority in this area. If the President is not serious about 

holding the line, Congress can and should remind our negotiating 

partners, as well as the President, that they—so that they are 

under no illusions about what the United States is likely to do. In 

other words, where enforceable measures are concerned, there is no 

avoiding Congress. 

Again, I thank the committee for the opportunity to offer these 

remarks, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman follows:] 
36 

Congressional Testimony 

Pitfalls of Unilateral Negotiations at 

the Paris Climate Change Conference 

Testimony before the Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology, 

United States House of Representatives 

December 1, 2015 

Andrew M. Grossman 

Associate, Baker & Hostetler LLP 

Adjunct Scholar, Cato Institute 
37 

My name is Andrew Grossman. I am an attorney in the Washington, 

D.C., office of Baker & Hostetler LLP and Adjunct Scholar at the Cato Institute. The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as representing those of my law firm, its clients, or the Cato Institute. 

The Committee has requested that I address the legal aspects of the climate agreement being negotiated in Paris, particularly the limitations that 

domestic law imposes on the President's ability to make commitments on behalf of the United States. In this instance, the law cannot be viewed in isolation-at least, not if one desires to understand the constraints as perceived by 

the Administration as it negotiates in Paris. To be sure, there are real legal 

barriers that will restrict the President's flexibility in Paris. Not all of them, 

however, are directly enforceable, and overreaching where judicial review can 

be avoided or evaded has been, as we all know, a hallmark of this Administration's approach to policymaking. Even so, whatever international-law obligations it may purport to impose on the United States, any treaty that comes out 

of Paris will have to be implemented by Congress through legislation to have 

a meaningful domestic effect. 

As a legal matter, then, Paris is a charade. While the President and his 

allies may attempt to use a Paris agreement as a political bludgeon, it cannot 

and will not alter the legal obligations of any American. 

That conclusion has implications for Congress, for the President, and for 

our negotiating partners in Paris. First, Congress can and should continue to 

make clear its policy views so that there is no ambiguity at Paris regarding the 

U.S. position on what can and will be implemented. Second, the President 

should exercise restraint and refuse to make commitments that go beyond 

clearly existing legal authority, unless he is willing to put the deal to a vote. 

Making nominally binding international commitments that the nation has no 

intention of actually carrying out, so as to influence domestic politics, would 

be stunningly cynical and irresponsible, inflicting unnecessary injury to the 

United States' credibility in international affairs for the sake of scoring political points. But, third, if the President does follow that cynical course, our negotiating partners should not be deceived about the extent of the President's 

authority, his reliability as a negotiating partner, and the likelihood that the 

United States will honor commitments made unilaterally by the President in 

reliance on his sole authority. 

I. The Limitations of Executive Agreements 

The legal status of an agreement struck in Paris involves two kinds of issues: first, the contents of the agreement itself and the obligations it establishes as a matter of international law; and, second, the extent to which the 

agreement imposes binding obligations within the United States. Logically, 

these are separate things: not every international agreement becomes or is im-
38 

plemented in U.S. law. But as a practical matter, they are interconnected: the 

President wants to negotiate an agreement in which the United States is a participant, not a bystander. And in theory, that means he has to grapple with the 

requirements that U.S. law imposes regarding international agreements and 

attempt to negotiate an agreement that stands a chance of becoming law in 

the United States. 

There are two ways that the United States can become party to a formal 

international agreement. The Treaty Clause of the Constitution empowers the 

President of the United States to propose and chiefly negotiate agreements, 

which must be confirmed by a two-thirds vote of the Senate-6 7 votes. 1 

Longstanding practice, validated by legislative and judicial actions, also 

recognizes that the President may enter into certain international agreements 

without separate ratification by the Senate. 2 According to a recent tally by the 

Congressional Research Service ("CRS"), over 18,500 such "executive 

agreements" have been completed-with the bulk from recent decadescompared to 1,100 ratified treaties. 3 

Executive agreements are generally divided into three categories: 

• Congressional-executive agreements are those approved by majorities in both chambers of Congress, as with normal legislation. 

Trade agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") are often implemented in this manner. Congressional authorization can come either before or after the President signs the agreement. 

Treaty-executive agreements are those that add annexes, protocols, or the like pursuant to the terms of an existing treaty. For 

example, the United States is a party to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species ("CITES"), which requires 

parties to regulate the import and export of listed species. The 

Convention provides a mechanism to list additional species, and 

such additions are regarded as treaty-executive agreements. 

1 U.S. Const. Art II, § 2, cl. 2. 

2 See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) ("(O]ur cases have 

recognized that the President has authority to make 'executive agreements' 

with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by 

Congress, this power having been exercised since the early years of the Republic."). 

3 Michael John Garcia, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon 

U.S. Law, CRS Report No. RL32528, Feb. 18,2015, at 5. 

2 
39 

Sole executive agreements are those based solely on the President's authority-typically his power as Commander in Chief or 

as representative of the nation in foreign affairs. Such agreements 

have traditionally concerned things such as the recognition of foreign states and international emergencies. For example, the Algiers Accords terminated private lawsuits in U.S. courts against 

Iran, and released Iranian property, in exchange for the release of 

U.S. hostages held by Iran. The Accords were upheld by the Supreme Court on the ground that the agreement was consistent 

with U.S. policy, as evidenced by statutes concerning the "President's authority to deal with international crises, and from the 

history of congressional acquiescence in executive claims settlement. "4 The Executive Branch has taken the view that the President may enter into sole-executive agreements that can be implemented pursuant to existing statutory authority that the President 

is duty-bound to faithfully execute. 5 

The availability of the executive agreement as a means of concluding international agreements raises a question: what, exactly, is the difference in 

scope or legal effect between a treaty entered pursuant to the Treaty Clause 

and an executive agreement? In other words, are there certain agreements that 

can only be concluded through a treaty ratified by the Senate (or through congressional approval), or are the two means of concluding agreements functionally identical? 

Unsurprisingly, the State Department's view is that the only difference 

between a treaty and an executive agreement, even one executed on the President's sole authority, is that a treaty is ratified by the Senate. In other words, 

there is no class of agreements that can only be ratified as treaties, rather than 

by the executive acting alone.6 The Senate, of course, takes a different view. 

Its position is that any significant international commitment should be entered into as a treaty or at least as an executive agreement with authorizing 

legislation. 7 

4 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 656 (1981) 

5 See 11 Foreign Affairs Manual§ 723.2-2. 

6 U.S. Dep't of State, Treaty vs. Executive Agreement, 

http:/ /www.state.gov I s/1/treaty /faqs/70 133.htm. 

7 See, e.g., U.S. Senate, Treaties, 

http:/ /www.senate.gov I artandhistory /history I common/briefing/Treaties.ht 

m. 

3 
40 

Being seldom litigated, the line between treaties and executive agreements is not one clearly delineated in the case law. What we do know is that 

historical practice and Congress's consent count for a lot in this area. "[L]ongcontinued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a 

presumption that the action had been taken in pursuance of its consent. "8 

Likewise, "a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 

knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned may be treated as a 

gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in the President." 9 Accordingly, the President's authority to enter into executive agreements is secure where he draws 

on consistent support in historical practice and congressional acquiescence, 

but his power is at its lowest ebb where he lacks those things. 10 

A final, but important, background point is that merely signing a Paris 

agreement will not necessarily give the agreement's strictures force as domestic law that is enforceable against Americans. While international agreements 

"may comprise international commitments ... [,] they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing' and is ratified on these terms." 11 

Instead, "when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of 

the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the 

political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the 

contract before it can become a rule for the Court." 12 The key question is 

whether "the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them operative." 13 The need for legislation may 

be due to the text of the agreement itself, the need for specificity and imple8 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (alterations omitted and quoting United 

States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,474 (1915)). 

9 Id. (alterations omitted and quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 

343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). See also Garamendi, 

539 U.S. at 414--15. 

10 Cf Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 

11 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa v. 

United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (lst Cir. 2005) (en bane) (Boudin, C.J.)). 

12 Fosterv. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). 

13 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505. (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 

(1888)). See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 

States§ 1 I 1, Reporter's Note 5 (citing cases in support of the proposition that, 

"[i]n general, agreements that can be readily given effect by executive or judicial bodies, federal or State, without further legislation, are deemed selfexecuting .... "). 

4 
41 

mentation, or constitutional requirements 1

'

1

-for example, that "[a]ll Bills for 

raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." 15 In this respect, congressional action may be necessary for an international agreement's 

terms to have domestic legal force. 

II. What Exactly Can the President Cram into a Sole Executive 

Agreement? 

Based on governing legal principles, as well as drafts and news reports 

regarding pre-Paris negotiations, one can evaluate the potential terms of an 

agreement and how they are likely to be implemented. At this time, a surprising amount remains to be decided. The pre-meeting draft agreement runs to 

51 pages, with more alternatives and options than a diner menu. 16 Everything 

seems to be in flux. Developing nations are demanding binding financial 

commitments. Some European Union nations want emissions reductionsreferred to, in exquisite bureaucratese, as "Intended Nationally Determined 

Contributions" ("INDC")-to be binding. Others want only implementation 

measures to be binding. One proposed article on "compliance" would establish an "International Tribunal of Climate Justice" to rule on countries' compliance on "mitigation, adaptation, provision of finance, technology development and transfer and, capacity-building" and exact punishment-what 

kind isn't said. An alternative to that option is "No reference to facilitating 

implementation and compliance" -in other words, strike the article altogether. In typical fashion, there's a third alternative: set up a committee to hold 

more meetings and publish another report. Procedural commitments like regularly updating INDCs, which had once seemed to be a point of agreement, 

are now in contention. Even the exact form that a final agreement may take is 

up in the air: for months, the Obama Administration has touted the possibility 

of a "hybrid agreement" that separates binding and non-binding commitments and buries more controversial items in separate annexes. 17 But the parties are still arguing over what goes where. 

In the domestic context, one thing we know for sure is that the the President's legal flexibility is limited. No Paris agreement is going to be ratified by 

14 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States§ 111(4). 

15 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 7. 

16 Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 

Draft agreement and draft decision on workstreams 1 and 2 of the Ad Hoc 

Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Version of 23 

October 2015@23:30hrs. 

17 Todd D. Stern, "Seizing the Opportunity for Progress on Climate," U.S. 

Department of State, Oct. 14,2014, 

http://www.state.gov Is! climate/releases/2014/232962.htm. 

5 
42 

the Senate as a treaty: the President lacks the votes. Likewise, the President 

lacks the votes for approval by both chambers of Congress as a congressionalexecutive agreement. This also means that there is no likelihood, at least for 

the foreseeable future, that Congress will enact legislation to implement any 

provisions of an agreement that are not self-executing. Accordingly, only 

those provisions supported by prior treaty authority or statutory authority, or 

falling within the Executive's exclusive purview, can be carried out under the 

President's sole authority. As a practical matter, then, the President's ability 

to conclude or give effect to many potential components of a Paris agreement 

is severely constrained. 

But the details matter. There are certain items, likely to be part of a final 

agreement, that are probably within the President's authority to adopt. But 

the key items, the ones that would give a Paris accord actual substance commensurate with the hype, are not among them. Let's consider, then, the legal 

basis for adoption of the major components of the most recent draft agreement. 

A. Aspirational Gibberish? Sure! 

Inevitably, the first few pages-or even more-of the final agreement 

will consist of aspirationallanguage with no intended legal effect. For example, from the draft: 

Emphasizing the importance of respecting and taking into account [, subject to jurisdiction] [right to development,] human 

rights [including people under occupation], gender equality 

[and women's empowerment], [the rights of indigenous peoples,] [local communities,] intergenerational equity concerns, 

and the needs of [migrants] [particularly vulnerable groups] 

[people in vulnerable situations], [including people under [foreign] occupation,] women, children and persons with disabilities, when taking action to address climate change .... 

(Brackets indicate optional language that will be subject to further negotiation.) 18 

Another portion of the draft that I cannot resist quoting states that the 

parties, in implementing the agreement, will act to "ensur[e] the integrity and 

resilience of natural ecosystems, [the integrity of Mother Earth, protection of 

health, a just transition of the workforce and creation of decent work and 

quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities] and 

the respect, protection, promotion and fulfillment of human rights for all, including the right to health and sustainable development, [including the right 

18 And it's not just the first few pages. The draft is shot through with this stuff. 

6 
43 

of people under occupation] and to ensure gender equality and the full and 

equal participation of women, [and intergenerational equity]." 

Not bad for a climate treaty, right? 

There's no real legal objection to any of this. Yes, it is silly. Yes, it will 

probably be cited as leverage for the next agreement or other future measures. 

And yes, there's no good reason for the United States to throw its weight behind empty platitudes and empty promises that range from the merely ponderous (e.g., "adaptation action should follow a country-driven, genderresponsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, [respecting [human 

rights][right to life][rights of people under occupation] and] taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems," etc., etc.) to the 

positively Orwellian (e.g., espousing a commitment "to mobilize public support for climate policies and action"). But as a practical matter, the chief impact of all these provisions will be to contribute further emissions from the 

diplomats negotiating them. Then again, the extra pages to print it all are a 

carbon sink, so it may be a wash. 

More seriously, it would be difficult to overestimate the time and effort 

that has been and will be devoted to fixing the Paris agreement's preambular 

and otherwise non-substantive provisions. The United States, for example, 

won the plaudits of climate activists for its push to have the agreement declare 

a long-term goal of" decarbonisation of the global economy over the course of 

this century." 19 Given the limitations on the President's ability to conclude 

and carry out substantive commitments, expect the United States delegation 

in Paris to fight hard over substance-free provisions that can be highlighted in 

victory-lap speeches and press releases. These things will make up a substantial part of the President's "climate legacy," which is apparently a central concern of the Administration. 20 

19 See Gwynne Taraska, An Inside Look at the U.N. Climate Negotiations in 

Bonn, ThinkProgress, Oct. 26, 2015, 

http: I lthinkprogress.orgl climate120 15 I I 012613 7160281bonn-un-sessionwrap-upl. 

20 See Colleen McCain Nelson, Barack Obama's Dual Mission at Climate 

Talks in Paris, Wall Street Journal Washington Wire, Nov. 25, 2015, 

http:/ lblogs.wsj .comlwashwire/20151 11 /251barack-obamas-dual-missionat-climate-talks-in-parisl ("During the months leading up to the talks, administration officials pointed to the Paris summit as the capstone in the president's climate legacy, an anticipated opportunity to demonstrate U.S. leadership and secure a deal to slow global warming."). 

7 
44 

B. Procedural and Reporting Conunitments? Probably. 

While the headlines may go to INDCs and financial commitments, a 

central plank of any Paris agreement will be procedural and reporting commitments. The draft refers to many of these provisions under the heading 

"Transparency." For example, parties may commit to regularly report their 

"national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by 

sinks of greenhouse gases," projected emissions, progress in achieving 

INDCs, mitigation funding to other nations, etc., all for review by experts and 

other nations. One proposal, which has proven controversial among some developing nations, would require parties to regularly review and update their 

INDCs. 21 When the Administration speaks of a "hybrid" agreement, these 

kinds of procedural obligations are the part that it anticipates would be binding. 

Generally speaking, these procedural commitments refer back to the 

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC"), a 

prior treaty ratified by the United States Senate in 1992. As a framework treaty, the UNFCCC contains no substantive requirements itself, instead setting 

forth procedures to negotiate subsequent deals concerning emissions, financing, and the like. A number of its provisions concern reporting. For example, 

it requires parties to publish "national inventories of anthropogenic emissions 

by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases," to publish descriptions of any "programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change," 

and to report to the Conference of the Parties on its national greenhouse gas 

inventories and the steps it has taken to implement the Convention. 22 

Arguably, reporting obligations that attach to the government-rather 

than to private parties-are supported by the UNFCCC. They could be 

viewed as simply implementing or amending the Convention23 and therefore 

as permissible subject matter for a treaty-executive agreement, particularly if 

they can be implemented under the President's existing authority. Moreover, 

an argument can (and has) been made that reporting is part and parcel of "the 

president's foreign affairs power is to communicate with foreign govern21 See Lee Logan, Review Provision in Paris Climate Deal Faces Host of Unresolved Details, InsideEPA/climate, Nov. 19, 2015. 

22 Arts. 4.1(a), 4.1(b), 12.1. 

23 Article 15 provides that "Amendments to the Convention shall be adopted 

at an ordinary session of the Conference of the Parties" by a three-fourths majority vote. 

8 
45 

ments." 24 Of course, any reporting or other procedural requirements that impose burdens on third parties would be subject to a more critical analysis. 

C. Monetary Commitments? Nope. 

President Obama lacks any authority to bind the United States to "mobilize" "climate finance"-that is, to make transfer payments to the governments of foreign countries in exchange for their denying their citizens economic activity and growth and associated emissions. Putting aside the moral 

and ethical issues inherent in such a scheme, the legal issue is insurmountable. The U.S. Constitution provides that "[n]o money shall be drawn from the 

treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law." 25 For that reason, it is well established that "an international agreement providing for the 

payment of money by the United States requires an appropriation of funds by 

Congress in order to effect the payment required by the agreement." 26 An 

agreement containing binding commitments cannot be executed on the President's sole authority. 

Moreover, Congress has already weighed in: the Senate rejected the 

President's request for a $500 million down payment on climate financing by 

a vote of 98 to I. 27 Concurrent resolutions now pending before the House and 

Senate would make this point absolutely clear. 28 

That is not to say, however, that the agreement will not contain some 

kind of financial "commitment." There will surely be aspirational language 

regarding the developed world's "obligation" to pay for climate mitigation 

and adaptation projects in the developing world. And there will most likely be 

things in the agreement referred to as "commitments," only those things 

won't actually be commitments, as that word is commonly understood. Instead, the model will be the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, in which parties, including the United States, made "political commitments" (i.e., not commitments) to "provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, 

technology and capacity-building to support the implementation of adaptation 

24 Daniel Bodansky, Legal Options for U.S. Acceptance of a New Climate 

Change Agreement 16 (2015). 

25 U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 9, cl. 7. 

26 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 111 

Commenti. 

27 http: I /www.senate.gov /legislative/LIS/ roll_call_lists/ roll_ call_ vote_cfm.cf 

m?congress= l14&session= l&vote=00085. 

28 S. Con. Res. 25, I 14th Cong. (2015-2016); H. Con. Res. 97, 114th Cong. 

(2015-2016). 

9 
46 

action m developing countries. " 29 The President may unilaterally accept a 

deal containing such a "commitment," but only because it is not a commitment at all. 

D. Intended Nationally Determined Contributions? Nope. 

As described above, historical practice and Congress's consent are key in 

assessing the scope of the President's ability to enter into international agreements on his sole authority. Both historical practice and congressional consent weigh heavily against the President's authority to commit the nation to 

binding emissions reductions-to the point that even those who support the 

Administration's climate agenda and favor a strong deal have recognized that 

legally binding commitments to reduce emissions would be, at best, dubious. 30 

As a matter of historical practice, the CRS's survey of international 

agreements places those concerning "environmental protection" in the class 

of "international agreements [that] have traditionally been entered as treaties 

in all or nearly every instance." 31 That includes, of course, the UNFCCC, 

which was put to Senate ratification despite its lack of substantive provisions. 

The UNFCCC's ratification history rebuts any claim of congressional 

acquiescence in this area. 32 To begin with, the Senate sought and extracted a 

pledge from the Bush Administration, prior to ratification, that any future 

29 UNFCCC, Copenhagen Accord, Dec. 18, 2009, at, 3. 

30 See, e.g., Bodansky, supra, at 15 (concluding that "committing to a target internationally without Senate or congressional approval would go beyond past 

practice"); Stem, supra (speech by Special Envoy for Climate Change recognizing that "many countries, including major ones, won't be willing to make 

their mitigation commitment legally binding at the international level"); 

Gwynne Taraska and Ben Bovamick, The Authority for U.S. Participation in 

the Paris Climate Agreement, Center for American Progress, July 2015, at 11 

("An agreement with national emissions reduction targets that are binding 

under international law would suggest the need for formal congressional consent after the agreement has been negotiated, as would an agreement with national targets for providing climate finance that are binding under international law."). 

31 Garcia, supra, at 7-8. See also John H. Knox, The United States, Environmental Agreements, and the Political Question Doctrine, 40 N.C. J. Int'l L. & 

Com. Reg. 933, 944-45 (2015). 

32 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 314(2) ("When the 

Senate gives its advice and consent to a treaty on the basis of a particular understanding of its meaning, the President, if he makes the treaty, must do so 

on the basis of the Senate's understanding."). 

10 
47 

protocols setting forth substantive commitments would be subject to Senate 

ratification: 

Question. Will protocols to the convention be submitted to the 

Senate for its advice and consent? 

Answer. We would expect that protocols would be submitted to 

the Senate for its advice and consent; however, given that a protocol could be adopted on any number of subjects, treatment of 

any given protocol would depend on its subject matter. 

Question. Would a protocol containing targets and timetables 

be submitted to the Senate? 

Answer. If such a protocol were negotiated and adopted, and 

the United States wished to become a party, we would expect 

such a protocol to be submitted to the Senate. 33 

That pledge, in tum, was memorialized in the stated understandings of 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when it reported the UNFCCC out 

of committee: 

[A] decision by the Conference of the Parties to adopt targets 

and timetables would have to be submitted to the Senate for its 

advice and consent before the United States could deposit its 

instruments of ratification for such an agreement. The Committee notes further that a decision by the executive branch to reinterpret the Convention to apply legally binding targets and 

timetables for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases to the 

United States would alter the "shared understanding" of the 

Convention between the Senate and the executive branch and 

would therefore require the Senate's advice and consent. 34 

Subsequently, the Senate reaffirmed that understanding in the 1997 

Byrd-Hagel Resolution. The resolution expressed the Senate's opposition to 

the "targets and timetables" protocol that was soon to be negotiated in Kyoto, 

Japan. 35 It further stated that "any such protocol...would require the advice 

33 Hearing, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (Treaty Doc. 

102-38), Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 102nd Cong., 2nd 

Sess., Sep. 18, 1992, pp. 105-06. 

34 S. Exec. Rept. 102-55, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), at 14. 

35 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the 

Senate Regarding the Conditions for the United States Becoming a Signatory 

to any International Agreement on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the 

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, July 25, 1997. 

11 
48 

and consent of the Senate" and demanded "a detailed explanation of any legislation or regulatory actions that may be required to implement the protocol. "36 President Clinton went on to sign the Kyoto Protocol, which set binding emissions targets, but it was never sent to the Senate for ratification, was 

never implemented, and was ultimately abandoned by the George W. Bush 

Administration. In short, the Kyoto Protocol was regarded as a treaty subject 

to Senate ratification, and, due to the inability to secure Senate ratification, 

the United States never deposited an instrument of ratification binding it to 

Kyoto's terms. 37 

All of this undermines any claim by the Administration that the UNFCCC authorizes it to adopt and implement binding emissions reductions. 38 If 

that were so, the Clinton Administration could have ratified the Kyoto Protocol on its own authority, by passing the Senate. The fact that it did not do so, 

and that the Senate as a body expressed its opposition to the deal, is decisive. 

In the field of international relations, this is extraordinarily strong precedent. 

And that precedent, as the CRS concluded, would lead any court weighing 

the claim that the UNFCCC authorizes the President "to adopt and implement quantitative emissions restrictions ... [to] most likely deem the Executive's action an unconstitutional usurpation of congressional power. ... "

39 

Nor is the President's ability to adopt binding emissions limitations supported by existing statutory authority. To begin with, the statutory authority 

most commonly cited by the Administration's supporters-Section lll(d) of 

the Clean Air Act, which underlies the Environmental Protection Agency's 

disputed "Clean Power Plan" emissions limitations for power plants-was in 

place at the time of the UNFCCC's ratification, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, 

and the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. Given the ratification history of the 

UNFCCC, the argument that the President actually had the power all along 

to adopt binding emissions limitations on his sole authority is not one that 

can be taken seriously. Moreover, the existence of Section lll(d) does nothing to alter Congress's view, repeatedly expressed, that any agreement containing such limitations must be subject to congressional approval. 

In any case the Clean Power Plan and the other emission-reduction initiatives identified by the Administration do not actually achieve its INDC tar36 Id. 

37 See UNFCCC, Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, 

http: //unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/ status_of_ratification/ items/2613. php. 

38 Cf Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 518, 530 (2008). 

39 Emily C. Barbour, International Agreements on Climate Change: Selected 

Legal Questions, CRS Report No. R41175, Aprill2, 2010, at 8. 

12 
49 

get of reducing gas emissions 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025. 

Even under the rosiest of scenarios-"rosy," in this instance, favoring slower 

economic growth, reduced energy consumption, and other generally bad 

things-there remains a substantial gap of nearly ten percentage points. 40 

Even that figure assumes that the Administration's "Climate Action Plan" 

continues on course and achieves the upper bound of expected emissions reductions; that no portion of the plan is delayed (as every major climate action 

has been to date); and that even legally vulnerable actions-including the centerpiece Clean Power Plan, the lawfulness of which is currently being litigated41-are upheld by the courts. Alter any of those assumptions, and the gap 

grows. For that reason, among others, the President would also be unable to 

commit the United States to implementation of its INDC, rather than to 

achievement of the target itself. 42 

None of this is to say, however, that the final agreement won't contain 

emission-reduction targets that are "binding" in the same way that its financial terms constitute "commitments." The Copenhagen Accord is again an 

example of this kind of sham obligation, purporting to "commit" parties to 

obtain "quantified economy-wide emissions targets" while, in reality, committing no one to anything at all. 43 In other words, the very centerpiece of the 

Paris agreement-binding emissions reductions-would have no actual legal 

effect in the kind of "hybrid agreement" anticipated by the Obama Administration. 

40 See, e.g., Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Achieving the United 

States' Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, June 2015, 

http:! /www.c2es.org/ doc Uploads/ achieving-us-indc.pdf. See also Obama 

clean power plan welcomed - but won't avoid dangerous warming, The 

Guardian, Aug. 4, 2015, 

http:/ /www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/04/obama-cleanpower-plan-welcomed-but-wont-avoid-dangerous-warming. 

41 It should be noted here that the Clean Power Plan is legally suspect, on both 

statutory and constitutional grounds. See generally David B. Rivkin, Jr., Andrew M. Grossman, and Mark W. DeLaquil, Does EPA's Clean Power Plan 

Proposal Violate the States' Sovereign Rights?, Engage, February 2015, available at http:! I object.cato.org/ sites/ cato.org/files/ articles/ grossman-engagefeb2015.pdf. 

42 And the idea that the President could, on his sole authority, subject the 

United States as a sovereign state, let alone its citizens, to the authority of an 

"International Tribunal of Climate Justice" or the like is so extraordinary as 

to require no further comment. No one, so far as I am aware, has suggested 

that the President could conclude an agreement containing such a term. 

43 UNFCCC, Copenhagen Accord, Dec. 18, 2009, at ~14. 

13 
50 

III. A More Cynical View 

So far, this analysis has relied on settled legal understandings and extrapolated from them to project how the Administration could structure the 

terms of a Paris agreement. But the assumption that the Administration will 

hew to settled legal understandings may be an unrealistic one. After all, the 

current Administration has been unusually aggressive in upsetting settled legal understandings that it believes are not strictly binding on it or legally enforceable.44 So perhaps we should relax that assumption. 

If we do, the first thing to consider is that the Administration has no intention of not concluding an agreement. In other words, it (along with the 

other Paris attendees) has every incentive to complete some kind of deal; the 

failure to conclude an agreement would be unthinkable. As would the conclusion of a deal that does not include the United States-just imagine the blow 

to the President's climate legacy! This means the Administration, at the end 

of the day, must be flexible in its approach, so as to ensure that it reaches the 

finish line: from its perspective, empty promises are far preferable to returning 

home empty-handed, and even crossing what some may view as red lines regarding legal authority would not be out of the question if that is the cost of 

striking a deal. Indeed, crossing those red lines may not be a "cost" at all 

when it can be spun as leadership. 

The easiest red line for the Administration to cross-or leap over joyfully-is that barring the President from unilaterally committing the nation to 

emissions reductions. While the President could not rely on such a commitment to adopt limitations binding within the United States as a matter of domestic law-for example, by imposing a cap-and-trade scheme in reliance on 

a Paris agreement-it would nominally establish an international-law obligation that (the President and his allies would then argue) Congress is obligated 

to carry out, lest the nation fall short of its international commitments. This 

commitment would be only nominal because, as described above, the President lacks the authority to establish such an obligation on his sole authority. 

But assuming that this Administration and its successors do not attempt to 

implement such an obligation administratively-and they would be insane to 

try--it is doubtful that any party would have standing to bring a court challenge. 

Another red line that may prove illusory is the bar on unilateral financial 

commitments. Again, standing would complicate any potential legal challenge. I suspect, however, that this line may prove durable in practice, given 

the clear assignment of spending power to Congress and lack of even an arguable basis for the President to make such a commitment. But if developing 

44 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 

14 
51 

nations continue to insist that any deal must establish international-law obligations, constitutional niceties may fall by the wayside. 

The decision to pursue a more cynical course-to commit the nation to 

international obligations that the President lacks the power to carry out and 

that are chiefly intended as a trump in domestic policy debates-is less a legal 

decision than a political one. On the plus side: burnishing the President's climate legacy, claiming international "leadership," obtaining additional leverage, in the form of international obligations, to wield in domestic policy debates over climate policy, and exerting an influence on the climate policies of 

successor administrations. The minuses, unfortunately, appear to be few; the 

chief one is the risk of a backlash from ... those who are not inclined to support 

the President's climate agenda anyway. Over the longer term, there is the 

damage to the rule of law and the nation's international credibility. How 

those things figure in the Administration's decisionmaking is anyone's guess. 

So far, at least, the Administration has paid lip service to the settled understandings.45 But we should not assume that this means it will necessarily 

exercise restraint at Paris-even if officials' statements regarding the limitations of Presidential authority have been sincere, the imperative of reaching a 

deal may prove overwhelming. For that reason, Congress has a valuable role 

to play in bolstering the position of restraint by making clear the limits of the 

President's flexibility, particularly in terms of implementation. In that way, 

Congress can provide additional leverage to those negotiating on behalf of the 

United States who wish to avoid breaching the red lines that hem the President's lawful authority. 

IV. Conclusion 

The Paris conference is a farce. It is highly unlikely that a final agreement will mandate anything beyond reporting and the like. But even an 

agreement that does purport to require emissions reductions and financial 

commitments will not, in the end, actually require anyone to do anything. Instead, changing the law in the United States to implement the U.S. INDC or 

to make financial commitments will require the President to come to Congress-one party with whom he has apparently no intention of negotiating. 

I thank the committee for the opportunity to testify on these important issues. 

45 See, e.g., Stern, supra; William Mauldin and William Horobin, Paris Climate 

Talks Face High Barriers and High Hopes, Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 2015 (reporting U.S. officials' continued support for "nonbinding targets"). 

15 
52 

Andrew M. Grossman 

Andrew M. Grossman practices appellate and constitutional litigation in 

the Washington, D.C., office of Baker & Hostetler LLP, and is an Adjunct 

Scholar at the Cato Institute, a think tank. As a litigator, he has served as 

counsel in many prominent cases raising significant issues of federal authority, the constitutional separation of powers, and individual rights. As a scholar, Grossman has written widely on administrative law, national security law, 

and the constitutional separation of powers and is a frequent adviser to Members of Congress on complex legal and policy issues, particularly concerning 

constitutional limitations on federal power. He has testified numerous times 

before both the House and Senate judiciary committees. In addition to articles 

in journals and professional publications, Grossman's legal commentary has 

appeared in dozens of newspapers and periodicals, including the Wall Street 

Journal, USA Today, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times. He is also 

a frequent commentator on legal issues on radio and television, having appeared on Fox News Channel, CNN, MSNBC, CNBC, NPR and its affiliates, CBN, and elsewhere. In addition to his regular practice, Grossman frequently represents the Cato Institute as an amicus curiae before the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals. Prior to joining the Cato Institute, he was affiliated for over a decade with the Heritage Foundation, most 

recently serving as a Legal Fellow in Heritage's Edwin Meese III Center for 

Legal and Judicial Studies. Grossman is a graduate of Dartmouth College, 

the University of Pennsylvania's Fels Institute of Government, and the 

George Mason University School of Law. He clerked for Judge Edith Jones 

of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
53 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Grossman. 

Dr. Steer. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. ANDREW STEER, 

PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 

Dr. STEER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a great honor to appear before you this morning. My name is Andrew Steer. I’m the 

President and CEO of the World Resources Institute, a nonprofit, 

nonpartisan research institution working in 50 countries. 

As I listened to the testimony from the other witnesses this 

morning and read Mr. Lomborg’s written testimony, I hear three 

messages: first, that action against climate change will cost too 

much; second, that it’ll hurt economic growth; third, that the climate deal under discussion in Paris won’t achieve much. 

Our analysis suggests that each of these is false. Let me address 

each in turn. Two years ago, WRI set up—help set up the Global 

Commission on the Economy and Climate to seek to address the 

first two of these questions. The Commission comprises global leaders from private business, government, and research, is led by 

former President Felipe Calderon of Mexico, an economic advisory 

group consisting of some of the world’s top growth economists, 

oversaw the technical quality of the work. 

On the costs of climate action, the Commission concluded that investment costs in a low-carbon future would rise slightly, by about 

four percent, but fuel savings alone would negate those increases. 

So the overall cost would be less than zero compared to current 

trends. 

But what about the impact on economic growth? Our work finds 

that far from undermining growth, smart policies to address climate change will promote competitiveness and growth. There are 

five paths through which this happens. First, action on climate 

change promotes resource efficiency such as through promoting energy efficiency, removing harmful energy subsidies and so on. 

Second, smart climate action promotes technological advance, an 

essential ingredient to increasing growth. There’s a large literature 

that shows how this happens with the U.S. the leading player in 

such innovation and job creation. 

Third, smart climate policies reduce other environmental drags 

on the economy. In many cities in the world, real incomes are being 

dragged down by nearly ten percent by congestion and another ten 

percent by pollution. Smart climate policies can help address these. 

Fourth, clarity on climate policy can give long-term policy predictability, something that private investors crave and something 

they do not currently have. 

Finally, climate-smart policies can reduce the negative impact on 

growth of climate change itself, which unchecked will be very substantial. Combined, these impacts explain why strong climate action on—strong action on climate can create a healthier and more 

vibrant economy. 

This explains why so many companies now are advocating for action. More than 1,000 major companies are advocating for a price 

on carbon. Last week, a group of 78 major corporations sent an 

open letter to world leaders calling for bold action in Paris. It ex-
54 

plains why more than 100 major global companies such as CocaCola, General Mills, Procter & Gamble have committed to set their 

own emissions reductions targets in line with what science says is 

necessary. 

It also explains why over 360 cities worldwide have signed on to 

the Compact of Mayors committing to track and reduce their own 

greenhouse gas emissions. One hundred and seven of these are 

from the United States: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Atlanta, 

Washington D.C., St. Louis, Phoenix, and so on. All of these players are advocating strong action and taking their own action because they believe it is good for their shareholders, their customers, 

and their citizens. 

On the third question, how much impact will the Paris deal have, 

our analysis shows that the climate pledges made by the 183 countries will make a substantial difference in stopping climate change. 

We’ve analyzed more than a dozen recent studies that added up 

the contribution of these so-called INDCs. These put us on a track 

for a world that warms by 2.7 to 3.7 degrees Celsius over the next 

century depending on modeling assumptions. This compares to fou 

to five degrees Celsius of warming under a business-as-usual path. 

This is significant progress but it’s not enough, and that’s why 

the provisions for increasing ambition every five years, ensuring 

full transparency of reporting, and supporting low-income countries 

as they adapt to climate change that are all being negotiated this 

week in Paris are so important. 

Finally, we’ve done detailed technical analysis on how the United 

States can deliver its own climate targets. Our recent report delivering on the U.S. climate commitment, which I have here today, 

shows several pathways to get there. 

In closing, we believe that the U.S. political and technical leadership in solving the great challenge of climate change is absolutely 

necessary. As with many other challenges before, the United States 

is an indispensable leader. We also believe that the United States 

will benefit economically from playing such a role, and we believe 

that we can be proud of the role that the United States is playing 

at this present time. 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Steer follows:] 
55 

TESTIMONY OF DR. ANDREW STEER 

PRESIDENT AND CEO, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 

HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY: 

"America's Leadership Opportunity at the Paris Climate Conference" 

DECEMBER 1, 2015 

My name is Andrew Steer, and I am President and CEO of the World Resources Institute. The World 

Resources Institute is a non-profit, non-partisan research institution that goes beyond research to 

provide practical solutions to the world's most urgent environment and development challenges. We 

work in partnership with scientists, businesses, governments, and non-governmental organizations in 

more than seventy countries to provide information, tools and analysis to address problems like food 

and energy security, water management, urbanization, and climate change. Our focus is on how to grow 

the economy, while protecting it for our grandchildren. 

My testimony has three main themes. First, the United States can achieve a low-carbon future and 

provide global leadership by harnessing key drivers of economic growth. Second, the U.S. has set an 

ambitious but achievable emissions reduction target for 2025 in its Intended Nationally Determined 

Contribution. Third, the leadership the U.S. is demonstrating at home is paying significant dividends, 

helping to spur greater action by all countries around the world, both developed and developing. 

First, a growing body of evidence shows that economic growth is not in conflict with efforts to reduce 

emissions of greenhouse gases. The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, which delivered a 

landmark report in 2014, Better Growth, Better Climate: The New Climate Economy Report, has shown 

that the perceived choice between growth and climate action is a false dilemma.' New evidence is 

demonstrating that smart climate policies promote economic efficiency, drive technological advances, 

provide policy predictability for investors, generate huge economic co-benefits, and reduce the negative 

impact on growth of climate change itself. 

The United States has tackled many environmental problems over the past SO years, and the historical 

record is clear: environmental protection is compatible with economic growth, and environmental 

policies have delivered huge benefits to Americans. Furthermore, recent experience at the state and 

national levels demonstrates that well-designed policies can reduce greenhouse gas emissions while 

providing overall net public benefits, for example, through improved public health, as well as direct 

financial benefits to businesses and consumers. 

The solutions typically lie in improved efficiency in resource use, smarter city growth, more efficient 

development of rural areas, cleanerfuels, and new technologies and processes- and these solutions 

often create net economic benefits. For example, we know that increased efficiency pays off. With 

strengthened fuel efficiency standards, drivers will save on average a net $3,400 to $5,000 over the life 

1 
56 

of light-duty vehicles built in 2025 compared with those made in 2016. Federal appliance efficiency 

standards put into place over the past twenty-five years resulted in $370 billion in cumulative utility bill 

savings. States with energy efficiency targets and programs in place are saving customers at least $2 for 

every $1 invested. 2 

Other countries also recognize the benefits of acting on climate change. In the lead-up to the Paris 

climate summit, more than 180 countries have put forward national climate action plans (known as 

Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, or INDCs) that both address climate change and can 

generate better growth for their economies.3 

Businesses have recognized the economic value of action. More than eighty major global companies, 

including eighteen U.S. companies- including Dell, Coca-Cola, General Mills, and Procter & Gamblehave committed to setting emissions reductions targets in line with science.• And recognizing the global 

nature of their operations, more than 80 U.S. companies- including Alcoa, Bank of America, Cargill, 

Coca-Cola, General Motors, Microsoft, PepsiCo, UPS, and Walmart recently signed a pledge in support 

of a strong international agreement and committed to significant actions in their own supply chainss Six 

major U.S. banks and investors also recently signed a statement supporting strong international action 

in order to set clear expectations and market signals. 6 Around 435 businesses worldwide already use an 

internal carbon price to guide investment decisions. For a number of major oil companies- including 

Shell, BP, Exxon-Mobil, and ConocoPhillips- the internal carbon price is typically around $40/t C02.' 

Taking action is essential because no nation is immune to the impacts of climate change and no nation 

can meet the challenge alone. Every nation needs to work together, take ambitious action, and do its 

share. The United States has always provided leadership when the world faces big challenges, and 

climate change should be no exception. That leadership can ensure a livable planet for ourselves and 

future generations. 

With global GHG emissions still on the rise, delaying action on climate change will only result in climatechange-related events becoming more frequent and severe, leading to mounting costs and harm to 

businesses, consumers, and public health. The new EPA report, Climate Change in the United States: 

Benefits of Global Action," estimates billions of dollars of avoided damages in the U.S. that would result 

from global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, ranging from reduced damage to agriculture, 

forestry, and fisheries, to reductions in coastal and inland flooding, to fewer heat-driven increases in 

electricity bills. 

If nations fail to combat climate change together, the U.S. will suffer billions of dollars of damages to 

agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, and to coastal and inland flooding, along with heat-driven increases 

in electricity bills, just to cite some of the impacts. A recent report from the CNA Military Advisory Board 

-composed of retired high-ranking military officers also highlighted the increased threats to national 

security from the effects of climate change." It is thus in our national interest to act at home so that we 

can work with other countries to achieve a universal international agreement where all countries act 

and where the most severe impacts in the U.S. can be avoided. 

2 
57 

Second, the U.S. has set an ambitious but achievable emissions reduction target for 2025 in its IN DC. 

WRI research finds that the United States can meet this target using existing federal laws combined with 

actions by the states. The United States can accelerate recent market and technology trends in 

renewable energy, energy efficiency, alternative vehicles, and many other areas to reduce emissions 26-

28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025. However, U.S. and global efforts to combat climate change 

cannot stop in 2025. Even deeper greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions will be needed in the 

decades ahead to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. In the meantime, however, the 

Administration is taking sensible steps to encourage recent market and technology trends that move us 

toward a low-carbon future. These measures would be even more effective if complemented by 

measures that only Congress can take. 

The United States can achieve the IN DC target in concert with economic growth. Over the next decade, 

the proposed Clean Power Plan will play a key role in meeting the IN DC target. Damage to health from 

air pollution in the United States is estimated to amount to as much as 4% of GOP per year on average. 10 

From a benefit-cost perspective, EPA estimates that just the air pollution co-benefits of the Clean Power 

Plan are worth $25-$62 billion, far more than the estimated $7-9 billion in compliance costs." Adding in 

global climate benefits increases total benefits to $55-$93 billion. 

Third, the leadership the U.S. is demonstrating at home is paying significant dividends, helping to spur 

greater action by all countries around the world, both developed and developing. The national climate 

plans (INDCs) that countries have submitted for the 2015 climate agreement represent action by a wide 

diversity of countries. Of the 183 countries that have submitted national plans, 142 of them are 

developing countries." The historic Joint Announcement on Climate Change by the United States and 

China last year, along with the recent Joint Presidential Statement, also demonstrate the tremendous 

shift in action by countries around the world13 

The national climate plans will deliver significant reductions in emissions. Analyses of the INDCs come to 

the conclusion that the implementation of INDCs would contribute to significant reductions of global 

GHG emissions compared to business as usual (approximately 3-8 gigatons of greenhouse gas emissions 

reduced in 2030). The International Energy Agency's Energy and Climate Change Report estimates that 

the path set by the INDCs would be consistent with an average global temperature increase of around 

2.7 degrees Celsius ( 4.8 Fahrenheit) by 2100,14 compared to an almost 4 degrees Celsius temperature 

increase given business as usual (BAU) policies15 

Moreover, the agreement that will be reached between all countries at the climate summit in Paris will 

be a major step forward in meeting U.S. objectives on climate change internationally. The agreement 

will be universal and applicable to all, will ensure transparency, and will be durable and effective. 

Building on and implementing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 

which was ratified by the Senate in 1992 by voice vote, the agreement will mark a critical step forward 

by involving action to reduce emissions by all countries, both developed and developing. Its structure, 

based on nationally-determined plans, has enabled broad-based participation and buy-in from all 

countries and sets a new pathway for international action. 

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The agreement will also include vital provisions on transparency and accountability to provide assurance 

that all countries are following through in meeting their targets. The agreement must also be durable, 

able to accommodate countries' evolving development and economic circumstances and ensure that all 

countries continue to move forward in a regular and timely way toward a commonly understood 

objective. Finally, it must be an effective agreement, driving the finance and investment needed for 

low-carbon climate resilient pathways from an array of countries and actors, including the private 

sector, while also meeting the need to address the serious impacts experienced by all countries, and 

especially the most vulnerable. 

The action that countries around the world are taking, along with the international framework to 

support that broad-based action, should be viewed as a significant success for the United States and its 

leadership role. Meeting the global challenge of climate requires global solutions, including actions by 

all. The world is now on the cusp of an international climate agreement that will concretize that vision. 

My testimony is organized as follows: Section I discusses why the United States can take meaningful 

climate actions while growing the economy overall and why U.S. leadership on climate change is 

essential. Section II reviews technology and market trends in some key sectors and demonstrates how 

accelerating these trends can reduce carbon emissions while generating positive economic impacts. 

Section Ill presents an overview of WRI analysis showing how the United States can meet or exceed its 

IN DC target with a portfolio of policies across key sectors. Section IV describes the national climate 

plans prepared by many countries and the benefits for the United States of the 2015 international 

agreement. Section V offers some concluding comments on climate policy. 

I. Climate Protection and Economic Growth 

A gro'vving body of evidence had found that economic gro'.vth and action on c!icnate change c~m no·.v be 

achieved together. According to the New Climate Economy Report, the scale of investment over the 

next 15 years means we now have a huge opportunity to create better growth and reduce the risk of 

climate change. Around US$90 trillion globally will be invested in cities, land use and energy 

infrastructure between now and 2030. 16 Choosing to invest that money in a low-carbon way will bring 

multiple economic benefits and reduce the negative economic impacts of climate change. 

Climate-smart policies promote economic efficiency, an area where the US has always been a global 

leader. These policies involve more efficient use of energy and natural resources, putting a price on 

greenhouse gas emissions, and removal of subsidies to fossil-fuels. 

Efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have already proven to be a win for local economies and 

jobs in the northeast United States. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a cooperative 

effort by nine New England and Mid-Atlantic states to cap and reduce emissions from the power sector. 

Economic growth in the nine RGGI states has been higher than in the rest of the states, at the same time 

as they have reduced their emissions by 18% compared to 4% in other states. The RGGI contributed a 

net benefit of $1.3 billion to these member economies in 2012-2014 alone, generating 14,200 new job 

years. All nine participating US states showed net job additions." 

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Climate-smart policies also drive technological advances. They involve policies to support the research, 

development and deployment of new technologies. The growth of wind and solar power 

has consistently outstripped projections from the International Energy Agency.'8 The lEA's 2007 

projections for renewables in 2030 have already been met. 19 Even Green peace underestimated how 

much solar would grow.20 The US is a world leader in developing and deploying the technologies that 

drive tomorrow's prosperity. 

In the coming years, the global clean energy market will expand dramatically, and it represents a 

significant opportunity for U.S. economic growth. The cost of LED lights has dropped 90% since 2008, 

large-scale solar by 60%, and wind and battery prices declined by over 40%. And with decreasing costs 

has come greater deployment. Since 2008, we've gone from 400,000 LED lightbulbs to more than 78 

million installed, wind energy production has tripled, and solar has increased more than twenty-foldn 

It is imperative that the United States continues to lead on clean energy innovation. On Monday in Paris, 

President Obama announced how this will happen. The president, along with a wide range of other top 

global leaders, announced "Mission Innovation," an initiative by 20 countries to double their respective 

clean energy research and development investment over five years to address global climate change, 

provide affordable clean energy to consumers, and create additional commercial opportunities in clean 

energy." Mission Innovation parallels a private sector effort, spearheaded by Bill Gates, which includes 

a coalition of over 28 significant private capital investors from 10 countries, and will be called the 

Breakthrough Energy Coalition." The combination of public and private sector investment will ensure 

that large scale penetration of clean energy technologies. 

Clean energy technologies will deliver hundreds of thousands of new jobs and deliver huge economic cobenefits in the United States. The U.S. solar industry is creating jobs twenty times faster than the overall 

economy. 24 There are already more solar workers than coal miners in the United States. A clean energy 

future could create on average 550,000 net jobs per year in the United States between now and 2050, 

according to a study from Synapse Energy. 25 Another new economic analysis from NextGen Climate 

America found that a clean energy economy will create more than 1 million additional jobs by 2030, 

increase U.S. GOP by $145 billion, increase household disposable income by $350-$400, and save 

families $5.3 billion on energy bills. 26 

Energy efficiency, another powerful way to reduce emissions, can also unlock savings for U.S. citizens. 

Investment in energy efficiency could boost global cumulative economic output by US$18 trillion by 

2035, according to the New Climate Economy." The United States' Energy Star program has already 

lowered household utility bills by an estimated US$360 billion since 1992.28 

While total policy certainty can never be guaranteed, it is always important for policy-makers to look at 

ways of making policy more credible and predictable. Climate-smart policies can provide a credible and 

predictable policy environment, which investors from the US and around the world crave. A price on the 

emissions of greenhouse gases, research and development funding, feed-in-tariffs, and tax credits: these 

policies give private investors the confidence needed to invest in, and deliver, greater economic 

efficiency and innovation, which will drive the productivity of all forms of capital and growth. 

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Many of the pessimistic economic models cited by opponents of climate action have serious 

shortcomings, as described in the 2014 report of the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate 

(Better Growth, Better Climate): 

The view that there is a rigid trade-off between low-carbon policy and growth is partly due to a 

misconception in many model-based assessments that economies are static, unchanging, and 

perfectly efficient .... Indeed, once market inefficiencies and the multiple benefits of reducing 

greenhouse gases, including the potential health benefits of reduced air pollution, are taken into 

consideration, the perceived net economic costs are reduced or eliminated. 29 

Our country has tackled many environmental problems over the past 50 years. We have achieved major 

reductions in air and water pollution. We have reduced our exposure to toxics, and cleaned up and 

redeveloped industrial "brownfield" sites in our cities. In concert with other nations, we have taken 

steps to repair damage to the ozone layer. At every step along this road to protection of the 

environment and public health, opponents have raised the specter of excessive cost and economic 

disaster. Some opponents of President's emission reduction targets and the Clean Power Plan are raising 

this specter again now. However, the historical record is clear: environmental protection is compatible 

with economic growth, and U.S. environmental policies have delivered huge benefits to Americans. In 

2010, The Office of Management and Budget reviewed 20 years of major Federal regulations (1999-

2009) for which agencies estimated and monetized both benefits and costs, and found aggregate annual 

benefits of $128-$616 billion, while annual costs were estimated at $43-$55 billion. Research also shows 

that the actual cost of environmental regulations frequently ends up being less than ex ante predictions 

by industry, and even the EPA.30 

The movement toward a low-carbon economy is already being demonstrated throughout the United 

States. Already between 2005 and 2012, greenhouse gas emissions dropped by 8 percent while real GDP 

grew by 8 percent.31 Projections from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimate that the 

intensity of energy use in the economy will continue to decline through 2040, even in the absence of 

new policies. With reduced energy intensity in manufacturing, more efficient appliances and buildings, 

and more fuel-efficient vehicles coming to market, the overall economy is becoming more energy 

efficient. EIA projects that GDP will grow at an average 2.4 percent per year through 2040, while energy 

use will grow at only 0.4 percent per year. 

Businesses have recognized the economic value of action. More than eighty major global companies, 

including eighteen U.S. companies- including Dell, Coca-Cola, General Mills, and Procter & Gamblehave committed to setting emissions reductions targets in line with science." More than 80 U.S. 

companies- including Alcoa, Bank of America, Cargill, General Motors, Microsoft, PepsiCo, UPS, and 

Walmart- recently signed a pledge in support of a strong international agreement and committed to 

significant actions in their own supply chains. 33 Six major U.S. banks and investors also recently signed a 

statement supporting strong international action in order to set clear expectations and market signals. 34 

435 businesses worldwide already use an internal carbon price to guide investment decisions. For a 

number of major oil companies- including Shell, BP, Exxon-Mobil, and ConocoPhillips the internal 

carbon price is typically around $40/t C02.35 

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In the context of meeting the U.S. IN DC target, the proposed Clean Power Plan will play a key role. The 

Energy Information Administration projects the macroeconomic impacts of the proposed plan to be very 

small: approximately a 0.12% decrease in GDP in 2030, which can be considered "background noise" in 

the context of a steadily growing $24 trillion economy. Employment impacts are essentially zero. 36 From 

a benefit-cost perspective, EPA estimates that the air pollution co-benefits alone are worth $25-$62 

billion, far more than the estimated $7-9 billion in compliance costs. 37 Adding in global climate benefits 

increases total benefits to $55-$93 billion. 

To get the full economic picture, one must also assess the cost of the impacts of climate change. Failure 

to reduce emissions will increase economic, social, and environmental risks for the United States and all 

nations38 With global GHG emissions still on the rise, 39 delaying action on climate change will only result 

in climate-change-related events becoming more frequent and severe, leading to mounting costs and 

harm to businesses, consumers, and public health. Climate smart policies reduce these negative impacts 

on growth. 

We are becoming more aware than ever of the true costs of a high carbon economy in the United 

States. Inaction on climate change could reduce the United States' per capita GDP up to 36% by the end 

of the century, according to a new estimate from leading researchers in Nature. 40 Damage to health 

from poor air quality, much of which is associated with burning fossil fuels, is valued at about 4% of GDP, 

according to the New Climate Economy." Urban sprawl is immensely expensive, raising the costs of 

infrastructure and service delivery up to 40% and costing the United States around $1 trillion per year. 42 

Subsidies and tax breaks for the production of oil, coal, and gas cost U.S. federal and state governments 

approximately $20.5 billion annually, distorting investment and consumption choices. 43 

The new EPA report, Climate Change in the United States: Benefits of Global Action, 44 estimates billions 

of dollars of avoided damages in the U.S. that would result from global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 

emissions, ranging from reduced damage to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, to reductions in coastal 

and inland flooding, to fewer heat-driven increases in electricity bills. We are already experiencing the 

effects of climate change. Last year the world experienced the hottest year on record in 2014. 45 

Fourteen of the fifteen hottest years on record have occurred since 2000. 46 In the United States, some 

regions are experiencing a higher frequency of floodingf heavier precipitation events, and more frequent 

heat waves and wildfires. 47 

Extreme weather events are expensive. Between 1980 and 2014, the United States experienced 178 

extreme weather and climate events that cost at least $1 billion each with total damages of more than 

$1 trillion.48 The frequency and severity of these types of events have increased over the same period, 

with four of the six years with the most billion dollar disasters on record in the United States have 

occurred since 2010. Hurricane Sandy cost New York City $67 billion, with power outages, subway 

tunnel flooding and other problems persisting well after the storm. 49 A similar increase in these costly 

events is happening around the world. 50•

51 While many factors contribute to the cost ofthese events, 

such as growing population density and increased development in vulnerable areas more prone to 

extreme events, increasing global temperatures and climate variability are making certain types of these 

costly events more frequent and severe. 

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According to Risky Business, if we continue on our current emissions path without significant 

adaptation, by the end of the century some states in the Southeast, lower Great Plains, and Midwest risk 

up to a 50% to 70% loss in average annual crop yields (corn, soy, cotton, and wheat), absent agricultural 

adaptation. 52 

The true costs of a continuing with a high-carbon economic growth model in the United States are much 

higher than previously realized, and they are rising as concentrations of greenhouse gases in the 

atmosphere increase year on year. The true job killer is inaction on climate change- not the solutions 

we need to stop it. 

Moreover, a recent report from the CNA Military Advisory Board- composed of 16 retired three- and 

four-star military officers- highlighted the increased threats posed to national security by the effects of 

climate change, including massive population displacement, conflicts due to food and water scarcity, 

and health catastrophes. 53 These are not only security threats, but also present substantial potential 

costs to our military and humanitarian relief agencies. 

U.S. leadership is critical to the success of the global efforts necessary to avoid billions of dollars in 

damaging costs to our country. That leadership is paying off as countries have submitted their INDCs and 

as we move toward an agreement in the international climate negotiations that culminate in Paris. 

II. Technology Trends and Emission Reduction Potential in Key Sectors 

Many of the key drivers of economic growth-including more efficient use of energy and natural 

resources, smart infrastructure investments, and technological innovation-can also drive the transition 

to a low-carbon future. 54 Early efforts to address conventional air and water pollution often relied on 

end-of-smokestack or end-of-pipe controls. However, in the case of carbon pollution, the solutions 

typically lie in improved efficiency in energy use, cleaner fuels, and new technologies and processes. 

Though upfront investments are often needed, these solutions often create net economic benefits 

rather than costs. The United States can bring the same spirit of competition, ingenuity, and innovation 

to the climate challenge that it has brought to solving other problems, or it can be left behind as other 

countries develop the solutions and capture the markets for the fuels, technologies, and processes that 

reduce emissions. 

Opportunities for cost-effective emission reductions are arising across many sectors of the economy. For 

instance, the capital costs of wind and solar photovoltatic systems continue a rapid downward trend.SS 

For example, Texas has seen wind generation multiply 12-fold since 2002, and solar generation in the 

state has more than doubled since 2011.55 Over 102,000 people are directly employed in renewable 

energy sectors in Texas, with thousands more working in businesses linked to renewable energy. Wellcrafted energy efficiency programs are lowering utility bills and reducing energy demand, which 

indirectly reduces GHG emissions. 5

7 increased production of low-cost shale gas, while raising concerns 

about methane emissions and other environmental impacts, has spurred fuel switching away from coal 

in power generation, reducing carbon dioxide (CO,) emissions. 5

8 Technological progress on many fronts 

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promises to create further opportunities, from creating climate-friendly refrigerants to breakthroughs in 

electric and fuel cell vehicles. 59 

Nevertheless, market barriers still exist, hindering investment and implementation of strategies needed 

to transition the United States toward a prosperous low-carbon economy. These barriers take many 

forms and cut across many sectors. For example: 

Split incentives The natural gas sector is not very well vertically integrated- many independent 

companies work along the supply chain without ever taking ownership of the natural gas itself. 

For this reason, the incentives to invest in control technologies to reduce methane emissions are 

often poorly aligned. 

Ownership transfer issues- In the residential sector, homeowners may not invest in energy 

efficient products or home upgrades, thinking they may move before reaping the cost savings. 

Network effects- Widespread penetration of alternative vehicles depends on availability of 

charging stations, but investment in charging stations may be limited while relatively few 

alternative vehicles are on the road. 60 

Overcoming these barriers will require targeted policies and measures, including GHG and efficiency 

standards, more research and development to stimulate innovation, and policies to stimulate market 

demand for new technologies.fi1 The sections below explore opportunities in some key sectors. 

The U.S. power sector has already started to transition to a lower-carbon future. 62 In 2013, carbon 

dioxide (CO,) emissions were 15 percent below 2005 levels because of a shift in fuel mix and slower 

demand growth. Coal's role appears to be diminishing while natural gas and zero-carbon alternatives 

are on the rise. The economics of all generation sources are shifting and if these trends continue, deep 

greenhouse gas reductions are possible from the power sector, with some parts of the country possibly 

achieving net savings. In many cases, the public health benefits outweigh the costs of replacing older, 

inefficient, and heavily polluting generation with newer, more efficient, cleaner generation. 

The recent decline in the carbon intensity of the power sector has been caused in large part by the low 

price of natural gas.fi3 Because of lower prices, gas-fired generation has surged and coal fired generation 

has declined. New coal plants accounted for only 5 percent of the new capacity built since 200064 This 

trend could accelerate as many existing coal plants struggle to compete with electricity from natural gas 

and renewable energy sources and if more protective public health standards are put in place. Existing 

natural gas plants certainly have the capacity to increase output In 2014, the fleet of combined-cycle 

natural gas plants ran at only about 48 percent capacity65 -well below their design capacity of 85 

percent Less coal generation would bring not only reductions in C02 emissions, but also would likely 

bring reductions in a variety of harmful pollutants, including sulfur dioxide (S02), nitrogen oxides (NO,), 

and mercury. 

Despite its reputation as a clean fuel, natural gas production, processing, transmission, and distribution 

still leak methane emissions while its combustion results in substantial C02 emissions, presenting long9 
64 

term challenges for the fuel, in absence of adoption of technologies that reduce methane leaks and costeffective carbon capture and storage technology. However, natural gas is still essential in reducing 

power sector emissions. Replacing all existing coal generation with combined-cycle gas generation could 

reduce power-sector co, emissions by 44 percent below 2012 levels66 In addition, as variable 

generation from resources such as wind and solar increases, grid operators will look to flexible resources 

such as natural gas to help ensure grid reliability. As a result, natural gas could play an important role 

even in an aggressive greenhouse gas abatement scenario. 

Renewable generation has been on the rise in recent years, and evidence suggests that it could play an 

even more significant role in the future. Generation from renewable resources accounted for 12.5 

percent of total generation in 2013- nearly half of which came from non-hydropower sources." 

Renewables represented 85% of the increase in power generation in 2014. 68 Wind and solar 

outcompete new coal generation in many markets, and are competitive with low-cost natural gas 

generation in a few markets. As a result, increased renewable energy generation has the potential to 

save American ratepayers tens of billions of dollars per year over the current mix of electric power 

options, according to studies by Synapse Energy Economics and the National Renewable Energy 

Laboratory. 69 These cost savings are illustrated by some recent actions at the state level: 

The Grand River Dam Authority, Oklahoma's state-owned utility, purchased lOOMW of wind 

energy that is estimated to "save its customers about $50 million over the project's lifetime".70 

DTE Energy in Michigan announced that it would be lowering customers' electricity rates by 6.5 

percent in 2014, citing low-cost wind energy {aided by technology improvements and tax 

credits) as a major factor. 71 

Austin Energy in Texas finalized a power purchase agreement for 150 megawatts of solar 

energy, with a price just under 5 cents per kilowatt hour (estimated at 7 cents per kilowatt hour 

before federal tax credits). 72 By comparison, the company estimates that new natural-gas-fired 

generation would have cost 7 cents per kilowatt hour, coal would have cost 10 cents, and 

nuclear 13 cents. 

MidAmerican Energy in Iowa recently announced that it will invest $1.9 billion in new wind 

power, bringing wind generation up to 39 percent of their generation portfolio. 73 The company 

estimates that this will save $10 million annually when all the turbines are completed. This work 

will create 460 construction jobs, 48 permanent jobs, and generate more than $360 million in 

new property tax revenue. 

While the variability of renewable generation creates some challenges for grid balancing authorities, 

renewables have considerable room to expand on the grid. Several studies have shown that existing 

grids across the country can handle about 35 percent generation from variable renewable resources 

with minimal cost. 74 This is partly because of improvements in renewable energy forecasting and subhourly supply scheduling, as well as recent increases in transmission infrastructure.75•

76 Utilities may also 

see the value in using renewable energy {with zero fuel costs) as a hedge against the uncertainty 

surrounding future coal and natural gas prices. 77 

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Over the longer term, however, as renewable penetration continues to increase with expected declines 

in equipment costs, the United States would benefit from expanded transmission78 and increased 

system flexibility. This could be done, for example, through increased grid storage, distributed 

generation sources, and demand response.79 

Nuclear power provides zero-carbon baseload generation. In 2013, it produced 20 percent of total U.S. 

electric generation80 and as of mid-2014, three new nuclear plants were under construction, the first 

new plants since 1996.81 However, several nuclear reactors closed in 201382 and some analysis suggests 

that some other plants are struggling to remain viable because of cheap natural gas, low renewable 

energy prices, lower demand for electricity, and rising costs for nuclear fuel, operations, and 

maintenance (particularly the smaller, older, standalone units).83 Continued retirements could prompt 

an increase in fossil baseload generation and lead to an overall increase in C02 emissions from the 

power sector. Even if these pressures do not force nuclear capacity to retire prematurely, the nation will 

eventually need to replace some of these units as they reach the end of their useful lives. Well-designed 

policies that value low-carbon generation could help improve the economics of the existing fleet, and 

could spur the construction of new nuclear units, particularly if increasing international development of 

nuclear plants leads to reductions in construction costs. Any expansion, however, will likely depend on 

solving the challenges of public concerns about nuclear safety and long-term waste storage. 

EPA's Clean Power Plan (CPP), finalized in August 2015, will build on and accelerate many ofthese 

positive trends noted above by establishing C02 emissions standards for existing power plants under 

section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. These standards incentivize the use of lower carbon sources of 

electricity generation, like natural gas, renewables, and nuclear, as well as incentivize programs that 

reduce the overall demand for electricity. EPA projects that the CPP will reduce power sector C02 

emissions by about 28-29 percent below 200S levels by 2025 and by 32 percent by 2030.84 The CPP also 

offers huge health benefits at four to nine times the amount of compliance costs. In total, the standards 

are expected to result in $32 to $54 billion in health benefits and global climate benefits per year by 

2030, far outweighing the costs of $5.1 to $8.4 billion. 

Given current technology trends in renewable power, these estimates may actually be overly 

conservative, and deeper reductions may be possible at a net public benefit. For example, when 

examining deep emission reductions in the power sector (approximately 61 percent below 2005 levels in 

2030), the Union of Concerned Scientists found that on an annualized basis, benefits to Americans from 

reduced S02 and NOx emissions alone would total $56 billion in 2025, growing to $69 billion in 2030 

(equal to 5 and 10 times the annual compliance cost to the power sector).85 And studies have also 

shown that a more rapid decarbonization of the power sector in the post-2020 time period is technically 

possible as well as legally defensible.86 

B. Reducing Electricity Consumption 

The U.S. economy is becoming more efficient as a result of development and deployment of new 

technologies supported by state and federal policies. This success is largely due to the fact that smart 

investments in efficiency save money. Federal appliance standards implemented since 2009 alone are 

expected to save consumers nearly $450 billion because of lower electricity bills through 2030. BJ.BB.B9 

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State efficiency portfolios regularly save customers over $2 for every $1 invested, and in some cases up 

to $5?0 And efficiency has been the cheapest resource option available to utilities for decades, with 

levelized costs one-half to one-third the cost of new electricity generation options. 91•

92 Harnessing 

efficiency as a resource leads to high-quality jobs in manufacturing, installation of efficient appliances, 

home energy auditing, and more. In part due to the expansion of efficiency programs, energy 

consumption is expected to grow at less than 0.5% per year on average through 2040 even as GDP 

grows by nearly 2.5% per year?3 But even greater opportunities to capture efficiency and associated 

savings can be captured by scaling up successful programs and implementing new initiatives. 

The discussion below focuses specifically on homes and commercial buildings (with efficiency 

opportunities in transportation and industry discussed later). In buildings, electricity demand growth 

has fallen from about 8 percent per year in the early 1970s to about 1 percent per year today?• This is in 

part due to a robust and growing portfolio of both regulatory and voluntary energy efficiency initiatives 

including: 

• Appliance and equipment standards, labeling, and research and development 

Customers have saved over $370 billion (net) as a result of lower utility bills from 1987 through 2012 

as a result offederal appliance and equipment standards that set minimum energy efficiency levels 

for more than SO products commonly used in homes and businesses?' This success has been 

achieved in part because major appliances-including refrigerators, dishwashers and clothes 

washers-have become 50 to 80 percent more energy efficient over the past two decades. 

Appliance and equipment standards are complemented by other federal and state initiatives, 

including research and development, partnerships with industry, competitions (e.g., L-prize and 

ENERGY STAR awards), voluntary labeling programs (e.g., ENERGY STAR and the Federal Trade 

Commission's Energy Guide), and rebates and incentives for efficient appliances. Together, these 

programs can drive innovation and commercialization of products that are more efficient than the 

minimum required by standards, as has been demonstrated in many product areas including 

lighting, water heaters, and clothes dryers?6 The Institute for Electric Innovation projects that 

pushing forward on new federal appliance and efficiency standards could reduce total electricity use 

by 6-10 percent below projections in 2035. 97 

• State energy efficiency savings targets 

Twenty-four states currently have mandatory electricity savings targets that require utilities and 

third-party administrators to offer energy-saving programs to their customers?8 Most state targets 

require incremental electricity savings of 1 percent of projected electricity sales or more each year 

once programs are fully ramped up, with a few requiring savings in excess of 2 percent per year. 

Scaling up state energy efficiency savings targets so that each state achieves savings of 2 percent 

annually would reduce electricity consumption in the range of 400-500 terawatt hours in 2035 (9-

11 percent of total projected electricity sales),99 and save customers tens of billions of dollars in the 

process. 

State building energy codes 

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Building codes help ensure that new construction and buildings undergoing major renovations and 

repairs meet minimum efficiency standards. According to the DOE, codes adopted between 1992 

and 2012 have saved approximately 2 quads in cumulative total energy savings, about 20 percent of 

the total energy directly consumed by homes each year. The codes are expected to net more than 

$40 billion in energy cost savings over the lifetime of the buildings constructed during this time 

period.100 To date, many states have adopted the 2007-09 codes for commercial and residential 

buildings. However, only about one-quarter of states have adopted the most up-to-date codes for 

residential and commercial buildings. The new codes reduce building energy use by 20 and 25 

percent, respectively, compared with the 2007-09 standards-leaving the door open for greater 

savings by other states. 101 

The continued emergence of new technologies-enabled by partnerships between federal agencies, 

manufacturers, and businesses-will create ongoing opportunities for savings. For example, DOE 

recently reached an with agreement manufacturers and efficiency advocates on the terms of an 

updated efficiency standard for commercial rooftop air conditioners that will net $50 billion in utility bill 

savings for businesses over 30 years. 102•

103 

DOE is also working with industry to advance adoption of next-generation intelligent energy information 

systems and controls that provide whole-building, web-accessible data in real time. These systems allow 

facility managers to identify wasted energy, with the potential of cutting building electricity use by as 

much as 30 percent74 Whole-building retrofits with the latest technologies have been shown to reduce 

building energy use in the range of 30 to 50 percent or greater, in some cases. 104 And the jobs needed to 

perform retrofits-including assessment, installation and maintenance of efficient appliances and 

systems-can't be sent overseas. 

But opportunities to cut energy use and utility bills still exist. Studies suggest that electricity demand 

could be reduced 14 to 30 percent below projected levels over the next two decades, creating hundreds 

of billions of dollars in net savings for consumers while significantly reducing U.S. greenhouse gas 

emissions. 105 These opportunities remain because ofthe persistence of a number of market barriers to 

investment in efficient technologies. For example, building owners frequently have little incentive to 

invest in efficiency if they do not pay the energy bills and therefore do not experience the financial 

benefits, another example of the "split incentives" problem noted earlier. Building occupants may not 

expect to capture the full lifetime benefits of an investment, thus creating "ownership transfer" issues. 

This is because residential energy efficiency measures have an average payback period of about 7 years, 

whereas about 40 percent of homeowners will have moved within that duration of time. Other market 

barriers, including capital constraints and lack of knowledge of the lifecycle costs and benefits of 

products, can also prevent the implementation of cost-effective efficiency measures. The United States 

can harness more of this potential and continue to save money for consumers and businesses in the 

near to medium term by scaling up existing programs and implementing new policies. 

The EPA has an important role to play by making sure that the Clean Power Plan takes into account all 

cost-effective energy efficiency potential when developing state-specific standards. This would 

encourage more widespread deployment of state efficiency programs, leading to greater demand 

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reductions and savings for consumers. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and EPA also should 

continue to scale up their existing programs, which are already delivering benefits many times greater 

than their costs. This includes continuing to strengthen existing appliance standards (for example, for 

residential boilers, commercial unit heaters); setting appliance standards for equipment not currently 

covered (for example, for ovens, commercial ventilation equipment, general service lamps); increasing 

funding for research, development, and deployment of efficient technologies and processes; expanding 

partnerships with businesses and industry (for example, DOE's Better Buildings Challenge); and 

expanding efficiency labeling programs (for example, ENERGY STAR). New and strengthened appliance 

standards and less energy-intensive manufacturing together with the Clean Power Plan could lead to 

total electricity demand reductions of at least 9-10 percent below projected levels in 2025 and 11-13 

percent in 2030. 

These policies should include or be complemented by other state, federal, and local actions including: 

(1) updates to building codes and improvements to their enforcement, (2) measures to promote 

retrofits of existing buildings, and (3) expanded access to low-cost finance for efficiency projects. 

C. Cleaner & More Fuel Efficient Transportation 

The U.S. transportation sector is becoming less carbon intensive due in large part to the most recent 

federal GHG emission and fuel economy standards covering light-duty cars and trucks (model year 

2012-25). A declining growth rate in vehicle miles traveled (VMT) by passenger vehicles also has 

contributed to declining emissions from light-duty vehicles over the past decade. Looking ahead, existing 

and proposed standards for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles and the development of C02 standards 

for aircraft will continue to increase the efficiency of the U.S. transport system, leading to even more 

fuel savings for households and businesses. 

1. Passenger Vehicles 

The Administration started to take bold action in this sector in 2010 when EPA and DOT established GHG 

and fuel economy standards for MY 2012-2016 passenger vehicles, and again in 2012 when these 

standards were expanded again to roughly double the fuel economy of model year 2025 vehicles. In 

response to these rules, car manufacturers have been utilizing advanced technologies to increase the 

fuel economy oftheirfleets- the number of sport utility vehicle models with a fuel economy of at least 

25 miles per gallon (mpg) has doubled over the last five years, while the number of car models with a 

fuel economy of at least 40 mpg has increased sevenfold. 106 Analysis shows that, because of this 

technology advancement, car manufacturers are actually outperforming the current standards and are 

on track to meet the model year 2025 standards. 107 As new vehicles become more efficient, they will 

also save consumers money, improve air quality, and increase energy security by lowering oil demand. 

Once fully implemented, owners are expected to save on average $3,400 to $5,000 (net) over the life of 

their vehicle, compared with model year 2016 vehicles. The automobile industry may even be on the 

brink of an even greater transition. Advances in electric vehicle battery technology, along with the 

anticipated roll out of fuel cell vehicles in the 2015-17 could transform automobile industry. Battery 

prices have fallen by more than 40 percent since 2010. Some industry analysts are predicting that by the 

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early 2020s, long-distance electric vehicles will be cost-competitive with internal-combustion-engine 

vehicles, thanks to fuel price savings, even without federal incentives. 108 

2. Transportation and land Use 

Transportation policies can also reduce passenger vehicle travel demand, thus lowering fuel use and 

emissions from vehicles. Passenger vehicle travel demand is already growing more slowly now than in 

the past decades, from an average growth rate of 3 percent per year from the 1970s to mid-2000s to 0.9 

percent per year between 2004 and 2012 (measured in vehicle miles traveled).109 Multiple factors are 

likely in play in this slowdown: the economic recession, changing demographics, high costs of driving 

(including rising fuel prices until late 2014), changing consumer preferences, as well as policy initiatives. 

It is uncertain whether these trends will continue or whether travel demand growth will rebound due to 

continued recovery from the recession, population growth, changes in oil prices (such as the rapid 

declines that occurred in late 2014), or other factors. 

State and local policies should aim to provide more safe, reliable transit options for citizens, for instance 

through compact development patterns coupled with improved public transportation and routes for 

walking and biking. DOT, EPA, DOE, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and other 

federal agencies can encourage and support these efforts in a number of ways, including increased 

funding for public transit infrastructure, implementation of performance criteria for funding that 

incentivizes compact development and related strategies, research and development, tax policies that 

promote infill development (such as renewal of the Federal Brownfield Tax Incentive), and technical 

assistance."0 

3. Medium- and Heavy-Duty Trucks 

The medium- and heavy-duty truck sector also presents opportunities to reduce emissions while saving 

fuel costs. Current medium- and heavy-duty vehicle GHG and fuel consumption standards are estimated 

to result in $49 billion in net benefits to society (from fuel savings, co, reductions, reduced air pollution, 

improved energy security due to decreases in the impacts of oil price shocks, and other benefits) over 

the lifetime of model year 2014-18 vehicles.'11 On June 19'', EPA and DOT proposed a second round of 

standards for the post-2018 time frame that would increase the fuel efficiency of medium-and heavyduty vehicles up to 40 percent by 2027 compared to 2010 levels.112 This level of fuel savings can be 

achieved using technologies that are currently available-such as tractor and trailer aerodynamic 

enhancements, hybridization and electric drive, and weight reduction, among others-that are 

estimated to have an average payback period of less than two years.'13 EPA should finalize the second 

round of standards in a timely manner and take the full potential of these cost-effective technologies 

into account. 

4. Aviation 

The United States has also taken steps to address GHG emissions from airplanes through its emission 

reduction plan for aviation. 114 The Federal Aviation Administration has initiatives in place to improve fuel 

efficiency through operations, including establishing direct routes and reducing delays, under its Next 

Generation Air Transport Systems program.115 And on June 10'', EPA took the first steps toward setting a 

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carbon dioxide emissions standard for commercial airplane engines. In anticipation of an international 

aircraft C02 emissions standard, expected from the International Civil Aviation Organization in 2016, EPA 

released an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking establishing the groundwork and seeking public 

input on relevant issues like timing and stringency.116 1t's not yet clear what the international standards 

will deliver, but studies show that there's significant room for improvement in aircraft fuel efficiency, in 

the range of 20-30 percent or greater in the 2025-30 timeframe through use of improved engines, lower 

weight and reduced drag.117 EPA should set standards that take full advantage of these technologies, 

aiming to improve the fuel efficiency of new aircraft in the range of 2-3 percent annually. FAA should 

also continue to expand its initiatives to enhance the management of air travel. 

D. Cleaner Industry 

Industry is a broad category that includes a wider range of economic activities than the residential, 

commercial, and transport sectors. The energy and emissions intensiveness of industrial activity varies 

among manufacturing, construction, agriculture, energy transformation, mining, and forestry 

subsectors."8 Total U.S. industrial sector emissions peaked at 1.9 billion metric tons of co, in 1979 and 

have intermittently declined since the late 1990s. Between 2010 and 2014, real U.S. industrial sector 

value-added grew by 7 percent while total industrial sector energy-related carbon dioxide emissions 

dropped by one percent.119 Emissions reductions have been driven by a combination of efficiency 

improvements, cleaner energy use, changing product mix, and additional combined-heat-and-power 

(CHP) utilization."" While the U.S. industrial sector has become more efficient, studies suggest that it 

can move forward at an even faster pace, reducing energy consumption by 15 to 32 percent below 2025 

forecast values.121 In 2014, total U.S. industrial sector emissions amounted to 1.5 billion metric tons 

co,, which covered 27 percent of total U.S. energy-related C02 emissions. 122 

The industrial sector presents a large challenge and opportunity for moving the United States to a 

prosperous low-carbon economy. The Administration's commitment to reduce U.S. emissions can 

improve industrial competitiveness by catalyzing innovation and investment. U.S. firms can leverage 

low-cost clean energy and efficiency improvements to expand production and market share. 123 Given 

that the vast majority of U.S. emissions increases to 2040 are expected to come from industry and 

manufacturing sector growth, 124 this sector has a unique opportunity to benefit from forward-thinking 

policies and new investments. Recent studies have clearly demonstrated the positive economic, 

employment, and competitiveness benefits of investing in U.S. industrial energy efficiency. In 2012 

Congress passed the American Energy Manufacturing Technical Corrections Act, which mandated that 

the Secretary of Energy should produce a report on the deployment of industrial energy efficiency in the 

United States. One high-level finding of the report, which was published in June, was that a $5 billion 

Federal matching industrial energy efficiency grant program implemented over a 10-year period would 

help support up to 9,700 to 11,200 jobs per year for the life of the program and help manufacturers save 

$3.3 to $3.6 billion per year in energy costs by Year 5 of the grant program, and $6.7 to $7.1 billion per 

year by Year 10 ofthe grant program. 125 The Administration's Climate Action Plan and international 

commitments offer a framework for re-invigorating U.S. industry in a low-carbon economy. 

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Within the industrial end use of energy, energy efficiency improvements (including technical 

improvements, material efficiency, and waste reduction) and fuel-switching are the primary levers for 

industrial sector emissions reduction, in addition to reductions from combined heat and power usage. 

Industrial sector demand, as reflected in the value of shipments, is expected to grow by more than a 

third between 2015 and 2030. 126 This growth creates opportunities for investments in efficiency and for 

well-designed policy interventions. 

Industrial energy efficiency is inhibited by persistent barriers, including financing (such as intra-company 

competition for capital, corporate tax structures that allow companies to treat energy expenditures as 

tax offsets, split incentives, and energy price trends), regulation (monopolistic utility business models 

and cost-recovery mechanisms, exclusion of efficiency from energy resource planning), and 

informational barriers (ignorance of incentives and risks, unavailable energy use data, and lack of 

technical expertise).127 1ndustrial sector demand growth combine with barriers to energy efficiency 

improvements to create a range of opportunities and challenges that will influence the absolute level of 

total U.S. GHG emissions. 

A 2010 National Academy of Sciences study estimated a cost-effective energy efficiency improvement 

potential of 14 to 22 percent for the U.S. industrial sector by 2020. 128 Numerous state and federal 

policies have been enacted to accelerate industrial sector efficiency improvements. These include 

regulations for equipment via emission performance standards under Boiler Maximum Achievable 

Control Technology (MACT); EPA's New Source Performance Standards; market and rate design that 

helps to reduce industry sector GHG emissions by promoting clean distributed generation; tax credits, 

exemptions and/or deductions; technical assistance from federal government agencies such as DOE's 

Better Buildings, Better Plants Program;129 and research grants such as Advanced Research Projects 

Agency-Energy130 and DOE's Advanced Manufacturing Office131 programs. 

Reducing industrial sector GHG emissions below current levels will require additional investment and 

policy action. Government can combine ambitious minimum performance standards for sources, along 

with voluntary benchmarking and labeling programs to encourage further industrial efficiency 

improvements. 

E. Improved Production, Processing and Transmission of Natural Gas 

Methane is the primary component of natural gas, and is therefore a valuable commodity132 It is also a 

potent greenhouse gas, with at least 34 times the global warming power of carbon dioxide. 133 Emissions 

of methane and other air pollutants occur throughout the natural gas life cycle, creating unnecessary 

waste along with damage to the local environment and the global climate. 134 Without additional 

policies, methane emissions from natural gas systems are expected to grow 4.5 percent by 2018, and to 

continue to grow slowly over the coming decades.135 But the right policies will encourage investment in 

cost-effective technologies and best practices that companies can use to reduce waste, save money, and 

cut harmful emissions of methane and other pollutants. 136 

Dozens of proven technologies that minimize leaks and vents of methane are currently available and 

deployed across the United States. However, their use remains uneven largely because of market 

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barriers that impair the ability of drillers and other service providers to capture the increased revenue 

by changing equipment and practices. In addition to the "split incentives" noted above, these barriers 

include: 

Imperfect Information: Because emissions measurement technology is still expensive and not 

widely used, many companies do not have a complete picture of how much methane they are 

emitting, and from which sources. Most companies, therefore, are not aware how much money they 

can save by investing in technologies that reduce methane emissions. 

Opportunity Costs: Investing capital or engineering capacity in equipment to reduce or eliminate 

natural gas leaks represents an opportunity cost for owners and operators of natural gas systems as 

investments in projects that reduce wasted natural gas compete with other potential investments, 

primarily the drilling of new production wells or other measures to increase natural gas production. 

Even though most emissions-control technologies pay for themselves in three years or less, that may 

not compare favorably to other investment opportunities. 

While some companies active throughout the natural gas supply chain-from production through 

distribution- have already recognized the economic advantages of investing in technologies that 

reduce methane emissions, many have not. Voluntary measures reduce about 20 percent of methane 

emissions from natural gas systems, according to EPA. 137 But existing voluntary measures merely skim 

the surface of available, cost-effective emissions reduction opportunities, according to recent studies 

from the Natural Resources Defense Council {NRDC) and ICF Consulting.138 This suggests the states and 

the federal government have ample opportunity to implement additional standards requiring reductions 

in methane emissions to overcome these barriers. 

EPA's 2012 standards to reduce emissions of hazardous air pollutants, and volatile organic compounds 

are expected to significantly reduce methane emissions, saving the industry approximately $10 million 

per year in 2015 because the value of the avoided emissions of natural gas is greater than the cost of 

equipment to capture it {annual savings are estimated at $330 million versus $320 million in compliance 

costs).lmportantly, these savings do not consider the benefit of reducing methane emissions and 

conventional air pollutants. EPA estimates that the standards will reduce emissions of volatile organic 

compounds by 172,000 metric tons in 2015 alone139 Some studies have found that the health benefits 

due to improved air quality could be as high as $2,640 per metric ton of volatile organic compounds 

nationwide, with even higher benefits in some localities. 140 

EPA rulemakings have taken the first steps by indirectly reducing methane emissions in this sector, and 

recently proposed methane standards for new and modified oil and gas infrastructure141 are an 

important step in the right direction, but much remains to be done. One recent study estimated that 40 

percent of emissions from onshore gas development can be eliminated at an average cost of a penny 

per thousand cubic feet. 142 EPA should propose and finalize standards on both new and existing natural 

gas systems by 2017, and phase in implementation through 2020, to reduce methane leakage by 67 

percent below business-as-usual projections. This can be achieved using existing technologies, many of 

which pay for themselves in three years or less. 

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F. Reducing Emissions of High Global Warming Potentia! Gases 

HFCs are used primarily for refrigeration, air conditioning, and the production of insulating foams. HFC 

emissions have been increasing because they are a replacement of ozone-depleting substances 

(chlorofluorocarbons and hydrochlorofluorocarbons) under the Montreal Protocol and Clean Air Act. 

Unfortunately, some HFCs have very high global warming potential (GWP). Fortunately, alternatives with 

low GWPs are increasingly available. Several companies have begun to use these alternatives, with many 

saving money and energy while they reduce GHG emissions143 For example: 

Coca-Cola uses co, in 1 million HFC-free coolers and aims to purchase only CO,-based equipment by 

2015.'44 Because of its transition to CO,-based technology for new equipment, Coca-Cola has 

improved its cooling equipment energy efficiency by 40 percent since 2000, and reduced its direct 

greenhouse gas emissions by 75 percent. 145 

Coolers introduced by PepsiCo, Red Bull, Heineken, and Ben & Jerry's are based on hydrocarbons 

including propane (R-290) or isobutane (R-600a). These companies combined have more than 

600,000 units in use today and have seen energy efficiency improvements from 10 to 20 percent or 

even greater.146 

Fifteen car companies, including General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, are moving forward with HF0-

1234yf,147 a new low-GWP refrigerant for personal vehicle air conditioners that has a GWP 99.9 

percent lower than the HFC it replaces. 148 An estimated 1 million cars on the road worldwide already 

use this low-GWP refrigerant.149 This number is expected to grow to nearly 3 million by the end of 

2014.'50 

However, some low-GWP replacements have relatively high upfront costs, require the replacement of 

old equipment, or require equipment redesign151 Thus, there is little reason to believe that the U.S. 

market will rapidly move to these alternatives without new rules or other incentives. 

The United States (with Canada and Mexico) has advocated for the past several years for an amendment 

to the Montreal Protocol that would phase down the use of HFCs globally. Agreement was finally 

reached in early November at the 27'h Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol to negotiate the 

terms of this amendment. These negotiations will be conducted during 2016 through a series of 

additional meetings, with the HFC amendment to be adopted in November 2016.152 However, to help 

reduce the use of HFCs domestically pending this amendment, EPA has started to implement measures 

that address high-GWP HFC use in personal vehicles and in pickups, vans, and combination tractors. 153 In 

February 2015, EPA finalized rules through the Significant New Alternatives Program (SNAP) program to 

approve low-GWP alternatives154 and in July 2015, EPA finalized rules to move some higher-GWP HFCs 

out of the market for various applications. 155 In October 2015, EPA proposed a rule that will help 

capture, reclaim and recycle more HFCs from existing equipment to reduce the amount of new HFCs 

produced.156 

Opportunities exist to make HFC reductions beyond those finalized by EPA to date. While a global 

phasedown, through the Montreal Protocol, would be much more effective than a few individual 

countries taking action alone, EPA can continue using the SNAP program to jump start the removal of 

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high-GWP HFCs from the market when low-GWP alternatives become available. However, it will be 

important for EPA to ensure that new alternatives are both safe and efficient. 

Ill. How the United States Can Reach Its IN DC Target 

As demonstrated in the previous sections, opportunities are emerging across the economy in multiple 

sectors to harness fuels, technologies, and processes in moving toward a low-carbon economy. The 

actions taken to date by the Obama Administration under the Climate Action Plan seize many of those 

opportunities and set an important foundation for meeting its target of reducing emissions 26-28 

percent below 2005 levels by 2025, as outlined in its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 

(INDC). 

In May 2015, WRI published Delivering on the U.S. Climate Commitment: A 10-Paint Plan Toward A LawCarbon Future. This study demonstrates that the United States can meet, and even exceed, its IN DC 

target with a broad policy portfolio using existing federal laws combined with actions by states. This 

would include expanding and strengthening some current and proposed policies and standards and 

taking actions on emission sources that are not yet addressed. Since we completed our analysis, the 

Administration has already started to move on some of the additional actions we identified as necessary 

for the US to meet its IN DC target, including taking steps toward improving the efficiency of mediumand heavy-duty trucks, aircraft, and rooftop air conditioning units. 

Figure 1 presents emissions projections for three low-carbon pathways that could reduce U.S. emissions 

by 26-30 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 and 34-38 percent by 2030. Delivering on the U.S. Climate 

Commitment outlines specific steps federal agencies and state governments can take to achieve these 

reductions, recognizing that other pathways could reach those targets as well by applying different 

policy portfolios. Notably, our pathways do not include steps to reduce emissions and increase 

sequestration from the agriculture and forestry sectors. However, in April2015, the Administration 

announced an initiative titled Building Blocks for Climate Smart Agriculture & Forestry. 157 USDA expects 

this comprehensive set of voluntary programs and initiatives to reduce net emissions and enhance 

carbon sequestration by over 120 million metric tons of C02 equivalent per year by 2025. The 

opportunities in agriculture and forestry reinforce the notion that there are multiple pathways to 

achieve the U.S. IN DC target. 

Figure 1. Net U.S. Greenhouse Emissions: Reference Case and low-Carbon Pathways Using Existing 

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Federal Authorities and Additional State Action 

Rot"""" C... 

Ccr•Arrtiti:n 

iO l'tloorSii:lorl'llw 

" TilfgO:l &<!cr Push 

Figure 1 depicts net GHG emissions under three low-carbon pathways we modeled in our analysis that 

could be pursued using existing federal laws and additional state action. The "Core Ambition" pathway 

reflects the EPA's Clean Power Plan (CPP), in addition to emission abatement opportunities across other 

sectors of the economy. (The modeling is based on the CPP as proposed, however, the reductions 

projected in 202Sfor the final rule are nearly the same.) "Power Sector Push" builds on Core Ambition 

by assuming that states and utilities go beyond the CPP to take advantage of cost-effective energy 

efficiency resources and continued decreases in renewable energy costs. "Targeted Sector Push" 

assumes that the CPP, but pushes the envelope in a few key areas outside the power sector to achieve 

economy-wide reductions similar to "Power Sector Push". Both of these pathways were designed to 

achieve very similar levels of emission reductions, illustrating alternative ways to go beyond a 26 

percent reduction across the economy, either through increased action in the power sector or outside 

the power sector. The shaded area between the pathways indicates that reductions anywhere in this 

range are possible given mixtures of policies that blend these three pathways. The full report contains 

all the details and assumptions underlying these pathways and the Reference Case projection, and the 

modeling approaches used. 

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IV. International Action 

A. Intended Nationally Determined Contributions {II'JDCs) and National 

Climate t\ctions 

The leadership shown by the United States has paid substantial dividends internationally. In the lead-up 

to the Paris climate summit and the 2015 international climate agreement, we have witnessed an 

unprecedented level of commitment to climate action by a wide array of countries, both developing and 

developed. As of November 30, 2015, 183 countries, including all major economies, have submitted 

national climate plans for the 2015 climate agreement."' These plans, known as Intended Nationally 

Determined Contributions (INDCs), are from countries representing more than 95 percent of global 

greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 159 This unprecedented effort indicates countries' increased 

seriousness in addressing climate change160 

The recently released UNFCCC IN DC synthesis report finds that these INDCs represent a much greater 

breadth of countries than those submitted in 2010,'61 when only 100 countries submitted plans in 

association with the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreement 162 We are also witnessing an 

extraordinary effort from developing countries in the lead up to the Paris negotiations. In 2010, only 33 

developing nations announced a national climate plan. 163 As of November 30, 2015, 142 developing 

countries- including 461east developed countries have submitted an IN DC, through which they 

outline their plans to mitigate emissions and adapt to a changing climate. Only two least developed 

countries (LDCs) have yet to submit an INDC164 

The effect of these plans on climate policies will be considerable. Of the plans submitted, those from at 

least 1231NDCs include a greenhouse gas emissions target, usually expressed as a percent reduction by a 

certain year. By contrast, of the countries with pledges adopted for 2020 targets in association with the 

Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreement, only 61 included greenhouse gas emissions targets, less 

than half of those with such targets in the current INDCs. 165 

Countries are also using their INDCs to outline significant policies and actions that support the 

deployment of clean energy and help countries adapt to the effects of climate change. In the plans 

submitted, more than 100 INDCs include plans to scale up clean energy between 2020 and 2030, as they 

look for ways to limit greenhouse gas emissions while sustaining economic growth, boosting energy 

security and providing energy access to the billions of people who lack it now. 166 More than half of these 

plans include specific targets for increasing renewable energy supply.167 

In addition to addressing mitigation, the plans from at least 135 INDCs include adaptation,'68 describing 

activities and goals in vulnerable sectors like water, agriculture and human health. Most countries 

clearly identify existing gaps, barriers and needs associated with adapting to their local climate change 

impacts, which begins to outline a road map for global efforts to build capacity, develop and share 

technology, and scale up adaptation finance. 169 

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As a whole, INDCs not only address climate change, but also address domestic goals such as sustainable 

economic growth and poverty reduction. Importantly, the INDCs signal a new phase of climate policy, in 

which climate action is strongly rooted in domestic policies and national development and economic 

agendas and aligned with country priorities.'70 

1. Plans and Actions 

The climate actions of major developing countries are particularly worth noting. Last year's U.S.-China 

Joint Announcement on Climate Change was an historic agreement that included unprecedented actions 

by China. China committed to reach a peak in its carbon dioxide emissions around 2030 and make best 

efforts to peak earlier, and to increase the non-fossil fuel share of its energy use to around 20 percent by 

2030.171 China's IN DC, submitted in June 2015 for the Paris climate agreement, formalized these targets 

and also set additional targets to reduce the carbon intensity (carbon emitted per unit of GDP) of its 

economy by 60 to 65 percent from 2005 levels by 2030 and to increase its forest stock by around 4.5 

billion cubic meters.172 In addition to national targets, eleven cities and provinces from across China 

committed to reach a peak in their carbon emissions before the national goal to peak around 2030173 

This group comprises a quarter of China's urban carbon emissions, roughly equivalent to the total 

annual carbon emissions of Japan or Brazil. 174 

China has made significant progress in decoupling emissions from economic growth in recent years and 

is on track to exceed the carbon intensity and energy intensity targets in its 12'' Five Year Plan175 These 

are key steps to achieving China's commitment to reduce its carbon intensity by 40 to 45 percent from 

2005 levels by 2020.176 

China's 2030 targets are in line with even stronger efforts. A 2014 study by MIT and China's Tsinghua 

University found that a scenario with emissions leveling off between 2025 and 2035 and slowly declining 

after that involves stronger measures well beyond current policies, including a rising price on carbon. 177 

Stronger steps will also be needed to achieve the non-fossil target. China will need to install 800-1,000 

gigawatts (GW) of non-fossil fuel electricity generation capacity to achieve its 2030 non-fossil energy 

target, greater than its current coal-fired capacity and almost the total current electricity generation 

capacity of the United States178 

Expert projections179 of a peak in China's carbon emissions and an increased share of non-fossil energy 

are supported by several major building blocks: scaling up non-fossil energy, limiting coal use, 180 

improving energy efficiency, placing a price on carbon, and rebalancing the economy from heavy 

industry toward services.'81 China is already taking significant action in each of these areas. 

China led the world with nearly a third of global investment in renewable energy in 2014,182 is the world 

leader in installed wind power capacity,183 and has set targets to roughly double its 2014 wind capacity 

to 200 gigawatts and more than triple its 2014 solar capacity to 100 gigawatts by 2020. 184 China has 

banned new coal plants in three key industrial regions185 and many provinces have targets to reduce 

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coal use.186 China has been strengthening and expanding policies to increase energy efficiency across its 

economy, including targets for the efficiency of coal plants, 187 energy-saving targets for industrial 

enterprises,'88 building energy codes,189 and fuel economy standards. 190 President Xi Jinping recently 

announced that in 2017 China will launch a national emissions trading system, 191 which has the potential 

to be a powerful instrument to reduce emissions over time. 192 Finally, China is seeking to shift away 

from its old growth model driven by investment in energy-intensive industry toward a new model driven 

by consumption, services, and advanced manufacturing,193 which should have an emissions reduction 

benefit.194 

China is working on including additional steps in its upcoming 13th Five Year Plan, to be released early 

next year.195 Signs of a recent decline in China's coal use196 and other trends have led some experts to 

predict that China's coal use may have already reached its structural peak (controlling for cyclical 

factors)197 and that China's emissions will likely peak before 2030, consistent with the government's 

stated aim to make best efforts to peak early. 198 

Other major developing countries have also taken important steps forward. In its IN DC, Brazil has set a 

target of reducing emissions by 37 percent below 2005 levels by 2025,'99 becoming the first major 

developing country to commit to an absolute reduction of emissions from a base year. Brazil also plans 

to increase the share of renewables (other than hydropower) in the power supply to at least 23 percent 

by 2030. This will increase Brazil's renewable electrical capacity (excluding hydropower) by an estimated 

48 gigawatts, more than quadrupling 2012 levels.200 The country also has set a target to achieve zero 

illegal deforestation by 2030 in the Brazilian Amazon. Over the past decade, the rate of deforestation in 

the Brazilian Amazon has already dropped by 70 percent compared with the previous decade, keeping 

3.2 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide (C02) emissions out of the atmosphere201 This is equivalent to 

taking all U.S cars off the road for three years. 202 

India has set goals to substantially increase its renewable energy capacity to 175 gigawatts by 2020, 

including increasing its solar capacity to 100 gigawatts-a twentyfold increase from current levels of 4 

gigawatts-and increasing its wind power capacity to 60 gigawatts203 The solar target is more than half 

the total global installed capacity of 181 gigawatts of solar energy in 2014. 204 1n its IN DC, India builds on 

this targets by committing to increase its non-fossil fuel power sector capacity to 40 percent by 2030. 

India's IN DC also commits to reducing the greenhouse gas intensity of its economy (greenhouse gases 

per unit of GDP) by 33-35% below 2005 levels by 2030. India will also create an additional carbon sink of 

2.5 to 3 billion tons of carbon dioxide through additional tree cover. 205 

Additional major developing countries have submitted INDCs that indicate a peak date for the absolute 

level of emissions. Mexico was the first developing country to release its IN DC and plans to reduce its 

greenhouse gas emissions by 22 percent and its black carbon (soot) by 51 percent by 2030 relative to 

BAU levels.206 The IN DC indicates that the policy is expected to lead to a peak in emissions by 2026. 

South Africa joins China and Mexico in stating intended peaking years for emissions. South Africa's 

IN DC provides a target to peak national greenhouse gas emissions between 2020 and 2025 and decline 

in absolute terms beginning no later than 2035. 

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2. Effect of INDCs on Global Temperature 

Several recent studies have shown that the INDCs submitted will make a significant difference in 

reducing global emissions in comparison to current policy trajectories. All of the studies find that the 

INDCs collectively reduce global emissions relative to the current trajectory, though additional effort will 

be needed to limit the global temperature increase to a rise of less than 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees 

F) above pre-industrial temperatures, the globally agreed goal for limiting climate change207 

The International Energy Agency's Energy and Climate Change Report208 concludes that full 

implementation of INDCs would contribute to 4-8 gigatons (GtCO,e) of greenhouse gas emissions 

reductions by 2030. The report estimates that the path set by the INDCs would be consistent with an 

average global temperature increase of around 2.7 degrees Celsius by 2100. That contrasts with the 

Agency's projections of an almost 4 degrees Celsius temperature increase by 2100 given business as 

usual (BAU) policies. 209 

The Synthesis Report of the INDCs conducted by the UNFCCC estimates that the implementation of 

INDCs would result in emissions in 2025 that are 2.8 gigatons (and up to 5.5 gigatons) of greenhouse gas 

emissions (GtC02e) lower than current policy trajectories and emissions in 2030 that are 3.6 gigatons 

(and up to 7.5 gigatons) lower. The synthesis report does not present the effect of INDCs on global 

temperature. 210 

The reports come to a similar conclusion that the implementation of INDCs would contribute to 

significant reductions of global greenhouse gas emissions (approximately 3-8 GtCO,e in 2030). Although 

the collective reductions of the IN DC emissions targets are not yet sufficient to achieve the 2 degrees 

Celsius goal, progress has already been made. The INDCs represent approximately one third of the 

emissions reductions needed to meet the 2 degrees Celsius goal relative to current trajectories, and half 

of the reductions needed relative to the business as usual policies in place in 2010. 211 While more needs 

to be done in the coming years, the INDCs are an important first step in transitioning to a low-carbon 

economy and limiting global temperature increase. This will assist in avoiding some of the most costly 

impacts in the United States and in other countries. 

Further action beyond the INDCs is in our economic interest, according to the New Climate Economy, in 

its 2015 report, Seizing the Global Opportunity: Partnerships far Better Growth and a Better Climate. It 

identified actions in 10 key areas that can drive economic growth and development and achieve as much 

as 96% of the greenhouse gas emissions reductions needed by 2030 to keep global warming under 

2'C. 212 These include investing in low-carbon cities, which could save urban areas around U5$17 trillion 

globally by 2050 and reduce emissions by 3.7 Gt CO,e and investing in energy efficiency measures, which 

could boost cumulative global economic output by US$18 trillion by 2035. 

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G. International Agreement 

The leadership role played by the United States has helped to catalyze not only broad-based action by 

other countries, but also the momentum toward an international agreement that achieves a key set of 

aims for the United States. 

First, and most important, the agreement is applicable to all countries. The Paris agreement will build on 

and implement the existing United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which 

was ratified by the Senate in 1992, and will mark a critical step forward by involving action to reduce 

emissions by all countries, both developed and developing. 

The universality of the agreement is exactly what the United States has been seeking for many years in 

the international climate negotiations and should be viewed as a major success. It will be an agreement 

with a structure that removes previous question marks about action by China and other countries and 

puts in place clear pathways for action by all countries. This shift to a universal system is also the result 

of a process in the negotiations to generate national climate plans, the INDCs, at the national level in 

accordance with their national circumstances. 213 This sets a strong foundation for countries to achieve 

what they have set out in their INDCs. 

Second, the Paris agreement is a critical opportunity to enhance the existing system of transparency and 

accountability to enable greater clarity and enhance trust about whether and how countries are fulfilling 

their INDCs. Following the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP) in Copenhagen in 2009 and the 

Conference of Parties in Cancun in 2010, all countries are required to track and report their emissions 

through a system referred to as Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV), with some differences 

for developed and developing countries in timelines and exact reporting requirements. 214 The Paris 

agreement can strengthen this system and ensure that developed and developing converge to the same 

MRV requirements over time (including through the use of capacity building support for developing 

countries to implement the requirements). 

A robust system of transparency is very much in line with the values of openness and accountability that 

are so fundamental and deeply imbedded in the United States. It is essential to making sure that other 

countries are carrying out what they have said they will do. The MRV system also offers an opportunity 

to identify challenges that developing countries with limited capabilities may be facing and to work with 

them to address those barriers. 

Third, it is vital that the Paris agreement is durable, designed not only for circumstances as they exist in 

2015, but also for years to come. In part, the agreement must be flexible enough to accommodate 

evolving national circumstances, particularly as countries' capabilities continue to grow. Beyond that, 

the agreement must also ensure that all countries continue moving forward over time, regularly 

returning to review, revisit and update their national climate plans. This is essential to making this 

agreement universal over the long-term, ensuring that countries across the board continue to move 

forward in a regular and timely way, while also providing an opportunity to consider whether countries 

are doing their part to take adequate action. Establishing a long-term global goal for action to reduce 

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emissions can also help to ensure that all countries, not just some, are expected to move toward a 

common objective over time. 

Fourth, the Paris agreement is an opportunity to effectively expand the scope of finance and investment 

needed to meet this challenge, bringing many new actors into the mix. Public funding remains essential, 

particularly to address the serious impacts of climate change on the poorest countries. But the 

substantial investment needed to shift our economies to low-carbon and climate resilient pathways also 

requires mobilizing and shifting the broader private sector financing that is so necessary to making 

progress. 

Moreover, developing countries with greater capabilities are increasingly stepping up to play a 

meaningful role in climate finance. Chinese President Xi's recent commitment in the Joint Presidential 

Statement with President Obama that China would provide more than $3 billion in climate finance was a 

game changer.'15 Some developing countries have also now contributed to the Green Climate Fund, a 

central international funding mechanism216 The Paris agreement can reflect this shift and the key role of 

finance from developing countries that are ready to provide it. 

Acting together with these other countries and private sectors investors, U.S. engagement to mobilize 

climate finance is a sensible investment. Especially by enabling vulnerable countries to build resilience to 

changing weather patterns, sea level rise, and extreme weather events, international climate change 

investments can help counter security threats that otherwise would have to be confronted with more 

costly interventions. The impacts of climate change must also be addressed to avoid undermining or 

reversing development gains in poor countries, especially those in vulnerable regions like Sub-Saharan 

Africa. An assessment by the World Bank illustrates how climate change increasingly threatens health 

and livelihoods of vulnerable populations, magnifying existing challenges to poverty alleviation. 217 

And, fifth, the Paris agreement can help catalyze action to address the impacts of climate change that 

are already being felt, especially in the most vulnerable and poorest countries. This is a challenge that 

affects us all- whether it is increased water scarcity and drought, vulnerable coastal areas facing sealevel rise, or growing risks to agricultural productivity. All countries need to work together to address 

these challenges, and the Paris agreement is a critical opportunity to catalyze collective action to build 

resilience to climate impacts. The United States has always stood with and supported the most 

vulnerable and poorest countries in tackling their challenges and should continue to do so today. 

Meanwhile, there is more that will happen in Paris beyond the bounds of the international agreement 

itself. A major platform for actors other than national governments- including businesses and cities 

and states- will highlight the many actions and initiatives that are already underway to advance a lowcarbon and climate resilient economy. Effective action on climate change cannot rest only on the actions 

of governments or agreements among them -it will depend on everyone playing a part. 

V. Conclusion 

The United States has the opportunity in the coming years to lay the foundation for a path to economic 

growth that delivers significant climate benefits. The key drivers of economic growth-including more 

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efficient use of energy and natural resources, smart infrastructure investments, and technological 

innovation-can also lead to a low-carbon future. By bringing a spirit of competition, ingenuity, and 

innovation to the climate challenge, the United States can be a leader in delivering the improvements in 

energy efficiency, the cleaner fuels, and the new technologies and processes that can lower emissions 

and create net economic benefits. With more than 50 years' experience in addressing environmental 

problems, the United States has demonstrated that environmental protection is compatible with 

economic growth, and environmental policies have delivered huge benefits to Americans. 

The U.S. emissions reduction target of reducing emissions by 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 

2025 is both ambitious and achievable. Use of existing federal laws combined with actions by the states 

can help accelerate recent market and technology trends in renewable energy, energy efficiency, 

alternative vehicles, and many other areas in order to meet or beat that target. 

It is very much in the national interest of the United States to play a leading role in addressing climate 

change. All nations will need to take ambitious action and do their share, since no nation is immune to 

the impacts of climate change and no nation can meet the challenge alone. U.S. leadership has already 

paid substantial dividends as we witness the wide variety of countries coming forward with their 

national climate plans and as we see the development of an international climate agreement that is 

universal, transparent, durable and effective. 

The United States has always provided leadership when the world faces big challenges, and by acting at 

home, we can work with other countries to achieve an effective international agreement in which all 

countries act. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee, and !look forward to answering any 

questions. 

1 The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate. 2014. "Better Growth, Better Climate." Accessible at: 

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2 N. Bianco, K. Meek, R. Gasper, M. Obeiter, S. Forbes, and N. Aden. 2014. "Seeing is Believing: Creating a New 

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3 UNFCCC, 2015, "INDCs as communicated by Parties", accessible at 

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4 See <http://sciencebasedtargets.org/companies-taking-action> 5 Fact Sheet: White House Announces Commitments to the American Business Act on Climate Pledge." October 19, 

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7 Carbon Disclosure Project, 2015, "Putting a Price on Risk: Carbon Pricing in the Corporate World," Available at 

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8 Available at: <http:/ /www2.epa.gov/cira>. 9 CNA Military Advisory Board, "National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change." Alexandria, VA: 

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11 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Carbon Pollution 

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12 UNFCCC, 2015, "INDCs as communicated by Parties", accessible at 

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13 White House Office of the Press Secretary, "FACT SHEET: U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and 

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14 lEA, 2015, "Energy and Climate Change", accessible at 

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15 lEA, 2015, "Energy Technology Perspectives", accessible at https:/ /www.iea.org/etp/. 

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17 P. Hibbard, A. Okie, S. Tierney, and P. Darling, 2015, "The Economic Impacts of the Regional Greenhouse Gas 

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19 Based on projections of lEA World Energy Outlooks in Reference Scenarios of WEO 2007 and New Policies 

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22 P. Bodnar. National Security Council, and D. Turk, U.S. Department of Energy, 2015, "Announcing, 'Mission 

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23 Breakthrough Energy Coalition, 2015, "Introducing the Breakthrough Energy Coalition," accessible at 

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24 The Solar Foundation, 2015, "Solar Industry Creating Jobs Nearly 20 Times Faster than Overall U.S. Economy." 

Avai I able at: http://www. thesola rfou nda tion. org/ press-release-sol a r-ind ustry-creating-jobs-nearly-20-timesfaster-than-overall-u-s-economy/ 

25 Synapse Energy, Labor Network for Sustainability, 350.org, 2015, "The Clean Energy Future: Protecting the 

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26 D. Lashof, 2015, "Our Clean Energy Economy," NextGen Climate America. Available at: 

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27 Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2015, "Seizing the Global Opportunity: Partnerships for Better 

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28 Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2015, "Seizing the Global Opportunity: Partnerships for Better 

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29 The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate. 2014. "Better Growth, Better Climate." (Chapter 5, 

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30 See the literature review and original research in US EPA, National Center for Environmental Economics. 2012. 

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<http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/368203f97a15308a852574ba005bbd01/3A2CA322F56386FA852577 

BD0068C654/$File/Retrospective+Cost+Study+3-30-12.pdf>._5ee also: Ruth Greenspan Bell, For EPA Regulations, 

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31 U.S. Energy Information Administration. Annual Energy0utlook2014. 32 See <http:/ I sci encebasedtargets. org/ companies-taking -action> 

33 Fact Sheet: White House Announces Commitments to the American Business Act on Climate Pledge." October 

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34 Major U.S. banks call for leadership in addressing climate change." September 28, 2015. Ceres. Accessed 

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35 Carbon Disclosure Project, 2015, "Putting a Price on Risk: Carbon Pricing in the Corporate World," Available at 

<https://www.cdp.net/CDPResults/carbon-pricing-in-the-corporate-world.pdf> 

36 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Analysis of the Clean Power Plan", 2015, Table 3, p. 24. Available at:< 

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37 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Carbon Pollution 

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38 See Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Available at: < 

https :f f unfccc. int/ sci en ce/wo rkstrea ms/ cooperation_ with_ the _i pcc/items/8732. ph p>. 

39 WRI. 2014. "CAIT 2.0, 2014, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool: WRI's Climate Data Explorer." Washington, DC: 

World Resources Institute. Accessible at: <http://cait2.wri.org>.lnternational Energy Agency. 2015. "Global 

energy-related emissions of carbon dioxide stalled in 2014." Accessible at: 

<http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/news/2015/march/global-energy-related-emissions-of-carbon-dioxidestalled-in-2014.html>. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2012. "Global Anthropogenic Non-C02 Greenhouse 

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<http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/economics/nonco2projections.html>. Between 2005 and 

2011, global GHG emissions increased by roughly 13 percent and it is unclear what trend emissions will follow in 

the future. While preliminary data from the International Energy Agency suggests that energy-related C02 

emissions stalled in 2014 (the first time in 40 years a halt or reduction in emissions was not tied to an economic 

downturn), non-C02 GHG emissions will continue to rise nearly 44 percent above 2005 levels by 2030, according to 

data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. In 2011, non-C02 emissions accounted for about 27 percent 

of global GHG emissions. 

40 M. Burke, S. Hsian, E. Miguel, "Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production," Nature. 

Available at: h ttps:/ I d I. d ropboxusercon tent.com/ u/30 114 70/Publicati ons/ nature 15 725 _ withSI. pdf. 41 The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate. 2014. "Better Growth, Better Climate." Accessible at: 

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42 T. Litman, 2015, "Analysis of Public Policies that Unintentionally Encourage and Subsidize Urban Sprawl." New 

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43 A. Doukas, 2015, "G20 Subsidies to oil, gas, and coal production: United States," Overseas Development Institute 

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44 Available at: <http://www2.epa.gov/cira>. 

45 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climatic Data Center. 2014. "Global Analysis- Annual 

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Accessible at: <http:/ jwww. wri.orgjpublication/new-climate-economy>. 

48 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climate Data Center. 11

Billion~Dollar Weather and 

Climate Disasters: Overview-" Accessible at: <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/>. 

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49 NOAA, 2014, "Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Table of Events" Available at: 

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50 Munich RE. 2014. "Loss Events Worldwide1980-2013." Accessible at: 

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52 Risky Business, 2015. Available at: http://riskybusiness.org/. 53 CNA Military Advisory Board, "National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change." Alexandria, VA: 

CNA Corporation, 2014. 

54 The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate. 2014. "Better Growth, Better Climate." Accessible at: 

<http:/ /newcli mateeconomy. report/>. 55 U.S. Department of Energy. 2014. "Photovoltaic System Pricing Trends: Historical, Recent, and Near-Term 

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56 Office of the Governor, Economic Development and Tourism, "The Texas Renewable Energy Industry", 2014 

Available at: <http://gov .texas.gov/files/ecodev/Renewable _ Energy.pdf>. 

57 U.S. Department of Energy. 2014. "Saving Energy and Money with Appliance and Equipment Standards in the 

United States." (chapter 2) Accessible at: 

<http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/05/f16/Saving%20Energy%20and%20Money2.pdf>. For state-specific 

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Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Accessible at: <http:/ /www.wri.org/publication/new-climateeconomy>. 

58 Since 2000 the United States has primarily built lower carbon resources, constructing 249 gigawatts (GW) of gas, 

along with 57 GW of wind, and only 18 GW of coal. This includes new capacity built for the electric utility sector 

and independent power producers between 2000 and 2012. See U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Form 

EIA-860 2012." Accessible at: <http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/>. U.S. Energy Information 

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86 

Administration. 2014. Monthly Energy Review. (June) Accessible at: 

<http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec12_9.pdf>. 

59 N. Bianco, K. Meek, R. Gasper, M. Obeiter, S. Forbes, and N. Aden. 2014. "Seeing is Believing: Creating a New 

Climate Economy in the United States." Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Accessible at: 

<http://www.wri.org/publication/new-climate-economy>. 

60 N. Bianco, K. Meek, R. Gasper, M. Obeiter, S. Forbes, and N. Aden. 2014. "Seeing is Believing: Creating a New 

Climate Economy in the United States." Working Paper (p. 72). Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. 

Accessible at: <http://www. wri.org/publication/new-climate-economy>. 

61 The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate. 2014. "Better Growth, Better Climate." Accessible at: 

<http://newclimateeconomy.report/>. 

62 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Table 12.6 Carbon Dioxide Emissions From Energy Consumption: 

Electric Power Sector," Monthly Energy Review, August 2014, accessible at 

http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec12_9.pdf. 

63 Shakeb Afsah and Kendyl Salclto, "Demand Reduction Slashes US CO, Emissions in 2012," C02 Scorecard, May 

2013, accessible at: http:/ /co2scorecard.org/home/researchitem/27. 

64 Since 2000 the United States has primarily built lower carbon resources, constructing 249 gigawatts (GW) of gas, 

along with 57 GW of wind, and only 18 GW of coal. Includes new capacity built for the electric utility sector and 

independent power producers between 2000 and 2012. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-860 

2012, accessible at http:/ /www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/. 

55 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Table 6. ?.A. Capacity Factors for Utility Scale Generators Primarily 

Using Fossil Fuels, January 20082013-2014March 2015," Electric Power Monthly, May 2015, accessible at 

http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_6_07 _a. 

66 Power sector data from 2012 for capacity, generation, and co, emissions by technology type from Annual 

Energy Outlook 2014 Reference Case detailed outputs provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. 67U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Table 12.6 Carbon Dioxide Emissions From Energy Consumption: 

Electric Power Sector," Monthly Energy Review, August 2014, accessible at 

http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec12_9.pdf. 

68 International Energy Agency, "World Energy Outlook 2015." 2015. OECD/IEA: Paris. 

69 Bob Fagan, Patrick Luckow, David White, and Rachel Wilson, 2013,''The Net Benefits of rncreased Wind Power in 

PJM," Synapse Energy Economics, Inc., May, accessible at http://www.synapseenergy.com/Downloads/SynapseReport.2013-05.EFC.Increased-Wind-Power-in-PJM.12-062.pdf; Bob Fagan, Max 

Chang, Patrick Knight, Melissa Schultz, Tyler Comings, Ezra Hausman, and Rachel Wilson, 2012, "The Potential Rate 

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accessible at http:/ I cleanenergytra nsm ission.org/wp-content/ u pi oads/2012/05/Fu 11-Report-The-Pote n tlai-RateEffects-of-Wind-Energy-and-Transmission-in-the-Midwest-ISO-Region.pdf; D. Lew, and G. Brinkman, 2013, "The 

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September, accessible at http:/ /www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/58798.pdf; 

Ryor and Tawney, 2014, "Shifting to Renewable Energy Can Save U.S. Consumers Money." 

70 Grand River Dam Authority, September 2014, "With potential to save customers $50 million over the project's 

lifetime ... GRDA signs 100 MW renewable energy purchase agreement with Apex Clean Energy," 

http://www.grda.com/with-potential-to-save-customers-50-million-over-the-projects-lifetime-grda-signs-100-mwrenewable-energy-purchase-agreement-with-apex-clean-energy/. 

71 DTE Energy's Renewable Energy Plan Surcharge (REPS) recovers the cost of incorporating renewable sources in 

DTE Energy's generation mix. Improvements in technology for wind and solar as well as federal production tax 

credits have allowed for a considerable decrease of this monthly surcharge, lowering rates by approximately 2.5 

percent. See DTE Energy, "Residential Electric Rates," accessible at http:/ /bit.ly/1nDqOyG; and DTE Energy, "DTE 

Energy to Lower Rates for Electric Customers," December 20, 2013, accessible at 

https://dteenergy.mediaroom.com/2013-12-20-DTE-Energy-to-lower-rates-for-electric-customers. 

72 Eric Wesoff, "Austin Energy Switches From SunEdison to Recurrent for S-Cent Solar," Green Tech Media, May 

2014, accessible at http://www .greentech media.com/ artie! es/ read/ Austin -Energy-Switches-From-Sun Edison-toRecurrent-For-S-Cent-Solar. 

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73 MidAmerican Energy, "MidAmericna Energy Announces $1.9 Billion Investment in Additional Wind Generation 

Capacity," May 8 2013, accessible at http:llwww.midamericanenergy.comlwind_news_article.aspx?id=634. 74 For example, PJM, National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) for the Western United States, and the state of 

Michigan have all found that 30-35 percent of electricity could be generated using variable renewable resources 

with minimal cost. See GE Energy Consulting, "PJM Renewable Integration Study Executive Summary Report," 

Revision 05, 2014, accessible at http:/ lpjm.coml-lmedialcommittees-groupsltask-forceslirtflpostingslprisexecutive-summary.ashx; GE Energy, Prepared for National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2010, "Western Wind 

and Solar Integration Study," accessible at http:/lwww.nrel.govldocslfy10osti/47434.pdf; J.D. Quackenbush and 

5. Bakkal, 2013, "Readying Michigan to Make Good Energy Decisions: Renewable Energy," Michigan Public Service 

Commission, licensing and Regulatory Affairs. Michigan Economic Development Corporation, accessible at 

http:llwww.michigan.govldocumentslenergylrenewable_final_ 4389S2_7.pdl. L. Bird, M. Milligan, and D. lew, 

2013, "Integrating Variable Renewable Energy: Challenges and Solutions," Technical Report, National Renewable 

Energy Laboratory, September, accessible at http:/ lwww.nrel.govldocslfy13ostil60451.pdf. 

75 Bird, et al., "Integrating Variable Renewable Energy: Challenges and Solutions." 

76 According to DOE, "more than 2,300 circuit miles of new transmission additions were constructed per year, with 

an additional18, 700 circuit miles planned over the next live years. By comparison, transmission was being 

constructed at a rate of about 1,000 circuit miles per year as recently as five years ago" Ryan Wiser and Mark 

Bolinger, "2012 Wind Technologies Market Report," U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and 

Renewable Energy, accessible at http:llemp.lbl.govlsiteslall/filesllbnl-6356e.pdf, Bird et al., "Integrating Voriable 

Renewable Energy: Challenges and Solutions." 77 R. Wiser and M.Bolinger. "2013 Wind Technologies Market Report." Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. 

Accessible at: <http:/ lemp.lbl.govlsiteslolllfilesl2013 _Wind_ Technologies_Market_Report_Final3.pdf>. 

78 American Wind Energy Association has identified near-term transmission projects which could integrate almost 

70 gigawatts of additional wind capacity if oil projects were completed. See Wiser and Bolinger, "2012 Wind 

Technologies Market Report." 

79 For more information, seeM. M. Hond, S. Baldwin, E. DeMeo, J. M. Reilly, T. Mai, D. Arent, G. Porro, M. Meshek, 

D. Sandor (eds.), Renewable Electricity Futures Study, 4 vols. NREL/TP-6A20-52409, Golden, CO: National 

Renewable Energy Laboratory, accessible at http:llwww.nrel.govlanalysislre_futuresl. 

80 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Table 7.2b Electricity Net Generation: Electric Power Sector," Monthly 

Energy Review, August 2014, accessible at http:/lwww.eia.govltotalenergyldatalmonthlylindex.cfm. 

81 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 

Electric Utility Generating Units," Proposed Rule, pp. 151-52, June 18, 2014, accessible at 

http :llwww.gpo.gov lfdsyslpkgiFR-2014-06-18lpdfl2014-13726.pdf. 

82 According to EIA, four nuclear units closed in 2013 with additional closures announced for 2014, including 

Entergy's Vermont Yankee plant. U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014, "Table 8.1: Nuclear Energy 

Overview," Monthly Energy Review, June 2014, accessible at 

http :llwww .ei a. gov ltota I energy Ida tal monthly I pdf I sec8 _ 3. pdf; 

U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant Closure in 2014 Will Challenge New 

England Energy Markets," September 6, 2013, accessible at 

http:/ lwww .eia. gov ltodayi nen ergy I deta il.cfm ?id= 12851. 

83 H. Northey, "Nuclear: Spate of Reactor Closures Threatens U.S. Climate Goals- DOE," Greenwire, February 5, 

2014, E&E Publishing, LLC, accessible at http:/lwww.eenews.netlgreenwirelstoriesi10S9994082; P. Maloney, 

"Power Price Recovery May Be too Late to Aid Its Nuclear Plants: Exelon Exec," Platts. com, April 9, 2014, McGraw 

Hill Financial, Las Vegas, accessible at http:/lwww.platts.comllatest-newslelectric-powerllasvegaslpower-pricerecovery-may-be-too-late-to-aid-its-21452315. 

84 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, " 

Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units" Final Rule, 

October 23, 2015, accessible at http:llwww.gpo.govlfdsyslpkgiFR-2015-10-23Ipdfl2015-22842.pdf 

85 Union of Concerned Scientists. 2014. Climate Game Changer. Accessible at: 

<www.ucsusa.orglsitesldefaultlfilesllegacylassetsldocumentslglobal_warmingiCarbon-Standards-Analysis-Unionof-Concerned-Scientists.pdf>. 

86 M. M. Hand, S. Baldwin, E. DeMeo, J. M. Reilly, T. Mai, D. Arent, G. Porro, M. Meshek, and D. Sandor (eds.). 

Renewable Electricity Futures Study. 4 vols. NREL/TP-6A20-52409. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy 

33 
88 

Laboratory. Accessible at: <http:/ /www.nrel.gov/analysis/re_futures/>. Natural Resources Defense Council. 2014. 

"Cleaner and Cheaper: Using the Clean Air Act to Sharply Reduce Carbon Pollution from Existing Power Plants, 

Delivering Health, Environmental, and Economic Benefits." Accessible at: <http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollutionstandards/files/pollution-standards-IB-update.pdf>. Union of Concerned Scientists. 2014. Climate Game Changer. 

Accessible at: http :j /www. ucsusa. org/ sites/ de fa ult/fi les/1 egacy I assets/documents/global_ warming/CarbonStandards-Analysis-Union-of-Concerned-Scientists.pdf. 

87 U.S. Department of Energy. 2014. "Saving Energy and Money with Appliance and Equipment Standards in the 

United States." Accessible at: 

<http://energy.gov/sites/prod/filesj2014/05/f16/Saving%20Energy%20and%20Money2.pdf>. 

88 Unpublished data provided by Energy Efficiency Standards Group, Lawrence Berkeley National laboratory. See 

S. Meyers, et al. 2013. "Energy and Economic Impacts of U.S. Federal Energy and Water Conservation Standards." 

Accessible at: <http:/ I eetd .lb l.gov I sites/ all/files/ standards _1987-2012 _impacts_ overview _lb nl-6217 e. pdf>. 

89 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2014. "Energy Conservation Standards Activities Report to Congress." 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy. Accessible at: 

<http:/ j energy .gov I sites/ prod/fi les/2014/08/f18/16th %20SemiAnnua!%20Report%20to%20Congress%20on%20Appliance%20Energy%20Efficiency%20Rulemakings.pdf>. 

90 N. Bianco, K. Meek, R. Gasper, M. Obeiter, S. Forbes, and N. Aden. 2014. "Seeing is Believing: Creating a New 

Climate Economy in the United States." Working Paper (Chapter 2). Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. 

Accessible at: <http://www. wri.org/publication/new-climate-economy>. 

91 Levelized costs are amortized over the lifetime of the energy resource and discounted back to the year in which 

the costs are paid and the actions are taken. Costs represent national averages. For more details see American 

Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, 2014, The Best Value for America's Energy Dollar: A National Review of 

the Cost of Utility Energy Efficiency Programs, accessible at 

http://www .aceee.org/sites/ default/files/ publications/research reports/u 1402. pdf. 

92 For a more detailed analysis of cost of saved energy across efficiency program types and regions of the United 

States, see lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 2014, "The Program-Administrator Cost of Saved Energy for 

Utility Customer-Funded Energy Efficiency Programs." This analysis found a national average electricity cost of 

saved energy of about two cents per kilowatt-hour from 2009 through 2011 when gross savings and spending were 

aggregated at the national level and the cost of saved energy was weighted by savings. The study noted wide 

variation for results across efficiency program types. 

93 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2015. "Annual Energy Outlook 2015- with projections to 2040." 

Accessible at: <http:/ /www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/>. 

94 Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review, http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/ 

95 Unpublished data provided by Energy Efficiency Standards Group, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. See 

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 2013, "Energy and Economic Impacts of U.S. Federal Energy and Water 

Conservation Standards Adopted from 1987 through 2012," accessible at 

http:/ I eetd .I bl.gov I sites/ all/files/ standards _198 7-20 12_i m pacts_ overview _Ibn 1-6217 e.pdf. 

96 For example, see U.S. Department of Energy, "Revolution Now: The Future Arrives for Four Clean Energy 

Technologies," accessible at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/09/f2/Revolution%20Now%20--

%20The%20Future%20Arrives%20for%20Four%20Ciean%20Energy%20Technologies.pdf; and E. Perratore, 11LG's 

New Dryer Saves Energy and Money: Uses a Hybrid Heat Pump to Recycle Wasted Heat," Consumer Reports, 

January 14, accessible at http:/ /www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/01/lg-s-new-dryer-saves-energy-andmoney/index.htm. 

97 Projections based on 100-percent state adoption of moderate and aggressive building codes, increased 

stringency of existing appliance standards, and adoption of appliance standards for new products. For more 

details, see Institute for Electric Innovation (lEE), an institute of the Edison Foundation, 2013, "Factors Affecting 

Electricity Consumption in the United States (2010-2035)," March, Edison Foundation, accessible at: 

http://www .edisonfou ndation. net/iei/Docu ments/1 E E _FactorsAffecti ngUSEiecConsumption _Fin a l.pdf. 

98 There is no single definition of "energy efficiency resource standards." The 24 states include those that set 

mandatory, long-term targets for electricity, either as part of a specific standard (with sufficient funding to achieve 

these targets according to the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy), a combined renewable portfolio 

34 
89 

standard and efficiency standard, or an "all cost-effective" energy policy, and are sufficiently funded to meet these 

targets. For more details, see http://aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/u1403.pdf. 

99 Estimate made using an updated version of the World Resources Institute's emission model described in '

1

Can 

the U.S. Get There From Here?" For details about the model, see Bianco et al., 2013, "Can the U.S. Get There from 

Here?" 

100 U.S. Department of Energy, U.S., Building Energy Codes Program, 2013, "National Benefits Assessment 1992· 

2040," accessible at http://assets.fiercemarkets.com/public/sites/energy/reports/usdebuildingcodereport.pdf. 

101 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), 2014, Building Energy Codes Program: "Status of State Energy Code 

Adoption," July, U.S. DOE Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, accessible at 

http://www .en ergycodes.gov /ad option/states. 

102 Appliance Standards and Rulemaking Federal Advisory Committee Commercial Package Air Conditioners and 

Commercial Warm Air Furnaces, Working Group Term Sheet, June 15, 2015, http:/ /www.appliancestandards.org/sites/default/files/Term_Sheet_FINAL_June152015.pdf. 

103 Natural Resources Defense Council, Major Agreement for Rooftop Air Conditioners Will Lead to Biggest Energy 

Savings Yet, June 15, 2015, http:/ /switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/mwaltner/major _agreement_for_rooftop_ai.html. 

74 A New Buildings Institute review of nine projects across the country showed that deep commercial retrofits are 

capable of reducing energy use by 30 percent or more, cutting energy costs in half, and elevating building 

performance to 50 percent better than the national average. See New Buildings Institute, 2011, "A Search for Deep 

Energy Savings," August, accessible at: 

http:/ 1 newbui ldi ngs. erg/sites/ default/files/N EEA _Meta _Report_ Deep_ Savings_ N 81_ Fin a 18152011. pdf. Residential 

retrofits through DOE's Building America program-which aims to reduce energy use in new and existing homes 50 

percent by 2017 through cost-effective measures-demonstrate that it is possible to bring existing building 

performance up to the same standard as best-in-class new construction. Homes in the program demonstrated 

average energy savings of nearly 60 percent, with some homes reaching as high as 90 percent improvement. 

Accessible at: 

http:/ 1 apps1.eere.en ergy .gov /buildings/publications/ pdfs/bu ildi ng_ america/ der _pi lot_ mass _rhodeisland. pdf. 

104 A New Buildings Institute review of nine projects across the country showed that deep commercial retrofits are 

capable of reducing energy use by 30 percent or more, cutting energy costs in half, and elevating building 

performance to 50 percent better than the national average. See New Buildings Institute, 2011, "A Search for Deep 

Energy Savings," August, accessible at 

http://newb u i ldi ngs.org/sites/ de fa ult/files/N E EA _Meta_ Report_ Deep_ Savings_ N Bl_ Fi na 18152011. pdf~ Residential 

retrofits through DOE's Building America program-which aims to reduce energy use in new and existing homes 50 

percent by 2017 through cost-effective measures-demonstrate that it is possible to bring existing building 

performance up to the same standard as best-in-class new construction. Homes in the program demonstrated 

average energy savings of nearly 60 percent, with some homes reaching as high as 90 percent improvement. 

See http:/ I a pps l.eere.en ergy.gov /bu ildings/pu blicati ons/ pdfs/building_ a meri caf der _pilot_mass _rhodeisl and. pdf. 105 H. C. Granade, J. Creyts, A. Derkach, P. Farese, S. Nyquist, and K. Ostrowski, 2009, "Unlocking Energy Efficiency 

in the U.S. Economy," July 2009, McKinsey Global Energy and Materials, accessible at 

http://www .green build inglawb log.com/ uploads/file/ m cki nseyUS _energy_ efficiency_ fu II_ report. pdf. 

National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and National Research Council, 2010, "Real 

Prospects for Energy Efficiency in the United States," The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, accessible at 

http://www .nap .edu/ open book. ph p ?record_i d= 12621. 106 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2013. "Light-Duty Automotive Technology, 

Carbon Dioxide Emissions, and Fuel Economy Trends: 1975 Through 2013." Accessible at: 

<http://www. epa .gov /fueleconomy /fetre nds/19 7 5-2013/ 420r13011. pdf>. 

107 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2015. "GHG Emission Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles: Manufacturer 

Performance Report for the 2013 Model Year." Accessible at: <http:/ /www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/ghgreport.htm>. Nic Lutsey. 2015. "Do the automakers really need help with the U.S. efficiency standards?" The 

International Council on Clean Transportation. Accessible at: <http:/ /theicct.org/blogs/staff/do-automakers-reallyneed-help-us-efficiency-standards>. 

108 The Department of Energy has a target of reducing the cost for long-range electric vehicle batteries from $500 

per kilowatt hour in 2012 to $125 per kilowatt hour by 2022 (U.S. Department of Energy, 2013,"EV Everywhere 

Grand Challenge Blueprint," accessible at: 

35 
90 

http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/02/f8/eveverywhere_blueprint.pdf). At this price point, along with other 

concomitant advancements, DOE expects long-range (280 miles) electric vehicles to be cost-competitive with 

internal combustion engines (on a levelized total cost of ownership basis over five years). DOE notes that shorterrange electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids would likely become cost-competitive before this price point for longrange electric vehicle batteries is met. Tesla Motors recently announced plans to build facilities by 2017 to produce 

large electric vehicle batteries that are 30 percent cheaper than today's batteries (around $190 per kilowatt hour, 

assuming current reported prices, see Chapter 3 for additional discussion). 

109 B. Davis and P. Baxandall. 2013. "Transportation in Transition: A Look at Changing Travel Patterns in America's 

Biggest Cities." U.S. PIRG Education Fund and Frontier Group. Accessible at: 

<http://www. us pi rg. org/ sites/pi rg/files/ reports/US_ Transp _trans_ scrn. pdf>. 

11° For a review of existing and potential new opportunities for federal action in these areas, see: U.S. Department 

of Energy. 2013. Effects of the Built Environment on Transportation: Energy Use, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and 

Other Factors. Accessible at, <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/55634.pdf>. 

111 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Transportation. 2011. "EPA and NHTSA Adopt FirstEver Program to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Improve Fuel Efficiency of Medium- and Heavy Duty 

Vehicles." Accessible at: http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/documents/420fl1031.pdf. U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 2011. "Final Rulemaking to Establish 

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and 

Vehicles: Regulatory Impact Analysis." Accessible at: 

<http:/ /www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/documents/420r11901.pdf>. 

112 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Department of Transportation, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 

Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles· Phase 2, RIN 2060-AS16; RIN 2127-

Al52, June 19, 2015, http:/ /www.epa.gov/oms/climate/documents/hd-ghg-fr-notice.pdf. 

113 ACEEE et al. (2014) found that many technologies could be used to achieve the highest level of reductions, 

including tractor aerodynamic enhancements and integration with the trailer, hybridization and electric drive, 

engine downsizing, dual-stage turbocharging, trailer aerodynamic enhancements, low rolling resistance tires, 

weight reduction, idle reduction, among other technologies that would improve engine, transmission and 

driveline, and vehicle and trailer performance. They also found that "a new truck that includes an advanced engine 

and transmission, new axle design, and improved aerodynamics to the tractor and trailer could save average 

tractor-trailer owners and drivers about $30,000 per year in fuel. In 2025, these new efficiency technologies would 

increase truck purchase costs by about $32,000, which is recovered by fuel savings in just 13 months." See: 

American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Sierra Club, and Union of Concerned Scientists. 2014. "Big Fuel Savings Available in New Trucks." 

Accessib I e at: <http:/ I aceee .org/fil es/ pdf /fact -sheet/truck-savings-0614. pdf>. 

114 United States Aviation Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Plan, June 2012, 

https :/ /www. faa.gov I about/ office_ org/h eadquarters _offices/ a pi/ en vi ron _policy _gui da nee/pol icy I media/ Aviation 

_Greenhouse_ Gas _Emissions_Reduction_Pian.pdf 

115 Federal Aviation Administration. 2012. Next Gen Implementation Plan. Accessible at: 

<http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/implementation/media/NextGen_lmplementation_Pian_2012.pdf>. 

116 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR Parts 87 and 1068, Proposed Finding that Greenhouse Gas 

Emissions from Aircraft Cause or Contribute to Air Pollution that May Reasonably Be Anticipated to Endanger 

Public Health and Welfare and Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, RIN 2060-A$31, June 10, 2015, 

http://www .epa .gov I otaq/ documents/aviation/aircraft -ghg-pr -a nprm-2015-06-10. pdf 117 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2010, EPA Analysis of the Transportation Sector, 

http://www .epa .gov I oms/ eli mate/GHGtra nsportation -analysis03-18-2010.pdf. 

118 Total national energy use and GHG emissions are commonly classified into four end-use sectors: residential, 

commercial, industrial, and transportation. From an end-use perspective, industry includes energy transformation 

activities such as electricity generation, petroleum refining, and natural gas production. This assessment also 

includes overlapping analysis of these energy transformation activities as key areas for reducing U.S. GHG 

emissions. 

"'See real (2009) value-added data at http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm; emissions data from 

http://www. eia.gov /tota I energy I data/monthly I pdf I sec12 _7. pdf. 

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91 

12° For examples from the U.S. pulp and paper sector, see Aden, et al. (2013) http://pdf.wri.org/energy-efficiencyin-us-manufacturing-midwest-pulp-and-paper.pdf 

121 DOE. 2015. Barriers to Industrial Energy Efficiency. http:/ /energy.gov/eere/amo/articles/barriers-industrialenergy-efficiency-report-congress-released 

122 These emissions numbers include both direct emissions and indirect emissions attributable to electricity use. 

U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Table 12.4 Carbon Dioxide Emissions From Energy Consumption: 

Industrial Sector." Electricity Power Monthly. Accessible at: <http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/>. 

123 For more information on emerging digital manufacturing technologies, see McKinsey's recent analysis at 

http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/manufacturing/manufacturings_next_act. 

124 DOE. 2015. Annual Energy Outlook 2015 with Projections to 2014. Accessible at, 

http://www .ei a.gov /forecasts/ a eo/ 

125 DOE. 2015. Barriers ta Industrial Energy Efficiency. http://energy.gov/eere/amo/articles/barriers-industrialenergy-efficiency-report-congress-released 

126 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "AEO 2014 Reference Case." Accessible at: 

<http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/>. 

127 For extensive discussion of barriers to U.S. industrial energy efficiency, see DOE. 2015. Barriers to Industrial 

Energy Efficiency. http://energy.gov/eere/amo/articles/barriers-industrial-energy-efficiency-report-congressreleased 

128 National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and National Research Council. 2010. "Real 

Prospects for Energy Efficiency in the United States." Washington, DC: National Academies Press (NAP). Accessible 

at: <http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12621>. 

129 http:// energy .gov I eere/ a mo/ advanced-man ufactu ring-office 

130 http:/ /arpa-e.energy.gov/ 

131 http://energy.gov/eere/amo/advanced-manufacturing-office 

132 Methane is the primary component of natural gas, but gas also has significant concentrations of volatile organic 

compounds-many of which are precursors to ground-level ozone formation. Hazardous air pollutants are present 

in unprocessed natural gas. For more information, seeR. Lattanzio, "Air Quality Issues in Natural Gas Systems," 

Congressional Research Service, March 2013, accessible at http://www.civil.northwestern.edu/docs/Tight-ShaleGas-20 13/ Ai r-Quality-lssues-Naturai-Gas-Ratner-2013. pdf. 

133 According to the latest estimates from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, because it is a powerful 

but short-lived greenhouse gas, methane traps 34 times as much heat in the atmosphere as COz over 100 years, 

and 86 times as much over 20 years. See G. Myhre and D.Shindell, "Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forcing," 

in Climate Change 20013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment 

Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, accessible 

at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1ARS_Chapter08_FINAl.pdf. 

134 Here, "natural gas systems" refers to the production of natural gas from natural gas wells, as well as the 

processing, transmission, and distribution of that gas. Natural gas produced at oil wells is not included. Similarly, 

the end use of natural gas- for electricity generation, transportation, residential heating, or other purposes- is 

not included. 

135 ICF International, 2014, "Economic Analysis of Methane Emission Reduction Opportunities in the U.S. Onshore 

Oil and Natural Gas Industries," March, Fairfax, VA, accessible at 

http://www .edf. org/ sites/ de fa u It/files/ methane_ cost_ curve _report. pdf. 

136 For more information on these technologies and practices, see Obeiter, M. and C. Weber. 2015. "Reducing 

Methane Emissions From Natural Gas Development: Strategies for State-level Policymakers." Working Paper. 

Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Accessible at: www.wri.org/publication/reducing-methane-emissions. 

137 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2014, "Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990 

2012. Chapter 3: Energy," April, EPA, Washington DC, accessible at 

http://www. epa .gov I cl i matechange/ghgemissions/ usi nventoryreport. htm I. 

138 S. Harvey, V. Gowrishankar, and T. Singer, 2012, "leaking Profits: The U.S. Oil and Gas Industry Can Reduce 

Pollution, Conserve Resources, and Make Money by Preventing Methane Waste," March, Natural Resources 

Defense Council, New York, NY, accessible at http://www.nrdc.org/energy/leaking-profits.asp; and ICF 

International, 2014, "Economic Analysis of Methane Emission Reduction Opportunities in the U.S. Onshore Oil and 

37 
92 

Natural Gas Industries," March, Fairfax, VA, accessible at 

http://www .edf. org/ sites/ default/files/methane_ cost_ curve _report. pdf. 

139 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and 

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews," accessible at 

http://www .epa .gov I ai rqual ity I oil a ndgas/ pdfs/20120417finalru le .pdf. 

140 N. Fann, C.M. Fulcher, and B.J. Hubbell, "The Influence of location, Source, and Emission Type in Estimates of 

Human Health Benefits of Reducing a Ton of Air Pollution," Air Quality, Atmosphere, & Heath, September 2009: 

169-76, accessible at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19890404. 

141 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR Part 60 (EPA-HQ-OAR-201D--0505; FRL-9929-75-

0AR], September 2015, "Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources," 

http://www .gp o.gov /fdsys/p kg/FR-20 15-09-18/pdf /2015-21 023.p df 

142 ICF International. 2014. "Economic Analysis of Methane Emission Reduction Opportunities in the U.S. Onshore 

Oil and Natural Gas Industries." Accessible at: 

<http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/methane_cost_curve_report.pdf>. For reference, the daily spot price for 

natural gas in 2014 ranged from $2.81 to $8.35 per thousand cubic feet, with an average price of $4.48. See: 

<http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdD.htm>. 

143 N. Bianco, K. Meek, R. Gasper, M. Obeiter, S. Forbes, and N. Aden. 2014. "Seeing is Believing: Creating a New 

Climate Economy in the United States." Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Accessible at: 

<http://www.wri.org/publication/new-climate-economy>. 

144 Coca-Cola Company, 2014, "Coca-Cola Installs 1 Millionth HFC-Free Cooler Globally, Preventing S.25MM Metric 

Tons of CO,," Press Release, January 22, accessible at http:/ /www.coca-colacompany.com/press-center/pressreleases/coca-cola-installs-1-millionth-hfc-free-cooler-globally-preventing-525mm-metrics-tons-of-co2#TCCC. 

145 1bid. 

146 PepsiCo, "PepsiCo Debuts Energy-Efficient, HFC-Free Cooler at Super Bowl," Press Release, February 2010, 

accessible at http:/ /www.pepsico.com/Media/PressRelease/PepsiCo-Debuts-Energy-Efficient-HFC-Free-Cooler-atSuper-Bowl02022010.html; Red Bull, "Efficient Cooling through Ecofriendly Coolers," accessible at 

http://energydrink.redbull.com/coolers; Heineken, "2013 Sustainability Report," accessible at 

http://sustainabilityreport.heineken.com/The-big-picture/What-we-said-and-what-weve-done/index.htm; 

Hydrocarbons 21, "Heineken1

S Successful Rollout of HC Coolers- Exclusive Interview with Maarten ten Houten," 

December 2013, accessible at http://www.hydrocarbons21.com/news/viewprintable/4760; Ben & Jerry's, 

"Experience with Natural Refrigerants," accessible at 

http://www .atmo.org/ presentations/files/124 _ 3 _ Asch _Ben_ n _Jerry. pdf. 

147 Honeywell, "Auto Industry Conversion Update," obtained from Thomas Morris, director of commercial 

development, Honeywell, July 25, 2014. 

148 HF0-1234yf has a GWP of 4 whereas the current refrigerant, HFC-134a, has a GWP of 1,430. See U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, "Final Rulemaking Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone: New Substitute in the 

Motor Vehicle Air Conditioning Sector under the Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) Program," Fact Sheet, 

accessible at http:/ /www.epa.gov/ozone/downloads/HF0-1234yf_Finai_Fact_ Sheet. pdf. 

149 Simon Warburton, "Honeywell Fights Back Against r1234yf Claims," Just Auto, May 2014, accessible at 

http://www.just-auto.com/news/honeywell-fights-back-against-r1234yf-claims_id145919.aspx. 

150 DuPont, "Rapid Growth Expected in Adoption of HF0-1234yf," accessible at 

http:/ /us.vocuspr.com/Newsroom/MultiQuery.aspx?SiteName=DupontEMEA&Entity=PRAsset&SF _PRAsset_PRAss 

etiD_EQ=128793&XSL=NewsRelease&lncludeChildren=True&Lang=English. 

151 Michael Parr, federal government affairs manager, DuPont, personal communication, July 24, 2014. 

152 Advance, unedited compilation of the decisions adopted by the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Parties to the 

Montreal Protocol. Accessible at <http://conf.montreal-protocol.org/meeting/mop/mop27/report/SitePages/Home.aspx> 

1

s3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2011. "EPA and NHTSA Adopt First-Ever Program to Reduce Greenhouse 

Gas Emissions and Improve Fuel Efficiency of Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles." Accessible at: 

<http:/ /www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/documents/420fl1031.pdf>. 

154 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2014. "Protection of Stratospheric Ozone Change of listing Status for 

Certain Substitutes under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program." 40 CFR, Part 82. Accessible at:< 

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http://www3. epa .gov I ozone/ down loads/SAN_ 57 50_ SNAP_ Status_ Change_ Rule _N PR M _signature_ versionsigned _7 -9-2014. pdf> 

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Certain Substitutes Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program; Final Rule." Accessible at: 

http :j /www .gpo.gov /fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-07-20/pdf /20 15-17066.pdf. 

156 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2015. "Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Update to the Refrigerant 

Management Requirements under the Clean Air Act." Available at: 

http:/ /www2 .epa.gov /sites/ prod uction/fi les/2015-10/ docu ments/608proposa I. pdf. 

157 Available at:< http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=climatesmart.html>. 

158 UNFCCC, 2015, "INDCs as communicated by Parties", accessible at 

http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx. 

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%20on%2030%20June%202015.pdf 

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40 
95 

statement by China's economic development planning agency in 2014, some provinces will be allowed to delay 

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AL.pdf. 

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http://www.wri.org/publication/clean-energy-landscape. 

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2014, http:/ /news. nation algeograph ic.com/n ews/2014/06/ 140605-braz i/-d eforestation-carbonemissionsenvironment/. 

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at 

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df. 

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http://www.wri.org/publication/clean-energy-landscape. India's IN DC specifies this target is achievable with the 

help of the transfer of technology and low cost international finance including from the Green Climate Fund. 

206 Government of Mexico, "Intended Nationally Determined Contribution", submitted on March 30, 2015, 

accessible at 

http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Mexico/1/MEXIC0%201NDC%2003.30.2015. 

pdf. 

207 UNFCCC, 2010, "Cancun Agreements", accessible at 

http:/ /unlccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2. 

41 
96 

208 !EA, 2015, "Energy and Climate Change", accessible at 

https://www. iea.org/media/news/WEO _INDC_Paper _Final_ WEB. PDF. 209 1EA, 2015, "Energy Technology Perspectives", accessible at https://www.iea.org/etp/. The ETP's 6DS scenario is 

"largely an extension of current trends and "broadly consistent with the WEO Current Policy Scenario through 

2040." It is associated with a global temperature rise above pre-industrial levels of almost 4 degrees Celsius by the 

end of this century. 

210 UNFCCC, 2015, "Synthesis report on the aggregate effect of INDCs", accessible at 

http:/ I unfccc. i nt/focus/indc _portal/items/92 40.php. 

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213 WRI & UNDP, 2015, "Designing and Preparing Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)", 

accessible at http:/ /www.wri.org/sites/default/files/designing-preparing-indcs-report.pdf. 

214 UNFCCC, 2010, "Cancun Agreements", accessible at 

http:// u niece. i nt/ resource/ docs/2010/ cop 16/ eng/07 aOl. pdf#page=2. 

215 White House Office of the Press Secretary, "FACT SHEET: The United States and China Issue Joint Presidential 

Statement on Climate Change with New Domestic Policy Commitments and a Common Vision for an Ambitious 

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216 Peru, Colombia, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea, Indonesia, Chile, and Panama have made pledges to the Green 

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World Bank. 

42 
97 

Dr. Andrew Steer, President and CEO of the World Resources Institute- Biography 

Dr. Andrew Steer is the President and CEO of the World Resources Institute, a global research 

organization that works in more than 50 countries, with offices in the United States, China, India. Brazil. 

Indonesia and Europe. WRI's 450 experts work closely with leaders to address six urgent global 

challenges at the intersection of economic development and the natural environment: food, forests, water, 

climate, energy and cities. 

Dr. Steer joined WRI from the World flank, where he served as Special Envoy for Climate Change from 

20 I 0- 2012. From 2007 to 20 I 0, he served as Director General at the UK Department of International 

Development (DFID) in London. 

Dr. Steer serves on the Executive Board of the UN Secretary General's Sustainable Energy For All 

initiative; is Co-Chair of the World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on Natural Capital; and is 

a member of the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development 

(CCICED), the Leadership Council of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, and IKEA's 

People and Planet Positive Advisory Group. 

Prior to joining the UK Government, Andrew held several senior posts at the World flank, including 

Director of the Environment Department. He also has directed World flank operations in Vietnam and 

Indonesia and served as Chief of the Country Risk Division and Director and Chief Author of the !992 

World Development Rep01t on Environment and Development. 

Andrew was educated at St Andrews University, Scotland, Cambridge University, and the University of 

Pennsylvania, where he received his PhD in economics. 
98 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Dr. Steer. 

We’ll now go to Dr. Lomborg, who is joining us from Paris. We 

very much appreciate his efforts to do so by video. I think it’s 4:30 

in the afternoon. I hope the weather is clear. And we look forward 

to your testimony. 

[The following testimony was delivered via teleconference.] 

TESTIMONY OF DR. BJORN LOMBORG, PRESIDENT, 

COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS CENTER 

Dr. LOMBORG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you very much to all your honored members. 

I’m actually going to show you some slides, so I hope that this 

will work at the same time. So we’re pushing the technology to its 

fullest. 

And so here it is. So fundamentally, I would like to show you two 

main points, namely, the impact and the cost of Paris. And this is 

perhaps not very surprising; I am going to take some issues with 

what Andrew Steer—Dr. Andrew Steer pointed out. 

So, look local global warming is an important issue. It’s manmade. It’s a long-term problem. But I think what we need to understand is that we have little sense of the scale. 

Let me just show you this, and this is the UNFCCC, the ones 

that are organizing the Copenhagen—sorry, the Paris meeting. If 

everybody does everything that is promised in Paris, we will cut 

the equivalent of 56 gigatons of CO2 until 2030. This is incontrovertible. Obviously, you can talk about is it 40, is it 50, might 

it be 60? And just to show you what we’re trying to achieve, there’s 

about—the 2 degree target will require us to cut more than 6,000 

gigatons over the century. 

Mr. Steer and also the—Eddie Johnson mentioned that we’re 

possibly on the road to 2.7 degrees. That would require about 3,000 

gigatons of reduction. So remember, we’re 1 or two percent of the 

way. That’s important because it gives us a sense of proportion. 

Now, let me to show you briefly with the Clean Power Plan. It 

will, if it’s achieved, reduce temperatures trivially, as has been 

pointed out several times, but it’ll reduce emissions by 4 gigatons 

by 2030 and 42 gigatons through the century. 

So again, just to show you the scale, 4, 42, and what we’re talking about achieving is 6,000 gigatons. That’s also why, if you run 

it in a standard climate model, you won’t be able to tell the difference. It’s in my description, but just to summarize it, if we just 

do the Clean Power Plan until 2030, it will reduce temperatures by 

0.007 degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the century, and even if it 

continued in its full implementation until the end of the century, 

it will reduce temperatures by 0.0023 degrees Fahrenheit. 

Likewise, if you’ll look at the U.S. climate promise, the promised 

to cut 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels in 2025, it will reduce 

temperatures trivially. It will reduce 6 gigatons by 2025 and 100 

gigatons throughout the century it. 

Again, just look at the changes here. We’re talking about a very, 

very small impact. And that’s of course why, if you run it in a climate model, again, you will get very, very small impacts. Again, if 

you actually keep your U.S. Paris promise until the end of the century, you will reduce temperatures by 1/20 of a degree Fahrenheit. 
99 

And let me just share with you what is the impact of all the 

INDCs, all the Paris promises. If you run this through a standard 

climate model, this is what you see. You can actually tell the difference but not by very much. So again, if we just keep our promise 

until 2030, which of course is the only thing on sale here, we will 

reduce temperatures by 0.09 degrees Fahrenheit. If indeed they are 

kept all the way through the century, they will reduce temperatures by about one third of a degree Fahrenheit. That is important 

because we’re essentially talking about very small changes. At the 

same time, the costs are significant. 

Now, Andrew Steer would like us to believe that this is not very 

much. Actually, overall, we’re going to see increases in growth and 

we’re actually going to make money from this. But certainly all 

standard models, these are all the models from the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum, and all the other multi-model forums have 

looked at the cost of climate policies through a variety of different 

models. They indicate on average the cost for the United States is 

going to be about $154 billion if you do this well. And fundamentally, that’s because if you make energy more expensive, it will inevitably affect everything. It’s not the end of the world economically, but it does have a cost of a couple of percent of GDP and 

that’s what turns out. 

Of course, we also know that most policies—I’m sorry for this 

committee to say that, but most policies are not perhaps most effectively implemented, and then we know they can be even more costly. So it’s likely that we will see a cost of at least $1 trillion globally and maybe even $2 trillion. And remember, this is the cost per 

year. 

And so in summary, the impacts of Paris are small, about 1/3 of 

a degree Fahrenheit at best. The cost of Paris is large. It’s not a 

benefit. That’s of course why we need everybody to cajole us into 

doing this. It’s at least one trillion dollars a year. Spending $1 trillion to cut virtually nothing of temperature, that’s perhaps not the 

best way forward. 

And that’s why we really need to recognize if we want to do better, we owe it to the world to spend our money better both on focusing on R&D for green energy, as the Chairwoman pointed out. 

That is what Bill Gates is now making us focus on, and of course 

also realize that there are many other problems we need to fix as 

a world. 

So, again, I say thank you very much to the Committee, and I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lomborg follows:] 
100 

a 

Testimony by Bjorn Lomborg, President, Copenhagen Consensus Center 
101 

US INDC 0.008 0.031 US INDC 0.014 0.057 

USCPP 0.004 USCPP 0.007 0.023 

EU2030 !NDC 0.017 0.053 EU2030 IN DC 0.031 0.096 

EU 2020 0.007 0.026 EU 2020 0.012 0.046 

China 0.014 0.048 China 0.025 0.086 

RoWINDC 0.009 0.036 RoWINDC 0.016 0.064 

Global 0.048 0.170 Global 0.086 0.306 

Bjorn Lomborg, Copenhagen Consensus Center, Tuesday December 1, 2 
102 

This paper will estimate the impact of the likely climate impact of the Paris 

Climate Summit, (the COP21, or hereafter Paris), its costs, and compare this with 

other model outcomes. 

Given the very contentious nature of the climate dehate, it is perhaps worthwhile 

to point out that the current paper embrace man-made global warming and use 

the standard models from the UN Climate Panel (the IPCC) and others. 

Is global warming happening? Yes. Man-made global warming is a reality and 

will in the long run have overall, negative impact. 

So far, the only peer-reviewed paper estimating the temperature impact of the 

likely Paris impact is my paper from November 10 2015 (Lomborg 2015). This 

paper uses the climate model MAG ICC 6.3. This is the latest version of a simple 

climate model used in all the five IPCC assessment reports from 1990-2014.1 All 

the following runs use default values of MAG ICC with a climate sensitivity of 3°C. 

Sensitivity analysis shows that different models and carbon cycling does not 

substantially change the outcome. 

The paper investigates the change in temperature in 2100 from implementing 

promises for Paris, both individual and collective. It does so by running two 

standard climate scenarios, RCP8.5 and RCP6 with and without the promised 

reductions. Sensitivity analysis shows that the outcome does not substantially 

change, and consequently only RCP8.5 is shown here. 

There is some discussion as to what the promises of Paris actually constitute. In 

my article I explicitly limit the promises to "policies that have practical political 

implications soon and have a verifiable outcome by 2030, but not policies that 

merely promise actions only or mostly starting after 2030." See the discussion 

below for why this fits with the definition of what most nations and UNFCCC 

understand as the Paris promises. It also avoids a slippery slope towards a 

ridiculous premise: since almost all states have already accepted the zoe promise, 

if all promises are included, then by default we will see temperatures rise less 

than zoe. 

If we look just at the US Clean Power Plan, it will reduce emissions by 535Mt 

(million metric tons) C02 every year by 2030, compared to the expected 

emissions from the US power sector, as estimated by the Energy Information 

Agency (EIA 2015). I investigate two scenarios. In the first, the optimistic 

scenario, the US will continue the Clean Power Plan forever, which means the US 

emissions will forever be 535Mt C02 lower than the baseline from EIA. In the 

pessimistic scenario, the US will live up to its Clean Power Plan promises by 

2030, but then fall back to its baseline emissions as estimated by EIA. 

Bjorn Lombory, Copenhagen Consensus Center, Tuesday December 1, 2015 3 
103 

If we run the MAGICC climate model with the RCP8.5 global emissions with and 

without the reductions in C02 emissions from the US Clean Power Plan, we get 

the following result: 

5.0 

4.5 1\cps:s ~ Pessimistic USCPP 

~ 4.0 Optimistic USCPP 

t;; 35 

"CI " 

·~ 3.0 

!!! 

~ 2.5 4]0 

> 0 

.<> 2.0 4.65 

"' !!! 1.5 " 4.60 

~ .. 1.0 455 

a. 

E 

.. 05 ... 450 

~ ~ ro 

~ ~ ~ ~ 0.0 

2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 

Figure 1 shows (most clearly in the enlargement in the bottom right) that the 

temperature reduction resulting from the US Clean Power Plan by the end of the 

century will be 0.007°F (0.004°C) if the policy is gradually abandoned after 2030. 

If the Clean Power Plan is continued throughout the century, reducing 535Mt 

C02 each year from the baseline, it will reduce global temperatures by 0.023°F 

(0.013°C) by 2100. 

The US administration has also promised in its Intended Nationally Determined 

Contribution (INDC) to the UNFCCC (USINDC 2015) that it will reduce its overall 

greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) 26-28% below the 2005-level by 2025. The US 

is very clear in its submission that this is a one-point promise in 2025: "The US 

target is for a single year: 2025." 

This reduction promise works out to about 1.27Gt of C02 equivalents in 2025. 

Again, I examine two possible scenarios. One pessimistic scenario where the US 

will only live up to the letter of its promise, cutting 1.27Gt C02 e in 2025, but then 

reverting back to the baseline. The optimistic scenario sees the US living up to its 

promise not just in 2025 but every year thereafter, reducing 1.27Gt C02e from 

the baseline throughout the 21st century. 

If we run the MAG ICC climate model with the RCP8.5 global emissions with and 

without the reductions in C02 emissions from the US INDC promises, we get the 

following result: 

Bjorn Lomborg, Copenhagen Consensus Center, Tuesday December 1, 2015 4 
104 

5.0 

;.> 4.5 

70 4.0 ·;: 

t: 

:::s 3.5 .., 

r: 

·~ 3.0 

"' 2.5 > 0 

..0 2.0 "' e 

:::s 

... 1.5 

lii LO Q. 

E 

~ 0.5 

0.0 

2000 

· RCPS.S 

Pessimistic USINDC 

Optimistic USINDC 

2020 2040 2060 

4.70 

4.60 

4.50 

4-40 

4.30 

4.20 

2080 2100 

Figure 2 shows (most clearly in the enlargement in the bottom right) that the 

temperature reduction resulting from the entire US Paris promise by the end of 

the century will be 0.014°F (0.008°C) if the policy is gradually abandoned after 

2025. If the US Paris promise is continued throughout the century, reducing 

1.27Gt C02 each year from the baseline, it will reduce global temperatures by 

0.057°F (0.031°C) by 2100. Since this includes the US Clean Power Plan, the net 

effect of the extra promise in the US INDC is in the optimistic case 0.034°F 

(0.057°F-0.023°F, 0.018°C). 

My article similarly estimates the impact of the other major players' contribution 

to the Paris emission reductions. The EU has done a climate policy for 2020 (the 

20-20 policy, promising 20% emission reductions below 1990-level in 2020, 

5.0 

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:§ Optimistic World !NDCs 

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Bjorn Lomborg, Copenhagen Consensus Center, Tuesday December 1, 2015 5 
105 

leading to 0.93Gt C02 annual reduction by 2030) and for its IN DC ( 40% 

reduction below 1990-level by 2030, resulting in an annual2.1Gt C02 reduction 

by 2030). China has promised to reduce its C02 intensity to 60-65% below 2005, 

which translates into a 1.95Gt C02 annual reduction promise by 2030. The US, 

China and the EU reductions approach almost 80% of the total promised 

reductions. Hence I estimate, using (Boyd, Turner, and Ward 2015), that the Rest 

of the World (RoW) INDCs will reduce emissions by 2030 by 1.48Gt COz annually. 

In total, the INDCs for Paris will result in an emission reduction of 6.8Gt C02 by 

2030 

In Table 1 one can see the total impact of these policies, both in Celsius and 

Fahrenheit. The total impact of alllNDC climate policies will reduce 

temperatures in 2100 by 0.086°F (0.048°C) if the Paris promises are gradually 

abandoned after 2030. If the Paris promises are kept all through the century, 

reducing emissions 6.8Gt below the baseline every year, the result will be a more 

optimistic temperature reduction of0.306°F (0.170°C) by 2100. The global 

model run can be seen in Figure 3. 

USINDC 0.008 0.031 USINDC 0.014 0.057 

USCPP 0.004 0.013 USCPP 0.007 0.023 

EU2030 IN DC 0.017 0.053 EU20301NDC 0.031 0.096 

EU 2020 0.007 0.026 EU 2020 0.012 0.046 

China 0.014 0.048 China 0.025 0.086 

RoWINDC 0.009 0.036 RoWINDC 0.016 0.064 

Global 0.048 0.170 Global 0.086 0.306 

Extraordinarily, there seems to be no official estimates of the costs of the 

proposed Paris climate policies, either for the US, the EU, China or for the entire 

world. 

I will here use existing data to make a reasonable first estimate of the total cost 

of Paris. 

Europe's climate promises are probably the best documented in peer reviewed 

literature, but this literature also clearly shows that the studies typically lag 

political decisions by some years. Thus, we have good estimates for previous 

decisions but much less exact for the ones the world is thinking of committing to 

in Paris. 

The Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF), the gold standard for the 

economics of climate and energy, has done several studies of the previous EU 

climate policy which promised a 20% reduction in C02 emissions from 1990-

levels by 2020. 

Bjorn Lomborg. Copenhagen Consensus Center; Tuesday December 1, 2015 6 
106 

It showed two things. First and perhaps not surprisingly, in the rare cases where 

official cost estimates are made, these are often much underestimated. The EU 

estimated that the total cost of its 2020-policies could be as little as an annual 

0.4% GDP loss ( €64 billion per year} (Capros et al. 2008, 48). The peer-reviewed 

cost was 1.3% (€209 billion annually), or more than three times larger (To! 

2012). Similarly, the Mexican government assumed its climate policies would 

cost $6-33 billion annually by 2050 (Veysey et al. 2015, 12). The peer reviewed 

literature, supported by the US EPA and the EU, shows that this is "far lower than 

any of the cost metrics reported by the CLIMACAP-LAMP models." Indeed, they 

find the cost in 2050 to be between 14 and 79 times higher, at about $475 billion 

annually (Veysey eta!. 2015). 

Second, politicians rarely pick the most efficient climate policies that cut C02 at 

lowest cost. This typically doubles the cost. The EU could have reduced its 

emissions by switching to gas and improving efficiency for a GDP loss of 0. 7% 

(Bohringer, Rutherford, and To! 2009). However, phenomenally inefficient solar 

subsidies and biofuels are often more alluring, which is why the actual EU cost 

almost doubled to 1.3% of GDP. As the researchers say: "The inefficiencies in 

policy lead to a cost that is 100-125% too high." 

In the following, I will tally the costs for the US, EU, Mexico, and China, which 

makes up about 80% of the total promised reductions. 

There is no official estimate for the cost of USA's promise to cut 26-28% of its 

greenhouse gasses by 2025. We can turn to the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum 

for the US, the so-called EMF 24 (Fawcett et al. 2014). The program has run more 

than a hundred scenarios estimating all greenhouse gas emissions and the GDP 

cost. Estimating the lost GDP cost with a regression across all these data points 

suggests that cutting 26% in 2025 results in a GPD Joss of about $154 billion 

annually, and 28% incurs an annual GDP loss of $172 billion. 

The EU promises in its INDC to cut its emissions by 40% below 1990-levels in 

2030 (EUJNDC 2015). While there are no official estimates of the cost, the latest 

peer-reviewed Stanford Energy Modeling Forum for the EU, the so-called EMF 28, 

estimates costs from a number of different reductions (Knopf et al. 2013). The 

closest policy attempts to reduce emissions by 80% in 2050, which leads to an 

average reduction in 2030 of 41%. That reduction across the models that 

estimate GDP loss is equivalent to reducing EU's GDP by 1.6% GDP in 2030- or 

€287 billion ($305 billion) in 2010-euros. 

China has promised to reduce its energy intensity to at least 60% below 2005 

(China INDC 2015), equivalent to reducing its emissions by at least 1.9 Gt C02 

each year. In the international research project the Asia Modeling Exercise 

(Calvin eta!. 2012; Calvin, Fawcett, and Kejun 2012), nine energy-economic 

models estimate what different efficient reduction policies will attain in emission 

reductions and GDP reductions. Using the AME data, it is likely that China can 

reduce 1.9Gt C02 for about $200 billion in annual GDP loss. 

Bjorn Lomborg, Copenhagen Consensus Center, Tuesday December 1, 2015 7 
107 

Another well-documented cost is for Mexico, which has enacted the strongest 

climate legislation of any developing country. It has conditionally promised to 

reduce its emissions by 40% below what it would otherwise have emitted by 

2030.2 As mentioned above, the cost estimates of the Mexican government are 

about 14-79 times lower than the actual cost estimated in a new study supported 

by the US EPA and the EU. The CLIMACAP-LAMP project has estimated costs 

throughout Latin America and the peer reviewed analysis for Mexico (Veysey et 

a!. 2015) finds that the Mexican cost in 2030 is about 4.5% of GOP or about $80 

billion annually. 3 

The total cost of US, EU, China and Mexico adds up to $739 billion (or $757 if the 

US goes for 28%}. Given that the reductions from US, EU, China and Mexico add 

to about 80%, it is reasonable to assume that the $739 billion constitute 80% of 

the total cost, making the global cost about $924 billion. 

Table 2 show the estimate of$924 billion in annual lost GOP by 2030 if all 

nations enact the most efficient climate policy (likely an increasing carbon tax 

which is uniform across sectors and countries). However, previous experience 

shows that it such an effective climate policy formulation is very unlikely, and 

this makes the total cost more likely to double (as found e.g. by (Bohringer, 

Rutherford, and To! 2009)). Thus, it is likely that the global cost of Paris will 

reach at least $1 trillion annually by 2030, and the cost with realistically lessefficient policies could very likely get close to $2 trillion annually. 

!fwe look across the entire spectrum of estimations of the Paris deal, there is a 

great deal of agreement. As is evident in Figure 4, all find that with Paris 

emissions will be around 53.7-57.6Gt C02 equivalent in 2030. My value is within 

0.2 Gt of the median. 

Bjorn Lomborg, Copenha_qen Consensus Center, Tuesday December 1, 2015 8 
108 

Global annual emissions 2030 with Paris 

56.7 56.8 57.6 

50 

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CAT UNEP MIT LSE Netherland UNFCCC lomhorg Climate 

EPA Interactive 

However, if we look at the baseline - no climate policy through the 21st centurythe expected cumulative emissions 2010-2100 in Figure 5 has significant outliers 

on both sides. MIT is on the low side, likely because it has already included 

emission reductions from climate policies until2014. 

The AME, Lomborg, EMF27, and UNEP lie just above 7,000 Gt C02, whereas CAT 

and Climate Interactive have much higher baselines, with Climate Interactive 

more than 2,000 Gt above. The Climate Interactive emissions are actually higher 

than any model in EMF27. 

That means CI can claim that Paris or any other policy will reduce about 2,000+ 

Gt more emissions than any other analysis, but such a claim is of course entirely 

spurious. Since the unrealistically high baseline is entirely made-up, these 

emissions would never have taken place, and hence Paris climate promises can't 

take credit for eliminating them. 

Bjorn Lomborg, Copenhagen Consensus Center, Tuesday December 1, 2015 9 
109 

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8,000 

7,000 

1:! 6,000 ., 

.... ,2: 

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0 

u 

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Bjorn Lomborg, Copenhagen Consensus Center, Tuesday December 1, 2015 

CAT Climate 

Interactive 

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lomborg MIT Climate Interactive CAT 

Bjorn Lombarg, Copenhagen Consensus Center, Tuesday December 1, 2015 11 
111 

If we look at the cumulative emissions from the Paris INDCs in Figure 6, it is clear 

that MIT, Climate Interactive and Lomborg find about the same level across the 

century, because all three have about the same estimate for 2030 and see the 

policies in 2030 continued approximately in the same way. CAT finds much 

higher reductions because it assumes much larger reductions after 2030. 

This is why we see the total reduction diverge radically in Figure 7. MIT and 

Lomborg both have realistic cumulative baselines and realistic cumulative 

emissions with the INDCs. That is why they both find about 500-600Gt 

cumulative reductions across the 21st century, which both finds translates into 

about 0.2°C temperature reduction. 

Climate interactive sees about 2,500 Gt higher emission reductions but almost all 

of this reduction stems from the vastly inflated baseline. Thus tbe correct finding 

of Climate Interactive without the exaggerated baseline would be almost similar 

findings to (MIT 2015; Lomborg 2015). 

CAT finds much higher reductions yet, partly because it has an unrealistically 

high baseline (about 1,300 Gt too high, Figure 5) and assume another 2,000+ Gt 

reductions after 2030. 

It is instructive to see how far away the estimates of Climate Interactive are, 

since they are often used in the public discourse, In Figure 8, we can see the 

difference between all EMF24 baseline estimates, with Climate Interactive 

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-climate Interactive 

2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 

Bjorn Lam borg, Copenhagen Consensus Center, Tuesday December 1, 201S 12 
112 

baseline increasingly diverging to the point of being about 80% too high at the 

end of the century. 

Similarly, Figure 9 shows the vast difference between the median baseline of 

AME and the Climate Interactive estimate for China emissions, which 

increasingly diverge from the academic literature and towards the end of the 

century is almost 90% too high. 

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Climate Interactive & Median Peer Reviewed AME 

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Bjorn Lomborg, Copenhagen Consensus Center, Tuesday December 1, 2015 13 
113 

Some critics claim that in analyzing Paris, we should look not just at the promises 

made for 2016-2030, but also promises much further out, like the Chinese 

promise to reduce emissions after 2030, the US promise to reduce its emissions 

to 80% below 2005 in 2050 and the EU promise to cut emissions 80-95% below 

1990-levels in 2050. 

Such an interpretation is implausible and for three interlocking arguments, as I 

also point out in my article 

First: It is difficult to defend the inclusion of targets with a very low 

likelihood of implementation. 

In my article, I only include policies that have practical political implications 

soon and have a verifiable outcome by 2030. 

It is undeniable that political targets further away are less likely to be 

implemented. Recent history clearly indicates that climate promises even 10-15 

years ahead will be routinely flouted. 

When China commits to reduce its carbon intensity of GOP by 60% to 65% below 

2005 levels by 2030, we can analyze the progression towards that goal very 

clearly over the next 15 years and clearly determine if it is met by 2030- so this 

is included in my analysis. 

However, the promise to "achieve the peaking of carbon dioxide emissions 

around 2030 and making best efforts to peak early" (often curiously misquoted, 

as for instance in "peak C02 emissions by 2030 at the Iatest" 4) is something that 

will only have an effect after around 2030, and it is something that will first be 

verifiable around 2035 or later. 

This is especially true given that Chinese energy statistics are notoriously 

opaque. Just in the last few weeks it became clear that China burned perhaps 

17% more coal per year in recent years than was previously understood.s 

China's 'peaking' promise is very unlikely to be achieved based on economic 

reality alone. The cost can be identified from the Asia Modeling Exercise which 

indicates that the lowest GDP loss would be about $400bn or about 1.7% of GOP, 

and likely twice that. It strains credibility to expect China to commit such 

economic self-harm. 

(It is worth noting in passing that China also promises in its IN DC to be 

"democratic" in 2050 (China INDC 2015). The one-party state's vow should 

probably be treated rather similarly to the suggestion that it will rein in 

economic growth so dramatically). 

Second: my approach is methodologically clear. The alternative is unable to 

avoid a slippery slope that would include every target, vow, promise, or 

vague political undertaking. 

In my analysis, I was consistent in ruling out longer-term promises that were 

further off and economically implausible. 

Bjorn Lomborg, Copenhagen Consensus Center, Tuesday December 1, 2015 14 
114 

I also left out the US promise of "deep, economy-wide emission reductions of 

80% or more by 2050." Data from the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum for the 

US (Fawcett et al. 2014) shows an average GDP loss at more than $1 trillion 

annually, if done efficiently. If not, which seems to be the only constant in climate 

policy, the cost will likely double to almost $2.5 trillion or 7.5% of US GDP in 

2050. 

And I left out the EU promise "to reduce its emissions by 80-95% by 2050 

compared to 1990." Data from the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (Knopf eta!. 

2013) shows the average GDP loss at almost €3 trillion annually, if done 

efficiently. If not, the cost will likely double to almost €6 trillion or 25% of EU 

GDP in 2050. 

If we were to include the Chinese 'peaking' promise, why not also include the US 

promise to cut 80% by 2050 and the EU promise to cut 80-95% by 2050, both of 

which are mentioned in their INDCs? 

Including these promises would make a mockery of any real analysis of what the 

Paris treaty can achieve. 

Indeed, since almost every nation has signed up to reduce temperature rises to 

2°C6, and about 80-90 nations including the EU and the US 'endorse' this target in 

their INDCs, where should we draw the line? 

Third: the commitment period of2016-2030 is by far the most common 

understanding ofwhat Paris constitutes. 

This is true whether we pay attention to the United Nations or at the official 

material from nations themselves: 

• The UNFCCC itself describes the central results as emission reductions 

achieved in 2025 and 2030, not further. It specifically labels possible 

emission reductions after 2030 as actions taken by nations "heyond the time 

frames stated in their INDCs (e.g. beyond 2025 and 2030)" (UNFCCC 2015) 

The US clearly states that its understanding of its INDC is for 2025 and not 

further: "The U.S. target is for a single year: 2025." (USINDC 2015) 

The EU sets its targets for 2030 and not any further. 

In its own IN DC, China clearly writes what it expects from the Paris 

agreement, namely to "formulate and implement programs and measures to 

reduce or limit greenhouse gas emissions for the period 2020-2030." (China 

INDC 20 15) So even China itself is unequivocal that the Paris deal is not 

about promises after 2030, but up until 2030. 

It is also worth remembering what previous promises have routinely been 

flouted, which lends less credibility to new promises, especially far-off promises. 

Consider an analysis conducted in 1997 on the likely effect of the Kyoto Protocol. 

Should it have included not just the specific commitments made in Kyoto, but 

every far-reaching promise made around that time? Likely not, because we 

should have assumed that not only would this treaty be implemented, but that 

stronger and ever-increasing cuts would consistently be made as a result of 

Bjorn Lomborg, Copenhagen Consensus Center. Tuesday December 1. 201 S 15 
115 

policy (and not economic downturns) for decades. History shows that we would 

have been utterly wrong to do so. 

Moreover, should such an analysis of Kyoto have included President Bill Clinton's 

1993 announcement? that the US would reduce its emissions by 2000? That 

promise was never fulfilled. According to the Washington Post, the US 

administration's excuse was that the "goal is no longer possible because the 

economy has grown more rapidly than expected."8 The commitment failed even 

though it was for just seven years later, was to be implemented right away, and 

under the same president who made it. 

Every industrialized nation actually promised in 1992 to return their emissions 

in 2000 to 1990-levels9 - and almost every single OECD country missed that 

target. 

Even the commitments made in the Kyoto Protocol itself ended up meaning 

nothing. The treaty was abandoned by the USA, and eventually by Russia, japan 

and Canada. 

We would clearly not have known this if we were conducting analysis in 1997-

but the examples show that it is folly to assume that we can realistically believe 

targets much further ahead to be right. 

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20/20/2020 Targets: An Overview of the EMF22 Assessment." Energy 

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doi: 10.1016 /j.eneco.2009.1 0.01 0. 

Boyd, Rodney, Joe Cranston Turner, and Bob Ward. 2015. "Tracking Intended 

Nationally Determined Contributions: What Are the Implications for 

Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 2030? I Grantham Research Institute on 

Climate Change and the Environment." In . LSE. 

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Mikiko Kainuma, Elmar Kriegler, Gunnar Luderer, and P.R. Shukla. 2012. 

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Exploring the Role of Asia in Mitigating Climate Change, 34, Supplement 3 

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Calvin, Katherine, Allen Fawcett, and Jiang Kejun. 2012. "Comparing Model 

Results to National Climate Policy Goals: Results from the Asia Modeling 

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http:/ jwww.eia.gov jforecastsjaeojtables_ref.cfm. 

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atvia/1/LV-03-06-EU%20INDC.pdf. 

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"Overview of EMF 24 Policy Scenarios." The Energy journal 35 (01 ). 

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Kanudia, Joanna Karkatsouli, Ilkka Keppo, Tiina Koljonen, Katja 

Schumacher, and Detlef P. Van Vuuren. 2013. "Beyond 2020- Strategies 

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' https: //www. ipcc.cllfP!LQ!icatio!]~ ... i\Ild.Jl;J ta/ ar4/wg 1/ eo/ ch8s8-8-2.h tml, 

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4 http:/ /climateactiontracker.orgjcountries/china.html 

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Bjorn Lomho(g, Copenhagen Consensus Center, Tuesday December 1, 2015 18 
118 
119 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Dr. Lomborg, for that great 

testimony. I will recognize myself for questions. 

Actually, you’ve anticipated my first question, which was what 

impact would President Obama’s pledge in Paris have on the 

Earth’s climate? I think your word was it would have a trivial impact. You said all the pledges made in Paris would affect temperature by only 1/3 of a degree over the next 85 years, and the cost 

would be about $1 trillion a day. Is that all accurate as a summary? 

Dr. LOMBORG. Yes. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Here’s a more recent question that just 

came up this morning because President Obama has said a few 

hours ago that he blamed climate change for flooding in Miami, 

Florida. The President said you go down to Miami, and when it’s 

flooding at high tide on a sunny day, the fish are swimming 

through the middle of the streets, there’s a cost to that. 

However, the President’s statement that Miami flooding is linked 

to climate change in my view is entirely false and in fact disputed 

by meteorologists at the National Weather Service. Those meteorologists have reported that the lunar cycle and wind patterns are 

to blame for unusually high floods in Miami, not climate change. 

Do you feel that the President’s statement linking the Miami 

floods to climate change is just another example of alarmist rhetoric or do you think it’s accurate? 

Dr. LOMBORG. Unfortunately, I’m going to tell you a little more 

complicated story. I don’t know the specific issue of Miami, but in 

general, it stands to reason that as temperatures rise, as sea levels 

rise, we will have more problems, for instance, with flooding. But 

what is incredibly important is to recognize that most of these 

things we know very well how to deal with at very low cost through 

adaptation. The simple answer is the Dutch have shown the way 

for a couple hundred years. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. 

Dr. LOMBORG. So, again, trying to deal with this through climate 

policies is probably one of the least effective ways to help people 

who are actually flooded. 

So remember, global warming is a problem. Global warming will 

cause problems, but the way that almost every catastrophe you see 

is being used as a way to bludgeon us to say we should cut carbon 

emissions as the only solution is unfortunately very often the worst 

or the least effective way to help. 

Chairman SMITH. I understand, and I understand also and appreciate your talking about the need to put more funds into research and technology, and I totally agree with that. 

By the way, if it comes down to choice of taking the meteorologist’s word for it or the President’s word for it when it comes to 

Miami flooding, every time I’ll go with the meteorologist. 

Let me go to Mr. Grossman for my next question, and it is this: 

How much impact on climate change, a little bit repetitive, will the 

Clean Power Plan have? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, by the Administration’s own estimates, the 

impact is incredibly minor. And keep in mind that even assumes 

that the Clean Power Plan remains in law. In my view, the most 

likely outcome is that it has zero impact on climate because it is 
120 

ultimately struck down by the courts as both unconstitutional and 

inconsistent with EPA’s statutory authority. 

Chairman SMITH. And if it is unconstitutional, what impact does 

that have on the President’s pledge? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. It would actually have an enormous impact, 

something like half of the—actually more than half of the estimated reductions that are fully enumerated in the INDC that the 

White House has released are attributable to the Clean Power 

Plan. So if that’s off the table, we’re not—under the way they’ve 

enumerated, we’re still 30 percent short. In that instance, I think 

we would be something like 80 percent to 90 percent short. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. GROSSMAN. It’s a very big gap. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Grossman. 

Mr. Cass, is any agreement President Obama makes legally binding on the United States? 

Mr. CASS. Well, I think, as Mr. Grossman testified, there are 

things that the President could agree to in Paris under his sole executive authority with respect to things like transparency and reporting measures, but he’s not able to commit either to binding 

emissions reductions or to the appropriation of funds. Any of that 

would need to move through Congress. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Thanks. 

And who would be hardest hit in the United States if the President’s emissions reduction passage was implemented? Yes. 

Mr. CASS. I think the primary costs are in the energy sector and 

then on those who rely on the energy sector. So the expectation is 

certainly that electricity prices would rise, and that affects both 

consumers, as well as industries that rely heavily on the use of energy. 

Chairman SMITH. And so the American family will pay a price? 

Mr. CASS. That’s exactly right, and that’s what they’ve seen happen in Europe when they tried to pursue similar policies. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Cass. 

The gentlewoman from Oregon, Ms. Bonamici, is recognized for 

her questions. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you to all the witnesses for being here. 

I’m encouraged this morning because I heard both Dr. Lomborg 

and Chair Smith talk about the importance of investing in technology and research in clean energy. I absolutely agree. I also understand, however, that it’s important to reduce carbon emissions 

while we’re doing that. 

Dr. Steer, thank you so much for being here. We appreciate your 

testimony. And you testified that businesses have recognized the 

economic value of action. And I agree. My home State of Oregon 

has many companies that have stepped up and demonstrated their 

commitment, companies like Nike, Genentech, Intel, Lam Research, Portland General Electric. They’re among the more than 

150 companies nationwide that have now signed the American 

Business Act on Climate Pledge. These companies have made business-specific commitments to take significant actions to address climate change, and they’ve expressed their support for a strong Paris 

agreement. And as we heard this morning, just a few days ago, Bill 
121 

Gates unveiled the world’s largest clean energy research and development partnership, all very encouraging. 

So, Dr. Steer, how are these businesses supporting a strong 

international agreement? Can you talk a little bit about why these 

business leaders see this not only as a critical issue but also as economically viable and valuable to their bottom line? 

Dr. STEER. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. 

And let me also say how pleased I am that we are in agreement 

on research and development and the kind of announcement that 

President Obama and 20 other leaders yesterday made on a doubling of research and investment for renewable energy is profoundly encouraging, especially when linked to the private sector 

and the efforts of Bill Gates. 

The private sector has a very major role to play in the climate 

talks. This weekend, thousands of private sector leaders will gather 

in Paris, and they’ll do two things. One, they’ll say this is what we 

are doing. And many of them, for example, will say, look, we looked 

at the science. We have no actual obligations necessarily to reduce 

our own greenhouse gases legally but we’re going to do it. And 

some of them are saying we’re not only going to do better, we’re 

going to do enough. That means that they are looking at the 

science and they’re saying what would it take for us to do enough 

to reduce our greenhouse gases so that the problem will be solved? 

And in Paris there will be a whole set of coalitions that are announced on renewable energy, on energy efficiency, a whole range 

of issues related to greening supply chains, deforestation. So first, 

they’re saying here’s what we’re doing; and then second, they’re 

saying to governments, look, we’re keen to act but you’ve got to 

help us out here. 

Since 1923, every economist has told us—since Professor Pigou 

at Cambridge University showed how you price externalities—that 

it is much better to tax bad things than good things. Stop taxing 

good things like your work and your profits and start taxing bad 

things like congestion and pollution. If you do that, the private sector is saying, you’ll help us a lot because you’ll shift the compass 

and you’ll once and for all say we’re going in this direction, which 

is better for our grandchildren rather than this direction. 

The problem they have at the moment is it’s sort of a dance. 

They don’t know whether we’re heading towards a low-carbon future or a high-carbon future. So they’re saying please—to the government—act firmly, clearly, set a long-term target. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you. And you talked about here the private 

sector, but you also state that a growing body of evidence shows 

that economic growth is not in conflict with efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. And you mentioned the role of subnational actors like States in addressing climate change. Portland, 

Oregon, Mayor Charlie Hales is in Paris speaking as we speak. 

So when I served in the Oregon Legislature, we passed a renewable portfolio standard to require large utilities to increase the use 

of renewable resources. That and other policies and commitments 

have created meaningful employment in that sector, in clean energy. Can you talk further about your statement that environmental protection and economic development go hand-in-hand, es-
122 

pecially when you combine the private sector and then the subnational actors as well? 

Dr. STEER. Yes, indeed. It wasn’t long ago when we really did believe there was a tradeoff. It’d be nice to address climate change 

but it would cost us a lot. We’ve learned so much in the last few 

years. Even if one looks at the performance of stock markets, you 

will see if you take, for example, the CDP green index, you’ll see 

over the last four years they performed considerably better than 

just any old Standard & Poor’s index, for example. So going green 

actually pays. 

And as you say, Congresswoman, that the States that have put 

renewable energy standards, it turns out that actually citizens are 

saving money, just as we show that, for example, having fuel economy standards will save consumers—the new fuel economy standards will save consumers, you know, several thousand dollars in 

fuel over the life of the vehicle. 

And so adding these things together, there is a dynamism here 

that actually—that economic models can’t capture very well. And 

here I do agree with my good friend Bjorn Lomborg here. I mean, 

economic models actually are deeply flawed in the sense that the 

economy is really a very dynamic thing. And it turns out the five 

things that I mentioned all add—all move in the same direction to 

show that actually climate action can lead to more economic 

growth. But very few economic models can really capture those 

well. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you, Dr. Steer. I see my time is expired. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Bonamici. 

The gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Lucas, is recognized for his 

questions. 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Cass and Mr. Grossman, would you characterize any of the 

policies discussed in the United States such as major industrial 

CO2 restrictions as flexible or adaptive? Either one, gentlemen. 

Mr. CASS. I would not. I think the Clean Power Plan in particular is marketed in that way but has been designed by EPA to 

give States very few options in how they proceed. 

Mr. LUCAS. And would either one of you care to address how 

those restrictions will impact the industries and the consumers of 

those products ultimately? 

Mr. CASS. Sure. Essentially, what the Clean Power Plan attempts to achieve is to implement a cap-and-trade system on the 

country in direct contravention of the decision of the Congress not 

to implement such a cap-and-trade plan. And what that will do is 

force States to install significant amounts of renewable energy in 

place of the reliable fossil fuel baseload that they use today. 

The impact of that is to replace lower-cost energy sources with 

higher-cost energy sources, and it does not take a very sophisticated economic model to conclude that replacing lower-cost sources 

with higher-cost sources is unlikely to reduce costs. 

Mr. LUCAS. And the net effect is giving government the control 

over both the production and, in effect, the consumption of energy, 

which is a major expansion of economic power. Fair assessment, 

gentlemen? 
123 

Mr. GROSSMAN. If I could, it is. And it’s one, interestingly 

enough, that this Congress has rejected on any number of occasions, holding that, you know, the mix of electricity and energy 

sources is something that really is left to the States for their regulation and something that has never been federalized and that, you 

know, has been resisted as a federal encroachment on State authority. And so this really—the EPA’s actions turn that on its head. 

Mr. LUCAS. I’m going to take that one step farther. We are—we 

live in a very intensive energy consumption society in both the 

manufacturing and in our personal consumption. Would the federal 

government, having that kind of control over both the production 

of and the consumption of energy, picking winners and losers so to 

speak, it’s fair to say that from this vantage point it’s almost unimaginable what the consequences could be. Fair assessment, gentlemen? 

Mr. CASS. I think that’s correct. And if I could make one additional point—— 

Mr. LUCAS. Please. 

Mr. CASS. —I think what we are seeing in the debate over the 

Clean Power Plan and the economic affect is really a very fundamental debate over whether an agency like EPA can manage a sector of the economy better than it will manage—be managed and operate in the free market. 

And so if you take, for instance, the testimony of Dr. Steer, the 

assumption he is making is that, in fact, we will get better efficiency and economic growth through government regulation than 

we get through the free market. I think that is something that has 

been asserted by those in favor of more government power at many 

points in history, and I think that is something that almost never 

works, and that there’s no evidence it would work better in this situation. 

Mr. LUCAS. And isn’t it a fair assessment to say that industry already is in effect being stampeded as they try to figure out what’s 

coming and how to prepare for that? 

Mr. CASS. That’s absolutely true. I think one very concerning 

thing about the way that the EPA has operated is to essentially 

put forward rules that in many cases it realizes it may not have 

the authority for and simply force industry to respond before the 

courts can throw out the rule. 

I think we saw this in the Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan 

v. EPA where it said EPA had overstepped its authority, and the 

EPA spokesman almost immediately put out a statement essentially saying, well, too bad; industry already had to adapt before 

you made your ruling so your ruling won’t have much effect. 

And they’re trying to do something similar with the Clean Power 

Plan, forcing States to move forward into a cap-and-trade structure 

before the question of authority is even resolved. 

Mr. LUCAS. When I was a kid at home, we would have called that 

the bully bluffing. 

Mr. CASS. That would be a fair description. 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Lucas. 

The gentlewoman from Maryland, Ms. Edwards, is recognized. 
124 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you to the witnesses today. 

I have to say I am just, you know, staggered yet again by a conversation where people acknowledge that there’s climate change 

happening, but because we can only do things that are small or 

trivial, it seems worthless to do anything. 

Dr. Steer, you pointed out in your testimony that opponents of 

acting on climate change often state that the Administration’s 

Clean Power Plan will be expensive, technically difficult, and not 

have meaningful impact on emissions. Given the history of this 

committee, I can’t help but be reminded of what President Kennedy 

said when he charged the Nation to go to the moon. He said we 

do these things ‘‘not because they are easy, but because they are 

hard; because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best 

of our energies and skills; because that challenge is one that we are 

willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone.’’ 

It does appear to me that what the Administration is doing with 

the Clean Power Plan and the commitment to the United Nations 

embodies the spirit of what President Kennedy was getting at. And 

to that end, Dr. Steer, I wonder if you could please elaborate on 

a statement that you make in your testimony that the United 

States’ carbon reduction targets are in fact achievable. Can you 

just describe how the United States can reduce carbon emissions 

to meet both its 2020 and ’25 targets? And tell us what kind of 

market signal is being sent by these emissions targets. 

Dr. STEER. Thank you very much. Yes, we’ve done a great deal 

of analysis of this both at the overall national level and at the 

State level as well. We’ve produced a report which lays out 10 actions that can be taken that actually will benefit business. Compliance costs, as you know, are estimated by 2020 about 1.4 billion 

to 2.5 billion, but the health impacts alone, the benefits from 

health alone are 3.5 to 8.1 billion. If you go further out, the compliance costs rise to about 5 billion, but the health benefits alone are 

32 billion. So—if you include climate benefits as well. 

So in other words, what you have got is a multiple of benefits 

compared to the costs. What we see is the—whether it’s in energy 

efficiency, whether it’s in expanding the fuel efficiency of vehicles, 

but also the power plant rule itself can be very, very doable and 

positive. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. And of course that drives both investment and spurs innovation in the clean energy technologies, which 

you also point out. 

And, Dr. Steer, I wonder if you could—and referring to Dr. 

Lomborg’s testimony, he states, ‘‘yes, manmade global warming is 

a reality and will in the long run have an overall negative impact.’’ 

However, Dr. Lomborg also suggests in his testimony that the cost 

of acting to address climate change would be very large with little 

impact. Do you agree with this assessment, and if not, why not? 

Dr. STEER. Well, I certainly agree with his assessment on the 

need for R&D. I do not agree with his assessment on his modeling. 

Look, modelers can—I’ve been a modeler a lot of my life. You can 

choose any assumption. So what Dr. Lomborg does is he assumes 

that after 2030 countries will go back to their old ways. In other 

words, when China says we are going to peak our emissions, actu-
125 

ally, as soon as they reach 2030, they’re going to start increasing 

again. 

So if you make that kind of assumption, you are going to find 

that the impact is not very good and the costs are high. In fact, 

what will happen between now and 2030, because of the action, the 

price of technology will fall, as already is the case in many technologies. Renewables are increasingly more attractive. And what 

one will find is that there will be a virtuous cycle that happens, 

led by the private sector but empowered by clear signals from the 

public sector. 

Ms. EDWARDS. And that kind of assumes that, even as consumers, that we would want to go back to our old inefficient dirty 

cars, that we would want to go back to the old technologies that 

we use in our homes for heating and air-conditioning. There are a 

lot of assumptions that go into a model where you basically stop 

in place instead of moving forward from that point, isn’t that right? 

Dr. STEER. Yes, absolutely. And this has nothing to do with government versus private sector. I mean, Mr. Cass said that I was 

assuming that the government should be in charge of energy efficiency and everything. That’s not the case at all. It will be the private sector that leads, but the government has a role to play for 

all kinds of well-known reasons that economists understand. 

So, for example, the Energy Star program in the United States 

has saved household utility bills 360 billion since 1992. Do households want to go back to their old ways? Of course they don’t. 

And what we’re going to see actually is a very interesting dynamic take place. In the United States and in most other countries 

around the world, cities over the last hundred years have been designed for automobiles rather than people. And so in the United 

States we lose $1 trillion of GDP a year due to what’s called 

sprawl. And this is technically estimated. A growing number of 

mayors around the world are saying actually, we don’t want to do 

that. 

Houston, Texas, spends 14 percent of its citizens’ income on traveling back and forth to work. Copenhagen spends four percent of 

its income. So once you can understand that actually having a 

more compact and connected city that’s designed around people, so 

that’s a dynamic that won’t happen immediately, but by 2030, you 

watch. That will be happening precisely because of the dynamic 

reasons you’re talking about. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. 

And the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, I’m pleased that you have a good idea 

of how the rest of us should live and where we should live and how 

close to the cities. And I don’t think that’s consistent with a free 

society, but I’m very pleased that you are able to express those 

views today. And I admire your courage to being here and—today. 

You’ve made some good points and you’ve got three other witnesses 

on the other side. Thank you for being here to give us some kind 

of balance to this. And the Chairman has seen—did invite you and 

you were invited by the minority also to provide that. 
126 

But you’ve made a couple points that I thought that Mr. 

Lomborg—you mentioned his testimony. Maybe he’d like to have a 

chance to comment on what your comments were. Mr. Lomborg? 

Dr. LOMBORG. Well, thank you very much. And the short version 

is, again, I’m very happy that we are both in agreement about the 

need for research and development. But if you look at what you 

think about the actual impact of Paris, now, there’s definitely many 

different ways, as Andrew Steer pointed out, many different ways 

to do the modeling. But I would surmise that if you’re going to look 

at what the impact of Paris—you look at what’s actually promised 

in Paris, you don’t look at all the extra things we might hope and 

wish and wait for the world is going to do in 2040, 2050 and on, 

unfortunately, that’s almost all of what we’re talking about here. 

As I tried to show, right now, Paris is promising about 50 

gigatons of CO2 cuts. That is if everybody does everything they 

promised. Of course, remember back, Kyoto did not work out that 

way. And if we go even further back in 1992 in the Rio Summit, 

all industrialized nations promised to cut their carbon emissions to 

1990 levels in 2000, and almost none of them, except for the Eastern European bloc, kept that promise. So fundamentally, we have 

lots of wasted promises. 

But even then assuming that we’ll have the 50 gigatons and then 

suddenly we will somehow magically get to 3,000 gigatons in order 

to get to 2.7 degrees, or 6,000 gigatons in order to get to 2 degrees 

is to me a very, very unlikely outcome. 

So if you’ll allow me the metaphor, in some ways this is a little 

bit like, you know, looking at the Greek tragedy, the debt tragedy, 

and saying, oh, if they had decided they’re going to pay off the next 

tranche of one of their loans in the next couple of months, hey, 

they’re on their way to being debt-free. I mean that’s technically 

true but very, very misleading because it means there’s lots and 

lots of hard decisions that have to be taken in decades to come. 

And that’s really the same conversation that we’re having with this 

climate discussion. You can’t just say, well, we’re not only going to 

do this for 2030, but we’ll do all kinds of great things on the way 

through the century. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. One question of my own and then I’ll let 

Dr. Steer have his retort to that. How much of the—we all admit 

that there’s a changing of the climate. It’s changed forever. I mean, 

the history of the globe is a constant change in the climate, constant adaptation of the planet to different factors that are going on. 

The question is, what impact is man having on the climate? 

And I recognize myself that we’ve had a lot of people advocating 

these restrictive policies. For example, the opposition to the Alaskan pipeline was long before anybody ever talked about global 

warming. People—and they were—it only won by one vote. The 

Alaskan pipeline only won by one vote in the United States Senate, 

and if they had all those—it had nothing to do with climate change 

then. It’s just—there’s a lot of people using climate change to 

achieve other goals. 

But what is—to the degree that the climate is changing because 

of nature, how much of that, Dr. Lomborg, how much of that is a 

result from CO2? 
127 

Dr. LOMBORG. Well, unfortunately, I an economist and a political 

scientist. I’m a modeler so I’m just going to give you the standard 

IPCC answer, but it’s more than half. But I think you’re very right 

in pointing out that because we know that we have survived many 

other changes in climate previously, we have to realize it’s not the 

only way to deal with global warming to say let’s cut carbon emissions and to keep temperatures at the same level. We also need to 

ask is it actually more efficient to adapt? And we definitely need 

to do both. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think Dr. Steer needs to have some time to 

retort that. Go right ahead. 

Dr. STEER. Well, thank you very much. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I’ve only got 10 seconds so—— 

Dr. STEER. Oh, thank you, Congressman, very much. By the way, 

it’s not me who’s suggesting where people should live. These are 

the mayors of cities who are democratically elected by their citizens. 

Look, Bjorn Lomborg has made certain assumptions. A professor 

at LSE Bob Ward said rather than calling it optimistic and pessimistic, we should call them highly pessimistic. So, too, a professor 

at MIT John Sterman says that Mr. Lomborg’s assumptions grossly 

misrepresent the pledges that are being made at Paris. And so, you 

know, we can make any kind of assumption we want. 

But here’s the point about whether or not this will continue. Consider Prime Minister Modi of India. He came into power last year 

not because he wanted to solve the environment. He came because 

he wanted to promote growth. One of the first things he says, he 

says I have 4 gigawatts of solar energy. The previous government 

had a target of 20 gigawatts. He said I want 100 gigawatts of solar 

energy by 2022. He didn’t say that because he’s a member of the 

Sierra Club. He said that because he thinks that will be good for 

his economy. And he’s right. And he’s not going to turn around. He 

wants to make the point that actually there’s something dynamic 

going on here relating to these technologies and the jobs that come 

from it, new industries that will actually set his country on a more 

competitive path. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Tonko, is recognized. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

As we speak, thousands of people have gathered in Paris for the 

U.N. climate change conference. And at this time more than 170 

countries have made intended nationally determined contributions, 

the INDCs we’ve heard of, outlining their commitments to reducing 

greenhouse gas emissions. These commitments cover nearly 95 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. This is incredible momentum for an agreement, and it demonstrates the potential to achieve 

real progress using a bottom-up, inclusive approach to climate policy. 

We’ve always been able to improve the air we breathe and the 

water we drink, while simultaneously growing our economy and 

creating jobs. And I strongly believe that this will continue to be 

the case as we work to mitigate and adapt to climate change. 

An agreement in Paris certainly will not solve our climate crisis 

but is an important step forward. We need global cooperation from 
128 

nations, subnational governments, businesses, and researchers. 

There may be difference of opinion around the world about the 

exact actions we should take, but I strongly agree with Dr. Steer 

that something must be done. 

Dr. Steer, New York has had a number of devastating natural 

disasters in recent years, including devastation from Super Storm 

Sandy, Hurricane Irene, and Tropical Storm Lee. In New York’s 

20th Congressional District, my home district, we used to talk 

about storms that came once every hundred or 500 years. This type 

of talk is no more with devastating weather events happening time 

and time again. I’ve sat with families who have lost everything and 

have witnessed the exorbitant cost that we are still trying to pay 

off from these extreme events. 

So I ask, in your testimony you discuss how extreme weather 

events are incredibly expensive. How do these costs affect communities and the Nation overall, and should we be factoring in these 

costs when calculating the overall cost of climate change? 

Dr. STEER. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, we definitely should. 

You know, it’s so tempting to look at the economy, but actually 

these are human lives we’re talking about. And whether it’s in New 

York City or it’s suburbs or whether it’s in Bangladesh, the potential impact is vast on families. 

We cannot say that any particular extreme weather event is 

caused by climate change, but what we can do is say that the 

science, at least 97 percent of the leading science predicts that they 

will be more and more intense. That is clear. 

The interesting thing is the insurance companies seem to believe 

them because they’re saying we need to act on this. And so it’s not 

only the scientists, it’s actually business now are saying this is not 

good enough. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. And one of the findings of the United 

States National Climate Assessment is that the impacts related to 

climate change are already evident in many sectors and are expected to become increasingly disruptive across the Nation through 

the century and beyond. 

In your testimony you mention the cost of delaying action, including concerns about national security and mounting harm to 

businesses, consumers, and public health. Can you please elaborate 

on the cost of not acting to address climate change on the United 

States? 

Dr. STEER. Well, each year we delay it will become more expensive. If we act strongly now, we can have a relatively smooth path 

in which we continue to grow and prosper each year, and we can 

keep growing and growing. 

If we fail to act soon, then the cost of adjustment will be much 

greater, and of course every year we get close to potentially very 

bad tipping points. 

Mr. TONKO. And in your testimony you state that businesses 

have recognized the economic value of action. In fact, Bill Gates 

unveiled the world’s largest clean energy research and development 

partnership yesterday. Can you please comment on the importance 

of the private sector in addressing climate change? 

Dr. STEER. Yes, Congressman. The private sector is—at least a 

good proportion of it now is very, very concerned. The private sec-
129 

tor does not like policy uncertainty, and they don’t like risk. And 

the risks they face at the moment are twofold from climate change. 

One, the climate itself will undermine what they’re doing as it 

changes; and second, they don’t know when a policy reform will be 

brought in. And that may lead to billions of dollars of stranded assets. And so they face these two risks and they are saying we want 

some policy certainty. And they also believe that their own longterm bottom line is healthier with action on climate change. 

Mr. TONKO. Okay. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Tonko. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Weber, is recognized. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A question for each of the three of the panelists here first and 

then we’ll go on to the video gentlemen. Range of the temperature 

increase that you consider would be happening with climate 

change, Mr. Cass, did you have an estimate for that, the range of 

the temperature increase by the end of the century? 

Mr. CASS. As Dr. Lomborg said, I think I would also look at what 

the IPCC has projected, which, depending on the scenario you use, 

I think a number between 3.5 and 4 degrees Celsius is probably the 

best available estimate. 

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Grossman, same question. 

Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Congressman, I’m an attorney. I’m not a climate scientist or anything of the sort. But, you know, you look at 

the agreement here and all of that and you kind of wonder, you 

know, is it going to make any difference at all, I don’t know. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And, Dr. Steer? 

Dr. STEER. Without action, by the end of the century between 3.8 

and 5 degrees Celsius with sea level rise of about 1 to 2 meters. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. I got the sea level rise as a bonus. 

And, Mr. Lomborg, how about you? Did you—— 

Dr. LOMBORG. Well, again, I would also take my starting point 

with the U.N. Climate Panel. If we don’t do anything, they find 

that the likely range towards the end of the century for RCP 6 is 

1.4 up to 4.8 for RCP 8.5. And again, the sea level rise would be 

somewhere between half and a full meter. I’m very surprised with 

Steer’s 2 meters. That’s certainly not in the standard range. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, as the President flies over to Paris to attend something that Mr. Cass and Mr. Grossman says he doesn’t have the 

authority to do or that you’ve showed that he doesn’t have the authority to do, is there any idea of what that—has anybody done the 

research? Do you know what that costs the American taxpayer? 

Anybody have that figure? Dr. Steer? 

Dr. STEER. I beg your pardon, the cost of the—— 

Mr. WEBER. The cost of his going over to Paris for the climate 

negotiations that these two gentlemen have shown that he doesn’t 

have the authority to do without, you know, Congress weighing in 

to spend the money for what he wants to agree to. 

Dr. STEER. I could talk about the cost of the Clean Power Plan 

but not about his trip to Paris. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Do any of you have—go ahead, Dr. Lomborg. 

Dr. LOMBORG. Sorry. I mean if you use the latest Stanford Energy Modeling Forum for the United States and estimate what is 
130 

it going to cost to cut 26 percent below 2005 by 2025 with the most 

efficient metric possible, so remember, this does not include—— 

Mr. WEBER. Well, but I’m—— 

Dr. LOMBORG. —undoubtedly, it’s not the most—— 

Mr. WEBER. Dr. Lomborg, I’m just talking about his trip, just his 

trip over there. 

Dr. LOMBORG. Oh, I’m sorry. 

Mr. WEBER. No, I got you. I got you. All right. Let me move on. 

Does anybody know what the cost in terms of the output of the 

CO2 are for the trip? Everybody seems to be concerned about the 

cost of the output of CO2. Has anybody calculated that? Dr. Steer, 

I’ll start with you. 

Dr. STEER. No, Congressman. 

Mr. WEBER. Dr. Lomborg? 

Dr. LOMBORG. No, I don’t know. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. So climate change—Dr. Steer, you made the 

comment earlier—or actually, I think Dr. Lomborg said that he 

quoted people saying we’re actually going to make money from this. 

Well, there’s people making money from pushing climate change, 

no question about it, in my estimation. 

One of the proponents of climate change on a national stage is 

actually presidential candidate—is reported to be saying—Bernie 

Sanders—that climate change caused the rise of ISIS. Are y’all 

aware of that? Just as a question, Mr. Cass, would you agree with 

that assertion? 

Mr. CASS. No. 

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Grossman? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. Of course not. 

Mr. WEBER. Dr. Steer? 

Dr. STEER. In the eight years leading up to the Syrian Civil War, 

there was a drought—— 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Dr. STEER. —so, too, in northeast Nigeria where Boko Haram 

has emerged there’s been a drought—— 

Mr. WEBER. So back when the Sunnis and the Shias split some 

six, seven, eight hundred years ago, was that because of climate 

change? 

Dr. STEER. No, I’m not making that link at all, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. Oh, I got you. Okay. Smart man in that regard. 

Dr. Lomborg? 

Dr. LOMBORG. It’s very, very tenuous, that connection. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. One of the other comments was made—and 

I’m going to move on very quickly now—that Kennedy wanted to 

go to the moon and so people—and that was a good thing and we’re 

going to—climate change ought to be tackled because it’s hard as 

well. But refresh my memory from the historical perspective because y’all have checked into this, back then, Congress was with 

him and actually appropriated the money to do that. Is that correct, Mr. Cass, your recollection, or Mr. Grossman? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. That’s absolutely correct, and indeed, that was— 

the President put special emphasis on that. 

Mr. WEBER. Right. And so you had the people with him at that 

point. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 
131 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Weber. 

And the gentlewoman from Massachusetts, Ms. Clark, is recognized for her questions. 

Ms. CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the witnesses. 

Dr. Steer, if I can follow up, what we’re hearing from Dr. 

Lomborg is small impact on what we’re going to do in Paris, big 

cost that far outweighs, and we could spend our resources better. 

How is that analysis changed when we look at what you are saying 

are what I believe the false assumptions that at—by 2030 we 

would just go back to what we were doing before? Does that change 

your analysis or do you see what we’re starting in Paris as part of 

iterative process that would move forward to different policies? 

Dr. STEER. Thank you, Congresswoman. Yes, exactly right. You 

put it exactly right, I think. 

Look, one thing that does have to be made clear is that the—that 

in Paris there needs to be some tough negotiating to make sure 

that everyone is transparent, to make sure that every five years we 

do come back and we ramp up our ambition, and that we have a 

long-term goal. 

So I’m not sitting here today to tell anybody that Paris is solving 

the problem. I have no incentive of exaggerating the benefit of 

Paris. Why? Because I want to solve the problem of climate change. 

If I believed Mr. Lomborg, I would say it because I would be upset 

at Paris. The estimates we’ve done—and we’ve got very, very good 

economists working across a lot of different models—is that actually—that the actions in Paris are quite significant, but they are 

not enough. And what we have to do is get precisely the kind of 

dynamism that’s in your question playing through. And the way 

you do that is have really tough transparency, you have really clear 

renegotiation every five years to ramp up ambition. 

Ms. CLARK. And that is necessarily a process that we have to go 

through, that we didn’t come to this point—and what I’m heartened by by Dr. Lomborg is, unlike some previous witnesses we’ve 

had that have said, yes, climate change is a huge problem, it’s 

going to be devastating to agriculture and our economy, but in the 

end we must continue the status quo, business as usual, at least 

Dr. Lomborg is saying we should be investing in research and development, which we all—well, certainly the two of us agree that 

that is where we need to also be working on. 

But it sort of brings me to looking at RGGI, which you brought 

up in your testimony, coming from Massachusetts, looking at the 

successes of that, and talking about taxation and creating the right 

incentives so we grow our economy, we create jobs of the future, 

would you say that a key piece of the policy moving forward after 

Paris is looking at setting market prices for carbon? 

Dr. STEER. Yes, indeed I do. I think that the—I am a strong believer that the President’s Clean Power Plan is a good plan, but it 

would be better if it were complemented with a serious price on 

carbon. As I said before, this has nothing to do with big government or small government. This has to do with putting a price on 

things that are hurting citizens and not putting a price on things 

that are helping citizens like hard work and profit. So we should 
132 

shift the tax, as fiscal economists have been saying for many decades now, but very few countries have actually managed to do it. 

So I agree very much with you. The States that are part of RGGI 

have been growing more rapidly than States that are not part of 

it, and serious analyses have been done on that. 

Ms. CLARK. And do you think that it would take setting that at 

a national level to really see the promise of RGGI—I mean is that 

a place for American leadership? 

Dr. STEER. Well, there are now about 40 countries that are setting a price on carbon, and many others are considering it. Even 

countries like South Africa will be introducing a tax on carbon soon 

and offsetting it against reductions in taxes elsewhere. By 2017 

China will have a nationwide cap-and-trade. We don’t need a nationwide tax or price on carbon, but it would certainly help a lot. 

Ms. CLARK. Great. And talking about American leadership, in 

Paris what do you see—what does it mean to the other countries 

to have us there and to be present and to be leading in this area? 

Dr. STEER. Oh, look, I was in China last week. I absolutely am 

certain that the radical change in the Chinese position since Copenhagen or really since three years ago is due to conversations 

and serious negotiations with the United States. And so, too—others are coming along, too. 

And interestingly, yesterday, when the R&D proposal was announced—it includes developing countries like India, like China, 

like Indonesia—this would not be happening, this level of coordination, had it not been for the United States, and certainly, we would 

not have 183 countries which have now made pledges for 2025 and 

2030. 

Ms. CLARK. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Clark. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Babin, is recognized for questions. 

Mr. BABIN. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Very interesting. Thank you, witnesses, for being here. 

Mr. Cass and Mr. Grossman, the Paris conference appears to be 

all about climate financing. I heard Dr. Steer a while ago was talking about how enthusiastic the Indian Prime Minister was in Paris. 

Maybe that has to do with all the wealth transfer that the developing nations might be getting from the developed nations. 

But not only is the United States supposed to hobble its own 

economy with the Clean Power Plan in the name of the President’s 

climate agenda, it must also pay billions to these developing countries. Do you agree with my assessment that we are transferring 

wealth? 

Mr. CASS. That’s certainly what is being expected of us and what 

I think President Obama would like to commit to. Until Congress 

appropriates it, though, it will not actually go out the door. 

Mr. BABIN. Right. And how about you, Mr. Grossman? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. I agree with that. I mean that’s—you know, the 

idea that we would be transferring wealth in the form of foreign 

aid is an integral part of the agreement, albeit one that, given the 

legal—current legal authority, is not enforceable at this time. 

Mr. BABIN. Right. Okay. And this is for Mr. Cass, Mr. Grossman, 

and Dr. Lomborg. I’m worried that regulations associated with cli-
133 

mate change will increase the cost of energy to American citizens 

and especially my constituents in east Texas. Could you describe 

how increased energy costs impact the macroeconomic health of the 

United States both for primary energy users and end-use consumers? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, I think one thing to note in particular is 

Texas is in a very unique situation, is uniquely harmed by the 

Clean Power Plan and by other regulations that increase the cost 

of energy. Texas is on its own grid and—known as ERCOT, and so 

for that reason what we’ve seen is regulations that affect the use 

of traditional fuels in that area tend to cause price spikes within 

the Texas area, which is something that potentially is very damaging to Texas’s economic growth. And, you know, to this date it’s 

been one of the bastions of growth in the country. And, you know, 

if you looked at the overall energy policy and how it affects Texas, 

that status is potentially at risk. 

Mr. BABIN. Thank you. Mr. Cass? 

Mr. CASS. Well, I think we actually have the Clean Air Act to 

look at in this respect to understand what happens when you see 

regulations on the energy sector and other heavy industry. And I 

provide the citations in my written testimony, but there’s very good 

peer-reviewed research that has been done on what happened when 

we applied strict pollution controls in that context. There was the 

loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs, the long-term reduction in 

the earnings of people in affected industries, decline in the profitability of manufacturing, and also a sharp decrease in the number 

of new facilities that were opened. 

And again, there may be benefits to offset costs in some contexts, 

certainly the Clean Air Act has achieved significant public health 

benefits, but it’s critical to understand what those costs are and understand that in the Clean Power Plan we are taking on the costs 

and yet we’re not getting the benefits. 

Mr. BABIN. Right. Okay. Thank you. 

And, Dr. Lomborg, are you still there? 

Dr. LOMBORG. Yes, I am. And, you know, very bluntly, yes, of 

course, if you increase the cost, if you say you have to buy energy 

that’s more costly, the price will go up. But what we’ve also seen 

in Europe is that we have dramatically increasing power costs. 

The—Germany and Denmark, I’m sorry to say, are the most expensive countries in the world for energy, certainly in the industrialized world, and the costs are typically in the order four times as 

costly as what your constituents are paying for their electricity. So, 

yes, it really does have impacts. And of course, remember, this is 

a regressive tax because the poor will actually end up paying the 

most. 

And what we’re seeing, for instance, in many places in Europe 

there’s—there are a lot of people who are now no longer able to pay 

their electricity bills. For instance, in Britain there is an increasing 

number of people who are energy-poor who are spending a very disproportionate part of their income on paying off energy and have 

to make very hard decisions on which rooms do I want to keep 

heated during the winter. 

Mr. BABIN. Okay. Thank you very much. And then also, just yes 

or no, do high energy prices spill over and translate and impact ev-
134 

eryday items like cost of groceries, everyday goods and services? 

And are there other areas where energy prices will impact the 

United States and especially my district in Texas? Can energy 

prices impact national security or the stability of financial markets? Mr. Grossman? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes. Energy is an input into everything that we 

do. 

Mr. BABIN. Absolutely. Okay. Mr. Cass? 

Mr. CASS. Yes, I would agree with that and note that it also 

poses a competitive problem for the United States against countries 

that are not imposing similar costs. 

Mr. BABIN. Okay. And, Dr. Lomborg, are you still—— 

Chairman SMITH. The—— 

Dr. LOMBORG. Yes, it does have real impact. So everything else 

gets more expensive. 

Mr. BABIN. So the American people will suffer the consequences 

of this plan is what it looks like to me. Thank you very much. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Babin. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Takano, is recognized. 

Mr. TAKANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that President George 

W. Bush deserves some credit for the point we are at with the 

Paris climate talks. It was his Administration in 2007 that negotiated the Bali Action Plan that eliminated a major roadblock to 

international climate policy. Developing countries such as China, 

Brazil, India, and South Africa finally went on record and agreed 

to submit their own cleanup plans. This set the stage for the negotiations taking place this week. So congratulations, President 

George W. Bush, for getting us to this point. 

Dr. Steer, the United States has a long history of leading global 

efforts on issues that have impacts beyond our borders. In the past, 

these kinds of global partnerships have had positive impacts on 

human rights issues, world trade, world health, trade, and technology innovation. It should be—it should surprise no one that the 

United States is now ready to lead the international response to 

climate change. 

In a relatively short period of time, we have seen developing nations step up and make commitments to reduce their GHG emissions. 

Dr. Steer, how has the United States’ willingness to act decisively on climate change affected the response from the rest of the 

international community? 

Dr. STEER. Thank you, Congressman. The United States is the 

leader in the world on technology. And its technological advances 

over the last few years have made it much easier for others to join 

in the discussion. 

Second, the fact that the United States is now taking firm action 

itself puts a lot of pressure on others. And the diplomatic efforts 

of the United States have been very, very positive in bringing the 

183 countries that are now signing up to action. 

Mr. TAKANO. Well, thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Takano. 
135 

And the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Moolenaar. Woops. I am 

sorry. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Loudermilk, is recognized. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this 

hearing. 

Something that Mr. Lomborg stated a minute ago really had an 

impact on me is the cost of electricity in Europe has dramatically 

risen. And it’s four times what it was. And what I’ve read about 

the CPP, the effect it would have in Georgia is an increase of about 

17 percent. And 40 percent of Georgia’s electrical customers earn 

less than $40,000 a year. 

So I’m having some grave concerns, as it was already stated here 

today, that these regulations impact the most vulnerable. They 

have the greatest impact on the most vulnerable in our society. It’s 

not just in climate regulation. If you look at Dodd-Frank, DoddFrank had a negative impact on Wall Street. It had a negative impact on the big mega businesses. But it was devastating to small 

struggling businesses because the big businesses can absorb the additional cost. The big businesses, it’s going to have an impact. The 

CPP will have an impact, but they’ll be able to absorb these costs. 

One way that they’ll absorb the costs is to cut their spending by 

laying off employees. They’re already talking about closing a power 

plant in my district, possibly up to 2,000 jobs being lost. 

I want to use not modeling or hyperbole but real-life instances 

of how this diminishing return of over-regulating affects the lives 

of everyday struggling Americans. I have an article here from National Public Radio, which is not known to be a strong right-wing 

publication by any—or radio outlet by any stretch of the imagination. It’s talking about a 65—or an elderly woman that basically— 

her name is Lydia Smith. She’s 87 years old, and she’s living on 

$900 a month Social Security. That’s all that she has. She has no 

retirement after working as a store clerk for most of her life. She 

never saved. As you’re finding out today, a lot of our Baby Boomers 

have not saved for retirement. They’re living on a fixed income that 

comes in. 

Even though she gets Section 8 housing, she still pays a third of 

her income, $300 goes to rent. She spends $600 on everything else, 

everything else that she needs to live. She rarely leaves home. In 

fact, it says in the interview that she mostly exclusively shops at 

Goodwill because that’s all she can afford. And what does she shop 

with? Well, her residual income is $20, $20. That’s her residual income that she has to live on. 

Under the CPP it’s estimated that her power costs will go up 

$20. So what is Ms. Smith to live on? What is going to happen 

when her electricity prices go up? She’s on most every government 

program except for food stamps at this point. Not only is it going 

to have a devastating impact on her, but when you look at what 

the impact it’s going to have on businesses, and again, reiterating 

what everybody’s said here, it’s going to be a minimal impact on 

the climate, but we’re going to see a significant impact on the lives 

of human beings in the name of making a statement or the hope 

that we may get some kind of .007 degree decrease in temperatures 

that we’re not even totally sure that we’re causing. 

I don’t understand how we go down this path to the point of diminishing returns and then, when these businesses get the impact, 
136 

they’re going to lay off more and there are going to be more people 

in the position of Ms. Smith. 

Mr. Cass, am I totally off base or is this the direction that we’re 

going with these radical climate regulations? 

Mr. CASS. Well, I think you’re focusing on a very important issue, 

which is who is actually hurt by rising energy prices. And you’re 

exactly right that it takes the largest bite out of those with the lowest incomes. And so it has both that direct effect on individuals and 

then it’s going to have broader effects on communities, as you see 

impacts on the economy more broadly. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Mr. Grossman, do you—I know that you’re a 

constitutional attorney, but in your opinion—— 

Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Congressman, I don’t think what you’re saying is a controversial view at least in general. I mean if you look 

at the EPA’s own publications, EPA acknowledges that there’s no 

free lunch and that these things come with costs. And so I find it 

very surprising to hear from some people that all of this is going 

to pay for it because they never explain how someone like this Ms. 

Smith you describe, how somehow she’s going to get the money 

back in her pocket. And I don’t know how that would happen. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. I mean with $18 trillion debt, are we just going 

to dump more—I know I’m out of time, Mr. Chairman, but the 

American people continually say that they want commonsense legislation. They want common sense coming out of Washington, and 

I have not been able to make any common sense out of the CPP 

or any of the administration’s radical agenda. 

So I yield back. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Loudermilk. 

The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Lofgren, is recognized for 

her questions. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think this hearing is an important one, coming as it does as 

leaders of the world are attempting to cope with the catastrophe 

of climate change that our planet is facing. And as we talk about 

really small board issues here, hey, I was fascinated to hear the 

comment that, you know, there are—mitigation issues would somehow help, that we should look at the Dutch and the dikes that 

they’ve done as if that would solve the problem of acidification of 

the ocean and the collapse of the food chain that the elderly and 

the poor will also face if we don’t deal successfully with this challenge. 

You know, Dr. Steer, my home State is California. We’ve always 

been a leader and we’ve always set the pace on climate change, and 

we have actually set some goals in California. And what we did, 

I mean, was—has actually increased the amount of alternative energy substantially in the last number of years. The solar industry 

in California created more than 54,000 jobs, and with our new commitment to 50 percent renewables by 2030, the estimate is that 

employment in the alternative energy sector will far surpass employment in the fossil fuel industry. 

You mentioned that climate-smart policies can provide a credible 

and predictable policy environment and give private investors the 

confidence needed to invest in, deliver, and create greater economic 

efficiency and innovation. Can you elaborate how the Administra-
137 

tion’s Clean Power Plan and the agreement in Paris might encourage even more energy investment and reduce barriers to implementation of new energy technologies? 

Dr. STEER. Thank you, Congressman—Congresswoman. I agree 

very much with you that, as we move forward, the new economy 

will generate a lot more jobs than the one we’re losing. But we still 

obviously—as you implied, we have to be very sensitive to the fact 

that we do need a just transition. Whilst the Nation as a whole will 

benefit, that doesn’t mean every single company will benefit or 

every single citizen will benefit, and we need a just transition. And 

we’ve learned a lot about how to compensate those that will be 

harder off. 

It turns out, by the way, that if you look at the entire impact of 

the President’s climate plan, whilst in the near-term it’s true that 

electricity costs per kilowatt hour will rise, that will be more than 

offset by savings due to energy efficiency, so household overall bills 

will in time be considerably less. 

But there still is that situation. I agree very much with you that 

what we are seeing now—and your own State is a very good example of this. Google has just made the biggest investment in a renewable energy plan in Africa, in Kenya. Google has. And that’s because—and it’s a commercial venture. And I think we were talking 

earlier about the need for money to go in. The overwhelming bulk 

of money will be private money, companies like Google that see 

where the future is and they’re investing. 

And what we’re hoping for out of Paris are clear signals so that 

kind of investment and thousands more like that will become the 

norm. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, thank you, Dr. Steer. It seems to me what 

we’ve seen most successfully in California is to set standards and 

then the private sector scrambles and innovates to meet them. And 

in scrambling to meet those standards, they create tons of new 

jobs. So isn’t that what we’re trying to bring to the whole world? 

Dr. STEER. Absolutely right, yes. I think everybody agrees that 

the government has some role in setting standards. Otherwise, you 

know, my kids would be electrocuted because, you know, it does 

take regulation. So we shouldn’t be sort of oversimplifying this. 

Standards on, for example, the Energy Star system has saved hundreds of billions of dollars for consumers. 

So you’re absolutely right. The private sector will drive everything, but they do so within a sensible environment created by government. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I’ll just close by saying that the cost of doing nothing is immense, and we’re already seeing it. In California we’ve 

had the largest drought in 1,200 years. The aquifer has been reduced and the land is sinking. It won’t be replaced, takes 1,000 

years to replenish that aquifer. So we have an issue about providing food, providing water. We’ve got rising sea levels. We’ve got 

collapse of the fishing season because of climate change in the 

ocean. So to think that doing nothing is cost-free is very false. 

And I see that my time is expired, Mr. Chairman, so I yield back. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Lofgren. 

The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Abraham, is recognized. 
138 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I’ll thank the witnesses, especially Dr. Steer and Dr. Lomborg, for their efforts to be 

here either in person or by videoconference. And our Chairman Dr. 

Smith has had thankfully many hearings on this Clean Power Plan 

rule that we’re discussing today. 

And I’ve looked back at past testimony and certainly the previous 

testimony today, and the figures that I come up with are if we go 

all in with President Obama’s full compliance is that it could cost 

up to five trillion dollars per year, which is over nine percent of our 

GDP. 

Now, the United States—the other figures I’ve seen that 40—at 

least 40 of our states would have increases in electricity costs of 

somewhere between ten and seventeen percent. And India, China— 

and, Dr. Steer, you said that, you know, China was glad that we’re 

leading the role—or leading the charge so to speak. But if you look 

at China’s own reports, they say that their coal consumption has 

increased 17 percent higher than previously anticipated. So they 

are—India, China, and some of these underdeveloped countries are 

building coal-fired plants at unprecedented rates. So for us as 

Americans, we’re—I look at it as kind of an all-pain/no-gain scenario from our previous stance. 

Now, the other thing that President Obama has said as far as 

the Paris talks are that it will be a ‘‘powerful rebuke to terrorism’’ 

because they are holding this climate meeting in Paris. But U.S. 

intelligence reports also tell me that ISIS—and I think it’s been 

mentioned by one of our members—receives up to half-a-billion dollars a year through the sale and control of Middle East oil reserves. 

So as our Commander-in-Chief, I think the President probably 

made a bold statement. It is a powerful rebuke to terrorism, but 

as his assumed role as our commander of climate change, he’s not 

allowing our businesses with this Clean Power Plan act to do business and make American more energy-independent. 

So I guess it will be a rhetorical question, but I’ll ask you, Mr. 

Cass, wouldn’t it be a more powerful rebuke to ISIS and other terrorists groups if the President worked to actually enact policies 

that would make America more energy-independent so that we 

don’t have to turn to groups of the Middle East to receive our oil? 

Mr. CASS. You know, I don’t think it’s especially constructive to 

try to take every other issue out in the world and draw it back to 

climate change somehow. I think that is a rhetorical device that 

has stirred up a lot of confusion but does not really reflect on the 

relevant energy policy choices or the relevant choices for international negotiation. 

So I would say the preferable approach would be to focus on 

what our energy policy actually does and does not accomplish with 

respect to the climate instead of suggesting that it has anything to 

do with ISIS. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Would you say, Mr. Cass, that the current policies, if we continue down this road, do restrict our energy companies from making American more energy-independent? 

Mr. CASS. I don’t know that the Clean Power Plan will have a 

significant effect on energy independence. It focuses almost entirely 

on the electricity sector for which we already get all the necessary 
139 

fuels domestically, whereas it’s really oil that is the issue of concern for energy independence. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Correct. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Abraham. 

And the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Beyer, is recognized. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Lomborg, you’re still with us? 

Dr. LOMBORG. I am. 

Mr. BEYER. Great, thank you very much. I’ve been reading your 

ideas for some time now and have always found them very interesting. In my simple terms, you agree that climate change is real 

and it’s manmade but the costs to stop or significantly slow this is 

much greater than the cost to simply adapt to it. 

And I know you’re aware that U.S. military strategists have been 

very concerned about the accelerating effects of climate change will 

lead to more conflict, revolution, even wars. Do you factor these 

costs, loss of human life, economic destruction, war materials, et 

cetera, into the overall cost of adapting to letting climate change 

just proceed? 

Dr. LOMBORG. I should just say I don’t necessarily say that we 

should just adapt. I do try to say we need to prioritize how much 

are we going to adapt and how much are we going to reduce our 

emissions. So it’s definitely going to be a balance. 

But to answer your specific question, we do try to take into account a lot of the costs in the models, so we do look at heat deaths, 

cold deaths, deaths from more polluted water, costs from higher— 

high amounts of floodings, potentially more hurricanes in the long 

run. So a lot of costs are calculated in there, but obviously not all 

costs. So again, I think in some way we’re stuck with saying we 

have the best models available, but that doesn’t mean it’s right. It’s 

probably just better than anything you or I or anyone else can 

come up with as our intuition. 

Mr. BEYER. One of the other costs that—it’s easier to think about 

retaining walls in Miami than to think about what I keep reading 

as being tens of millions of Bangladeshis that will be displaced by 

even a 1 meter sea level rise. How do you get a handle on the modeling of what it takes to relocate 20 or 30 million people in Bangladesh? 

Dr. LOMBORG. Well, I actually—you should be aware that we 

know and we have good data for most of the world which indicates 

that almost no populated areas are going to be abandoned simply 

because it’s very cheap to cover the costs of—essentially put up 

dikes and levees to make sure that you do not have to relocate. 

And so what is ultimately going to happen is that you will see 

some shore lost in, for instance, Alaska, you’ll see it in Siberia, 

some other places, but pretty much everywhere—and certainly in 

Bangladesh, remember, Bangladesh is the most tightly populated 

country in the world. They will definitely put up those sea levels— 

sorry, those sea barriers that are necessary simply because it will 

protect a lot of valuable land both for people and for production. 

Mr. BEYER. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Steer, I keep reading articles about how climate change just 

takes us from one set of climate conditions to a different set, as has 

happened through the ages and that we must and will adapt. But 
140 

I’ve also long been fascinated by the Gaia hypothesis, which states 

that organisms interact with their inorganic surroundings on Earth 

to form a self-regulating, complex system, that there’s a homeostasis going on, that we’ll always adapt to maximize the conditions 

for life on Earth. Do you see any evidence of such homeostatic 

mechanisms going on right now with all the climate changes? 

Dr. STEER. I—Congressman, I think the planet will take care of 

itself; it’s us I’m worried about. Or it’s actually our great-grandchildren I’m worried about. And I’m profoundly worried when I 

hear my good friend Bjorn Lomborg say don’t worry, Bangladesh 

will be able to build dikes. I think that is something we have to 

think very, very deeply about. Fifty years from now the idea that 

something that’s never been proven before-it’s absolutely the right 

thing to do. The Netherlands does it. The Netherlands does it but 

the Netherlands is very worried because—and that’s why the Netherlands is a champion to change things now because they know 

how difficult it is, how expensive it is, and how risky it is to be 

building dikes. So we absolutely should not accept that. 

And your point, sir, about the Department of Defense is so accurate. Two weeks ago I was with NATO leaders. They are profoundly worried about the security risks of climate change. In 

many ways it is Departments of Defenses around the world that 

are the ones that are ringing the bell most loudly. So I really do 

agree with you there. 

Mr. BEYER. And, Dr. Steer, thank you for going right to the correct answer to the question, which is we talk so many times about, 

yes, the climate changes and changes and we’ve always adapted. 

What they miss is that, you know, life will adapt but the impact 

on human beings is very significant. And if you look at how climate 

changes in the past, it has led to, you know, dramatically different 

conditions for humanity, including the agricultural revolution. So 

thank you very much. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Beyer. 

The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. LaHood, is recognized. 

Mr. LAHOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the witnesses here today for your testimony. 

I guess in looking at what the President and the administration 

are doing in Paris, you know, the words that come to mind in some 

respects is almost illegitimate in terms of the pact or agreement 

that they’re working on. 

And I guess my question to you, Mr. Grossman, in terms of circumventing the Congress and kind of doing an end run is what this 

looks to be, you know, whether we call it an agreement or a pact 

or whatever comes out of Paris, you know, is there going to be advice and consent from the Senate? Is there going to be ratification 

there? Is there going to be any input from the House or Senate? 

In looking at the elected Congress, what role will the elected Congress play in having input on something this significant? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

When you look at what the Administration has discussed so far, 

they spoke in terms of a hybrid agreement where the central 

planks of the agreement—in other words, we’re all assuming that 

there’s going to be this agreement and countries are going to follow 
141 

through on it in terms of financing and in terms of reaching emissions targets. 

But the way the Administration has looked at it, due to the fact 

that they don’t want to come to Congress, has been to have a hybrid agreement where those central planks aren’t enforceable in 

any sense. They’re pledges, they’re promises, they’re things that 

may or may not happen, but at the end of the day, you know, as 

a lawyer, I look at what does the law require you to do, whether 

that’s international law or domestic law. And what’s being contemplated at this point is an agreement that has no teeth, that 

doesn’t commit anyone to anything. 

So in that instance on the one hand, as a legal matter, that probably would not require advice and consent of the Senate. On the 

other hand, it doesn’t really have any substance. 

But if the President were to go beyond that and to attempt to 

enter into binding commitments, I think he would—that would 

raise some very serious constitutional questions and would really 

call into question the legitimacy of the United States’ involvement 

in such an agreement. 

Mr. LAHOOD. And is there legal precedent for other things that 

have circumvented the Congress that have been upheld in federal 

court? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. I think in this instance we’re really going into 

new territory because if you look, for example, at the Kyoto Protocol, both political branches recognized that the binding emission 

reductions that were part of that protocol, even though Bill Clinton 

had signed it, they recognized that Senate ratification was a part 

of it. It had to go through as a treaty. And because that never happened, because there wasn’t the political support for it, the United 

States never ratified it, never deposited its documents of ratification, and it never took effect here. 

And so given that kind of precedent, I think the Administration 

would be on very shaky legal ground were it to agree to any type 

of binding commitments. 

Mr. LAHOOD. Thank you. Mr. Cass, I wanted to follow up with 

you. You know, in looking at this agreement and looking at how 

we verify that foreign countries—India, China, Russia—are going 

to be compliant with the commitments in this agreement, you 

know, can you elaborate on that, you know, in terms of what satisfaction we can have that they are going to be compliant when they 

haven’t had a very good track record of doing that? 

Mr. CASS. Well, you know, I think one enormous challenge in 

that respect is that a lot of these countries don’t really even have 

a mechanism for tracking even if they wanted to be transparent. 

You know, there was an enormous story very recently when China 

admitted it was using about 17 percent more coal than it thought. 

It was an entire new Germany worth of emissions just within 

China. And the striking thing is that the Chinese said, well, of 

course we’re not going to change any of our commitments. It probably makes it easier to meet our commitments, but we’re not going 

to change anything as a result. 

And so I think, you know, accurately tracking the pledges is an 

important challenge. The interesting thing with countries like 

China and India, though, is that they have not pledged to do any-
142 

thing except the trajectory that they were already on. And so in 

that respect the question is less how do we make sure they do what 

they promised than why is no one standing up and saying they 

haven’t promised anything? 

Mr. LAHOOD. Well, as just a follow-up on that, you know, I was 

going ask you—I was going to read—there was an agreement released by the White House regarding its 2014 U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, and it said, ‘‘China intends to 

achieve the peaking of CO2 emissions around 2030.’’ There is presumably a reason China committed to peak ‘‘around 2030’’ and that 

word around is really undefined in this, and so we have no idea 

if this means 2031, 32, 35, or even later. 

And I guess in looking at that, I mean doesn’t this give an incentive to china to go beyond that in using that kind of undefined ambiguous language? That concerns me. 

Mr. CASS. Well, you know, the reason that that is what China 

agreed to is because they had already done the work and knew that 

that is around when their emissions would peak anyway. Unfortunately, President Obama knew this as well. The U.S. Government’s 

own Lawrence Berkeley laboratory had done a very in-depth study 

four years earlier and had already said based on the way China’s 

economic development is going, it will peak its emissions around 

2030. So for China to make that commitment now is essentially a 

promise to do nothing. 

And the fact that we are applauding that and putting our own 

very costly commitment up against it is really just another example 

of how poorly we are positioning our own country’s interests on the 

international stage. 

Mr. LAHOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. [Presiding] Yes. The Chair will now recognize our colleague from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Obviously, there are big differences of opinion between both sides 

of the aisle on this subject. We agree on quite a few things on this 

committee but this is not one of them. And it’s disappointing to me 

but that’s the way it is. 

So, Dr. Lomborg, I want to start with you. You’ve been talking 

about dikes and I’m just looking—are you in Copenhagen now or 

where are you? 

Dr. LOMBORG. I’m in Paris right now. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. You’re in Paris but you spoke fondly of Copenhagen so I assume that’s got some—it’s close to your heart in some 

fashion. Is that where you’re from—— 

Dr. LOMBORG. Yes, it is. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. —or your family? Okay. So Copenhagen, I was 

just looking at it. I mean, it’s pretty much at sea level or below sea 

level, is it not? 

Dr. LOMBORG. It’s at sea level and higher, yes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. So have you estimated how much it’s 

going to cost Copenhagen to build the dikes that you say might be 

necessary—and I think you said sea levels are going to rise between a half and a meter. Dr. Steer said between a half and 2 meters and you kind of objected to that. But how much are the dikes 
143 

going to cost Copenhagen if it goes a meter, which is your testimony? 

Dr. LOMBORG. Yes. I’m sorry, I don’t know the numbers for Copenhagen. I do know the numbers that have been published internationally in period for—globally, and they indicate for almost all 

countries the cost of adapting to sea level rise up to a meter is less 

than 0.1 percent of GDP, and mostly much, much less. So it’s a 

fairly small cost. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. So who—— 

Dr. LOMBORG. It’s not a trivial cost—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I mean the—— 

Dr. LOMBORG. —but it’s a—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. You mean the world’s GDP? 

Dr. LOMBORG. Of the individual nations. But yes, of course, for 

the world it will be the world’s GDP. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. When was the last time you were in Miami? 

Dr. LOMBORG. A couple years ago. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. And you’re probably aware that Miami 

is seeing street flooding on a pretty regular basis already, are you 

not? 

Dr. LOMBORG. Yes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I mean what’s it going to cost Miami to build 

dikes and what do you think—— 

Dr. LOMBORG. Again, sir—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. —what do you think—— 

Dr. LOMBORG. —I don’t know the—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. What will that do—— 

Dr. LOMBORG. I don’t know the—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. What will that do to their tourism? 

Dr. LOMBORG. It will do very little to their tourism. Look, again, 

I think you’re trying to pin me into a false dichotomy. I’m simply 

pointing out that trying to do the Clean Power Plan or even all of 

what the U.S. is promising or even what everybody is promising, 

which will cut a couple of inches at best of sea level rise by the end 

of the century is not actually a very effective way of helping either 

Miami or anyone else. 

Yes, I do recognize that we need to fix this problem in the long 

run. That’s why I’m supporting green energy. But saying that we 

are somehow being illogical by not focusing on say, well, let’s actually do the things that we can do to help poor Bangladeshis today 

dealing with sea level rise or indeed rich Miami—I’m sorry, I’m not 

sure what to call—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. All right. So—— 

Dr. LOMBORG. —Miamians. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. So I mean I guess my question to you is—and 

I appreciate that. You’re saying we need to do all of the above. 

There should be some mitigation in terms of increased temperature, as well as prevention, those areas that are going to be especially affected. And is science so good to tell us those areas that are 

going to be especially affected? If sea levels rise a meter, does that 

pretty much flood all of Miami? 

Dr. LOMBORG. No, it doesn’t. The cost of Miami—the wealth of 

Miami—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. It—no—without—— 
144 

Dr. LOMBORG. —is so great that—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Without dikes, without dikes, does that flood 

Miami? Because Miami is less than a meter. 

Dr. LOMBORG. It probably would flood—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. So if I just do my basic—— 

Dr. LOMBORG. —significant parts of Miami, yes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. —map—okay. So, you know, everybody’s been 

talking about the cost of this, and so I want to turn my attention 

to you for a second, Mr. Grossman. And you guys have an office 

in Denver. Have—did you talk to anybody in the Denver office before you came to testify today? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. No, I did not. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. Do you know what—in Colorado we 

were the very first to pass by ballot an initiative renewable portfolio standards. Are you aware of that? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. I’m aware that Colorado has such a law. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Are you aware of what our unemployment rate 

is today in Colorado? Three point eight percent. And I have many 

friends who are partners at your firm, and I’d say that they’re 

probably doing pretty well because we are doing well in Colorado, 

despite taking some very rigorous steps with respect to the environment because in Colorado we appreciate the outdoors, we appreciate our climate, and even so, we’ve managed to continue to have 

strong employment across all industries, except for oil and gas, 

which has dropped like a rock because the Saudis are pumping like 

crazy. 

So are you—I mean so is it your testimony that because of clean 

action plan or these kinds of things, that that causes a reduction 

in employment? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. I think my testimony concerns the legal authority—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. All right. So—— 

Mr. GROSSMAN. —of the executive to enter into a Paris agreement. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. So looking at your testimony—— 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank 

you. We have other members that—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. That’s true. 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. —need to go. 

The Chair now recognizes our colleague from Alabama, Mr. 

Palmer. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to go back to you, Mr. Grossman, and the point you were 

about to make. The President has made it clear that he doesn’t 

plan to submit any agreement reached in Paris to the Senate. Does 

the position of Congress, the official position of Congress on a particular policy issue have any bearing on whether or not the agreement requires Congressional approval? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. The answer is yes. 

Congress’s position makes a great deal of difference, particularly in 

this instance because potentially the Administration, if there were 

some kind of binding agreement, might point to the Framework 

Convention perhaps as supporting that, and were there any legal 
145 

challenge over that, the first thing the courts would look to would 

be Congressional understanding—— 

Mr. PALMER. All right. 

Mr. GROSSMAN. —of what that is. 

Mr. PALMER. All right. Let me—I have a little short clip I’d like 

to show if the staff can put that up that I think might bring some 

clarity to where Congress is on this. Can they do the video? 

[Video shown.] 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you. Is there any ambiguity there, Mr. 

Grossman? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. No, there is not. 

Mr. PALMER. I don’t think that it’s an issue here in regard to the 

legality of what the President is doing as to whether or not we 

should debate this issue. Clearly, we should. I think that Congress 

has debated this issue. It’s been pointed out that Congress brought 

up a cap-and-trade bill, which is arguably the same thing as the 

Clean Power Plan, and rejected it. It was passed by the House but 

rejected by the Senate. And I would like to point out that my colleagues on the Democrat side controlled both houses of Congress. 

So Congress has spoken. 

You just heard from the Energy and Commerce Committee—I 

think that was in 2009—who was present as a Member of Congress 

when the Clean Air Act was passed, and it’s clear that it was never 

the intention of Congress to give the executive branch through the 

EPA the authority to regulate greenhouse gases. 

So back to your point, I think this is relevant. I think we talk 

about the danger of global climate change, but I think there’s another danger here that needs to be addressed, and that is the loss 

of the authority of Congress to make laws. 

So I think there’s another point I want to make. Dr. Lomborg, 

are you familiar with a paper that was published—I think it was 

last year by Dr. Philip J. Lloyd, who was one of the lead authors 

for the International Panel on Climate Change. And he says that 

he now concludes that the majority of climate change is the result 

of natural variation. Are you familiar with that? 

Dr. LOMBORG. No, I’m not. Sorry. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter this abstract 

into the record if we may do so. 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. Without objection. 

[The information appears in Appendix II] 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you. I think that if climate change is predominantly the result of natural variation, I think logic would require us to put as much emphasis on dealing with the consequences of climate change as a result of natural variation, maybe 

even more so as the science continues to evolve on this, than 

spending enormous amounts of money and resources on human activities. Would you agree with that, Dr. Lomborg? It’s a yes or no. 

Dr. LOMBORG. Yes, absolutely. 

Mr. PALMER. Okay. I think to you, Dr. Steer, and your comments 

about forcing people into smaller and smaller environments and 

living spaces and changing their cultures and how they live reminds me of a book that came out in 1978 by a guy named Clarence B. Carson, the ‘‘World in the Grip of an Idea,’’ and his point, 

if I may simplify it, is basically that there’s always this great idea 
146 

out there that empowers government to do things that people don’t 

want it to do to—and in this case it’s achieving human progress 

through saving the planet and focusing everyone’s efforts on that 

and using government power as the instrument to achieve that 

end. 

My time is expired. I yield, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. The gentleman has yielded back. I now 

recognize our colleague from California, Mr. Swalwell. 

Mr. SWALWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the 

witnesses taking the time to come here today. 

And, Mr. Cass, are you a scientist? 

Mr. CASS. No. 

Mr. SWALWELL. Mr. Grossman? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. No, sir. 

Mr. SWALWELL. And I know Dr. Lomborg and Dr. Steer are. And 

with respect to Mr. Cass and Mr. Grossman, you know, I think one 

of the chief complaints that my colleagues and I have around this 

issue—we’re here talking about climate change—is that we’re not 

hearing from scientists. I mean I’m a lawyer. I know Mr. Perlmutter is a recovering lawyer himself. But we would be best informed by having scientists testify before this committee. 

When I was a prosecutor and I wanted to prove a murder case, 

I had DNA testimony, I would not call in somebody who watches 

CSI as my DNA witness. I would call in a scientist. And I think 

the fact that this committee chooses to run from science rather 

than to put forward scientists only hurts our ability to get to the 

bottom of this issue. 

I also am not a scientist but I can read and understand numbers. 

And I’ve heard so much talk about the will of the American people 

and an elected Congress, and I just wanted to go through some 

numbers for my colleagues. In 2008, a Senator named Barack 

Obama ran for President of the United States. He made it unequivocally clear that, if elected President, he would take bold actions to address greenhouse gas emissions, including the policies he 

would enact. He was elected in 2008 by 52 percent of the popular 

vote and doubled the electoral vote that his Republican opponent 

received. 

In 2012, having already taken four years of actions on climate 

change, he was reelected with 51 percent of the popular vote. Over 

3 million more people elected him than his Republican opponent. 

A majority of Americans have elected the person trying to take on 

these negotiations. An overwhelming majority of nations are participating in these negotiations. And an overwhelming majority of 

scientists believe that climate change is real, it’s caused by man, 

and we should do something about it. 

Dr. Steer, I ask are we really gathered here today to say that so 

many people are so wrong about this issue? 

Dr. STEER. Well, just last week Pew came out with a poll that 

says 2/3 of Americans want the United States to join the Climate 

Change Pact. So I think you’re making a very good point, Congressman. 

Mr. SWALWELL. And, you know, I really respect Dr. Lomborg’s 

position and I respect his credentials, and I think there’s a difference of opinion here as to the actions. And that’s where I’d like 
147 

to see our country really move this debate to, which is acknowledging that it’s happening, acknowledging who has caused it, but 

really getting into the details as far as solutions. 

And if you could summarize, Dr. Steer, what are some of the solutions you think that both Republicans and Democrats could agree 

on that could move us forward and show real action on this issue? 

Dr. STEER. Well, I do sense that we all care about our grandchildren and great-grandchildren, so there clearly, you know, is a 

reason to work together. A price on carbon need not be an ideological issue. It need not increase the size of government. Indeed, it 

could shrink the size of government. It’s just a smart way to reorientate the way we collect money. Go to Singapore and you will 

find that actually you are charged to drive your car into the center 

of the city. That goes into the general revenue. So instead of that, 

that enables them to lower taxes on profits, for example. 

London does the same thing whereby you don’t even know-you’re 

paying the fee as you drive into London, but as a result of that, 

you know, I was born in London, I now will never drive into London the rest of my life. I don’t need to, quite frankly. It’s a psychological shift. And life is much better, quite frankly. The center of 

London is better. We have good public transportation. 

That’s—and as a result of that, the Mayor of London, who is a 

pretty conservative guy, Boris Johnson, he’s able to lower other 

fees that the businesses are paying. It doesn’t need to be ideological 

at all. So it seems to me that’s one area. 

And this is where, you know, I’m really interested by this discussion about, you know, China’s not doing anything and so on. I 

mean, China is spending far more than any other country in the 

world on renewable energy. It has figured out how to invest in research. We should, as we are now going to do, have a partnership 

with them. That should be a reasonable understanding that will 

drive down the costs. 

And by the way, we say that China now is getting off for free. 

In fact, China has a commitment to lower its carbon-to-GDP ratio 

by 65 percent by 2030. So don’t kid—nobody should believe that 

China’s not doing as much as it could. 

Mr. SWALWELL. Thank you, Dr. Steer. And I yield back. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. [Presiding] Thank you. And I now recognize myself for five minutes. 

I want to thank Mr. Cass and Mr. Grossman and Dr. Lomborg. 

And I think I wanted to highlight something that you had said, Mr. 

Cass, in your testimony, that ‘‘climate policy that does not help the 

climate is not good policy.’’ And I think the results are what the 

three of you are trying to focus on if I’m correct, and really looking 

at a results-focused policy. 

And if I’m understanding this correctly, your concern is not—I 

mean we’ve had a lot of discussion about the costs and things that 

are running up here, but the real problem here is that it’s not 

doing what it says it’s going to do, is that correct? 

Mr. CASS. That’s exactly right. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. And so the—this sort of—I guess it’s called 

pledge-and-review process really is more of a praise-and-hope. I feel 

like it’s a little bit like when the children all get their trophy for 

the soccer game except this is a very expensive trophy because 
148 

we’re hoping this increases their self-esteem so to speak or we’re 

hoping they’re going to do more. I think some of the testimony you 

had cited was, you know, this is—we hope this will all make everyone feel better to do a little bit more. So it’s not results-focused, so 

this is not about what we intend. 

And I appreciate, Dr. Steer, you recognizing we all care about 

our children and grandchildren because we certainly do and want 

to have a cleaner environment. And I come from Virginia, a state 

that did not put in a renewable portfolio but we did work very aggressively on the state level on an all-of-the-above strategy, seeing 

where we could find things. We actually passed a bill that we’re 

still waiting for the federals to allow us to implement, which would 

have offshore drilling and the royalties from that go towards, in 

part, research in our universities for renewables and for alternative 

energies. It would be a way of using what we have now while we’re 

investing in these other things without imposing a lot of these costs 

that you were doing. 

And I will point out in Virginia we have a really low unemployment rate, too, but unfortunately, in southwest Virginia if you talk 

to my colleague Morgan Griffith, you’ll find he has a very high unemployment rate due to the decimation of our coal industry. And, 

you know, poverty has its threats and problems, too, which they’ve 

had to deal with. 

So what I wanted to ask is what—since we really are concerned 

about results and having a cleaner environment, and actually, instead of a praise-and-hope, sort of a trust-and-verify type of system 

but also very measurable-so that we’re not just kind of getting together in Paris and doing something to feel good but something 

that will actually improve our economy, improve people’s everyday 

life, and not impose on the least of us and the poorest of us what 

they need. So if you could describe some of that. I think you’ve testified to that but I wanted to really clarify—you all really are going 

into—so there’s a third way here we often don’t talk about, and I 

think we’ve sort of been talking past that so I wanted to give you 

an opportunity to—— 

Mr. CASS. Yes, thank you. I think that’s exactly the right way of 

framing the issue. And I would make two points. One is that in 

terms of affirmative policies that are worth taking, by far the most 

important is investment in research and development. And I think 

you’ve heard a lot of consensus from Dr. Steer, Dr. Lomborg. I 

would agree with that as well that the only way we’re going to address this problem long term is if we have new technologies that 

are cheaper than fossil fuels that developing countries want to use. 

And we don’t have that today. 

I think the second piece that’s very important is just some fundamental honesty in the processes we’re using and what’s happening. 

I think you’re right to call out this kind of pledge-and-review concept as not really being pursued faithfully. 

And I would say I genuinely have a tremendous amount of respect for Dr. Steer. I think it very—is very problematic the way 

that he has characterized the pledges that countries are making. 

I mentioned that China has pledged only to peak where it was 

going to peak anyway. He didn’t contest that. He offered a new statistic, which is that they plan to be more efficient in their use of 
149 

carbon, which is true, but Bloomberg New Energy Finance, which 

is a—certainly not a right-wing analyst of these issues—looked specifically at that pledge and similarly found that that was less aggressive than the trajectory that China was already on. 

And you can go right down the list of major developing countries. 

You know, Dr. Steer mentioned Prime Minister Modi. India’s 

pledge is perhaps the weakest of all of them. India refused to make 

any pledge with respect to emissions and said only that it would 

improve its efficiency less quickly than it is already improving its 

efficiency. And so, you know, at one point Dr. Steer said if I were 

upset, I would say it. And I think it’s important that people say it, 

that this process in Paris is not producing commitments, that leadership by the United States is not getting developing countries to 

do things they wouldn’t otherwise do. And if that’s the case, then 

incurring the costs that we’re incurring here, even the Obama Administration would say doesn’t make very much sense. 

Mrs. COMSTOCK. I appreciate that because the worst thing is 

when we cost everyone a lot of money and don’t get any results. 

Then that’s the worst of all worlds. And I think if we can kind of 

unite on some of those things, you know, we want to have good results. So I appreciate your highlighting that and us able to also discuss the science of this and getting to a results-focused orientation. 

So I would like to, on behalf of the Chairman and on behalf of 

the committee, thank the witnesses for their insightful testimony, 

all of our witnesses, and the members for their questions. And the 

record will remain open for two weeks for additional written comments and written questions from members. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(151) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
152 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Questions submitted by Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson 
153 

new coal plants in three key industrial regions5 and many provinces have targets to reduce coal use. 6 

China has been strengthening and expanding policies to increase energy efficiency across its economy, 

including targets for the efficiency of coal plants, 7 energy-saving targets for industrial enterprises, 8 

building energy codes,' and fuel economy standards. 10 President Xi Jinping recently announced that in 

2017 China will launch a national emissions trading system, 11 which has the potential to be a powerful 

instrument to reduce emissions over time.'' Finally, China is seeking to shift away from its old growth 

model driven by investment in energy-intensive industry toward a new model driven by consumption, 

services, and advanced manufacturing, 13 which should have an emissions reduction benefit. 14 China is 

working on including additional steps in its upcoming 13'h Five Year Plan, to be released early next 

year. 15 Signs of a recent decline in China's coal use16 and other trends, including China's increasingly 

5 http://www.ibtimes.com/china-bans-new-coal-plants-three-its-biggest-industrial-regions-attempt-curb-airpollution-1405362 

6 Li Shuo and Lauri Myllyvirta, "The End of China's Coal Boom-6 Facts You Should Know" (2014) 

http://www.greenpeace.org/internationai/Giobal/international/briefings/dimate/2014/The-End-of-Chinas-Coal-

"Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China's Intended Nationally Determined Contributions", submitted to 

UNFCCC June 30, 2015 (scroll to page 17 for English translation) 

http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/China/1/China's%201NDC%20-

%20on%2030%20June%202015.pdf 

8 http ://iepd. i i pnetwork.org/pol icy/top-10000-en ergy-consu mi ng -enterprises-program 9 S. Yu, M. Evans and Q. Shi, "Analysis of the Chinese Market for Building Energy Efficiency". Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (March 2014) 

http://www.pnnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical reports/PNNL-22761.odf 10 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/21/china-auto-fuel-idUSL3NOCC2EK20130321; White House Office of 

the Press Secretary, "FACT SHEET: The United States and China Issue Joint Presidential Statement on Climate 

Change with New Domestic Policy Commitments and a Common Vision for an Ambitious Global Climate 

Agreement in Paris" (September 25, 2015) https:(/www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheetunited-states-and-china-issue-joint-presidential-statement 

11 "FACT SHEET: The United States and China Issue Joint Presidential Statement" (September 25, 2015). According 

to a senior official in China's economic planning agency, the ETS will initially cover 31 provinces, nearly 10,000 

enterprises in six industrial sectors, and 4 billion tons of carbon dioxide emissions. 

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-summit-china-carbontradidUSKBNOTR18420151208#ArtQkjsxif9TEWPy.97 

12 Xiliang Zhang, Valerie J. Karplus, Tianyu Qi, Da Zhang and Jiankun He, "Carbon emissions in China: How far can 

new efforts bend the curve?", Tsinghua-MIT China Energy and Climate Project (2014) 

http :((globalchange. mit. ed u/ CE CP /files/ docu ment/M ITJ PSPGC Rpt2 67 .pdf 13 Fergus Green and Nicholas Stern, "China's 'new normal': structural change, better growth, and peak emissions", 

Policy Brief (June 2015) http:l/www.lse.ac.uk/Granthamlnstitute/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/Chinas new normal green stern June 2015.pdf; https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint; 

http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/20]~ /15-sino-shift-dollar; China State Council, '"Made in China 

2025' plan issued" (May 19, 2015) 

http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest releases/2015/05/19/content 281475110703534.htm 14 Carbon Tracker Initiative, "The Great Coal Cap: China's energy policies and the financial implications for thermal 

coal" (2014) http:l/www .carbon tracker .org/re port/the-great -coal-cap-chin as-energy-policies-and-the-financiali m plications-for-therm a 1-coal/ 15 http://www.chinafaqs.org/blog-posts/making-plans-steps-development-chinas-crucial-13th-five-year-olan 16 Green and Stern, "China's 'new normal"' (2015); http://energydesk.greenpeace.org/2015/09/09/china-coaldemand-falls-for-eleven-straight-months/; John A. Mathews and Hao Tan, "A 'Great Reversal' in China? Coal 

continues to decline with enforcement of environmental laws" (August 2015) http:l/www.japanfocus.org/-Hao-
154 

strong measures, have led some experts to predict that China's coal use may have already reached its 

structural peak (controlling for cyclical factors)" and that China's emissions will likely peak before 2030, 

consistent with the government's stated aim to make best efforts to peak early. 18 

In the hearing, there seemed to be a misunderstanding in some of the discussion that China will achieve 

its climate targets without additional effort. This is not the case. 

China will need to take stronger near-term and ongoing action to meet its commitments. Stronger steps 

will be needed to achieve China's non-fossil target. China will need to install800-l,OOO gigawatts (GW) 

of non-fossil fuel electricity generation capacity to achieve its 2030 non-fossil energy target, greater 

than its current coal-fired electricity generation capacity and almost the total current electricity 

generation capacity of the United States. 19 

With respect to China's peaking and carbon intensity targets, in 2009, China committed to reduce its 

carbon intensity by 40 to 45 percent from 2005 levels by 2020. 20 A 2014 study by MIT and China's 

Tsinghua University found in their Continued Effort Scenario that if China were to continue this level of 

effort, emissions would level off between 2030 and 2045 without a subsequent decline. The Accelerated 

Effort scenario, which shows emissions leveling off between 2025 and 2035 and slowly declining after 

that, involves stronger measures well beyond current policies, including a price on carbon beginning in 

2015 which rises significantly21. 

22 

Accordingly, analysis shows that China has not set itself easy targets, and it is launching an array of 

stronger actions beyond current efforts to achieve those targets. The suggestion to the contrary by a 

Ian/4365iaticle.ht_r8; Tim Buckley and Tom Sanzillo, "Past Peak Coal in China" (November 2015) 

b.t!J:J.Jli e e fa. QI~:f9n tent I ,'.219JJSW.1Ql5/llJ.I£ff.iLI'.c~.lsc.Coal N OYsllJ..be r- ?_O_}jJJ_gf; International Energy 

Agency, "Global coal demand stalls after more than a decade of relentless growth: Annual lEA coal report sees 

market under intense pressure, reflecting Chinese economic restructuring and global environmental policies", 

December 18, 2015 b.liR~L/.}YJ'lw.iea.q,eg/n.f<wsrgQ!l~an9~~J.t~C.E2~Z~~_?$..?}.1Q15/g~mber/gLqJ2?J.:.~g§l::_Qj;~OJ2Dsl-=. 

E.g. variation in hydroelectric power generation due to hydrological conditions 18 Green and Stern, "China's 'new normal"' (2015); 1Jtto:i/www<nytimes.corQ/20_1:2L_O}_{..?_?.(~Qfld/asia/fi2Qi.o.g~cg_il]: 

in9:JiJ "y-in-chi r ct.::L!J.?L.9Lf2: -c h d;. ~&.::.tQ.:? i d -.cl i 0}.9J: e. h t.rrlllcrl::.Y{o rl ct.&.. r:; t; 

House Office of the Press Secretary, "FACT SHEET: U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and 

Clean Energy Cooperation" (November 11, 2014) httos://ww'"''!'i!lll!:.h9!!2.!Ul.O_v[the.::QI.ess-offic~Ql4L.UD 1/J.?J:.l: 

21 One-page summary of report: Tsinghua-MIT China Energy and Climate Project, "An Energy Outlook for China" 

(2014) ililllJlglg_I:J!lJfbanrn.rnlL§Q!U]l_g:J.QocumentKEIT...lQlLQ.lJliQQ.LPslf; full report: Xi liang Zhang, Valerie J. 

Karplus, Tianyu Qi, Da Zhang and Jiankun He, "Carbon emissions in China: How far can new efforts bend the 

curve?", Tsinghua-MIT China Energy and Climate Project (2014) 

!J.UQ~J_gjQQ@.If.'l'l'2RE:JlllU:Qc,:L"'S!J:J.iii£.;:L!J:!2f.L!'Jl'ill!DYll.L'Y~!:!eL..fio!:£QLicm; Regarding the need for stronger 

efforts beyond current policies1 see also http·/ /ww\:YS.hl~:.9JE191oo-oost~b!;IQJJR.~C::£QJ11mitnle.[.1£..~b..in9.:i!Q!:L 

An Open Climate Network review of studies on China's emissions trajectory found that of the reference 

scenarios it analyzed, none projected a peak in carbon emissions by 2030. Qiang Liu et al, "Peaking China's C02 

Emissions: Trends and Mitigation Potential", Open Climate Network (2015), p. 3, 7 
155 

witness at the hearing, Mr. Oren Cass, is incorrect, and mistakenly relies on a 201l_?tudyJ2'L1'l'cLL~LlC:~ 

§§rkeleyJ'till.9Jli!l.Jabora!Qr_y. 23 However, the study, which estimates two possible scenarios for China's 

future emissions trajectory, states that "neither scenario represents what we believe would actually 

happen in the long term without policy intervention." 24 Both scenarios, the more conservative of which 

projects a peak in China's carbon emissions in 2033, involve "aggressive policy measures to support 

industrial reform and energy efficiency improvement" to meet current world best practice, 

"strengthening or expansion of energy efficiency policies in industry, buildings, appliances, and motor 

vehicles," large increases in electric vehicles and rail electrification, improvements in coal plant 

efficiency, and "aggressive deployment of more renewable and non-fossil fuel energy" 25 • 

25 

It is not surprising that China is aggressively pursuing climate action, as such action is driven by strong 

national interests in energy security, public health, environmental protection, and sustainable economic 

growth. 27 As China's actions indicate, on balance, economic and other trends are hastening rather than 

preventing China's shift away from fossil energy. China is working to control coal use to address air 

pollution, which contributes to as many as 4,000 deaths in China per day28 and has raised widespread 

public concern. 29 Further, China's top weather official has said that the impacts of climate change are 

already damaging China's economy, 30 and China's recently released national report on climate change 

finds that it may "further intensify the occurrence of floods and droughts," threaten agricultural 

productivity, and increase its low-lying coastal cities' vulnerability to storms. 31 As China's economy relies 

substantially on fossil fuel imports, China's leaders are concerned with the country's energy security, 

and China has already begun to see the economic benefits of clean energy. 32 Finally, China's leaders 

23 "Testimony of Oren M. Cass before the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology", December 1, 

2015, p. 8 h ttos:// sc: e nee. house. g ov I sites/reo u b! i c:a ns. science .l;ou se ~<ZQYLfiLec'i£9..9S..'LilJ£n ts IH H R G~l.:l1c.?1::1!Y'.?!Qlt:: 

Nan Zhou, David Fridley, Michael McNeil, Nina Zheng, Jing Ke, and Mark levine, "China's Energy and Carbon 

Emissions Outlook to 2050", lawrence Berkeley National laboratory (2011), p.2 

Ibid., p. 30, p. 4, p. 37, p. 38. For a full list scenario's assumptions, see pp. 3-4. 26 The two other studies cited by Mr. Cass, by Bloomberg New Energy Finance and Climate Action Tracker 

("Testimony of Oren M. Cass" pp. 8-9), both assume China will undertake additional effort. Bloomberg New Energy 

Finance, "How Ambitious Are The Post-2020 Targets?", October 2, 2015, p. 17 

b..ttP_il::19J?..IJ1J?J1~ Co0lLfo n tent 1 u"'"qlg_g.s;!5~ /4/2015/1012 015-1 0'"0 2 -H Q~~:.?JJ"lli(![QJ:.0~:}L?_:1b.!l::2.9j_t- 2 0 2 9.:l~OZ£li:: 

UPDATE~£::0ct.odf; Climate Action Tracker, "China", last updated November 26, 2015 

httP,j/cHD_'@jeact!,QSlti.;?Q_~C:S?JJ1~counl'J~?L~~Lra.hJ:l"l}l; As described above, China has at ready begun to implement 

stronger policies and plans to increase its efforts over time. 
156 

recognize the need to shift the economy away from energy-intensive industry toward services for 

economic growth to continue at a strong rate. 33 

For additional information, we have attached our fact sheet, ~Tak~tronger Action on Climate ChilJ:lR<::: 

China ao_cL!be Unit~d S@!gL and ask that it be included in the record. 

Q: The iterative nature of the agreement from the 21" Conference of Parties (COP21) is one of its 

more important aspects. Essentially, the framework of the agreement would allow nations to review 

their climate goals at regular intervals and make necessary adjustments to their plans to achieve 

additional emissions reductions. This mechanism appears to do two things: first, it recognizes that a 

rigid solution or target for emissions reduction is not realistic, and second, it provides nations with the 

ability to incorporate new information and technologies into future solutions. 

Why is it important that the agreement be iterative and flexible? 

The connection between national action plans and a regular schedule to 'progress' those plans every 

five years is a smart combination in the Paris Agreement. It allows flexibility for countries to decide 

themselves their approach to reduce emissions, while creating a process where each country will know 

what the other is committing to at the same moment. This iterative system, in conjunction with the 

credible transparency system in place under the Paris Agreement, should provide the clarity and 

predictability necessary for countries to know both what their own direction of travel is, and what other 

countries are doing. It also means that all countries will continue moving forward- the universal nature 

of action under the Paris Agreement will be maintained over time. 

How does this approach to addressing climate change differ from past international efforts? 

And what, if any, benefits does this approach provide? 

The Paris Agreement is a hybrid agreement which combines a nationally-based approach for mitigation 

targets and goals with international rules and norms that apply to all. The combination ensures greater 

national buy-in to increase the likelihood of implementation, while also providing the transparency so 

that countries know what others are doing. It is also very different because it is universal, i.e. there are 

no annexes that distinguish between developed and developing countries for their mitigation actions in 

a strictly bifurcated fashion .. All countries have to undergo an enhanced review and verification 

process, and reporting will follow common guidelines for all, but those developing countries that need it 

will have a bit of flexibility and extra capacity building support. 

Q: Now that the COP21 has concluded, please share with us any thoughts you may have on the 

process and the outcome of the talks. Specifically, 

Do you believe the agreement has set forth a realistic and meaningful path to address climate 

change? 

~The pathway is both meaningful and realistic. It is also science-based. It is imperative that the pace 

and scale of change increases in order to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. In order for that to 

occur, the world needs to reduce emissions together, step-by-step in a fair way. The Paris Agreement 

33 Fergus Green and Nicholas Stern, 11China1

s 'new normal': structural change, better growth, and peak emissions", 

Policy brief (June 2015) iltto://www.)2_e.ac.ukiGran_ttLal'J)Dititutel!YQc 
157 

provides the machinery to do this. The core elements of this machinery are the regular five year 

opportunities for review and strengthened national climate action, a robust common transparency 

system, and a global stock take every five years to review implementation of the Agreement and 

progress towards achieving its purpose. At the same time, by basing mitigation actions in national 

policy-making, the Agreement will be driven by countries' priorities and national objectives. Never 

before has the climate regime had such a comprehensive process for addressing all elements of climate 

change- not only emissions reductions through mitigation actions, but also adaptation to climate 

impacts and the support necessary to ensure a fair pathway for action. 

How will the actions of developing nations evolve over time to meet the goals of the 

agreement? 

The starting point for the Paris Agreement is that it is universal. The long term goals, for mitigation and 

adaptation, apply to all countries. Nearly all countries 187 of them- have put forward national 

climate plans, Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. However, recognizing that all countries 

have very different national circumstances and capabilities, the Agreement provides flexibility and 

support for those developing countries that need it. This ensures a fair, but ambitious common 

pathway. Through enhanced support, including technology development and transfer and increased 

capacity over time, developing countries will be able to move towards having even stronger mitigation 

actions. In addition, although developed countries will continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate 

finance, the Agreement recognizes that many developing countries are already proving financial support 

and encourages them to do so. 

The Paris Agreement places a strong emphasis on capacity building to enable developing countries to 

establish effective transparency systems and comply with the common rules established under the 

Agreement. The Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency that was established to strengthen 

institutional and technical capacity and support developing countries in meeting their requirements 

under the Paris agreement. The technical expert review for each country will pay particular attention to 

the national capabilities and circumstances of developing country Parties and assist developing 

countries in identifying capacity-building needs, especially for lDCs and 51D5. 

How does an absence of a formal enforcement mechanism impact the overall goals of the 

agreement? 

The foundation of the Paris Agreement is the national action plans, Intended Nationally Determined 

Contributions {INDCs), determined by each country based on their national circumstances. For many 

countries, the targets and measures contained in these national action plans are already rooted in 

national legislation and policy- providing a strong basis for compliance. Meanwhile, the agreement 

includes an enhanced, robust system for transparency and accountability that will ensure that the 

emissions levels of all countries, and their progress in meeting their IN DC targets, will be subject to full 

scrutiny. The nationally-determined underpinning of the INDCs, combined with systems in the Paris 

Agreement to promote and facilitate compliance and ensure transparency and accountability, is what 

will ensure implementation. 
158 

Questions submitted by Chairman Lamar Smith 

Response by Dr. Bjorn Lomborg to Committee on Science, Space and 

Technology Written Question 

Is the scientific backbone (i.e. scientific models) of U.S. climate policy misguided? 

Are the baselines used correct? In your opinion has there been a misrepresentation 

and selective distortion of the scientific models? 

In general, I find the scientific models used for climate policy reasonable. 

Obviously, there are different ways that different scientists and policy advocates 

interpret these models, and this should be taken into consideration when we 

consider the approaches. 

However, there is one instance where I believe a model is used in a problematic 

way. I refer to the Climate Interactive model, which it has been suggested is the 

"backbone" of U.S. analytic work on climate policy by the U.S. State Department) 

This work has also been quoted by climate activists including joe Romm, with a 

graph that is seemingly created for advocacy work.ii 

The chief problem is that the Climate Interactive analysis of the effects of Paris 

relies on an incredibly far-fetched 'no action' scenario where the planet will emit 

huge amounts of carbon if it doesn't enact carbon-cutting policies. It is this 

artificially high baseline - unsupported by any mainstream analysis - that 

accounts for the massive reduction that Climate Interactive expects from Paris. 

Indeed, about 70% of the suggested temperature reduction identified by Climate 

Interactive is completely spurious. 

We can see how dramatic the assumption is in this figure, comparing the Climate 

Interactive "no action" baseline for the USA, to two 'Business as Usual' scenarios 

from nine mainstream, peer-reviewed models from the Stanford Energy 

Modeling Forum 24: 

... 14 

"' 

~ 

~12 ... 

a; 

;o 

~ 

::l 10 .,. 

"' 0 

u 8 

~ 

"' c 

0 6 ·: 

e 

Ill "' 4 ::> 

2 

0 

2000 

US Business As Usual emissions 2000-2100 

Climate Interactive and 18 peer-reviewed scenarios 

2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 

-ADAGEBAU 

-FARMSAU 

-FAA:MUS02F 

-GCAMVS02f 

~-""NEMSBAV 

USREPBAU 

~!tmate Interactive 
159 

Globally, Climate Interactive equates "no action" with the planet emitting an 

astonishing 140Gt C02 equivalents every year towards the end of the century. 

This is a fairly wild exaggeration. The UN Environment Programme, along with 

most responsible, mainstream organizations, estimates that without any climate 

policies after 2010, the planet would likely hit emissions of just under 1 OOGt. 

My own analysis of Paris used the gold standard for energy modeling from the 

latest Stanford Energy Modeling Forum, encompassing 10 of the world's top 

models, all individually and collectively peer reviewed. These find a very similar 

scenario to UNEP, with much lower emissions than Climate Interactive assumes. 

This means that about two-thirds (about 2,000Gt) of Climate Interactive's entire 

expected emission reduction is a result of its artificial baseline, not of emissions 

reductions. 

Since these emissions would never have taken place, Paris climate promises can't 

take credit for eliminating them. 

Once we take this assumption away, we find that instead of a reduction of 1 oc 

there is only a cut of about 0.3°C: 

64% of Paris emission 

reduction made u 

150 

:::! 100 

.s 

~ tl) 

c: 

0 

'iii 

tl) 

·e so UJ 

0 

2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 

Of this, about 0.2°C represents the actual reductions - comparable to what my 

paper finds. The last 0.1 oc appears mostly to be based on emission reductions 

happening far after the likely end-point of Paris in 2030. This exaggerates the 
160 

effects of Paris. Hoping that more cuts happen after the period of the Paris treaty 

is not a robust way to analyze the effects of Paris. 

; "You have been the backbone of our analytic work here."- Eric Maltzer, U.S. 

State Department, Climate Change Analyst, quoted on the Climate Interactive 

website at https://www,c:li!11<lt~interac:tiYe.org/about/ 

;; See for example: 

h11!tiLJ;hinkiKQg.res~_&rg/ eli nlatej2 O_L5JllLQ.:?JJ1JJl146/ mi~leacling-ll!l- re Q_Q!Jc:onfu?~s:meciia:pi.'\ris:t::lirn<!te-talks/ 
(161) 

Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
162 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE GARY PALMER

417 

AN ESTIMATE OF THE CENTENNIAL VARIABILITY OF 

GLOBAL TEMPERATURES 

Philip J. Lloyd 

Energy Institute, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Cape Town 

P.O.Box 652 Cape Town 8000 lloydp@cput.ac.za 

ABSTRACT 

There has been widespread investigation of the drivers of changes in global 

temperatures. However, there has been remarkably little consideration of the 

magnitude of the changes to be expected over a period of a few decades or even a 

century. To address this question, the Holocene records up to 8000 years before 

present, from several ice cores were examined. The differences in temperatures 

between all records which are approximately a century apart were determined, after 

any trends in the data had been removed. The differences were close to normally 

distributed. ll1e average standard deviation of temperature was 0.98 ± 0.27 °C. 

This suggests that while some portion of the temperature change observed in the 

20th century was probably caused by greenhouse gases, there is a strong likelihood 

that the major portion was due to natural variations. 

Keywords: Global temperatures, natural variation, ice core, Holocene 

1. INTRODUCTION 

There is ongoing debate about the extent to which various drivers have impacted the 

observed global temperature. Increases in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, resulting 

from the combustion of fossil fuels, are almost certain to have had some impact. 

However, quantifying the impact requires the detennination of some feedbacks in the 

climate system, and it has not thus far been possible either to measure these feedbacks 

to any degree of precision, or to agree on the physical principles that would allow their 

rigorous calculation. 

There are many natural drivers which could impact the global temperature. Some 

are extraterrestrial, such as the activity of the sun. Some are terrestrial, such as 

volcanoes. All are dynamic. Thus global temperatures will naturally vary with time. 

In order to quantify the impact of any one driver, it is necessary to possess a reasonable 

measure of the natural variability of the global system. 

There have been surprisingly few attempts to determine the natural variability over 

periods of a few decades. Folland et al 1 discussed rapid changes observable in the ice 

cores records, and shifts over a millennium or longer, but that is little guide to the 

variation over periods of a century or less. Trenberth et al 2 noted "The standard 
163 

418 Energy & Environmem · Vol. 26, No.3, 2015 

deviation of the HadCRUT3 annual average temperatures for the globe for 1850 to 

2005 shown in Figure 3.6 is 0.24°C. The greatest difference between two consecutive 

years in the global average since 1901 is 0.29°C between 1976 and 1977, 

demonstrating the importance of the 0.75°C and 0.74°C temperature increases (the 

HadCRUT3linear trend estimates for 1901 to 2005 and 1906 to 2005, respectively) in 

a centennial time-scale context." This can only be regarded as na'ive - the standard 

deviation of annual temperatures cannot indicate much about the standard deviation 

over a century. 

Davies and Hunt3 discussed the problem of detecting climate change in the 

presence of climate variability. Many authors have sought reasons for the natural 

variability - for instance, Muller ct al4 showed that decadal shifts were strongly 

correlated with the North Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation, confirming an earlier 

supposition by Hurrc115. Many models reproduce the observed level of variability 

reasonably welL and North and Stcvens6, for example, have shown how models of 

various forcings can be used to demonstrate that the signals caused by the forcings 

exceed the noise level. 

So while there has been an examination of short-term noise in the global 

temperature record, there has been little work on centennial noise, which is surprising, 

given that the global temperature records derived from direct measurement only 

extend back about 150 years. During that time there have been decade-long 

temperature shifts both up and down, and over the whole of the 20th century an 

increase of approximately 0.7°C. But it is still not certain if the signal of any 

greenhouse-gas-induced warming has emerged from the background noise. This was 

the stimulus for examining the icc core records, to try to develop an estimate of the 

natural centennial variations in the global temperature during the Holocene. 

2.DATA 

Data were downloaded from National Climatic Data Center7. Figure I shows the 

Holocene to 10 000 years before present for Agassiz/Rcnland8. The temperature 

reconstruction is based on an average of uplift corrected o 180 data from Agassiz and 

Renland. This average has been corrected for changes in the o180 of seawater, and 

calibrated to borehole temperature records from Camp Century, NGRIP, GRIP and 

DYE-3. 

Figure 2 shows the Holocene to 4 000 years before present for, based upon Ar-N2 

isotope temperature reconstruction9. 

Figure 3 gives the Holocene to I 0 000 years before present from the Vostok 

wcbsitc 10. The relative temperature, L'l.T, was given by: 

(I) 

where 6o 180 is the globally averaged change from today's value of sea water o180sea• 

and 9 parts per thousand per °C is the spatial isotope/temperature gradient derived 

from deuterium data for the region of East Antarctica ncar Vostok 11 • The accuracy of 

the oD estimation was I part per thousand 12 . Model rcsults 13, 14 suggest that there may 

be a slight underestimation of temperature changes using Equation ( 1). 
164 

An estimate of the centennial variability of global temperatures 419 

Figure 1 Holocene temperature anomaly for GISP by oxygen isotope 
165 

420 Energy & Environment · Vol. 26, No. 3, 2015 

7000 8000 9000 

Figure 3 Holocene temperature anomaly for Vostok ice core by oxygen isotope 

Figure 4 gives the temperature reconstruction for the EPICA Dome C Antarctic ice 

core 15. 

Figure 4. Holocene temperature anomaly for EPICA Dome C ice core by oxygen 

isotope 
166 

An estimate of the centennial variability of global tempcratllres 421 

3. ANALYSIS 

The method of analysis is illustrated with reference to the data given in Figure 1. There 

is an anomaly at approximately 8200 years before 2000, so only the data to 8140 was 

analysed. Several models for the trends in the data were tested; a second order 

polynomial gave slightly better performance than any other. The data were detrended 

using this model. Then the differences between de trended temperatures 100 years 

apart were determined. These differences were normally distributed, with a zero mean 

and a standard deviation of 0.67°C±0.03°C, where the error is !/-ln. 

The same methodology was applied to the data in Figure 2, which extended only to 

4000 years before present. In this case the best trend model was linear. The estimated 

standard deviation of global temperatures during the Holocene was l.27°C±0.02°C. 

The methodology had to be adapted for the Vostok data to 8135 YB 1950 shown in 

Figure 3. Inspection showed that, while samples were taken every metre, over the first 

15m, there was approximately 100±20 years between every 5 metres. The depth 

equivalent to 100±20 years decreased with depth, reaching about 2 metres at 250 m 

depth. It was therefore possible to measure the temperature difference between layers 

100±20 years apart. As before, the data were dctrended by adding the trend in the 

temperature anomaly, as given by linear regression, to the measured temperature. The 

temperature difference between layers I 00±20 years apart was then taken as the 

difference between the detrended temperatures. The average age difference was 98.6 

years with a standard deviation of 9.3 years, and the differences were nonnally 

distributed about the mean. The standard deviation of the temperature anomaly was 

0.83°C±0.06°C. 

A similar methodology was adopted for the Dome C data shown in Figure 4. There 

was no significant trend in the data to 8140 YB 1950. The raw temperature anomalies 

were therefore used direct. The average time between reported temperature anomalies 

was 100.8 years with a standard deviation of 5.5 years, and the differences were 

normally distributed about the mean. The standard deviation of the temperature 

anomaly was 1.15°C±0.06°C. 

4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 

A single site on earth cannot describe the global climate, but it can clearly track 

changes in global temperatures to a reasonable degree. Certainly all relatively deep ice 

cores record a steep rise in temperatures at around II 000 YBP marking the start of 

the Holocene, and the anomaly at 8200 YBP is equally clear in most rccordsi. 

Similarly, the temperature derived from the isotopic signatures is not an exact 

temperature, but there is general agreement that the lowest temperatures experienced 

during the previous glacial era were of the order of -10± 1 °C below present 

temperatures, so the relative temperatures derived from isotopic signatures for the 

Holocene are probably accurate to about 0.5°C. Isotope measurements have a 

precision of the order of I per thousand, which would suggest a temperature precision 

of the order of 0.3°C at temperatures of -300K. However, all the samples analysed in 

this study had well over 200 values, so the precision of measurement should have had 

little influence on the results. 

1 The Vostok record shows an increase in temperature at this date - most others show a sudden decrease. 
167 

422 Energy & Environment · VoL 26, No. 3, 2015 

The method of using as many as possible of the pairs of samples -1 00 years apart 

has two possible sources of error. First, there is the possibility that they are not 

independent, because most data points were employed twice, first as a starting date 

and then as an end date. Any possible effect of lack of independence was checked by 

testing six sub-samples of the EPICA data, consisting of independent strings with 

different starting dates, with all data points in each string 100 years apart. The average 

standard deviation of the six was 1.12±0.13°C, where the error limits are those for the 

sample of six. This value should be compared with the standard deviation for the 

entire set of the EPICA data, 1.15°C±0.06°C. It is therefore apparent that the data are 

effectively independent. 

The second potential source of error arises from the approximation to an exact 

century by a collection of measurements approximately 100±10 years apart. To 

examine this effect, the standard deviation was calculated for various different periods 

of time. Figure 5 shows the results for the data of Figure 1. 

0.70 ~ 

::. 0.68 7\i 

~ 0.66 a. 

~ 0.64 ... 

0 0.62 

t: s 0.60 

·~ 0.58 <II 

"0 0 56 1! . 

{)! 0.54 t: J! 0.52 Ill 

0.50 

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 

Years between measurements 

Figure 5. Variation of standard deviation with changes in number of years between 

measurements 

It is evident that the standard deviation varies relatively slowly with change in the 

number of years between measurements from about 80 years onwards. Other cores 

gave a similar result. It is therefore clear that the use of 100±10 years does not 

introduce any additional error. 

Table 1 summarises the results. It seems possible that the GISP data yield a lower 

result than the other three samples because each point represents the average over 20 

years, whereas the other data are for a single year. Taken together, however, it makes 
168 

An estimate of the centennial variability of global temperatures 423 

Table 1 Summary of data 

Core Estimated Standard Comment 

Standard Deviation on 

Deviation, deg C Estimate, deg C 

G!SP 0.67 0.03 20 year average 

GISP-2 1.27 0.02 Ar-N2 temperature estimate 

Vostok 0.83 0.06 

Dome-C 1.13 0.06 

little difference; the best estimate of the centennial standard deviation of temperature 

during the Holocene is 0.98 ± 0.27 °C. 

During the 201

h century, them10meters recorded an increase of about 0.7°C. It 

seems reasonably certain that there was some warming due to the increasing buildup 

of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, but it seems difficult to estimate the magnitude 

of this wanning in the face of a likely natural variation of the order of I °C. The signal 

of anthropogenic global wanning may not yet have emerged from the natural 

background. 

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170 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE SUZANNE BONAMICI

Opening Statement 

Ranking Member Bonamici 

An Overview of the Nation's Weather Satellite Programs and Policies 

December 10,2015 

I'd like to begin by thanking Chairman Bridenstine and 

Chairman Loudermilk for holding today's hearing. It's fitting 

that we are ending our work this session the same way we began 

it- by holding a hearing to examine the progress and health of 

our nation's weather satellites. Unfortunately, problems remain 

and progress has been slow. 

Oversight of these critical systems and finding ways to 

improve weather forecasts and warnings that protect the 

American people and the economy from severe weather are 

issues on which we can successfully identify common ground. 

This year we have partnered to advance NOAA's weather 

research enterprise through the Weather Forecasting 

Improvement Act. This bill would improve the products and 

services offered by the National Weather Service- ultimately 

saving lives. 
171 

But we can't have accurate and timely weather forecasts 

unless we have high-quality and continuous data from our polar 

and geostationary satellites. Any loss of coverage would have 

very serious consequences on the capabilities of the National 

Weather Service. 

This is important for my constituents and for every 

American. In fact, Northwest Oregon is currently being 

inundated with severe rainfall. As of December 9th, areas in the 

district I represent experienced up to 12 inches of rain in a threeday period. The excessive rainfall has resulted in power outages, 

school delays, fallen trees, flooding, severe highway damage, 

and rerouted transit service. I want to thank our hardworking 

forecasters in the Portland Weather Service Office, first 

responders, and emergency managers for their work monitoring 

and mitigating the damages of this severe weather event. These 

rainstorms emphasize the importance of ensuring there is not a 

gap in weather data. 

Unfortunately, both the geostationary and polar satellite 

programs, GOES and JPSS, respectively have been marked by 

schedule delays, significant cost growth, technical performance 

2 
172 

concerns, and management challenges. And although I would 

prefer to hear in today' s hearing that the programs are both on 

track and that the risks of a data gap have been sufficiently 

mitigated, regrettably that is not the case. Since our last hearing 

in February, NOAA has announced that they will delay the 

launch of GOES-R from March 2016 to October 2016 and a 

mission critical instrument on JPSS, the Advanced Technology 

Microwave Sounder, has missed a key milestone- its 

November delivery date. 

These delays are unacceptable. The stakes are too high and 

I cannot emphasize enough the importance of getting these 

programs on track to protect the American people and our 

economy. 

We will hear testimony today from Mr. David Powner with 

the Government Accountability Office. He will identifY some of 

the key risks and challenges that NOAA faces in successfully 

executing these critical programs, but I want to focus the 

remainder of my time on two areas that he will discuss in detail 

and that are important for Congress to consider. 

3 
173 

First, in April of this year NOAA adjusted the life 

expectancy estimates for the current constellation of 

geostationary and polar satellites. Specifically, NOAA now 

expects the current geostationary satellites to remain operational 

for 10 years, not seven years, and that our current polar satellite, 

Suomi-NPP, will be operational for nine years, not five years. 

These adjustments in operational lifespan will significantly 

mitigate or eliminate any potential gap in satellite coverage. 

This is a positive development, but we must make sure that 

these adjustments are realistic and that we remain vigilant in our 

oversight ofNOAA. 

Second, the changes to the expected lifespan of our current 

satellites raises important questions about the best and most cost 

effective way to structure the timing and development of the 

next-generation satellites. There is no question that NOAA 

needs to work expeditiously to launch GOES-Rand JPSS-1 as 

well as GOES-S and JPSS-2, but as we consider the out years it 

will be important for NOAA to clearly evaluate and document 

the costs and benefits of various launch scenarios. 

4 
174 

Mr. Chairman, I know you share my strong desire to ensure 

that the American people and industries that rely on this data 

have the most accurate and timely weather forecasts and 

warnings. Our capabilities are dependent on a robust 

constellation of weather satellites and I look forward to hearing 

from our witnesses about how we can accomplish that goal. 

Thank you and I yield back the balance of my time. 

5 
175 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE SUZANNE BONAMICI

Æ 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY 

Statement and Questions for the Record 

Hearing of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

"Pitfalls of Unilateral Negotiations at the Paris Climate Change 

Conference" 

December 1, 2015 

Thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Johnson, for holding today's 

hearing on the United Nations climate change conference in Paris and to 

investigate America's role in the global effort to limit greenhouse gas emissions. 

I hear every day from neighbors in central and northwest Connecticut who are 

concerned about climate change. They are frankly tired of endless debate. They 

want action, and they want American leadership. Today's hearing is not only an 

opportunity for these constituents to consider the reservations and criticisms of 

skeptics with whom they disagree. It is also an opportunity to address those 

concerns and speak for the unheard majority of Americans who want this Congress 

to do more, not less, to address the growing climate crisis. 

Perhaps the most frequent criticism of any domestic emission reduction policy is 

that the U.S. alone cannot impact global emissions. This is a global problem 

requiring international cooperation. So critics often contend that the rest of the 

world is uninterested in curbing emissions at the expense of their own economic 

gro>vth. 

Dr. Steer, your testimony would indicate otherwise. Specifically, you state that "a 

growing body of evidence shows that economic growth is not in conflict with 

efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases." You also mention the role of 

subnational actors like states in addressing climate change. Last month, the Deputy 

Commissioner ofthe State of Connecticut's Department of Environment and 

Energy discussed the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, noting that states 

participating in the initiative were been able to reduce their carbon emissions by 40 

percent while simultaneously expanding the regional economy by 8 percent.