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THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S 

REPRIORITIZATION EFFORTS

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Audit Division 

Audit Report 05-37 

September 2005
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THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION’S REPRIORITIZATION EFFORTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

 For more than three years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

has been undergoing a broad transformation aimed at focusing the agency on 

terrorism and intelligence-related matters. In May 2002, in the aftermath of 

the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (9/11), the FBI established 

counterterrorism and counterintelligence as its top two investigative 

priorities. At the same time, the FBI Director formally transferred more than 

500 agents from traditional criminal areas to terrorism-related programs.1

 

These changes were designed to transform the FBI into a more proactive, 

intelligence-driven agency dedicated to preventing acts of terrorism against 

the United States and its citizens. 

 The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) previously reviewed the FBI’s 

reprioritization efforts, focusing on the internal operational changes that 

occurred within the FBI between fiscal years (FYs) 2000 and 2003. In that 

audit we identified the specific types of offenses that the FBI was no longer 

investigating at pre-9/11 levels.2

 We found that the FBI’s investigative 

efforts in FY 2003 were generally consistent with its post-9/11 priorities and 

that the FBI was performing less work in certain traditional criminal 

investigative areas and more work in matters related to terrorism. 

We performed the current OIG audit as a follow-on to our previous 

work. In this review, we examined the traditional criminal areas in which 

the FBI had reduced its investigative efforts and attempted to identify the 

impact those changes have had on the operations of other law enforcement 

organizations at the federal, state, and local levels. To accomplish this 

objective, we analyzed FBI data and documentation from FYs 2000 through 

2004 to identify the specific changes in the FBI’s investigative efforts related 

to traditional crime areas. We also reviewed case management data from 

 

* The full version of this report includes a limited amount of information that the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and 

Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) considered to be law enforcement 

sensitive and therefore could not be publicly released. To create this public version of the 

report, the OIG redacted (deleted) the portions of the full report that were considered 

sensitive by the FBI, DEA, and EOUSA; and we indicated where those redactions were made. 

1

 Traditional crime matters include narcotics trafficking, organized crime, violent 

crime, white-collar crime, and civil rights. 

2

 Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. Audit Report Number 04-39, 

The Internal Effects of the FBI’s Reprioritization, September 2004. 
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the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, which showed changes in 

the number of criminal matters that the FBI had referred to United States 

Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) during our review period. 

We interviewed headquarters-level officials at the FBI and other federal 

law enforcement entities, such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 

and Explosives (ATF); the Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA); the Executive Office of the President’s High Intensity 

Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program; and the United States Marshals 

Service (USMS) to determine the impact of the FBI’s changed investigative 

priorities. Further, to obtain the views of state and local law enforcement 

officials, we disseminated a web-based survey to approximately 3,500 state 

and local law enforcement agencies located in the jurisdictional areas of the 

following 12 FBI field offices: Atlanta, Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Dallas, 

Texas; Denver, Colorado; Detroit, Michigan; Los Angeles, California; Miami, 

Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; New York City, New York; Phoenix, Arizona; 

San Francisco, California; and Washington, D.C. We then conducted 

interviews with field-level federal, state, and local officials within seven of 

these FBI field office jurisdictions.3 The following sections summarize the 

results of the OIG’s review.

FBI Criminal Resources 

By analyzing the FBI’s field agent allocations (planned resource usage) 

and field agent utilization (actual use of resources), we first identified the 

specific changes that had taken place in FBI resource usage between 

FYs 2000 and 2004. We determined that, through its reprioritization efforts, 

the FBI had formally reallocated 1,143 field agent positions away from 

investigating drugs, violent crime, white-collar crime, and other traditional 

crime and primarily placed these resources in terrorism-related programs. 

Further, our review of agent utilization data revealed that the FBI had 

reduced the actual investigative work of field agents related to traditional 

crimes by more than 1,200 personnel, which is in addition to the formal 

reallocation of 1,143 field agent positions. According to senior FBI officials, 

these additional agents were diverted from criminal investigative areas to 

terrorism-related matters as needs arose. 

 3

 For our interviews with state and local officials, we spoke with the major police 

department located in each city we visited. In addition, we judgmentally selected police 

departments based on responses to the OIG survey, choosing agencies that indicated they 

had been either negatively or positively affected by the FBI’s reprioritization.
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Allocation of Field Agent Personnel 

 A major element of the FBI’s reprioritization efforts has been to 

reallocate FBI personnel resources and transfer agents from traditional 

criminal investigative areas to terrorism-related issues. The following charts 

provide a FY 2000 to FY 2004 comparison of the allocation of the FBI’s nonsupervisory field agent workforce, according to the type of investigative 

matter to which they were assigned. 

COMPARISON OF FBI FIELD AGENT ALLOCATIONS 

IN TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 20044

FISCAL YEAR 2000 FISCAL YEAR 2004

Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource Management and Allocation (RMA) Office data 

 In FY 2000 the FBI allocated 75 percent of its field agent workforce to 

criminal investigative areas, predominantly organized crime, drugs, violent 

crime, and white-collar crime. By FY 2004, the proportion of FBI field agents 

involved in criminal-related matters declined to 65 percent. 

These percentages reflect the FBI’s allocation of fewer field agent 

positions to criminal areas in FY 2004 compared to FY 2000. The following 

graph depicts the changes in allocations between FYs 2000 and 2004 within 

traditional criminal program areas.

 4

 We categorized FBI activities as terrorism-related or criminal-related based on the 

program in which the work was captured. We considered terrorism-related work to be 

captured in the National Foreign Intelligence, Domestic Terrorism, and National 

Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion programs. We considered criminal-related 

work to be captured in the Civil Rights, Criminal Enterprise Investigations, Cyber Crime, 

Organized Crime/Drug, Violent Crime/Major Offenders, and White-Collar Crime programs. 
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TRADITIONAL CRIME ALLOCATIONS OF FBI FIELD AGENTS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Source: OIG analysis of FBI RMA Office data 

As shown above, the majority of this reduction occurred in the 

resources allotted for drug investigations. In total, the FBI allocated 

1,143 fewer agents to these traditional criminal areas in FY 2004 compared 

to FY 2000. 

Utilization of Field Agent Personnel 

In addition to the reallocation of positions, we found that the actual 

reduction in the number of agents investigating criminal matters was 

significantly greater than the FBI planned.5 During FY 2004, the FBI 

allocated a total of 5,753 agent resources to traditional crime matters; 

however, only 4,474 field agents were actually utilized in these areas, a 

difference of 1,279 agents. 

According to FBI officials, FBI field offices were directed to ensure that 

no terrorism-related matter went unaddressed, which primarily contributed 

to the significant gap in the utilization and allocation figures. As a result, the 

total number of agents actually investigating traditional crime matters was 

2,190 less during FY 2004 than during FY 2000. Overall, the FBI had 

6,664 agents involved in traditional crime areas in FY 2000, while 

4,474 agents investigated such matters in FY 2004. 

Further analyses revealed that each of the FBI’s current criminal 

investigative programs experienced agent utilization reductions during this 

4-year period, as shown in the following graph. Significant decreases 

 5

 Resource allocations reflect the FBI’s planned resource usage, while resource 

utilization indicates the actual time that FBI field agents spent performing their duties. 
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occurred in Americas Criminal Enterprises (45 percent), which is responsible 

for investigating narcotics trafficking, gang-related crime, and major theft, 

and Transnational Criminal Enterprises (35 percent), which includes the 

FBI’s organized crime investigative efforts. 

FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION IN SPECIFIC CRIMINAL AREAS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 20046

Source: OIG analysis of FBI Time Utilization and Recordkeeping data 

FBI Criminal Casework 

For additional insight into the impact of the FBI’s reprioritization efforts, 

we analyzed data on changes in the number of FBI cases opened. We found 

that the FBI opened 28,331 fewer criminal cases in FY 2004 than it had in 

FY 2000, a 45-percent reduction. During FY 2000, the FBI initiated 

62,782 criminal investigations, while in FY 2004 the number of investigations 

declined to 34,451. Within the Criminal Investigative Division, each criminal 

program experienced a reduction in case openings during our review period, 

as depicted in the following graph. Notably, the Americas Criminal 

Enterprises Program initiated over 50 percent fewer cases in FY 2004 than in 

FY 2000. Additionally, significant decreases in case initiations occurred in 

Financial Crimes (40 percent) and Violent Crimes (47 percent). 

 6

 During FY 2004, the FBI restructured its Criminal Investigative Division in an effort to 

better reflect current trends in criminal activity. Included in this restructuring was the creation 

of new programs, such as the Americas Criminal Enterprises. We adjusted the data to reflect 

this current program arrangement for both FYs 2000 and 2004. 
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FBI CASE OPENINGS IN SPECIFIC CRIMINAL AREAS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI Automated Case Support data 

Aside from the decrease in the number of case openings, we also 

observed a reduction in the number of case serials associated with certain 

traditional crime matters in FY 2004 as compared to FY 2000.7

 The following 

graph illustrates a general decrease in case serials in four traditional crime 

areas. 

FBI CASE SERIALS FOR SELECT TRADITIONAL CRIME MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI case serials 

 7

 FBI agents submit documents reflecting work on a case to the appropriate case 

file. Each document entry receives a serial, or tracking, number and is known as a “serial.” 
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In addition to the results of our FBI casework analysis, we found that 

the FBI reduced the number of criminal-related matters referred to the 

USAOs by 6,151, or 27 percent, between FYs 2000 and 2004.8

 As the 

following exhibit shows, the FBI referred 22,876 criminal-related matters to 

the USAOs during FY 2000; this figure declined to 16,725 criminal matters in 

FY 2004. 

FBI CRIMINAL MATTERS REFERRED TO THE USAOs 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004 

Source: OIG analysis of United States Attorney case data 

Impact of Shift in FBI Criminal Investigative Effort 

 We examined the effect of the FBI’s shift in resources and case openings 

on the operations of other law enforcement agencies. To assess these 

impacts, we interviewed FBI and other federal law enforcement officials. We 

also surveyed and interviewed many state and local officials. The following 

sections provide an overview of the results of our interviews and survey. 

FBI Field Office Perspective 

Several FBI field division officials commented that the significant 

resource reductions in traditional crime areas have considerably affected 

their investigative efforts. For example, prior to 9/11 one of the FBI’s 

56 field offices had at least 9 drug squads. By the time of our fieldwork in 

April 2005, the number of drug squads in that field office had been reduced 

to three. Similarly, another FBI field office had at least four drug squads 

before the FBI’s reprioritization, but is currently operating with two. 

According to FBI field managers, the reduction in the number of drug squads 

resulted in a reduction in the number of drug-related investigations. 

 8

 The figures presented for criminal-related matters include all non-terrorism related 

referrals to the USAOs. For purposes of this report, we considered the matters referred to 

the USAOs that are categorized as Internal Security Offenses to be terrorism-related. 
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Reductions in the number of FBI squads were not limited to drug-related 

matters, but also occurred within the areas of violent crime and white-collar 

crime. For example, one FBI field office had three individual squads 

responsible for bank robberies, fugitives, and truck hijacking/cargo theft 

which, after 9/11, were combined into one squad with a resource level 

equivalent to only one of the original squads. Additionally, another FBI field 

office had operated with at least four white-collar crime squads prior to 9/11, 

but at the time of our fieldwork in March 2005 the office had two such squads. 

Some FBI officials we interviewed stated that the FBI’s more limited 

presence in violent crime and white-collar crime had impaired the law 

enforcement community’s efforts to address these crime areas, particularly 

financial institution fraud and bank robberies. They added that state and 

local law enforcement agencies generally do not have the necessary 

resources or jurisdictional authority to effectively address many of these 

violations, and they commented that no other law enforcement agency has 

been able to compensate entirely for the FBI’s reduced efforts in these areas. 

Other Federal Law Enforcement Perspectives 

We obtained mixed perspectives from the non-FBI federal agency 

officials we interviewed regarding the FBI’s reprioritization. At the 

headquarters-level, while some agency officials stated that they had not 

observed significant changes in the FBI’s traditional criminal operations, 

other agency representatives said they noticed a reduction in FBI 

investigative effort in traditional crime matters.

At the field-level, many non-FBI federal officials we interviewed said 

they had observed changes in the FBI’s investigative efforts of criminal 

matters. They commented that the FBI focused much of its attention on 

terrorism-related matters while pulling back in traditional areas such as 

drugs and fugitive apprehensions. Despite the FBI’s reduced investigative 

effort in these traditional crime areas, most non-FBI federal managers in the 

field said they did not believe their agencies’ operations had been 

significantly affected, aside from an increase in their caseloads. However, 

these other non-FBI federal law enforcement officials raised concerns about 

their resource levels and commented that it will become increasingly difficult 

for their agencies to assume a greater role investigating traditional crime 

areas without increased resources. 

In addition to the feedback obtained from non-FBI federal investigative 

officials, representatives from various USAOs said they noted a significant 

decline in the number of FBI cases brought to them for prosecution. These 

federal prosecutors also commented that they believed the FBI’s shift in 
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priorities had created investigative gaps in certain crime areas, such as 

financial crimes. 

State and Local Law Enforcement Perspectives 

The overall response to our web-based survey of state and local law 

enforcement agencies located within 12 different FBI field office jurisdictions 

indicated that state and local law enforcement operations were affected only 

minimally by the FBI’s reprioritization. Our survey contained several 

questions inquiring as to whether the responding agency’s investigative 

efforts had been affected by the FBI’s reprioritization in various criminal 

areas, such as drug-related crime and white-collar crime. Participants were 

provided a scaled response to select not only the type of impact but also the 

magnitude of that impact.9 The following graph illustrates the perceived 

impact of respondents for traditional crime matters.10

SURVEY RESULTS OF THE IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL 

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES’ TRADITIONAL CRIME INVESTIGATIONS 

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 

 9

 Participants were provided a scaled response to select whether the impact was positive 

or negative, and the magnitude of such impact. A negative impact was defined as an agency 

being impaired by the FBI’s shift in priorities, such as if the agency experienced severe difficulty 

in handling the type of investigation listed. A positive impact was defined as an agency 

benefiting from the FBI’s reprioritization, such as if the agency significantly enhanced its 

operations to successfully address the investigative area in question. 

10 We distributed our survey to 3,514 agencies, and 1,265 agencies submitted a 

response. However, not every agency answered each question and in some instances agencies 

submitted multiple responses. Detailed information on the survey instrument, recipients, 

respondents, and responses can be found in Appendices I, VIII, IX, and X of this report. 
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As shown in this graph, only a small percentage of the state and local 

respondents indicated that their operations had been impaired by the FBI’s 

reprioritization. However, in the white-collar crime area, more agencies said 

they were negatively affected (9 percent of respondents) than in other crime 

areas (5 to 6 percent of respondents). 

In addition to questions related to these general traditional crime areas, 

our survey included questions related to specific types of violations, such as 

bank robberies and gang-related activity. Although the answers to these 

questions mirrored the results of the overall investigative areas – a majority 

of respondents said their operations were only minimally affected by the FBI’s 

shift in priorities – we did identify some matters, such as bank robberies and 

financial institution fraud, in which respondents indicated a greater negative 

impact caused by the FBI’s reprioritization. 

To follow-up on our survey, we interviewed state and local law 

enforcement officials in 7 of the 12 geographic areas to which the survey 

was disseminated. In these interviews, the officials described the impact 

that the FBI’s shift in investigative priorities had on state and local 

operations. These discussions were more detailed than the survey results 

indicated, and many officials discussed specific concerns they had with the 

FBI’s post-9/11 shift in investigative priorities. 

In general, state and local law enforcement officials commented that 

their caseloads have increased following the FBI’s reprioritization. Officials 

at several of these agencies expressed concern that they do not have 

adequate resources to address this increased volume. Moreover, some of 

these officials stated that the complex and far-reaching crimes that the FBI 

had been handling often exceeded their departments’ resource levels, 

expertise, and jurisdictional authority. 

During our discussions with state and local law enforcement 

representatives, we also asked for information on specific crime areas in which 

they had noticed an impact following the FBI’s reprioritization. According to 

these officials, the primary area that their agencies were not able to 

adequately address alone was financial crimes, especially matters related to 

financial institution fraud. To a lesser extent, several local law enforcement 

agencies observed reduced involvement by the FBI in the investigation of 

gangs and bank robberies, which some local officials stated had caused a gap 

that the local agencies have been unable to completely fill. 
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Specific Crime Areas Affected by the FBI Reprioritization 

 Through our discussions with FBI and non-FBI law enforcement 

officials, we identified and focused on several specific crime areas that these 

individuals said were negatively affected by the FBI’s reprioritization efforts. 

In addition, our discussions with the FBI and other federal law enforcement 

agencies revealed areas such as identity theft and fugitive apprehension in 

which it appears that the federal government’s response should be 

addressed in a more coordinated manner. 

Financial Crimes

 Our data analyses and fieldwork revealed that the FBI had significantly 

reduced its investigations of financial institution fraud (FIF), especially less 

significant, low-dollar incidents. Between FYs 2000 and 2004, the FBI 

reduced the number of agents addressing FIF matters under $100,000 from 

111 agents to 20. Based on our interviews and data analysis, we concluded 

that this decreased effort created an investigative gap that no other law 

enforcement agency had substantially filled. Several local law enforcement 

officials stated that many of these crimes were going unaddressed as a 

result of the FBI’s reduced presence in this area. Similarly, discussions with 

USAO representatives and analysis of USAO criminal data showed that 

generally no other law enforcement agency had assumed a greater 

investigative role on FIF matters to compensate for the FBI’s reduced effort 

in this area. 

 To a lesser extent, our data analysis and interviews revealed that a 

gap existed within the law enforcement community related to telemarketing 

and wire fraud. Comparing FY 2004 to FY 2000, the FBI used fewer agents 

to address telemarketing and wire fraud, opened fewer such cases, and 

referred fewer telemarketing fraud matters to the USAOs. According to FBI 

and local law enforcement officials, other law enforcement agencies were 

unable to assume a greater investigative role in these areas because they 

lacked sufficient resources, technical capability, and jurisdictional authority. 

 In addition, according to FBI data, the FBI experienced reductions in 

both its overall agent utilization and case openings between FYs 2000 and 

2004 on health care fraud investigations, even though it is the FBI’s second 

highest national priority for financial crimes. Our analysis of USAO data 

showed similar results – the FBI referred fewer health care fraud matters to 

the USAOs in FY 2004 than in FY 2000. Other federal agencies increased the 

number of such matters referred to the USAOs, but not nearly to the extent 

of the FBI’s reduction. At our exit conference, the FBI provided evidence 
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that its efforts related to health care fraud had increased in FY 2005 

compared to FY 2004. 

 

Corporate fraud is the FBI’s top financial crime priority nationally. In 

accordance with this ranking, the FBI utilized more agents on corporate 

fraud investigations and referred more corporate fraud matters to the USAOs 

in FY 2004 than in FY 2000. 

Criminal Enterprises 

In this section, we assess the FBI’s investigative efforts with regard to 

criminal enterprises, which include drug trafficking, gangs, and organized 

crime. The FBI’s greatest reduction in agent resources between FYs 2000 

and 2004 occurred in its drug-related investigations, resulting in fewer drug 

cases being opened and a decreased overall effort in investigating drug 

crime. According to the FBI, it has focused its limited resources on 

dismantling major drug trafficking criminal enterprises rather than on lowlevel narcotics trafficking investigations. The DEA field managers we 

interviewed stated that their drug-related efforts had not been negatively 

affected by the FBI’s reprioritization in the large metropolitan areas, but 

some of these officials were concerned that an investigative gap existed in 

smaller urban areas in which prior to 9/11 the FBI was the predominant 

federal agency addressing drug crime. Many of the state and local law 

enforcement officials we interviewed noted that their drug-related operations 

had not been adversely affected by the FBI’s change in priorities. 

Our analysis of USAO data revealed that the FBI had submitted almost 

1,600 fewer drug-related criminal matters to the USAOs in FY 2004 than it 

had in FY 2000. Other federal law enforcement agencies, particularly the 

DEA and ATF, increased the number of drug trafficking matters that they 

referred to the USAOs between FYs 2000 and 2004. However, these 

increases did not fully compensate for the overall decrease in drug-related 

matters referred to the USAOs. The following table details the drug 

trafficking matters received by the USAOs in FYs 2000 and 2004. 

OVERALL DRUG-RELATED MATTERS RECEIVED BY THE USAOs 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

All Agencies 20,331 18,368 -1,963 -10% 

FBI 3,292 1,699 -1,593 -48% 

DEA 10,053 10,296 243 2% 

ICE 5,683 4,834 -849 -15% 

ATF 464 779 315 68% 

Source: OIG analysis of United States Attorneys’ central case management system data 
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Similar to the FBI’s reduced investigative effort in drug-related crime, 

the FBI experienced a reduction in its organized crime effort between 

FYs 2000 and 2004. We found that the FBI utilized 35 percent fewer agents 

on organized crime matters, resulting in fewer organized crime case 

openings and referrals to the USAOs since FY 2000. Several USAO officials 

that we interviewed commented that the FBI’s reduced organized crime 

effort had a negative effect in their jurisdictions. 

 

In contrast to the FBI’s decreased emphasis on drug crimes and 

organized crime, the FBI has increased its investigation of gangs over the 

past few years. Data revealed that the FBI essentially maintained the same 

level of agents investigating gang-related matters in FY 2004 than it had in 

FY 2000. Moreover, the FBI initiated more cases on gang matters during 

FY 2004 than during FY 2000. 

However, our fieldwork revealed that the law enforcement community 

in many metropolitan areas believed they lacked useful communication 

regarding gang-related activity and investigations. Despite the number of 

agencies addressing these matters, we were told that the FBI, the ATF, local 

police and sheriff’s departments, and other agencies in several large cities 

did not adequately coordinate gang-related efforts. For example, we were 

told of instances in which multiple agencies in a city targeted the same gang 

without knowing about the other agencies’ efforts. We believe the FBI 

should seek a more coordinated approach with other members of the law 

enforcement community to successfully combat gangs. 

Fugitive Apprehension 

Our analysis and review of FBI data showed that the FBI has reduced 

its efforts in fugitive-related investigations since FY 2000. In line with our 

analysis, USMS officials at several of the district offices we visited remarked 

that they had noticed a lessened effort by the FBI in fugitive-related 

matters, although they said this change had not affected their ability to 

address an increased caseload. Moreover, the majority of state and local 

law enforcement agency representatives we interviewed did not indicate that 

their work had been negatively affected by any changes in the FBI’s efforts 

with respect to fugitive-related matters. However, during our discussions 

with executives at the FBI and the USMS about fugitive operations, we found 

that the relationship between the agencies was strained and that there was 

little agreement about the types of cases each agency would work in order 

to avoid duplication of effort. 
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Bank Robberies 

Another area in which the FBI has reduced its efforts since 9/11 is the 

investigation of bank robberies. According to the FBI’s data, the number of 

agents handling bank robberies decreased by approximately 30 percent 

between FYs 2000 and 2004. Both FBI and non-FBI officials agreed that the 

FBI was no longer addressing bank robberies as aggressively as it had prior 

to 9/11. 

According to state and local officials, the primary effect of the FBI’s 

reduced role in bank robberies was an increase in their caseloads. However, 

a few state and local officials indicated that the FBI’s reprioritization had 

created a gap in bank robbery investigations for which they were unable to 

compensate. 

Identity Theft 

Identity theft was cited as a major concern by the majority of state 

and local law enforcement agencies we interviewed. Officials at these 

agencies viewed identity theft as an emerging criminal issue and expected 

criminal activity in this area to increase in the future. Although we found 

that several federal agencies, including the FBI, are involved in investigating 

identity theft to varying degrees, we found no coordinated approach for 

combating this crime. Local law enforcement officials said they are, at 

times, confused about which agency to turn to for assistance. 

Overwhelmingly, local law enforcement agencies conveyed the need for the 

development of a federal strategy to combat identity theft at all levels of law 

enforcement. 

Public Corruption 

Public corruption is the FBI’s highest non-terrorism criminal 

investigative priority. As a result, field offices considered these matters of 

utmost importance in their criminal investigative efforts. Despite this, the 

FBI’s agent utilization data revealed an overall reduction on public corruption 

matters from FYs 2000 to 2004. Additionally, the FBI opened fewer public 

corruption cases during FY 2004. It also appeared that some field offices 

were not giving these matters sufficient emphasis given its priority status. 

As a result, the FBI has implemented an initiative to review the public 

corruption efforts within its field offices to ensure that this crime area 

receives adequate attention. At our exit conference, the FBI provided 

evidence that its resource utilization in public corruption had significantly 

increased in FY 2005 compared to FY 2004.
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Other Crime Areas 

FBI and non-FBI law enforcement officials also raised concerns about 

their investigative efforts related to child pornography, human trafficking, and 

alien smuggling. The primary problem for federal agencies, including the FBI, 

was a lack of resources to adequately address these crimes. In addition, 

state and local law enforcement officials said their agencies lacked sufficient 

resources, technical capability, and jurisdictional authority required to 

investigate these matters. Moreover, in certain locations we identified a lack 

of coordination between the FBI and ICE on these types of investigations. 

Relationships with Others in the Law Enforcement Community 

Communication and coordination among law enforcement agencies at 

the federal, state, and local level is crucial to effective and efficient law 

enforcement. Given its broad range of investigative jurisdiction, the FBI has 

significant contact with other law enforcement personnel at each of these 

levels. With the FBI’s reprioritization and resulting reduced focus on 

traditional crime areas, the FBI’s relationships with other law enforcement 

officials, who will more often address these matters instead of the FBI, are 

critical. 

According to the majority of FBI managers and other law enforcement 

officials we interviewed, the overall relationships between the FBI and other 

law enforcement agencies has improved over the last few years. These 

sentiments were voiced by officials at both the headquarters and field office 

levels. State and local law enforcement officials also indicated that the FBI 

has shared more terrorism-related information with them since 9/11. 

However, while they welcome this intelligence information, these officials 

said they would like the FBI to share more traditional information related to 

crime areas such as gangs. 

In several cities we visited, monthly meetings of law enforcement 

agency managers within a jurisdiction were highly regarded. According to 

many officials, these meetings fostered and maintained good working 

relationships among the law enforcement community. Additionally, these 

meetings provided an opportunity for agencies to share ideas and 

information surrounding current investigative efforts. However, FBI 

managers at some field divisions told us that such meetings were not 

occurring in their jurisdictions. 
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OIG Conclusions and Recommendations 

 Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI has attempted to transform 

itself into a more proactive, intelligence-driven law enforcement agency with 

a greater emphasis on counterterrorism and intelligence gathering. As part 

of this process, in May 2002 the FBI issued a new set of priorities and 

transferred a significant number of agent positions from traditional crime 

areas to terrorism-related programs. This reprioritization has affected not 

only the FBI’s operations but also the investigative operations of other law 

enforcement agencies. 

Our analyses of FBI agent utilization data revealed that the FBI has 

lessened its efforts to combat traditional crime even more than it had 

planned. Further, the FBI opened fewer criminal cases and referred fewer 

criminal matters to the USAOs throughout the country in FY 2004 compared 

to FY 2000. 

The effects of the FBI’s shift in priorities and resources on other law 

enforcement agencies’ operations varied from agency to agency, and often 

from crime area to crime area. Still, our review identified specific crime 

areas, such as financial institution fraud and bank robberies, in which other 

law enforcement officials said the FBI’s reduced investigative activity has 

hurt their ability to address the crime problem in their area and has left an 

investigative gap. 

 In our report, we provided seven recommendations to assist FBI 

management in the allocation of its agent resources and for improving 

specific areas of its operations. These recommendations include: 

(1) assessing investigative need among its various programs to establish 

realistic and practical personnel projections; (2) pursuing an interagency 

working group on identity theft; and (3) seeking a more coordinated 

approach in the areas of fugitive apprehension, child pornography, alien 

smuggling, and human trafficking. 
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THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION’S REPRIORITIZATION 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................1

Overview of the FBI .......................................................1

FBI Reprioritization........................................................1

Prior Reviews................................................................3

Audit Approach .............................................................4

CHAPTER 2: THE FBI’S CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION ................ 8

Overview of the CID ......................................................8

Criminal Enterprise Plan ............................................... 10

CHAPTER 3: FBI RESOURCE AND CASEWORK ANALYSIS..................... 12

FBI Resource Allocations .............................................. 12

FBI Resource Utilization ............................................... 15

Comparison of Resource Allocation to Actual Utilization..... 17

Reasons for Criminal Agent Underutilization .................... 19

FBI Casework Data ...................................................... 20

Criminal Matters Received by 

United States Attorneys’ Offices ............................. 21

Comments from FBI Personnel on 

Effects of Reprioritization....................................... 22

CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ON THE LAW ENFORCEMENT 

COMMUNITY ........................................................ 24

Federal Law Enforcement Perspectives ........................... 24

State and Local Law Enforcement Perspectives ................ 26

Overview of Affected Crime Areas.................................. 31

CHAPTER 5: FINANCIAL CRIMES ..................................................... 34

FBI Financial Crimes Focus ........................................... 35

Overall Changes within the FBI’s Financial Crime Efforts ... 36

Impact on Other Law Enforcement Agencies’ 

Financial Crime Efforts .......................................... 37

Financial Institution Fraud (Bank Fraud) ......................... 39

Telemarketing and Wire Fraud ...................................... 45

Health Care Fraud ....................................................... 48

Corporate (Securities) Fraud ......................................... 52

Chapter Summary ....................................................... 53
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CHAPTER 6: CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES .............................................. 55

Overall FBI Criminal Enterprise Investigative Efforts ......... 55

Narcotic/Illegal Drug Trafficking Organizations ................ 57

Street Gangs .............................................................. 67

Organized Crime ......................................................... 73

Chapter Summary ....................................................... 79

CHAPTER 7: FUGITIVES ................................................................. 81

Impact of Investigative Changes ................................... 83

Chapter Summary ....................................................... 86

CHAPTER 8: BANK ROBBERIES ....................................................... 87

FBI Bank Robbery Measured Response Initiative .............. 87

FBI Investigative Effort ................................................ 88

External Observations and Impact ................................. 89

Chapter Summary ....................................................... 90

CHAPTER 9: IDENTITY THEFT ......................................................... 91

FBI Involvement ......................................................... 91

Need for Federal Strategy on Identity Theft .................... 92

CHAPTER 10: PUBLIC CORRUPTION ................................................... 94

Statistical Evaluation of FBI Public Corruption Efforts........ 94

Public Corruption’s Priority Status .................................. 95

Impact of Public Corruption Emphasis ............................ 96

Chapter Summary ....................................................... 98

CHAPTER 11: OTHER CRIME MATTERS ............................................... 99

Child Pornography ....................................................... 99

Alien Smuggling and Human Trafficking........................ 101

Chapter Summary ..................................................... 102

CHAPTER 12: FBI RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT 

AGENCIES ......................................................... 103

FBI Relationships with Law Enforcement Community ...... 103

Other Federal Agencies .............................................. 104

State and Local Agencies............................................ 104

Best Practice ............................................................ 104

CHAPTER 13: OIG CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............. 105
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APPENDIX I: OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY ................... 111

APPENDIX II: PRIOR FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ORGANIZATION CHART ....................................... 121

APPENDIX III: CROSSWALK OF FBI INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAMS AND 

SUBPROGRAMS .................................................. 122

APPENDIX IV: AGENT UTILIZATION IN FBI INVESTIGATIVE 

CLASSIFICATIONS .............................................. 126

APPENDIX V: AGENCIES USED IN OIG ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY CASE MANAGEMENT DATA ................... 128

APPENDIX VI: CHANGES IN REFERRALS FOR THE CRIMINAL 

CATEGORIES USED BY THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEYS’ OFFICES ......................................... 129

APPENDIX VII: LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONTACTED DURING 

FIELDWORK ....................................................... 133

APPENDIX VIII: WEB-BASED SURVEY RESULTS................................. 137

APPENDIX IX: ADDITIONAL SURVEY ANALYSES............................... 159

APPENDIX X: LIST OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS ............................... 165

APPENDIX XI: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE ....... 183

APPENDIX XII: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND 

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE 

THE REPORT ...................................................... 192

 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) has worked to become a more proactive, intelligencedriven agency. To achieve this goal, the FBI is undergoing an extensive 

transformation, driven by new priorities which resulted in a realignment of its 

investigative resources from traditional crime areas to terrorism-related 

matters. During the past three years, the FBI has devoted more agents to 

counterterrorism and counterintelligence, while reducing its investigative 

involvement in organized crime, drugs, violent crime, and white-collar crime. 

With a more limited FBI presence in these traditional crime areas, the 

responsibility to address an increasing number of these issues has fallen to 

other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The purpose of this 

review was to determine the impact the FBI’s reprioritization has had on other 

agencies in the law enforcement community. 

Overview of the FBI 

The FBI is the largest investigative agency of the Department of Justice 

(DOJ) and is responsible for enforcing more than 200 federal laws. It has the 

broadest jurisdiction of any federal law enforcement agency. The FBI is 

charged with not only investigating criminal matters such as organized crime, 

drugs, and violent crime, but it is also responsible for counterterrorism and 

counterintelligence matters. 

The FBI is comprised of divisions and offices within the United States 

and around the world. The FBI’s executive management is located at 

FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Domestically, the FBI has 56 field 

divisions, with approximately 400 resident agencies that report to a respective 

field division.11 The FBI also has several additional, specialized facilities, such 

as the Critical Incident Response Group and the FBI Laboratory, as well as 

more than 50 Legal Attaché offices located in U.S. embassies and consulates 

around the world. As of May 31, 2005, the FBI employed 12,382 special 

agents and 17,271 support personnel. 

FBI Reprioritization 

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the FBI began 

transforming itself, including the primary emphasis of its investigative efforts. 

According to the FBI Director, the reprioritization process was designed to 

reshape the FBI into an organization better able to combat the imminent 

 11 FBI domestic offices are referred to as divisions, such as the FBI Chicago Division. 

The FBI also refers to its divisions as field offices, such as the FBI Phoenix Field Office. We use 

the terms “division” and “field office” interchangeably throughout the report.
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terrorist threat and to prevent another terrorist attack against the 

United States and its citizens. One of the major results of this process was 

the issuance of a new set of priorities in May 2002, which established the 

order of precedence for the investigative operations of the FBI. These 

priorities are presented in the following exhibit. 

As shown, the FBI’s top priorities are counterterrorism and 

counterintelligence. In line with the newly established priorities, the FBI 

Director formally shifted more than 500 field agents from traditional crime 

areas to terrorism-related programs in May 2002. These resources were taken 

primarily from the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division (CID), which addresses 

traditional criminal areas such as narcotics trafficking and white-collar crime. 

This reprogramming of resources is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. 

 Additionally, the FBI has undergone and continues to undergo several 

changes in its organizational structure since 9/11, including the creation of 

the Office of Intelligence and the Cyber Division and a restructuring of the 

CID. The restructuring of the CID included a resource management initiative 

and the implementation of the Criminal Enterprise Plan, which gave the FBI 

field divisions more flexibility in investigating criminal organizations. These 

CID changes are more fully explained in Chapter 2. 

 
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Prior Reviews 

 We previously performed two audits related to the FBI’s reprioritization 

efforts, issuing our first report in September 2003 and the second in 

September 2004.12 The first review examined the FBI’s casework and 

resource utilization before and immediately after 9/11. In that report, we 

found that prior to 9/11, although the FBI identified counterterrorism in its 

top priorities, the FBI utilized the majority of its agent resources in 

traditional criminal investigative areas, such as white-collar crime, violent 

crime, organized crime, and drugs.13 Following 9/11, agent usage on 

terrorism-related matters dramatically increased. Additionally, after the 

initial response to these terrorist incidents, resource usage related to 

counterterrorism stabilized at a level higher than it was prior to 9/11. One 

of the recommendations we made in that review was that the FBI Director 

explore additional means of analyzing the FBI’s resource utilization among 

its various programs. As a result, the FBI Director now receives resource 

level reports similar to the analyses we performed in our initial review. 

Our second review focused solely on the internal operations of the FBI 

and the changes it had undergone between fiscal years (FY) 2000 and 2003. 

The FBI formally moved a significant number of funded personnel from 

traditional criminal investigative areas to matters related to terrorism, and 

reorganized itself with the intent of becoming a more proactive, 

intelligence-driven law enforcement agency. Our analyses found that FBI 

activities in FY 2003 were generally in line with its post-9/11 priorities. 

Specifically, our analysis of FBI timekeeping data detailed how the FBI was 

performing less work in certain traditional criminal investigative areas and 

more work in matters related to terrorism. 

 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also conducted 

several reviews of the FBI’s post-9/11 reprioritization efforts, issuing its most 

 12 See Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation Casework and Human Resource Allocation, Audit Report Number 03-37, 

September 2003; Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The Internal 

Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Reprioritization, Audit Report Number 04-39, 

September 2004. 

13 Prior to the FBI Director’s issuance of the top 10 priorities, the FBI operated under 

a three-tiered structure for prioritizing its investigations. Tier One represented the FBI’s 

highest priority area, which focused on national and economic security, including terrorismrelated activity. 
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recent report in August 2004.14 In this report, the GAO followed up its previous 

work regarding the FBI's changes since 9/11.15 The GAO found that its review 

of data was inconclusive on determining the impact the FBI's changes have had 

on traditional law enforcement areas. 

Audit Approach 

 This review was performed as a follow-on to our previous work in which 

we focused on the internal operational changes occurring within the FBI. This 

audit primarily concentrated on the external effects of the FBI’s shift in 

priorities on the law enforcement community. Specifically, our objective was 

to determine the impact of the FBI’s reprioritization efforts on other federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies. As the FBI reduces its 

involvement in traditional crime areas, other law enforcement agencies need 

to enhance their investigative efforts to compensate for the FBI’s changes. If 

not, the potential for certain crimes to go unaddressed increases. 

To accomplish our objective, we reviewed various data and 

documentation and solicited feedback from numerous law enforcement 

representatives. Specifically, we obtained FBI data related to its allocation 

of FBI field agent positions, its actual utilization of FBI field agents, and its 

investigative caseload for FYs 2000 through 2004. We focused on the 

traditional criminal investigative areas of organized crime, drug trafficking, 

violent crime, and white-collar crime. 

Additionally, we interviewed headquarters-level management at the FBI 

and other federal law enforcement entities to gain a national perspective. 

Within the FBI, we spoke primarily with CID officials and personnel from the 

Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. We also obtained feedback from 

11 different federal agencies and programs, including the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the Drug Enforcement Administration 

 14 Government Accountability Office. FBI Transformation: Data Inconclusive on 

Effects of Shift to Counterterrorism-Related Priorities on Traditional Crime Enforcement, 

Report Number GAO-04-1036, August 2004. 

15 The GAO previously issued four reports on the FBI’s reprioritization efforts: 

(1) Government Accountability Office. FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps Encouraging but 

Broad Transformation Needed, Report Number GAO-02-865T, June 21, 2002; (2) 

Government Accountability Office. FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to 

Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, Report Number GAO-03-759T, June 18, 2003; 

(3) Government Accountability Office. FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress 

in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities, Report Number GAO-04-578T, March 23, 

2004; and (4) Government Accountability Office. FBI Transformation: Human Capital 

Strategies May Assist the FBI in Its Commitment to Address Its Top Priorities, Report 

Number GAO-04-817T, June 3, 2004. 
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(DEA); and the Executive Office of the President’s High Intensity Drug 

Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program. A complete listing of the federal agencies 

we visited is contained in Appendix I. 

Further, to obtain the viewpoints of state and local law enforcement 

officials, we disseminated a web-based survey to chief law enforcement 

executives of 3,514 agencies located in the jurisdictional areas of 12 FBI field 

offices: Atlanta, Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Dallas, Texas; Denver, Colorado; 

Detroit, Michigan; Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; 

New Orleans, Louisiana; New York City, New York; Phoenix, Arizona; 

San Francisco, California; and Washington, D.C.16 These 3,514 agencies 

generally encompass all state and local law enforcement agencies operating in 

those 12 FBI jurisdictional areas. Exhibit 1-2 provides the number of 

recipients and respondents for these locations, as well as the response rate. 

In addition to the survey, we interviewed representatives at international and 

national law enforcement associations, such as the International Association of 

Chiefs of Police and the Major Cities Chiefs Association. 

EXHIBIT 1-2

SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS BY LOCATION17

FBI Field Office 

Jurisdiction 

Number of 

Recipients 

Number of 

Respondents 

Survey Response 

Rate 

Atlanta 593 170 28.7% 

Chicago 366 181 49.5% 

Dallas 526 204 38.8% 

Denver 361 105 29.1% 

Detroit 556 220 39.6% 

Los Angeles 159 71 44.7% 

Miami 101 35 34.7% 

New Orleans 362 75 20.7% 

New York City 178 69 38.8% 

Phoenix 129 45 34.9% 

San Francisco 150 72 48.0% 

Washington, D.C. 33 18 54.5% 

Totals 3,514 1,265 36.0% 

Source: Office of the Inspector General analysis 

After analyzing the FBI data and survey results, we judgmentally 

selected seven of the FBI field office jurisdictions in which to perform 

additional audit work. Exhibit 1-3 presents the seven areas visited, which 

are highlighted in yellow. The areas shown in gray are the remaining five 

jurisdictions to which we disseminated the survey. 

 16 Appendix I contains details on our selection of FBI field office jurisdictions for the 

dissemination of the web-based survey. 

17 Each respondent equates to a distinct state or local law enforcement agency. 
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EXHIBIT 1-3

MAP OF FBI FIELD OFFICE JURISDICTIONS VISITED 

Source: Office of the Inspector General 

At each site visited, we interviewed officials at the main FBI field 

division and representatives from at least one FBI resident agency. Further, 

we spoke with management at five federal agencies: the ATF, the Bureau of 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the DEA, the United States 

Attorneys Office (USAO), and the United States Marshals Service (USMS). 

We also met with officials from at least five state or local law enforcement 

departments per location, including the major police department located in 

each city visited. We also selected local law enforcement agencies based on 

survey responses, choosing departments that indicated being either 

negatively or positively affected by the FBI’s changed priorities. During the 

course of our audit, we spoke with approximately 330 officials. 

The results of our review are detailed in Chapters 2 through 13, and 

the audit scope and methodology are presented in Appendix I. Most of our 

work at the FBI focused on the FBI’s CID, which is responsible for overseeing 

the FBI’s traditional crime efforts. Chapter 2 of this report discusses the 

FBI’s CID and the structural changes it has undergone since our last review 

issued in September 2004. In Chapter 3, we present our overall analyses of 

FBI resource data, which identify the changes in the FBI’s criminal 

investigative efforts between FYs 2000 and 2004. Additionally, Chapter 3 

describes the overall changes occurring in the FBI’s criminal casework and in 

the criminal matters the FBI refers to the USAOs. 
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In Chapter 4, we discuss the overall effect the FBI’s shift in priorities 

has had on the national law enforcement community. In particular, this 

chapter incorporates feedback gathered during our interviews with non-FBI 

officials, as well as the responses from our survey of law enforcement 

officials across the country. Further, we summarize the specific crime areas 

affecting other law enforcement agencies’ operations. 

Chapters 5 through 11 of this report detail the impact of the FBI’s 

reprioritization within distinct, traditional crime areas, namely financial 

crimes, criminal enterprises, fugitives, bank robberies, identity theft, and 

integrity in government, as well as other criminal areas such as child 

pornography, alien smuggling, and human trafficking. Within each of these 

chapters, we identify the FBI’s investigative changes based on interviews 

with FBI officials and our review of statistical data, and we describe the 

concerns and perspectives of the non-FBI officials we interviewed. 

During fieldwork, we examined the existing relationships between the 

FBI and other law enforcement agencies. Chapter 12 of this report contains 

details on information we collected regarding the manner in which the FBI 

and these other agencies interact. Finally, Chapter 13 presents our overall 

conclusions and recommendations for FBI management to consider in 

allocating its agent resources and for improving specific areas of its 

operations. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE FBI’S CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE 

DIVISION 

 The Criminal Investigative Division (CID) is the primary component 

within the FBI responsible for overseeing FBI investigations of traditional 

crimes such as narcotics trafficking and violent crime. According to the FBI, 

the CID revised its organizational structure during FY 2004 in an effort to 

better reflect current trends in criminal activity. 

Overview of the CID 

 The CID addresses issues four through eight of the FBI’s national 

priorities (listed on page 2 in Chapter 1). The organizational structure of the 

CID consists of branches, which are further separated into sections and units 

that focus on specific crime areas. Prior to the FY 2004 reorganization, the 

CID’s structure consisted of two branches: (1) Integrity in Government/Civil 

Rights, Financial Crimes, & Operational Support; and (2) Drug, Organized 

Crime, Violent Crimes and Major Offenders, and Criminal Intelligence.18 The 

restructuring involved a realignment of sections and units within two newly 

named branches: (1) National Crimes, and (2) Criminal Enterprise. 

Exhibit 2-1, on the following page, presents the current organizational 

structure of the CID. 

 Generally, the sections within each branch remained intact after the 

restructuring process. However, the Violent Crimes Section was moved from 

the new Criminal Enterprise Branch to the National Crimes Branch. Other 

than this shift, the National Crimes Branch (previously called the Integrity in 

Government/Civil Rights, Financial Crimes, & Operational Support Branch) 

did not experience further revisions. 

 The Criminal Enterprise Branch experienced more significant change 

than the National Crimes Branch. One of the primary modifications was the 

creation of the Americas Criminal Enterprise Section (ACES), which 

addresses drugs, gangs, and major thefts, and the Transnational Criminal 

Enterprise Section (TCES), which continues to investigate organized crime 

matters. These sections were formerly known as the Drug Section and 

Organized Crime (OC) Section. 

 18 Appendix II contains the CID’s previous organization chart.
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EXHIBIT 2-1

FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION 

ORGANIZATION CHART

Source: FBI Criminal Investigative Division Organization Chart dated October 25, 2004 
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Criminal Enterprise Plan 

 In addition to its restructuring, the Criminal Enterprise Branch also 

experienced a major management policy change. In February 2004, the 

FBI Director approved the implementation of the Criminal Enterprise Plan, a 

strategy that provided the impetus for restructuring the CID.19 Essentially, 

the Criminal Enterprise Branch attempted to pool resources to enable the 

FBI to more effectively investigate criminal enterprises. 

 The CID previously operated with separate squads designated to 

oversee investigations of specific crimes using a set number of resources. 

However, with reduced criminal resources, the FBI has focused its 

investigations on higher-threat targets, particularly criminal enterprise 

organizations. The FBI concluded that most of today’s criminal enterprises 

could not be addressed simply by crime type, as these organizations usually 

perpetrate a variety of crimes. Therefore, field agents are no longer 

allocated specifically to drug, organized crime, major theft, or street gang 

investigations. Beginning in FY 2005, these resources are considered as one 

allocation – called criminal enterprise – enabling field managers to assign 

staff to investigations according to case needs and an assessment of local 

threats. 

 According to a senior CID manager, the Criminal Enterprise Plan 

concept establishes a new mindset for the FBI. In the past, Special Agents in 

Charge (SAC) monitored “burn rates” to ensure they were utilizing agents at 

expected levels for distinct crime problems.20 However, the FBI reported that 

SACs were constantly frustrated trying to monitor burn rates while also 

attacking the most prominent crime threats. The Criminal Enterprise Plan 

attempts to alleviate this situation by providing field offices the flexibility to 

utilize resources to attack poly-criminal enterprise operations. According to 

senior CID officials, under the enterprise approach field office managers can 

assess the different facets of a case and assign agents with the requisite 

experience and skills to conduct the investigation. For example, using the 

criminal enterprise resource approach to investigate a street gang involved in 

theft, drugs, violence, and identity theft, a field office can develop a squad 

with expertise in each of those areas, similar to how the FBI creates an 

internal task force. 

 19 According to the FBI, its criminal enterprise theory of investigation – building a case 

against the entire criminal organization – is not a new investigative model; the innovation exists 

in how the FBI views and utilizes its resources in managing criminal enterprise cases.

20 The FBI uses the term “burn rate” to refer to the difference between allocated 

resources and actual utilized resources. An “overburn” occurs when more resources are utilized 

than allocated. In turn, the FBI defines “underburn” as using fewer resources than allocated.
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 The Criminal Enterprise Plan was a major catalyst in restructuring the 

CID in that it realigned units and sections of the FBI. According to the FBI, 

the approach enabled a more fluid resource management approach to 

addressing criminal enterprise organizations, affording FBI field divisions 

flexibility in combating traditional crime problems with fewer resources. 
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CHAPTER 3: FBI RESOURCE AND CASEWORK ANALYSIS 

During the FBI’s reprioritization process, the FBI Director shifted 

resources from traditional crime areas to terrorism-related programs. We 

obtained and reviewed data on planned and actual utilization of FBI 

resources and actual casework data to assess changes in the FBI’s 

investigative efforts between FYs 2000 and 2004.21 Our review focused on 

the FBI’s traditional crime-related investigative efforts, specifically the areas 

within the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division (CID), such as 

drugs/narcotics trafficking, organized crime, violent crime, white-collar 

crime, and civil rights violations. 

Our analyses revealed that the FBI’s CID is operating with significantly 

fewer resources than it had in FY 2000.22 Specifically, the FBI’s funded 

agents for CID-related programs in its 56 field offices decreased by 

1,143 positions between FYs 2000 and 2004, declining from 6,896 to 5,753 

during this time period. However, the FBI actually utilized 2,190 fewer field 

agents on traditional crime matters in FY 2004 than it had in FY 2000. In 

response to the reduction in criminal agent resources, the FBI directed field 

divisions to concentrate the majority of their criminal investigations on the 

most significant leads and cases. As a result, the FBI opened fewer criminal 

cases and referred fewer criminal matters to the USAOs in FY 2004 than it 

did in FY 2000. 

FBI Resource Allocations 

The FBI allocates its resources throughout its Headquarters and field 

divisions by establishing Funded Staffing Levels (FSLs). One FSL equates to 

one funded employee, or one full-time equivalent (FTE). These positions are 

assigned according to divisions, investigative programs (or subprograms), or 

support categories. For instance, allocated positions for agents in the field 

offices are allotted to specific programs, such as white-collar crime. The 

assignment of FSLs to the various field divisions, and specifically to 

programs, is the primary means by which the FBI implements its priorities 

and institutes its operational structure. Resource allocations represent the 

levels at which FBI executive management intends to address particular 

investigative areas. 

 21 When available and appropriate, we include FY 2005 data. In general, we did not 

use FYs 2001 and 2002 data in comparative analyses, as the events of 9/11 and the FBI’s 

response to investigating the terrorist attacks skewed utilization data during that time period. 

22 Our previous report, which included analyses of FBI data between FYs 2000 and 

2003, detailed similar results. 
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Between FYs 2000 and 2001, the FBI experienced an overall decrease in 

field agent FSLs, dropping from 10,474 agent positions to 9,981.23 Since that 

time, the number of allocated positions has steadily risen. The total number of 

field agents in FY 2005 (10,911) represents an increase of 437 over the number 

of FSLs in FY 2000. Exhibit 3-1 illustrates the FBI’s field agent FSLs for 

FYs 2000 through 2005. 

EXHIBIT 3-1

TOTAL FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS FOR FBI FIELD AGENTS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2005

Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource Management and Allocation (RMA) Office data 

 Exhibit 3-1 also shows the composition of total field agent FSLs in terms 

of field agent and field management positions. Field agent positions, which 

are non-supervisory, are allocated to specific programs, while field 

management positions, which are supervisory in nature, are allocated to field 

offices rather than to specific investigative areas. The non-supervisory field 

agent allocations mirrored the changes that occurred in the total number of 

field agent FSLs: a decline between FYs 2000 and 2001, followed by a steady 

increase through FY 2005. The field management positions, however, 

experienced an increase in each fiscal year throughout our review period. 

 23 The FBI experienced an overall decline in FSLs from FYs 2000 to 2001. This 

reduction was primarily a result of a mandate issued by the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB), which has become known as the “hollow work year” issue. During FY 2001 (but prior 

to 9/11), OMB ordered the FBI to reduce its reported number of funded positions because 

OMB believed the FBI did not have sufficient money to fund its level of authorized positions. 
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Terrorism and Criminal Field Agent Allocations 

 A major element of the FBI’s reprioritization efforts has been to 

reallocate FBI personnel resources and transfer agents from traditional 

criminal investigative areas to terrorism-related issues. The following charts 

provide a FY 2000 to FY 2004 comparison of the allocation of the FBI’s nonsupervisory field agent workforce, according to the type of investigative 

matter to which they were assigned. 

EXHIBIT 3-2

COMPARISON OF FBI FIELD AGENT ALLOCATIONS 

IN TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 200424

FISCAL YEAR 2000 FISCAL YEAR 2004

Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource Management and Allocation (RMA) Office data 

 In FY 2000 the FBI allocated 75 percent of its field agent workforce to 

criminal investigative areas, predominantly organized crime, drugs, violent 

crime, and white-collar crime. By FY 2004, the proportion of FBI field agents 

involved in criminal-related matters declined to 65 percent. 

FBI Field Agent Resource Allocations within Traditional Criminal Programs 

In our September 2004 report, we found that the FBI experienced 

reductions in the number of allocated field agent positions to CID programs 

from FYs 2000 through 2003. We extended our analyses in this review to 

include FY 2004 data and generally did not observe any significant changes 

between FYs 2003 and 2004. 

 24 We categorized FBI activities as terrorism-related or criminal-related based on the 

program in which the work was captured. We considered terrorism-related work to be 

captured in the National Foreign Intelligence, Domestic Terrorism, and National 

Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion programs. We considered criminal-related 

work to be captured in the Civil Rights, Criminal Enterprise Investigations, Cyber Crime, 

Organized Crime/Drug, Violent Crime/Major Offenders, and White-Collar Crime programs. 
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Exhibit 3-3 details the non-supervisory field agent FSL levels for 

CID-related areas for FYs 2000 through 2004. The data in the table indicates 

that while there was a slight increase in criminal agent-allocated resources 

from FYs 2003 to 2004, the FBI still allotted more than 1,100 fewer field 

agents for traditional crime matters than it had in FY 2000. Therefore, the 

FBI planned to use significantly fewer resources in FY 2004 than it had in 

FY 2000. By far, the 732 agent reduction from drug and organized crime 

matters was the largest decrease among the crime areas. 

EXHIBIT 3-3

FIELD AGENT FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS ALLOCATED TO 

FBI TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL AREAS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 200425

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004-2000

Drug & Organized Crime 2,279 2,078 1,511 1,521 1,547 -732 

Violent Crime 2,004 1,821 1,656 1,710 1,711 -293 

White-Collar Crime 2,460 2,404 2,210 2,303 2,342 -118 

Civil Rights 153 153 153 153 153 0 

TOTALS 6,896 6,456 5,530 5,687 5,753 -1,143 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI RMA Office data 

FBI Resource Utilization 

While the FBI develops a resource utilization plan through its FSL 

assignments, actual utilization of its resources often deviates from the plan 

due to local public safety threats and jurisdictional crime trends. The FBI 

tracks actual time worked by its field personnel in its Time Utilization and 

Recordkeeping (TURK) system. Field agent personnel record the percentage 

of time worked on investigative cases, which is converted in TURK to 

Average On-Board (AOB) data. One AOB equals one agent and refers to 

either: (1) one agent working solely in a single investigative area, or 

(2) multiple agents working part-time on the same investigation. For 

instance, three agents spending one-third of their time investigating a 

kidnapping is equivalent to one agent working the case fulltime, or one AOB. 

Unlike resource allocations (or FSLs), AOB is tracked by specific investigative 

classifications, which are assigned to programs or subprograms.26 An 

example is provided in Exhibit 3-4. 

 25 Allocation figures are displayed according to the FBI’s allocation categories used in 

FYs 2000 through 2004. In FY 2005, the FBI allocated its field agent positions in accordance 

with the CID’s new organizational structure. For example, instead of allocating positions to 

organized crime and drugs, positions are now allocated to Transnational Criminal Enterprises and 

Americas Criminal Enterprises. This change precludes us from comparing resource allocation 

data from FYs 2000-2004 to FY 2005. 

26 At the beginning of FY 2005, the FBI had over 630 investigative classifications.
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EXHIBIT 3-4

FBI INVESTIGATIVE NOMENCLATURE EXAMPLE

Category Name

Program Violent Crime 

Subprogram Violent Incident Crimes 

Classification Kidnapping 

Overall Criminal Agent Resource Utilization 

In our September 2004 review, we reported that in FY 2003 the FBI 

utilized substantially fewer agent resources on criminal matters than it had 

in FY 2000. The FBI used 

6,664 agents on traditional crime in 

FY 2000 compared to 4,639 in 

FY 2003 – a decline of 2,025 agents. 

Our current analysis revealed that 

the FBI utilized even fewer agents on 

criminal matters during FY 2004 than 

during FY 2003. 

The FBI utilized 2,190 fewer 

criminal field agent resources in 

FY 2004 compared to FY 2000, 

declining from 6,664 agents to 4,474. 

Essentially, in FY 2004, the FBI was 

operating at 67 percent of its FY 2000 

criminal agent resource level. These results are displayed in the chart in 

Exhibit 3-5. 

Criminal Agent Utilization After Implementing the Criminal Enterprise Plan 

In Chapter 2, we discussed the FBI’s development of the Criminal 

Enterprise Plan and analyzed actual agent utilization data according to the 

CID’s new structure resulting from implementation of the Plan, as seen in 

Exhibit 3-6. This analysis identified that the most noticeable reductions 

occurred within the Americas Criminal Enterprises and OCDETF programs, 

which primarily embody the FBI’s efforts to combat illegal drug trafficking.27 

The reduction in resource utilization in these two programs coincides with 

the FBI’s plan to reduce its efforts to investigate drug-related crime. Further 

evaluation of agent utilization data is addressed in Chapters 5 through 11. 

 27 OCDETF is the acronym for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, a 

congressionally funded program administered by the Criminal Division in the DOJ that 

focuses on the disruption and dismantling of major drug trafficking organizations.

EXHIBIT 3-5

FBI CRIMINAL AGENT RESOURCES 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data 
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Additionally, Appendix IV separately identifies the 30 FBI investigative 

classifications experiencing the greatest AOB reductions and increases 

between FYs 2000 and 2004. 

EXHIBIT 3-6

FBI AGENT UTILIZATION CHANGE IN SPECIFIC CRIMINAL AREAS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data 

Comparison of Resource Allocation to Actual Utilization 

As previously discussed, the FBI reduced the allocation of agent 

resources assigned to address traditional crime matters between FYs 2000 

and 2004. Additionally, through analysis of FBI agent utilization data, we 

found that the FBI was, in fact, utilizing even fewer resources for criminal 

investigations than it had allocated. 

In addition to the formally transferred 1,143 allocated field agent 

positions away from investigating drugs, violent crime, white-collar crime, 

and other traditional crime between FYs 2000 and 2004 (as detailed in 

Exhibit 3-3), the FBI utilized over 1,200 fewer agents than it had allocated to 

these areas. Specifically, in FY 2004, of the 5,753 field agents allocated to 

criminal matters, the FBI utilized 4,474 of these agents – a difference of 

1,279 agents. According to senior FBI officials, these agents were diverted 

to terrorism-related matters as needs arose. Adding these diverted agents 

to the planned reduction of 1,143 allocated field agent positions shows that 

the FBI reduced its investigative efforts related to traditional crimes by more 

than 2,400 agents, or more than twice the amount originally planned. 
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EXHIBIT 3-7

EVALUATION OF FBI FIELD OFFICE CRIMINAL RESOURCES 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK and RMA Office data 

It was clear from our discussions with FBI Headquarters and field-level 

management that FBI field offices were directed to ensure that the FBI’s 

national priority areas were adequately staffed and that no terrorism-related 

matter went unaddressed, which explains the significant gap in the 

utilization and allocation figures. The FBI needs to ensure that it has 

accurately evaluated its investigative needs and necessary resource levels 

within each area of the FBI’s operations – including both terrorism and nonterrorism related programs – and translate this information into realistic and 

practical field agent allocations. 

Breaking down our comparison of agent allocation and actual utilization 

to specific crime areas, we confirmed that the general crime areas 

investigated by the FBI experienced resource under-utilization during 

FY 2004. As Exhibit 3-8 illustrates, all general crime areas experienced 

significant gaps between funded staffing levels and actual utilization. 
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EXHIBIT 3-8

COMPARISON OF FISCAL YEAR 2004 ALLOCATED CRIMINAL AGENT 

POSITIONS AND ACTUAL AGENT UTILIZATION28

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK and RMA Office data 

Reasons for Criminal Agent Underutilization 

As discussed above, FBI criminal programs have utilized fewer agents 

than allocated in order to address terrorism-related matters, often using 

criminal resources. FBI field office management commented to us that it 

would not permit understaffed counterterrorism squads or tolerate any 

unaddressed terrorism lead. Besides utilizing criminal resources for terrorismrelated matters, personnel vacancies, temporary duty assignments, and field 

division surveillance contributed to the underutilization of criminal agents. 

Personnel Vacancies – According to many FBI officials interviewed, 

criminal squads absorb any field division personnel vacancies and are required 

to augment any understaffed counterterrorism squads. Field division 

management stated that criminal squads would suffer any agent vacancy within 

the division and that counterterrorism squads would be fully staffed at all times. 

Temporary Assignments – Temporary assignment responsibilities 

remove agents from their field division duties, often for extended periods of 

time. We learned from discussions with FBI officials that if these agents are 

taken from a criminal squad, that squad will usually operate with one less 

 28 We conducted this analysis according to the CID program areas to which the FBI 

allocated resources in FY 2004. 
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agent. However, if the agent is chosen from a counterterrorism squad, a 

criminal agent will normally fill that vacancy so no counterterrorism squad is 

understaffed. 

Surveillance Responsibilities – Each field office staffs a surveillancespecific unit, such as a Surveillance and Operations Group. This unit is tasked 

with providing necessary technical support to investigative cases, allowing 

case agents to concentrate on pursuing other case leads. To develop these 

groups, each investigative program assigns agents in accordance with the 

amount of support that program receives from the surveillance unit 

throughout the year. However, with the overall FBI emphasis on 

counterterrorism, many offices reported that surveillance resources are often 

monopolized by the counterterrorism squads, which have primary use of their 

services. As a result, criminal squads are left to conduct surveillance and 

technical operations by themselves. These tasks are usually resourceintensive and time-consuming, thereby preventing agents from pursuing other 

leads or performing other case-related work. 

FBI Casework Data 

 The FBI maintains its universe of data about its cases within its 

Automated Case Support (ACS) system. Similar to agent utilization data, 

ACS data is tracked at the specific investigative classification level and tracks 

the dates of case openings and closings. We analyzed this data to identify 

substantial changes in the number of case openings between FYs 2000 and 

2004. Our analyses of ACS data help to quantitatively demonstrate an effect 

that reduced FBI criminal resources have had on the FBI’s operations. 

We found the FBI opened over 28,000 fewer criminal cases in FY 2004 

than it did in FY 2000.29 During FY 2000, the FBI initiated 62,782 criminal 

investigations. In FY 2004, that figure declined 45 percent to 34,451 cases. 

Exhibit 3-9 depicts the case openings at the subprogram level for the FBI’s 

CID for FYs 2000 and 2004 and shows that each criminal area experienced a 

reduction during our 5-year review period. Notably, the Americas Criminal 

Enterprises Program, which addresses narcotics trafficking, gang-related 

crime, and major theft, experienced the greatest decline in case openings in 

terms of percentage, initiating over 50 percent fewer cases in FY 2004 than 

in FY 2000. Further, case initiations in Financial Crimes and Violent Crimes 

decreased by 6,939 (40 percent) and 15,236 (47 percent), respectively. 

 29 We identified these case openings by segregating the investigative areas for which 

the FBI CID was responsible after its reorganization in FY 2004. 
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EXHIBIT 3-9

FBI CASE OPENINGS IN SPECIFIC CRIMINAL AREAS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI Automated Case Support (ACS) data 

Criminal Matters Received by United States Attorneys’ Offices 

In addition to FBI casework data, we evaluated data from the 

United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAO), including the number of criminal 

matters the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies referred to the 

USAOs during FYs 2000 and 2004.30 Analysis of this data provides insight 

into the effect the FBI’s reduction in investigations of traditional criminal 

cases has had on the overall enforcement of criminal activity by the federal 

government. 

It is important to note that “criminal matter” is not synonymous with 

“criminal case.” A “criminal matter” involves information submitted to a 

USAO for review; a “criminal case” only refers to instances in which 

defendants have been charged. Therefore, in assessing actual FBI 

investigative efforts, we believed the USAO’s “criminal matters” data to be 

more appropriate for our review. The USAO tracks criminal matters received 

for numerous criminal categories. 

 30 Appendix V lists the federal agencies included in our analyses of USAO criminal 

referrals. Appendix VI provides the criminal categories used by the USAOs and details the 

number of referrals for each category from the FBI and all agencies combined for FYs 2000 

and 2004. 
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 In FY 2004, the FBI referred approximately 6,100 fewer criminal–related 

matters to the USAOs than in FY 2000 (a 27-percent reduction).31 As the 

following exhibit shows, the FBI referred 22,876 criminal-related matters 

during FY 2000; this figure declined to 16,725 for FY 2004. Additional 

analyses of USAO case management data for specific crime areas are 

contained in Chapters 5 through 11. 

EXHIBIT 3-10

FBI CRIMINAL MATTERS REFERRED TO THE USAOs 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004 

Source: OIG analysis of United States Attorneys’ (USA) central case management system data 

Comments from FBI Personnel on Effects of Reprioritization 

In addition to statistical impact, FBI field division personnel 

commented to us on the qualitative effects of the FBI’s criminal resource 

reductions. As discussed earlier, FBI officials said that criminal squads often 

operate understaffed. Moreover, most field divisions function with fewer 

criminal squads compared to four years ago. Additionally, several non-FBI 

law enforcement officials and USAO representatives commented to us that 

less experienced agents tended to work criminal cases, while 

counterterrorism matters were staffed by more experienced agents. FBI 

field division management generally confirmed these comments. Thus, the 

FBI is investigating criminal matters with less experienced personnel than 

that devoted to counterterrorism matters, as well as with a fewer number of 

agents and fewer criminal squads. In certain instances, USAO officials 

stated that this has resulted in fewer matters being referred to the USAOs.

 31 The figures presented for criminal-related matters include all non-terrorism related 

referrals to the USAOs. For purposes of this report, we considered the matters referred to 

the USAOs that are categorized as Internal Security Offenses to be terrorism-related. 
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Some FBI field managers commented that undermanned squads could 

jeopardize the safety of criminal investigative agents. FBI officials reported 

that criminal agents often attempted to handle pre-9/11 squad caseloads, 

even though each squad operated significantly understaffed. FBI field 

managers commended the agents’ work ethic but were concerned that the 

agents were going to “burn out” mentally and physically. Additionally, some 

FBI officials commented that the morale of criminal agents was diminishing 

because most of the recognition went to those agents involved in terrorismrelated matters.
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CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ON THE LAW 

ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY 

We obtained mixed perspectives from other federal agencies regarding 

the FBI’s reprioritization from the non-FBI federal law enforcement officials 

we interviewed. At the headquarters-level, while some agency officials 

stated that they had not observed significant changes in the FBI’s traditional 

criminal operations, other agency representatives said they noticed a 

reduction in FBI investigative effort in traditional crime matters. At the fieldlevel, many non-FBI federal officials we interviewed said they had observed 

changes in the FBI’s investigative efforts of criminal matters. They 

commented that the FBI focused much of its attention on terrorism-related 

matters while pulling back in traditional areas such as drugs and fugitive 

apprehensions. However, most of these field managers told the OIG they 

did not believe the FBI’s new focus critically impaired their agencies. 

In response to our survey, the majority of the state and local respondents 

reported a minimal impact as a result of the FBI’s change in priorities. From 

the survey responses, we selected several local law enforcement agencies to 

visit during our fieldwork, choosing agencies that indicated varying degrees of 

impact resulting from the FBI’s reprioritization. Generally, the local law 

enforcement representatives we interviewed stated that the FBI had reduced its 

investigative efforts in certain traditional crime areas, which in some instances 

created an investigative gap. 

The following sections provide detailed accounts of the effects that the 

FBI’s shift in priorities has had on law enforcement agencies at the federal, 

state, and local levels, including an overview of specific crime areas that were 

affected by the FBI’s reprioritization. 

Federal Law Enforcement Perspectives 

Headquarters officials at ATF, ICE, and USMS stated that they had not 

observed a significant decrease in the FBI’s traditional criminal enforcement 

operations. However, a DEA Headquarters official stated that the DEA had 

observed a reduction in the FBI’s narcotics-related work. Despite this 

reduction in the FBI’s efforts, the DEA official added that the DEA was not 

adversely affected. U.S. Postal Inspection Service officials commented that 

the FBI worked more closely with their agency since the reprioritization 

because the FBI’s resources in this crime area became limited. 

By contrast, many field-level officials at other federal law enforcement 

agencies commented that the FBI was involved less in certain traditional 

crime matters. However, none of these officials reported negative effects 
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caused by this reduction in FBI involvement. Several of these agency 

officials said their workload had increased as a result of the FBI’s shift in 

priorities, but these officials believed their agencies had been able to address 

the additional investigative matters. However, several officials noted that 

their agency’s limited resources could potentially hinder their future 

investigative efforts in traditional crime areas. 

Specifically, representatives at six of the eight USMS District Offices 

we visited commented that their local FBI field offices were handling fewer 

fugitive investigations, an observation confirmed by FBI resource and 

caseload data.32 Nevertheless, these USMS field managers asserted that the 

USMS is fully capable of addressing fugitive matters. 

Similarly, managers at six of the seven DEA field divisions we visited 

commented that the FBI is not as aggressive in working drug-related cases 

as it was in the past. FBI data supports these observations. DEA field 

managers did not indicate that their operations were adversely affected by 

the FBI’s reductions in drug-related work.

In addition to obtaining comments from federal investigative officials, we 

gathered feedback from USAO representatives at each of the seven field sites 

we visited. Officials at all these USAOs noted that the FBI currently focuses its 

attention on terrorism-related matters, while pulling back in traditional criminal 

areas such as drugs and bank robberies. USAO Case Management data 

supports these observations. As shown in Exhibit 4-1, the FBI reduced the 

number of non-terrorism criminal matters referred to USAOs by 6,151, or 

27 percent, between FYs 2000 and 2004, decreasing from 22,876 matters in 

FY 2000 to 16,725 in FY 2004. Conversely, the FBI referred 1,048 more 

terrorism-related matters to USAOs in FY 2004 than it did in FY 2000, 

increasing sevenfold from 150 matters in FY 2000 to 1,198 matters in FY 2004. 

 32 We spoke with USMS officials from the Eastern District of New York and the 

Southern District of New York. The FBI New York City Division’s jurisdiction covers these 

two districts. 
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EXHIBIT 4-1

NON-TERRORISM AND TERRORISM MATTERS 

REPORTED TO USAOs FROM THE FBI 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004 

Non-Terrorism Matters Terrorism Matters

Source: OIG analysis of USA central case management system data 

Officials at five of the seven USAOs remarked that the FBI’s reduced 

efforts in financial crime investigations have left a significant gap that no 

other law enforcement agency has filled. These individuals indicated that 

while other federal agencies handle such cases, they believe these agencies 

are unable to address the issues to the same extent as the FBI in terms of 

both the quantity and quality of cases. 

USAO officials made similar comments about the FBI’s reduced 

emphasis on drug-related matters. However, some USAO officials said that 

the DEA helped fill the gap by submitting additional cases for prosecution. 

Chapters 5 through 11 contain more extensive information from USAO 

officials as it relates to particular crime areas. 

State and Local Law Enforcement Perspectives 

 To obtain feedback from state and local law enforcement agencies, we 

surveyed 3,514 state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies located in 

the jurisdictional areas of 12 FBI field offices.33 In total, 1,265 agencies 

 33 The 12 FBI field offices were Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, 

Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York City, Phoenix, San Francisco, and 

Washington, D.C. 

FY 2000 FY 2004
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responded to our survey, which equated to an overall response rate of 

36 percent.34

We judgmentally selected 7 of the 12 FBI field office jurisdictions to 

conduct fieldwork based on survey responses and analyses of FBI data.35 

We spoke with officials at the major police department located in each city 

visited. In addition, at each site we judgmentally selected local law 

enforcement agencies to visit. In this selection process, we used responses 

to the survey, choosing departments that indicated they were either 

negatively or positively affected by the FBI’s reprioritization. In total, we 

spoke with officials at 47 departments in these 7 cities. We provide a list of 

the agencies contacted in each jurisdictional area in Appendix VII. 

Survey Analysis 

The overall responses to the survey indicated a minimal impact on 

state and local law enforcement agencies as a result of the FBI’s shift in 

investigative priorities and resources. The survey contained several 

questions that asked whether the responding agency’s operations in various 

investigative areas had been affected by the FBI’s reprioritization. 

Participants were provided a scaled response to select whether the impact 

was positive or negative, and the magnitude of such impact. A negative 

impact was defined as an agency being impaired by the FBI’s shift in 

priorities, such as if the agency experienced severe difficulty in handling the 

type of investigation listed. A positive impact was defined as an agency 

benefiting from the FBI’s reprioritization, such as if the agency significantly 

enhanced its operations to successfully address the investigative area in 

question. 

In response, many agencies indicated that their efforts in addressing 

specific matters were only nominally impacted by any change at the FBI. 

 34 The 1,265 agencies responded in varying degrees. Some agencies answered all 

of the survey questions, others answered all multiple choice survey questions except for the 

open-ended questions, and others only answered a few questions. Our analyses detailed 

throughout this report are based solely upon the number of actual responses to each 

question. Appendix X lists the names of each state and local law enforcement agency that 

responded to our survey. Some agencies responded more than once, which occurred 

primarily with the larger-sized police departments. For example, the Chicago Police 

Department submitted 17 individual responses to the survey, which came from its various 

bureaus, divisions, and districts. Although not reflected in the figures presented in 

Exhibit 1-2, the information provided in these multiple responses from the same agency are 

reflected in our survey analyses. 

35 We visited the following cities: Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, 

New York City, Phoenix, and San Francisco. 
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The following exhibit presents a graphic display of our survey results for 

general investigative areas of computer crime, drugs, organized crime, 

terrorism, violent crime, and white-collar crime. 

EXHIBIT 4-2

SURVEY RESULTS OF THE IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL 

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES’ INVESTIGATIONS

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 

 As shown above, at least 59 percent of respondents indicated that 

they were not affected by the FBI’s reprioritization in each crime area, with 

the exception of their investigative efforts on terrorism-related matters. 

Although several noted no effects in terrorism-related matters, 32 percent 

indicated that their departments experienced a positive impact from the 

FBI’s shift in priorities. In turn, no more than 9 percent of survey 

respondents remarked that they were impaired in any one investigative 

area. Based on the survey responses, we found that the greatest adverse 

effect on state and local law enforcement agencies pertained to white-collar 

crime matters. The chapters that follow contain more in-depth analyses of 

survey responses related to specific crime areas. 

 In addition to determining whether state and local agencies were 

affected by the FBI’s reprioritization, we sought the respondents’ opinion on 

the FBI’s level of investigative efforts. In particular, we attempted to ascertain 

if these agencies observed changes in the degree of FBI involvement in 

addressing certain investigative areas. Exhibit 4-3 provides a snapshot of 

these survey results. 
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EXHIBIT 4-3

STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES’ OBSERVATIONS 

OF CHANGES IN FBI INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS 

COMPARISON OF CALENDAR YEARS 2000 TO 2004 

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 

 As depicted in Exhibit 4-3, the majority (at least 64 percent) noted that 

they had not observed a change in the FBI’s level of investigative efforts in 

any one area when comparing calendar years 2000 to 2004. Depending on 

the investigative category, between 10 and 14 percent of respondents were 

unaware, or uncertain, of any changes in the FBI’s efforts in traditional crime 

matters. 

The survey also asked questions related to changes in the agencies’ 

crime rates between calendar years 2000 and 2004 at both an overall level 

and within individual crime areas. The results showed that 52 percent 

(581 out of 1,109 responses) experienced an increase, by varying degrees, in 

their overall crime rate during our review period. In turn, 31 percent noted a 

decline between calendar years 2000 and 2004, while the remaining 

17 percent indicated no change in the crime rate. The following exhibit 

displays the survey results to the question of overall crime rate changes 

between calendar years 2000 and 2004. 
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EXHIBIT 4-4

STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES’ RESPONSE TO 

THE CHANGE IN THEIR OVERALL CRIME RATE 

BETWEEN CALENDAR YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 

 Our survey found that even though the FBI has reduced its 

investigative effort in traditional crime matters over the last 4 years, state 

and local law enforcement agencies indicated a minimal impact on their 

operations resulting from the FBI’s shift in priorities and resources. 

Additionally, the majority of survey respondents did not observe any change 

within FBI operations on traditional crime matters. 

Discussions with State and Local Officials 

As mentioned previously, we interviewed officials at 47 state and local 

law enforcement agencies within the 7 locations visited. The majority 

reported that they were aware of the FBI’s new priorities. However, some of 

these officials were concerned about the FBI shifting its resources away from 

traditional crime areas to focus them on counterterrorism issues. For 

example, officials expressed concerns that because they continue to combat 

traditional (non-terrorism) crimes and the FBI is less available to aide in 

these local crime-fighting efforts, state and local departments have assumed 

a greater investigative role, resulting in a greater caseload for their officers 

and detectives. These officials said that while their departments have done 

the best they can with available resources, they miss the FBI’s expertise and 

the quality of its investigative tools. Particular concerns of these local 

officials are discussed within the following chapters according to specific 

crime type. 
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Overview of Affected Crime Areas 

Some FBI officials we interviewed stated that the FBI’s more limited 

presence in violent crime and white-collar crime had impaired the law 

enforcement community’s efforts to address these crime areas, particularly 

financial institution fraud and bank robberies. They added that state and 

local law enforcement agencies generally do not have the necessary 

resources or jurisdictional authority to effectively address many of these 

violations, and they commented that no other law enforcement agency has 

been able to compensate entirely for the FBI’s reduced efforts in these 

areas. 

Our discussions with other federal agencies generally indicated that 

these agencies were willing and in some cases eager to increase their 

investigative efforts in those areas in which the FBI has reduced its 

involvement. However, our review led us to conclude that there are specific 

criminal areas in which the FBI’s shift of its priorities and resources has 

affected investigative efforts, as we describe below. 

Financial Crimes 

Of the types of criminal acts categorized as financial crimes, financial 

institution fraud (FIF) incurred the most noticeable effect from the FBI’s shift 

in priorities. From our analyses of FBI data, we found that the FBI was 

minimally addressing FIF matters under $100,000 in FY 2004 as compared 

to FY 2000. USAO representatives stated that this lessened involvement by 

the FBI has created an investigative gap that no other law enforcement 

agency has sufficiently filled. 

 To a lesser extent, a gap exists within the law enforcement community 

related to telemarketing and wire fraud. According to FBI and local law 

enforcement officials, other law enforcement agencies have not assumed a 

greater role in these areas due to a lack of resources, technical capability, 

and jurisdictional authority. Chapter 5 contains more detail on these 

financial crime matters. 

Criminal Enterprises 

 As noted previously, the FBI’s new Criminal Enterprise Branch 

oversees all drug, gang, and organized crime investigations. The FBI’s most 

significant reduction in agent resources occurred in its drug-related 

investigations, resulting in decreased casework and overall investigative 

effort in drug crimes. According to DEA field officials, the FBI’s reduced 

efforts in drug-related crime had not impaired the DEA’s operations in large 
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metropolitan areas. However, the DEA officials raised concerns that smaller 

urban areas were hurt by the FBI’s shift in emphasis because the DEA often 

has a limited presence in these areas. 

 With regard to gang-related investigations, our analyses revealed that 

the FBI initiated more gang-related investigations during FY 2004 than 

during FY 2000. Additionally, the FBI did not alter its agent utilization in the 

investigation of gang-related matters between FYs 2000 and 2004. 

Nonetheless, certain local law enforcement agencies indicated that they 

received less investigative assistance from the FBI on gang cases. Further, 

they commented that the law enforcement community in many metropolitan 

areas could improve communication and coordination regarding gang-related 

activity and investigations. A more detailed discussion on gang, drug, and 

organized crime-related matters is contained in Chapter 6. 

Fugitive Apprehension 

According to FBI data analysis and interviews with FBI and USMS field 

managers, the FBI reduced its efforts in fugitive-related investigations since 

FY 2000. According to USMS field officials, the FBI’s reduced involvement in 

this area did not significantly impair the operations of other law enforcement 

agencies. Further details about fugitive matters are contained in Chapter 7. 

Bank Robberies 

According to the comments of federal, state, and local officials, the FBI 

is no longer investigating bank robberies at the same level as it has in the 

past. This was confirmed by our analyses of FBI data. Consequently, most 

state and local agencies reported that they had experienced an increased 

bank robbery caseload, which exceeded a few of these agencies’ 

investigative capabilities. Chapter 8 contains additional information on bank 

robberies. 

Identity Theft 

Identity theft was a major concern for the majority of the local law 

enforcement officials we interviewed, and many said they expect criminal 

activity in this area to increase in the coming years. They stated that the 

nature of identity theft investigations is generally beyond the technical 

capability and jurisdictional authority of state and local law enforcement 

agencies. Although several federal agencies in addition to the FBI are 

involved in addressing identity theft, we found no evidence of a coordinated 

approach for combating this crime. Details on identity theft are conveyed in 

Chapter 9. 
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Public Corruption 

According to the FBI’s national priorities, public corruption is the FBI’s 

highest criminal priority. Yet, the FBI’s agent utilization and casework data 

revealed an overall reduction on public corruption matters. Our review 

found that some FBI field offices were slow to make changes to emphasize 

their public corruption investigations over lesser priority areas. However, in 

FY 2005 the FBI has implemented an initiative to ensure that field offices are 

appropriately emphasizing public corruption matters, and the FBI has 

significantly increased its resource utilization in this area in FY 2005 

compared to FY 2004. Chapter 10 contains additional details on public 

corruption matters. 

Other Crime Areas 

Both FBI and non-FBI law enforcement officials we interviewed cited 

problems in investigating child pornography, human trafficking, and alien 

smuggling, particularly insufficient resources to adequately address these 

crimes. State and local law enforcement agencies, in turn, commented that 

they lacked sufficient resources and the technical ability and jurisdictional 

authority that often are required to handle these investigations. In addition, 

in certain locations we identified a lack of coordination between the FBI and 

other agencies on these types of cases. Further details about these crime 

problems are discussed in Chapter 11. 
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CHAPTER 5: FINANCIAL CRIMES 

The FBI’s White-Collar Crime (WCC) program can be separated into 

the general areas of financial crimes and integrity in government crimes. 

Financial crimes include fraud-related crimes such as corporate, health care, 

and bank fraud. Integrity in government involves issues such as public 

corruption and government fraud. 

In FY 2004, the FBI allocated 2,342 agent positions for all white-collar 

crime matters throughout its field offices, which accounted for 41 percent of 

the total resources allotted to program areas within the CID.36 In conjunction 

with its change in focus to terrorism-related matters, the FBI reduced the 

number of positions it allocated for white-collar crime by 118 field agent 

positions (or almost 5 percent) between FYs 2000 and 2004. As shown 

previously in Exhibit 3-3, this was the least significant reduction within the 

traditional crime program areas with the exception of Civil Rights. 

In our analysis of Agent On-Board (AOB) data, we found that the FBI 

was using approximately 500 fewer agents on white-collar crime matters 

when comparing utilization data for FY 2004 to data for FY 2000. During 

FY 2000, the FBI utilized 2,385 agents on these investigations while the 

number of on-board agents dropped to 1,882 during FY 2004. Exhibit 5-1 

compares the allocation of white-collar crime positions to the actual utilization 

of FBI resources for FYs 2000 and 2004. During each of these FYs, the FBI 

utilized fewer agents on white-collar crime matters than it allocated. The 

FY 2004 difference between allocated and actual was six times greater than 

FY 2000’s variation. 

 36 The FBI does not separately allocate field agent positions between financial crimes 

and public corruption. Thus, the figures reported within this section of the report include all 

white-collar crime areas. However, the remainder of this chapter focuses solely on financial 

crime matters. Chapter 10 discusses integrity in government crimes. 
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EXHIBIT 5-1

ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION OF FBI AGENTS ON 

WHITE-COLLAR CRIME MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Source: OIG analysis of FBI RMA Office and TURK data 

The FBI also opened 7,992 fewer white-collar crime cases during 

FY 2004 than in FY 2000. In FY 2000, the FBI opened 19,893 cases, whereas 

in FY 2004 it opened 11,901 cases. 

FBI Financial Crimes Focus 

The FBI is the primary federal investigative agency that investigates 

financial crimes. No other federal agency has the investigative authority to 

handle the range of financial-related violations as the FBI. Although other 

federal agencies are involved in certain areas, such as health care fraud, 

these agencies are more narrowly focused in their investigations. The FBI 

has the authority to investigate nearly all violations in the financial arena, 

including securities, health care, and bank fraud. The FBI’s national financial 

crime priorities are listed in Exhibit 5-2. 

EXHIBIT 5-2

FBI NATIONAL FINANCIAL CRIME PRIORITIES37

1. Securities and Commodities Fraud 

2. Health Care Fraud 

3. Financial Institution Fraud 

4. Money Laundering 

5. Insurance Fraud 

Source: FY 2005 FBI Program Plans 

 37 The priorities established by FBI Headquarters covered the entire White-Collar Crime 

Program, including both public corruption and financial crimes. This list only presents the 

financial crime national priorities. However, in relation to all white-collar crime matters, public 

corruption is the FBI’s top priority. Moreover, the FBI’s national non-priority areas in financial 

crimes include telemarketing fraud and bankruptcy fraud. 
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Overall Changes within the FBI’s Financial Crime Efforts 

In the area of financial crimes, the FBI experienced reductions in agent 

utilization and case openings between FYs 2000 and 2004. In August 2002, 

the FBI revised its established dollar-related thresholds for addressing 

financial crime investigations, which has generally limited its investigations to 

high-dollar matters. We found that these changes have affected other law 

enforcement agencies in certain jurisdictional areas, especially in the area of 

financial institution (or bank) fraud, as detailed in the sections that follow. 

FBI Agent Utilization and Casework Data 

Apart from its overall allotments to white-collar crime, the FBI does not 

allocate funded agent positions to specific financial crimes except health care 

fraud, which is discussed later in this chapter. Therefore, we were unable to 

provide an overview of agent allocation changes to financial crimes. However, 

we were able to assess the FBI’s actual agent utilization in financial crime 

matters. Our analyses show that the FBI’s investigative personnel resources 

for financial crime investigations decreased from 1,641 on-board agents in 

FY 2000 to 1,335 in FY 2004, or an almost 20 percent reduction. 

We also identified differences in the utilization of agents on financial 

crime matters for the seven field offices we visited (presented in Exhibit 5-3). 

Six of the seven offices used fewer agents on these investigations during 

FY 2004 than in FY 2000, with the Phoenix Field Office experiencing the 

greatest reduction of 50 percent. 

EXHIBIT 5-3

FBI AGENT UTILIZATION ON FINANCIAL CRIME MATTERS 

FOR THE FIELD OFFICES VISITED 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004 

Field Office FY 2000 

AOB 

FY 2004 

AOB 

Change in 

Number 

Change in 

Percent 

Chicago 71 59 -12 -17% 

Los Angeles 131 103 -28 -21% 

Miami 70 63 -7 -10% 

New Orleans 28 20 -8 -29% 

New York City 120 125 5 4% 

Phoenix 28 14 -14 -50% 

San Francisco 41 37 -4 -10% 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data 

Likewise, the FBI’s casework data showed that the FBI opened 

6,939 fewer financial crime cases between FYs 2000 and 2004, decreasing from 

17,402 cases to 10,463. Moreover, each of the field offices we visited 
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experienced at least a 24 percent reduction in financial crime case openings. 

Exhibit 5-4 provides data on the changes occurring at each of these offices. 

EXHIBIT 5-4

FBI FINANCIAL CRIME CASE OPENINGS 

FOR THE FIELD OFFICES VISITED 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004 

Field Office 

FY 2000 

Case 

Openings 

FY 2004 

Case 

Openings 

Change in 

Number 

Change in 

Percent 

Chicago 461 209 -252 -55% 

Los Angeles 425 325 -100 -24% 

Miami 383 197 -186 -49% 

New Orleans 299 144 -155 -52% 

New York City 413 315 -98 -24% 

Phoenix 297 100 -197 -66% 

San Francisco 150 94 -56 -37% 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data 

Impact on FBI Financial Crime Operations 

At each site we visited, FBI officials indicated that they place more 

emphasis on those financial crime areas near the top of the FBI’s national 

priorities (previously presented in Exhibit 5-2). As a result, FBI officials at 

many of these locations said they have reduced investigative efforts in lowdollar financial institution fraud (FIF or bank fraud) matters and low priority 

areas like telemarketing fraud and other wire/mail fraud. To identify highlevel investigations, FBI field offices have implemented dollar-related 

thresholds to determine whether to open a case. These thresholds and their 

effect are discussed in further detail in the FIF section of this chapter. 

We also observed various levels of FBI involvement in financial crime 

matters during our site visits. For instance, the FBI Miami Field Office 

essentially maintained the same number of financial crime squads between 

FYs 2000 and 2004 with only a slight reduction in agent resources. In 

contrast, the number of investigative squads focused on financial crime 

matters in the FBI Phoenix Field Office declined during this same period from 

five white-collar crime squads in FY 2000 to two in FY 2004, both of which 

focused almost exclusively on public corruption matters. 

Impact on Other Law Enforcement Agencies’ Financial Crime Efforts 

 In general, the other federal agencies we visited were primarily 

involved in other crime areas and were not heavily involved in financial crime 

investigations either before or after the FBI’s reprioritization. Therefore, the 
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FBI’s reduced efforts in financial crimes have not affected their operations. 

However, USAO representatives and USAO case management data indicated 

that the FBI’s reprioritization has resulted in fewer financial-related matters 

being referred for U.S. Attorney review and prosecution. Additionally, several 

state and local law enforcement agency officials commented that their 

departments and communities were negatively affected by the FBI’s 

decreased efforts in certain financial crime areas. 

Other Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 

 Of all the federal agency officials we interviewed, only USAO officials 

commented on the FBI’s reduced financial crime investigative efforts and the 

resulting reduction in criminal matters being referred to the USAO for review 

and prosecution. According to USAO case management data, actual FBI 

financial crime matters referred to the USAOs declined from 6,794 to 4,193 

between FYs 2000 and 2004, a reduction of almost 40 percent. 

In certain instances, the USAO representatives commented that they 

attempted to encourage other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Postal 

Inspection Service or Internal Revenue Service (IRS), to increase their 

investigative efforts in financial crime matters. Generally, the USAO officials 

we interviewed considered non-FBI agencies to be able to conduct most 

financial crime investigations. However, these officials noted that the FBI 

remains the premier investigative agency for financial-related matters. 

These officials said they did not believe another agency was as capable as 

the FBI on highly complex cases or capable of completely backfilling any 

investigative gap resulting from the FBI’s reduced financial crime efforts. 

In addition, officials at six USAOs commented on the experience level 

of FBI agents who are still handling traditional crime matters, including 

financial crime cases. Some of these officials said the FBI took experienced 

agents from the white-collar crime area and moved them to 

counterterrorism squads. According to these prosecutors, the sophistication 

of financial crime cases requires significant experience to effectively address 

case needs. With fewer experienced agents left to handle these complex 

investigations, these prosecutors commented that the quality of FBI financial 

crime cases has been affected. 

State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 

 Several of the state and local law enforcement agency representatives 

that we interviewed indicated that their operations related to financial crime 

matters were negatively affected by the FBI’s changed priorities. They 

commented that since the FBI’s shift in priorities there has been less FBI 
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involvement on their cases, primarily because the cases did not meet the 

FBI’s investigative threshold. In many locations, the officials specifically 

noted that FIF investigations were impaired the most. Many remarked that 

their agencies did not have sufficient resources or expertise to effectively 

handle these matters by themselves. As a result, they believed many FIF 

crimes were unaddressed. 

 According to our survey of state and local law enforcement officials, 

the majority responded that their white-collar crime investigations were not 

affected by the FBI’s new priorities, while 106 out of 1,231 respondents (or 

9 percent) indicated a negative impact on their investigative efforts in this 

area. Exhibit 5-5 presents these survey results. 

EXHIBIT 5-5

SURVEY RESULTS OF THE IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL LAW 

ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES’ WHITE-COLLAR CRIME INVESTIGATIONS

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 

 The following sections of this chapter provide more detailed analysis of 

the FBI’s investigative changes by specific financial crime areas. 

Specifically, we discuss FIF, telemarketing and wire fraud, health care fraud, 

and corporate fraud. Additionally, we provide comments obtained from nonFBI law enforcement officials related to each area, including any perceived 

impact on their law enforcement operations. 

Financial Institution Fraud (Bank Fraud) 

 A variety of criminal acts can be categorized as FIF, including bank 

failures, check fraud, and loan fraud. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION 

REDACTED] 

 In general, FBI officials at each field office we visited stated that their 

offices had de-emphasized low-dollar FIF investigations and essentially left 
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them for other law enforcement agencies to handle. While none of the 

offices had completely stopped investigating these matters, all reported that 

they limited their efforts to the most significant cases. 

Statistical Analyses 

 We analyzed FBI agent utilization and casework data to assess the 

level of FBI investigations involving FIF matters. Specifically, we determined 

the changes occurring within the FBI overall and at the field office level 

between FYs 2000 and 2004. Additionally, we reviewed the FBI data 

according to the dollar losses involved on these investigations, in particular 

FIF matters under $100,000 and those greater than or equal to $100,000. 

We performed similar analyses of USAO case management data to identify, 

from the USAOs’ perspective, the changes resulting from the FBI’s reduced 

emphasis on FIF matters. 

FBI’s Overall FIF Efforts – Our analyses of FBI data support FBI 

officials’ reports of decreased investigative efforts on FIF matters. During 

FY 2000, 499 agents worked on FIF cases. This number dropped to 337 

during FY 2004 – a decrease of 162 agents, or 32 percent. Similarly, the 

FBI opened 5,011 fewer FIF cases in FY 2004 than in FY 2000 – decreasing 

from 10,383 cases in FY 2000 to 5,372 in FY 2004. 

USAO case management data demonstrates that the FBI was the 

primary federal law enforcement agency investigating FIF matters in both 

FYs 2000 and 2004. In FY 2000, the FBI contributed 81 percent of all FIF 

matters referred to the USAOs. Although this proportion dropped to 

67 percent in FY 2004, the FBI remained the predominant agency providing 

FIF matters to the USAOs. Between FYs 2000 and 2004, the USAOs received 

a total of 1,701 fewer FIF matters from federal agencies. The FBI essentially 

accounted for all of this decrease, reducing its FIF referrals by 1,700. 

The 7 FBI field divisions we visited reduced the number of FIF referrals 

to their respective USAOs, with 6 divisions decreasing referral numbers at 

least 40 percent. The FBI New York City Division was an anomaly, 

decreasing its FIF referrals by only 4 percent. The following exhibit provides 

the total number of FIF referrals to USAOs. This table also shows overall FBI 

referral numbers, as well as referral figures for those field divisions in which 

we conducted fieldwork. 
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EXHIBIT 5-6

FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FRAUD MATTERS RECEIVED BY THE USAOs 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004 

 FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percentage 

Change 

All Federal 

Agencies 4,000 2,299 -1,701 -43% 

FBI Field Office 

Jurisdictions38: 

All Divisions 3,243 1,543 -1,700 -52% 

Chicago 143 44 -99 -69% 

Los Angeles 72 43 -29 -40% 

Miami 52 19 -33 -63% 

New Orleans 103 24 -79 -77% 

New York City 104 100 -4 -4% 

Phoenix 13 2 -11 -85% 

San Francisco 34 20 -14 -41% 

Source: OIG analysis of USA central case management system data 

As our analysis of USAO data illustrates, other federal investigative 

agencies did not replace the FBI’s reduced efforts in FIF matters. 

FBI’s FIF Efforts Relative to Dollar Loss – From our review of individual 

FIF classifications, we found that FBI agents spent nominal time investigating 

FIF matters involving losses under $100,000 during FY 2004, [SENSITIVE 

INFORMATION REDACTED]. FBI agents were primarily utilized on FIF 

investigations involving losses greater than or equal to $100,000. The 

following exhibit provides a proportional perspective of FBI agent utilization on 

FIF matters for FYs 2000 and 2004. 

 38 The FBI’s field office jurisdictions usually coincide with a USAO district; however, in 

some instances an FBI field office jurisdiction includes more than one USAO district. Following 

are the FBI field office jurisdictions listed in this exhibit with their corresponding USAOs: FBI 

Chicago Division – Northern District of Illinois USAO; FBI Los Angeles Division – Central 

District of California USAO; FBI Miami Division – Southern District of Florida; FBI New Orleans 

Division – Eastern, Middle, and Western Districts of Louisiana; FBI New York City Division – 

Eastern and Southern Districts of New York; FBI Phoenix Division – District of Arizona USAO; 

and FBI San Francisco Division – Northern District of California USAO. The figures presented 

incorporate the criminal matters submitted to the USAOs within these FBI jurisdictions. 
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EXHIBIT 5-7

FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION 

ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FRAUD MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 200439

FY 2000 FY 2004

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data 

We further analyzed FIF matters associated with dollar-related losses 

of less than $100,000 and those with losses greater than or equal to 

$100,000. The FBI experienced overall agent utilization reductions in both 

areas, but at a much greater level for the lower-dollar investigations. For 

FIF matters under $100,000, the FBI used over 80 percent fewer agents in 

FY 2004 than it had in FY 2000, decreasing from 111 on-board agents to 20. 

In contrast, the agent utilization decline on FIF matters with losses greater 

than or equal to $100,000 was not as substantial. During FYs 2000 and 

2004, the FBI utilized 287 and 243 agents, respectively, or a reduction of 

44 agents (15 percent). 

Of the field offices we visited, the FBI’s data shows that each office 

used fewer agents on FIF investigations under $100,000. Almost all offices 

had reduced their efforts on these cases to less than one AOB agent. We also 

noted that several offices experienced significant decreases in on-board 

agents for FIF investigations greater than or equal to $100,000. Two offices 

(New Orleans and New York City) slightly increased the number of agents 

involved on these cases during our review period. Exhibit 5-8 details the 

agent utilization changes that occurred between FYs 2000 and 2004 at the 

FBI field offices we visited, as well as the FBI’s overall agent utilization 

changes on such matters. 

 39 Other FIF Matters consist of FBI investigative classifications to which a dollar 

amount is not associated. 
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EXHIBIT 5-8

FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FRAUD MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

 UNDER $100,000 $100,000 AND OVER 

Field Office FY 2000 

AOB 

FY 2004 

AOB 

Change in 

AOB 

FY 2000 

AOB 

FY 2004 

AOB 

Change in 

AOB 

Chicago 4.0 0.1 -3.9 15.8 15.2 -0.6 

Los Angeles 0.7 0.1 -0.6 34.8 17.3 -17.5 

Miami 0.7 0.1 -0.6 9.7 7.3 -2.4 

New Orleans 4.0 0.7 -3.3 3.2 3.9 0.7 

New York City 1.8 0.4 -1.4 23.0 23.5 0.5 

Phoenix 1.9 0.1 -1.8 2.0 1.4 -0.6 

San Francisco 1.0 0.1 -0.9 6.4 2.1 -4.3

Total of Sites 

Visited 14.1 1.6 -12.5 94.9 70.7 -24.2 

Total of FBI 

Overall 111.2 19.7 -91.5 287.3 243.2 -44.1 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

 Evaluation of FBI casework data provided similar results to that of our 

agent utilization analyses. Each of the FBI sites we visited initiated fewer FIF 

investigations during FY 2004 than during FY 2000. Exhibit 5-9 lists the 

changes in the number of case openings occurring within these locations for 

our review period. As evidenced in that exhibit, all but 1 of the 7 field offices 

opened fewer than 10 FIF cases under $100,000 in FY 2004. 

EXHIBIT 5-9

FBI CASE OPENINGS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FRAUD MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

 UNDER $100,000 $100,000 AND OVER 

Field Office FY 2000 FY 2004 Change FY 2000 FY 2004 Change 

Chicago 114 1 -113 129 46 -83 

Los Angeles 6 2 -4 73 55 -18 

Miami 27 2 -25 51 16 -35 

New Orleans 105 23 -82 35 26 -9 

New York City 27 9 -18 85 55 -30 

Phoenix 167 2 -165 23 9 -14 

San Francisco 44 5 -39 24 12 -12

Totals 490 44 -446 420 219 -201 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Impact on Law Enforcement Community 

 During our fieldwork, we obtained comments from non-FBI law 

enforcement officials regarding the FBI’s reduced FIF efforts. 
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USAO Perspectives – In our discussions with the USAOs, prosecutors in 

the various districts had different views about the impact of the FBI’s reduced 

FIF investigative efforts. For instance, [SENSITIVE INFORMATION 

REDACTED]. Representatives from both these USAOs stated that the FBI was 

referring fewer FIF cases for prosecution and that no other federal agency 

had increased the number of FIF matters to compensate for the FBI’s reduced 

efforts in this area. However, the USAO official in Chicago indicated that his 

office was interested in receiving matters that are below the FBI’s threshold 

while the federal prosecutor in San Francisco was satisfied with the FBI 

investigating only the most egregious violations. These two prosecutors, as 

well as prosecutors from the Southern District of New York, did not believe 

that any other law enforcement agency was able to fill the investigative gap 

resulting from less FBI effort in this area. 

 State and Local Law Enforcement Perspectives – State and local law 

enforcement officials at several field office jurisdictions we visited raised 

concerns about FIF issues. In particular, they stated that the FBI was less 

available to assist their agencies in addressing these crimes. One local official 

in South Florida commented that he stopped requesting assistance from the 

FBI because he was repeatedly turned down. Several other officials also 

remarked that they were aware of the FBI’s dollar-related thresholds, and 

many times only approached the FBI when they had a case exceeding those 

limits. 

In the past, these local agencies said they relied on the FBI’s 

assistance in investigating these crimes. Now, without the FBI’s 

involvement, these agencies are left to handle bank fraud matters on their 

own. The local officials said this has caused problems because their 

agencies do not have sufficient resources or the expertise to effectively 

investigate these cases. They said that as a result, many of these crimes 

are unaddressed. In addition, the officials said they believed that FIF crimes 

could escalate in the coming years. 

In our survey of state and local law enforcement agencies, we asked 

participants if the FBI’s shift in priorities had any effect on their 

investigations of FIF matters with losses greater than or equal to $100,000 

and those under $100,000. The majority reported that their investigation of 

these cases was not affected by the FBI’s reprioritization. However, a few 

agencies noted an adverse impact on such investigations. Specifically, 101 

out of 1,223 responses, or 8 percent, indicated varying degrees of negative 

impact on FIF matters under $100,000. Exhibit 5-10 illustrates the survey 

results as related to FIF investigations.
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EXHIBIT 5-10

SURVEY RESULTS RELATED TO THE IMPACT ON 

STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES’ 

FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 

Conclusions on Financial Institution Fraud Matters 

Overall, we determined that FBI field divisions reduced their efforts on 

FIF investigations, and it does not appear that any other law enforcement 

agency has fully replaced the FBI’s contributions. Consequently, an 

investigative gap exists for low-dollar FIF matters. These results were 

supported by USAO representatives and state and local law enforcement 

officials, who believed that no other agency has filled the gap and that a 

portion of FIF crimes are not being investigated. 

Telemarketing and Wire Fraud 

 According to the FBI, telemarketing fraud, which often transcends state 

and international boundaries, is an escalating crime problem. Nonetheless, in 

line with its financial crime priorities, since the FBI’s reprioritization it has 

reduced its efforts in investigating telemarketing and wire fraud. 

 The operations of some state and local law enforcement agencies have 

been affected by the FBI’s decreased efforts in telemarketing and wire fraud 

matters, although to a lesser extent than for FIF. Telemarketing and wire 

fraud crimes tend to cross multiple jurisdictions, which hinder state and local 

departments’ investigations. Moreover, FBI officials commented that no 

other federal investigative agency has the resources available to devote 

significant time to these investigations. As a result, the FBI officials believed 

that some of these telemarketing and wire fraud crimes are not being 

investigated. 
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Statistical Analyses 

The FBI uses two investigative classifications to track its involvement 

in telemarketing and wire fraud matters: Classifications 196A 

(Telemarketing Fraud) and 196D (Other Wire & Mail Fraud Schemes). We 

analyzed the changes in resource utilization and case openings for each of 

these classifications between FYs 2000 and 2004. The analyses were 

conducted for the FBI’s overall efforts, as well as at the field office level. 

Further, we reviewed USAO case management data to determine the change 

in FBI referrals to USAO prosecutors. 

 Overall FBI Efforts – The FBI’s agent utilization data indicates fewer 

resources were used on Classifications 196A and 196D matters in FY 2004 

than in FY 2000. Exhibit 5-11 illustrates the AOB changes that occurred in 

these two areas during our review period. As shown, 60 agents addressed 

telemarketing fraud in FY 2000, while only 16 were used in FY 2004. This 

resulted in a reduction of 44 on-board agents, or 74 percent. Similarly, the 

FBI used almost 80 fewer agents on other wire and mail fraud schemes in 

FY 2004 than in FY 2000, decreasing from 244 agents in FY 2000 to 

165 agents in FY 2004. 

EXHIBIT 5-11

FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION FOR 

CLASSIFICATIONS 196A (TELEMARKETING FRAUD) AND 

196D (OTHER WIRE & MAIL FRAUD SCHEMES) 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2004

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data 
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 Data from the FBI’s ACS system further showed that the FBI reduced its 

efforts on these investigative matters. Specifically, the FBI opened 159 fewer 

telemarketing fraud cases during our review period –215 cases in FY 2000 to 

56 in FY 2004. Likewise, the FBI initiated 1,727 other wire and mail fraud 

cases during FY 2000 and 1,062 during FY 2004 – a reduction of 665 cases, or 

almost 40 percent. 

 USAO case management data were consistent with the reported FBI 

reductions in telemarketing fraud investigations. The FBI submitted 18 fewer 

referrals on telemarketing fraud matters to USAOs during our review period, 

referring 31 such matters in FY 2000 compared to 13 in FY 2004. 

 FBI Field Efforts – Based upon FBI data, many of the FBI divisions we 

visited experienced reductions in terms of agent utilization and casework for 

both telemarketing and wire fraud classifications during our review period. 

FBI officials at some of these offices also remarked that they had lessened 

their efforts in these fraud areas. For example, an FBI official in Phoenix 

stated that, in response to the FBI’s reprioritization efforts, the office had 

stopped handling telemarketing fraud cases and disbanded its telemarketing 

fraud task force. This official said that telemarketing fraud is a significant 

problem in Arizona, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service has attempted to 

increase the number of telemarketing fraud investigations, but there was 

only so much it could do with its available resources. 

Impact on Law Enforcement Community 

 None of the other federal investigative agencies we interviewed during 

our site visits were involved in addressing telemarketing fraud or wire fraud. 

However, we surveyed state and local law enforcement agencies about 

telemarketing and wire fraud matters. The majority of the respondents 

(about 60 percent) reported that their operations had not experienced any 

consequences, good or bad, from the FBI’s reduced efforts in the 

telemarketing and wire fraud arenas. Our survey revealed that 7 percent of 

respondents (81 out of 1,224 responses) said they had been negatively 

affected in these criminal areas, the same percentage who indicated a 

positive impact on their operations resulting from the FBI’s changes. 

 Analyses of the survey responses by FBI field office jurisdiction showed 

that some jurisdictions indicated a greater impact than others. From this 

analysis, agencies within the Denver, Miami, and Phoenix FBI Field Office 

jurisdictions experienced the greatest adverse effect related to telemarketing 

and wire fraud matters, with 12 percent of respondents in each city indicating 

a negative impact. The following exhibit illustrates the results by field office. 
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EXHIBIT 5-12

SURVEY RESULTS OF THE IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL 

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES’ TELEMARKETING 

AND WIRE FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 

ACCORDING TO FBI FIELD OFFICE JURISDICTION 

Field Office Negative 

Impact 

No 

Impact 

Positive 

Impact 

Not 

Applicable 

Atlanta 4% 56% 9% 31% 

Chicago 4% 63% 5% 28% 

Dallas 3% 59% 4% 34% 

Denver 12% 52% 7% 29% 

Detroit 9% 54% 10% 27% 

Los Angeles 7% 70% 3% 20% 

Miami 12% 64% 3% 21% 

New Orleans 3% 56% 14% 27% 

New York City 6% 64% 5% 25% 

Phoenix 12% 64% 5% 19% 

San Francisco 11% 69% 3% 17% 

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 

Conclusions on Telemarketing and Wire Fraud 

 Our analyses of FBI data showed that the FBI reduced its investigative 

efforts on telemarketing and wire fraud matters, using fewer agents to 

address these matters and opening fewer cases since FY 2000. In addition, 

some FBI field officials commented that their offices had placed less 

emphasis on handling these matters than in the past. Based on the data we 

analyzed and the interviews we conducted, it appears that the FBI’s reduced 

presence has created an investigative gap in the area of telemarketing and 

wire fraud because no other section of the federal law enforcement 

community has significantly increased its efforts in this area. 

Health Care Fraud 

 According to USAO representatives, health care fraud is a significant 

criminal problem that is expected to increase during the coming years. 

According to the FBI, several FBI field offices rank health care fraud as their 

number one white-collar crime problem. In its investigative efforts in this 

area, the FBI focuses its health care fraud resources on multi-district cases 

of large health care corporations suspected of committing fraud against 

government programs and private entities, such as insurance companies, 

businesses, or individuals. In addition to the FBI, the Department of Health 

and Human Services (HHS) OIG conducts many health care fraud 

investigations, either by itself or jointly with the FBI. 
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FBI Investigative Efforts 

 Health care fraud is the FBI’s second highest national priority for 

financial crime matters. However, our analysis of FBI data showed that 

fewer agents were addressing these matters in FY 2004 than in FY 2000, 

and that the FBI opened fewer health care fraud cases during this time 

period. Additionally, the FBI utilized fewer agents than allocated for health 

care fraud investigations. 

 Allocated Agent Positions – Beginning in FY 2003, the FBI allocated field 

agent positions specifically for health care fraud. Since 1997, the FBI has 

received funding for its health care fraud efforts through reimbursement from 

a specialized expenditure account created by the Health Insurance Portability 

and Accountability Act of 1996 (hereafter referred to as the HIPAA account).40

 In FY 2003, the FBI allocated 449 funded agent positions to health 

care fraud matters. In FY 2004, the total funded staffing level (FSL) had 

decreased to 420. According to FBI officials, the number of positions 

allocated to health care fraud is calculated by determining how many agents 

can be funded by the reimbursement agreement. They said that the number 

of allocated agents has decreased since FY 2003 because rising salary costs 

resulted in reimbursement for fewer agents. Prior to FY 2003, the FBI did 

not specify how many of its white-collar crime FSLs were intended for health 

care fraud matters; thus, we were unable to compare the change in funded 

positions between FYs 2000 and 2004. 

 Actual Agent Utilization – The FBI utilized 418 agents in health care 

fraud matters during FY 2000. In FY 2004, this number decreased to 

377 agents, a reduction of 41 agents. 

 Moreover, the FBI’s utilization of 377 agents on health care fraud 

matters in FY 2004 was less than the number of allocated agent positions for 

such matters. The FBI intended to use 420 field agents in the area of health 

care fraud, a difference of more than 40 agent positions. As noted 

previously, we were informed by the FBI that the number of positions 

allocated to health care fraud is calculated by determining how many agents 

can be funded by the reimbursement agreement. Therefore, this is a 

concern because the FBI is utilizing fewer agents on health care fraud 

matters than allocated to this area and the FBI is being reimbursed by the 

HIPAA Account for its efforts. The GAO recently issued a report on the FBI’s 

health care fraud reimbursements and found that the FBI was utilizing fewer 

 40 This account is co-administered by the HHS OIG and the Department of Justice. 

The appropriations are in specified amounts for each fiscal year. Since FY 2003, the FBI’s 

funding has amounted to $114 million per year. Pub. L. No. 104-191 (1996).
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agents than budgeted.41 In response, the FBI initiated an extensive manual 

review to identify other, non-agent salary costs attributable to its health care 

fraud efforts.42 Further, at our exit conference the FBI provided evidence 

that it increased its efforts related to health care fraud in FY 2005 compared 

to FY 2004. 

 Case Openings – Our analysis of FBI ACS data revealed that the FBI 

initiated 163 fewer health care fraud cases in FY 2004 than in FY 2000, 

equating to a 13 percent reduction. During FY 2000, the FBI opened 

1,244 health care fraud investigations compared to 1,081 cases during 

FY 2004. 

 Field Office Perspectives – Four of the 7 FBI field offices we visited 

(Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, and New York City) accounted for almost 

30 percent of the FBI’s total FY 2004 agent utilization on health care fraud 

investigations. Each of these offices also had more agents addressing these 

matters in FY 2004 than in FY 2000 (as did the San Francisco Field Office). 

In contrast, the New Orleans and Phoenix Divisions used fewer agents for 

health care fraud in FY 2004 compared to FY 2000. 

 According to FBI managers in Miami, South Florida is the epicenter for 

health care fraud violations. To help combat this problem, the Miami Division 

has dedicated two squads entirely to health care fraud investigations. 

However, this FBI official noted that this type of fraud is so problematic in the 

division’s jurisdiction that the FBI could easily use a third squad to investigate 

these matters. 

 To assist in the coordination of health care fraud investigative efforts 

in Miami, the FBI constructed an off-site facility dedicated solely to health 

care fraud investigations. The purpose of this facility is to allow FBI agents 

to work side-by-side on these investigations with personnel from other 

agencies, such as HHS OIG investigators and federal prosecutors. The 

facility also serves as a central location for storing health care fraud case 

files. FBI officials in Miami believed that this facility has enhanced 

relationships among various agencies and suggested that other large FBI 

 41 Government Accountability Office. Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

Accountability over the HIPAA Funding of Health Care Fraud Investigations Is Inadequate, 

Report Number GAO-05-388, April 2005. 

42 The GAO recommended that the FBI establish policies and procedures to report 

and adequately support the costs of its health care fraud investigations. The FBI agreed 

with the recommendation and acknowledged the need to establish control mechanisms to 

monitor both personnel and non-personnel costs.
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offices, such as New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles, would benefit from 

establishing similar facilities. 

Impact on Law Enforcement Community 

 As mentioned previously, the HHS OIG is the other federal agency 

primarily involved in health care fraud investigations.43 Because most 

health care fraud lies outside the jurisdictional purview of state and local law 

enforcement agencies, the state and local officials we interviewed did not 

raise this issue. 

 We obtained the USAO’s perspective on the FBI’s health care fraud 

efforts through review of USAO case management data and our interviews 

with USAO officials. The USAO data reflected reduced FBI efforts related to 

health care fraud over the past 5 years. However, comments from 

prosecutors at various USAOs were mixed. While representatives at some 

USAOs stated that the FBI was not as active in its health care fraud efforts 

as it was prior to 9/11, prosecutors from other USAOs we visited said the 

FBI continued its aggressive efforts in combating such violations.

 USAO Case Management Data – Analysis of USAO case management 

data demonstrated that the FBI and the HHS OIG, combined, accounted for 

approximately 90 percent of health care fraud referrals to the USAOs during 

FYs 2000 and 2004. In FY 2000, the FBI made 82 percent of such referrals. 

However, as Exhibit 5-14 shows, the FBI decreased its referrals by 231 

between FYs 2000 and 2004. Although the HHS OIG provided 77 more health 

care fraud matters to the USAOs during this period, the FBI’s 444 referrals 

accounted for 70 percent of the total health care fraud matters received by 

USAOs in FY 2004 while HHS OIG referrals accounted for 22 percent of the 

referred matters. Moreover, total health care fraud referrals declined by 

193 matters from FY 2000 to FY 2004, evidencing that despite the HHS OIG’s 

increased efforts other law enforcement agencies have not fully compensated 

for the FBI’s reduced investigative efforts in this area. 

 43 The HHS OIG was not one of the federal agencies visited during our audit. 

Therefore we cannot comment on the impact of the FBI’s reprioritization on the HHS OIG’s 

operations. 
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EXHIBIT 5-14

HEALTH CARE FRAUD MATTERS RECEIVED BY THE USAOs 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

 FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change Percent Change 

Total Referrals 824 631 -193 -23% 

FBI 675 444 -231 -34% 

HHS OIG 60 137 77 128% 

Source: OIG analysis of USA central case management system data

USAO Officials’ Perspective – Prosecutors at some USAO districts 

mentioned that the FBI’s involvement on health care fraud matters has 

lessened since 9/11, corroborating USAO case referral decreases shown in 

Exhibit 5-14. For example, USAO officials in the District of Arizona 

commented that the FBI’s health care fraud task force was more active prior 

to 9/11 than it is currently. In addition, USAO representatives from the 

Southern District of New York stated that they received significantly fewer 

cases from the FBI in recent months compared to pre-9/11. 

Conclusions on Health Care Fraud 

 Our analyses revealed that the FBI has experienced reductions in both 

its overall agent utilization and case openings between FYs 2000 and 2004 on 

health care fraud investigations. Similarly, data from the USAO also showed 

that the FBI referred fewer health care fraud matters to the USAOs in 

FY 2004 than in FY 2000. 

In addition, fewer FBI agents worked health care fraud matters in 

FY 2004 than the FBI had intended (underburn). Since the FBI receives 

congressional funding for its agent positions involved in health care fraud 

matters, we believe that the FBI must accurately convey the number of 

agents that will actually be investigating this crime area. 

Corporate (Securities) Fraud 

 Corporate or securities fraud is the FBI’s top priority within the financial 

crimes arena. The FBI has placed increased emphasis on this investigative 

area, primarily a result of the events surrounding the Enron bankruptcy. 

Statistical Analyses 

 Our analysis of the FBI’s agent utilization data confirms the prominence 

the FBI puts on this crime area. The FBI had 159 agents involved in 

corporate fraud investigations during FY 2000. In FY 2004, this number rose 
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to 258 agents, an increase of 62 percent.44 In contrast to the increase in 

resources, the FBI opened 67 fewer corporate fraud cases in FY 2004 than in 

FY 2000 (524 cases in FY 2000 to 457 cases in FY 2004). 

 According to USAO data, the FBI submitted the majority of criminal 

referrals on corporate fraud matters during FYs 2000 and 2004. Specifically, 

the FBI’s referrals encompassed 74 percent of all submitted corporate fraud 

matters in FY 2000 and 70 percent in FY 2004. The FBI referred 72 more 

corporate fraud matters to USAOs during the time period under review, 

increasing from 303 referrals in FY 2000 to 375 in FY 2004. 

Impact on Law Enforcement Community 

 The nature of corporate fraud does not lend itself to state and local law 

enforcement involvement. Instead, these violations are generally addressed 

by federal agencies, most notably the FBI. An official at the Securities and 

Exchange Commission (SEC) stated that the SEC’s efforts differ from the 

FBI’s in this area because the SEC primarily focuses on civil matters, while 

the FBI investigates criminal violations. This SEC official stated that the FBI 

has become more selective in the investigations it conducts, focusing on the 

higher dollar, higher profile cases. 

Conclusions on Corporate Fraud 

 The FBI designated corporate fraud as its top national priority for 

financial crimes and has increased the number of agents handling those 

matters between FYs 2000 and 2004. Case management data from the 

USAO also demonstrated the FBI’s increased emphasis on corporate fraud 

matters, showing that the FBI had referred more matters to the USAOs 

during FY 2004 than it had during FY 2000. Further, the other law 

enforcement entity officials that we interviewed did not indicate that their 

agencies had been negatively affected by the FBI’s reprioritization in the 

area of corporate fraud. 

Chapter Summary 

The FBI reduced its overall investigative efforts on financial crime 

matters between FYs 2000 and 2004, resulting in fewer agents handling 

these investigations and fewer FBI financial crime case openings. Of the 

specific crime areas discussed in this chapter, we noted reduced FBI efforts 

 44 In FY 2000, the FBI used Classification 196C (Securities/Commodities Fraud) to 

track its corporate fraud efforts. In FY 2004, it eliminated Classification 196C; instead it 

used five classifications: (1) 318A (Corporate Fraud), (2) 318B (Prime Bank and High Yield 

Investment Fraud), (3) 318C (Market Manipulation), (4) 318D (Insider Trading), and 

(5) 318E (Other Security/Commodities Fraud Matters). 
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(in both agent utilization and case openings) in FIF, telemarketing fraud, 

wire fraud, and health care fraud. Corporate fraud was the only area in 

which the FBI used additional agents between FYs 2000 and 2004. 

Similarly, USAO case management data revealed that the FBI referred fewer 

criminal matters to USAOs on FIF, telemarketing fraud, and health care 

fraud matters between FYs 2000 and 2004, while submitting more referrals 

on corporate fraud matters during this period. 

The FBI’s reduced resources on FIF matters had the most noticeable 

impact on the law enforcement community. In particular, the FBI’s reduced 

investigative efforts in this area created a gap that other law enforcement 

agencies have not filled. The FBI generally focused its resources on FIF 

cases involving large dollar losses, while the low-dollar FIF investigations 

were seldom initiated. Based upon USAO data, other federal agencies did 

not replace the FBI’s reduced effort in FIF matters. 

To a lesser extent, we determined that a gap exists in telemarketing 

and wire fraud investigations. These violations often exceed the technical 

capability and jurisdictional authority of state and local law enforcement 

agencies. 

The FBI’s investigative efforts in health care fraud have also diminished 

since FY 2000, even though health care fraud is the FBI’s second highest 

national priority for financial crimes. According to USAO data, the FBI 

continues to refer the majority of health care fraud matters handled by 

USAOs. Although USAO case management data indicated the HHS OIG 

increased the number of its health care referrals to USAOs between FYs 2000 

and 2004, the increase only compensated for 33 percent of the FBI’s 

reduction in such referrals. Thus, it appears that health care fraud is not 

being addressed as aggressively as in the past. 

Finally, corporate fraud is the FBI’s highest investigative priority for 

financial crime matters. In line with this priority status, the FBI utilized 

more agents on these investigations and referred more corporate fraud 

matters to the USAOs in FY 2004 than in FY 2000. 
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CHAPTER 6: CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES 

 According to the FBI, a criminal enterprise is a structured organization 

engaging in acts of criminal conspiracy and/or criminal activity. Among the 

common criminal enterprises are drug-trafficking organizations, street gangs, 

and organized crime syndicates. These organizations are the focus of the 

FBI’s efforts in combating criminal enterprises. 

 Overall, the FBI utilized fewer agents on criminal enterprise matters in 

FY 2004 compared to FY 2000, and it opened fewer criminal enterprise cases 

during this timeframe. While the FBI used fewer agents on narcotics 

trafficking and organized crime investigations, the FBI did not alter its agent 

utilization on overall gang-related investigative efforts between FYs 2000 

and 2004. The following sections discuss the results of our review of the 

FBI’s criminal enterprise investigative efforts, as well as the specific areas of 

narcotics trafficking, street gangs, and organized crime. 

Overall FBI Criminal Enterprise Investigative Efforts 

Allocation and Utilization of Agent Resources 

As discussed in Chapter 2, the FBI’s Criminal Enterprise Plan, which was 

created in FY 2004, pooled drug, gang, organized crime, and major theft 

resource allocations into criminal enterprise allocations. However, FY 2004 

field agent resources were allocated according to the CID’s old structure, 

before the implementation of the Criminal Enterprise Plan. These allotments 

were not altered with the implementation of the Criminal Enterprise Plan in 

mid-FY 2004. For FY 2005, the FBI allocated criminal agent positions 

according to its new organizational structure.45

While we were unable to determine the change in the FBI’s allocation of 

criminal enterprise agent positions from FYs 2000 to 2004 because of the 

reasons stated above, we were able to identify changes in the actual 

utilization of agents on criminal enterprise matters. We also analyzed agent 

utilization data at the subprogram level to obtain a more specific perspective 

on these changes. As evidenced in Exhibit 6-1, all criminal enterprise 

subprograms, except Violent Gangs, experienced on-board agent reductions 

between FYs 2000 and 2004, amounting to an overall decrease of 

1,285 positions, or 45 percent. 

 45 The new CID organization chart is located on page 9. 
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EXHIBIT 6-1

FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION BY CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE SUBPROGRAM 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 200446

Subprograms FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

OCDETF47 1,062 540 -522 -49% 

Mexican/Criminal Syndicates 353 75 -278 -79% 

La Costa Nostra/Italian/ 

Labor Racketeering 437 261 -176 -40% 

Major Theft 251 90 -161 -64% 

Colombian/Caribbean 146 35 -111 -76% 

Asian 137 95 -42 -31% 

Other Matters48 93 67 -26 -28% 

Russian/Eurasian 108 90 -18 -17% 

Violent Gangs 266 315 49 18% 

TOTALS 2,853 1,568 -1,285 -45% 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data 

Case Openings 

 The reduction in resources noted above corresponds with a significant 

decrease in case openings for criminal enterprise matters. As detailed in 

Exhibit 6-2, the number of criminal enterprise cases opened decreased by 

3,994, or 52 percent, between FYs 2000 and 2004. Additionally, most of the 

criminal enterprise subprograms experienced substantial decreases in case 

openings during this period, with 6 of the 9 subprograms showing a reduction 

of at least 50 percent. In contrast, violent gangs, which experienced an 

increase in agent utilization of 49 agents or 18 percent, had more case 

initiations in FY 2004 than in FY 2000, increasing by 58 percent. 

 46 These subprograms comprise the current Americas Criminal Enterprise Section 

and the Transnational Criminal Enterprise Section, which constitute the investigative 

components of the CID’s Criminal Enterprise Branch. 

47 This OCDETF figure represents combined totals for the OCDETF subprogram and 

the OCDETF – Gangs subprogram. The FBI received 488 reimbursable OCDETF positions in 

FY 2004. 

48 Subprograms Other Matters – Drugs and Other Matters – Organized Crime are 

combined within this table. 
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EXHIBIT 6-2

FBI CASE OPENINGS OF CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Subprograms FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

OCDETF47 499 202 -297 -60% 

Mexican/Criminal Syndicates 671 152 -519 -77% 

La Costa Nostra/Italian/ 

Labor Racketeering 233 90 -143 -61% 

Major Theft 1,556 649 -907 -58% 

Colombian/Caribbean 143 60 -83 -58% 

Asian 120 102 -18 -15% 

Other Matters48 3,882 1,575 -2,307 -59% 

Russian/Eurasian 80 71 -9 -11%

Violent Gangs 495 784 289 58% 

TOTALS 7,679 3,685 -3,994 -52% 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data 

Narcotic/Illegal Drug Trafficking Organizations 

The FBI targets various criminal enterprises involved in illegal drug 

trafficking. For some criminal enterprises, drug trafficking is the 

organization’s primary mission; for others, it is a means to financially 

support its other criminal operations. According to the DEA, the 

United States is one of the most profitable illegal drug markets in the world, 

attracting ruthless, sophisticated, and aggressive drug traffickers. 

Overall Allocation of FBI Drug-Related Resources 

As part of its reprioritization efforts, the FBI assessed the areas in 

which it had concurrent jurisdiction with other law enforcement agencies, 

particularly with the DEA. As a result, the FBI significantly shifted resources 

away from investigating drug-related crime more than any other criminal 

area over the last 4 years. 

Specifically, the FBI reduced drug-related field agent allocations from 

890 agents in FY 2001 to 339 in FY 2004.49 This 551-agent reduction 

accounts for almost half of the reduction in the FBI’s total criminal agent FSL 

allocation of 1,143 positions. The FBI also staffs its drug-related 

investigations with reimbursed OCDETF agent positions. Between FYs 2000 

and 2004, the number of FBI OCDETF positions decreased by 45 positions 

from 533 to 488, a reduction of 8 percent. As noted in Exhibit 6-1, the FBI 

 49 In FY 2000, the FBI allocated drug and organized crime resources together; it 

separately apportioned agent positions to these sections in FYs 2001 through 2004. 
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actually used 540 agents on OCDETF matters during FY 2004. While this 

number is above the reimbursed number of 488 positions, it is significantly 

less than the 1,062 agents that actually worked OCDETF matters in FY 2000. 

Overall FBI Agent Utilization on Drug-Related Matters 

FBI Headquarters managers stated that most Mexican and Colombian 

criminal enterprise investigations involved drug-related matters, so we focused 

our analyses of the FBI’s narcotics trafficking efforts on three subprogram 

areas: (1) Mexican/Criminal Syndicates, (2) Colombian/Caribbean, and 

(3) OCDETF. Exhibit 6-3 provides data on the resource reductions in FBI drugrelated investigations. As the exhibit demonstrates, the FBI operated its drugrelated efforts in FY 2004 at less than half the staffing level it utilized in 

FY 2000. Specifically, the Mexican/Criminal Syndicates subprogram utilized 

278 fewer agents in FY 2004 as compared to FY 2000, a decline of 79 percent 

in investigative resources. The Colombian/Caribbean subprogram experienced 

a decline of 111 agents, down from 146 agents in FY 2000 to only 35 in 

FY 2004. In addition, the FBI used over 50 percent fewer agents on OCDETF 

matters in FY 2004 than in FY 2000. 

EXHIBIT 6-3

FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION WITHIN DRUG-RELATED SUBPROGRAMS

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

FBI Subprogram FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

OCDETF 891 420 -471 -53% 

Mexican Criminal Syndicates 353 75 -278 -79% 

Colombian/Caribbean 146 35 -111 -76% 

TOTALS 1,390 530 -860 -62% 

Source: OIG Analysis of FBI TURK data 

Overall FBI Drug-Related Casework 

 The significant decline in the number of FBI agents investigating drugrelated crime has affected the number of drug-related cases opened by the 

FBI. Comparing case openings in the OCDETF, Mexican/Criminal Syndicates, 

and Colombian/Caribbean subprograms, the FBI opened 874 fewer cases in 

FY 2004 than in FY 2000, a decrease of 70 percent. Exhibit 6-4 displays the 

FBI case openings in these subprograms. 

 
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EXHIBIT 6-4

FBI CASE OPENINGS OF DRUG-RELATED MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

FBI Subprogram FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

OCDETF 432 160 -272 -63% 

Mexican/Criminal Syndicates 671 152 -519 -77% 

Columbian/Caribbean 143 60 -83 -58% 

TOTALS 1,246 372 -874 -70% 

Source: OIG Analysis of FBI ACS data 

Aside from the decrease in the number of case openings, we also 

observed a reduction in the number of case serials associated with FBI drugrelated investigations. FBI agents show evidence of their work on a case by 

submitting documents to the appropriate case file. Each document entry 

receives a serial, or tracking, number. Therefore, in evaluating the level of 

effort the FBI afforded drug investigations, the difference in the number of 

serials opened within each FY for a specific crime category provides additional 

perspective on the level of effort within active cases. In FY 2004, the FBI filed 

50 percent fewer case serials on OCDETF matters than it had in FY 2000, 

declining from 391,275 serials to 195,954.

FBI officials acknowledged that its shift in resources away from 

narcotics has resulted in fewer drug-related cases. [SENSITIVE 

INFORMATION REDACTED] 

Overall FBI Referrals of Drug-Related Matters to the USAOs 

In addition to FBI casework statistics, we assessed the FBI’s 

investigative efforts in drug-related matters by analyzing information from 

USAOs. Specifically, we computed the change in the number of criminal 

matters reported to USAOs by federal investigative agencies for all drugrelated violations, which is presented in Exhibit 6-5. Our analysis showed 

that the federal agencies submitted almost 2,000 fewer drug-related matters 

to the USAOs in FY 2004 than in FY 2000, a 10-percent reduction. In line 

with the FBI’s resource and casework reductions, overall FBI drug-related 

matters referred to federal prosecutors decreased by about 50 percent 

between FYs 2000 and 2004, from 3,292 referrals in FY 2000 to 1,699 in 

FY 2004. 
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EXHIBIT 6-5

OVERALL DRUG-RELATED MATTERS RECEIVED BY THE USAOs 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

All Agencies 20,331 18,368 -1,963 -10% 

FBI 3,292 1,699 -1,593 -48% 

DEA 10,053 10,296 243 2% 

ICE 5,683 4,834 -849 -15% 

ATF 464 779 315 68% 

Source: OIG analysis of USA central case management system data 

The USAO tracks drug-related matters in three specific categories: 

(1) drug trafficking, (2) OCDETF, and (3) simple drug possession. During 

FY 2004, drug-trafficking violations comprised 85 percent of the overall drugrelated matters referred to USAOs, while OCDETF matters accounted for an 

additional 14 percent of all drug matters received by the USAOs. The 

remaining one percent consisted of simple drug possession referrals. We 

performed additional analyses of drug trafficking and OCDETF referrals to 

USAOs. 

Drug-Trafficking Matters – The FBI, DEA, ATF, and ICE accounted for 

96 percent of the total 15,543 drug trafficking matters received by the USAOs 

during FY 2004. As Exhibit 6-6 shows, between FYs 2000 and 2004, total 

drug-trafficking matters received by the USAOs remained at nearly the same 

level, decreasing by only one percent. However, there were significant 

changes among federal agencies submitting the drug trafficking matters. For 

instance, the FBI decreased its drug trafficking referrals by 905, or 

44 percent, between FYs 2000 and 2004, while the DEA increased its drug 

referrals by 811 during this period, covering a majority of the FBI’s reduction. 

Also noteworthy is that the ATF more than doubled its drug-trafficking 

referrals to the USAOs between FYs 2000 and 2004. 

EXHIBIT 6-6

DRUG TRAFFICKING MATTERS RECEIVED BY THE USAOs 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

All Agencies 15,665 15,543 -122 -1% 

FBI 2,072 1,167 -905 -44% 

DEA 7,621 8,432 811 11% 

ICE 5,036 4,622 -414 -8% 

ATF 316 677 361 114% 

Source: OIG analysis of USA central case management system data 
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As shown in the preceding table, other federal law enforcement 

agencies, particularly the DEA and the ATF, appeared to compensate for the 

FBI’s decrease in drug trafficking matters, as total referrals to USAOs did not 

significantly change between FYs 2000 and 2004. 

 OCDETF Matters – Similar to drug-trafficking referrals, the FBI, the 

DEA, the ATF, and ICE comprised 96 percent of the total OCDETF matters 

received by the USAOs during FY 2004.50 However, unlike drug trafficking 

referrals, overall OCDETF matters received by the USAOs decreased by 

34 percent between FYs 2000 and 2004, as evidenced in Exhibit 6-7.51 

Moreover, each of these agencies referred significantly fewer OCDETF matters 

between FYs 2000 and 2004. As in the drug-related matter referrals, the FBI 

accounted for the greatest reduction in the number of OCDETF referrals, 

dropping from 1,127 OCDETF matters in FY 2000 to 485 in FY 2004. 

EXHIBIT 6-7

OCDETF MATTERS RECEIVED BY THE USAOs 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

All Agencies 4,008 2,628 -1,380 -34% 

FBI 1,127 485 -642 -57% 

DEA 2,192 1,760 -432 -20% 

ICE 365 193 -172 -47% 

ATF 128 91 -37 -29% 

Source: OIG analysis of USA central case management system data 

 

The FBI’s reduction in these OCDETF referrals correlates to its resource 

reductions in OCDETF and general drug-related investigations and the 

resulting decreases in cases.

Drug-Related Resource Changes within FBI Field Divisions 

At the FBI field office level, we reviewed the FBI’s agent utilization 

data in the three drug-related subprogram areas: (1) Mexican/Criminal 

 50 Many law enforcement agencies participate in the OCDETF program, which 

provides reimbursable funding for drug trafficking investigations meeting certain criteria. 

OCDETF cases involve multiple agencies and target well-established and complex 

organizations that direct, finance, or engage in illegal narcotics trafficking and related 

crimes. 

51 According to the Associate Director of the Executive Office for OCDETF, in FY 2002 

the OCDETF Program Guidelines were revised to instruct participants to focus OCDETF 

resources on coordinated, nationwide investigations of major drug trafficking and money 

laundering organizations. As a result of these revised guidelines, EOUSA officials told us that 

they expected the number of OCDETF matters referred to the USAOs to decrease. 
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Syndicates, (2) Colombian/Caribbean, and (3) OCDETF. This analysis 

afforded insight into changes within those investigative areas. 

Exhibit 6-8 illustrates the 10 FBI field divisions with the greatest agent 

utilization reductions for these 3 drug-related subprogram areas combined. 

The Miami Division experienced the greatest decrease in agent utilization, 

declining by 69 agents between FYs 2000 and 2004. Five of the other 

10 field divisions are located on or near the U.S. southwest border: El Paso, 

Houston, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and San Antonio. 

EXHIBIT 6-8

FBI FIELD DIVISIONS EXPERIENCING THE GREATEST 

AGENT UTILIZATION REDUCTIONS IN DRUG-RELATED MATTERS 

BETWEEN FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Impact of FBI Drug-Related Resource Changes within the Field 

Effect on FBI Drug Squads and Related Casework – One of the major 

effects from the FBI’s reduction in agents assigned drug cases was the impact 

on squads focusing on drug crime. In FY 2000, the Miami Division had at least 

nine drug squads; however, at the time of our review in April 2005, it operated 

with only three such squads. Similarly, the Phoenix Division used at least 

four separate drug squads in its pre-9/11 narcotics trafficking investigative 

efforts. During our visit to Phoenix in March 2005, FBI managers informed us 

that they scaled back to two drug squads. These FBI officials in Phoenix 

further commented that they believe that operating with fewer drug squads 
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and resources caused drug crime in their jurisdiction to be significantly underaddressed by the FBI. The New York City Division did not reduce the number 

of its drug squads but operated each squad at significantly reduced staffing 

levels. 

With fewer resources and fewer squads addressing drug-related crime, 

FBI field divisions, as a whole, opened fewer drug cases in FY 2004 than they 

did in FY 2000, as evidenced in Exhibit 6-4. Of the seven field offices where 

we conducted fieldwork, Exhibit 6-9 shows that six experienced substantial 

reductions in case openings. The FBI Los Angeles and Chicago Divisions were 

among the top five divisions experiencing the greatest decreases in case 

openings. Compared to FY 2000, the Los Angeles Division opened 93 percent 

fewer drug cases in FY 2004, declining from 72 case openings in FY 2000 to 

only 5 in FY 2004. In contrast, the New Orleans Division initiated two more 

cases during FY 2004 than it opened in FY 2000. 

EXHIBIT 6-9

FBI COMBINED CASE OPENINGS FOR SUBPROGRAMS 

OCDETF, MEXICAN AND COLOMBIAN ORGANIZATIONS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Field Division FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

Chicago 57 21 -36 -63% 

Los Angeles 72 5 -67 -93% 

Miami 46 31 -15 -33% 

New Orleans 8 10 2 25% 

New York City 33 19 -14 -42% 

Phoenix 24 11 -13 -54% 

San Francisco 24 9 -15 -63% 

TOTALS 264 106 -158 -60% 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data 

In addition to field offices initiating fewer drug cases, FBI field 

managers reported that the timeliness and quality of such investigations has 

been impaired. FBI representatives in the New York City and San Francisco 

Divisions stated that it takes their offices longer to close drug cases than it 

had prior to the shift in resources because fewer agents work on each drug 

case; however, both divisions asserted that the quality of work had not 

suffered. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

Nearly all of the FBI field divisions we visited submitted fewer drugrelated matters to federal prosecutors. Five of the seven FBI divisions 

referred fewer drug-related matters to their respective USAOs between 

FYs 2000 and 2004. As the following exhibit reflects, the Los Angeles, 

Miami, and New Orleans Divisions submitted significantly fewer drug matters 
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to the USAOs in FY 2004 than in FY 2000. In contrast, there were nominal 

increases in the Phoenix and Chicago Divisions. 

EXHIBIT 6-10

FBI REFERRALS OF DRUG-RELATED MATTERS TO THE USAOs 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

FBI Field Office 

Jurisdictions38: 

FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent Change 

Chicago 68 70 2 3% 

Los Angeles 76 41 -35 -46% 

Miami 91 57 -34 -37% 

New Orleans 73 38 -35 -48% 

New York City 113 96 -17 -15% 

Phoenix 38 39 1 3% 

San Francisco 27 22 -5 -19% 

TOTALS 486 363 -123 -25% 

Source: OIG analysis of USA central case management system data 

During our fieldwork, comments from representatives at various USAOs 

on the FBI’s drug-related efforts supported our data analyses. For example, 

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]. Exhibit 6-10 shows that the FBI 

Los Angeles Division did, in fact, refer fewer drug-related matters to the USAO 

between FYs 2000 and 2004. Additionally, officials at the Eastern District of 

Louisiana USAO observed that the FBI reduced its drug-related work, which is 

reflected in the fewer number of such FBI referrals in the preceding table. 

DEA Resource Adjustments – Other law enforcement officials we 

interviewed commented on the reduction of FBI drug resources and the 

resultant diminished FBI effort in narcotics-related matters. In particular, 

DEA Headquarters officials stated that the DEA recognized the FBI’s resource 

reductions and incorporated that factor into its decisions related to allocation 

of DEA agents to its field divisions. According to DEA and FBI managers, the 

DEA attempted to place additional resources in those locations where the FBI 

greatly decreased its drug-related investigative effort. The locations with 

the largest actual DEA agent increases are displayed in Exhibit 6-11. All of 

these field divisions, except Chicago, were among the 10 locations in which 

the FBI reduced its drug resources the most, as indicated in Exhibit 6-8. 

However, resources in the DEA’s New York, Miami, and Los Angeles offices 

still fell significantly short of the FBI’s drug-related reductions. In contrast, 

the DEA El Paso Division compensated fully for the FBI’s shift in priorities, 

while the DEA Chicago Division increased its on-board agents by more than 

double the FBI’s agent reduction. 
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EXHIBIT 6-11

ON-BOARD AGENTS IN SELECT DEA FIELD DIVISIONS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Field Division52 FY 2000 FY 2004 DEA Agent 

Increase 

FBI Agent 

Decrease 

Chicago 182 213 31 -15 

El Paso 102 127 25 -25 

Los Angeles 280 299 19 -57 

Miami 404 428 24 -69 

New York 346 374 28 -63 

Source: OIG analysis of DEA on-board agent data 

A DEA Headquarters executive who oversees the agency’s domestic 

and international operations told us that he believed the DEA would be able 

to handle a greater number of drug cases than in the past, filling at least 

some of the gap left by the FBI’s reduction of investigative resources in this 

crime area. DEA field division managers echoed this sentiment, generally 

agreeing that their offices have been and will continue to be able to address 

the drug trafficking crime in their respective jurisdictions in light of the FBI’s 

reduced drug investigation efforts. 

For example, officials at the Chicago DEA Division stated that because 

the FBI is investigating fewer drug-specific cases the DEA has experienced an 

increased number of requests from local law enforcement agencies regarding 

drug-trafficking matters in the Chicago metropolitan area, and they believe the 

DEA has been able to address these requests. Similarly, officials at the DEA in 

New Orleans said they have compensated for the FBI’s reduction in drug 

investigations by adding more agents to their office’s investigative operations. 

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED] 

Local Law Enforcement Perspective – Generally, local law enforcement 

agencies reported to us that they consider the DEA its primary federal contact 

for drug-related crime issues. For example, in California both the Los Angeles 

Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department consider 

the DEA its principal partner in drug-related operations. Additionally, the 

San Jose, California, Police Department also considers the DEA its primary 

partner in drug-related matters. Local police departments in the Phoenix, 

Miami, and New Orleans metropolitan areas expressed similar viewpoints. 

Even though officials at many local law enforcement agencies viewed the DEA 

as their primary federal contact for narcotics-related matters, representatives 

at some of the local police departments we visited commented that the FBI 

 52 There are 21 DEA field divisions compared to 56 for the FBI. Therefore, DEA field 

divisions generally encompass larger geographic jurisdictions than FBI field divisions. 
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was more involved in their departments’ drug-related investigations prior to 

the FBI’s shift in resources than the FBI had been recently. Overall, the state 

and local law enforcement officials we interviewed indicated that their 

agencies were not negatively affected by the FBI’s reprioritization in the area 

of drug-related crime. 

Drug Task Force Operations 

In our discussions with law enforcement representatives, we were told 

by numerous officials that a multi-agency task force is an essential tool in 

investigating certain crime matters such as narcotics trafficking. Task force 

operations bring together law enforcement personnel, and at times industry 

representatives, to cooperatively address a pervasive crime issue. Several 

officials stated that task forces provide “the biggest bang for the buck” by 

multiplying each agency’s efforts through utilizing each others’ resources 

and expertise. During our audit fieldwork, we learned of two particularly 

effective drug task forces that assisted in coordinating agencies’ efforts in 

addressing narcotics trafficking. 

OCDETF Strike Force – The OCDETF Strike Force (Strike Force) in 

New York City is an example of a task force operation. The Strike Force, which 

began operation in May 2004, is a co-located, co-managed, multi-agency task 

force with over 20 investigative squads. The Strike Force is comprised of over 

200 participants from various agencies, including the ATF, DEA, FBI, ICE, 

Internal Revenue Service, New York City Police Department (NYPD), New York 

State Police, and USAOs of the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York. 

Participants are detailed to one of the investigative squads so that each squad 

consists of personnel from multiple agencies. Management is shared 

throughout agencies on the Strike Force, from executive management to 

squad supervisors. The Strike Force’s top-level management consists of a 

Chief (a DEA Associate SAC) and two Deputy Chiefs (an FBI Assistant SAC and 

an NYPD official). 

During the development of this Strike Force, the FBI stated it would 

allocate 40 agents to this effort. However, at the time of our review, only 

25 FBI agents participated on the Strike Force and FBI officials in the 

New York City Division expressed concern that the FBI may be required to 

reduce its resource contribution even further. A DEA Headquarters official 

commented that an FBI withdrawal from the Strike Force would be a 

significant blow to the task force’s capabilities and effectiveness. 

Officials from the FBI, DEA, ATF, and ICE New York City Divisions, as 

well as the Southern District of New York USAO and the NYPD, endorsed the 
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value of the Strike Force, considering it successful even in its infancy and 

calling it a model for large-scale, multi-agency task force ventures. 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Initiative – On a smaller 

scale as compared to the OCDETF Strike Force in New York City, the Chicago 

FBI and DEA divisions have developed a co-located, commingled narcotics 

squad. This squad was formed as part of the HIDTA initiative to attack drug 

trafficking organizations listed on the Department of Justice’s Consolidated 

Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list. FBI and DEA division managers we 

interviewed considered this squad a success and cited the cooperation of the 

agents as the primary factor contributing to its achievements. 

Conclusions on Narcotics Trafficking 

Since 9/11, the FBI has significantly reduced the number of resources it 

devotes to drug-related investigations. FBI field divisions have decreased the 

number of drug squads, the number of agents on the remaining squads, the 

number of drug cases opened, and the number of drug-related criminal 

matters referred to the USAOs. Moreover, our analyses showed that the 

USAOs received 10 percent fewer drug-related matters from federal 

investigative agencies in FY 2004 than in FY 2000 and that the majority of this 

reduction occurred in OCDETF matters. 

 DEA officials commented that the FBI’s work in drug cases is important 

to the national effort to address drug crime; however, these officials did not 

believe the FBI’s reduced drug investigative efforts have negatively affected 

the DEA’s efforts in combating drug crime. Similarly, representatives at the 

state and local law enforcement agencies we visited indicated that their drugrelated efforts had not been negatively affected by the FBI’s reprioritization. 

Street Gangs 

 In many communities across the country, particularly urban settings, 

gang-related crime is a grave threat to public safety. Gangs are involved in 

many crimes that threaten the security and well-being of many 

communities. Traditionally, gang activity has encompassed the drug trade 

and violent crime. However, according to some local law enforcement 

agency officials, gangs are becoming more sophisticated and are becoming 

involved in other criminal activity, including identity theft. 

Overall FBI Gang-Related Agent Utilization 

The FBI did not allocate field agent resources specifically to gangs in 

FYs 2000 through 2004. Therefore, we were unable to compare the overall 
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change in funded positions dedicated to this area during this period. 

Instead, we relied on more specific FBI agent utilization data to assess 

changes in the FBI’s gang-related effort. As Exhibit 6-1 demonstrates, the 

Violent Gangs subprogram was the only FBI criminal enterprise subprogram 

area to experience a personnel increase between FYs 2000 and 2004. 

However, OCDETF matters focusing on gangs experienced a decrease during 

this period. When added together, the FBI did not alter its overall gangrelated investigative effort between FYs 2000 and 2004, committing about 

435 agents in each FY, as shown in Exhibit 6-12. 

EXHIBIT 6-12

FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION ON GANG-RELATED MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004 

Subprogram FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

Violent Gangs 266 315 49 18% 

OCDETF - Gangs53 171 120 -51 -30% 

TOTALS 437 435 -2 0% 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data 

Overall FBI Gang-Related Case Openings 

 Although the FBI committed approximately the same amount of 

resources toward investigating gang-related matters in FY 2004 as it did in 

FY 2000, it increased the number of gang-related case openings between 

FYs 2000 and 2004 by 264 cases. As Exhibit 6-13 shows, the FBI initiated 

826 cases in FY 2004 and 562 cases in FY 2000, a 47-percent increase. 

EXHIBIT 6-13

FBI GANG-RELATED CASE OPENINGS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Subprogram FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

Violent Gangs 495 784 289 58% 

OCDETF - Gangs53 67 42 -25 -37% 

TOTALS 562 826 264 47% 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data 

 53 The FBI tracks agent utilization and case openings for OCDETF investigations with 

connections to gang-related crime, which are not captured in the FBI’s Violent Gangs 

subprogram. We were able to separately identify these OCDETF gang-related matters and 

include these figures in this section of the report. 
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FBI Field Divisions’ Gang-Related Resource Changes 

As evidenced in Exhibit 6-14, some FBI field divisions focused fewer 

resources on gang-related matters from FY 2000 to FY 2004 while others 

increased their efforts. The Los Angeles and Baltimore Divisions decreased 

their agent utilization the most, with nine fewer agents working gang-related 

investigations in FY 2004 compared to FY 2000, amounting to 17-percent 

and 50-percent reductions in these respective divisions. Conversely, the 

New York City and Chicago Divisions increased the number of agents 

working gang-related investigations, utilizing 19 (or 146 percent) and 17 (or 

68 percent) more agents, respectively. 

EXHIBIT 6-14

FBI FIELD DIVISIONS EXPERIENCING THE GREATEST INCREASES AND 

DECREASES IN AGENT UTILIZATION ON GANG-RELATED MATTERS 

BETWEEN FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Field Division FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

Los Angeles 52 43 -9 -17% 

Baltimore 18 9 -9 -50% 

Washington, D.C. 32 24 -8 -25% 

Atlanta 12 8 -4 -33% 

Miami 12 8 -4 -33% 

New York City 13 32 19 146% 

Chicago 25 42 17 68% 

Philadelphia 7 16 9 129% 

Newark 9 15 6 67% 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data 

FBI Field Divisions’ Gang-Related Casework Changes 

The resource utilization changes represented in Exhibit 6-14 do not 

entirely correspond to the change in gang-related case openings between 

FYs 2000 and 2004. For instance, while the Atlanta, Miami, and Washington, 

D.C. Divisions experienced agent utilization reductions of at least 25 percent 

between FYs 2000 and 2004, each nonetheless opened more gang-related 

cases in FY 2004 than in FY 2000, as evidenced in Exhibit 6-15. 
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EXHIBIT 6-15

FBI GANG-RELATED CASE OPENINGS AT THE FIELD DIVISION LEVEL 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Field Division FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

Los Angeles 15 21 6 40% 

Baltimore 15 13 -2 -13% 

Washington, D.C. 18 28 10 56% 

Atlanta 8 21 13 163% 

Miami 8 16 8 100% 

New York City 24 50 26 108% 

Chicago 15 64 49 327% 

Philadelphia 10 44 34 340% 

Newark 22 62 40 182% 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data 

Of those divisions shown in Exhibit 6-14 as experiencing the greatest 

increase or decrease of agents involved in gang investigations, Exhibit 6-15 

shows that only the Baltimore Division opened fewer cases in FY 2004. The 

Philadelphia Division increased its gang-related case openings threefold, rising 

from 10 cases in FY 2000 to 44 in FY 2004. This increase of 34 cases occurred 

concurrently with the 9-agent increase it experienced in actual agent utilization. 

The Chicago Division, with 17 additional agents working gang-related 

investigations, also significantly increased its gang-related case initiations 

during this period, opening 49 additional cases in FY 2004 than in FY 2000. 

FBI Safe Streets Task Forces 

In January 1992, the FBI announced its Safe Streets Violent Crime 

Initiative, which was designed to allow field offices the ability to address 

street gang and drug-related violence through the establishment of FBIsponsored task forces. These task forces are referred to as the FBI’s Safe 

Streets Task Forces (SSTF). An SSTF is a multi-agency task force comprised 

of FBI agents, local police, and other federal law enforcement agents that 

traditionally focused its efforts on violent crime matters, such as fugitives, 

gangs, and major theft. In October 2004, the FBI CID Assistant Director 

stated that the FBI would be expanding its efforts in combating gangs, 

particularly through its SSTFs. 

In FY 2000, the FBI committed over 820 agents to 180 SSTFs 

nationwide. In December 2004, about 550 FBI agents participated in 

143 SSTFs, a decrease of approximately 270 agents and 37 task forces. 

Recently, the FBI announced that it will add 25 new SSTFs to specifically 

target violent gangs. 
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ATF’s Perspective on Gang-Related Matters 

In addition to the FBI, many other law enforcement agencies combat 

gang crime issues, especially local police and sheriff’s departments. At the 

federal level, the ATF, DEA, and ICE also perform gang-related 

investigations.54 As an ATF Headquarters official stated, with so many law 

enforcement agencies investigating gangs the possibility of investigative 

duplication is significant. 

Management at ATF Headquarters stated that there is a duplication of 

effort in the anti-gang arena among the FBI, ATF, and other DOJ 

components. FBI and ATF officials in New York City and San Francisco also 

commented that there was a duplication of effort in gang investigations 

between the FBI and the ATF, as well as with other agencies. 

We found during our fieldwork in March 2005 that sufficient 

communication and coordination of gang-related investigations did not occur 

at several locations we visited. For example, FBI New York City Division 

officials acknowledged that communication with the ATF on gang activity 

within the city of New York could improve.55 Additionally, representatives 

from the ATF San Francisco Division stated that while gang issues 

constituted its number one investigative focus, there was no coordination 

with the FBI’s on-going gang efforts. 

Overall Impact on Law Enforcement Community’s Gang-Related Efforts 

In most cases, representatives from local law enforcement agencies 

did not indicate a significant change in the FBI’s investigative presence in 

gang matters. However, a few local officials indicated the FBI’s involvement 

in this investigative area has diminished in the past 4 years. For instance, 

representatives at the Oakland, California, Police Department remarked that 

FBI assistance in the police department’s violent crime matters decreased by 

approximately 60 percent since 9/11. 

 54 ICE recently announced a national plan to become involved in attacking the 

nation’s prevailing gang problem, focusing particular attention on the Mara Salvatrucha 

(MS-13) gang. 

55 The ATF New York Division SAC believed that the ATF’s communication with the 

FBI New York City Division on gang-related issues was good in the jurisdictional areas 

outside of New York City. He further stated that his Division was not heavily involved in 

gang-related investigations within New York City but was handling such matters in the 

Division’s other jurisdictional areas. 
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Top Gangs Meetings 

In discussions with law enforcement personnel in Chicago, which has 

significant gang problems, we were informed about monthly meetings 

among the federal and local law enforcement community. All law 

enforcement agencies that investigate gangs in the Chicago area meet once 

a month to discuss their gang-related operations. These meetings were 

established by the Chicago Police Department and attended by law 

enforcement agencies including the ATF, FBI, DEA, ICE, the Northern District 

of Illinois USAO, and the Cook County Sheriff’s Department. ATF, DEA, and 

FBI officials in Chicago believe the meetings aided gang investigations 

throughout the city. 

In our discussions with law enforcement agencies at other locations that 

do not have these types of monthly coordination meetings, many managers 

stated that it would be useful to incorporate such a practice with regard to 

gang-related issues in their cities. We believe the FBI and other federal 

agencies in locations with significant gang problems should consider 

developing such working groups with each other and their state and local 

counterparts. 

DOJ Anti-Gang Initiative 

At our exit conference, the FBI informed us of a new DOJ anti-gang 

initiative. Under this initiative, the Department intends to examine the 

possibility of creating an integrated gang database and co-locating the various 

anti-gang intelligence and information systems maintained within the 

Department. In addition, the USAOs are to establish an “Anti-Gang 

Coordinator” position responsible for preparing a comprehensive, district-wide 

anti-gang strategy and coordinating such investigations at the federal, state, 

and local levels. Further, the DOJ established the policy that all jurisdictions 

with multiple anti-gang task forces or initiatives should co-locate such 

activities if feasible. In July 2005, the FBI promulgated guidance on this 

anti-gang initiative to its field offices and directed them to work with the local 

USAOs in implementing the new strategy. 

Conclusions on Street Gangs 

 Overall, the FBI’s reprioritization efforts have not affected the number 

of agents working on gang-related matters. FBI agent utilization data 

illustrated that the FBI essentially maintained the same level of agents 

investigating gang-related matters in FY 2004 that it had in FY 2000. 

Additionally, the FBI opened almost 50 percent more gang-related cases in 

FY 2004 than in FY 2000. 
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Organized Crime 

 In addition to drug trafficking enterprises and street gangs, the other 

main type of criminal enterprise that the FBI investigates is organized crime. 

Contemporary organized crime within the United States has expanded 

beyond historical La Cosa Nostra and Italian syndicates to include, for 

example, Asian and African organizations, as well as those of Russian and 

Albanian descent. 

Overall FBI Organized Crime Resources 

 As illustrated in Exhibit 6-16, the FBI specifically allocated 700 field 

agent resources for organized crime matters in FY 2001.56 During FY 2004, 

the FBI assigned 720 organized crime resources to the field, an increase of 

20 agents. The FBI’s allocations of agents for organized crime matters showed 

little change in each of the last four FYs, as shown in the following exhibit. 

EXHIBIT 6-16

FBI ALLOCATION OF FIELD AGENTS 

FOR ORGANIZED CRIME MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2001 THROUGH 2004

Source: OIG analysis of FBI RMA Office data

In our discussions with FBI Headquarters personnel, we found that the 

following FBI subprograms predominantly comprise the FBI’s investigative 

efforts in organized crime matters: (1) La Cosa Nostra and Italian 

organizations, (2) Asian organizations, and (3) Russian and Eurasian 

organizations. We analyzed actual agent utilization data for these 

three subprograms and found that although the FBI’s allocation of agents 

remained relatively static over the past 4 years, the FBI actually decreased 

its agent utilization rate in organized crime matters since FY 2000. 

Specifically, the FBI decreased its overall organized crime agent utilization 

 56 In FY 2000, the FBI allocated drug and organized crime resources as a total; it began 

separately apportioning agents to these sections in FYs 2001 through 2004. Therefore, we 

were only able to compare the change in allocated organized crime resources between FYs 2001 

and 2004.
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by 236 agents between FYs 2000 and 2004, as shown in Exhibit 6-17. Thus, 

while the FBI did not plan for the organized crime resource levels to be 

affected by its reprioritization, it appears that a significant reduction has 

occurred over the last few years. 

EXHIBIT 6-17

FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION ON ORGANIZED CRIME MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

FBI Subprogram FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

La Cosa Nostra and Italian 437 261 -176 -40% 

Asian 137 95 -42 -31% 

Russian and Eurasian 108 90 -18 -17% 

TOTALS 682 446 -236 -35% 

Source: OIG Analysis of FBI TURK data 

Overall FBI Organized Crime Casework 

 Analysis of FBI organized crime case openings for the three subprogram 

areas noted in the previous section shows fewer cases opened in FY 2004 

than in FY 2000. In total, the FBI initiated 170 fewer cases in these 

subprograms, with 143 fewer case openings in La Cosa Nostra and Italian 

organized crime matters alone during this time period. This overall decline 

corresponds to a 39-percent reduction, as illustrated in Exhibit 6-18.

EXHIBIT 6-18

FBI ORGANIZED CRIME CASE OPENINGS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

FBI Subprogram FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

La Cosa Nostra and Italian 233 90 -143 -61% 

Asian 120 102 -18 -15% 

Russian and Eurasian 80 71 -9 -11% 

TOTALS 433 263 -170 -39% 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data 

 An FBI Headquarters official confirmed that the FBI was underutilizing 

organized crime resources and opening fewer such cases. He attributed this 

to the FBI field divisions’ commitment to fulfilling the FBI’s mandate of 

addressing all counterterrorism leads. In complying with this requirement, 

field divisions took resources from their traditional criminal squads, which 

generally resulted in reductions in both agent utilization and case openings 
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in traditional crime areas. At the field offices we visited, FBI managers 

confirmed this occurrence. 

Overall Organized Crime Matters Referred by the FBI to the USAOs 

 Exhibit 6-19 shows the six federal agencies referring the most 

organized crime matters to the USAOs in FYs 2000 and 2004. These 

agencies comprised at least 97 percent of all organized crime matters 

received by the USAOs during this timeframe. The FBI accounted for 

83 percent of all organized crime matters submitted to the USAOs in 

FY 2000, but this percentage dropped to 75 percent in FY 2004. 

EXHIBIT 6-19

ORGANIZED CRIME MATTERS RECEIVED BY THE USAOs 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

All Agencies 545 378 -167 -31% 

FBI 451 283 -168 -37% 

ICE 37 21 -16 -43% 

Internal Revenue Service 26 12 -14 -54% 

U.S. Secret Service 11 10 -1 -9% 

DEA 5 15 10 200% 

ATF 6 26 20 333% 

Source: OIG analysis of USA central case management system data 

In total, comparing FYs 2000 and 2004, the FBI referred 168 fewer 

organized crime matters to the USAOs, with 451 matters received in 

FY 2000 and 283 in FY 2004. As evidenced in Exhibit 6-19, the FBI’s referral 

reduction matches the total decrease of organized crime matters received by 

the USAOs during our review period. Although the ATF and DEA increased 

their referrals by a combined total of 30, this increase did not compensate 

for the FBI’s reduction in organized crime-related referrals. 

FBI Organized Crime Resources within Field Divisions 

 We found that FBI agent allocations among field divisions for organized 

crime matters varied considerably. Exhibit 6-20 illustrates the eight FBI field 

divisions receiving the greatest organized crime allocations in FY 2004. The 

New York City Division’s 212 funded agent positions for organized crime 

matters were considerably more than any other field division. Additionally, the 

chart shows the actual number of on-board agents used to investigate 
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organized crime matters in the field divisions’ jurisdictions.57 In each of these 

field divisions, organized crime resources were utilized below the planned 

level. For example, the New York City Division used only 143 of its 

212 positions allocated to investigate organized crime. 

EXHIBIT 6-20

FBI FIELD OFFICES WITH THE GREATEST NUMBER OF ALLOCATED 

ORGANIZED CRIME AGENTS AND CORRESPONDING AGENT UTILIZATION

FISCAL YEAR 2004

Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource Management and TURK data

 Looking specifically at agent utilization reductions in organized crime 

matters between FYs 2000 and 2004, we found that the New York City 

Division’s reduction of 64 on-board agents accounted for the greatest 

decrease, as shown below in Exhibit 6-21.

 57 The organized crime agent utilization figures were derived in summing the agent 

on-board data for the following three FBI subprograms: (1) La Cosa Nostra and Italian Criminal 

Enterprises, (2) Asian Criminal Enterprises, and (3) Russian and Eurasian Criminal Enterprises. 

We recognize the fact that other organized crime investigations may occur in other FBI Criminal 

Enterprise Branch subprograms. However, we relied on information provided by an FBI

Headquarters official, stating these three subprograms predominantly comprise the FBI’s 

organized crime investigative efforts.
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EXHIBIT 6-21

FBI FIELD DIVISIONS EXPERIENCING THE GREATEST AGENT UTILIZATION 

INCREASES OR DECREASES IN ORGANIZED CRIME MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Field Division FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

New York City 207 143 -64 -31% 

Newark 68 44 -24 -35% 

Los Angeles 43 23 -20 -47% 

Chicago 51 35 -16 -31% 

San Francisco 32 17 -15 -47% 

Philadelphia 28 18 -10 -36% 

Las Vegas 19 10 -9 -47% 

Washington, D.C. 13 5 -8 -62% 

San Antonio 1 8 7 700% 

Miami 16 20 4 25% 

Detroit 15 19 4 27% 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data 

Although most of the FBI’s field divisions experienced reductions in 

organized crime agent utilization, there were a few divisions that had an 

increase. The San Antonio, Miami, and Detroit Divisions increased by at 

least one on-board agent in organized crime matters between FYs 2000 and 

2004. The San Antonio Division increased from one to eight agents during 

this time period, equaling its intended FY 2004 resource level. 

FBI Miami Division personnel stated that their office’s efforts to 

investigate organized crime were not affected by the FBI’s shifting of 

resources. However, although the Miami Division experienced an increase in 

agent utilization between FYs 2000 and 2004, it utilized only about 20 of the 

planned 35 organized crime agents it was allocated for FY 2004. 

FBI Organized Crime Casework among Field Divisions 

 Exhibit 6-22 shows the FBI’s organized crime case openings for those 

field divisions that we visited. The Los Angeles Division opened 19 fewer 

organized crime cases in FY 2004 than in FY 2000, declining from 32 case 

initiations to 13. The San Francisco Division experienced a reduction of 

18 case openings, opening 9 investigations in FY 2004 compared to 27 in 

FY 2000. Further, the New Orleans Division did not open any organized crime 

cases in FY 2004. The table also shows that the New York City Division, which 

we previously reported utilized 64 fewer agents in FY 2004 than it did in 

FY 2000, actually increased its organized crime case openings by 6 during this 

period. 
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EXHIBIT 6-22

FBI ORGANIZED CRIME CASE OPENINGS BY FIELD DIVISION 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Field Division FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

Los Angeles 32 13 -19 -59% 

San Francisco 27 9 -18 -67% 

Chicago 22 17 -5 -23% 

Miami 14 12 -2 -14% 

New Orleans 7 0 -7 -100% 

Phoenix 1 3 2 67% 

New York City 34 40 6 18% 

TOTALS 137 94 -43 -31% 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data 

Organized Crime Matters Referred to the USAOs by FBI Field Divisions 

 For the FBI field divisions we visited, the number of organized crime 

matters received by the USAOs from the FBI for FYs 2000 and 2004 

correlated with each office’s change in case openings. The San Francisco, 

Miami, Los Angeles, and Chicago Divisions’ case opening reductions displayed 

in Exhibit 6-22 corresponded with decreases in the number of organized 

crime matters referred to their respective USAOs, as reflected in Exhibit 6-23. 

EXHIBIT 6-23

ORGANIZED CRIME MATTERS RECEIVED BY THE USAOS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

FBI Field Office 

Jurisdictions38: 

FY 2000 FY 2004 Number 

Change 

Percent Change 

San Francisco 31 10 -21 -68% 

Miami 15 6 -9 -60% 

Los Angeles 13 8 -5 -38% 

Chicago 10 8 -2 -20% 

New Orleans 3 1 -2 -67% 

Phoenix 0 0 0 0% 

New York City 77 79 2 3% 

TOTALS 149 112 -37 -25% 

Source: OIG analysis of USA central case management system data 

Impact on Law Enforcement Community 

In those FBI offices in which we conducted fieldwork, most of the 

divisions experienced reductions in agent utilization, reductions in organized 

crime case openings, and reductions in referrals to USAOs. The one anomaly 

was the FBI’s New York City Division. While experiencing resource reductions 

in its organized crime investigative efforts, the New York City Division 

continued to refer similar numbers of organized crime matters to the USAOs. 
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The Southern District of New York USAO in Manhattan confirmed that the FBI 

has maintained its efforts in pursuing organized crime. Further, federal 

prosecutors and local police department officials communicated their desire 

that the FBI continue its assistance in organized crime matters. USAO 

representatives stressed the need to continue prosecuting organized-crime 

matters in New York. They also stated that the growing networks of Russian 

and Asian organized crime require intervention by federal law enforcement. 

These USAO officials consider the FBI’s role in these efforts to be critical. 

In the other FBI field divisions reviewed, officials commented on the 

negative effect of the FBI’s reduced effort in organized crime investigations. 

For instance, officials from the Central District of California USAO in 

Los Angeles, noting the reduction in organized crime matters received from 

the FBI, stated that the FBI Los Angeles Division needed more agents to 

address such issues. Additionally, officials at the Southern District of Florida 

USAO in Miami remarked that the FBI Miami Division’s four squads dedicated 

to criminal enterprise investigations had been reduced to two, which 

decreased investigative outcomes. 

Conclusions on Organized Crime Matters 

Overall, the FBI’s reprioritization has not affected the number of agents 

allocated to work organized crime matters. However, agent utilization data 

illustrated that the FBI decreased the actual number of agents investigating 

organized crime matters, resulting in fewer organized crime case openings 

and referrals to the USAOs since FY 2000. 

Chapter Summary 

The FBI decreased the number of agents assigned to criminal enterprise 

matters by 45 percent between FYs 2000 and 2004, most notably in drugtrafficking and organized crime matters. During this same period, the FBI’s 

agent utilization in gang-related matters changed little. FBI criminal 

enterprise case openings generally reflected the FBI’s resource utilization 

changes, declining in drug-trafficking and organized crime. However, the FBI 

initiated 47 percent more gang-related investigations in FY 2004 than in 

FY 2000. 

Overall, the FBI’s drug-related matters were affected the greatest, which 

correlates with the FBI’s policy decision to most significantly reduce its 

resources targeting drug cases. However, neither the DEA nor the state and 

local law enforcement agencies contacted indicated that they had been 

negatively affected in this area by the FBI’s reprioritization. 
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Conversely, the FBI intended to slightly increase its organized crime 

agents, but actually reduced its agent utilization in this area by 35 percent 

between FYs 2000 and 2004 and several USAO officials indicated that this had 

a negative effect in their jurisdictions. 
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CHAPTER 7: FUGITIVES 

 FBI officials at the headquarters and field office level commented that 

they were not pursuing fugitive investigations as aggressively as they had in 

the past in light of the FBI’s reprioritization and reallocation of resources. 

While officials at USMS Headquarters indicated that they had not observed a 

reduced effort by the FBI in this area, USMS officials at several of the district 

offices we visited remarked that they had noticed a lessened effort by the 

FBI in fugitive-related matters although they said this change had not 

affected their ability to address an increased caseload. The majority of state 

and local law enforcement agency representatives we interviewed did not 

indicate that their work had been negatively affected by any changes in the 

FBI’s efforts with respect to fugitive-related matters. 

We analyzed FBI agent utilization and casework data to determine the 

changes occurring in the FBI’s overall fugitive-related efforts, as well as 

within specific field offices. 

The FBI’s Overall Fugitive-Related Efforts 

The FBI uses several investigative classifications that are categorized as 

fugitive-related matters. According to an FBI official, the majority of fugitive 

investigations fall within one of three investigative classifications: 

(1) Classification 088A (Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAP) – Crime of 

Violence); (2) Classification 088B (UFAP – Property +$25,000 etc.); or 

(3) Classification 088C (UFAP – All Others). We focused our data analyses on 

these three areas and found that the FBI has reduced its efforts in fugitiverelated matters since FY 2000. Specifically, we found that the FBI’s combined 

utilization of agents on these three investigative classifications decreased from 

181 to 55 on-board agents between FYs 2000 and 2004, an almost 70 percent 

reduction. Exhibit 7-1 provides details on the changes for each of the FBI’s 

primary fugitive classifications during our review period. 

EXHIBIT 7-1

FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION IN FUGITIVE-RELATED MATTERS 

FISCALS YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Investigative Classification FY 2000 FY 2004 Difference 

088A – UFAP – Crime of Violence 170 53 -117 

088B – UFAP – Property +$25,000 etc. 4 1 -3 

088C – UFAP – All Others 7 1 -6 

Totals 181 55 -126 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data 

Additionally, our analyses show that the FBI opened nearly 13,000 fewer 

fugitive cases during FY 2004 than it had in FY 2000 in these classifications. 
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In FY 2000, the FBI initiated 14,800 fugitive investigations, while in FY 2004 

that number decreased to 1,808 – an 88 percent reduction. When looking 

specifically at individual classifications, we identified the majority of the FBI’s 

fugitive cases in FYs 2000 and 2004 were categorized as Classification 088A 

matters. This particular area also experienced the greatest reduction in case 

openings during the 5-year review period. Specifically, the FBI opened 

13,387 Classification 088A cases during FY 2000 and only 1,721 during 

FY 2004, a reduction of 11,666 cases that accounts for 90 percent of the 

overall decrease in fugitive case openings. Our review of the number of case 

serials inputted for fugitive cases further show the FBI’s decreased fugitive 

effort. In FY 2004, the FBI filed 119,643 fewer case serials on fugitive-related 

matters than it had in FY 2000, declining from 168,715 serials to 49,072. 

FBI Field Division Fugitive-Related Efforts 

The information gathered during our site visits supports the changes 

reflected in our analyses of FBI data. FBI officials at each field office we 

visited said they had reduced their emphasis on fugitive cases. In some field 

offices, this has meant elimination of separate fugitive-related squads. For 

example, the Chicago Field Office used to have a separate squad focusing 

solely on fugitive matters. After 9/11, this squad was merged with two other 

violent crime squads. Thus, the office currently has one squad addressing 

three separate crime areas, while previously it had a distinct squad handling 

each matter on its own. Prior to the reorganization, the fugitive squad was 

comprised of eight FBI agents, as well as task force officers from other law 

enforcement agencies. The current violent crime squad, in which fugitive 

investigations are handled along with other criminal investigations, consists of 

12 FBI agents and other task force members. 

We analyzed the FBI’s agent utilization and casework data related to 

each location’s fugitive efforts. Exhibit 7-2, which details the changes 

experienced by the field offices between FYs 2000 and 2004, shows that 

each office we visited has undergone considerable reductions in both 

categories. 
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EXHIBIT 7-2

CHANGES IN AGENT UTILIZATION & CASEWORK 

RELATED TO FUGITIVE MATTERS 

BETWEEN FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 200458

Field Office FY 2000 

AOB 

FY 2004 

AOB 

Change 

in AOB 

FY 2000 

Cases 

Opened 

FY 2004 

Cases 

Opened 

Change in 

Cases 

Opened 

Chicago 7.26 3.33 -3.93 441 51 -390 

Los Angeles 9.11 3.88 -5.23 315 59 -256 

Miami 6.32 1.81 -4.51 867 22 -845 

New Orleans 1.20 0.26 -0.94 36 4 -32 

New York City 10.35 1.34 -9.01 382 0 -382 

Phoenix 3.47 1.77 -1.70 334 35 -299 

San Francisco 5.84 2.10 -3.74 358 34 -324 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK and ACS data

Officials at nearly every USMS district office visited remarked about the 

decline in the FBI’s investigative efforts in pursuing fugitives, commenting that 

the number of cases the FBI is now handling in this area has dropped 

considerably. Additionally, some USMS officials said that it seems to take the 

FBI a longer period of time to address the fugitive cases it works. 

Impact of Investigative Changes 

The FBI’s shift in priorities away from fugitive matters had various 

effects on other law enforcement agencies. For example, USMS officials at 

the sites we visited commented that their fugitive caseloads had increased 

since FY 2000, which they perceived as a result of the FBI’s reduced efforts in 

this area. Additionally, during our interviews some state and local law 

enforcement representatives expressed concerns regarding the FBI’s work on 

fugitive investigations. The following sections present the different concerns 

articulated by non-FBI agency officials. 

Increased Fugitive Caseload 

Some USMS officials at the district offices we visited indicated that 

their fugitive caseloads have increased since FY 2000. Besides the increase 

in their caseloads, these officials remarked that state and local law 

enforcement agencies have been contacting the USMS more often for 

assistance on fugitive matters. 

The USMS district officials said their offices have been able to handle the 

additional fugitive-related matters. However, many discussed the limited 

 58 The table provides the combined totals for the FBI’s these three primary fugitive 

investigative classifications: Classifications 088A, 088B, and 088C. 
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resources with which the USMS has to conduct its duties. In particular, they 

expressed concerns regarding their ability to maintain their increased 

caseloads with current personnel and funding levels. 

State and Local Fugitive Assistance 

When a local department contacts the FBI for assistance on a fugitive 

matter, the FBI will often obtain a federal warrant, charging the subject with 

“Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution” (UFAP). Once a UFAP is obtained, no 

other federal law enforcement agency can take on the matter unless the FBI 

first annuls the UFAP. Although the majority of state and local officials we 

interviewed did not comment on the FBI’s fugitive efforts, officials at one 

department raised concerns about the FBI’s work on UFAP investigations. 

Specifically, they explained that they have over 30 UFAPs with the FBI that 

have been outstanding for prolonged periods of time. They stated that if the 

FBI does not intend to address these cases, it should inform the department 

so that it can pursue other avenues to apprehend the felons, such as 

requesting assistance from other agencies. 

According to USMS representatives, state and local agencies have 

requested USMS assistance on the apprehension of fugitives more frequently 

now than in the past. They further noted that this increase is partly a result 

of the FBI taking a longer period of time to address fugitive investigations. 

USMS and FBI Coordination of Fugitive Efforts 

Both the FBI and USMS have task forces involved in the apprehension 

of fugitives, and each solicits participation from state and local law 

enforcement agencies.59 According to USMS Headquarters officials, state 

and local law enforcement agencies do not have adequate resources to 

participate in both FBI and USMS task forces; thus, they must choose one or 

the other. The USMS officials further stated that more times than not, these 

agencies opt for the FBI’s fugitive task forces because the FBI-led task force 

is able to offer them overtime funding and vehicles. As a result, the USMS 

officials believed that their agency’s fugitive task force operations had been 

negatively affected by the FBI’s fugitive efforts. 

For example, USMS Headquarters solicited feedback from various USMS 

districts as to the occurrence of duplicate fugitive task forces and any 

resulting impact. Of the 20 districts that responded, 19 indicated that the FBI 

had an existing fugitive-related task force in place or was creating such a task 

 59 The OIG recently conducted a detailed evaluation of the USMS’s fugitive apprehension 

efforts. See Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. Review of the United States 

Marshals Service’s Apprehension of Violent Fugitives, Report Number I-2005-008, July 2005.
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force. We reviewed the USMS district submissions and found that in at least 

two locations the USMS reported that it had been negatively affected by the 

FBI’s fugitive task forces because members had left the USMS task force and 

joined the FBI. 

It is clear from our discussions with USMS and FBI Headquarters 

officials that the two agencies are not effectively communicating or 

coordinating their efforts in the area of fugitive apprehension. FBI 

Headquarters officials stated that the FBI and the USMS have met to discuss 

the coordination of fugitive apprehension efforts but no concrete resolution 

has resulted from these discussions. Moreover, officials responsible for 

overseeing fugitive operations at both agencies acknowledged the lack of a 

coordinated approach, and we believe that the relationship between these 

two agencies could be improved. 

Survey Results on Impact 

Our survey results indicated that the majority of responding state and 

local law enforcement agencies had been minimally affected in the area of 

fugitives as a result of the FBI’s reprioritization. Specifically, only 5 percent 

of the respondents noted a negative impact from the FBI’s reduction in 

fugitive-related investigations. Exhibit 7-3 is a graphical representation of 

the survey results. 

EXHIBIT 7-3

SURVEY RESULTS OF THE IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL 

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES’ 

FUGITIVE-RELATED INVESTIGATIONS

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 
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Chapter Summary 

FBI data indicates a decline in the number of agents used for fugitive 

investigations. In addition, FBI data shows almost 90 percent fewer fugitive 

cases being opened in FY 2004 than in FY 2000. Comments by both FBI and 

USMS field officials concur with the results of our data analyses. In addition, 

our review indicated that the coordination and communication between the 

FBI and the USMS on fugitive matters needs improvement. 
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CHAPTER 8: BANK ROBBERIES 

 Another area in which the FBI has reduced its efforts is the 

investigation of bank robberies. Both FBI and non-FBI officials agreed that 

the FBI is no longer addressing bank robberies at the same level as in the 

past. Many of the state and local law enforcement representatives we 

interviewed also cited the FBI’s reduced involvement in this area. 

FBI Bank Robbery Measured Response Initiative 

 The FBI has sole jurisdiction among federal law enforcement agencies 

to investigate bank robberies.60 In addition, the offense can be investigated 

by local law enforcement agencies. In March 2001, FBI Headquarters 

implemented a “measured response” initiative designed to scale back the 

number of FBI bank robbery investigations. The initiative stated that a 

“measured response in no way means no response.” It is also important to 

note that the FBI’s initial decision to reduce its efforts related to bank 

robberies was announced prior to 9/11 and the FBI’s reprioritization. The 

initiative described the circumstances in which the FBI would continue to 

aggressively respond, which were: (1) violent bank robberies (e.g., a 

weapon was displayed or a gang-related robbery); (2) robberies in which a 

significant financial loss occurred; or (3) situations involving serial robbers 

and/or criminal organizations that cross jurisdictional boundaries. 

 After 9/11 and the FBI’s resulting reprioritization, the “measured 

response” initiative continues to exist and has been reiterated in memoranda 

disseminated to FBI field offices on several occasions. During our site visits, 

many FBI officials remarked that the FBI currently investigates only violent or 

takeover-style bank robberies. For “note jobs” (a non-violent bank robbery in 

which a note is used), the FBI opens a case, inputs information obtained from 

local law enforcement regarding the incident into its analytical database, and 

closes the case immediately thereafter. According to these FBI officials, the 

FBI does not conduct an actual investigation in these types of bank robberies. 

In contrast, FBI officials at some offices stated that they continue to 

respond and investigate all bank robberies, although fewer agents are sent to 

investigate each incident than in the past. FBI officials in these districts said 

it was important to work these cases because it helped strengthen 

relationships with state and local partners. 

 60 If a bank robbery involves a weapon, the ATF has jurisdiction over the weaponsrelated issues and can therefore perform a criminal investigation. 
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FBI Investigative Effort 

 According to the FBI’s TURK system, the actual number of agents 

handling bank robberies decreased by nearly 30 percent between FYs 2000 

and 2004. Specifically, an average of 316 agents handled these cases in 

FY 2000 compared to 225 agents in FY 2004. Exhibit 8-1 illustrates the 

changes that occurred within the field offices we visited. Each office, except 

New York City, experienced an agent utilization reduction in bank robbery 

matters. 

EXHIBIT 8-1

FBI AGENT UTILIZATION ON BANK ROBBERIES 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Field Office FY 2000 

AOB 

FY 2004 

AOB 

Number 

Change 

Percent 

Change 

Chicago 14.2 9.0 -5.2 -37% 

Los Angeles 21.1 14.8 -6.3 -30% 

Miami 7.7 7.1 -0.6 -8% 

New Orleans 4.5 3.7 -0.8 -18% 

New York City 7.3 8.7 1.4 19% 

Phoenix 5.8 2.5 -3.3 -57% 

San Francisco 13.1 9.0 -4.1 -31% 

Totals of Field Offices Visited 73.7 54.8 -18.9 -26% 

Overall Totals for Entire FBI 315.5 225.0 -90.5 -29% 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data 

 According to FBI casework data, the FBI opened 1,067 more bank 

robbery cases during FY 2004 than in FY 2000. This increase is primarily a 

result of the FBI opening a case file for each bank robbery committed for the 

purpose of inputting all incidents into its analytical database. In reviewing the 

number of case serials inputted for bank robbery cases, the FBI actually 

decreased its bank robbery effort by 19 percent between FYs 2000 and 2004. 

We consider the casework serial figures and the FBI agent utilization data 

more reflective of the FBI’s actual investigative efforts in this area, since case 

openings for bank robbery matters does not necessarily reflect any actual 

investigation on the FBI’s part. 

 The FBI’s decreased involvement in bank robbery investigations resulted 

in it referring fewer such matters to the USAOs. In total, the FBI forwarded 

10 percent fewer bank robbery matters to the USAOs since FY 2000, 

decreasing referrals from 2,019 in FY 2000 to 1,809 in FY 2004. In both 

FYs 2000 and 2004, the FBI contributed 98 percent of the bank robbery 

matters received by the USAOs. 
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External Observations and Impact 

The majority of the officials we interviewed at state and local law 

enforcement agencies commented about the FBI’s reduced involvement in 

bank robbery investigations since 9/11. For example, officials at the 

Scottsdale, Arizona, Police Department and Tucson, Arizona, Police 

Department stated that the FBI's response to bank robberies is probably the 

most noticeable reduction that has occurred and that this reduction has 

created a marked void. The officials at these two local agencies said that 

the FBI’s reprioritization has placed an extra burden on many of the local 

agencies who now must handle an increased bank robbery caseload. 

Officials at other state and local departments commented that the FBI 

continues to assist on bank robbery cases. Many of these cases involved 

armed or serial perpetrators and therefore the FBI’s participation was in line 

with the FBI Headquarters “measured response” guidelines issued in 

March 2001. For example, officials at the West Palm Beach, Florida, Police 

Department remarked that the FBI was very much involved in the 

investigation of a recent string of bank robberies that occurred in the city. 

Officials from the Ventura County, California, District Attorney’s Office 

and the Ventura County, California, Sheriff’s Department told us that each 

local law enforcement agency in the county had noticed an almost complete 

withdrawal of FBI involvement in traditional crime matters, especially bank 

robberies. Ventura County officials cited several specific bank robberies that 

the FBI failed to assist local law enforcement agencies with the investigations. 

For example, the Ventura County officials cited a string of liquor store 

robberies in Ventura County in December 2004. Subsequent to the liquor 

store robberies, the same suspects robbed banks located in five different 

grocery stores, taking over the entire building each time. In each incident the 

assailants were armed with automatic weapons. In March 2005, the suspects 

were apprehended by local law enforcement officers while attempting to rob 

one of the grocery store banks a second time. The investigation revealed that 

the suspects were conducting their criminal activities in at least three counties, 

using money laundering to purchase real estate in and out of the state. 

Ventura County officials stressed to us that the FBI was not involved in 

the investigation of any of these incidents, even though these bank robbery 

cases involved at least two of the criteria specifically articulated in the FBI’s 

“measured response” initiative for bank robbery investigations. We discussed 

this matter with FBI officials in the Los Angeles Division who reported that 

they were unaware of the situation and agreed to look into the issue. 
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The results of our web-based survey shed additional light on the impact 

that the FBI’s shift in investigative priorities has had on state and local law 

enforcement agencies’ efforts to investigate bank robberies. Overall, 

approximately 10 percent of respondents (128 out of 1,232 responses) 

responded that their agency’s operations were negatively affected to some 

degree by the FBI’s reduced involvement in bank robbery investigations. 

Approximately 9 percent of participants (107 out of 1,232 responses) 

indicated a positive effect of the FBI’s reprioritization on their investigative 

efforts, while the remaining responses noted either no impact or were 

inapplicable. 

Several USAO representatives commented that the FBI has not 

investigated bank robbery cases as much as it had in the past. For example, 

USAO officials from the Southern District of Florida noted fewer bank 

robbery cases were brought to the USAO by the FBI. As a result, these 

officials reported that they are considering a new initiative under which 

certain cases investigated by local law enforcement could be referred for 

federal prosecution. USAO representatives in the Southern District of 

New York also observed a decrease in the number of bank robbery cases the 

FBI investigated over the past 4 years. The Assistant U.S. Attorneys we 

interviewed in New York also noted that there has not been a decrease in 

the number of bank robberies in their jurisdiction, and they said they would 

like to see more FBI resources allocated to investigate these cases because 

federal courts have more severe sentences than state courts. 

Some FBI Headquarters and field officials commented that state and 

local law enforcement agencies are fully capable of handling most bank 

robbery investigations, especially the larger police and sheriff’s departments. 

Chapter Summary 

Both FBI and non-FBI officials agreed that the FBI was no longer 

addressing bank robberies as aggressively as it had prior to 9/11. These 

statements were corroborated by our analyses of FBI data, which revealed 

that the FBI used fewer agents on such matters in FY 2004 than in FY 2000. 

According to state and local officials, the primary effect of the FBI’s reduced 

role in bank robberies was an increase in their caseloads. In a few instances, 

we were informed of bank robbery caseloads that were exceeding state and 

local law enforcement capabilities. 
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CHAPTER 9: IDENTITY THEFT 

 The crime nearly all local law enforcement agencies cited as the most 

critical for federal involvement was identity theft. The nature of this crime 

often places the victim and offender in separate geographical jurisdictions – 

different cities, different states, or even different countries. Additionally, 

many identity theft offenses are technically complex and exceed the abilities 

of local law enforcement to successfully investigate. Taken together, these 

jurisdictional and technical impediments generally affect local law 

enforcement agencies’ ability to address identity theft offenses. 

In testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on April 13, 

2005, the FBI’s Assistant Director for the Criminal Investigative Division stated 

that “Identity theft has emerged as one of the dominant white-collar crime 

problems of the 21st Century.” In this same hearing, he commented that 

identity theft usually is not a singular crime; normally it is associated with 

other thefts or frauds, such as mortgage fraud and health care fraud. 

Moreover, he stated that identity theft crimes are normally perpetrated via the 

Internet. These factors make identity theft a complex crime to investigate. 

Many law enforcement officials we interviewed said that identity theft 

has become a major crime problem affecting their constituents. For example, 

representatives from several local police departments in Arizona, including 

the Mesa Police Department and Tucson Police Department, listed identity 

theft as one of their predominant crime problems and the officials expected 

continued increase in such incidents. Officials from the Miami-Dade County, 

Florida, Police Department remarked that identity theft is “out of control” in 

South Florida. Los Angeles County, California, Sheriff’s Department officials 

stated identity theft has become a significant, high-profile crime problem over 

the past 4 years. 

Several local police agency representatives noted the need for a 

national plan to combat identity theft; a plan they said must come from the 

federal government. In particular, Miami-Dade County, Florida, Police 

Department officials stated that a void exists in law enforcement’s response 

to this crime and that a federal agency needs to assume a larger role in 

combating this problem. 

FBI Involvement 

Identity theft has only recently become recognized as a major crime 

matter. Therefore we cannot assess the impact on identity theft 

investigations resulting from the FBI’s shifting of priorities and resources. 

According to FBI data, the FBI opened 36 cases that were strictly identity 

theft matters in FY 2004 and utilized 2.5 on-board agents to specifically 
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address identity theft issues in FY 2004; statistics are not available for 

FY 2000 because the FBI had not yet created a specific subprogram for 

identity theft. However, as previously stated, identity theft is often part of 

larger fraud schemes and the FBI may have been involved in many more 

identity theft investigations through cases tracked under different 

investigative classifications, like health care fraud or bank fraud. FBI 

officials provided the OIG with a report that presented the number of 

pending FBI investigative cases with an identity theft link. During FY 2004, 

the total number of such pending cases was nearly 900 for the entire FBI, 

including its legal attaché offices. 

Some FBI offices participate in identity theft task forces, such as the 

Chicago Metropolitan Identity Fraud Task Force. This task force includes 

local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, as well as representatives 

from the private sector, such as the banking industry. In addition, the FBI 

participates on the Southern California High Technology Task Force led by the 

Los Angeles County, California, Sheriff’s Department, which focuses on 

identity theft. 

Need for Federal Strategy on Identity Theft 

The survey results indicated that the majority of responding state and 

local law enforcement agencies had been minimally affected in the area of 

identity theft as a result of the FBI’s reprioritization. Specifically, only 

10 percent of the respondents noted a negative impact on their agencies 

investigative efforts in identity theft matters resulting from the FBI’s 

reprioritization. Exhibit 9-1 is a graphical representation of the survey 

results. 

EXHIBIT 9-1

SURVEY RESULTS OF THE IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL 

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES’ 

IDENTITY THEFT INVESTIGATIONS

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 
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Many law enforcement agencies are involved in identity theft 

investigations, such as the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), U.S. 

Secret Service, ICE, and local police and sheriff departments. However, few 

local police departments consider themselves capable of investigating many 

identity theft cases. For example, officials at several local agencies in the 

Miami area explained that these crimes often surpass their agencies’ 

expertise. Some of these officials remarked that their departments can 

address a few of these incidents but not the massive number of such 

violations that occur. They believed that the involvement of the federal 

government is crucial to fighting this growing crime problem. 

Moreover, with several different federal agencies investigating identity 

theft cases, local law enforcement officials said they are, at times, confused 

about which agency to turn to for assistance. Overwhelmingly, local law 

enforcement agencies conveyed the need for the development of a federal 

strategy to combat identity theft at all levels of law enforcement.
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CHAPTER 10: PUBLIC CORRUPTION 

Public corruption is the FBI’s highest criminal investigative priority, and 

its fourth highest priority overall. The FBI has the authority to investigate 

corruption across all levels of government – local, state, and federal – and 

across all branches – legislative, executive, and judicial. Consequently, the 

FBI is the primary investigative agency for public corruption matters. Local 

law enforcement agencies and federal Offices of Inspectors General also 

investigate corruption matters involving employees of their respective 

agencies. 

According to FBI field managers, public corruption investigations often 

require difficult, time-consuming source development. USAO officials agreed 

with these statements and noted that public corruption cases take longer to 

develop than other public integrity cases, such as government fraud, due to 

the complex and sensitive nature of the investigations. 

Statistical Evaluation of FBI Public Corruption Efforts 

The FBI’s public corruption resource allocations are included within its 

white-collar crime allotments and are not specifically identified as public 

corruption allocations. Therefore, we could not determine specific funded 

staffing levels (FSL) for public corruption matters. However, we were able to 

evaluate the actual FBI agent utilization in the public corruption area. 

Overall, between FYs 2000 and 2004, the FBI utilized 36 (or 8 percent)

fewer agents on public corruption matters, decreasing from 465 agents in 

FY 2000 to 429 agents in FY 2004. The FBI initiated 849 public corruption 

cases during FY 2000 and 834 such cases during FY 2004. Viewing the FBI’s 

activity through a different lens, we found that the number of serials 

inputted in public corruption cases declined 23 percent between FYs 2000 

and 2004. 

Using fewer resources and opening fewer public corruption cases, the 

FBI forwarded 63 fewer public corruption matters to the USAOs comparing 

FYs 2000 and 2004 – 673 referrals in FY 2000 compared to 610 in FY 2004. 

This 9-percent decline correlated with the USAOs’ overall 7-percent decline 

in public corruption matters received from all agencies. The FBI accounted 

for about 75 percent of public corruption matters received by the USAOs in 

both FYs 2000 and 2004. 

FBI Field Divisions 

We also conducted agent utilization analyses at the field level and 

looked specifically at the seven field divisions that we visited. As Exhibit 10-1 
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demonstrates, FBI field divisions experienced disparate changes between 

FYs 2000 and 2004 in their level of public corruption effort. While the 

Chicago Division increased the number of agents investigating public 

corruption by seven agents, the Los Angeles and New York City Divisions 

each decreased by six and eight agents, respectively. 

EXHIBIT 10-1

FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION AND CASE OPENINGS ON 

PUBLIC CORRUPTION MATTERS AT DIVISIONS VISITED 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Agent Utilization Case Openings

Field Division FY 2000 FY 2004 Change FY 2000 FY 2004 Change

Chicago 23 30 7 34 40 6 

Los Angeles 20 14 -6 29 40 11 

Miami 13 17 4 47 18 -29 

New Orleans 20 23 3 22 20 -2 

New York City 25 17 -8 18 19 1 

Phoenix 9 12 3 18 17 -1 

San Francisco 8 9 1 12 14 2 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK and ACS data 

Additional analyses of FBI ACS data for these field offices reflected 

differing results – some offices opened more cases during FY 2004 than 

during FY 2000, while others initiated fewer investigations. One of the most 

noticeable changes occurred within the Miami Field Office. In FY 2000, 

Miami opened 47 public corruption cases compared to 18 in FY 2004, a 

62 percent reduction. In contrast, the Los Angeles Field Office opened 

35 percent more public corruption cases in FY 2004 than it had in FY 2000, 

moving from 29 investigations in FY 2000 to 40 in FY 2004, even though it 

utilized fewer agents on public corruption matters during this time period. 

Public Corruption’s Priority Status 

Our fieldwork indicated that some FBI offices assessed their public 

corruption efforts and decided that changes were necessary to adequately 

combat this high priority crime area. For instance, although the Phoenix Field 

Office had reduced the number of its white-collar crime squads from five to 

two, the two remaining squads primarily focused on addressing public 

corruption matters. Similarly, the Miami Field Office devoted two squads to 

combat the significant corruption problems in South Florida. 

At the New Orleans Field Office, public corruption was placed ahead of 

cyber crime in its prioritization of investigations because of the problem public 

corruption posed in the New Orleans area. In fact, according to FBI officials, 

the New Orleans Field Office has the third largest public corruption problem in 
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the country. To address these issues, the office established a separate public 

corruption squad at its Baton Rouge Resident Agency. 

However, it appeared that some field offices were not giving these 

matters sufficient priority. For example, FBI officials in the New York City 

Division stated to us that since New York City is a premier financial center, 

corporate fraud and high-profile bank fraud matters must be considered a 

higher priority than public corruption. As a result, the New York City Division 

experienced a reduction in agent utilization on public corruption matters 

during FY 2004 as compared to FY 2000, while case openings remained 

relatively static over the same period of time. 

In January 2005, the FBI initiated an effort to review the public 

corruption efforts within its field offices. As a result, the New York City 

Division was developing a second public corruption squad to provide 

additional resources to investigate public corruption within the Division’s 

jurisdiction. Further, at our exit conference the FBI provided evidence that it 

had significantly increased its public corruption efforts in FY 2005 compared 

to FY 2004. 

Impact of Public Corruption Emphasis 

 FBI field division managers stated that any additional public corruption 

resources they received were often agents transferred from government 

contract fraud investigations. Therefore, according to FBI field managers, 

many government contract squads within FBI field divisions were reduced, 

rolled into general white-collar crime squads, or completely eliminated. 

 For instance, the Chicago Division previously had a public corruption 

squad and a government contract squad. Currently, the office operates 

two public corruption squads and no government contract squad. Similarly, 

the FBI’s New York City Division indicated that it intends to follow Chicago’s 

lead and convert its only government contract fraud squad into its second 

public corruption squad. 

 Exhibit 10-2 shows the changes in agent utilization and case openings 

in government fraud matters for FYs 2000 and 2004. The data shows that 

agent resources investigating these matters were reduced by 51 percent, 

while case openings declined by 56 percent. 
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EXHIBIT 10-2

OVERALL FBI EFFORTS ON GOVERNMENT FRAUD MATTERS 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

AGENT UTILIZATION CASE OPENINGS

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK and ACS data

 We also reviewed agent utilization and casework data at the field office 

level. As evidenced in Exhibit 10-3, all the field offices that we visited 

experienced decreases in agent utilization for government fraud matters 

from FY 2000 to FY 2004. The data shows that the San Francisco Division 

did not have a single agent investigating government contract fraud during 

FY 2004. By contrast, the Los Angeles Division utilized 12 agents on 

government fraud matters in FY 2004. Compared to FY 2000, each office 

opened fewer government fraud cases during FY 2004. In fact, all offices 

except New Orleans experienced case opening reductions in excess of 

50 percent compared to FY 2000 figures. 

EXHIBIT 10-3

FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION AND CASE OPENINGS ON 

GOVERNMENT FRAUD MATTERS AT DIVISIONS VISITED 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004

Agent Utilization Case Openings

Field Division FY 2000 FY 2004 Change FY 2000 FY 2004 Change 

Chicago 8 4 -4 25 2 -23 

Los Angeles 17 12 -5 47 16 -31 

Miami 3 1 -2 4 0 -4 

New Orleans 3 2 -1 15 8 -7 

New York City 9 4 -5 21 8 -13 

Phoenix 4 1 -3 9 3 -6 

San Francisco 7 0 -7 7 3 -4 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK and ACS data 
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Chapter Summary 

Although public corruption is the FBI’s fourth highest national priority, 

the FBI utilized fewer resources in this area in FY 2004 than it did in 

FY 2000. This decline resulted in fewer case openings during FY 2004 and 

less activity in public corruption cases, as evidenced by the 23-percent 

decline in case serials. Additionally, the FBI’s reduced investigative efforts 

corresponded with fewer public corruption matters referred to the USAOs. 
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CHAPTER 11: OTHER CRIME MATTERS 

In addition to the traditional crime areas discussed in Chapters 5 

through 10, law enforcement officials raised concerns related to other crime 

areas during our fieldwork. For example, FBI and non-FBI officials discussed 

problems in their investigative efforts to combat child pornography, human 

trafficking, and alien smuggling. The primary problem for federal agencies, 

according to these officials, including the FBI, was a lack of resources to 

adequately address these crimes. Moreover, state and local law 

enforcement agencies often lacked sufficient resources and the technical 

capability or jurisdictional authority that may be required for these 

investigations. In addition, we heard concerns about coordination issues 

arising between the FBI and ICE in each of these criminal areas. 

Child Pornography 

According to FBI, ICE, and local law enforcement officials, online child 

pornography (or child sexual exploitation) is an escalating crime problem. 

Groups involved in child pornography are not necessarily located in the same 

geographic area, or even the same country. The FBI and ICE are the two 

primary federal law enforcement agencies that investigate child pornography 

matters. However, in pursuing these cases, each of these agencies has 

established its own approach: the FBI developed the Innocent Images 

National Initiative (Innocent Images) and ICE created the Operation Predator 

program. 

FBI Investigative Efforts 

The FBI implemented the Innocent Images initiative in 1995 to: 

(1) identify, investigate, and prosecute sexual predators who use the 

Internet and online services to exploit children sexually; (2) establish a 

law enforcement presence on the Internet as a deterrent to subjects that 

use it to exploit children; and (3) identify and rescue child victims. 

Through this initiative, the FBI focuses on individuals who indicate a 

willingness to travel across state lines for the purposes of engaging in 

sexual activity with a minor, as well as those who produce and distribute 

child pornography. The FBI’s Cyber Division oversees the FBI’s 

investigative efforts in child pornography matters. 

Our analysis of FBI agent utilization data indicates that the FBI has 

enhanced its efforts in child pornography matters between FYs 2000 and 

2004. Overall, the FBI used 110 agents in this area during FY 2000, which 

increased by over 100 percent to 242 agents in FY 2004. Similarly, the FBI 
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significantly increased its child pornography investigations opened during the 

past 4 years, increasing from 60 cases in FY 2000 to 2,647 cases in FY 2004. 

 Despite the FBI’s increased efforts, officials at several FBI field offices 

stated that the volume of child pornography far outweighs the FBI’s available 

resources for investigating these matters, which officially fall under the FBI’s 

Cyber Crime Program. As a result, some field divisions often focus only on 

the most significant cyber crime incidents, which often pertain to non-child 

pornography issues, such as computer intrusions. 

Some FBI field offices, including New Orleans, Phoenix, and 

San Francisco, are involved in task force operations that combine FBI 

resources with other agencies in combating child pornography. For example, 

the FBI San Francisco Division participates on two such task forces, one of 

which includes ICE. 

In contrast, other FBI offices we visited did not coordinate their child 

pornography efforts with any other federal agencies. FBI managers in 

Chicago, Miami, and New York City each acknowledged that although ICE 

was involved in child pornography investigations, there has not been 

coordinated efforts between the two federal agencies. 

Perspective from Other Law Enforcement Agencies 

 ICE officials in the field expressed similar sentiments on coordination 

between the FBI and ICE. Some ICE offices, such as New Orleans and Phoenix 

(which are involved in child pornography task forces with the FBI), did not 

report any friction between the two agencies on child pornography matters. In 

contrast, ICE managers in the Chicago and New York City offices commented 

that no coordination existed between the FBI and ICE on child pornography 

matters. For example, ICE managers in Chicago stated that the FBI has not 

been receptive to working with ICE in this area, nor has the FBI shared any 

investigative information with ICE. Consequently, ICE officials expressed 

concerns regarding duplication of investigative effort in this criminal area. The 

Special Agent in Charge at the FBI Chicago Division told us that he would 

discuss this matter with ICE officials. 

Representatives from several state and local law enforcement agencies 

commented that they needed assistance from federal law enforcement in 

combating child pornography. Certain local officials remarked that child 

pornography cases entail a level of technological expertise beyond that 

possessed by many local departments. Additionally, they indicated that 

many of these crimes are beyond their jurisdictional boundaries. 
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Alien Smuggling and Human Trafficking 

 Alien smuggling and human trafficking are two criminal activities that 

fall under U.S. immigration and naturalization laws. Alien smuggling 

involves the illegal transportation of foreign persons across U.S. borders, 

while human trafficking is, essentially, a modern-day slave trade where 

victims are forced against their will into prostitution or labor offering little or 

no pay. 

Alien smuggling and human trafficking are often committed by criminal 

enterprises. Moreover, law enforcement officials have commented on the 

potential of terrorism-related persons or equipment being transported into 

the United States during these criminal operations. 

Perspective from Other Law Enforcement Agencies 

 According to ICE managers in Los Angeles, the USAO wanted the FBI, 

ICE, and the Department of Labor to be jointly involved in each human 

trafficking investigation, which these officials stated was occurring at the 

time of our fieldwork in April 2005. These ICE officials also believed that this 

strategy worked well. 

 According to ICE managers in Phoenix, their office has experienced a 

significant increase in the number of immigration-related cases, while 

simultaneously undergoing reductions in resource levels. As a result, these 

officials noted that their office is unable to address every alien smuggling case. 

FBI Perspective 

 During our site visits, FBI managers in Phoenix remarked that alien 

smuggling is a significant crime problem in Arizona due to its location on the 

Southwest Border. Despite the extent of the problem, these officials stated 

that the office was investigating only a handful of alien smuggling cases 

because they do not have available resources to devote to this criminal 

activity. 

FBI managers in Los Angeles commented that a duplication of effort 

exists between the FBI and ICE in human trafficking and alien smuggling and 

indicated that a clarification of investigative responsibility is greatly needed. 

They said that, in Los Angeles, the FBI joined ICE’s human trafficking task 

force to help reduce duplicative efforts. 

According to FBI officials, they have drafted a memorandum of 

understanding and are actively seeking to coordinate with ICE on alien 
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smuggling and human trafficking matters. However, this document has not 

been finalized. 

Chapter Summary 

FBI and ICE officials we interviewed during our audit cited problems in 

investigating child pornography, human trafficking, and alien smuggling. 

These federal agencies were primarily concerned about the amount of 

resources available to adequately address these crimes. State and local law 

enforcement agency officials commented that they also lacked sufficient 

resources. In addition, these officials stated that their agencies lacked the 

technical ability and jurisdictional authority often required to handle these 

investigations. Moreover, in certain locations we identified a lack of 

coordination between the FBI and ICE on these types of cases. 
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CHAPTER 12: FBI RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER 

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 

 

Good communication and positive working relationships between law 

enforcement agencies are critical for effective and efficient law enforcement. 

Given its broad investigative jurisdiction, the FBI has significant contact with 

other law enforcement personnel on the federal, state, and local levels. The 

FBI’s relationships with its law enforcement partners are crucial in combating 

crime, both reactively and proactively. 

According to FBI managers and other law enforcement officials, the 

overall relationships between the FBI and other agencies have improved 

over the last few years. At the field level, other federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies generally reported in our interviews that they 

considered their relationships with the FBI to be good. 

FBI Relationships with Law Enforcement Community 

 As part of the FBI’s reprioritization, the FBI Director emphasized the 

necessity of establishing partnerships with other federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies. For example, he cited the formation of these 

partnerships as one of the FBI’s new priorities. Additionally, the FBI Director 

established the FBI Office of Law Enforcement Coordination (OLEC) in 

March 2002 to enhance the FBI’s relationships with state and local law 

enforcement agencies. The OLEC’s mission is to establish and maintain 

partnerships between the FBI, state and local law enforcement entities, and 

national organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of 

Police, for the purpose of mutual assistance and cooperation. 

Management personnel at FBI Headquarters told us they recognized 

the increasing importance of building better relationships among law 

enforcement agencies and the communities they serve. Statements by 

officials at many of the FBI field offices reflected the Director’s emphasis on 

establishing cooperative efforts with members of the law enforcement 

community. In general, they believed they had positive working 

relationships with other law enforcement agencies. Several FBI field division 

managers emphasized that professional relationships are dependent on the 

personalities of those involved. They noted that the discovery of 

communication gaps between agencies regarding the events leading up to 

the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States highlighted the need for 

improving relationships within the law enforcement community. 
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Other Federal Agencies 

Within the field, non-FBI officials remarked that problems would arise at 

times among federal divisional offices, but most of these were addressed and 

corrected at the field level. Additionally, we spoke with almost 90 non-FBI 

federal law enforcement officials and nearly all remarked that their relationships 

with the FBI were good to outstanding. In addition, the majority commented 

that their interactions with the FBI had improved over the past few years. 

State and Local Agencies 

Almost every state and local law enforcement representative that we 

interviewed acknowledged a good relationship with the local FBI field office, and 

reported that this relationship appeared to become stronger over the past few 

years. Additionally, many local law enforcement agencies indicated that the 

FBI’s sharing of information with local departments has improved since 9/11. 

One example cited was the dissemination of intelligence bulletins. However, 

much of this information is terrorism-related, and several local officials 

indicated that they would like the FBI to share more of its intelligence and 

research regarding traditional crime areas, such as gangs and organized crime. 

However, local law enforcement officials were concerned about 

maintaining working relationships when FBI agents are frequently 

transferred, either through the FBI’s reprioritization from criminal to 

terrorism-related squads or through normal career transfers. These 

movements required new agents to rebuild relationships and re-establish 

trust with local departments, all of which requires time and commitment. 

Best Practice 

In several areas we visited, monthly meetings of law enforcement 

agency managers within a jurisdiction were highly regarded. According to 

many officials, these meetings fostered and maintained good working 

relationships among the law enforcement community. Additionally, these 

meetings provided an opportunity for agencies to share ideas and information 

surrounding current investigative efforts. For example, these meetings were 

being held in both Chicago and Phoenix, and all parties involved agreed that 

these meetings were beneficial. Further, FBI managers at other field divisions 

stated that such meetings were not occurring in their jurisdictions and might 

be worthwhile to replicate. 
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CHAPTER 13: OIG CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

After 9/11, the FBI reoriented its investigative efforts away from many 

traditional criminal areas to focus on counterterrorism. Comparing FY 2004 

to FY 2000, the FBI planned to use 1,143 (17 percent) fewer resources in its 

criminal programs during FY 2004. However, according to FBI agent 

utilization data, the FBI actually reduced its criminal resources more than 

twice as much as it had intended. In turn, the FBI opened fewer criminal 

cases and referred fewer criminal matters to the USAOs in FY 2004 than in 

FY 2000. 

To examine the effect the FBI’s reprioritization has had on other law 

enforcement agencies, we interviewed representatives at numerous federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies. Additionally, we disseminated a 

web-based survey to 3,514 state and local law enforcement agencies to 

obtain a large-scale perspective on the impact that the FBI’s reprioritization 

has had on their operations. Overall, the results of the survey indicated that 

most state and local law enforcement agencies did not believe that criminal 

investigations in their jurisdictions were greatly affected by the FBI’s 

reprioritization. However, according to our follow-up discussions with 

representatives of the law enforcement community in seven FBI field 

jurisdictions, the effect was more pronounced in some jurisdictions and in 

some criminal areas. 

As a result of our review, we provide the following conclusions and 

recommendations for the FBI to consider in allocating its agent resources 

and for improving specific areas of its operations. 

FBI Resource Projection 

In FY 2004, the FBI allocated 5,753 field agents for criminal matters, 

but only utilized 4,474 of these agents on such issues – a difference of 

1,279 agents. A similar underutilization of FBI agents on criminal matters 

also existed in FY 2003. According to FBI Headquarters and field-level 

managers, FBI field offices were directed to ensure that the FBI’s national 

priority areas were adequately staffed and that no terrorism-related matter 

went unaddressed. These officials further stated that this explains the 

significant gap in the utilization and allocation figures. However, the FBI 

needs to make sure that its allocations of field agents to both terrorism and 

non-terrorism programs are practical, effective, and based upon sound 

evaluations of need. 

1. We recommend the FBI ensure that it has accurately evaluated 

its investigative needs and necessary resource levels within each 
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area of the FBI’s operations – including both terrorism and nonterrorism related programs – and translate this information into 

realistic field agent allocations. 

Financial Institution Fraud 

 

The FBI significantly reduced its investigative efforts for fraudulent 

activity involving financial institutions (such as banks). Principally, the FBI 

scaled back its handling of lower dollar cases [SENSITIVE INFORMATION 

REDACTED]. We agree that the FBI must prioritize its investigations and 

first address the most egregious criminal activities. However, discussions 

with USAOs and analysis of USAO data revealed that no other federal agency 

has replaced the reduced FBI effort in this crime area. Therefore, an 

investigative gap exists for financial institution fraud (FIF), [SENSITIVE 

INFORMATION REDACTED]. 

Telemarketing/Wire Fraud 

According to FBI officials, FBI field offices are only nominally involved 

in the investigation of telemarketing and wire fraud. Additionally, no other 

law enforcement agency has assumed a significantly larger investigative role 

in these areas. Therefore, an investigative gap also exists for telemarketing 

and wire fraud. 

Health Care Fraud 

The FBI was provided funding on a reimbursable basis to address 

health care fraud issues. Through this funding, the FBI allocates agents to 

specifically address health care fraud issues. In FY 2004, the FBI allocated 

420 reimbursable agent positions towards this endeavor. However, our 

review of FBI agent utilization data showed that the FBI used approximately 

380 agents for health care fraud matters. 

In its April 2005 report, the GAO noted the FBI’s failure to utilize 

agents at the level at which it was being reimbursed. In its response to this 

finding, the FBI stated that its health care fraud investigative effort included 

other costs besides agent salaries. Nonetheless, the FBI overestimated the 

number of agents it would dedicate to health care fraud matters by over 

40 positions. At our exit conference, the FBI provided evidence that it 

increased its efforts related to health care fraud in FY 2005 compared to 

FY 2004. 

2. We recommend the FBI ensure that it accurately conveys to 

Congress the number of agents it will dedicate to health care 

fraud using reimbursable funds. 
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Drugs 

Since 9/11, the FBI significantly reduced the number of agents working 

on drug-related matters. Consequently, the FBI has opened fewer drugrelated cases and has submitted fewer drug-related criminal matters to the 

USAOs in FY 2004 than it had in FY 2000. Specifically, our analysis of USAO 

data revealed that the FBI had submitted almost 1,600 fewer drug-related 

criminal matters to the USAOs in FY 2004 than it had in FY 2000. Other 

federal law enforcement agencies, particularly the DEA and ATF, increased the 

number of drug trafficking matters that they referred to the USAOs between 

FYs 2000 and 2004. However, these increases did not fully compensate for 

the overall decrease in drug-related matters referred to the USAOs. The DEA 

field managers we interviewed stated that their drug-related efforts had not 

been negatively affected by the FBI’s reprioritization in the large metropolitan 

areas, but some of these officials were concerned that an investigative gap 

existed in smaller population centers surrounded by rural areas. Many of the 

state and local law enforcement officials we interviewed noted that their 

operations had not been adversely affected by the FBI’s change in priorities. 

Gangs 

Gang-related crime is a serious problem in many jurisdictions. 

Numerous federal agencies, in addition to many local law enforcement 

departments, investigate gang-related criminal activity. With multiple 

agencies involved, communication and coordination are essential to effectively 

investigating gang crime. The Chicago law enforcement community has 

established a working group that meets monthly to discuss each agency’s 

gang investigations, to share gang-related intelligence, and to formulate a 

comprehensive gang strategy. All federal and local agencies in the Chicago 

area that address gang crime participate in these meetings. In other cities, 

however, we discovered an uncoordinated approach in gang matters among 

the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. FBI field division managers in 

other cities indicated that coordination meetings would benefit the fight 

against gangs in their jurisdictions. 

At our exit conference, the FBI informed us of a new DOJ initiative, led 

by the USAOs, aimed at improving coordination, increasing information 

sharing, and reducing duplication of efforts in combating gangs. In July 2005, 

the FBI promulgated guidance on this anti-gang initiative to its field offices and 

directed them to work with the local USAOs in implementing the new strategy. 
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3. We recommend the FBI ensure that field offices are coordinating 

their anti-gang investigative efforts and executing the DOJ antigang initiative. 

Fugitive Apprehension 

The FBI’s reprioritization process involved assessing the criminal areas 

in which the FBI has concurrent jurisdiction with other federal law 

enforcement agencies and deciding which of these areas were appropriate 

for reduction of FBI involvement. One of these areas is the apprehension of 

fugitives, where responsibility is shared with the USMS. FBI agent utilization 

data demonstrates that the FBI significantly reduced its involvement in 

fugitive-related matters over the past four years, partly because of the work 

of the USMS in this area. However, a notable lack of coordination between 

the FBI and the USMS exists in the fugitive apprehension arena.

4. We recommend the FBI seek to better coordinate fugitive 

apprehension efforts with the USMS. 

Public Corruption 

Despite the priority status of public corruption cases, our review 

disclosed that public corruption was addressed by the FBI at a slightly 

reduced level in FY 2004 compared to FY 2000. Additionally, we found that 

the FBI’s largest field office, the New York City Division, only recently 

evaluated its public corruption needs in light of the offense’s priority status 

within the FBI. According to the FBI, it has established an initiative to 

ensure that all field offices are appropriately prioritizing public corruption 

matters. Further, at our exit conference the FBI provided evidence that it 

had significantly increased its public corruption efforts in FY 2005 compared 

to FY 2004. 

Bank Robberies 

Both FBI and non-FBI officials we interviewed agreed that the FBI is no 

longer addressing bank robberies at the same level as in the past. In a few 

instances, we were informed of bank robbery caseloads that were exceeding 

state and local law enforcement capabilities. The FBI’s diminished 

involvement in this crime area is consistent with the FBI’s bank robbery 

“measured response” policy established in March 2001, which was designed 

to scale back the FBI’s involvement in bank robbery investigations and focus 

its involvement on violent, serial, or take-over style acts. In most field 

offices, we found that the FBI adhered to the measured response policy, 

which continues to be in existence. 
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Identity Theft 

The crime of identity theft is an increasing problem in the United States. 

Several local law enforcement officials reported that their agencies do not have 

the ability or jurisdictional authority to effectively address this crime. Several 

federal agencies, including the FBI, are involved in combating identity theft. 

However, our review revealed that the federal investigative response to these 

matters is often uncoordinated and local law enforcement officials said they 

are, at times, confused about which agency to turn to for assistance. 

Overwhelmingly, local law enforcement agencies conveyed the need for the 

development of a federal strategy to combat identity theft at all levels of law 

enforcement. 

5. We recommend the FBI pursue the formation of a multi-agency 

working group to develop and implement a national strategy to 

combat identity theft. This group should include, at a minimum, 

representatives from within the DOJ, including the FBI, as well 

as the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the U.S. Secret Service, 

ICE, and local law enforcement. 

Operational Coordination with ICE 

Because the FBI and ICE share responsibility for investigating several 

crimes, coordination of operations involving such shared authority is important 

to the effective use of both agencies’ resources. In our discussions with FBI 

and ICE field managers, we identified three criminal areas in which these 

agencies need to improve their coordination and communication: (1) child 

pornography, (2) alien smuggling, and (3) human trafficking. At the exit 

conference, FBI officials informed us that they are working with ICE on a 

memorandum of understanding related to alien smuggling and human 

trafficking matters. This agreement has not been finalized.

6. We recommend the FBI continue to work with ICE to develop 

agreements for coordinating FBI and ICE investigations of 

human trafficking and alien smuggling, as well as child 

pornography. 

Best Practice 

During our discussions with FBI field managers, we identified a practice 

that the FBI should consider in other FBI field divisions. Law enforcement 

officials in Phoenix and Chicago hold monthly meetings of operations 

management personnel from various agencies. All participants with whom we 

met believed these meetings were useful in fostering communication and the 

sharing of information. Additionally, FBI managers at other field divisions 
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stated that such meetings were not taking place in their jurisdictions but 

believed that the meetings would be beneficial.

7. We recommend the FBI pursue regular meetings among law 

enforcement officials, similar to the meetings held in Phoenix 

and Chicago, in more jurisdictions. 

 
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APPENDIX I: OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 

Audit Objective

 The objective of this audit was to assess the change in FBI 

investigative resources devoted to criminal areas and assess the impact of 

these changes on other federal, state, and local law enforcement entities. 

Scope and Methodology 

We performed our audit in accordance with the Government Auditing 

Standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and included 

such tests of the records and procedures that we considered necessary to 

accomplish the audit objective. The informational nature of our audit objective 

did not require that we perform testing of the FBI’s compliance with laws and 

regulations or overall internal control structure. To accomplish our objective, 

we interviewed officials at various law enforcement agencies, conducted a 

web-based survey of state and local law enforcement agencies, and analyzed 

computer-processed data from the FBI and Executive Office for United States 

Attorneys (EOUSA). 

Interviews 

Much of our work centered on interviews with officials at various 

federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, which were conducted at 

the headquarters and field office levels. These interviews, as well as 

documentation obtained during interviews, provided perspective on the 

effects that the FBI’s shifting priorities and resources had on it and the law 

enforcement community as a whole. In total, we interviewed 328 law 

enforcement representatives. 

Of these interviews, 65 were conducted with executive personnel at 

federal agencies and programs in the Washington, D.C., area. Specifically, 

we spoke with 23 officials at FBI Headquarters, including the Executive 

Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Services and the Assistant Directors 

for the Criminal Investigative Division and the Office of Law Enforcement 

Coordination. We also spoke with FBI officials at the FBI Academy in 

Quantico, Virginia, and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force in McLean, 

Virginia. Additionally, we interviewed 42 headquarters representatives at 

the following federal law enforcement agencies and programs: 
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APPENDIX I 

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• ATF 

• DEA 

• Executive Office for U.S. 

Attorneys (EOUSA) 

• Executive Office of the 

President’s High Intensity Drug 

Trafficking Area (HIDTA) 

Program 

• Financial Crimes Enforcement 

Network (FinCEN) 

• ICE 

• Organized Crime and Drug 

Enforcement Task Force 

(OCDETF) Program 

• Securities and Exchange 

Commission 

• U.S. Secret Service61

• U.S. Marshals Service 

• U.S. Postal Inspection 

 Service 

Further, we spoke with four officials at the following international and 

national law enforcement agency associations: International Association of 

Chiefs of Police (IACP), Major Cities Chiefs Association, and Major County 

Sheriff’s Association. We also spoke with 259 law enforcement representatives 

of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and departments during 

our visits to seven FBI field office jurisdictional areas. At each site, we 

interviewed officials at the FBI, ATF, DEA, ICE, U.S. Attorneys Office (USAO), 

and USMS. Further, we interviewed state and local law enforcement 

representatives at a minimum of five departments per site. For these state and 

local interviews, we judgmentally selected police departments based upon 

responses to our web-based survey, choosing agencies that indicated they had 

been either negatively or positively affected by the FBI’s reprioritization. 

Additionally, we spoke with the primary police department located in each city 

visited. For example, while in Chicago, we met with officials from the Chicago 

Police Department. The table in Appendix VII lists the agencies contacted at 

each location. 

Survey and Computer-Processed Data 

In an attempt to obtain more thorough insight on the effects the FBI’s 

reprioritization had on local law enforcement agencies, we developed and 

deployed a web-based survey to 3,514 state and local law enforcement 

agencies located in 12 FBI field office jurisdictions. Details regarding the 

survey are discussed later in this appendix. 

To further understand the results of the FBI’s reprioritization, we 

analyzed data provided by the FBI and the EOUSA. Specifically, we conducted 

analyses of FBI statistical data on its resource allocation, resource utilization, 

and casework. Additionally, we requested and analyzed U.S. Attorney Office 

 61 The U.S. Secret Service provided feedback in written form instead of a face-to-face 

interview.
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(USAO) data on the number of criminal matters the USAOs received from 

federal law enforcement agencies, particularly the FBI. 

To examine the FBI’s human resource utilization, we examined data 

from the FBI’s Time Utilization Recordkeeping (TURK) system – a module of 

the FBI’s payroll system – for the period of September 26, 1999, through 

September 18, 2004.62 The TURK system contains work-hour and Average 

On-Board (AOB) data for most FBI agents and support involved with 

investigative matters. To examine the types and quantity of cases the FBI 

investigated for the same period, we analyzed data from the Automated 

Case Support (ACS) system. 

In September 2003, we issued an audit report on FBI Casework and 

Human Resource Utilization.63 During that audit, we performed tests to 

establish the reliability of the computer-processed data from the TURK and 

ACS systems. For both systems, we reviewed management controls and we 

performed data validity tests at the FBI Chicago Division. Based on these 

test results and the FBI’s confirmation of data, we concluded the data was 

sufficiently reliable to achieve our audit objective.64 Therefore, we did not 

repeat this process for our current audit. 

Data Analysis

We performed analyses of FBI resource allocation, resource utilization, 

and casework data to identify trends and note significant changes in the 

FBI’s operations from September 26, 1999, through September 18, 2004. 

We also reviewed U.S. Attorney criminal matters data for FYs 2000 through 

2004, as well as the responses to our web-based survey. In total, this data 

amounted to 2,752,582 records. 

 

FBI Human Resources 

We conducted analyses of FBI Funded Staffing Levels (FSL) and 

Agent On-Board data. 

 62 This time period represents FYs 2000 through 2004, the five latest years for which 

full FY data was available. 

63 Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. Federal Bureau of 

Investigation Casework and Human Resource Allocation, Audit Report Number 03-37, 

September 2003. 

64 FBI field agents are responsible for reporting the proportion of their time worked 

in FBI investigative classifications. Therefore, the data derived from the FBI TURK system 

are only as valid as the information reported by FBI agents. 
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Funded Staffing Level – We used the FBI’s FSL figures established by 

the Resource Management and Allocation Office to analyze agent resource 

allocations. We obtained field division FSLs for each program and each fiscal 

year, for both agents and support personnel for FYs 2000 through 2004. We 

also received FSLs for FBI Headquarters, organized by Division level, for the 

same period. These FSLs represented the final allocations set for each fiscal 

year, reflecting any mid-year adjustments. We reviewed the FBI’s agent 

allocations, focusing on changes in FSLs between FYs 2000 and 2004. The 

total FSL data amounted to 9,834 records. 

Average On-Board (AOB) – TURK generally records percentages of 

time worked for both agents and support personnel in the FBI’s 56 field 

offices (Headquarters personnel do not record their time in TURK). TURK 

data collection is divided into 13 TURK periods per fiscal year; each TURK 

period is 4 weeks. Each agent records the percentage of time worked each 

day according to FBI investigative classifications (the percentages are based 

on a 10-hour day for agents and an 8-hour day for support personnel).65 

These percentages are recorded and the result is averaged to show time 

worked in a specific classification equivalent to a full-time employee, which 

the FBI calls Average On-Board (AOB). 

For example, if three agents within a particular field office each spent 

one-third of their time (33 percent) on Bank Robbery – FBI Investigative 

Classification 091A – within a given TURK period, the AOB for that field office 

(in Classification 091A, within the TURK period) would be equal to 1 agent AOB 

(100 percent of 1 agent-equivalent). The FBI considers the TURK system’s AOB 

data to be the best way to assess the actual time worked by FBI employees in 

specific FBI investigative programs, subprograms, and classifications. In this 

report, we use the term AOB and on-board agent interchangeably. 

The FBI retroactively adds employee leave and miscellaneous time into 

the TURK record of each employee at the program/subprogram level. The FBI 

does this through use of an automated Investigative Program Allocator, which 

prorates the data back into each record based on that employee’s activity in the 

previous six pay periods. Therefore, to most accurately represent the FBI’s 

AOB actualities, we requested separate data runs for AOB at the FBI’s 

investigative classification level and at the FBI’s program/subprogram level. 

Hence, only when presenting data at the classification level do we use data 

from the classification runs. 

 65 The FBI assigns each of its cases to an investigative classification based on the 

nature of the case. The investigative classification is the greatest level of detail for which 

the FBI tracks resource utilization. Each classification is assigned to a program and, if 

appropriate, a subprogram. 
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The classification level data run was provided in a text file, which we 

imported into a database file. The data run contained 611,333 records, each 

containing the following fields: 

Field Name Field Description

• Field Office: City of FBI Field Office 

• Employee Indicator: Agent or Support 

• Fiscal Year: 2000 through 2004 

• Turk Period: 1 through 13 

• Program: Numeric Indicator 

• Subprogram: Alpha Indicator 

• Classification: Alpha-Numeric Indicator 

• Average On-Board: AOB for the program/subprogram/ 

 classification designated 

The program level data run possessed the same fields noted above 

except for the Classification field. This data run, provided in a text file and 

imported into a database file, contained 410,902 records. We compared 

FYs 2000 and 2003 AOB figures at the program and classification level to the 

figures verified by the FBI in our Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Reprioritization report issued in September 2004 to confirm that our current 

data and analysis methodology were correct. 

Based on analyses of the AOB data at both the program and 

classification levels, we judgmentally selected 12 FBI field divisions for 

possible locations to conduct additional work: Atlanta; Chicago; Dallas; 

Denver; Detroit; Los Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; New York City; Phoenix; 

San Francisco; and Washington, D.C. We requested unclassified AOB data 

runs at the classification and program levels according to these offices’ 

resident agencies. A resident agency is a satellite office to one of the FBI’s 

56 field divisions. The unclassified classification level data run, provided in a 

text file, was imported into a database file containing 302,293 records, each 

including the following fields: 

Field Name Field Description

• Field Office: City of FBI Field Office

• Resident Agency: Name of FBI Resident Agency Office

• Employee Indicator: Agent or Support

• Fiscal Year: 2000 through 2004

• Turk Period: 1 through 13

• Program: Numeric Indicator

• Subprogram: Alpha Indicator 

• Classification: Alpha-Numeric Indicator

• Average On-Board: AOB for the program/subprogram/ 

 classification designated
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The unclassified program level Resident Agency data run for the 

12 field divisions contained the same fields noted above except for the 

Classification field. This data run was supplied in a text file and imported 

into a database file containing 503,147 records. 

Agent Utilization – We elected to analyze AOB data by fiscal year. To do 

this, we totaled the AOB for all TURK periods within each fiscal year for each 

investigative program, subprogram, or classification. Next, we divided this 

total by the number of TURK periods (13) to obtain the average agents working 

a particular program, subprogram, or classification in a given fiscal year. 

Analysis at the Program/Subprogram Level – We evaluated AOB data 

to identify internal operational changes in FBI investigative efforts occurring 

as a result of the FBI’s reprioritization and internal reorganization. 

Therefore, to assess the change in agent utilization, we focused our analysis 

on comparing AOB totals between FYs 2000 and 2004, while looking for 

conspicuous differences in AOB for FYs 2003 and 2004. This approach 

afforded a view of AOB both before and well into the FBI’s reprioritization 

efforts, revealing the areas of greatest change in actual agent-time worked. 

In order to accurately compare the change in agent utilization at the 

program level, we adjusted AOB data to reflect the FBI’s program 

composition during FY 2004. During FY 2004, the FBI initiated the Criminal 

Enterprise Plan, subsequently resulting in the restructuring of the FBI’s 

Criminal Investigative Division (CID). The implementation of this plan 

resulted in new program names and the transferring of particular 

subprograms and units. The FBI Program Crosswalk in Appendix III displays 

the current FBI program and subprogram architecture.66 Generally, we 

analyzed FBI program change according to its current structure.67

Analysis at the Investigative Classification Level – Besides conducting 

analyses of resource utilization at the program/subprogram levels, we also 

performed analyses down to the classification level. We computed the 

change in agent AOB for each classification between FYs 2000 and 2004, 

noting those classifications experiencing significant changes. Appendix IV 

shows the classifications experiencing the greatest AOB reductions and 

increases between FYs 2000 and 2004. 

 66 The latest transformation of CID was initiated in May 2004 following the 

announcement of the Criminal Enterprise Plan. The TURK system continued to track data 

according to CID’s former structure for the remainder of FY 2004. It began recording data 

according its current organization for FY 2005. 

67 A current CID Organization Chart is located on page 9 of this report. Appendix III 

shows the FY 2005 program and subprogram composition. 
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FBI Casework 

For our analyses of the FBI’s casework, we received a data run from 

the ACS system, and focused on cases opened from September 26, 1999, 

through September 18, 2004. The data run was provided in a text file and 

imported into a database file containing 762,350 records, separated into the 

following fields: 

Field Name Field Description

• File Type: “u” for unclassified

• Office Code: Two digit alpha designation for office of origin

• Case ID: Universal Case File Number (UCFN)

• Class Classification of case

• Previous Class: Previous classification of case if reclassified

• Subclass: Subclassification of case

• Program: Name of Program

• Subprogram: Name of Subprogram

• Open Date: yyyymmdd format

• Close Date: yyyymmdd format

• Days Pending: Numeric identification of days the case is open

• Delete Code: “D” designation when case is destroyed

 In reviewing the data, we discovered 7,183 cases in the database that 

were designated as having been destroyed. Of these 7,183 cases, we found 

2,756 that contained opening and closing dates. We determined that we 

could include these 2,756 cases in any analyses involving case opening and 

closing dates, while we needed to eliminate those that contained no open and 

close dates. We therefore retained the 2,756 destroyed cases that contained 

open and close dates and eliminated the remaining 4,427 cases that did not. 

These 4,427 cases reflected one percent of the remaining database of 

370,622 cases on which we performed our analyses. 

We confined our casework analysis to the data we obtained from the 

ACS system, and did not review individual case files to determine the actual 

level of effort expended on any single case. Thus, if a case was open during 

a particular timeframe, we considered it to be worked during that period. 

 Case Openings – The number of cases opened in a given time period 

demonstrates the types of cases the FBI was investigating. In order to 

conduct such an evaluation, we first organized the cases according to the 

fiscal years in which they were opened. Then, we analyzed the difference in 

case openings between FYs 2000 and 2004 for FBI programs, subprograms, 

and investigative classifications. This analysis afforded perspective on the 
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changes in the FBI’s level of investigative effort in different criminal areas, 

as well as the FBI’s overall traditional crime operations. 

Case Serials – The FBI’s ACS system records each document entry into 

a case file as a serial. In discussion with an FBI Headquarters official, we 

were informed that the number of serials inputted into a case during a given 

time period would afford an indication of the amount of effort devoted to a 

case. We agreed that this analysis would provide such perspective and 

requested a copy of such reports of activity. We obtained a document 

detailing the number of serials opened for the FBI as a whole, according to 

particular investigative classification categories for FYs 1999 through 2004. 

We analyzed the number of serials opened in a given FY, specifically 

evaluating the difference in serial quantities for certain investigative 

categories between FYs 2000 and 2004.

U.S. Attorney Criminal Matters Received 

We requested U.S. Attorney data for all felony categories in the 

94 federal judicial districts for certain federal law enforcement components 

(and their task forces where appropriate).68 The components used in our 

analyses of criminal matters received by the USAOs are listed in Appendix V. 

We believe these agencies encompass the majority of the federal 

investigative efforts in the types of crimes under review. 

In analyzing the data files provided by the EOUSA, we concluded that 

data involving criminal matters received by the USAOs provided the best 

perspective on the level of effort an investigative agency afforded a 

particular criminal category. Criminal matters refer to those investigative 

cases referred to USAOs for review and possible prosecution. A matter 

becomes a prosecution case once defendants are charged. Thus, the 

number of USAO cases would not reflect investigative effort as well as the 

number of criminal matter referrals. Therefore, we analyzed the number of 

criminal matters received in particular federal crime violation categories. We 

assessed the change from FY 2000 to FY 2004 for all agencies combined and 

for specific agencies, chiefly the FBI. We converted the original text files 

into a database file containing 22,130 records. The following details the field 

categories for the U.S. Attorney data we evaluated: 

 68 This data also includes matters handled by U.S. Magistrate Courts, which hear 

Class A & B misdemeanor cases. An EOUSA representative stated that many of these 

misdemeanor cases involved immigration issues or arrests in national parks. She did not 

believe, given the scope of our review, that the data we used was skewed to an invalid or 

unreliable status given this inclusion. 
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Field Name Field Description

• Fiscal Year 2000 through 2004

• District Name of U.S. judicial district

• Agency Alpha indicator of federal agency

• Program Category Name of federal crime violation category

• Matter Receive Count Number of criminal matters received by USAOs 

 

Web-Based Survey of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 

In order to obtain a large-scale perspective on the impact that the FBI’s 

shift in resources has had on state and local law enforcement agencies, we 

conducted a web-based survey. We set the parameters of the survey to 

focus on state and local law enforcement agencies located in the jurisdictional 

area of FBI field offices, and we judgmentally selected 12 jurisdictions: 

Atlanta; Chicago; Dallas; Denver; Detroit; Los Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; 

New York City; Phoenix; San Francisco; and Washington, D.C. During the 

selection process, we considered three primary factors: (1) FBI field agent 

utilization changes in traditional crime areas, (2) FBI field office size in terms 

of agent FSLs, and (3) geographic location to obtain a nationwide 

perspective. 

After identifying the jurisdictional areas, we queried an electronic 

directory of law enforcement agencies for determining our survey 

population.69 The law enforcement agencies we concentrated on were state, 

county, municipal, tribal, and others, such as airport and railroad police. In 

contrast, we excluded specialized local agencies like university campus 

police departments. In total, our survey population amounted to 3,514 state 

and local law enforcement agencies, which generally encompassed all such 

agencies in the 12 jurisdictional areas. 

Since the electronic directory did not contain e-mail addresses, we 

notified our population about the survey through an initial letter and 

reminded them later with a postcard. Each was addressed to the chief law 

enforcement executive. We also followed up by calling larger departments, 

such as the Chicago Police Department and New York City Police Department, 

and encouraged their participation. State and local officials accessed the 

survey using a distinctive Internet address dedicated to the survey. In total, 

we obtained 1,265 responses from our population of 3,514 state and local law 

 69 The FBI Office of Law Enforcement Coordination provided a listing of the 

jurisdictional areas of each FBI field office by county, which assisted in our query of the 

electronic directory. 
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enforcement agencies, a response rate of 36 percent.70 The following table 

provides a breakdown of the survey respondents by location. A listing of all 

agencies that responded to the survey is located in Appendix X. 

SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS BY LOCATION

FBI Field Office 

Jurisdiction 

Number of 

Recipients 

Number of 

Respondents 

Survey 

Response Rate 

Atlanta 593 170 28.7% 

Chicago 366 181 49.5% 

Dallas 526 204 38.8% 

Denver 361 105 29.1% 

Detroit 556 220 39.6% 

Los Angeles 159 71 44.7% 

Miami 101 35 34.7% 

New Orleans 362 75 20.7% 

New York City 178 69 38.8% 

Phoenix 129 45 34.9% 

San Francisco 150 72 48.0% 

Washington, D.C. 33 18 54.5% 

Totals 3,514 1,265 36.0% 

Source: Office of the Inspector General analysis 

Conducting any survey lends itself to various types of errors related to 

survey responses. For example, questions might be interpreted differently by 

agency representatives, or agency officials might use a different basis for 

answering questions, such as readily available agency data or one’s own 

experience. In addition, respondents might not be uniformly conscientious in 

expressing their views or they may be influenced by concerns about how their 

answers might be construed by the OIG, the FBI, or the public. We 

incorporated various steps to limit these errors. For instance, we performed a 

survey beta-test with local law enforcement agencies to address differences in 

how questions were interpreted. We also solicited comments from the FBI’s 

Criminal Investigative Division and Office of Law Enforcement Coordination 

about the content and clarity of the survey. We modified our survey questions 

based upon the beta-test results and comments received from the FBI. 

The survey responses were contained in a database format within the 

survey software program. For analysis purposes, we exported the survey 

database, which contained 130,593 records, to another software program to 

conduct our examination of the responses. Detailed results of our survey 

are contained in Appendix VIII. 

 70 Each of the 1,265 respondents equates to a distinct state or local law enforcement 

agency. We did receive more than one response from some agencies. These multiple responses 

are not reflected in deriving our response rate but are included in our survey analyses.
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APPENDIX II: PRIOR FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVIS

ORGANIZATION CHART 

Source: FBI Criminal Investigative Division Organization Chart as of September 11, 2003 
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APPENDIX III: CROSSWALK OF FBI INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAM

SUBPROGRAMS 

FYS 2000 THROUGH 2005 

FY 2000 FY 2000 Subprograms FY 2004 Programs FY 2004 Subprograms FY 2005 Programs 

National Foreign Intelligence 

• Foreign 

Counterintelligence 

• FBI Security • International 

Terrorism 

National Foreign Intelligence 

• Foreign 

Counterintelligence 

• FBI Security • International 

Terrorism 

National Foreign Intelligence 

National Infrastructure/ Computer Intrusion 

No Subprograms Computer Intrusion Program • Computer Intrusion • Critical Assets71 Computer Intrusion Program 

Domestic Terrorism No Subprograms Domestic Terrorism 

• Counterterrorism 

Preparedness 

• Domestic Terrorism 

Operations 

• Weapons of Mass 

Destruction 

Domestic Terrorism 

71 The Critical Assets subprogram was originally the Infrastructure Protection subprogram.
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FY 2000 FY 2000 Subprograms FY 2004 Programs FY 2004 Subprograms FY 2005 Programs 

White-Collar Crime 

• Antitrust • Bankruptcy Fraud • Environmental 

Crimes 

• Financial Institution 

Fraud 

• Fraud Against the 

Government 

• Health Care Fraud • Insurance Fraud • Intellectual Property 

Rights 

• Money Laundering • Public Corruption • Securities/ 

Commodities Fraud 

• Telemarketing Fraud • Other Matters 

White-Collar Crime 

• Antitrust • Bankruptcy Fraud • Environmental 

Crimes 

• Financial Institution 

Fraud 

• Fraud Against the 

Government 

• Health Care Fraud • Insurance Fraud • Money Laundering • Public Corruption • Securities/ 

Commodities Fraud 

• Telemarketing Fraud • Other Matters • Other Wire & Mail 

Fraud Schemes 

White-Collar Crime 

72 The Antitrust, Bankruptcy Fraud, Environmental Crimes, Fraud Against Government, and Public Corruption s

managed by the Integrity in Government/Governmental Fraud Unit at FBI Headquarters. This and the Civil Rights Unit 

in Government Civil Rights Section. Still, for data tracking purposes, the Public Corruption/Governmental Fraud Unit surecorded within White-Collar Crime.
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FY 2000 Programs FY 2000 Subprograms FY 2004 Programs FY 2004 Subprograms FY 2005 Programs 

Organized Crime/ Drugs 

• Asian Criminal 

Enterprise 

• Columbian/ 

Caribbean 

• Community 

Outreach Program 

• OCDETF • La Cosa Nostra • Mexican Criminal 

Syndicates 

• Russian/Eastern 

European/Eurasian 

• Other Matters 

Organized Crime/ Drugs 

• Asian Criminal 

Enterprise 

• Columbian/ Caribbean • Community Outreach 

Program 

• OCDETF • La Cosa Nostra/Italian 

Organized Crime/Labor Racketeering 

• Mexican Criminal 

Syndicates 

• Russian/Eastern 

European/Eurasian 

• Other Matters-Drugs • Other MattersOrganized Crime 

Transnational Criminal Enterprise 

No Program No Subprograms No Program No Subprograms Americas Criminal Enterprise No Program No Subprograms Criminal Enterprise Investigations 

• OCDETF • Major Theft • Violent Gangs 

No Program 
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FY 2000 Programs FY 2000 Subprograms FY 2004 Programs FY 2004 Subprograms FY 2005 Programs 

Violent Crimes and Major Offenders 

• Crimes Against 

Children 

• OCDETF-VCMO • Fugitives • Crimes in Indian 

Country 

• Innocent Images 

Initiative 

• Major Theft • Special Jurisdiction 

Matters 

• Transportation 

Crimes 

• Violent Incident 

Crimes 

• Victim Witness 

Assistance 

• Other Matters • Violent Gangs 

Violent Crimes and Major Offenders 

• Crimes Against 

Children 

• Fugitives • Crimes in Indian 

Country 

• Special Jurisdiction 

Matters 

• Transportation 

Crimes 

• Violent Incident 

Crimes 

• Victim Witness 

Assistance 

• Other Matters 

Violent Crimes 

• Cri• Fug• Cri• Sp• Tra

• Vio• Vic• Oth

No Program No Subprograms Cyber Crime 

• Internet Fraud • Identity Theft • Intellectual Property 

Rights 

• Innocent Images 

National Initiative 

• Other Matters 

Cyber Crime

• Int• Ide• Int

Inf

• Inn• Oth

Civil Rights No Subprograms Civil Rights 

• Color of Law • Hate Crimes • Freedom of Access 

to Clinics 

• Involuntary 

Servitude & Slavery 

• Other Matters 

Civil Rights 

• Co• Ha• Fre• Inv• Oth
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APPENDIX IV: AGENT UTILIZATION 

IN FBI INVESTIGATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS 

THE TOP 30 FBI INVESTIGATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING 

THE GREATEST REDUCTIONS IN AGENT UTILIZATION 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 200473

 AOB Change 

FYs 2000 - 2004 

Classification 

Number Classification Name Number Percent

281C OC/DI – Mexican Organizations -145 -78% 

245C OCDETF – Mexican Organizations -126 -45% 

088A Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution – Crime of Violence -117 -69% 

281A OC/DI – LCN and Italian Organizations -106 -35% 

091A Bank Robbery -91 -29% 

281F OC/DI – Other Major Criminal Organizations -90 -83% 

196D Other Wire & Mail Fraud Schemes -79 -32% 

245F OCDETF – Other Major Criminal Organizations -71 -62% 

245B OCDETF – Central/South American Organizations -70 -61% 

029C FIF - $29K - $99,999 Fed-Insured Bank -61 -82% 

281E OC/DI – Asian Organizations -56 -47% 

281B OC/DI – Central/South American Organizations -47 -76% 

196A Telemarketing Fraud -44 -74% 

245D OCDETF – VCMO – Gangs -44 -33% 

281I OC/DI – Caribbean Organizations -43 -75% 

209A Health Care Fraud – Government Sponsored Program -42 -17% 

092C REI – Mexican Organizations -36 -85% 

026B ITSMV – Commercial Theft or Chop Shops -36 -76% 

196B Insurance Fraud -36 -66% 

087B Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property - $25,000 or 

more 

 -34 -64% 

245I OCDETF – Caribbean Organizations -33 -49% 

029B FIF - $100,000+ Fed Ins. Bank -33 -12% 

015B TFIS – Loss of $25K; Weapons, Explosives -27 -77% 

209B Health Care Fraud – Private Ins. Program -27 -29% 

046B Fraud Against the Government – HUD -25 -56% 

007A Kidnapping -23 -48% 

282A Civil Rights – Color of Law – force &/or Violence -22 -27% 

245A OCDETF – LCN and Italian Organizations -22 -77% 

029K FIF – (-)$25,000 Ins. Fin. Inst. Not Fast Track -20 -88% 

046H Fraud Against the Government – Other -20 -55% 

ACRONYMS: 

OCDETF = Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

OC/DI = Organized Crime/Drug Investigations 

REI = Racketeering Enterprise Investigation 

LCN = La Cosa Nostra

FIF = Financial Institution Fraud 

ITSMV = Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 

TFIS = Theft From Interstate Shipment 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data 

 73 For this analysis, we excluded investigative classifications that pertained to administrative or 

miscellaneous matters, as well as those classifications that existed in FY 2000 but not in FY 2004. 

Additionally, we excluded all investigative classifications related to the FBI’s National Foreign Intelligence 

Program. 
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THE TOP 30 FBI INVESTIGATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING 

THE GREATEST INCREASES IN AGENT UTILIZATION 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 200474

 AOB Change 

FYs 2000 - 2004 

Classification 

Number Classification Name Number Percent

279A Use, Possession, Transfer, Production, Transport of WMD 37 447% 

300A CT Preparedness – Special Events 35 57% 

166E ITAR – Violent Gangs 34 16% 

305B IINI – Travelers/Enticement 28 969% 

266A AOT-DT – Violent Crimes-Predicate Offense 26 21% 

279B Threaten or Attempt to Use, Possess, Produce, or Transport 

WMD 17 2,028% 

288B Computer Intrusions – CT/CI 17 2,967% 

089B Assaulting or Killing a Federal Officer 12 81% 

174D Bomb Technician Activities 11 61% 

281J Criminal Enterprise-OC/DI – Alien Smuggling Investigations 11 530% 

031C White Slave Traffic Act – Sexual Exploitation – Children 9 85% 

300B CT Preparedness – Aviation Security 9 582% 

295B IPR Infringement – Copyright Infringement-Computer 

Software Matters 9 85% 

050 Involuntary Servitude and Slavery 8 180% 

174A Actual & Attempted Bombings & Explosives Violations 8 106% 

164C Crime Aboard Aircraft – All Other 8 272% 

306 Serial Killings 7 311% 

295C IPR Infringement – Copyright Infringement – Other Matters 7 92% 

305A IINI – E-Groups/Organizations/Enterprises for Profit 5 5% 

272F Money Laundering – Drugs 4 45% 

253C FRAID – All Other 3 306% 

198E IC Controlled Substance Act 3 60% 

198S IC Rape 3 196% 

253A Fraud & Rel Activity – Passport/Visa/Identity Documents-DT 3 237% 

194C Corruption of State & Local Public Officials – Law Enforcement 2 5% 

300C CT Preparedness – Other 2 16% 

194A Corruption of State and Local Public Officials – State Level 1 2% 

205 Foreign Corruption Practices Act of 1977 1 86% 

272D Money Laundering – Unknown SUA 1 19% 

266B AOT-DT – Organized Crime – Predicate Offense 1 71% 

ACRONYMS: 

WMD = Weapons of Mass Destruction 

CT = Counterterrorism 

ITAR = International Traffic in Arms Regulations 

IINI = Innocent Images National Initiative 

AOT = Acts of Terrorism 

DT = Domestic Terrorism 

CI = Counterintelligence

OC/DI = Organized Crime/Drug Investigations 

IPR = Intellectual Property Rights 

FRAID = Fraud & Related Activity Identification Documents 

IC = Indian Country 

SUA = Specified Unlawful Activity 

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data 

 74 For this analysis, we excluded investigative classifications that pertained to administrative or 

miscellaneous matters, as well as those classifications that existed in FY 2004 but not in FY 2000. Additionally, 

we excluded all investigative classifications related to the FBI’s National Foreign Intelligence Program. 
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APPENDIX V: AGENCIES USED IN OIG ANALYSIS OF 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY CASE MANAGEMENT DATA 

Federal Department and Relevant Components:75

Securities and Exchange Commission

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

Office of Inspector General

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement76

U.S. Coast Guard 

U.S. Secret Service

U.S. Department of Justice 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

U.S. Marshals Service 

U.S. Department of Treasury 

Internal Revenue Service 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

U.S. Postal Inspection Service 

 75 The departments and components shown in bold were included in our analyses of 

United States Attorney Case Management data. We also received and analyzed task force 

data for each of the agencies shown in bold. 

76 The U.S. Attorneys’ Offices continue to separately track data related to the Bureau 

of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) according to the former two entities that 

were combined to form ICE: (1) the Immigration and Naturalization Service and (2) the 

U.S. Customs Service. We combined the data for these two agencies to derive ICE totals.
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APPENDIX VI: CHANGES IN REFERRALS FOR THE CRIMINAL CAT

USED BY THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ OFFICES 

FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2004 

ALL AGENCIES FBI A

VIOLATION CATEGORY 2000 2004 Number Change Percent Change 2000 Public Corruption Federal Corruption – Procurement 47 39 -8 -17% 33 Federal Corruption – Program 73 64 -9 -12% 43 Federal Corruption – Law Enforcement 87 60 -27 -31% 56 Federal Corruption – Other 147 136 -11 -7% 59 State Corruption 115 133 18 16% 98 Local Corruption 346 293 -53 -15% 326 Other Public Corruption 68 98 30 44% 58 

PUBLIC CORRUPTION TOTAL 883 823 -60 -7% 673 

Government Fraud Federal Procurement Fraud 93 50 -43 -46% 68 Federal Program Fraud 407 523 116 29% 239 

GOVERNMENT FRAUD TOTAL 500 573 73 15% 307 

Organized Crime Organized Crime – Traditional 374 206 -168 -45% 312 Organized Crime – Emerging 171 172 1 1% 139 

ORGANIZED CRIME TOTAL 545 378 -167 -31% 451 

Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Drug Trafficking 15,665 15,543 -122 -1% 2,072 Simple Drug Possession 658 197 -461 -70% 93 Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) 

4,008 2,628 -1,380 -34% 1,127 

NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS TOTAL 20,331 18,368 -1,963 -10% 3,292 
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ALL AGENCIES FBI A

VIOLATION CATEGORY 2000 2004 Number Change Percent Change 2000 Triggerlock77Major Operation Triggerlock Prosecutions 7,329 12,280 4,951 68% 605 Other Operation Triggerlock Prosecutions 3 0 -3 -100% 1 

TRIGGERLOCK TOTAL 7,332 12,280 4,948 67% 606 

White Collar Crime Tax Fraud 724 878 154 21% 29 Financial Institution Fraud 4,000 2,299 -1,701 -43% 3,243 Bankruptcy Fraud 516 260 -256 -50% 490 Advance Fee Schemes 188 134 -54 -29% 140 Other Fraud Against Business 1,005 842 -163 -16% 604 Consumer Fraud 312 276 -36 -12% 215 Securities Fraud 379 287 -92 -24% 291 Commodities Fraud 28 21 -7 -25% 12 Other Investment Fraud 191 151 -40 -21% 164 Health Care Fraud 824 631 -193 -23% 675 Fraud Against Insurance Providers 215 101 -114 -53% 145 Insider Fraud Against Insurance Providers 24 24 0 0% 20 Multiple Employer Welfare Arrangements (MEWA) Fraud NA 4 4 - NA Telemarketing Fraud 42 26 -16 -38% 31 Corporate Fraud NA 229 229 - NA Other White-Collar Crime/Fraud 1,204 1,105 -99 -8% 720 

WHITE-COLLAR CRIME TOTAL 9,652 7,268 -2,384 -25% 6,779 

Antitrust Violations Antitrust – Other 14 6 -8 -57% 10 Antitrust – Airlines 1 1 0 0% 1 Antitrust – Banking 4 2 -2 -50% 4 

ANTITRUST TOTAL 19 9 -10 -53% 15 

77 Triggerlock is a U.S. Department of Justice initiative.
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ALL AGENCIES FBI A

VIOLATION CATEGORY 2000 2004 Number Change Percent Change 2000 Civil Rights Civil Rights – Other 260 154 -106 -41% 248 Civil Rights – Law Enforcement 562 502 -60 -11% 560 Civil Rights – Slavery/Involuntary Servitude 16 55 39 244% 15 Civil Rights – Racial Violence 133 109 -24 -18% 127 Civil Rights – Access to Clinic Entrances 8 1 -7 -88% 7 Civil Rights – Hate Crimes Arising Out of Terrorist Attacks NA 13 13 - NA 

CIVIL RIGHTS TOTAL 979 834 -145 -15% 957 

Indian Offenses Offenses by or against Indians 942 516 -426 -45% 924 Violent Crime in Indian Country NA 460 460 - NA 

INDIAN OFFENSES TOTAL 942 976 34 4% 924 

Labor Management Offense Union Official Corruption – Pension Benefit Funds 7 0 -7 -100% 7 Union Official Corruption – Bribery Kickbacks 7 1 -6 -86% 7 Labor Racketeering 4 5 1 25% 4 Other Labor/Management Offense 15 10 -5 -33% 11 

LABOR MANAGEMENT OFFENSE TOTAL 33 16 -17 -52% 29 

Terrorism Related International Terrorism 30 288 258 860% 24 Domestic Terrorism 126 334 208 165% 99 Terrorism Related Hoaxes NA 138 138 - NA Terrorist Financing NA 155 155 - NA Anti-Terrorism/Environmental NA 14 14 - NA Anti-Terrorism/Identity Theft NA 42 42 - NA Anti-Terrorism/Immigration NA 237 237 - NA Anti-Terrorism/OCDETF Drugs NA 3 3 - NA Anti-Terrorism/Non-OCDETF Drugs NA 15 15 - NA Anti-Terrorism/Violent Crime NA 62 62 - NA Anti-Terrorism/All Others NA 316 316 - NA 

TERRORISM RELATED TOTAL 156 1,604 1,448 928% 123 
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ALL AGENCIES FBI A

VIOLATION CATEGORY 2000 2004 Number Change Percent Change 2000 Computer Fraud Computer Fraud 529 762 233 44% 452 

Computer Fraud TOTAL 529 762 233 44% 452 

Pornography/Obscenity Pornography – Child 1,124 2,521 1,397 124% 756 Obscenity 24 50 26 108% 13 

PORNOGRAPHY/OBSCENITY TOTAL 1,148 2,571 1,423 124% 769 

Other Violations Fugitive Matters 1,282 1,082 -200 -16% 923 Bank Robberies 2,058 1,844 -214 -10% 2,019 Immigration 15,685 35,120 19,435 124% 54 Crimes Against Government Property 37 61 24 65% 18 Embezzlement and Theft of Government Property 194 181 -13 -7% 69 Offenses Involving the Administration of Justice 152 268 116 76% 86 Theft of Property in Interstate Transportation 445 196 -249 -56% 413 Postal Service Crimes 1,627 1,532 -95 -6% 73 Election Fraud 12 48 36 300% 10 Motor Vehicle Theft 131 52 -79 -60% 119 Domestic Violence 33 43 10 30% 25 Internal Security Offenses 45 81 36 80% 27 All Other Violent Crime NA 285 285 - NA All Other 6,668 4,705 -1,963 -29% 3,812 * NA signifies a violation category did not exist in FY 2000. 
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APPENDIX VII: LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 

CONTACTED DURING FIELDWORK 

Location: Law Enforcement Agency: 

Chicago Field Office FBI 

West Resident Agency (Lisle, Illinois) 

ATF Chicago Field Division 

DEA Chicago Field Division 

ICE Chicago Field Division 

USAO for the Northern District of Illinois 

Other Federal Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

USMS for the Northern District of Illinois 

Arlington Heights Police Department 

Aurora Police Department 

Chicago Police Department 

Cook County Sheriff’s Office 

Elk Grove Village Police Department 

Kane County Sheriff’s Office 

Palatine Police Department 

Chicago, Illinois 

State and Local Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

St. Charles Police Department 

Los Angeles Field Office FBI Long Beach Resident Agency 

ATF Los Angeles Field Division 

DEA Los Angeles Field Division 

ICE Los Angeles Field Division 

USAO for the Central District of California 

Other Federal Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

USMS for the Central District of California 

Buena Park Police Department 

Fullerton Police Department 

Los Angeles Police Department 

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 

Pasadena Police Department 

Ventura County District Attorney’s Office 

Los Angeles, 

California 

State and Local Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

Ventura County Sheriff’s Department 
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Location: Law Enforcement Agency: 

Miami Field Office FBI 

West Palm Beach Resident Agency 

ATF Miami Field Division 

DEA Miami Field Division 

ICE Miami Field Division 

USAO for the Southern District of Florida 

Other Federal Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

USMS for the Southern District of Florida 

Boca Raton Police Department 

Fort Lauderdale Police Department 

Hallandale Beach Police Department 

Miami Police Department 

Miami-Dade County Police Department 

Palm Beach Gardens Police Department 

Miami, Florida 

State and Local Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

West Palm Beach Police Department 

New Orleans Field Office FBI 

Baton Rouge Resident Agency 

ATF New Orleans Field Division 

DEA New Orleans Field Division 

ICE New Orleans Field Division 

USAO for the Eastern District of Louisiana 

Other Federal Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

USMS for the Eastern District of Louisiana 

Baton Rouge Police Department 

Bogalusa Police Department 

Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office 

Louisiana State Police 

New Orleans Police Department 

Slidell Police Department 

New Orleans, 

Louisiana 

State and Local Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

West Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office 
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Location: Law Enforcement Agency: 

New York City Field Office FBI 

White Plains Resident Agency 

ATF New York City Field Division 

DEA New York City Field Division 

ICE New York City Field Division 

OCDETF Strike Force 

USAO for the Southern District of New York 

USMS for the Eastern District of New York 

Other Federal Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

USMS for the Southern District of New York 

Amityville Police Department 

Nassau County Police Department 

New York City Police Department 

Old Brookville Police Department 

Port Chester Police Department 

New York City, 

New York 

State and Local Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

Yonkers Police Department 

Phoenix Field Office 

Flagstaff Resident Agency 

Lake Havasu Resident Agency 

Sierra Vista Resident Agency 

Tucson Resident Agency 

FBI 

Yuma Resident Agency 

ATF Phoenix Field Division 

DEA Phoenix Field Division 

ICE Phoenix Field Division 

USAO for the District of Arizona 

Other Federal Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

USMS for the District of Arizona 

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department 

Mesa Police Department 

Phoenix Police Department 

Scottsdale Police Department 

Phoenix, Arizona 

State and Local Law 

Enforcement Agencies78

Tucson Police Department 

 78 During fieldwork, we also conducted a telephonic interview with the Tempe Police Department.
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Location: Law Enforcement Agency: 

San Francisco Field Office 

FBI Oakland Resident Agency 

San Jose Resident Agency 

ATF San Francisco Field Division 

DEA San Francisco Field Division 

ICE San Francisco Field Division 

USAO for the Northern District of California 

Other Federal Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

USMS for the Northern District of California 

Hayward Police Department 

Mountain View Police Department 

Oakland Police Department 

San Francisco Police Department 

San Jose Police Department 

San Francisco, 

California 

State and Local Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department 
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APPENDIX VIII: WEB-BASED SURVEY RESULTS 

 Our web-based survey of state and local law enforcement agencies 

consisted of 37 questions, which were divided into separate sections. 

Specifically, some of the segments included questions related to the FBI’s 

investigative assistance, the impact of the FBI’s shift in priorities, the survey 

participants’ joint investigations with the FBI, and the level of FBI 

investigations in each participant’s jurisdiction. The remainder of this 

appendix provides the results of our survey, question-by-question. 

FBI Investigative Assistance: 

1. During calendar year 2000 (January through December 2000), how many 

times did your agency request criminal investigative assistance from the 

FBI? 

Available Answer Number of 

Responses 

0 times 515 

1 to 10 times 630 

11 to 25 times 69 

26 to 50 times 15 

51 to 100 times 10 

More than 100 times 13 

Total Responses 1,252 

2. During calendar year 2000, on what percentage of your agency’s 

requests was the FBI able to provide criminal investigative assistance? 

Available Answer Number of 

Responses 

0 times 500 

1 to 10 times 200 

11 to 25 times 41 

26 to 50 times 65 

51 to 100 times 148 

More than 100 times 279 

Total Responses 1,233 
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3. During calendar year 2004 (January 2004 to the present), how many 

times did your agency request criminal investigative assistance from the 

FBI? 

Available Answer Number of 

Responses 

0 times 480 

1 to 10 times 648 

11 to 25 times 60 

26 to 50 times 27 

51 to 100 times 14 

More than 100 times 17 

Total Responses 1,246 

4. During calendar year 2004, on what percentage of your agency’s 

requests was the FBI able to provide criminal investigative assistance? 

Available Answer Number of 

Responses 

0 times 481 

1 to 10 times 178 

11 to 25 times 45 

26 to 50 times 72 

51 to 100 times 148 

More than 100 times 305 

Total Responses 1,229 

Impact of FBI’s Shift in Priorities: 

Questions 5 through 8 asked respondents to indicate the impact the 

FBI’s shift in priorities had on their investigative operations for certain 

investigative areas. For each of these questions, respondents were provided 

with a scaled response ranging from -5 (Very Negative Impact) to +5 (Very 

Positive Impact). Specifically, an answer of “-5” indicated that an agency 

had been significantly impaired by the FBI’s shift in priorities. For example, 

an agency experienced severe difficulty in handling the type of investigation 

listed. In contrast, a response of “+5” signified that an agency had 

benefited from the FBI’s shift in priorities, such as an agency significantly 

enhancing its operations to successfully address the investigative area in 

question. An answer of “0” indicated that an agency had continued to 

operate as it had prior to the FBI’s reprioritization and had experienced no 

change. Finally, a reply of “N/A” denoted that the agency had no 

involvement in a particular investigative area during the last three years. 
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5. What impact, if any, has the FBI’s shift in priorities during the last 

three years had on your agency’s law enforcement efforts in addressing each 

of the following types of investigations? 

 Number of Responses 

Available 

Answer 

Computer Crime 

Investigations 

Drug 

Investigations 

Organized Crime 

Investigations 

-5 (Very Negative 

Impact) 12 9 11 

-4 3 7 9 

-3 10 10 14 

-2 24 16 19 

-1 31 25 20 

0 747 831 738 

1 38 31 22 

2 27 22 19 

3 36 31 23 

4 16 14 8 

5 (Very Positive 

Impact) 37 17 11 

N/A 253 225 344 

Total Responses 1,234 1,238 1,238 

Number of Responses 

Available 

Answer 

Terrorism-Related 

Investigations 

Violent Crime 

Investigations 

White-Collar Crime 

Investigations 

-5 (Very Negative 

Impact) 4 5 9 

-4 3 5 10 

-3 1 13 21 

-2 4 18 32 

-1 4 27 34 

0 542 792 747 

1 60 31 37 

2 78 34 41 

3 83 35 31 

4 59 19 14 

5 (Very Positive 

Impact) 117 23 18 

N/A 279 234 237 

Total Responses 1,234 1,236 1,231 
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6. What impact, if any, has the FBI’s shift in priorities during the last 

three years had on your agency’s law enforcement efforts in addressing each 

of the following violent crime areas? 

 Number of Responses 

Available 

Answer Bank Robberies Crimes Against Children Fugitives 

-5 (Very Negative 

Impact) 11 3 3 

-4 8 1 2 

-3 28 4 6 

-2 35 6 17 

-1 46 19 32 

0 692 850 774 

1 20 26 43 

2 13 9 31 

3 21 21 28 

4 16 13 18 

5 (Very Positive 

Impact) 37 19 23 

N/A 305 254 250 

Total Responses 1,232 1,225 1,227 

 Number of Responses 

Available 

Answer Gangs Hate Crime 

Interstate 

Transportation of 

Stolen Motor 

Vehicles 

-5 (Very Negative 

Impact) 1 1 5 

-4 2 3 7 

-3 5 3 5 

-2 8 2 10 

-1 23 14 18 

0 764 809 763 

1 29 21 21 

2 27 18 11 

3 15 12 11 

4 7 4 7 

5 (Very Positive 

Impact) 12 8 6 

N/A 337 324 363 

Total Responses 1,230 1,219 1,227 
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 Number of Responses 

Available 

Answer 

Interstate 

Transportation of 

Stolen Property 

Major Theft 

(>$10,000) Motor Vehicle Theft 

-5 (Very Negative 

Impact) 6 9 4 

-4 5 11 5 

-3 6 6 4 

-2 9 14 6 

-1 24 34 26 

0 773 803 869 

1 18 20 19 

2 10 10 9 

3 10 10 6 

4 4 9 5 

5 (Very Positive 

Impact) 9 8 5 

N/A 353 292 267 

Total Responses 1,227 1,226 1,225 

 Number of Responses 

Available 

Answer 

Theft From 

Interstate 

Shipment 

Violent Crimes 

Against Persons 

-5 (Very Negative 

Impact) 5 5 

-4 4 5 

-3 3 9 

-2 4 6 

-1 21 31 

0 752 818 

1 14 31 

2 7 26 

3 5 19 

4 5 9 

5 (Very Positive 

Impact) 2 23 

N/A 404 242 

Total Responses 1,226 1,224 
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7. What impact, if any, has the FBI’s shift in priorities during the last 

three years had on your agency’s law enforcement efforts in addressing each 

of the following white-collar crime areas? 

 Number of Responses 

Available Answer Environmental 

Crimes 

Financial 

Institution Fraud 

(< than $100,000)

Financial 

Institution Fraud 

(> than $100,000)

-5 (Very Negative 

Impact) 3 7 3 

-4 2 10 7 

-3 1 16 8 

-2 2 22 17 

-1 10 46 23 

0 747 744 730 

1 12 31 17 

2 8 21 13 

3 2 13 7 

4 1 3 1 

5 (Very Positive 

Impact) 3 11 8 

N/A 437 299 394 

Total Responses 1,228 1,223 1,228 

 Number of Responses 

Available Answer Insurance Fraud Identity Theft Mortgage Fraud 

-5 (Very Negative 

Impact) 3 12 5 

-4 2 6 0 

-3 7 21 2 

-2 12 37 4 

-1 21 49 18 

0 800 711 755 

1 18 63 11 

2 7 40 1 

3 1 27 2 

4 3 7 2 

5 (Very Positive 

Impact) 6 17 3 

N/A 349 236 418 

Total Responses 1,229 1,226 1,221 
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 Number of Responses 

Available Answer Public Corruption Telemarketing and 

Wire Fraud 

-5 (Very Negative 

Impact) 3 12 

-4 2 2 

-3 5 11 

-2 4 28 

-1 12 28 

0 750 729 

1 16 36 

2 6 17 

3 5 11 

4 4 6 

5 (Very Positive 

Impact) 6 10 

N/A 409 334 

Total Responses 1,222 1,224 

8. What impact, if any, has the FBI’s shift in priorities during the last 

three years had on your agency’s law enforcement efforts in addressing each 

of the following types of organized crime/drug organizations? 

 Number of Responses 

Available 

Answer 

African 

Organizations 

Asian 

Organizations 

Caribbean 

Organizations 

-5 (Very Negative 

Impact) 3 2 2 

-4 1 1 1 

-3 2 5 2 

-2 14 4 3 

-1 14 14 6 

0 676 685 683 

1 13 22 15 

2 6 4 4 

3 7 9 4 

4 2 5 2 

5 (Very Positive 

Impact) 6 5 2 

N/A 479 468 496 

Total Responses 1,223 1,224 1,220 
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 Number of Responses 

Available 

Answer 

Central/South 

American 

Organizations 

Eurasian and 

Russian 

Organizations 

La Cosa Nostra/ 

Italian 

Organizations 

-5 (Very Negative 

Impact) 2 3 3 

-4 1 0 0 

-3 2 6 5 

-2 7 8 5 

-1 14 17 10 

0 683 684 685 

1 23 16 9 

2 5 6 2 

3 6 4 1 

4 1 3 1 

5 (Very Positive 

Impact) 10 5 1 

N/A 468 473 501 

Total Responses 1,222 1,225 1,223 

 Number of Responses 

Available 

Answer 

Mexican 

Organizations 

Other Major 

Criminal 

Organizations 

-5 (Very Negative 

Impact) 5 3 

-4 4 3 

-3 8 5 

-2 16 8 

-1 26 23 

0 665 715 

1 31 17 

2 8 6 

3 14 12 

4 4 4 

5 (Very Positive 

Impact) 14 10 

N/A 429 415 

Total Responses 1,224 1,221 
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Joint (Non-Task Force) Investigations with the FBI: 

9. During calendar year 2000, approximately how many joint (non-task 

force) investigations did your agency work with the FBI? 

Available Answer Number of 

Responses 

0 investigations 661 

1 to 10 investigations 502 

11 to 25 investigations 37 

26 to 50 investigations 9 

51 to 100 investigations 6 

More than 100 investigations 4 

Total Responses 1,219 

10. Comparing calendar years 2000 to 2004, rate the change, if any, in 

the number of your agency’s joint (non-task force investigations with the 

FBI. 

Available Answer Number of 

Responses 

Significant decrease (greater than 25%) 51 

Moderate decrease (10% to 25%) 34 

Slight decrease (less than 10%) 50 

No change 922 

Slight increase (less than 10%) 88 

Moderate increase (10% to 25%) 43 

Significant increase (greater than 25%) 24 

Total Responses 1,212 
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11. During calendar year 2000, approximately how many joint (non-task 

force) investigations did your agency work with the FBI in each of the 

following general investigative areas? 

 Number of Responses 

Available 

Answer 

Computer Crime 

Investigations 

Drug 

Investigations 

Organized Crime 

Investigations 

0 894 889 1,030 

1-10 276 267 141 

11-25 11 17 4 

26-50 3 10 2 

50-100 1 1 1 

More than 100 5 5 3 

Total Responses 1,190 1,189 1,181 

 Number of Responses 

Available 

Answer 

Terrorism 

Related 

Investigations 

Violent Crime 

Investigations 

White-Collar 

Crime 

Investigations 

0 1,006 895 896 

1-10 149 255 265 

11-25 10 19 11 

26-50 2 8 3 

50-100 3 3 0 

More than 100 4 7 5 

Total Responses 1,174 1,187 1,180 
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12. Comparing calendar years 2000 to 2004, rate the change, if any, in 

the number of your agency’s joint (non-task force) investigations with the 

FBI in each of the following general investigative areas. 

 Number of Responses 

Available Answer Computer 

Crime 

Drug 

Investigations 

Organized 

Crime 

Investigations 

Significant Decrease 

(> 25%) 14 30 14 

Moderate Decrease 

(10%-25%) 17 18 11 

Slight Decrease 

(< 10%) 42 33 27 

No Change 1,004 1,041 1,087 

Slight Increase (< 10%) 69 41 31 

Moderate Increase 

(10%-25%) 32 23 11 

Significant Increase 

(> 25%) 10 6 3 

Total Responses 1,188 1,192 1,184 

 Number of Responses 

Available Answer 

Terrorism 

Related 

Investigations 

Violent Crime 

Investigations 

White-Collar 

Crime 

Investigations 

Significant Decrease 

(> 25%) 7 12 16 

Moderate Decrease 

(10%-25%) 0 15 13 

Slight Decrease 

(< 10%) 8 40 41 

No Change 948 1,035 1,048 

Slight Increase (< 10%) 117 61 58 

Moderate Increase 

(10%-25%) 57 15 9 

Significant Increase 

(> 25%) 50 9 3 

Total Responses 1,187 1,187 1,188 
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Level of FBI Investigations in Your Agency’s Jurisdiction: 

13. Comparing calendar years 2000 to 2004, rate the change, if any, you 

have observed in the level of investigations conducted by the FBI in your 

agency’s jurisdiction in each of the following general investigative areas. 

 Number of Responses 

Available Answer 

Computer 

Crimes 

Investigations 

Drug 

Investigations 

Organized Crime 

Investigations 

Decrease 58 82 37 

No Change 887 896 947 

Increase 113 76 46 

Uncertain 148 150 171 

Total Responses 1,206 1,204 1,201 

 Number of Responses 

Available Answer 

Terrorism 

Related 

Investigations 

Violent Crime 

Investigations 

White-Collar 

Crime 

Investigations 

Decrease 3 58 63 

No Change 769 934 914 

Increase 307 70 61 

Uncertain 124 138 158 

Total Responses 1,203 1,200 1,196 
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Availability of FBI Training: 

14. Comparing calendar years 2000 to 2004, what level of change, if any, 

has your agency experienced in the availability of FBI training in the 

following areas? 

 Number of Responses 

Available Answer Counterterrorism 

Related Training 

Traditional Crime 

Related Training 

Significant Decrease (> 25%) 7 27 

Moderate Decrease 

(10%-25%) 10 49 

Slight Decrease (< 10%) 16 58 

No Change 487 708 

Slight Increase (< 10%) 146 96 

Moderate Increase 

(10%-25%) 186 60 

Significant Increase (> 25%) 175 32 

Not Applicable 182 183 

Total Responses 1,209 1,213 
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Joint-Investigative Efforts with Other Federal Law Enforcement 

Agencies: 

15. Comparing calendar years 2000 to 2004, rate the change, if any, in the 

number of joint (non-task force) investigations between your agency 

and the following federal law enforcement agencies. 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF) 

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 

U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) 

U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) 

U.S. Secret Service (USSS) 

 Number of Responses 

Available Answer ATF ICE CBP HHS DEA IRS 

Significant Decrease 

(> 25%) 8 10 14 3 7 4 

Moderate Decrease 

(10%-25%) 11 7 13 3 9 5 

Slight Decrease 

(< 10%) 19 9 23 7 41 14 

No Change 641 697 620 748 616 753 

Slight Increase (< 10%) 224 92 174 39 173 73 

Moderate Increase 

(10%-25%) 68 33 74 15 95 14 

Significant Increase 

(> 25%) 38 25 38 2 43 1 

N/A 198 328 254 380 219 334 

Total Responses 1,207 1,201 1,210 1,197 1,203 1,198 

 Number of Responses 

Available Answer USMS USPIS USSS 

Significant Decrease 

(> 25%) 1 3 3 

Moderate Decrease 

(10%-25%) 4 4 12 

Slight Decrease 

(< 10%) 14 22 19 

No Change 686 650 659 

Slight Increase (< 10%) 129 186 180 

Moderate Increase 

(10%-25%) 53 72 73 

Significant Increase 

(> 25%) 28 30 26 

N/A 282 234 230 

Total Responses 1,197 1,201 1,202 
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16. During calendar year 2000, if your agency participated in any of the 

following federal task forces, approximately how many of your agency’s 

officers (Full-Time Equivalents) were assigned each task force and 

approximately how many investigations did the task force handle? 

Text Response – No summary available 

17. During calendar year 2004, if your agency participated in any of the 

following federal task forces, approximately how many of your agency’s 

officers (Full-Time Equivalents) were assigned each task force and 

approximately how many investigations did the task force handle? 

Text Response – No summary available 

18. Besides those federal task forces noted in Question 17, are there any 

other federal task forces that your agency participated in during calendar 

year 2004 but not during calendar year 2000? 

Text Response – No summary available 
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General Questions About Your Agency: 

19. What type of agency do you represent? 

Available Answer Number of 

Responses 

Police Department 942 

Sheriff’s Department 206 

State Law Enforcement Agency 28 

Tribal Law Enforcement Agency 9 

Other (e.g., airport, railroad, harbor) 

(Please specify) 

32 

Total Responses 1,217 

20. As of January 1, 2000, how many sworn (on-board) officers did your 

agency have? 

Text Response – No summary available 

21. As of November 1, 2004, how many sworn (on-board) officers did your 

agency have? 

Text Response – No summary available 
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22. Per the 2000 Census, what was the size of the population your agency 

represented? 

Available Answer Number of 

Responses 

Less than 20,000 residents 711 

20,000 to 50,000 residents 221 

50,001 to 100,000 residents 94 

100,001 to 250,000 residents 80 

Over 250,000 residents 91 

Total Responses 1,197 

23. Compared to the 2000 Census, rate the change, if any, in the size of 

the population that your agency currently represents. 

Available Answer Number of 

Responses 

Significant decrease (> than 15%) 16 

Moderate decrease (5%-15%) 46 

Slight decrease (< than 5%) 113 

No change 312 

Slight increase (< than 5%) 379 

Moderate increase (5%-15%) 230 

Significant increase (> than 15%) 98 

Total Responses 1,194 
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24. As of January 1, 2000, approximately how much was your agency’s 

annual law enforcement budget, including federal financial assistance? 

Text Response – No summary available 

25. As of January 1, 2000, approximately how much federal financial 

assistance did your agency receive for law enforcement matters? 

Text Response – No summary available 

26. As of January 1, 2004, approximately how much was your agency’s 

annual law enforcement budget, including federal financial assistance? 

Text Response – No summary available 

27. As of January 1, 2004, approximately how much federal financial 

assistance did your agency receive for law enforcement matters? 

Text Response – No summary available 
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28. Comparing calendar years 2000 to 2004, how significant was the 

change in the overall crime rate that occurred within your agency’s 

jurisdiction? 

Available Answer Number of 

Responses 

Very significant decrease (more than 25%) 18 

Moderately significant decrease (10%-25%) 99 

Slightly significant decrease (0-10%) 228 

No change 183 

Slightly significant increase (0-10%) 383 

Moderately significant increase (10%-25%) 159 

Very significant increase (more than 25%) 39 

Total Responses 1,109 

29. Comparing calendar years 2000 to 2004, rate the change, if any, in 

the number of crimes experienced within your jurisdiction for each of the 

following categories. 

 Number of Responses 

Available Answer Bank 

Robberies 

Computer 

Crimes 

Drug 

Crimes 

Gang 

Related 

Crimes 

Significant Decrease 

(> 25%) 23 6 14 8 

Moderate Decrease 

(10%-25%) 16 6 22 11 

Slight Decrease 

(< 10%) 64 23 64 58 

No Change 502 289 277 499 

Slight Increase (< 10%) 132 343 326 164 

Moderate Increase 

(10%-25%) 27 169 248 72 

Significant Increase 

(> 25%) 22 75 97 20 

N/A 295 165 35 243 

Total Responses 1,081 1,076 1,083 1,075 
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Number of Responses 

Available Answer 

Hate 

Crimes 

Major 

Thefts 

Organized 

Crime 

Public 

Corruption 

Significant Decrease 

(> 25%) 12 7 2 1 

Moderate Decrease 

(10%-25%) 7 30 3 3 

Slight Decrease 

(< 10%) 26 96 14 19 

No Change 657 408 596 581 

Slight Increase (< 10%) 75 301 66 55 

Moderate Increase 

(10%-25%) 16 126 14 12 

Significant Increase 

(> 25%) 7 30 3 1 

N/A 279 77 378 406 

Total Responses 1,079 1,075 1,076 1,078 

 Number of Responses 

Available Answer Violent Crimes 

Against Persons 

White-Collar 

Crime 

Significant Decrease 

(> 25%) 21 2 

Moderate Decrease 

(10%-25%) 41 7 

Slight Decrease 

(< 10%) 134 37 

No Change 382 506 

Slight Increase (< 10%) 321 217 

Moderate Increase 

(10%-25%) 98 80 

Significant Increase 

(> 25%) 25 42 

N/A 60 180 

Total Responses 1,082 1,071 
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30. In what FBI field office jurisdiction is your agency located? 

Available Answer Number of 

Responses79

Atlanta 174 

Chicago 205 

Dallas 205 

Denver 107 

Detroit 218 

Los Angeles 77 

Miami 36 

New Orleans 76 

New York City 73 

Phoenix 46 

San Francisco 75 

Washington, D.C. 20 

Total Responses 1,312 

31. With which FBI Resident Agency (RA) does your agency primarily 

work? 

Text Response – No summary available 

 79 As previously noted, we received multiple responses from the same agency on a few 

occasions. The figures in this table reflect the actual number of responses received, including the 

multiple responses.
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Additional Comments: 

32. Describe the specific areas (if any) in which the FBI during the past 

three years changed the level of its: (1) working relationship with your 

agency, (2) information sharing with your agency, or (3) investigative 

assistance or support provided to your agency. In particular, consider the 

following areas when addressing your response: Organized Crime, Drugs, 

Violent Gangs, White-Collar Crime, Violent Crime, and Bank Robberies. 

Text Response – No summary available 

33. If possible, please provide specific examples or data that your agency 

may have to support your response to Question 32. 

Text Response – No summary available 

34. Describe the impact that the changes described in Question 32 have 

had on your agency’s ability to address criminal activity in your jurisdiction. 

Text Response – No summary available 

35. If applicable, please provide specific instances in which the FBI was 

unable to provide investigative assistance to your agency when it was 

requested over the past three years. 

Text Response – No summary available 

36. Describe the nature and extent of your law enforcement 

responsibilities, particularly in the following areas: Organized Crime, Drugs, 

Violent Gangs, White-Collar Crime, Violent Crime, and Bank Robberies. 

Text Response – No summary available 

37. What other comments would you like to provide that were not 

addressed in this survey? 

Text Response – No summary available 
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APPENDIX IX: ADDITIONAL SURVEY ANALYSES 

 In Chapter 4, we identified the overall results of our web-based 

survey. As noted, these analyses indicated that state and local law 

enforcement agencies were minimally affected by the FBI’s change in 

investigative priorities. Although the overall results primarily showed no 

impact on these departments, we performed additional analyses according to 

distinct criteria. Specifically, we reviewed the responses based upon field 

office jurisdiction, department size, and population. Each of these analyses 

mirrored the overall survey results, in other words, there was no significant 

variation in the outcome due to differing criteria. The following sections 

provide the results of these further analyses. 

Field Office Jurisdictions 

As discussed in the report, we disseminated the survey to state and 

local law enforcement agencies located in the jurisdictional areas of 12 FBI 

field offices. The following exhibit illustrates these locations, as well as the 

number of survey participants and recipients within each jurisdiction. 

MAP OF SURVEY RECIPIENTS 

Source: Office of the Inspector General 

We reviewed the survey data according to the FBI field office 

jurisdictions in which the respondents were located. We focused on the 

survey questions that pertained to the impact of the FBI’s shift in priorities 
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APPENDIX IX 

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during the last three years. Through our analyses, we determined that the 

majority of respondents within each location were minimally affected by the 

FBI’s reprioritization. As such, we chose to further analyze the negative 

responses to determine if any locations indicated more of a negative impact 

than others. 

General Traditional Crime Areas 

 We reviewed the negative responses by field office location in general 

traditional crime areas. In other words, we looked at the impact the FBI’s 

reprioritization had on the state and local law enforcement agencies’ efforts 

in addressing drugs, organized crime, violent crime, and white-collar crime. 

The following exhibit illustrates the results of this analysis. 

NEGATIVE IMPACT ON TRADITIONAL CRIME AREAS 

ACCORDING TO FIELD OFFICE LOCATION

Drugs Organized Crime

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Atlanta

Chicago

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

Los Angeles

Miami

New Orleans

New York

Phoenix

San Francisco

Washington

Number of Responses

Violent Crime White-Collar Crime

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 
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For drug-related matters, there were a total of 67 respondents from all 

12 jurisdictions that indicated a negative effect on their operations. State 

and local law enforcement agencies located in the FBI Atlanta Field Office 

jurisdiction accounted for nearly 20 percent of the negative responses. In 

contrast, none of the respondents in the FBI Washington, D.C., Field Office 

jurisdiction noted a negative impact in this crime area. 

In the area of organized crime, there were a total of 73 respondents 

that indicated a negative effect on their operations from the 12 jurisdictions. 

Two of the 12 locations (Chicago and Los Angeles) comprised over 30 percent 

of the negative replies. 

Similar to organized crime, 21 of the 68 negative responses in violent 

crime came from agencies located in the Chicago and Los Angeles jurisdictions. 

Moreover, the jurisdictions of the FBI Miami and Washington, D.C., Field Offices 

did not disclose any negative effect from the FBI’s reprioritization in violent 

crime matters. 

Regarding white-collar crime, we noted that agencies within each 

jurisdictional area revealed that their operations were negatively affected by 

the FBI’s shift in priorities. Of these four traditional crime areas, white-collar 

crime matters had the largest overall negative impact with 106 negative 

responses. Five of the 12 FBI jurisdictional areas (Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, 

Detroit, and Los Angeles) comprised over 60 percent of the total negative 

responses, with the Dallas Field Office accounting for the largest percentage. 

Law Enforcement Agency Size 

In our survey, 1,171 participants identified their agency’s calendar 

year 2004 sworn-officer level. For our analysis, we judgmentally developed 

ranges of resource levels to determine if department size had any bearing on 

the degree to which agencies were negatively affected by the FBI’s shift in 

priorities. The following table provides the number of survey respondents 

within each range. 

SURVEY RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO 

CALENDAR YEAR 2004 SWORN OFFICER LEVELS

Range of Sworn Officers Number of Respondents 

Less than 50 798 

50 – 99 178 

100 – 299 124 

300 – 499 23 

500 and Above 48 

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 
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Within each range, we determined the number of respondents who 

indicated that agency operations were impaired as a result of the FBI’s 

reprioritization, specifically focusing on the traditional crime areas of drugs, 

organized crime, violent crime, and white-collar crime. The following graphs 

illustrate the negative impact on in these four crime areas as they relate to 

the size of law enforcement agencies. 

NEGATIVE IMPACT ON TRADITIONAL CRIME AREAS 

AS IT RELATES TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY SIZE 

Drugs Organized Crime

16%

43%

13%

26%

2%

Violent Crime White-Collar Crime

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 

The majority of respondents noting a negative impact on their 

agency’s operations in these criminal areas were those departments with 

fewer than 50 sworn officers. Those agencies with 100 to 299 sworn officers 

accounted for the second largest group of negative responses in three of the 

four investigative areas: organized crime, violent crime, and white-collar 

crime. In contrast, those departments with 300 to 499 sworn officers or 

500 sworn officers and above had the lowest percentage of total negative 

responses in each of these criminal areas. 
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Population 

 We further analyzed the survey responses based upon the population 

size that each agency serviced. Our survey asked participants the 

population of their jurisdictional area according to the 2000 Census. This 

analysis enabled us to determine if population size had any correlation to 

areas most impacted by the FBI’s reprioritization. The following table 

identifies the number of survey respondents within each population range. 

SURVEY RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO 

POPULATION SIZE 

Population Size Number of Respondents 

Less than 20,000 711 

20,000 to 50,000 221 

50,001 – 100,000 94 

100,001 – 250,000 80 

Over 250,000 91 

Total 1,197 

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 

This analysis revealed that those agencies located in an area where 

the population was less than 20,000 experienced the largest impact in each 

of the 4 traditional crime areas as a result of the FBI’s shift in priorities. The 

second largest demographic negatively affected by the FBI’s reprioritization 

were those locations where the population ranged from 20,000 to 50,000, 

which occurred in 3 of the 4 crime areas. 
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NEGATIVE IMPACT ON TRADITIONAL CRIME AREAS 

ACCORDING TO POPULATION OF 

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES’ LOCATION 

Drugs Organized Crime

Violent Crime White-Collar Crime

Source: OIG analysis of survey responses 
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APPENDIX X: LIST OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS 

Following are the names of the state and local law enforcement 

agencies that responded to our survey. The list is categorized according to 

FBI field office jurisdictional areas. Those names followed by an “*” indicate 

that more than one response was received from the agency. 

ATLANTA, GEORGIA, FBI FIELD OFFICE JURISDICTION 

Acworth Police Department Climax Police Department 

Adairsville Police Department Cobb County Police Department 

Albany Police Department College Park Police Department 

Alma Police Department Columbia County Sheriff's Office 

Alpharetta Police Department Columbus Police Department 

Aragon Police Department Conyers Police Department 

Arlington Police Department Cuthbert Police Department 

Atlanta Police Department Claxton Police Department 

Attapulgus Police Department Clayton County Police Department 

Austell Police Department Dawson County Sheriff's Department 

Baldwin County Sheriff's Department Decatur Public Safety Department 

Ball Ground Police Department DeKalb County Police Department*

Bartow County Sheriff’s Office DeKalb County Sheriff's Office 

Berrien County Sheriff's Department Donalsonville Police Department 

Blairsville Police Department Doraville Police Department 

Bloomingdale Police Department Dougherty County Police Department 

Brantley County Sheriff’s Department Dougherty County Sheriff's Office 

Bremen Police Department Douglas Police Department 

Buchanan Police Department Dublin Police Department 

Bulloch County Sheriff’s Office Early County Sheriff’s Office 

Cairo Police Department East Point Police Department 

Calhoun County Sheriff's Department Effingham County Sheriff's Department 

Calhoun Police Department Emerson Police Department 

Camden County Sheriff’s Office Eton Police Department 

Canon Police Department Euharlee Police Department 

Carroll County Sheriff's Department Forsyth County Sheriff's Office 

Carrollton Police Department Forsyth Police Department 

Cedartown Police Department Fort Gaines Police Department 

Centerville Police Department Fort Valley Police Department 

Clarkesville Police Department Fort Oglethorpe Police Department 

Clarkston Police Department Franklin County Sheriff’s Department 

Cleveland Police Department Fulton County Police Department 
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Georgia Bureau of Investigation Miller County Sheriff’s Department 

Georgia Department of Public Safety Morgan County Sheriff's Department 

Georgia Ports Authority Police Department Mount Vernon Police Department 

Georgia State Patrol* Mount Zion Police Department 

Glennville Police Department Muscogee County Sheriff's Office 

Glynn County Police Department Nahunta Police Department 

Grady County Sheriff's Department Newnan Police Department 

Greene County Sheriff's Office Newton County Sheriff's Department 

Greenville Police Department Newton Police Department 

Grovetown Department of Public Safety Norcross Police Department 

Gwinnett County Police Department Omega Police Department 

Gwinnett County Sheriff's Department Oxford Police Department 

Hahira Police Department Palmetto Police Department 

Hall County Sheriff's Office Paulding County Sheriff’s Office 

Hampton Police Department Peach County Sheriff 's Department 

Heard County Sheriff’s Office Peachtree City Police Department 

Helen Police Department Pembroke Police Department 

Hiawassee Police Department Pierce County Sheriff’s Department 

Hinesville Police Department Pike County Sheriff's Office 

Ivey Police Department Port Wentworth Police Department 

Jackson Police Department Remerton Police Department 

Jefferson Police Department Richmond County Sheriff's Office 

Jeffersonville Police Department Ringgold Police Department 

Kingsland Police Department Rochelle Police Department 

Lakeland Police Department Rockdale County Sheriff's Office 

Lamar County Sheriff's Office Rome Police Department 

Lee County Sheriff's Department Roswell Police Department 

Leesburg Police Department Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan 

Police Department 

Leslie Police Department Schley County Sheriff's Department 

Lilburn Police Department Screven County Sheriff's Office 

Lowndes County Sheriff's Office Smyrna Police Department 

Ludowici Police Department Soperton Police Department 

Lyons Police Department Southwest Georgia Regional Airport 

Madison County Sheriff’s Office Statesboro Police Department 

Marshallville Police Department Stone Mountain Park 

Police Department 

McDonough Public Safety Sumter County Sheriff's Office 

McDuffie County Sheriff's Department Suwanee Police Department* 

McIntyre Police Department Sycamore Police Department 

Milledgeville Police Department Sylvania Police Department 
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Sylvester Police Department Valdosta Police Department* 

Tattnall County Sheriff's Office Varnell Police Department 

Temple Police Department Vidalia Police Department 

Thomaston Police Department Vienna Police Department 

Thomasville Police Department* Walker County Sheriff's Department 

Thunderbolt Police Department Warner Robins Police Department 

Treutlen County Sheriff's Department Waverly Hall Police Department 

Tybee Island Police Department Waynesboro Police Department 

Tyrone Police Department West Point Police Department 

Uvalda Police Department Whitfield County Sheriff's Department 

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, FBI FIELD OFFICE JURISDICTION 

Addison Police Department Darien Police Department 

Algonquin Police Department Deerfield Police Department 

Amtrak National Railroad 

Passenger Corporation DeKalb Police Department 

Antioch Police Department Dixon Police Department 

Arlington Heights Police Department Downers Grove Police Department 

Aurora Police Department DuPage County Sheriff's Department 

Bannockburn Police Department Durand Police Department 

Bartlett Police Department Elk Grove Village Police Department 

Bedford Park Police Department Evanston Police Department 

Bellwood Police Department Evergreen Park Police Department 

Belt Railway County of Chicago Forest Park Police Department 

Berwyn Police Department Fox Lake Police Department 

Bolingbrook Police Department Fox River Grove Police Department 

Burnham Police Department Franklin Grove Police Department 

Calumet Park Police Department Franklin Park Police Department 

Carol Stream Police Department Freeport Police Department 

Chadwick Police Department Galena Police Department 

Cherry Valley Police Department Geneva Police Department 

Chicago Heights Police Department Gilberts Police Department 

Chicago Police Department* Glen Ellyn Police Department 

Cicero Police Department Glendale Heights Police Department 

City of McHenry Police Department Glenview Illinois Police Department 

Cook County Sheriff's Office Glenwood Police Department 

Countryside Police Department Golf Police Department 

Crestwood Police Department Grayslake Police Department 

Crystal Lake Police Department Grundy County Sheriff's Office 
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Gurnee Police Department Mazon Police Department 

Harvey Police Department McCook Police Department 

Harwood Heights Police Department McHenry County Sheriff's Department 

Hawthorn Woods Police Department Mendota Police Department 

Hazel Crest Police Department Merrionette Park Police Department 

Hickory Hills Police Department Metra Police Department* 

Highland Park Police Department Midlothian Police Department 

Highwood Police Department Milledgeville Police Department 

Hinckley Police Department Minooka Police Department 

Hinsdale Police Department Monee Police Department 

Hometown Police Department Morrison Police Department 

Homewood Police Department Mount Carroll Police Department 

Huntley Police Department Mount Prospect Police Department 

Illinois State Police Mundelein Police Department* 

Indian Head Park 

Police Department New Lenox Police Department 

Itasca Police Department Norfolk Southern 

Railroad Police 

Jo Daviess County Sheriff's Office Norridge Police Department 

Johnsburg Police Department North Utica Police Department 

Justice Police Department Northbrook Police Department 

Kane County Sheriff's Department Northfield Police Department 

Kendall County Sheriff's Office Northlake Police Department 

Kenilworth Police Department Oak Forest Police Department 

Kildeer Police Department Oak Lawn Police Department 

Kingston Police Department Oak Park Police Department 

La Grange Police Department Ogle County Sheriff's Department 

Lake Bluff Police Department Oregon Police Department 

Lake Zurich Police Department Orland Hills Police Department 

Lansing Police Department Orland Park Police Department 

Leland Police Department Oswego Police Department 

Lemont Police Department Ottawa Police Department 

Lena Police Department Palatine Police Department 

Libertyville Police Department Palos Heights Police Department 

Lincolnshire Police Department Palos Hills Police Department 

Lindenhurst Police Department Palos Park Police Department 

Lockport Police Department Park City Police Department 

Lombard Police Department Phoenix Police Department 

Loves Park Police Department Posen Police Department 

Lyndon Police Department Prospect Heights Police Department 

Lyons Police Department Richton Park Police Department 
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APPENDIX X 

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Riverdale Police Department Stockton Police Department 

River Forest Police Department Stone Park Police Department 

River Grove Police Department Streamwood Police Department 

Riverside Police Department Summit Police Department 

Rochelle Police Department Tampico Police Department 

Rock Falls Police Department Tinley Park Police Department 

Rockdale Police Department Tonica Police Department 

Rockford Police Department* Tower Lakes Police Department 

Rockton Police Department Union Pacific Railroad 

Police Department 

Rolling Meadows 

Police Department University Park Police Department 

Roscoe Police Department Vernon Hills Police Department 

Round Lake Police Department Villa Park Police Department 

Schaumburg Police Department Waukegan Police Department 

Schiller Park Police Department Wayne Police Department 

Seneca Police Department West Chicago Police Department 

Shorewood Police Department West Dundee Police Department 

Skokie Police Department Westchester Police Department 

Sleepy Hollow Police Department Westmont Police Department 

South Barrington Police Department Wheaton Police Department 

South Beloit Police Department Willowbrook Police Department 

South Chicago Hts. 

Police Department Wilmette Police Department 

South Elgin Police Department* Winnebago Police Department 

St. Charles Police Department Winnetka Police Department 

Stephenson County 

 Sheriff's Department Woodstock Police Department 

Sterling Police Department Zion Police Department 

Stickney Police Department 

DALLAS, TEXAS, FBI FIELD OFFICE JURISDICTION 

Allen Police Department Archer County Sheriff’s Office 

Alvarado Police Department Argyle Police Department 

Amarillo International 

Airport Police Department 

Armstrong County 

Sheriff's Department 

Amherst Policy Department Athens Police Department 

Anderson County Sheriff's Office Atlanta Police Department 

Angelina County Sheriff's Department Aubrey Police Department 

Anson Police Department Ballinger Police Department 

Anton Marshal's Office Bedford Police Department 
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Bells Police Department Dublin Police Department 

Benbrook Police Department Duncanville Police Department 

Blue Mound Police Department Early Police Department 

Bonham Police Department Eastland Police Department 

Bovina Police Department East Tawakoni Police Department 

Bowie Police Department Eden Police Department 

Briscoe County Sheriff's Office Edgewood Police Department 

Bullard Police Department Electra Police Department 

Burkburnett Police Department Ennis Police Department 

Burleson Police Department Euless Police Department 

Callahan County Sheriff's Department Fisher County Sheriff's Office 

Caney City Police Department Foard County Sheriff's Office 

Canyon Police Department Forest Hill Police Department 

Carrollton Police Department Franklin County Sheriff's Department 

Cedar Hill Police Department Friona Police Department 

Clay County Sheriff’s Department Frisco Police Department 

Cleburne Police Department Frost Police Department 

Cochran County Sheriff’s Office Garland Police Department 

Colleyville Police Department Garza County Constable's Office 

Collin County Sheriff's Office Garza County Sheriff's Department 

Comanche County Sheriff's Office Glenn Heights Police Department 

Coppell Police Department Godley Police Department 

Corinth Police Department Granbury Police Department 

Corrigan Police Department Grand Prairie Police Department 

Cottle County Sheriff's Department Grand Saline Police Department 

Crockett Police Department Grandview Police Department 

Dalhart Police Department Grapevine Police Department 

Dallas County Constable Pct. 4 Gray County Sheriff's Office 

Dallas County Hospital 

District Police Department Grayson County Sheriff's Office 

Dallas County Sheriff’s Office Greenville Texas Police Department 

Dallas Marshal's Office Groveton Police Department 

Dallas Police Department Gun Barrel City Police Department 

Dawson County Sheriff’s Department Gunter Police Department 

Decatur Police Department Hale Center Police Department 

Delta County Sheriff's Office Hall County Sheriff's Department 

Denison Police Department Hamlin Police Department 

DeSoto Police Department Hansford County Sheriff’s Department 

DFW Airport Police Service Hartley County Sheriffs' Office 

Diboll Police Department Haskell County Sheriff's Office 
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Hereford Police Department Mitchell County Sheriff’s Office 

Hickory Creek Police Department Mt. Enterprise Marshal's Office 

Highland Park 

Department of Public Safety Murphy Police Department 

Hood County Sheriff's Office New Summerfield Police Department 

Hopkins County Sheriff's Office Nolan County Sheriff's Office 

Houston County Sheriff’s Office North Richland Hills Police Department 

Hughes Springs Police Department Olton Police Department 

Hurst Police Department Ore City Police Department 

Hutchinson County Sheriff's Office Ovilla Police Department 

Idalou Police Department Paducah Police Department 

Irion County Sheriff's Office Palestine Police Department 

Irving Police Department Paris Police Department 

Italy Police Department Parker County Sheriff's Office 

Jacksboro Police Department Parmer County Sheriff' s Office 

Jefferson Police Department Pittsburg Police Department 

Jones County Sheriff's Department Plano Police Department 

Kaufman Police Department Potter County Sheriff's Office 

Kemp Police Department Princeton Police Department 

Kent County Sheriff's Office Randall County Sheriff's Office 

Kilgore (TX) Police Department Red Oak ISD Police Department 

Knox County Sheriff's Office Red Oak Police Department 

Lake Dallas Police Department Reklaw Police Department 

Lakeside Police Department Rice Police Department 

Lake Worth Police Department Rio Vista Police Department 

Lamesa Police Department Roanoke Police Department 

Lancaster Police Department Roberts County Sheriff’s Department 

Leonard Police Department Royse City Police Department 

Little Elm Police Department Rusk Police Department 

Lockney Police Department Sabine County Sheriff's Office 

Longview Police Department Sachse Police Department 

Lubbock Police Department Saginaw Police Department 

Lufkin Police Department San Angelo Airport Police Department 

Mabank Police Department San Augustine Police Department 

Malakoff Police Department Scurry County Sheriff’s Office 

Marion County Sheriff's Office Seagoville Police Department 

Marshall Police Department Seminole Police Department 

Mesquite Police Department Shallowater Police Department 

Milford Police Department Shelby County Sheriff's Department 

Mineral Wells Police Department Sherman County Sheriff’s Office 
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Sherman Police Department Tulia Police Department 

Slaton Police Department Tye Police Department 

Snyder Police Department Union Pacific Railroad Police 

Sonora Police Department Valley View Police Department 

Southmayd Police Department University Park Police Department 

Stamford Police Department Vernon Police Department 

Tahoka Police Department Waxahachie Police Department 

Tarrant County Sheriffs' Department White Oak Police Department 

Taylor County Sheriff's Office Whitesboro Police Department 

Terrell Police Service Whitewright Police Department 

Texas Department of Public Safety Wichita Falls Police Department 

Titus County Sheriff's Office Wilmer Police Department 

Tom Green County Sheriff’s Office Wise County Sheriff’s Office 

Tool Police Department Wolfforth Police Department 

Trenton Police Department Wood County Sheriff's Office 

Trinidad Police Department Yoakum County Sheriff’s Office 

DENVER, COLORADO, FBI FIELD OFFICE JURISDICTION 

COLORADO 

Alamosa County Sheriff's Office Denver Police Department 

Alamosa Police Department Denver Sheriff Department 

Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office Dolores County Sheriff's Office 

Archuleta County Sheriff's Department Durango Police Department 

Aurora Police Department Edgewater Police Department 

Basalt Police Department Evans Police Department 

Bent County Sheriff’s Office Firestone Police Department 

Boulder Police Department Fort Lupton Police Department 

Burlington Police Department Fort Morgan Police Department 

Cañon City Police Department Fountain Police Department 

Cedaredge Police Department Grand Junction Police Department 

Center Police Department Greeley Police Department 

Central City Police Department Greenwood Village Police Department 

Clear Creek County Sheriff's Office Gunnison County Sheriff's Office 

Colorado Bureau of Investigation Idaho Springs Police Department 

Colorado Springs Police Department Jackson County Sheriff’s Office 

Cortez Police Department Jefferson County Sheriff's Office 

Costilla County Sheriff's Office Kiowa Police Department 

Craig Police Department Kit Carson County Sheriff’s Department 

Dacono Police Department La Junta Police Department 

Delta County Sheriff's Office Lakeside Police Department 
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Lakewood Police Department Sedgwick County Sheriff’s Office 

Logan County Sheriff's Office Silt Police Department 

Louisville Police Department Silverthorne Police Department 

Minturn Police Department Simla Police Department 

Monte Vista Police Department Snowmass Village Police Department 

Montrose County Sheriff's Office Southern Ute Police Department 

Montrose Police Department Steamboat Springs Police Department 

Nederland Police Department Summit County Sheriff’s Office 

New Castle Police Department Teller County Sheriff's Office 

Olathe Police Department Vail Police Department 

Otero County Sheriff's Office Walsenburg Police Department 

Palisade Police Department Washington County Sheriff's Department 

Palmer Lake Police Department Weld County Sheriff's Office 

Parker Police Department Windsor Police Department 

Pueblo County Sheriff's Office Woodland Park Police Department 

Pueblo Police Department Yuma County Sheriff's Office 

San Luis Police Department Yuma Police Department 

WYOMING

Baggs Police Department Mountain View Police Department 

Bairoil Police Department Natrona County Sheriff's Office 

Basin Police Department Park County Sheriff's Office 

Buffalo Police Department Platte County Sheriff's Office 

Byron Police Department Powell Police Department 

Douglas Police Department Riverton Police Department 

Evanston Police Department Sublette County Sheriff's Office* 

Gillette Police Department Sundance Police Department 

Goshen County Sheriff's Office Uinta County Sheriff's Office 

Green River Police Washakie County Sheriff's Office 

Hot Springs County Sheriff's Office Wheatland Police Department 

Jackson Police Department Worland Police Department 

Lander Police Department Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation 

Laramie County Sheriff's Department Wyoming Highway Patrol* 

Lyman Police Department 
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DETROIT, MICHIGAN, FBI FIELD OFFICE JURISDICTION 

Adrian Police Department Chesterfield Township 

Police Department 

Albion Department of Public Safety City of Clio Police Department 

Alcona County Sheriff's Office Clare County Sheriff’s Department 

Alger County Sheriff's Office Clinton Police Department 

Allegan County Sheriff's Office CN Railroad Police 

Allen Park Police Department Coldwater Police Department 

Alma Police Department Croswell Police Department 

Almont Police Department Crystal Falls Police Department 

Arenac County Sheriff’s Office Davison City Police Department 

Armada Police Department Dearborn Heights Police Department 

Auburn Police Department Delta County Sheriff’s Office 

Bangor Police Department Denton Township Police Department 

Baroda-Lake Township 

Police Department Dowagiac Police Department 

Bath Township Police Department Dryden Township Police Department 

Benzie County Sheriff's Office East Grand Rapids 

Department of Public Safety 

Beverly Hills 

Department of Public Safety East Lansing Police Department 

Birch Run Police Department Eastpointe Police Department 

Birmingham Police Department Eaton County Sheriff’s Department 

Bishop Airport Police 

Department Of Public Safety Eaton Rapids Police Department 

Blackman Township Public Safety Eau Claire Police Department 

Blissfield Police Department Emmett Township 

Department of Public Safety 

Boyne City Police Department Essexville Public 

Safety Department 

Bridgman Police Department Evart Police Department 

Calumet Village Police Department Farmington Hills Police Department 

Caro Police Department Farmington 

Department of Public Safety 

Caseville Police Department Fenton Police Department 

Cass County Sheriff's Office Flat Rock Police Department 

Center Line Public Safety Department Flint Township Police Department 

Central Lake Police Department Flushing Township Police Department*

Charlevoix City Police Department Forsyth Police Department 

Charlevoix County Sheriff's Office Frankenmuth Police Department 

Cheboygan County 

Sheriff’s Department Franklin Police Department 
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Fraser Department of Public Safety Kentwood Police Department 

Genesee Township 

Police Department 

Keweenaw Bay Tribal 

Police Department 

Gerald R Ford International Airport 

Police 

Lac Vieux Desert 

Tribal Police Department 

Gerrish Township Police Department Laingsburg Police Department 

Gogebic County Sheriff's Office Lake Angelus Police Department 

Grand Blanc Township Police 

Department Lake County Sheriff's Office 

Grand Ledge Police Department Lake Orion Police Department 

Grand Traverse Band Tribal 

Police Department Lakeview Village Police Department 

Grandville Police Department Lansing Police Department 

Grosse Ile Police Department Lapeer City Police Department 

Grosse Pointe Farms Public Safety Laurium Police Department 

Grosse Pointe Woods 

Public Safety Department Lawton Police Department 

Hampton Township 

Police Department Leoni Township Police Department 

Hamtramck Police Department Leslie Police Department 

Harbor Beach Police Department Linden Police Department 

Hart Police Department Litchfield Police Department 

Hartford Police Department Livingston County Sheriff's Office 

Hazel Park Police Department Livonia Police Department 

Hillsdale City Luce County Sheriff’s Office 

Holland Police Department Luna Pier Police Department 

Homer Police Department Mackinaw City Police Department 

Houghton County Sheriff's Office Madison Heights Police Department 

Huntington Woods 

Department of Public Safety Manistee County Sheriff's Office 

Huron Clinton Metro Parks Authority* Maple Rapids Police Department 

Huron County Sheriff's Office Marenisco Township Police Department 

Ingham County Sheriff's Office Marshall Police Department 

Iron County Sheriff’s Office Mason Police Department 

Iron Mountain Police Department Metamora Township Police Department 

Ironwood Public Safety Department Michigan State Police* 

Ishpeming Police Department Midland Police Department 

Jackson County Sheriff's Office Milford Police Department 

Jackson Police Department Millington Police Department 

Jonesville Police Department Monroe County Sheriff’s Office 

Kalkaska Police Department Morrice Police Department 

Keego Harbor Police Department Mundy Township Police Department 
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Munising Police Department Saginaw Chippewa Tribal Police Department 

Muskegon County Sheriff's Office Saginaw Police Department 

Muskegon Police Department Saginaw Township Police Department 

Muskegon Township Police Department Saint Ignace Police Department 

Newaygo Police Department Saline Police Department 

North Muskegon Police Department Sand Lake Police Department 

Northfield Township Police Department Sandusky Police Department 

Northville Township Police Saugatuck Douglas Police Department 

Norvell Police Department Sault Ste. Marie Police Department 

Oak Park Department Of Public Safety Sebewaing Police Department 

Oakley Brady Township Police 

Department Shelby Township Police Department 

Ontonagon County Sheriff's Office Somerset Township Police Department 

Orchard Lake Police Department South Haven Police Department 

Oscoda County Sheriff’s Department South Lyon Police Department 

Oscoda Police Department Southfield Police Department 

Ottawa County Sheriff’s Department Sparta Police Department 

Owendale Police Department Spring Lake/Ferrysburg 

Police Department 

Oxford Village Police Department Springfield Department of Public Safety 

Paw Paw Police Department St. Clair Shores Police Department 

Peck Police Department St. Joseph Township Police Department 

Pentwater Police Department Sterling Heights Police Department 

Perry Police Department Suttons Bay Police Department 

Petoskey Department of Public Safety Tecumseh Police Department 

Pinconning Police Department Three Oaks Police Department 

Pittsfield Township 

Department of Public Safety Trenton Police Department 

Plainwell Department of Public Safety Troy Police Department 

Pontiac Police Department Tuscarora Township Police Department 

Port Austin Police Department Unadilla Township Police Department 

Portage Police Department Union City Police Department 

Richfield Township Police Department Unionville Police Department 

Richland Township Police Department Utica Police Department 

Riverview Police Department Vernon Police Department 

Rochester Police Department Vicksburg Police Department 

Rockford Police Department Village of Marion Police Department 

Romeo Police Department Warren Police Department 

Roscommon County Sheriff’s Office Waterloo Township Police Department 

Rose City Police Department Wayne County Airport Police 

Roseville Police Department Wayne Police Department 
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West Branch City Police Department Wolverine Lake 

White Cloud Police Department Wyandotte Police Department 

White Lake Police Department Wyoming Police Department 

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, FBI FIELD OFFICE JURISDICTION 

Anaheim Police Department Hemet Police Department* 

Arroyo Grande Police Department Huntington Park Police Department 

Azusa Police Department Inglewood Police Department 

Barstow Police Department Laguna Beach Police Department 

Bell Gardens Police Department Long Beach Transit 

Bell Police Department Los Angeles Police Department* 

Blythe Police Department Manhattan Beach Police Department 

Brea Police Department Monrovia Police Department 

Buena Park Police Department Montebello Police Department* 

Burbank Police Department Murrieta Police Department 

Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport 

Authority Police Department Newport Beach Police Department 

Burlington Northern Santa Fe 

Railway Police Ontario International Airport Police 

Cabazon Tribal Police Department Orange County Sheriff’s Department 

California Bureau of Investigation Palm Spring Police Department 

Chino Police Department* Pasadena Police Department 

City of Long Beach (Airport) Paso Robles Police Department 

City of Orange Police Department Port Hueneme Police Department 

Colton Police Department Redlands Police Department 

Corona Police Department Redondo Beach Police Department 

Costa Mesa Police Department Riverside County Sheriff’s Department 

Culver City Police Department Riverside Police Department 

Cypress Police Department San Bernardino County 

Sheriff’s Department 

Desert Hot Springs Police Department San Bernardino County Sheriff’s 

Adelanto Station 

Downey Police Department San Bernardino Police Department 

El Monte Police Department San Gabriel Police Department 

El Segundo Police Department San Luis Obispo Police Department 

Fontana Police Department Santa Ana Police Department 

Fullerton Police Department Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department 

Gardena Police Department Santa Monica Police Department 

Glendale Police Department Seal Beach Police Department 

Glendora Police Department Sierra Madre Police Department 
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Simi Valley Police Department Vernon Police Department 

South Pasadena Police Department West Covina Police Department 

Torrance Police Department Westminster Police Department* 

Tustin Police Department Whittier Police Department 

Upland Police Department 

MIAMI, FLORIDA, FBI FIELD OFFICE JURISDICTION

Atlantis Police Department Jupiter Island Public Safety Department 

Bay Harbor Islands Police Department Key West Police Department* 

Belle Glade Police Department Margate Police Department 

Boca Raton Police Services Department Medley Police Department 

Broward County Sheriff’s Office Miami Springs Police Department 

City of Avon Park Police Department Miami-Dade Police Department 

City of Miami Police Department Miami-Dade Schools Police Department 

City of Miramar Police Department North Miami Police Department 

City of Pahokee Police Department North Palm Beach 

Department of Public Safety 

City of West Palm Beach Police 

Department Palm Beach Gardens Police Department 

Coconut Creek Police Department Palm Beach Shores Police Department 

Davie Police Department Palm Springs Public Safety Department 

Delray Beach Police Department Pembroke Pines Police Department 

Fort Lauderdale Police Department Royal Palm Beach Police Department 

Hallandale Beach Police Department Stuart Police Department 

Highland Beach Police Department Sunrise Police 

Hillsboro Beach Police Department Vero Beach Police Department 

Hollywood Police Department 

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, FBI FIELD OFFICE JURISDICTION 

Abbeville Police Department Clarence Police Department 

Alexandria Police Department Clinton Police Department 

Angie Police Department Dixie Inn Police Department 

Ball Police Department Dubberly Police Department 

Baton Rouge Police Department East Carroll Sheriff’s Office 

Beauregard Parish Sheriff’s Office Eunice Police Department 

Berwick Police Department Fordoche Police Department 

Bogalusa Police Department Franklin Police Department 

Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office Grant Parish Sheriff’s Department 

Cameron Parish Sheriff’s Office Gueydan Police Department 
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Hammon Police Department Pineville Police Department 

Haughton Police Department Pointe Coupee Parish Sheriff’s Office 

Haynesville Police Department Pollock Police Department 

Houma Police Department* Port Barre Police Department 

Iberia Parish Sheriff’s Department Port of New Orleans 

Harbor Police Department 

Iota Police Department Port Vincent Police Department 

Jeanerette Police Department Rapides Parish Sheriff’s Office 

Jefferson Davis Parish Sheriff’s 

Department Richland Parish Sheriff’s Department 

Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office* Sabine Parish Sheriff’s Department 

Kaplan Police Department Sarepta Police Department 

Kentwood Police Department Scott Police Department 

Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office Slaughter Police Department 

Leesville Police Department Slidell Police Department 

Lincoln Parish Sheriff’s Office St. Martin Parish Sheriff’s Office 

Lockport Police Department St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Department 

Louisiana State Police* St. Charles Sheriff’s Office 

Mandeville Police Department St. John the Baptist Parish Sheriff’s Office 

Marksville Police Department Sulphur Police Department 

McNary Police Department Tallulah Police Department 

Morehouse Parish Sheriff’s Office Terrebonne Parish Sheriff’s Office 

Morgan City Police Department* Town of Erath Police Department 

Natchitoches Parish Sheriff’s Office Turkey Creek Police Department 

New Orleans Aviation Board Vernon Parish Sheriff’s Office 

New Orleans Police Department West Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Department 

Oak Grove Police Department West Monroe Police Department 

Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Department Winnsboro City Police 

Patterson Police Department 

NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, FBI FIELD OFFICE JURISDICTION

Amityville Police Department East Hampton Town Police Department 

Amtrak Police and Security Department Eastchester Police Department 

Ardsley Police Department Floral Park Police Department 

Briarcliff Manor Police Department Garden City Police Department 

City of Middletown Police Department Greenwood Lake Village Police Department 

City of Rye Police Department Harriman Police Department 

City of Yonkers NY Police Department Hempstead police department 

Dutchess County Sheriff's Office Irvington Police Department 
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Kensington Village Police Department Suffolk County Park Police Department 

Kings Point Police Department Suffolk County Police Department 

Nassau County Police Department Suffolk County Sheriff’s Office 

New Rochelle Police Department Sullivan County Sheriff's Department 

New York City Police Department* Town of Clarkstown Police Department 

New York State Police Department Town of Cornwall 

Northport Police Department Town of Deerpark Police Department 

Ocean Beach Police Department Town of East Fishkill Police Department 

Old Brookville Police Department Town of Fallsburg Police Department 

Old Westbury Police Department Town of Haverstraw Police Department 

Orange County Sheriff's Office* Town of North Castle Police Department 

Pelham Manor Police Department* Town of Poughkeepsie Police Department 

Port Chester Town of Ramapo Police Department* 

Port Jervis Police Department Town of Tuxedo Police Department 

Port Washington Police District Village of Bronxville Police Department 

Putnam County Sheriff's Department Village of Buchanan Police Department 

Quogue Village Police Dept Village of Cold Spring Police 

Riverhead Police Department Village of Croton-on-Hudson Police Department 

Rockland County Sheriff’s Department Village of Goshen Police Department 

Rye Brook Police Department Village of Hastings on Hudson Police 

Department 

Scarsdale Police Department Village of Ossining Police Department 

Sea Gate Police Department Village of Rhinebeck Police Department 

Sleepy Hollow Police Department Walden Police Department 

Southampton Village Police Department Wappingers Falls Village Police Department 

Southold Town Police Department Westchester County Department of Public 

Safety*

Spring Valley Police Department Yorktown Police Department 

Stony Point Police Department 

PHOENIX, ARIZONA, FBI FIELD OFFICE JURISDICTION 

Arizona Department of Public Safety Eloy Police Department 

Benson Police Department Flagstaff Police Department 

Bullhead City Police Department Fort McDowell Police Department 

Casa Grande Police Department Gila County Sheriff's Office 

Chandler Police Department Gila River Police Department 

Chino Valley Police Department Glendale Police Department 

Cochise County Sheriff’s Office Goodyear Police Department 

Coolidge Police Department Huachuca City Police Department 

Cottonwood Police Department Lake Havasu City Police Department 
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Mammoth Police Department Sedona Police Department 

Marana Police Department Sierra Vista Police Department 

Maricopa County Sheriff's Office South Tucson Police Department 

Mesa Police Department Springerville Police Department 

Mohave County Sheriff's Office Superior Police Department 

Nogales Police Department Thatcher Police Department. 

Paradise Valley Police Department Tolleson Police Department 

Parker Police Department* Tucson Airport Police Department 

Peoria Police Department Tucson Police Department 

Phoenix Police Department Williams Police Department 

Prescott Police Department Yavapai-Prescott Tribal Police 

Safford Police Department Youngtown Police Department 

Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Office Yuma Police Department 

Scottsdale Police Department 

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, FBI FIELD OFFICE 

JURISDICTION 

Alameda Contra-Costa Transit District Fremont Police Department 

Alameda County Sheriff’s Office/ 

Dublin Police Services Gilroy Police Department 

Alameda County Sheriff's Office Gonzales Police Department 

Alameda Police Department Greenfield Police Department 

Arcata Police Department Half Moon Bay Police Department 

Belmont Police Department Hayward Police Department 

Brentwood Police Department Hercules Police Department 

Broadmoor Police Department Humboldt County Sheriff's Office 

Burlingame Police Department Kensington Police Department 

Campbell Police Department Lakeport Police Department 

Capitola Police Department Livermore Police Department 

Carmel Police Department Los Gatos/Monte Sereno 

Police Department 

Concord Police Department Marin County Sheriff's Department 

Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Office Millbrae Police Department 

Cotati Police Department Milpitas Police Department 

Crescent City Police Department Monterey Peninsula Airport District Police 

Danville Police Department Monterey Police Department 

East Bay Regional Park Police Mountain View Police Department 

El Cerrito Police Department Napa County Sheriff's Department 

Emeryville Police Department Napa Police Department 
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Newark Police Department Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority 

(VTA) 

Novato Police Department Santa Cruz Police Department 

Office of the Sheriff, Santa Clara Co., 

West Valley Patrol Santa Rosa Police Department 

Pacific Grove Police Department Sausalito Police Department 

Pacifica Police Department Scotts Valley Police Department 

Palo Alto Police Department Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department 

Piedmont Police Department South San Francisco Police Department 

Salinas Police Department* Sunnyvale Public Safety Department 

San Bruno Police Department Town of Windsor Police Department 

San Carlos Police Department Twin Cities Police Authority 

San Francisco Municipal Railway 

Police and Security Ukiah Police Department 

San Francisco Police Department Union City Police Department 

San Jose Police Department Union Pacific Railroad Police 

San Leandro Police Department Walnut Creek Police Department 

San Mateo County Sheriff's Office* Willits Police Department 

Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office* Yurok Department of Public Safety 

WASHINGTON, D.C. FBI FIELD OFFICE JURISDICTION80

Arlington County Police Department Leesburg Police Department 

Arlington County Sheriff’s Office Loudoun County Sheriff's Office 

City of Fairfax Police Department Metro Transit Police Department 

City of Falls Church Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority 

District Department of Transportation Purcellville Police Department 

Fairfax County Police Department Quantico Police Department 

Fairfax County Sheriff's Office Stafford County Sheriff’s Office 

Falls Church Sheriff's Office Vienna Police Department 

Front Royal Virginia Police Department Warren County Sheriff’s Office 

 80 The jurisdiction of the FBI Washington Field Office includes the District of 

Columbia and portions of Virginia. 
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APPENDIX XI: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

RESPONSE 
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FBI RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE 

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S AUDIT OF THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S REPRIORITIZATION EFFORTS

Recommendation 1. We recommend the FBI ensure that it has 

accurately evaluated its investigative needs and necessary 

resource levels within each area of the FBI's operations - 

including both terrorism and non-terrorism related programs - 

and translate this information into realistic field agent 

allocations. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and will 

continue its efforts to accurately evaluate its investigative 

needs and necessary resource levels within each area of the 

FBI's operations - including both terrorism and non-terrorism 

related programs - and translate this information into realistic 

field agent allocations. 

In order to improve its ability to evaluate accurately its 

investigative needs and necessary resource levels within each 

area of the FBI's operations - including both terrorism and nonterrorism related programs - and translate this information into 

realistic field agent allocations, the FBI established the 

Strategic Planning and Execution Council in September 2004. 

This Council developed a strategic plan for the FBI for FYs 

2007 - 2011, using the work of subject matter experts and the 

Directorate of Intelligence to forecast the growing threats the 

FBI will face in future years. This was the FBI's first attempt 

to articulate full funding requirements for its "total mission" 

- intelligence, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal 

investigative, cyber, and associated law enforcement services, 

and administrative support segments. The strategic plan 

specifically addresses the operational requirements of the FBI's 

mission and proposes a larger, more technically specialized 

operational workforce managed and deployed to cover forecasted 

threats to the U.S. 

The strategic plan also recognized that the FBI cannot 

continue to meet additional resource requirements by drawing on 

the resources of other programs. The FBI's counterterrorism, 

counterintelligence, intelligence, and criminal investigative 

responsibilities are additive and these missions can no longer 

be supported at the expense of the others. The strategic plan 

forecasts a need to expand the FBI's total workforce by 48% and 

the Special Agent workforce by 38% by FY 2011 in order to meet 

the increasingly complex threats facing the FBI. The FBI 
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forecasted the need to increase its Special Agent workforce in 

all of its operational/investigative missions - intelligence, 

counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal investigative 

and cyber. 

While the FBI's workforce and budget increased 

significantly between FY 2000 and 2005, the resource demands of 

the FBI's national security missions, the creation of a new 

Cyber Division, and the need to address special events and other 

immediate needs, such as the aggressive hiring of intelligence 

analysts, increased at an even greater rate. As a result the 

FBI was forced to continue to cover these additional resource 

requirements largely by drawing on resources from other FBI 

programs, most notably the Criminal Investigative Program. From 

FY 2000 to FY 2004, the Special Agents dedicated to the Criminal 

Investigative Program decreased by approximately 33%, from 6,664 

in FY 2000 to 4,474 in FY 2004. 

In response, the FBI acted decisively and aggressively to 

address and to minimize, where possible, the negative impact on 

the FBI and local, state, and federal law enforcement, as well 

as the general public, caused by the reallocation of 2,190 

Special Agents from the Criminal Investigative Program. At the 

SACs Conference in November 2004 and three Criminal 

Investigative Program Management Regional Coordination 

Conferences in FY 2005, the Criminal Investigative Division 

clearly communicated the priorities of the Criminal 

Investigative Program and provided detailed guidance on the 

prioritization and use of those resources to the SACs, ASACs and 

SSAs responsible for managing those resources. FBI Headquarters 

and field office Criminal Investigative Program coordinators and 

managers were provided with a matrix of criminal priorities that 

provided guidance on how limited Criminal Investigative Program 

resources should be used to address Public Corruption, Civil 

Rights, Violent Gangs/Organized Crime/Criminal Enterprises, 

Financial Crimes and Violent Crimes. Other specific program 

guidance was also disseminated to the field offices. 

One of the first steps undertaken by the FBI to address the 

dramatic impact of shifting large numbers of skilled personnel 

to counterterrorism and other higher priorities was the 

restaffing and rebuilding of our highest priority programs 

within the Criminal Investigative Program. One of our 

priorities was to ensure the Public Corruption Program was as 

robust and aggressive as its importance to our nation demands. 

Although the OIG noted the FBI dedicated fewer resources to the 

Public Corruption Program and had fewer case openings in FY 2004 
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than in FY 2000, that statistic does not fairly depict the FBI's 

efforts and accomplishments in the Public Corruption Program in 

FY 2004. By FY 2004, the FBI had substantially rebuilt the 

Public Corruption program and had only utilized 36 fewer Agents 

than in FY 2000 (8% less) and opened 15 fewer cases (1.7 % less) 

than in FY 2000. Despite these slight reductions in personnel 

resources and case openings, the Public Corruption program had 

significantly higher statistical accomplishments in FY 2004 than 

FY 2000, including 102 more convictions. 

The re-establishment of the Public Corruption Program as 

the cornerstone of the FBI's Criminal Investigative Program 

continued in FY 2005. In FY 2005, the Agents dedicated to the 

program increased and a Public Corruption Enhancement Initiative 

was developed and used to conduct an internal assessment to 

identify those FBI field offices whose Public Corruption 

Programs would best benefit from an on-site assessment and 

training. To fully implement this initiative, an experienced 

team of FBI Headquarters and field personnel were used to begin 

conducting these assessments. SACs were also advised they would 

be held personally accountable for ensuring they had an 

aggressive, robust Public Corruption Program. The data on the 

Public Corruption Enhancement Initiative was provided to the OIG 

during their audit and the data on the FY 2005 increases in 

resources for the Public Corruption program were provided to the 

OIG immediately following the exit conference on September 13, 

2005. 

Health Care Fraud is another priority of the FBI that 

suffered from the redeployment of resources to higher priority 

areas. However, the underutilization of these resources was 

corrected in FY 2005. The year-to-date data on the utilization 

of Health Care Fraud resources in FY 2005 (Funded Staffing Level 

- 407, Annualized Resource Utilization to date - 403) 

established that these resources were utilized at the level 

conveyed to Congress for FY 2005. This data was provided to the 

OIG immediately following the exit conference on September 13, 

2005. 

In addition to its internal efforts to maximize the use of 

its own personnel, the FBI also increased its efforts to more 

fully leverage its personnel resources by increasing the use of 

task forces consisting of local, state and federal law 

enforcement agencies, particularly in its anti-gang efforts. To 

this end the FBI increased the number of Safe Streets Gang Task 

Forces from 104 in FY 2004 to 125 during FY 2005, established a 
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MS-13 National Gang Task Force, and initiated the start up of a 

National Gang Intelligence Center. 

The FBI has undertaken similar, interagency task force 

efforts in the White Collar Crime field. Over the last nine 

years the FBI has used 89 Financial Crimes Task Forces, 

including 25 Health Care Fraud Task Forces and 32 Financial 

Institution Fraud Task Forces to address the criminal threat in 

these areas. During this time period, these task forces 

produced over 1,700 convictions or pretrial diversions and $42 

million in fines, $27.7 million in recoveries and $1.5 billion 

in restitutions. 

In the areas of Financial Institution Fraud, Fraud By Wire 

and Governmental Fraud, the FBI instituted dollar loss case 

initiation thresholds to prioritize the investigation of these 

and other financial crimes and manage the best use of limited 

personnel. These dollar loss thresholds do not preclude field 

offices from working cases below those thresholds, however, they 

must obtain FBI Headquarters authorization to do so. This 

controlled flexibility allows field offices, particularly 

smaller field offices, to address financial crimes below these 

thresholds, based on factors such as the impact on the local, 

regional or national community. 

In evaluating its investigative needs and required resource 

levels the FBI must consider the obvious interrelation and 

interdependence of its intelligence, counterterrorism, 

counterintelligence, criminal and cyber programs. Due to the 

fact that terrorists make use of criminal enterprises and 

criminal activities to further their interests, the FBI must 

make use of its criminal investigative program and criminal 

investigations to enhance the FBI's ability to prevent another 

terrorist attack. Criminal investigations develop invaluable 

intelligence and investigations on terrorists, which further 

identify the United States' vulnerability to attack and directly 

support the FBI's and the Intelligence Community's 

counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber efforts. 

Criminal investigations of drug trafficking, money laundering, 

fraud, and trafficking in everything from people, cigarettes and 

counterfeit goods to infant formula have led to the development 

of invaluable intelligence and investigations on terrorists and 

their supporters. 

Recommendation 2. We recommend the FBI ensure that it 

accurately conveys to Congress the number of agents it will 

dedicate to health care fraud using reimbursable funds. 
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FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and 

accurately conveyed to Congress the number of agents it 

dedicated to health care fraud using reimbursable funds for FY 

2005. The FBI ensured the underutilization of Health Care Fraud 

resources in FY 2004, as noted by the OIG and the GAO, was 

corrected in FY 2005. The most recent year-to-date data for FY 

2005, on the number of agents dedicated to health care fraud was 

provided to the DOJ-OIG following the exit conference on 

September 13, 2005. The Funded Staffing Level reported to 

Congress for FY 2005, was 407 Agents, and the current annualized 

resource utilization for Health Care Fraud is 403 (99%). The 

FBI will continue to convey to Congress the number of agents it 

will dedicate to Health Care Fraud using reimbursable funds in 

each forthcoming FY. 

Recommendation 3. We recommend the FBI ensure that field 

offices are coordinating their anti-gang investigative efforts 

and executing the DOJ anti-gang initiative. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and will 

continue its efforts to ensure field offices are coordinating 

their anti-gang efforts and executing the DOJ anti-gang 

initiative. The FBI disseminated a policy directive to each FBI 

field office, dated July 5, 2005, which set forth the FBI's role 

and responsibility in executing DOJ's anti-gang initiative 

directive, dated June 17, 2005. A copy of this policy directive 

was provided to the DOJ-OIG immediately following the exit 

conference on September 13, 2005. The Assistant Director of the 

Criminal Investigative Division also summarized the AG's antigang strategy and the FBI's role in that strategy for the field 

office SACs and ASACs during three rounds of regional 

coordination meetings conducted by the FBI in 2005. 

 The FBI will continue its other ongoing, nationwide 

interagency anti-gang coordination efforts, including the 

National Gang Intelligence Center, the MS-13 National Gang Task 

Force, and 124 Safe Streets Gang Task Forces. The FBI has 

welcomed and encouraged the broadest possible participation of 

local, state and federal law enforcement and intelligence 

counterparts in these efforts, as well as the use of these 

efforts to facilitate and enhance communication, 

information/intelligence sharing, and coordination among its 

anti-gang counterparts. All of these efforts are critical to 

the continued implementation of the FBI's National Gang Strategy 

and the full use of the Enterprise Theory of Investigation to 

identify, investigate, and dismantle gangs, in the same way the 
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FBI has worked with local, state and federal law enforcement to 

successfully dismantle other organized crime groups and criminal 

enterprises. 

Recommendation 4. We recommend the FBI seek to better 

coordinate fugitive apprehension efforts with the USMS. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and will 

continue its efforts to work with the USMS at the national and 

field office level to better coordinate fugitive apprehension 

efforts. The Criminal Investigative Division Deputy Assistant 

Director and Section Chief responsible for the FBI's fugitive 

program initiated discussions with and then met with the 

Assistant Director, Deputy Assistant Director and Section Chiefs 

responsible for the USMS's fugitive program within the last six 

months in an effort to better coordinate fugitive apprehension 

efforts with the USMS. FBI field office SACs have also been 

instructed to seek better coordination of fugitive apprehension 

efforts with the USMS at Criminal Investigation Program 

Management Regional Conferences. 

Recommendation 5. We recommend the FBI pursue the formation of 

a multi-agency working group to develop and implement a national 

strategy to combat identity theft. This group should include, 

at a minimum, representatives from within the DOJ, including the 

FBI, as well as the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the U.S. 

Secret Service, ICE and local law enforcement. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and will 

pursue the formation of a multi-agency working group to develop 

and implement a national strategy to combat identity theft in 

conjunction with the DOJ. The FBI has identified approximately 

900 cases in FY 2004, in which identity theft was involved. 

Repeated FBI proposals to establish a National Identity Theft 

Center were unsuccessful due to a lack of funding. 

Recommendation 6. We recommend the FBI continue to work with 

ICE to develop agreements for coordinating FBI and ICE 

investigations of human trafficking and alien smuggling, as well 

as child pornography. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and will 

continue its ongoing negotiations with ICE to develop a mutually 

agreeable Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to address human 

trafficking and alien smuggling, as well as child pornography. 

The most recent drafts of a proposed MOU, dated December 9, 

2004, and May 23, 2005, were provided to the DOJ-OIG following 
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the exit conference on September 13, 2005. The FBI is also a 

full participant in the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center 

which is the principle mechanism for coordinating these 

investigations. 

Recommendation 7. We recommend the FBI pursue regular meetings 

among law enforcement officials, similar to the meetings held in 

Phoenix and Chicago, in more jurisdictions. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and has 

presented the regular meetings it attends with law enforcement 

officials in Phoenix and Chicago as a "best practice" to SACs 

and ASACs and encouraged them to pursue the initiation of 

similar interagency meetings with their respective United States 

Attorneys Offices and other local, state and federal 

investigative and prosecutive counterparts. This will be 

reinforced at the SACs Conference on September 24, 2005, and in 

an upcoming communication by the Assistant Director of the 

Criminal Investigative Division to all SACs. 
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APPENDIX XII: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 

ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO 

CLOSE THE REPORT 

 In its response to our draft audit report, the FBI concurred with each 

of our seven recommendations. This appendix provides our analyses of the 

FBI’s responses to our recommendations, including the actions needed to 

close each. 

Recommendation Number:

1. Resolved. In its response to our draft report, the FBI concurred with 

our recommendation to accurately evaluate its investigative needs and 

necessary resource levels within each area of the FBI’s operations and 

translate this information into realistic field agent allocations. The FBI 

stated that its establishment of the Strategic Planning and Execution 

Council (Council) in September 2004 has improved its ability to 

accurately evaluate investigative needs and necessary resource levels. 

In particular, the FBI noted that the Council developed a strategic plan 

for the FBI that forecasts the growing threats facing the FBI in the 

coming years that articulates the full funding requirements for the 

FBI’s total mission, including intelligence, counterterrorism, 

counterintelligence, criminal investigative, cyber, law enforcement 

services, and administrative support. 

In order to close this recommendation, please provide us with the 

FY 2007 – 2011 strategic plan. In addition, please provide us with the 

FY 2006 Funded Staffing Levels along with an explanation as to how 

they were developed in light of the new strategic plan. 

2. Resolved. The FBI noted that it concurs with our recommendation to 

accurately convey to Congress the number of agents that the FBI has 

dedicated to health care fraud matters using reimbursable funds. 

Further, the FBI stated in its response that it ensured the agent 

underutilization in health care fraud during FY 2004 was corrected in 

FY 2005, and noted that the FBI had accurately conveyed the number 

of field agents dedicated to health care fraud matters to Congress in 

FY 2005. 

This recommendation can be closed when we are provided evidence 

that the FBI has conveyed accurate information to Congress regarding 

the number of agents that the FBI has utilized in health care fraud 

matters during FY 2006. Specifically, please provide support for the 

FBI’s FY 2006 field agent allocation for health care fraud, as well as 
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the actual number of FBI agents utilized on health care fraud matters 

during FY 2006, along with evidence that this information was 

accurately reported to Congress. 

3. Resolved. In its response, the FBI concurred with our recommendation 

to ensure that its field offices were coordinating their anti-gang 

investigative efforts and executing the DOJ anti-gang initiative. The FBI 

stated that it will continue promoting its on-going nationwide 

interagency anti-gang coordination efforts and noted that guidance on 

the anti-gang initiative was provided to field management during 

regional coordination meetings conducted by the FBI during FY 2005. 

To close this recommendation, please provide us with support of the 

guidance provided to field management during the FBI’s regional 

coordination meetings. Additionally, please provide us with evidence 

of the continuing steps taken by FBI field offices in their interagency 

anti-gang coordination efforts, such as the existence of multi-agency 

working groups involved in gang-related investigations or field specific 

strategies on gang coordination efforts. 

4. Resolved. The FBI responded that it concurs with our 

recommendation to seek better coordination with the USMS on fugitive 

apprehension efforts. The FBI stated that it will seek to improve 

fugitive coordination efforts with the USMS at the national and field 

office levels. Specifically, the FBI noted that high-level meetings 

between the FBI and USMS have taken place during the past 

6 months. Further, the FBI’s response indicated that FBI field 

management has been instructed to seek better coordination with the 

USMS. 

To close this recommendation, please provide us with specific 

documentation on the FBI’s meetings with the USMS related to the 

coordination of fugitive apprehension efforts, including evidence of ongoing discussions and the results of these efforts. Further, please 

provide us with documentation on the guidance provided to FBI field 

management related to coordinating efforts with the USMS. In 

addition, please provide evidence of any improvement in the 

coordination with the USMS related to fugitive matters. 

5. Resolved. In responding to our draft report, the FBI concurred with 

the OIG’s recommendation to pursue the formation of a multi-agency 

working group to develop and implement a national strategy to combat 

identity theft. The FBI stated that it would work in conjunction with 

the DOJ in forming this working group. 
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This recommendation can be closed by providing us with evidence on 

the FBI’s efforts in forming a multi-agency working group and 

implementing a national strategy to combat identity theft. 

6. Resolved. The FBI concurs with our recommendation to continue 

working with ICE to establish agreements for coordinating FBI and ICE 

investigations of alien smuggling and human trafficking, as well as 

child pornography. The FBI commented that it has drafted 

memoranda of understanding (MOU) on these crime areas and will 

work with ICE to finalize these MOUs. Further, the FBI noted that it 

participates in the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, which is 

the principle mechanism for coordinating such investigations. 

To close this recommendation, please provide us with documentation 

on the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, including the FBI’s 

participation in this endeavor. Further, please provide us with support 

of the FBI’s on-going efforts to develop mutual agreements with ICE 

on investigations of alien smuggling and human trafficking, as well as 

child pornography. Additionally, please provide us copies of the final 

MOUs between the FBI and ICE on these investigative matters. 

7. Resolved. In its response to our draft report, the FBI concurred with 

our recommendation on pursuing regular meetings among law 

enforcement officials at the field office level, similar to those currently 

held in Phoenix and Chicago. The FBI noted that its field management 

was made aware of these meetings and will continue to provide 

guidance on such meetings in upcoming communications. 

In order to close this recommendation, please provide us with the 

FBI’s instruction to field management on pursuing regular meetings 

among law enforcement officials. Moreover, please provide examples 

of FBI field offices’ efforts in conducting such meetings.