UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4333

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMARIO CURTIS HILL,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, Chief District Judge. (3:15-cr-00100-FDW-1)

Submitted: March 29, 2018 Decided: April 2, 2018

Before AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony Martinez, Federal Public Defender, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

Jamario Curtis Hill appeals his conviction and 58-month sentence imposed 

following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). On appeal, Hill’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds 

for appeal but questioning whether the district court erred in applying an enhanced base 

offense level. Hill was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not 

done so. The Government has declined to file a response brief. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm.

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a deferential 

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We first 

determine whether the district court committed significant procedural error, such as 

incorrect calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines range, inadequate consideration of the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, or insufficient explanation of the sentence imposed. 

United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 170 (4th Cir. 2014).

In evaluating the district court’s Guidelines calculations, we review the district 

court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. 

White, 771 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir. 2014). We review unpreserved Guidelines challenges 

for plain error. United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416, 422 (4th Cir. 2015); see 

Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343, 1345 (2016) (describing 

standard).
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If we find no procedural error, we examine the substantive reasonableness of the 

sentence under “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence 

imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals of 

sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume on appeal that a within-Guidelines 

sentence is substantively reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th 

Cir. 2014). Hill bears the burden to rebut this presumption “by showing that the sentence 

is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.

In his Anders brief, counsel advises that Hill has questioned the impact of 

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), on his enhanced base offense level. 

Hill received an enhanced base offense level based on the sentencing court’s finding that 

he committed his underlying federal offense “subsequent to sustaining one felony 

conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2015); see USSG § 4B1.2(a) (defining 

“crime of violence”). As a predicate crime of violence for the enhancement, the court 

relied upon Hill’s prior North Carolina conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon. 

In light of recent authority, we conclude that there was no procedural error in 

calculating the sentence. In Johnson, the Supreme Court determined that the residual 

clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), reaching offenses that “involve[] 

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012), is unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2556-63. In Beckles 

v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017), however, the Supreme Court declined to extend 

the reasoning in Johnson to the Guidelines, holding that the Guidelines are not subject to 
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a due process vagueness challenge and that the residual clause under USSG § 4B1.2(a) is 

not void for vagueness. 137 S. Ct. at 895. In light of Beckles, Hill cannot raise a 

vagueness challenge to his predicate crimes of violence under Johnson. Further, any 

potential challenge Hill could raise to the classification of his predicate conviction as a 

crime of violence is foreclosed by recent authority from this court. See United States v. 

Burns-Johnson, 864 F.3d 313, 315 (4th Cir.) (holding that North Carolina robbery with 

dangerous weapon categorically qualifies as violent felony under ACCA’s force clause), 

cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 461 (2017) ; see also United States v. Montes-Flores, 736 F.3d 

357, 363 (4th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that decisions evaluating whether offense qualifies 

as ACCA violent felony are used interchangeably with decisions evaluating whether 

offense qualifies as Guidelines crime of violence). Thus, we find no error, plain or 

otherwise, in Hill’s enhanced base offense level.

Our review of the record reveals that Hill’s sentence is reasonable. The district 

court properly calculated Hill’s Guidelines range and sentenced him below the advisory 

Guidelines range and the applicable statutory maximum. The court considered the 

parties’ arguments in sentencing Hill and articulated a reasoned basis for the sentence it 

imposed, grounded in the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Further, Hill fails to rebut the 

presumption of reasonableness accorded his below-Guidelines sentence. See Louthian, 

756 F.3d at 306.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and 

have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Hill’s conviction and 

sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Hill, in writing, of the right to petition 
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the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Hill requests that a petition 

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may 

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Hill.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED