COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

MARQUE T. KNIGHTNOR 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1799-97-1 JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

 JUNE 16, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 

Wilford Taylor, Jr., Judge 

 Robert B. Wilson, V (McDermott & Roe, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Marque T. Knightnor (appellant) was convicted in a bench 

trial in the Hampton Circuit Court (trial court) for possessing a 

firearm after having been convicted of a felony. On appeal, he 

contends the evidence is insufficient to prove he possessed the 

firearm. We disagree and affirm the conviction. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The judgment of a trial court will be 

disturbed only if plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it. See id. The credibility of a witness' testimony and the 

inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely for 

the fact finder's determination. See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. 

App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). 

 "Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to 

as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently 

convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of 

guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 

876 (1983). However, "the Commonwealth need only exclude 

reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, 

not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant." 

Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 

(1993). Whether a hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a 

question of fact. See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 269, 

290, 373 S.E.2d 328, 339 (1988). 

 Here, the only reasonable hypothesis flowing from the 

evidence is that appellant had actual possession of the gun when 

he was handcuffed and that he attempted to hide it in the couch 

to avoid being found with it on his person. The evidence, viewed 

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, showed that the 

gun was not in the couch before appellant sat down on it; 

Officer Davis testified that there was "no question in [his] 

mind" that he would have "seen or felt" the gun if it had been in 
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the couch when he searched it. Thereafter, Detective Oakley saw 

appellant moving his hands from behind his back to the right side 

of his body and reaching between the sofa cushion on which he was 

sitting and the arm of the sofa. When she checked the handcuffs, 

appellant's hands were positioned with his palms together. 

Detective Oakley then moved appellant and found a loaded .32 

caliber revolver between the cushion and the arm of the couch, 

precisely where she had just seen appellant's hands. Detective 

Oakley testified that it would have been physically impossible 

for appellant's petite girlfriend, who had been seated on the 

couch beside him, to have put the gun in the place it was found, 

and appellant himself testified that she did not put it there. 

 Although appellant testified in his own behalf, denying that 

he put the gun in the couch and claiming that he was moving 

around because the handcuffs hurt, the trial court was entitled 

to conclude that the handcuffs were not too tight and that 

appellant was lying to conceal his guilt. See, e.g., Carter v. 

Commonwealth, 223 Va. 528, 532, 290 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1982). The 

only reasonable hypothesis flowing from the remaining evidence is 

that appellant had actual possession of the gun before it was 

found in the couch. See Glover v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 152, 

160-61, 348 S.E.2d 434, 440, aff'd, 236 Va. 1, 372 S.E.2d 134 

(1988); see also Powell v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 173, 497 

S.E.2d 899 (1998). 

 For these reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction. 
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 Affirmed.