WASHINGTON 

METROPOLITAN AREA 

TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Improved Planning of 

Future Rehabilitation 

Projects Could Prevent 

Limitations Identified with 

SafeTrack

Statement of Mark Goldstein, Director, Physical 

Infrastructure

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on 

Government Operations, Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform, 

House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. ET

Wednesday, March 29, 2017

GAO-17-519T

United States Government Accountability Office
Letter

Page 1 GAO-17-519T 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our March 2017 report on the 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s (WMATA) SafeTrack 

project.1 Recent inquiries into WMATA’s Metrorail system—the nation’s 

second-busiest—have revealed a range of serious safety issues.2 In 

response to some of these issues, as well as its backlog of track work, 

WMATA began SafeTrack in May 2016. According to WMATA, SafeTrack 

is a unique effort, designed to address urgent safety issues with railroad 

track infrastructure.

WMATA’s Metrorail system has experienced a variety of serious safety 

incidents in recent years. On June 22, 2009, one Metrorail train struck the 

rear of a second train stopped near the Fort Totten station on the Red 

Line, resulting in nine deaths and over 50 injuries. The National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report on the incident found, among 

other things, evidence of an ineffective safety culture within WMATA.3

More recently, WMATA has experienced smoke and fire incidents 

involving the electrical cables and other components supporting its thirdrail system.4 For example, on January 12, 2015, a Metrorail train stopped 

after encountering heavy smoke in the tunnel between the L’Enfant Plaza 

station and the Potomac River Bridge on the Yellow Line caused by an 

electrical issue, resulting in one passenger’s death and numerous 

injuries. In a report on this incident, the NTSB again found a lack of a 

safety culture within WMATA.5 In November 2015, WMATA’s current 

 1 GAO, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority: Improved Planning of Future 

Rehabilitation Projects Could Prevent Limitations Identified with SafeTrack, GAO-17-348 

(Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2017).

2 According to the American Public Transportation Association, WMATA’s Metrorail 

system had the second-highest average daily ridership in 2016.

3 NTSB, Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail Trains 

Near Fort Totten Station, NTSB/RAR-10/02. According to NTSB, organizations with 

effective safety cultures are generally described as having a commitment to safety that 

permeates the entire organization; that is, senior management demonstrates a 

commitment to safety and a concern for hazards that are shared by employees at all 

levels within the organization.

4 The third rail is a high voltage rail bar along the track that carries electrical energy to run 

the trains on that track.

5 NTSB, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority L’Enfant Plaza Station Electrical 

Arcing and Smoke Accident, NTSB/RAR-16/01.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-519T 

General Manager began his tenure and initiated a variety of efforts to 

address WMATA’s Metrorail safety issues.

On May 19, 2016, WMATA announced SafeTrack, a large-scale 

rehabilitation project to address safety issues and rehabilitate the 

Metrorail system on an accelerated basis by expanding all available 

maintenance windows.6 The primary focus of SafeTrack is rehabilitating 

Metrorail’s track infrastructure by replacing over 45,000 crossties, which 

are the wooden beams that lay across the railroad bed on above ground 

sections of the track, and 35,000 fasteners, which secure rails directly to 

concrete on underground or aerial sections of the track where wooden 

crossties are not used. SafeTrack is being carried out through a series of 

“surges” that involve intensive work on specific areas of track that are 

either shut down to normal traffic or have only one of the two tracks open, 

a type of operation known as “single tracking.” According to WMATA’s 

initial announcement, the project was designed to bring Metrorail’s track 

infrastructure to a “state of good repair,” which WMATA defines as the 

condition at which individual railroad assets can be sustained at ongoing, 

annual replacement rates under normal maintenance cycles. According to 

a March 2017 report from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the 

total cost of SafeTrack is estimated to be over $133 million.

My testimony today summarizes findings from our report that examined 

the planning and implementation of SafeTrack.7 Accordingly, this 

testimony addresses the extent to which:

1. WMATA’s planning of the SafeTrack project was consistent with 

leading project management practices, and

2. WMATA’s implementation of SafeTrack was consistent with these 

practices.

In our report, we recommended that WMATA develop a policy that 

requires and includes relevant procedures specifying that certain actions 

be taken prior to starting future large-scale rehabilitation projects.

 6 Throughout this statement, we refer to “large-scale rehabilitation projects” as projects 

that involve extended disruption to normal operating service for the maintenance or 

replacement of transit infrastructure.

7 Our full report also discusses the steps taken by FTA to oversee SafeTrack, and we 

have work planned to examine FTA and Federal Railroad Administration safety oversight 

programs.
Page 3 GAO-17-519T 

To conduct this work, we examined documentation and interviewed 

WMATA officials on how WMATA planned SafeTrack, including the 

alternative plans it developed, as well as how it carried out work for 

SafeTrack. We also examined WMATA documentation on the quality 

control and quality assurance frameworks in place for SafeTrack as well 

as the results of WMATA’s own SafeTrack quality reviews. We also 

reviewed recent investigations and studies regarding WMATA, including 

those from the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Office of Inspector 

General (OIG), NTSB, and WMATA’s OIG. We also interviewed officials 

from the DOT’s OIG, FTA, NTSB, and WMATA’s OIG about their work 

with WMATA and perspectives on SafeTrack. Additionally, we interviewed 

officials from local jurisdictions (the District of Columbia; Montgomery 

County, Maryland; and Fairfax County, Virginia) about the coordination 

and communication between them and WMATA officials concerning 

SafeTrack. We also compared WMATA’s planning and implementation of 

SafeTrack to leading project management practices identified by the 

Project Management Institute (PMI) in its A Guide to the Project 

Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide),8 and by the Transit 

Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) in its Report 157, which focuses 

on rehabilitation of transit assets.9 Further details on our scope and 

methodology are included in our report. The work on which this statement 

is based was performed in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards.

 8 Project Management Institute, Inc., A Guide to the Project Management Body of 

Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), Fifth Edition, 2013. PMBOK is a trademark of Project 

Management Institute, Inc. PMI is a not-for-profit association that provides global 

standards for, among other things, project and program management. These standards 

are utilized worldwide and provide guidance on how to manage various aspects of 

projects, programs, and portfolios.

9 TCRP, State of Good Repair: Prioritizing the Rehabilitation and Replacement of Existing 

Capital Assets and Evaluating the Implications for Transit, Report 157 (Washington, D.C.: 

2012). The FTA sponsored this report.
Page 4 GAO-17-519T 

In our March 2017 report, we found that WMATA’s planning of SafeTrack 

did not fully align with leading project management practices.10 While 

WMATA generally followed leading practices to coordinate with 

stakeholders, it did not comprehensively collect and use data on the 

condition of its assets, analyze project alternatives, and develop a project 

management plan before starting work. WMATA did not follow these 

practices because it believed it needed to start work immediately to 

address critical safety issues. Further, WMATA does not have a policy 

that requires, and includes relevant procedures for how to carry out, these 

planning activities for large-scale rehabilitation projects. More specifically:

• WMATA’s Collection and Use of Data in Planning SafeTrack Did Not 

Align with Leading Practices. Leading management practices for 

transit rehabilitation projects state that transit agencies should collect 

and use data on assets when planning projects.11 Although WMATA 

inspected its track assets when planning SafeTrack, those inspections 

were not comprehensive and did not collect detailed data on the 

condition of all track infrastructure, such as all interlockings, where 

trains cross from one track to another, or of all track power systems, 

including the electrical cables that power the third rail system.

According to WMATA officials we spoke with, electrical cables were 

not included in the inspections leading up to SafeTrack because the 

Track and Structures department that lead the inspections is not 

responsible for the maintenance of the third rail system. In addition, 

serious safety incidents continued to occur on the Metrorail system 

during SafeTrack on assets that were not being addressed in the 

project. For example, on July 29, 2016, a train derailed near the East 

Falls Church station. This derailment occurred on an interlocking, 

which while part of the Track and Structures department’s 

responsibilities, was not scheduled at that time for rehabilitation under 

SafeTrack. As a result of using limited data on its track infrastructure, 

WMATA’s decision makers may not have used sufficient information 

to develop project objectives and to properly prioritize SafeTrack 

work.

• WMATA’s Analysis of Alternatives for Improving the State of Repair of 

the Track Did Not Align with Leading Practices. Leading management 

practices for transit rehabilitation projects state that transit agencies 

 10 See GAO-17-348 for a full discussion of the leading project management practices.

11 TCRP, 2012.

WMATA Did Not Fully 

Follow Leading 

Practices When 

Planning SafeTrack
Page 5 GAO-17-519T 

should have a policy in place for evaluating project alternatives.12

Though WMATA developed three alternatives for SafeTrack—

including options for 8, 10, and 22-month work schedules—it did not 

determine the costs and impacts of each alternative, or assess them 

to determine which approach may have resulted in greater 

efficiencies, lower costs, or less disruption for riders and local 

jurisdictions. Moving forward, WMATA plans to spend over $56 million 

a year on track rehabilitation projects alone starting in fiscal year 

2018. By not having a policy and procedures in place requiring 

analysis of alternatives prior to starting future large-scale rehabilitation 

projects, WMATA lacks a framework to comprehensively plan such 

projects to meet their objectives.

• SafeTrack Work Began Before Key Elements of a Project 

Management Plan Were in Place. Leading project management 

practices emphasize the importance of developing project 

management plans.13 Federal law requires that recipients of federal

financial assistance for a major capital project related to public 

transportation prepare a project management plan approved by the 

Secretary of Transportation, and carry out the project in accordance 

with the project management plan.14 Before WMATA began 

SafeTrack, it lacked a comprehensive project management plan, 

which is a key tool to ensure a project is completed on-time, withinbudget, and according to quality standards.15 WMATA officials told us 

that they implemented SafeTrack to respond to a critical safety 

situation and that they could not postpone this track work to develop a 

project management plan. SafeTrack, though, involves an 

unprecedented amount of track work performed over an extended 

 12 TCRP, 2012.

13 PMI, 2013. The PMI PMBOK® Guide notes that the content of such plans can vary 

depending upon the application area and complexity of the project.

14 49 U.S.C. § 5327(a). However, FTA officials told us that, based on discretion provided 

in agency regulations, a project management plan is not necessarily required prior to the 

start of a major capital project. 49 C.F.R. § 633.21. Major capital projects include, among 

other things, projects that involve the rehabilitation or modernization of an existing fixed 

guideway with a total project cost in excess of $100 million. 49 C.F.R. § 633.5.

15 FTA found that SafeTrack met the $100-million criteria for a major capital project when 

it approved an additional $20 million in safety-related federal funding for the project in midJune 2016, during the first surge. WMATA submitted a project management plan to FTA in 

September 2016. FTA initially found the plan lacked sufficient detail, but after WMATA 

made subsequent revisions, according to FTA, it conditionally approved the plan in March 

2017. FTA also requested additional changes to the plan, such as further explanation of 

risk management.
Page 6 GAO-17-519T 

period, significantly disrupts ridership, and is estimated to cost well 

over $100 million. WMATA currently lacks a policy and procedures 

requiring the development of a project management plan prior to 

starting large-scale rehabilitation projects like SafeTrack, according to 

WMATA officials, regardless of whether the work is to be completed in 

response to an emergency situation or within WMATA’s normal state 

of good repair efforts.

We concluded in our report that, without a policy requiring planning 

processes that are more consistent with leading project management

practices, WMATA’s ability to effectively address future infrastructure 

challenges may be limited. This situation is particularly true for future 

large-scale rehabilitation projects that may not be subject to FTA’s project 

management oversight authority, but which could still benefit from having 

a project management plan in place before beginning the project, 

consistent with leading practices.16 To ensure future large-scale 

rehabilitation projects are in line with leading project management 

practices, we recommended that WMATA develop a policy that requires, 

and includes relevant procedures specifying, that it, prior to starting largescale projects, (1) use detailed asset data to develop project objectives; 

(2) analyze alternatives; and (3) develop a project management plan for 

those projects that may not be designated as major capital projects.

WMATA agreed with our findings and conclusions, and said that it is 

working to address the recommendations.

 16 FTA’s project management oversight authority includes monitoring a major capital 

project’s progress to determine whether a project is on time, within budget, and in 

conformance with design criteria, and whether it is constructed to approved plans and 

specifications, and is efficiently and effectively implemented. 49 C.F.R. § 633.5.
Page 7 GAO-17-519T 

In our March 2017 report, we found that WMATA’s implementation of 

SafeTrack generally aligned with leading project management practices.17

Specifically, WMATA officials collected information on the work performed 

and the condition of assets repaired during SafeTrack. WMATA officials 

also collect lessons learned during and after each surge, and use those 

lessons during subsequent maintenance and planning efforts.

Additionally, WMATA developed a new organization-wide quality control 

and assurance framework and is implementing it for the first time through 

SafeTrack.

We concluded in our report that, through SafeTrack, WMATA has 

accomplished a substantial amount of repair work to bring its track 

infrastructure closer to a state of good repair. WMATA is also learning 

some important lessons in implementing SafeTrack that could better 

equip it to identify and address issues in future large-scale rehabilitation 

projects. Perhaps more importantly, SafeTrack indicates that WMATA is 

now committed to preventative maintenance, including the repairing of 

track assets before they break and cause more cost and safety impacts 

on Metrorail riders.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee, this 

concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions 

you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.

For questions about this statement, please contact Mark Goldstein at 

(202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony 

were Matt Barranca, Jason Blake, Kyle Browning, Lacey Coppage, 

Hannah Laufe, Sara Ann Moessbauer, and Michelle Weathers.

 17 See GAO-17-348.

WMATA Is Using 

Several Leading 

Practices to 

Implement SafeTrack 

and Improve the 

Quality of Completed 

Work

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(101938)
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