United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 22-50202

Summary Calendar

Officer Mary Teague, formerly known as Mary 

Werchan, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Williamson County, 

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:18-CV-1098

Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Plaintiff Mary Teague (“Teague”) worked as a deputy for the 

Williamson County Sheriff’s Office (“Williamson County”) from January 

2011 until her honorable discharge in November 2013. Teague later applied 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 16, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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to work for the Travis County Constable Precinct Two (“Travis County”) 

in 2016 and the Giddings Police Department (“Giddings”) in 2017, but 

neither department hired her. Teague claims that Williamson County 

retaliated against her by providing negative references to Travis County and 

Giddings in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 

Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”). 

The district court granted Williamson County’s motion for summary 

judgment as to these claims. Applying the elements of a prima facie 

retaliation claim,1 the district court concluded that Teague failed to satisfy 

the second prong: an adverse employment action. While the provision of a 

negative reference may form the basis of a retaliation claim, the district court 

found that Teague offered no competent summary judgment evidence that 

Williamson County provided a negative reference to either Travis County or 

Giddings. 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 

Brown v. City of Houston, Tex., 337 F.3d 539, 540 (5th Cir. 2003). We view the 

evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 

to the non-moving party. Id. at 541. As a corollary, unsubstantiated 

assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not 

sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id.

The factual background of this appeal is sufficiently set forth in the 

district court’s order, and we incorporate it here by reference.

1 To make a prima facie retaliation claim, Teague must demonstrate that: “(1) [she] 

engaged in a protected activity pursuant to one of the statutes, (2) an adverse employment 

action occurred, and (3) there exists a causal link connecting the protected activity to the 

adverse employment action.” Badgerow v. REJ Properties, Inc., 974 F.3d 610, 618 (5th Cir. 

2020). The elements are identical for a retaliation claim under TCHRA. Gorman v. Verizon 

Wireless Texas, L.L.C., 753 F.3d 165, 170 (5th Cir. 2014).

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On appeal, Teague argues there is a genuine issue of material fact as 

to whether Williamson County provided a negative reference to Travis 

County and Giddings. As in her briefing before the district court, Teague 

premises this argument on Texas Government Code § 614.023. Section 

614.023 provides that a signed complaint must be given to a law enforcement 

officer within a reasonable time and no disciplinary action may be taken 

against the officer unless the signed complaint is given. Tex. Gov’t Code §

614.023(a)-(b). Additionally, an officer may not be indefinitely suspended or 

terminated unless the complaint is investigated and there is evidence to prove 

the allegation of misconduct. Id. § 614.023(c). The district court found this 

provision “inapplicable to the current case given that neither party contends 

that Teague ever sustained a complaint while employed at Williamson 

County or that Williamson County told Teague’s prospective employersthat 

she had.” Teague disputes this finding and repeatedly asserts in her briefing 

that she was subject to three sustained misconduct complaints for 

insubordination, endangerment, and untruthfulness during her employment 

at Williamson County. She then insists that because she had complaints 

lodged against her, she should have been afforded the procedural protections 

of section 614.023. As Williamson County points out, there is simply no 

record evidence of these complaints. To the contrary, Williamson County’s 

Internal Affairs Lieutenant Storey Sherouse confirmed that the investigation 

of another officer in which Teague served as a witness was not punitive 

against Teague and did not involve investigations of Teague for any policy 

violations. According to Williamson County’s form memorializing Teague’s

honorable discharge, she “[r]etired, resigned, or separated from employment 

with or died while employed by a law enforcement agency while in good 

standing and not because of pending or final disciplinary actions or a 

documented performance problem.” On this record, any claim that Teague 

was indeed subject to a disciplinary complaint is unsupported speculation 

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and insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Brown, 337 

F.3d at 541. Additionally, Teague alleged in her First Amended Complaint

that “no reprimands or disciplinary proceedings were ever conducted against 

Officer Teague during her employment with [Williamson County].” Teague

is bound by the allegations in her live pleading, and she may not now seek

factual findings that would contradict them. Davis v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 

Inc., 823 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Factual assertions in pleadings are 

judicial admissions conclusively binding on the party that made them.”). 

Teague’s arguments based on section 614.023 are unavailing. After 

carefully reviewing the record and the remaining issues raised on appeal, we 

agree with the district court that Teague has failed to present summary 

judgment evidence to establish the second element of her retaliation claims. 

Therefore, we AFFIRM for the reasons discussed above in addition to the 

reasons set forth by the district court, and we incorporate its order in full by 

reference.

AFFIRMED.

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