中国梦,航天梦 China Dream, Space Dream

China’s Progress in Space Technologies

and Implications for the United States

A report prepared for the

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

Kevin Pollpeter

Eric Anderson

Jordan Wilson

Fan Yang
Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank Dr. Patrick Besha and Dr. Scott Pace for reviewing a 

previous draft of this report. They would also like to thank Lynne Bush and Bret Silvis for their master 

editing skills. Of course, any errors or omissions are the fault of authors. 

Disclaimer: This research report was prepared at the request of the Commission to support its 

deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission's website is intended to promote greater public 

understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China 

economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public 

Law 108-7. However, it does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission or any individual 

Commissioner of the views or conclusions expressed in this commissioned research report.
CONTENTS

Acronyms......................................................................................................................................... i

Executive Summary.......................................................................................................................iii

Introduction................................................................................................................................... 1

Sources........................................................................................................................................2

China’s Space Policy .....................................................................................................................2

China’s Grand Strategy ................................................................................................................3

The Pursuit of Comprehensive National Power and China’s Grand Strategy ...................................5

China’s Space Strategy .................................................................................................................7

Space Power’s Contribution to China’s Comprehensive National Power .............................. 7

The Role of Space in China’s Military ............................................................................................7

National Military Strategy................................................................................................................9

Chinese Military Concept of Operations........................................................................................10

Striking Centers of Gravity and Assassin’s Mace Weapons...........................................................11

Space Warfare................................................................................................................................12

Space-based C4ISR.........................................................................................................................14

Counterspace Capabilities .............................................................................................................15

Manned Platforms.........................................................................................................................17

Co-orbital Counterspace Technologies..........................................................................................18

China’s View on Outer Space Weapons and Arms Control ...........................................................19

Economic and Commercial Benefits ............................................................................................19

Market Creation and Spin-off Technologies..................................................................................20

Satellite Application Technologies.................................................................................................21

Commercial Launch Services and Satellite Exports .......................................................................21

Satellite Exports.............................................................................................................................22

China’s Satellite Exports in Detail ..................................................................................................22

Launch Services..............................................................................................................................23

Political Benefits and Cooperative Activities ...............................................................................24

Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization ................................................................................24

Brazil...............................................................................................................................................25

Russia .............................................................................................................................................27

Ukraine...........................................................................................................................................28

Europe............................................................................................................................................28

France ............................................................................................................................................32

United Kingdom .............................................................................................................................33

Germany.........................................................................................................................................34

Venezuela.......................................................................................................................................34

United States..................................................................................................................................35

China’s Space Technologies....................................................................................................... 41

China’s Space Projects in Detail ..................................................................................................45

Human Spaceflight.........................................................................................................................45

Shenzhou Space Capsule................................................................................................................46

Tiangong-1 Space Station...............................................................................................................47
Long-term Space Station................................................................................................................48

Shenzhou Missions in Detail ..........................................................................................................48

Lunar Exploration Program............................................................................................................53

Manned Lunar Missions.................................................................................................................60

Mars Exploration Project ...............................................................................................................62

Earth Remote Sensing....................................................................................................................62

Satellite Navigation........................................................................................................................71

Communication Satellites..............................................................................................................74

Tianlian...........................................................................................................................................74

Other Satellites ..............................................................................................................................76

Launch Vehicles..............................................................................................................................78

New Generation of Launch Vehicles..............................................................................................81

Counterspace Technologies...........................................................................................................86

Organization................................................................................................................................ 93

Creation of an Executive Agent for Space and a Military Space Force...........................................94

Space Organizations in Detail ........................................................................................................96

Implications for the United States........................................................................................... 106

National Security Implications..................................................................................................107

Economic Implications..............................................................................................................112

Diplomatic Implications............................................................................................................114

Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................115

Appendix A: Chinese Operational Satellites in Orbit................................................................. 117

Appendix B: U.S. Operational Satellites in Orbit....................................................................... 121
i

ACRONYMS

A2/AD Antiaccess/area denial 

APAS Androgynous Peripheral Attach System 

APSCO Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization

ASAT Anti-satellite

ASB Air-sea battle 

ASBM Antiship Ballistic Missile 

ASLV Aerospace Solid Propellant Launch Vehicle Company 

C4ISR Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance

CALT China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology 

CAS Chinese Academy of Sciences

CASC China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation

CASIC China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation

CAST Chinese Academy of Space Technology 

CBERS China-Brazil Earth Remote Sensing Satellite 

CCD Charge-coupled device

CCP Chinese Communist Party 

CEOS Committee on Earth Observation Satellites 

CFOSAT China-France Oceanography SATellite 

CGWIC China Great Wall Industry Corporation 

CMC Central Military Commission 

CNP Comprehensive national power 

CMSA China Manned Space Agency

CNSA China National Space Agency

CRESDA Center for Resources Satellite Data and Application

DORIS Doppler Orbitography and Radiopositioning Integrated by Satellite 

EO Electrooptical 

EOS Earth Observation System

ESA European Space Agency 

EUMETSAT European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites 

EVA Extravehicular activity 

FAA U.S. Federal Aviation Administration 

FYP Five-Year Plans

GAD General Armament Department 

GEO Geosynchronous Earth orbit

GEO Group on Earth Observations

GF Gaofen 

GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System

GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System

GPS Global Positioning Systems 

GSD General Staff Department

GTO Geosynchronous transfer orbit 

IADC Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee 

IRMSS Infrared multispectral scanner 
ii

ISR Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

LEO Low Earth orbit

MEO Medium Earth orbit

MLP Medium and Long-term Plan for Science and Technology Development 

MOST Ministry of Science and Technology

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NOSS Naval Ocean Surveillance System

NPOESS National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System

NDRC National Development and Reform Commission

NSOAS National Satellite Ocean Application Service

NSRCC National Remote Sensing Center of China

PGM Precision guided munitions 

PLA People’s Liberation Army 

PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force 

PRC People’s Republic of China 

RADI Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth

RDSS Radio determination satellite service 

RF Radio frequency 

SASMAC Satellite Surveying and Mapping Application Center

SAR Synthetic aperture radar

SASTIND State Administration for Science, Technology, and National Defense 

SBIRS U.S. Space-based Infrared System 

SSO Sun synchronous orbit 

SVOM Space Variable Objects Monitor

TDRS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

TT&C Telemetry, tracking, and control 

VISR Visible and infrared scanning radiometer 

WFI Wide field imager 
iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

China’s position in the world has been evolving. It seeks increased influence and independence from 

foreign powers with the ultimate goal of preserving China’s sovereignty, independence, territorial 

integrity, and political system. Over the long term, China seeks to transform the international system to 

better suit its interests, but seeks to integrate itself into the existing international system over the short 

term with the goal of reshaping the Asia-Pacific political environment into one in which its interests must 

be given greater attention.

China’s pursuit of space power is intended to support this strategy. China views the development of space 

power as a necessary move for a country that wants to strengthen its national power. Indeed, China’s goal 

is to become a space power on par with the United States and to foster a space industry that is the equal 

of those in the United States, Europe, and Russia. China takes a comprehensive, long-term approach to 

this goal that emphasizes the accrual of the military, economic, and political benefits space can provide. 

By placing much of its space program in a 15-year development program and providing ample funding, 

the Chinese government provides a stable environment in which its space program can prosper. Although 

China is probably truthful when it says that it is not in a space race, such statements mask the true intent 

of its space program: to become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and economically as competitive 

as the United States is in space. 

For China’s military, the use of space power can facilitate long-range strikes, guide munitions with 

precision, improve connectivity, and lead to greater jointness across its armed forces. Economically, space 

technologies can create markets for new technologies and result in “spin-off” technologies for commercial 

uses that will make its industry more competitive. Politically, space power provides “carrots and sticks”

that China can use to influence the international situation. Internally, China’s rise as a space power is 

designed to demonstrate to the Chinese people that the Chinese Communist Party is the best organization 

to lead the country. 

In examining China’s use of its space program to advance its national security, economic, and diplomatic 

interests, this study finds that China has made much progress, particularly in serving its national security 

interests, but that its goals of using space to advance its economic and diplomatic interests remain 

underdeveloped. As a result, China is a “partial space power”; that is, a global actor that has yet to 

translate its power into comprehensive influence. 

This conclusion should not be unexpected, however. China is a latecomer as a serious space power. 

China’s rapid progress in space technology, although impressive, is also the result of starting from a low 

base and a reliance on the pioneering work of the United States and Russia. The United States remains 

the world’s leading space power, and Chinese space technologies still lag behind the United States.

Nevertheless, China’s efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a military, economic, and 

technological power may come at the expense of U.S. leadership and has serious implications for U.S. 

interests. Even if U.S. space power continues to improve in absolute terms, China’s rapid advance in space 

technologies will result in relative gains that challenge the U.S. position in space. At its current trajectory, 

China’s space program, even if not the equal of the U.S. space program, will at some point be good enough 

to adequately support modern military operations, compete commercially, and deliver political gains that 

will serve its broader strategic interest of again being a major power more in control of its own destiny.
iv

Military Benefits

China’s space program has made the most progress in addressing its national security needs. China’s space 

program assists the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in its efforts to achieve information superiority, 

defined as the ability to use information freely and to deny the use of information by an adversary. Based 

on their analyses of U.S. military operations, Chinese military researchers view space as a critical 

component in making the PLA into a force capable of winning “informatized” wars and recognize the role 

space plays in the collection and transmittal of information and the need to deny those capabilities to an 

adversary. 

Indeed, nearly every Chinese source describes space as the “ultimate high ground,” leading many Chinese 

analysts to assess that space warfare is inevitable. Because of the preeminence of the space battlefield, 

analysts writing on space argue that it will become the center of gravity in future wars and one that must 

be seized and controlled. In fact, these analysts argue that the first condition for seizing the initiative is to 

achieve space supremacy.

China’s space program plays a central role in its effort to possess antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) 

capabilities. Chinese analysts writing on space argue that the development of long-range precision strike 

weapons “cannot be separated from space power.” Long-range anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles 

require the ability to locate, track, and target enemy ships hundreds or thousands of kilometers from 

China’s shores. Such capabilities could also be used to attack U.S. bases and the bases of its allies in Asia 

as well as targets within the 50 states.

Chinese writings also devote much attention to the need to develop counterspace capabilities and offer 

multiple rationales for why China must develop counterspace weapons. China must be able to protect its 

own space-based assets from attack and prevent an adversary from using space to attack terrestrial 

targets. A second reason is to deny an adversary the use of space. Chinese military analysts have noted 

the dependence of the U.S. military on space and have concluded that the degradation of U.S. space 

capabilities may result in decisive losses for the U.S. military. Third, counterspace capabilities can be used 

against space-based missile defense to preserve China’s nuclear deterrent. Finally, space can be used to 

deter real and potential adversaries from using force, both in space and in other domains.

Economic and Commercial Benefits

China’s rise as a space power also appears to have potential negative economic consequences for the 

United States, although that impact will be felt more in the long-term. China has embraced its space 

program as a driver of economic growth and technological advancement that can help change its economy 

from a low-cost manufacturer to a high-tech competitor. According to Chinese analysts, investments in 

space technologies can produce a ten-fold return. The demand created by space projects can spur 

advances in high technologies that not only can be applied to other uses but also can create new markets. 

The creation of high technology space products is also intended to support the development of other 

industries through the introduction of spin-off technologies―technologies originally developed for the 

space industry that have found a civilian application. Progress in space technologies can create new 

markets, such as satellite communications, radio and television, remote sensing data, and satellite 

navigation products as well as those related to new materials and information technology. 

Space can also aid economic growth directly through commercial launch services and satellite exports. 

Because of U.S. export control laws, China realizes that it must also develop satellites for other countries 
v

if it is also to provide commercial launch services. China aims to capture 10 percent of the world’s 

commercial satellite market and 15 percent of the global space launch business by 2015.

To date, China has built and launched satellites for Nigeria, Venezuela, Pakistan, and Bolivia. It has also 

signed contracts for satellites with Belarus, Laos, and Sri Lanka, and Venezuela for an additional satellite. 

In addition to offering lower-priced satellites, China offers a competitive package that includes launch 

services, training for local operators, and low-cost loans through its export-import bank. 

In addition to satellite exports, China has also provided launch services to Indonesia, Turkey, Ecuador,

Argentina, and Luxembourg and has signed contracts with Bolivia, Laos, Belarus, Sri Lanka, Congo, and 

Algeria. In 2011, CASC launched a satellite for European satellite communications provider Eutelsat. This 

was the first time that China had launched a foreign-made satellite for a foreign client since 1999.

Political Benefits

The Chinese government also uses its space program for domestic and international political gain. By 

developing a robust space program and participating in high-profile activities such as human space flight 

and lunar exploration, the Chinese Communist Party can demonstrate that it is the best provider of 

material benefits to the Chinese people and the best organization to propel China to its rightful place in 

world affairs. Outwardly, China conducts numerous cooperative activities with other countries and holds 

international exchanges and cooperation to improve its international position, which increases its 

influence among less developed countries and facilitates technology transfer to China. These activities 

build China’s reputation as a reliable and attractive space partner and could help to achieve China’s goal 

of establishing a multi-polar world.

The importance of China’s space diplomacy should not be overstated, however. Cooperation in space do 

not drive relations on Earth. International cooperation on space activities usually follows progress in the 

overall relationship and is more of an indicator of the state of a relationship than a critical component. 

Although China’s increasing space power does play a role in advancing its diplomatic interests, there is no 

evidence that it has directly produced tangible political benefits in other areas besides space. 

China conducts cooperative activities with numerous countries and as China’s space program continues 

to improve, countries without the security concerns of the United States will increasingly look upon space 

as another venue for interacting with China. China cooperates with many countries in space and looks to 

Europe in particular for access to technology and expertise denied by the United States.

China’s longest cooperative space relationship is with Russia and its predecessor, the Soviet Union. China 

has a long-term cooperation plan with Russia that has resulted in technology transfer and agreements on 

joint space science and deep space exploration. Russia is also receptive to cooperating with China on 

human spaceflight and the exploration of the moon and Mars. 

European countries and the European Space Agency are also seeking opportunities for greater 

cooperation with China in space technologies, space exploration, and human spaceflight in order to 

facilitate greater economic ties between Europe and China and to compensate for the reduced funding of 

the European Space Agency. Europe and China have conducted a variety of cooperative activities since 

2000. These include an agreement to develop China-based applications of the Galileo satellite navigation 

system and cooperative activities on monitoring space weather and Earth remote sensing. Europe is also 

interested in collaborating with China on human spaceflight and is considering providing experiments on 
vi

China’s space station as well as having European astronauts conduct Chinese experiments on the 

International Space Station.

China’s relationship with the United States space program has been turbulent, with successive NASA 

administrators considering cooperative activities with China. In 2004, the head of the China National 

Space Administration visited NASA for the first time, and in 2006, a NASA administrator for the first time 

visited the China National Space Administration. This was followed four years later by a visit to China by 

NASA Administrator Charles Bolden. All visits were described as familiarization tours, and no substantive 

agreements on cooperation resulted. In 2011, Congress prohibited NASA from conducting many types of 

activities with China. Since then, NASA’s activities with China’s space program have been restricted to 

multinational fora.

Organization

China’s space program is inherently dual-use. The main organizational actor is the military’s General 

Armament Department (GAD). The GAD is responsible for overseeing the research and development of 

spacecraft and runs the country’s launch centers, satellite control centers, and human spaceflight program. 

Responsibility for providing missions for China’s spacecraft can come from a variety of organizations. 

Military tasking can come from the General Staff Department, but civilian missions, such as weather 

forecasting, and other remote sensing missions can be led by civilian organizations, such as China’s 

National Meteorological Administration. 

The plethora of organizations responsible for space-related activities has led some Chinese authors to 

argue that China needs an executive agent in order to respond efficiently to crises. Officers from the PLA 

Air Force have been most vociferous in advocating for this role. They argue that the Air Force is best suited 

to manage the space portfolio since it is the most high-tech of the services, and other air forces of the 

world are responsible for space. But other services have also indicated that they may be tasked with space 

missions. In particular, the Second Artillery may play a role in conducting counterspace missions, 

especially those involving direct ascent capabilities.

Space Technologies

China has made impressive progress in space technologies since 2000. With the exception of missile early 

warning, China now has nearly a full range of satellites to accomplish a variety of missions. These include 

remote sensing satellites with various resolutions and covering various spectrums, a satellite navigation 

system, communication satellites, and robust human spaceflight and lunar exploration programs. China 

places a priority on the development of space technologies: three of the sixteen mega-projects of the 

Medium and Long-term Plan for Science and Technology Development involve space. China’s space megaprojects have been unofficially dubbed the “221 Program,” which refers to the human spaceflight program 

and lunar exploration programs, the Earth remote sensing and Beidou satellite navigation programs, and 

a next generation of launch vehicles.

Human Spaceflight

China’s human spaceflight program has conducted a total of ten missions, five of them manned. The first 

Shenzhou space capsule was launched in 1999. Since then, the space capsule and the missions have 

increased in complexity. In 2008, China conducted its first spacewalk and in 2011 conducted its first 

docking. China has also launched a small station, Tiangong-1, in 2011. The ultimate goal of China’s human 

spaceflight program is to complete a large, long-term space station by 2023.
vii

China conducts human spaceflight for a variety of reasons. The main reason is political. As demonstrated 

by the U.S. Apollo program, human spaceflight can have immense domestic and international political 

benefit. Large space projects, like those necessary for human spaceflight, can also create a skilled 

workforce and produce high technology. Militarily, Chinese analysts regard human-operated spaceflight 

as having advantages over robotic missions, and they often discuss manned ISR and counterspace 

missions.

Lunar Exploration

China has conducted four lunar exploration missions. The first two missions, Chang’e 1 and 2, orbited the 

moon to take images of the lunar surface. A third lunar mission landed a robotic rover, Jade Rabbit, on 

the moon in December 2013 to analyze the lunar surface. This rover experienced mechanical difficulties 

after the first lunar night and became nearly unusable. The fourth mission was launched in October 2014 

and involved a flyby of the moon and the return of the orbiter to Earth. The ultimate goal of China’s lunar 

exploration program is to conduct a mission that will collect lunar soil samples and return them to Earth

by 2020. Although China is conducting feasibility studies of manned missions to the moon, no official 

approval has been given.

A primary purpose of China’s lunar exploration program is to analyze the lunar soil for possible economic

exploitation. Foremost is speculation about the mining of helium-3, an element that could be used in a 

future fusion reactor. According to Chinese analysts, 100 tons of helium-3 could supply the world’s 

electrical needs for one year, and they estimate that the moon has one to five million tons. At a price of 

$4‒10 billion per ton, these analysts conclude that mining helium-3 could be profitable.

Satellite Navigation

China’s Beidou satellite navigation system is planned to provide a global service by 2020. Designed to be 

similar to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), Beidou will consist of 35 satellites in medium Earth

and geosynchronous orbits that will provide positioning accuracies of less than 10 meters. With the use 

of a nation-wide system of differential Beidou, accuracy will be improved to one meter. Unlike GPS, Beidou 

has a short messaging service in which messages as long as 120 characters can be sent to other Beidou 

receivers.

Similar to GPS, Beidou is first and foremost a military system that has extensive civilian applications. 

Seeing the need to eliminate their reliance on GPS, Chinese scientists and military officers have advocated 

since the early 1980s for China to have its own satellite navigation system. Beidou is now being 

increasingly used by the Chinese military at the regiment level and above and is reportedly being 

integrated into weapon guidance systems. 

China also sees great economic benefit in promoting Beidou for domestic civilian use. The Chinese market 

for satellite navigation products is projected to reach to 400 billion yuan ($65.14 billion) by 2020. Currently, 

products for GPS have 95 percent of the market. China plans for Beidou products to capture 70‒80 percent 

of the domestic market by 2020 and has enacted preferential policies, including the mandatory 

installation of Beidou receivers on certain vehicles, to achieve that end.

Remote Sensing

The stated purpose of China’s satellite remote sensing project is to build an all-weather, 24-hour, global 

Earth remote sensing system by 2020 capable of monitoring the ground, atmosphere, and oceans. China 

has a variety of remote sensing satellites, including four new series of satellites introduced since 2000: 
viii

the Gaofen, Yaogan, Huanjing, and Tianhui satellites. This is in addition to legacy satellite series such as 

the Ziyuan Earth remote sensing satellite and the Fengyun meteorological satellite. Although China has 

many remote sensing satellites, the first official satellite to be launched under the remote sensing megaproject is the Gaofen-1, launched in 2013.

With these satellites, China can serve a variety of remote sensing needs. Chinese imagers have stated 

resolutions of one to thirty meters and can image in the visible, infrared, and multispectral ranges. The 

Yaogan and Huanjing satellites also use synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to be able to image through cloud 

cover or at night. Certain Yaogan satellites are also rumored to have electronic intelligence capabilities.

Accessing information from these satellites is facilitated by a network of three satellites, designated 

Tianlian, that relay communications and data between satellites and ground stations anywhere on the 

Earth regardless of the position of the satellite in orbit or the location of the unit on the ground. As such, 

the Tianlian satellites play a critical role in facilitation of real-time intelligence collection to China’s military.

Launch Vehicles

China is also developing a new generation of launch vehicles. These new rockets will use “non-polluting”

fuel and are planned to be more reliable and cost effective. The Long March 5 will be able to launch 14 

metric tons into low Earth orbit, which is more than three times the current payload capacity. This heavier 

lift capacity will allow China to orbit its larger space station and launch heavier remote sensing and 

communication satellites. The Long March 6 will be a light lift rocket capable of launching one metric ton 

into low Earth orbit. The Long March 7 will be a medium lift rocket capable of launching 13.5 metric tons 

into low Earth orbit and will eventually replace the Long March 2F as the launch vehicle for human 

spaceflight missions. The first launch of these rockets is scheduled to occur in 2015.

China has also developed the solid-fueled Long March 11, Kuaizhou, and Feitian-1 launch vehicles. These

light lift rockets are intended to provide China with a rapid response capability that could be used to 

quickly launch satellites in response to disasters or military conflict.
1

INTRODUCTION

China’s growing military, economic, and political power has been of increasing concern to the United 

States. The expansion of its interests, coupled with increasingly assertive behavior, has led to a perception 

of many in the West that the United States is a country on the decline while China is a country on the rise. 

At a time when China’s rapid economic growth continues, its military swiftly modernizing, and its political 

clout increasing, the economic growth of the United States remains slow, and its ability to shape world 

affairs appears to be on the decline. This has led some to conclude that the Chinese model based on an 

authoritarian-directed form of capitalism is replacing global acceptance of an American model built on 

democracy and free markets or that China will replace the United States as the most powerful country.1

China’s rise as a world power has been accompanied by its rise as a space power. China’s ambition to 

become a space power is driven by a belief in the benefits of space power to contribute significantly to 

China’s national power. China regards its space program as an important expression of its comprehensive 

national power and is intended to portray China as a modernizing nation committed to the peaceful uses 

of space while at the same time serving its political, economic, and military interests.2It contributes to 

China’s overall influence and provides capabilities that give China more freedom of action and helps 

maintain national security. Indeed, China has the ultimate goal of transforming itself from a “major space 

power to a strong space power” on par with the United States and Russia. In recent years, China has made 

important progress across a broad range of space technologies, including launchers, satellites, lunar 

exploration, human space flight, and counterspace technologies. 

The rise of China’s space program presents military, economic, and political challenges to the United 

States. As the U.S. National Security Space Strategy states, “Space is vital to U.S. national security and our 

ability to understand emerging threats, project power globally, conduct operations, support diplomatic 

efforts, and enable global economic viability.”

3 China’s efforts to use its space program to transform itself 

into a military, economic, and technological power may thus come at the expense of U.S. leadership in 

both absolute and relative terms. 

Uncertainty over China’s pathway to potential major power status, the possibility of a conflict over its 

territorial claims, and the inherent dual-use nature of space technologies means that China’s improving 

space capabilities could be used against the U.S. military. China’s space program contributes to the 

Chinese military’s antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities by providing critical C4ISR (command, 

control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) support to longrange precision strikes weapons and providing the ability to threaten U.S. space-based assets. 

Space is also becoming more economically competitive. China’s space program officials believe that space 

technology is the highest of high technologies, the mastery of which can have positive consequences far 

beyond the realm of space power to produce tangible benefits for the Chinese people and the national 

interests of the country. To carry out this plan, China’s space industry has been designated as one of 

 

1 Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: 

Basic Books, 2010), X; Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New 

Global Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 363.

2

Information Office of the State Council, China’s Space Activities in 2011, December 

2011,http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-12/29/content_2033200.htm.

3 Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space Strategy, January 2011, 

1.
2

China’s strategic emerging industries, and space technologies figure prominently in China’s science and 

technology modernization plans. Indeed, China’s space industry has the goal by 2020 to become a “worldclass” aerospace industry on par with Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Airbus Group. 

China has also been able to use its space program to further its diplomatic objectives and to increase its 

influence in the developing world and among second-tier space powers. China conducts numerous 

international cooperative activities that provide leadership opportunities, improve bilateral relations, and 

open up avenues for technology transfer.

Sources

This report is supported by hundreds of sources, ranging from Chinese language news sources, journals,

and space industry and military publications to English language news and analysis. Although individual 

facts may not be a cause for debate, the larger epistemological question of the intent of China’s space 

program and its implications may be. Most controversial will be the use of space for military purposes. 

This work builds upon the principal author’s previous work and reaffirms the finding that Chinese 

researchers are unanimous in their belief that space war is inevitable, a belief also stated by the Vice 

Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xu Qiliang. China’s commitment to this vision is exemplified 

by the large amount of theoretical and technical research being carried out in China by the PLA, defense 

industrial research institutes, and civilian research organizations. While such writings do not necessarily 

reflect official Chinese military strategy, the near unanimity of opinion by Chinese writers on this topic 

suggests a consensus within the defense community.

China’s Space Policy

According to one Chinese source, space policy is determined by the overall strategy of a country and its 

political, economic, military, science and technology, and societal goals. The main investor in space 

technologies is the government and, as a result, the highest level of government leadership determines 

space policy. As this source states, “Our country’s strategic goals for space development and the policies 

to realize those goals have consistently received the attention of the highest leadership and have received 

the support of every organization. It can be said that the country’s space policy is the lifeline for space 

development.”

4

To date, China has released three space “white papers,” in 2001, 2006, and 2011. Entitled “China’s Space 

Activities,” these documents can be considered nominal statements of policy but are primarily geared 

towards China’s technological accomplishments and goals and not to how the government and military 

use or plan to use space, nor to the organizations that are charged with carrying out space policy and how 

they are funded. As a result, even though China’s space program is much more open than before, much 

more work needs to be done to equal the transparency of the U.S. space program.

Each white paper contains an “aims and principles” section that is akin to a broad policy statement. The 

purposes of China’s space program have remained consistent in all three white papers:

to explore outer space and to enhance understanding of the Earth and the cosmos; to 

utilize outer space for peaceful purposes, promote human civilization and social progress, 

and to benefit the whole of mankind; to meet the demands of economic development, 

 

4 Geng Yandong, 军事航天系统工程 [Military Space System Engineering] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 2007), 138.
3

scientific and technological development, national security and social progress; and to 

improve the scientific and cultural knowledge of the Chinese people, protect China's 

national rights and interests, and build up its national comprehensive strength.5

All three white papers have stated a commitment to independent and self-reliant development while at 

the same time welcoming cooperation with international partners. Reflecting the progress its space 

program has made since the initial white paper in 2001, the principles by which China has sought to 

achieve these aims have been revised to reflect its modernization goals. The 2001 white paper, for 

example, stated that China would only select a “limited number of targets” in which to make 

breakthroughs according to its national situation and strength.6 By 2006, China would instead “maintain 

comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable development,” and in 2011 China would also concentrate 

on making breakthroughs in key technologies for leapfrog development. 

China’s Grand Strategy

Because China’s explanation of its space policy is limited and because China has not issued a space strategy, 

determining the direction of its space program can be difficult. This does not mean, however, that China’s 

space strategy is unknowable. In order to address this challenge this study will position China’s space 

strategy within the context of its grand strategy. Although it is important to stress that China does not 

appear to have an official grand strategy, there is a consensus that China desires to increase its power and 

position in the world and that this desire is based on several principles. First is the Chinese concept of 

fuqiang (富强), or “wealth and power.” The term fuqiang is a shortened version of fuguo qiangbing (富国

强兵) meaning “rich country and strong army.” The goal of having a rich country and strong army was first 

expressed by the Legalist philosopher Han Feizi during the Warring States Period of the fifth century BC 

when he stated, “If a wise ruler masters wealth and power, he can have whatever he desires.”

7

The pursuit of wealth and power has taken on new impetus with the rise to power of Chinese President 

Xi Jinping in 2012 and his call for China and the Chinese people to chase the “China Dream.” Although the 

concept of the China Dream remains ill-defined, Xi has described it as “improvement of people’s 

livelihoods, prosperity, construction of a better society, and military strengthening.”

8 The concept of the 

China Dream and China’s pursuit of wealth and power also ties closely to the Chinese idea of national 

rejuvenation. Chinese history stresses China’s role as a world power that was lost to the hands of 

foreigners beginning in 1839 with the first Opium War. From then until the founding of the People’s 

Republic of China in 1949, described as the “one hundred years of humiliation,” China was engulfed in 

domestic turmoil, civil war, and foreign invasion that rendered it weak, with no real standing in the world 

order. Since 1839, Chinese politicians and intellectuals sought to restore China to its previous periods of 

 

5

Information Office of the State Council, China’s Space Activities in 2011, December 2011, 

http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-12/29/content_2033200.htm.

6

Information Office of the State Council, China’s Space Activities, November 2000, http://www.china.org.cn/ewhite/8/index.htm.

7 Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House, 

2013), 21.

8 For example, Xi Jinping’s first mention of the China Dream was at the National Museum of Chinese History at the permanent 

exhibition “Road to Rejuvenation.” See 习近平:承前启后 继往开来 继续朝着中华民族伟大复兴目标奋勇前进 [Xi Jinping: 

Inherit the Past and Usher in the Future, Carry Forward the Revolutionary Cause and Forge Ahead into the Future, Continue 

Forging Valiantly Ahead Toward the Chinese People’s Mighty Goal of Rejuvenation], Xinhua, November 29, 2012, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-11/29/c_113852724.htm.
4

economic and military power,

9 with little success untilthe founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

in 1949 when the Communist Party rid China of foreign influence and later sought greater prosperity 

through economic reform started by Deng Xiaoping.

This legacy of China’s downfall into foreign subjugation, economic stagnation, and national humiliation is 

seen today in China’s pursuit of wealth and power. According to David Lampton, Hyman Professor and 

director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,

“One almost universally shared goal in the PRC―indeed in China for the last 150 years or more, since the 

Qing Dynasty went into decline―is to make China rich and powerful and to regain the nation’s former 

status as a great power that controls its own fate.”

10 As Ye Zicheng of Peking University writes, “China is a 

unique country in the history of world civilization. Nearly all the more than 20 great civilizations in world 

history have vanished...Unlike all these other civilizations, China is the only country that has continuously 

maintained its historical civilization for some 5,000 years...This unique continuity expresses its creativity 

for self-renewal.”

11 He continues, “That China was able to become a great power many times over the 

course of more than 2,000 years was due to its strong points and the superiority that it enjoyed. This also 

confers on contemporary China some cultural and historical resources that can be made use of today to 

expedite growth.”

12

According to David Finkelstein, vice president and director of the China Studies Division at the Center for 

Naval Analyses, China’s grand strategy can be summarized as “the attainment of a strong, modern, and 

prosperous China.”

13 Avery Goldstein further elaborates, writing that China aims to engineer its

rise to great power status within the constraints of a unipolar international system that 

the United States dominates. It is designed to sustain the conditions necessary for 

continuing China’s program of economic and military modernization as well as to 

minimize the risk that others, most importantly the peerless United States, will view the 

ongoing increase in China’s capabilities as an unacceptably dangerous threat that must 

be parried or perhaps even forestalled. China’s grand strategy, in short, aims to increase 

the country’s international clout without triggering a counterbalancing reaction.14

The basis for China’s rise to great power status is a strong economy. Chinese scholars point to the Soviet 

Union as proof that merely having a strong army is not sufficient for maintaining a country’s position in

the world. Not only will a growing economy give China more influence in the world, it will also enable it 

to afford the capabilities it needs to wield that power. 

The ultimate goal of becoming a rich country with a strong army is to preserve China’s sovereignty, 

independence, territorial integrity, and political system by integrating itself into the existing international 

system,

15 while at the same time working to transform the system to better suit China’s interests.16 But 

 

9 For a discussion of “wealth and power” see Schell and Delury, Wealth and Power, 5‒10.

10 David Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 

25.

11 Ye Zicheng, Inside China’s Grand Strategy, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 30‒31.

12 Ibid., 37.

13 David Finkelstein, “Commentary on China’s External Grand Strategy,” Center for Naval Analyses, January 2011, 2.

14 Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 

Press, 2005), 17.

15 Ye Zicheng, Inside China’s Grand Strategy (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 79.

16 Ibid., 260.
5

because the United States remains the world’s lone superpower, China must not derail its economic 

modernization effort by coming into military or economic conflict with the United States. As a result, even 

though China is becoming more assertive in defending what it sees are its legitimate interests, it will try 

to do so in a way that does not fundamentally harm its economic interests and lead it into a military 

conflict with the United States. 

Although China does not seek conflict with the United States, it must at the same time act in ways to bring 

about its goal of becoming a world power.

17 As Peking University’s Ye writes, “there is a close connection 

between the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and China’s becoming a world power. If China does not 

become a world power, the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will be incomplete. Only when it becomes 

a world power can we say that the total rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been achieved.”

18

Although President Xi Jinping has stated that China “must strive to make our neighbors more friendly in 

politics, economically more closely tied to us, and we must have deeper security cooperation and closer 

people-to-people ties,”

19 he has also stated that China “would never sacrifice its legitimate rights or basic 

interests” and that “no foreign country should expect us to make a deal on our core interests and hope 

we will swallow the bitter pill that will damage our sovereignty, security, and development interests.”

20

As Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, concludes:

China appears to believe that growing Chinese economic and military clout will over time 

persuade its neighbors that there is more to gain from accommodating Chinese interests 

than from challenging them. In handling relations with its neighbors, China is employing 

both carrots and sticks to deter countries from pursuing policies that inflict damage on 

Chinese interests.21

This strategy will require a careful balancing act. China must learn to minimize confrontation with 

potential foes while at the same time strengthening its economic ties with them. As Peking University’s 

Wang Jisi writes, “All this means that it is virtually impossible to distinguish China's friends from its foes. 

The United States might pose political and military threats, and Japan, a staunch U.S. ally, could be a 

geopolitical competitor of China's, but these two countries also happen to be two of China's greatest 

economic partners.”

22

The Pursuit of Comprehensive National Power and China’s Grand Strategy

In order to carry out this grand strategy, China must build up what it calls comprehensive national power 

(CNP). There is no set definition of comprehensive national power. According to a report written by the 

Chinese Academy of Sciences, comprehensive national power refers to “the complete power and 

international influence that a sovereign country uses and develops...It includes societal, material, and 

spiritual factors. It also includes real power and potential power and mechanisms to turn potential power 

 

17 Ibid., 73.

18 Ibid., 74.

19 Mu Xuequan, “Xi Jinping: China to Further Friendly Relations with Neighboring Countries,” Xinhua, October 26, 2013, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-10/26/c_125601680.htm.

20 “No Compromises Over China’s Sovereignty: Xi,” Xinhua, January 30, 2013, accessed September 1, 2014, 

http://english.sina.com/china/2013/0129/555233.html.

21 Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Grand Strategy in Asia,” Statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, March 13, 2014.

22 Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011, 

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67470/wang-jisi/chinas-search-for-a-grand-strategy.
6

into real power. It is the organic integration and interactive use of a country’s politics, economy, science, 

culture, education, national defense, diplomacy, national resources, and national will. 23 It is also the 

representation of a country’s ability to protect and garner its national interests.”

24

Ye Zicheng defines CNP as the “power of a sovereign country, including both hard power, such as 

economic and military power, and soft power, such as spiritual, cultural, national historical tradition, and 

national cohesiveness. National power also includes both present power and potential power.”

25 In short, 

Ye writes that CNP is best understood “as comprising a country’s survival ability, development capacity, 

and international influence.”

26 David Lampton uses a more political science-oriented description of CNP 

as “the sum total of coercive, economic, and ideational power of a nation.”

27

CNP is difficult to operationalize due to the difficulty in appropriately measuring resources and their 

relative importance, and then combining them into one measurement while at the same time taking into 

account both real and potential power.28 The purpose here, however, is not to debate the merits of using 

CNP, but rather to explore how it guides Chinese analysts in their conception of China’s grand strategy. As 

George Washington University professor David Shambaugh writes, “The Chinese have wisely learned one 

key lesson from studying the experiences of other previous powers: genuine powers possess 

multidimensional strength.”

29 This includes “the economy, science, technology, education, culture, values, 

military, governance, diplomacy, and other sectors” as well as a strong component of soft power.30

A critical part of China’s quest to increase its CNP and become a world power is the ability to develop high 

technology independently. China’s leadership understands that its growth model based on being the 

world’s low cost manufacturer is not sustainable over the long term and that it must move up the value 

chain by being able to manufacture its own high technology products. The importance of technological 

innovation was highlighted in a June 2014 speech by Xi Jinping in which he urged China’s scientists and 

engineers to “innovate, innovate, and innovate again.”

31 According to Xi, China “is closer than at any other 

time in its history of reaching its mighty goal of the rejuvenation of the Chinese people” and that China 

“must continue by resolutely implementing the strategy of using science and education to rejuvenate the 

country and innovation to drive development and unswervingly continue on the road of making China 

into a strong science and technology power.”

32 Drawing on lessons from history, Xi statesthat science and 

technology are the basis of a strong and prosperous country and that since the sixteenth century every 

science and technology revolution has influenced the global power structure. Drawing on China’s own 

history since the end of the Ming Dynasty, Xi states that the strength of a country cannot simply be based 

on the size of its population or territory and that the reason China “took a beating” between 1839 and 

1949 was that it was backwards in science and technology. Xi concludes that China “cannot lag in the 

 

23 Jiang Zhou, “国家战略性产业生命路径及其拐点分析” [An Analysis on the Life Path and Inflexion Point of the National 

Strategic Industry], master’s thesis, University of Science and Technology of China June 28, 2009, 4.

24 Ibid., 4‒5.

25 Ye Zicheng, Inside China’s Grand Strategy, 17.

26 Ibid., 19.

27 Lampton, Three Faces of Chinese Power, 21.

28 Ibid.

29 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 5.

30 Ibid., 6.

31 Xi Jinping, “在中国科学院第十七次院士大会、中国工程院第十二次院士大会上的讲话” [Speech at the Chinese Academy 

of Sciences Seventh Academician Congress and China Academy of Engineering Twelfth Academician Congress], June 9, 2014, 

http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0610/c1024-25125483.html.

32 Ibid.
7

competitive arena of science and technology” and must catch up to and eventually surpass the current 

science and technology leaders by first focusing on core technologies. Consequently, China can only 

maintain its economic and military security through original innovation and not on relying on “dressing 

up” foreign technologies into Chinese products.33

China’s Space Strategy

China’s grand strategy is reflected in its pursuit of space power. Indeed, China’s space program has 

received high-level endorsement from China’s leadership. Mimicking the China Dream slogan, members 

of China’s space program are encouraged to chase the “Space Dream” (航天梦). According to Xi Jinping, 

“the dream of space flight (飞天梦) is an important part of the strong country dream (强国梦)”

34 and 

“the space dream is an important component of realizing the Chinese people’s mighty dream of national 

rejuvenation.”

35

The importance of the space program is rooted in the importance of the role high technology plays in 

China’s development. According to one researcher, “building China as a strong space power is the only 

way that China can rejuvenate to have wealth and power.”

36 According to this view, space technologies 

are both high risk yet a high value added strategic industry that places great demands on a country’s 

research and development apparatus across many different industries.37 As a result, the development of 

space technologies is both a display of a country’s technological capability and by extension a display of 

its military, economic, and scientific capabilities, but also a necessary move for a country that wants to 

strengthen its national power.38

SPACE POWER’S CONTRIBUTION TO

CHINA’S COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POWER

China’s space program furthers its grand strategy ambitions by adding to China’s CNP. Although space 

power is not a main contributor to China’s CNP, it nevertheless is considered an important component. 

Space activities increase China’s hard power by improving its military capability and economy and its soft 

power by enhancing its political status. As one analyst writes, “For a country, space activities not only can 

expand its strategic space, but also can also help it to gain the initiative in international political, economic, 

technological, military and diplomatic arenas.39

The Role of Space in China’s Military

China’s space program assists the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in its transformation into a military 

reliant on information for winning wars. According to China’s 2013 defense white paper, “China’s armed 

 

33 Ibid.

34“习近平”天地通话”激励中国飞天梦” [Xi Jinping: ‘Space to Earth Communications’ Encourages China’s Dream of Spaceflight], 

http://www.chinanews.com/gj/2013/06-25/4964690.shtml.

35“航天梦与中国梦” [The Space Dream and the China Dream], 中国航天报 [China Space News], July 31, 2013, 3.

36 Wu Weiqiang, “浅谈航天强国评价体系研究” [A Brief Discussion on Research on the Analysis of Strong Space Power 

Evaluation System], 航天工业管理 [Space Industry Management], 2013/3, 37.

37 Wu Weiqiang, “浅谈航天强国评价体系研究” [A Brief Discussion on Research on the Analysis of Strong Space Power 

Evaluation System], 航天工业管理 [Space Industry Management], 2013/3, 34.

38 Ibid., 33.

39 Feng Shuxing, 我国空间力量发展与空间安全的思考 [Reflection on Development of Space Power and Space Security] 装备

学院学报 [Journal of Academy of Equipment], October 2012, 9.
8

forces firmly base their military preparedness on winning local wars under the conditions of 

informatization.” Indeed, information superiority is seen now by the PLA as a primary component for 

winning future wars. The side that can best collect and process information and deny that ability to an 

adversary will be better able to detect and exploit battlefield opportunities and counter enemy 

movements. 

Chinese writings on space and counterspace indicate that China sees that it has widespread economic and 

military interests in space and that these interests must be protected. Underlying this analysis is the belief 

that “whoever controls space controls the Earth.” This belief is based on the premise that space is the new 

high ground on which success on the terrestrial battlefield is based. Indeed, space is so important to 

battlefield success that conducting modern war is not possible without its effective use. In November 

2009, then People’s Liberation Army Air Force Commander and now Vice Chairman of the Central Military 

Commission General Xu Qiliang stated that space had become a “new commanding height for 

international strategic competition” and that having control of the air and space “means having control 

of the ground, oceans, and the electromagnetic space, which also means having the strategic initiative in 

one’s hands.”

40

Space can be used for a variety of national security applications, including reconnaissance, meteorology, 

missile early warning, communication, and navigation. These technologies can provide critical capabilities 

to monitor the activities of potential adversaries, facilitate communication between far-flung forces, and 

provide navigation data to naval and air forces. Weapons can also be placed in space. These include 

ballistic missile defenses to intercept incoming nuclear-armed missiles, anti-satellite weapons to destroy 

orbiting satellites, and orbital bombardment systems that can conduct strikes against terrestrial targets.

A robust, space-based C4ISR system is often described as a critical component of a future networked PLA. 

The necessity to develop space-based C4ISR systems is based on the requirement to develop powerprojection and precision-strike capabilities. The development of long-range cruise missiles and anti-ship 

ballistic missiles for over-the-horizon attacks requires the ability to locate, track, and target enemy ships 

hundreds of kilometers away from China’s shores, as well as the ability to coordinate these operations 

with units from multiple services. In doing so, remote sensing satellites can provide intelligence on the 

disposition of enemy forces and provide strategic intelligence before a conflict begins. Communication 

satellites can provide global connectivity and can facilitate communications between far-flung forces. 

Navigation and positioning satellites can provide critical information on location and can improve the 

accuracy of strikes. 

However, the PLA also recognizes that it must deny the use of information to its opponents. Chinese 

analysts assess that the employment of space-based C4ISR capabilities by potential adversaries, especially 

the United States, requires the PLA to develop capabilities to attack space systems. Based on this 

assessment, Chinese analysts surmise that the loss of critical sensor and communications capabilities 

could imperil the U.S. military’s ability to achieve victory or to achieve victory with minimal casualties. 

According to the U.S. Defense Department, China is developing a wide range of counterspace technologies 

to include direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles, directed energy weapons, and jammers.41

 

40 “奋飞在新世纪的天空: 中央军委委员、空军司令员许其亮答本报记者问” [Flying with Force and Vigor in the Sky of the 

New Century—Central Military Commission Member and PLA Air Force Commander Xu Qiliang Answers Reporter’s Questions in 

an Interview], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], November 1, 2009.

41 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014,” 32. 
9

Despite the importance China’s military places on space, PLA military doctrine does not designate space 

as a unique operational campaign.42 Nevertheless, space operations play an important role in supporting 

other PLA campaigns and in the PLA’s anti-access/area denial operations. As a result, China’s military 

strategy, the missions given to the PLA, its thinking on modern war, and its concept of operations play a 

central role in how Chinese military analysts conceive of space operations and its role in Chinese military 

operations.

National Military Strategy

China’s national military strategy is served by the PLA’s military strategic guidelines, which in turn guide 

the PLA’s reform and modernization efforts. These guidelines represent a “capabilities-based and 

contingency-based strategy” that provides a direction “for the development of warfighting capabilities as 

well as professional and other institutional capacities...that are subject to larger-order national 

objectives.”

43 In doing so, the military strategic guidelines are “pragmatic, deliberate, and based on the 

types of calculations that any professional military establishment would undertake.”

44 According to David 

Finkelstein, based on this, China’s military strategy has four main components:

1. Provide for the defense of strategic assets on the mainland in light of twenty-first century

precision-guided munitions and other high-tech weapons that could be used to threaten China 

or actually be employed against the mainland;

2. Strengthen the deterrent value of its nuclear forces;

3. Fight and win high-tech joint campaigns in the maritime, aerospace, and electromagnetic battle 

spaces off its littoral if need be; and 

4. Field credible operational capabilities to deter potential aggression against the mainland or its 

interests (political or economic), support the diplomatic element of national power with real 

“teeth,” and provide options to China’s leaders across the full spectrum of operations, from 

“show of force” to the application of force in such a manner that any required escalation control 

can be managed.45

In 2004, the PLA was given more specific guidance to the types of operational capabilities it needed to 

develop and to the types of operations it is expected to conduct. Known as the “new historic missions”

(新历史使命), these missions give priority to certain responsibilities and guide the PLA in training and 

weapons and equipment acquisition. They also reflect China’s growing economic and security interests 

around the world and the PLA’s mission in protecting them. The new historic missions are:

• Guarantee Chinese Communist Party rule. The PLA remains the ultimate backer of the 

Communist Party.

• Safeguard the strategic opportunity for national development. The PLA is to deter aggression 

against China and protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity so that China may 

develop economically.

 

42 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China (2014), 32. 

43 David Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the “Military Strategic Guidelines,” in Right Sizing the 

People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007), 132.

44 Ibid., 131‒32.

45 Ibid., 130‒31.
10

• Safeguard national interests. The PLA must defend China’s interests, not only within its land 

borders, territorial waters, and territorial air space, but also in international waters, outer space, 

and in the electromagnetic sphere.

• Play an important role in world peace. China will maintain a defensive military strategy and will 

participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions and international cooperation on 

counterterrorism.46

The most important of the historic missions for the purposes of this paper is the third, devoted to 

safeguarding China’s national interests. This mission not only charged the PLA with defending China’s 

interests within its land borders, territorial waters, and territorial air space, but then expanded its 

responsibilities to defend China in international waters, outer space, and cyber space. Based on these 

missions, the PLA could be expected to develop operational concepts and weapons to carry out these 

missions.

Chinese Military Concept of Operations

A second factor that affects PLA space operations is its concept of operations. Chinese writings place a 

heavy emphasis on gaining the initiative at the outset of a conflict, including during the U.S. military’s 

deployment stage. The PLA, like most militaries, would prefer to fight a “quick war with a quick resolution”

(速战速决). Based on the their study of war since the 1982 Falklands War, PLA analysts assess that the 

relatively quick conclusion of modern wars places an emphasis on seizing the initiative at the outset of a 

campaign. Looking at the 1991 Gulf War, and the initial invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, 

Chinese military analysts assess that the PLA cannot allow the U.S. military to become fully prepared lest 

they cede victory. 

In carrying out this concept of operations, the Chinese government states that its national defense policy 

is “purely defensive in nature” and that it “places the protection of national sovereignty, security, 

territorial integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national development, and the interests of the 

Chinese people above all else.”

47 In doing so, China follows a military strategy of active defense (积极防

御), which was been described by Mao Zedong as “offensive defense or defense through decisive 

engagements...for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive.”

48

At face value, an adherence to a defensive national defense policy would seem to be counter to the goal 

of fighting a quick war with a quick resolution and the need to take the initiative at the beginning of an 

operation. In fact, there is little operational difference between China’s active defense strategy and an 

offensive military strategy. Chinese analysts assert that, within the context of protecting China’s national 

interests, the full range of offensive actions are possible. As a result, active defense is best thought of as 

a politically defensive but operationally offensive strategy in which China will maintain a rhetorically 

defensive posture up until the time that war appears imminent. Thus, any U.S. military support or 

deployment that is deemed a precursor to U.S. action could be grounds for a preemptive strike. In this 

case, the United States would be considered to have taken a “first shot” at the strategic level that would 

allow China to conduct first strikes at the operational and tactical levels.

 

46 Liberation Army Daily editorial department, “论新世纪新阶段我军的历史使命——写在《解放军报》创刊 50 周年之

际”[On Our Military's Historic Missions in the New Century, New Stage―Written on the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of 

the Liberation Army Daily], Liberation Army Daily (解放军报), 9 January 2006.

47 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense, December 2009.

48 Mao Zedong, Selected Military Writings of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 105.
11

Chinese thinking on active defense can be seen in writings on space operations. A 2013 textbook on space 

operations, for example, argues that China’s space strategy is defensive in nature and thus it will “do all it 

can at the strategic level to avoid firing the first shot” (emphasis added).49 In other places, however, the 

authors recommend conducting first strikes at the operational and tactical levels, writing that one should 

“strive to attack first at the campaign and tactical levels in order to maintain the space battlefield 

initiative”

50 and argue that fighting a quick war with a quick resolution is one of the “special characteristics 

of space operations” and that a military should “conceal the concentration of its forces and make a 

decisive large-scale first strike.”

51

Striking Centers of Gravity and Assassin’s Mace Weapons

A third factor influencing the conduct of space operations is the focus on striking centers of gravity. China’s 

military is no longer focused on fighting wars of annihilation in which the PLA will concentrate on killing 

large numbers of enemy troops. Instead, similar to how the U.S. military fights wars, the PLA now focuses 

on operational centers of gravity whose destruction or debilitation could have a direct impact on the 

overall battlefield situation. By striking these targets, the PLA hopes to create a cascade effect that will 

open up windows of opportunity that it can exploit to achieve a decisive effect on the battlefield. The PLA 

has identified these centers of gravity as those targets involved in collecting and processing information.

Indeed, information warfare and achieving information superiority is seen now as the main determiner of 

success on the battlefield. In fact, the PLA is now tasked with fighting and winning “local wars under 

conditions of informatization.” Under this goal, the PLA must not only be able to effectively use 

information but also deny information to an enemy. Information superiority, however, does not have to 

be achieved permanently across all battlefields and can be achieved locally for short periods of time. The 

goal, again, is to create windows of opportunity that can be exploited for overall success.

One important factor in the development of a force capable of striking centers of gravity and fighting 

informatized warfare is the requirement to develop ‘assassin’s mace weapons’ (杀手锏). While Chinese 

writers often use the term loosely to describe any technology, tactic, or strategy that could give the PLA 

an advantage, Chinese writings on space state that the term is more narrowly defined, and their 

development was ordered by then President Jiang Zemin, who encouraged the PLA to go from “fighting 

with the weapons it has” to “developing the weapons it needs.”

52 In this context, assassin’s mace weapons 

are described as a 

type of weapon that can be used suddenly with good effect and can deliver a fatal blow 

to the enemy. It can effectively deter and hinder an enemy from going to war, effectively 

strike against the enemy’s weaknesses, and restrain an enemy’s strike configuration.

Towards a side that is in a disadvantageous position, developing “assassins’ mace”

weapons is very significant.53

 

49 Jiang Lianju, 空间作战学教程 [Space Operations Textbook], (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2013), 42.

50 Ibid., 52.

51 Ibid., 142‒43.

52 Li Zhichong, Sun Qiangyin, and Li Rongkun, 高技术条件下非对称作战研究 [Asymmetric Operations Under High Technology 

Conditions] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000), 225.

53 Ibid.
12

The impetus to build assassin’s mace weapons is the result of policy guidance from the highest levels of 

the Chinese leadership. According to the biography of Chinese general and former vice chairman of the 

Central Military Commission, Zhang Wannian, the roots of the assassin’s mace weapons program lie in the 

accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. On the day of the bombing an emergency 

meeting was held to discuss the event, which was followed by an expanded meeting of the Central Military 

Commission (CMC) in which the PLA was ordered to develop strategic capabilities that could deter the 

United States.54 Although no details are given as to which specific weapons were approved, according to 

guidance given by Jiang Zemin, “what the enemy is most fearful of is what we should be developing.”

Furthermore, Zhang instructed the PLA to look at the requirements of future war and solve the problems 

of “seeing far, striking far, and striking accurately.”

55 The capabilities space technologies offer in 

strengthening C4ISR systems to better enable precision strikes and the ability to threaten enemy spacebased assets with counterspace technologies suggest that they were likely candidates for inclusion in 

Zhang’s directive.

Space Warfare

The PLA does not appear to have one official definition of space war, but all Chinese definitions of space 

war have the following characteristics:

• Military offensive and defensive operations in outer space

• Attacks against targets in air, ground, sea, or space from space 

• Attacks against targets in space from air, ground, sea, or space

The PLA’s interest in the use of space gained momentum after the 1991 Gulf War, which has been referred 

to as the first space war, and has only increased since. Chinese analysts noticed the increasing dependency 

on space by the U.S. military. According to some Chinese analysts, the U.S. military relies upon space for 

70‒80 percent of its intelligence and 80 percent of its communication.56 Some Chinese writings also 

attribute an almost omnipotent quality to U.S. space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) and conclude that the U.S. receives exquisite intelligence from these platforms.

Without a doubt, space has become more integrated with U.S. military operations and now plays a vital 

role at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. During the Gulf War, 50 satellites supported 

the U.S. war effort. In the 2003 Iraq War, that number had increased to more than 74.57 The Gulf War was 

the first conflict to feature the use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) for navigation, which has since 

become a critical component of precision guided munitions. During the Gulf War, just eight percent of 

munitions used were precision guided munitions (PGM) and those PGMs used were laser guided. Eight 

years later, during Operation Allied Force in the former Yugoslavia, three percent of munitions dropped 

 

54 Wu Qiong. “A Preliminary Exploration of Our Army’s Military Deterrent Thinking,” Military Historical Research, no. 2 (2002), 

16.

55 Guo Xiangjie, 张万年传 [The Biography of Zhang Wannian] (Beijing: PLA Press), 163.

56 Chang Xianqi, 军事航天学 [Military Astronautics] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 2002), 257‒58; and Chi Yajun and 

Xiao Yunhua, 信息化战争与信息作战理论精要 [The Fundamentals of Informationized Warfare and Information Operations 

Theory] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2006), 38‒39.

57 “Satellites Provide Vital Reconnaissance, Communications to War Effort,” Post-Gazette, April 2, 2003, http://old.postgazette.com/nation/20030402spacewar0402p4.asp.
13

were guided by GPS.58 This percentage had increased to 22 percent during the initial invasion of Iraq with 

90 percent of the munitions dropped on Baghdad being precision guided.59

During this time, the U.S. military also acquired a massive need for connectivity. During the 1991 Gulf War,

the U.S. military used 99 megabits per second (Mbps) of bandwidth. During the Iraq War that number had 

jumped to 3.63 gigabits per second (Gbps), even though fewer than one-quarter of the troops were 

involved in that conflict as compared to the Gulf War.60 From 2000‒2012, U.S. military satellite capacity 

usage had increased fivefold, due, in part, to an increase in the number of remotely piloted vehicles. 

Indeed, the number of remotely piloted vehicles the U.S. military is able to deploy may be limited by 

available satellite bandwidth.61 The need for more bandwidth has resulted in the Defense Department 

relying on commercial satellite providers for 40 percent of its satellite communication needs.62

The increasing reliance on space by the U.S. military has resulted in an increasing interest by Chinese 

analysts in counterspace technologies to deny potential adversaries the use of space. Counterspace 

technologies include kinetic- kill vehicles that destroy their targets by ramming them at high speeds, 

directed energy weapons such as lasers that can degrade or disable satellites, and co-orbital technologies 

that can orbit to a satellite and ram it or grab it for nefarious purposes. The most recent well-known 

example of an anti-satellite test was the 2007 Chinese test of a direct ascent kinetic-kill vehicle that 

destroyed a defunct weather satellite. 

Because of this, Chinese sources conclude that space warfare will follow the evolution of air warfare. 

Initially air power was used for reconnaissance over the European trenches of World War I. To deny access 

to this intelligence, airplanes were equipped with weapons to shoot down other aircraft. Other aircraft 

were assigned to bomb and strafe ground forces. During World War II, air power became more decisive 

and strategic, with air power playing a key role in naval operations and in the invasion of northern Europe. 

In recent conflicts, air power has played a critical role in achieving victory for the U.S. military. 

According to Chinese sources, space warfare is now at the equivalent stage of the state of air power in 

World War I in which intelligence gathering was the main mission of air forces.63 But just as with air power, 

space power will become so vital to military operations that militaries will seek to control space, resulting 

in a contest over its supremacy. As a result, Chinese analysts conclude that space war is inevitable and 

that the Chinese military must not only develop space-based C4ISR assets, but also develop the means to 

 

58 George C. Marshall Institute, “A Day Without Space: Economic and National Security Ramifications,” October 16, 2008, 26, 

http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Day-without-Space-Oct-16-2008.pdf.

59 T. Michael Moseley, “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM―By the Numbers,” USCENTAF, April 30, 2003, 

http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130613-025.pdf; “Smart Bombs’ Move to Center Stage in U.S. Arsenal,” The 

Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 2003, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0320/p06s01-woiq.html.

60 The George C. Marshall Institute, “A Day Without Space: Economic and National Security Ramifications,” 2008, 22‒27.

61 “Satellite Shortages May Choke off Military Drone Expansion,” National Defense, April 2013, 

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2013/April/Pages/SatelliteShortagesMayChokeOffMilitaryDroneExpansion.a

spx.

62 “Report to the Secretary of Defense: Taking Advantage of Opportunities for Commercial Satellite Communications Services, 

Report FY13-02,” Defense Business Board, http://dbb.defense.gov/Portals/35/Documents/Reports/2013/FY13-

02%20Taking%20Advantage%20of%20Opportunities%20for%20Commercial%20Satellite%20Communications%20Services.pdf.

63 Cai Fengzhen and Tian Anping, 空天战杨与中国空军 [The Air-Space Battlefield and China’s Air Force] (Beijing: Liberation 

Army Press, 2004), 36.
14

protect those assets and to deny an enemy access to its space-based C4ISR assets.64 In this regard, Chinese 

writers on space advocate the PLA to prepare to achieve space supremacy, defined as the ability to use 

space and to deny the use of space to its adversaries.

Space-based C4ISR 

Space-based C4ISR figures prominently in Chinese writings on C4ISR systems and is often considered a 

critical component in extending China’s power projection capabilities. Indeed, as China’s military is 

increasingly called to conduct operations farther from its shores, the utility of space becomes more 

important (see Figure 1). As Jesse Karotkin, Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) for China at the Office of Naval 

Intelligence (ONI), writes

In order to characterize activities in the “near seas,” China must build a maritime and air 

picture covering nearly 875,000 square nautical miles (sqnm). The Philippine Sea, which 

could become a key interdiction area in a regional conflict, expands the battlespace by 

another 1.5 million sqnm. In this vast space, many navies and coast guards converge 

along with tens of thousands of fishing boats, cargo ships, oil tankers, and other 

commercial vessels.65

Figure 1. The Chinese coastline and near seas

 

64 See, for example, Liu Xinde, “空间战” [Space Warfare], in China Strategic Rocket Force Encyclopedia Department, 中国战略

导弹部队百科全书 [China Strategic Rocket Unit Encyclopedia] (Beijing: China Encyclopedia Press, 2012), 60; and Zhang Zhiping, 

ed., 空军战略 [Air Force Strategy] (Beijing: China Encyclopedia Press, 2007), 122‒23.

65 Jesse Karotkin, “Trends in China’s Naval Modernization,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Security and Economic Review 

Commission, January 30, 2014.
15

As a result, space becomes more important in regards to targeting naval assets and the requirement to 

develop A2/AD capabilities against the U.S. Navy. The development of long-range cruise missiles and antiship ballistic missiles for over-the-horizon attacks requires the ability to locate, track, and target enemy 

ships hundreds or thousands of kilometers from China’s shores. In fact, Chinese analysts argue that 

development of this capability “cannot be separated from space power.”

66 Such capabilities could also be 

used to attack U.S. bases and the bases of its allies in Asia.

The capabilities derived from a space-enabled, networked force will also better integrate disparate 

services into a joint force, an essential prerequisite for winning informatized wars. Space-enabled 

operations allow a service to better support other services, for example, through precision strikes. 

Additionally, space-based C4ISR capabilities will allow services to share a common battlefield picture and 

better communicate.67

Counterspace Capabilities

Because space holds such a preeminent position on the battlefield and because overall victory flows from 

space superiority, many authors advocate the development of space weapons to achieve space 

superiority. In the words of one source, 

The development of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) will greatly enhance China’s prospects

of winning a regional high-tech war....It is not only necessary, but also feasible to develop 

such weapons.... To make certain the credibility of deterrence, and to safeguard its 

security and national interests in the 21st Century, China must apply an asymmetric 

strategy in accordance with its particular condition, actively researching and developing 

ASAT weapons.68

Many analysts argue that space will become the center of gravity in future wars and one that must be 

seized and controlled.69 In fact, analysts argue that the first condition for seizing the initiative is to achieve 

space supremacy. Because space will become the center of gravity in future wars, they argue, the first 

shots of a war will take place in space as adversaries vie for its control.70

Chinese military writers point to U.S. space policy and tests of counterspace technologies as evidence that 

the PLA needs to develop its own weapons. Chinese analysts point to the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy, 

which stated that “the United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other 

restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit access to or use of space,” and the 2010 U.S. National Space 

Policy, which states that “the United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of 

 

66 Wu Xiaopeng, Feng Shuxing, Zhang Yan, and He Zhonglong, 剖析一体化联合作战对空间力量的信息需求 [“Anatomizing the 

Integrative Joint Operations Information Requirement for the Space Force”], 装备指挥技术学院学报 [Journal of the Academy 

of Equipment Command and Technology], June 2006, 44; and Guan Qingbo, Luo Xiaoming, and Zhang Rong, 军事卫星信息支援

下导弹攻防作战仿真系统的研究与实现 [“The Research and Practice of the Simulation of Military Satellite Information 

Support to Offensive and Defensive Missile Operations”], 装备指挥技术学院试验指挥系 [Journal of the Academy of 

Equipment Command and Technology], March 2001, 32.

67 Zhu Hui, ed., 战略空军论 [Strategic Air Force] (Beijing: Blue Sky Press, 2009), 39.

68 Yuan Liwei and Yang Jianjun, “反卫星武器装备发展探过” [An Exploration of Anti-Satellite Weapon Development], 飞航导弹

[Winged Missiles], December 2004, 46.

69 Chang Xianqi, 军事航天学 [Military Astronautics], (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 2005), 259‒60.

70 Ibid. 
16

space for all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from 

interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allied space systems, 

and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them” as evidence that the U.S. government supports the 

development of counterspace weapons and their use.71 According to Chinese analysts, these include the 

1985 test involving the launch of a kinetic-kill vehicle from an F-15, the 1997 test of the MIRACL laser, the 

2008 shoot down of an errant satellite with an SM-3 missile, and the test of the XSS-11 satellite to test 

close proximity maneuvers.72

Chinese analysts offer four reasons why China must develop counterspace weapons. The first reason is to 

deny an adversary the use of space. In this context, the Chinese military would seek to deny the U.S. 

military use of information from its space-based assets. Chinese military analysts have noted the 

dependence of the U.S. military on space and have concluded that the loss of the use of space for the U.S.

military may cause it to lose the conflict. 

A second reason is in response to U.S. missile defenses. Chinese analysts regard the deployment of missile 

defense systems as giving the United States a de facto counterspace capability. Chinese analysts may also 

be concerned that the United States will deploy space-based interceptors.73 In this context, China may be 

concerned that space-based interceptors would negate its nuclear deterrent and require China to develop 

countermeasures to ensure the viability of its nuclear missile force.

A third reason is to protect Chinese space-based assets from attack and to prevent an adversary from 

using space to attack terrestrial targets.74 In this context, space weapons would protect Chinese spacecraft 

from attack through the interception of interceptors or co-orbital weapons. It could also include attacking 

the source conducting attacks against Chinese spacecraft. In addition, Chinese counterspace technologies 

would defend Chinese territory and forces from space-based attack.

In addition to actual warfighting, space power can also be used to coerce. Chinese analysts write that 

having the ability to destroy or disable an opponent’s satellites may deter an adversary from conducting 

counterspace operations against Chinese satellites. Space power can also improve the overall capabilities 

of a military and serve as a deterrent force not just against the use of specific types of weapons, but also 

as a general capability that can deter a country from even becoming involved in a conflict.75

 

71 Hou Menglan, Mu Yongming, and Peng Hui, “美国反卫星武器发展方向及启示” [Direction and Implication of the 

Development of the U.S. Anti-Satellite Weapons], 国防科技 [National Defense Science and Technology], 2013/1; and Yang 

Caixia and Ai Dun, “论中国发展反卫星武器的合法性,” [On the Legality of the Development of ASATs for China], 北京航空航

天大学学报(社会科学版) [Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics ( Social Sciences Edition)], March 

2010/2.

72 See, for example, Xu Jun, Weng Xiaodong, Zhou Wenming, “美俄激光反卫星武器的发展现状” [Development of American 

and Russian Laser Anti-Satellite Weapons], 激光与光电子学进展 [Advances in Laser and Opto-electtronics Studies], August 

2003; Li Daguang, “由美国”导弹打卫星”看其反卫星武器发展” [Using the U.S. ‘Missile to Hit a Satellite’ to View Its 

Development of Anti-Satellite Weapons], 国防技术基础 [National Defense Technology Basics], 2008/7; and Song Yanxue, 

Zhang Zhifeng, and Qi Lihui, “美国反卫星武器最新发展动态” [The Most U.S. Anti-Satelllite Weapons Recent Developments], 

飞航导弹[Winged Missile Journal], 2008/1. 

73 Jiang Lianju, 空间作战学教程 [Space Operations Textbook], (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2013), 127.

74 Chang, Military Astronautics, 260; and Zhang Zhiwei and Feng Chuangjiang, “Analysis of Future Integrated Air and Space 

Operations [空天战长与国家空天安全战略],” 中国军事科学 [China Military Science], no. 2 (2006): 58.

75 Jiang Lianju, Space Operations Textbook, 127.
17

In carrying out these missions, Chinese analysts discuss a combination of both hard and soft attacks. Soft 

attacks refer to attacks whose effects are often temporary and do not create debris. These can include 

the use of electromagnetic radiation, infrared, or laser interference and jamming methods. They can also 

include computer network operations to infiltrate space information systems in order to steal, tamper 

with, and delete computer code and information in an attempt to deceive or obstruct adversary 

operations.76 According to another author:

A military satellite cannot connect with the Internet. Therefore, some people think 

“hackers” cannot attack a satellite’s command and control [system]. But in actuality, the 

microwave antenna of the satellite control is open, so one can intercept satellite 

information through technological means and seize the satellites command and control 

[system]. Using this as a springboard to invade the enemy’s independent network systems 

is entirely possible.77

Hard attacks, on the other hand, refer to the employment of weapons systems to destroy space- and 

terrestrially-based space assets. Kill methods include nuclear weapons, kinetic weapons such as missiles 

and satellites, and high power directed energy weapons such as lasers, particle beams, and microwaves.78

Even before China’s 2007 ASAT test, Chinese analysts preferred soft attack methods to hard attacks 

because they do not produce debris and often produce temporary effects that can be useful when trying 

to limit escalation or when targeting third-party satellites. Moreover, the effects of soft methods may be 

less observable than hard kill methods, which may enable China to attack satellites covertly and thus may 

be more prone to use in politically sensitive situations.79 Hard kill methods, however, are still considered 

to be of value and can be used when soft kills are ineffective or unsuitable for the mission.80

Manned Platforms

Chinese analysts also see a role for manned platforms in space warfare. Manned platforms are described 

as more responsive than unmanned platforms and able to employ a variety of weapons.81 Other authors

write that manned platforms are “the best space weapon for attacking satellites in low Earth orbit, 

synchronous orbit, and high orbit.”

82

Manned space platforms include space capsules, space stations, and space planes. Space capsules and 

space planes can transport goods and people between ground and space, carry out space rescue missions, 

and conduct reconnaissance and surveillance against targets.83 According to an article written by the 

current director of the China Manned Space Agency, space stations can service military satellites in orbit, 

 

76 Chang, Military Astronautics, 295‒96.

77 Xiao Wenguang and Li Yuanlei. “计算机网络于未来战争” [Computer Networks in Future Wars], 江苏航空 [Jiangsu Aviation]

1 (2007), 31.

78 Qi Xianfeng, 空间信息系统防护探讨 [“Study on the Protection of Space Information System”], 装备指挥技术学院学报

[Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command and Technology], 2007/5, 62.

79 Ibid, 173.

80 Ibid, 258.

81 Li Yiyong, Li Zhi, and Shen Huairong, “临近空间飞行器发展与应用分析” [Analysis on Development and Application of Near 

Space Vehicle],” 装备指挥技术学院学报 [Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command and Technology], 2008/2, 64 and 

Chang, Military Astronautics, 118‒19.

82 Li, Cheng, and Zheng, Integrated Aerospace Information Operations, 218.

83 Chang, Military Astronautics, 123, 145.
18

including repair, maintenance, fueling, and replenishment of ammunition, as well as serve as platforms 

for kinetic and directed energy weapons.84

Co-orbital Counterspace Technologies

Chinese researchers also discuss the use of co-orbital counterspace technologies. As one researcher states, 

the “ample use of the superiority and characteristics of modern small satellites (satellites with a mass 

between 100 and 500 kg), ingeniously applied to space attack and defense, will cause small satellites to 

become a space weapon assassin’s mace.”

85 Co-orbital satellites are those satellites that come within a 

close distance to another satellite to interfere with, disable, or destroy the target satellite. Co-orbital 

satellites can be armed with kinetic energy weapons, lasers, radio frequency weapons, jammers, or 

robotic arms that can dismember the satellite. Co-orbital satellites can also be armed with unusual 

weapons, such as “spray paint” that can be used to paint over optical lenses or even “umbrellas” that can 

block the view of sensors. Finally, co-orbital satellites can crash into another satellite or self-destruct close 

to the target satellite. Moreover, co-orbital satellites do not have to be dedicated to the counterspace 

role and instead can serve legitimate peacetime functions.86

Co-orbital satellite weapons can come in the form of operational satellites performing legitimate 

peacetime missions, free-floating dedicated co-orbital weapons such as space mines, and satellites that 

can be released from a “mother” satellite. Co-orbital space weapons can orbit alone, in constellations, or 

be hidden among debris, and can be deployed in four ways. “Trailing ASATs” follow close to their target 

satellite, mimicking their orbital movements. This type of weapon would be easy to detect and would 

probably not be used unless a country were attempting to signal. So-called parasitic satellites, on the 

other hand, can attach themselves to the target satellite to be employed at an appropriate time. A third 

type of deployment is to place the attacking satellite in a distant part of the same orbit as the target 

satellite, though this method would increase the chances of detection as it maneuvered to its target. The 

final method is to place the attacking satellite in the crossing orbit of the target satellite so that its orbit 

approaches the target satellite at a certain time and place.87

Given the variety of employment methods and the possibility of covert peacetime employment, the use 

of co-orbital ASAT weapons potentially complicates the ability of the U.S. military to defend its satellites. 

Moreover, even if a satellite was identified as being a co-orbital weapon during peacetime, the U.S. 

military would have to detect its employment during wartime far enough in advance, so as to issue 

repositioning commands to the target satellite. A country unaware that its satellites are the targets of a 

co-orbital attack could not take steps to defend itself. A country with an effective space surveillance 

network, however, could detect an attack and take relatively simple steps that due to orbital dynamics 

would make it difficult for a co-orbital attack to be successful. Thus the effectiveness of co-orbital satellites 

is somewhat dependent on the “cooperativeness” of the target satellite.

 

84 Wang Zhaoyao, “军事航天技术及其发展” [Military Space Technology and Its Development], 航天器工程 [Spacecraft 

Engineering] 1 (2008): 17.

85 Lin Laixing, “Study on the Overseas Microsatellite Application in Space Attack-Defense (国外微小卫星在空间攻防中的应用

研究),” Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command and Technology (装备指挥技术学院学报), 2006/6, 49.

86 See, for example, Huang Siyong and Xu Peide, “空间武器平台潜伏轨道分布模型研究” [Study of Distributed Model of 

Hidden Orbits for Space Weapons Platforms], 航天控制 [Aerospace Control], June 2007; and Ma Wendi, 小卫星编队与反卫星

卫星 [“Small Satellite Formations and ASAT Satellites”], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], April 2006.

87 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual (Cambridge: American 

Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005), 151.
19

China’s View on Outer Space Weapons and Arms Control

China maintains that “outer space is common heritage of all mankind, and the benefits of space 

development should be enjoyed by all,” and that “for any country, to maximize the military and security 

value of outer space, or even seek to place weapons there, would yield no benefit to the security of its 

own or the world.”

88 Before China’s 2007 ASAT test, Chinese policy was widely regarded as unconditionally 

opposed to all types of ASAT weapons. Official Chinese policy, however, only expresses opposition to the 

“deployment of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against objects in outer space, so 

as to ensure that outer space is used purely for peaceful purposes.”

89

With this formulation, the Chinese stance on space weapons neither prohibits the development, testing, 

and deployment of terrestrially-based counterspace weapons, such as direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles 

and directed energy weapons nor the development of any type of counterspace weapon or their storage, 

including space-based weapons, as long as they are not deployed in space. Moreover, China’s stance does 

not prohibit “use of force” or the “threat of force” against objects in space during armed conflict. 

According to a Chinese and Russian draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer 

Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects” nothing in the proposed treaty “may 

be interpreted as impeding the exercise by the States Parties of their right of self-defense in accordance 

with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”

90 This last condition renders the treaty useless 

considering the emphasis of China’s military strategy on striking first and since most countries claim the 

right of self-defense before going to war.

Economic and Commercial Benefits

In addition to military utility, China has also embraced its space program as a driver of economic and 

technological advancement. China’s 2006 space white paper states: “Since the space industry is an 

important part of the national overall development strategy, China will maintain long term, steady 

development in this field.”

91 China sees much potential in developing the space market. Revenue from 

the global space industry increased 7 percent to $304.31 billion in 2012. This is a 63 percent increase from

$186.64 billion in 2005. Of this amount, 26 percent, or $78.44 billion, is made up of government space 

budgets, which increased just 1 percent in 2012. The largest portion of the space economy is commercial 

satellite services, which accounts for 38 percent of global space activity or $115.97 billion. This includes 

telecommunications, earth observation, and positioning services.92 China has identified four areas in 

which its space program brings economic benefits: 1) Creating a market for high technology; 2) The 

development of “spin-off” civilian technologies; 3) The use of satellite application technologies; and 4) 

The export of satellites and commercial launch services. 

 

88 “Remarks by H.E. Ambassador WU Haitao at the Space Security Conference 2014,” United Nations Conference on 

Disarmament, March 19, 2014, http://www.china-un.ch/eng/dbtyw/cjjk_1/cjthsm/t1140194.htm.

89 Full text of white paper on arms control: State Council Information Office, “China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament 

and Non-Proliferation,” www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Aug/140343.htm.

90 “Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament and People’s Republic of China to the Conference on Disarmament,” 

CD/1839, accessed November 3, 2014, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/604/02/PDF/G0860402.pdf?OpenElement.

91 Information Office of the State Council, China’s Space Activities in 2006, October 2006, 

http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620681/n771967/79970.html.

92 Space Foundation, The Space Report 2013: The Authoritative Guide to Global Space Activity (Washington, DC: Space 

Foundation, 2013), 5‒6.
20

Market Creation and Spin-off Technologies

According to Chinese analysts, space has its most profound effect on high technology development, with 

investments in space technologies said to yield $10 in gross domestic product growth for every dollar 

spent.

93 Space programs can be large endeavors requiring the participation of numerous government and 

commercial entities and involving many different technologies, including propulsion, electronics, 

computers, guidance, power supply, and materials.94 The demand created by space projects can spur 

advancement in computers, microelectronics, precision manufacturing, automatic control, new energy, 

and new materials. Chinese analysts point to the U.S. Apollo program as the best example of this, which 

is said to have led to advances in radar, radio-guidance, synthetic materials, computers, and biological 

engineering and laid a solid foundation for U.S. high-technology development and technology-based 

military innovation.

95

Chinese analysts point to a similar effect in their country. China’s first computer was used to develop 

space technology.96 Of the 1,000 new materials developed in China, 80 percent are said to have resulted 

from research in space technology; and more than 2,000 space technology achievements have been 

reported in various sectors of the national economy and nearly 1,000 products developed by the space 

industry have been converted for civilian use. Finally, the work of the more than 3,000 enterprises 

involved in China’s human spaceflight program is said to have contributed to technological progress in 

electronics, new materials, and automatic control.97

The creation of markets for high technology products is also intended to support the development of 

China’s other strategic emerging industries through the introduction of spin off 

technologies―technologies originally developed for the space industry that have found a civilian 

application. This effort is conducted through eight industrial parks called “aerospace bases” formed 

through partnerships between the space industry and the governments of Beijing, Shanghai, Xi’an, 

Chengdu, Tianjin, Inner Mongolia, Shenzhen, and Hainan. These bases are not only designed to 

manufacture space products, but also to leverage the industry’s capabilities in space technologies to build 

civilian products. In doing so, the space industry focuses on technologies and products in areas identified 

as strategic emerging industries by the central government. These include high-end manufacturing, 

alternative energy, new materials, alternative energy automobiles, and new generation information 

technologies.98

 

93 This figure appears to be taken from studies of the Apollo program, which have never been definitively proven. Zhang 

Shaoqiang, “我国航天产业发展的战略重点与几点思考” [Some Reflections on Our Country’s Space Industry Strategic 

Development], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2007/4, 3.

94 Hou Dandan, “中国航天发射服务参与国际竞争的对策研究” [Research on Countermeasure of Participation in International 

Competition of China Aerospace Launching Service], 导弹与航天运载技术 [Missile and Launch Vehicle Technology], 2000/6, 

43.

95 Feng Shuxing, “我国空间力量发展与空间安全的思考” [Reflection on Development of Space Power and Space Security] 装

备学院学报 [Journal of Academy of Equipment], October 2012, 9.

96 Zhang Qingwei, “发展中的中国航天” [China’s Space Program in Development], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2007/8, 3.

97 Feng, “Reflection on Development of Space Power and Space Security,” 9; Zhang Shaoqiang, “我国航天产业发展的战略重点

与几点思考” [Some Reflections on Our Country’s Space Industry Strategic Development], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2007/4, 

3.

98 Ma Xingrui, “坚持自主创新推动中国航天事业又好又快发展” [Continue with Indigenous Innovation and Promote the 

Development of China’s Space Enterprise], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 8 (2011), 5.
21

Satellite Application Technologies

A second area where space can help improve the economy is in the satellite application market. Satellite 

application technologies refer to ancillary products designed to add value to the information provided by 

space technologies, such as satellite communications, remote sensing data, and satellite navigation 

products. Satellite communication applications include such services as satellite television and telephony. 

Remote sensing includes imagery of the earth in order to monitor agricultural use, environmental 

protection, or municipal planning. Satellite navigation products include satellite navigation receivers such 

as GPS receivers. 

Commercial Launch Services and Satellite Exports

The third way in which space helps improve China’s economy is through commercial launch services and 

satellite exports. China realizes that its space program must be successful in international markets if it is 

to become a leading space power, and the international competiveness of its space industry is viewed as 

an indicator of the space industry’s overall strength.99 China’s struggles with developing commercial space 

capabilities are placed squarely on the United States and its export control laws that prohibit U.S.-

manufactured satellites and satellites containing U.S. manufactured components from being launched by 

China. 100

Because of this, China has focused on marketing launch services and satellites to markets in Europe and 

the developing world.101 Since U.S. export control laws bar most satellites from being launched on Chinese 

rockets, China has decided that it must also export satellites so that it can completely break free of U.S. 

trade restrictions by offering Chinese-made satellites launched on Chinese rockets.102 In doing so, China 

aims to capture 10 percent of the world’s commercial satellite market and 15 percent of the global space 

launch business by 2015.103 While the number of Chinese commercial launches is increasing, China is still 

some way from meeting its goal.

The results of China’s commercial launch efforts are shown in Table 1. Commercial launches are defined 

in different ways and thus two annual commercial launch numbers are used here―one from the space 

consulting company Futron and the other from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The 

number of Chinese commercial launches is further muddied by China’s own calculations. As a result, this 

paper uses total commercial launch numbers by Futron and the FAA that takes into account two different 

methods of calculating the market share of Chinese commercial launches. The first measure is a more 

liberal definition of Chinese commercial launches provided by the China Great Wall Industry Corporation 

(CGWIC) that includes launches of satellites owned or operated by the Chinese government or a Chinese 

state-owned enterprise. This would include satellites launched for the China Satellite Communications Co. 

Ltd., a subsidiary of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, and the China-Brazil Earth

Remote Sensing Satellite (CBERS) jointly developed by the Chinese and Brazilian governments. Another 

measure, called true Chinese commercial launches, is defined as the commercial launch of a satellite not 

owned or operated, in whole or part, by the Chinese government or a Chinese state-owned enterprise. 

 

99 Ibid.

100Zhang Huiting, “中国航天发射业开拓国际市场对策分析” [Policy Analysis on Opening Up the International Market for 

China’s Space Launch Industry], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2005/4, 7.

101 Ibid.

102 Zhang, “Policy Analysis,” 8.

103 Xin Dingding, “China Seeks Bigger Share of Global Satellite Market,” China Daily, October 21, 2010.
22

Table 1. China’s share of the commercial launch market

Chinese 

Commercial 

Launches Country

World 

Commercial

Launches, 

Futron

PRC Share, 

Futron

(%)

PRC Share, 

Futron, w/PRC 

owned sats 

(%)

World 

Commercial 

Launches, 

FAA

PRC Share, 

FAA

(%)

PRC Share, FAA,

w/PRC owned 

sats (%)

Market Share

Range

(%)

Market Share 

Range w/PRC 

owned sats 

(%)

2007

NigComSat-1 Nigeria 20 5.0 10.0 23 4.35 8.7 4.35‒5.0 8.7‒10.0

ChinaSat-6B ChinaSat, CH

2008

VeneSat-1 Venezuela 26 3.85 7.69 28 3.57 7.14 3.57‒3.85 7.14‒7.69

ChinaSat-9 ChinaSat, CH

2009

PALAPA-D Indonesia 23 4.35 24 4.17 4.17‒4.35 4.17‒4.35

2010

― ― 17 0 0 23 0 0 0 0

2011

Paksat-1R Pakistan 16 18.75 NA 18 16.67 NA 16.67‒18.75 16.67‒18.75

W3C France

NigComSat-1R Nigeria

2012

Vesselsat-2 Luxembourg 19 15.79 26.32 20 15.0 25.0 15.0‒15.79 25.0‒26.32

VRSS-1 Venezuela

GÖKTÜRK-2 Turkey

APSTAR-VII Hong Kong

ChinaSat-12 ChinaSat, CH

2013

3U ISIPOD Netherland 19 10.53 NA 23 8.7 NA 8.7‒10.53 8.7‒10.53

TKSAT-1 Bolivia

According to these numbers, using the first and more liberal Chinese definition of commercial launches,

China was able to meet its goal of 15 percent of the launch market for four years between 2007‒2013. 

Using the more restrictive definition of true Chinese commercial launches, China was only able to meet 

its goal for two of those years. 

Satellite Exports

Another area of emphasis for China’s commercial space effort is satellite exports. China has built 

communication satellites for Nigeria, Venezuela, Pakistan, Bolivia, and a remote sensing satellite for 

Venezuela. It has also signed contracts for satellites with Belarus, Laos, and Sri Lanka for communication 

satellites and Venezuela for an additional remote sensing satellite. China’s satellite exports cannot be 

divorced from its diplomatic agenda, however, and it is no coincidence that China’s first two satellite 

export agreements were signed with countries with large oil reserves—Nigeria and Venezuela. 

China’s Satellite Exports in Detail

Nigeria

China’s first satellite export was to Nigeria for the Nigeria Communications Satellite-1 (Nigcomsat-1). The 

contract for this satellite was signed in 2004 and launched in 2007, but failed in 2008 due to a faulty solar 

array. It was replaced by the Nigcomsat-1R launched in 2011. Although sources are unclear, Nigcomsat-1 

cost in the range of $310 million for the building, launch, and operation of the satellite, and training of 

Nigerian personnel. China reportedly outbid 21 other competitors.104

 

104 “Nigeria’s N40bn Satellite Missing from Orbit,” November 12, 2008, http://www.nairaland.com/194568/nigerias-n40bnsatellite-missing-orbit.
23

Venezuela

China has built and launched two satellites, a communication satellite in 2008 and a remote sensing in 

2012 for Venezuela and in 2014 agreed to build and launch a second remote sensing satellite. The 

Venesat-1 “Simon Bolivar” communications satellite project was proposed by Venezuelan President Hugo 

Chavez in 2004 and began in 2005 with the signing of a $400 million contract. It was launched in 2008. 

The VRSS-1 “Francisco de Miranda” remote sensing satellite was launched in 2012 on a $144.8 million 

contract, which included $67.8 million for the satellite, $22 million for the launch, $16 million for the use 

of ground stations, $22 million for software, $2 million for a modeling system, and $7 million for training. 

It is equipped with a 2.5-meter resolution color imager and a 10-meter multispectral imager.105 In July 

2014, China and Venezuela signed a second contract for a remote sensing satellite in which China would 

build, launch, and help operate the satellite. No cost figures have been given.106

Pakistan

China launched Pakistan’s first satellite, Pakistan-1R, on August 11, 2011. The satellite is based on the 

DFH-4 satellite bus with 18 Ku-band and 12 C-band transponders and a service life of 15 years.107 The cost 

of the contract was not revealed by either the Pakistani or Chinese government, but a Chinese source 

states that Pakistan received a nearly $200 million discount.108

Bolivia

China has built one communication satellite for Bolivia. China launched the Tupac Katari (TKSat)-1 

telecommunications satellite on December 21, 2013, for a total package cost of $302 million that included 

the building, launch, and operation of the satellite, and training of Bolivian personnel.109

Launch Services

In addition to satellite exports, launch services are also another critical area of China’s commercial space 

effort. China has provided launch services to Indonesia, Turkey, Ecuador, Argentina, and Luxembourg and 

has signed contracts with Laos, Belarus, Sri Lanka, Congo, and Algeria. In 2011, CASC launched a satellite 

for European satellite communications provider Eutelsat. This was the first time that China had launched 

a foreign-made satellite for a foreign client since 1999. CASC also signed contracts for launch services with 

Turkey for its GK-2 satellite and with Luxembourg for two microsatellites (satellites with a mass between 

10 and 100 kg). Figures on the cost of Chinese launches are scarce, but according to one BBS source the 

cost to launch the Palapa-D Indonesian communications satellite was $52 million.110 If such costs are 

 

105 Rui C. Barbosa, “Chinese Long March 2D Launches Venezuela’s VRSS-1 Satellite,” September 28, 2012, 

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2012/09/chinese-long-march-2d-launches-vrss-1/; and “中国遥感卫星突破零出口” [China 

Breaks Through Zero Remote Sensing Satellites], September 29, 2014, 

http://war.163.com/12/1009/14/8DCOPFNC00014J0G.html.

106“中国将向委内瑞拉在轨交付一颗遥感卫星,” [China Will Orbit Another Remote Sensing Satellite for Nigeria], July 22, 2014, 

http://news.10jqka.com.cn/20140722/c566670542.shtml.

107 Salman Sidiqqi, “PAKSAT-1R: China Launches Pakistan’s ‘First’ Communication Satellite, Express Tribune, August 12, 2011, 

http://tribune.com.pk/story/229797/paksat-1r-china-launches-pakistans-first-communications-satellite/.

108 Yan Zhonghua, “中国和巴基斯坦签署通信卫星项目合作协议” [China and Pakistan Sign Cooperative Agreement for 

Satellite Project], 中国军网 [China Military Net], September 28, 2009, http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/xwpdxw/2009-

09/18/content_4043287.htm.

109“中国为玻发射卫星造价 3 亿美元 中方担部分费用,” [China Will Launch a Satellite for Bolivia Worth $300 Million, China to 

Provide a Portion of Funding], sina.com, December 22, 2013, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-12-22/023929048296.shtml.

110

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WWAmXVLdrXEJ:bbs.9ifly.cn/forum.php%3Fmod%3Dviewthread%2

6action%3Dprintable%26tid%3D266+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
24

representative of China’s launch costs then China appears to be much more competitive than Europe’s 

Arianespace, where costs can range from $56 to 120 million.111

Political Benefits and Cooperative Activities

The Chinese government also uses its space program for domestic and international political gain. Space 

programs are described as an indicator of a country’s comprehensive national power and as a measure of 

a country’s rank in the world. The Chinese leadership believes that major powers have large space 

programs, and to be considered a major power one must have the trappings of a big power. This sentiment 

was most evident in the approval of the human spaceflight program, when many in the top leadership 

voiced support for the program based on its effect on prestige.112

The space program’s effect on prestige is also directed inward. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is now 

communist in name only, and its continued legitimacy is predicated on delivering economic and 

nationalistic benefits in an informal social contract with its citizens: the CCP agrees to increase the 

standard of living and develop China into an internationally respected country, and the people agree not 

to rebel. By developing a robust space program and participating in high-profile activities such as human 

space flight and lunar exploration, the CCP can demonstrate that it is the best provider of material benefits 

to the Chinese people and the best organization to propel China to its rightful place in world affairs.

China conducts numerous cooperative activities with other countries and states that it holds international 

exchanges and cooperation “to promote inclusive space development on the basis of equality and mutual 

benefit, peaceful utilization and common development.”

113 China pursues cooperative activities for a 

number of reasons. These include improving its international position, increasing its influence among less 

developed countries, and technology transfer. This section details China’s major multilateral and bilateral 

space cooperation activities.

Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization

China’s most prominent multilateral cooperative activity is the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation 

Organization (APSCO/亚太空间合作组织). APSCO was formally established in 2008 and is headquartered 

in Beijing. It is made up of nine member countries: China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, 

Peru, Thailand, and Turkey, and has been granted permanent status at the UN Committee on the Peaceful 

Uses of Outer Space. The purpose of APSCO is to promote multilateral cooperation in space science, 

technology, and applications between the member countries. In doing so, it conducts cooperation in six 

areas:

1. Space technologies and their application.

2. Earth observation, disaster management, environmental protection, satellite communications, 

and satellite navigation and positioning.

3. Space science research.

4. Education, training, and exchange of scientists and technology.

 

111 Amy Svitak, “Proving It,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 10, 2014, 48‒51; Craig Covault, “Space Probes,” Aviation 

Week & Space Technology, May 5, 2008, 28‒30.

112 Deng Ningfeng, ed., 天河圆梦 [Dream About the Milky Way Fulfilled] (Beijing: China Astronautics Press, 2004), 41.

113 Information Office of the State Council, China’s Space Activities in 2011, December 2011, 

http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-12/29/content_2033200.htm.
25

5. Establishment of a central data bank for development of programs of the organization and 

dissemination of technical and other information relating to the programs and activities of the 

Organization.

6. Other cooperative programs agreed upon by the Member States.

Much of APSCO’s work appears to focus on training, with nine events being held from 2009 to 2012. In 

addition to training, APSCO regularly holds international conferences, mainly on the application of space 

technologies to fields such as agriculture and earthquake monitoring. Through ASPCO, China has donated 

ground systems to member countries, including a data broadcasting system for its Fengyun 

meteorological satellites to several member countries and a receiving station for remote sensing data to 

Thailand.114 China will also provide remote sensing data from its Gaofen, Ziyuan, Fengyun, and Haiyang 

satellites to member countries.115

APSCO has seven ongoing multinational R&D projects. These include the development of a data-sharing 

platform for remote sensing, a unified space observation network, a high-resolution earth observation 

satellite, a communication satellite and communication satellite applications, the promotion of satellite 

navigation technologies, and research on atmospheric effects on satellite communications.116

Brazil

The most visible of China’s bilateral space activities are those conducted with Brazil, which has longstanding scientific and technological ties with China. China’s first space cooperation agreement with Brazil 

was signed in 1984 concerning communication and remote sensing satellites, image processing, launch 

vehicles, and sounding rockets, but China’s most prominent and first space cooperative activity with Brazil 

is the China-Brazil Earth Remote Sensing Satellite (CBERS).117 In 1988, China and Brazil agreed to jointly 

develop two identical remote sensing satellites with China responsible for a 70 percent and Brazil a 30 

percent share of the $300 million project.

118 The total included the costs of two satellites, their launchers, 

and launch services.119 This agreement resulted in the development of the CBERS-1 and CBERS-2 satellites, 

launched in 1999 and 2003, respectively. These satellites, along with future CBER satellites, were jointly 

operated and controlled from Brazil’s Satellite Control Center in São José dos Campos and China’s Xi’an 

Satellite Control Center.120

The development of CBERS-1 and 2 was followed by an agreement in 2002 for two additional satellites, 

CBERS-3 and 4. These were equipped with improved payloads and were funded on a 50‒50 cost share 

 

114 Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, “Introduction of the Organization and Its Space Cooperative Activities,” 

http://swfound.org/media/41415/11.%20pres%20swfcas%20space%20policies%20and%20laws%20-%20xu%20yansong%20-%20apsco%20intro.pdf; and Asia-Pacific Space 

Cooperation Organization, “Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO),” 

http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/Archive/20th/ARF%20Workshop%20on%20Space%20Security,%20Hoi%20An,%206-

7December2012/Annex%2019%20-%20APSCO.pdf.

115 Wu Minghui, “中国为亚太空间合作组织成员国提供遥感卫星数据”[China Provides Remote Sensing Satellite Data to APSCO 

Member Countries], ifeng.com, July 6, 2013, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2013_07/06/27207409_0.shtml.

116 “Program,” APSCO, http://www.apsco.int/program.asp?LinkNameW1=ACAP&LinkCodeN=88.

117 Jose Monseratt Filho, “Brazilian-Chinese Space Cooperation: An Analysis,” Space Policy, May 1997, 157.

118 “History,” CBERS, http://www.cbers.inpe.br/ingles/satellites/history.php.

119 Filho, “Brazilian-Chinese Space Cooperation,” 158.

120 “Control,” CBERS, http://www.cbers.inpe.br/ingles/satellites/control.php.
26

basis.121 CBERS-3 was launched in December 2013 but due to a launch failure did not reach orbit. CBERS4 is scheduled to be launched at the end of 2014.

In 2004, the two countries signed another agreement for the construction and launch of CBERS-2B, which 

was launched in 2007 and operated until 2010.122 This satellite was similar to CBERS-1 and 2. A CBERS-5 

satellite is planned to be launched in 2017.123

China and Brazil shared development responsibilities for the service and payload modules for CBERS-1, 2, 

and 2B (see Table 2). The service module includes technologies for the operation of the satellite and is 

composed of the structure, thermal control, orbit and attitude control, energy supply, on-board 

supervision, and service telecommunications subsystems. The payload module includes the cameras, 

image data transmitters, recorder, and transponder for the Brazilian Environmental Data Collection 

System.124

Table 2. CBERS-1, 2, and 2B service and payload module technology development

Service Module

Structure Brazil

Thermal Control China 

Attitude and Orbit Control China 

Power Brazil

On Board Supervision China 

Service Telecommunication Brazil/China 

Payload Module

CCD Camera China 

IRMSS Camera (CBERS-1 and 2) and HRC (CBERS-2B) China 

WFI Camera Brazil 

Image Data Transmitter China 

Transponder for the Brazilian Environmental Data 

Collection System

Brazil 

Space Environmental Monitor China 

Source: Industrial Participation CBERS-1, 2 and 2B,” CBERS website, 

http://www.cbers.inpe.br/ingles/satellites/participation_industrial.php.

 

121 “CBERS 3 and 4 Launching,” CBERS, http://www.cbers.inpe.br/ingles/satellites/launching_cbers3_4.php.

122 “CBERS 2B Launching,” http://www.cbers.inpe.br/ingles/satellites/launching_cbers2b.php.

123 “Brazilian President Rousseff Trumpets Cooperation in Science, Space with China,” Xinhuanet, July 18, 2014, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-07/18/c_133492063.htm.

124 “Industrial Participation CBERS-1, 2 and 2B,” CBERS, http://www.cbers.inpe.br/ingles/satellites/participation_industrial.php.
27

Russia

China’s longest cooperative space relationship is with Russia and its predecessor, the Soviet Union. This 

relationship began in the 1950s when the Soviet Union transferred rocket technologies, including 

complete rockets, to China. Their cooperation came to a halt with the breakdown of relations between 

the two countries in 1958. In the 1990s, the relationship was reignited as China’s human spaceflight 

program gained momentum and the Russian space industry was in need of cash. During this time, China 

purchased a docking mechanism and a life support system that were reengineered for use on the 

Shenzhou space capsule. Russia also trained two Chinese astronauts in the mid-1990s who then served as 

trainers for other Chinese astronauts. More recently, China has a long-term cooperation plan with Russia 

that has resulted in agreements on joint space science and deep space exploration and the opening of a 

Russian Federal Space Agency office in Beijing and a Chinese National Space Agency (CNSA) office in 

Moscow. 125 As with other defense technologies, Russia’s relationship with China on space technologies is 

not without controversy. Owing to Chinese reverse engineering, some argue that Russia has received little 

long-term benefit from its cooperation with China.126

The two countries have been discussing, and in some cases, implementing more truly cooperative 

activities. The most prominent cooperation to date has been the failed Mars mission, Phobos-Grunt, 

launched in 2012. The Chinese satellite Yinghuo-1 was paired with the Russian satellite Phobos-Grunt,

which was to retrieve soil samples from the Mars moon, Phobos. China’s Yinghuo-1, which was to study 

the space environment around Mars, was attached to the Russian satellite and was to be deployed as the 

spacecraft neared Mars. Due to a malfunction with the Russian satellite soon after launch, neither craft 

was able to complete the mission and both satellites burned up on reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere.

Despite this setback, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin has stated that his country is “ready 

to go forth with our Chinese friends, hand in hand” on human spaceflight and exploration of the solar 

system, including exploration of the moon and Mars.127 The exact nature of the cooperation is unclear at 

this point and may include a joint Russian-Chinese space station to replace the International Space Station 

(ISS) or Russian participation in China’s space station, as well as cooperation in rocket engine 

development.128

In addition, China and Russia are in discussions to build monitoring stations in each other’s countries for 

their respective satellite navigation systems, Beidou and the Global Navigation Satellite System 

(GLONASS). This comes at a time when Russia has restricted the use of GPS stations on its territory.129

 

125 Charlotte Mathieu, “Assessing Russia’s Space Cooperation With China And India: Opportunities and Challenges for Europe,” 

Acta Astronautica 66, no. 3-4 (2010): 21‒22; “China’s Space Activities in 2006,” China National Space Administration, October 

2006, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620681/n771967/79970.html; and “China’s Space Activities in 2011,” China National 

Space Administration, December 2011, http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-12/29/content_2033200.htm.

126 “Russia, China Sign Space Exploration Agreement,” Moscow Times, May 19, 2014, 

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-china-sign-space-exploration-agreement/500463.html.

127 “Russia, China Ready to Cooperate in Space, Explore Mars,” Space Travel, July 1, 2014, http://www.spacetravel.com/reports/Russia_China_Ready_to_Cooperate_in_Space_Explore_Mars_999.html.

128 “Russia, China Sign Space Exploration Agreement.”

129 “China, Russia to Cooperate in Satellite Navigation,” July 7, 2014, 

http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/China_Russia_to_cooperate_in_satellite_navigation_999.html; “Russia, China Expand 

Cooperation on Satellite Navigation,” GPS Daily, July 5, 2014, 

http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/Russia_China_expand_cooperation_on_satellite_navigation_999.html. 
28

Ukraine

Ukraine inherited a substantial amount of the former Soviet Union’s space industry on which Ukraine 

bases its cooperation with China, especially those related to ballistic missile and launch vehicles. China 

has extensive cooperation with Ukraine under the Space Cooperation Subcommittee Mechanism of the 

Sino-Ukrainian Cooperation Commission,

130 with both countries seeking opportunities to expand 

cooperation in large-scale projects.131 China and Ukraine signed a space cooperation plan for 2006–10 

covering 29 long-term projects on the joint development of space rocketry, earthquake monitoring and 

remote sensing satellites, and satellites to monitor and study space weather. The two sides also discussed 

adding 15 new programs, including projects for the exploration of the moon and Mars, engine 

manufacture, welding in space, and use of solar energy.132 In 2012, the two countries agreed to jointly 

work on more than 50 projects in the areas of earth observation, including a joint ionospheric satellite, 

Ionosat, to create an earthquake prediction system, and the development of rocket and satellite 

technologies, especially large launch vehicles.133

Europe

Europe in general and the European Space Agency (ESA) in particular are seeking opportunities for greater 

cooperation with China in the realm of space technologies, space exploration, and human spaceflight. This 

drive for greater cooperation is driven by two factors: the growing economic ties between Europe and 

China and reduced funding for ESA. According to Oliver Brauner of the Stockholm International Peace 

Research Institute,

Beijing regularly praises the EU for being China’s largest source of technology imports. 

According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the EU accounted for 30 percent of 

China’s overall technology imports in 2009...Gaining access to the Chinese market 

remains the No. 1 motivation for Europeans, with the EU Chamber of Commerce in China 

estimating that the Chinese government procurement market alone is worth $1 

trillion...European companies want a piece of that pie.134

European officials insist, however, that Europe has “no intention of turning away from the Americans”

and that “the cooperation with China ‘complements rather than competes with’ projects being 

undertaken with the United States.”

135

Europe and China have conducted a variety of cooperative activities since 2000. Annual ESA and CNSA 

workshops on space science cooperation have been held every year since 2004.136 China and the ESA have 

 

130 “China’s Space Activities in 2011.”

131 “Ukraine, China to Expand Space Cooperation Program Until 2015 With New Large-scale Projects,” Kyiv Post, September 12, 

2013, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/business/ukraine-china-to-expand-space-cooperation-program-until-2015-with-newlarge-scale-projects-329268.html.

132 “China’s CPMIEC To Expand Space Cooperation With Ukraine,” Russia & CIS Military Weekly, August 7, 2009.

133 “Yuriy Boyko, Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine for Ecology, Natural Resources, Energy and Space,” Space News, November 25, 

2013, http://www.spacenews.com/article/features/38347profile-yuriy-boyko-vice-prime-minister-of-ukraine-for-ecologynatural; “Ukraine, China to Prepare Space Cooperation in April,” China Defense Mashup, March 22, 2012, http://www.chinadefense-mashup.com/ukraine-china-to-prepare-space-cooperation-in-april.html.

134 “EU and China’s Tech Rise,” Diplomat, July 26, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/2011/07/eu-and-chinas-tech-rise/.

135 “Challenging America: Europe Seeks Space Cooperation with China,” Spiegel Online International, February 2, 2012, 

http://www.spiegel.de/international/challenging-america-europe-seeks-space-cooperation-with-china-a-812273.html.

136 Yi Zhou, “Perspectives on Sino-U.S. Cooperation in Civil Space Programs,” Space Policy 24 (2008): 137.
29

signed the “Status Quo of China-Europe Space Cooperation and the Cooperation Plan Protocol” under the 

mechanism of the China-Europe Joint Commission on Space Cooperation as well as the “Cooperation 

Agreement on the Application, Exchange and Distribution of Meteorological Satellite Data“ with the 

European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) to promote sharing 

and application of meteorological satellite data.137 Several European countries are also collaborating with 

China on “the Hard X-ray Modulation Telescope; developing silicon detectors for probing dark matter; and 

testing cross-continental quantum key distribution.”

138 European experiments will also be onboard the 

Shijian-10 satellite, which is to be launched in 2015.139

Galileo

The most high profile and contentious cooperative space activity between Europe and China was on the 

Galileo satellite navigation project. Europe initially sought Chinese participation in the project to enhance 

trade relations with China and to distance itself from the United States due to tensions arising from the 

U.S. invasion of Iraq.140 China was initially invited to develop technologies for Galileo applications in the 

Chinese market, but this set of projects was not expanded due to concerns over China’s intentions with 

its Beidou satellite navigation system, the strategic nature of satellite navigation technologies, and a 

change in the project from a public-private partnership to a pure public venture. 

Formal discussions for Chinese participation in Galileo began in 2003 and resulted in an agreement 

committing China to an investment of 200 million euros ($250 million). 141 Despite this investment, 

European technical assistance played a critical role in making these projects a success. According to one 

source, “Chinese officials at the Ministry of Science and Technology and the China-Europe Global 

Navigation Satellite System Technical Training and Co-operation Centre are adamant in recognizing that 

without the active involvement of European partners and European expertise/know-how and technology 

travelling to China, the local subcontractors would have been unable to complete projects.”

142

Europe, however, decided not to invite additional Chinese participation in the project. After the initial 

invasion of Iraq, relations between the United States and Europe began to improve and Europe became 

more receptive to U.S. concerns over arms exports to China. Moreover, Galileo had changed from a publicprivate partnership to a pure public program due to the inability to get adequate private financing. As a 

public program, public procurement rules only allowed “non-European sources for certain components 

and services in case of demonstrated substantial advantages in terms of quality and costs, taking account 

of the strategic nature of the European global navigation satellite system programs and of the EU security 

and export control requirements.”

143 Additionally, Galileo officials were under the impression that Beidou 

would remain a regional system for military use, and when it became obvious that Beidou would be a 

 

137 “China’s Space Activities in 2011.”

138 Jane Qiu, “Head of China’s Space Science Reaches Out,” Nature, March 6, 2014, http://www.nature.com/news/head-ofchina-s-space-science-reaches-out-1.14797.

139 Qiu, “Head of China’s Space Science Reaches Out”; and Ni Sijie, “中国航天事业发展不平衡:空间科学待”上位”[China’s Space 

Sector Development is Uneven: Space Science Waits to Become Priority], 

http://news.ifeng.com/a/20140715/41166384_0.shtml.

140 Nicola Casarini, Remaking Global Order: The Evolution of Europe-China Relations and its Implications for East Asia and the 

United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 130.

141 Ibid, 102.

142 Ibid, 105.

143 Glen Gibbons, “Europe Readies Galileo Procurement,” Inside GNSS, March/April 2008, 

http://www.insidegnss.com/node/585.
30

global dual-use system Europe became concerned that Beidou would become a competitor to Galileo.144

Security concerns were also raised when some in the European Union expressed fear that China was 

gaining too much access to a strategic technology.145

Double Star

A second prominent collaboration between China and Europe was the Double Star project conducted 

from 2004 to 2007 to study the Earth’s magnetosphere, in particular magnetic storms that can affect 

space flight as well as navigation, communications, and radar systems. The agreement was signed in 2001 

and was the first between CNSA and ESA. The Double Star satellites were launched in 2003 and 2004 with 

one in equatorial and the other in polar orbit where they studied the lower regions of the Earth's 

magnetosphere. ESA contributed 8 million euros to the project to refurbish and integrate European 

instruments, acquire data, and coordinate scientific operations.146

The Double Star satellites consisted of eight Chinese and eight European instruments intended to 

supplement Europe’s Cluster II program, which was designed to measure the solar wind and its interaction 

with the magnetosphere.147 The addition of Chinese satellites allowed the two missions “to observe 

different regions of the sky at the same time as well as to obtain tridimensional spatial and temporal 

readings of dynamic events in the magnetosphere.”

148

The Double Star project is described as providing “an unprecedented measurement capability of geospace”

that enabled the “first coordinated six-point measurements of the Earth magnetosphere.” The Double 

Star and Cluster II programs “drew significant attention from both the research community and public, 

providing many scientific discoveries including: the extent of oscillations in the tail of the magnetosphere, 

density holes in the solar wind, pulsed magnetic reconnection observed for several hours, and crustal 

cracking of a neutron star.”

149

Dragon Programs

The Dragon programs are a set of cooperative activities between ESA and the National Remote Sensing 

Center of China that are intended “to encourage increased exploitation of ESA space resources within 

China as well as stimulate increased scientific cooperation in the field of Earth Observation (EO) science 

and applications between China and Europe.” The program is said to have become “a model for scientific 

and technological cooperation between China and Europe.”

150

Training is a key component of the program where “lead scientists are paired with young researchers so 

that know-how can be transferred to the next generation. Training seminars and advanced courses are 

organized routinely for PhD students, post-doctoral and research scientists from China and other Asian 

 

144 Peter B. de Selding, “European Officials Poised to Remove Chinese Payloads from Galileo Sats,” Space News, March 12, 2010, 

http://www.spacenews.com/article/european-officials-poised-remove-chinese-payloads-galileo-sats.

145 Dan Levin, “Chinese Wrestle with Europe in Space; Dispute about Radio Frequency Is Latest Glitch for Galileo Satellite 

Project,” International Herald Tribune, March 23, 2009.

146 “Double Star Overview,” ESA, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Science/Double_Star_overview2.

147 “Double Star Instrument,” ESA, http://sci.esa.int/double-star/33153-instruments/.

148 Michael A Taverna, “Chinese, Italian Moves Highlight Growing Scientific Collaboration,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 

155, no. 18 (2001), 89.

149 “Laurels for Cluster-Double Star Teams,” ESA, September 29, 2010, 

http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Science/Cluster/Laurels_for_Cluster-Double_Star_teams.

150 “ESA-China Collaboration Takes Earth Observation to New Heights,” ESA, June 29, 2012, 

http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Observing_the_Earth/ESA_China_collaboration_takes_Earth_observation_to_new_heights.
31

countries. Courses provide training in processing, algorithm and product development from EO data in 

geo-science applications.”

151

The first phase of the Dragon program was conducted from 2004 to 2008 and involved the use of ESA 

European Remote Sensing Satellite (ERS) and Environmental Satellite (Envisat) data for science and 

application development in China, including applying remote sensing data to the monitoring of flooding, 

forestry, agriculture, oceanography, and drought monitoring, among others, in China.152

The second phase of the Dragon program began in 2008 and expanded the cooperation to 25 projects 

using ESA and Chinese earth observation data in land, ocean and atmospheric science and applications in 

China. The program ended in 2012 and involved the CBERS, Haiyang, and Huanjing series of satellites, the 

Fengyun-3 meteorological satellite, as well as European satellites.153

The third phase of the Dragon program began in 2012 and will continue until 2016. Dragon 3 involves 51 

projects and promotes the “exploitation of ESA and Chinese earth observation data for science and 

application development” to simulate scientific exchange between China and Europe.154

Dragoness Program

Dragoness was a project funded from 2007 to 2010 by the European Commission to assess and establish 

an inventory of European and Chinese capacities in marine monitoring for environment and security by 

capitalizing on the previous work done by the Dragon program. The end result of Dragoness was “an 

inventory and assessment of existing marine and coastal observing systems in both Europe and China that 

highlighted strengths and weaknesses, identified gaps and inconsistencies, and provided 

recommendations for a strategy to develop harmonized monitoring elements which met the 

requirements of international standards and monitoring programs.”

155

Human Spaceflight

ESA is also seeking opportunities to work with China on human spaceflight. Following discussions with 

Chinese human spaceflight program personnel that revealed problems with docking the Shenzhou with 

the Tiangong-1 space station, ESA officials discussed building a European docking mechanism for the 

Shenzhou space capsule and the Tiangong space station in exchange for allowing European astronauts to 

visit the space station. 156

The docking mechanism is one of three working groups set up by ESA and China. The other two are crew 

training and the exchange of payload facilities and experiments. In 2012, a delegation from the Chinese 

astronaut training center spent a week at the European Astronaut Center in Germany to learn more about 

ESA’s astronaut program. This visit was preceded by a visit by the head of the China Manned Space Agency 

 

151 “Dragon: 10 Years of Cooperation,” ESA, 

https://dragon3.esa.int/documents/163802/523346/Dragon_cooperation_10_years.

152 See European Space Agency website on Dragon Program, https://dragon3.esa.int/.

153 “ESA-MOST Dragon 2 Cooperation Programme,” ESA, http://dragon2.esa.int/.

154 “Dragon 3 Programme Brochure 2013,” ESA, 

https://dragon3.esa.int/documents/163802/523346/Dragon_brochure_FINAL_2013.pdf/2be07b10-af1f-4839-936b3cc3d201b4fa?version=1.0.

155 “Sixth Framework Programme Priority: Priority Title: Aeronautics and Space,” Dragoness, November 22, 2006, 

http://dragoness.nersc.no/?q=system/files/Dragoness_DOW_v1.pdf.

156 “Europe May Work with China on Space Station,” Space.com, February 26, 2013, http://www.space.com/19960-china-spacestation-europe-cooperation.html.
32

and China’s first female astronaut, Liu Yang. These trips were reciprocated by the visit of ESA astronauts 

and trainers to Beijing in 2013. 

ESA is also “‘seriously looking’ at providing experiments for future Tiangong missions” as well as having 

European astronauts conduct Chinese experiments on the ISS, though that last possibility would have to 

be approved by other ISS partners, most notably the United States. Although no plans have been finalized, 

European astronauts are taking Chinese language courses in the event such cooperation takes place.157

France

China has signed a cooperation framework agreement on space and marine science and technology with 

France under the mechanism of the Sino-French Joint Commission on Space Cooperation, aiming at 

developing bilateral cooperation on astronomic satellite, ocean satellite, and other satellite programs.158

In March 2014, France and China agreed to work cooperatively on the Space Variable Objects Monitor 

(SVOM) and the China-France Oceanography Satellite (CFOSAT). According to CNES head Jean-Yves Le Gall, 

“France is very keen to work in space with China, whose engineers and scientists are unquestionably some 

of the best in the world. The boost given today to the CFOSAT and SVOM missions paves the way for closer 

cooperative ties likely to lead to new joint projects in the future, pursued either directly by CNES or 

through the European Space Agency, to which France is the main contributor.”

159

CFOSAT began in 2007 and is to be developed jointly by France’s Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES)

and CNSA with France investing around $200 million on the project.160 CFOSAT will be used to study ocean 

surface winds and waves and will be equipped with a rotating radar built by Thales Alenia to measure 

both swell wave length and direction over a 70-km large swath, and a rotating scatterometer developed 

by China. The CFOSAT satellite bus will be built by China for an expected launch in 2018 on a three-year 

mission.161

SVOM is an astronomy mission to observe and characterize gamma-ray bursts. “France will provide the 

ECLAIRs burst-detection instrument and the ground alerting network.” The exact sharing of 

responsibilities between France and China was to be decided in June 2014 with the goal to orbiting the 

satellite on a Chinese launcher by 2020.162 According to a French space official, continuing revisions to the 

U.S. export control list and the need to consider future revisions has hindered development of SVOM. As 

a result, U.S.-made components on the satellite have been reduced to a minimum.163

In addition to this, France has also contributed a Doppler Orbitography and Radiopositioning Integrated 

by Satellite (DORIS) system to China’s Haiyang-2A ocean surveillance system launched on August 15, 

 

157 Ibid.

158 Information Office of the State Council, China’s Space Activities in 2011, December 2011, 

http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-12/29/content_2033200.htm.

159 “CNES and China National Space Administration (CNSA) Strengthen Cooperative Ties,” CNES, March 27, 2014, 

http://www.cnes.fr/automne_modules_files/pPressReleases/public/r8418_81_cp038-2014_-_accord_cnsa_va.pdf.

160 “France, China Set Sail on Joint Ocean-Surface Satellite Project,” Space News, March 29, 2014, 

http://www.spacenews.com/article/civil-space/40020france-china-set-sail-on-joint-ocean-surface-satellite-project.

161 “About CNES,” Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales website, accessed September 9, 2014, http://www.cnes.fr/web/CNESen/3773-about-cnes.php; and “CNES and China National Space Administration (CNSA) Strengthen Cooperative Ties.”

162 “CNES and China National Space Administration (CNSA) Strengthen Cooperative Ties.”

163 De Selding, “U.S. Export Rules Complicate Sino-French Cooperation.”
33

2011.164 The Doris system “was designed and developed by France’s CNES and is used to determine the 

orbit of satellites equipped with Doris receivers with centimeter accuracy using a network of ground 

stations as reference points on Earth.”

165

France has also contracted with China to launch satellites. The French company Thales Alenia marketed 

an “ITAR-free” satellite, which it claimed did not contain U.S. export-controlled components. Thales Alenia 

has sold eight of these satellites, with five being launched on Chinese rockets. In 2013, it was determined 

that a U.S. supplier had mischaracterized export-controlled components and that the satellites should not 

have been sold to China or launched on Chinese rockets.166

United Kingdom

According to China’s 2011 space white paper, “China and Britain have established a joint laboratory on 

space science and technology, jointly organized a seminar on space science and technology, and 

conducted exchanges on lunar exploration, earth observation, space science research and experiment, 

personnel training, and other areas.”

167

The most prominent example of space cooperation is the University of Surrey and Surrey Satellite 

Technology’s (SSTL) relationship with China. In 1999, the University of Surrey entered into a 25-year joint 

venture agreement with Tsinghua University to form the Tsinghua-Surrey Small Satellite Company to build 

microsatellites. Tsinghua University owns 75 percent of the company and sought financing from the 

Chinese side from the China Aerospace Machinery and Electronics Corporation, the Tsinghua University 

Enterprise Group, and Tsinghua Tongfang Co. Ltd.168 The company launched its first satellite, Tsinghua-1, 

a remote sensing satellite, in 2000.169 In 2005, SSTL built the Beijing-1 remote sensing satellite for the 

Chinese government in partnership with the Beijing Landview Mapping Information Technology Co. Ltd. 

(BLMIT/北京宇视蓝图信息技术有限公司).

170

In 2009, Surrey Satellite Technology was acquired by Astrium, a subsidiary of EADS, now the Airbus Group. 

In 2011, SSTL signed a contract with the Chinese Twenty-First Century Aerospace Technology Co. Ltd. for 

110 million British pounds for three remote sensing satellites. According to one report, no Chinese 

personnel will be involved in the manufacture of the satellites, and the satellite will not be launched on a 

Chinese rocket. This is to assuage U.S. concerns over technology transfer.171

 

164 “Doris,” CNES, December, 2009, http://www.cnes.fr/web/CNES-en/1513-doris.php.

165 Craig Covault, “China Seeks ISS Role, Accelerates Space Program,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 155, no. 20 (2001): 52.

166 Jim Worf, “Exclusive: U.S. Squeezes French-led Satellite Maker Over China,” Reuters, February 9, 2012, 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/us-usa-france-china-satellite-idUSTRE8181F020120209; and Peter B. de Selding, 

“Thales Alenia Space: U.S. Suppliers at Fault in “ITAR-free” Misnomer,” Space News, August 9, 2013, 

http://www.spacenews.com/article/military-space/36706thales-alenia-space-us-suppliers-at-fault-in-%E2%80%9Citarfree%E2%80%9D-misnomer.

167 Information Office of the State Council, China’s Space Activities in 2011.

168 “Surrey Satellite Technology Limited,” Encyclopedia.com, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3479900088.html; and 

Wei Long, “China’s First Microsat Operational,” Space Daily, July 11, 2000, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/microsat00k.html.

169 Wei, “China’s First Microsat Operational.”

170 “Deimos and Surrey Satellite Technology Contract for Spanish Imaging Mission,” Surrey, October 10, 2006, 

http://www.sstl.co.uk/Press/Deimos-and-Surrey-Satellite-Technology-Contract-fo.

171 Peter B. de Selding, “Surrey to Build Three Optical Imaging Satellites for Chinese Firm,” Space News, June 29, 2011, 

http://www.spacenews.com/article/surrey-build-three-optical-imaging-satellites-chinese-firm.
34

A second Sino-British space cooperative activity is the University of Strathclyde’s partnership with the 

China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT). A 2012 agreement established the International 

Space Mechatronic Systems Technology research laboratory with $2.3 million in funding from CALT. The 

laboratory will host two Chinese engineers and will conduct annual seminars to promote collaboration.172

Germany

Scientific exchanges between China and Germany began in the early 1980s. According to the German 

government’s space advisor, Peter Hintze, “The Chinese have great ambitions and have such enormous 

means at their disposal that we can hardly keep up in areas such as manned space travel,” so much so 

that Germany must “seek cooperation.”

173

In 1984, the Chinese Ministry of Astronautics and the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology signed 

the Agreement on Cooperation in Civilian Space Science and Technology. In 1988, the countries signed a 

contract for Deutsch Aerospace AG to provide a communications payload for the DFH-3 communications 

satellite. In 1993, China and Germany signed an agreement to establish a joint venture, EurasSpace. This 

joint venture is reported to have worked on a Sinosat Space Communications Satellite Project.174

China and Germany also signed a bilateral agreement on space life sciences.175 Under this agreement,

Germany supplied equipment for the Shenzhou-8 mission in 2011 to “conduct 17 biological and medical 

experiments in collaboration with Chinese scientists” on “immune, muscle and thyroid cells, as well as 

plants and euglena, under conditions of weightlessness.”

176

Venezuela

China’s space cooperation with Venezuela has reportedly been the result of intense lobbying by former 

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez with the resulting relationship described as a “Chavez Innovation.”

China and Venezuela have signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in space technologies 

and have established a technology, industry, and space sub-committee under the China-Venezuela Senior 

Mixed Committee. 177 China has built and launched two satellites for Venezuela. The Venesat-1 

communications satellite was proposed by Chavez in 2004 and began in 2005 with the signing of a $400 

million contract. The satellite was launched in 2008. The VRSS-1 remote sensing satellite was launched in 

2012.178

China is also assisting Venezuela in building small satellites. Venezuela plans to begin manufacturing at a 

factory located in Borburata de Carabobo in 2014, and China is training Venezuelan engineers in the design 

of small satellites, which will be built with the assistance of Chinese technology.179 In 2013, 60 Venezuelan 

 

172 Lauren Reed, “University of Strathclyde and CALT Launch Joint Laboratory,” SITC Bulletin Analysis, March 2013, 

http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/504437.pdf.

173 “Germany and China Step Up Cooperation in Space,” DLR, December 16, 2008, 

http://www.dlr.de/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-3432/7418_read-14864/.

174 Jiyuan Liu, “Strengthening Sino-German Space Cooperation Looking Forward to 21st Century,” Space, 

http://www.space.cetin.net.cn/docs/HTM-E/002.HTM.

175 Information Office of the State Council, “China’s Space Activities in 2011.”

176 “Germany and China Step Up Cooperation in Space.” 

177 Information Office of the State Council, “China’s Space Activities in 2011.”

178 Rui C. Barbosa, “Chinese Long March 2D launches Venezuela’s VRSS-1 satellite,” NASA Space Flight.com, September 28, 

2012, http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2012/09/chinese-long-march-2d-launches-vrss-1/.

179 Veronica Magan, “Venezuela: Latin America’s Next Space Pioneer?” Via Satellite, August 23, 2013, 

http://www.satellitetoday.com/publications/2013/08/23/venezuela-latin-americas-next-space-pioneer-2/.
35

engineers were sent to China to study satellite design.180 Venezuela is building a space base to launch 

these satellites with financial support from China and technical support from Belarus. According to a 2013 

statement by Venezuelan President Nicolas Madura, Venezuela will launch satellites “sooner rather than 

later.”

181

United States

As with its overall relationship, China’s relationship with the U.S. space program has been turbulent. 

Cooperative activities started small, with the two countries signing an Understanding on Cooperation in 

Space Technology in 1979. In 1986 China set up a ground station to receive satellite imagery from the U.S. 

Geological Survey’s Landsat remote sensing satellite, and in 1992 two small student experiments flew on 

a space shuttle mission. 182

The most prominent cooperative activities between the two countries occurred in the 1990s when China 

began launching U.S.-manufactured commercial satellites. The use of Chinese launch services came about 

due to the phasing out of expendable rockets in favor of the space shuttle, whose launch costs promised 

to be cheaper. The loss of the space shuttle Challenger in 1986 and the subsequent grounding of the fleet 

for two years, and the resultant prohibition against using the shuttle for commercial launches, resulted in 

a backlog that could not be resolved by European launchers, leaving only Chinese launchers to fill the gap. 

China launched the first U.S. manufactured commercial satellite in 1990 and launched a total of 19 U.S.-

manufactured satellites between 1990 and 1999. During this time, Chinese launchers failed six times, 

including three times in 1995 and 1996. Investigations conducted by Hughes Space and Communications 

into launch failures of Hughes satellites in 1992 and 1995 and by Loral of a launch failure involving one of 

their satellites built for Intelsat identified the failures as resulting from a faulty fairing for the Hughes 

launches and from a faulty inertial measurement unit for the Loral launches. These investigations also 

involved their counterparts from Chinese industry, including a joint investigation by Hughes, Loral, and 

China’s space industry. Subsequent disclosures of these investigations led to allegations that Hughes and 

Loral had illegally transferred technical assistance to the Chinese that could have been used to improve 

the reliability of Chinese ballistic missiles.183 In 2002, Loral reached a settlement with the U.S. government 

to pay a $14 million fine, but neither admitted nor denied the government’s charges as part of the 

settlement.184 In 2003, Hughes Electronics Corporation and Boeing, which had acquired Hughes Space and 

Communications in 2000, reached a settlement with the U.S. government to pay $32 million in fines and 

expressed “regret for not having obtained licenses that should have been obtained” and acknowledged 

“the nature and seriousness of the offenses charged by the Department of State, including the harm such 

 

180 “Belarus to Help Build Space Facility in Venezuela,” Fox News Latino, July 4, 2012, 

http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/lifestyle/2012/07/04/belarus-to-help-build-space-facility-in-venezuela/; “Venezuela Looks to 

Get into Space Satellite Business Thanks to Chinese,” Before It’s News, September 3, 2013, accessed September 4, 2014, 

http://beforeitsnews.com/alternative/2013/09/venezuela-looks-to-get-into-space-satellite-business-thanks-to-chinese2754582.html.

181 “Venezuela Looks to Get into Space Satellite Business Thanks to Chinese.”

182 Brian Harvey, China’s Space Program: From Conception to Manned Spaceflight (Chichester, UK: Springer, 2004), 69, 191.

183 For more information, see the report by the United States House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S. National 

Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (aka Cox Commission), especially chapters 5 

and 6, http://www.house.gov/coxreport/ and Shirley Kan, “China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers from U.S. Satellite 

Export Policy: Actions and Chronology,” Congressional Research Service, September 5, 2014, 

http://fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/98-485.pdf.

184 Jonathan Berr, “Loral Settles China Satellite Allegations,” Bloomberg News, January 10, 2002, 

http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jan/10/business/fi-loral10.
36

offenses could cause to the security and foreign policy interests of the United States.”

185These illegal 

transfers of technical know-how, coupled with the Chinese theft of U.S. nuclear weapons secrets,186 led 

to a prohibition against launching U.S. satellites on Chinese launchers that remains in place to today. 

After these violations, the Clinton administration became opposed to space cooperation with China and 

it was not until the early part of the George W. Bush administration that the United States began to 

reconsider space cooperation with China. By 2002, China’s human spaceflight program was making 

progress with several unmanned test flights, and the United States began contemplating “measured and 

appropriate levels of space cooperation with China.” In 2002, then NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe 

stated that he and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage had been “spending ‘a lot of time’ exploring 

whether and how to bring China into closer cooperation with the U.S. in space.” O’Keefe also told a 

Women in Aerospace forum that NASA was “looking at cooperative arrangements, partnering 

arrangements, a range of different opportunities for avoiding, really, duplication of the aerospace capacity 

and technology that we currently have.”

187

This renewed interest in cooperation with China resulted in CNSA Administrator Sun Laiyan visiting NASA 

in 2004, though no substantive discussions took place.188 This was the first time that a CNSA head had 

visited NASA. This visit was reciprocated in 2006 when NASA Administrator Michael Griffin and a 

delegation visited CNSA. This was the first time that a NASA administrator had visited CNSA,189 and was 

billed as a “get acquainted session” by Griffin since the two countries up to that point had not seriously 

discussed space cooperation.190 During the trip, NASA visited the Chinese Academy of Space Technology 

(CAST), the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), and the National Satellite Meteorological Center as well 

as a CAST facility in Shanghai. 

During a press conference covering the trip, Griffin stated that he wanted to “welcome China to the rank 

of space faring nations by virtue of their ability to put people into orbit entirely on their own resources. 

That is a milestone accomplishment and one to be proud of.” But Griffin also stated that Chinese 

involvement in the ISS was still some way off and required much greater transparency than what the 

Chinese were willing to provide at that point. As Griffin stated, “with regard to cooperation on space 

programs generally, and human space programs in particular, that the greatest possible degree of 

transparency and openness is a requirement, if for no reason more important than without it we stand a 

chance to kill people.” As if to drive home the point, Griffin cancelled a trip to China’s Jiuquan Launch 

Center since China only offered a visit to the launch pad and not to other more informative parts of the 

center. Nevertheless, Griffin was encouraged by the initial discussions on cooperation in robotic space 

 

185 Jeff Gerth, “Two U.S. Aerospace Companies Agree to Fines Over Helping China,” New York Times, March 5, 2003, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/05/national/05CND-SPACE.html.

186 In addition to the illegal transfer of rocket technology, a major aspect of the investigations involved the illegal transfer of 

nuclear weapons technology. The Cox Commission concluded that China had “stolen classified information on all of the United 

States’ most advanced thermonuclear weapons” and that this information had helped China “fabricate and successfully test 

modern strategic thermonuclear weapons.” See the report by the United States House of Representatives Select Committee on 

U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (aka Cox Commission), chapter 2, 

http://www.house.gov/coxreport/.

187 Craig Covault, “NASA Eyes China Ties as New Shenzhou Flies,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 156, no. 13 (2002): 27.

188 Craig Covault, “The China Car,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 162, no. 5 (2005): 27.

189 Yi Zhou, “Perspectives on Sino-US Cooperation in Civil Space Programs,” Space Policy 24 (2008): 135.

190 “Space Diplomacy,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 165, no. 12 (2006): 41.
37

exploration missions,

191 with the talksresulting in the formation of two working groups on earth and space 

sciences, which have had only limited contacts.192

During the Obama administration, the United States and China continued exploratory discussions on

cooperative space activities, but achieved no real progress. During President Obama’s visit to China in 

2009, the countries issued a statement that “China and the United States look forward to expanding 

discussions on space science cooperation and starting a dialogue on human space flight and space 

exploration” with “reciprocal visits of the NASA Administrator and the appropriate Chinese counterpart 

in 2010.”

193

In 2010, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden visited China on “a very comprehensive visit to Chinese 

human spaceflight related facilities” that was intended for NASA to become “acquainted with relevant 

Chinese space officials and institutions” and to have a better “understanding of Chinese human spaceflight 

programs and plans, and reaching a common understanding of the importance of transparency, 

reciprocity, and mutual benefit as the underlying principles of any future interaction between our two 

nations in the area of human spaceflight.”

194

Bolden’s trip to China drew criticism from members of Congress, in particular Frank Wolf (R-VA), who sat

on the powerful House Appropriations Committee and who was chair of the Subcommittee on Commerce, 

Justice, Science, and Related Agencies which oversees NASA’s budget. Wolf, now retired, a long-time critic 

of China who opposes space cooperation with China on human rights and security grounds, wrote in a 

letter to the NASA administrator that “[i]t should go without saying that NASA has no business cooperating 

with the Chinese regime on human spaceflight.”

195 In a follow up letter, Wolf and Congressmen John 

Culberson (R-TX), Robert Aderholt (R-AL), and Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), requested that NASA deliver a 

full briefing on the trip and a “personal assurance that at no time during your trip there were any 

discussions of cooperation on human space flight activities.”

196 In response, Bolden wrote in a letter dated 

November 9, 2010, that he “appreciated the concerns raised” in their letter and that “you can be confident 

that my visit was introductory in nature and did not include consideration of any specific proposals for 

human spaceflight cooperation or new cooperation in any other areas of NASA’s activities.” He added that 

he “stood ready” to brief Congressman Wolf on the details of the trip.197

During the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Washington in 2011, the two sides agreed on a reciprocal 

visit of a Chinese delegation to NASA headquarters and other NASA facilities in 2011, as a follow-up to the 

 

191 “NASA Administrator Michael Griffin Conference,” NASA, September 27, 2006, 

http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/159546main_Griffin_Shanghai_China_060927.pdf.

192 James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2012), 95.

193 White House, “Joint Press Statement by President Obama and President Hu of China,” November 17, 2009, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-press-statement-president-obama-and-president-hu-china.

194 David Weaver, “NASA Administrator Statement on China Visit,” NASA, October 25, 2010, 

http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2010/oct/HQ_10-270_Bolden_China.html.

195 “U.S. Lawmaker Balks at NASA Chief’s China Visit,” Space.com, October 9, 2010, http://www.space.com/9295-lawmakerbalks-nasa-chief-china-visit.html.

196 “NASA Delegation to China Sets the Stage for More Talks,” Spaceflight Now, October 26, 2010, 

http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n1010/26boldenchina/.

197

http://wolf.house.gov/sites/wolf.house.gov/files/documents/Administrator%20Response%20to%20the%20Honorable%20Fran

k%20Wolf_110910.pdf
38

NASA administrator’s visit to China in 2010, and agreed “to continue discussions on opportunities for 

practical future cooperation in the space arena, based on principles of transparency, reciprocity, and 

mutual benefit.”

198 The Chinese delegation visit to NASA facilities did not take place, however. In April 

2011, Congress passed a prohibition, initiated by Congressman Wolf, against NASA conducting a wide

range of activities with China. The law states:

None of the funds made available by this Act may be used for the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA) or the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 

to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, 

order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any 

way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically 

authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act.

The law, however, did allow NASA to engage “in activities which NASA or OSTP have certified pose no risk 

of resulting in the transfer of technology, data, or other information with national security or economic 

security implications to China or a Chinese-owned company” but that any certification “shall be submitted 

to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate no later than 14 

days prior to the activity in question and shall include a description of the purpose of the activity, its major 

participants, and its location and timing.”

199

Since the passage of the law, NASA activities with China have been curtailed, and no additional visits 

between NASA and CNSA have occurred in a bilateral setting. In 2013, however, Wolf accused NASA of 

not abiding by the notification clause when NASA hosted Chinese officials at the Committee on Earth

Observation Satellites (CEOS), a multilateral body made up of 23 countries to ensure “international 

coordination of civil space-based earth observation programs” and promote the “exchange of data to 

optimize societal benefit and inform decision making for securing a prosperous and sustainable future for 

humankind.”

200 NASA, on the other hand, argued that the restrictions and reporting requirements for 

Chinese participation at NASA sponsored events only applied to bilateral events and did not apply to 

multilateral events such as CEOS.201 This issue came up again in 2013 when Chinese researchers were 

initially banned from attending a conference at NASA’s Ames Research Center on the use of NASA’s Kepler 

space telescope to search for exoplanets. The ban attracted international attention and prompted many 

attendees to threaten a boycott of the conference. 202 The uproar resulted in a clarification from 

Congressman Wolf in a letter to NASA Administrator Bolden that Chinese nationals were able to attend 

the conference as it was multilateral in nature.203

 

198 White House, “U.S.-China Joint Statement,” January 19, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/uschina-joint-statement.

199 U.S. Congress, “Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW112publ55/html/PLAW-112publ55.htm.

200 “31 CEOS Members,” CEOS, 

http://www.ceos.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=30&Itemid=76.

201 “Lawmaker: NASA Broke Law with Visits by China Officials,” USA Today, March 7, 2013, 

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/03/07/wolf-nasa-china-kennedy-space-center/1971699/.

202 “U.S. Scientists Boycott NASA Conference Over China Ban,” Guardian, October 4, 2013, 

http://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/oct/05/us-scientists-boycott-nasa-china-ban.

203 “Wolf Letter to NASA’s Bolden Correcting Record on Restrictions Involving Chinese Nationals,” Congressman Frank Wolf 

official website, October 8, 2013, http://wolf.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/wolf-letter-to-nasas-bolden-correctingrecord-on-restrictions-involving#.U8_3nU3Qdy0.
39

Also in 2013, Bolden traveled to China a second time to attend the International Astronautical Congress 

in Beijing. Bolden made a speech at the Congress, but did not meet with Chinese space officials. He did 

meet, however, with Chinese Academy of Sciences President Bai Chunli. According to the South China 

Morning Post, Bolden and Bai “exchanged frank opinions on pragmatic co-operation in relevant fields in 

the future” and that NASA was “highly serious” about working with China, especially in earth 

observation.204

In November 2014, Bolden traveled again to China to discuss air traffic management in conjunction with 

the International Forum for Aviation Research. While there, he met with the head of China’s State 

Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense and the China National Space 

Administration, Xu Dazhe, and the head of China’s Manned Space Agency, Wang Zhaoyao. Bolden 

“declined to be specific about” his talks in China, but stated that it was a “listening opportunity.” 205

According to a Chinese press report, Bolden and Xu had a “frank” exchange of views on aviation and space 

issues and “agreed to strengthen communication and exchanges to mutually promote cooperation in the 

areas of aviation and space.”

206 According to a news release by the China Manned Space Agency, “both

parties presented with each other’s latest development and follow-on planning for the manned space 

program, held an in-depth talk on the international manned space co-operation, exchanged opinions, and 

expressed the good will of strengthening the multi-lateral co-operations and communications.”

207

Other U.S.-China Cooperative Activities

The United States and China are also involved in cooperative activities that do not involve NASA. These 

include bilateral activities by the U.S. Geological Survey and the National Academy of Sciences and 

multilateral activities.

U.S. Geological Survey

In 2012 the United States and China signed a remote sensing agreement between the U.S. Geological 

Survey (USGS) of the Department of the Interior and Center for Earth Observation and Digital Earth of the 

Chinese Academy of Sciences in which the United States will provide imagery from USGS Landsat satellites. 

This agreement appears to continue China’s use of Landsat imagery since 1986.

Landsat is a joint program by NASA and the USGS. With the launch of its first satellite in 1972, it is the 

longest running Earth remote sensing program. The Landsat program currently operates two satellites, 

Landsat-7 and 8, which image the Earth continuously and cross every point on Earth every 16 days. 

Landsat-7 regularly acquires 438 images per day and can image one-quarter of the Earth’ surface during 

this 16 days. Landsat-8, on the other hand, regularly acquires 550 images per day. Together, the satellites 

can provide eight-day coverage.208 The two satellites provide imagery with resolutions of 15, 30, 60, and 

100 meters in the visible, infrared, and panchromatic bands. The USGS provides Landsat imagery free of 

charge to anyone, without restrictions.

 

204 “US and China Partner on Small-scale Space Projects,” South China Morning Post, September 30, 2013, 

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1321102/us-and-china-partner-small-scale-space-projects.

205 Frank Morring, Jr., “Bolden Meets Human-Spaceflight Chief During China Visit,” Aviation Week, December 3, 2014, 

http://aviationweek.com/space/bolden-meets-human-spaceflight-chief-during-china-visit.

206 “许达哲会见美国国家航空航天局局长博尔登,” [Xu Dazhe Meets with U.S. NASA Administrator Bolden], China National 

Space Agency, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n1081/n7529/n308608/656303.html.

207 Shi Peixin, “Wang Zhaoyao Met with NASA Chief in Beijing,” China Manned Space Agency, 

http://en.cmse.gov.cn/show.php?contentid=1469.

208 http://landsat.usgs.gov/planned_acquisition_schedule.php
40

The Chinese Academy of Sciences uses imagery from the Landsat satellites for its research on 

environmental and land-use issues in China.209 The use of Landsat imagery by the PLA cannot be ruled out, 

but due to the lower resolutions of Landsat imagery, the revisit rate of the satellites, and the availability 

of higher resolution from Chinese satellites, any applications may be limited to map making and observing 

trends in infrastructure development. For example, the U.S. military used Landsat imagery during 

Operation Desert Shield to create maps of the Kuwaiti theater of operations and to assist in airfield 

construction. Given the long deployment time before the onset of military operations during Desert Storm

and the ease with which large-scale troop movements could be monitored in the desert, Landsat imagery 

was also used to monitor Iraqi troop deployments.210 PLA researchers have used Landsat imagery in their 

research, including image fusion and map making.211

National Academy of Sciences

The U.S. National Academy of Sciences has created a forum for space science exchange between the 

National Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences.212 The first forum was held in Beijing 

in May 2014 to:

1. Identify and highlight the research achievements of the best and brightest young scientists 

currently working at the frontiers of their respective disciplines;

2. Build informal bridges between the space-science communities in China and the United States; 

and

3. Enhance the diffusion of insights gained from participation in the Forum to the larger spacescience communities in China and the United States.213

Group on Earth Observations

The United States and China are members of the 90-nation Group on Earth Observations (GEO), whose 

mission is to “establish a comprehensive, coordinated and sustained [observation] of the Earth” in order 

to advance “the availability of long-term, global data and information as a basis for sound decision-making 

for improving human welfare; encouraging innovation and growth, [and] alleviating human suffering, 

including eradicating poverty; protecting the global environment; and advancing sustainable 

developmental [with] voluntary partnership[s].”

214 According to one source, the United States and China 

were the first countries to actively support establishment of the organization.215

 

209 See, for example, Luguang Jiang, Xiubo Yu, Huixia Yao, Yangming Zhou, “China’s Wetlands Restoration Around Poyang Lake, 

Middle Yangtze: Evidence from Landsat TM/ETM Images,” IEEE, 2005, 2387‒89 and Hui Fengming, Cheng Xiao, Liu Yan, Zhang 

Yanmei, Ye Yufang, Wang Xianwei, Li Zhan, Wang Kun, Zhan Zhifei, Guo Jianhong, Huang Huabing, Li Xiuhong, Guo Ziqi, and 

Gong Peng, “An Improved Landsat Image Mosaic of Antarctica,” Science China 56 (January 2013): 1‒12.

210 Robert B. Kane, “Land Remote Sensing Satellite,” in Spencer C. Tucker, ed., Persian Gulf War Encyclopedia: A Political, Social, 

and Military History (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2014), 256‒57.

211 See, for example, Cong Aiyan and Lian Lian, “基于 RBF 神经网络的水深遥感研究,” [Remote Sensing Image Fusion Based On 

Wavelet Transition], 解放军理工大学学报(自然科学版) [Journal of PLA University of Science and Technology], 1 (2013): 90‒

94; and Ding Jing, 利用航天遥感影像更新 1:25 万地形图数据库 [Using Space Remote Sensing Imagery for a New 1:25,000 

Map Database], master’s thesis, PLA University of Information Engineering, April 1, 2001.

212 Qiu, “Head of China’s Space Science Reaches Out.”

213 “Space Studies Board,” National Academies website, http://sites.nationalacademies.org/SSB/SSB_086017.htm.

214 “Geneva Convention,” Group on Earth Observations, https://www.Earthobservations.org/min_declaration.php.

215 Craig Covault, “Reopening China,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 169, no. 9 (2008): 28‒30.
41

CHINA’S SPACE TECHNOLOGIES

China realizes it is not alone in its drive to develop space technologies and that it still has a significant gap 

with the United States and other countries in advanced aerospace technology. Chinese analysts point to 

their country’s relatively late commitment to becoming a space power as well as a lack of an ability to 

independently innovate. 

As a result, Chinese space officials admit that they still have much more work to do to become a strong 

space power. According to one source, being a strong space power means having an absolute superiority 

in space technology that can then be expanded into other areas.216 In order to accomplish this, one author 

writes that China must make progress in six broad categories of a space program’s impact on technology, 

military and national defense, economics, management, culture, and overall effects.

217 Another source 

states that to be considered a strong space power China must not only be able to launch a variety of 

payloads into orbit, it must also be able to do so rapidly. Moreover, China must also not only have satellites 

of varying capabilities with long service lives, but also be able to use them effectively. Finally, China must 

be able to control space, described as being able to prevent its satellites from being interfered with or 

destroyed.218

Nevertheless, there is no denying that China has made tremendous progress in space technologies. Gone 

are the days when Chinese launchers were unreliable and China had just a few satellites in orbit. Today 

China has more than 100 operational satellites in orbit and has the third largest fleet of spacecraft behind 

the United States and Russia (See Appendix A).

Several factors have played a role in this success. First is recognition by the nation’s top leadership of the 

importance of space to China. Chinese presidents and premiers from Jiang Zemin and Wen Jiabao to the 

current leadership of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang have sought to associate themselves in public ways with 

the space program, in particular the human spaceflight and lunar programs. This leadership attention has 

translated into policy attention and ample funding of a broad range of programs.

Support for China’s space program is guided by a series of goals that are to be met in five-year increments. 

Called “five-year plans,” (FYP) these policy documents provide specific technology development goals to 

be met within the plan’s timeframe. China is currently under the 12th FYP, which began in 2011 and will 

end in 2015. The 12th FYP designated the space industry as a part of the high-end manufacturing industry, 

one of China’s seven strategic emerging industries, due to its ability to increase China’s comprehensive 

national power and spur development in secondary industries. As a strategic emerging industry, the space 

program will receive preferential policy treatment and funding. Overall, the goal is to have all strategic 

emerging industries account for 8 percent of GDP by 2015 and 15 percent of GDP by 2020.219

China’s five-year plans fit into a larger set of goals detailed in the 2006 Medium and Long-term Plan for 

Science and Technology Development (MLP). This document established a number of policies to foster 

 

216 Wu Weiqiang, “浅谈航天强国评价体系研究” [A Brief Discussion on Research on the Analysis of Strong Space Power 

Evaluation System], 航天工业管理 [Space Industry Management] (March 2013): 33.

217 Ibid., 36.

218 “中国载人航天之父:我国离航天强国还有距离,” [The Father of China of China’s Space Program: Our Country is Still Far 

from Being a Strong Space Power], Sina News, June 21, 2012, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2012-06-21/163024635232.shtml.

219 U.S.-China Business Council, China’s Strategic Emerging Industries: Policy, Implementation, Challenges, and 

Recommendations, March 2013, 4.
42

innovation and set a number of goals for China’s S&T development that are to be met in the 2006‒2020 

timeframe. One of the important outcomes of the MLP was the establishment of 16 mega-projects that 

identified 16 technology areas (13 unclassified, 3 classified) for increased funding and attention. These

range from information technology to pharmaceuticals and agriculture. Space plays a prominent role in 

three of the megaprojects. China’s space megaprojects have been unofficially dubbed the “221 Program,”

which refers to the two programs involving human spaceflight and lunar exploration, two programs

involving earth remote sensing and Beidou satellite navigation programs, and one program involving a 

next generation of launch vehicles.220

This policy focus has also been matched by ample funding. Getting reliable data on how much China 

spends on its space program is difficult, but indications are that in relative terms China spends much less 

on space than the United States yet still manages to fund an extensive and robust program. According to 

one 2012 source, China invests less than 0.1 percent of its GDP on its space program. If correct, this would 

place China’s spending on space below $8.227 billion.221 This is in comparison to the United States, which 

spent $41.26 billion in 2013 on space.222 The relatively low amount of funding is also reflected in the 

official budgets given for China’s human spaceflight and lunar exploration programs. In 2003, Chinese 

officials stated that the cost of the program through Shenzhou 5 (1992‒2003) was 18 billion yuan (~$2.2 

billion). This included 10 billion yuan for developing the space capsule, launch vehicle, electronic and 

application equipment, and astronaut training. Another 8 billion yuan was spent on infrastructure, 

including the building of astronaut training facilities, the launch site, and the telemetry, tracking, and 

control (TT&C) system.

223 In 2012, a spokesperson for the China Manned Space Agency stated that the 

country had spent a total of 39 billion yuan ($6.35 billion) on human spaceflight, with 20 billion yuan being 

spent on Shenzhou flights 1‒6 and 19 billion yuan being spent on Shenzhou missions 7‒10.

224 The Chang’e1 lunar orbiter, on the other hand, cost 1.0 billion‒1.4 billion yuan ($130‒190 million).225

There is apparently some concern in China on the amount of money spent on the human space program. 

Speaking about the human spaceflight program, Luan Enjie, former head of China’s National Space 

Administration, admitted that “[t]here are questions about...what effect the program will have on the 

general economic situation. The scale of our manned program should be limited.”

226

Funding for the Beidou satellite navigation systems, however, appears to be substantial. From its initiation 

in 1994 to 2012, China had invested more than 16 billion yuan ($2.57 billion)227 in Beidou and plans to 

 

220 Sun Laiyan, “中国航天的发展战略和重点领域” [China Space Development Strategy and Key Areas], 中国航天 [Aerospace 

China], January 2007, 7.

221 Feng Shuxing, 我国空间力量发展与空间安全的思考 [Reflection on Development of Space Power and Space Security] 装备

学院学报 [Journal of Academy of Equipment], October 2012, 9.

222 Space Foundation, “The Space Report 2014,” 4.

223 “[神舟快报] 国新版记者招待会详解神五发射” [Shenzhou News Flash] The State Council Information Office Press 

Conference on the Shenzhou V Launch, CCTV.com, November 4, 2003.

224 “中国载人航天预算共 390 亿元 并非一次发射 600 亿)” [The Budget for China’s Human Space Flight Program is 39 Billion 

Yuan One Launch Does Not Cost 60 Billion Yuan], 新京报 [Beijing News], June 25, 2012, 

http://news.qq.com/a/20120625/000134.htm.

225 Bradley Perrett, Frank Morring, Jr., and Craig Covault, “Spacefarers,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, no. 17 (2007): 26‒

28.

226 Craig Covault, “China Seeks ISS Role, Accelerates Space Program,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 12, 2001.

227 Zhang Ke, “’北斗’今起照耀亚太区 中国版 GPS 年创产值超千亿” [‘Beidou’ Begins to Cover Asia China’s GPS Annual Output 

to Exceed Billions], 低碳网 [ditan360.com], December 28, 2012.
43

allocate a further 40 to 50 billion yuan ($6.41–8.02 billion) from 2013 to 2020 to develop Beidou 2.228 In 

addition, the country will invest 5 billion yuan ($810 million) in a Beidou industrial park.229 These funding 

figures suggest Beidou is one of the most significant space projects undertaken by China. By comparison, 

Russia spent $694 million on its GLONASS system in 2012230 and has budgeted more than 300 billion rubles 

($10.2 billion) to further develop GLONASS and bring 30 satellites into operation by 2020. Europe has also 

been building the Galileo navigation system at a projected cost of $6.25 billion.231

Another factor contributing to China’ success has been an emphasis on systems engineering, project 

management, and quality control. Best practices, often derived from U.S. R&D processes and developed 

for the human spaceflight project, appear to have been disseminated to the broader space community.

An emphasis has also been placed on training and continuing education. These practices may become 

more fruitful and established as China’s relatively young aerospace workforce gains experience.

The role of foreign technology has also played a role, although it is difficult to assess its effect due to the 

secretive nature of China’s space program and the inability to observe most spacecraft. Nevertheless, the 

admission by then China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation President Ma Xingrui in 2011 

that China’s space industry must move from imitative innovation to true innovation indicates that foreign 

technologies and designs still play an important role in China’s space program.232 In some respects this is 

not surprising since the acquisition of foreign technologies and know-how is a common practice for 

“catch-up” countries. Indeed, China’s policy towards its mega-projects is inherently based on the use of 

foreign technologies to achieve leapfrog development.

233

The space industry’s desire for foreign technology is reflected in its cooperative activities with Europe, 

Russia, and Ukraine, and China’s overall policy of welcoming all forms of cooperation on space activities, 

described earlier. In addition to the technology transfer for specific spacecraft described in the next 

sections, China has also been involved in illegal technology transfers that could be used for space-related 

applications. These include:

 The conviction of a U.S. citizen in 2013 for exporting high-grade carbon fiber to China, which has 

applications in the aerospace and nuclear fields.234

 

228 “Liu Kun, “未来十年中国将投数百亿建全球北斗导航系统” [In the Coming 10 Years China Eyes Greater Market Share for 

its GPS Rival,” 环球网 [huanqiu.com], December 27, 2012.

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-12/27/content_16062407.htm.

229 Wang Qian, “Funding Kick Starts Creative Research,” China Daily, May 2, 2013, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-

05/02/content_16466336.htm.

230 “Russia to Test Second Glonass-K Satellite in 2013”, RIA Novosti, April 17, 2012, 

http://en.rian.ru/science/20120417/172871888.html. 

231 “Galileo Navigational System Enters Testing Stage.” Deutsche Welle, October 13, 2012. http://www.dw.de/galileonavigational-system-enters-testing-stage/a-16304096-1. 

232 Ma Xingrui, “Continue with Indigenous Innovation and Promote the Development of China’s Space Enterprise [坚持自主创

新推动中国航天事业又好又快发展], Aerospace China [中国航天], 8 (2011): 6‒7.

233 Ministry of Science and Technology, “State Medium and Long-term Plan for Science and Technology Development,” 

http://www.most.gov.cn/kjgh/kjghzcq/.

234 “New York Man Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to Three Months in Prison for Exporting High-Grade Carbon Fiber To 

China,” http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/102-about-bis/newsroom/pressreleases/press-releases-2013/606-new-york-man-sentenced-in-manhattan-federal-court-to-three-months-in-prison-forexporting-high-grade-carbon-fiber-to-china.
44

 The conviction of a Chinese citizen in 2013 for trying to illegally export weapons-grade fiber to 

China.235

 The arrest of a U.S. citizen in 2011 on charges of illegally shipping sensitive materials to China 

that could be used as protective coatings on rocket nozzles.236

 The conviction of two Chinese nationals in 2011 for smuggling thousands of radiation-hardened 

computer chips to the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.237

China’s space program may also be the beneficiary of Chinese cyber espionage. In 2014, the network 

security firm CrowdStrike released a report detailing cyber activities against U.S. and European aerospace 

companies since 2007.238 The Shanghai-based unit carrying out the attack, 61486, has been described as 

a unit involved in space activities and likely involved in the “intercept of satellite communications and 

possibly space-based signal intelligence collection.”

239

In 2014, it was reported that the German Aerospace Center was the subject of a cyber attack likely 

originating from China that infected all of the center’s computer systems. It is unknown if or what 

information was compromised.240

Also in 2014, it was reported that Chinese hackers had stolen documents and data relating to Israel’s Iron 

Dome missile defense system and the Arrow 3 missile. The attack first occurred in October 2011 and 

targeted the Israeli companies Elisra Group, Israel Aerospace Industries, and Rafael Advanced Defense 

Systems.241

In 2012, NASA Inspector General Paul Martin stated in a report that cyber attacks from Chinese IP 

addresses had resulted in the perpetrators gaining “full access to key Jet Propulsion Laboratory

[computer] systems and sensitive user accounts.”

242 According to the report,

With full system access the intruders could: (1) modify, copy, or delete sensitive files; (2) 

add, modify, or delete user accounts for mission-critical JPL systems; (3) upload hacking 

tools to steal user credentials and compromise other NASA systems; and (4) modify 

 

235 “Cyber-Sting Nets Chinese National in Attempt to Export Sensitive Defense Technology,” 

http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases?id=538.

236 “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Arrest of Queens Resident for the Export of Military-Use Items to Taiwan and 

Attempting to Export Them to China,” http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/about-bis/newsroom/archives/press-releasearchives/98-about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2012/473-manhattan-u-s-attorney-announces-arrest-ofqueens-resident-for-the-export-of-military-use-items-to-taiwan-and-attempting-to-export-them-to-china.

237 “Chinese Nationals Sentenced 24 Months for Illegally Attempting to Export Radiation-Hardened Microchips to the PRC,” 

http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2011/09/20110930Chinesenr.html.

238 CrowdStrike, “Putter Panda,” 2014, 5.

239 Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is derived from electronic signals and systems, such as communications systems, radars, and 

weapons systems. Mark Stokes, Jenny Lin, and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and 

Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure,” Project 2049 Institute, November 2011, 11.

240 Swati Khandelwal, “German Aerospace Center Targeted by Self-destructing Spyware,” Hacker News, April 14, 2014, 

http://thehackernews.com/2014/04/Spyware-german-aerospace-center-cyber-espionage.html.

241 Umberto Bacchi, “Gaza: Israel’s Iron Dome Blueprints Were ‘Stolen by Chinese Hackers’,” International Business Times, July 

28, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/gaza-israels-iron-dome-blueprints-were-stolen-by-chinese-hackers-1458746.

242 Statement of Paul K. Martin, Inspector General, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA Cybersecurity: An 

Examination of the Agency’s Information Security,” February 29, 2012, 5.
45

system logs to conceal their actions. In other words, the attackers had full functional 

control over these networks.243

Although the extent of the damage from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) hacking has not been revealed, 

JPL at the time was conducting 23 missions,

244 including missions for the Mars rovers Opportunity and 

Curiosity, other planetary missions to Saturn and Jupiter, the moon, earth environmental monitoring, and 

astronomy. Speaking broadly about compromises of NASA computer systems and the computer systems 

of its contractors, the NASA inspector general wrote that “some NASA systems house sensitive 

information which, if lost or stolen, could result in significant financial loss, adversely affect national 

security, or significantly impair our Nation’s competitive technological advantage” through the loss of 

technical and engineering data.245 Such information could have assisted the Chinese space program in the 

development of its lunar rover, sensing technology such as infrared sensors and synthetic aperture radar, 

and the control of deep space missions. 

China’s Space Projects in Detail

Human Spaceflight

China’s marquis space program is its human spaceflight program. China is just the third country to have 

independently launched a human into space. Overseen by the PLA’s General Armament Department, the 

program was officially started in September 1992 under then President Jiang Zemin and has conducted a 

combination of manned and unmanned launches for a total of 10 missions by the end of 2013 (Table 3). 

The human spaceflight program is one of China’s largest projects ever and required the services of several 

hundred thousand personnel and 3,000 organizations.246 China’s human spaceflight program follows a 

three-step process with the goal of orbiting a 60-ton space station by 2023.

The first step in this process began in 1992 with the approval of the human spaceflight program and 

included development and testing of manned spaceflight technologies. China carried out its first test 

launch of the Shenzhou space capsule and the Long March-2F launch vehicle in 1999 and sent its first 

astronaut, Yang Liwei, into space in 2003 on the Shenzhou-5 capsule. It concluded in 2005 with the 

Shenzhou-6 mission involving multiple crew members. The second, and current, step involves 

extravehicular activities, space docking, and the launch of a small space laboratory. The 2008 Shenzhou7 mission involved a spacewalk, and in 2011 the 8-ton Tiangong-1 space station was launched. Subsequent 

missions tested docking procedures between the Shenzhou space capsule and the space station and 

involved two extended habitations by three member crews, including female astronauts, to Tiangong-1. 

The third and final step involves the launch of a larger 60-ton space station by 2023 and a long-term 

human presence in space.247

 

243 Ibid.

244 “Chinese Hackers ‘Had Full Access’ to NASA Lab that Commands 23 Spacecraft,” Daily Mail, March 7, 2012, 

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2110506/Chinese-hackers-control-Nasa-lab-commands-23-spacecraft.html.

245 Statement of Paul K. Martin, 1.

246 Chen Ding, “专家访谈:中国航天人的差距观” [Expert Interview: The Viewpoint of Industry People on the Gaps in China’s 

Space Program], China National Space Administration, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615708/n942529/n942833/70610.html.

247 “CMSP,” China Manned Space Engineering, http://en.cmse.gov.cn/list.php?catid=42.
46

Table 3. China’s human spaceflight missions

Mission Launch Date Approximate 

Launch Interval

Flight Time Purpose

Shenzhou-1 20 November 1999 NA 21 hours Test

Shenzhou-2 10 January 2001 14 Months 7 days Test

Shenzhou-3 25 March 2002 14 Months 7 days Test

Shenzhou-4 30 December 2002 9 Months 7 days Test

Shenzhou-5 15 October 2003 10 Months 21 hours Manned (1 crew)

Shenzhou-6 12 October 2005 24 Months 4+ days Manned (2 crew)

Shenzhou-7 25 September 2008 35 Months 2+ days Manned (3 crew EVA)

Tiangong-1 29 September 2011 NA 36 months (ongoing) Prototype space lab

Shenzhou-8 1 November 2011 37 months 17 days Unmanned (docking)

Shenzhou-9 16 June 2012 7.5 months 13 days Manned (3 crew docking)

Shenzhou-10 11 June 2013 12 months 15 days Manned (3 crew docking)

Shenzhou Space Capsule

The Shenzhou spacecraft was developed by the China Academy of Space Technology.248 The nearly 7.8-

ton, 8.86-meter craft can support up to three people for seven days and is divided into three sections: an 

orbital module, a descent module, and a propulsion module. The Shenzhou is the largest spacecraft of its 

kind and is slightly larger than the Russian Soyuz space capsule.249

Shenzhou’s orbital module has been outfitted with scientific equipment and optical imagers with a 

resolution of 1.6 meters, and is rumored to have electronic intelligence capabilities.250 Shenzhou missions 

1‒6 had two sets of solar panels, one on the orbital module and one on the propulsion module, enabling 

the orbital module to remain functional for up to six months to conduct scientific experiments and earth 

observation.251 The Shenzhou 7‒10 missions had just one set of solar panels, however. Shenzhou-7 lost its 

solar panels to accommodate a spacewalk, and the solar panels on the orbital module for Shenzhou 

missions 8‒10 were unnecessary due to the reconfiguration of the orbital module into a docking module.

 

248 “Shenzhou III Unmanned Spacecraft Successfully Launched,” People’s Daily, March 25, 2002, 

http://english.people.com.cn/200203/25/eng20020325_92794.shtml. 

249 “Facts and Figures: China’s First Manned Spaceship,” People’s Daily, October 16, 2003, 

http://english.people.com.cn/200310/16/eng20031016_126187.shtml.

250 Wei Long, “New Details of Shenzhou and Its Launcher Revealed,” Space Daily, April 1, 2002, 

http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-02zf.html.

251 Craig Covault, “China Seeks ISS Role, Accelerates Space Program,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 12, 2001.
47

Table 4. Comparison of Shenzhou 5 space capsule and Soyuz TM

Description Shenzhou Soyuz TM

Length 8.86 meters 7 meters

Liftoff mass 7. 8 tons 7 tons

Descent module volume 6 cubic meters 4 cubic meters

Descent module diameter 2.5 meters 2.2 meters

Solar panels 2 pair 1 pair

Orbital module 6 month orbital capability N/A

It is not a coincidence that the Shenzhou space capsule is similar in appearance to the Russian Soyuz(Table 

4). Before designing Shenzhou, Chinese engineers looked at both the Soyuz and Apollo spacecraft designs 

and chose the Soyuz due to its long safety record.252 But China has also received technological assistance 

from Russia. In 1995, China purchased a complete life support system, an Energiya docking module, and 

a Kurs rendezvous system from Russia.253Chinese officials assert, however, that the Shenzhou is entirely 

designed and constructed by China.According to Su Shuangning, the chief designer of the space capsule’s 

astronaut systems, “All crucial technologies and equipment of our nation’s manned space engineering are 

developed by us. Undoubtedly, we have learned and imported some advanced technology from others, 

but Chinese characteristics cannot be sacrificed despite this openness, and any introduction of foreign 

technology must be supplementary to domestic innovation.”

254 Indeed, a look at the control panels in the 

cockpits of the Shenzhou and Soyuz demonstrate that Chinese engineers sought their own path in 

developing some of the spacecraft’s electronic components, but examination of the parachute 

compartments on the two spacecraft reveal an uncanny resemblance to the Soyuz. China’s use of a 

combination of foreign and domestic technology has culminated in a product that is said to be equivalent 

to Soviet 1980s or 1990s technology.255

Tiangong-1 Space Station

Tiangong-1 (天宫-1/Heavenly Palace) is described as an experimental space station and is often called a 

space laboratory. Tiangong-1 was launched on September 29, 2011. It was developed by the China 

Academy of Space Technology and has a mass of 8.5 tons, is 10.4 meters in length, and is 3.35 meters at

its widest point. The interior of Tiangong-1 is 15 cubic meters and can house three astronauts.256 In 

comparison, the International Space Station has a mass over 400 tons, is 51 meters long, with an interior

 

252 Zhu Zengquan, “中国飞船- 中国载人航天工程总设计师王永志访谈录” [China’s Space Capsule: An Interview with China 

Human Space Flight Project Chief Engineer Wang Yongzhi], People’s Daily, October 17, 2003, 

http://scitech.people.com.cn/GB/1059/2138482.html.

253 Harvey, China’s Space Program, 147.

254 Li Xianqing and Liu Cheng, “神舟四飞太空告诉我们 。。。” [What Shenzhou IV Tells Us about Its Space Journey], 解放军

报 [PLA Daily], January 7, 2003, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2003/01/07/20030107001009_todaynews.html.

255 “神舟专家揭密载人飞船 航天员有望 2 年内升空” [Shenzhou Expert Reviews Space Capsule, Astronauts Hope to Reach 

Space in Two Years], china.com.cn, April 2, 2002, http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/TEC-c/126675.htm; “Reason for China’s 

Development of Manned Spacecraft,” People’s Daily, January 16, 2003, 

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200301/16/eng20030116_110254.shtml.

256 “天宫一号承载梦想上九霄 中国载人空间站建设大幕开启” [Tiangong-1 Bearing the Weight of the Dream Goes into the 

Heavens: China’s Manned Space Station Begins], September 30, 2011, 

http://www.spacechina.com/n25/n144/n212/n309/n312/c113447/content.html.
48

Figure 2. The Tiangong space station (left) and the International Space Station (right)

volume of 916 cubic meters and has housed up to six astronauts(see Figure 2).

257 Tiangong-1 was designed 

to have a service life of two years, but as of writing is still in orbit after three years. The follow-on to 

Tiangong-1, Tiangong-2, is to be launched in 2016.

258

Long-term Space Station

The first of three modules for China’s 60-ton space station is expected to be launched in 2018, with 

additional modules planned for launch in 2020 and 2022. China is still considering how best to use the 

space station. According to an official from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the space station will be 

used to study applied physics, the origins of life, and black holes. The space station will also conduct earth 

observation, presumably with remote sensing equipment onboard the space station.259

Shenzhou Missions in Detail

Shenzhou-1 

Shenzhou-1 was launched November 20, 1999 and returned to Earth 21 hours later on November 21 after 

orbiting the Earth 14 times.260 The Shenzhou 1 space capsule was originally a test capsule used to test the 

electrical system and was not originally designed to go into space.261 As a result, the main objectives of 

this first mission were to test the guidance, navigation, and control systems and reentry, separation, 

landing, and heat-resistant technologies.262

 

257 “International Space Station: By the Numbers,” Space.com, August 03, 2010, http://www.space.com/8876-internationalspace-station-numbers.html; “International Space Station: Facts and Figures,” NASA, accessed February 10, 15, 

https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/main/onthestation/facts_and_figures.html.

258 “我国 2016 年将发射”天宫二号”空间实验室,” [Our Country Will Launch Tiangong-2 Space Laboratory in 2016], 人民网, 

[People’s Net], September 10, 2014, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2014/0910/c1011-25634041.html.

259 Luo Wangshu, “Earlier Launch Possible for Space Station Modules,” China Daily, July 18, 2014, 

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-07/18/content_17831873.htm.

260 Michael Laris, “Chinese Test Craft for Manned Orbits,” Washington Post, November 22, 1999.

261 Deng Ningfeng, ed., 天河圆梦 [Dream About the Milky Way Fulfilled] (Beijing: China Astronautics Press, 2004), 158.

262 Zhu Zengquan, ed., 飞天梦圆:一来自中国载人航天工程的内部报告 [The Realized Dream of Human Space Flight: Taken 

From the Internal Report of China’s Human Space Flight Program] (Beijing: Huayi Press, 2003), 122‒24.
49

Shenzhou-2 

Shenzhou-2 was launched January 10, 2001, and returned to Earth January 16, 2001. It was characterized 

as a “basic” space capsule in which many of the components used in the first Shenzhou flight had to be 

redesigned or reworked. 263 This includes the solar panels, which had to undergo further vibration 

testing.264 Shenzhou-2 orbited the Earth 108 times, during which hundreds of orbital maneuvers were 

performed.265 The main tasks for this mission were to test the reliability, compatibility, and safety of the 

capsule’s systems and to conduct orbital maneuvers.

Shenzhou-2 is the only mission in which photos of the returned spacecraft were not released to the public.

Chinese officials denied that any mishap occurred until General Armament Department head Li Jinai 

admitted in a 2003 China Space News article that “the descent did not completely reach our planned 

goals.”

266 China has not revealed the cause of the mishap, but problems with the drogue parachute, the 

spacecraft’s main parachute, or landing rockets could have caused a catastrophic hard landing. Shenzhou2’s orbital module stayed in orbit for 260 days after the return of the descent module.267

Shenzhou-3

Shenzhou-3 was launched March 25, 2002, and returned to Earth April 1.268 The primary focus of the 

Shenzhou-3 mission was the testing of safety systems, including “assessing the functionality, reliability, 

and safety of each manned space flight system; coordination among different systems; the spacecraft 

environment for manned flight; the effectiveness of the improved measures that have been implemented; 

the escape and emergency life support systems; and the capability of the launcher’s redundant control 

system.”

269On landing, Chinese human spaceflight program leaders declared the Shenzhou space capsule

“technically suitable for astronauts.”

270

As with previous missions, the orbital module of Shenzhou-3 stayed in orbit for nearly 232 days and 

reentered the atmosphere on November 12, 2002, during which time ground controllers issued 2,000 

commands.271 These tests allowed ground operators to control the craft within 100 meters of its intended 

orbit. 272 Unlike Shenzhou-2, Shenzhou-3 carried a “simulated person” to monitor the effects of the 

capsule’s internal environment on humans.273

 

263 Ibid, 124.

264 Deng, Dream About the Milky Way Fulfilled, 236.

265 David Whitehouse, “Chinese Launch Capsule,” BBC, March 25, 2002.

266 Li Jinai, “难忘的历史时刻” [An Unforgettable Historical Moment], 中国航天报 [China Space News], November 12, 2003, 2.

267 “Shenzhou Expert Reveals Secrets of Human Space Flight.”

268 Ibid.

269 Cheng Ho, “Shenzhou-5 May Carry Out First Chinese Manned Mission,” Terra Daily, April 9, 2002, 

http://www.terradaily.com/reports/Shenzhou5_May_Carry_Out_First_Chinese_Manned_Mission.html.

270 “Shenzhou III Unmanned Spacecraft Returns,” People’s Daily, April 1, 2002, 

http://english.people.com.cn/200203/25/eng20020325_92794.shtml.

271 “Shenzhou Expert Reveals Secrets of Human Space Flight.” 

272 Wei Long, “Shenzhou-3 Module Reentry Wraps Up Long-Duration Mission,” Space Daily, November 25, 2002, 

http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-02zzi.html.

273 “Exploring the Secrets of the Astronauts of the Shenzhou Spaceship: Dummy Astronauts on Board Shenzhou-3,” People’s 

Daily, April 6, 2002.
50

Shenzhou-4

Shenzhou-4 was launched December 30, 2002, and returned to Earth January 5, 2003. With the successful 

completion of the Shenzhou-4 mission, China stated that China’s human space flight program had grown 

“increasingly mature, which lays a solid foundation for eventually sending up manned flights.”

274 The 

Shenzhou-4 mission was a dress rehearsal for the Shenzhou-5 mission and included “all the systems for 

manned space flight, including an astronaut system and [a] life-support sub-system”

275 as well as a 

sleeping bag, food, medicine, fire extinguisher, hygiene articles, and other necessities.276

Shenzhou-5

Shenzhou-5 was launched October 15, 2003, and was China’s first manned spaceflight. Shenzhou-5’s 

mission schedule was similar to the Shenzhou-1 launch, encompassing 14 orbits.277 Air Force Lt. Colonel 

Yang Liwei, selected as an astronaut in 1998, became China’s first astronaut. During the flight Yang spoke 

with President Hu Jintao, the minister of national defense, and his family.

The capsule landed safely on October 16, 2003. Yang emerged from the capsule waving to the camera and 

was immediately ushered into a nearby chair. Shortly thereafter Yang was announced to be in good 

physical health and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao congratulated Yang, stating “the motherland and people 

express thanks to you.”

278 It was later revealed, however, that Yang had suffered a cut lip due to excessive 

g-forces during reentry and had to be cleaned up and put back in the capsule so he could emerge again 

for photos.279

Shenzhou-6

Shenzhou-6, China’s second manned mission, was launched on October 12, 2005, and remained in orbit 

for more than four days. Shenzhou-6 was crewed by two astronauts with the purpose to gain experience 

in “multi-person and multi-day” flight. 280 The Shenzhou-6 space capsule contained more than 180 

technical improvements, but the main mission of Shenzhou-6 was to learn how to operate in space for 

extended periods of time.281 In addition to learning to live in a microgravity environment, the astronauts 

conducted a number of unknown scientific experiments.282

Shenzhou-7

Shenzhou-7 is the only Chinese mission involving an extravehicular activity (EVA). It was launched 

September 25, 2008, and returned on September 28, 2008 (see Figure 3). The mission was crewed by 

three astronauts. The Shenzhou-7 mission made a number of technological breakthroughs, including 

 

274 “China’s Unmanned Spaceship Lands,” People’s Daily, January 6, 2003.

275 Ibid.

276 Li Heng, “Shenzhou IV Strictly Identical with Manned Spacecraft: General Director,” People’s Daily, December 31, 2002, 

http://china.org.cn/english/scitech/52515.htm.

277 “China’s Manned Spacecraft Completes Orbit Shift,” People’s Daily, October 15, 2003, 

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200310/15/eng20031015_126092.shtml.

278 “Timeline of the Launch and Recovery of Shenzhou V,” People’s Daily, October 16, 2003, 

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200310/16/eng20031016_126192.shtml.

279 Andrew Jacobs, “In Leaked Lecture, Details of China’s News Cleanups,” New York Times, June 3, 2010.

280 “Shenzhou VI Manned Spaceship Flight,” China Manned Space Engineering, http://en.cmse.gov.cn/list.php?catid=61.

281 “中国载人航天新起点 新跨越 新高度” [China’s Human Spaceflight’s New Starting Points New Advances New Heights], 

CCTV (Online) (中央电视台), http://www.cctv.com/news/china/20051126/100788.shtml.

282 Ibid.
51

Figure 3. Two photographs of the Shenzhou-7 taken by the Banxing-1 satellite. 

those for airlocks, EVA, data relay satellite, missions involving a three-person crew, and concomitant 

satellite technologies.283

On September 27, astronaut Zhai Zhigang conducted an EVA using a Chinese-made spacesuit called feitian. 

Zhai left the vehicle but was tethered to the spacecraft. A second astronaut, Liu Boming, remained in the 

orbital module wearing a Russian-made spacesuit. During the 20-minute spacewalk, Zhai retrieved a solid 

lubricant that had been attached to the outside of the orbital module to both test the spacesuit and gain 

experience in conducting EVAs and to test the effects of the space environment on the lubricant.284

In addition to the astronautic mission, the Shenzhou-7 mission also involved the release of a miniature 

satellite, Banxing-1 (伴星/BX-1/Companion Satellite), that flew around Shenzhou-7 at a distance of 

several tens of meters to several hundred meters. After the astronauts departed for Earth, BX-1 orbited 

Shenzhou-7 at a distance of one to two hundred kilometers. BX-1 was equipped with two cameras that 

took images of Shenzhou-7. The stated reason for the BX-1 was to test the orbiting of a spacecraft with 

the Shenzhou 7 to prepare for an eventual docking mission with a space station.285

The BX-1 mission was involved in some controversy when it passed within 45 kilometers of the 

International Space Station, leading some to conclude that the mission was also a test of a co-orbital ASAT 

capability286 or that it was testing satellite inspection capabilities.287 The proximity of the BX-1 did not 

 

283 “Shenzhou VII Manned Spaceship Flight,” China Manned Space Engineering, http://en.cmse.gov.cn/list.php?catid=62.

284 “Chinese Taikonaut Greets Nation, World in First Spacewalk,” Xinhuanet, September 27, 2008, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/27/content_10121998.htm.

285 “伴飞小卫星将”追赶”分离后的神七轨道舱” [Small Companion Satellite Will Chase After the Shenzhou 7 Orbital Capsule 

After Separation], Xinhuanet, September 24, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-

09/24/content_10104787.htm; “Shenzhou-7 Launches Small Monitoring Satellite,” Xinhuanet, September 27, 2008, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/27/content_10123015.htm; “伴飞小卫星将给神七 ‘照相’” [Small Companion 

Satellite Will Take Photographs of Shenzhou 7], Xinhuanet, September 24, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-

09/24/content_10104656.htm.

286 “Closer Look: Shenzhou-7’s Close Pass by the International Space Station,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, 

October 9, 2008, http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.191/pub_detail.asp.

287 “China’s BX-1 Microsatellite: A Litmus Test for Space Weaponization,” Space Review, October 20, 2008, 

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1235/1.
52

present a hazard to the International Space Station. The Shenzhou-7 mission was also the first human 

spaceflight mission to use the Tianlian data relay satellite to communicate with ground control.288

Shenzhou-8

Shenzhou-8 was an unmanned mission launched November 1, 2011, that was intended to test docking 

technologies and docking procedures with the Tiangong-1 space station. The mission was completed on 

November 17, 2011, when Shenzhou-8 returned to Earth. Shenzhou-8 conducted two dockings. It first 

docked on November 3 and remained docked with Tiangong-1 for 12 days. On November 14, Shenzhou8 was separated from Tiangong-1 and then redocked.289

In order to conduct the docking, the Shenzhou-8 orbital module was outfitted with a docking mechanism 

based on the Russian Androgynous Peripheral Attach System (APAS),290 and a microwave radar, laser radar 

and a high-resolution imaging sensor to monitor the distance between the space capsule and space 

station.291According to an ESA official, the dockings experienced difficulties. Due to its relatively low mass, 

the Shenzhou space capsule kept bouncing off the Tiangong-1 space station, requiring the space capsule 

to be rammed into the space station at speeds too high to be considered safe.292

Shenzhou-9

Shenzhou-9 was the first manned mission to Tiangong-1 and the first mission to have a female astronaut. 

In total, three astronauts participated in the Shenzhou-9 mission. Shenzhou-9 was launched June 16, 2012,

and returned to Earth on June 29. Its goals were to further test China’s docking technology and procedures 

and to test the ability of Tiangong-1 to support human spaceflight.293 Shenzhou-9 conducted two dockings 

with Tiangong-1. The first occurred on June 18. The second occurred on June 24 and was the first manual 

docking conducted by China.294During their stay in Tiangong-1, the astronauts conducted a number of 

space physiological studies and microbiological experiments.295

Shenzhou-10

Shenzhou-10 was the second manned mission to Tiangong-1. With this mission, the Shenzhou ended its 

status as an experimental spacecraft and officially became operational, indicating that major technological 

revisions had been completed.296 Like Shenzhou-9, Shenzhou-10 had a crew of three, one of whom was a 

woman. Shenzhou-10 was launched June 11, 2013, and is China’s longest human spaceflight mission,

 

288 Tianlian satellites are discussed in further detail later in the paper.

289 “China Completes Second Space Docking Test,” Xinhuanet, November 14, 2011, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/14/c_131246417.htm.

290 “Europe May Work with China on Space Station,” Space.com, February 26, 2013, http://www.space.com/19960-chinaspace-station-europe-cooperation.html.

291 “2nd Docking of Tiangong-1 and Shenzhou-8 on Schedule,” Xinhuanet, November 7, 2011, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/video/2011-11/07/c_131233226.htm.

292 “Europe May Work With China on Space Station.”

293 “Tiengong I/Shenzhou IX Manned Rendezvous and Docking Mission,” China Manned Space Engineering, 

http://en.cmse.gov.cn/list.php?catid=206.

294 “China’s First Manual Space Docking Successful,” Xinhuanet, June 24, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2012-

06/24/c_131672642.htm.

295 “Five Space Medical Experiments Succeed Onboard Unified Tiangong 1 and Shenzhou 9,” Youtube (video), June 23, 2012, 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HV4FWYTVLsU.

296 “China’s Shenzhou-10 Mission Successful,” Xinhuanet, June 26, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2013-

06/26/c_132488807.htm.
53

Figure 4. Shenzhou-10 (left) docked with the Tiangong-1 (right). Artist simulation.

lasting 15 days. The goal of the Shenzhou-10 mission was to further verify rendezvous and docking

technology and the ability of Tiangong-1 to support human spaceflight, to conduct space physiological 

and space science experiments and maintenance on Tiangong-1, and test the function of Tiangong-1’s 

systems.

Like Shenzhou-9, the Shenzhou-10 crew performed a second docking with Tiangong-1 (see Figure 4). This 

time the Shenzhou-10 faced in a forward-flying position while the Tiangong-1 faced in a backward-flying 

position. The Shenzhou space capsule was then guided around the Tiangong-1 and docked. This was the 

first time that the space capsule had been flown around the Tiangong space station and docked.297

Shenzhou-10 was the last mission to Tiangong-1. 

Lunar Exploration Program

China’s lunar exploration program, Chang’e, also involves three steps, which are intended to culminate in 

a robotic mission that will gather lunar soil samples and return them to Earth. The program is described 

as a “major strategic decision by the Party Central Committee, State Council, and CMC taking a broad look 

at our country’s overall modernization and construction by grasping the world’s large S&T events and 

promoting our country’s space enterprise development, promoting our country’s S&T advancement and 

innovation, and improving our country’s CNP.”

298

The first step of the lunar exploration program was to orbit and take images of the moon. In 2007 China 

launched Chang’e 1 and in 2010 launched Chang’e-2 (Table 5). Chang’e-1 resulted in the first complete 

map of the lunar surface and was later purposefully crashed into the lunar surface to analyze lunar soil.299

The Chang’e-2 also orbited the moon, but at a lower altitude which resulted in images with a greater 

resolution. After completing its lunar mission, Chang’e-2 orbited to the La Grangian point L2 to test China’s 

ability to control deep space objects. The spacecraft then conducted a flyby of the asteroid 4179 Toutatis. 

 

297 “Tiengong I/Shenzhou X Manned Spaceflight Mission.”

298 “许达哲:以’探月梦’托起’中国梦’,” [Xu Dazhe: ‘Lunar Exploration Dream’ Upholds the ‘China Dream’], 

http://www.sastind.gov.cn/n132/n230/n18088/c242836/content.html. 

299 “China Publishes First Full Map of the Moon Surface,” SSERVI, http://sservi.nasa.gov/articles/china-publishes-first-full-mapof-the-moon-surface/.
54

Table 5. Chang’e launches

Chang’e-3 represented the second stage of China’s lunar exploration program and involved landing a 

robotic rover similar to the Mars rovers employed by the United States. The purpose of the Chang’e-3 was 

to study the lunar surface. With the successful landing of Chang’e-3 in 2013, China is just the third country 

to conduct a landing on the moon. 

The most recent lunar exploration mission was the Chang’e-5T1. This mission involved a lunar flyby and a 

reentry of the Earth’s atmosphere. The Chang’e-5T1 mission has paved the way for the third phase of the 

lunar exploration program, the landing and return of a robot. During this phase, soil samples of the moon 

will be collected and returned to Earth.

300

Consideration of a lunar exploration program began in 1991 when Chinese scientists began preliminary 

work under the 863 Program. In 1994, the first feasibility study was completed. In 2000, China’s first space 

white paper stated that China had begun preliminary research on a lunar exploration program, and in 

2002 China publicly announced that it had begun a lunar exploration program. In 2004 the development 

program was formally started.301

China conducts lunar exploration for a variety of reasons. Like human spaceflight, lunar exploration is said 

to be able to increase China’s comprehensive national power. Prestige appears to be a main motivation 

of the program and China has generated positive publicity by being just one of three countries to have 

conducted a robotic soft landing on the moon. Science is also an important motivation, and China has 

conducted numerous scientific studies through its Chang’e program that have added to our knowledge of 

the moon. A third motivation is the development of technology, in particular the ability to control 

spacecraft in deep space. 

A final motivation unique to China is the exploitation of the moon’s natural resources. China’s scientific 

exploration of the moon has centered on the composition of the lunar surface. Chinese analysis concludes 

that the moon contains large amounts of 14 elements that could be useful to industry, including iron, 

titanium, uranium, thorium, and potassium. Chinese researchers are particularly interested in helium-3. 

A controversial mission for the Chang’e program, helium-3 could be used to power a future nuclear fusion 

reactor, if one is ever invented. Chinese analysts write that 100 tons of helium-3 could power all of the 

Earth’s energy needs for one year and that there is 1 million to 5 million tons of helium-3 on the moon. 302

 

300 “我国月球探测工程的发展规划” [Our Country’s Lunar Exploration Project’s Development Plan], accessed September 11, 

2014, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n1081/n7499/n314807/n330895/331346.html.

301 “中国嫦娥工程的’大三步’和’小三步’” [China’s Chang’e Program ‘Three Large Steps’ and ‘Three Small Steps’], China News 

Service, December 1, 2013, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2013/12-01/5565595.shtml.

302 Deng Yongchun and Ouyang Ziyuan, “嫦娥一号绕月探测—中国航天迈向深空” [Chang’e-1 Lunar Exploration: China’s Space 

Program Marches Toward Deep Space], 航天器工程 [Spacecraft Engineering], November 2007, 48‒50.

Spacecraft Launch Year Notes

Chang’e-1 2007 Lunar Orbiter

Chang’e-2 2010 Lunar Orbiter

Chang’e-3 2013 Lunar Rover

Malfunctioned after landing

Chang’e-5 2014 Lunar flyby and Earth return mission
55

At an estimated value of $4 billion to 10 billion per ton,303 Chinese analysts conclude that the revenue 

derived from mining helium-3 could be economically viable and could cover the costs of the infrastructure 

needed for such a technologically complex endeavor.

Chang’e-1 and 2

The first step of the lunar exploration program involved using the Chang’e-1 and Chang’e-2 lunar orbiters,

launched in 2007 and 2010, respectively, to take images of the lunar surface. The Chang’e-1 mission 

resulted in the first complete map of the lunar surface304 and was later purposefully crashed into the lunar 

surface to analyze the lunar soil. Chang’e-2 also orbited the moon, but at a lower altitude, which resulted 

in images with a one-meter resolution. After completing its lunar mission, Chang’e-2 traveled to the La 

Grangian point L2 to test China’s ability to control deep space objects. The spacecraft then conducted a 

flyby of the asteroid 4179 Toutatis and imaged the asteroid. 

Chang’e-1 was launched October 24, 2007, and entered lunar orbit on November 5, 2007, when it entered 

into an orbit 200 km above the moon. Chang’e-1’s mission was to take three-dimensional images of the 

lunar surface, measure the depth of its regolith, and assess the composition of the lunar surface by 

mapping up to 14 chemical elements. The launch was originally scheduled for April 2007 but was 

postponed until October for unknown reasons.305 According to chief designer Sun Jiadong, the Chang’e-1 

“is much heavier than that of developed nations, even though the quality is otherwise the same and the 

products meet the same technical criteria.”

306

The Chang’e-1 is described as the most sophisticated satellite China had produced up until that time due 

to the variety of missions it needed to conduct as well as the need to conduct 10 maneuvers to reach the 

moon. According to Huang Jianchuan, a deputy chief designer for the program, Chang’e-1 “adopted a 

large amount of new technology, smart enough to find a correct path, make the right maneuvers, diagnose 

and repair equipment breakdowns by itself.”

307

Indeed, the TT&C system for the Chang’e missions is described as the most difficult challenge of the 

program since China could not have line of sight communications using control centers within its territory. 

In addition, the Chang’e-1 controllers had to follow a careful balancing act in which the spacecraft’s 

sensors had to face the moon to collect data, its antennas had to face the Earth to communicate with 

ground control, and its solar panels had to face the sun (see Figure 5).

308

To control the spacecraft, China built two dish antennas: a 50-meter diameter antenna near Beijing and a 

40-meter diameter antenna near Kunming, Yunnan Province. The European Space Agency assisted CNSA 

in the tracking effort by allowing it to track a European lunar spacecraft launched in 2003.309 In addition, 

 

303 Sima Hangren, “月球能源离我们有多远” [Lunar Resources Are How Far Away From Us], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 

October 2006, 25.

304 “China Publishes First Full Map of the Moon Surface,” SSERVI, http://sservi.nasa.gov/articles/china-publishes-first-full-mapof-the-moon-surface/.

305 “Chang’e-1 Satellite Launch Delayed,” CRIEnglish.com, March 15, 2007, 

http://english.cri.cn/2906/2007/03/15/1261@205784.htm.

306 Bradley Perrett and Joseph C. Anselmo, “Steps to the Moon,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 167, no. 18 (2007): 29‒30.

307 Ibid.

308 Bradley Perrett, Frank Morring, Jr., and Craig Covault, “Spacefarers,” 26‒28.

309 Ibid.
56

Figure 5. Chang’e-1 spacecraft

ESA also provided TT&C support at its stations in Maspalomas, Canary Islands; and Kourou, French Guiana. 

This was the first time that a command was issued from an ESA station to a Chinese spacecraft.310

ESA and CNSA will also share data and scholarly exchanges on lunar exploration. According to Hermann 

Opgenoorth, head of ESA’s Solar System Missions Division, “Participation in Chang’e-1 gives European 

scientists and ESA experts a welcome opportunity to maintain and pass on their expertise and to continue 

their scientific work. Based on the experience gained with this first mission, we intended to cooperate on 

the next missions in China's Chang’e line of lunar explorers.”

311

Chang’e-1 was charged with several missions. In addition to taking the first three-dimensional map of the 

entire moon’s surface312 and mapping the moon’s resources, Chang’e-1 also assessed the thickness of the 

lunar soil and analyzed the space environment between the Earth and the moon.313

In order to conduct these missions, the Chang’e-1 was equipped with an electro-optical imager and a laser 

altimeter to produce three-dimensional images of the lunar surface, a spectrometer and a gamma and xray spectrometer to identify the composition of the lunar surface, a microwave radiometer to measure 

temperature variations on the lunar surface and its depth, and a high energy particle detector and solar 

wind detector to collect data on the space environment.314

The Chang’e-1 mission resulted in several scientific accomplishments. The three-dimensional images 

taken by the lunar orbiter resulted in a map of the entire lunar surface that was released on November 

 

310 “Chang’e-1 (Lunar-1 Mission of China),” eoPortal Directory, https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellitemissions/c-missions/chang-e-1.

311 “Chang’E-1 New Mission to Moon Lifts Off,” ESA, October 24, 2007, 

http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Science/SMART-1/Chang_e-1_-_new_mission_to_Moon_lifts_off.

312 Deng Yongchun and Ouyang Ziyuan, “嫦娥一号绕月探测—中国航天迈向深空” [Chang’e-1 Lunar Exploration: China’s Space 

Program Marches Toward Deep Space], 航天器工程 [Spacecraft Engineering], November 2007, 48‒50.

313 Ibid.

314 “Chang’e-1 (Lunar-1 Mission of China).” 
57

12, 2008.315 Remote imagery of the moon also provided additional information on the exact shape of the 

moon. Chang’e-1 also conducted the first multi-channel microwave sensing of the lunar surface allowing

the measurement of thermal variance in the lunar soil and its thickness, which could assist in the location 

of helium-3.316

Chang’e-2

Chang’e-2 was launched October 1, 2010, China’s national day, and entered the moon’s orbit October 9, 

2010. Chang’e-2 is still operating in deep space after four years of service. In July 2014, the spacecraft was 

100 million km from Earth.

317 The cost of the development of Chang’e-2 was 900 million RMB.318

The Chang’e-2 took a more direct route to the moon than Chang’e-1, taking 112 hours or almost five days 

to reach the moon as opposed to the 12 days it took Chang’e-1.319 The Chang’e-2 also flew at 100 km 

above the moon, half as high as the Chang’e-1, in order to take images with one-meter resolutions. The

Chang’e-2 was also equipped with more precise instruments to detect lunar elements.320 In addition, 

because three-dimensional mapping of the lunar surface had already been completed, Chang’e-2 was not 

equipped with stereoscopic imagers and instead used a high-resolution electro-optical imager.321

Chang’e-2 also had different mission goals from the Chang’e-1. These include making high-resolution 

images of the moon’s poles and Rainbow Bay, the landing site of Chang’e-3. Because Chang’e-2 had fuel 

remaining after completing its missions, it left the moon’s orbit to travel 77 days to the L2 La Grange point 

to test China’s deep space TT&C network. China is just the third country behind the United States and 

Europe to have sent a satellite to L2.322 After completing its mission at L2, in April 2012 Chang’e-2 went to 

image an asteroid, Toutatis, passing within two miles of the object. 323

Chang’e-3

The Chang’e-3 mission began the second stage of China’s lunar exploration program, consisting of landing 

a lunar rover on the surface of the moon (see Figure 6). The Chang’e-3 began development in 2008 with 

 

315 “嫦娥一号所拍中国首幅月球全图发布 (组图))” [Chang’e-1 in One Shot Releases China’s First Full Picture of the Moon], 

Sina News, November 12, 2008, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/s/2008-11-12/1559529860.html.

316 “China’s Lunar Probe Chang’e-1 Impacts Moon,” People’s Daily, March 2, 2009, accessed September 11, 2014,

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90781/90876/6603492.html.

317 “专家:玉兔号或难修好 “嫦娥四号”或无落月计划” [Expert: Jade Rabbit or Difficult to Repair or Will ‘Chang’e 4’ Not Land 

on the Moon], People.cn, May 13, 2014, http://scitech.people.com.cn/n/2014/0513/c1007-25010766.html. 

318 “嫦娥二号任务由 5 大系统构成 总投入约 9 亿元” [Chang’e-2 Mission has 5 Large Systems Total Investment About 9 Billion 

Yuan], China News, September 30, 2010, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2010/09-30/2567259.shtml.

319 “Chang’e-2 Moon Orbiter Travels Around L2 in Outer Space,” Xinhuanet, October 10, 2010, accessed September 11, 2014, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/sci/2010-10/01/c_13539035.htm.

320 Ouyang Ziyuan, “嫦娥一号的初步成果” [The Initial Results of the Chang’e-2], 自然杂志 [Chinese Journal of Nature], June 

2013, 391‒93.

321 嫦娥二号与嫦娥一号的四大不同 [The Four Main Differences Between the Chang’e-2 and the Chang’e-1], 中国航天

[Aerospace China], October 2010, 11.

322 “Chang’e-2 Moon Orbiter Travels Around L2 in Outer Space.”

323 Liu Jianun, Ren Xin, Mou Lingli, Zhang Liyan, Feng Jianqing, Wang Xiaoqian, and Li Chunlai, “嫦娥二号卫星有效载荷与科学

探测”[Chang’e-2’s Payload and Scientific Surveying], 生命科学仪器 [Life Science Instruments], January 2013, 37; Chinese 

Spacecraft Flies by Asteroid Toutatis,” Space.com, December 17, 2012, http://www.space.com/18933-chinese-probe-asteroidtoutatis-flyby.html.
58

Figure 6. Chang’e-3 spacecraft on the moon.

a designed service life of three months.324 Chang’e-3 was launched December 2, 2013, and involved 

landing a lunar rover, called “Yutu,” or “Jade Rabbit,” on the surface of the moon. Chang’e-3 landed on 

the moon on December 14, 2013, marking the first time that a soft landing had been conducted on the 

moon since the Soviet Luna 24 mission in 1976. Chang’e-3 has been called China’s most complex and 

difficult mission due to the requirement to land a spacecraft on the moon and then separate the Jade 

Rabbit lunar rover from spacecraft. In doing so, both platforms had to be controlled from ground stations 

on Earth.

325 Perhaps as acknowledgement of the complicated nature of the mission, ESA assisted China 

with tracking Chang’e-3. ESA’s tracking station in New Norcia, Western Australia, complemented Chinese 

tracking and control of the spacecraft on its descent to the lunar surface while an ESA station in Spain 

assisted with positioning data once the spacecraft had landed.326

The Chang’e-3 spacecraft is equipped with an ultraviolet telescope to observe galaxies, binary stars, active 

galactic nuclei, and bright stars. Viewing objects in space from the moon offers better visibility than 

observing them from the Earth due to interference from the Earth’s atmosphere, weather, and pollution. 

The lander also carries a camera capable of taking images in the extreme ultraviolet band to observe the 

Earth’s plasmasphere. The lander is also equipped with electrooptical cameras that can take still pictures

and video of the rover and surrounding areas.327

Jade Rabbit

The Jade Rabbit is China’s first lunar rover. At 140 kg, the Jade Rabbit is much smaller than the 899 kg 

NASA Mars rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, but uses their same six-wheel design. The Jade Rabbit 

underwent a competitive design competition in 2004 involving more than a dozen research institutes and 

 

324 “嫦娥三号副总设计师:玉兔行进中被石块磕碰受伤” [Chang’e 3 Deputy Chief Designer: Jade Rabbit Was Injured While 

Moving Among Rocks], People.cn, July 20, 2014, http://scitech.people.com.cn/n/2014/0720/c1007-25304168.html; “超龄”玉

兔”第八月昼再醒来 伤未好已”衰老,” [Elderly Jade Rabbit Wakes Up on Eighth Lunar Day, Injury Is Good, but It Is Already Old] 

July 21, 2014, http://scitech.people.com.cn/n/2014/0721/c1007-25306225.html.

325 “Chang’e-3 Deputy Chief Designer: Jade Rabbit Was Injured While Moving Among Rocks.”

326 Leonard David, “Under a China Moon: The Politics of Cooperation in Space,” Space.com, December 13, 2013, accessed 

September 8, 2014, http://www.space.com/23965-china-moon-rover-landing-cooperation.html.

327 “Chang’e-3: Mission Overview,” Space flight 101, http://www.spaceflight101.com/change-3.html.
59

universities that submitted four, six, and eight-wheeled designs.328 Jade Rabbit ended up being developed 

by the Shanghai Space Systems Engineering Research Institute (上海宇航系统工程研究所), a subsidiary 

of Shanghai Academy of Space Technology, and the Beijing Spacecraft Systems Engineering Research 

Institute (北京飞行器系统工程研究所).329 Designers studied foreign designs when conducting basic 

research into the rover.330

Jade Rabbit has a payload of panoramic cameras and two spectrometers.331 The panoramic cameras 

permit three-dimensional imaging while the spectrometers are used to analyze the chemistry of the lunar 

surface. The rover is also equipped with a ground-penetrating radar to analyze the depth of the lunar 

surface down to 100 meters.332 Similar to the Mars rovers, Jade Rabbit is equipped with a robotic arm to 

scoop up samples of the lunar surface.

Jade Rabbit is powered by two solar panels, which were then planned to be folded in to better endure the 

14-day lunar night (see Figure 7). During the long lunar night, a radioisotope heating unit made up of 

plutonium-238 heats the rover.

Jade Rabbit suffered a “mechanical control abnormality” after the first 14-day lunar night on January 25, 

2014, and lost contact with the Earth; contact was reestablished in February 2014.333 The problem was 

identified as a control circuit malfunction that prevented the rover from folding its mast and solar panels 

in preparation of the colder temperatures of the lunar night.334 According to more recent reports, the 

rover could have been damaged by rocks that were larger than anticipated.335 Even though the rover had 

mechanical problems, the mission has exceeded its designed service life of three months and at time of 

writing was still operational with its imagers, spectrometers, and radar in working condition, just 20 

meters from the Chang’e-3 lander.336 As a result, the mission has still been called a “complete success” by 

Xi Jinping, who proclaimed it to be a “new milestone” as it completed its “designated scientific and 

engineering tasks.”

337

 

328 “China Focus: The Prequel of Jade Rabbit,” Xinhuanet, June 23, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-

06/23/c_133430433.htm.

329 “中国迎来探月新纪元” [China Welcomes in the New Era of Lunar Exploration], Sciencenet.cn, February 21, 2014, 

http://blog.sciencenet.cn/blog-85876-769553.html.

330 “China Focus: The Prequel of Jade Rabbit.”

331 “Chang’e-3 Revealed―and It’s Massive!” Pulispace.com, http://www.pulispace.com/en/media/news/231-change-3-

revealed-and-its-massive.

332 “Chang’e-3: Mission Overview.”

333 “Top Chinese Space Scientist Hopes to Send Rover ‘Better than Jade Rabbit’ to Mars,” South China Morning Post, July 4, 

2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1546446/top-chinese-space-scientist-hopes-send-rover-better-jade-rabbitexplore.

334 “China Exclusive: Control Circuit Malfunction Troubles China’s Yutu,”Xinhuanet, March 1, 2014, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-03/01/c_133152096.htm.

335 “China Exclusive: Lunar Rock Collisions Behind Yutu Damage: Designer,”Xinhuanet, July 21, 2014, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-07/21/c_133499472.htm.

336 “Lunar Rover Is ‘Awake’ but Faults Continue,”Xinhuanet, July 21, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-

07/21/c_133498925.htm; “China Focus: Uneasy Rest Begins for China’s Troubled Yutu Rover; Xinhuanet, February 23, 2014, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-02/23/c_133136885.htm.

337 “Lunar Rover Is ‘Awake’ but Faults Continue”; “习近平会见嫦娥三号任务参研参试人员代表”[Xi Jinping Sees 

Representatives from the Chang’e-3 Research and Testing Personnel], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], February 2014, 4.
60

Figure 7. Jade Rabbit on the moon. 

A second lunar rover mission will not follow the Chang’e-3. Similar to Chang’e-2, Chang’e-4 was a backup 

for Chang’e-3, but will not be launched.338

Chang’e-5

The Chang’e-5-T1 was launched on October 23, 2014 and was an experimental mission that conducted a 

lunar flyby and then returned to Earth on October 31, 2014. The mission was to test technologies and 

techniques to reach the moon and then conduct a reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere in preparation for 

the Chang’e-6 mission.

Chang’e-6

The Chang’e-6 mission is planned to be launched in 2017 from China’s new space launch center on Hainan 

Island.339 The mission will involve landing a spacecraft on the moon, retrieving samples of the lunar soil, 

and then returning them to Earth. The spacecraft is designed with two modules that separate. One module 

will scoop the soil into a second module that will then blast off from the lunar surface and return to Earth. 

The soil will be scooped from a depth of up to two meters. Although no landing site has been selected, 

scientists are considering areas where lava flows or recent meteor impacts are present.340

Manned Lunar Missions

China does not have a formal plan for sending humans to the moon even though rumors existed for years 

that China was contemplating the endeavor.341 In 2011, China announced that it was conducting feasibility 

studies for a manned mission to the moon with proposed launch dates of 2020, 2025, and 2030.342

Parameters being studied are the number of astronauts and the duration of the mission, the launch 

vehicle, and the mass of the spacecraft and lunar lander.343

 

338 “专家:玉兔号或难修好 “嫦娥四号”或无落月计划” [Expert: Jade Rabbit or Difficult to Repair or Will ‘Chang’e-4’ Not Land 

on the Moon], People.cn, May 13, 2014, http://scitech.people.com.cn/n/2014/0513/c1007-25010766.html. 

339 “China Plans to Launch Chang’e-5 in 2017,” Xinhuanet, December 16, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-

12/16/c_132971252.htm.

340 “Chang’e-5, China’s New Moon Mission, Is on Track for 2017 Landing,” China Topix, Jul 29, 2014, 

http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/5136/20140729/china-sets-sights-2017-sample-return-lunar-mission.htm.

341 Perrett, Morring, and Covault, “Spacefarers.”

342 Bradley Perrett, “Precision Innovation,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 173, no. 1 (2011): 54.

343 “叶培建:我国载人登月的条件还没有完全具备” [Ye Peijian: Our Country Does Not Yet Have the Conditions for a Manned 

Moon Mission], People.cn, May 15, 2014, http://scitech.people.com.cn/n/2014/0515/c1007-25021377.html.
61

Although no decision has been made on whether China will send humans to the moon, many in China’s 

space program argue for such a mission. For example, former Chief Commander and Chief Designer of 

Chang’e-1, Ye Peijian has stated,

First, in order for mankind to conquer space we must first go to the moon. Americans 

have gone. Chinese must go and Chinese absolutely have the ability to go. Second, our 

country currently does not have a manned lunar mission plan, so these postings on the 

web that it has been cancelled is utter nonsense. Third, for a country to have a manned 

lunar plan depends on the country’s actual strength and the overall needs of the country’s 

development. As the country’s economic capabilities develop and science and technology 

improve, I believe that our country sooner or later will have a manned lunar mission. The 

space white paper is released once every five years, the most recent one stated, “Our 

country has already started researching the critical technologies for manned lunar 

exploration.” I hope that during my lifetime I can see China land people on the moon.344

Lunar Bases

The possibility of manned lunar missions has led some Chinese analysts to discuss the utility of lunar bases. 

According to an unnamed official in the Lunar Exploration Center, the ultimate goal of a manned mission 

to the moon would be to establish a lunar base, which would, according to a proposal by the Chinese 

Academy of Sciences, be established by 2050. This moon base would fulfill a variety of missions. The 

weaker gravity on the moon could assist in the better production of pharmaceuticals and new materials,

and the moon could act as a way station for longer human spaceflight missions. The increased radiation 

levels on the moon could aid in the development of new strains of crops. The mining of valuable elements, 

such as helium-3 (described earlier in this paper), could also require a permanent manned presence.345

Interestingly, several analysts have written on the utility of lunar bases to conduct missile strikes against 

targets on Earth and in space.346Although the authoritativeness of these sources is unknown, according 

to one writer, lunar military bases “are very attractive to the military” and that “as space technologies 

develop and advance, lunar military bases will go from vision to reality.”

347

Despite the interest of some analysts in lunar bases, it should be remembered that China has not yet 

approved a manned moon program. In addition, establishing a permanent lunar base would be a technical 

challenge that China may decide not to initiate, based on its cost and the feasibility and value of using the 

moon for military and economic benefit.

 

344 “‘娥之父’叶培建:嫦娥五号将首试’弹跳式返回’)” [The ‘Father of the Chang’e Ye Peijian: Chang’e 5 Will for the First Time 

Conduct a Skipping Reentry], Guangzhou Daily, December 25, 2013, 

http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/changesanhao/content-3/detail_2013_12/25/32449912_0.shtml.

345 “中国预计在 2030 年前后实现载人登月建月球基地” [China Plans to Establish a Manned Lunar Base Around 2030] China 

News, December 2, 2013, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/12-02/5570038.shtml. See also Deng Lianyin, Guo Jifeng, and 

Cui Naigang, “月球基地工程研究进展及展望” [Progress and Prospects of Engineering for Lunar Bases], 导弹与航天运载技术

[Missile and Space Vehicle], February 2009.

346 “China Plans to Establish a Manned Lunar Base Around 2030”; Wu Guoxing, “月球上的军事基地” [Lunar Military Bases], 太

空探索 [Space Exploration], 2006/10, 45.

347Wu Guoxing, “月球上的军事基地” [Lunar Military Bases], 太空探索 [Space Exploration], 2006/10, 45.
62

Mars Exploration Project

China is conducting preliminary research on a Mars exploration project. A full-scale model of a proposed 

six-wheeled lunar rover was exhibited at the 2014 Zhuhai Airshow.348 According to Ouyang Ziyuan, who 

was instrumental in getting China’s lunar exploration plan approved, China’s plans include launching a 

rover to Mars in the 2020 timeframe.349

Earth Remote Sensing

China’s Earth remote sensing megaproject is to develop satellite, airship, and aircraft systems of remote 

sensing and their corresponding ground system and data centers to form an all-weather, 24-hour, global 

earth remote sensing system by 2020 capable of monitoring the ground, atmosphere, and oceans.350

China has a variety of remote sensing satellites, including five new series of satellites introduced since 

2000: the Gaofen, Yaogan, Huanjing, Haiyang, and Tianhui satellites (Table 6). Although China has many 

remote sensing satellites, the first official satellite to be launched under remote sensing megaproject is 

the Gaofen-1, launched in 2013.351

Due to the increase in the number and variety of remote sensing satellites, China has greatly reduced its 

dependence on foreign remote sensing data. In 2009, 80 percent of the Earth imagery used in China was 

purchased from international providers at a cost of $19.5 million. By 2013 China purchased just 20 percent 

of its Earth imagery from abroad and is expected to reduce this to 10 percent in 2014.352

Gaofen Satellites

The Gaofen (GF) series of satellites was approved in 2011 and is the first satellite launched as part of the 

Earth remote sensing mega-project of the 2006‒2020 Medium and Long-term Plan for Science and 

Technology Development. The satellite was developed by the China Spacesat Company (航天东方红卫

星有限公司). The first Gaofen satellite was launched April 26, 2013, and is equipped with a two-meter 

resolution CCD camera, an eight-meter resolution multi-spectrum imager, and a 16-meter resolution 

wide-field multi-spectrum imager. The Gaofen-1 uses the CAST2000 satellite bus and has a planned service 

life of 5 to 8 years.353 The satellite is said to have been developed according to the requirements of the 

Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Environmental 

Protection.354

Gaofen-2 was launched in August 2014 and uses the CS-L3000A bus and features an electro-optical imager 

with a one-meter resolution and a four-meter resolution multi-spectrum imager.

 

348 Zhao Lei, “China Looks Towards Mars as Rover Model Debuts,” China Daily, November 18, 2014, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-11/18/content_18931565.htm.

349 “Mars: China’s Next Goal?,” China Daily, September 25, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-

09/25/content_18662327.htm.

350 “高分频率对地观测系统” [High Resolution Ground Monitoring System], State Administration of Science, Technology and 

Industry for National Defense, PRC, September 30, 2013, http://www.sastind.gov.cn/n132/c43594/content.html.

351 “聚焦高分一号卫星的创新与突破” [Focusing on Gaofen-1’s Innovations and Breakthroughs], CNSA, April 27, 2013, 

http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n1081/n7634/n516721/n516736/528906.html.

352 Peter B. de Selding, “China Quickly Weaning Itself off Earth Observation Data Bought from Abroad,” Space News, September 

12, 2014, http://www.spacenews.com/article/civil-space/41848world-satellite-business-week-china-quickly-weaning-itself-offEarth.

353 “高分一号卫星地面系统介绍” [An Introduction to the Gaofen-1 Ground System], China Center for Resources Satellite Data 

and Application, http://www.cresda.com/n16/n1145/n189058/index.html.

354 “高分一号卫星应用纪实:破空间时间分辨率冲突” [Gaofen-1 Satellite Application Account: Breaking Through the 

Differentiation of Space and Time], Chinese Science News, February 13, 2014, http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2014-

02/4828166.html.
63

Table 6. Chinese Earth remote sensing satellites

Satellite Year Launched Sensor Type Resolution (meters) Active

Gaofen-1 2013 EO 2.0 Y

Multispectral 8.0

Gaofen-2 2014 EO 1.0 Y

Multispectral 4.0

Yaogan-1 2006 Possible SAR payload/Broke up in orbit in 

2010.

1.5 N

Yaogan-2 2007 Possible EO payload 1.0 N

Yaogan-3 2007 Possible SAR payload 1.5 N

Yaogan-4 2008 Possible EO payload 1.0 N

Yaogan-5 2008 Possible EO payload 1.0 N

Yaogan-6 2009 Possible SAR payload 1.5 N

Yaogan-7 2009 Possible EO payload 1.0 N

Yaogan-10 2010 Possible SAR payload 1.5 Y

Yaogan-11 2010 Possible EO payload 1.0 Y

Yaogan-12 2011 Possible EO payload 1.0 Y

Yaogan-13 2011 Possible SAR payload 1.5 Y

Yaogan-14 2012 Possible EO payload 1.0 Y

Yaogan-15 2012 Possible SAR payload 1.5 Y

Yaogan-16A, B, C 2012 Possible ELINT payload NA Y

Yaogan-17A, B, C 2013 Possible ELINT payload NA Y

Yaogan-18 2013 Possible SAR payload Unknown Y

Yaogan-19 2013 Possible SAR payload Unknown Y

Yaogan-20A, B, C 2014 Possible ELINT payload NA Y

Yaogan-21 2014 Possible EO payload Unknown Y

Yaogan-22 2014 Possible EO payload Unknown Y

Yaogan-23 2014 Possible SAR payload Unknown Y

Yaogan-24 2014 Possible EO payload Unknown Y

Haiyang-1A 2002 EO 250 N

Color Scanner 1,100

Haiyang-1B 2007 EO 250 N

Color Scanner 3,000

Haiyang-2 2011 Microwave Imager NA Y

Huanjing-1A 2008 EO 30 N

Hyperspectral 100

Huanjing-1B 2008 EO 30 N

Hyperspectral 100

Huanjing-1C 2012 SAR 20 Y

Tianhui-1A 2010 3-D Survey Camera 5.0 Y

Multispectral 10

Panchromatic 2.0

Tianhui-2A 2012 3-D Survey Camera 5.0 Y

Multispectral 10

Panchromatic 2.0

Ziyuan-1-02C 2011 EO 2.36 Y

Panchromatic 5.0

Panchromatic 10

Ziyuan-03-01 2013 EO 2.1 Y

EO 3.5

Multispectral 6.0

Fengyun-2D 2006 Meteorological Multiple N

Fengyun-2E 2008 Meteorological Multiple N

Fengyun-2F 2012 Meteorological Multiple Y

Fengyun-3A 2010 Meteorological Multiple Y

Fengyun-3B 2012 Meteorological Multiple N

Fengyun-3C 2013 Meteorological Multiple Y
64

Gaofen-1 incorporates several design innovations. These include the integration of sensor, data 

distribution, and control technologies and the ability to use both sensors at the same time. The two-meter 

resolution electro-optical imager is an improved version of the imager used on the Ziyuan-2C remote 

sensing satellite, and the eight-meter resolution multi-spectral imager is based on the 30-meter 

multispectral imager on the HaiyangY-1A/B satellites. The Gaofen-1 is the first satellite to use two 

gyroscopes for three-axis stabilization. In addition, its increased service life is due to a battery that is 28 

percent more efficient than that used on previous satellites.355

According to a presentation given by a CNSA official, the Gaofen-1 “has been used in land resource 

investigation, mineral resource management, atmospheric and water environment quality monitoring, 

and natural disaster emergency response and monitoring,” and its imagery has been used by “tens of 

national ministries and agencies, local governments, research institutions, universities, enterprises and 

organizations in China.”

356

The Gaofen series will be made up of either five or seven satellites. Gaofen-3 will also use the CS-L3000A 

bus with an eight-year service life. Unlike Gaofen-1 and 2, it will have a synthetic aperture radar (SAR)

payload with one-meter accuracy and may launch in 2015. Gaofen-4 is also scheduled to be launched in 

2015 into a geosynchronous orbit. It will be outfitted with a staring camera with a 50-meter resolution. 

Gaofen-5 will use the SAST5000B satellite bus and will be equipped with six types of sensors: a visible and 

short-wave infra hyper-spectral camera, a spectral imager, a greenhouse gas detector, an atmospheric 

environment infrared detector at very high spectral resolution, a differential absorption spectrometer for 

atmospheric trace gas, and a multi-angle polarization detector. It is also designed to have an eight-year 

service life and will be launched in 2016. Gaofen-6 will have the same characteristics as Gaofen-1.357

According to one source, the Gaofen-7 satellite will be a stereoscopic satellite similar to the Ziyuan-3.358

Yaogan Satellites

Yaogan (遥感/Remote Sensing) is a series of remote sensing satellites first launched in 2006. Up to August 

2014 China had launched 26 Yaogan satellites. Official Chinese press describe the satellites as being used 

to conduct “scientific experiments, carry out land surveys, monitor crop yields and aid in preventing and 

reducing natural disasters,”

359 but the secretive nature of the program suggests that these satellites are 

primarily intended for military use. The satellites are rumored to be a mixture of electro-optical, synthetic 

aperture radar, and electronic intelligence satellites. They are reported to have a resolution of one meter 

for the electro-optical variant and 1.5 meters for the SAR variant.360

In March 2010, November 2012, and August 2014 China launched three Yaogan satellites on one launcher 

to form constellations suspected of being electronic intelligence satellites (Yaogan-9A, 9B, 9C/Yaogan-16A, 

 

355 Bai Zhaoguang, “高分一号卫星的技术特点” [The Technical Characteristics of the Gaofen-1], 中国航天 [China Aerospace], 

August 2013, 7‒8.

356 “Construction and Development of China High Resolution Earth Observation System,” presentation, Coordination Group for 

Meteorological Satellites, CNSA, May 22, 2014.

357 “高分一号的落后与特色” [Gaofen-1 Deficiencies and Characteristics], Defense Review, http://news.qq.com/zt2013/GF1/; 

“Construction and Development of China High Resolution Earth Observation System.”

358 Li Xia, “自主创新开启我国航天摄影测量新纪元:’资源三号卫星测绘关键技术’成果展示” [Independent Innovation: A 

New Era Begins for Our Country’s Imaging and Monitoring: Ziyuan-3 Critical Surveying Technology], 科技成果管理与研究

[Management and Research on Scientific & Technical Achievements], February 2013, 67.

359 “China Launches Remote-Sensing Satellite,” Xinhuanet, August 9, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-

08/09/c_133544286.htm.

360 “Yaogan,” Dragon in Space, accessed June 30, 2012, http://www.dragoninspace.com/earth-observation/yaogan.aspx.
65

16B, 16C/Yaogan-20A, 20B, 20C, respectively) due to the similarity of the constellation and its orbit to the 

U.S. Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) used for electronic intelligence. 361

On February 4, 2010, Yaogan-1 broke up in orbit. Due to the slow speed of the debris (22 meters per 

second versus hundreds of meters per second in an ASAT test), it is suspected that the satellite suffered 

an internal explosion, such as that from a battery.362 According to NASA, the satellite broke up into seven 

pieces traveling at moderate speeds, with two of them at least two meters long.363

Haiyang Satellites

Haiyang satellites are China’s ocean monitoring satellites, funded by the Chinese State Oceanic 

Administration.364 They were a goal of China’s Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996‒2000). The Haiyang is planned 

to consist of three series of satellites. The Haiyang-1 (HY-1) series are color remote sensing satellites that 

use infrared remote sensing technology to monitor ocean pollution and topography in shallow waters. 

The Haiyang-2 (HY-2) series is a dynamic environment satellite that uses microwave remote sensing 

technology to monitor ocean wind fields and ocean surface temperatures. The Haiyang-3 (HY-3) series will 

be an ocean surveillance satellite that will have the combined features of the previous two series as well 

as SAR.365 To date, three Haiyang satellites have been launched: two Haiyang-1 series satellites and one 

Haiyang-2 satellite.

China plans to launch eight Haiyang satellites before 2020. This will include four satellites to observe the 

color of the sea, two to observe ocean currents, and two maritime radar satellites. Although Haiyang 

satellites are ostensibly used to monitor the ocean environment, a Chinese official has stated that the 

satellites can be used to monitor the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and Scarborough Shoal/Huangyan 

Island.366

Haiyang-1

The first HY-1 satellite, HY-1A, was launched May 15, 2002, and cost 200 million yuan (~$24.2 million) to 

manufacture.367 The satellite has a mass of 360 kilograms368 and has a 10-band color scanner with a 1,100-

meter resolution. It has a two frequency infrared sensors, eight visible light sensors, and an imager with 

a 250-meter resolution.369 The satellite observed the characteristics of seawater, including chlorophyll 

 

361 “China Returns to Action with Yaogan Weixing-20 Mission,” NASA Spaceflight, August 9, 2014, 

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2014/08/china-returns-yaogan-weixing-20-mission/.

362 “Yaogan-1 Erupts,” Arms Control Wonk, February 11, 2010, http://forden.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2625/yaogan-1-

erupts.

363 “Orbital Debris Success Story: A Decade in the Making,” Orbital Debris Quarterly News 14, no. 2 (2010), 

http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv14i2.pdf.

364 “China’s Surge Continues with HaiYang-2A Launch via Long March 4B,” NASA Spaceflight, August 15, 2011, 

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2011/08/chinas-surge-haiyang-21a-launch-long-march-4b/.

365 “China Plans to Launch 3rd Ocean Survey Satellite in 2010,” Beijing Review, February 18, 2009, 

http://www.bjreview.com.cn/science/txt/2009-02/18/content_179265.htm; “中国的海洋卫星” [China’s Ocean Satellites], 中

国航天 [Aerospace China], April 2009, 10‒11.

366 “Nation to Upgrade Maritime Satellite Network By 2020,” China Daily, September 6, 2012, 

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-09/06/content_15737032.htm.

367 “Oceanic Satellites to Form a Network to Monitor Sea,” People’s Daily [online], June 7, 2002, 

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200206/07/eng20020607_97331.shtml.

368 “China’s First Independently Developed Marine Satellite,” People’s Daily [online], May 15, 2002, 

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200205/15/eng20020515_95726.shtml.

369 Zuo Saichun, “追踪我国第一颗海洋卫星” [Following the Trail of Our Country’s First Ocean Satellite], 中国航天报 [China 

Space News] [online], May 15, 2002.
66

density, color of the ocean, sea surface temperature, suspended sand content, yellow materials, and 

marine pollution.370

The HY-1A is based on the CAST 968 platform and had a designed service life of two years. It is said to 

have many innovative characteristics for Chinese satellites, including redundancy, an optimized payload, 

mechanical cooling, and a rotating solar panel to maximize exposure to the sun. It has been used to 

develop maps of the Yellow, Yangtze, and Pearl rivers focusing on the mouths of the rivers, and to monitor 

vegetation distribution around these rivers, detail the changes in the coastline and the sediment in rivers, 

as well as to forecast sea ice in the Bohai Sea and gather data on the North and South Poles. It has also 

detected red tide and oil spills. The use of the satellite by fishery departments is said to have increased 

fishing harvests and profits.371

The HY-1B was launched April 11, 2007. It is based on the HY-1A, but is said to have had an improved 

ocean color scanner and coastal imaging device. The remote sensing view of the ocean color scanner had 

its width increased from 1,600 km to 3,000 km and its return rate has been reduced from three days to 

one. The coastal imaging device has improved spectrum resolution so it can more clearly see things like 

red tide, and its storage capacity has increased from 80 MB to 2 GB. The amount of propellant has been 

increased as well, in part to accommodate an increased mass of 75 kg. The service life was also increased 

from two to three years with a more reliable structure and increased protection from external impact. 

The HY-1B also provided three times the data with lower power consumption.372

Haiyang-2

The HY-2 was launched August 15, 2011, and was designed to monitor and detect the dynamic ocean 

environment and to conduct all-weather 24-hour integrated monitoring of the sea surface wind field, sea 

surface height, wave field, oceanic gravity field, oceanic currents, and sea surface temperature. The HY-2 

is equipped with a radar altimeter, microwave diverging meter, and microwave radiation meter, which 

are all new technologies for China and are said to have achieved an advanced level by international 

standards. It had a design life of three years. The HY-2 satellite platform is based on the Ziyuan-1 satellite 

platform using mature technology. The satellite is equipped with GPS, DORIS, and satellite laser ranging. 

By using all three in combination with ground tracking, the satellite can achieve millimeter-level accuracy 

on orbit. The satellite was used to conduct China’s first test of a satellite-ground laser communication 

data transmission. The satellite can transfer data at 504 Mbps, which is said to be at international levels. 

Huanjing Satellites

China’s Huanjing (环境/HJ), or “environment,” satellites are designed for environmental and disaster 

forecasting and monitoring. In 2003, the Chinese government approved the development of an 

environment and disaster small satellite constellation to forecast and monitor pollution, ecosystem 

destruction, and natural disasters. They are to be used by the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of 

Environmental Protection.373 The project is divided into two phases. The first phase is a constellation of 

three satellites made up of two optical satellites and a SAR satellite. This constellation was to have been 

 

370 “Oceanic Satellites to Form a Network to Monitor Sea,” People’s Daily [online], June 7, 2002, 

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200206/07/eng20020607_97331.shtml.

371 “China’s Ocean Satellites,” 10.

372 Ibid.

373 “环境与灾害监测预报小卫星” [Environmental and Disaster Monitoring and Forecasting Small Satellite], Ministry of 

Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China, April 3, 2009, 

http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293877/n12221440/n12221472/12227839.html.
67

established by 2010, but was not completed until 2012. The second phase of development will involve the 

launch of four optical satellites and four SAR satellites.374

Three Huanjing satellites have been launched since 2008. The first two satellites, HJ-1A and HJ-1B, were 

launched September 6, 2008. Both were manufactured by the China Spacesat Company (航天东方红卫

星有限公司) and use the CAST 968 satellite bus with a designed service life of three years.375 The HJ-1A 

was equipped with an electro-optical imager with a 30-meter resolution and a 700-km swath, and a 

hyperspectral imager with a 100-meter resolution and a 50-km swath. The HJ-1B was also equipped with 

an electro-optical imager with a 30-meter resolution and an infrared multispectral imager with a 150-

meter resolution and a 700-km swath. 

A third Huanjing satellite, HJ-1C, was launched November 16, 2012, and is equipped with a synthetic 

aperture radar with a resolution of 20 meters and a swath of 100 meters.376 The HJ-1C is reported to be 

the first Chinese satellite equipped with SAR. It also has a service life of three years and uses the CAST2000 

satellite bus.377

Tianhui 

The Tianhui (天绘) series are stereoscopic satellites that can provide three-dimensional images. Two 

Tianhui satellites, manufactured by China Spacesat, were launched in 2010 and 2012. A third Tianhui will 

be launched in 2015 so that there are at least two of the satellites in operation at any one time.

The satellites are based on the CAST2000 satellite bus and have a service life of 3 to 5 years. They are 

equipped with a three-dimensional survey camera with a resolution of five meters, a multispectral imager 

with a resolution of 10 meters, and a two-meter panchromatic imager.378 They also are equipped with a 

GPS device for accurate orbital positioning.379

The Tianhui satellites are said to have had a significant impact on China’s surveying enterprise and were 

described in 2012 as China’s most complex and most technologically diverse satellites.380 They are also 

the first satellite using completely indigenously derived technologies and manufacturing to not only 

achieve stereoscopic images, but also the best imagery resolution at that time. In addition to indigenously 

 

374 Wang Qiao, Wu Chuanqing, and Li Qing, “Environment Satellite 1 and Its Application in Environmental Monitoring,” Journal 

of Remote Sensing 1 (2010): 104.

375 “China Launches Natural Disaster Monitoring Satellites,” Xinhuanet, September 6, 2008, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/06/content_9806611.htm.

376 “HJ-1A/1B,” CRESDA, http://www.cresda.com/n16/n92006/n92066/n98627/index.html.

377 “环境卫星 (一)” [Huanjing Satellite (Part 1)], 360Doc, 

http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0722/17/2506309_135239891.shtml; “CAST 2000 平台卫星研制中环境工程的应用研

究” [Applied Research on the CAST2000 Satellite Bus for the Huanjing Satellite Project], Docin, http://www.docin.com/p788342801.html.

378 Wang Rong, Li Shengli, and Deng Wei, “天回一号卫星及应用” [Tianhui-1 and Its Uses], 卫星应用 [Satellite Applications], 

June 2014, 21.

379 Xu Zhenyao, Yang Junfeng, Li Hui, and Li Jing, “天回一号立体测绘卫星概览”[Overview of the Tianhui-1 Stereoscopic Survey 

Satellite], 国际太空 [Space International], May 2013, 41.

380 “走近我国首颗传输型立体测绘卫星天绘一号” [Taking a Look at Our Country’s First Stereoscopic Satellite Tianhui-1], 

Xinhuanet, December 26, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/tech/2012-12/26/c_124151354.htm. 
68

developed satellite payloads, the data ground receivers, control, and production are said to completely 

rely on Chinese technologies and manufacturing.381

Interestingly, the Tianhui is one of the few satellites that China admits has been used for military purposes. 

According to a 2012 article, the satellites have been used during the “Peace Mission” (和平使命) military 

exercises, counter-terror operations in Xinjiang, and air defense for Beijing.382

Ziyuan Satellites

China’s Ziyuan satellites (ZY/资源/Resources) are based on the CBERS series of satellites built jointly with 

Brazil. The Ziyuan-1 2C, launched December 22, 2011, was manufactured by the China Academy of Space 

Technology and has a service life of three years.383 The ZY-1 2C is equipped with a high-resolution camera 

with a resolution of 2.36 meters and a panchromatic multi-spectral camera with a resolution of five meters 

and 10 meters.384

There is relatively little information on the Ziyuan-2 series of satellites. A total of three ZY-2 satellites were 

launched between 2000 and 2004 to form a three-satellite constellation.385 They are reported to have a 

three-meter resolution electro-optical imager.386 The satellites are said to have an unstated “long” service 

life due to improved solar panels.387

The ZY-3 was launched January 9, 2012. It was manufactured by the China Academy of Space Technology 

with a service life of five years.388 The primary customer for the satellite is stated to be the National 

Administration of Surveying, Mapping, and Geoinformation (国家测绘地理信息局).389 The satellite is 

equipped with three cameras with a resolution of 2.1 meters and 3.5 meters that when used together can 

provide stereoscopic images. The satellite also has a multispectral camera with a resolution of six meters. 

The ZY-3 is reported to be the first Chinese remote sensing satellite that can provide imagery comparable 

to international standards.390 The satellite is also equipped with GPS for accurate positioning.391

 

381 “中国首颗传输型立体测绘卫星天绘一号组网运行” [China’s Stereoscopic Tianhui-1 Network Operating], GMW.cn, 

December 27, 2012, http://mil.gmw.cn/2012-12/27/content_6162317.htm.

382 “走近我国首颗传输型立体测绘卫星天绘一号” [Taking a Look at Our Country’s First Stereoscopic Satellite Tianhui-1], 

Xinhuanet, December 26, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/tech/2012-12/26/c_124151354.htm.

383 “中国成功发射资源一号 02C 卫星” [China Successfully Launches Ziyuan-1 02C], 航天器工程 [Spacecraft Engineering], 

2012/1, 30.

384 “资源一号 02C 卫星” [Ziyuan-1 02C Satellite], http://www.cresda.com/n16/n1130/n175275/175577.html.

385 Tian Zhaoyun, “中国资源二号 03 星升空 长征火箭 40 次发射成功” [China Ziyuan 2 03 Satellite Launched Into Space for 

40th Successful Launch of Long March Rocket], 人民网[People’s Net], 

http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2969850.html

386 “江苏省委书记听取南京地理与湖泊所成果汇报(图)” [Jiangsu Provincial Committee Chair Listens to the Nanjing 

Geography and Lakes Activities Report], 

http://web.archive.org/web/20050429135623/http://www.cas.ac.cn/html/Dir/2003/06/09/4945.htm.

387 “中国的资源探测卫星(上)” [China’s Resource Monitoring Satellites (Part 1)], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2008/12, 15.

388 “我国成功发射’资源’三号卫星” [Our Country Successfully Launches Ziyuan-3], 航天工业管理 [Aerospace Industry 

Management], 2012/1, 42.

389 Yu Shaojie, “我国首颗高分辨率光学立体测绘卫星:资源三号交付使用” [Our Country’s First High Resolution Stereoscopic 

Satellite: Ziyuan-3 Delivered], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2012/8, 13.

390 Xin Dingding, “New Remote-Sensing Satellite on the Job,” China Daily, July 31, 2012, 

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-07/31/content_15634589.htm.

391 Cao Haiyi, Liu Xigang, Li Shaohui, Zhang Xinwei, “‘资源三号’卫星遥感技术” [ZY-3 Satellite Remote Sensing Technology], 航

天返回与遥感 [Spacecraft Recovery & Remote Sensing], 2012/6, 12.
69

Fengyun Meteorological Satellites

China is the third country behind the United States and the Soviet Union to have independently launched 

meteorological satellites. China began researching meteorological satellites in the late 1970s and 

launched its first satellite, Fengyun-1A (FY-1A/风云) in 1988. China has since launched 12 satellites in total. 

As of 2013, seven were still functioning.392

Fengyun-1

The Fengyun-1 is China’s first generation of meteorological satellites. A total of four FY-1 satellites were

launched between 1988 and 2002 to provide visible and infrared radiometry measurement for weather 

forecasting and environmental monitoring. These polar orbiting satellites had service lives of two to three

years, though one source states that they exceeded five years.393 For example, the FY-1C was launched in 

1999 with a service life of two years, but as of 2005 was still operational. The FY-1A/B carried five channel 

electro-optical and infrared imagers with a resolution of 1,100 meters.394

Fengyun-2

From 1997 to 2008 China launched six Fengyun-2 satellites into geostationary orbits. The Fengyun-2 

satellites monitor weather conditions through optical and infrared imagers for day and night observation. 

They are said to be at the same level as the first generation of U.S., European, and Japanese

meteorological satellites and are comparable to the U.S. GOES-1M meteorological satellite.395

The first two FY-2 satellites were experimental and were equipped with a three-channel visible and 

infrared scanning radiometer (VISR). The last two satellites, FY-2C/D were said to feature improved 

sensors and have better reliability than the FY-2A/B and are equipped with a five channel VISR. The FY-2A 

was China’s first geostationary meteorological satellite. The FY-2D/E is said to have improved performance 

over the other FY-2 satellites, including an increased battery life,396 a wide coverage area, the ability to 

make more frequent observations, and the capability to take stereoscopic images of clouds.

Fengyun-3

The Fengyun-3 is China’s second generation of meteorological satellites and is planned to be in use until 

2021. It was built by the Shanghai Academy of Space Technology. 397 It is also China’s most recent 

meteorological satellite series and features improved vertical temperature and humidity sounding, ozone 

detection, and microwave, visible, and infrared imaging.398 The FY-3 was planned to be comparable to the 

U.S. National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System satellite. A total of eight FY-3 are 

to be launched. The FY-3 are equipped with many more sensors than the FY-1 or FY-2. These include a 

visible and infrared radiometer, an infrared atmospheric sounder, a microwave temperature sounder, a 

microwave humidity sounder, a medium-resolution spectral imager, a solar backscatter ultraviolet 

sounder, a total ozone unit microwave radiation imager, a solar irradiation monitor, an Earth radiation 

 

392 “风云三号卫星太原升空” [Fengyun-3 Launches from Taiyuan], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2013/10, 22.

393 Li Qing, “中国气象卫星技术成就与展望(上)” [The Technological Accomplishments and Future of China’s Meteorological 

Satellites (Part 1)], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2008/6, 8.

394 http://www.nsmc.cma.gov.cn/NewSite/NSMC_EN/Channels/100182.html.

395 Li, “The Technological Accomplishments and Future of China’s Meteorological Satellites (Part 1),” 11‒12.

396 “FY-2 Program,” National Satellite Meteorological Center, 

http://www.nsmc.cma.gov.cn/NewSite/NSMC_EN/Channels/100096.html.

397 “风云三号卫星太原升空” [Fengyun-3 Launches from Taiyuan], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2013/10, 22.

398 “Overview of Fengyun Meteorological Satellite Programs,” National Satellite Meteorological Center, 

http://www.nsmc.cma.gov.cn/NSMC_EN/Channels/100090.html.
70

monitor, and a space environment monitor. The FY-3A/B were planned to have limited sounding 

capabilities that were to be improved in subsequent satellites. 399

FY-3 are equipped with a 10-channel electro-optical imager, a 26-channel infrared imager, and a 

microwave radiation imager. At least some of these imagers have a resolution of 250 meters. The FY-3 is 

China’s first meteorological satellite to be able to conduct three-dimensional, quantitative, and 24-hour 

monitoring. They have the most sensors of any of China’s meteorological satellites, with eight different 

types to monitor vegetation, ice and snow pack, sand storms, the marine environment, strong storms, soil 

temperature, ozone levels, and solar radiation, and measure humidity and temperature at altitudes below 

20 km.

400 Future FY-3 models will be equipped with sensors to monitor atmospheric composition for 

greenhouse gases.401

China is researching a FY-4 satellite that will be similar to the U.S. GOES-R satellite.402 The Fengyun-4 will 

feature three-axis stabilization, improved optical and microwave imagers, a lightning detector, and 

extreme ultraviolet and x-ray solar observation.403 The satellite was proposed to have a fast scanning 

capability that can image an area in less than 7.5 minutes or in critical situations in less than one minute. 

It was also proposed that the FY-4 would be divided into an electro-optical satellite series and a SAR 

satellite series with the first two being experimental satellites with a service life of five years.404 The first 

FY-4 is planned to be launched in 2015 with subsequent satellites in 2017 and 2019.405

China Brazil Earth Remote Sensing Satellite 

The China Brazil Earth Remote Sensing Satellite (CBERS) is a series of remote sensing satellites jointly 

developed by China and Brazil. To date, a total of four satellites have been launched, divided between 

CBERS-01 and 02 and CBERS-03 (Table 7). 

CBERS-01 and 02

The CBERS-01 and 02 were launched in 1999 and 2003, respectively, and were identical spacecraft. Each 

was equipped with three imagers. The first was a wide field imager (WFI) with a ground swath of 890 km 

Table 7. CBERS launches

Satellite Launch Year Notes

CBERS-01 1999 NA

CBERS-02 2003 NA

CBERS-02B 2007 NA

CBERS-03 2013 Launch failure

 

399 Peng Zhang, “Present and Future Chinese Meteorological Satellite Mission for Atmospheric Remote Sensing,” presentation 

given at Europe-China Dragon Program conference; and Yang Jun, “Progress on CMA’s Meteorological Satellites,” presentation 

given to the World Meteorological Organization, April 12‒16, 2011, http://earth.esa.int/dragon/Opening-L1-ZhangP.pdf.

400 Li, “The Technological Accomplishments and Future of China’s Meteorological Satellites (Part 1),” 10.

401 “Overview of Fengyun Meteorological Satellite Programs,” National Satellite Meteorological Center, 

http://www.nsmc.cma.gov.cn/NSMC_EN/Channels/100090.html.

402 “风云三号卫星太原升空” [Fengyun-3 Launches from Taiyuan], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2013/10, 22.

403 “FY-4 Program,” National Satellite Meteorological Center, 

http://www.nsmc.cma.gov.cn/NewSite/NSMC_EN/Channels/100099.html.

404 Peng, “Present and Future Chinese Meteorological Satellite Mission for Atmospheric Remote Sensing”; Yang “Progress on 

CMA’s Meteorological Satellites.”

405 “Overview of Fengyun Meteorological Satellite Programs.”
71

with a spatial resolution of 260 m. The second was a high-resolution charge-coupled device (CCD) imager 

that provided images with a ground swath of 113 km and 20-meter spatial resolution. The third was an 

infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) that operated in four spectral bands in the thermal infrared 

spectral region. It imaged a 120-km swath with a resolution of 80 meters.

CBERS-02B

The CBERS-02B was launched in 2007 and was nearly identical to the CBERS-01 and 02. Instead of the 

IRMSS it was equipped with a high resolution camera capable of producing images with a swath of 27 km 

and a 2.7-meter spatial resolution,

406 a new on-board recording system, and an advanced positioning 

system that used GPS and a star sensor.407

CBERS-03 and 04

CBERS-03 was launched in 2013 but did not reach orbit due to a launch failure. CBERS-04 was launched in 

December 2014. These satellites have four cameras with improved geometrical and radiometric 

performance and include a PanMux camera, a multispectral camera, an infrared scanning medium 

resolution scanner, and a wide-field imaging camera.408

The Chinese built PanMux camera (PANMUX) produces stereoscopic images with a swath width of 60 km 

and a 2-meter spatial resolution. The multispectral camera (MUXCAM) is built by Brazil and produces 

images with a 120-km swath and a 20-meter resolution.

The infrared medium resolution scanner (IRSCAM) is built by China and is an upgrade of the Infrared 

Multispectral Scanner (IRMSS) carried by the CBERS-1 and 2 satellites. It can produce images with a 120 

km swath and a spatial resolution of 40 meters. 

The wide field imaging camera (WFICAM) built by Brazil is an upgrade of the wide field imager (WFI) of 

the CBERS-1, 2, and 2B satellites. It can produce images with a swath width of 866 km and a spatial 

resolution of 64 meters.409

Satellite Navigation

Beidou is China’s satellite navigation system and is intended to reduce China’s reliance on the U.S. Global 

Positioning System (GPS). Similar to the human spaceflight, lunar exploration, and earth remote sensing 

programs, Beidou is one of China’s 16 mega-projects under the Medium and Long-term Plan for Science 

and Technology Development. China is spending significant sums on Beidou and plans to spend between 

$6 billion to $8 billion on the development of Beidou technologies to 2020. Like GPS, Beidou is 

fundamentally a military-run program with civilian applications. Beidou’s architecture, however, differs 

substantially from GPS in terms of technology, number of satellites, and performance.

 

406 “CBERS-1, 2 and 2B Cameras,” Brazil National Institute for Space Research, 

http://www.cbers.inpe.br/ingles/satellites/cameras_cbers1_2_2b.php.

407 “CBERS-2B Launching,” Brazil National Institute for Space Research, 

http://www.cbers.inpe.br/ingles/satellites/launching_cbers2b.php.

408 “CBERS 3 and 4 Launching,” Brazil National Institute for Space Research, 

http://www.cbers.inpe.br/ingles/satellites/launching_cbers3_4.php.

409 “CBERS 3 and 4 Cameras,” Brazil National Institute for Space Research, 

http://www.cbers.inpe.br/ingles/satellites/cameras_cbers3_4.php.
72

Table 8. Beidou launches

Spacecraft Launch Year Comments

Beidou-1A 2000 NA

Beidou-1B 2000 NA

Beidou-1C 2003 NA

Beidou-1D 2007 NA

Beidou-2

Compass-M1

2007 Test satellite/Atomic clock 

malfunction

Beidou-2

Compass-G2

2009 Drifting

Beidou-2

Compass-G1

2010 GEO

Beidou-2

Compass-G3

2010 GEO

Beidou-2

Compass-IGSO1

2010 Inclined GEO

Beidou-2

Compass-G4

2010 GEO

Beidou-2

Compass-IGSO2

2010 Inclined GEO

Beidou-2

Compass-IGSO3

2011 Inclined GEO

Beidou-2

Compass-IGSO4

2011 Inclined GEO

Beidou-2

Compass-IGSO5

2011 Inclined GEO

Beidou-2

Compass-G5

2012 GEO

Beidou-2

Compass-M3

2012 MEO

Beidou-2

Compass-M4

2012 MEO

Beidou-2

Compass-M5

2012 MEO

Beidou-2

Compass-M6

2012 MEO

Beidou-2

Compass-G6

2012 GEO

Like other programs, China’s Beidou navigation satellite program has followed a three-step development 

plan.410 This plan has produced two generations of the system (Table 8). In Step 1, the program launched 

an experimental regional system, Beidou-1, in 2000 that became operational in 2003. Beidou-1 uses an 

active system called radio determination satellite service (RDSS). This system comprised two satellites in 

geostationary orbit, a backup satellite, at least one ground station, and customer receiver/transmitters 

that communicated with each other. These receivers both pick up the satellite signal and send a signal 

back to the satellites, which then forward it to the ground station. The ground station then calculates the 

position of the receiver and communicates this data to the receiver. Beidou-1 could achieve accuracies of 

up to 20 meters. It also supports a short message service for messages of up to 120 characters. 

 

410 Li Chengzhi, “The Chinese GNSS: System Development and Policy Analysis,” Space Policy 29 (2013): 9‒19.
73

In Step 2, development of the more advanced Beidou-2 system was initiated in 2007 and began operating 

on a regional basis in 2012. Beidou currently provides regional coverage with 16 satellites using the same 

active system used by Beidou-1. This system uses an open code that provides accuracies of 10 meters or 

better, depending on the location, and a restricted military service that could provide better accuracies. 

GPS, on the other hand, uses as few as 24 satellites to provide positioning accuracies of just several meters. 

Chinese officials, however, claim that with the optimized positioning of Beidou satellites over China and 

the construction of thousands of differential ground stations, Beidou’s accuracy will be boosted to one 

meter and possibly even centimeters. This is in comparison to a GPS accuracy of three to five meters in 

China. Currently, maritime users can receive accuracies of three centimeters, and with the introduction 

of a recently developed Beidou receiver chip, other users can receive accuracies of 2.5 meters.411

In Step 3, Beidou-2 will expand to provide a global service by 2020, with 35 satellites using a passive system 

similar to the one used by GPS. Like its predecessor, Beidou-2 also provides a short message service that 

allows communication between Beidou receivers.

Military Use

As Beidou’s capabilities improve, the PLA can be expected to replace its GPS receivers with Beidou. In a 

2011 article, a PLA officer assigned to a border unit in Xinjiang identified Beidou, along with helicopters, 

as the most important technology used by his outfit while acknowledging that for times when truly precise 

location and positioning data were required they used GPS.412 In 2009, the CMC designated Beidou as the 

timing standard for the PLA and according to a 2013 news report, Beidou is now used in the majority of 

units at the regiment level and above.413

China used Beidou in a 2011 cross-border operation into Laos to capture the drug lord Naw Kham, who 

was accused of ordering the deaths of multiple Chinese fishermen.414 In addition, the use of Beidou was 

described as one of the three bright spots of the “Mission Action-2013” exercise along with early warning 

aircraft and airborne command and control aircraft. 415 Information on the use of Beidou in weapon 

systems such as in missiles or bombs is scant, but it should be expected that Beidou is being incorporated 

into these munitions. A 2013 article stated that the PLA Navy had for the first time used an unmanned 

surface vehicle guided by Beidou.416 The Changjian-10 long-range cruise missile and DF-11 ballistic missile 

are also rumored to be guided by Beidou.417 To incorporate security and accuracy, these weapons could 

be outfitted with a receiver that accepts both the GPS and Beidou signals. 

 

411 Tu Yun, “BeiDou Has Better Accuracy than GPS in Some Regions: Experts,” CRIENLISH.com, September 4, 2014, 

http://english.cri.cn/12394/2014/09/04/3521s843043.htm.

412 Meng Jia and Liu Yanping, “探秘中国北斗导航卫星: 最高机密到民用历时 20 年” [Exploring China’s Beidou Navigation 

Satellite System: Top Secret to Civilian-Use Period Lasts 20 Years], 中国新闻周刊 [China News Weekly], June 20, 2011, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/tech/2011-06/20/c_121557752.htm.

413 “北斗副总师:没先进定位手段曾是心中说不出的痛” [Beidou Deputy Chief Designer: Not Having Advanced Positioning 

Methods Was an Unspeakable Suffering], http://youth.chinamil.com.cn/qnht/2013-11/11/content_5640840.htm.

414 Li Yun, Wu Xu, and Gao Chongquan, “总参卫星导航定位总站致力北斗导航事业记事,” [An Account of the GSD Satellite 

Navigation and Positioning Main Station Devoting Itself to Beidou], 新华 [Xinhua], Nov. 9, 2013.

415 “南京军区”使命行动 2013”演习开展海陆军投送” [Nanjing Military Region ‘Mission Action-2013’ Exercise Opens with 

Naval Ground Force Delivery], 人民网 [People’s Net], http://js.people.com.cn/html/2013/09/27/258563.html.

416“海军无人靶船首用北斗定位” [Naval Unmanned Surface Vehicle for the First Time Uses Beidou Positioning], 

http://youth.chinamil.com.cn/qnht/2013-11/11/content_5640878.htm. 

417 “长剑-10导弹配合北斗系统可毁万吨巡洋舰” [Missile Incorporates Beidou System and Can Destroy a 10,000-ton Cruiser], 

http://money.163.com/13/1022/08/9BPE68CR00254TI5.html; and “汉和称中国东风 11 导弹已配北斗系统打击精度超高” 
74

Commercialization

Due to its early adoption, superior performance, and free availability, GPS has a 95 percent market share 

in China. Viewing the adoption of Beidou as a national security imperative, China wants to capture 70‒80 

percent of the market by 2020. To achieve this goal, China has implemented a number of measures to 

encourage or force the adoption of Beidou technologies. These include requiring the installation of Beidou 

receivers on 80 percent of all buses and trucks in nine provinces and requiring new heavy trucks and semitrucks to have factory-installed Beidou receivers.418

Communication Satellites

China uses a combination of foreign and domestically made communication satellites. The China Satellite 

Communications Company (Chinasat), a subsidiary of the China Aerospace Science and Technology 

Corporation, operates 13 satellites under the Chinasat and Apstar series(Table 9). Several communication 

satellites are not claimed by Chinasat and are suspected of being operated by the military. These include 

the Chinasat-1A, 2A, 20, 20A, 22, and 22A. 

Chinese communication satellites use the DFH-3 and DFH-4 satellite buses. Both the DFH-3 and DFH-4 are 

three axis stabilized as opposed to the DFH-2, which was spin stabilized. A total of five DFH-3 have been 

launched since 1994. The first DFH-3 to become operational was launched in 1997.

The DFH-4 satellite bus replaced the DFH-3 and is described as having more power, a larger payload 

capacity, and an extended service life. A total of eight DFH-4 communication satellites have been launched

since 2006, but this satellite series has experienced many technical problems. The solar panels of the first 

DFH-4, Sinosat-2, failed to open, resulting in the loss of the satellite.419 The Nigerian communications 

satellite Nigcomsat-1, launched in 2007, also experienced problems with its solar panels and was lost.420

Chinasat-6A, launched in 2010, suffered a leak in its propulsion system that reduced its service life from 

15 to 10 years.421

China's main spacecraft builder, the China Academy of Space Technology, is developing a larger version 

of its DFH-4 bus with a launch mass of 5.5 tons as well as the DFH-5 which “is still in its initial development 

phase.” The DFH-5 bus will “meet the demand for new-generation large [geostationary] communications 

satellites and Earth-observation satellites.” According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, “In late 

2010, DFH-5 was due to go into service in 2016 or 2017, but no firm target is given now.”

422

Tianlian

The Tianlian (天链/Skylink) satellites are a series of data rely satellites similar to the U.S. Tracking and 

Data Relay Satellite (TDRS). The satellites are built by the China Academy of Space Technology and are 

 

[Kanwa States China DF-11 Missile Incorporates Beidou System for High Precision Strikes], http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2013-

10-19/1153745174.html.

418 “China Promotes Beidou Tech on Transport Vehicles”, China Daily, January 14, 2013, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-01/14/content_16115994.htm. 

419 “Failed Sinosat-2 May Be Pushed Out of Orbit,” China Daily, November 29, 2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-

11/29/content_746362.htm.

420 “Chinese Space Failure,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 169, no. 19 (2008): 22.

421 Peter B. de Selding, “New Chinese Satellite Suffers Life-Shortening Leak,” Space News, September 13, 2010, 

http://www.space.com/9110-chinese-satellite-suffers-life-shortening-leak.html.

422 Bradley Perrett, “Long Pole,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 25, 2013, 30.
75

Table 9. DFH communication satellites

No. Satellite Launch Year Comments

1 DFH Satellite 1984 Experimental

2 DFH 1984 Experimental

3 DFH 1986 Experimental

4 DFH 1988 NA

5 DFH 1988 NA

6 DFH 1990 NA

7 DFH 1991 NA

8 DFH 1994 NA

9 ChinaSat 6 1997 NA

10 ChinaSat 20 2003 NA

11 ChinaSat 22A 2006 NA

12 SinoSat-2 2006 Malfunction

13 NigComSat-1 2007 Malfunction

14 SinoSat-3 2007 NA

15 VeneSat-1 2008 NA

16 SinoSat-6 2010 Propellant 

leakage

17 PakSat-1R 2011 NA

18 NigcomSat-1R 2011 NA

19 ChinaSat-11 2013 NA

20 TKSAT-1 2013 NA

Source: “Communication Satellites,” China Great Wall Industry Corporation, accessed September 2, 2014, 

http://www.cgwic.com/In-OrbitDelivery/CommunicationsSatellite/DFHList.html.

based on the DFH-3 satellite bus, with a service life of six years.423 Similar to the U.S. system, the satellites 

were developed to relay data and communications between China’s manned spacecraft and ground 

control. The first Tianlian satellite was launched in 2008, with two more satellites launched in 2011 and 

2012 (Table 10). With three satellites strategically positioned at 120-degree intervals around the Earth, 

these satellites eliminated the communication blackout periods experienced by early Shenzhou missions. 

Table 10.Tianlian launches

Spacecraft Launch Year Notes

Tianlian-1-01 2008 NA

Tianlian-1-02 2011 NA

Tianlian-1-03 2012 NA

 

423 “天链一号星和第四颗北斗导航试验卫星交付使用” [Tianlian-1 and the Fourth Beidou Navigation Satellite Handed Over 

for Use], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2009/1, 15.
76

Although primarily developed to serve China’s human spaceflight program, these satellites have 

additional applications. They can be used to transmit remote sensing data from satellites not in line of 

sight of China’s receiving stations. A remote sensing satellite at an altitude of 600 km, such as China’s 

Yaogan series, can communicate with ground stations at a range of around 2,800 km. Beyond this range 

they must retain their data until they come in range of a ground station.424 With the use of data relay 

satellites operating in GEO above ISR satellites, an ISR satellite can transmit its data to a data relay satellite, 

which will then transmit the data to a ground station. In this way, time-sensitive data and communications 

can be immediately downloaded to a ground station for processing. They can also be used to assist with 

data transmission from launch vehicles to ground stations and can transfer data between aircraft, space 

tracking ships, and other craft.425

Other Satellites

Kuaizhou

The Kuaizhou (Quick Vessel/快舟) satellites are small remote sensing satellites with a mass of no more 

than 400 kg. Kuaizhou-1 was launched on September 25, 2013 on the Kuaizhou rocket. The second 

Kuaizhou was launched on November 21, 2014. Both satellites were developed by the Harbin Institute of 

Technology (哈尔滨工业大学), the first satellite at a cost of 790 million yuan (~$128 million).426

Fengniao

The Fengniao (Humming Bird or Hummersat/蜂鸟) satellites were two microsatellites (satellites with a 

mass between 10 and 100 kg) launched November 18, 2012, with the HJ-1C satellite. According to a 

research article on the proposed mission, China Spacesat Co. built the two satellites as technology 

demonstrators for a new type of microsatellite bus based on the CAST968 and CAST2000 satellite buses. 

The larger of the two satellites, Fengniao-1,, according to two reports, had a mass of either 130 kg or 60 

kg, and its counterpart, Fengniao-1A, has a mass of 30 kg. The two satellites were used to test formation 

flying, perhaps to study its ability to form a constellation of minisatellites. In addition, the larger Fengniao 

was equipped with a remote sensing payload of an unspecified nature.427

Xinyan-1

The Xinyan-1 (XY-1/新技术试验卫星/新验-1) is a microsatellite launched with the HJ-1C satellite 

November 19, 2012. The XY-1 was independently developed by the China Academy of Space Technology 

and was equipped with sensors to monitor the space environment to improve future spacecraft 

reliability.428

 

424 Roger Cliff, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, and David Yang, Ready for Takeoff China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry, (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2001), 95.

425 Wang Jiasheng, “填补我国航天技术空白的终端卫星系统” [Relay Satellite System Fills a Gap in Our Country’s Space 

Technologies], 国际太空 [Space International], 2013/6, 25

426 Guo Xuan, “消息称解放军或再添太空装备可迅速摧毁敌卫星” [Sources Say the PLA Can Add Space Equipment or Destroy 

Enemy Satellites], http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2013-10-11/0959743810.html.

427 Zhang Xiaomin, Xie Bin, Dai Shoulun, Zhang Weiwen, Hu Gefeng, and Lan Ding, “First Micro-Satellite and New Enhanced 

Small Satellite Series in DFH Satellite Co. Ltd.,” Acta Astronautica, June-August 2007; and Xie Bin, Luo Ying, Zhang Xiaomin, Lan 

Ding, Dai Shoulun and Zhang Weiwen, “Hummersat-1: A New Space Mission with Microsatellite and Nanosatellite for Twinsatellite Formation Flying Test, proceedings of the International Astronautical Federation, 58th International Astronautical 

Congress, 2007, http://www.lw20.com/201206148925519.html.

428 http://www.shenkong.net/News/1209/WGJJFSXJSSYWX1H27093307.htm.
77

Zhejiang University Pico Satellite 

The Zhejiang University Pico Satellite-1 (ZDPS-1/浙江大学皮卫星) was launched May 25, 2007, along with 

the Yaogan-2 satellite. ZDPS-1 was developed by the Zhejiang University Microsatellite Center as part of 

the GAD’s 11th Five-Year Plan’s basic research into picosatellites (satellites with a mass of no more than 

1 kg). The satellite did not appear to carry a payload and appears to be a technology demonstration of the 

satellite itself.429

Chuangxin

Chuangxin (Innovation/创新) satellites cover the Chuangxin-1 series and the Chuangxin-3. The Chuangxin1 is a series of satellites built by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and launched between 2003 and 2011. 

These microsatellites have a mass of 88 kg and appear to have been experimental satellites for 

communications and are described as the first small Chinese satellite to integrate the satellite with 

command and control, and ground applications. This involved the development of the satellite, ground 

control and application equipment, and low cost mobile satellite communication terminals. 430 The 

Chuangxin-3 mission appears similar to Chuangxin-1, but involved the transmission of data rather than 

communications.431

Shijian Satellites

China’s Shijian (Practice/实践) satellites test new technologies. Even though China has launched 25 Shijian 

satellites, Chinese press accounts provide little information on their missions. The Shijian-16, for example, 

is described as conducting “space science and research.”

432 Sources do reveal the functions of at least 

some of the Shijian satellites. Shijian-1 was China’s second satellite and was a platform to test satellite 

technologies. Shijian-2, 4, and 5 launched in 1981, 1994, and 1999, respectively, took measurements of 

the space environment. Shijian-2 actually consisted of three satellites (Shijian-2A, B, and C) launched on 

the same rocket.433 Shijian-5 may have been used to test the first CAST 968 satellite bus.434 Shijian-8 was 

the world’s first satellite devoted to crop breeding. Seeds were placed in the satellite and then exposed 

to the higher radiation levels of space in the hopes that genetic mutations may occur.435 The seeds were 

then removed from the satellite after it returned to Earth and grown. The Shijian-9A satellite, launched in 

2012, is a remote sensing satellite with a multi-spectral imager that took part in the search for Malaysian 

Airlines flight 370.436

A total of six Shijian-11 satellites have been launched. It is speculated that these satellites are early 

warning satellites designed to detect the heat signatures of ballistic missiles. Early warning satellites have 

been identified by some Chinese press accounts as a necessary component of a future missile defense 

 

429 http://microsat.zju.edu.cn/redir.php?catalog_id=2341.

430 Jiang Mianheng, “创新一号卫星研制实践及微小卫星发展趋势” [Chuangxin-1 Research and Development and the 

Development Trend of Microsatellites], 中国科学院 [Chinese Academy of Sciences], 2003/18, 420‒21. 

431 创新三号、试验七号有效载荷数据传输分系统在轨开机工作正常 [Chuangxin-3, Shiyan-7 Payload Data Subsystem 

Operating Normally in Orbit], http://www.cssar.ac.cn/xwzx/kydt/201308/t20130820_3915839.html

432 “China Launches Experimental Satellite Shijian-16,” Xinhuanet.com, October 25, 2013, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2013-10/25/c_132830192.htm.

433 Harvey, China’s Space Program, 61.

434 Wu Bing, “当代中国航天器的发展” [Contemporary Chinese Spacecraft Development], 现代军事 [ConMilLit], 2009/7, 18.

435 Ibid., 16.

436 “实践九号 A 星多光谱相机首次在美国中部开机成像,” [Shijian 9A Multi-spectral Imagers Take Images of the American 

Midwest for the First Time], October 21, 2012, 

http://news.ifeng.com/mil/bigpicture/detail_2012_10/21/18411852_0.shtml?_from_ralated#p=1.
78

system and could indicate a change in China’s nuclear posture (see Conclusion). In 2014, the Shijian-11 

program received a first class national defense science and technology award suggesting that it was a 

significant leap in technology.437

Launch Vehicles

Chinese launch vehicles have a history of unreliability that has harmed China’s efforts to become a major 

player in the commercial launch market. Since 2000, however, the reliability of Chinese launchers has 

improved dramatically and has reached international standards. China currently operates four different 

types of Long March launch vehicles that can launch a variety of payloads to low earth, medium earth, 

and high Earth orbits. The Long March series of launch vehicles are derived from China’s Dongfeng ballistic 

missiles. The first Long March, a Long March-1, flew on April 24, 1970, and deposited China’s first satellite 

into orbit. Since then China has conducted more than 190 launches. 

Following a series of launch failures in the mid-1990s, China’s Long March launchers are now generally as 

reliable as their counterparts in the United States, Europe, and Russia. The Long March booster reached 

a 95 percent success rate based on more than 190 launches, a figure equivalent to international standards. 

The success rates of the Long March family vary widely depending on launcher, however. The LM-2C 

continues to be a solid workhorse with just one failure in 41 launches. The LM-3, on the other hand, has 

just a 77 percent success rate. As a result, while the success rate of the Long March family as a whole is at 

international levels, certain launchers are still far from reaching these standards (Table 11). Because of 

this, the Great Wall Industry Corporation, the commercial representative for the China Aerospace Science 

and Technology Corporation, does not market the LM-2E and LM-3 to international customers.

China is now launching more rockets and satellites than at any other time in its history (Table 12). China 

launched just one satellite in 2001 but in 2013 conducted 14 launches and launched 17 spacecraft. In 2010 

and 2011, China first equaled and then surpassed the number of U.S. launches. In 2010, China and the 

United States both conducted 15 launches, and in 2011 China conducted 19 launches compared to 18 by 

the United States. Based on the 12-year period 2001‒2013, China’s Long March launch vehicles 

successfully completed 125 of 128 launches for a 98 percent success rate, a rate comparable with 

international competitors. China’s goal is to launch 100 rockets during the 12th Five-year Plan (2011‒

2015).438

From 2011‒2013 China launched 52 rockets; this means it will have to conduct nearly as many launches 

during the last two years of the 12th FYP as it did during its first three years if it is to meet its 100-launch 

goal (Table 13).

 

437 “遥感卫星九号和实践十一号卫星喜获国防科技进步一等奖,” [Yaogan 9 and Shijian 11 Satellites Win the First Class 

National Defense Science and Technology Advancement Award], China Spacesat Co., Ltd, 

http://www.spacesat.com.cn/templates/content/index.aspx?nodeid=9&page=ContentPage&contentid=694.

438 “China Aims to Launch 100 Satellites by 2015,” China Daily, March 10, 2012, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-

03/10/content_14806055.htm.
79

Table 11. Long March family success rates

Vehicle Launches Successes Failures Success Rate

LM-1 2 2 0 100%

LM-2 1 0 1 0%

LM-2C 41 40 1 98%

LM-2D 20 20 0 100%

LM-2E 7 5 2 71%

LM-2F 11 11 0 100%

LM-3 13 10 3 77%

LM-3A 23 23 0 100%

LM-3B 26 24 2 92%

LM-3C 10 10 0 100%

LM-4A 2 2 0 100%

LM-4B 20 19 1 95%

LM-4C 13 13 0 100%

TOTAL 189 179 10 95%

Table 12. International launches

2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006

China 14 19 19 15 6 11 10 6

United States 18 13 18 15 24 15 20 17

Russia 32 29 35 31 29 26 26 25

Europe 5 8 5 6 7 6 6 5

Table 13. Chinese launches, 2001‒2013

Year Satellites Spacecraft Total Launches Failures

2001 0 1 1 1 0

2002 3 2 5 5 0

2003 6 1 7 6 0

2004 10 0 10 8 0

2005 4 1 5 5 0

2006 7 0 7 6 0

2007 10 0 10 10 0

2008 13 1 14 11 0

2009 6 0 6 7 1

2010 16 0 16 15 0

2011 19 2 21 19 1

2012 25 1 26 15 0

2013 16 1 17 14 1

Totals 135 9 145 125 3
80

Current Chinese Long March Launch Vehicles

Long March 2

The first Long March 2 was launched in 1975 and has been a steady workhorse for China’s launch industry 

ever since. It had constituted 79 of 188 Chinese launches by the end of 2013. The Long March 2 series has 

three variants: the LM-2C, D, and F/G. The LM-2C and D are used for satellite launches and can launch 

payloads up to 3,850 kg into low Earth orbit (LEO), 1,900 kg into sun synchronous orbit (SSO) or 1,250 kg 

into geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO), depending on the variant.439

The LM-2F is dedicated to the China’s human spaceflight program. It is 58.3 meters long and comes with 

a dedicated payload faring that houses the Shenzhou space capsule. Because it can deliver up to eight 

metric tons into LEO, the LM-2F differs significantly from the other variants. Unlike the LM-2C and D, the 

LM-2F has four 2.25-meter diameter strap-on boosters that can each generate 740 kN of thrust to enable 

it to launch heavier payloads.440

The LM-2F also differs significantly from other LM-2 variants in that as a human-rated launcher it features 

enhanced reliability and survivability. The components of the LM-2F were subjected to increased quality 

control procedures and standardization for the 55,000 electrical components that incorporated 55 new 

technologies. In addition, an escape system on top of the payload faring is designed to propel the space 

capsule away from a failed launch. With improved manufacturing processes and escape systems, the LM2F is intended to achieve a 97 percent launch success rate and a 99.7 percent survivability rating.441

The LM-2G is similar to the LM-2F, but features a modified payload faring to fit the Tiangong-1 space 

station.

Long March 3

The Long March 3 is a three-stage rocket based on the LM-2 and is mainly used to launch communication 

satellites into GEO. By the end of 2013, the LM-3 made up 72 of 188 Chinese launches. The first two stages 

of the rocket are 3.35 meters in diameter with the third stage three meters in diameter. The LM-3A is 

mainly used for launching satellites into GTO and is capable of lifting 2,600 kg into that orbit. The LM-3B 

is capable of launching 5,100 kg into orbit while an “E” version of the launcher can lift 5,500 kg into GTO. 

The LM-3C is similar to the LM-3B, but with just two strap-on boosters and a reduced payload capacity of 

3,800 kg into GTO442.

Long March 4

The Long March 4 is three-stage launch vehicle with a core diameter of 3.35 meters. The LM-4 is the least 

used Chinese launcher and by the end of 2013 constituted only 35 of China’s 188 launches. The launcher 

was originally developed as a backup to the Long March 3 to launch communication satellites into SSO, 

 

439 “LM-2D,” China Great Wall Industry Corporation, http://www.cgwic.com/LaunchServices/LaunchVehicle/LM2D.html; “LM2C,” China Great Wall Industry Corporation, http://www.cgwic.com/LaunchServices/LaunchVehicle/LM2C.html.

440 “Long March 2F Launch Vehicle,” http://www.spaceflight101.com/long-march-2f.html.

441 See Kevin Pollpeter, “Organization as Innovation: Instilling a Quality Management System in China’s Human Spaceflight 

Program,” in Tai Ming Cheung, ed., Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation, (Baltimore, MD: 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 213‒40.

442 “LM-3A,” China Great Wall Industry Corporation, http://www.cgwic.com/LaunchServices/LaunchVehicle/LM3A.html; “LM3B,” China Great Wall Industry Corporation, http://www.cgwic.com/LaunchServices/LaunchVehicle/LM3B.html; “LM-3C,” China 

Great Wall Industry Corporation, http://www.cgwic.com/LaunchServices/LaunchVehicle/LM3C.html.
81

but has since been used to launch remote sensing and meteorological satellites into LEO.443 The LM-4A 

has a length of 41.9 meters and the LM-4B is slightly longer at 45.58 meters. The LM-4A can lift 1,500 kg 

into SSO and the LM-4B can lift 2,200 kg into SSO.444

See Table 14 for summary of specifications for the Long March launchers.

New Generation of Launch Vehicles

Despite the improved performance of China’s current launch vehicles, China is developing a new 

generation that will be capable of launching China’s large space station and larger satellites. This new 

generation of launch vehicles would also presumably play a central role in any manned lunar exploration 

program. Reflecting the importance of these new launchers, former China Aerospace Science and 

Technology Corporation President Ma Xingrui told a delegation of U.S. space engineers and scientists: “I 

remind government leaders that engines are the heart of space launch technology, and that is where 

money must be invested.”

445

The new rockets are designed to meet China’s launch needs for the next 30‒50 years and offer increased 

reliability and adaptability and will be powered by “nonpoisonous” and “nonpolluting” engines that will 

provide more thrust than the current generation of launch vehicles. 446 The new generation of rockets will 

be divided into light, medium, and heavy-lift versions that will be able to send 1 to 25 metric ton payloads 

into LEO and 1 to 14 metric ton payloads into GEO.447 This presents a significant increase in payload 

capacity. China’s current heaviest launch vehicle, the LM-2F, can lift eight metric tons into low Earth orbit.

This new generation of Long March vehicles has been designated the Long March 5, 6, and 7. The Long 

March 5 will be used to launch the heaviest payloads into orbit, such as China’s planned large space station. 

The Long March 7 will be a medium-lift rocket that will be used to ferry supplies to the space station. The 

Long March 6 is a light launch vehicle intended to launch payloads of up to one metric ton into orbit. In 

addition to these liquid fuel rockets, China is also developing the Long March 11, Kuaizhou, and Feitian

solid-fuel rockets. These rockets are designed to launch lighter payloads on short notice. The Kuaizhou 

was first launched in September 2013.

China is also researching rockets even larger than the LM-5. China is conducting preliminary research on 

a super-heavy-lift launcher with an eight-meter core diameter rocket, the Long March 9, capable of lifting 

100 tons into orbit into low Earth orbit.448 The LM-9 will be submitted for approval during the current fiveyear plan and could be used to send large payloads to the moon, such as a manned lunar lander.449

 

443 “LM-4,” China Great Wall Industry Corporation, http://www.cgwic.com/LaunchServices/LaunchVehicle/LM4.html.

444“长征四号运载火箭 (组图)” [The Long March 4 Launch Vehicle], sina.com.cn, September 30, 2005, 

http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-09-30/16147910699.shtml.

445 Bradley Perrett, “Thrust for the Moon,” Aviation Week & Space Technology March 12, 2012, 32.

446 Zhang Feng, “中国的长征五号运载火箭” [China’s Long March 5 Launch Vehicle], 卫星应用 [Satellite Application], 2012/5, 

29.

447 Sun Zifa, “中国未来 5 年实现”长征”五号六号七号火箭首飞” [In 5 Years China Will Realize the First Flights of the ‘Long 

March’ 5, 6, and 7], sohu.com, http://news.sohu.com/20130301/n367552968.shtml.

448 Xin Dingding, “Jumbo Rocket Design Poses Challenges,” China Daily, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-

03/04/content_16272148.htm.

449 Bradley Perret, “Chinese Super-Heavy Launcher Designs Exceed Saturn V,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 

30, 2013, http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_09_30_2013_p22-620995.xml
82

Table 14. Selected Long March launcher data

LM-2C 

Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage Upper Stage

Stage diameter 3.35 3.35

Propellant UDMH/N2O4

Overall length(m) 42

LM-2C LEO 3850(200km/63o

)

SSO 1400(600km)

LM-2C/SM GTO 1250(28o)

LM-2C/SMA SSO 1900(600km)

LM-2D 

Stage 1st Stage

2nd Stage

Main Engine Vernier Engine

Diameter (m) 3.35 3.35

Propellant N2O4/UDMH

Overall length 41.056

SSO payload capability (kg) 1300

LM-3A 

Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage

Stage diameter (m) 3.35 3.35 3.00

Propellant N2O4/UDMH LOX/LH2

Overall length (m) 52.52

GTO launch capability (kg) 2600

LM-3B 

Stage Booster 1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage

Stage diameter (m) 2.25 3.35 3.35 3.00

Propellant N2O4/UDMH LOX/LH2

Overall length (m) 54.838/56.326*

GTO Launch capacity (kg) 5100/5500*

LM-3C 

Stage Booster 1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage

Stage diameter (m) 2.25 3.35 3.35 3.00

Propellant N2O4/UDMH LOX/LH2

Overall length (m) 54.838(56.638)

GTO launch capacity (kg) 3800

LM-4B 

Stage Booster 1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage

Stage diameter (m) 3.35 3.35 2.9

Propellant N2O4/UDMH

Overall length (m) 45.80 

LEO launch capacity (kg) 2800 (GTO: 1500)

LM-4C 

Stage Booster 1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage

Stage diameter (m) 3.35 3.35 2.9

Propellant N2O4/UDMH

Overall length (m) 39.98

GTO launch capacity (kg) 1500 

*LM-3B/E launch vehicle.
83

The planned maiden launches of these new rockets have changed. A 2002 Aviation Week and Space 

Technology article stated that the first new rocket would launch in 2008 to coincide with the Beijing 

Olympics.450 In 2006, CNSA Vice Administrator Luo Ge stated that the launch of the Long March 5 would 

occur by 2011, but this date has been repeatedly pushed back and is now scheduled for 2015.451 The Long 

March 6 was originally scheduled to be launch in 2013, but that launch has not yet occurred. The Long 

March 7 is planned to be first launched in 2014, but has not yet occurred at time of writing.452 The Long 

March 11, on the other hand, is planned to be launched by 2016.453

These new launch vehicles are expected “to improve rocket reliability to 0.98 for unmanned missions and 

0.99 for manned flights, compared with 0.91 for the existing model line.” They are also planned to reduce 

launch costs by 20 percent to 30 percent and have reduced launch preparation times of less than 15 

days.454 Despite the promise of increased reliability and reduced costs, China is expected to continue using 

its current generation of Long March launchers for 10 to 20 more years until the new rockets become fully 

mature.455

A focus of the new generation of launch vehicles is the development of new engine technology with staged 

combustion technology to increase payload. The focus of the effort has been on the YF-100 engines for 

the Long March 5, based on the Russian RD-120 engine, capable of generating 120 tons of thrust. The 

Long March 6 and 7 will also use staged combustion in their second stages. According to Aviation Week 

and Space Technology, a staged combustion cycle “has limited meaning for China’s military capabilities 

since it is used on liquid-fueled engines,” but the 

practical result should be a greater payload to orbit for a launcher of a given size. The 

improved performance will probably be essential for China's next generation of launchers 

to be competitive as the technology becomes increasingly common in the future...and 

underscores the country's ability to catch up with advanced foreign aerospace 

technology.456

With the use of just one engine using staged combustion cycle, Chinese rockets should be able to achieve 

a 5‒10 percent increase in payload. With the use of two they could achieve a 10‒15 percent increase in 

payload.457

Another important feature of the new engine technology for the next generation of liquid-fueled launch 

vehicles is the use of so-called non-polluting fuel consisting of liquid hydrogen, liquid oxygen, and liquid 

oxygen kerosene engines instead of hydrazine-fueled engines. Hydrazine is easier to ignite than kerosene, 

 

450 Michael A. Taverna, “Giant Leap,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 6, 2003, 46.

451 Bradley Perret, “China’s Long March 5 Will Not Launch Until 2015,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 25, 2013, 

http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_03_25_2013_p30-561101.xml.

452 “2014 Maiden Launch for Long March-7 Rocket,” China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-

03/01/content_16267164.htm

453 Bradley Perret, “China’s Long March 5 Will Not Launch Until 2015,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 25, 2013, 

http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_03_25_2013_p30-561101.xml.

454 Michael A. Taverna, “Giant Leap,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 6, 2003, 46.

455 Xin Dingding, “Jumbo Rocket Design Poses Challenges,” China Daily, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-

03/04/content_16272148.htm.

456 Bradley Perrett, Frank Morring Jr., Amy Svitak, and Jay Menon, “Out of the Bottle,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 

September 16, 2013, 50.

457 Bradley Perrett, “Next Stage,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 10, 2011, 35.
84

but it is also toxic and can create hazards during fueling and in the event of catastrophic failure when parts 

of a rocket separate from the launcher and return to Earth. In March 2011, for example, a part from a 

Long March 3 fell in Guizhou Province and was surrounded by a yellow cloud.458

Kerosene, on the other hand, packs more energy, but requires liquid oxygen that must be cryogenically 

stored. Developing the means to cryogenically store the liquid has been one of the major efforts of the 

new-generation launch vehicle and one in which China has sought outside assistance. China is working 

with a Russian design bureau on the new engines,

459 and in 2009 a native of China and naturalized U.S. 

citizen, Shu Quan-sheng, was convicted of illegally exporting rocket engine cryogenic technology to 

China.460

China’s New Long March Launchers in Detail

Long March 5

The Long March 5 is the largest rocket under development by China. It is comparable to the U.S. Delta 

IV461 and will have the ability to launch 25 metric tons into LEO and 14 metric tons into GTO. Research and 

development of the Long March 5 was begun in 2000. The LM-5 will stand 60 meters tall and is based on 

a core vehicle with a diameter of five meters as compared to the 3.35 diameter of the current largest Long 

March launchers. The rocket is the first Chinese rocket to be completely designed digitally, which is said 

to have improved its quality and reduced development times.462

The LM-5 is the most technically challenging of the new rockets, due to the large diameter core engines 

divided into two stages housing 50-ton LOX/LH2 engines.463 The LM-5 will come in six configurations to 

carry a variety of payloads with the use of either 2.25-meter or 3.35-meter boosters attached to the sides 

of the core engines.464

The rocket is essential to carrying out China’s future human space flight and potential manned lunar 

missions and is being developed specifically to launch China’s large space station. It is also expected to 

launch China’s next generation of remote sensing and communication satellites, which are expected to 

be larger than the current generations. Difficulties in manufacturing the LM-5 core structure, however, 

have led to continuing delays, and is believed to be the reason why plans to complete China’s large space 

station have been delayed from 2020 to 2023.465

 

458 Zhang Feng, “中国的长征五号运载火箭” [China’s Long March 5 Launch Vehicle], 卫星应用 [Satellite Application], 2012/5, 

29.

459 Michael A. Taverna, “Giant Leap,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 6, 2003, 46.

460 “Virginia Physicist Sentenced to 51 Months in Prison for Illegally Exporting Space Launch Data to China and Offering Bribes to 

Chinese Officials,” FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/norfolk/press-releases/2009/nf040709.htm.

461 “In Orbit,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 14, 2009, 18.

462 Zhang, “China’s Long March 5 Launch Vehicle,” 31.

463 Li and Cheng, “The New Generation of Launch Vehicles and Its Applying to China’s Lunar Exploration Program”; Tangming 

Cheng, Xiaojun Wang, and Dong Li, “The New Generation Launch Vehicles of Long-March Family,” paper presented at the 54th 

International Astronautical Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, the International Academy of Astronautics, 

and the International Institute of Space Law, September 29‒3 October 3, 2003, Bremen, Germany, 4, 

http://arc.aiaa.org/doi/pdf/10.2514/6.IAC-03-V.1.04.

464 Li and Cheng, “The New Generation of Launch Vehicles and Its Applying to China’s Lunar Exploration Program.”

465 Xin Dingding, “Jumbo Rocket Design Poses Challenges,” China Daily, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-

03/04/content_16272148.htm.
85

Long March 6

The Long March 6 is a light-lift rocket capable of launching one metric ton into LEO. The LM-6 is made up 

of a 2.25-meter core with a 120-ton engine based on the strap-on boosters of the LM-5 and a second stage 

powered by a 15-ton engine.466 The LM-6 was approved in 2009 and is being developed by the Shanghai 

Academy of Space Technology and is said to use many new technologies that have never been used before 

in China.467

Long March 7

The Long March 7 is a medium-lift rocket capable of launching 13.5 metric tons to LEO and 5.5 metric tons 

into SSO. Its first launch is expected around 2016. The LM-7 will be two stages made up of two 3.35-meter 

core engines and 2.25-meter strap-on boosters. 468 The LM-7 will eventually replace the LM-2F in 

transporting personnel and supplies to China’s space station.

Long March 11

The Long March 11 program, officially started in 2012, will be China’s largest solid-fueled rocket.

469 It is 

reportedly based on the DF-31A ballistic missile and is expected to make its first launch by the end of 

2015.470 As a solid-fueled rocket, the LM-11 is positioned to provide China an ability to launch satellites 

into orbit on shorter notice than its liquid-fueled cousins. Chinese press accounts tout its ability to respond 

quickly to natural disasters and “sudden instances,” which probably includes natural disasters and military 

conflict.471

Kuaizhou

Kuaizhou (快舟) is a small, solid-fueled rocket first launched September 25, 2013 that involved launching 

the Kuaizhou-1 small satellite into orbit. Developed by the China Aerospace Science & Industry 

Corporation (CASIC) and similar to the LM-11, Kuaizhou is also intended to give China a rapid response 

launch capability. A second launch of the Kuaizhou rocket and the Kuaizhou-2 satellite occurred November 

21, 2014.

472 The program was formally begun in 2009 and is said to have involved many new concepts and 

technologies for China, including grid fins.473 The Kuaizhou can launch satellites from a mobile launcher 

and is reported to be based on the three-stage DF-21-derived KT-1 solid-fueled rocket, which experienced 

 

466 Li and Cheng, “The New Generation of Launch Vehicles and Its Applying to China’s Lunar Exploration Program”; Cheng, 

Wang, and Li, “The New Generation Launch Vehicles of Long-March Family.”

467 Yin Linfa, “我国火箭家族天壤新成员长征六号研制启动” [Research and Development of the Long March 6, a New Member 

of the Rocket Family, Started], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2009/9, 9.

468中国 2016 年左右发射长征七号与天舟货船[China Around 2016 Will Launch the Long March 7 and Supply Vessel for the 

Tianggong and Shenzhou], 新华[Xinhua], http://news.xinhuanet.com/tech/2014-03/02/c_119565025.htm; Fan Ruixiang and 

Rong Yi, “我国新一代中型运载火箭的发展展望” [The Development and Prospects of Our Country’s New Generation Medium 

Lift Launch Vehicle], 载人航天 [Manned Spaceflight], 2013/1, 2; Li and Cheng, “The New Generation of Launch Vehicles and Its 

Applying to China’s Lunar Exploration Program”; Cheng, Wang, and Li, “The New Generation Launch Vehicles of Long-March 

Family.”

469 “China’s First Solid-fuel Rocket to Debut Before 2016,” China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-

03/02/content_16269380.htm.

470 “长征 11 号快速机动小型固体运载火箭通过国家立项” [Long March 11 Rapid and Mobile Small Solid Fueled Rocket is 

Approved by the Government], http://www.shenkong.net/News/1209/CZ11HKSJDXXGTYZHJTGGJLX07070110.htm.

471 Ren Qinqin, “长征 11 号十二五首飞 中国首枚固体运载火箭” [Long March 11 Will Launch During the 12th FYP China’s First 

Solid Fueled Rocket], March 2, 2013, 21cn.com, http://mil.21cn.com/gn/a/2013/0302/13/20515412.shtml.

472 “我国成功发射“快舟二号”卫星,” [Our Country Successfully Launches Kuaizhou-2 Satellite], 新华社 [Xinhua], November 21, 

2014.

473快舟固体运载火箭总设计师 [Kuaizhou Solid Fueled Rocket Chief Designer],

http://liuqiankktt.blog.163.com/blog/static/121264211201442483039223/.
86

one, if not two, launch failures in 2002 and 2003 and was reportedly not approved for further 

development. The Kuaizhou is said to have a 1.7 meter diameter booster instead of the 1.4-meter 

diameter booster of the KT-1. The Kuaizhou is also said to be related to the KT-409, which ultimately was 

developed into the Dongneng-1 (动能-1/DN-1) direct-ascent kill vehicle used in China’s 2007 ASAT test. 

Kuaizhou was designated one of the top ten news stories of China’s national defense industry in 2013.474

Feitian

Feitian (飞天) is a small, solid-fuel rocket developed by the China Aerospace Science and Industry 

Corporation. The existence of the Feitian was first made public at the 2014 Zhuhai Airshow and it is not 

known to have been launched. The three-stage Feitian is very similar to the Kuaizhou rocket and can 

launch 300 kg into orbit with just four hours of preparation. As such, Feitian is also advertised as providing 

operationally responsive space capabilities. Due to its similarity to the Kuaizhou, Chinese press reports 

have speculated that it is a commercial version of the Kuaizhou meant for export.475

Counterspace Technologies

China has a broad-based development program for counterspace technology that consists of jammers, 

direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles, directed-energy weapons, and co-orbital spacecraft.

476 China’s 

development of counterspace weapons appears to be aimed at developing an all-around capability to 

threaten satellites with a variety of weapons at all orbits (Table 15).

Table 15. Chinese ASAT tests and tests with counterspace implications

Year Technology

2006 Chinese laser paints U.S. satellite, though intent of action is unknown

2007 China destroys aging FY-1C meteorological satellite with direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicle

2007 Unattributed hacking attack against Landsat-7 satellite command and control center 

resulted in 12 or more minutes of interruption

2008 Unattributed hacking attack against Landsat-7 satellite command and control center

resulted in 12 or more minutes of interruption

2008 Unattributed hacking attack against Terra EOS satellite command and control center

resulted in two or more minutes of interruption 

2008 Unattributed hacking attack against Terra EOS satellite command and control center

resulted in nine or more minutes of interruption 

2010 China conducts mid-course ballistic missile defense test

2010 Two Shijian satellites involved in close proximity operation, causing slight change in one 

satellite’s orbit

2013 China conducts mid-course ballistic missile defense test

2013 Three satellites involved in close proximity operation to test space debris removal and 

robotic arm technologies

2013 China conducts “high altitude science” mission with rocket reaching GEO 

2014 China conducts mid-course ballistic missile defense test

 

474 Ibid.

475 “观察者网珠海航展前线:飞天一号火箭引发关注 4 小时即可“飞天”” [Guancha Net on the Frontlines of the Zhuhai 

Airshow: Feitian-1 Triggers Attention That it Can Launch in Four Hours], http://m.guancha.cn/militaryaffairs/2014_11_12_285792.

476 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China (2012), 9. 
87

The most prominent demonstration of China’s counterspace technologies was the 2007 destruction of a 

defunct FY-1C meteorological satellite 800 kilometers above the Earth’s surface with a directascentkinetic-kill vehicle. The U.S. government was the first to announce the January 11 test and did so 

on January 18 after consulting with the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which appeared to be ignorant of the 

matter. It was not until January 23―five days after the U.S. announcement―that China admitted to the 

test, stating that it “was not targeted against any country and does not pose a threat to any country.”

477

The seeming ignorance of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the five-day wait between the U.S. 

announcement and the Chinese statement admitting the test raised serious questions about civil-military 

relations in China and the message, if any, that was intended by the test. According to one interlocutor, 

the test was briefed at the highest levels of the Chinese government, but its potential ramifications, 

including space debris, were not covered. According to one analysis based on numerous interviews with 

Chinese interlocutors, the test was actually a missile defense test that was carried out against a satellite 

because it was an easier object to target than a speeding warhead. The test, according to their 

interlocutors, was “carefully vetted” before being presented to the ultimate, but unidentified, decisionmakers.478 According to former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the U.S. Defense Department would 

assess that the test “had been conducted by the PLA without the knowledge of the civilian leadership in 

Beijing.”

479

This test was widely condemned as being seemingly contrary to China’s stance against the weaponization 

of space. More importantly, the test created more than 3,400 pieces of debris, the majority of which are 

still in orbit and traveling as fast as 17,500 mph. According to NASA, more than 50 percent of this debris 

could still be in orbit 20 years later.480

Due to the increasing amount of debrisin LEO, space debris is becoming an increasing hazard to spacecraft. 

The International Space Station has been forced to change orbit to avoid debris created by the 2007 ASAT 

test,

481 and in 2013 a small Russian satellite was destroyed after space debris generated from the 2007 

test rammed into it.482 China’s space program has also been affected by space debris. China states that 

debris comes close to Chinese spacecraft at least twice per week.483

Interestingly, Chinese officials do not admit responsibility for the debris caused by the 2007 ASAT test. A 

2014 statement by the head of the China National Observatory only mentions the 2009 collision between 

a Russian Cosmos satellite and an Iridium communications satellite and the 2013 destruction of the small 

Russian satellite, but does not assign responsibility.484 Chinese researchers also follow a similar tack and 

 

477 Edward Cody, “China Confirms Firing Missile to Destroy Satellite,” Washington Post, January 24, 2007, 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/23/AR2007012300114.html.

478 Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis, “Understanding China’s ASAT Test,” Union of Concerned Scientists, 

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/solutions/us-china-cooperation/understanding-chinasasat.html.

479 Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014).

480 “Fengyun-1C Debris Cloud Remains Hazardous,” Orbital Debris Quarterly News, January 2014, 3‒4.

481 Tariq Malik, “Space Station Dodges Debris from Destroyed Chinese Satellite,” Space.com, http://www.space.com/14398-

space-station-dodges-chinese-space-junk.html.

482 Leonard David, “Russian Satellite Hit by Debris from Chinese Anti-Satellite Test,” Space.com, http://www.space.com/20138-

russian-satellite-chinese-space-junk.html.

483 “我国应对空间碎片威胁成果丰硕” [Our Country’s Substantial Achievements in Countering the Threat of Space Debris], 

http://jmjhs.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11295193/n11312030/16000759.html.

484 Ibid.
88

only identify the 2009 collision as the major source of space debris and neglect to mention the 2007 ASAT 

test.485

Since the 2007 ASAT test, China appears to have become more serious about mitigating the threat of 

space debris, although one analyst writes that China’s research on space debris is still comparatively 

weak.

486 China has been a member of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) since 

1995. During the group’s 32nd annual meeting in Beijing in May 2014, an official from the Chinese Foreign 

Ministry stated, “Human exploration and use of outer space during the past decades have resulted in a 

large amount of debris. The increase of debris poses a serious threat to space activities, space assets, and 

the space environment. This issue can only be resolved through the joint efforts of all spacefaring 

countries...China requiresits domestic institutions to conduct space activities in accordance with the work 

plan of the IADC and urges the Chinese space agency and enterprises to abide by its own guidelines on 

mitigation of space waste.”

487

According to Xu Dazhe, head of CNSA, “China has allocated a considerable amount of resources in research 

and development for the detection, protection, and mitigation of space debris,” and has established an 

initial surveillance and early warning system that was “beginning to provide technical support to our 

manned space exploration and satellite operation.” CNSA has also implemented a space debris plan, 

established a space debris coordination and expert group, established a space debris high-speed-collision 

testing center, and established the Chinese Academy of Sciences Space Target and Debris Monitoring 

Research Center (中国科学院空间目标与碎片观测研究中心).

488 China has also redesigned its launch 

vehicles to minimize the creation of debris during launch and orbiting of satellites489 and has retired

satellites to higher orbits so that they do not interfere with operational satellites.490

In 2005 China published the “PRC Space Sector Standards―Space Debris Mitigation Requirements” (中国

人民共和国航天行业标准--空间碎片减缓要求) and in 2009 published the “Space Debris Mitigation 

Guide” (空间碎片减缓指南). In 2009, China also published the “Provisional Management Methods for 

Space Debris Mitigation and Protection” (空间碎片减缓与防护暂行管理办法),

491 which were the first 

Chinese regulations governing debris mitigation measures for the R&D of Chinese spacecraft. The 

“Management Methods” may have been written in response to the 2007 ASAT test, as drafts of the 

 

485 See, for example, Ying Luju, “太空垃圾挑战人类” [Space Debris and the Challenge to Humans], 近日科技 [Today Science 

and Technology] 2 (2009): 52; and Lin Laixing, “空间碎片现状与清理” [Status and Removal of Space Debris], 航天器工程

[Spacecraft Engineering] 6 (2012): 3.

486 Ping Guodong, “关于完善我国空间碎片减控立法的思考和建议” [Some Reflections and Suggestions on Improving Our 

Country’s Space Debris Mitigation Laws], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2014/2, 32.

487 Zhao Lei, “China Aids in Cutting Down Space Debris,” China Daily, May 13, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-

05/13/content_17503107.htm.

488 “多国航天机构在京研讨应对太空垃圾” [Many Space Organizations from Around the World Meet in Beijing to Discuss 

Space Debris], http://tech.ifeng.com/discovery/astronomy/detail_2014_05/13/36294721_0.shtml/ ; Wang Haiping and Ma 

Weihong, “我国有了”太空垃圾”观测中心” [Our Country has a ‘Space Debris” Monitoring Center], 人民网 [People’s Net], 

March 10, 2005, http://scitech.people.com.cn/GB/25892/3232749.html; and 

489 “China Aids in Cutting Down Space Debris,” http://www.china.org.cn/china/2014-05/13/content_32369026.htm.

490 “China’s Space Activities in 2011,” Information Office of the State Council, December 2011, 

http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-12/29/content_2033200.htm.

491 “中国代表在联合国外空委法律小组委员会第 52 届会上关于”空间碎片”议题的发言,” [China Delegation at the 52nd 

Meeting of the UN Committee on Space Law Delivers Speech on ‘Space Debris’], http://www.chinesemissionvienna.at/chn/hplywk/t1034115.htm; and Zhao Lei, “China Aids in Cutting Down Space Debris,” China Daily, May 13, 2014, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/13/content_17503107.htm.
89

regulations were discussed by the Space Debris Research Office (空间碎片研究专项办公室) and the 

Space Debris Research Expert Group (空间碎片研究专家组) in November 2007 and March 2008.492 The 

regulations assigned the State Administration for Science, Technology, and National Defense (SASTIND)

responsibility for space debris mitigation efforts for civilian-use satellites and launch vehicles and for 

cooperation with IADC. They also stipulated that manufacturers of spacecraft and launch vehicles must 

sign the “Provisional Methods for the Management of Civil space Launch Permit” (民用航天发射项目许

可证管理暂行办法), which acknowledges that spacecraft and launch vehicles have been built to mitigate 

space debris.493

Despite these documents, CNSA has not posted a space debris mitigation policy or information on its 

website nor are there any postings on the IADC website, even though the mitigation policies of the U.S. 

government, NASA, ESA, and France are posted.494

China is also conducting research on space debris mitigation technologies. The Shanghai Astronomical 

Observatory established a preliminary laser ranging system for space debris in 2006. The tests used a 

Chinese 40W laser with a range of 900 km, and 1,200 km using a 10W U.S. laser. The tests demonstrated 

that China could establish the range of an object in space with a precision of 50‒70 cm.495 China has also 

developed a space debris protection design system, developed many types of high-speed launch devices

to simulate debris impacts, and developed new structures and materials to protect against space debris.496

China has also been conducting research on the use of robotic arms to remove space debris. To date, 

Chinese press reports have stated this research has involved modeling and simulation and will move to 

actual testing in the future. The testing of robotic arm technologies also has counterspace implications

and was the focus of a 2013 test involving satellites in orbit (discussed in more detail later).497

China’s sensitivity to the creation of space debris appears to be reflected in its subsequent ASAT-related 

tests. In 2010, 2013, and 2014, China conducted mid-course tests of a missile defense system that are 

believed to be de facto ASAT tests. The technologies associated with midcourse missile defense

technologies are so similar to direct-ascent kinetic-kill ASAT technologies that they provide an inherent 

counterspace capability. But because interceptions during the midcourse phase take place at such low 

altitudes, any debris produced by the interception quickly returns to Earth. The utility of midcourse missile 

defense technologies for counterspace operations was demonstrated in 2008 when the United States 

used an SM-3 missile interceptor to destroy an errant satellite.498

Some Chinese commentators assess that China’s missile defense technologies have dramatically 

improved, or even achieved, their initial operational capability. Second Artillery Engineering Institute 

professor Song Zhongping stated that the success of the 2013 missile defense test meant “that China has 

 

492 Ping Guodong, “关于完善我国空间碎片减控立法的思考和建议” [Some Reflections and Suggestions on Improving Our 

Country’s Space Debris Mitigation Laws], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], 2014/2, 30.

493 Ibid., 31.

494 ‘References,” http://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=documents.

495 Zhang Zhongping, Yang Fumin, Zhang Haifeng Zhang, Wu Zhibo, Chen Juping, Li Pu, and Meng Wendong, “The Use of Laser 

Ranging to Measure Space Debris,” Research in Astronomy and Astrophysics 12, no. 2 (2012): 212–18.

496 “Our Country’s Substantial Achievements in Countering the Threat of Space Debris.”

497 “中国进军太空垃圾清理 验证机械手捕捉碎片” [China Advances Towards Space Debris Mitigation Testing Robotic Arm 

Technology to Remove Debris], http://war.163.com/14/0906/12/A5F6DIB200014OMD.html.

498 Taken from Kevin Pollpeter, “China’s Second Ballistic Missile Defense Test: A Search for Strategic Stability,” SITC News 

Bulletin, February 2013, http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/504391.pdf.
90

already successfully resolved the issues of upper atmosphere target identification and tracking and 

terminal guidance issues and that its mid-course missile defense technology is at the forefront of world 

technology.”

499 At the same time, Chinese commentators noted that China had conducted just two tests 

and was still far behind the United States. Many more issues need to be addressed, including improving 

the system’s accuracy and reaction time, its resistance to electromagnetic jamming, and its ability to 

intercept multiple warheads. Moreover, for a mid-course interceptor system to be truly effective, it needs 

to be supported by a capable C4ISR system, especially a space-based early warning system.500

After China’s July 2014 test, the U.S. State Department called on China to “refrain from destabilizing 

actions—such as the continued development and testing of destructive anti-satellite systems—that 

threaten the long term security and sustainability of the outer space environment, on which all nations 

depend.” China, however, has denied the counterspace implications of the test, stating that “to associate 

it with an anti-satellite test is entirely groundless.”

501

In addition to missile defense tests, China conducted a “high altitude science mission” in 2013 using a 

sounding rocket. According to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the rocket reached an altitude of more 

than 10,000 kilometers and released a barium cloud to study the dynamic characteristics of the Earth’s 

magnetosphere.502 This claim appeared to be contradicted by a U.S. government assessment that the 

rocket “appeared to be on a ballistic trajectory nearly to geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO),” which could 

refer to a distance of 30,000 kilometers.503 If so, the test would represent an expansion of China’s ASAT 

capabilities. The 2007 ASAT destroyed a satellite at an altitude of 800 kilometers, demonstrating the ability 

to threaten satellites, such as remote sensing satellites, in LEO. The May 2013 high-altitude science 

mission would allow China to threaten satellites such as GPS and communication satellites in medium and 

high Earth orbits.

There is little information in Chinese sources on the interceptor technology used to conduct these tests. 

The missile used to conduct the initial 2007 ASAT test, the SC-19,

504 also reportedly called the Dongneng1 (动能-1/DN-1), is, according to one blog posting, based on the Kaituozhe-1 (KT-1/开拓者一号/Pioneer), 

a solid-fueled launch vehicle that was never deployed.

505 The SC-19 was developed by the China 

 

499 “中国反导战力快速突破 海基拦截系统也开始起步” [China Makes Breakthrough in Missile Defense Combat Effectiveness 

Sea-based Interception System Also Begun], January 31, 2013, 

http://news.ifeng.com/mil/4/detail_2013_01/31/21820257_0.shtml.

500 Pollpeter, “China’s Second Ballistic Missile Defense Test: A Search for Strategic Stability.”

501 Mike Gruss, “U.S. State Department: China Tested Anti-Satellite Weapon,” Space News, July 28, 2014, 

http://www.spacenews.com/article/military-space/41413us-state-department-china-tested-anti-satellite-weapon.

502 “中国再次高空科学探测试验:高度更高数据更多” [China Again Conducts a High Altitude Science Mission: Higher 

Altitude and More Data], 中国新闻网 [China News], May 14, 2013, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/05-

14/4817925.shtml.

503 Brian Weeden, “Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian Anti-Satellite Testing in Space,” Space Review, 

March 17, 2014, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2473/1.

504 “Senator Clinton Questions Vice Admiral John M. McConnell, USN (Ret), Director of National Intelligence and Lieutenant 

General Michael Maples, USA, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency at a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing 

on Worldwide Threats,” 

http://web.archive.org/web/20070330225204/http://www.senate.gov/~clinton/news/statements/details.cfm?id=269792.

505快舟固体运载火箭总设计师 [Kuaizhou Solid Fueled Rocket Chief Designer],

http://liuqiankktt.blog.163.com/blog/static/121264211201442483039223/.
91

Aerospace Solid Propellant Launch Vehicle company (ASLV) of CASIC and is based on the road-mobile DF21 medium-range ballistic missile.506

A larger version of the KT-1, the KT-2, based on the road-mobile DF-31 ballistic missile, was also reported 

to be under development. The KT-2 may have been used in China’s 2013 high altitude science mission.

This missile has also been called the Kunpeng-7 (鲲鹏七号/Roc), though one source states that this was 

the name of the mission rather than the rocket.507

China is also developing directed-energy weapons such as lasers, high-powered microwave, and particle 

beam weapons for ASAT missions.508 The Defense Department concluded in 2006 that China had “at least 

one...ground-based laser designed to damage or blind imaging satellites.”

509 Lasers at higher power levels 

can permanently damage satellites and at lower power levels can temporarily blind the imagers of a 

remote sensing satellite. Lasers can be based on the ground, on aircraft, on ships, or in space. In 2006 it 

was reported that China had fired a laser at a U.S. satellite. According to U.S. officials, the intent of the 

lasing is unknown and did not damage the satellite, suggesting that China could have been determining 

the range of the satellite rather than trying to interfere with its function.510

China is also researching radio frequency (RF) weapons that could be used against satellites. Radio 

frequency weapons using high power microwaves can be ground-based, space-based, or employed on 

missiles to temporarily or permanently disable electronic components through either overheating or short 

circuiting. RF weapons are thus useful in achieving a wide spectrum of effects against satellites in all 

orbits.

511 RF weapons employed on satellites may be detected since the satellite would need to be close 

to the target satellite for the weapon to be effective. A satellite armed with an RF weapon on a crossing 

orbit with the target satellite, however, may not be recognized as a threat. RF weapons launched on 

rockets could detonate near the target satellites and thus may not be detected. Because RF weapons 

affect the electronics of satellites, evaluating the success of an attack may be difficult since no debris 

would be produced.512

China may also have been involved in computer hacks against satellite computer systems. In October 2007 

and July 2008, a computer attack against the command and control system of Landsat-7, a remote sensing 

satellite operated by the USGS and NASA, resulted in 12 or more minutes of interference on each occasion. 

The attacks did not result in the perpetrator achieving the ability to take command of the satellite. In June 

and October 2008, the command and control system for the Terra EOS (Earth Observation System) was 

 

506 Richard Fisher, “China’s Direct Ascent ASAT,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, 

http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.142/pub_detail.asp.

507快舟固体运载火箭总设计师 [Kuaizhou Solid Fueled Rocket Chief Designer],

http://liuqiankktt.blog.163.com/blog/static/121264211201442483039223/.

508 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China (2012), 9. 

509 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China (2006), 35. 

510 Elaine M. Grossman, “Top Commander: Chinese Interference with U.S. Satellites Uncertain,” World Politics Review, October 

18, 2006. 

511 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China (2006), 34; and Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms 

Control, September 1985, 66‒67.

512 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual (Cambridge, MA: 

American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005), 133.
92

hacked into, resulting in two or more minutes and nine or more minutes of interference, respectively. In 

both cases, the perpetrator had the ability to command the satellite, but refrained from doing so.513 China 

has denied responsibility for the attacks.514

China has also acquired foreign and indigenous jammers that give it “the capability to jam common 

satellite communications bands and GPS receivers.”

515 GPS, in particular, can be easily jammed due to the 

attenuation of the signal over the 12,500-mile distance between the satellites and Earth.

516 As a result, 

even low-power jammers can achieve effects over long distances. According to the Defense Science Board, 

“modest (few watt) jammers can deny acquisition [of the GPS signal]” at ranges up to hundreds of 

kilometers.517

China’s 2008 defense white paper mentions all services, except the PLA Navy, as having electronic warfare 

units that could be used to jam satellite communications and GPS signals. Ground force electronic warfare 

units are subordinate to the General Staff Department’s Fourth Department and are maintained at the 

military region level. The PLA Air Force and Second Artillery also maintain their own electronic warfare 

units while PLA Navy electronic warfare capabilities are resident on individual ships. Although China’s GPS 

jamming strategy is unknown, given the relatively small size and long range of GPS jammers, it could 

consist of a series of vehicle-mounted jammers that are spaced at intervals within the theater of 

operations to provide overlapping GPS jamming zones.

Space-based jamming is less of a threat since jamming is conducted against receivers and not transmitters. 

As a result, GPS satellites would not be the targets of GPS jamming, although satellites that use GPS to aid 

in orbital positioning could be.

In addition, China could detonate a nuclear weapon in space to destroy satellites through both the blast 

and the electromagnetic pulse generated by the explosion. The use of a nuclear weapon in space, however, 

would also affect China’s satellites, as well as those of third parties.518

According to the U.S. Defense Department, China has also “conducted increasingly complex close 

proximity operations between satellites.”

519 The ability to conduct these operations has been aided by the 

development of a TT&C system to support China’s human spaceflight and lunar exploration programs that 

enables China to better control with precision its own satellites as well as to monitor the satellites of 

potential adversaries. 

 

513 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Security and Economic 

Review Commission, November 2011, 216.

514 Sui-lee Wei, “China Denies It Is Behind Hacking of U.S. Satellites,” Reuters, October 31, 2011, 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/31/us-china-us-hackingidUSTRE79U1YI20111031?feedType=RSS&feedName=scienceNews&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&dlvrit=309301.

515 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China (2011), 37. 

516 Congressional Budget Office, “The Global Positioning System for Military Users: Current Modernization Plans and 

Alternatives,” October 2011, 4.

517 Defense Science Board, “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Tactical Air Warfare,” November 1993, 12.

518 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China (2011), 37. 

519 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China (2012), 9. 
93

In addition to the BX-1 test discussed earlier, China has conducted other close proximity operations. In 

August 2010 it was reported that after conducting a series of maneuvers the Shijian-12 (SJ-12) satellite 

had most likely bumped into the Shijian 6F (SJ-6F), causing it to drift slightly from its original orbit. The 

maneuvering could have been practice for docking the Shenzhou space capsule with the Tiangong-1 space 

station, but Chinese silence on the true intention of the test fueled concern that it was a cover for testing 

ASAT capabilities.520

In addition to these tests, in August 2013 China conducted a test of robotic arm technologies involving 

the Chuangxin-3, Shiyan-7, and Shijian-15 satellites where one of the satellites acted as a target satellite 

and another satellite, most likely equipped with a robotic arm, grappled the target satellite. As with the 

August 2010 test involving the SJ-12 and SJ-6F, the test could have been for a legitimate peaceful purpose: 

the testing of robotic arm technologies that will be used on future Chinese space stations. As with the 

August 2010 tests, however, the dual-use nature and silence by the Chinese on the matter have only 

fueled speculation that China was also testing counterspace technologies.521

ORGANIZATION

Similar to the United States, China’s space enterprise is made up of a numerous organizations spanning 

the military, government, and defense industry. Like the United States, China does not appear to have a 

peacetime executive agent for space. The military, through the General Armament Department (GAD), 

oversees the R&D of all spacecraft and operates China’s launch centers and satellite control centers. 

Although the GAD oversees spacecraft R&D, it also appears that civilian stakeholders, such as the China 

National Meteorological Administration and the State Oceanographic Administration, provide 

requirements during the R&D process for satellites in their respective areas of responsibilities and operate 

their own spacecraft. In fact, one justification given for the development of multiple types of remote 

sensing satellites is to have primarily civilian-use satellites available for civilian end-users to have access 

to remote sensing data without going through more complicated military channels.522

Unlike the United States, however, China’s space enterprise is inherently dual-use. In the United States, 

for example, civilian meteorological satellites are operated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Agency, while the military has its own Defense Meteorological Satellite Program satellites.523 Chinese 

weather satellites, on the other hand, serve both civilian and military purposes. As a result, in the event 

of military conflict, it is probable that the military will take direct command over all space assets regardless 

of their peacetime affiliation.

Two large space industry conglomerates, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and 

the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, conduct Chinese spacecraft R&D. Similar to the 

operation of spacecraft, both military and civilian stakeholders can also participate in R&D for satellites in 

their respective areas of responsibility. The work of the space industry is overseen by the military through 

the GAD and by the government through SASTIND.

 

520 Brian Weeden, “Dancing in the Dark: The Orbital Rendezvous of SJ-12 and SJ-06F,” Space Review, August 30, 2010, 

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1689/1.

521 See Kevin Pollpeter, “China’s Space Robotic Arm Programs,” SITC News Analysis, October 2013, 

http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/505021.pdf.

522 “高分一号的落后与特色” [Gaofen-1 Deficiencies and Characteristics], Defense Review, http://news.qq.com/zt2013/GF1.

523 The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program is run by a joint military-NOAA team.
94

Creation of an Executive Agent for Space and a Military Space Force

The multiplicity of organizations responsible for different aspects of China’s space program have led some 

in China to conclude that China’s space enterprise is too dispersed among a number of different 

organizations and that effective coordination is not possible without centralized command. Ye Peijian, 

chief designer of China’s first moon probe, and Qi Faren, former chief designer of the Shenzhou space 

capsule, stated at the 2009 session of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political 

Consultative Conference that China’s space bureaucracy is made up of too many disparate pieces that 

cannot be coordinated well, and advocated for an executive agent for space. Ye asserts that the country’s 

response to the earthquake in 2008 would have been better had it had an integrated approach to the 

organization of space.524

The Chinese Academy of Sciences has also recognized the need for an executive agent for space, at least 

on the civil side. In its Vision 2020: The Emerging Trends in Science and Technology and Strategic Option 

of China, the Academy writes 

For example, the essence of human spaceflight and deep space survey programs is the 

human exploration of space, with the goal of scientific discovery and scientific research, 

thereby motivating technological development. The managing organs executing these 

two programs, however, are not the same ministry, and these two organs do not have 

the function of developing science. This then has unavoidably made it so that these two 

programs have an intense emphasis on the project mission and technological 

breakthrough.

In the area of space applications, China has launched a large quantity of application 

satellites, but because of separation between ministries, there is a lack of unified planning 

and coordination, data sharing rates are extremely low, and the phenomenon of 

redundant acquisition of the same or similar data is commonplace, creating low-level 

redundancy.525

The Academy then provides a series of recommendations that include 

• Restoring the leadership of a special committee in the central government for space policy and 

planning

• Establishing a national space ministry

• Breaking down the barriers dividing ministries that have satellites

• Commercializing launch and satellite research and development to lower costs, improve quality, 

and promote the transfer of space technologies to other sectors526

The inevitably of conflict in space has also led many Chinese military analysts to propose establishing an 

independent military space force to combine the various functions of China’s space program into one 

 

524 “Scientists: China Should Integrate Space Resources to Improve Emergency Response,” People’s Daily Online, March 4, 2009, 

http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90781/90876/6605410.html.

525 Gregory Kulacki, “Strategic Options for Chinese Space Science and Technology: A Translation and Analysis of the 2013 Report 

from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Union of Concerned Scientists,” November 2013, 15.

526 Ibid.
95

organization.527 The most vociferous organization arguing for control of China’s military space program is 

the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). Institutionally, the Air Force follows a strategy of “integrated air and space, 

simultaneous offensive and defensive operations” 空天一体, 攻防兼备) that suggests that the service 

is at least rhetorically committed to the space mission. PLAAF researchers, however, are less circumspect 

in their belief that the PLAAF should lead the PLA’s space efforts. Supporters of an “integrated air and 

space force” argue that although air and space are different mediums, the integration of force 

enhancement capabilities with air power and the eventual deployment of manned space planes will 

technologically merge the two mediums into one seamless medium. Consequently, future wars will see 

combat between manned space plane “fighter craft” and intercontinental bombing missions conducted 

through space.528

PLAAF analysts also write that air power is critical to the success of any operation and that the air force is 

inextricably linked to the use of space-based information.529 Moreover, PLAAF officers describe their 

service as the most technical of all of the services and the most suitable choice for leading a space force.530

A final argument made by PLAAF analysts is that every other military in the world places the responsibility 

for the command of space forces with its air force. As one author writes, “as of today, no country, from 

the large such as the United States and Russia to the small such as Israel, puts the country’s space force 

under a service other than the air force, let alone under the establishment of the rocket forces.”

531

Unstated by PLAAF researchers, but perhaps also relevant, is the service’s responsibility for missile 

defense, which would give the PLAAF responsibility for a de facto ASAT capability.

The PLAAF is not the only service that may have a role in China’s space enterprise, however. The use of 

road-mobile direct-ascent assets and the PLA’s push to develop an operationally responsive space 

capability using road-mobile launchers to quickly launch satellites into orbit suggests that the Second 

Artillery, China’s strategic rocket force, may also have a claim to the space mission. The Second Artillery’s 

responsibility for the launching ballistic missiles would also seem to be more suitable experience on which 

to base an argument for leading a space force than the PLAAF’s space plane argument, which is at yet 

unproven, and in the case of manned space planes, operationally questionable. 

How this may conclude is unclear. In September 2014, the Japanese paper Yomiuri Shimbun reported that 

China had established a space force as an independent service,532 but there is no additional evidence 

supporting this claim. Considering that the establishment of an independent space force may signal a 

more militaristic intent towards space, China may choose not to form a space force. It may instead spread 

the space mission across various organizations where the GAD maintains responsibility for the launch and 

operation of satellites, the Air Force assumes responsibility for space planes and missile defense, and the 

Second Artillery assumes responsibility for direct ascent road-mobile ASATs. But even this scenario is 

uncertain. 

 

527 Li Xin, Lei Xu, and Li Jun, 未来航天部队 C4ISR 系统建设初探 [“Preliminary Analysis of Future Space Unit C4ISR System 

Construction”], 飞航导弹 [Winged Missile Journal], March 2006, 41; and Yang Zhiqiang and Zhang Dongliang, 空间力量与联合

作战体系[“Space Power and Joint Operations System”], 飞航导弹 [Winged Missile Journal], July 2008, 32.

528 Li Guangchang, Cheng Jian, and Zheng Lianqing, 空天一体信息作战 [Integrated Aerospace Information Operations], (Beijing: 

Military Sciences Press, 2004), 9, 18; Zhu Hui, ed., 战略空军论 [Strategic Air Force] (Beijing: Blue Sky Press, 2009), 43.

529 Zhu Hui, ed., Strategic Air Force [战略空军论] (Beijing: Blue Sky Press, 2009), 48.

530 Chen Ling and Chen Peng, “Interview with Major General Lu Gang, Head of the PLAAF Informatization Specialists Advisory 

Committee and Director of the PLAAF Equipment Research Institute,” AirForce News, April 19, 2007, 2.

531 Zhu, Strategic Air Force, 48.

532 Zachary Keck, “China’s Military Creates New Space Force,” Diplomat, September 10, 2014, 

http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/chinas-military-creates-new-space-force/.
96

Space Organizations in Detail

Military Organizations

General Staff Department (总参某部/GSD)

The General Staff Department acts as the headquarters for the PLA and is responsible for the military’s 

day-to-day operations, planning, training, and mobilization. The GSD’s role in China’s space enterprise is 

to provide operational tasking for China’s remote sensing, meteorological, and communication satellites, 

although the inner workings of the GSD are not well understood. It most likely provides requirements to 

the General Armament Department, which maintains operational control over China’s satellites. The GSD 

is also a consumer of space products and in this role receives, processes, and analyzes space-derived 

information. 

The GSD accomplishes this through several organizations. The collection of imagery intelligence is 

conducted by the GSD’s Second Department, responsible for intelligence. This is most likely conducted 

through the Department’s Technology Reconnaissance Bureau. Meteorological data is most likely 

requested by the GSD’s First Department, which is responsible for operations. Satellite communications, 

on the other hand, is the responsibility of the Informatization Department (总参信息化部).

533

The GSD is most involved in satellite navigation. Its Surveying, Mapping, and Navigation Bureau (总参测

绘导航局) was responsible for the development of the Beidou satellite navigation system534 and most 

likely runs the China Satellite Navigation System Management Office (中国卫星导航系统管理办), a joint 

organization responsible for the development, promotion, and industrialization of the Beidou system and 

its applications.535

General Armament Department (总装备部/GAD)

The General Armament Department was formed in April 1998 and is responsible for the PLA’s weapons 

and equipment research, development, acquisition, and maintenance. It determines, formulates, 

supervises, and implements the policies, laws, and regulations regarding weapons and equipment for the 

entire military. In conducting these tasks, the GAD operates China’s test, evaluation, and training bases.536

The GAD is responsible for the R&D of nearly China’s entire space program, including all satellite and 

launch vehicle R&D, with the exception of China’s lunar exploration program, which is managed by 

SASTIND. In addition, the GAD, under the auspices of the China Manned Space Agency, manages China’s 

human spaceflight program.

The GAD also runs China’s four launch centers at Jiuquan, Xichang, Taiyuan, and Wenchang, its control 

centers at Xi’an and Beijing, and a network of TT&C stations based in China and around the world as well 

as three operational tracking ships (Figure 8). 

 

533 Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department: Evolving Organization and 

Missions,” in Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen, The PLA as Organization: Reference Volume 2.0 (Washington, DC: Defense 

Group Inc., forthcoming), 119‒42.

534 Meng and Liu, “Exploring China’s Beidou Navigation Satellite System.”

535 China Satellite Navigation Office, “Report on the Development of the BeiDou Satellite Navigation System (Version 2.2),” 

December 2013, 1.

536 Fu Quanyou, ed., The Chinese Military Encyclopedia: Supplemental [中国军事百科全书: 增补] (Beijing: Military Science 

Press, 2002), 658.
97

Figure 8. China’s space launch centers

Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (中国酒泉卫星发射中心)

The Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center is China’s oldest and largest, and conducts launches of spacecraft into 

low, medium, and high Earth orbits. Although the launch center is named after the city of Jiuquan in Gansu 

Province, it is actually located 210 kilometers from Jiuquan in Inner Mongolia. It is the only launch center 

that conducts human space flight launches.537

The launch center is composed of a northern launch pad and a southern launch pad. The northern launch 

pad launches LM-2C and 2D rockets while the southern launch pad launches LM-2E and 2F rockets. In 

addition to the launch pads, the launch center has a command and control center, a rocket fuel storage 

area, a tracking station, a satellite and launch vehicle assembly station, a solid fuel rocket assembly station, 

and other support facilities.538

Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center (中国太原卫星发射中心) 

The Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center is located near Taiyuan, Shanxi Province. Construction of the Taiyuan 

Satellite Launch Center began in 1967. The launch center conducts launches of satellites into sun 

synchronous and low Earth orbits, including meteorological, remote sensing, and communications 

satellites. The center consists of a launch site, a command and control center, and a technology testing 

area. The launch site consists of a single launch pad.

539

Xichang Satellite Launch Center (中国西昌卫星发射中心)

The Xichang Satellite Launch Center is located 60 kilometers north of Xichang, Sichuan Province. 

Construction on the launch center began in 1970. This center launches satellites into geosynchronous 

orbits, including communication, broadcast, and meteorological satellites. The launch center is composed 

 

537解放军总装备部:中国军工系统核心 [“PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core”],

www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml; and 

http://www.cgwic.com/LaunchServices/LaunchSite/JSLC.html.

538 Zhang, China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition): Introduction to Military Equipment, 434‒36. 

539 Ibid., 438‒39. 
98

of a headquarters department, a launch site, a communication station, a command and control center, a 

technology testing station, and three tracking stations. The technology testing station has a launch vehicle 

testing facility, a satellite assembly and testing facility, and a rocket engine assembly, testing, and flaw 

detection facility.540

Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (文昌卫星发射中心)

The Wenchang Satellite Launch Center on Hainan Island was approved in 2007 by the Central Military 

Commission. As of September 2014, the center was still under construction, but possessed all of the 

facilities for launch.541 The launch center’s closer proximity to the equator than China’s three other launch 

centers can increase launch payloads by 10–15 percent and satellite life by 2–3 years, a factor important 

for developing the commercial launch market. Launches will also be directed over the ocean, which will 

permit debris from launches to land safely out to sea.

China Manned Space Agency (中国载人航天工程办公室/CMSA)

The China Manned Space Agency is responsible for planning, technology development, engineering, 

facilities, outlays, international cooperation, and promotion of the human spaceflight program. CMSA

manages the human spaceflight program through the entire process of technology development, 

astronaut training, and operations.542

Government Organizations

State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (国家国防科技工业局

/SASTIND)

The State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense is a regulatory and 

policy-making body that oversees the work and personnel management of the defense industry. SASTIND 

was created in 2008 out of the former Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National 

Defense (COSTIND). Whereas COSTIND was a ministry-level organization, SASTIND was placed under the 

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and is thus of lower bureaucratic rank than COSTIND.

Although the China National Space Agency is often called “China’s NASA”, it appears that SASTIND 

oversees the work of the space industry. SASTIND also appears to manage China’s lunar exploration 

program.

China National Space Agency (中国航天局/CNSA)

The China National Space Agency oversees the work of the space industry by providing policy, guidance, 

and regulations as well as promoting efforts to capitalize on the dual-use nature of space products. The 

SASTIND director is also the director of CNSA. In addition to its policy and regulatory role, CNSA is 

responsible for promoting international collaboration on civilian space programs and technologies. 

The National Remote Sensing Center of China (中国遥感中心/NRSCC)

The National Remote Sensing Center of China acts as a nationwide coordinating body for organizations 

involved in remote sensing and Earth observation.543 Its intended aim is to develop China’s innovation 

capacity and foster strategic industries in the areas of remote sensing, geographic information systems, 

 

540 Ibid., 436‒38. 

541 “杨利伟:海南发射场已基本完工 具备发射条件,” [Yang Liwei: Hainan Launch Site is Basically Completed Possesses 

Conditions for Launch], 人民网 [People’s Net], September 10, 2014, http://scitech.people.com.cn/n/2014/0910/c1007-

25637052.html.

542 http://www.cmse.gov.cn/AboutUs/list.php?catid=9\.

543 “Functions,” National Remote Sensing Center of China, 2012, http://www.nrscc.gov.cn/nrscc/en/functions/.
99

and navigation and positioning.544 NRSCC was established as an independent organization reporting to 

the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) in 2006, having begun in 1981 within the State Science 

and Technology Commission.545

NRSCC’s primary roles include providing recommendations to MOST regarding China’s overall remote 

sensing development strategy; supplying information to the General Office of the State Council regarding 

natural disasters and other agricultural, ecological, and environmental developments; and implementing 

remote sensing and space information technology projects.546 It is centrally involved in international 

cooperation efforts as well, responsible for coordinating the implementation of the China-Europe 

Cooperation Project on Galileo; participating in formulating national standards, norms, and regulations in 

the fields of Earth observation and navigation technology; organizing multilateral and bilateral 

international cooperation and personnel exchange activities; hosting the China Secretariat of the 

Committee on Earth Observation Satellites and Group on Earth Observations and acting as China’s 

national focal point for the United Nations Regional Space Applications Program for Sustainable 

Development in Asia and the Pacific; and liaising with remote sensing institutes in China to provide 

technical training and consultancy services.547 The center has additionally played a role in software testing 

and evaluation and coordinated efforts aimed at producing indigenous GIS software, remote sensing 

imaging processing software, and GNSS applications software copyrights.548

Center for Resources Satellite Data and Application (中国资源卫星应用中心/CRESDA)

China’s Center for Resources Satellite Data and Application, described as a “scientific research and 

operational management institution”, is subordinate to both the National Development and Reform 

Commission (NDRC) and SASTIND, but defense conglomerate China Aerospace Science and Technology 

Corporation (CASC) is responsible for the administrative management of its research efforts.

549

“Its tasks 

include developing strategies, plans, and budgets for remote sensing satellite development, providing 

program design, engineering supervision, technical coordination, and operational management functions 

for the development of remote sensing satellite applications, setting quality and technical standards for 

these applications, and organizing research and development efforts for applications, technologies, and

approaches relating to remote sensing data.550 It also provides key recommendations to NDRC and data 

end-users, submitting development proposals based on user community demands and internal research 

results and suggesting applications in the fields of resource, environment, and disaster monitoring.551

Surprisingly, CRESDA is not located within the network of satellite-related institutions coordinated by the 

NRSCC. 

 

544 Ibid. 

545 “Introduction and Main Functions” [简介及主要职能], National Remote Sensing Center of China, 2011, 

http://www.nrscc.gov.cn/nrscc/zxgk/jjjzyzn/. 

546 “Functions.”

547 Ibid. 

548 “Software Evaluation Expert Committee [软件测评专家委员会]”, National Remote Sensing Center of China, 2011, 

http://www.nrscc.gov.cn/nrscc/zjdw/zjwyh/. 

549 “Center Introduction” [中心介绍], China Centre for Resources Satellite Data and Application, 2001, 

http://www.cresda.com/n16/n1085/n1220/index.html;

“CRESDA Introduction,” China Centre for Resources Satellite Data and Application, 2012, 

http://www.cresda.com/n16/n92006/n92162/n98541/index.html. 

550 Ibid.

551 Ibid. 
100

The center has operated six satellites: CBERS-01 and -02, -02B, operated jointly with a facility in Brazil and 

Huanjing-1A, 1B, and 1C.552 It has developed data processing systems on the ground to complement 

these,553 yielding applications in areas such as resource investigation, environmental protection, and 

disaster monitoring.554

National Satellite Meteorological Satellite Center (国家卫星气象中心)

China’s National Satellite Meteorological Satellite Center reports to the China Meteorological 

Administration. The center is responsible for the operation and management of China’s Fengyun 

meteorological satellites and the processing and dissemination of meteorological satellite imagery and 

data. 

Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences (中国科学院遥感与数字地

球研究所)

The Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth (RADI) was created in 2012, merging the Institute of 

Remote Sensing Applications and the Center for Earth Observation and Digital Earth.555 RADI is now said 

to be China’s largest research institute in this field, working to promote the development of cutting-edge 

scientific research. 556 Its stated objectives are threefold: to explore leading technologies in earth 

observation, geospatial information science, and remote sensing data acquisition and distribution; to 

construct and operate major earth observation infrastructures, in particular a “spaceborne-airborneground system” for data acquisition; and to enhance capacity for worldwide environmental and natural 

resources observation through the creation of a digital earth science platform.557

RADI’s primary subordinate organizations, which conduct its research work, include the State Key 

Laboratory of Remote Sensing Science, the Center for Applied Technologies of Earth Observation, the 

National Engineering Center for Geoinformatics, the CAS Laboratory of Digital Earth Sciences, the China 

Remote Sensing Satellite Ground Station, and the CAS Center for Airborne Remote Sensing.558 It also 

houses other centers and laboratories involved in space technology, engineering technology, and land 

satellite data.559

Satellite Surveying and Mapping Application Center (国家测绘地理信息局卫星测绘应用中心

/SASMAC)

China’s Satellite Surveying and Mapping Application Center, subordinate to the State Bureau of Surveying 

and Mapping of China, which in turn reports to the Ministry of Land and Resources of the State Council, 

 

552 “CBERS-01/02,” China Centre for Resources Satellite Data and Application, 2012, 

http://www.cresda.com/n16/n92006/n92066/n98575/index.html. 

553 “CBERS-02B Data Processing System,” China Centre for Resources Satellite Data and Application, 2012, 

http://www.cresda.com/n16/n92006/n92096/n98716/index.html. 

554 “Resource Investigation,” China Centre for Resources Satellite Data and Application, 2012, 

http://www.cresda.com/n16/n92006/n92123/n98829/index.html. 

555 “Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences,” Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, 

Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2013, http://english.ceode.cas.cn/. 

556 “Director Speech” [所长致辞], Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2014, 

http://www.radi.cas.cn/skjs/szzc/. 

557 “Brief Introduction,” Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2013, 

http://english.radi.cas.cn/ARADI/Vision/; “Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences”; 

“Message from the Director”, Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2013, 

http://english.radi.cas.cn/ARADI/DM/. 

558 “Introduction,” Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2013, 

http://english.radi.cas.cn/Research/Introduction/. 

559 Ibid. 
101

was established in 2009 to conduct planning functions for satellite applications development in the 

specific areas of surveying and mapping.560 SASMAC also comprises the Department of Satellite Surveying 

and Mapping within the NRSCC, which coordinates a wide network of satellite-related institutions 

throughout China.561 In addition to planning functions, SASMAC is responsible for the establishment, 

management, and maintenance of the applications system in this field, as well as data processing and 

related scientific research.562 It is primarily engaged in constructing the satellite application system for the 

Ziyuan-3.563 The Ministry of Land and Resources, rather than SASMAC, operates the satellite,564 the only 

one with which the center is reported to be affiliated.565

SASMAC has a total of 58 staff members including those from affiliated government institutions, 14 of 

whom have doctorates.566 Ultimately the center aims to become a “national processing and service center”

and “world-class research and application service institution” in the domain of satellite surveying and 

mapping.567

China’s National Satellite Ocean Application Service (中国卫星海洋应用中心/NSOAS)

The National Satellite Ocean Application Service receives, processes, and utilizes data generated by 

China’s ocean monitoring satellites. NSOAS responsibilities include developing ocean remote sensing 

applications, building and operating ground receiving stations, organizing technical standards and user 

training, managing databases and producing information products, initiating commercialization and 

technological research opportunities, fostering international cooperation and academic exchange, and 

annually compiling the “China Ocean Satellite Application Report.”

568 To this end, it has constructed an 

ocean remote sensing infrastructure, including three ground receiving stations in Beijing, Sanya, and 

Mudanjiang, a data processing and applications center in Beijing, and a laboratory for ocean remote 

sensing applications, also in Beijing.569

NSOAS is located within two chains of command. It was created in 2000 as an independent organization 

under the jurisdiction of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), replacing a former SOA department 

created in 1996.570 SOA is subordinate to the Ministry of Land and Resources, which in turn reports to the 

State Council.571 NSOAS also, however, comprises the Department of Ocean Remote Sensing under the 

NRSCC, 572 an organization reporting to the State Council’s Ministry of Science and Technology that 

 

560 “Department of Satellite Surveying and Mapping,” National Remote Sensing Center of China, 2012, 

http://www.nrscc.gov.cn/nrscc/en/departments/201205/t20120508_30924.html

561 Ibid. 

562 Ibid. 

563 Ibid.

564 “ZY-3A,” EOPortal, 2014, https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/v-w-x-y-z/zy-3a. 

565 “Department of Satellite Surveying and Mapping.”

566 Ibid. 

567 Ibid.

568 “Main Responsibilities,” National Satellite Ocean Application Service, 2012, 

http://www.nsoas.gov.cn/NSOAS_En/responsibilities.html;“National Satellite Ocean Application Service Introduction [国家卫星

海洋应用中心介绍]”, National Satellite Ocean Application Service, 2007, http://nsoas.gov.cn/zx/channel/default.asp. 

569 “Department of Ocean Remote Sensing,” National Remote Sensing Center of China, 2012, 

http://www.nrscc.gov.cn/nrscc/en/departments/201205/t20120508_30907.html. 

570 “About NSOAS,” National Satellite Ocean Application Service, 2012, http://www.nsoas.gov.cn/NSOAS_En/index.html. 

571 “State Oceanic Administration,” Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, December 29, 2009, 

http://english.gov.cn/2005-10/01/content_73182.htm. 

572 “Department of Ocean Remote Sensing.”
102

provides strategic planning and support in the field of Earth observation and navigation technology and 

also coordinates actors in this field nationwide.573

NSOAS has been active in international collaboration, notably participating in the search for Malaysian 

Airlines Flight 370 in March 2014,574 and won China’s leading Maritime Science and Technology Award in 

2013 for a research project involving a remote sensing survey of China’s “island and coastal zone.”

575 The 

primary end users of the satellite data NSOAS generates are said to be marine administration agencies, 

environmental protection agencies, and departments for marine rights protection and law 

enforcement, 576 the latter likely including the China Coast Guard and China Marine Surveillance 

organizations, also located within SOA. 

Defense Industrial Organizations

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (中国航天科技集团/CASC)

The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation was established in 1998, but traces its roots 

back to 1956. It is China’s sole entity performing development, production, and launch testing of launch 

vehicles, manned spacecraft, space station, deep space exploration spacecraft, and strategic missiles, and 

is also heavily engaged in satellites and tactical missiles. Additionally, it puts significant investment into 

applications for space technology into other products, such as satellite applications, IT, new energy and 

new material products, auto parts, and space biology products. In services, it focuses on satellite and 

ground operations, international space commerce, aerospace financial investment, and software and 

information services. It is China’s only domestic service provider for broadcast communication satellite 

operations.577

CASC is composed of eight large research and production academies, 14 specialized firms, and nine listed 

firms. Its development and production bases are located in Beijing, Shanghai, Xi’an, Chengdu, Tianjin, 

Inner Mongolia, Shenzhen, and Hainan. It is also home to 11 defense S&T key laboratories, one national 

engineering laboratory, and five national engineering research centers. As of 2011, it employed 159,400 

individuals.578

China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (中国运载火箭技术研究院/CALT)

Established November 16, 1957, the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, or CASC First Academy,

is China’s largest base for missile and rocket research, design, prototyping, testing and production. Its 

research and production activities center on aerospace engineering and aerospace technology 

applications, including overall system design, space flight, control automation, ground launch control, and 

total test assembly.579 It is the lead developer of the LM-1D, LM-1F, LM-2, LM-2C, LM-2E, LM-2F, LM-3, 

 

573 “Functions.”

574 “National Satellite Ocean Application Service Emergency Monitoring Loses Contact with Malaysia Airlines Passenger Plane” 

[国家卫星海洋应用中心紧急监测马航客机失联海域], National Satellite Ocean Application Service, March 11, 2014, 

http://www.nsoas.gov.cn/new/channel/detail.asp?Content_id=430. 

575 “National Island and Coastal Region Remote Sensing Survey Research Project Wins 2013 Annual Marine Science and 

Technology Award” [我国海岛与海岸带遥感调查研究项目获得 2013 年度海洋科学技术奖一等奖], National Satellite Ocean 

Application Service, May 26, 2014, http://www.nsoas.gov.cn/new/channel/detail.asp?Content_id=439. 

576 “Department of Ocean Remote Sensing.”

577 “中国航天科技集团公司:公司简介” [China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation: Company Introduction], 

http://www.spacechina.com/n25/n142/n152/n164/index.html.

578 Ibid.

579 “中国运载火箭技术研究院:本院概况” [China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT): Academy Introduction], 

http://www.calt.com/GuanYuWoMen.
103

LM-3A, LM-3B, LM-3C, LM-3F, and LM-5 Long March rockets.580 While not mentioned on its website, CALT 

also produces the Dong Feng DF-1 and DF-2 short-range ballistic missiles, the DF-3 medium-range ballistic 

missile, the DF-4 intermediate-range ballistic missile, and the DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missile.581 The 

latest number of employees reported on its website is 29,900.582

Academy of Aerospace Solid Propulsion Technology (航天动力技术研究院)

The Academy of Aerospace Solid Propulsion Technology, or CASC Fourth Academy, was established July 

1, 1962 and is China’s largest institute working on solid rocket motors. Headquartered in Xi’an, it is 

comprised of five research institutes, three production facilities, and five subsidiary companies. It is also 

host to the State Key Laboratory on Work Process for Solid Rocket Motors. It has over 10,000 

employees.583

China Academy of Space Technology (中国空间技术研究院/CAST)

The China Academy of Space Technology, also known as the Fifth Academy, was established February 20, 

1968 and is China’s premier institute for satellite and spacecraft development. It engages in space 

technology development, spacecraft development, and the facilitation of foreign exchanges and 

cooperation in space technology. Additionally, it participates in the formation of national space 

technology development plans. It has been involved in prominent Chinese space projects, beginning with 

the development of China’s first artificial satellite Dongfanghong I (DFH-1). More recently, it has 

developed the Shenzhou series of manned spacecraft, China’s lunar orbiter, and the Tiangong-1 space 

laboratory. In addition to these large projects, it designs many other satellite types, including 

communications/broadcasting satellites, retrievable satellites, Earth resources satellites, meteorological 

satellites, scientific/technological experiment satellites, navigation and positioning satellites, and remote 

sensing satellites. It employs over 10,000 individuals.584

Academy of Aerospace Propulsion Technology (航天推进技术研究院)

The Academy of Aerospace Propulsion Technology, or Sixth Academy, was established in 1965 and is 

headquartered in Xi’an. As China’s primary liquid rocket engine development center, it reportedly is the 

only center in China that integrates research, design, production, and testing of primary power systems, 

orbit attitude control power systems and spacecraft propulsion systems for rockets. It oversees 12

subsidiary companies with approximately 18,000 employees. It has been involved in China’s first longrange rocket, the DFH satellite series, the Shenzhou manned space project, and the lunar exploration 

project. Notably, it has developed all the liquid rocket engines for the Long March rocket family.585

Sichuan Academy of Aerospace Technology (四川航天技术研究院)

The Sichuan Academy of Aerospace Technology, also known as the Seventh Academy, is headquartered 

in Chengdu and has approximately 15,000 employees. Its primary products include multiple launch rocket 

systems, including the WS-1, WS-1B, WS-1E, and WS-2. The academy also performs work on integrated 

 

580 China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology webpage, English version, http://www.calt.com/english/ps/?pageIndex=1; 

“China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology: CALT, 1st Academy,” GlobalSecurity.org, 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/calt.htm.

581 “China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology: CALT, 1st Academy.”

582 “China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT): Academy Introduction.”

583 “航天动力技术研究院:研究院简介” [Academy of Aerospace Solid Propulsion Technology (AASPT): Academy 

Introduction], http://www.sunvalor-casc.com/guanyu.aspx.

584 中国空间技术研究院 [China Academy of Space Technology], http://www.cast.cn/Castcn/.

585 “航天推进技术研究院” [Academy of Aerospace Propulsion Technology], http://www.aalpt.com/www/index.asp.
104

manufacturing, precision machining and electronic control equipment, turbojet engines, and control 

guidance equipment.586

Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (上海航天技术研究院)

The Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology, also known as the Eighth Academy, was established in 

1961 and has approximately 22,000 employees. It is a major developer of missile systems, rocket systems,

and satellites, and a major contributor to the manned space program and lunar exploration program.587

It produces the LM-2D and LM-4 launch vehicles.

588

China Academy of Aerospace Electronics Technology (中国航天电子技术研究院)

The China Academy of Aerospace Electronics Technology, also referred to as the CASC Ninth Academy or 

the China Academy of Space Electronics Technology, produces electronics for the missile and space 

industry. It is headquartered in Beijing.589

China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics (中国航天空气动力技术研究院)

The China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics, or CASC Tenth Academy, was established in 1956 and 

employs about 1,400 individuals. It performs research on aircraft aerodynamics. Its primary product is the 

“Cleve Hawk” Series UAV system.590

China Aerospace Science & Industry Corp. (中国航天科工集团公司/CASIC)

The China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation is the second major industrial enterprise engaged in 

space-related R&D and production. Established in 1956 as the Fifth Academy of the Ministry of Defense, 

CASIC now has five academies, two scientific research and production bases, six publicly-listed companies,

and over 570 enterprises and institutes, with more than 137,000 employees. 

As the largest missile weapon designer and manufacturer in China, CASIC is engaged in development, 

research and manufacturing of air defense missile systems, cruise missile systems, solid rockets, and space 

products. CASIC has successively developed dozens of advanced missile weapons, including the Hongqi 

series and DF series. CASIC is building a space-ground integrated security and support system in manned

spaceflight, lunar exploration, and other major national projects.

CASIC Academy of Information Technology (CASIC First Academy) 

Established in 2002 and restructured in 2009, CASIC’s First Academy is focused on research and 

development of information systems and the production of related equipment.591 It is also engaged in the 

R&D of satellite navigation and communication. One of its subordinate companies, Xi’an Aerospace 

Huaxun Technology Corp., Ltd, is the pioneer in China’s GPS/Beidou navigation core chip technology with 

 

586 “四川航天技术研究院” [Sichuan Academy of Aerospace Technology], http://scaat.spacechina.com.

587 “上海航天技术研究院” [Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology], 

http://www.spacechina.com/n25/n150/n284/n298/c123114/content.html.

588 “LM-2D,” 中国长城工业集团有限公司 [China Great Wall Industry Corporation], 

http://www.cgwic.com/LaunchServices/LaunchVehicle/LM2D.html; Gu Song-an and Gong Jun, “LM-4 and LM-2D Launch 

Vehicles,” Proceedings of the Euro-Asia Space Week on Cooperation in Space: ‘Where East & West Finally Meet’, February 1999, 

http://adsabs.harvard.edu/full/1999ESASP.430..499S.

589 Evan S. Medeiros et al., A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 57.

590 China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics webpage, English version, http://www.caaaspacechina.com/Enhangtian/channels/70.html.

591 “中国航天科工信息技术研究院 (中国航天科工一院) 简介” [Overview of CASIC Academy of Information Technology 

(CASIC First Academy)], 中国航天科工一院网站 [CASIC First Academy website], February 25, 2014, 

http://www.xxjs.casic.cn/n382287/n382288/index.html.
105

the fourth-generation Beidou navigation chip launched in 2014.592 As a major player in the national 

emergency satellite communication network, the academy has constructed communication sites for five 

major domestic satellites and more than 600 remote sites.593 One institute under CASIC’s First Academy 

specializes in space-based and missile-borne electronic countermeasure research and development.594

CASIC Academy of Defense Technology (CASIC Second Academy) 

CASIC’s Second Academy is the principal institute for kinetic-kill counterspace systems, and is China’s 

largest producer of air defense missile systems.595 Established in 1957, it has developed early-generation 

missile control systems and China’s first solid fueled strategic missiles. The academy consists of a design 

department, eight specialized research institutes, a simulation center, a factory, and one public listed 

enterprise. With a growing emphasis on integrated air and space defense, it is engaged in research and 

development of overall weapon systems, radar, simulation technology, and ground equipment.596 The 

Second Academy’s most prominent defense products include the Hongqi-series anti-aircraft missiles 

system, including the missile, radar, and associated ground equipment.597

CASIC Academy of Cruise Missile Technology (CASIC Third Academy)

CASIC’s Third Academy, established in 1961, is China’s premier entity engaged in design, development,

and production of aerodynamic technology. Its products include cruise missiles (Hong Niao series), antiship missiles (Ying Ji series),598 propulsion systems, and associated launchers.599 The academy has one 

design department, 10 research institutes, two factories and seven subordinate companies.600 Centered 

upon the “Hai Ying” series UAV, it intends to develop an unmanned combat surveillance system.601 The 

31st research institute under the Third Academy is engaged in R&D on ramjet (scramjet) technology, 

including an air-breathing supersonic combustion engine that is in support of a national hypersonic cruise 

vehicle program.602 Today, it appears that the Third Academy has a near monopoly on the Chinese cruise 

missile market.603

 

592 “高性能第四代北斗导航芯片 定位精确度达到 2.5 米” [The Fourth Generation Beidou High-performance Chip Positioning 

Accuracy Reaches 2.5 Meter], 科技讯 [Kejixun], August 15, 2014, http://www.kejixun.com/article/201408/65448.html.

593 Yang Shu, “中国航天科工信息技术研究院信息化产品开发的经验和展望” [Experience and Outlook of Information 

Product Development of CASIC Academy of Information Technology], 电子设计应用 [Electronic Design & Application World for 

Design and Application Engineers], 2010, Z1.

594 Mark A. Stokes and Dean Cheng, “China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. Interests,” report prepared for 

the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 26, 2012, 21.

595 Ibid.

596 “二院简介” [Overview of Second Academy], 中国航天科工二院网站 [CASIC Second Academy website], June 15, 2011, 

http://www.fyjs.casic.cn/n355672/n355673/index.html.

597 “中国航天二院二部成立 50 年引领中国防空导弹研发” [50th Anniversary of CASIC Second Academy Second Department: 

Leading R&D of China’s Air Defense Missile], 中国新闻网 [Chinanews.com], October 18, 2008, 

http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2008/10-18/1416679.shtml. 

598 “俄媒评中国鹰击 12 导弹:配冲压发动机速度极快” [Russian Media Comments on China Yingji-12 Missile: High Speed 

with Ramjet], 新浪 [Sina.com], January 21, 2014, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2014-01-21/1024761079.html.

599 Stokes and Cheng, “China’s Evolving Space Capabilities,” 21.

600“航天科技:中国航天科工飞航技术研究院关于公司详式权益变动报告” [Detailed Report on Change of Equity of CASIC 

Academy of Cruise Missile Technology], 金融界 [JRJ.com], September 19, 2009, http://stock.jrj.com.cn/share,disc,2009-09-

19,000901,00000000000001yjll.shtml.

601 Duan Danfeng, “中国航天科工推出海鹰无人机品牌” [CASIC Launched Haiying UVA Brand], 人民网 [People.cn], November 

13, 2012, http://scitech.people.com.cn/n/2012/1113/c1007-19569150.html. 

602 Liu Yidan, “中国航天科工三院三十一所:为飞航导弹铸”心” [31st Research Institute of CASIC Third Academy: Build ‘Heart’ 

for Cruise Missile], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], November 24, 2012, 

http://www.qstheory.cn/kj/kjcx/201211/t20121124_196070.htm.

603 Stokes and Cheng, “China’s Evolving Space Capabilities,” 21.
106

CASIC Academy of Launch Technology & China Sanjiang Aerospace Group (CASIC Fourth Academy)

CASIC’s Fourth Academy was established in late 2011 and is a consolidated entity from the original CASIC 

Fourth Academy, which is also known as CASIC Academy of Vehicle Technology, and the original CASIC 

Ninth Academy, also known as the 066 Base. This merger and reorganization is CASIC’s major effort to 

develop a world-class research institute on solid-fueled technology.

As a majority of previous subordinate entities remain, the new academy has 31 member units with around 

20,000 employees.604 The priority of the new Fourth Academy is likely to remain the development and 

production of missile weapon systems and solid fueled rockets.

605 Both the original Fourth Academy and 

the Ninth Academy had been engaged in the design, development, and manufacturing of the DF series 

ballistic missiles.606

CASIC Academy of Propulsion Technology (CASIC Sixth Academy) 

Located in Inner Mongolia, the CASIC Sixth Academy is China’s first development, production, and test 

base of large-scale solid rocket motors.

607 Formally a subsidiary of the CASC Fourth Academy, key 

landmark achievements of the Sixth Academy were the LM-1 third stage solid rocket motor and the EPKM 

perigee orbit solid rocket motor.608 The Academy also manages smaller diameter motors, including kick 

motors designed to boost communications satellites to geosynchronous orbit.609 Beside rocket engines, 

its self-developed F-12 high-strength organic fibers have been widely used in both military and civilian 

areas.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

China is a nation on a quest for wealth and power. No longer guided by Maoist proletarian ideology, it 

now sees science and technology as a major factor in its rise as a world power as it seeks increased 

influence and independence. China’s pursuit of space power is a reflection of this emphasis on science

and technology and its grand strategy to, in the words of David Lampton, “regain the nation’s former 

status as a great power that controls its own fate.”

610

China’s goal is to become a space power on par with the United States and to foster a space industry that 

is the equal of those in the United States, Europe, and Russia. China takes a comprehensive, long-term 

approach to its space program that emphasizes the accrual of the military, economic, and political benefits 

space can provide. By placing much of its space program in a 15-year development program and providing 

adequate funding, the Chinese government provides a stable environment in which its space program can 

prosper. Even longer-range studies, such as the feasibility studies currently being conducted for manned 

 

604 Wang Min, “中航科工重组旗下固体火箭资源 打造国际一流固体运载技术研究院’ [CASIC Restructure Its Solid Rocket 

Resources to Build a World-Class Research Institute on Solid Vehicle Technology], 人民网 [People.cn], December 31, 2011, 

http://finance.people.com.cn/BIG5/70846/16777381.html.

605 “四院简介” [Overview of the Fourth Academy], 中国航天科工四院网站 [CASIC Fourth Academy website], July 13, 2011, 

http://www.yzjs.casic.cn/n382323/n382324/c423755/content.html.

606 Stokes and Cheng, “China’s Evolving Space Capabilities,” 21, 22.

607 http://www.dljs.casic.cn/n1605869/n1605883/index.html

608 “塞外铸神剑 赤诚捍和平” [Casting the Great Excalibur to Defend Peace], 中国共产党新闻网 [CPC.people.com], July 15, 

2012, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/0715/c87228-18519272.html.

609 Stokes and Cheng, “China’s Evolving Space Capabilities,” 22.

610 Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power, 25.
107

lunar missions and analysts’ writings on mining the moon, may spur the Chinese government to think even 

bigger when it comes to space.

National Security Implications

China’s space program has made the most progress in addressing its national security needs. According 

to former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, the United States is “entering an era where American 

dominance on the seas, in the skies, and in space...can no longer be taken for granted....And while the 

United States continues to maintain a decisive military and technological edge over any potential 

adversary, our continued superiority is not a given.”

611 China’s improving space capabilities has negativesum consequences for U.S. military security and require the United States to prepare to confront an 

adversary possessing space and counterspace technologies.

Chinese analysts assess that space-based information will become a deciding factor in future wars, that 

space will be a dominant battlefield, and that in order to achieve victory on Earth, one must first seize the 

initiative in space. This will require China to achieve space supremacy, defined as the ability to freely use 

space and to deny the use of space to adversaries. Moreover, the assessment that space is the dominant 

battlefield has led PLA analysts to conclude that war in space is inevitable. In making this assessment,

Chinese writings are reminiscent of U.S. writings on space during the 1950s and 1960s. This includes a 

universal belief that space is the strategic high ground, and a prominent role for manned military space 

missions, including the use of manned military space planes, space stations, and lunar bases.

Whether it is the acquisition of intelligence or navigation information from space-based platforms to 

enable long-range strikes or the use of offensive space control measures against U.S. satellites, space plays 

a prominent role in China’s efforts to establish an effective A2/AD capability. The denial of critical spacebased C4ISR capabilities integrated with cyber and kinetic attacks against non-space based C4ISR nodes 

could greatly complicate the ability of the U.S. military to flow forces to the region and to conduct 

operations effectively. This strategy gains more salience when pitted against the U.S. concept of air-sea 

battle, which emphasizes standoff weaponry enabled by information technologies to penetrate and 

defeat A2/AD systems.612

Although the PLA is not expected to be able to conduct large-scale operations far from its coast prior to 

2020,613 space-based remote sensing capabilities will become more important due to China’s lack of 

airborne ISR assetsthat can cover the long distances to targets in the western Pacific and South China Sea. 

According to a 2011 study, China can image a target near Taiwan 35 times per day.614 The PLA could also 

use this capability to identify both land- and sea-based targets across Asia and to provide intelligence for 

PLA aviation and missile forces to adjust fire, restrike targets, or verify a target’s destruction. With the use 

of space-based ISR capabilities in combination with the 1,500-kilometer range DF-21D anti-ship ballistic 

missile and the 2,000+ kilometer range DH-10, China “could engage surface ships while keeping its own 

navy out of range of the adversary’s surface ships. These attacks could also force the U.S. Navy to operate 

 

611 Lolita C. Baldor, “Hagel: U.S. Needs to Maintain Military Superiority,” ABC News, September 3, 2014, 

http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/hagel-us-maintain-military-superiority-25232419.

612 David Fulghum, “Navy Aviation in the Crosshairs,” Aviation Week, April 9, 2012, 49.

613 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress (2010), 27.

614 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “Space, China’s Tactical Frontier,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 5 (2011): 741.
108

beyond the optimal limits of its carrier-based aircraft, shortening the amount of time that these aircraft 

could stay on station.”

615

The PLA’s space-based ISR capabilities will be assisted by its network of Tianlian data relay satellites. As 

discussed earlier, China’s constellation of data relay satellites allows the PLA to receive communications 

and data from other satellites regardless of their position relative to the Earth’s surface. With the use of

the Tianlian constellation, remote sensing satellites beyond the range of China’s land-based satellite data 

receiving stations can still transmit this data back to stations in China, providing near real-time transmittal 

of ISR data. Such near real-time capabilities could greatly assist in providing timely battlefield intelligence, 

including the position of ships, the movements of which would be tracked for the targeting of anti-ship 

cruise and ballistic missiles.

The Tianlian constellation, however, is not absolutely necessary for China’s military to receive timely 

space-based ISR intelligence, since the Chinese Academy of Sciences operates three satellite remote 

sensing data stations in Kashgar, Xinjiang; Beijing; and Sanya, Hainan (see Figure 9). Together, these three 

stations can receive data from satellites covering the entirety of China’s territory, including Taiwan and 

areas in the South China and East China Seas where China has territorial disputes. The Sanya station, in 

particular, covers all three disputed areas whereas the Beijing station can cover Taiwan and the disputed 

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Data received by any one of these stations can then be transmitted to other 

organizations, such as leadership or intelligence organizations in Beijing. In addition, the timely transmittal 

of data may not be critically affected if one of these stations were inoperable. For example, in the event 

of the loss of the Sanya station, a satellite on a northbound track would be in range of the Beijing station 

within five minutes of passing over Hainan Island. Satellites passing over the South China Sea on a 

southbound track would not be in range of the Kashgar station until 90 minutes later, however.616

As a result, the Tianlian provides four main benefits to the PLA in terms of delivering timely space-based 

ISR intelligence: 1) the timely transmittal of data from areas beyond the range of China’s ground-based 

receiving stations; 2) the timely transmittal of data directly to leadership or PLA intelligence organizations 

located in Beijing; 3) redundancy in China’s ISR transmittal capabilities in the event other stations are 

inoperable; and 4) greater download times for ISR data that may not be possible given a narrow download 

window to ground stations. 

China’s improving satellite navigation and positioning system will also make China’s military operations 

more secure. Although the Beidou system only provides ten-meter accuracy, it provides the PLA with the 

autonomy that it could not obtain from using a foreign satellite-navigation system. Such autonomy would 

immunize China against U.S. efforts to deny GPS to China and would allow the PLA to jam GPS while 

continuing to use its own Beidou system for navigation and to guide precision munitions.

Additionally, China appears to be developing operationally responsive space capabilities that will allow it 

to replace depleted or destroyed satellites quickly. Its development of the Kuaizhou, Feitian-1, and Long

March-11 solid-fueled rockets provide China with the capability to launch relatively small satellites rapidly 

if other satellites destroyed or degraded. Although not as capable as larger satellites, these smaller

 

615 Kevin Pollpeter, “Controlling the Information Domain: Space, Cyber, and Electronic Warfare,” in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis 

Tanner, Strategic Asia 2012‒2013: China’s Military Challenge, (Seattle and Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 

2012), 185.

616 Jonathan McDowell, email interview, November 9, 2014.
109

Source: “中国遥感卫星地面站”[China’s Remote Sensing Satellite Ground Stations], 遥感与数字地球研究所

[Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, Chinese Academy of Sciences].

Figure 9. Range of Chinese satellite remote sensing stations

satellites would be “good enough” to meet the needs of the Chinese warfighter. Moreover, the ability to 

launch these rockets from road-mobile launchers will also provide the Chinese military with the capability 

to replenish or augment its satellite architecture when its launch centers have been damaged or destroyed 

and would be less susceptible to U.S. prompt global strike capabilities. 

China’s growing counterspace capabilities will also present a threat to the U.S. military. The loss of critical 

sensor and communications capabilities could imperil the military’s ability to operate effectively in the 

western Pacific or, at the very least, to win victories with minimal casualties. China’s directed-energy, 

kinetic-kill vehicle, co-orbital satellite, and cyber capabilities threaten satellites across the spectrum in 

terms of type and orbit, and their effectiveness will be aided by China’s growing tracking and control 

capabilities. Moreover, due to the inherent dual-use nature of most space technologies, technologies 

developed for legitimate peaceful use can have military applications. China’s debris mitigation technology 

program is just one example. Laser ranging techniques to determine the altitude of space debris can also 

determine the altitude of an adversary’s satellites for better targeting. Similarly, China’s space robotic arm 

technology cannot only be used to remove debris, but could also be used against an adversary’s satellite. 

These activities are supported by China’s improving network of satellite tracking and control stations. 

These stations―21 in China, one each in Pakistan, Namibia, Kenya, Australia, and Chile, and one in the 

works in Argentina―will enhance China’s ability to control its spacecraft from around the globe and 

facilitate the tracking and targeting of adversary spacecraft.
110

Table 16. U.S. satellites by class and orbit

Orbit

Satellite class LEO MEO GEO Elliptical Total

Commercial 95 0 112 3 210

Military 62 32 51 7 152

Government 103 0 13 4 120

Civil 19 0 1 0 20

Total 279 32 177 14 502

As China’s space program grows in capability and its counterspace technologies improve, a larger number 

of U.S. satellites may be susceptible to Chinese counterspace threats. According to the Union of 

Concerned Scientist Satellite Database, there are 1,167 satellites in orbit around Earth (see Appendix B). 

Of these, more than half (605) are in LEO and more than one-third are in GEO. Of these 1,167 satellites, 

just under half (502) belong to the United States. Of these 502, 152 are military, 210 are commercial, 120 

government, and 20 civil satellites (Table 16).

The majority of U.S. satellites are in LEO and are the most susceptible to Chinese counterspace platforms. 

These include direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles, ground-based directed energy weapons, and co-orbital 

satellites. The majority of satellites in LEO are communication satellites operated by Iridium and Orbcom. 

Both are contractors to the U.S. government and military. The majority of U.S. military satellites in LEO 

are ISR satellites.

All 32 U.S. satellites in MEO belong to the U.S. military’s Global Positioning System. These satellites would 

be susceptible to larger direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles, such as the sounding rocket launched by China 

in May 2013, and to co-orbital satellites. Ground-based directed-energy weapons would be less effective 

against these satellites, unless extremely high powered.

The majority of satellites in GEO are communications satellites, including 35 military communication 

satellites. The U.S. military also operates six early warning satellites and five electronic intelligence 

satellites in GEO.

The effects of a Chinese attack on U.S. satellites need not be as catastrophic as is sometimes reported, 

however. According to an analysis conducted by Geoffrey Forden of the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology on the operational effects of direct-ascent ASAT attacks against U.S. satellites, China would 

have to limit its attacks to the U.S. satellites above China. In conducting these attacks, China would need 

36 mobile launchers and its fixed launch centers. Assuming that the United States absorbs the first blow 

and all strikes are successful, by focusing exclusively on GPS satellites, China could deny GPS to U.S. forces 

for as little as a few hours until the constellation was repositioned or has many as eight hours per day, 

depending on the number of satellites destroyed. Similarly, an attack solely against communication 

satellites would degrade, but not eliminate, the U.S. ability to communicate through satellites if civilian 

satellites are used. The effect on the U.S. space-based ISR system could be more problematic, however.

Additionally, Forden concludes that for an attack solely against satellites in LEO,

China could destroy a total of nine such satellites before the US responds in the specific 

case examined here. This includes two out of the three functioning Keyhole high 

resolution photo-reconnaissance satellites, one of the three Lacrosse signals intelligence 
111

satellites in orbit, and six of the 15 NOSS satellites that the Navy uses to locate enemy 

ships at sea. This represents billions of dollars lost and, more important, a large fraction 

of the US space assets in low Earth orbit that could have been used in the subsequent 

conflict.617

Chinese counterspace developments since the publication of his analysis could lead to a revision of the 

impact of Chinese ASAT attacks on the U.S. military, however. First, it is uncertain if China would limit the 

number of road-mobile launchers to 36, especially if the Second Artillery is given the direct ascent ASAT 

mission. The Second Artillery has more than 300 road-mobile launchers for its conventional and nuclear 

road- mobile missiles, and it would not be unthinkable that China could easily expand an inventory of 

road-mobile ASAT launchers beyond the 36 envisioned by Forden.

618 Forden’s analysis also does not take 

into account Chinese lasers or the prepositioning of co-orbital ASATs in space. Forden’s analysis also 

assumes that China would have to launch direct-ascent ASATs at targets beyond LEO from its four fixed 

launch centers. The rocket used for China’s 2013 high-altitude science mission, however, may have 

reached GEO and was most likely derived from the road-mobile DF-31 ballistic missile that does not 

require a fixed launch site.

619

Forden also concludes that “the United States could effectively stop China’s attack simply by changing the 

remaining satellites’ orbital speeds.”

620 But research by Brian Weeden at the Secure World Foundation 

calls into question the effectiveness of changing the orbits of targeted satellites. Weeden argues that 

changing the orbit of satellite to an incoming attack is virtually impossible given the speed of missiles and 

directed energy weapons and the relatively long period of time needed to send commands to a satellite. 

The United States, on the other hand, could preemptively change the orbit of its satellites, but the net 

effect would still be beneficial to China. Although the United States could avoid damage to its satellites by 

placing them out of range of China’s ASAT weapons, they would also be out of range of the areas that 

need coverage. Moreover, all satellites in sun synchronous orbit, such as remote sensing satellites with 

electro-optical imagers, fly over the entire surface of the Earth due to the nature of their orbits and would

sooner or later have to fly over Chinese territory in range of ASAT weapons.621

In addition, Forden’s analysis neither takes into account Chinese warfighting doctrine, with its emphasis 

on seizing the initiative at the beginning of a conflict, nor Chinese military writings on space, with their 

emphasis on conducting strong strikes at the beginning of a conflict. As a result, the effects of a wellcoordinated, simultaneous, and multi-pronged attack against U.S. remote sensing, communication, and 

GPS satellites using multiple counterspace methods could, through the denial of access to strategic areas 

or the disabling or destruction of satellites, result in serious gaps in U.S. C4ISR capabilities, especially 

considering the U.S. military’s dependence on space. Moreover, China’s military strategy does not 

necessarily call for the PLA to achieve space supremacy for the entirety of a conflict. Instead, the PLA could 

work to achieve space supremacy in a specific location or for a certain period of time, which would allow

it to conduct a critical strike against U.S. forces. Gaps in intelligence, precision navigation, and 

communications described in the analysis, though limited, could thus have decisive effects.

 

617 Noah Shachtman, “How China Loses the Coming Space War,” Wired, January 10, 2008, 

http://www.wired.com/2008/01/inside-the-chin/.

618 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2013, 13‒21.

619 Weeden, “Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian Anti-Satellite Testing in Space.”

620 Shachtman, “How China Loses the Coming Space War.”

621 Brian Weeden, “How China ‘Wins’ a Space War,” China Security 4 (2008): 137‒50.
112

As a result, over the long term, a dynamic may exist in which, in their pursuit of offensive capabilities 

designed to suppress each other’s information systems, both the United States and China must also 

increase their reliance on them. While China is now pursuing an asymmetrical advantage over the United 

States, over the long-term both sides are actually responding symmetrically to the threat posed by the 

other. Indeed, Chinese efforts to develop A2/AD space capabilities to keep the U.S. military at bay, and 

the possibility that the U.S. military would try “to get to left of the kill chain” to defeat those capabilities,

suggests that a potentially unstable situation may occur where it is advantageous for both sides to strike 

first in order to negate the precision firepower of the other. Certainly China’s extensive counterspace 

programs, coupled with U.S. plans to gain advantages in space control technologies622 and to “accelerate 

initiatives to counter adversary space capabilities including adversary ISR and space-enabled precision 

strike,”

623 suggest that outcome is now more probable.

The targeting of early warning satellites that detect ballistic missile launches, such as the U.S. Space-based 

Infrared System (SBIRS) or a Chinese space-based early warning system that detects missile launches may 

be further destabilizing. The degradation of either side’s early warning satellites in the support of 

conventional strikes could lead to concern that the strikes are a prelude to a nuclear strike. This is 

especially concerning considering the prominent role that conventionally armed ballistic missiles play in 

Chinese operations and the role that U.S. early warning satellites would play in defending against them. 

Moreover, the deployment of a space-based ballistic missile early warning system may also signal a 

change in China’s nuclear doctrine from “no first use” to “launch on warning.” China’s current nuclear 

forces doctrine relies on retaliating only after a nuclear first strike from an opponent. A launch on warning 

system would make China’s nuclear force more survivable since China would have warning that an attack 

is imminent, but would also present the possibility for false warnings, which could be catastrophically 

destabilizing during a conventional conflict. 

The military implications of China’s space program do not just have implications for the United States. 

Countries around China’s periphery, especially those in territorial disputes with China, will face a PLA that 

is more capable, in part, because China is deriving benefit from the use of space. A space-enabled U.S.

military has handily defeated lesser powers; and it is this capability that the PLA seeks with its 

development of space power. A Chinese military made strong, in part, by the use of space would also 

increase the costs of war to a potential adversary to such an extent that it may decide that it is not in its 

interest to fight China. This could potentially challenge U.S. influence in Asia, as countries decide whether 

to balance against or bandwagon with a rising China. 

Economic Implications

China’s rise as a space power also appears to have potential negative sum economic consequences for 

the United States, although it appears to have had less of an immediate effect. For example, China’s 

entrance into the commercial satellite sector so far has had little effect on established satellite 

manufacturers. The satellites sold to Nigeria, Venezuela, Pakistan, Bolivia, and Laos were part of a 

competitive package that included launch services, training for local operators, and low-cost loans 

through its export-import bank. Indeed, China’s approach to satellite exports has been to target countries 

unable to afford satellites from more established, higher-priced satellite manufacturers. In this way,

China’s satellite manufacturing is following a business plan similar to that used by Chinese information 

technology giant Huawei, which first entered into lower-priced, but underserved, markets to gain 

 

622 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 20.

623 Ibid., 37.
113

experience and build up its technology before moving into the higher-end markets of Europe and the 

United States. Moreover, some of China’s commercial launches have been for Chinese state-owned 

enterprises that may have no choice but launch their satellites on Chinese rockets. As a result, China has 

had only a minor effect on the international launch market since many of its customers would not have 

been able to afford non-Chinese satellites.

If China is successful in breaking back into the commercial launch for high-end satellites, it could portend 

trouble for more established commercial launch providers serving a relatively small market in terms of 

number of launches. The Russian government is the clear leader in the commercial launch sector and 

regularly captures more than 50 percent of the market. The European company Arianespace makes a 

strong presence by regularly capturing more than 20 percent of the market. China has been able to break 

back into the market by offering prices well below these two competitors. According to former 

Arianespace chairman Jean-Yves Le Gall speaking in 2009, “China offers prices which do not reflect 

economic reality,”

624 and are “probably about three-quarters the cost.”625 Until recently, the United States 

was priced out of the commercial launch market with launch costs 10 to 20 percent higher than their 

competitors.626 In recent years, however, U.S. launch providers, led by SpaceX, have made a comeback 

and have captured up to 26 percent of the market. In fact, officials from China’s space industry have stated 

that they cannot beat the SpaceX price of $54 million per launch,

627 while SpaceX’s vice president for 

government affairs has stated that his company views China as the main competition.628

The economic consequences of China’s rise as a space power could also impact the market for spacerelated technologies and services, such as those for positioning, navigation and timing, and remote 

sensing. For example, the designation of China’s Beidou satellite navigation system as “national 

infrastructure” and preferential policies designed to decrease the market share of products and services 

based on GPS indicate a preference for Chinese companies in China’s GNSS market. Although China is not 

marketing space remote sensing products, the entrance into this weak market as its remote sensing 

satellites become more capable could disrupt the market.

The ability of China’s space program to jump-start technology development is also in question. Although 

the Apollo program is regarded as having provided a market for certain technologies in their infancy, such 

as semiconductors, it is not apparent that these market conditions exist today in China. The manufacture 

of solar panels by China’s space industry, for example, comes at a time when that market is experiencing 

a global glut and a dramatic downturn in prices. It is possible that other types of technology may benefit 

from the expertise of China’s space industry, but these as of yet do not appear to be internationally 

competitive.

 

624 “China to Build, Launch Satellite for Laos,” AFP, September 26, 2009, 

http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_to_build_launch_satellite_for_Laos_999.html.

625 Doug Young, “China Trades Goods, Influence for Satellite Launches,” Reuters, November, 9 2009, 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/09/arianespace-idCNHKG21345620091109.

626 Peter B. de Selding, “Satellite Firms Tap Warner in Bid for Wider Access to Launchers,” Space News, September 16, 2009, 

http://www.spacenews.com/article/satellite-firms-tap-warner-bid-wider-access-launchers.

627 Frank Morring, Jr., “China Great Wall Confounded by SpaceX Prices,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 15, 2011, 

http://aviationweek.com/awin/china-great-wall-confounded-spacex-prices.

628 Mike Wall, “China Looms as Main Launch Competition, SpaceX Says,” Space.com, October 15, 2013, 

http://www.space.com/23207-spacex-commercial-launch-competition-china.html.
114

Diplomatic Implications

Whereas space can contribute to the hard power accumulation of military and economic capabilities, it 

can also work to increase China’s soft power. According to Joseph Nye, “soft power is more than just 

persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the 

ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence.”

629 Although measuring the effects of soft 

power is difficult, Nye writes that it rests “on the ability to shape the preferences of others.”

630

China’s burgeoning space program is used as one of the many barometers of its rise as a military, economic, 

and political power. It reinforces the image that China is a dynamic country capable of doing things well 

and also a country with which relations can be beneficial. This could make China more attractive, 

especially to developing countries without strong democratic traditions. 

China’s strategy thus appears to be a combination of seeking cooperative activities with the main space 

powers while at the same time seeking leadership opportunities with lesser space powers through such 

activities as its leadership of APSCO and its agreements to build Beidou stations in several countries in 

Asia. These activities reinforce the image that China can interact with the major space powers as equals 

while also creating an “alternative universe” where China can lead space activities free from the 

interference of the other major space powers. ASPCO, for example, does not grant other countries

observer status.631

Moreover, as China becomes more capable in space, it will become a more attractive partner for Europe, 

Russia, and smaller space powers. These activities may increase multipolarity by presenting another 

avenue for countries to participate in space in addition to―or without―the United States. This is 

especially true in the area of human spaceflight where the lack of an independent capability to launch 

humans into space by the United States has made China an attractive new partner for collaboration.

Although Europe states that its collaborative activities with China do not mean a diminution of its activities 

with the United States, reduced budgets for space programs and the orbiting of China’s larger space 

station at the same time that the International Space Station will be nearing the end of its service life may 

result in increasing influence for China in space. 

These additional opportunities for collaboration could not only assist China’s space program in becoming 

more competitive, they could also assist Europe’s space industry in becoming less dependent on the 

United States for space technology. As China’s space program continues to improve, countries without 

the security concerns of the United States will increasingly look upon space as another venue for 

interacting with China. China cooperates with many countries in space and looks to Europe in particular 

for access to technology and expertise denied by the United States. It maintains important cooperative 

activities with Russia and Ukraine and has cooperative relationships with the European Space Agency and 

the countries of the European Union. Spurred on by U.S. export control laws, European cooperation with 

China could improve China’s space technology while at the same time making Europe more 

technologically independent of U.S. industry. Although the “ITAR-free” satellites sold to China were 

eventually determined to be anything but, the possibility of further collaboration cannot rule out such 

satellites being developed in the future.

 

629 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 6.

630 Ibid., 5.

631 Clay Moltz, interview via email, November 19, 2014.
115

The importance of China’s space diplomacy should not be overstated, however. Relations in space do not 

drive relations on Earth. International cooperation on space activities usually follows progress in the 

overall relationship and is more of an indicator of the state of a relationship than a critical component. 

Although China’s increasing space power does play a role in advancing its diplomatic interests, there is no 

evidence that it has directly produced tangible political benefits in other areas besides space.632 As its 

space power increases this may change. China, for example, could have more of a say in international 

technical organizations such as the International Telecommunications Union over rules governing 

satellites and satellite frequency issues, but as yet this is unrealized.

Conclusion

Even if U.S. space power continues to improve in absolute terms, China’s rapid advance in space 

technologies will result in relative gains that challenge the U.S. position in space. The real question 

concerning U.S. competiveness may not be whether Chinese satellites and launchers are the equal of their 

U.S. competitors, but whether their products provide sufficient value. A Chinese industry that can offer 

moderately priced but sufficiently capable products may be able to compete effectively in the market.

Similarly, a Chinese space program that can provide a good enough solution to deter or raise the costs of 

military intervention for an adversary may be all that is necessary. 

If the current trajectory of China’s space program continues, by 2030 the China will have a new line of 

advanced launch vehicles, a robust, space-based C4ISR network made up of imagery satellites with 

resolutions well below one meter, and more capable electronic intelligence communication satellites 

linked together by data-relay satellites, in addition to a global satellite-navigation system that may 

gradually approach current GPS standards. At this point, China could also likely have made operational a 

number of advanced counterspace capabilities, including kinetic-kill, directed-energy, and co-orbital ASAT 

capabilities as well as some form of missile defense system. In addition, China’s more capable satellites 

and launch vehicles could not only compete with U.S., European, and Russian industry but also provide 

new avenues for cooperation. This could be especially true if China were to conduct manned lunar 

missions.

Although China is probably truthful when it says that it is not in a space race, such statements mask the 

true intent of its space program: to become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and economically as 

competitive as the United States is in space. Despite Chinese statements that it is not in a space race, 

China’s space program has generated concern both in the United States and in Asia. As Clay Moltz of the 

Naval Postgraduate School writes, “There is a space race going on in Asia, but its outcome―peaceful 

competition or military confrontation―is still uncertain.” He concludes that although “there are still 

reasonable prospects for avoiding negative outcomes in space...Asia is at risk of moving backward, 

motivated by historical mistrust and animosities and hindered by poor communications on security 

matters.”

633 As a result, China’s progress in space technologies, whether in relative or absolute terms, has 

implications for the United States and its neighbors. As China’s space program increases in capability, it 

can be expected to wield this power in ways that, according to Bonnie Glaser, not only “persuade its 

neighbors that there is more to gain from accommodating Chinese interests” but also “deter countries 

from pursuing policies that inflict damage on Chinese interests.”

634

 

632 Clay Moltz, interview via email, November 19, 2014.

633 James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2012), 191.

634 Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Grand Strategy in Asia.”
116

Nevertheless, although China’s space program may pose challenges for the United States and its space 

power neighbors, it may also present opportunities for scientific collaboration on the Earth’s environment 

and outer space. In addition, it may make human spaceflight safer by providing additional capabilities to 

rescue stranded or imperiled astronauts through the use of common docking apparatus.

Moreover, what is unwritten in Chinese analyses is that as China becomes more invested in space 

capabilities it takes on the same vulnerabilities as the United States. Although China would not have the 

same asymmetries as the United States in a conflict in the Western Pacific, the goal of having a global, 24-

hour, all-weather remote sensing capability and spending nearly $1 billion per year until 2020 to establish 

a global satellite navigation system and associated technologies indicates that China is devoting significant 

effort and resources to establish a system that is similar in architecture to that of the U.S. military’s space 

program. With this trajectory, China will have as much to lose as it has to gain from the management or 

mismanagement of the outer space global commons. It is in this vein that some sort of strategic 

accommodation that ameliorates the worst effects of competition could be achieved. 
117

APPENDIX A

CHINESE OPERATIONAL SATELLITES IN ORBIT

Satellite

Launch 

Date Operator/Owner Purpose

Class of 

Orbit

Planned 

Service Life

(years)

CIVIL

BeijinGalaxy-1 (Beijing 1 [Tsinghua], Tsinghau-2, 

China DMC+4)

10/27/05 Beijing Landview Mapping 

Information Technology Co. Ltd 

(BLMIT)

Earth Observation LEO UNK

Tian Xun-1 (TX-1) 11/9/11 Nanjing University of Aeronautics an

d Astronautics

Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

XW-1 (Hope Oscar 68, HO-68, Xi Wang 1, Hope1, CAS-1)12/15/09 DFH Satellite/AMSAT-China Communications LEO UNK

Zheda Pixing 1B (ZP-1B, Zhejiang University-1B) 9/22/10 Zhejiang University Scientific Research LEO UNK

Zheda Pixing 1C (ZP-1C, Zhejiang University-1B) 9/22/10 Zhejiang University Scientific Research LEO UNK

COMMERCIAL

Apstar 1 7/21/94 APT Satellite Holdings Ltd. Communications GEO 9

Apstar 1A 7/3/96 APT Satellite Holdings Ltd. Communications GEO 10

Apstar 6 4/12/05 APT Satellite Holdings Ltd. Communications GEO 15

Apstar 7 3/31/12 APT Satellite Holdings Ltd. Communications GEO 15

AsiaSat 3S (Asiasat 3SA) 3/21/99 Asia Satellite Telecommunications 

Co. Ltd. (SES [Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES)])

Communications GEO 15

AsiaSat 4 4/12/03 Asia Satellite Telecommunications 

Co. Ltd. (SES [Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES)])

Communications GEO 15

AsiaSat 5 8/11/09 Asia Satellite Telecommunications 

Co. Ltd. (SES [Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES)])

Communications GEO 15

AsiaSat 7 11/25/11 Asia Satellite Telecommunications 

Co. Ltd. (SES [Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES)])

Communications GEO 15

Sinosat-6 (Chinasat-6A, XN-6) 9/4/10 China Direct Broadcast Satellite co. Communications GEO 15 (10 due 

to leak)

ABS-2i (MBSat, Mobile Broadcasting Satellite, 

Han Byul)

3/13/04 Asia Broadcasting Satellite Communications GEO UNK

COMMERCIAL/GOVERNMENT

ChinaSat 6B (Zhong Xing 6B) 7/6/07 China Satellite Communication Corp. 

(China Satcom)

Communications GEO 15

GOVERNMENT

Chuangxin 1-1 (Innovation 1-1, Chuang Xin 1, 

CZ-1-1)

10/21/03 Chinese Academy of Sciences Communications LEO UNK

Chuangxin 1-2 (Innovation 1-2) 11/5/08 Chinese Academy of Sciences Earth Observation LEO UNK

Chuangxin 1-3 (Innovation 1-3) 11/20/11 Chinese Academy of Sciences Earth Observation LEO UNK

Chuangxin-3 7/19/13 Chinese Academy of Sciences Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

Fengniao 1 (Hummingbird 1) 11/20/12 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Technology 

Development

LEO 2

Fengniao 1A (Hummingbird 1A) 11/20/12 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

Fengyun 2D (FY-2D) 12/8/06 China Meteorological 

Administration

Earth Science GEO 3

Fengyun 2E (FY-2E) 12/23/08 China Meteorological 

Administration

Earth Science GEO 3

Fengyun 2F (FY-2F) 1/12/12 China Meteorological 

Administration

Earth Science GEO 3

Fengyun 3A (FY-3A) 5/27/08 China Meteorological 

Administration

Earth Science LEO 3

Fengyun 3B (FY-3B) 11/4/10 China Meteorological 

Administration

Earth Science LEO 3
118

Satellite

Launch 

Date Operator/Owner Purpose

Class of 

Orbit

Planned 

Service Life

(years)

GOVERNMENT (CONT.)

Fengyun 3C (FY-3C) 9/23/13 China Meteorological 

Administration

Earth Science LEO 5

Gaofen 1 4/26/13 Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight 

Technology (SAST)

Remote Sensing LEO 5 to 8

Haiyang 1B (HY 1B, Ocean 1B) 4/11/07 State Oceanic Administration (SOA) Meteorology LEO 3

Haiyang 2A (HY 2A) 8/15/11 State Oceanic Administration (SOA) Meteorology LEO 3

HJ-1A (Huan Jing 1A) 9/5/08 National Remote Sensing Center 

(NRSCC)

Remote Sensing LEO 3

HJ-1B (Huan Jing 1B) 9/5/08 National Remote Sensing Center 

(NRSCC)

Remote Sensing LEO 3

HJ-1C (Huan Jing 1C) 11/18/12 National Committee for Disaster 

Reduction and State Environmental 

Protection

Remote Sensing LEO 3

Kuaizhou-1 (KZ-1) 9/25/13 National Academy of Sciences Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Shijian 11-01 (SJ-11-01) 11/12/09 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Space Physics LEO UNK

Shijian 11-02 (SJ-11-02) 7/29/11 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

Shijian 11-03 (SJ-11-03) 7/6/11 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

Shijian 11-05 (SJ-11-05) 7/15/13 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

Shijian 12 (SJ-12) 6/15/10 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

Shijian 15 (SJ-15) 7/19/13 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

Shijian 16 (SJ-16) 10/25/13 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

Shijian 6A (SJ-6A, Dong Fang Hong 60) 9/8/04 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Space Physics LEO UNK

Shijian 6B (SJ-6B) 9/8/04 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Space Physics LEO UNK

Shijian 6C (SJ-6-02A) 10/23/06 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Space Physics LEO UNK

Shijian 6D (SJ-6-02B) 10/23/06 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Space Physics LEO UNK

Shijian 6E (SJ6-03A, SJ-6E) 10/25/08 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Space Physics LEO UNK

Shijian 6F (SJ6-03B, SJ-6F) 10/25/08 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Space Physics LEO UNK

Shijian 6G (SJ6-04A) 10/6/10 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Reconnaissance LEO UNK

Shijian 6H (SJ6_04B) 10/6/10 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Reconnaissance LEO UNK

Shijian 7 (SJ7, Dong Fang Hong 65) 7/5/05 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Space Physics LEO UNK

Shijian 9A (SJ 9A) 10/14/12 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

Shijian 9B (SJ 9B) 10/14/12 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

Shiyan 1 (SY 1, Tansuo 1, Experimental 

Satellite 1)

4/18/04 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Shiyan 3 (SY3, Experimental Satellite 3) 11/5/08 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Remote 

Sensing/Research

LEO 2

Shiyan 4 (SY4, Experimental Satellite 4) 11/20/11 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Remote 

Sensing/Research

LEO UNK

Shiyan 5 (SY5, Experimental Satellite 5) 11/25/13 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Remote 

Sensing/Research

LEO UNK

Tiangong-1 (TG-1) 9/29/11 Beijing Aerospace Flight Control 

Center

Technology 

Development

LEO 2
119

Satellite

Launch 

Date Operator/Owner Purpose

Class of 

Orbit

Planned 

Service Life

(years)

GOVERNMENT (CONT.)

Tianhui 1-01 8/24/10 China Aerospace Science and 

Technology Corporation (CASTC)

Earth Observation LEO 3 to 5

Tianhui 1-02 5/6/12 China Aerospace Science and 

Technology Corporation (CASTC)

Earth Observation LEO 3 to 5

TianLian 1 (TL-1-01, CTDRS) 4/25/08 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Communications GEO 6

TianLian 2 (TL-1-02, CTDRS) 7/11/11 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Communications GEO 6

TianLian 3 (TL-1-03, CTDRS) 7/25/12 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Communications GEO 6

Tiantuo 1 5/10/12 National University of Defense 

Technology

Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

Xinyan 1 (XY-1) 11/18/12 DFH Satellite Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

Yaogan 4 (Remote Sensing Satellite 4) 12/1/08 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 5 (Remote Sensing Satellite 5, JB 5-C, 

Jian Bing 5-C)

12/15/08 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 6 (Remote Sensing Satellite 6, Jian Bing 

7-A)

4/22/09 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 7 (Remote Sensing Satellite 7) 12/9/09 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 8 (Remote Sensing Satellite 8) 12/15/09 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 9A (Remote Sensing Satellite 9A) 3/5/10 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 9B (Remote Sensing Satellite 9B) 3/5/10 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 9C (Remote Sensing Satellite 9C) 3/5/10 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Zhongxing 10 (XZ-10, Chinasat 10) 6/20/11 China Satellite Communication Corp. 

(China Satcom)

Communications GEO 15

Zhongxing 11 (Chinasat 11) 5/1/13 China Satellite Communication Corp. 

(China Satcom)

Communications GEO 15

Zhongxing 12 (Chinasat 12, ZX-12) 11/27/12 China Satellite Communication Corp. 

(China Satcom)

Communications GEO 15

Zhongxing 9 (Chinasat 9, Chinastar 9) 6/9/08 China Satellite Communication Corp. 

(China Satcom)

Communications GEO 15

Ziyuan 1-02C 12/22/11 China Centre for Resources Satellite 

Data and Application (CRESDA)

Earth Observation LEO 3

Ziyuan 3 (ZY-3) 1/9/12 China Centre for Resources Satellite 

Data and Application (CRESDA)

Earth Observation LEO 5

MILITARY

Compass G-1 (Beidou G1) 1/16/10 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

GEO 8

Compass G-10 (Beidou ISGO-5) 12/1/11 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

GEO 8

Compass G-11 (Beidou G5) 2/24/12 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

GEO 8

Compass G-3 (Beidou G3) 6/2/10 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

GEO 8

Compass G-4 (Beidou G4) 10/31/10 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

GEO 8

Compass G-5 (Beidou IGSO-1) 7/31/10 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

GEO 8

Compass G-6 (Beidou 2-16) 10/25/12 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

GEO 8

Compass G-7 (Beidou IGSO-2) 12/17/10 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

GEO 8

Compass G-8 (Beidou IGSO-3) 4/9/11 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

GEO 8

Compass G-9 (Beidou ISGO-4) 7/26/11 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

GEO 8

Compass M1 (Beidou M1) 4/14/07 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO 8
120

Satellite

Launch 

Date Operator/Owner Purpose

Class of 

Orbit

Planned 

Service Life

(years)

MILITARY (CONT.)

Compass M3 (Beidou 2-12) 4/28/12 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO 8

Compass M4 (Beidou 2-13) 4/28/12 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO 8

Compass M5 (Beidou 2-14) 9/18/12 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO 8

Compass M6 (Beidou 2-15) 9/18/12 Chinese Defense Ministry Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO 8

Shiyan 7 (SY7, Experimental Satellite 7) 7/19/13 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology (CAST)

Technology 

Development

LEO UNK

Yaogan 10 (Remote Sensing Satellite 10) 8/9/10 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 11 (Remote Sensing Satellite 11) 9/22/10 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 12 (Remote Sensing Satellite 12) 11/9/11 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 13 (Remote Sensing Satellite 13) 11/29/11 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 14 (Remote Sensing Satellite 14) 5/10/12 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 15 (Remote Sensing Satellite 15) 5/29/12 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 16A (Remote Sensing Satellite 16A, 

Yaogan Weixing 16)

11/25/12 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 16B (Remote Sensing Satellite 16B) 11/25/12 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 16C (Remote Sensing Satellite 16C) 11/25/12 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 17A (Remote Sensing Satellite 17A, 

Yaogan Weixing 17)

9/1/13 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 17B (Remote Sensing Satellite 17B) 9/1/13 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 17C (Remote Sensing Satellite 17C) 9/1/13 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 18 (Remote Sensing Satellite 18) 10/29/13 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 19 (Remote Sensing Satellite 19) 11/20/13 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 2 (Remote Sensing Satellite 2, Jian Bing 

5-2, JB 5-2)

5/25/07 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Yaogan 3 (Remote Sensing Satellite 3, Jian Bing 

5-3, JB 5-3)

11/11/07 People's Liberation Army (C41) Remote Sensing LEO UNK

Zhangguo Ziyuan 2B (ZY-2B, JB-3B) 10/27/02 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology

Remote Sensing LEO 2

Zhangguo Ziyuan 2C (ZY-2C, JB-3C) 11/4/04 Chinese Academy of Space 

Technology

Reconnaissance LEO UNK

Zhongxing 1A (Chinasat 1A, Fenghuo 2) 9/18/11 People's Liberation Army (C41) Communications GEO UNK

Zhongxing 20A 11/24/10 People's Liberation Army (C41) Communications GEO 8

Zhongxing 22A (Chinastar 22A) 9/12/06 China Satellite Communication Corp. 

(China Satcom)

Communications GEO 8

MILITARY/GOVERNMENT

Zhongxing 2A (Chinasat 2A) 5/26/12 People's Liberation Army (C41) Communications GEO 3

Source: Data from Union of Concerned Scientists database, updated January 31, 2014, 

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/solutions/space-weapons/ucs-satellitedatabase.html#.VHUDZU3Qe74.
121

APPENDIX B

U.S. OPERATIONAL SATELLITES IN ORBIT

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

CIVIL

GOES 3 (Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, 

GOES-C)

6/16/1978 University of Miami, 

Rosenstiel School of 

Marine and Atmospheric 

Science (RSMAS) (loaned 

by NOAA)

Communications GEO

Amsat-Oscar 7 (AO-7) 11/15/1974 Amsat-NA Amateur Radio LEO

CAPE-2 (Cajun Advanced Picosatellite Experiment) 11/19/2013 University of Louisiana at 

Lafayette

Technology Development LEO

CINEMA-1 (Cubesat for Ion, Neutral, Electron, Magnetic 

fields)

9/13/2012 University of CaliforniaBerkeley/Imperial 

College-London

Space Science LEO

CINEMA-2 (Cubesat for Ion, Neutral, Electron, Magnetic 

fields)

11/21/2013 University of CaliforniaBerkeley/Imperial 

College-London

Space Science LEO

CINEMA-3 (Cubesat for Ion, Neutral, Electron, Magnetic 

fields)

11/21/2013 University of CaliforniaBerkeley/Imperial 

College-London

Space Science LEO

CUNYSat-1 (City University of New York Satellite-1) 12/6/2013 City University of New 

York

Technology Development LEO

CUSat-1 (Cornell University Satellite 1) 9/29/2013 Space Systems Design 

Studio, Cornell University

Technology Development LEO

Eagle 2 ($50Sat) 11/21/2013 Morehead State 

University

Technology Development LEO

FAST 1 (Sara Lilly and Emma, USA 222) 11/20/2010 University of Texas -

Austin

Technology Development LEO

Ho'oponopono-2 (H2) 11/19/2013 University of Hawaii Radar Calibration LEO

KySat-2 11/19/2013 Kentucky Space Technology Development LEO

M-Cubed/E1P-U2 (Michigan Multipurpose Minisat; Explorer 

1 Prime - Unit 2 - HRBE [William A. Hiscock Radiation Belt 

Explorer])

10/28/2011 University of 

Michigan/Montana 

University

Technology Development LEO

MCubed-2 (Michigan Multipurpose Minisatellite 2) 12/6/2013 University of Michigan 

Exploratory Lab

Technology Development LEO

Vermont Lunar Cubesat 11/19/2013 Vermont Technical 

College/University of 

Vermont

Technology Development LEO

CIVIL/GOVERNMENT

DANDE (Drag and Atmospheric Neutral Density Explorer) 9/29/2013 University of Colorado, 

Boulder

Technology Development LEO

Firebird-A (Focused Investigations of Relativistic Electron 

Burst, Intensity, Range, and Dynamics)

12/6/2013 Firebird Consortium 

(Montana State Univ., 

Univ. of New Hampshire, 

Aerospace Corp., Los 

Alamos National 

Laboratory)

Space Science LEO

Firebird-B (Focused Investigations of Relativistic Electron 

Burst, Intensity, Range, and Dynamics)

12/6/2013 Firebird Consortium 

(Montana State Univ., 

Univ. of New Hampshire, 

Aerospace Corp., Los 

Alamos National 

Laboratory)

Space Science LEO

O/OREOS (Organism/Organic Exposure to Orbital Stresses, 

USA 219)

11/20/2010 NASA-Ames Research 

Center/Stanford 

University

Scientific Research LEO
122

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

CIVIL/MILITARY

Falconsat-3 3/9/2007 US Air Force Academy Technology Development LEO

COMMERCIAL

Intelsat 5 (Arabsat 2C, Panamsat-5, PAS-5) 8/28/1997 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Sirius 1 (SD Radio 1) 6/30/2000 Sirius Satellite Radio Communications Elliptical

Sirius 2 (SD Radio 2) 9/5/2000 Sirius Satellite Radio Communications Elliptical

Sirius 3 (SD Radio 3) 11/30/2000 Sirius Satellite Radio Communications Elliptical

Galaxy-13 (Horizons 1, Galaxy 13L) 10/1/2003 PanAmSat (Intelsat, 

Ltd.)/Sky Perfect JSAT Corp.

Communications GEO

Horizons 2 12/21/2007 Horizons 2 Satellite, LLC 

(Intelsat, Sky Perfect JSAT 

Corporation)

Communications GEO

MSAT 1 4/20/1996 Mobile Satellite Ventures Communications GEO

MSAT 2 (AMSC-1, ACTel-1) 4/7/1995 Mobile Satellite Ventures Communications GEO

Afristar 10/28/1998 1Worldspace Communications GEO

AMC-1 (Americom 1, GE-1) 9/8/1996 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-10 (Americom-10, GE 10) 2/5/2004 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-11 (Americom-11, GE 11) 5/19/2004 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-15 (Americom-15) 10/14/2004 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-16 (Americom-16) 12/17/2004 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-18 (Americom 18) 12/8/2006 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-2 (Americom 2, GE-2) 1/30/1997 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-21 (Americom 21) 8/14/2008 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-3 (Americom 3, GE-3) 9/4/1997 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-4 (Americom-4, GE-4) 11/13/1999 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-5 (Americom-5, GE-5) 10/28/1998 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-6 (Americom-6, GE-6) 10/22/2000 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-7 (Americom-7, GE-7) 9/14/2000 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-8 (Americom-8, GE-8, Aurora 3) 12/19/2000 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AMC-9 (Americom 9, GE-12) 6/7/2003 SES (Société Européenne 

des Satellites (SES))

Communications GEO

AsiaStar 3/21/2000 1Worldspace Communications GEO

DirecTV-10 7/7/2007 DirecTV, Inc. Communications GEO

DirecTV-11 3/19/2008 DirecTV, Inc. Communications GEO

DirecTV-12 12/29/2009 DirecTV, Inc. Communications GEO

DirecTV-4S 11/27/2001 DirecTV, Inc. Communications GEO

DirecTV-5 (Tempo 1) 5/7/2002 DirecTV, Inc. Communications GEO

DirecTV-7S 5/4/2004 DirecTV, Inc. Communications GEO

DirecTV-8 5/22/2005 DirecTV, Inc. Communications GEO

DirecTV-9S 10/13/2006 DirecTV, Inc. Communications GEO

Echostar 10 2/15/2006 Echostar Technologies, LLC Communications GEO
123

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

COMMERCIAL (CONT.)

Echostar 11 7/16/2008 Echostar Technologies, LLC Communications GEO

Echostar 12 (Rainbow-1) 7/17/2003 Echostar Technologies, LLC Communications GEO

Echostar 14 3/20/2010 Echostar Technologies, LLC Communications GEO

Echostar 15 7/10/2010 Echostar Technologies, LLC Communications GEO

Echostar 16 11/20/2012 Echostar Technologies, LLC Communications GEO

Echostar 17 7/5/2012 Echostar Technologies, LLC Communications GEO

Echostar 3 10/5/1997 Echostar Technologies, LLC Communications GEO

Echostar 6 7/14/2000 Echostar Technologies, LLC Communications GEO

Echostar 7 2/21/2002 Echostar Technologies, LLC Communications GEO

Echostar 8 8/21/2002 Echostar Technologies, LLC Communications GEO

Echostar 9/Galaxy 23 (G-23, Intelsat 1A-13, Telstar 13) 8/8/2003 Echostar Technologies, 

LLC/Intelsat 

Communications GEO

Echostar G1 (ICO G1, DBSD G1) 4/14/2008 Dish Network Communications GEO

Galaxy-11 1/21/1999 PanAmSat (Intelsat, Ltd.) Communications GEO

Galaxy-12 4/9/2003 PanAmSat (Intelsat, Ltd.) Communications GEO

Galaxy-14 8/13/2005 PanAmSat (Intelsat, Ltd.) Communications GEO

Galaxy-15 10/13/2005 PanAmSat (Intelsat, Ltd.) Communications GEO

Galaxy-16 6/18/2006 PanAmSat (Intelsat, Ltd.) Communications GEO

Galaxy-17 5/4/2007 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Galaxy-18 5/21/2008 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Galaxy-19 9/24/2008 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Galaxy-25 (G-25, Intelsat 1A-5, Telstar 5) 5/24/1997 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Galaxy-26 (G-26, Intelsat 1A-6, Telstar 6) 2/15/1999 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Galaxy-27 (G-27, Intelsat IA-7, Telstar 7) 9/25/1999 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Galaxy-28 (G-28, Intelsat IA-8, Telstar 8) 6/23/2005 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Galaxy-3C 6/15/2002 PanAmSat (Intelsat, Ltd.) Communications GEO

Intelsat 10 (PAS-10) 5/14/2001 PanAmSat (Intelsat, Ltd.) Communications GEO

Intelsat 10-02 (Thor 4) 6/16/2004 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 11 (PAS 11) 10/5/2007 PanAmSat (Intelsat, Ltd.) Communications GEO

Intelsat 14 (IS-14) 11/23/2009 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 15 (IS-15, JCSat 85) 11/30/2009 Intelsat, Ltd./Sky Perfect 

JSAT Corp.

Communications GEO

Intelsat 16 (IS-16) 2/12/2010 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 17 (IS-17) 11/26/2010 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 18 (IS-18) 10/5/2011 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 19 (IS-19) 6/1/2012 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 1R (IS-1R, PAS-1R, PanAmSat 1R) 11/15/2000 PanAmSat (Intelsat, Ltd.) Communications GEO

Intelsat 20 (IS-20) 8/2/2012 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 21 (IS-21) 8/19/2012 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 22 3/25/2012 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 23 10/14/2012 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 25 (IS-25, Protostar 1, Chinasat 8) 7/7/2008 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 26 (JCSat R, JCSAT-4, Japan Communications 

Satellite 4)

2/16/1997 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 603 (Intelsat 6 F-3, IS-603) 3/14/1990 Intelsat, Ltd./New Skies 

Satellites N.V. [SES] (shared 

capacity)

Communications GEO

Intelsat 7 (IS-7, PAS-7) 9/16/1998 PanAmSat (Intelsat, Ltd.) Communications GEO
124

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

COMMERCIAL (CONT.)

Intelsat 701 10/22/1993 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 702 6/17/1994 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 706 5/17/1995 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 8 (IS-8, PAS-8) 11/4/1998 PanAmSat (Intelsat, Ltd.) Communications GEO

Intelsat 805 6/18/1998 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 9 (IS-9, PAS-9) 7/28/2000 PanAmSat (Intelsat, Ltd.) Communications GEO

Intelsat 901 6/9/2001 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 902 8/30/2001 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 903 3/30/2002 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 904 2/23/2002 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 905 6/5/2002 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 906 9/6/2002 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat 907 2/15/2003 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat APR-2 (INSAT 2E) 4/3/1999 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

Intelsat New Dawn 4/22/2011 Intelsat, Ltd. Communications GEO

QuetzSat-1 9/29/2011 SES World Skies (SES 

[Société Européenne des 

Satellites (SES)]) -- total 

capacity leased to 

subsidiary of EchoStar Corp. 

Communications GEO

SES-1 (AMC-4R) 4/24/2010 SES World Skies (SES 

[Société Européenne des 

Satellites (SES)])

Communications GEO

SES-2 9/21/2011 SES World Skies (SES 

[Société Européenne des 

Satellites (SES)])

Communications GEO

SES-3 7/15/2011 SES World Skies (SES 

[Société Européenne des 

Satellites (SES)])

Communications GEO

SES-4 2/14/2012 SES World Skies (SES 

[Société Européenne des 

Satellites (SES)])

Communications GEO

SES-5 (Sirius 5, Astra 4B) 7/9/2012 SES World Skies (SES 

[Société Européenne des 

Satellites (SES)])

Communications GEO

SES-6 6/3/2013 SES World Skies (SES 

[Société Européenne des 

Satellites (SES)])

Communications GEO

SES-7 (Protostar 2, Indostar 2) 5/16/2009 SES World Skies (SES 

[Société Européenne des 

Satellites (SES)])

Communications GEO

SES-8 12/3/2013 SES World Skies (SES 

[Société Européenne des 

Satellites (SES)])

Communications GEO

Sirius FM-5 6/30/2009 Sirius XM Radio, Inc. Communications GEO

Sirius FM-6 10/25/2013 Sirius XM Radio, Inc. Communications GEO

Sirius XM-5 10/14/2010 Sirius XM Radio, Inc. Communications GEO

SkyTerra 1 11/14/2010 LightSquared Communications GEO

Spaceway 3 8/14/2007 Hughes Network Systems Communications GEO

Spaceway F1 4/26/2005 DirecTV, Inc. Communications GEO

Spaceway F2 11/16/2005 DirecTV, Inc. Communications GEO

TerraStar 1 7/1/2009 TerraStar Corporation Communications GEO

ViaSat-1 10/19/2011 ViaSat, Inc. Communications GEO
125

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

COMMERCIAL (CONT.)

WildBlue 1 12/8/2006 WildBlue Communications Communications GEO

XM Radio 3 (Rhythm) 3/1/2005 XM Satellite Radio USA Communications GEO

XM Radio 4 (Blues) 10/30/2006 XM Satellite Radio USA Communications GEO

XM Rock (XM 2) 3/18/2001 XM Satellite Radio USA Communications GEO

XM Roll (XM 1) 5/8/2001 XM Satellite Radio USA Communications GEO

AprizeSat 3 7/29/2009 Aprize Satellite/Latin Trade 

Satellite

Communications/

Maritime Tracking

LEO

AprizeSat 4 7/29/2009 Aprize Satellite/Latin Trade 

Satellite

Communications/

Maritime Tracking

LEO

AprizeSat 5 8/17/2011 Aprize Satellite/Latin Trade 

Satellite

Communications

/Maritime Tracking

LEO

AprizeSat 6 8/17/2011 Aprize Satellite/Latin Trade 

Satellite

Communications/

Maritime Tracking

LEO

AprizeSat 7 11/21/2013 Aprize Satellite/Latin Trade 

Satellite

Communications/

Maritime Tracking

LEO

AprizeSat 8 11/21/2013 Aprize Satellite/Latin Trade 

Satellite

Communications/

Maritime Tracking

LEO

Aerocube 4.5A 9/13/2012 Aerospace Corporation Technology Development LEO

Aerocube 4.5B 9/13/2012 Aerospace Corporation Technology Development LEO

Aerocube 5A 12/6/2013 Aerospace Corporation Technology Development LEO

Aerocube 5B 12/6/2013 Aerospace Corporation Technology Development LEO

Ardusat-1 11/19/2013 NanoSatisfi Inc. Technology Development LEO

Dove-2 4/19/2013 Planet Labs, Inc. Technology Development LEO

Dove-3 11/21/2013 Planet Labs, Inc. Technology Development LEO

Dove-4 11/21/2013 Planet Labs, Inc. Technology Development LEO

Genesis-1 7/12/2006 Bigelow Aerospace Technology Development LEO

Genesis-2 6/28/2007 Bigelow Aerospace Technology Development LEO

Globalstar M004 (Globalstar 4) 2/14/1998 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M006 (Globalstar 6) 4/24/1998 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M023 (Globalstar 9) 2/9/1999 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M025 (Globalstar 21) 6/10/1999 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M027 (Globalstar 34) 8/17/1999 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M028 (Globalstar 30) 7/25/1999 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M029 (Globalstar 47) 11/22/1999 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M031 (Globalstar 44) 10/18/1999 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M037 (Globalstar 16) 3/15/1999 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M039 (Globalstar 45) 11/22/1999 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M040 (Globalstar 10) 2/9/1999 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M047 (Globalstar 23) 6/10/1999 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M056 (Globalstar 43) 10/18/1999 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M059 (Globalstar 42) 10/18/1999 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M063 (Globalstar 49) 2/8/2000 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M065 (Globalstar 65) 5/29/2007 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M066 (Globalstar 66) 10/20/2007 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M067 (Globalstar 67) 10/20/2007 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M068 (Globalstar 68) 10/20/2007 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M069 (Globalstar 69) 5/29/2007 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M070 (Globalstar 70) 10/20/2007 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M071 (Globalstar 71) 5/29/2007 Globalstar Communications LEO
126

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

COMMERCIAL (CONT.)

Globalstar M072 (Globalstar 72) 5/29/2007 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M073 (Globalstar 73, Globalstar 2-6) 10/19/2010 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M074 (Globalstar 74, Globalstar 2-2) 10/19/2010 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M075 (Globalstar 75, Globalstar 2-5) 10/19/2010 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M076 (Globalstar 76, Globalstar 2-3) 10/19/2010 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M077 (Globalstar 77, Globalstar 2-4) 10/19/2010 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M078 (Globalstar 95, Globalstar 2-23) 2/6/2013 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M079 (Globalstar 79, Globalstar 2-1) 10/19/2010 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M080 (Globalstar 80, Globalstar 2-14) 12/28/2011 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M081 (Globalstar 81, Globalstar 2-11) 7/13/2011 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M082 (Globalstar 82, Globalstar 2-15) 12/28/2011 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M083 (Globalstar 83, Globalstar 2-7) 7/13/2011 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M084 (Globalstar 84, Globalstar 2-13) 12/28/2011 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M085 (Globalstar 85, Globalstar 2-10) 7/13/2011 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M086 (Globalstar 86, Globalstar 2-18) 12/28/2011 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M088 (Globalstar 88, Globalstar 2-8) 7/13/2011 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M089 (Globalstar 89, Globalstar 2-12) 7/13/2011 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M090 (Globalstar 90, Globalstar 2-17) 12/28/2011 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M091 (Globalstar 91, Globalstar 2-9) 7/13/2011 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M092 (Globalstar 92, Globalstar 2-16) 12/28/2011 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M093 (Globalstar 87, Globalstar 2-20) 2/6/2013 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M094 (Globalstar 93, Globalstar 2-21) 2/6/2013 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M095 (Globalstar 96, Globalstar 2-24) 2/6/2013 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M096 (Globalstar 94, Globalstar 2-22) 2/6/2013 Globalstar Communications LEO

Globalstar M097 (Globalstar 78, Globalstar 2-19) 2/6/2013 Globalstar Communications LEO

Ikonos-2 9/24/1999 GeoEye Remote Sensing LEO

ORBCOMM FM-10 (ORBCOMM A2) 12/23/1997 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-11 (ORBCOMM A3) 12/23/1997 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-12 (ORBCOMM A4) 12/23/1997 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-13 (ORBCOMM B1) 8/2/1998 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-14 (ORBCOMM B2) 8/2/1998 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-15 (ORBCOMM B3) 8/2/1998 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-16 (ORBCOMM B4) 8/2/1998 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-18 (ORBCOMM B6) 8/2/1998 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-19 (ORBCOMM B7) 8/2/1998 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-20 (ORBCOMM B8) 8/2/1998 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-22 (ORBCOMM C2) 9/23/1998 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-23 (ORBCOMM C3) 9/23/1998 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-25 (ORBCOMM C5) 9/23/1998 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-27 (ORBCOMM C7) 9/23/1998 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-30 (ORBCOMM D2) 12/4/1999 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-31 (ORBCOMM D3) 12/4/1999 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-32 (ORBCOMM D4) 12/4/1999 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-34 (ORBCOMM D6) 12/4/1999 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-35 (ORBCOMM D7) 12/4/1999 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-36 (ORBCOMM D8) 12/4/1999 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO
127

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

COMMERCIAL (CONT.)

ORBCOMM FM-4 (ORBCOM G2) 2/10/1998 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-5 (ORBCOMM A6) 12/23/1997 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-6 (ORBCOMM A7) 12/23/1997 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-7 (ORBCOMM A8) 12/23/1997 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-8 (ORBCOMM A1) 12/23/1997 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

ORBCOMM FM-9 (ORBCOMM A5) 12/23/1997 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications LEO

Quickbird 2 10/18/2001 DigitalGlobe Corporation Earth Observation LEO

SkySat-1 11/21/2013 Skybox Imaging Remote Sensing LEO

Vesselsat-1 10/12/2011 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications/

Maritime Tracking

LEO

Vesselsat-2 1/9/2012 ORBCOMM Inc. Communications/

Maritime Tracking

LEO

COMMERCIAL/GOVERNMENT

GeoEye-1 (Orbview 5) 9/6/2008 GeoEye Remote Sensing LEO

GOVERNMENT

Chandra X-Ray Observatory (CXO) 7/23/1999 NASA Goddard Space Flight 

Center

Astrophysics Elliptical

Interstellar Boundary EXplorer (IBEX) 10/19/2008 NASA/Goddard Space Flight 

Center

Space Physics Elliptical

Van Allen Probe A (RBSP-A, Radiation Belt Storm Probes) 8/30/2012 NASA/Johns Hopkins 

University Applied Physics 

Laboratory

Earth Science Elliptical

Van Allen Probe B (RBSP-B, Radiation Belt Storm Probes) 8/30/2012 NASA/Johns Hopkins 

University Applied Physics 

Laboratory

Earth Science Elliptical

GOES 13 (Geostationary Operational Environmental 

Satellite, GOES-N)

5/24/2006 NOAA (National 

Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric 

Administration)

Earth Science/

Meteorology

GEO

GOES 14 (Geostationary Operational Environmental 

Satellite, GOES-O)

6/27/2009 NOAA (National 

Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric 

Administration)

Earth Science/

Meteorology

GEO

GOES 15 (Geostationary Operational Ennvironmental 

Satellite, GOES-P)

3/4/2010 NOAA (National 

Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric 

Administration)

Earth Science/

Meteorology

GEO

SDO (Solar Dynamics Observatory) 2/11/2010 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

(NASA)

Space Science GEO

TDRS-10 (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, TDRS-J) 12/4/2002 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

(NASA)

Communications GEO

TDRS-11 (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, TDRS K) 1/31/2013 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

(NASA)/Goddard Space 

Flight Center

Communications GEO

TDRS-12 (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, TDRS L) 1/23/2014 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

(NASA)

Communications GEO

TDRS-3 (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, TDRS-C) 9/29/1988 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

(NASA)

Communications GEO

TDRS-7 (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, TDRS-G) 7/13/1995 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

(NASA)

Communications GEO
128

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

GOVERNMENT (CONT.)

TDRS-8 (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, TDRS-H) 6/30/2000 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

(NASA)

Communications GEO

TDRS-9 (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, TDRS-I) 3/8/2002 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

(NASA)

Communications GEO

EOS-PM Aqua (Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer 

for EOS, EOS PM-1)

5/4/2002 NASA - Earth Science 

Enterprise/Japan 

Meteorological 

Agency/Brazilian Space 

Agency

Earth Observation LEO

Global Change Observation Mission - 1 Water (GCOM-1, 

Shikuzu)

5/17/2012 Japan Aerospace 

Exploration Agency (JAXA)

Earth Science LEO

Jason 2 6/20/2008 NASA/Centre National 

d'Etudes Spatiales 

(CNES)/NOAA/EUMETSAT

Earth Science LEO

EOS-AM Terra 12/18/1999 Earth Sciences Enterprise 

(NASA)

Earth Science LEO

AcrimSat (Active Cavity Radiometer Irradiance Monitor) 12/21/1999 NASA Goddard Space Flight 

Center, Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory

Solar Physics LEO

Aeneas 9/13/2012 Department of Homeland 

Security

Technology Development LEO

AIM (Aeronomy of Ice in Mesosphere) 4/25/2007 Center for Atmospheric 

Sciences, Hampton 

University/NASA

Earth Science LEO

CFESat (Cibola Flight Experiment Satellite) 3/9/2007 Los Alamos National Labs 

(LANL)

Technology Development LEO

EO-1 (Earth Observing 1) 11/21/2000 NASA Earth Science Office Earth Observation/

Research

LEO

EOS-CHEM Aura 7/15/2004 Goddard Space Flight 

Center/EOS Data and 

Operations System

Remote Sensing LEO

Fermi Gamma-Ray Space Telescope (formerly GLAST) 6/11/2008 NASA/GSFC Astrophysics LEO

FORTÉ (Fast On-orbit Recording of Transient Events) 8/29/1997 Los Alamos National 

Labs/DOE

Earth Observation LEO

IPEX (Intelligent Payload Experiment, CalPoly 8) 12/6/2013 NASA/Goddard Space Flight 

Center

Technology Development LEO

IRIS (Interface Region Imaging Spectrometer) 6/28/2013 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

(NASA)

Space Science LEO

Landsat 7 4/15/1999 NASA/US Geological Survey Earth Science LEO

Landsat 8 2/11/2013 NASA/US Geological Survey Earth Science LEO

NOAA-15 (NOAA-K) 5/13/1998 National Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) (part of 

international program)

Earth Science/

Meteorology

LEO

NOAA-16 (NOAA-L) 9/21/2000 National Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) (part of 

international program)

Earth Science/

Meteorology

LEO

NOAA-18 (NOAA-N, COSPAS-SARSAT) 5/20/2005 National Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) (part of 

international program)

Meteorology LEO

NOAA-19 (NOAA-N Prime, COSPAS-SARSAT) 2/6/2009 National Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) (part of 

international program)

Meteorology LEO
129

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

GOVERNMENT (CONT.)

NPP (National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental 

Satellite System [NPOESS])

10/28/2011 National Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA)/NASA

Meteorology LEO

NuSTAR (Nuclear Spectroscopic Telescope Array) 6/13/2012 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

(NASA)

Space Science LEO

PCSat (Prototype Communications SATellite, Navy-Oscar 44, 

NO-44)

9/30/2001 US Naval Academy Technology Development/

Communications

LEO

Phonesat 2.4 11/19/2013 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

(NASA)

Technology Development LEO

NPS-SCAT (Naval Post-graduate School - Solar Cell Array 

Tester)

11/19/2013 Naval Post-Graduate School Technology Development LEO

GOVERNMENT/CIVIL

Swift 11/20/2004 Goddard Space Flight 

Center/Penn State 

University

Astrophysics LEO

Cloudsat 4/28/2006 NASA/Colorado State 

University

Earth Science LEO

Firefly 11/19/2013 NASA/Sienna College/Univ. 

of Maryland

Earth Science LEO

HESSI (RHESSI, Reuven Ramaty High Energy Solar 

Spectroscopic Imager)

2/5/2002 Space Sciences Laboratory, 

UC Berkeley/NASA

Astrophysics LEO

SORCE (SOlar Radiation and Climate Experiment) 1/25/2003 NASA Earth Science 

Office/Laboratory for 

Atmospheric and Space 

Physics, Univ. of Colorado

Astrophysics LEO

TIMED (Thermosphere • Ionosphere • Mesosphere • 

Energetics and Dynamics)

12/7/2001 NASA/Applied Physics 

Laboratory, Johns Hopkins

Astrophysics LEO

GOVERNMENT/COMMERCIAL

TDRS-5 (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, TDRS-E) 8/2/1991 SES Americom (SES [Société 

Européenne des Satellites 

(SES)])

Communications GEO

TDRS-6 (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, TDRS-F) 1/13/1993 NASA/SES Americom (SES 

[Société Européenne des 

Satellites (SES)])

Communications GEO

Iridium 10 (Iridium SV010) 6/18/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 11A (Iridium SVO88) 12/19/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 12 (Iridium SV012) 6/18/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 13 (Iridium SV013) 6/18/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 14A (Iridium SV092) 6/11/1999 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 15 (Iridium SV015) 7/9/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 18 (Iridium SV018) 7/9/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 19 (Iridium SV019) 9/27/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 20A (Iridium SV089) 12/19/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 21A (Iridium SVO93) 6/11/1999 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 22 (Iridium SV022) 8/21/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 23 (Iridium SV023) 8/21/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 25 (Iridium SV025) 8/21/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 29 (Iridium SV029) 9/14/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 3 (Iridium SV078) 8/19/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 30 (Iridium SV030) 9/14/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 31 (Iridium SVO31) 9/14/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 32 (Iridium SV032) 9/14/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO
130

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

GOVERNMENT/COMMERCIAL (CONT.)

Iridium 34 (Iridium SV034) 9/27/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 35 (Iridium SV035) 9/27/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 37 (Iridium SV037) 9/27/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 39 (Iridium SV039) 11/9/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 40 (Iridium SV040) 11/9/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 41 (Iridium SV041) 11/9/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 42 (Iridium SV042) 12/8/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 43 (Iridium SV043) 11/9/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 45 (Iridium SV045) 12/20/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 47 (Iridium SV047) 12/20/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 49 (Iridium SV049) 12/20/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 5 (Iridium SV005) 5/5/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 50 (Iridium SV050) 2/18/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 51 (Iridium SV 051) 3/25/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 52 (Iridium SV052) 2/18/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 53 (Iridium SV053) 2/18/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 54 (Iridium SV054) 2/18/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 55 (Iridium SV055) 3/30/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 56 (Iridium SV056) 2/18/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 57 (Iridium SV057) 3/30/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 58 (Iridium SV058) 3/30/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 59 (Iridium SV059) 3/30/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 6 (Iridium SV006) 5/6/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 60 (Iridium SV060) 3/30/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 61 (Iridium SV061) 3/25/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 62 (Iridium SV062) 4/7/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 63 (Iridium SV063) 4/7/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 64 (Iridium SV064) 4/7/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 65 (Iridium SV065) 4/7/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 66 (Iridium SV066) 4/7/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 67 (Iridium SV067) 4/7/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 68 (Iridium SV068) 4/7/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 7 (Iridium SV007) 5/5/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 70 (Iridium SV070) 5/17/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 72 (Iridium SV072) 5/17/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 74 (Iridium SV074) 5/17/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 75 (Iridium SV075) 5/17/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 76 (Iridium SV076) 8/19/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 77 (Iridium SV077) 9/8/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 8 (Iridium SV008) 5/5/1997 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 80 (Iridium SV080) 9/8/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 81 (Iridium SV081) 9/8/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 82 (Iridium SV082) 9/8/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 83 (Iridium SV083) 11/6/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 84 (Iridium SV084) 11/6/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 86 (Iridium SV086) 11/6/1998 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO
131

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

GOVERNMENT/COMMERCIAL (CONT.)

Iridium 90 (Iridium SV090) 2/11/2002 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 91 (Iridium SV091) 2/11/2002 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 94 (Iridium SV094) 2/11/2002 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 95 (Iridium SV095) 2/11/2002 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 96 (Iridium SV096) 2/11/2002 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 97 (Iridium SV097) 6/20/2002 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

Iridium 98 (Iridium SV098) 6/20/2002 Iridium Satellite LLC Communications LEO

GOVERNMENT/MILITARY

MTI (Multispectral Thermal Imager) 3/12/2000 US Department of 

Energy/Office of 

Nonproliferation and 

National Security

Technology Development LEO

MILITARY

Improved Trumpet 4 (NROL-22, National Reconnaissance 

Office Launch-22, SBIRS HEO-1, Twins 1, USA 184)

6/28/2006 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Electronic Surveillance Elliptical

Improved Trumpet 5 (NROL-28, National Reconnaissance 

Office Launch-28, SBIRS HEO-2, Twins 2, USA 200)

3/13/2008 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Electronic Surveillance Elliptical

SDS III-4 (Satellite Data System) (NRO L-1, Nemesis, USA 

179) 

8/31/2004 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)/US Air Force

Communications Elliptical

SDS III-5 (Satellite Data System) (NRO L-24, Scorpius, USA 

198) 

12/10/2007 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)/US Air Force

Communications Elliptical

SLDCOM-3 (Satellite Launch Dispenser Communications 

System) (USA 119)

5/12/1996 National Reconnaissance

Office (NRO)

Communications Elliptical

TacSat 4 9/27/2011 Naval Research Laboratory Technology Development Elliptical

Trumpet 3 (NROL-4, National Reconnaissance Office 

Launch-4, USA 136)

11/8/1997 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)/USAF

Electronic Surveillance Elliptical

Leasat 5 (Syncom IV-5, Leased Satellite F5) 1/9/1990 US DoD/Royal Australian 

Navy/Panamsat (owner)

Communications GEO

Advanced Orion 2 (NROL 6, USA 139) 5/9/1998 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Electronic Surveillance GEO

Advanced Orion 3 (NROL 19, USA 171) 9/9/2003 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Electronic Surveillance GEO

Advanced Orion 4 (NRO L-26, USA 202) 1/18/2009 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Electronic Surveillance GEO

Advanced Orion 5 (NRO L-32, USA 223) 11/21/2010 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Electronic Surveillance GEO

Advanced Orion 6 (NRO L-15, USA 237) 6/29/2012 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Electronic Surveillance GEO

AEHF-1 (Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite-1, 

USA 214)

8/14/2010 US Air Force Communications GEO

AEHF-2 (Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite-2, 

USA 235)

5/3/2012 US Air Force Communications GEO

AEHF-3 (Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite-3, 

USA 246)

9/18/2013 US Air Force Communications GEO

DSCS III-A3 (USA 167, DSCS III-A3) (Defense Satellite 

Communications System)

3/11/2003 US Air Force Communications GEO

DSCS III-B6 (USA 170, DSCS III B-6) (Defense Satellite 

Communications System)

8/29/2003 US Air Force Communications GEO

DSCS III-F10 (USA 135, DSCS III B-13) (Defense Satellite 

Communications System)

10/24/1997 US Air Force Communications GEO

DSCS III-F11 (USA 148, DSCS III B-8) (Defense Satellite 

Communications System)

1/1/2000 US Air Force Communications GEO

DSCS III-F12 (USA 153, DSCS III B-11) (Defense Satellite 

Communications System)

10/20/2000 US Air Force Communications GEO

DSCS III-F6 (USA 82, DSCS III B-12) (Defense Satellite 

Communications System)

7/2/1992 US Air Force Communications GEO

DSCS III-F8 (USA 97, DSCS III B-10) (Defense Satellite 

Communications System)

11/28/1993 US Air Force Communications GEO
132

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

MILITARY (CONT.)

DSCS III-F9 (USA 113, DSCS III B-7) (Defense Satellite 

Communications System)

7/31/1995 US Air Force Communications GEO

DSP 18 (USA 130) (Defense Support Program) 2/23/1997 Air Force Early Warning GEO

DSP 20 (USA 149) (Defense Support Program) 5/18/2000 Air Force Early Warning GEO

DSP 21 (USA 159) (Defense Support Program) 8/6/2001 Air Force Early Warning GEO

DSP 22 (USA 176) (Defense Support Program) 2/14/2004 Air Force Early Warning GEO

FLTSATCOM-8 (USA 46) 9/25/1989 US Navy Communications GEO

Mercury 1 (Advanced Vortex 1, USA 105) 8/27/1994 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)/USAF

Surveillance GEO

Mercury 2 (Advanced Vortex 2, USA 118) 4/24/1996 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)/USAF

Surveillance GEO

Milstar DFS-1 (USA 99, Milstar 1-F1) (Military Strategic and 

Tactical Relay)

2/7/1994 US Air Force Communications GEO

Milstar DFS-2 (USA 115, Milstar 1-F2) (Military Strategic and 

Tactical Relay)

11/6/1995 US Air Force Communications GEO

Milstar DFS-4 (USA 157, Milstar 2-F2) (Military Strategic and 

Tactical Relay)

2/27/2001 US Air Force Communications GEO

Milstar DFS-5 (USA 164, Milstar 2-F3) (Military Strategic and 

Tactical Relay)

1/16/2002 US Air Force Communications GEO

Milstar DFS-6 (USA 169) (Military Strategic and Tactical 

Relay)

4/8/2003 US Air Force Communications GEO

MUOS-1 (Mobile User Objective System 1) 2/24/2012 DoD/US Navy Communications GEO

MUOS-2 (Mobile User Objective System 2) 7/19/2013 DoD/US Navy Communications GEO

PAN-1 (Palladium at Night, P360, USA 207) 9/8/2009 Unknown US agency Communications GEO

SBIRS GEO 1 (Space Based Infrared System Geosynchronous 

1, USA 230)

5/7/2011 US Air Force Early Warning GEO

SBIRS GEO 2 (Space Based Infrared System Geosynchronous 

2, USA 241)

3/19/2013 US Air Force Early Warning GEO

SDS III-2 (Satellite Data System) (NRO L-10, Great Bear, USA 

155)

12/6/2000 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Electronic Surveillance GEO

SDS III-3 (Satellite Data System) (NRO L-12, Aquila-1, USA 

162) 

10/10/2001 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)/US Air Force

Communications GEO

SDS III-6 (Satellite Data System) NRO L-27, Gryphon, USA 

227)

3/2/2011 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)/US Air Force

Communications GEO

SDS III-7 (Satellite Data System) NRO L-38, Drake, USA 236) 6/20/2012 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)/US Air Force

Electronic Surveillance GEO

UFO-10 (USA 146, UHF F/O F10) “UHF Follow-On” 11/24/1999 US Navy Communications GEO

UFO-11 (USA 174) “UHF Follow-On” 12/18/2003 US Navy Communications GEO

UFO-2 (USA 95) “UHF Follow-On” 9/3/1993 US Navy Communications GEO

UFO-4 (USA 108, UFO F4 EHF) “UHF Follow-On” 1/29/1995 US Navy Communications GEO

UFO-6 (USA 114, UFO F6 EHF) “UHF Follow-On” 10/22/1995 US Navy Communications GEO

UFO-7 (USA 127, F7 EHF) “UHF Follow-On” 7/25/1996 US Navy Communications GEO

UFO-8 (USA 138, UHF F/O F8) “UHF Follow-On” 3/16/1998 US Navy Communications GEO

Wideband Global Satcom 1 (WGS-1, USA 195) 10/11/2007 Military Satellite 

Communications - US Air 

Force

Communications GEO

Wideband Global Satcom 2 (WGS-2, USA 204) 4/4/2009 Military Satellite 

Communications - US Air 

Force

Communications GEO

Wideband Global Satcom 3 (WGS-3, USA 211) 12/6/2009 Military Satellite 

Communications - US Air 

Force

Communications GEO

Wideband Global Satcom 4 (WGS-4, USA 233) 1/20/2012 Military Satellite 

Communications - US Air 

Force

Communications GEO
133

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

MILITARY (CONT.)

Wideband Global Satcom 5 (WGS-5, USA 243) 5/25/2013 Military Satellite 

Communications - US Air 

Force

Communications GEO

Wideband Global Satcom 6 (WGS-6, USA 244) 8/8/2013 Military Satellite 

Communications - US Air 

Force

Communications GEO

ALiCE (AFIT LEO iMESA CNT E) 12/6/2013 US Air Force Institute of 

Technology

Technology Development LEO

C/NOFS (Communication/Navigation Outage Forecasting 

System)

4/16/2008 US Air Force Technology Development LEO

Coriolis (Windsat) 1/6/2003 US Air Force/ US Navy/NASA Earth and Space Science LEO

DMSP 5D-2 F13 (Defense Meteorological Satellites Program, 

USA 109)

3/24/1995 DoD/NOAA Earth 

Science/Meteorology

LEO

DMSP 5D-2 F14 (Defense Meteorological Satellites Program, 

USA 131)

4/4/1997 DoD/NOAA Earth 

Science/Meteorology

LEO

DMSP 5D-3 F15 (Defense Meteorological Satellites Program, 

USA 147)

12/12/1999 DoD/NOAA Earth 

Science/Meteorology

LEO

DMSP 5D-3 F16 (Defense Meteorological Satellites Program, 

USA 172)

10/18/2003 DoD/NOAA Earth 

Science/Meteorology

LEO

DMSP 5D-3 F17 (Defense Meteorological Satellites Program, 

USA 191)

11/4/2006 DoD/NOAA Earth 

Science/Meteorology

LEO

DMSP 5D-3 F18 (Defense Meteorological Satellites Program, 

USA 210)

10/18/2009 DoD/NOAA Earth 

Science/Meteorology

LEO

FIA Radar 1 (Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) Radar 1, 

NROL-41, USA 215, Topaz)

9/21/2010 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Reconnaissance LEO

FIA Radar 2 (Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) Radar 2, 

NROL-25, USA 234, Topaz)

4/3/2012 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Reconnaissance LEO

FIA Radar 3 (Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) Radar 3, 

NROL-39 , USA 247, Topaz)

12/6/2013 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Reconnaissance LEO

Keyhole 3 (Advanced KH-11, KH-12-4, Advanced Keyhole, 

Misty-2, EIS-1, 8X Enhanced Imaging System, USA 144)

5/22/1999 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Reconnaissance LEO

Keyhole 4 (Advanced KH-11, Advanced Keyhole, Improved 

Crystal, EIS-2, 8X Enhanced Imaging System, NROL 14, USA 

161)

10/5/2001 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Reconnaissance LEO

Keyhole 5 (Advanced KH-11, KH-12-5, Improved Crystal, EIS3, USA 186)10/19/2005 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Reconnaissance LEO

Keyhole 6 (NRO L49, Advanced KH-11, KH-12-6, Improved 

Crystal, USA 224)

1/20/2011 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Reconnaissance LEO

Keyhole 7 (NRO L65, Advanced KH-11, Improved Crystal, 

USA 245)

8/28/2013 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Reconnaissance LEO

Lacrosse/Onyx 3 (Lacrosse-3, USA 133) 10/24/1997 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Surveillance LEO

Lacrosse/Onyx 4 (Lacrosse-4, USA 152) 8/17/2000 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Surveillance LEO

Lacrosse/Onyx 5 (Lacrosse-5, NROL 16, USA 182) 4/30/2005 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Surveillance LEO

NFIRE (Near Field InfraRed Experiment) 4/24/2007 Missile Defense Agency Technology Development LEO

ORS - Tech 1 11/19/2013 US Army Technology Development LEO

ORS - Tech 2 11/19/2013 US Army Technology Development LEO

ORS-1 (Operationally Responsive Space One, USA 231) 6/30/2011 U.S. Air Force/ DoD Reconnaissance LEO

ORSES (ORS Enabler Satellite) 11/19/2013 US Army Technology Development LEO

Prometheus 1A 11/19/2013 Los Alamos National 

Laboratory

Technology Development LEO

Prometheus 1B 11/19/2013 Los Alamos National 

Laboratory

Technology Development LEO

Prometheus 2A 11/19/2013 Los Alamos National 

Laboratory

Technology Development LEO

Prometheus 2B 11/19/2013 Los Alamos National 

Laboratory

Technology Development LEO
134

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

MILITARY (CONT.)

Prometheus 3A 11/19/2013 Los Alamos National 

Laboratory

Technology Development LEO

Prometheus 3B 11/19/2013 Los Alamos National 

Laboratory

Technology Development LEO

Prometheus 4A 11/19/2013 Los Alamos National 

Laboratory

Technology Development LEO

Prometheus 4B 11/19/2013 Los Alamos National 

Laboratory

Technology Development LEO

Rapid Pathfinder Program (NROL-66, USA 225) 2/6/2011 National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO)

Technology Development LEO

SBSS-1 (Space Based Space Surveillance Satellite, SBSS Block 

10 SV1, USA 216)

9/26/2010 Strategic Space 

Command/Space 

Surveillance Network

Reconnaissance LEO

SB-WASS 3-1 (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System) 

(NOSS 3-1, NOSS C1-1, USA 160)

9/8/2001 National Reconnaissance 

Office/US Navy

Electronic 

Surveillance/Ocean

LEO

SB-WASS 3-1 (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System) 

(NOSS 3-1,USA 160, NOSS C1-2) 

9/8/2001 National Reconnaissance 

Office/US Navy

Electronic 

Surveillance/Ocean

LEO

SB-WASS 3-2 (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System) 

(NOSS 3-2, USA 173, NOSS C2-1) 

12/2/2003 National Reconnaissance 

Office/US Navy

Electronic 

Surveillance/Ocean

LEO

SB-WASS 3-2 (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System) 

(NOSS 3-2, USA 173, NOSS C2-2) 

12/2/2003 National Reconnaissance 

Office/US Navy

Electronic 

Surveillance/Ocean

LEO

SB-WASS 3-3 (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System) 

(NOSS 3-3, USA 181, NRO L23) 

2/3/2005 National Reconnaissance 

Office/US Navy

Electronic 

Surveillance/Ocean

LEO

SB-WASS 3-3 (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System) 

(NOSS 3-3, USA 181, NRO L28) 

2/3/2005 National Reconnaissance 

Office/US Navy

Electronic 

Surveillance/Ocean

LEO

SB-WASS 3-4 (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System) 

NOSS 3-4, USA 194, NRO L30)

6/15/2007 National Reconnaissance 

Office/US Navy

Electronic 

Surveillance/Ocean

LEO

SB-WASS 3-4 (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System) 

NOSS 3-4, USA 194, NRO L30)

6/15/2007 National Reconnaissance 

Office/US Navy

Electronic 

Surveillance/Ocean

LEO

SB-WASS 3-5 (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System) 

NOSS 3-5, USA 229, NRO L34)

4/15/2011 National Reconnaissance 

Office/US Navy

Electronic 

Surveillance/Ocean

LEO

SB-WASS 3-5 (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System) 

NOSS 3-5, USA 229, NRO L34)

4/15/2011 National Reconnaissance 

Office/US Navy

Electronic 

Surveillance/Ocean

LEO

SB-WASS 3-6 (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System) 

NOSS 3-6, USA 238, NRO L36)

9/13/2012 National Reconnaissance 

Office/US Navy

Electronic 

Surveillance/Ocean

LEO

SB-WASS 3-6 (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System) 

NOSS 3-6, USA 238, NRO L36)

9/13/2012 National Reconnaissance 

Office/US Navy

Electronic 

Surveillance/Ocean

LEO

SMDC-ONE 1.1 (Techsat) 9/13/2012 U.S.Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command

Technology Development LEO

SMDC-ONE 1.2 (ORSES [Operationally Responsive Space 

Enabler Satellite])

9/13/2012 U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command

Technology Development LEO

SMDC-ONE 2.3 12/6/2013 U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command

Technology Development LEO

SMDC-ONE 2.4 12/6/2013 U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command

Technology Development LEO

SNaP-3-1 (Space and Missile Defense Command NanoSat 

Program)

12/6/2013 U.S. Southern Command Communications LEO

STARE-B (Horus [Space-Based Telescopes for Actionable 

Refinement of Ephemeris])

11/19/2013 National Reconaissance 

Office

Remote Sensing LEO

STPSat-2 (USA 217) 11/20/2010 USAF Space Test Program Technology Development LEO

STPSat-3 (Space Test Program Satellite-3) 11/19/2013 US Air Force Technology Development LEO

STSS ATRR (Space Tracking and Surveillance System 

Advanced Technology Risk Reduction Satellite, USA 205)

5/5/2009 Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA)

Technology Development LEO

STSS Demo-1 (Space Tracking and Surveillance System 

Demonstrator)

9/25/2009 Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA)

Technology Development LEO

STSS Demo-2 (Space Tracking and Surveillance System 

Demonstrator)

9/25/2009 Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA)

Technology Development LEO

TacSat 6 Operational Responsive 

Space (ORS) Office

Technology Development LEO

X37-B OTV-1 (USA 240) 12/11/2012 US Air Force Technology Development LEO
135

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

MILITARY/COMMERCIAL

Worldview 1 9/18/2007 DigitalGlobe Corporation Earth Observation LEO

Worldview 2 10/8/2009 DigitalGlobe Corporation Earth Observation LEO

Navstar GPS II-10 (Navstar SVN 23, PRN 32, USA 66) 11/26/1990 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS II-14 (Navstar SVN 26, PRN 26, USA 83) 7/7/1992 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS II-21 (Navstar SVN 39, PRN 09, USA 92) 6/26/1993 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS II-23 (Navstar SVN 34, PRN 04, USA 96) 10/26/1993 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS II-24 (Navstar SVN 36, PRN 06, USA 100) 3/10/1994 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS II-25 (Navstar SVN 33, PRN 03, USA 117) 3/28/1996 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS II-26 (Navstar SVN 40, PRN 10, USA 126) 7/16/1996 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS II-28 (Navstar SVN 38, PRN 08, USA 135) 11/6/1997 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS II-35 (Navstar SVN 35, PRN 30, USA 94) 8/30/1993 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIF-1 (Navstar SVN 62, PRN 25, USA 213) 5/28/2010 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIF-2 (Navstar SVN 63, PRN 01, USA 232) 7/16/2011 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIF-3 (Navstar SVN 65, USA 239) 10/4/2012 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIF-4 (Navstar SVN 66, USA 242) 5/15/2013 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-10 (Navstar SVN 47, PRN 22, USA 175) 12/21/2003 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-11 (Navstar SVN 59, PRN 19, USA 177) 3/20/2004 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-12 (Navstar SVN 60, PRN 23, USA 178) 6/23/2004 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-13 (Navstar SVN 61, PRN 02, USA 180) 11/6/2004 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-2 (Navstar SVN 43, PRN 13, USA 132) 7/23/1997 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-3 (Navstar SVN 46, PRN 11, USA 145) 10/7/1999 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-4 (Navstar SVN 51, PRN 20, USA 150) 5/11/2000 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-5 (Navstar SVN 44, PRN 28, USA 151) 7/16/2000 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-6 (Navstar SVN 41, PRN 14, USA 154) 11/10/2000 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-7 (Navstar SVN 54, PRN 18, USA 156) 1/30/2001 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-8 (Navstar SVN 56, PRN 16, USA 166) 1/29/2003 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-9 (Navstar SVN 45, PRN 21, USA 168) 3/31/2003 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-M-1 (Navstar SVN 53, PRN 17, USA 183) 9/26/2005 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-M-2 (Navstar SVN 52, PRN 31, USA 190) 9/25/2006 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-M-3 (Navstar SVN 58, PRN 12, USA 192) 11/17/2006 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-M-4 (Navstar SVN 55, PRN 15, USA 196) 10/17/2007 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO
136

Satellite

Launch 

Date Owner Purpose Orbit

MILITARY/COMMERCIAL (CONT.)

Navstar GPS IIR-M-5 (Navstar SVN 57, PRN 29, USA 199) 12/20/2007 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-M-6 (Navstar SVN 48, PRN 07, USA 201) 3/15/2008 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Navstar GPS IIR-M-8 (Navstar SVN 50, PRN 05, USA 206) 8/17/2009 DoD/US Air Force Navigation/Global 

Positioning

MEO

Source: Data from Union of Concerned Scientists database, updated January 31, 2014, 

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/solutions/space-weapons/ucs-satellitedatabase.html#.VHUDZU3Qe74.