JUDICIAL

DISQUALIFICATION

An Analysis of Federal Law

Third Edition

Judicial Disqualification

An Analysis of Federal Law

Third Edition

Judicial Disqualification

An Analysis of Federal Law

Third Edition

Charles Gardner Geyh

Distinguished Professor

John F. Kimberling Professor of Law

Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Kris Markarian

Legal Editor
Third edition 2020

Second printing 2018

Second edition 2010

First edition 2002

Federal Judicial Center

Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building

One Columbus Circle NE

Washington, DC 20002

fjc.dcn • fjc.gov

This Federal Judicial Center publication was undertaken in furtherance of the Center’s statutory 

mission to develop educational materials for the judicial branch. While the Center regards the content 

as responsible and valuable, this publication does not reflect policy or recommendations of the Board 

of the Federal Judicial Center.

This publication was produced and published at U.S. taxpayer expense.
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Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I. Judicial Disqualification: History and Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

A. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

B. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

II. Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

A. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

1. The text of § 455 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2. Interpretive ground rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

a. Interpreting § 455(a) in relation to § 455(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

b. Balancing the duty to decide with the duty to disqualify . . . . . 15

c. The rule of necessity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

d. Special concerns in bench trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

e. Standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

B. Grounds for disqualification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

1. General standard: when impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned—§ 455(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

a. Framework for analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

b. Recurring scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

i. Judge’s prior relationship with parties, witnesses, 

or lawyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

ii. Judge’s conduct in judicial proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

iii. Judge’s extrajudicial conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

iv. Parties’ conduct toward judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

2. Specific grounds: § 455(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
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a. Personal bias, prejudice, or knowledge: § 455(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . 51

i. Bias and prejudice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

ii. Extrajudicial source of bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

iii. Bias against nonparties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

iv. Knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

b. Prior association with matter as private practitioner or 

witness: § 455(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

c. Prior association with matter as governmental employee: 

§ 455(b)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

d. Financial interest in matter: § 455(b)(4) and § 455(f) . . . . . . . 61

i. Disqualification for financial interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

ii. Divestiture as a cure for “financial interest” 

disqualification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

e. Other interests of judge and judge’s family: § 455(b)(5) . . . . . 66

i. When judge or relatives are parties or associated with 

parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

ii. When judge or relative acts as lawyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

iii. When judge or relatives have an interest that could be 

substantially affected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

iv. When judge or relative is likely to be material witness . . . 71

C. Disqualification procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

1. Investigating disqualification claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

2. Waiver of disqualification: § 455(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

3. Timeliness of disqualification motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

4. Evaluation of motion by merits judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

5. Postdisqualification procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

a. Postdisqualification actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

b. Predisqualification orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

III. Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 144 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

A. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

B. Grounds for disqualification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Contents

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1. Bias or prejudice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

2. “Extrajudicial source” doctrine revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

3. Bias toward counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

C. Disqualification procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

1. Timeliness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

2. Facially sufficient affidavit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

3. Counsel’s certificate of good faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95

IV. Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

V. Disqualification on Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

A. Routes of appellate review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

B. Standards of review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

C. Issues on appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

1. Harmless error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

2. Reviewability of lower court decisions to disqualify . . . . . . . . . . . 106

3. Mootness of underlying dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

4. Impact of guilty plea on reviewability of nondisqualification . . . 108

5. Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

D. Disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Appendix A: Code of Conduct for United States Judges (Canons 3C and 3D) . . . 115

Appendix B: For Further Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Alphabetical Table of Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Table of Cases by Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

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Preface and

Acknowledgments

This monograph updates and revises the second edition. The author would like 

to thank Kyle Grothoff and Charles Rice, who helped to assemble and analyze 

much of the new material included in the third edition, and Katelyn Klingler, 

Jordan Lee, and Celia Meredith, who reviewed and revised the draft for publication ahead of schedule. Thanks too—and as always—to Rita Eads for her administrative support.

The Federal Judicial Center acknowledges the contribution of the Committee 

on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States and staff 

members of the Office of General Counsel of the Administrative Office of the 

U.S. Courts.

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Introduction

For centuries, impartiality has been a defining feature of the Anglo-American 

judge’s role in the administration of justice. The reason is clear: in a constitutional 

order grounded in the rule of law, it is imperative that judges make decisions according to law, unclouded by personal bias or conflicts of interest. Accordingly, 

upon ascending the bench, every federal judge takes an oath to “faithfully and 

impartially discharge and perform all the duties” of judicial office. 1 Moreover, the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been construed to guarantee litigants the right to a “neutral and detached,” or impartial, judge. 2

 Lastly, 

in a democratic republic in which the legitimacy of government depends on the 

consent and approval of the governed, public confidence in the administration of 

justice is indispensable. It is not enough that judges be impartial; the public must 

perceive them to be so. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges therefore 

admonishes judges to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” and to “avoid impropriety 

and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.” 3

When the impartiality of a judge is in doubt, the appropriate remedy is to 

disqualify that judge from hearing further proceedings in the matter. In Caperton 

v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 4 a case concerning disqualification of a state supreme 

court justice, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that litigants have a due process 

right to an impartial judge, and that under circumstances in which judicial bias 

is probable, due process requires disqualification. The Court noted, however, that 

disqualification rules may be and often are more rigorous than the Due Process 

Clause requires. In the aftermath of Caperton, the House Judiciary Committee 

held a hearing on the state of judicial disqualification in the federal system. 5

Disqualification requirements for federal judges require disqualification not just 

1. 28 U.S.C. § 453. Note: All cites to U.S. Code are to the most recent version unless otherwise 

indicated.

2. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).

3. Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 2A.

4. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).

5. Examining the State of Judicial Recusals after Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Hearing Before the 

Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009).
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when a judge is biased or probably biased, but also when a judge’s impartiality 

“might reasonably be questioned.” 6

This monograph describes its subject as “disqualification,” not “recusal,” except when “recusal” is embedded in quoted material. In common parlance, “disqualification” and “recusal” are sometimes used interchangeably. Other times, 

the two terms are distinguished, with “recusal” referring to withdrawal on the 

judge’s own initiative, and “disqualification” meaning withdrawal on the motion 

of a party. Applicable federal statutes—and the Code of Conduct for United States 

Judges—however, use “disqualification” broadly to embrace withdrawal both on 

motion and sua sponte. Because none of the primary sources of applicable law 

under study here refer to recusal, this monograph follows their lead.

Disqualification has ethical and procedural dimensions. The ethical dimension is governed by Canon 3C of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 7

as construed by the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference 

of the United States. 8 Readers are encouraged to consult the Code of Conduct, 

the Published Advisory Opinions 9 of the committee, and the Compendium of 

Selected Opinions of the committee.

The procedural dimension, in contrast, is governed by four sections in Title 

28 of the U.S. Code: §§ 47, 144, 455, and 2106. Although the text of Canon 3C on 

disqualification is substantially similar to 28 U.S.C. § 455, and both seek to promote 

public confidence in the judiciary, the focus of the two is different. Whereas the 

goal of the Code of Conduct—including Canon 3C—is to inform federal judges 

of their ethical obligations, to the end of advising them on conduct, § 455 is a 

procedural statute aimed at articulating disqualification standards, to the end of 

preserving the rights of litigants to impartial justice. This monograph focuses on 

the procedural dimension of federal judicial disqualification through an analysis 

of the applicable statutory law.

The two principal statutes governing judicial disqualification are 28 U.S.C. 

§ 455, “Disqualification of justice, judge or magistrate judge” (discussed in section II), and 28 U.S.C. § 144, “Bias or prejudice of judge” (discussed in section III). 

The relationship between the two has been a source of some confusion. Although 

the two sections provide overlapping remedies for bias, there are some important 

differences. First, § 144 aims exclusively at actual bias or prejudice, whereas § 455 

deals not only with actual bias and other forms of partiality but also with the 

6. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

7. See appendix A for text of Canon 3C.

8. “The Code of Conduct is the law with respect to the ethical obligations of federal judges.” 

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

9. Available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/judiciary-policies.
Introduction

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appearance of partiality. Second, § 144 is triggered by a party’s affidavit, whereas 

§ 455 may be invoked in a motion by a party or sua sponte by the judge. Third, 

§ 144 applies only to district judges, while § 455 covers “[a]ny justice, judge, or 

magistrate judge of the United States.”10

A third disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 47 (discussed in section IV), 

provides that “[n]o judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision 

of a case or issue tried by him.” The statute applies to judges sitting on courts of 

appeals who were recently appointed from the district court or who are district 

judges sitting by designation, and directs their disqualification from appeals of 

cases they decided as trial judges. Given its limited applicability, this statute has 

been utilized infrequently, and for the most part uneventfully.

A fourth statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (discussed in section V), is not a 

disqualification statute as such but has been used to serve a comparable purpose. 

It authorizes the Supreme Court and circuit courts to “remand the cause 

and . . . require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the 

circumstances.” Section 2106 effectively enables an appellate court to disqualify a 

district judge by remanding a matter to a different judge for further proceedings 

if the appellate court doubts the original judge’s impartiality.

10. See Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 544 n.10 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The District Court is 

thus ultimately responsible for the decision, including for the Magistrate’s report and recommendation 

if it is adopted in its entirety, but magistrate judges play an important role in the operation of the 

federal courts and must take care to word their published recommendations accordingly. Indeed, it is 

equally applicable to District Judges and Magistrates that ‘[w]henever a judge’s impartiality “might 

reasonably be questioned” in a proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) commands the judge to disqualify 

himself sua sponte in that proceeding.’”).

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I

Judicial Disqualification 

History and Policy

A. History

Disqualification standards in the United States have been a work in progress, 

gaining in complexity and strength over time. In 1792, Congress enacted legislation that was the precursor to 28 U.S.C. § 455. This legislation codified the common law by calling for disqualification of a district judge who was “concerned in 

interest” but added that a judge could also be disqualified if the judge “has been 

of counsel for either party.”11 The statute was expanded in 1821 to require disqualification when relatives of the judge appeared as parties. 12

In 1891, Congress enacted legislation, later codified as 28 U.S.C. §  47, forbidding a judge from hearing the appeal of a case that the judge tried. 13 In 1911, 

the precursor to § 455 was further amended to require disqualification when the 

judge was a material witness in the case. 14 That same year, Congress also enacted 

legislation—the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 144—entitling a party to secure the 

disqualification of a judge by submitting an affidavit that the judge has “a personal bias or prejudice” against the affiant or for the opposing party. 15 A decade later, 

in Berger v. United States, 16 the Supreme Court interpreted this statute to prohibit 

a judge from ruling on the truth of matters asserted in such an affidavit and to 

require automatic disqualification if the affidavit was facially sufficient.

11. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 279.

12. Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643.

13. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 23, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090.

14. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090.

15. Id. § 21.

16. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
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In 1927, the Supreme Court added a constitutional dimension to the law of disqualification. In Tumey v. Ohio, 17 the Court invalidated, on due process grounds, an 

Ohio statute that authorized a judge to preside over cases in which the judge would 

receive court costs assessed against convicted (but not acquitted) defendants.

By the mid-twentieth century, common-law aversion to judicial bias as 

grounds for disqualification continued to exert considerable influence. Section 455 

remained silent as to bias. Section 144—although ostensibly enabling a party to 

disqualify a district judge simply by submitting an affidavit alleging personal 

bias—had been construed exactingly by the courts of appeals. As Professor John 

Frank explained at the time, “narrow construction of the phrase ‘bias and prejudice’” had allowed frequent evasion of the statute. 18 Courts would find affidavits 

“not ‘legally sufficient’” because the “specific acts mentioned” did not “indicate 

‘bias and prejudice,’” thereby “emasculat[ing] the Berger decision by transferring 

the point of conflict.”19 Frank warned that “[u]nless and until the Supreme Court 

gives new force and effect to the Berger decision, the disqualification practice of 

the federal district courts will remain sharply limited.” 20

In 1948, § 455 was further amended to disqualify judges who were related to 

a party’s lawyer (not just related to a party, as had been the case since 1821). As 

amended, the statute then provided:

Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any 

case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has, 

been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with a party or his 

attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, 

appeal, or other proceeding therein. 21

In 1964, the Fifth Circuit articulated a so-called duty to sit. 22 “It is a judge’s 

duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified, but it is equally his duty to sit when 

there is no valid reason for recusation.” 23 In context, this created a duty to preside 

notwithstanding obvious appearance problems—problems that did not warrant 

disqualification under existing law. By 1972, Justice William Rehnquist reported, 

in Laird v. Tatum, 24 that the duty to sit had been accepted by all circuit courts.

17. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).

18. John Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L.J. 605, 629 (1927).

19. Id.

20. Id. at 630. See also United States v. Malinsky, 153 F. Supp. 321, 324–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (relying 

on Frank’s discussion in support of trend justifying court’s rejection of § 144 claim).

21. 28 U.S.C. § 455, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 908 (1948).

22. United States v. Edwards, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964).

23. Id. at 362 n.2.

24. 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972).
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History and Policy

In 1972, the American Bar Association published the Model Code of Judicial 

Conduct to replace the Canons of Judicial Ethics it had promulgated fifty years 

earlier. The Model Code sought to encapsulate the ethics of disqualification into 

a unified rule. 25 Under the new rule, a judge was subject to disqualification “in a 

proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including 

but not limited to” cases in which the judge had an actual bias concerning a party, 

had served as a lawyer in the matter (or was still with his former firm when the 

matter was being handled by another lawyer in that firm), had an interest in the 

case, or was related to the parties or their lawyers.

In 1973, the Judicial Conference of the United States adopted the Code of 

Conduct for United States Judges, based on the 1972 Model Code. The Code of 

Conduct applies to appellate and district judges, judges on the Courts of International Trade and Federal Claims, and bankruptcy and magistrate judges. The 

Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct is authorized to render advisory opinions about the code when requested by a judge to whom the code applies.

In 1974, Congress adopted, with some variations, the Model Code’s disqualification rule in an amendment to § 455, which—by virtue of its requirement 

that judges disqualify themselves whenever their impartiality might reasonably 

be questioned—was generally seen as qualifying, if not ending, the “duty to sit.” 26

B. Policy

The history of judicial disqualification, discussed in the preceding section, reveals at least three policies at work, all of which are oriented toward preserving 

and promoting an impartial judiciary. First is fair process. To guarantee litigants 

their day in court before an impartial judge, we need a mechanism to disqualify 

judges who may be biased against a party or otherwise closed-minded. This is, in 

effect, the due process justification for disqualification—a means to protect the 

rights of litigants to a fair hearing before an impartial judge. 27

25. Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C (Am. Bar Ass’n 1972).

26. See Charles Gardner Geyh, James J. Alfini, Steven Lubet & Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial 

Conduct and Ethics § 4.03 (5th ed. 2013).

27. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (Due Process Clause guarantees parties “right to have 

an impartial judge”); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 

basic requirement of due process”). See also Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Terminology (Am. Bar 

Ass’n 2007) (defining “impartial” as the “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular 

parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may 

come before a judge”).
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Second is court legitimacy. To reassure the general public that its courts can 

be trusted to administer justice impartially, we must exclude judges whose conduct calls their impartiality into question. This focus on public confidence is what 

led lawmakers to amend § 455 in 1974 to disqualify judges whose impartiality 

“might reasonably be questioned.” 28

Third is civic virtue. Disqualification rules are embedded in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges as a means to promote ethical and virtuous judging 

by exhorting judges to live up to the ideals of the judicial role and step aside when 

their impartiality is in doubt. 29

Taken in isolation, these three justifications for disqualification rules—fair 

process, court legitimacy, and civic virtue—would seem to favor a robust disqualification regime. But there are three countervailing concerns to be weighed in the 

balance. First, an unduly rigorous system of disqualification could be counterproductive. If the goal is to promote public and litigant confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary, a system in which judges are forever being challenged and 

removed could engender the perception that the judiciary is awash with bias. So 

there is something to be said for disqualification rules establishing a meaningful 

threshold that must be met before the time-honored presumption of impartiality 

is rebutted. Chief Justice Roberts made this point in his dissent in Caperton v. 

A.T. Massey Coal Co. 30 He argued that reading the Due Process Clause to require 

disqualification for probable bias “will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those charges may be. The end 

result will do far more to erode public confidence in judicial impartiality than an 

isolated failure to recuse in a particular case.” 31 The Caperton majority was mindful of the Chief Justice’s concern but concluded that “[a]pplication of the constitutional standard implicated in this case will . . . be confined to rare instances.” 32

Second, an unduly rigorous disqualification regime can put a strain on the 

judicial workforce that jeopardizes the expeditious administration of justice. 

To the extent that justice delayed is justice denied, the need for meaningful 

28. “If we are concerned, as most of us are with the need to shore up public confidence in our 

public institutions, we need to remove any scintilla of doubt that the public might have that that judge 

would be prejudiced in his decision. And that is why the criteria that we establish in S. 1886 is rather 

strict.” Judicial Disqualification: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery

of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1064, 93d Cong. 14 (1971 & 1973) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, 

cosponsor).

29. Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble, para. 3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2011).

30. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).

31. Id. at 891 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

32. Id. at 890 (Kennedy, J., opinion of the court).
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History and Policy

disqualification standards must be weighed against the concern that “overdisqualification” depletes the supply of judges available to adjudicate cases. 33

Third, unduly rigorous disqualification standards enable litigants and their 

lawyers to game the system. If disqualification is made too easy to obtain, litigants can exploit disqualification strategically, to remove judges who are unlikely 

to be receptive to a party’s arguments on the merits, for reasons having little to do 

with the judges’ “impartiality,” as properly understood. 34

These policy considerations are of limited relevance to the interpretation of 

unambiguous rules requiring judges to disqualify themselves for clearly defined 

conflicts of interest, such as when the judge owns stock in a corporate party or 

the judge’s daughter enters an appearance before the court as counsel of record. 

But they can play a role when the court is called on to decide whether a judge’s 

impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.” This is particularly true in greyarea cases that present a novel set of facts, where these policy implications can help 

strike a balance that promotes the purposes served by a rigorous disqualification 

regime without being so rigorous as to raise countervailing concerns.

33. Canon 3A(2) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges (see appendix A) provides that 

“A judge should hear and decide matters assigned, unless disqualified.” Commentary accompanying 

a similar rule in the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct explains that “judges must be available 

to decide matters that come before the courts,” and that “unwarranted disqualification” is at odds 

with “the judge’s respect for fulfillment of judicial duties, and a proper concern for the burdens that 

may be imposed upon the judge’s colleagues.” Model Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.7, cmt. (Am. Bar 

Ass’n 2014).

34. Justice Breyer made this point in an opinion he wrote on behalf of the court when he was a 

circuit judge, emphasizing that the disqualification standard must be crafted “to prevent parties from 

too easily obtaining the disqualification of a judge, thereby potentially manipulating the system for 

strategic reasons, perhaps to obtain a judge more to their liking.” In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 

970 (1st Cir. 1989).

fjc.dcn • fjc.gov 11

II Disqualification Under 

28 U.S.C. § 455

A. Overview

1. The text of § 455

The primary source of disqualification law in the federal judicial system is 

28 U.S.C. § 455. It provides, in its entirety, as follows:

§ 455. Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall 

disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality 

might reasonably be questioned. 

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: 

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, 

or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; 

(2) Where in private practice he served as a lawyer in the matter 

in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced 

law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the 

matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness 

concerning it; 

(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in 

such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy; 

(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse 

or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the 

proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially 

affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 
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12 Federal Judicial Center

(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: 

(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or 

trustee of a party; 

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be 

substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 

(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness 

in the proceeding. 

(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary 

financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself 

about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household. 

(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases 

shall have the meaning indicated:

(1) “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other 

stages of litigation;

(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil 

law system; 

(3) “fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian;

(4) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or 

other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that: 

(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that 

holds securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of 

the fund; 

(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a “financial interest” in 

securities held by the organization; 

(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual 

insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings 

association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a “financial interest” in the organization only if the outcome of 

the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the 

interest; 

(iv) Ownership of government securities is a “financial interest” in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding 

could substantially affect the value of the securities. 
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fjc.dcn • fjc.gov 13

(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the parties 

to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification 

arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided 

it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for 

disqualification. 

(f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any 

justice, judge, magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge to whom a 

matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after substantial 

judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her, 

that he or she individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse 

or minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial 

interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if 

the justice, judge, magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or 

minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of the 

interest that provides the grounds for the disqualification. 

Subsections (a) and (b) occupy the core of § 455 and should be read together. 

The two subsections divide the universe of disqualification into two categories: 

the general catchall of § 455(a), which requires disqualification from any proceeding in which a judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned”; and a 

list of more specific grounds for disqualification in § 455(b).

The rest of § 455 is directed at implementing subsections (a) and (b):

• Subsection (c) admonishes judges to keep abreast of their financial interests to ensure that they know when to disqualify themselves under 

§ 455(b)(4).

• Subsection (d) defines the terms used in subsections (a) and (b).

• Subsection (e) provides parties with a limited opportunity to waive disqualification otherwise required by the catchall subsection (a), typically 

where the judge is poised to disqualify himself or herself sua sponte. It 

does not, however, permit the parties to waive disqualification required 

by the more specific provisions of subsection (b).

• Subsection (f) provides a limited opportunity for judges to avoid the 

need to disqualify themselves for financial interest under subsection 

(b)(4) through divestiture.
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14 Federal Judicial Center

2. Interpretive ground rules

a. Interpreting § 455(a) in relation to § 455(b)

As embodied in § 455, subsections (a) and (b) are conceptually separate. Subsection (a) compels disqualification for the appearance of partiality, while subsection 

(b) “also” compels disqualification for bias, financial interest, and other specific grounds. In contrast, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct—after which 

§ 455 was originally modeled—and the current Code of Conduct for United States 

Judges unify the two halves conceptually by characterizing the specific grounds 

for disqualification in subsection (b) as a nonexclusive subset of circumstances in 

which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned in subsection (a). 35

In other words, § 455 says that judges must disqualify themselves under subsection (a) when their impartiality might reasonably be questioned and when one 

of the specific scenarios enumerated in subsection (b) applies. The ABA Model 

Code, in contrast, declares that judges must disqualify themselves when their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, which includes but is not limited to the 

conflict-of-interest scenarios enumerated in subsection (b).

For the most part, this may be a distinction without a difference—disqualification is required if the specific or general provisions are triggered, regardless of 

whether the specific provisions are characterized as a subset of or separate from 

the general. On the other hand, by conceptualizing them separately, § 455 can 

require disqualification under specific circumstances enumerated in subsection 

(b) that might not reasonably be characterized as calling a judge’s impartiality 

into question under subsection (a). For example, subsection (b)(4) requires judges to disqualify themselves for “financial interest” (defined in subsection (d) as 

“however small”)—which necessarily includes an interest so small that it could 

not reasonably call the judge’s impartiality into question. 36

Any circumstance in which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned under § 455(a) requires disqualification, even if the circumstance is not 

enumerated in § 455(b). 37 At the same time, when § 455(b) identifies a particular 

situation requiring disqualification, it will tend to control any §  455(a) analysis with respect to that specific situation. For example, § 455(b)(5) requires disqualification when one of the parties is within the third degree of relationship to 

the judge. Consequently, a fourth-degree relationship to a party does not by itself 

create an appearance of partiality requiring disqualification under § 455(a). As 

35. Model Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.11(a) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2011); Canon 3C, Code of Conduct 

for United States Judges (2019).

36. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 n.8 (1988).

37. Id.
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fjc.dcn • fjc.gov 15

the Supreme Court explained, “[s]ection 455(b)(5), which addresses the matter 

of relationship specifically, ends the disability at the third degree of relationship, 

and that should obviously govern for purposes of § 455(a) as well.” 38 That said, 

disqualification under §  455(a) might still be appropriate if, for example, the 

judge’s personal relationship with the fourth-degree relative was so close as to call 

the judge’s impartiality into question. In that situation, disqualification would be 

required not because the party is a remote blood relative of the judge but because 

of the close personal relationship between the two. As a practical matter, however, 

when a litigant seeks disqualification under both §§ 455(a) and (b), and the court 

is satisfied that disqualification is required under § 455(a), it will frequently avoid 

the complexities of interpreting the sections in relation to each other by concluding that it need not address the § 455(b) claim. 39

b. Balancing the duty to decide with the duty to disqualify

Prior to 1974, the courts of appeals applied a judicial “gloss” to § 455 that created a 

“duty to sit,” 40 whereby judges resolved close questions against disqualification—

including cases in which a judge’s impartiality was in doubt, as long as an 

enumerated conflict of interest requiring disqualification did not apply. The 1974 

amendments to § 455, however, shifted the balance by requiring disqualification 

whenever a judge’s impartiality “might” reasonably be questioned, and the 

legislative history made clear that in revising the statute, Congress sought to end 

the “duty to sit.” 41 The First, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have since 

said that close questions should be decided in favor of disqualification, 42 while 

the Seventh Circuit has remarked that “[a] judge may decide close calls in favor 

of recusal.” 43 Justice Scalia, in declining a request for his own disqualification, 

cited the proposition that judges should err on the side of disqualification with 

apparent approval as applied to the lower courts, but opined that the absence of 

38. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 (1994).

39. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2003) 

(ruling that judge should have recused under § 455(a), rendering § 455(b) analysis unnecessary); In 

re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 781 (3d Cir. 1992) (allegations relating to §§ 455(a) and (b)(1), 

but decided on basis of § 455(a) alone); United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995-96 (10th Cir. 1993) 

(involving § 144 and § 455(b)(1) but decided on basis of § 455(a)); Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 

1510, 1527 (11th Cir. 1988) (ordering recusal under § 455(a) and declining to rule on § 455(b)(5)(iii)).

40. See section I.A.

41. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355.

42. See In re United States, 158 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1998); Republic of Panama v. American Tobacco 

Co., 217 F.3d 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing In re Chevron, 121 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1997)); United 

States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1349 (6th Cir. 1993); Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 352 (10th Cir. 1995); 

United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir. 1989).

43. N.Y.C. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
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16 Federal Judicial Center

a mechanism to replace a disqualified justice on the Supreme Court renders it 

inapplicable there. 44

Even though the “duty to sit” ended with the adoption of § 455, Canon 3A(2) 

of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges nonetheless declares that “a 

judge should hear and decide matters assigned, unless disqualified.” The point is 

simply to underscore that judges have a duty to decide the cases that come before them and that disqualification should not be used as an excuse to shirk that 

duty by dodging difficult or unpleasant cases. As a result, most circuits have said 

“there is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion 

for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is.” 45

c. The rule of necessity

Rooted in common law dating back to the fifteenth century, the rule of necessity 

states that “where all are disqualified, none are disqualified.” 46 In United States 

v. Will, 47 the Supreme Court ruled that the adoption of § 455 was not intended to 

abridge the rule of necessity. 48

Will involved a class action brought by thirteen federal district judges challenging an act of Congress that stopped or reduced previously authorized cost-of-living 

increases for certain federal employees, including judges. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs (judges). On appeal, the Supreme Court 

addressed whether the Court itself was disqualified from hearing the case since all 

of its members had a direct financial interest in the outcome. Invoking the rule of 

necessity, the Court held that disqualification could not be required because then 

no federal judge would be able to entertain this federal constitutional challenge.

Courts have used the rule of necessity to reject disqualification in a variety of 

situations. 49 In In re Wireless Telephone Radio Frequency Emissions Products Liability 

44. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 915–16 (2004) (mem.) (Scalia, J.).

45. Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987). Accord Nakell v. Attorney Gen. of N.C., 

15 F.3d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 1994); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988); 

Easley v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351, 1356 (6th Cir. 1988); Suson v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 763 F.2d 304, 308–09 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985); Brody v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 664 F.2d 

10, 12 (1st Cir. 1981).

46. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).

47. 449 U.S. 200 (1980).

48. Id. at 217.

49. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1025–26 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 

185 F.3d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1999); Bartley v. United States, 123 F.3d 466, 467 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 

522 U.S. 1062 (1998); Jefferson Cty. v. Acker, 92 F.3d 1561, 1583 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated and 

remanded on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1261 (1997), aff’d, 137 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev’d on 

other grounds, 527 U.S. 423 (1999); Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 662 (5th Cir. 1979).
Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455

fjc.dcn • fjc.gov 17

Litigation, 50 for example, four of seven members of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) assigned to hear the matter held stock interests in one 

or more of the parties. The JPML determined that the rule of necessity precluded 

disqualification under § 455(a) because there was no statutory provision for substituting panel members, and disqualification would result in fewer than the four 

judges required by statute to hear the case.

In Ignacio v. Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 51

the pro se plaintiff sought to disqualify the entire circuit from hearing his case, 

on the grounds that all of the Ninth Circuit judges had conspired to dismiss his 

previous suits. In denying the motion, the court explained that “a judge is not 

disqualified to try a case because of a personal interest in the matter at issue if 

‘the case cannot be heard otherwise.’” 52 The Ninth Circuit held that the rule of 

necessity applies when a litigant “indiscriminately sues all of the judges” in a 

circuit. 53 Quoting the axiom that “where all are disqualified, none are disqualified,” 54 the court found that disqualification was “not necessary” because all of 

the Ninth Circuit judges would have been eliminated, making it impossible to 

hear the case. 55

d. Special concerns in bench trials

The question has arisen as to whether the standard for disqualification differs 

in a bench trial, where the judge’s role is even more pivotal than in a jury trial. 

In Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 56 the Third Circuit said, “We cannot 

overlook the fact that this is a non-jury case . . . . When the judge is the actual 

trier of fact, the need to preserve the appearance of impartiality is especially 

pronounced.” 57

50. 170 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (J.P.M.L. 2001).

51. 453 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2006).

52. Id. at 1163 (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 (1980)).

53. Id. at 1164.

54. Id. at 1165 (quoting Pilla v. ABA, 542 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1976). See also Haase v. Countrywide 

Home Loans, Inc., 838 F.3d 665, 666 (5th Cir. 2016) (rule of necessity authorized court to hear case 

in which plaintiff brought suit against entire Fifth Circuit); Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 509 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (where plaintiff sued all district court’s judges, none were required to recuse, citing rule 

of necessity); Zaleski v. Burns, 606 F.3d 51, 53 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010) (rule of necessity enabled court 

to address claim against entire federal judiciary alleging conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his 

constitutional rights).

55. Ignacio, 453 F.3d at 1165.

56. 10 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 1993).

57. Id. at 163, 166.
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Price Bros. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp. 58 involved an alleged ex parte communication. The Sixth Circuit held that “where a suit is to be tried without a jury,

sending a law clerk to gather evidence is so destructive of the appearance of impartiality required of a presiding judge” that a remand was necessary to determine the truth of the allegation. 59 The D.C. Circuit has stated that “recusal might 

well be prudent when a perjury bench trial involves testimony from a proceeding 

over which the same judge presided,” although § 455(a) “does not require it.” 60

Even though disqualification issues may be of special concern in bench trials, 

it does not follow that a different disqualification standard is justified in jury 

trials. As the Third Circuit has stated:

[S]ection 455 properly makes no distinction between jury and nonjury 

trials. The district judge in a jury trial must still make numerous pretrial 

rulings, including crucial summary judgment rulings, and will doubtless 

be called on to make numerous rulings on the qualification of witnesses 

and on evidentiary matters, not to mention post-trial motions. 61

e. Standing

Parties who file disqualification motions claim, in effect, that they will be aggrieved if their cases are decided by judges who are partial or appear to be so. 

In the usual case, a movant alleges that the judge has a real or perceived bias or 

interest against the movant or in favor of the movant’s opponent. For example, a 

plaintiff may seek to disqualify a judge on the grounds that the defendant is the 

judge’s close friend. In that scenario, however, may the judge’s friend likewise 

move for disqualification? Although it might seem that the friend lacks standing, 

insofar as the friend stands to be helped rather than injured by the allegedly disqualifying bias, the friend could harbor an understandable concern that the judge 

might err in favor of his friend’s opponent to appear fair.

Does a party have standing to challenge a refusal to disqualify when the 

judge’s alleged partiality would be in that party’s favor? In Pashaian v. Eccelston 

Properties, Ltd., 62 the judge’s sister-in-law was married to a partner in the law firm 

of a defendant’s attorney. Even though any potential bias would seem to favor the 

defendants, multiple defendants moved to disqualify the judge, who granted the 

motion, but not before ordering a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff. 

58. 629 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1980).

59. Id. at 446 (emphasis added) (finding harmless error on remand, 649 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1981)).

60. United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See also United States v. Parker, 742 

F.2d 127, 128–29 (4th Cir. 1984) (disqualification not required in same circumstance).

61. In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 782 (3d Cir. 1992).

62. 88 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996).
Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455

fjc.dcn • fjc.gov 19

The movants challenged the judge’s failure to disqualify earlier, and the Second 

Circuit raised the standing issue sua sponte:

[A party] has standing to challenge the judge’s refusal to recuse even if 

the alleged bias would be in the moving party’s favor. Such a party might 

legitimately be concerned that the judge will “bend over backwards” to 

avoid any appearance of partiality, thereby inadvertently favoring the opposing party. The possibility of this compensatory bias by an interested 

judge is sufficiently immediate to constitute the “personal injury” necessary to confer standing under Article III. 63

A different standing issue has arisen with respect to nonparty witnesses who 

seek a judge’s disqualification. In United States v. Sciarra, 64 the Third Circuit 

concluded that nonparty witnesses lacked standing to seek the disqualification of 

a judge in the context of a posttrial investigation. In that case, the United States 

government filed a civil complaint against a local union and twelve individuals, 

including the two petitioners who were members of the union’s executive 

board. After holding a bench trial, the district judge found the executive board 

culpable of aiding and abetting corruption. After the trial court’s judgment was 

affirmed on appeal, the government moved to depose the petitioners about the 

union’s operations during the intervening period. 65 The petitioners, who had 

been removed from their executive board positions as part of the trial court’s 

final judgment, filed a cross-motion to disqualify the presiding judge. The judge 

declined to disqualify himself. In reviewing that decision, the Third Circuit 

construed § 455(a)’s “proceeding” requirement to mean any stage of litigation 

in which a judge’s decision affects the “substantive rights of litigants to an actual 

case or controversy.” 66 Because there was no pending action in which the rights of 

the litigants were at issue, the petitioners had no standing, as nonparty witnesses, 

to invoke § 455 to disqualify the judge. The Third Circuit reserved judgment on 

the question whether, in the context of a case or controversy, a nonparty witness 

can move for the disqualification of a judge. 67

63. Id. at 83. See also United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989). When the district judge is 

placed in the “awkward position” of ruling one way and appearing to indulge his or her perceived bias, 

or ruling the other way and appearing to bend over backward to avoid perceived bias, disqualification 

is necessary. Id. at 745.

64. 851 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1988).

65. Id. at 624.

66. Id. at 635.

67. Id. at 636.
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B. Grounds for disqualification

1. General standard: when impartiality might reasonably 

be questioned—§ 455(a)

a. Framework for analysis

Section 455(a) requires disqualification for the appearance of partiality (i.e., when a 

judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned”). Unlike § 455(b)(1)—which 

requires disqualification for actual partiality (i.e., when a judge “has a personal 

bias or prejudice toward a party”)—whether the judge is, in fact, impartial is not 

dispositive of disqualification under subsection (a). The justification for making perceived partiality a ground for disqualification is at least twofold. First, regardless of whether judges are partial in fact, public perceptions of partiality can 

undermine confidence in the courts. Second, disqualifying judges for outward 

manifestations of what could reasonably be construed as bias obviates the need 

to make subjective judgment calls about what is actually going on inside a judge’s 

heart and mind.

Section 455(a) makes clear that judges should apply an objective standard 

in determining whether to disqualify. Judges contemplating disqualification 

under § 455(a), then, should not ask whether they believe they are capable of 

impartially presiding over the case. Rather, the question is whether a judge’s 

impartiality might be questioned from the perspective of a reasonable person. 

Every circuit has adopted some version of the “reasonable person” standard to 

answer this question. 68 In the context of denying a motion for his disqualification 

from Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 69 Justice 

Scalia noted that this reasonable person is aware “of all the surrounding facts and 

circumstances.” 70 The Second Circuit has characterized the reasonable person 

as an “objective, disinterested observer” who is privy to full knowledge of the 

68. See, e.g., In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981); SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 

29 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 1995); United States 

v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1137 (1999); Vieux Carre Prop. 

Owners v. Brown, 948 F.2d 1436, 1448 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Nelson, 922 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 

1990); In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1998); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 902 F.2d 1289, 

1290 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986); Hinman v. Rogers, 831 

F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Scrushy, 721 F.3d 1288, 1303 (11th Cir. 2013); In re Barry, 

946 F.2d 913, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. FrankSu Enter. Corp., 78 F.3d 550, 557 

(Fed. Cir. 1996).

69. 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (mem.) (Scalia, J.).

70. Id. at 924 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)).
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fjc.dcn • fjc.gov 21

surrounding circumstances. 71 The Fourth Circuit has clarified that the hypothetical reasonable observer is not a judge because judges, keenly aware of the obligation to decide matters impartially, “may regard asserted conflicts to be more 

innocuous than an outsider would.” 72 The Seventh Circuit has likewise noted that 

an outside observer is “less inclined to credit judges’ impartiality and mental discipline than the judiciary.” 73 And relying on the Supreme Court’s observation in 

Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 74 the Fifth Circuit commented that 

“[p]eople who have not served on the bench are often all too willing to indulge 

suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of judges.” 75

At the same time, this hypothetical “reasonable” observer “is not a person 

unduly suspicious or concerned about a trivial risk that a judge may be biased.” 76

The reasonable observer must be “thoughtful” and “well-informed.” 77 The First 

Circuit has emphasized that a reasonable person does not draw conclusions on 

the basis of groundless suspicion:

[W]hen considering disqualification, the district court is not to use the 

standard of “Caesar’s wife,” the standard of mere suspicion. That is because the disqualification decision must reflect not only the need to secure public confidence through proceedings that appear impartial, but 

also the need to prevent parties from too easily obtaining the disqualification of a judge, thereby potentially manipulating the system for strategic 

reasons, perhaps to obtain a judge more to their liking. 78

Numerous cases have rejected disqualification under circumstances in which 

calling a judge’s impartiality into question would require suspicion or speculation 

beyond what a reasonable person would indulge. The Second Circuit upheld a 

refusal to disqualify where the defendant alleged that the judge, a personal 

acquaintance, had grown unfriendly to him because of the defendant’s public 

71. United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Scrushy, 721 F.3d at 1303 

(disqualification under § 455(a) is determined with reference to whether “an objective, disinterested, 

lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would 

entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality”).

72. DeTemple, 162 F.3d at 287. See also Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc., 787 F.3d 1297, 1310 

(10th Cir. 2015) (“The reasonable observer is not the judge or even someone familiar with the judicial 

system, but rather an average member of the public.”)

73. In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990). See also O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 

F.3d 975, 988 (7th Cir. 2001).

74. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).

75. In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864–65). See also

United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995).

76. DeTemple, 162 F.3d at 287.

77. Mason, 916 F.2d at 386. See also Jordan, 49 F.3d at 156; O’Regan, 246 F.3d at 988.

78. In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 970 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.) (citation omitted).
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22 Federal Judicial Center

opposition to the Gulf War. The court reasoned that “a disinterested observer 

could not reasonably question [the judge’s] impartiality based upon his alleged 

failure to return the plaintiff’s greetings.” 79

Uninformed speculation and criticism—even if widely reported in the media—

do not trigger disqualification under § 455(a). In United States v. Bayless, 80 a district 

judge was criticized in the media for granting a motion to suppress in a drug case, 

culminating in members of Congress calling for the judge’s impeachment. The 

judge subsequently reversed his earlier ruling, and the defendant argued that the 

judge should have disqualified himself. Although it was widely speculated that 

the judge had reversed his earlier ruling in response to the threats and criticism, 

the Second Circuit concluded that disqualification was unnecessary. The need 

for disqualification “is to be determined ‘not by considering what a straw poll of 

the only partly informed man-in-the-street would show[,] but by examining the 

record facts and the law, and then deciding whether a reasonable person knowing 

and understanding all the relevant facts would recuse the judge.’” 81

Explaining his decision not to disqualify himself in Cheney, Justice Scalia 

rejected the assertion that newspaper editorials calling his impartiality into 

question were dispositive. The reasonable observer must be “informed of all the 

surrounding facts and circumstances,” 82 and, in Scalia’s view, the editorials in 

question were not only factually inaccurate, but lacked recognition and understanding of relevant precedent. 83

Section 455 also requires disqualification if a reasonable person might believe 

that the judge was aware of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality, 

even if the judge was in fact unaware. In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition 

Corp., 84 the trial judge was a member of the board of trustees of a university that 

had a financial interest in litigation before the judge. But the judge stated that he 

was unaware of the financial interest when he conducted a bench trial and ruled 

in the case. The court of appeals, nevertheless, vacated the judgment under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 60(b) because the judge failed to disqualify himself pursuant to § 455(a). 

The Supreme Court agreed. Noting that the purpose of § 455(a) is to promote 

public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process, the Court observed 

that such confidence “does not depend upon whether or not the judge actually 

79. Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1998).

80. 201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000).

81. Id. at 127 (citing In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir. 1988)).

82. Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004) 

(mem.) (Scalia, J.) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)).

83. Id.

84. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
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knew of facts creating an appearance of impropriety, so long as the public might 

reasonably believe that he or she knew.” 85

The Supreme Court addressed a related issue in São Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil v. American Tobacco Co. 86 The respondents sought the disqualification of the district judge because his name had been associated with an 

earlier, similar suit prior to his appointment to the bench. In the earlier case, the 

judge was erroneously named in an amicus curiae brief as the president of the 

association that submitted the brief, although he had retired from that position 

six months before filing. The respondents argued that the inclusion of the judge’s 

name created an appearance of partiality on the part of the judge in the later 

case, even though the judge was unaware that his name was on the earlier brief, 

he played no part in preparing the brief, and he was only “vaguely aware” of the 

case. 87 The judge declined to disqualify himself. The court of appeals reversed. 

The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the court of appeals had misapplied the “reasonable person” standard and overlooked the requirement that the 

reasonable person be aware of all relevant facts when determining the need for 

disqualification. In the Court’s view, the fully informed, reasonable person would 

not believe that the erroneous use of the judge’s name could call into question the 

judge’s impartiality.

Courts of appeals have likewise required disqualification when a reasonable 

observer might think that judges were aware of events or information that could 

impair their impartiality—even if they were not so aware. The Seventh Circuit, for 

example, remanded a habeas case directing the judge to whom the case had been 

reassigned to provide the petitioner the opportunity to challenge the dismissal of 

four claims by the previously assigned district judge. 88 That judge had ruled on 

the habeas petition without realizing that he, as a state court judge years earlier, 

had been on the panel whose decision was now challenged.

85. Id. at 860.

86. 535 U.S. 229 (2002).

87. Id. at 233 (emphasis omitted).

88. Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989). See also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 

967 F.2d 1280, 1295 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating district judge’s lack of actual knowledge of his former 

firm’s involvement in the litigation is irrelevant).
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b. Recurring scenarios

i. Judge’s prior relationship with parties, witnesses, 

or lawyers

Prior relationship with a party. The First Circuit has observed that “[f]ormer affiliations with a party may persuade a judge not to sit; but they are rarely a basis for 

compelled [disqualification].”89 Judges often cannot avoid some acquaintance with 

the underlying parties or events that give rise to litigation, particularly in smaller 

communities. Acquaintance, by itself, will not require disqualification. The Second 

Circuit upheld a refusal to disqualify where the judge had a social relationship with 

a shareholder in a company victimized by the defendants. The judge’s relationship 

with the shareholder “ended seven or eight years prior to sentencing[,] . . . he had 

no specific knowledge of the contested facts[,] and . . . the . . . allegations [regarding the judge’s friend’s restaurant] were not outcome-determinative in these 

proceedings.”90 The Second Circuit also upheld a refusal to disqualify where the 

defendant had a remote (but adversarial) business relationship with the judge’s 

husband. “[I]t requires too much speculation to convert [the husband’s] alleged 

past frustrated dealings with [the defendant] into any interest, financial or otherwise, in the outcome of [the defendant’s] unrelated criminal trial.”91

The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that a judge’s penchant for strip 

clubs required him to disqualify himself from a case in which a strip club was a 

party. In so ruling, the court emphasized that the judge did not frequent the club 

in question. 92 In a related vein, the D.C. Circuit ruled that disqualification was 

unnecessary where the judge and a party shared an interest in glass art and were 

co-donors (with others) of a glass sculpture to the Metropolitan Museum of Art. 93

Some personal relationships, however, are so friendly or antagonistic as to 

require disqualification. The Sixth Circuit reversed a failure to disqualify in a 

sex discrimination suit where, in pretrial proceedings, the judge stated that he 

personally knew one of the people accused of discrimination and that “he is an 

honorable man and I know he would never intentionally discriminate against 

anybody.” 94 “Once the district court expressed his ardent sentiments . . . the 

objective appearance of impartiality vanished.” 95 Similarly, the Second Circuit 

89. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 221 (1st Cir. 1997).

90. United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 817 (2d Cir. 1992).

91. United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 47–49 (2d Cir. 1998).

92. Curves, LLC v. Spalding Cty., 685 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 2012).

93. Armenian Assembly of Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 758 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

94. Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 127 (6th Cir. 1980).

95. Id. at 129.
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found disqualification necessary when the judge admitted to a prior relationship 

with the defendant that influenced his decision making. 96

In In re Faulkner, 97 the Fifth Circuit concluded that although there was no 

actual bias, the judge’s close, familial relationship with his cousin, who was integral to a number of transactions giving rise to the indictment, was sufficient to 

establish an appearance of bias. Both the judge and his cousin “describe[d] their 

relationship as more like that of ‘brother and sister’; she is the godmother to one 

of his children.” 98

In another Fifth Circuit case, the court reversed a failure to disqualify where 

there was a publicized history of “bad blood” between the defendant and a close 

personal friend of the judge. 99 While noting that friendship between the judge and 

a person with an interest in the case need not be disqualifying, here the judge’s 

friend and the defendant “were embroiled in a series of vindictive legal actions 

resulting in a great deal of publicity,” some of which involved the judge’s spouse. 100

A recurring issue has arisen with respect to litigants who stand accused of 

threatening, attacking, or killing federal judges. The cases are in general accord 

that if the presiding judge is among those targeted by the alleged assailant, 

disqualification is appropriate under § 455(a). Thus, where the alleged assailant 

targeted a courthouse (rather than an individual judge) the Seventh Circuit 

determined that all judges presiding in the circuit where the courthouse was 

situated at the time of the attack should disqualify themselves. 101 Likewise, where 

the alleged assailant targeted judges within the circuit generally, the Eleventh 

Circuit decided that all judges presiding in the circuit when the attack occurred 

would disqualify themselves. 102

On the other hand, when the assigned judge is not among those targeted, disqualification may be unnecessary. A defendant was accused of threatening three 

California district judges who handled his pro se cases. The Ninth Circuit declined to disqualify the district judge assigned to hear the case because he was not 

96. United States v. Toohey, 448 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2006).

97. 856 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1998).

98. Id. at 718.

99. United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995).

100. Id. at 157.

101. In re Nettles, 394 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2005). See also Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995) 

(mandating recusal where federal judge’s chambers were damaged by Oklahoma City bombing of 

federal building a block away).

102. United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1992).
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among the defendant’s intended victims. 103 Similarly, in a habeas petition filed 

twenty years after the attack at issue, the Eleventh Circuit held that disqualification was necessary only for those judges who were on the bench and in the circuit 

at the time of the attack. 104 These cases are distinct from the cases (discussed in 

Section II.B.1.b.iv) in which a party threatens a judge in a strategic move to force 

disqualification.

Courts distinguish personal or otherwise direct relationships between judges and parties—which sometimes give rise to a need for disqualification—from 

shared affiliations or characteristics among judges and parties, which, by themselves, are insufficient to warrant disqualification. Shared religious affiliation, for 

example, is insufficient to justify disqualification. In Bryce v. Episcopal Church in 

the Diocese of Colorado, 105 the Tenth Circuit rejected the assertion that disqualification was necessary simply because the judge was a member of the same religion 

as the defendants. The court found that the plaintiff’s argument that the judge’s 

subscription to the same belief system as the defendant was tenuous and mere 

“associational bias,” rendering it insufficient to necessitate disqualification. 106

Likewise, shared political affiliation is not enough, by itself, to require disqualification. In Higganbotham v. Oklahoma, 107 the Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that disqualification was necessary because the judge and a litigant 

shared a partisan affiliation in a politically charged case. The court explained, “an 

inescapable part of our system of government [is] that judges are drawn primarily 

from lawyers who have participated in public and political affairs.”108

Similarly, a judge’s sexual orientation is not enough to disqualify a judge from 

hearing cases in which a party is advocating in support of rights that could inure 

to the benefit of people who share the judge’s orientation. The Ninth Circuit held 

that a district judge was not disqualified from ruling on the constitutionality of a 

state ban on same-sex marriage simply because he was in a long-term, same-sex 

relationship (the Supreme Court, however, subsequently vacated the decision on 

the grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing). 109

103. Clemens v. U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, 428 F.3d 1175, 1179–80 

(9th Cir. 2005). See also United States v. Spiker, 649 F. App’x 770 (11th Cir. 2016) (district judge and 

magistrate judge were not required to disqualify on grounds that they belonged to the same court as 

the magistrate judge whom the defendant attempted to have murdered).

104. In re Moody, 755 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2014).

105. 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002).

106. Id. at 660.

107. 328 F.3d 638 (10th Cir. 2003).

108. Id. at 645.

109. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. 

Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013).
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Courts have reached the same conclusions when confronted with requests to 

disqualify on the basis of the judge’s race or gender. In MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group 

Equipment Financing, Inc., 110 a defendant moved for an Asian judge to disqualify 

himself because the defendant had been publicly critical of a prominent Asian 

man. The Second Circuit opined that “it is intolerable for a litigant, without any 

factual basis, to suggest that a judge cannot be impartial because of his or her 

race and political background.”111

In a district court case where the judge’s impartiality was challenged because 

of her gender, the judge denied the motion for disqualification.

The assertion, without more, that a judge who . . . happens to be of the 

same sex as a plaintiff in a suit alleging sex discrimination on the part of 

a law firm, is, therefore, so biased that he or she could not hear the case, 

comes nowhere near the standards required for [recusation]. Indeed, if 

background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition, sufficient 

grounds for removal, no judge on this court could hear this case. 112

There is authority for declining to disqualify when the judge’s friend is a 

public official who is sued in an official (as opposed to a personal) capacity. In 

Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 113 Justice Scalia 

declined to disqualify himself from hearing a case in which Vice President Dick 

Cheney was a named party after Justice Scalia went on a hunting trip with the 

vice president while the case was pending before the Supreme Court. Justice 

Scalia emphasized that the suit in question was filed against the vice president 

in his official, as distinguished from his personal, capacity, and explained the 

importance of that distinction:

[W]hile friendship is a ground for recusal of a Justice where the personal 

fortune or the personal freedom of the friend is at issue, it has traditionally not been a ground for recusal where official action is at issue, no matter 

how important the official action was to the ambitions or the reputation 

of the Government officer. 114

On the other hand, there may be circumstances in which the ties between 

the judge and the public official are so close, and the consequences of a ruling 

adverse to the official are so dire, that disqualification is appropriate regardless 

of the capacity (if any) in which the official is sued. In United States v. Bobo, 115

an Alabama district judge disqualified himself from hearing a case of interest 

110. 157 F.3d 956 (2d Cir. 1998).

111. Id. at 963.

112. Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

113. 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (mem.) (Scalia, J.).

114. Id. at 916.

115. 323 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2004).
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to the governor because the judge had previously attended private functions 

endorsing the governor’s candidacy. Although the governor was not a party in 

the case, the outcome of the case could have affected the governor’s reelection. 

To avoid an appearance of bias, the district court concluded that disqualification 

was appropriate.

Prior relationship with a witness. As with parties, a judge’s mere acquaintance or 

familiarity with a witness does not require disqualification. In Fletcher v. Conoco 

Pipe Line Co.,

116 the Eighth Circuit found disqualification unnecessary even though 

the judge maintained a thirty-six-year friendship with a fact witness for the 

plaintiff and remained a client of the witness’s law firm in an unrelated, ongoing 

matter. The court found this relationship insufficient to overcome a presumption of 

impartiality. In In re Beyond Innovation Technology Co.,

117 the Federal Circuit ruled, 

in the context of a mandamus action, that the movant “had not met its burden of 

showing that the judge clearly abused his discretion in not disqualifying”118 when a 

close personal friend of the judge testified as a witness. The court emphasized that 

“we are not reviewing the matter de novo. We do not review to determine whether 

we would recuse in such circumstances. Instead, we are only to review whether the 

judge abused his discretion in declining to disqualify himself.”119

On the other hand, in some cases disqualification may be necessary. In 

United States v. Kelly, 120 the Eleventh Circuit held that a trial judge improperly 

failed to disqualify himself when, among other things, a close personal friend was 

a key defense witness. The judge had expressed concern on the record that he 

might “bend over backwards to prove he lacked favoritism” toward the witness, 

and that a guilty verdict might “jeopardize his wife’s friendship” with the witness’s 

wife. 121 These “profound doubts about the propriety of continuing . . . on the case 

. . . should have been resolved in favor of disqualification.”122

Prior relationship with an attorney. While a judge’s acquaintance with one of the 

attorneys does not ordinarily require disqualification, there are cases where the 

extent of intimacy, or other circumstances, renders disqualification necessary. 

In United States v. Murphy, 123 the Seventh Circuit concluded that a judge should 

have disqualified himself where he and the prosecuting attorney were close 

116. 323 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2003).

117. 166 F. App’x 490 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

118. Id. at 492.

119. Id.

120. 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989).

121. Id. at 738.

122. Id. at 745.

123. 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985).
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friends and planned to vacation together immediately after the trial. The court 

noted that “friendships among judges and lawyers are common” and “a judge 

need not disqualify himself just because a friend—even a close friend—appears 

as a lawyer.”124 Yet here the extent of intimacy was “unusual,” and an objective 

observer might reasonably doubt the judge’s impartiality where the judge “was 

such a close friend of the prosecutor that the families of both were just about to 

take a joint vacation.”125

By the same token, a judge’s antipathy toward a lawyer is not enough, by itself, 

to require disqualification, unless it casts doubt on the judge’s impartiality toward 

the lawyer’s client. As the Tenth Circuit opined in United States v. Ritter, 126 “bias 

in favor of or against an attorney can certainly result in bias toward the party. 

Thus, if a judge is biased in favor of an attorney, his impartiality might reasonably 

be questioned in relationship to the party.”127 Even then, however, circumstances 

can change. In Diversified Numismatics, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 128 the district judge 

had previously disqualified himself from prior cases “because of his feeling that 

he might be biased against counsel.”129 When the judge declined to disqualify 

himself from a later case in which the attorney entered an appearance, the 

Eleventh Circuit affirmed the ruling: “Tempers do cool, and anger does dissipate. 

Prior recusals, without more, do not objectively demonstrate an appearance of 

partiality.”130

The Eleventh Circuit held that a trial judge should have disqualified himself 

where his law clerk’s father—who himself had been the judge’s law clerk—was a 

partner in the law firm representing one of the parties. 131 The court nevertheless 

found the failure to disqualify harmless error in this case. 132

Similarly, the First Circuit held that refusal to disqualify was “probably” 

improper where, during pendency of the action, the judge was represented in an 

unrelated matter by a partner in a firm that was involved in the case before the 

124. Id. at 1537.

125. Id. at 1538. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit chose not to reverse because the defendant’s 

disqualification motion was inexcusably untimely. Id. at 1541.

126. 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1976).

127. Id. at 463.

128. 949 F.2d 382 (11th Cir. 1991).

129. Id. at 384.

130. Id.

131. Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1988). See also First Interstate Bank of Ariz. 

v. Murphy, Weir & Butler, 210 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that when firm representing party 

hires law clerk of presiding judge, judge must make sure law clerk ceases further involvement in case).

132. Parker, 855 F.2d at 1527.
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judge. 133 Because of the procedural posture of the case, the court did not resolve 

the question on the merits, but remarked:

Most observers would agree that a judge should not hear a case argued by 

an attorney who, at the same time, is representing the judge in a personal 

matter. Although the appearance of partiality is attenuated when the lawyer appearing before the judge is a member of the same law firm as the 

judge’s personal counsel, but not the same individual, many of the same 

cautionary factors are still in play. This principle would seem to have particular force where, as here, the law firm is small and the judge’s lawyer is 

a name partner. 134

Problems concerning a judge’s relationship with counsel become acute when 

personal and financial relationships are entangled. As a state judge, G. Thomas 

Porteous, Jr., often solicited friends and former colleagues in the Louisiana Bar 

for money to pay personal gambling and other debts, and received monies from 

two of those same lawyers in exchange for court-appointed “curatorships.”135

After becoming a federal judge, Porteous declined to disqualify himself from a 

case in which a party was represented by one of those same two lawyers from 

whom he had received thousands of dollars over the years. While that case was 

under advisement, Porteous solicited that lawyer for additional money. Although 

there is no indication that Judge Porteous was soliciting a bribe, his refusal to 

disqualify himself from hearing the case under these circumstances gave rise 

to the first of four articles of impeachment voted against him by a unanimous 

House of Representatives. The Senate convicted him on the same article—

Article I: engaging in a pattern of conduct incompatible with the trust and 

confidence placed in him as a federal judge.

Likewise, problems arise when judges explore postjudicial employment with 

lawyers or law firms that enter an appearance before the judge. In In re Continental Airlines Corp., 136 a law firm representing one of the parties appearing before 

the judge was considering the judge for employment but did not communicate 

its interest to the judge until the day after the judge awarded the firm’s lawyers 

$700,000 in legal fees. The Fifth Circuit, quoting from Liljeberg, acknowledged 

that § 455(a) “does not call upon judges to perform the impossible;”137 hence, the 

judge was not “required to stand recused before discovering that he was being 

133. In re Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d 1256, 1260 (1st Cir. 1995).

134. Id. at 1260 n.4 (citations omitted).

135. See John Conyers, Impeachment of G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Judge of the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, H.R. Rep. No. 111-427 (2010); and John Conyers, 

Impeaching G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District 

of Louisiana, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 1031, 111th Cong. 2d Sess. (2010).

136. 901 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1990).

137. Id. at 1262 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1988)).
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considered for employment.”138 Once the judge received an offer of employment 

and became aware of the firm’s interest, however, he was “required to take the 

steps necessary to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.”139 In this case 

that meant “either . . . reject[ing] the offer outright, or, if he seriously desired to 

consider accepting the offer, st[anding] recused and vacat[ing] the rulings made 

shortly before the offer was made.”140

In Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillan, 141 a federal district judge who was contemplating 

resigning from the bench and returning to private practice spoke to a recruiter 

who agreed to contact law firms on the judge’s behalf. Although the recruiter did 

not use the judge’s name, it was generally known in the legal community that this 

was the only judge who was contemplating resignation. Two of the firms that were 

contacted represented opposing parties in an action pending before the judge, but 

the judge denied a motion to disqualify. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit ruled that 

the judge had acted improperly in denying the motion. According to the court, 

although there was no indication of actual bias or favoritism toward either of the 

law firms, there was, to an objective observer, an appearance of partiality that was 

disqualifying. 142 The court explained that disqualification is necessary whenever 

a judge is in negotiations—even preliminary and tentative negotiations—for 

employment with a lawyer or law firm appearing before the judge. 143 The Judicial 

Conference subsequently issued an advisory opinion admonishing judges to 

refrain from negotiations if the firm’s cases before the court are “so frequent and 

so numerous that the judge’s recusal in those cases (which would be required) 

would adversely affect the litigants or would have an impact on the court’s ability 

to handle its dockets.”144

Disqualification questions sometimes arise when a party is represented 

by a lawyer from the judge’s former firm. Disqualification is automatic under 

138. Continental Airlines, 901 F.2d at 1262.

139. Id.

140. Id. at 1262–63. The Fifth Circuit held, however, that the violation of §  455(a) constituted 

harmless error. But see In re Continental Airlines, 981 F.2d 1450, 1461–64 (5th Cir. 1993) (ruling, on 

different order in same litigation, that failure to disqualify was not harmless error; explaining that 

prior order was subject to de novo review, which enabled appellate court to protect parties from 

injustice resulting from failure to disqualify, whereas here, order was subject to “abuse of discretion” 

standard, which did not afford parties adequate safeguards).

141. 764 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1985).

142. Id. at 461.

143. Id. Cf. Anderson v. United States, 754 A.2d 920 (D.C. Ct. App. 2000) (disqualification 

unnecessary when news article mentioned that judge was potential candidate for federal prosecutor’s 

position; no showing that judge had sought position).

144. Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Opinion No. 84 (June 2009).
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§  455(b)(2) only if the judge was affiliated with the firm at the time the firm 

was handling the matter now before the court. But relationships between judges 

and lawyers at judges’ former firms can remain close long after matters pending 

during the judge’s tenure at the firm have been resolved. For that reason, some 

judges choose to disqualify themselves from hearing matters argued by lawyers 

at their former firms for a period of years. 145 With the exception of isolated, 

unusually close friendships discussed above, however, relationships between 

judges and lawyers at their former firms naturally dissipate over time. In Patterson 

v. Mobil Oil Corp., 146 the plaintiffs moved for disqualification because the judge 

had previously been employed by the law firm that represented the defendants. 

The Fifth Circuit concluded that disqualification was unnecessary because the 

judge had terminated his relationship with the firm thirty years earlier. 

When relatives rather than friends appear as counsel, the issue is ordinarily 

resolved by § 455(b)(5). Sometimes § 455(a) is used to fill gaps. In In re Hatcher, 147

the Seventh Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify where the judge’s son, a thirdyear law student, had assisted the government in the prosecution of a defendant 

in a case arising from the same circumstances as that of the present defendant. 

Although the cases were formally separate proceedings, “they are both component parts of one large prosecution of the continuing criminal enterprise. . . . 

Outside observers have no way of knowing how much information the judge’s son 

acquired about that broader prosecution while working on the . . . case.”148 The 

court emphasized that a judge whose son is an assistant U.S. attorney need not 

disqualify himself from all cases in which the United States is a party, or even 

those cases where the son prosecuted a case bearing some relationship to the case 

before the judge. “This is instead the rare case where the earlier proceedings were 

so close to the case now before the judge that disqualification under § 455(a) was 

the only permissible option.”149

145. See Financial Settlement and Disqualification on Resignation from Law Firm, Advisory Op. 

No. 24 (Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct June 2009) (recommending that judges 

consider a recusal period of at least two years, recognizing that there will be circumstances where a 

longer period is more appropriate).

146. 335 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2003).

147. 150 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1998).

148. Id. at 638.

149. Id.
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Former clerks appearing as counsel before judges for whom they worked 

presents a recurring issue. The First Circuit has noted that this issue is often 

addressed by the imposition of moratoriums:

It is common knowledge in the profession that former law clerks practice 

regularly before judges for whom they once clerked. Courts often have 

prophylactic rules that forbid a former law clerk from appearing in that 

court for a year or more after the clerkship. 150

When the judge’s current law clerk has a possible conflict of interest, the Eleventh Circuit notes that “it is the clerk, not the judge who must be disqualified.”151

In a case involving medical malpractice, the plaintiff had moved to disqualify the 

judge because the judge’s law clerk used to work for the law firm representing 

some of the defendants. The Eleventh Circuit held that disqualification was not 

required under § 455(a) since the judge had screened the law clerk from the case 

and assigned the matter to another law clerk. 152 The court reasoned that since 

“precedent approves the isolation of a law clerk who has accepted future employment with counsel appearing before the court[,] it follows that isolating a law 

clerk should also be acceptable when the clerk’s former employer appears before 

the court.”153 If a disqualified clerk is screened from substantive responsibilities 

but performs ministerial tasks in relation to the case, the Eighth Circuit and the 

U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia have ruled that the judge’s disqualification is unnecessary. 154

ii. Judge’s conduct in judicial proceedings

“Extrajudicial source” doctrine and its limits. The authority for the extrajudicial 

source doctrine started with United States v. Grinnell Corp., 155 which predated the 

1974 amendments to § 455. The Supreme Court said that “[t]he alleged bias and 

prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source . . . other 

150. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 221 (1st Cir. 1997).

151. Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1101–02 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hunt v. American Bank & 

Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir. 1986)).

152. Id. at 1100.

153. Id. at 1102 (internal citation omitted). See also Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc., 787 F.3d 

1297, 1312–13 (10th Cir. 2015) (§ 455(a) satisfied by prompt screening of law clerk whose husband 

was hired by defendant’s insurance company to watch the trial); Trammel v. Simmons First Bank of 

Searcy, 345 F.3d 611, 612-13 (8th Cir. 2003) (§ 455(a) satisfied by screening clerk who attended bible 

study with important witness).

154. United States v. Martinez, 446 F.3d 878, 883 (8th Cir. 2006); Doe v. Cabrera, 134 F. Supp. 3d 

439, 451-52 (D.D.C. 2015).

155. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.”156 The Court 

ruled that disqualification was unnecessary because “[a]ny adverse attitudes 

that [the judge] evinced toward the defendants were based on his study of the 

depositions and briefs which the parties had requested him to make.”157 This 

so-called “extrajudicial source” doctrine is born of the common-sense view that 

ordinarily the circumstances suggesting or creating the appearance of partiality 

cannot reasonably be derived from information revealed in the normal course 

of litigation because it is natural for judges to form attitudes about litigants 

and issues before the court as the facts unfold, and no reasonable person would 

question the impartiality of judges who do. As the Supreme Court explained later, 

in Liteky v. United States:

The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be 

exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be 

a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby recusable 

for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced 

were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings, 

and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to completion 

of the judge’s task. 158

The Liteky Court added, however, that “[i]t is wrong in theory, though it may 

not be too far off the mark as a practical matter,”159 to say that disqualification 

for bias requires an extrajudicial source. Rather, an extrajudicial source “is the 

only common basis [for disqualification], but not the exclusive one.”160 The Court 

referred to two different scenarios when disqualification follows from remarks 

made during judicial proceedings: when the remarks reveal an extrajudicial bias, 

and when the remarks reveal an excessive bias arising from information acquired 

during judicial proceedings. Comments judges make during trial—even remarks 

that are hostile toward “counsel, the parties, or their cases[—]ordinarily do not 

support a bias or partiality challenge.”161 Such judicial remarks, however, can “reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if 

they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.”162 The Court emphasized that bias that arises from what the 

judge learns in the courtroom must be truly excessive to warrant disqualification: 

“A favorable or unfavorable predisposition can also deserve to be characterized 

156. Id. at 583.

157. Id.

158. 510 U.S. 540, 550–51 (1994).

159. Id. at 551.

160. Id.

161. Id. at 555.

162. Id.
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as ‘bias’ or ‘prejudice,’” the Court reasoned, “because, even though it springs from 

the facts adduced or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as to display 

clear inability to render fair judgment.”163

Comments on parties or issues in the pending case. The general rule is that remarks a judge makes in the course of ongoing judicial proceedings—remarks 

that are in the nature of reactions to what the judge has observed—do not warrant disqualification. 164 This rule is consistent with Liteky and the extrajudicial 

source doctrine.

In In re Huntington Commons Associates, 165 the district court had stated that 

“any predisposition this court has in this matter is a result of things that have 

taken place in this very courtroom.”166 The Seventh Circuit ruled that the district court’s acknowledgment of a “predisposition” was not “remotely sufficient 

evidence of the required ‘deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would 

render fair judgment impossible.’”167

Similarly, in In re Marshall, 168 a bankruptcy court ruled that the media’s 

characterization of the court’s remarks from the bench as hostile to the creditor’s 

claims was insufficient to require disqualification. The court noted that in litigation, courts are likely to form opinions about parties and that an adverse ruling 

in a prior, related case is insufficient to require disqualification. While the court 

made some negative comments about the creditor, the court concluded, consistent with Liteky, that the comments were not so antagonistic as to show that the 

judge was unable to judge the matter fairly. 169

In In re Mann, 170 disqualification was again unwarranted where, during a status hearing with the petitioner, the judge “expressed skepticism about the likelihood that a Rule 60(b) motion, filed fourteen years after entry of an order, would 

163. Id. at 551.

164. See, e.g., In re City of Milwaukee, 788 F.3d 717, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2015) (comments critical of 

police in stop-and-frisk case not enough to warrant disqualification); In re Steward, 828 F.3d 672, 

682 (8th Cir. 2016) (party not entitled to recusal merely because a judge is “exceedingly ill disposed” 

toward them, where judge’s “knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily 

acquired in the course of the proceedings’”); United States v. McChesney, 871 F.3d 801, 808 (9th Cir. 

2017) (“[J]ocular comments are no basis for recusal.”).

165. 21 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1994).

166. Id. at 158.

167. Id. at 159 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556).

168. 291 B.R. 855 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003).

169. Id. at 860.

170. 229 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2000).
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be granted.”171 The Seventh Circuit held, “That comment, standing alone, is not 

enough to prove an improper motive.”172 The judge had also told the petitioner 

“he harbored no animosity towards her and would therefore consider the merits 

of her claim.”173

In re Chevron U.S.A. 174 was a more difficult case, in which the district judge 

made race-related remarks in the courtroom, including a statement rejecting a 

study as illegitimate because it was conducted by Caucasians. The Fifth Circuit 

characterized the remarks as “unfortunate, grossly inappropriate, and deserving 

of close and careful scrutiny.”175 While the court found that the district judge’s 

comments created “a reasonable perception of bias or prejudice,” it also found 

that they did not “reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as 

to make fair judgment impossible,”176 which, in its view, was required by the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Liteky before in-court statements would require 

disqualification. Observing that the litigation was near completion, the court 

declined to issue a writ of mandamus. In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit did not appear 

to distinguish between in-court statements in which a judge arguably acquired an 

excessive bias from information received during judicial proceedings (to which 

the quoted passage from Liteky pertained) and in-court statements that revealed 

extrajudicial bias, arguably at issue here.

It is not uncommon for judges, at sentencing, to express outrage at defendants’ conduct or at defendants themselves, or a desire to see defendants severely 

punished. Ordinarily, none of this is grounds for disqualification. 177 Although decided before Liteky, United States v. Barry178 illustrates the relevant principle. At 

sentencing, the trial judge claimed that jurors who voted to acquit the defendant 

171. Id. at 658.

172. Id. at 659.

173. Id. at 658.

174. 121 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 1997).

175. Id. at 166.

176. Id. at 165 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555).

177. See, e.g., United States v. Minard, 856 F.3d 555, 556–57 (8th Cir. 2017) (disqualification not 

required when judge commented on victim impact statement: “It happened to me, too, when my kids 

were little, so I know exactly what you’re talking about”); United States v. Pulido, 566 F.3d 52, 62–63 

(1st Cir. 2009) (judge’s statement, made prior to defendant’s sentencing and in different but related 

case, that defendant was a thoroughly corrupt police officer did not require judge to recuse himself 

because opinion was based on facts introduced in proceedings); United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 

1243, 1277–78 (10th Cir. 2000) (disqualification not required where district judge made remarks about 

defendant’s character during sentencing); United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1995) 

(disqualification not necessary despite judge’s “unfortunate comment” that he wanted defendant to 

“die in prison”).

178. 938 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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on several charges “will have to answer to themselves and to their fellow citizens.”179 The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that “this statement may indicate that the 

court thought appellant was guilty of more counts than he was convicted of” but 

“there is no indication that the court reached this conclusion based on anything 

other than its participation in the case.”180

The Tenth Circuit upheld a refusal to disqualify, even though the trial judge 

opined pretrial that “the obvious thing that’s going to happen . . . is that [the 

defendant is] going to get convicted.”181 The court believed the judge merely expressed a view of what was likely to happen from what he had observed in the 

case: “Nothing in the remark indicates that the judge was unable or unwilling to 

carry out his responsibilities impartially.”182

In a Ninth Circuit case, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in 

denying a motion to disqualify based on his criticism of the government’s initial 

failure to charge the defendant with carrying a weapon during the commission of 

a robbery. At a status conference, the judge had commented that the government’s 

omission of the gun count was “absurd” and “asinine,” and told counsel to “[s]

hare that with your head of [the] criminal [division].”183 The Ninth Circuit found 

that the judge’s comments did not rise to the level required for disqualification 

under § 455(a), stating that “[a] judge’s views on legal issues may not serve as the 

basis for motions to disqualify.”184

As the Supreme Court’s opinion in Liteky notes, there are times when the 

comments a judge makes in court are so excessive as to trigger the need for 

disqualification. 185 In Unites States v. Whitman, 186 the Sixth Circuit remanded the 

sentencing of a criminal defendant to a different trial judge after the original 

judge engaged in a “lengthy harangue” of the defense attorney that “had the 

unfortunate effect of creating the impression that the impartial administration of 

the law was not his primary concern.”187 However, there was no evidence that the 

judge was actually biased in this case.

179. Id. at 1341.

180. Id.

181. United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1414 (10th Cir. 1995).

182. Id. at 1416. See also United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding no abuse 

of discretion in denying motion to disqualify where, during sentencing hearing, district judge became 

frustrated with defendant and counsel, and made “testy” remarks about defendant’s credibility). 

183. United States v. Wilkerson, 208 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2000).

184. Id. (quoting United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 882 (9th Cir. 1980)).

185. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).

186. 209 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000).

187. Id. at 626–27.
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In United States v. Antar, 188 the trial judge commented during a sentencing 

hearing on the amount of restitution he might award: “My object in this case from 

day one has always been to get back to the public that which was taken from it as a 

result of the fraudulent activities of this defendant and others.”189 The Third Circuit 

held that the judge’s remark reflected a mindset that required disqualification. 

The district judge “told the parties that his goal in the criminal case, from the 

beginning, was something other than what it should have been and, indeed, was 

improper.”190

It is difficult to imagine a starker example of when opinions formed 

during the course of judicial proceedings display a high degree of antagonism against a criminal defendant. After all, the best way to effectuate 

the district judge’s goal would have been to ensure that the government 

got as free a road as possible towards a conviction, which then would give 

the judge the requisite leverage to order a large amount of restitution. 191

The court noted the trial judge’s reputation for fairness and acknowledged 

the perils of focusing on one sentence out of volumes of transcripts. Yet “in 

determining whether a judge had the duty to disqualify him or herself, our focus 

must be on the reaction of the reasonable observer. If there is an appearance of 

partiality, that ends the matter.”192

In United States v. Franco-Guillen, 193 the district judge withdrew the defendant’s guilty plea and set the matter over for trial after the defendant objected to 

certain information in the presentence report. In the course of the hearing, the 

judge said, “I will not put up with this from these Hispanics or anybody else, any 

other defendants”; 194 and again,

I’m not putting up with this. I’ve got another case involving a Hispanic defendant who came in here and told me that he understood what was going 

on and that everything was fine and now I’ve got a 2255 from him saying 

he can’t speak English. And he is lying because he told me he could. 195

The Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction and remanded the case for reassignment to a different judge, with the explanation, “The judge’s statements on the 

record would cause a reasonable person to harbor doubts about his impartiality, 

188. 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1995).

189. Id. at 573.

190. Id. at 576.

191. Id.

192. Id.

193. 196 F. App’x 716 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished decision).

194. Id. at 717.

195. Id. at 718.
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without regard to whether the judge actually harbored bias against Franco-Guillen 

on account of his Hispanic heritage.”196

Finally, in United States v. Bergrin,

197 the Third Circuit ordered a district judge’s 

disqualification under § 455(a) after the judge repeatedly expressed “discomfort” 

with the indictment, which combined an array of witness tampering counts under the umbrella of a RICO charge and which the Third Circuit noted “is exactly 

what” RICO allows.198 The Third Circuit concluded that “in light of the District 

Court’s statements—both before and after the earlier appeal in this case—about 

a perceived unfairness in trying the various witness-tampering counts together, 

we believe that the Court’s ‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned[.]’”199

Comments on parties or issues in prior judicial proceedings. The general rule that 

bias or prejudice must be derived from an extrajudicial source and that comments based on a judge’s observations in pending proceedings will not ordinarily 

form the basis for disqualification applies equally to comments a judge makes in 

earlier proceedings. In Liteky v. United States, 200 the Supreme Court made two 

relevant observations. First, it stated that in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 201 it 

“clearly meant by ‘extrajudicial source’ a source outside the judicial proceeding at 

hand—which would include as extrajudicial sources earlier judicial proceedings 

conducted by the same judge.” 202 This observation, however, must be understood 

in the larger context of the opinion as a whole, in which the Court rejected rigid 

adherence to an extrajudicial source doctrine (which it characterized not as a 

“doctrine” but as a “factor” 203). 

The Court’s second, and ultimately more important, observation—regardless 

of whether prior proceedings are characterized as an “extrajudicial source”—was 

that for purposes of disqualification analysis, a judge’s comments in pending and 

past proceedings are on equal footing:

[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events 

occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they 

display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair 

judgment impossible. 204

196. Id. at 719.

197. 682 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2012).

198. Id. at 284.

199. Id. (quoting United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 226 (3d Cir. 2007)).

200. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).

201. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).

202. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 545.

203. Id. at 555.

204. Id.
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In Liteky, the defendant moved to disqualify the judge on the ground that, 

during an earlier criminal trial, the judge displayed “impatience, disregard for 

the defense and animosity” 205 toward the defendant. He cited various comments 

by the judge, including admonitions of defense witnesses and counsel as well as 

certain trial rulings. The Court rejected the contention that disqualification was 

in order: “All occurred in the course of judicial proceedings, and neither (1) relied 

upon knowledge acquired outside such proceedings nor (2) displayed deep-seated 

and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.” 206

In Frey v. EPA, 207 the Seventh Circuit observed that “information a judge has 

gleaned from prior judicial proceedings is not considered extrajudicial and simply does not require recusal.” 208 Similarly, in United States v. Pulido, 209 the First 

Circuit concluded that a judge’s statement—made prior to the defendant’s sentencing and in a different but related case—that the defendant was a “thoroughly 

corrupt police officer” did not require the judge to recuse himself, since that 

opinion was based on facts introduced in the proceedings. 210 In Town of Norfolk 

v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 211 a district judge had overseen compliance with a city plan to clean up the Boston Harbor. In a subsequent case about 

locating a landfill pursuant to the Clean Water Act, a party moved for the judge’s 

disqualification, and the judge refused. The First Circuit upheld the refusal, noting that “a judge is sometimes required to act against the backdrop of official 

positions he took in other related cases. A judge cannot be replaced every time a 

case presents an issue with which the judge’s prior official decisions and positions 

may have a connection.” 212

Ex parte communications. Trial courts should be wary of ex parte contacts, which 

can result in reversals and disqualification. Ex parte contacts contributed to the 

D.C. Circuit’s decision to remand a case to a different trial judge in United States 

v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft I). 213 The court was “concerned by the district judge’s 

205. Id. at 542.

206. Id. at 556.

207. 751 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2014).

208. Id. at 472.

209. 566 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2009).

210. Id. at 62–63.

211. 968 F.2d 1438 (1st Cir. 1992).

212. Id. at 1462.

213. 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (contacts included argumentative letters and a redacted exhibit). 

See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding judge’s secret interviews 

with reporters during course of trial violated Code of Conduct, Canon 3A(4), which prohibits “ex parte 

communications on the merits, or procedures affecting the merits, of a pending . . . proceeding”).
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acceptance of ex parte submissions” and indicated that “the appropriate course 

would have been simply to refuse to accept any ex parte communications.” 214

In a Sixth Circuit case, the appellant alleged that the trial judge had sent his 

law clerk to gather evidence and that therefore the judge should have disqualified 

himself. The court observed that while “not every ex parte communication to the 

trial court requires reversal,” 215 the allegation here was sufficiently serious as to 

require a remand to determine its truth.

Where the trial judge met ex parte with a panel of experts and prohibited 

counsel from discovering the contents of the meeting, the Seventh Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify. 216 In a similar situation, however, the Sixth Circuit 

upheld a refusal to disqualify because the judge had “explained to Plaintiffs’ counsel the ministerial nature of these ex parte discussions before they took place” 

and “personally extended to Plaintiffs’ counsel an invitation to attend all of these 

meetings.” 217 Counsel chose not to attend and “failed to register any objection to 

the meetings at that time.” 218

Conduct in relation to guilty pleas. In Halliday v. United States, 219 the First Circuit implied that disqualification is sometimes appropriate when a judge faces a 

motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate a conviction with respect to which they 

imposed the sentence. In a postconviction motion, the defendant argued that a 

different judge should have conducted the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 

plea agreement hearing. Since the § 2255 challenge would have forced the same 

judge to evaluate his own actions, the First Circuit found it preferable (but not required) for a different judge to conduct the § 2255 evidentiary hearing. The First 

Circuit has clarified that Halliday is limited to cases in which the § 2255 motion 

accuses the sentencing judge of violating Rule 11. 220

Where a judge’s conduct during plea negotiations violated Rule 11, and a defendant subsequently pled not guilty and was convicted, the Fifth Circuit held 

that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial but was entitled to resentencing 

214. Microsoft I, 56 F.3d at 1464.

215. Price Bros. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1980).

216. Edgar v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996). See also In re Kensington Int’l, Ltd., 368 F.3d 289 (3d 

Cir. 2004). The judge had assembled an asbestos advisory panel. The panel members represented 

clients—in unrelated asbestos bankruptcy proceedings—who would likely have claims against the 

companies involved in the consolidated litigation. The Third Circuit ordered disqualification in light 

of the judge’s ex parte communication with the panel.

217. Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 468 (6th Cir. 1999).

218. Id.

219. 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967).

220. See, e.g., Panzardi-Alvarez v. United States, 879 F.2d 975, 985 (1st Cir. 1989).
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before a new judge. 221 The Eighth Circuit concurred that when cases are remanded after a court of appeals finds a Rule 11 violation, judges need not disqualify 

themselves from the subsequent trial, though disqualification might be in order 

for sentencing if a defendant is convicted. 222

Similarly, the Third Circuit required resentencing before a new judge when 

the trial judge had communicated his preference to defense counsel that the 

defendant plead guilty and indicated that the defendant would receive a lighter 

sentence if he did. 223 After the defendant went to trial and was convicted, the 

Third Circuit vacated the sentence because a reasonable person might conclude 

that “the judge’s attitude as to sentence was based at least to some degree on the 

fact that the case had to be tried, an exercise which the judge seemed anxious 

to avoid.” 224

Conduct reflecting that the judge took personal offense. In assorted cases, disqualification has been deemed necessary where trial judges took unusual actions, or 

made comments, that indicated they took personal offense. In In re Johnson, 225 a 

bankruptcy trustee had been held in contempt because the trial judge thought 

the trustee had misrepresented the judge’s conduct to another judge in order to 

obtain a favorable court order. At the contempt proceedings, the judge declared 

that he was “prejudiced in this matter,” had “all but made up his mind,” was “not 

in the least inclined to be neutral,” and would serve as “complaining witness, 

prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner.” 226 The Fifth Circuit held that the judge 

clearly “considered [the party’s] actions to be a personal affront to his authority” 

such that a reasonable person would doubt his impartiality. 227

Trial judges occasionally appear insulted when their rulings are challenged 

by litigants. The Third Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify when the judge had 

responded to the petitioners’ mandamus motion for disqualification by writing a 

lengthy letter. The judge, “in responding to the mandamus petition . . . has exhibited a personal interest in the litigation.” 228 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit reversed 

a conviction when the judge remarked in court that the defendant had “broken 

faith” with him by raising a certain issue on appeal following his earlier trial. 229

221. United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 835–43 (5th Cir. 1981).

222. In re Larson, 43 F.2d 410, 416 (8th Cir. 1994).

223. United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1989).

224. Id. at 583.

225. 921 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1991).

226. Id. at 587.

227. Id.

228. Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 165 (3d Cir. 1993).

229. United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1981).
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On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit found disqualification unnecessary 

where the judge called the motion for his disqualification by a lawyer–litigant 

“offensive,” claimed it “impugned” his integrity, and directed the party to testify 

under oath about the judge’s alleged bias because, the judge claimed, the motion 

reflected unethical behavior. 230 The judge was reacting, “albeit strongly,” to a motion brought on the eve of trial, and the Seventh Circuit believed that his comments did not “reflect a bias or prejudice gained from outside the courtroom.” 231

iii. Judge’s extrajudicial conduct

As explained in Section ii, “Extrajudicial Source” Doctrine and Its Limits, a judge 

is subject to disqualification for apparent partiality evidenced by extrajudicial 

conduct. The focus here, however, is on extrajudicial conduct that impugns impartiality or perceived impartiality. “Impartiality” subsumes a lack of bias toward 

a party, and perhaps open-mindedness toward the issues before the court, but it 

does not require the absence of preexisting views on the legal questions that the 

judge must decide. 232 The fact that a judge comes to a case with preexisting views 

on the legal questions presented, based on prior, extrajudicial learning, is no 

grounds for disqualification. As the Court observed in Liteky v. United States, 233

“some opinions acquired outside the context of judicial proceedings (for example, 

the judge’s view of the law acquired in scholarly reading) will not suffice” to warrant disqualification. 234

What will require disqualification is conduct manifesting bias or prejudgment. Such conduct can arise in a variety of settings.

Extrajudicial comments on pending or impending cases. The general rule against 

disqualification for in-court comments on pending cases, discussed in Section 

II.B.1.b.ii, does not apply to out-of-court comments on pending cases, for two 

related reasons. First, judges are expected to comment in open court on pending 

cases—it is an unavoidable part of the job. There is no comparable need for 

judges to opine to the media. Second, when judges take the unnecessary step 

of commenting on the merits of pending cases outside of court, they appear 

personally invested in their rulings and the outcome of the case, which is 

incompatible with their role as indifferent and impartial adjudicators. For that 

reason, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges provides that “[a] judge 

should not make public comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending 

230. Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1996).

231. Id. at 356.

232. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).

233. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).

234. Id. at 554.
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in any court,” subject to the exception that this prohibition “does not extend to 

public statements made in the course of the judge’s official duties.” 235

In United States v. Cooley, 236 the Tenth Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify 

when the defendants were abortion protesters and the trial judge had appeared 

on national television and stated that “these people are breaking the law.” 237 The 

court observed that the judge’s TV appearance conveyed two messages. The first 

“consisted of the words actually spoken.” 238 The second “was the judge’s expressive conduct in deliberately making the choice to appear in such a forum at a 

sensitive time to deliver strong views on matters which were likely to be ongoing 

before him.” 239 In the court’s view, when taken together, 

these messages unmistakably conveyed an uncommon interest and degree of personal involvement in the subject matter. It was an unusual 

thing for a judge to do, and it unavoidably created the appearance that the 

judge had become an active participant in bringing law and order to bear 

on the protesters, rather than remaining as a detached adjudicator. 240

In re Boston’s Children First 241 was a case that challenged an elementary 

school’s student-assignment process on grounds of racial discrimination. Seeking 

to correct misinterpretations in press accounts unfavorably comparing her action 

in the pending matter with her action in a previous case, the district judge told 

a newspaper reporter in a phone interview—the content of which was later 

published— that the pending case was “more complex.” 242 The plaintiffs moved 

for disqualification, and the judge denied the motion. The First Circuit held that 

disqualification was necessary and granted the petitioners’ writ of mandamus 

pursuant to § 455(a). Although it found the media contact “less inflammatory 

than that in Cooley,” the court saw “the same factors at work” for three reasons. 243

First, because the school-assignment program was a matter of significant local 

concern, the public attention and rarity of such public statements by a judge 

made it “more likely that a reasonable person [would] interpret such statements 

as evidence of bias.” 244 Second, like Cooley, the “‘appearance of partiality’ at 

issue here . . . stems from the real possibility that a judge’s statements may be 

235. Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3A(6).

236. 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993).

237. Id. at 990.

238. Id. at 995.

239. Id.

240. Id.

241. 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001).

242. Id. at 166.

243. Id. at 169.

244. Id. at 170.
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misinterpreted because of the ambiguity of those statements.” 245 Finally, a judge’s 

defense of her own orders before the resolution of appeal could also create the 

appearance of partiality. 246 The court noted that its holding was “based on the 

particular events” of a “highly idiosyncratic case.” 247

Similarly, the Fourth Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify in a case in 

which, while a jury trial was pending against an automobile company, the judge 

gave a speech at an auto torts seminar that expressed hostility toward defendants 

and defense counsel in such cases. 248

In United States v. Microsoft Corp., 249 the district judge had given “secret interviews to select reporters” throughout the course of the trial, requiring “that 

the fact and content of the interviews remain secret until he issued the Final 

Judgment.” 250 The interviews began to appear in press accounts immediately after the final judgment was entered. Some interviews were conducted after the 

final judgment was entered. Because the full extent of the judge’s actions did not 

become apparent until the case was on appeal, the D.C. Circuit decided to adjudicate Microsoft’s disqualification request even though the published interviews 

had not been admitted into evidence and no evidentiary hearing had been held 

on them. The D.C. Circuit held that the judge “breached his ethical duty under 

Canon 3A(6) each time he spoke to a reporter about the merits of the case.” 251 The 

judge’s comments did not fall into one of “three narrowly drawn exceptions” under the canon because the judge did not discuss “purely procedural matters” but 

actually “disclosed his views on the factual and legal matters at the heart of the 

case.” 252 The fact that the judge “may have intended to ‘educate’ the public about 

the case or to rebut ‘public misperceptions’” was not an excuse for his actions, 

and his “insistence on secrecy . . . made matters worse” because it prevented the 

245. Id.

246. Id. “Canon 3A(6) does not bar comment in final, completed cases, so long as judges refrain 

from revealing the deliberative processes and do not place in question their impartiality in similar 

future cases.” Compendium of Selected Opinions § 3.9-1(d) (2009).

247. Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d at 171. After receiving a petition for rehearing en banc from 

the district judge, the appeals panel sought the opinions of the three nonpanelist active judges. The 

nonpanelists agreed that the judge’s comment was “particularly unwise,” but disagreed that it required 

mandatory disqualification. Id. The panel acknowledged that this difference of view among the active 

judges indicated “the continuing need for a case-by-case determination of such issues.” Id.

248. Hathcock v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 53 F.3d 36, 41 (4th Cir. 1995).

249. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

250. Id. at 108.

251. Id. at 112. Canon 3A(6), explained in Section II.B.1.b.iii, Extrajudicial Comments on Pending 

or Impending Cases, applies to cases pending before any court—state or federal, trial or appellate.

252. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 112.
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parties from raising objections or seeking disqualification before the judge issued 

a final judgment. 253

The D.C. Circuit noted that other courts of appeals had found violations of 

§ 455(a) “for judicial commentary on pending cases that seems mild in comparison to what we are confronting in this case.” 254 “[W]e have not gone so far as to 

hold that every violation of Canon 3A(6) . . . inevitably destroys the appearance 

of impartiality and thus violates § 455(a).” 255 “In this case, however, . . . the line 

has been crossed,” and the judge’s comments “would lead a reasonable, informed 

observer to question the District Judge’s impartiality.” 256 Because Microsoft “neither alleged nor demonstrated that [the judge’s conduct] rose to the level of actual bias or prejudice,” the court found “no reason to presume that everything 

the District Judge did [was] suspect.” 257 The court concluded that there was no 

reason to set aside the findings of fact and conclusions of law and that the appropriate remedy was disqualification of the judge “retroactive only to the date he 

entered the order breaking up Microsoft.” 258

In Ligon v. City of New York, 259 a racial profiling case that challenged the New 

York City Police Department’s “stop and frisk” policy, the district judge agreed to 

several media interviews and made a number of public statements while the case 

was pending, “purporting to respond publicly to criticism of the District Court.” 260

The Second Circuit reassigned the case to a different judge, concluding that the 

district judge’s statements gave rise to an appearance of impropriety. 261 The 

court was criticized for its decision and issued a second opinion explaining the 

reassignment. The circuit panel referenced one article that quoted the judge as 

saying of city officials, “I know I’m not their favorite judge[,]” and other articles 

reporting that the judge “describes herself as a jurist who is skeptical of law 

enforcement, in contrast to certain of her colleagues, whom she characterizes as 

inclined to favor the government.” 262 The court explained that “interviews in which 

253. Id.

254. Id. at 114 (citing In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001) and United States v. 

Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993)).

255. Id. at 114.

256. Id. at 115.

257. Id. at 116.

258. Id.

259. 736 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam), vacated in part, 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014).

260. Id. at 131.

261. Id. at 129–30.

262. Id. at 127.
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the presiding judge draws such distinctions between herself and her colleagues 

might lead a reasonable observer to question the judge’s impartiality.” 263

In contrast, disqualification has been deemed unnecessary if the judge’s extrajudicial comments are sufficiently balanced to belie claims that they manifest 

bias. In United States v. Pitera, 264 the judge gave a videotaped lecture to a government drug enforcement task force seven months before a narcotics case was tried 

but after the case had already been assigned to her. In the lecture, the judge urged 

the assembled agents and prosecutors to take certain steps to increase prospects 

for conviction in narcotics cases. The Second Circuit nevertheless upheld the refusal to disqualify because the judge’s lecture “included several emphatic criticisms of prosecutors that would lead a reasonable person not to question, but to 

have confidence in the [j]udge’s impartiality.” 265 In addition, the judge participated in various programs for criminal defense lawyers, and she “commendably 

lectures to a variety of trial practice seminars.” 266

Similarly, in United States v. Barry, 267 an extrajudicial comment on a pending 

case did not give rise to a perception of partiality sufficient to warrant disqualification. After sentencing the defendant, the judge addressed a forum at Harvard 

Law School in which he spoke of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s 

guilt. When the sentence was vacated on unrelated grounds and the case remanded for resentencing, the defendant moved for disqualification, claiming the 

judge’s remarks at Harvard created an appearance of partiality. The D.C. Circuit 

ruled, however, that because the judge’s remarks were “based on his own observations during the performance of his judicial duties,” disqualification was not 

required. 268

Attendance at party-sponsored educational seminars on issues in litigation. For 

years, educational institutions and other organizations have hosted expensepaid educational seminars for judges on a range of issues that come before the 

courts. When seminar sponsors later appear as parties before those judges in 

cases raising issues covered in the seminars, it brings up questions of ethics and 

disqualification. As to the ethics of participating in expense-paid seminars, the 

263. Id.

264. 5 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 1993).

265. Id. at 626.

266. Id. at 627.

267. 961 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

268. Id. at 263. See also In re Wilborn, 401 B.R. 848 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (judge’s speech at CLE 

seminar, which explained the basis of his prior decisions and those of other judges concerning the 

disclosure obligations of mortgage lenders, did not provide a basis for his disqualification).
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Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct has opined at length and 

in considerable detail. 269 As to the need to disqualify, the answer is: it depends.

The Third Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify where the trial judge in a 

mass tort asbestos case attended a scientific conference on the dangers of asbestos. 270 The conference was funded in part by $50,000 from the plaintiffs’ settlement fund. The request to use these funds for this purpose was approved by the 

judge. 271 The Third Circuit, in reversing, offered the following explanation:

We are convinced that a reasonable person might question [the judge’s] 

ability to remain impartial. To put it succinctly, he attended a predominantly pro-plaintiff conference on a key merits issue; the conference was 

indirectly sponsored by the plaintiffs . . . and his expenses were largely defrayed by the conference sponsors. . . . Moreover, he was, in his own words, 

exposed to a Hollywood-style “pre-screening” of the plaintiffs’ case. 272

The court declined to address whether any of these facts alone compelled 

disqualification because “together they create an appearance of partiality that 

mandates disqualification.” 273

The Second Circuit, in contrast, upheld a refusal to disqualify in a case 

involving a trial judge’s attendance at an expense-paid environmental seminar 

funded indirectly by Texaco. 274 After the judge attended the seminar, a lawsuit 

against Texaco that he had previously dismissed was remanded to him. The 

Second Circuit agreed with the district judge that his presence at the seminar 

did not warrant disqualification under § 455(a) because Texaco provided only a 

minor part of the funding to one of two nonprofit organizations that conducted 

the seminar and because the organizations had no connection to the case. Also, 

there was no showing that any aspect of the seminar touched on issues material 

to any claims or defense in the litigation. 275

iv. Parties’ conduct toward judge

Parties and their lawyers sometimes behave in ways that predictably engender a 

judge’s animus, but such behavior does not trigger the need for disqualification. 

269. See Participation in a Seminar of General Character, Advisory Op. No. 3 (Judicial Conference 

Committee on Codes of Conduct June 2009); Attendance at Independent Educational Seminars, 

Advisory Op. No. 67 (Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct June 2009).

270. In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992).

271. Id. at 779.

272. Id. at 781–82.

273. Id. at 782.

274. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2001).

275. Id. at 202.
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To hold otherwise would be to create an opportunity for parties to exhibit hostile 

behavior strategically, as a means to force disqualification. Upholding a refusal to 

disqualify where the litigant had verbally attacked the judge in public, the First 

Circuit said, “[a] party cannot force disqualification by attacking the judge and 

then claiming that these attacks must have caused the judge to be biased against 

[her].” 276 Indeed, when a party argued that the judge’s ongoing hostility toward 

him required disqualification, the Third Circuit held that the party’s own public 

hostility toward the judge (including writing a letter to a Supreme Court justice 

urging punishment of the judge) counseled against disqualification, “lest we 

encourage tactics designed to force recusal.” 277 For the same reason, the filing of a 

collateral lawsuit or other adversarial legal action against the judge will generally 

not require disqualification. 278

In upholding a refusal to disqualify when the plaintiff had sent a letter to 

the Senate Judiciary Committee opposing the judge’s nomination to the bench, 

the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that disqualification was necessary: 

“Such a letter is probative of [the plaintiff’s] dislike for [the judge], not the other 

way around.” 279

The courts have taken a similar approach to threats against the judge. In 

United States v. Mosby, 280 the respondent moved for disqualification on the 

grounds that he had previously threatened the judge, that the judge was made 

aware of these threats through a motion filed with the court, and that the judge 

was thus incapable of approaching the case impartially. The Eighth Circuit 

found that the judge was previously unaware of these threats and that therefore 

276. FDIC v. Sweeney, 136 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 

Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3542 at 577–78 (2d ed. 1984)). 

277. United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1414 (3d Cir. 1994). See also Akins v. Knight, 863 F.3d 

1084, 1087 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 992 (2018) (“[A] rule that would require recusal 

any time a litigant has been critical of a judge would create perverse incentives and enable judge 

shopping.”); United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 129 (2d Cir. 2000) (judge did not commit clear error 

in denying disqualification because of media and political attacks on him; to read § 455 to allow such 

disqualification “would create a moral hazard by encouraging litigants or other interested parties to 

maneuver to obtain a judge’s disqualification”).

278. See, e.g., In re Bush, 232 F. App’x 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2007) (recusal not required on grounds 

that debtor had filed civil claim against district judge, who had entered adverse ruling against debtor 

in prior case); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (recusal not required when judge was 

one of the numerous federal judges against whom plaintiff had filed suit). See also Jones v. Pittsburgh 

Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1355–56 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 

1986); United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 

1176, 1181 (6th Cir. 1976).

279. DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage, 974 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1992).

280. 177 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 1999).
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disqualification was unnecessary. In another Eighth Circuit case, 281 a district 

judge did not disqualify himself after a letter threatening his life was sent to a 

local newspaper. Because the judge believed the threat was an attempt to have the 

case removed to a different court with a more favorable judge and the defendant 

was incapable of carrying out the threat, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the 

judge properly denied the motion for disqualification. And in a case where the 

judge told the press that he was not intimidated by a party’s threats, the Second 

Circuit concluded that disqualification was unnecessary, observing that the 

judge’s statement evinced his capacity to separate his personal interests from the 

facts of the case. 282

It bears emphasis, however, that this line of cases seeks to thwart the efforts 

of parties or their counsel to engage in strategic behavior aimed at forcing disqualification. Cases in which a party is independently discovered to have threatened the judge’s life stand on different footing. 283 In United States v. Greenspan, 284

the Tenth Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify in the face of a threat to the 

trial judge. The court concluded that the judge should have disqualified himself 

because he “learned of the alleged threat from the FBI, and there is nothing in 

the record to suggest the threat was a ruse by the defendant in an effort to obtain 

a different judge.” 285 Moreover, the trial court had expedited sentencing in order 

to “‘get [the defendant] into the federal penitentiary system immediately, where 

he [could] be monitored more closely.’” 286 Under the circumstances, the court’s 

impartiality could reasonably be questioned. But the Tenth Circuit clarified, in 

dicta, that threats against a judge will rarely be a ground for disqualification:

[I]f a death threat is communicated directly to the judge by a defendant, 

it may normally be presumed that one of the defendant’s motivations is to 

obtain a recusal, particularly if he thereafter affirmatively seeks a recusal. 

. . . [I]f a judge concludes that recusal is at least one of the defendant’s 

objectives (whether or not the threat is taken seriously), then section 455 

will not mandate recusal because that statute is not intended to be used 

as a forum shopping statute. . . . Similarly, if a defendant were to make 

281. United States v. Dehghani, 550 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2008).

282. LoCascio v. United States, 473 F.3d 493, 496 (2d Cir. 2007). See also United States v. Beale, 574 

F.3d 512, 520 (8th Cir. 2009) (recusal not required when threats were clearly an attempt to manipulate 

the judicial system); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 170 (2d Cir. 2003) (disqualification 

unnecessary when defendants repeatedly raised their aborted attempt to kill an unnamed judge in an 

effort to harass and force disqualification).

283. See Charles Gardner Geyh, James J. Alfini, Steven Lubet & Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial 

Conduct and Ethics (5th ed. 2013).

284. 26 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 1994).

285. Id. at 1006.

286. Id. at 1005 (Appellant’s Appendix 358–59).
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multiple threats to successive judges or even to multiple judges on the 

same court, there might be some reason to suspect that the threats were 

intended as a recusal device. 287

Cases in which parties are being prosecuted for having threatened, attempted to murder, or murdered, the judge or the judge’s colleagues, ordinarily require 

disqualification and are discussed in Section II.B.1.b.i.

Judges have likewise been loath to disqualify themselves from cases in which 

a party or that party’s lawyer has been complimentary of the judge. In Sullivan v. 

Conway,

288 the defendant (a lawyer) wrote a letter to his client praising the judge. 

Sullivan, a lawyer representing himself as plaintiff, inadvertently received a copy 

of the letter, submitted it to the court, then moved for disqualification on the 

ground that the praise could influence the judge. “[T]he praise would not have 

come to [the judge’s] attention . . . had not the lawyer wishing to disqualify him 

brought it to his attention.” 289 Rejecting the argument that the judge should have 

disqualified himself, the Seventh Circuit observed that “it is improper for a lawyer 

or litigant (Sullivan being both in this case) to create the ground on which he seeks 

the recusal of the judge assigned to his case. That is arrant judge-shopping.” 290

2. Specific grounds: § 455(b)

a. Personal bias, prejudice, or knowledge: § 455(b)(1)

Disqualification under § 455(b)(1) requires disqualification when the judge “has 

a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 291

i. Bias and prejudice

As a practical matter, parties rarely seek disqualification under § 455(b)(1) alone 

for two reasons. First, relief for actual bias may be easier to obtain under § 144 

than § 455(b)(1). 292 Section 144 requires disqualification whenever a timely and 

287. Id. at 1006. See also United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (disqualification 

not required when judge concluded there was no active threat against him; defendant had taken no 

affirmative steps toward carrying out threat).

288. 157 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 1998).

289. Id. at 1096.

290. Id. Accord United States v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1990). See also In re Mann, 229 

F.3d 657, 658 (7th Cir. 2000).

291. The corollary to § 455(b)(1) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3C(1)(a). 

See Appendix A.

292. This is not to imply that obtaining relief under § 144 is easy. Section 144 is discussed in section III.
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facially sufficient affidavit alleging bias is filed, whereas § 455(b)(1) requires 

disqualification “only if actual bias or prejudice is ‘proved by compelling evidence.’” 293 If courts analyze a claim under § 144 and it fails, there will not be sufficient evidence to meet the higher burden of proof under § 455(b)(1); if the claim 

is valid, disqualification is required under § 144, and an analysis of § 455(b)(1) 

becomes unnecessary. As a consequence, litigants often argue for disqualification 

under both statutes when alleging actual bias. Courts often conflate the analysis 

of bias under the two statutes, deciding to “view judicial interpretations of ‘personal bias or prejudice’ under § 144 as equally applicable to § 455(b)(1).” 294

Second, most litigants who file motions for disqualification for actual bias 

or partiality under § 455(b)(1) also argue that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned under § 455(a). Because demonstrating an appearance of 

partiality under § 455(a) is easier (and implicitly less critical of the subject judge) 

than demonstrating actual bias or prejudice, courts again often decide the issue 

on § 455(a) grounds without ever reaching § 455(b)(1).

The issue of disqualification for bias, while not a common occurrence, still 

arises occasionally. Disqualification under §  455(b)(1) requires that a litigant 

present evidence of a “negative bias or prejudice [which] must be grounded in 

some personal animus or malice that the judge harbors against him.” 295 The standard for determining if such bias exists is “whether a reasonable person would be 

convinced the judge was biased.” 296 The Fifth Circuit noted that the standard for 

finding actual bias is objective and that “it is with reference to the ‘well-informed, 

thoughtful and objective observer, rather than the hypersensitive, cynical and 

suspicious person’ that the objective standard is currently established.” 297

293. Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Balistrieri, 779 

F.2d 1191, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985)). The court concluded that the judge’s statement that a motion for 

disqualification was “offensive” and “‘impugn[ed]’ his integrity” was not sufficiently compelling 

evidence of an extrajudicial source of actual bias against the defendant. Id. at 355–56.

294. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d at 1202.

295. Id. at 1201.

296. Hook, 89 F.3d at 355. See also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 

2016); Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567 (4th Cir. 2011); Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2009); 

United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394 (6th 

Cir. 2005); In re Community Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2005); Cordoza v. Pacific States Steel 

Corp., 320 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2003); Ocasio v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 9 F. App’x 66 (2d Cir. 2001); In re 

American Ready Mix, Inc., 14 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Barry, 946 F.2d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Hale 

v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884 (1st 

Cir. 1983).

297. Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 462 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 49 

F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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In Mann v. Thalacker, 298 the Eighth Circuit was unwilling to imply actual bias 

or prejudice from the judge’s own personal history. After his conviction for sexual 

abuse of a child, the defendant argued, in the context of his habeas petition, that 

the state trial judge’s own history of sexual abuse at the hands of his father should 

have caused him to disqualify himself on the grounds of personal bias. Although 

§ 455(b)(1) does not apply to the actions of a state trial judge, the court used it 

as a standard in this case. The court held that reference to the judge’s personal 

history was insufficient to establish actual bias, although it stated that the defendant’s argument would have been stronger “if the abuse the judge suffered as a 

child bore a closer resemblance to the conduct with which [the defendant] was 

charged.” 299

ii. Extrajudicial source of bias

Most circuits have adopted the requirement, based on the Supreme Court’s use of 

the extrajudicial source doctrine for § 455(a), 300 that “[b]ias against a litigant must 

. . . arise from an extrajudicial source” for disqualification under § 455(b)(1). 301

Adverse contempt orders and other judicial rulings in the same case, for example, are thus not, by themselves, sufficient for establishing bias for disqualification under § 455(b)(1). 302 Explaining the application of the extrajudicial source 

doctrine to § 455(b)(1), one district court noted: “In every lawsuit, judges make 

rulings adverse to one or the other party. That these rulings may be unwelcome 

is simply too commonplace a circumstance to support an allegation of bias.” 303

The Fifth Circuit held, in Andrade v. Chojnacki, 304 that opinions formed in 

the course of the current proceedings, as well as those based on prior judicial 

proceedings, are “nearly exempt from causing recusal” and can only do so if they 

“reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment 

impossible.” 305 The judge’s off-the-record insults and expressions of distaste 

for several of the parties were not enough to meet this high standard because 

298. 246 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 2001).

299. Id. at 1097.

300. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554–55 (1994). See Section II.B.1.b.ii for a discussion of 

Liteky and the extrajudicial source doctrine as it applies to § 455(a).

301. Hook, 89 F.3d at 355. See also United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 820, 831 (7th Cir. 1996).

302. See, e.g., Brokaw v. Mercer Cty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000).

303. Marion v. Radtke, No. 07-cv-243-bbc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41031, at *14–15 (W.D. Wis. May 14, 

2009) (holding defendant’s motion to disqualify, which was based wholly on motions the judge made 

that were not in defendant’s favor, lacked sufficient evidence of actual bias for disqualification under 

§ 455(b)(1)).

304. 338 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2003).

305. Id. at 462 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555–56).
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“expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, and even anger” will not establish the 

bias or prejudice required by § 455(b)(1). 306

In Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 307 the Seventh Circuit 

rejected the disqualification arguments of an attorney whom the trial judge had 

found in contempt several times. The attorney had repeatedly violated court orders, including a confidentiality agreement, and he had misrepresented himself 

as a party’s counsel after that party had dismissed him. The Seventh Circuit found 

his argument for disqualification without merit because the attorney made “no 

attempt to establish any bias stemming from a personal relationship or prior litigation,” instead relying exclusively on “rulings during the litigation, which absent 

extraordinary circumstances, are not grounds for recusal.” 308 No such extraordinary circumstances were enumerated, and the court made clear that “efforts at 

courtroom administration and enforcing compliance with a court order do not 

amount to an inability to render fair judgments.” 309

Although establishing disqualifying bias on the basis of a judge’s statements 

made during judicial proceedings is difficult, it is not impossible. As the foregoing 

discussion suggests (and the Supreme Court has opined), disqualification is required in those rare circumstances in which a judge’s comments “reveal such a high 

degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.”310 Thus, for 

example, in Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co.,311 the Eighth Circuit concluded that a judge’s 

comments during proceedings rose to the level of pervasive bias when, without a 

trial, the judge suggested that he believed the allegations against the defendant.312

306. Id. See also United States v. White, 582 F.3d 787, 807 (7th Cir. 2009) (recusal not required 

when judge referred to defendant, convicted as leader of drug-trafficking street gang, as a kingpin; 

expressed doubts about defendant’s capacity to produce the briefs he submitted without help; and 

called defendant’s briefs “rude”).

307. 299 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2002).

308. Id. at 640.

309. Id. See also United States v. Lanza-Vázquez, 799 F.3d 134, 143 (1st Cir. 2015) (judge’s pattern of 

interceding to assist with prosecution’s questions “skirted near the line,” but was ultimately a proper 

exercise of trial management, because judge generally intervened only to expedite trial after defense 

counsel’s repetitive and technical objections unnecessarily slowed pace of trial); Burley v. Gagacki, 

834 F.3d 606, 617 (6th Cir. 2016) (recusal not required for instructing plaintiffs’ counsel to use the 

question-and-answer format during cross-examination, reminding a witness to testify truthfully, 

refusing to allow a witness without personal knowledge of a document to testify about the document, 

and questioning merits of plaintiffs’ case-in-chief).

310. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555–56.

311. 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984).

312. Id. at 1192. See also Parliament Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 676 F.2d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying 

exception to extrajudicial source doctrine and finding judge’s comments in judicial context showed no 

ill will, and thus no bias or prejudice).
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iii. Bias against nonparties

Actual bias for or against an attorney, witness, or other participant is not ordinarily enough to warrant disqualification under § 455(b)(1), unless it is so extreme 

as to engender bias for or against a party. In Dembowski v. New Jersey Transit Rail 

Operations, Inc., 313 a part-time magistrate judge was allowed to continue his representation of a party involved in a suit in the same district in which the magistrate judge served his judicial function. The party seeking disqualification of the 

magistrate judge from his role as advocate alleged that the judge and jury would 

be inclined to favor the arguments of the magistrate judge because of his status as 

a member of the judiciary. In reaching its decision denying the motion to disqualify, the district court held that, in the context of § 455(b)(1), “potential ‘bias for or 

against an attorney, who is not a party, is not enough to require disqualification 

unless it can also be shown that such a controversy would demonstrate bias for 

or against the party itself.’” 314 The court further held that “a judge’s acquaintance 

with a party, an attorney, or a witness without some factual allegation of bias or 

prejudice, is not sufficient to warrant recusal.” 315

The Second Circuit held that a judge’s comment on the possibility of disbarment proceedings against a party’s attorney does not establish the personal 

bias required by §  455(b)(1). In LoCascio v. United States, 316 the trial judge, in 

a hearing not attended by the attorney threatened with disbarment, mentioned 

the possibility of disbarment proceedings should the attorney testify as planned. 

The Second Circuit found that, when read in context, the judge’s comment could 

not “reasonably be construed as exhibiting personal animosity towards [the attorney or the defendant],” nor could it be seen as “displaying hostility towards 

[the defendant’s] claim.” 317 The court went on to hold that personal bias was not 

established because the judge’s comment did not derive from an extrajudicial 

source or reveal the requisite favoritism or antagonism, making disqualification 

unnecessary.

313. 221 F. Supp. 2d 504 (D.N.J. 2002).

314. Id. at 511 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 39 F. Supp. 2d 692, 699 (M.D. La. 1999)).

315. Id. (quoting Bailey v. Broder, No. 94, 1997 WL 73717, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1997)).

316. 473 F.3d 493 (2d Cir. 2007).

317. Id. at 496–97. See also Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1146 (10th Cir. 2006) 

(disqualification under § 455(b)(1) unnecessary, despite judge repeatedly calling attorney 

incompetent, making sarcastic comments about attorney’s incompetence, urging client to proceed 

pro se, and encouraging party to file a malpractice claim against counsel). 
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iv. Knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts

Section 455(b)(1) requires disqualification when judges have prior knowledge of 

disputed facts. The Fifth Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify when a relative of 

the judge was a major participant in transactions relating to the defendant’s indictment and “had communicated to the judge . . . material facts and her opinions 

and attitudes regarding those facts.” 318

In United States v. Alabama, 319 the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial judge 

should have disqualified himself from a lawsuit against Alabama and its state universities when the judge had been a state legislator involved in legislative battles 

germane to the litigation. The judge was “forced to make factual findings about 

events in which he was an active participant.” 320

Alabama can be reconciled with Easley v. University of Michigan Board of Regents, 321 in which the Sixth Circuit rejected the contention that knowledge gained 

by the judge while serving on a law school’s “committee of visitors” required 

him to disqualify himself from a discrimination suit against the law school. In 

Easley, the judge’s position did not give him knowledge of the events at issue in 

the litigation.

In United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft I), 322 the D.C. Circuit remanded a case to a different trial judge when, among other things, the original judge 

appeared to be influenced in his handling of a case by his private reading of a 

book related to the case. While the court did not explicitly cite § 455(b)(1), the 

facts and holding of the case suggest the relevance of this subsection. The court 

noted that “[t]he book’s allegations are, of course, not evidence on which a judge 

is entitled to rely.” 323

The Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge’s decision to revoke the bail bonds 

of bank robbery defendants after the U.S. attorney informed the judge about 

threats to the witnesses’ safety could not constitute a disqualifying fact with regard to the subsequent trial. 324 The fact that the judge was made aware of the 

information in private rather than in open court was irrelevant, considering the 

defense counsel’s refusal of an offer to review the information in camera.

318. In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1988).

319. 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987).

320. Id. at 1545.

321. 906 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1990).

322. 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

323. Id. at 1463.

324. United States v. Jackson, 430 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1970).
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In Edgar v. K.L., 325 the Seventh Circuit extended § 455(b)(1) to information 

acquired in off-the-record briefings and held that § 455(b)(1) required disqualification when a judge who was briefed privately by a panel of experts declined 

to inform the parties about the briefing’s contents. The court acknowledged that 

§ 455 is primarily concerned with knowledge gained “outside a courthouse”; however, knowledge acquired in a judicial capacity typically “enters the record and 

may be controverted or tested by the tools of the adversary process . . . in the 

record—and in this case the judge has forbidden any attempt at reconstruction. 

. . . This is ‘personal’ knowledge.” 326 In Rupert v. Ford Motor Co., 327 in contrast, 

the Eighth Circuit ruled that disqualification was unnecessary under § 455(b)(1) 

when the judge became privy to facts underlying the plaintiff’s loss of consortium 

claim at a status conference, because “[a]ll information exchanged during the 

conference was inadmissible at subsequent proceedings.” 328

When the judge simply possesses information generally available to the public, 

disqualification is unnecessary. In In re Hatcher, 329 the judge’s son had assisted in 

the prosecution of a defendant in a case related to the case before the judge, and 

the judge had sat in on the trial to observe his son’s performance. The Seventh 

Circuit noted that the district judge

was present only as a spectator in the courtroom. He therefore learned 

nothing . . . that any member of the public could not also have learned by 

attending the trial or reading a good newspaper account of its progress. 

This limited exposure is simply not the kind of personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts with which § 455(b)(1) is concerned. 330

The Seventh Circuit nonetheless concluded that disqualification was required 

under § 455(a) because the cases were so closely related.

b. Prior association with matter as private practitioner or 

witness: § 455(b)(2)

Subsection 455(b)(2) requires disqualification under the following circumstance:

[w]here in private practice [the judge] served as lawyer in the matter in 

controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served 

325. 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996).

326. Id. at 259.

327. 640 F. App’x 205 (3d Cir. 2016).

328. Id. at 209.

329. 150 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1998).

330. Id. at 635.
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during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or 

such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it[.] 331

In In re Rogers, 332 the Fourth Circuit defined the “matter in controversy” 

quite broadly. The defendants were charged with using unlawful means to secure 

passage of a bill in the state legislature. A former law partner of the trial judge 

had represented a company in its own efforts to get the bill passed. The defendants planned to argue that their conduct was no more culpable than that of the 

company represented by the judge’s former partner, whom they planned to call 

as a witness. Holding that disqualification was required under § 455(b)(2), the 

Fourth Circuit observed that “the actual case before the court consists of more 

than the charges brought by the government. It also includes the defense asserted 

by the accused. Here, this defense, in part at least, will consist of matters in which 

the judge’s former partner served as lawyer.” 333

In United States v. DeTemple, 334 the Fourth Circuit distinguished Rogers and 

held disqualification unnecessary when the judge had represented a creditor of 

the defendant several years before the current charges of bankruptcy fraud. The 

creditor “played no role in either the defense or the prosecution of the case. . . . 

The connection between the judge’s prior professional associations and the case 

before him is far more tenuous here than in Rogers.” 335

In Little Rock School District v. Armstrong, 336 the district judge (Wilson)—

when he was a private practitioner decades earlier—had defended a judge 

(Woods) in a mandamus proceeding that sought Woods’s disqualification from 

a case that came before Wilson twenty years later in the context of a motion for 

release from court supervision. The Eighth Circuit concluded that Judge Wilson’s 

prior representation of Judge Woods was irrelevant to the merits of the underlying dispute and thus that “there is not a sufficient relationship between the 

recusal proceedings with respect to Judge Woods and the issues now before us on 

the merits to make them the same ‘matter in controversy.’” 337

331. The corollary to § 455(b)(2) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3C(1)(b). 

See Appendix A.

332. 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976).

333. Id. at 1198.

334. 162 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 1998).

335. Id. at 284.

336. 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2004).

337. Id. at 961.
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c. Prior association with matter as governmental 

employee: § 455(b)(3)

Subsection 455(b)(3) requires disqualification when the judge has “served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or 

material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning 

the merits of the particular case in controversy.”

The Eighth Circuit has held that “[i]f an indictment or investigation leading 

directly to the indictment began after a former prosecutor took office as a judge, 

he or she is not considered to have been ‘of counsel’ and is not required by § 455 

to disqualify himself or herself.” 338

In United States v. Arnpriester, 339 the Ninth Circuit held that a judge who was 

formerly a U.S. attorney when the case at hand was under investigation should 

have disqualified himself from ruling on the appellant’s motion for a new trial. 

The court noted that its analysis “imputes to the United States Attorney the 

knowledge and acts of his assistants.” 340

In United States v. Silver, 341 the Ninth Circuit held that a trial judge who had 

served as U.S. attorney for the preliminary investigation of the defendant’s prior 

offense need not disqualify himself under § 455(b)(3). The judge had served as 

U.S. attorney during the first two years of a five-year mail fraud investigation of 

the defendant, conducted more than ten years before the indictment that led to 

the current case. In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit said, “There is no factual connection or relationship between the current case and the 1982 mail fraud 

case.” 342 It further noted that the previous case was referenced only “for purposes 

of sentencing” and that the judge “was not asked to make any determinations or 

to render an opinion on the mail fraud conviction.” 343 Distinguishing Arnpriester, 

the court explained that here the trial judge had not initiated the current case 

and only happened to have been U.S. attorney at the beginning of an investigation 

of a factually unrelated case involving the same defendant. 344

In Murray v. Scott, 345 the Eleventh Circuit held that a district judge who had 

served as counsel of record in prior litigation for one of the current parties should 

338. United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 908 (8th Cir. 1985).

339. 37 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 1994).

340. Id. at 467. The court held that both § 455(a) and (b) required disqualification in this case.

341. 245 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2001).

342. Id. at 1079.

343. Id. at 1080.

344. Id. at 1079–80.

345. 253 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001).
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have disqualified himself under §§ 455(b)(1) and (b)(3). In 1970, while serving 

as a U.S. district attorney, the judge appeared as counsel of record for the defendant, a sporting association, the status of which was the subject of the current 

litigation. He had filed a brief that the party now seeking disqualification claimed 

would likely be used as evidence in the current proceeding. The Eleventh Circuit 

found that the judge “may have knowledge of facts in dispute in the present case” 

and that disqualification was thus required because “the record is strong enough 

to presume personal knowledge.” 346

The Seventh Circuit held that disqualification was not required when the 

judge presiding over a tax evasion case had previously served as an assistant U.S. 

attorney (AUSA) at the same time when, and in the same district where, the defendant had been indicted. 347 The court stated: “As applied to judges who were 

formerly AUSAs, § 455(b)(3) requires some level of actual participation in a case 

to trigger disqualification.” 348 Absent evidence of actual participation, the judge 

did not commit plain error in not disqualifying himself. 349

In Clemmons v. Wolfe, 350 decided in 2004, the district judge denied a habeas 

petition filed by a petitioner over whose trial that same judge, before his appointment to the federal bench, had presided in state court. The Third Circuit 

concluded that the district judge erred in declining to disqualify himself, on the 

grounds that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned under § 455(a). 

The court went further, however, taking the unusual step of exercising its broad 

supervisory authority over federal proceedings to require that all federal district 

judges disqualify themselves from habeas corpus proceedings that raise issues 

concerning trials or convictions over which the judges presided in their former 

capacities as state judges. Clemmons was decided under § 455(a), not § 455(b)(3). 

The corollary to § 455(b)(3) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges—

Canon 3C(1)(e)—was amended in 2009 to make its applicability to former judicial service explicit. 351

346. Id. at 1313.

347. United States v. Ruzzano, 247 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2001), overruled in part by Fowler v. Butts, 829 

F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Several of this circuit’s decisions hold that failure to file a [§ 455(a)] 

motion in the district court waives the right to present the contention on appeal.”).

348. Ruzzano, 247 F.3d at 695 (citing cases).

349. Id. at 696. Because the defendant didn’t request disqualification at trial and raised the issue 

for the first time on appeal, the Seventh Circuit could only review for plain error. Id. at 695.

350. 377 F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 2004).

351. For the text of Canon 3C(1)(e), see Appendix A.
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d. Financial interest in matter: § 455(b)(4) and § 455(f)

i. Disqualification for financial interest

Subsection 455(b)(4) requires disqualification when a judge

knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child 

residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter 

in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that 

could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding[.] 352

Section 455(d)(4) defines “financial interest” for the purposes of § 455(b) 

and provides specific exemptions, such as investment in a mutual fund or ownership of government securities. Apart from such exemptions, even the smallest 

financial interest (e.g., ownership of a single share of stock) requires disqualification. Under § 455(c), it is a judge’s duty to keep abreast of all of his or her 

financial interests. 353

Courts of appeals have interpreted “financial interest” to refer to a direct 

interest, not a “remote or contingent” interest. 354 In a case involving the constitutionality of a “privilege” tax as applied to federal judges working within Jefferson County, Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit raised the issue of disqualification 

sua sponte when “nine of the en banc panel’s twelve judges [had] sat in Jefferson County at least one day—and some a few days more.” 355 Because the city 

had never tried to collect the privilege tax from a federal judge who did not have 

chambers in the county, and none of the Eleventh Circuit judges had chambers 

in Jefferson County, the court held that any possible interest the judges may have 

was too remote and contingent to constitute a financial interest. 356

Similarly, in an antitrust case alleging price-fixing by oil companies, all of the 

trial judges in the district were residents of New Mexico, whose future utility bills 

could have been affected by the outcome of the litigation. The Tenth Circuit held 

that this was too remote and contingent to qualify as a “financial interest” under 

352. The corollary to § 455(b)(4) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3C(1)(c). 

See Appendix A.

353. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1, Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.4, and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 require a nongovernmental 

corporate party to a proceeding to file a statement identifying any parent corporation or publicly held 

corporation that owns 10% or more of its stock. This disclosure is meant to aid judges in decisions 

about disqualification under Canon 3C(1)(c) and § 455(b)(4). Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.4, the 

government must also file a statement identifying an organizational victim of a crime and providing 

the same information on a corporate victim that a nongovernmental corporate party must file.

354. See, e.g., In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 366–67 (4th Cir. 1976).

355. Jefferson Cty. v. Acker, 92 F.3d 1561, 1581 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing appendix).

356. Id. at 1582. The court also held that disqualification would be contrary to the rule of necessity. 

Id. at 1583–84.
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§ 455(b)(4). 357 In each case, the courts considered the potential benefit to the 

judges of an “other interest” under the statute, which meant, under § 455(b)(4), 

that disqualification was required only if this “other interest” would be “substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”

Contributions by a judge’s spouse have not been considered a financial interest. In a Second Circuit case involving an attack on an abortion clinic, the defendant moved for disqualification on the grounds that the judge’s wife had made 

financial contributions to the victim clinic and so had created a financial interest 

under § 455(b)(4). 358 The court noted that “[r]ecusal is not required . . . when the 

alleged interest or bias on the part of the judge or his spouse is ‘not direct, but is 

remote, contingent, or speculative.’” 359 In affirming the trial judge’s denial of the 

disqualification motion, the court explained that the clinic in question, although 

named as the victim, was not a party to the litigation, and that “contributions 

made by [the judge’s] wife to [the clinic] did not constitute a financial interest in 

the organization.” 360

In Draper v. Reynolds, 361 a civil rights suit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 

plaintiff sought to disqualify the trial judge on the grounds that the judge owned 

property in the same county in which the defendant was deputy sheriff. The 

Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the judge, who previously 

filed a zoning application in the county, would likely side with his own financial 

interests and hence the county in violation of § 455(b)(4). It held that a property 

interest in a given county is grounds for disqualification only if “[that county and 

its commissioners] are parties to the case and . . . [the judge’s] zoning application 

is currently pending before [that county and its commissioners].” 362

The Fifth Circuit held that when the judge or someone in his family is a member of a class seeking monetary relief, § 455(b)(4) imposes a “per se rule” requiring disqualification. 363 The Fourth Circuit, in contrast, held that a trial judge who, 

as a rate-paying customer of a utility company involved in the case before him, 

could have received a $100 refund as a putative member of the class of plaintiffs, 

357. In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 794, 796 (10th Cir. 1980).

358. United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1999).

359. Id. at 398 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 48 (2d Cir. 1998)). See also Sensley v. 

Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 600 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that trial judge was not disqualified even though 

his wife’s position at district attorney’s office might conceivably be affected indirectly by outcome of 

case, because such an interest was “remote, contingent or speculative”).

360. Arena, 180 F.3d at 398.

361. 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004).

362. Id. at 1280.

363. Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025, 1029–30 (5th Cir. 1998).
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should not have disqualified himself under § 455(b)(4). 364 The court classified 

the potential refund as an expectancy interest, and as such it was not a “financial 

interest” but rather “some other interest” under the language of § 455(b)(5). It 

further explained that the words “however small” apply only to financial interests 

under subsection (b)(4) and that in addressing other interests a judge “must necessarily consider the remoteness of the interest and its extent or degree.” 365 The 

Fourth Circuit held that the possible refund was “de minimis” and therefore not 

grounds for disqualification. 366

In a class action arising from the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina, 

a New Orleans district judge refused to disqualify himself on the grounds 

that possible inconvenience experienced by the judge and his family gave 

him a potential financial interest in the outcome of the proceedings under 

§ 455(b)(4). 367 In its disqualification analysis, the district court referred to the 

Fifth Circuit’s statement that “[a] remote, contingent, or speculative interest is 

not a disqualifying financial interest under the statute.” 368 Because the judge and 

his family had suffered no financial loss or property damage as a result of Katrina, 

any interest or potential class membership based on possible inconvenience was, 

at best, “ephemeral, inchoate, and bordering on the metaphysical,” and so could 

not justify disqualification. 369

In United States v. Rogers, 370 a mail fraud case, the trial judge was “one of millions of stockholders” in a defrauded bank. 371 Holding that disqualification was 

not required under § 455(b)(4), the Ninth Circuit explained that the bank, which 

was the victim of the crime, is not a party to the proceeding under § 455(b)(4). 372

Moreover, “stock ownership in the corporate victim of a crime cannot be deemed 

a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy” under § 455(b)(4). 373

364. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976).

365. Id. at 368.

366. Id. But see Gordon v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1043–44 (S.D. Cal. 2001) 

(holding that disqualification was required of a judge who, as wholesale customer of defendant/

electric company, had “legal claims identical to those raised by plaintiffs,” which qualified both as 

financial and other claims under language of § 455(b)(4)).

367. Berthelot v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 431 F. Supp. 2d 639 (E.D. La. 2006).

368. Id. at 648 (citing In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786–87 (5th Cir. 1986)).

369. Id. at 649–50.

370. 119 F.3d 1377 (9th Cir. 1997).

371. Id. at 1384.

372. Id. See also United States v. Aragon, No. 99-50341, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15423, at *5 (9th Cir. 

June 29, 2000).

373. Rogers, 119 F.3d at 1384. Disqualification was not required under §  455(a) either, the 

court ruled.
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ii. Divestiture as a cure for “financial interest” disqualification

The conflicts enumerated in § 455(b) require automatic disqualification—even 

if judges believe they are capable of impartial judgment; even if they believe 

that a reasonable person would not question their impartiality; and even if the 

parties are willing to waive any objections. Section 455(f), however, provides an 

opportunity for the judge to “cure” certain § 455(b) conflicts. 

Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice, 

judge, magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been 

assigned would be disqualified, after substantial judicial time has been 

devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or discovery, after the 

matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her household, 

has a financial interest in a party (other than an interest that could be 

substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if 

the justice, judge, magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor 

child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of the interest that 

provides the grounds for disqualification. 374

A number of courts of appeals have upheld and applauded the use of subsection (f) to prevent disqualification. 375 In Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Maxus Energy 

Corp., 376 the judge sold stock as soon as he learned that the corporation in which 

he owned stock held a large percentage of the stock of one of the parties. The Second Circuit noted that the judge’s curative action pursuant to § 455(f) prevented the waste of “three years of the litigants’ time and resources and substantial 

judicial efforts.” 377

In United States v. Lauersen, 378 an insurance fraud case, the trial judge disclosed his ownership of a small number of shares in one of the victimized insurance companies eligible to receive monetary restitution as a result of the judge’s 

ruling in the case. Because the recovery of restitution would affect the price of the 

374. 28 U.S.C. § 455(f).

375. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 70, 80–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 

(criticizing Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025 (5th Cir. 1998)) (denying defendants’ motion for 

disqualification and holding that, under § 455, “a judge . . . assigned a case in which she has a financial 

or other curable conflict . . . may continue to preside if she promptly eliminates it”); Key Pharm., Inc. 

v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 480, 484 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (judge divested stock in parent corporation 

and declined to disqualify himself, noting that disqualification would be mandatory except for the 

provisions of § 455(f)). But see Gordon v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1046 (S.D. Cal. 

2001) (relying on Tramonte) (both cases holding disqualifying interests incurable even if discovered 

and removed at beginning of case).

376. 925 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1991).

377. Id. at 561.

378. 348 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2003).
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shares in question, the company agreed to waive its right to monetary recovery 

so the judge could continue on the case with no financial conflict. The Second 

Circuit held that what otherwise would have provided a basis for disqualification 

under § 455(b)(4) was not a financial interest in this case because the company’s 

decision to “forgo its restitution claim” served to “eliminate such a basis” under 

§ 455(f). 379

In In re Certain Underwriter, 380 the district judge discovered—after being assigned to hear a class-action antitrust suit—that she owned shares in two of the 

defendant corporations, making her a putative class member. The judge immediately informed the parties of the conflict, divested herself of the shares, and 

opted out of the class. She denied the subsequent §  455(b)(4) disqualification 

motion. The Second Circuit affirmed, stating that § 455(f) was created to allow 

the continued participation of a “district judge with a minor interest in a class 

action lawsuit discovered after assignment, who quickly divested herself of the 

conflicting interest.” 381

In a class-action copyright case, two of the reviewing Second Circuit judges 

declined to disqualify themselves despite their membership in the relevant class 

for five months during their work on the case. 382 The class included anyone with 

copyrighted material posted on the electronic databases LexisNexis and Westlaw, among others. Having promptly divested themselves of any legal or financial 

claim as soon as they realized that they were members in the class, the judges 

relied on § 455(f) to justify their decision not to disqualify themselves. As they 

explained, “a reasonable person would not have known that we were class members” before the date on which they discovered—and promptly divested themselves of—the interest. 383 Also relevant to their refusal to disqualify was the fact 

that “many—if not most—other judges are similarly situated,” including all but 

one of the other members of the Second Circuit, as well as (presumably) all the 

members of the Supreme Court. 384

Some courts, however, have construed the “divestiture cure” strictly. The 

Sixth Circuit held that disqualification was required in a case in which the trial 

judge’s daughter was employed by the law firm representing a party before the 

judge, even though the daughter resigned from the law firm. 385 It observed that 

379. Id. at 338.

380. 294 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2002).

381. Id. at 304.

382. In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007).

383. Id. at 142.

384. Id. at 142–43.

385. In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1990).
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§ 455(f) refers to the judge himself or herself, his or her spouse, or a minor child 

residing with the judge. This “suggests that Congress intended to exclude the 

types of cure not permitted by this provision, for Congress had the opportunity to 

enact a broader amendment than it devised with section 455(f).” 386

The Second Circuit held that a district judge who had unknowingly possessed 

a substantial financial stake in one of the plaintiffs (a bank) during a bench trial 

could not cure this conflict by divesting himself of the interest on remand. 387

Although the court based its decision on an “appearance of partiality” problem 

under § 455(a), its analysis is relevant to the divestment cure of a § 455(b)(4) 

conflict. The court held that “where an earlier ‘appearance’ of a potentially 

disqualifying interest mandated recusal under Section 455(a), a divestiture years 

later cannot cure a judge’s presiding over significant proceedings in a case—here 

rendering a decision after a bench trial—in the intervening years.” 388

e. Other interests of judge and judge’s family: § 455(b)(5)

Section 455(b)(5) requires a judge’s disqualification when

He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to 

either of them, or the spouse of such a person:

(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee 

of a party;

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the 

proceeding. 389

i. When judge or relatives are parties or associated 

with parties

Under § 455(b)(5)(i), judges shall disqualify themselves when they or a close 

family member is a party to the proceeding. Based on this subsection, the Tenth 

Circuit held that a trial judge should have disqualified himself from hearing 

habeas claims challenging state court cases in which his uncle had participated 

386. Id. at 1147 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

387. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2003).

388. Id. at 131.

389. The corollary to § 455(b)(5) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3C(1)(d). 

See Appendix A.
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as a criminal appeals judge. 390 The judge’s uncle, who had since died, was nonetheless a named defendant in the claims, thus requiring disqualification pursuant 

to § 455(b). 391

The District Court of Puerto Rico held that § 455(b)(5) did not reach the 

father of the judge’s son-in-law, who was on the board of directors of one of the 

named parties. 392 The Checklist for Financial and Other Conflicts contained within the Code of Conduct for United States Judges identified “the following blood 

relatives as falling within the third degree relationship: parent, child, grandchild, 

great grandparent, great grandchild, sister, brother, aunt, uncle, niece, and nephew.” 393 Regarding this as an exclusive list of possible third-degree relationships, 

the court concluded that a judge could not disqualify himself under § 455(b)(5) 

without establishing the existence of such a relationship. 394

ii. When judge or relative acts as lawyer

The Seventh Circuit held that a judge’s attendance at a related trial, to watch his 

son act as assistant counsel, did not require disqualification under § 455(b)(1). 395

The defendant also sought disqualification under § 455(b)(5)(ii). Although the 

son, who was a third-year law student, “acted as a lawyer,” the court held that 

disqualification was not required under subsection (b)(5)(ii) because the proceeding was not the same as that involving the defendant. It involved a defendant 

charged with conduct arising from the same conduct as the defendant in the case 

at bar, but the two men were not codefendants. “No matter how closely related the 

two cases were factually or legally . . . the fact remains that they were separate 

‘proceedings.’” 396

In similar circumstances, the Sixth Circuit required disqualification. In In re 

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 397 seven claims against an insurance company were 

consolidated for trial, and the trial judge initially disqualified himself because his 

daughter’s law firm represented four of the claimants. The judge later separated 

the cases and planned to try the three claims in which his daughter’s firm was not 

390. Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994).

391. Id. at 1571.

392. Oriental Fin. Group, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.P.R. 2006).

393. Id. at 179.

394. Id.

395. In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1998).

396. Id. at 637. The court found that disqualification was required under § 455(a), which illustrates 

that the appearance of impropriety may require disqualification even absent grounds for disqualification specifically enumerated in § 455(b).

397. 919 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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involved. On mandamus petition, the court reversed because the cases remained 

intimately connected: “A decision on the merits of any important issue in any of 

the seven cases . . . could . . . constitute the law of the case in all of them, or involve 

collateral estoppel, or might be highly persuasive as a precedent.” 398 The court did 

not specify whether it based its decision on § 455(a) or § 455(b)(5)(ii), but a concurring opinion, joined by seven judges, emphasized that there was an actual conflict of interest pursuant to § 455(b)(5), as well as an appearance of partiality. 399

A proposed substitution or addition of counsel by one of the parties may 

create a conflict of interest requiring disqualification of the judge under § 455(b). 

The Eleventh Circuit held that, in such a case, the court may deny the request 

for new counsel, even apart from evidence or suspicion that it is made to spark 

disqualification, if it would cause undue delay. 400 However, a showing of “overriding need” for the new counsel “would trump both time delay and the loss of prior 

judicial activity.” 401 Where the defendants retained the judge’s brother-in-law six 

years after the complaint was filed, the Fifth Circuit remanded for a determination of whether the primary motive in his hiring had been to disqualify the 

judge. 402 The court held that “a lawyer may not enter a case for the primary purpose of forcing the presiding judge’s recusal.” 403 Otherwise, it observed, “a litigant 

could in effect veto the allotment and obtain a new judge by the simple expedient 

of finding one of the judge’s relatives who is willing to act as counsel.” 404

iii. When judge or relatives have an interest that could be 

substantially affected

A recurring problem implicating subsection 455(b)(5)(iii) arises when relatives 

of the judge are employed by a law firm that represents a party in litigation 

before the judge. In 1993, seven members of the Supreme Court, each with 

relatives employed by law firms, issued a letter responding to this concern. 405

The justices noted that in a case in which a relative appears before the judge as 

counsel, § 455(b)(5)(ii) requires disqualification. Since Congress could have, but 

did not, broaden this subsection to require disqualification whenever a relative 

is affiliated with a law firm that appears before a judge, the justices opined that 

398. Id. at 1143.

399. Id. at 1147.

400. Robinson v. Boeing Co., 79 F.3d 1053 (11th Cir. 1996).

401. Id. at 1056.

402. McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1983).

403. Id. at 1265.

404. Id. at 1264.

405. Supreme Court of the United States, Statement of Recusal Policy (Nov. 1, 1993).
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Congress must not have regarded so broad a disqualification as necessary. 406 That 

conclusion, in turn, refuted categorical assertions under § 455(a) that a judge’s 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned whenever a firm that employs one of 

the judge’s relatives appears before him or her. And in the minds of the justices, it 

likewise refuted categorical claims that any lawyer–relative at the firm possessed 

an interest in the case under § 455(b)(5)(iii) sufficient to require disqualification. 

The signatories to the letter nonetheless indicated that they would disqualify 

themselves from any case in which a relative held a partnership interest in a 

firm appearing before the Court, unless the Court received assurances from the 

firm that the relative would not share in profits derived from the case. Salaried 

employees, in contrast, did not share in the profits of the firm and so had no 

significant interest in the outcome of cases heard by the Court.

The courts of appeals appear to concur that disqualification is unnecessary 

when a relative is simply a salaried employee of the firm that appears before 

the court. For example, the Eighth Circuit found disqualification unnecessary in 

a case in which a law firm representing a party before the judge had hired the 

judge’s daughter, who worked for the firm as a law clerk and later accepted a 

permanent job offer as associate starting in the fall. 407 The court said, “an employment relationship between a party and a judge’s son or daughter does not per 

se necessitate a judge’s disqualification.” 408 The issue is fact-dependent, and the 

facts in this case didn’t show an actual conflict under § 455(b)(iii). 409 The daughter was not, and would not—as a future employee of the law firm—be involved in 

the present litigation. She “was to be a salaried employee . . . not a partner whose 

income is directly related to the profit margin of the firm and could be substantially affected by the outcome of this case.” 410 Finally, the firm was only one of 

many firms representing the parties, and its share of any damages almost certainly would not affect the salary or benefits of a first-year associate. Similarly, in 

Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 411 a court of appeals judge found that his 

son’s employment as a nonmanagement entry-level computer programmer for an 

intervenor in the case on appeal did not require the judge’s disqualification from 

the panel hearing the appeal.

406. Id. at 53.

407. In re Kansas Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 85 F.3d 1353 (8th Cir. 1996).

408. Id. at 1364.

409. Id. The court also held that there was no appearance of a conflict of interest in violation of 

§ 455(a). Id. at 1365.

410. Id. at 1364.

411. 153 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 1998).
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The circuits are divided, however, on whether a relative of the judge who is 

a partner at a firm in litigation before the judge has an interest in the outcome 

that is sufficient to trigger the need for disqualification. In Potashnick v. Port City 

Construction Co., 412 the Fifth Circuit adopted a per se rule requiring disqualification when a relative of the judge is a partner in a law firm representing a party in 

the case. The judge will always know that the partner has “‘an interest that could 

be substantially affected by the outcome of’ a proceeding involving the partner’s 

law firm.” 413

The Second Circuit, however, explicitly rejected this per se approach in Pashaian 

v. Eccelston Properties, Ltd.

414 It found disqualification unnecessary when a partner 

in the law firm representing the defendant was married to the sister of the judge’s 

wife. “It would simply be unrealistic to assume . . . that partners in today’s law firms 

invariably ‘have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome 

of’ any case in which any other partner is involved.” 415 The trial court had noted 

that the law firm in question had sixty partners and gross revenue in excess of 

$100 million. Moreover, the case was not likely to affect the firm’s reputation. The 

judge had concluded that his sister-in-law’s interest would not be “substantially 

affected” by the outcome of the case, and the court of appeals agreed.

In a Fifth Circuit false advertising case, 416 the district judge was not disqualified even though her father-in-law was a retired partner in the firm representing the defendants. The judge’s alleged interest in the proceeding under 

§ 455(b)(5)(iii) was connected to the fact that since her father-in-law’s death, 

the firm had been paying her husband death benefits that were adjustable based 

on the salaries of partners within the firm. The Fifth Circuit held that this interest was too remote to constitute a disqualifying financial interest because “the 

Consumer Price Index always served as a ceiling on the adjustment to which [the 

judge’s father-in-law] was entitled,” making any interest the judge had in the outcome of the case so small as to be insignificant. 417

In Sensley v. Albritton, 418 the trial judge’s wife was employed as an assistant 

district attorney in the office representing the defendants, though she herself was 

in no way involved in the case. The plaintiffs moved to disqualify. Relying on 

§ 455(b)(5)(iii), they alleged that the outcome of the case might have an indirect 

412. 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980).

413. Id. at 1113 (quoting § 455(b)(5)(iii)).

414. 88 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996).

415. Id. at 83 (quoting § 455(b)(5)(iii)).

416. IQ Prods. Co. v. Pennzoil Prods. Co., 305 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2002).

417. Id. at 378.

418. 385 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2004).
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effect on the judge’s wife’s ongoing employment in the office, in the event that 

the district attorney lost political popularity by losing the case. The Fifth Circuit found the plaintiffs’ allegations unconvincing because “they are only able 

to make this argument by layering several speculative premises on top of one 

another to reach a speculative conclusion.” 419

In a case about the constitutionality of state taxation practices, 420 the Tenth 

Circuit concluded that § 455(b)(5) did not require disqualification even though 

the father-in-law of the trial judge’s son was state governor. It found that the 

governor was not within the third degree of relationship required by § 455(b)(5). 

In addition, the court rejected the idea that the governor had an interest in the 

outcome of the suit because it was not “alleged that [the governor] has a personal 

or financial interest in the outcome of this litigation,” and “[a]ny political interest 

that [the governor] may have in the outcome of this case is filtered through 

the State.” 421

iv. When judge or relative is likely to be material witness

In United States v. Robinson, 422 the Eighth Circuit ruled that the trial judge’s 

failure to disqualify himself under § 455(b)(5)(iv) when his nephew was one of 

thirty-four witnesses testifying on the same subject was harmless error. The court 

declined to reach the issue of whether the nephew was a material witness, holding that even if he was, the judge’s failure to disqualify was harmless. The court 

explained that, “[a]s in other areas of the law, there is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who inadvertently overlook disqualifying 

circumstances.” 423

C. Disqualification procedure

By its terms, § 455 simply states that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself” under 

the circumstances specified. It obligates disqualification regardless of whether a 

motion to disqualify has been filed. Accordingly, the disqualification process may 

be triggered by a judge on his or her own initiative or by a party on motion.

419. Id. at 600.

420. Higganbotham v. Oklahoma, 328 F.3d 638 (10th Cir. 2003).

421. Id. at 645.

422. 439 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2006).

423. Id. at 779 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862 (1988)).
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1. Investigating disqualification claims

United States v. Morrison424 addressed the question of whether a trial judge, asked 

to disqualify herself based on conflict of interest, may investigate the matter. 

When the defendant sought disqualification based on an alleged adverse business 

relationship between himself, the judge’s husband, and a friend of the judge, the 

judge asked her husband and friend to review the materials submitted in the defendant’s motion. Both the judge’s husband and friend stated that the allegations 

were false and denied any relationship with the defendant. Accordingly, the judge 

declined to disqualify herself. The Second Circuit noted that “it was not irregular 

for [the judge] to ascertain her husband’s and friend’s possible involvement with 

the defendant simply by asking them, in a reasonable effort to confirm that [the 

defendant’s] incredible claims were indeed not factual.” 425

Conversely, when the trial judge does not adequately investigate and disclose 

potential grounds for disqualification, the judge’s ignorance of those grounds 

does not eliminate the potential conflict. In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated 

FM Insurance Co., 426 Chemical Bank merged with The Chase Manhattan Bank 

just before the case was assigned to the district judge. The newly merged entity 

used the Chase name, while counsel and the court used the Chemical Bank name 

to refer to the plaintiff. As a consequence, the district judge was unaware that his 

stock in Chase actually meant he had a financial interest in the plaintiff. 427 Three 

years later and on remand, the judge became aware of the interest and immediately divested himself of his stock. Although it could not be established that the 

judge was in fact aware of his financial interest, the Second Circuit concluded 

that “a reasonable person knowing the pertinent facts” would conclude the judge 

was aware, which created the appearance of partiality under § 455(a). 428 The appropriate remedy was the vacatur of the district court’s judgment awarding damages to Chemical Bank. 429

In a variation on this theme, the Sixth Circuit clarified that a litigant has 

no obligation to investigate possible bases for disqualification. 430 After learning of a conflict of interest, the trial judge transferred the case to another judge. 

The second judge—faced with deciding whether a prior dispositive ruling by the 

424. 153 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1998).

425. Id. at 48 n.4.

426. 343 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2003).

427. Id. at 123.

428. Id. at 130.

429. Id. at 132–33.

430. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 190 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 1999).
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first judge should be allowed to stand—noted that the disqualification motion 

had been filed after the judge’s adverse ruling. Refusing to “reward [the movant] 

or encourage this trend,” 431 the judge observed that “litigants have a duty to investigate and inform the court of any perceived biases before the court and the 

parties invest time and expense in a case.” 432 Rejecting this analysis, the Sixth 

Circuit said: 

We believe instead that litigants (and, of course, their attorneys) should 

assume the impartiality of the presiding judge, rather than pore through 

the judge’s private affairs and financial matters. Further, judges have an 

ethical duty to “disclose on the record information which the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question 

of disqualification.” Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1489 (11th Cir. 1995). 

. . . [The judge] possibly did not consider the matter sufficiently relevant 

to merit disclosure, but his nondisclosure did not vest in [the party] a 

duty to investigate him. 433

2. Waiver of disqualification: § 455(e)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(e), waiver of a ground for disqualification based on § 455(a) 

“may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis 

for disqualification”; waiver of disqualification under § 455(b) is not permissible. 434

Some courts of appeals have recognized waivers pursuant to § 455(e).435 In 

Perkins v. Spivey,

436 the trial judge fully disclosed the potential conflict arising from 

his law clerk accepting an employment offer from a firm that occasionally represented one of the parties to the lawsuit. Counsel for both parties elected to proceed, 

expressing no concern about the law clerk’s continued participation.437 The Eighth 

Circuit found that when counsel expressly assented to the clerk’s participation and 

failed to seek the judge’s disqualification in a timely manner after disclosure, the 

parties effectively waived the grounds for the judge’s disqualification.438

431. Id. at 742.

432. Id.

433. Id. See also In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 

(holding that when facts are undisputed, expert opinion on a disqualification motion is not 

acceptable). See also United States v. Eyerman, 660 F. Supp. 775, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same).

434. The corollary to § 455(e) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3D. See

Appendix A.

435. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d 

1256, 1261 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 236–37 (3d Cir. 1982).

436. 911 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1990).

437. Id. at 33.

438. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit noted, however, that “[w]hile it is . . . permissible for 

a judge to accept a waiver of recusal, we believe this option should be limited to 

marginal cases and should be exercised with the utmost restraint.” 439 The court 

found that the defendant did not validly waive his disqualification claim, even 

though he was apprised of the potential disqualifying circumstance and did not 

seek disqualification. The Eleventh Circuit held that:

as a general rule, “‘a federal judge should reach his own determination 

[on recusal], without calling upon counsel to express their views. . . . The 

too frequent practice of advising counsel of a possible conflict, and asking 

counsel to indicate their approval of a judge’s remaining in a particular 

case is fraught with potential coercive elements which make this practice 

undesirable.’” 440

Failure to comply with the procedural requirements for disclosure under 

§ 455(e) for waiver of disqualification can result in reversal. 441 In Barksdale 

v. Emerick, 442 the district court rejected a “belated” disqualification motion, 

explaining that it had initially “disclosed . . . that one of its law clerks was related 

to a Defendant party . . . at the . . . status conference and counsel . . . voiced no 

objections.” 443 Quoting § 455(e), the Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that “[t]here is 

no disclosure ‘on the record’ and therefore no properly obtained ‘waiver.’” 444 The 

court went on to say that § 455(e)’s disclosure and waiver requirements “must be 

strictly construed.” 445

3. Timeliness of disqualification motion

Unlike § 144, § 455 has no explicit requirement for a “timely” affidavit. Most 

circuits, however, require that a motion for disqualification be brought “at the 

earliest moment after knowledge of the facts demonstrating the basis for such 

439. United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 745 (11th Cir. 1989).

440. Id. at 745–46 (quoting In re National Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1226, 1231 (7th Cir. 1988) 

(quoting Resolution L, Judicial Conference of the United States, Oct. 1971)).

441. See, e.g., Hall v. Small Bus. Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding § 455(e) waiver 

not valid when magistrate judge “failed fully to disclose the basis on which a reasonable person might 

‘harbor doubts about the magistrate’s impartiality’” (quoting Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 

F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980)); and vacating lower court’s judgment).

442. 853 F.2d 1359 (6th Cir. 1988).

443. Id. at 1361.

444. Id. (Contie, J., dissenting).

445. Id. Accord United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1538–39 (7th Cir. 1985) (disclosure must be 

on record).
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disqualification.” 446 And all the circuits that have considered the issue agree that 

a party may not withhold “a recusal application as a fall-back position in the 

event of adverse rulings on pending matters.” 447 These circuits have held that the 

timeliness requirement applies to § 455(b) as well, even though disqualification 

under that section cannot be waived. 448 “[A] party having information that raises 

a possible ground for disqualification cannot wait until after an unfavorable 

judgment before bringing the information to the court’s attention.” 449 The Fifth 

Circuit has said that “[t]he most egregious delay—the closest thing to per se 

untimeliness—occurs when a party already knows the facts purportedly showing 

an appearance of impropriety but waits until after an adverse decision has been 

made by the judge before raising the issue.” 450

The Ninth Circuit requires “reasonable promptness after the ground for such 

a motion is ascertained.” 451 The Second Circuit uses a four-factor analysis for 

determining the timeliness of a motion: (1) whether the movant has participated 

in a substantial manner in trial or pretrial proceedings; (2) whether granting the 

motion would waste judicial resources; (3) whether the motion was made after 

entry of judgment; and (4) whether the movant can show good cause for delay. 452

446. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir. 1994). See also Apple v. 

Jewish Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1987). Accord United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 

951–52 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing cases); Pontarelli v. Stone, 978 F.2d 773, 775 (1st Cir. 1992); United States 

v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1071 (7th Cir. 1990); In re National Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1226, 1232 (7th 

Cir. 1988).

447. In re IBM Corp., 45 F.3d 641, 643 (2d Cir. 1995). See also Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 

867 F.2d 1415, 1418–21 (Fed. Cir. 1989). But see United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1324 (8th Cir. 1996) 

and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

448. See Summers v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 917, 921 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The policy considerations supporting a timeliness requirement are the same in each section: to conserve judicial resources and prevent 

a litigant from waiting until an adverse decision has been handed down before moving to disqualify 

the judge.”); In re Kansas Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 85 F.3d 1353, 1363 (8th Cir. 1996) (“While it is true that a 

§ 455(b)(1) objection cannot be waived, it is still subject to the timeliness requirement of our cases.”).

449. Nordbrock v. United States, 2 F. App’x 779, 779 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion) (citing 

United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997)).

450. United States v. Vadner, 160 F.3d 263, 264 (5th Cir. 1998). Accord Rabushka v. Crane Co., 122 

F.3d 559, 566 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1040 (1998); United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 

1382 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Stenzel, 

49 F.3d 658, 661 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1990).

451. Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 1991).

452. Apple v. Jewish Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 334 (2d Cir. 1987). See also United States v. 

Amico, 486 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that motion for disqualification—raised two years after 

judge’s impartiality was first questioned—made prior to entry of judgment and with demonstrated 

good cause for delay, not untimely).
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At the same time, the Third Circuit has held that where a judge has knowledge of facts that lend themselves to an appearance of impropriety but fails to disclose this information, a party will not be charged with constructive or imputed 

knowledge of those facts when the court is determining whether the motion was 

made in a timely manner. 453 However, in a case in which a city board of education 

was charged with constructive knowledge of the facts it used as grounds for its 

disqualification motion, the district court held that by failing to file the motion 

in a timely manner “in the vain and remote hope that a jury would somehow rule 

in favor of the Board and against the Plaintiff,” the board waived its right to raise 

the disqualification issue. 454

The Second Circuit has said that untimeliness can “constitute the basis 

for finding an implied waiver. But the distinction is a critical one, because 

while waiver—whether express or implied—will preclude appellate [review], 

untimeliness need not do so.” 455 Assuming the defendant’s failure to move for 

disqualification until after the trial judge had ruled against her was a forfeiture 

and not an implied waiver, the Second Circuit could review the claim only for 

plain error, and it held that the judge’s decision not to disqualify himself sua 

sponte was not plain error.

4. Evaluation of motion by merits judge

In a statutory scheme so committed to the appearance of impartial justice that 

it requires disqualification whenever a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be 

questioned,” numerous commentators have found it problematic that the task of 

deciding whether a judge is (or appears to be) too biased or conflicted to decide a 

matter fairly is left to the judge who is allegedly too biased or conflicted to decide 

the matter fairly. 456 But given the presumption of impartiality to which a judge is 

453. In re Kensington Int’l, Ltd., 368 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2004).

454. Drake v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 476 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1349 (N.D. Ala. 2007).

455. United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 2000).

456. See, e.g., Russell Wheeler & Malia Reddick, Judicial Recusal Procedures p. 5 (June 2017), 

http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/judicial_recusal_procedures.pdf

(“Allowing the judge who is the subject of the recusal motion to make a dispositive decision denying 

that motion flies in the face of the oft-invoked, age-old proposition that no person should be a judge in 

his own case.”); Matthew Menendez & Dorothy Samuels, Judicial Recusal Reform: Toward Independent 

Consideration of Disqualification p. 1 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/

publications/Judicial_Recusal_Reform.pdf (“challenged judges themselves determine whether there 

are adequate grounds to question their own impartiality—a task for which, research and commonsense suggest, they are wholly unsuited”); Charles G. Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. 

Again., 30 Rev. Litig. 671, 710 (2011) (“The majority rule in the state and federal courts continues to be 

that the presumption of impartiality judges enjoy justifies them deciding their own disqualification 
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entitled, and the inefficiency of calling on a second judge to resolve a preliminary 

motion, the practice in most federal courts has been for disqualification motions 

to be decided by the judge whose disqualification is sought.

The First Circuit observed that “[a]lthough a trial judge faced with a 

section 455(a) [disqualification] motion may, in her discretion, leave the motion 

to a different judge, no reported case or accepted principle of law compels her to 

do so.” 457 The weight of authority indicates that it is proper, indeed the norm, for 

the challenged judge to rule on a disqualification motion pursuant to § 455. 458

Because § 455 contains no provision about the transfer of disqualification motions 

to another judge, a district judge in the Southern District of Illinois ruled that 

the motion to disqualify “must be decided by the judge whose disqualification 

is sought.” 459

5. Postdisqualification procedure

Postdisqualification procedure involves two distinct issues: a) what further actions a judge may take in relation to the pending case after disqualification, and 

(b) what happens to rulings issued by the judge before disqualification.

a. Postdisqualification actions

The Supreme Court has opined that after disqualification, the judge generally 

“simply steps aside and allows the normal administrative processes of the court 

to assign the case to another judge.” 460 Most courts of appeals have held that 

after disqualification, a judge must take no nonministerial actions with respect 

to the case. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits concur with the First and Ninth 

Circuits that judges can take no nonministerial actions after announcing their 

motions, while survey data shows that the vast majority of the public thinks that disqualification 

requests should be assigned to a different judge. In short, the prospects for an appearances-based 

disqualification regime to promote public confidence in the courts are undercut by recurrent 

divergence of public and judicial views over when a judge’s impartiality appears doubtful.”); Amanda 

Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. Kan L. Rev. 531, 

571 (2005) (“The Catch-22 of the law of judicial disqualification is that the very judge being challenged 

for bias or interest is almost always the one who, at least in the first instance, decides whether she is 

too conflicted to sit on the case.”).

457. In re United States, 158 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Accord United States v. 

Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

458. See, e.g., Schurz Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1992) (opinion of Posner, 

J., in chambers); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1202–03 (7th Cir. 1985).

459. Cohee v. McDade, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (emphasis added).

460. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 212 (1980).
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intention to disqualify. 461 Ministerial actions are limited to performing duties 

incidental to transferring a case to a new judge. 462

A few litigants have objected to a disqualified judge transferring the case to 

another judge as an improper, nonministerial act. This claim has generally been 

rejected. 463 In McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 464 however, the Fifth Circuit 

concluded that permitting a disqualified judge to reassign the case “would violate 

the congressional command that the disqualified judge be removed from all participation in the case” and might also “create suspicion that the disqualified judge 

will select a successor whose views are consonant with his.” 465

One lingering issue concerns whether judges may, after disqualifying themselves, reconsider or amend their rulings to disqualify. Although entertaining a 

motion to reconsider a disqualification order is clearly more than a ministerial 

task, there is a conflict among the circuit courts as to whether judges who disqualify themselves may thereafter reconsider.

At least three circuits—the First, Ninth, and Fifth—have disallowed postdisqualification actions of this sort. In El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. The M/Y Johanny, 466

on motion from one party, the trial judge disqualified himself under § 455(a). 

When the other party moved for reconsideration, however, the judge listened to 

arguments and entered a reconsideration order vacating the disqualification order. The First Circuit found this action improper: “[A] trial judge who has recused 

461. See Moody v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137, 143–44 (3d Cir. 1988) (after disqualification, judge 

is limited to “the ‘housekeeping’ duties necessary to transfer a case to another judge”); Arnold v. 

Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899, 904 (4th Cir. 1983) (“a judge who is disqualified from acting must 

not be able to affect the determination of any cause from which he is barred”); Doddy v. Oxy USA, 

Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 457 (5th Cir. 1996) (district judge erred in vacating her disqualification order after 

disqualifying herself); El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. The M/Y Johanny, 36 F.3d 136, 141 (1st Cir. 1994) (“As 

a general rule, a trial judge who has recused himself ‘should take no other action in the case except the 

necessary ministerial acts to have the case transferred to another judge.’”) (quoting 13A Charles Alan 

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3550 (2d ed. 1984)); Stringer v. United 

States, 233 F.2d 947, 948 (9th Cir. 1956) (judge’s nonministerial involvement in case after disqualifying 

himself for cause was an “incurable error”).

462. Moody, 858 F.2d at 143–44.

463. See United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1992) (this judicial assignment “was 

a purely ministerial act, without any implications concerning the merits of the case”); In re Aetna 

Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136, 1145 (6th Cir. 1990) (“even a judge who has recused himself ought to 

be permitted to perform the duties necessary to transfer the case to another judge”); In re Cement 

Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to construe “proceeding” to include 

“ministerial duties” like “assigning a case to another judge”).

464. 714 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1983).

465. Id. at 1261.

466. 36 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 1994).
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himself ‘should take no other action in the case except the necessary ministerial 

acts to have the case transferred to another judge.’” 467

In United States v. Feldman, 468 the Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning when 

it reversed a district court order of partial disqualification. While the defendant’s 

appeal was pending, a corporate merger made the judge a stockholder in an institution to which the defendant had been ordered to pay restitution. On remand, 

the trial judge disqualified himself from presiding over restitution-related issues, 

but not others. In reversing, 469 the Ninth Circuit noted that § 455(d)(1) disqualified the judge from a “proceeding,” and defined “proceeding” to include “pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation.” Thus, “when a judge 

determines that recusal is appropriate, it is not within his discretion to recuse by 

subject matter or only as to certain issues and not others. Rather, recusal must be 

from a whole proceeding, an entire ‘stage of litigation.’” 470

In United States v. O’Keefe, 471 the judge granted a party’s motion for a new 

trial, then disqualified himself from further involvement. After the case was 

transferred to a new judge, the government moved for reconsideration of the order granting a new trial. The new judge transferred the case back to the original 

judge to rule on the motion for reconsideration, which the judge did. The Fifth 

Circuit ruled that this was improper, rejecting the contention “that an exception 

from the bright-line rule for recusals . . . should be created for motions for reconsideration because a [new] judge cannot reconsider what that judge has not 

considered previously.” 472 New judges often must act on motions for reconsideration first heard by other judges who later died or became ill. 473 The Fifth Circuit 

acknowledged that its “ruling today may put one district court judge in the somewhat uncomfortable position of having to pass judgment on the discretionary 

rulings of another judge” but found this circumstance was outweighed by “the 

values underlying 28 U.S.C. § 455,” which require that judges who have disqualified themselves take no further action. 474

467. Id. at 141 (quoting 13A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 

§ 3550 (2d ed. 1984)).

468. 983 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1992).

469. Id. at 145. Accord Stringer v. United States, 233 F.2d 947, 948 (9th Cir. 1956) (“once having 

disqualified himself for cause . . . it was incurable error for the district judge to resume full control and 

try the case”).

470. Feldman, 983 F.2d at 145.

471. 128 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1078 (1998).

472. Id. at 891.

473. Id.

474. Id. at 891–92 n.6.
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The Second Circuit, in contrast, has authorized district judges to reconsider 

their decisions to disqualify, at least when disqualification was unnecessary and 

the case had yet to be transferred. In Pashaian v. Eccelston Properties, Ltd., 475 the 

trial judge concluded that disqualification was not legally required but disqualified himself as a matter of prudence to avoid any possibility of reversal after prolonged proceedings. He chose, however, to make disqualification effective only 

after he ruled on a pending motion for preliminary injunction. On appeal, the 

Second Circuit found that disqualification was indeed unnecessary and rejected 

the contention that, “once he decided to recuse himself as a matter of discretion, 

such recusal had to be total and immediate.” 476 The Second Circuit explained 

that it was “loath to articulate a rule that would frustrate or obviate the careful 

exercise of judicial discretion by district judges in responding to disqualification 

motions in unusual circumstances.” 477

In United States v. Lauersen, 478 the district judge owned an insubstantial 

amount of stock in a corporation that may have had a negligible restitution claim 

against the criminal defendant. The judge disqualified himself but later reversed 

his ruling. The Second Circuit agreed that disqualification was unnecessary and 

concluded that, “[t]here is no reason to prohibit a judge from reconsidering a recusal decision, at least in the absence of transfer of the case to another judge.” 479

The Second Circuit justified its conclusion by pointing to the example of a judge 

who disqualifies himself because his wife owns stock in one of the parties, only 

to learn later that day that his wife had sold that stock months before. “No one,” 

the court said, “could seriously maintain that the judge could not reconsider and 

revise his initial decision to recuse.” 480 The court cited, without discussing, precedent in other circuits that placed greater weight on the judge’s duty to take no 

further action following disqualification and that forbade judges from engaging 

in postdisqualification activity of this sort.

b. Predisqualification orders

A difficult question arises with respect to orders that a disqualified judge issued prior to disqualification and whether such orders must be vacated. In cases where the 

grounds for disqualification do not come to light (and hence, disqualification is not 

sought or secured) until after judgment is entered, seeking relief from judgment is 

475. 88 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996).

476. Id. at 84.

477. Id. at 84–85.

478. 348 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2003).

479. Id. at 338.

480. Id.
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governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b). In cases where the judge 

is disqualified under § 455(a), on the grounds that the judge’s “impartiality might 

reasonably be questioned,” the operative analysis is Rule 60(b)(6), which entitles 

petitioners to relief from judgment “for any other reason that justifies relief.”

In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 481 the Supreme Court observed 

that Rule 60(b)(6) authorized judges to “vacate judgments whenever such action 

is appropriate to accomplish justice” 482 but cautioned that it was reserved for 

“extraordinary circumstances” 483 and that “[a]s in other areas of the law, there 

is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who inadvertently 

overlook a disqualifying circumstance.” 484 “[I]n determining whether a judgment 

should be vacated for a violation of § 455(a),” the Court introduced a three-factor 

analysis: “it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the 

particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other 

cases, and the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process. 485

In Liljeberg, the district judge served on a university board of trustees and 

attended board meetings where the university’s interest in acquiring a hospital 

from Liljeberg, was discussed. Liljeberg, the petitioner, was a pharmacist, promoter, and half-owner of a real estate brokerage firm. The meetings occurred 

amid litigation over which the district judge presided, where Liljeberg’s ownership rights to the hospital (and hence his right to sell the hospital to the university) were at issue—an issue the district judge resolved in Liljeberg’s favor. Of the 

three factors the Court identified, it focused here on the third: the adverse impact 

on public confidence in the judiciary. If the district court’s order were allowed to 

stand, it would create an understandable public perception that the judge was 

aware of the university’s interest in the proceeding and was acting on the university’s behalf. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment.

The courts of appeals have applied Liljeberg to reach different conclusions 

in different cases. In United States v. Amico, 486 the Second Circuit ruled that the 

district judge’s previous business dealings with a key witness, coupled with his 

imprudent reactions to recusal, created an appearance of partiality that rendered 

vacatur advisable to discourage similar behavior in future cases and to preserve 

481. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).

482. Id. at 864 (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 355 U.S. 601, 614–15 (1994)).

483. Id. (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 200 (1950)).

484. Id. at 862.

485. Id. at 864.

486. 486 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 2007).
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public perception. 487 Conversely, in In re Continental Airlines Corp., 488 the Fifth 

Circuit concluded that disqualification—but not vacatur—was warranted when 

the district judge accepted an offer of employment the day after awarding $700,000 

in legal fees to his future employer. It reasoned that disqualification, coupled with 

de novo review of the district judge’s order, was sufficient to ensure fairness, discourage such judicial conduct in future cases, and protect public perception. 489

Liljeberg arose in the context of a case seeking relief from judgment under 

Rule 60(b)(6) for orders issued by judges who were later disqualified from 

the proceeding under § 455(a). The courts of appeals have applied the same 

Rule 60(b)(6) analysis to litigants seeking relief from judgment ordered by 

district judges disqualified under § 455(b). In some cases, they have ordered 

vacatur. 490 In other cases, they have deemed vacatur unnecessary. 491

Applying Rule 60(b)(6) and the Liljeberg factors when reviewing orders issued 

by judges subject to disqualification under § 455(b), however, warrants a caveat. 

As the Supreme Court explained in Liljeberg, judgments entered by judges whose 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned under § 455(a) are not automatically void but are voidable under Rule 60(b)(6) if the Court’s three-part analysis 

487. See also El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. The M/Y Johanny, 954 F. Supp. 23 (D.P.R. 1996) (ordering 

vacatur of order issued by judge after he invited friend with knowledge of subject to watch proceedings 

and give advice; concluding that vacatur was necessary to avoid risk of injustice to losing party, and to 

preserve public perception of fair trial).

488. 901 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1990).

489. Id. at 1263. See also United States v. Van Griffin, 874 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1989) (magistrate 

judge’s review of ex parte police report required disqualification under § 455(a); vacatur unnecessary 

because report duplicated other testimony, so improper ex parte communication posed no risk of 

injustice to parties and minimal risk to public perception; ordering disqualification ensured more 

prudent judicial conduct in future cases).

490. See Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (vacating judgment given 

district judge’s failure to disqualify under § 455(b)(4), citing risk of prejudice in ongoing related cases 

and impact of judge’s nondisqualification on the judiciary’s reputation); Preston v. United States, 

923 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1991) (vacating judgment because of district judge’s failure to disqualify under 

28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a) and (b)(2) and the consequent damage to public’s perception of the judiciary).

491. See United States v. Robinson, 439 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2006) (declining to vacate for violation 

of § 455(b)(5)(iv) because evidence in question would have been introduced by other means); 

Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2003) (declining to vacate summary judgment 

for nondisqualification under §§ 455(a) and (b)(2), reasoning that de novo review ensured fairness 

to appellant, that ordering disqualification will have sufficient salutary effect on future related 

litigation, and that enough time had passed to protect public perception without vacatur); Harris v. 

Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994) (declining to vacate for nondisqualification under §§ 455(a) 

& 455(b)(5)(i) because doing so would result in adjudicatory delay for plaintiffs, there was no risk to 

other proceedings given the unique procedural posture, and disqualification alone was sufficient on 

its own to protect public perception).
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warrants vacatur. If, however, a judgment is “void,” it is subject to vacatur under 

Rule 60(b)(4) at any time, without recourse to the balancing of justice-related 

equities called for by Rule 60(b)(6) or Liljeberg. In New York Life Insurance Co. 

v. Brown, 492 the Fifth Circuit quoted a widely cited treatise on federal practice 

and procedure for the proposition that “[a] judgment is not void merely because 

it is erroneous.” 493 “A judgment “‘is void only if the court that rendered it lacked 

jurisdiction . . . or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.’” 494

The Supreme Court has held that nondisqualification gives rise to due process 

problems when the judge has “a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” 

in a case 495 and when the judge exhibits a “probability of bias.” 496 As to the standard 

for “probability of bias,” the Supreme Court has referred to “judicial reforms” 

(reflected in § 455(a) and in state codes of conduct) that aim “to eliminate even 

the appearance of partiality,” 497 which the Court characterized as “more rigorous” 

than due process required. That is because appearance-based standards—such as 

when a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned”—can be met when 

a reasonable person might doubt the judge’s impartiality, even if the likelihood 

of actual bias falls short of “probable.” “Because the codes of judicial conduct 

provide more protection than due process requires,” the Court concluded, “most 

disputes over disqualification will be resolved” 498 without recourse to the due 

process threshold. In other words, simple failure to disqualify under § 455(a), 

when the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, does not give rise 

to a due process problem. Hence, orders issued under these circumstances are 

at most voidable, and the operative rule governing relief from judgment in such 

cases is Rule 60(b)(6), as interpreted by Liljeberg.

In some cases, however, nondisqualification under § 455(b), may need to be 

analyzed separately. If orders issued by judges subject to disqualification under 

§ 455(b) violate due process, then the resulting judgments are arguably void and 

492. 84 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1996).

493. Id. at 143 (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice 

and Procedure § 2862 (1973 ed.)).

494. Id. (quoting Williams v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 728 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting 

11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1973 

ed.))). This analysis is, of necessity, speculative as it applies to disqualification, insofar as the federal 

courts have not been called on to address whether orders of judgment entered by judges whose 

failure to disqualify is so egregious as to violate due process, are void, and thus subject to relief under 

Rule 60(b)(4).

495. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).

496. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009).

497. Id. at 888.

498. Id. at 890.
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as such are eligible for relief under Rule 60(b)(4). The Supreme Court’s rulings 

to date indicate that nondisqualification can violate due process in at least three 

circumstances regulated by § 455(b). First, judgments entered by judges subject 

to disqualification for actual bias under § 455(b)(1) may be categorically void, 

insofar as the “probability of bias” threshold for due process violations logically 

includes within its scope all cases of actual bias. Second, the Supreme Court has 

ruled that a state judge who presided over a case in which he had participated 

actively as a public official before being appointed to the bench (conduct that 

subjects federal judges to disqualification under § 455(b)(3)) created a probability of bias that violated due process. 499 Third, orders issued by judges subject to 

disqualification under § 455(b)(4) (or the state-rule corollary) for having a financial interest in a proceeding violate due process if that financial interest rises 

to the level of “direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary.” 500

The foregoing analysis is necessarily speculative because cases in which the 

Supreme Court has held that nondisqualification violates due process have been 

limited to state judges whose nondisqualification violated the Due Process Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal courts have little occasion to address whether the nondisqualification of a federal judge violates the Due Process 

Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the federal disqualification statute imposes disqualification standards more rigorous than due process requires. If failure to disqualify violates the statute, disqualification will be ordered without need 

for recourse to due process analysis. Conversely, if failure to disqualify does not 

violate the statute, nondisqualification is sure to satisfy less exacting due process 

scrutiny. Whether nondisqualification of a federal judge violates the due process 

clause of the Fifth Amendment becomes relevant only when seeking relief from 

judgment, where judgments rendered in violation of due process are arguably 

void and hence eligible for relief under Rule 60(b)(4). And cases addressing this 

issue are in short supply.

So far, our discussion has focused on vacatur in the context of cases in which 

a party seeks postjudgment relief under Rule 60(b). Courts of appeals, however, 

have also applied Liljeberg’s multifactor analysis to cases in which parties seek 

relief from orders issued by judges who are disqualified before judgment is 

entered—often in the context of mandamus proceedings.

In In re Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, 501 for example, the D.C. Circuit ordered 

disqualification in light of the judge’s comments on the defendant’s guilt before 

being appointed as a judge, and vacated an order of the three-judge panel on 

499. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1903 (2016).

500. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523.

501. 866 F.3d 473 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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which the judge sat. 502 Similarly, in In re Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 503 the Sixth 

Circuit ordered disqualification under §§ 455(b)(4) and (b)(5)(ii) and vacated 

predisqualification orders. The district judge’s daughter had conducted depositions in the matter prior to the judge being assigned the case, leading the circuit 

court to conclude that vacatur was necessary to avoid a risk of injustice to parties and damage to public perception of the courts. 504 In In re School Asbestos 

Litigation, 505 on the other hand, the Third Circuit declined to vacate orders that 

the district judge issued before being disqualified under §§ 455(a) and (b)(1) for 

disbursing litigation funds to sponsor a conference that the judge attended. In 

defense of its decision not to vacate predisqualification orders, the Third Circuit 

panel cited the high costs of duplicative proceedings and the low risk of harm to 

public perception given the court’s disqualification order. 506

502. Id. Recusal was required pursuant to Rule 902 of the Rules for Military Commissions 

which was modeled on § 455. Like § 455(b), Rule 902(b) is a strict provision specifying mandatory 

disqualification under its enumerated circumstances, one of which is where a military judge has 

“expressed an opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused.” R.M.C. 902(b)(3).

503. 919 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1990).

504. Id. at 1146.

505. 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992).

506. Id. at 787–88.

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III Disqualification Under 

28 U.S.C. § 144

A. Overview

Section 144 of Title 28 states in its entirety:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files 

a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is 

pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of 

any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias 

or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause 

shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only 

one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of 

counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith. 507

By its terms, § 144 applies only to district judges, as compared to § 455, which 

applies to any “justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States.” A literal 

reading of § 144 suggests that a party can force disqualification automatically, 

simply by filing an affidavit alleging that the judge is biased against the affiant or 

in favor of the affiant’s opponent. That interpretation would render § 144 akin to 

peremptory disqualification procedures adopted by judicial systems in a number 

of western states—and the legislative history of § 144 lends some support for this 

interpretation. 508

The federal courts have indeed held that under § 144 a judge must step aside 

upon the filing of a facially sufficient affidavit, but they have been exacting in 

507. 28 U.S.C. § 144. Originally enacted as § 21 of the Judicial Code of 1911, the statute was recodified 

as § 144 in 1948 without significant change.

508. 46 Cong. Rec. 2627 (1911) (remarks of Representative Cullop).
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their interpretations of what a facially sufficient affidavit requires and of the 

procedural prerequisites to application of the statute. Thus, motions have been 

dismissed because of untimeliness, because the movant failed to submit an affidavit or submitted more than one affidavit, because the attorney rather than a 

party submitted the affidavit, because the movant’s affidavit was unaccompanied 

by a certificate of counsel or failed to make allegations with particularity, and 

because the certificate of counsel certified only to the affiant’s—not counsel’s—

good faith. 509

As a consequence, § 144 has been rendered a much more cumbersome tool 

to obtain disqualification than § 455, even though the latter calls on judges to 

evaluate the merits of a movant’s allegations and not simply the facial sufficiency 

of those allegations. Despite criticism of the federal courts for what is seen as a 

“stingy” construction of § 144, it bears note that none of Congress’s bills to override federal court interpretation of § 144 have passed. 510

Another reason why § 144 has fallen into relative disuse is that it requires 

the more difficult showing of actual bias, whereas § 455(a) requires a mere appearance of bias. Section 455 thus subsumes § 144. As the Supreme Court has 

observed of § 144, it “seems to be properly invocable only when § 455(a) can be 

invoked anyway.” 511 Moreover, many of the circumstances that might qualify as 

actual bias under § 144 are specifically enumerated in § 455(b), which explicitly 

addresses various conflicts of interest, in addition to actual bias. 512 In short, while 

parties still file motions under § 144, they usually do so in tandem with § 455, with 

the latter section typically monopolizing the court’s attention.

509. See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1343 (11th Cir. 2015) (denying defendant’s 

pro se motion for recusal since it was not accompanied by good-faith certificate from his appointed 

counsel of record); United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1072 (7th Cir. 1990) (counsel did not present 

certificate of good faith, “another requirement of section 144 with which Barnes failed to comply”); 

In re Cooper & Lynn, 821 F.2d 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[N]o party filed an affidavit. . . . Rather the 

affidavit was filed by an attorney.”); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 961 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Elder’s 

affidavit violates the one-affidavit rule . . . and need not be considered.”); United States v. Balistrieri, 

779 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Because of the statutory limitation that a party may file only one 

affidavit in a case, we need consider only the affidavit filed with Balistrieri’s first motion.”); Roberts v. 

Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1980) (motion rejected because counsel, not plaintiff, signed and filed 

affidavit); United States ex rel. Wilson v. Coughlin, 472 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1973) (same); Morrison 

v. United States, 432 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 1970) (motion rejected because there was no certificate 

of good faith by counsel); United States v. Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856, 860 (6th Cir. 1967) (same).

510. For a discussion of failed amendments, see Peter A. Galbraith, Comment, Disqualifying 

Federal District Judges Without Cause, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 109 (1974).

511. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994).

512. See id. (“section 455 is the more modern and complete recusal statute”).
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B. Grounds for disqualification

1. Bias or prejudice

As noted in the overview, under § 144, disqualification is triggered by an affidavit that alleges “the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal 

bias or prejudice either against [the affiant] or in favor of any adverse party.” 

Many courts of appeals have explained that “[t]o warrant recusal under § 144, 

the moving party must allege facts that would convince a reasonable person that 

bias actually exists.” 513 In Liteky v. United States, 514 the Supreme Court noted that 

the standard for bias or prejudice under § 144 is identical to disqualification for 

bias and prejudice under § 455(b)(1). 515 In so stating, it distinguished § 455(a), 

which requires allegations of bias “to be evaluated on an objective basis, so that 

what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.” 516 The 

Ninth Circuit, however, has imported § 455(a)’s objective standard into its § 144 

analysis (before and after Liteky), declaring that “[u]nder both recusal statutes, 

the substantive standard is ‘[W]hether a reasonable person with knowledge of 

all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned.’” 517

2. “Extrajudicial source” doctrine revisited

The “extrajudicial source” doctrine (discussed in section II, in connection with 

§ 455) likewise applies to § 144. Indeed, the doctrine was initially developed under 

§ 144. Thus, ordinarily, disqualifying bias will have an extrajudicial origin—

judges often acquire an unfavorable opinion of a party in light of what they learn 

in the course of judicial proceedings, but that will rarely warrant disqualification. 

It bears reemphasis, however, that in Liteky the Supreme Court took pains to 

emphasize that “there is not much doctrine to the doctrine” 518 and that sometimes 

a judge is subject to disqualification under §§ 144 and 455 for bias manifested in 

513. Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Phillips v. Joint Legislative 

Comm. on Performance & Expenditure Review, 637 F.2d 1014, 1019 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981)). See also United 

States v. Farkas, 669 F. App’x 122, 123 (4th Cir. 2016); In re Yunik, 425 F. App’x 112, 113 (3d Cir. 2011); 

Scott v. Metropolitan Health Corp., 234 F. App’x 341, 352 (6th Cir. 2007); West v. Litscher, 209 F. App’x 

557, 559 (7th Cir. 2006).

514. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).

515. Id. at 548 (“paragraph (b)(1) entirely duplicated the grounds of recusal set forth in § 144”).

516. Id.

517. Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Hernandez, 

109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997)).

518. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554.
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judicial proceedings if the “opinions formed . . . display a deep-seated favoritism 

or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” 519

To illustrate the disqualifying bias that can manifest itself in judicial proceedings, the Liteky Court pointed to an alleged comment of the district judge in 

the 1921 case of Berger v. United States: 520 “‘One must have a very judicial mind, 

indeed, not [to be] prejudiced against the German Americans’ because their 

‘hearts are reeking with disloyalty.’” 521

Liteky rejected an additional argument in support of a rigid extrajudicial 

source rule under § 144. Section 144 requires disqualification for “personal bias 

or prejudice.” Limiting § 144 to “personal” bias arguably justifies the exclusion of 

official or “judicial” bias from its scope and so confines its application to allegations of extrajudicial or personal bias. In Liteky, the Supreme Court acknowledged 

that “a number of Courts of Appeals have relied upon the word ‘personal’ in restricting § 144 to extrajudicial sources” but concluded that “that mistakes the basis 

for the ‘extrajudicial source’ doctrine.” 522 As Justice Scalia explained for the Court, 

“[b]ias and prejudice seem to us not divided into the ‘personal’ kind, which is offensive, and the official kind, which is perfectly all right.” 523 To the contrary, bias 

and prejudice “are never appropriate.” 524 Moreover, the Court added, “interpreting the term ‘personal’ to create a complete dichotomy between court-acquired 

and extrinsically acquired bias produces results so intolerable as to be absurd.” 525

The Court illustrated disqualifying official bias with the example of “a lengthy 

trial in which the presiding judge for the first time learns of an obscure religious 

sect and acquires a passionate hatred for all its adherents.” 526

Some federal courts have since adopted Liteky’s more nuanced approach to 

§ 144 and analyze allegations of in-court bias to see if they meet the “high degree 

of favoritism or antagonism” standard. 527 Others, however, continue to use the 

pre-Liteky analysis by rejecting § 144 motions if the accompanying affidavit does 

519. Id. at 555.

520. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).

521. Id. at 28 (quoted in Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555).

522. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548–49.

523. Id. at 549.

524. Id.

525. Id. at 550.

526. Id.

527. See, e.g., Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Liteky at length, 

noting allegations of bias were based on conduct in judicial proceedings, and upholding district court’s 

assessment that “Pesnell failed to ‘demonstrate any such “deep-seated favoritism that would make fair 

judgment impossible”’”); United States v. Jones, 294 F. App’x 624 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Liteky, and 

concluding that judge’s comment that defendant was “a violent person who does not deserve to be 
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not allege an “extrajudicial source” for the judge’s purported bias or fails to show 

that the bias was “personal,” as opposed to “judicial.” 528

3. Bias toward counsel

Of the cases dealing primarily with § 144, a sizable percentage involve a judge’s 

alleged antipathy toward counsel. On its terms, § 144 requires bias against the 

party. Accordingly, a judge’s hostility toward counsel is generally an insufficient 

ground for disqualification. 529 Yet courts have held that “under specific circumstances bias against an attorney can reasonably be imputed to a party.” 530 As the 

Seventh Circuit explained, “the party seeking recusal on that theory must allege 

facts suggesting that the alleged bias against counsel might extend to the party.” 531

The allegations to that effect cannot be “merely conclusory.” 532

Conversely, the Seventh Circuit rejected the contention that a lawyer’s praise 

of the judge required disqualification. In Sullivan v. Conway, 533 the lawyer had 

written a letter to his client maintaining that, as a result of removal of the case 

to federal court, “we have a much better judge.” 534 By mistake, the letter ended 

a free person” did not rise to the level of deep-seated antagonism); LoCascio v. United States, 473 

F.3d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 2007) (trial judge’s decision to hold federal criminal defendant in contempt, 

which was subsequently vacated, and judge’s denial of defendant’s various motions during and after 

trial did not rise to the level of deep-seated antagonism, citing Liteky); Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 

1324, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Liteky and concluding that affiant’s allegations did not show 

extrajudicial source of bias or reflect improper hostility or partiality).

528. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 355 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Defendant’s allegations concern judicial, non-personal matters and cannot properly be the basis of a motion for disqualification.”); Young v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2003) (relying on pre-Liteky cases for 

the propositions that the “alleged bias ‘must stem from an extrajudicial source’” and that “extrajudicial conduct encompasses only ‘personal bias as distinguished from a judicial one,’” and concluding 

that “recusal is also unwarranted because Plaintiffs do not allege bias from extrajudicial sources”).

529. See, e.g., United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 

117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991); Souder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 939 F.2d 647, 653 (8th Cir. 1991); In re 

Cooper & Lynn, 821 F.2d 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1987).

530. Souder, 939 F.2d at 653. Accord Sykes, 7 F.3d at 1339. See also United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 

652, 656 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 830 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ritter, 540 

F.2d 459, 462 (10th Cir. 1976); Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm’rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1050–51 (5th Cir. 1975). 

And see Henderson v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrs., 901 F.2d 1288, 1296 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Bias for 

or against an attorney, who is not a party, is not enough to require disqualification unless it can also 

be shown that such a controversy would demonstrate a bias for or against the party itself.”).

531. Sykes, 7 F.3d at 1339.

532. Id. at 1340. Accord Souder, 939 F.2d at 653 n.6.

533. 157 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 1998).

534. Id. at 1095.
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up in the hands of opposing counsel, who showed it to the judge and petitioned 

for disqualification. The Seventh Circuit rejected the contention that the affidavit 

evinced alleged bias sufficient to require referral of the matter to another judge:

We can imagine, though only with great difficulty, a case in which public praise of a judge by a lawyer was so fulsome as to call into question 

the judge’s psychological fortitude to rule against his encomiast. But here 

there was no public praise . . . and the praise would not have come to [the 

judge’s] attention, and so would never have threatened to turn his head, 

had not the lawyer wishing to disqualify him brought it to his attention. 535

C. Disqualification procedure

Section  144 is triggered only by the submission of an affidavit and motion for 

disqualification (unlike § 455(a), which can be brought by motion but also requires judges to disqualify sua sponte where appropriate). Absent an affidavit and 

motion, there is no basis for disqualification under § 144, and no appeal based on 

§ 144 will be heard. 536 Apart from meeting the substantive standard, § 144 sets 

forth several procedural requirements, and courts demand “strict compliance.” 537

1. Timeliness

Section 144 raises issues of timing twice—in the first paragraph, when it calls for 

the filing of a “timely” affidavit, and again in the second paragraph, when it states 

that a motion for disqualification “shall be filed not less than ten days before the 

beginning of the term [session] at which the proceeding is to be heard.” With the 

abolition of terms of court in 1963, this latter provision no longer applies directly. 

Some federal courts have nonetheless required that the affidavit be filed within 

ten days of the beginning of the proceeding. 538 Other courts have determined 

timeliness on the basis of whether the affidavit was filed as soon as practicable539

or promptly “after the facts forming the basis of the disqualification became 

535. Id. at 1096.

536. See, e.g., United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1999).

537. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997); In re Medlock, 406 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th 

Cir. 2005).

538. See, e.g., Bumpus v. Uniroyal Tire Co. Div. of Uniroyal, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1974); 

United States v. Iddeen, 854 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1988); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 710 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. 

Ill. 1989).

539. Danielson v. Winnfield Funeral Home of Jefferson, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1986).
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known.” 540 Either way, numerous cases have involved rejection of § 144 motions 

because of untimely affidavits. 541

2. Facially sufficient affidavit

Section 144 conditions disqualification on the moving party filing a sufficient affidavit. If no affidavit is filed, disqualification will be denied. In the landmark case 

Berger v. United States, 542 the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory predecessor to § 144 to require that the challenged judge accept all facts alleged in the affidavit as true and not pass on the truth of the alleged facts. Rather, the judge’s role 

was limited to evaluating the facial sufficiency of the affidavit for the purpose of 

determining whether a reasonable person could find “fair support” for the charge 

that the judge was biased against the movant or in favor of another party. 543 Many 

circuits have since reiterated this principle. 544

In Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 545 the Ninth Circuit departed from the 

prevailing view. The party had accused the judge of various improper ex parte 

communications. While acknowledging that judges are “generally required” to 

accept the allegations in a § 144 affidavit as true, the court made an exception because the allegation of bias “relates to facts that were peculiarly within the judge’s 

knowledge.” 546 The Ninth Circuit held that disqualification was unnecessary in 

part because the judge knew the allegations were false.

540. United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 505, 510 (D. Del. 1981).

541. See, e.g., Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Young, 907 F.2d 

867, 868 (8th Cir. 1990); Easley v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351, 1357 (6th Cir. 1988). 

See also United States v. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525, 538 (7th Cir. 2017) (upholding rejection of § 144 

motion on tardiness grounds where it was filed eleven days after issuance of an adverse opinion and 

sufficiency of affidavit was questionable).

542. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).

543. Id. at 33–34.

544. See In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 

1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993); Souder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 939 F.2d 647, 653 (8th Cir. 1991); 

Weatherhead v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 1987); Albert v. United States Dist. Ct., 

283 F.2d 61, 62 (6th Cir. 1960). See also United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 110 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting 

trial court felt “bound by statute and Supreme Court precedent to accept Rankin’s factual allegations 

as true”). But see Henderson v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrs., 901 F.2d 1288, 1296 (5th Cir. 1990) 

(“the judge must pass on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, but may not pass on the truth of the 

matter alleged”) (quoting Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile Cty., 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th 

Cir. 1975)).

545. 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984).

546. Id. at 701.
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The prevailing view—that judges must accept all allegations in a § 144 affidavit 

as true—has prompted concern that judges are left helpless to stop parties from 

disqualifying judges by filing false affidavits. There are isolated cases in which 

disqualification on the basis of sham affidavits may have occurred. For example, 

in United States v. Rankin, 547 the defendant alleged that in a previous trial, the 

judge had chased the defendant around the courtroom and assaulted him. While 

denying the bizarre accusation, the trial judge nevertheless disqualified himself 

from the second trial on the ground that § 144 bound him to accept the allegations 

as true. 548 In an earlier, unrelated case, the Third Circuit had held a refusal to 

disqualify improper, even though “[p]robably the district court is right that there 

is no basis for the allegations” 549 that the judge made improper statements (e.g., 

“If I had anything to do with it you would have gone to the electric chair”). The 

court of appeals expressed “sympathy with district judges confronted with what 

they know to be groundless charges of personal bias” but held that § 144 requires 

acceptance of factual allegations as true. 550

Courts have, however, countered this potential problem by scrutinizing the 

facial sufficiency of § 144 affidavits. 551 As the First Circuit explained, “courts have 

responded to the draconian procedure—automatic transfer based solely on one 

side’s affidavit—by insisting on a firm showing in the affidavit that the judge does 

have a personal bias or prejudice toward a party.” 552

Virtually every circuit has therefore imposed some variation of the requirement that movants’ affidavits be sufficient to “convince a reasonable person” that 

their judge is biased. 553 In the Seventh Circuit,

the facts averred must be sufficiently definite and particular to convince a 

reasonable person that bias exists; simple conclusions, opinions, or rumors 

547. 870 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1989).

548. The second trial was reassigned. Then the government indicted the defendant for perjury 

arising out of the statements in his affidavit seeking the first judge’s disqualification. The Rankin

opinion concerned issues relating to this indictment.

549. Mims v. Shapp, 541 F.2d 415, 417 (3d Cir. 1976).

550. Id.

551. Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hile a court must assume 

the truth of the factual assertions, it is not bound to accept the movant’s conclusions as to the facts’ 

significance”).

552. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997).

553. See, e.g., United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088, 1090 (6th Cir. 1983); Chitimacha Tribe v. Laws, 

690 F.2d 1157, 1167 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 858 (10th Cir. 1976); United States 

v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 53 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Curry v. Jensen, 523 F.2d 

387, 388 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 998 (1975); Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679, 686 

(8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1967).
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are insufficient. . . . Because the statute “is heavily weighed in favor of 

recusal,” its requirements are to be strictly construed to prevent abuse. 554

In a similar vein, the Tenth Circuit observed that § 144 creates a rebuttable 

presumption that the challenged judge is impartial, which imposes a burden on 

the affiant to demonstrate the judge’s partiality. 555 Several circuits have thus ruled 

that the movant’s affidavit must state with particularity material facts supporting 

allegations of the judge’s bias. 556 According to the D.C. Circuit, “stating the facts 

with particularity” means the affidavit “must be strictly construed [against the 

affiant]; it must be definite as to time, place, persons and circumstances.” 557 The 

Tenth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion. 558 By requiring that the challenging 

party state facts material to the allegations of the judge’s bias with particularity, 

the courts have excluded conclusory assertions, as well as opinions and rumors, 

from the realm of allegations that may support a judge’s disqualification. 559 Even 

if the affidavit is deemed facially sufficient and the case is transferred, the First 

Circuit has observed that “the possibility remains, although not developed in the 

statute, that the transferee judge might hold a hearing, conclude that the affidavit 

was false and transfer the action back to the original judge.” 560

3. Counsel’s certificate of good faith

Section 144 states: “A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be 

accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good 

faith.” 561 The question has arisen whether counsel’s certificate of good faith must 

assert that counsel believes the allegations to be true or whether counsel merely 

believes that his or her client is acting in good faith. The word “it” in the phrase 

quoted above seems to refer back to the party’s affidavit and thus to require that 

counsel vouch for the good faith of the party’s belief—not counsel’s own belief—

that the facts are true. But the two circuits that have addressed the question 

554. United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).

555. In re McCarthy, 368 F.3d 1266, 1269 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 

1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1992)).

556. Brokaw v. Mercer Cty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000); Henderson v. Department of Pub. 

Safety & Corrs., 901 F.2d 1288, 1296 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988).

557. United States v. Miller, 355 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting United States v. 

Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).

558. Burger, 964 F.2d at 1070. See also Weatherhead v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 1227 (10th 

Cir. 1987).

559. See, e.g., Burger, 964 F.2d 1065; Weatherhead, 832 F.2d 1226.

560. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997).

561. 28 U.S.C. § 144.
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directly in modern times have held otherwise. The First Circuit held a §  144 

motion inadequate in part because counsel’s certificate of good faith asserted 

only that the party acted in good faith. 562 The court noted that “[i]f a certificate 

is to serve the purpose of shielding a court which cannot test the truth of claimed 

facts, it should at least carry the assertion that counsel believes the facts alleged 

to be accurate and correct.” 563 The D.C. Circuit reached a similar conclusion. 564

562. In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1961).

563. Id. at 385.

564. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 380 F.2d 570, 577–78 & n.17 

(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 327 (1967). Cf. United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 

1993) (certificate must “stat[e] that the affidavit is made in good faith”). But see Flegenheimer v. 

United States, 110 F.2d 379, 381 (3d Cir. 1936) (“As long as the [client] honestly believed that the Judge 

was biased and stated on what facts he based his opinion, it was his right to call on his counsel to give 

the certificate provided by the statute in order to have the question of bias determined.”)
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IVDisqualification Under 

28 U.S.C. § 47

A little-used disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 47, provides that “no judge shall 

hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.” 565

One reason the statute has barely surfaced in the case law is that its applicability 

is limited to cases in which a trial judge subsequently serves as an appellate judge 

in the same matter, which may occur when a district judge is appointed to the 

circuit court or sits on the circuit court by designation. Another reason § 47 is so 

rarely employed is that on those occasions where it suggests a basis of disqualification, the same result would also be reached by reference to § 455(a). As an 

historical aside, however, it may be noted that this was not always so. When members of the Supreme Court “rode circuit” in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 

centuries, it was not uncommon for them to hear appeals as Supreme Court justices from cases they decided as circuit court judges.

In Russell v. Lane, 566 the trial judge in a habeas case reviewed a decision of 

a state appellate court in which the judge had been a member of the panel. The 

Seventh Circuit found that this created an appearance of impropriety in violation 

of § 455(a). In reaching that decision, however, the court cited the relevance of 

§ 47 and noted that it “is an express ground for recusal . . . in modern American 

law for a judge to sit on the appeal from his own case.” 567

In a Fourth Circuit opinion explaining his disqualification from a school desegregation case, Judge James Craven Jr. discussed § 47 more extensively. 568 As 

a district judge years earlier, he heard and decided a case involving the same 

565. For a rare usage, see United States v. Hudson, 685 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2012) (disqualification 

of appellate judge who was formerly a district judge).

566. 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989).

567. Id. at 948.

568. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1970).
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parties. Although the instant case was a separate lawsuit, it raised the identical “ultimate question.” Citing the Supreme Court’s treatment of the predecessor 

statute to § 47, Judge Craven held that the statute must be “strictly construed” to 

prevent judges from, in effect, sitting in appellate judgment of their own earlier 

decisions. 569

In Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 570 the Supreme Court observed 

that it makes no difference whether “the question may be easy of solution or that 

the parties may consent to the judge’s participation” because “the sole [statutory] 

criterion” is whether the case on appeal “involve[s] a question which the judge 

has tried or heard” in the proceedings below. 571 In Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine 

Building Co. v. International Curtiss Marine Turbine Co., 572 the Supreme Court vacated an appellate decision notwithstanding the parties’ consent to the trial judge 

sitting on the appeal, holding that the appellate panel was “not organized in conformity to law.” 573

The Third Circuit, however, rejected without explanation the contention that 

a district judge, sitting by designation on the Third Circuit panel (and the author 

of the court opinion), should be disqualified pursuant to § 47. 574 In his capacity as 

trial judge, he had accepted the defendant’s conditional plea of guilt. On appeal, 

the defendant argued that his guilty plea should be vacated because the indictment against him resulted from prosecutorial vindictiveness. At oral argument, 

the judge informed counsel of his involvement in the case. Counsel did not object, 

and disqualification was waived. In a footnote, the Third Circuit, after “[h]aving 

independently considered this matter, . . . conclude[d] that there is no basis for 

recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 47.” 575 The court’s reasoning may have been based on 

the nature of the defendant’s appeal, which did not claim any impropriety in the 

plea agreement or challenge any action taken by the judge. Rather, the defendant 

objected to the bringing of the indictment in the first place.

569. Id. at 136. See also Moran v. Dillingham, 174 U.S. 153 (1899). And see Weddington v. Zatecky, 721 

F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2013).

570. 228 U.S. 339 (1913).

571. Id. at 344.

572. 228 U.S. 645 (1913).

573. Id. at 652.

574. United States v. Morrow, 717 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1983).

575. Id. at 801 n.1.
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V

Disqualification on Appeal

A. Routes of appellate review

Aggrieved parties often challenge a judge’s refusal to disqualify. In general, parties may seek review of a district judge’s decision not to disqualify via one of two 

routes. First, they may seek review via postjudgment appeal. Second, they may 

seek prejudgment review via a petition for writ of mandamus filed with the court 

of appeals, subject to the “extraordinary” circumstances needed to invoke the 

writ. Other means of interlocutory appeal have largely proved unsuccessful. Review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), interlocutory decisions, is ordinarily unavailing. 

The statute limits interlocutory appeals to matters that concern a “controlling 

question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.” 576 Disqualification will rarely meet that test. Review under the collateral order doctrine has likewise failed, given the availability of postjudgment appeal as a 

means to vindicate the movant’s right to challenge the judge’s nondisqualification 

(to obtain interlocutory review of review of a collateral order, the order must be 

“effectively unreviewable” later).

All courts of appeals allow a party to seek interlocutory review via mandamus, 577 reasoning that, at least in some cases, the damage to public confidence in 

576. Jeffrey Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 589, 635 (1987).

577. See, e.g., In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976). A motion for mandamus 

was brought under § 1292(b). The motion involved a “controlling question of law as to which there 

is substantial ground for difference of opinion” as to how the recently amended § 455 should be 

applied to the facts. Id. at 363 (quoting § 1292(b)). Although the decision against disqualification 

is not ordinarily appealable under § 1292(b), this case presented an exception because the trial 

judge’s decision effectively meant that no judge residing in the state of Virginia could preside over 

the case, even though the lawsuit was filed in the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. at 364. See also In re 

Arunachalam, 812 F.3d 290, 292–94 (3d Cir. 2016).
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the justice system (or perhaps to the litigants) would not be undone by postjudgment appeal. 578 The Third and Seventh Circuits have said that while petitioning 

for a writ of mandamus is a proper means for appellate review of a district court’s 

refusal to disqualify pursuant to § 455(a), it is unavailable for a challenge under 

§ 144. 579 The reasoning is that § 144, which addresses actual bias, protects litigants but that § 455, which concerns whether a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, also protects public confidence in the judiciary. “While review 

after final judgment can (at a cost) cure the harm to a litigant, it cannot cure the 

additional, separable harm to public confidence that section 455 is designed to 

prevent.” 580

Most circuits apply their usual standard for mandamus—often placing a 

heavy burden on the movant. 581 Allocating the burden to the movant serves a 

“strong judicial policy” that disfavors piecemeal appeals. 582 After all, the movant 

has the opportunity to appeal the disqualification decision after the case has been 

decided on the merits 583 and a full “contextual assessment” can be done for allegations of partiality. 584

578. In re Vazquez-Botet, 464 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2006); In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950, 956 (2d Cir. 

2008); In re Briggs, No. 00-1434, 2000 WL 961881, at *1 (4th Cir. July 12, 2000); In re Cameron Int’l 

Corp., 393 F. App’x 133, 134 (5th Cir. 2010); In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136, 1139–43 (6th Cir. 

1990); In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1998); Liddell v. Board of Educ., 677 F.2d 626, 643 (8th 

Cir. 1982); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1982); Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 

937, 938 (10th Cir. 1987) (dealing with § 144) (citing Bell v. Chandler, 569 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1978) 

(dealing with § 455)); In re Moody, 755 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2014); In re Barry, 946 F.2d 913, 915 (D.C. 

Cir. 1991); In re Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 166 F. App’x 490, 491 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

579. See School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 774–78; SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117 (7th 

Cir. 1977).

580. School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 776.

581. See, e.g., Mischler v. Bevin, 887 F.3d 271, 272 (6th Cir. 2018) (available only when “petitioner 

alleges that delay will cause irreparable harm”); In re Larson, 43 F.3d 410, 412 (8th Cir. 1994) (petitioner 

must establish “clear and indisputable right” to disqualification); In re McCarthy, 368 F.3d 1266, 1269 

(10th Cir. 2004) (where party “lacks an adequate factual basis for disqualification,” court of appeals 

will not issue mandamus).

582. Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 709 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1983).

583. See, e.g., In re Vazquez-Botet, 464 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2006) (where motion for mandamus 

denied because of lack of “clear and indisputable” entitlement to relief, court did not have to address 

whether judge should have disqualified; so defendant was still free to raise denial of motion for 

disqualification on appeal after final judgment).

584. Alexander, 709 F.2d at 471. See also Scenic Holding, LLC v. New Bd. of Tr. of the Tabernacle 

Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., 506 F.3d 656, 665 (8th Cir. 2007) (although judge improperly injected 

his religious beliefs into proceedings, a reasonable person looking at totality of circumstances would 

not conclude religious favoritism on judge’s part; thus refusing to disqualify not abuse of discretion).
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The First Circuit, however, has adopted a separate standard for entertaining 

a mandamus action seeking disqualification: “[w]hen the issue of partiality has 

been broadly publicized, and the claim of bias cannot be labeled as frivolous.” 585 It 

has also stated that the standard for granting mandamus should be relaxed “in a 

criminal case in which the government seeks the judge’s recusal, for a defendant’s 

verdict will terminate the case, thereby rendering the usual remedy, end-of-case 

appeal, illusory.” 586 Where the government seeks disqualification in a criminal 

case, “the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard rather than the more exacting 

standard usually applicable to petitions for mandamus” should be used. 587

In the Seventh Circuit, the sole route to review a refusal to disqualify pursuant to § 455(a) had long been a writ of mandamus, although appeal after final judgment was available to challenge refusals to disqualify under § 144 and 

§ 455(b). 588 A party that failed to seek mandamus forfeited its right to raise the 

issue in a postjudgment appeal, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, because if a party 

waited until judgment was entered it was too late to avoid the damage to public 

confidence that § 455(a) sought to prevent. In 2016, however, the Seventh Circuit 

reconsidered, concluding that because § 455(a) directs judges to disqualify on 

their own initiative, litigants should not be penalized for failing to seek prejudgment review of disqualification via mandamus. 589

B. Standards of review

When reviewing a trial judge’s disqualification, every court of appeals—with 

the occasional exception of the Seventh Circuit—uses a deferential, “abuse 

of discretion” standard in which findings of fact are typically accepted unless 

585. In re United States, 158 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). See 

also In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d 164, 167 (1st Cir. 2001) (where question of judge’s partiality 

was highly publicized, writ of disqualification issued where it may not have been under normal 

circumstances) (citing In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 217 (1st Cir. 1997)).

586. United States, 158 F.3d at 30.

587. Id. at 31.

588. See, e.g., United States v. Farrington, 27 F. App’x 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. 

Ruzzano, 247 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2001); In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1998); United States 

v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1205 (7th Cir. 1985). 

Cf. United States v. Boyd, 208 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2000) (Ripple, J., dissenting) (urging Seventh 

Circuit to join rest of courts of appeals in permitting appellate review of failure to disqualify under 

§ 455(a)).

589. Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2016).
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“clearly erroneous.” 590 The Seventh Circuit sometimes applies a de novo standard 

of review. 591

There are sometimes ad hoc variations. In Southern Pacific Communications 

Co. v. AT&T, 592 for example, the D.C. Circuit used a stricter standard in reviewing 

a judge’s factual findings that gave rise to Southern Pacific’s claim that it was 

denied a fair trial because of the judge’s legal and policy bias. Southern Pacific 

asked the court to remand the case for a new trial or, in the alternative, to abandon the “clearly erroneous” standard when reviewing the district court’s factual findings. Although the court declined to abandon the standard, it “reviewed 

the District Court’s findings against the record with particular, even painstaking, 

care” in view of the judicial misconduct allegations. 593

In SEC v. Loving Spirit Foundation Inc., 594 the D.C. Circuit adopted the “abuse 

of discretion” standard for disqualification under § 455 but did not articulate a 

binding standard of review for § 144, finding that it “need not decide which standard to adopt, for even reviewing de novo we can easily sustain [the trial judge’s] 

decision.” 595 In United States v. Microsoft Corp., 596 however, the D.C. Circuit rejected greater scrutiny of the judge’s fact findings because, absent evidence of actual 

bias, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) “mandates clearly erroneous review of 

all district court factfindings.” 597

When applying the “abuse of discretion” standard, the appellate courts recognize that “there will be occasions in which [it] affirm[s] the district court 

even though [it] would have gone the other way” had the standard been de novo 

590. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 827 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Morrison, 

833 F.3d 491, 506 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Torres-Estrada, 817 F.3d 376, 379 (1st Cir. 2016); 

United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2015); United States v. Apple Inc., 787 F.3d 131, 

138 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2015); Decker v. GE Healthcare 

Inc., 770 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 2014); In re Marshall, 721 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 2013); Central Tel. 

Co. of Va. v. Sprint Commc’ns Co. of Va., 715 F.3d 501, 515 (4th Cir. 2013).

591. See United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1203 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying de novo standard 

of review to motions brought under both §§ 144 and 455). See also Sac & Fox Nation v. Cuomo, 193 F.3d 

1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying de novo standard where district judge “did not create a record or 

document her decision not to recuse”). But see Tezak v. United States, 256 F.3d 702, 716 (7th Cir. 2001) 

(applying “abuse of discretion” standard).

592. 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

593. Id. at 984.

594. 392 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

595. Id. at 492.

596. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

597. Id. at 117.
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review. 598 Factors that may be used to assess whether trial judges have abused 

their discretion include whether a trial judge “engaged in measured and considered deliberations” before handing down a ruling; 599 whether a judge’s ruling was 

“well-reasoned”; 600 whether, after declining to disqualify, a judge’s rulings and 

conduct called the judge’s impartiality into question; 601 whether the judge provided the appellant an opportunity to argue and brief the appellant’s positions; 602

and whether the judge fully considered the appellant’s motions. 603

In Moran v. Clarke, 604 the plaintiff moved to disqualify the judge after a defendant revealed at her deposition that she had known the judge socially for over 

twenty years. The district judge declined to disqualify himself without comment, 

and the Eighth Circuit, faced with a record insufficient to apply the “abuse of 

discretion” standard to the case before it, remanded to the same judge for further 

proceedings, with the following explanation and instructions:

The district judge’s appearances at the same social events as Clarke and 

Smith brooks [sic] little mention. Judges, attorneys and public officials 

will often share public appearances. This does little to create the appearance of impropriety. The social relationship, however, invites more scrutiny. The image of one sitting in judgment over a friend’s affairs would likely 

cause the average person in the street to pause. That the judge and Clarke 

enjoyed a friendship of sufficient depth and duration as to warrant several 

reciprocal visits to one another’s homes only exacerbates the problem. 

We find particularly worrisome the district court’s failure to disclose this 

conflict himself, as permitted by section 455(e). Moreover, the record suggests a fractious relationship between the district court and Moran’s attorneys. We do, however, have the utmost faith in the district court’s ability to 

rule impartially, and have imposed on ourselves an obligation to reverse 

a district court only where we can say with certainty that it has abused its 

discretion. Accordingly, rather than remand to a different judge, we remand this question to the district court with the suggestion that it revisit 

and more thoroughly consider and respond to Moran’s recusal request. 605

598. Alloco v. City of Coral Gables, 159 F. App’x 921, 923 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 

Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc)).

599. Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 719 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Dixon v. Clem, 492 

F.3d 665, 679 (6th Cir. 2007) (judge didn’t abuse discretion by writing “lengthy and meticulous legal 

analysis” as to why he refused to disqualify himself, and by imposing sanctions against plaintiff’s 

attorney).

600. Alloco, 159 F. App’x at 923.

601. In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950, 956 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 

775 (2d Cir. 2007)).

602. Lewin v. Cooke, 28 F. App’x 186, 197 (4th Cir. 2002).

603. Id.

604. 296 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 2002).

605. Id. at 649.
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A party’s motion must be timely. A few appellate courts are willing to entertain an argument about disqualification that was not raised in a timely manner 

but apply a “plain error” standard. 606

C. Issues on appeal

1. Harmless error

Section 455 tells judges when disqualification is required but does not spell out 

the appropriate remedy for a failure to disqualify. In Liljeberg v. Health Services 

Acquisition Corp., 607 the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

60(b), authorizing relief from a final judgment, is an appropriate remedy for a trial court’s improper failure to disqualify. The Court cautioned that Rule 60(b)(6) 

relief is “neither categorically available nor categorically unavailable for all 

§ 455(a) violations.” 608 Rather, “there is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circumstance.” 609

In spelling out the factors to be considered in determining whether a new 

trial is the appropriate remedy, the Court cautioned against too casual a finding 

of harmless error:

[I]t is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other 

cases, and the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process. We must continuously bear in mind that “to perform its high 

function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’” 610

Heeding the Court’s warning, courts of appeals have been slow to deem a 

failure to disqualify harmless error. A few exceptions are instructive.

In Harris v. Champion, 611 a judge in a habeas case failed to disqualify himself 

even though his uncle had been a judge in some of the state cases challenged on 

606. See, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1276 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Arache, 

946 F.2d 129, 140 (1st Cir. 1991); Osei-Afriyie v. Medical Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 886 (3d Cir. 1991). See 

also United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 968 (5th Cir. 1997).

607. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).

608. Id. at 864.

609. Id. at 862. Courts have also applied the harmless error standard to § 455(b) violations. See

Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1571 (10th Cir. 1994); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 

1415, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527 (11th Cir. 1988).

610. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (citation omitted)). 

For more on Liljeberg—and the circumstances in which predisqualification orders should be vacated 

under Rule 60(b)(6) and possibly 60(b)(4)—see section II.C.5.b.

611. 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994).
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appeal. The Tenth Circuit found that disqualification was required under both 

§ 455(a) and § 455(b)(5)(i). But the “case presented [a] very unusual situation 

[in] that . . . [the judge] did not act alone, but rather as one member of a threejudge panel that ruled unanimously.” 612 In part for that reason, the court opted not 

to vacate the rulings. (The viability of the Harris analysis is in doubt, following 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Pennsylvania, 613 where the Court rejected the argument that a Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice’s nondisqualification was harmless error because the justice did not cast a decisive vote, reasoning 

that the disqualified justice could have influenced the views of his colleagues.) 614

In Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 615 the judge disqualified herself based on inaccurate information, then vacated her disqualification order when she realized the 

mistake. The Fifth Circuit held that it was error to vacate the disqualification 

order. The error was harmless, however, because:

[R]ecusal was sua sponte, and based on incomplete and incorrect information. . . . [N]one of the parties ever moved to have the judge step aside, 

and none has suggested any actual bias or prejudice. . . . [T]here is no 

risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process. Indeed, overturning the many decisions [the judge] made after vacating her 

recusal order—simply because she recused herself too hastily and in error—would be wasteful and unnecessary. 616

The Fifth Circuit also found harmless error in an improper failure to disqualify in United States v. Jordan. 617 It concluded that the defendant’s well-known, 

extremely antagonistic relationship with a close personal friend of the judge created an appearance of impropriety under § 455(a). The Fifth Circuit vacated the 

sentence and remanded the case for resentencing by a different judge. But, under 

the circumstances, it found that upholding the conviction would not undermine 

the public’s confidence in the judicial process and would not be unjust to the appellant, who “never contend[ed] that she suffered any harm during trial because 

of any alleged bias or prejudice.” 618

Faced with a mandamus action seeking mistrial in the midst of complex 

mass tort litigation, the First Circuit, in In re Allied-Signal Inc., 619 noted that while 

the Liljeberg analysis arose in the context of a Rule 60(b) motion, “we believe it 

612. Id. at 1572.

613. 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016).

614. Id. at 1903.

615. 101 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 1996).

616. Id. at 459.

617. 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995).

618. Id. at 158.

619. 891 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1989).
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should apply as well to present circumstances, where ‘mistrial’ . . . would threaten 

to undo matters of considerable importance previously decided.” 620 Thus, even 

assuming arguendo that disqualification was improperly denied, the court nevertheless denied the requested relief because it would mean retrying complex and 

costly litigation and reopening settlement agreements. 621 Moreover, no future injustice would result because there were no allegations of actual bias infecting 

any findings or rulings, and no rulings had been made that were “incurable or 

could have preclusive effect in some other action.” 622 Finally, because the alleged 

appearance of impropriety—brothers of the judge’s law clerks were among the 

attorneys in the case—was not egregious, the court did “not believe . . . that the 

relevant public’s confidence in the judiciary would be seriously undermined were 

no mistrial declared.” 623

2. Reviewability of lower court decisions to disqualify

The majority of disqualification appeals concern a judge’s refusal to disqualify. 

The courts of appeals are split as to whether a judge’s decision to disqualify is 

reviewable. 

Holding that a decision to disqualify is unreviewable, the Seventh Circuit 

explained its rationale:

[W]e fail to conceive of any interest which the plaintiffs have as litigants 

for review of [the judge’s] recusal order. The effect of his decision to step 

aside is merely to have the case reassigned to another judge of the district 

court. The order does not strip plaintiffs of a fair forum in which they can 

pursue their claim. . . . [T]hey have no protectable interest in the continued exercise of jurisdiction by a particular judge. 624

The court held that the order to disqualify is not a final order and, because 

a party lacks a claim of right to the original judge, the collateral order doctrine 

does not apply. 625 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have taken the same position. 626

The Ninth Circuit has allowed a party to seek a writ of mandamus to review a 

decision to disqualify in “exceptional situations in which the costs of familiarizing 

a new judge, in terms of delay, will prove to be very great” and the litigation is 

620. Id. at 973.

621. Id.

622. Id.

623. Id.

624. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 643 F.2d 478, 479 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

625. Id. at 479–80.

626. See, e.g., Liddell v. Board of Educ., 677 F.2d 626, 644 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Cement Antitrust 

Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1022–24 (9th Cir. 1982).
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“greatly disrupted.” 627 The First Circuit addressed the reviewability of sua sponte 

disqualifications in United States v. Snyder.

628 The district court judge had exhibited pervasive hostility toward a federal prosecutor for what the judge perceived to 

be a selective and “grossly disparate” sentencing request. 629 The district judge disqualified himself sua sponte, and the defendant appealed the decision claiming 

the judge had a duty to sit. 630 The First Circuit held that a sua sponte disqualification must be examined in light of both the duty to sit and the duty to disqualify:

[W]e have recognized that the duty to recuse and the duty to sit do not 

exert equal pull; in close cases, “doubts ordinarily ought to be resolved 

in favor of recusal.” No one suggests that different principles of review 

apply here, where a judge has recused himself sua sponte. Hence, our review in this case, as in our prior cases, is both deferential and weighted: 

we inquire whether, in light of the policy favoring recusal in close cases, 

[the trial judge] abused his discretion in finding that he had a duty to 

recuse himself. 631

Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have been willing to review orders by 

judges disqualifying themselves, at least in some circumstances. 632

3. Mootness of underlying dispute

A claim for disqualification, like any other claim, cannot be adjudicated absent 

a live dispute between the parties. Courts have implicitly or explicitly rejected 

disqualification requests as moot in a variety of circumstances. 633 In Pontarelli 

627. Cement Antitrust, 673 F.2d at 1025.

628. 235 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2000).

629. Id. at 47.

630. The “duty to sit,” as used here, should not be misunderstood. As discussed in Section I.A, the 

traditional duty to sit ended in 1974. But federal judges nonetheless remain subject to an ethical duty 

to hear the cases they are assigned except when disqualification is necessary, which is at issue here.

631. Snyder, 235 F.3d at 46 (citation and footnote omitted).

632. See In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 363–65 (4th Cir. 1976) (decision to disqualify 

reviewable by mandamus, and as collateral order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), where it raises important 

legal issue that would otherwise escape review); Kelley v. Metropolitan Cty. Bd., 479 F.2d 810, 811 

n.1 (6th Cir. 1973) (decision to disqualify reviewable, apparently immediately, though court did 

not clarify).

633. See, e.g., In re Starr, 152 F.3d 741, 751 n.23 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding party moving for 

disqualification lacked standing to bring underlying action); United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 

452 (7th Cir. 1998) (violation of Rule 11 required remand to a different judge anyway); Reynolds v. 

International Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1121 (6th Cir. 1994) (trial court’s judgment reversed 

on substantive grounds unrelated to disqualification); United States v. Ahmed, 980 F.2d 161, 163 (2d 

Cir. 1992) (trial judge had already directed clerk of court to reassign case to a different judge); Mallory 

v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir. 1991) (trial judge had already withdrawn from case).
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v. Stone, 634 after all the parties had settled the merits of the underlying disputes, 

one of the lawyers appealed the denial of attorney fees. The focus of the claim, 

however, was that the judge should have disqualified himself pursuant to § 455(a). 

The First Circuit found the issue moot.

[B]efore an appellate court can make a ruling on the appropriateness of 

disqualification by a district judge . . . the underlying dispute as to which 

the district court ruling is relevant must still remain a live controversy. . . . 

If a trial judge has wrongly failed to disqualify him or herself, the remedy 

. . . is for the appellate court to reverse the decision . . . on the merits and 

to order a new trial before a different judge. 635

Where, as here, the underlying case had settled, and no party challenged 

the settlement, the issue of disqualification was moot. The court noted that the 

lawyer’s recourse was to file a disciplinary complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 351. 636

4. Impact of guilty plea on reviewability of 

nondisqualification

The courts of appeals differ as to whether a defendant who pleads guilty waives 

the challenge to the trial judge’s denial of a motion to disqualify. In the First and 

Second Circuits, a guilty plea does not waive a § 455 challenge. In United States v. 

Chantal, 637 a defendant was charged with, and pled guilty to, various drug-related 

offenses. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge made critical comments about 

the defendant. It was later discovered that the defendant engaged in further drugrelated activity while free on bond pending sentencing that resulted in a second 

indictment. The new case was assigned to the same judge, and the defendant 

moved to disqualify, but the judge refused. The defendant pled guilty to that 

charge as well. On appeal, when the defendant challenged the judge’s refusal to 

disqualify himself with respect to the second indictment, the government argued 

that a guilty plea waives all but jurisdictional defenses and therefore waived the 

defendant’s § 455(a) challenge. The First Circuit disagreed, reasoning that, “It is 

plain that Congress would never have thought its purpose to assure actions by 

judges who are not only impartial but appear to be, could be . . . eradicated by a plea 

engendered by the immediate prospect of a trial/decision by a biased judge.” 638

634. 978 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1992).

635. Id. at 775.

636. Id. at 776.

637. 902 F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1990).

638. Id. at 1021. Accord United States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1995) (endorsing First 

Circuit’s reasoning and conclusion).
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The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have taken the opposite approach, holding that 

an unconditional guilty plea waives appeal of a §  455(a) disqualification motion. 639 They reason that since § 455(e) permits waiver of disqualification when 

a judge is faced with an appearance of impropriety under § 455(a) but makes full 

disclosure, waiver may also be found when a party enters a guilty plea without 

specifically preserving the issue for appeal. 640

5. Jurisdiction

Courts of appeals have sometimes found that they have jurisdiction to review a 

refusal to disqualify—for example, on a habeas petition—even though they lack 

jurisdiction to review the underlying merits of the trial court’s decision on the 

issue in the case. 641

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), “an order remanding a case to the State court from 

which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” Yet the Fifth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to determine whether the district court abused 

its discretion in denying a motion to disqualify. It reasoned that because a trial 

judge who has disqualified himself from a case may take no further action (except transferring the case to another federal judge), if the judge should have disqualified himself, then any orders entered after denying the motion to disqualify 

were improper. 642 Therefore, reviewing the refusal to disqualify would not really 

be reviewing the order of remand, even though a finding that disqualification was 

required would lead to vacating the remand order. “[W]e would be performing 

an essentially ministerial task of vacating an order that the district court had no 

authority to enter into for reasons unrelated to the order of remand itself.” 643

D. Disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 2106

In addition to the explicitly iterated disqualification statutes, appellate courts 

have used 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to disqualify judges on appeal. In Liteky v. United 

States, 644 the Supreme Court recognized this practice and acknowledged that 

639. United States v. Hoctel, 154 F.3d 506, 507 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 

1324 (10th Cir. 1988).

640. Hoctel, 154 F.3d at 508 (citing Gipson, 835 F.2d at 1325).

641. See Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 

1989); Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1978).

642. Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (5th Cir. 1998).

643. Id. at 1028.

644. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
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“Federal appellate courts’ ability to assign a case to a different judge on remand 

rests not on the recusal statutes alone, but on the appellate courts’ statutory 

power . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2106.” 645

Section 2106 provides:

The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the 

cause and direct entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, 

or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.

646

Appellate courts have interpreted this statute to require reassignment to a 

different judge on remand when “removal is essential to ‘preserve[ ] both the appearance and reality of fairness.’” 647 Reassignment should only be used in “rare 

and extraordinary circumstances,” 648 including but not necessarily limited to circumstances manifesting personal bias. 649

The presence of personal bias will warrant reassignment to a different judge 

on remand. In determining whether personal bias is evident, courts often rely on 

the framework set forth in § 455 and interpreted by Liteky. 650 For example, the 

First Circuit has held that when the district judge’s views—even if arguably incendiary—were grounded entirely on information acquired at trial, there was no evidence of personal bias sufficient to require reassignment. 651 Likewise, the Ninth 

645. Id. at 554.

646. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (emphasis added).

647. Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

648. See, e.g., Arrowpoint Cap. Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, 793 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 

2015) (“Reassignment is ‘an exceptional remedy, one that we weigh seriously and order sparingly.’”) 

(citing United States v. Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244, 258 (3d Cir. 2012)); Villegas v. Metropolitan Gov’t of 

Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 580 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[r]eassignment . . . is an extraordinary power and should 

be rarely invoked. Reassignments should be made infrequently and with the greatest reluctance.”) 

(quoting Solomon v. United States, 467 F.3d 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2006)). See also Candelario Del Moral 

v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of Puerto Rico, 699 F.3d 93, 106 (1st Cir. 2012); Mustang Mktg., Inc. v. Chevron 

Prods. Co., 406 F.3d 600, 610 (9th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1333 (5th Cir. 1997).

649. See Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1987).

650. See, e.g., id. at 562 (determining that “[r]emand to a different trial judge is appropriate under 

a demonstration of personal bias”). See also Arthur D. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics 

in the Federal System: A Peek Behind Closed Doors, 69 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 189, 204 (2007) (highlighting 

appellate courts’ use of § 2106 as “a device for enforcing an ethical standard almost identical to that of 

§ 455(a)”).

651. Hull v. Municipality of San Juan, 356 F.3d 98, 104 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding, as in Liteky, that 

“views formed by a judge in considering a case are normally not a sound basis either for required 

recusal or for directing that a different judge be assigned on remand” (citing Liteky v. United States, 

510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994)).
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Circuit has ruled that even though adopting a party’s findings in their entirety is 

a “disfavored practice,” this action does not meet the standard for personal bias 

necessary to require reassignment. 652

Absent personal bias, the courts of appeals require a showing of “unusual 

circumstances” in order for reassignment on remand to be warranted. 653 They 

use two different tests to determine whether unusual circumstances exist: a 

three-factor test and an “objective observer” test.

The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits apply the three-factor test to determine 

whether unusual circumstances exist that would merit reassignment: “(1) whether on remand the district judge can be expected to follow [the appellate] court’s 

dictates; (2) whether reassignment is advisable to maintain the appearance of 

justice; and (3) whether reassignment risks undue waste and duplication.” 654 In 

weighing these factors, “[t]he first two factors are considered to be of equal importance and a finding of either one will support a remand to a different judge.” 655

This test has been used most often by the Ninth Circuit where questionable judicial tactics have compromised the appearance of justice. For example, 

in Living Designs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 656 the district court had adopted a 

party’s summary judgment order wholesale with only minor changes, directed 

publication of the ghost-written order, and reversed a previously entered certification sub silento. The Ninth Circuit concluded that even though the district 

judge’s impartiality was arguably still intact, his actions gave rise to the unusual circumstances necessary to require reassignment on remand. 657 Similarly, in 

Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Cincom Systems, Inc., 658 the district judge had displayed blatant disregard for the appellate court’s mandates (by reaffirming his 

prior ruling without addressing or attempting to distinguish the appellate court’s 

652. See Vuitton et Fils v. J. Young, 644 F.2d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 1981).

653. See, e.g., Mustang Mktg., 406 F.3d at 610, discussing the two inquiries that must be made in 

applying § 2106 to decide whether reassignment is appropriate. Did the district court exhibit “personal 

bias requiring recusal from a case”? Id. (citing United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 777, 

779–80 (9th Cir. 1986)). If not, are there “unusual circumstances” that merit reassignment? Id.

(quoting Sears, Roebuck, 785 F.2d at 780).

654. United States v. Lyons, 472 F.3d 1055, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007). See also Solomon v. United States, 

467 F.3d 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc).

655. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Cincom Sys., Inc., Nos. 99-55111 & 55453, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 

18166, at *13 (9th Cir. July 25, 2000) (unpublished table opinion). See also Living Designs v. E.I. Dupont 

de Nemours, 431 F.3d 353, 372 (9th Cir. 2005).

656. 431 F.3d 353 (9th Cir. 2005).

657. Id. at 372.

658. Nos. 99-55111 & 55453, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18166 (9th Cir. July 25, 2000) (unpublished 

table opinion).
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112 Federal Judicial Center

determination) and overt animosity (by denying the party’s motions without review). The Ninth Circuit ordered reassignment on remand. 659

The Third, Eighth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have adopted 

the more lenient, “objective observer” standard to determine whether unusual 

circumstances that would merit reassignment on remand are present. 660 This test 

requires reassignment when “facts ‘might reasonably cause an objective observer 

to question [the judge’s] impartiality.’” 661 In this way, the appellate courts can 

combat not only actual bias but also the appearance of bias by remanding to a 

different judge when “reasonable observers could believe that a judicial decision 

flowed from the judge’s animus toward a party rather than from the judge’s 

application of law to fact.” 662

In applying the objective observer test, courts of appeals have typically found 

reassignment necessary when judicial conduct exceeds the bounds of unquestioned impartiality. In Cobell v. Kempthorne, 663 the D.C. Circuit heard the ninth 

appeal in six years of a case involving a dispute between the beneficiaries of Indian land trusts and their trustee, the United States. Although the district judge’s 

conduct had not met the Liteky standard for personal bias, 664 the harsh language 

in all eight of the judge’s prior opinions, coupled with a string of reversals by the 

D.C. Circuit, required reassignment. 665 The D.C. Circuit concluded that, taken together, these facts would leave “‘an objective observer . . . with the overall impression’ 666 that the district court’s professed hostility to [the defendant] has become 

‘so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.’” 667

659. Id. at *14.

660. The Fifth Circuit uses both the “objective observer” test and the three-factor test, declining to 

specifically adopt either. In re DaimlerChrysler Corp., 294 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2002).

661. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft I), 56 F.3d 1448, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) 

(quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988)). See also Haines v. 

Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 93 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th 

Cir. 1989).

662. Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

663. 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

664. Id. at 332 (noting that it is a “rare case that meets the Liteky standard” for disqualification, 

in which “the judge’s views have become ‘so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair 

judgment’”) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994)).

665. Id. at 333–35.

666. Id. at 335 (quoting Microsoft I, 56 F.3d at 1463).

667. Id. (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551). See also Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 

1992). Although not citing to § 2106 explicitly, the Third Circuit found that the district judge’s use of 

inflammatory language threatened the “appearance of impartiality.” To preserve this impartiality, the 

court exercised its “supervisory powers” and remanded the case to a different judge. Id. at 98.
Disqualification on Appeal 

fjc.dcn • fjc.gov 113

Similarly, in United States v. Tucker, 668 the Office of Independent Counsel 

(OIC) sought disqualification of the district judge because of “reported connections among Judge Woods, the Clintons, and [defendant] Tucker”—connections 

it chronicled with various newspaper articles. 669 Although none of the articles directly linked the judge to the defendant, the Eighth Circuit ordered remand of the 

case to a different judge under § 2106, noting that the judge had worked with and 

admired Hillary Clinton and had spent a night in the White House. The court further noted that “President and Mrs. Clinton have been reported to have expressed 

continued support for Tucker since his indictment by the grand jury” 670 and attended a fundraising luncheon for him. In the court’s view, reassignment was necessary because of the “risk of a perception of judicial bias or partiality” 671 “[g]iven 

the high profile” 672 of the OIC’s work and the widely reported connections.

The decision in Tucker also involved the use of an unusual procedure for requesting disqualification of the district judge. Instead of presenting the issue to 

the judge directly, the appellant presented the request for the first time on appeal. 

The Eighth Circuit held that it was empowered, pursuant to § 2106, to direct the 

entry of any order “as may be just under the circumstances,” including the reassignment of the case to a different district judge where, under § 455(a), the judge’s 

“impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 673

The D.C. Circuit, in “a departure from [its] usual practice of declining to 

address issues raised for the first time on appeal,” 674 considered the appellant’s 

request for disqualification of the trial judge where “the full extent of [the judge’s] 

actions [were] not . . . revealed until this case was on appeal.” 675

668. 78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir. 1996).

669. Id. at 1325.

670. Id. at 1323.

671. Id. at 1324.

672. Id. at 1325.

673. Id. at 1324.

674. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

675. Id. at 108.

fjc.dcn • fjc.gov 115

A

Appendix A

Code of Conduct for United States Judges

(Effective March 12, 2019)

Canons 3C and 3D

Canon 3: A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the Office Fairly, 

Impartially and Diligently

C. Disqualification.

(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the 

judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 

limited to instances in which:

(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or 

personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 

proceeding;

(b) the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer 

with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such 

association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or lawyer 

has been a material witness;

(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the 

judge’s spouse or minor child residing in the judge’s household, has 

a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party 

to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be affected substantially by the outcome of the proceeding;
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116 Federal Judicial Center

(d) the judge or the judge’s spouse, or a person related to either within 

the third degree of relationship, or the spouse of such a person is:

(i) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee 

of a party;

(ii) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(iii) known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; or

(iv) to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the 

proceeding;

(e) the judge has served in governmental employment and in that capacity participated as a judge (in a previous judicial position), counsel, advisor, or material witness concerning the proceeding or has 

expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in 

controversy.

(2) A judge should keep informed about the judge’s personal and fiduciary 

financial interests and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about 

the personal financial interests of the judge’s spouse and minor children 

residing in the judge’s household.

(3) For the purposes of this section:

(a) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law 

system; the following relatives are within the third degree of relationship: parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, great grandparent, 

great grandchild, sister, brother, aunt, uncle, niece, and nephew; the 

listed relatives include whole and half blood relatives and most step 

relatives;

(b) “fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, administrator, 

trustee, and guardian;

(c) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, 

however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or other active 

participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

(i) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds 

securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless 

the judge participates in the management of the fund;

(ii) an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or 

civic organization is not a “financial interest” in securities held 

by the organization;
Appendix A: Code of Conduct for United States Judges

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(iii) the proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance 

company, or a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a 

similar proprietary interest, is a “financial interest” in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest;

(iv) ownership of government securities is a “financial interest” in 

the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities;

(d) “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation.

(4) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Canon, if a judge would 

be disqualified because of a financial interest in a party (other than an 

interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if the judge (or the judge’s spouse or minor child) 

divests the interest that provides the grounds for disqualification.

D. Remittal of Disqualification. Instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, a 

judge disqualified by Canon 3C(1) may, except in the circumstances specifically set out in subsections (a) through (e), disclose on the record the basis 

of disqualification. The judge may participate in the proceeding if, after that 

disclosure, the parties and their lawyers have an opportunity to confer outside the presence of the judge, all agree in writing or on the record that the 

judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate. 

The agreement should be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.

fjc.dcn • fjc.gov 119

B

Appendix B

For Further Reference

Charles Gardner Geyh, James J. Alfini, Steven Lubet & Jeffrey M. Shaman, 

Judicial Conduct and Ethics (5th ed. 2013) 

Richard E. Flamm, Recusal and Disqualification of Judges (3d ed. 2018) 

fjc.dcn • fjc.gov 121

Alphabetical Table of Cases

A

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., In re, 919 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1990), nn. 385–86, 

397–99, 463, 503–04, 578

Aguinda, In re, 241 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2001), nn. 274–75

Akins v. Knight, 863 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2017), n. 277

Albert v. United States District Court, 283 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1960), n. 544

Alexander v. Chicago Park District, 709 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1983), nn. 582, 584

Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 1993), nn. 56–57, 228

Allied-Signal Inc., In re, 891 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1989), nn. 34, 78, 619–23

Alloco v. City of Coral Gables, 159 F. App’x 921 (11th Cir. 2005), nn. 598–600

American Ready Mix, Inc., In re, 14 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1994), n. 296

American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 190 F.3d 729 

(6th Cir. 1999), nn. 430–33

Anderson v. United States, 754 A.2d 920 (D.C. Ct. App. 2000), n. 143

Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2003), nn. 297, 304–06

Apple v. Jewish Hospital & Medical Center, 829 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1987), 

nn. 446, 452

Armenian Assembly of America, Inc. v. Cafesjian, 758 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2014), 

n. 93

Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983), n. 461

Arrowpoint Capital Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Management, LLC, 793 F.3d 313 

(3d Cir. 2015), n. 648

Arunachalam, In re, 812 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2016), n. 577

Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 2006), n. 278

B

Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. FrankSu Enterprise Corp., 78 F.3d 550 (Fed. Cir. 1996), 

n. 68
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122 Federal Judicial Center

Barksdale v. Emerick, 853 F.2d 1359 (6th Cir. 1988), nn. 442–45

Barry, In re, 946 F.2d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1991), nn. 68, 296, 578

Bartley v. United States, 123 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1997), n. 49

Basciano, In re, 542 F.3d 950 (2d Cir. 2008), nn. 578, 601

Beard, In re, 811 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1987), n. 530

Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Cincom Systems, Inc., Nos. 99-55111 & 55453, 2000 

U.S. App. LEXIS 18166 (9th Cir. July 25, 2000), nn. 655, 658–59

Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567 (4th Cir. 2011), n. 296

Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), nn. 16, 520–21, 542–43

Berthelot v. Boh Brothers Construction Co., 431 F. Supp. 2d 639 (E.D. La. 2006), 

nn. 367–69

Beyond Innovation Technology Co., In re, 166 F. App’x 490 (Fed. Cir. 2006), 

nn. 117–19, 578

Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 1995), n. 68

Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), n. 112

Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2006), n. 317

Boston’s Children First, In re, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001), nn. 241–47, 585

Briggs, In re, No. 00-1434, 2000 WL 961881 (4th Cir. July 12, 2000), n. 578

Brody v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 664 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1981), n. 45

Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000), nn. 302, 556

Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad, 380 F.2d 

570 (D.C. Cir. 1967), n. 564

Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 

2002), nn. 105–06

Bumpus v. Uniroyal Tire Co. Division of Uniroyal, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 

1974), n. 538

Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2016), n. 309

Bush, In re, 232 F. App’x 852 (11th Cir. 2007), n. 278

Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 2001), nn. 151–53

C

Cameron International Corp., In re, 393 F. App’x 133 (5th Cir. 2010), n. 578

Candelario Del Moral v. UBS Financial Services Inc. of Puerto Rico, 699 F.3d 93 

(1st Cir. 2012), n. 648

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), nn. 4, 30–32, 496–98
Alphabetical Table of Cases

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Cargill, Inc., In re, 66 F.3d 1256 (1st Cir. 1995), nn. 133–34, 435

Cement Antitrust Litigation, In re, 673 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1982), nn. 463, 578, 

626–27

Central Telephone Co. of Virginia v. Sprint Communications Co. of Virginia, 715 

F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2013), n. 590

Certain Underwriter, In re, 294 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2002), nn. 380–81

Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co., 343 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2003), 

nn. 39, 387–88, 426–29

Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 

(2004), nn. 44, 69, 70, 82–83, 113–14

Chevron U.S.A., In re, 121 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 1997), nn. 174–76

Chitimacha Tribe v. Laws, 690 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1982), n. 553

Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2000), nn. 513, 527

Clemens v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, 428 

F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2005), n. 103

Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 2004), n. 350

Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006), nn. 647, 662–67

Cohee v. McDade, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (S.D. Ill. 2006), n. 459

Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2009), n. 296

Community Bank of Northern Virginia, In re, 418 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2005), n. 296

Continental Airlines, In re, 981 F.2d 1450 (5th Cir. 1993), n. 140

Continental Airlines Corp., In re, 901 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1990), nn. 136–40, 

488–89

Cooper & Lynn, In re, 821 F.2d 833 (1st Cir. 1987), nn. 509, 529

Cordoza v. Pacific States Steel Corp., 320 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2003), n. 296

Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Co. v. International Curtiss Marine 

Turbine Co., 228 U.S. 645 (1913), nn. 572–73

Curry v. Jensen, 523 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1975), n. 553

Curves, LLC v. Spalding County, 685 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2012), n. 92

D

DaimlerChrysler Corp., In re, 294 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2002), n. 660

Danielson v. Winnfield Funeral Home of Jefferson, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. 

La. 1986), n. 539

Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975), n. 530
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124 Federal Judicial Center

Decker v. GE Healthcare Inc., 770 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2014), n. 590

Dembowski v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 504 

(D.N.J. 2002), nn. 313–15

DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage, 974 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1992), n. 279

Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1998), n. 79

Diversified Numismatics, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 949 F.2d 382 (11th Cir. 1991), 

nn. 128–30

Dixon v. Clem, 492 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2007), n. 599

Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 1996), nn. 461, 615–16

Doe v. Cabrera, 134 F. Supp. 3d 439 (D.D.C. 2015), n. 154

Drake v. Birmingham Board of Education, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (N.D. Ala. 2007), 

n. 453

Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004), nn. 361–62

Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., In re, 861 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1988), n. 45

Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979), n. 49

E

E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1992), n. 88

Easley v. University of Michigan Board of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351 (6th Cir. 1988), 

nn. 45, 541

Easley v. University of Michigan Board of Regents, 906 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1990), 

n. 321

Edgar v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996), nn. 216, 325–26

El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. The M/Y Johanny, 36 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 1994), nn. 461, 

466–67

El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. The M/Y Johanny, 954 F. Supp. 23 (D.P.R. 1996), n. 487

Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2016), n. 296

Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), n. 46

F

Faulkner, In re, 856 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1998), nn. 75, 97–98, 318

FDIC v. Sweeney, 136 F.3d 216 (1st Cir. 1998), n. 276

First Interstate Bank of Arizona v. Murphy, Weir & Butler, 210 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 

2000), n. 131
Alphabetical Table of Cases

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Flegenheimer v. United States, 110 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1936), n. 564

Fletcher v. Conoco Pipe Line Co., 323 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2003), n. 116

Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2016), nn. 347, 589

Frey v. EPA, 751 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2014), nn. 207–08

G

Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984), nn. 311–12

Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 2015), n. 54

Gordon v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Cal. 2001), nn. 366, 375

Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1992), n. 541

Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 299 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2002), 

nn. 307–09

H

Haase v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 838 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2016), n. 54

Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992), nn. 661, 667

Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1985), n. 296

Hall v. Small Business Administration, 695 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983), n. 441

Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967), n. 219

Hampton v. City of Chicago, 643 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1981), nn. 624–25

Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994), nn. 390–91, 491, 609, 611–12

Hatcher, In re, 150 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1998), nn. 68, 147–49, 329–30, 395–96, 578, 588

Hathcock v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 53 F.3d 36 (4th Cir. 

1995), n. 230

Henderson v. Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 901 F.2d 1288 (5th Cir. 

1990), nn. 5, 530, 544, 556

Higganbotham v. Oklahoma, 328 F.3d 638 (10th Cir. 2003), nn. 107–08, 420–21

Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1987), nn. 45, 68, 578

Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966), n. 553

Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2004), nn. 551, 599

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013), n. 109

Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 1996), nn. 230–31, 293, 296, 301

Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984), nn. 545–46
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126 Federal Judicial Center

Hull v. Municipality of San Juan, 356 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2004), n. 651

Huntington Commons Associates, In re, 21 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1994), nn. 165–67

I

IBM Corp., In re, 45 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1995), n. 447

Ignacio v. Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 453 

F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2006), nn. 51–55

Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, In re, 174 F. Supp. 2d 70 (S.D.N.Y. 

2001), n. 375

Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, In re, 174 F. Supp. 2d 61 (S.D.N.Y. 

2001), n. 433

IQ Products Co. v. Pennzoil Products Co., 305 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2002), nn. 416–17

J

Jefferson County v. Acker, 92 F.3d 1561 (11th Cir. 1996), nn. 49, 355–56

Johnson, In re, 921 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1991), nn. 225–27

Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1997), n. 648

Jones v. Pittsburgh National Corp., 899 F.2d 1350 (3d Cir. 1990), n. 278

K

Kansas Public Employees Retirement System, In re, 85 F.3d 1353 (8th Cir. 1996), 

nn. 407–10, 447

Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board, 479 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1973), n. 632

Kensington International, Ltd., In re, 368 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2004), nn. 216, 453

Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 480 (W.D. 

Pa. 1998), n. 375

Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, In re, 866 F.3d 473 (D.C. Cir. 2017), nn. 501–02

Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Maxus Energy Corp., 925 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1991), 

nn. 376–77

L

Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972), n. 24

Larson, In re, 43 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 1994), nn. 222, 581
Alphabetical Table of Cases

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Lewin v. Cooke, 28 F. App’x 186 (4th Cir. 2002), nn. 602–03

Liddell v. Board of Education, 677 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1982), nn. 578, 626

Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013), nn. 259–63

Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988), nn. 36–37, 74, 

84–85, 481–85, 607–10

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), nn. 38, 158–63, 185, 200, 202–06, 

233–34, 300, 310, 511–12, 514–16, 518–19, 522–26, 644–45

Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation, In re, 509 F.3d 136 

(2d Cir. 2007), nn. 382–84

Little Rock School District v. Arkansas, 902 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1990), n. 68

Little Rock School District v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2004), nn. 336–37

Living Designs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 431 F.3d 353 (9th Cir. 2005), nn. 655–57

LoCascio v. United States, 473 F.3d 493 (2d Cir. 2007), nn. 282, 316–17, 527

M

MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equipment Financing, Inc., 157 F.3d 956 (2d Cir. 1998), 

nn. 110–11

Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1991), n. 633

Mann, In re, 229 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2000), nn. 170–73

Mann v. Thalacker, 246 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 2001), nn. 298–99

Marion v. Radtke, No. 07-cv-243-bbc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41031 (W.D. Wis. 

May 14, 2009), n. 303

Marshall, In re, 291 B.R. 855 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003), nn. 168–69

Marshall, In re, 721 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2013), n. 590

Martinez-Catala, In re, 129 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 1997), nn. 89, 150, 537, 544, 552, 560

Mason, In re, 916 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1990), nn. 73, 77

Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc., 787 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2015), nn. 72, 153

McCarthy, In re, 368 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2004), nn. 555, 581

McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1983), nn. 402–04, 

464–65

Medlock, In re, 406 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 2005), n. 537

Milwaukee, City of, In re, 788 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2015), n. 164

Mims v. Shapp, 541 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1976), nn. 549–50

Mischler v. Bevin, 887 F.3d 271 (6th Cir. 2018), n. 581

Moody, In re, 755 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2014), nn. 104, 578
Judicial Disqualification

128 Federal Judicial Center

Moody v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1988), nn. 461–62

Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 2002), nn. 604–05

Moran v. Dillingham, 174 U.S. 153 (1899), n. 569

Morrison v. United States, 432 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1970), n. 509

Murchison, In re, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), n. 27

Murray v. Scott, 253 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001), nn. 345–46

Mustang Marketing, Inc. v. Chevron Products Co., 406 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2005), 

nn. 648, 653

N

Nakell v. Attorney General of North Carolina, 15 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1994), n. 45

National Union Fire Insurance Co., In re, 839 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1988), n. 446

Nettles, In re, 394 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2005), n. 101

New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, In re, 620 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1980), 

n. 357

New York City Housing Development Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1986), 

n. 43

New York Life Insurance Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1996), nn. 492–94

Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995), nn. 42, 101

Nordbrock v. United States, 2 F. App’x 779 (9th Cir. 2001), n. 448

Norfolk, Town of, v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 968 F.2d 1438 

(1st Cir. 1992), nn. 211–12

O

Ocasio v. Fashion Institute of Technology, 9 F. App’x 66 (2d Cir. 2001), n. 296

O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2001), nn. 73, 77

Oriental Financial Group, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 176 

(D.P.R. 2006), nn. 392–94

Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1991), n. 606

P

Panzardi-Alvarez v. United States, 879 F.2d 975 (1st Cir. 1989), n. 220

Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1988), nn. 39, 131–32, 609
Alphabetical Table of Cases

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Parliament Insurance Co. v. Hanson, 676 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1982), n. 312

Pashaian v. Eccelston Properties, Ltd., 88 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996), nn. 62–63, 

414–15, 475–77

Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2003), nn. 146, 491

Pearson v. Prison Health Service, 850 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 2017), n. 10

Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillan, 764 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1985), nn. 141–43

Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1990), nn. 436–38

Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), n. 109

Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2008), nn. 517, 527

Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1989), nn. 447, 609

Pontarelli v. Stone, 978 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1992), nn. 446, 634–36

Potashnick v. Port City Construction Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980), nn. 412–13

Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1991), nn. 451, 490

Price Brothers v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1980), 

nn. 58–59, 215

R

Rabushka v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 1997), n. 449

Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1999), nn. 217–18

Republic of Panama v. American Tobacco Co., 217 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2000), n. 42

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), n. 232

Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 228 U.S. 339 (1913), nn. 570–71

Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Federation, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 

1994), n. 633

Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1991), n. 529

Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1978), n. 641

Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1980), nn. 94–95, 509

Robinson v. Boeing Co., 79 F.3d 1053 (11th Cir. 1996), nn. 400–01

Rogers, In re, 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976), nn. 332–33

Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), nn. 545–46

Rupert v. Ford Motor Co., 640 F. App’x 205 (3d Cir. 2016), nn. 327–28

Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989), nn. 88, 566–67, 641
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130 Federal Judicial Center

S

Sac & Fox Nation v. Cuomo, 193 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 1999), n. 591

São Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil v. American Tobacco Co., 535 

U.S. 229 (2002), nn. 86–87

SCA Services, Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1977), n. 579

Scenic Holding, LLC v. New Board of Trustees of the Tabernacle Missionary 

Baptist Church, Inc., 506 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 2007), n. 584

School Asbestos Litigation, In re, 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992), nn. 39, 61, 270–73, 

505–06, 579–80

Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1992), n. 458

Scott v. Metropolitan Health Corp., 234 F. App’x 341 (6th Cir. 2007), n. 513

SEC v. Loving Spirit Foundation Inc., 392 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2004), nn. 594–95

SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14 (2d Cir. 2013), n. 68

Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2004), nn. 359, 418–19

Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012), n. 490

Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1987), nn. 649–50

Solomon v. United States, 467 F.3d 928 (6th Cir. 2007), n. 654

Souder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 939 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1991), 

nn. 529–30, 532, 544

Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 

nn. 592–93

Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 1998), n. 411

Starr, In re, 152 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 1998), n. 633

Steward, In re, 828 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 2016), n. 164

Stringer v. United States, 233 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1956), nn. 461, 469

Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 1998), nn. 288–90, 533–35

Summers v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 1997), n. 447

Suson v. Zenith Radio Corp., 763 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1985), n. 45

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 431 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1970), 

nn. 568–69

T

Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8 (2d Cir. 1999), n. 49

Tezak v. United States, 256 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2001), n. 591
Alphabetical Table of Cases

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Trammel v. Simmons First Bank of Searcy, 345 F.3d 611 (8th Cir. 2003), n. 153

Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025 (5th Cir. 1998), nn. 363, 642–43

Travelers Insurance Co. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., 38 F.3d 1404 (5th Cir. 1994), 

n. 446

Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999), n. 641

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), nn. 17, 27, 495, 500

U

Union Leader Corp., In re, 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1961), nn. 562–63

United States, In re, 666 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1981), n. 68

United States, In re, 158 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1998), nn. 42, 457, 585–87

United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1981), n. 221

United States v. Ahmed, 980 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1992), n. 633

United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987), nn. 319–20, 556

United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007), n. 296

United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 2007), nn. 452, 486

United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1995), nn. 188–92

United States v. Apple Inc., 787 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2015), n. 590

United States v. Arache, 946 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1991), n. 606

United States v. Aragon, No. 99-50341, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15423 (9th Cir. 

June 29, 2000), n. 372

United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1999), nn. 358–60

United States v. Arnpriester, 37 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 1994), nn. 339–40

United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985), nn. 294–95, 458, 509, 

588, 591

United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1990), nn. 446, 509

United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1997), nn. 60, 446, 449

United States v. Barry, 938 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1991), nn. 178–80

United States v. Barry, 961 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1992), nn. 267–68

United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000), nn. 71, 80–81, 277, 455

United States v. Beale, 574 F.3d 512 (8th Cir. 2009), n. 282

United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2012), nn. 197–99

United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384 (3d Cir. 1994), n. 277

United States v. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2017), n. 541
Judicial Disqualification

132 Federal Judicial Center

United States v. Bobo, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2004), n. 115

United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 505 (D. Del. 1981), n. 540

United States v. Boyd, 208 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2000), n. 588

United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1976), n. 553

United States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633 (2d Cir. 1995), n. 638

United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1992), nn. 558–59

United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1990), nn. 637–38

United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993), nn. 39, 236–40

United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2015), nn. 287, 590

United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1993), n. 42

United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1976), n. 553

United States v. Dehghani, 550 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2008), n. 281

United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1985), n. 338

United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 1998), nn. 68, 72, 76, 334–35

United States v. Edwards, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964), nn. 22–23

United States v. Eyerman, 660 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), n. 433

United States v. Farkas, 669 F. App’x 122 (4th Cir. 2016), n. 513

United States v. Farrington, 27 F. App’x 640 (7th Cir. 2001), n. 588

United States v. Feldman, 983 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1992), nn. 468–70

United States v. Franco-Guillen, 196 F. App’x 716 (10th Cir. 2006), nn. 193–96

United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1989), nn. 223–24

United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1988), n. 639

United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997), n. 606

United States v. Greenspan, 26 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 1994), nn. 284–87

United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 1996), n. 301

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), nn. 155–57, 201

United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1977), n. 278

United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981), n. 457

United States v. Hoctel, 154 F.3d 506 (5th Cir. 1998), nn. 639–40

United States v. Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1967), n. 509

United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1981), n. 229

United States v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313 (7th Cir. 1996), n. 588

United States v. Hudson, 685 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2012), n. 565

United States v. Iddeen, 854 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1988), n. 538
Alphabetical Table of Cases

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United States v. Jackson, 430 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1970), n. 324

United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1988), n. 530

United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2005), n. 296

United States v. Johnson, 827 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2016), n. 590

United States v. Jones, 294 F. App’x 624 (2d Cir. 2008), n. 527

United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995), nn. 75, 77, 99–100, 617–18

United States v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884 (1st Cir. 1983), n. 296

United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989), nn. 42, 63, 120–22, 439–40

United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269 (10th Cir. 1995), n. 177

United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1998), n. 633

United States v. Lanza-Vázquez, 799 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2015), n. 309

United States v. Lauersen, 348 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2003), nn. 378–79, 478–80

United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1992), n. 90

United States v. Lyons, 472 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2007), n. 654 

United States v. Malinsky, 153 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), n. 20

United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2002), n. 182

United States v. Martinez, 446 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2006), n. 154

United States v. McChesney, 871 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2017), n. 164

United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986), n. 509

United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft I), 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995), 

nn. 213–14, 322–23, 661

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), nn. 8, 213, 249–58, 

447, 596–97, 674, 675

United States v. Miller, 355 F. Supp. 2d 404 (D.D.C. 2005), nn. 528, 557

United States v. Minard, 856 F.3d 555 (8th Cir. 2017), n. 177

United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1992), nn. 102, 463

United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1998), nn. 91, 424–25

United States v. Morrison, 833 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2016), n. 590

United States v. Morrow, 717 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1983), nn. 574–75

United States v. Mosby, 177 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 1999), n. 280

United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985), nn. 123–25, 445

United States v. Nelson, 922 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1990), n. 68

United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1982), n. 435

United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. 1997), nn. 471–74
Judicial Disqualification

134 Federal Judicial Center

United States v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1990), nn. 290, 449

United States v. Parker, 742 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1984), n. 60

United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2000), nn. 177, 606

United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2015), n. 590

United States v. Pitera, 5 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 1993), nn. 264–66

United States v. Pulido, 566 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2009), nn. 177, 209–10

United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1989), nn. 544, 547

United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1976), nn. 126–27, 530

United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977), n. 654

United States v. Robinson, 439 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2006), nn. 422–23, 491

United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377 (9th Cir. 1997), nn. 370–73, 435, 449

United States v. Ruzzano, 247 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2001), nn. 347–49, 588

United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1999), n. 536

United States v. Sciarra, 851 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1988), nn. 64–67

United States v. Scrushy, 721 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2013), nn. 68, 71

United States v. Silver, 245 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2001), nn. 341–44

United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2000), nn. 628–29, 631

United States v. Spiker, 649 F. App’x 770 (11th Cir. 2016), n. 103

United States v. Stenzel, 49 F.3d 658 (10th Cir. 1995), n. 449

United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1983), n. 553

United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1986), nn. 68, 278

United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331 (7th Cir. 1993), nn. 529–32, 544, 554, 564

United States v. Toohey, 448 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2006), n. 96

United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1989), n. 661

United States v. Torres-Estrada, 817 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2016), n. 590

United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir. 1996), nn. 447, 668–73

United States v. Vadner, 160 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1998), n. 449

United States v. Van Griffin, 874 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1989), n. 489

United States v. White, 582 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2009), n. 306

United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1976), n. 278

Unites States v. Whitman, 209 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000), nn. 186–87

United States v. Wilkerson, 208 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2000), nn. 183–84

United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), nn. 47–48, 460

United States ex rel. Wilson v. Coughlin, 472 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1973), n. 509
Alphabetical Table of Cases

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United States v. Young, 907 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1990), n. 541

United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir. 1995), nn. 181–82

United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003), n. 282

V

Vazquez-Botet, In re, 464 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2006), nn. 578, 583

Vieux Carre Property Owners v. Brown, 948 F.2d 1436 (5th Cir. 1991), n. 68

Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013), 

n. 648

Virginia Electric & Power Co., In re, 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976), nn. 354, 364–66, 

577, 632

Vuitton et Fils v. J. Young, 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981), n. 652

W

Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), n. 2

Weatherhead v. Globe International, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226 (10th Cir. 1987), 

nn. 544, 558–59

Weddington v. Zatecky, 721 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2013), n. 569

West v. Litscher, 209 F. App’x 557 (7th Cir. 2006), n. 513

Wilborn, In re, 401 B.R. 848 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009), n. 268

Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016), nn. 499, 613–14

Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001), n. 49

Wilson v. City of Chicago, 710 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1989), n. 538

Wireless Telephone Radio Frequency Emissions Products Liability Litigation, 

In re, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (J.P.M.L. 2001), n. 50

Y

Young v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2003), n. 528

Yunik, In re, 425 F. App’x 112 (3d Cir. 2011), n. 513

Z

Zaleski v. Burns, 606 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2010), n. 54

fjc.dcn • fjc.gov 137

Table of Cases by Court

Supreme Court

Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), nn. 16, 520–21, 542–43

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), nn. 4, 30–32, 496–98

Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 

(2004), nn. 44, 69, 70, 82–83, 113–14

Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Co. v. International Curtiss Marine 

Turbine Co., 228 U.S. 645 (1913), nn. 572–73

Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), n. 46

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013), n. 109

Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984), nn. 545–46

Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972), n. 24

Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988), nn. 36–37, 74, 

84–85, 481–85, 607–10

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), nn. 38, 158–63, 185, 200, 202–06, 

233–34, 300, 310, 511–12, 514–16, 518–19, 522–26, 644–45

Moran v. Dillingham, 174 U.S. 153 (1899), n. 569

Murchison, In re, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), n. 27

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), n. 232

Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 228 U.S. 339 (1913), nn. 570–71

São Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil v. American Tobacco Co., 535 

U.S. 229 (2002), nn. 86–87

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), nn. 17, 27, 495, 500

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), nn. 155–57, 201

United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), nn. 47–48, 460

Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), n. 2

Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016), nn. 499, 613–14
Judicial Disqualification

138 Federal Judicial Center

Courts of Appeals

First Circuit

Allied-Signal Inc., In re, 891 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1989), nn. 34, 78, 619–23

Boston’s Children First, In re, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001), nn. 241–47, 585

Brody v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 664 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1981), n. 45

Candelario Del Moral v. UBS Financial Services Inc. of Puerto Rico, 699 F.3d 93 

(1st Cir. 2012), n. 648

Cargill, Inc., In re, 66 F.3d 1256 (1st Cir. 1995), nn. 133–34, 435

Cooper & Lynn, In re, 821 F.2d 833 (1st Cir. 1987), nn. 509, 529

El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. The M/Y Johanny, 36 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 1994), nn. 461, 

466–67

FDIC v. Sweeney, 136 F.3d 216 (1st Cir. 1998), n. 276

Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967), n. 219

Hull v. Municipality of San Juan, 356 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2004), n. 651

Martinez-Catala, In re, 129 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 1997), nn. 89, 150, 537, 544, 552, 560

Norfolk, Town of, v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 968 F.2d 1438 

(1st Cir. 1992), nn. 211–12

Panzardi-Alvarez v. United States, 879 F.2d 975 (1st Cir. 1989), n. 220

Pontarelli v. Stone, 978 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1992), nn. 446, 634–36

Union Leader Corp., In re, 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1961), nn. 562–63

United States, In re, 158 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1998), nn. 42, 457, 585–87

United States, In re, 666 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1981), n. 68

United States v. Arache, 946 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1991), n. 606

United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1990), nn. 637–38

United States v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884 (1st Cir. 1983), n. 296

United States v. Lanza-Vázquez, 799 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2015), n. 309

United States v. Pulido, 566 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2009), nn. 177, 209–10

United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2000), nn. 628–29, 631

United States v. Torres-Estrada, 817 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2016), n. 590

Vazquez-Botet, In re, 464 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2006), nn. 578, 583

Second Circuit

Aguinda, In re, 241 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2001), nn. 274–75

Apple v. Jewish Hospital & Medical Center, 829 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1987), nn. 446, 452
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Basciano, In re, 542 F.3d 950 (2d Cir. 2008), nn. 578, 601

Certain Underwriter, In re, 294 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2002), nn. 380–81

Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co., 343 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2003), 

nn. 39, 387–88, 426–29

Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1998), n. 79

Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., In re, 861 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1988), n. 45

IBM Corp., In re, 45 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1995), n. 447

Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Maxus Energy Corp., 925 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1991), 

nn. 376–77

Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013), nn. 259–63

Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation, In re, 509 F.3d 136 

(2d Cir. 2007), nn. 382–84

LoCascio v. United States, 473 F.3d 493 (2d Cir. 2007), nn. 282, 316–17, 527

MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equipment Financing, Inc., 157 F.3d 956 (2d Cir. 

1998), nn. 110–11

Ocasio v. Fashion Institute of Technology, 9 F. App’x 66 (2d Cir. 2001), n. 296

Pashaian v. Eccelston Properties, Ltd., 88 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996), nn. 62–63, 

414–15, 475–77

SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14 (2d Cir. 2013), n. 68

Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8 (2d Cir. 1999), n. 49

United States v. Ahmed, 980 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1992), n. 633

United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 2007), nn. 452, 486

United States v. Apple Inc., 787 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2015), n. 590

United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1999), nn. 358–60

United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000), nn. 71, 80–81, 277, 455

United States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633 (2d Cir. 1995), n. 638

United States v. Jones, 294 F. App’x 624 (2d Cir. 2008), n. 527

United States v. Lauersen, 348 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2003), nn. 378–79, 478–80

United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1992), n. 90

United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1998), nn. 91, 424–25

United States v. Pitera, 5 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 1993), nn. 264–66

United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977), n. 654

United States v. Toohey, 448 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2006), n. 96

United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003), n. 282

Zaleski v. Burns, 606 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2010), n. 54
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140 Federal Judicial Center

Third Circuit

Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 1993), nn. 56–57, 228

Arrowpoint Capital Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Management, LLC, 793 F.3d 313 

(3d Cir. 2015), n. 648

Arunachalam, In re, 812 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2016), n. 577

Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 2006), n. 278

Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 1995), n. 68

Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 2004), n. 350

Community Bank of Northern Virginia, In re, 418 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2005), n. 296

Flegenheimer v. United States, 110 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1936), n. 564

Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992), nn. 661, 667

Jones v. Pittsburgh National Corp., 899 F.2d 1350 (3d Cir. 1990), n. 278

Kensington International, Ltd., In re, 368 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2004), nn. 216, 453

Mims v. Shapp, 541 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1976), nn. 549–50

Moody v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1988), nn. 461–62

Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1991), 

n. 606

Pearson v. Prison Health Service, 850 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 2017), n. 10

Rupert v. Ford Motor Co., 640 F. App’x 205 (3d Cir. 2016), nn. 327–28

School Asbestos Litigation, In re, 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992), nn. 39, 61, 270–73, 

505–06, 579–80

United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1995), nn. 188–92

United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2012), nn. 197–99

United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384 (3d Cir. 1994), n. 277

United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1976), n. 553

United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1989), nn. 223–24

United States v. Morrow, 717 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1983), nn. 574–75

United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1982), n. 435

United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1989), nn. 544, 547

United States v. Sciarra, 851 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1988), nn. 64–67

Yunik, In re, 425 F. App’x 112 (3d Cir. 2011), n. 513
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Fourth Circuit

Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983), n. 461

Beard, In re, 811 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1987), n. 530

Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567 (4th Cir. 2011), n. 296

Briggs, In re, No. 00-1434, 2000 WL 961881 (4th Cir. July 12, 2000), n. 578

Central Telephone Co. of Virginia v. Sprint Communications Co. of Virginia, 715 

F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2013), n. 590

Hathcock v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 53 F.3d 36 (4th Cir. 

1995), n. 230

Lewin v. Cooke, 28 F. App’x 186 (4th Cir. 2002), nn. 602–03

Nakell v. Attorney General of North Carolina, 15 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1994), n. 45

Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1978), n. 641

Rogers, In re, 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976), nn. 332–33

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 431 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1970), 

nn. 568–69

United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 1998), nn. 68, 72, 76, 334–35

United States v. Farkas, 669 F. App’x 122 (4th Cir. 2016), n. 513

United States v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1990), nn. 290, 449

United States v. Parker, 742 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1984), n. 60

Virginia Electric & Power Co., In re, 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976), nn. 354, 

364–66, 577, 632

Fifth Circuit

Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2003), nn. 297, 304–06

Cameron International Corp., In re, 393 F. App’x 133 (5th Cir. 2010), n. 578

Chevron U.S.A., In re, 121 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 1997), nn. 174–76

Chitimacha Tribe v. Laws, 690 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1982), n. 553

Continental Airlines, In re, 981 F.2d 1450 (5th Cir. 1993), n. 140

Continental Airlines Corp., In re, 901 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1990), nn. 136–40, 

488–89

DaimlerChrysler Corp., In re, 294 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2002), n. 660

Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975), n. 530

Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 1996), nn. 461, 615–16

Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979), n. 49

Faulkner, In re, 856 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1998), nn. 75, 97–98, 318
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142 Federal Judicial Center

Haase v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 838 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2016), n. 54

Hall v. Small Business Administration, 695 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983), n. 441

Henderson v. Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 901 F.2d 1288 (5th Cir. 

1990), nn. 5, 530, 544, 556

IQ Products Co. v. Pennzoil Products Co., 305 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2002), nn. 416–17

Johnson, In re, 921 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1991), nn. 225–27

Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1997), n. 648

McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1983), nn. 402–04, 

464–65

Morrison v. United States, 432 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1970), n. 509

New York Life Insurance Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1996), nn. 492–94

Parliament Insurance Co. v. Hanson, 676 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1982), n. 312

Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2003), nn. 146, 491

Potashnick v. Port City Construction Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980), nn. 412–13

Republic of Panama v. American Tobacco Co., 217 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2000), n. 42

Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2004), nn. 359, 418–19

Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025 (5th Cir. 1998), nn. 363, 642–43

Travelers Insurance Co. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., 38 F.3d 1404 (5th Cir. 1994), 

n. 446

Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999), n. 641

United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1981), n. 221

United States v. Edwards, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964), nn. 22–23

United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997), n. 606

United States v. Hoctel, 154 F.3d 506 (5th Cir. 1998), nn. 639–40

United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1981), n. 229

United States v. Iddeen, 854 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1988), n. 538

United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995), nn. 75, 77, 99–100, 617–18

United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986), n. 509

United States v. Morrison, 833 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2016), n. 590

United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. 1997), nn. 471–74

United States v. Vadner, 160 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1998), n. 449

Vieux Carre Property Owners v. Brown, 948 F.2d 1436 (5th Cir. 1991), n. 68
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Sixth Circuit

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., In re, 919 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1990), nn. 385–86, 

397–99, 463, 503–04, 578

Albert v. United States District Court, 283 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1960), n. 544

American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 190 F.3d 729 

(6th Cir. 1999), nn. 430–33

Barksdale v. Emerick, 853 F.2d 1359 (6th Cir. 1988), nn. 442–45

Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2016), n. 309

Decker v. GE Healthcare Inc., 770 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2014), n. 590

Dixon v. Clem, 492 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2007), n. 599

Easley v. University of Michigan Board of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351 (6th Cir. 1988), 

nn. 45, 541

Easley v. University of Michigan Board of Regents, 906 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1990), 

n. 321

Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board, 479 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1973), n. 632

Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1991), n. 633

Mischler v. Bevin, 887 F.3d 271 (6th Cir. 2018), n. 581

Price Brothers v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1980), 

nn. 58–59, 215

Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1999), nn. 217–18

Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Federation, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 

1994), n. 633

Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1991), n. 529

Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1980), nn. 94–95, 509

Scott v. Metropolitan Health Corp., 234 F. App’x 341 (6th Cir. 2007), n. 513

Solomon v. United States, 467 F.3d 928 (6th Cir. 2007), n. 654

United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1993), n. 42

United States v. Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1967), n. 509

United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2005), n. 296

United States v. Nelson, 922 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1990), n. 68

United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1999), n. 536

United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1983), n. 553

United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1976), n. 278

Unites States v. Whitman, 209 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000), nn. 186–87
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144 Federal Judicial Center

Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013), 

n. 648

Young v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2003), n. 528

Seventh Circuit

Alexander v. Chicago Park District, 709 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1983), nn. 582, 584

Bartley v. United States, 123 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1997), n. 49

Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000), nn. 302, 556

Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2009), n. 296

Edgar v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996), nn. 216, 325–26

Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2016), nn. 347, 589

Frey v. EPA, 751 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2014), nn. 207–08

Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 299 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2002), 

nn. 307–09

Hampton v. City of Chicago, 643 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1981), nn. 624–25

Hatcher, In re, 150 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1998), nn. 68, 147–49, 329–30, 395–96, 

578, 588

Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2004), nn. 551, 599

Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 1996), nn. 230–31, 293, 296, 301

Huntington Commons Associates, In re, 21 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1994), nn. 165–67

Mann, In re, 229 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2000), nn. 170–73

Mason, In re, 916 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1990), nn. 73, 77

Milwaukee, City of, In re, 788 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2015), n. 164

National Union Fire Insurance Co., In re, 839 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1988), n. 446

Nettles, In re, 394 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2005), n. 101

New York City Housing Development Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1986), 

n. 43

O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2001), nn. 73, 77

Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillan, 764 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1985), nn. 141–43

Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989), nn. 88, 566–67, 641

SCA Services, Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1977), n. 579

Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1992), n. 458

Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 1998), nn. 288–90, 533–35

Suson v. Zenith Radio Corp., 763 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1985), n. 45

Tezak v. United States, 256 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2001), n. 591
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United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985), nn. 294–95, 458, 509, 

588, 591

United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1990), nn. 446, 509

United States v. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2017), n. 541

United States v. Boyd, 208 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2000), n. 588

United States v. Farrington, 27 F. App’x 640 (7th Cir. 2001), n. 588

United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 1996), n. 301

United States v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313 (7th Cir. 1996), n. 588

United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1998), n. 633

United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985), nn. 123–25, 445

United States v. Ruzzano, 247 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2001), nn. 347–49, 588

United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331 (7th Cir. 1993), nn. 529–32, 544, 554, 564

United States v. White, 582 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2009), n. 306

United States ex rel. Wilson v. Coughlin, 472 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1973), n. 509

Weddington v. Zatecky, 721 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2013), n. 569

West v. Litscher, 209 F. App’x 557 (7th Cir. 2006), n. 513

Eighth Circuit

Akins v. Knight, 863 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2017), n. 277

Fletcher v. Conoco Pipe Line Co., 323 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2003), n. 116

Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984), nn. 311–12

Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1985), n. 296

Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966), n. 553

Kansas Public Employees Retirement System, In re, 85 F.3d 1353 (8th Cir. 1996), 

nn. 407–10, 447

Larson, In re, 43 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 1994), nn. 222, 581

Liddell v. Board of Education, 677 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1982), nn. 578, 626

Little Rock School District v. Arkansas, 902 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1990), n. 68

Little Rock School District v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2004), nn. 336–37

Mann v. Thalacker, 246 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 2001), nn. 298–99

Medlock, In re, 406 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 2005), n. 537

Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 2002), nn. 604–05

Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1990), nn. 436–38

Rabushka v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 1997), n. 449
Judicial Disqualification

146 Federal Judicial Center

Scenic Holding, LLC v. New Board of Trustees of the Tabernacle Missionary

Baptist Church, Inc., 506 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 2007), n. 584

Souder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 939 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1991), 

nn. 529–30, 532, 544

Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 1998), n. 411

Starr, In re, 152 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 1998), n. 633

Steward, In re, 828 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 2016), n. 164

Trammel v. Simmons First Bank of Searcy, 345 F.3d 611 (8th Cir. 2003), n. 153

United States v. Beale, 574 F.3d 512 (8th Cir. 2009), n. 282

United States v. Dehghani, 550 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2008), n. 281

United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1985), n. 338

United States v. Johnson, 827 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2016), n. 590

United States v. Martinez, 446 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2006), n. 154

United States v. Minard, 856 F.3d 555 (8th Cir. 2017), n. 177

United States v. Mosby, 177 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 1999), n. 280

United States v. Robinson, 439 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2006), nn. 422–23, 491

United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir. 1996), nn. 447, 668–73

United States v. Young, 907 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1990), n. 541

Ninth Circuit

Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Cincom Systems, Inc., Nos. 99-55111 & 55453, 2000 

U.S. App. LEXIS 18166 (9th Cir. July 25, 2000), nn. 655, 658–59

Cement Antitrust Litigation, In re, 673 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1982), nn. 463, 578, 

626–27

Clemens v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, 428 

F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2005), n. 103

Cordoza v. Pacific States Steel Corp., 320 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2003), n. 296

Curry v. Jensen, 523 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1975), n. 553

DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage, 974 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1992), n. 279

E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1992), n. 88

First Interstate Bank of Arizona v. Murphy, Weir & Butler, 210 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 

2000), n. 131

Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 2015), n. 54

Ignacio v. Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 453 

F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2006), nn. 51–55
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Living Designs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 431 F.3d 353 (9th Cir. 2005), 

nn. 655–57

Marshall, In re, 721 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2013), n. 590

Mustang Marketing, Inc. v. Chevron Products Co., 406 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2005), 

nn. 648, 653

Nordbrock v. United States, 2 F. App’x 779 (9th Cir. 2001), n. 448

Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), n. 109

Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2008), nn. 517, 527

Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1991), nn. 451, 490

Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), nn. 545–46

Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1987), nn. 649–50

Stringer v. United States, 233 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1956), nn. 461, 469

United States v. Aragon, No. 99-50341, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15423 (9th Cir. 

June 29, 2000), n. 372

United States v. Arnpriester, 37 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 1994), nn. 339–40

United States v. Feldman, 983 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1992), nn. 468–70

United States v. Jackson, 430 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1970), n. 324

United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1988), n. 530

United States v. Lyons, 472 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2007), n. 654 

United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2002), n. 182

United States v. McChesney, 871 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2017), n. 164

United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377 (9th Cir. 1997), nn. 370–73, 435, 449

United States v. Silver, 245 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2001), nn. 341–44

United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1986), nn. 68, 278

United States v. Van Griffin, 874 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1989), n. 489

United States v. Wilkerson, 208 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2000), nn. 183–84

Vuitton et Fils v. J. Young, 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981), n. 652

Tenth Circuit

American Ready Mix, Inc., In re, 14 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1994), n. 296

Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2006), n. 317

Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 

2002), nn. 105–06

Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1992), n. 541

Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994), nn. 390–91, 491, 609, 611–12
Judicial Disqualification

148 Federal Judicial Center

Higganbotham v. Oklahoma, 328 F.3d 638 (10th Cir. 2003), nn. 107–08, 420–21

Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1987), nn. 45, 68, 578

Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc., 787 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2015), nn. 72, 153

McCarthy, In re, 368 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2004), nn. 555, 581

New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, In re, 620 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1980), 

n. 357

Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995), nn. 42, 101

Sac & Fox Nation v. Cuomo, 193 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 1999), n. 591

United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1976), n. 553

United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1992), nn. 558–59

United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993), nn. 39, 236–40

United States v. Franco-Guillen, 196 F. App’x 716 (10th Cir. 2006), nn. 193–96

United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1988), n. 639

United States v. Greenspan, 26 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 1994), nn. 284–87

United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1977), n. 278

United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269 (10th Cir. 1995), n. 177

United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2000), nn. 177, 606

United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1976), nn. 126–27, 530

United States v. Stenzel, 49 F.3d 658 (10th Cir. 1995), n. 449

United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir. 1995), nn. 181–82

Weatherhead v. Globe International, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226 (10th Cir. 1987), nn. 544, 

558–59

Eleventh Circuit

Alloco v. City of Coral Gables, 159 F. App’x 921 (11th Cir. 2005), nn. 598–600

Bush, In re, 232 F. App’x 852 (11th Cir. 2007), n. 278

Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 2001), nn. 151–53

Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2000), nn. 513, 527

Curves, LLC v. Spalding County, 685 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2012), n. 92

Jefferson County v. Acker, 92 F.3d 1561 (11th Cir. 1996), nn. 49, 355–56

Moody, In re, 755 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2014), nn. 104, 578

Murray v. Scott, 253 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001), nn. 345–46

Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1988), nn. 39, 131–32, 609

Robinson v. Boeing Co., 79 F.3d 1053 (11th Cir. 1996), nn. 400–01
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Summers v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 1997), n. 447

United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987), nn. 319–20, 556

United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007), n. 296

United States v. Hudson, 685 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2012), n. 565

United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989), nn. 42, 63, 120–22, 439–40

United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1992), nn. 102, 463

United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2015), n. 590

United States v. Scrushy, 721 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2013), nn. 68, 71

United States v. Spiker, 649 F. App’x 770 (11th Cir. 2016), n. 103

United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1989), n. 661

District of Columbia Circuit

Armenian Assembly of America, Inc. v. Cafesjian, 758 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2014), 

n. 93

Barry, In re, 946 F.2d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1991), nn. 68, 296, 578

Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad, 380 F.2d 

570 (D.C. Cir. 1967), n. 564

Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006), nn. 647, 662–67

Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, In re, 866 F.3d 473 (D.C. Cir. 2017), nn. 501–02

SEC v. Loving Spirit Foundation Inc., 392 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2004), nn. 594–95

Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 

nn. 592–93

United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1997), nn. 60, 446, 449

United States v. Barry, 938 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1991), nn. 178–80

United States v. Barry, 961 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1992), nn. 267–68

United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2015), nn. 287, 590

United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981), n. 457

United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft I), 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995), 

nn. 213–14, 322–23, 661

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), nn. 8, 213, 249–58, 

447, 596–97, 674, 675
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150 Federal Judicial Center

Federal Circuit

Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. FrankSu Enterprise Corp., 78 F.3d 550 (Fed. Cir. 1996), 

n. 68

Beyond Innovation Technology Co., In re, 166 F. App’x 490 (Fed. Cir. 2006), 

nn. 117–19, 578

Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2016), n. 296

Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1989), nn. 447, 609

Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012), n. 490

Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001), n. 49

District Courts

Alabama

Drake v. Birmingham Board of Education, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (N.D. Ala. 2007), 

n. 453

United States v. Bobo, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2004), n. 115

California

Gordon v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Cal. 2001), nn. 366, 375

Delaware

United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 505 (D. Del. 1981), n. 540

District of Columbia

Doe v. Cabrera, 134 F. Supp. 3d 439 (D.D.C. 2015), n. 154

United States v. Miller, 355 F. Supp. 2d 404 (D.D.C. 2005), nn. 528, 557

Illinois

Cohee v. McDade, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (S.D. Ill. 2006), n. 459

Wilson v. City of Chicago, 710 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1989), n. 538

Louisiana

Berthelot v. Boh Brothers Construction Co., 431 F. Supp. 2d 639 (E.D. La. 2006), 

nn. 367–69
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Danielson v. Winnfield Funeral Home of Jefferson, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. 

La. 1986), n. 539

New Jersey

Dembowski v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 504 

(D.N.J. 2002), nn. 313–15

New York

Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), n. 112

Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, In re, 174 F. Supp. 2d 61 (S.D.N.Y. 

2001), n. 433

Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, In re, 174 F. Supp. 2d 70 (S.D.N.Y. 

2001), n. 375

United States v. Eyerman, 660 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), n. 433

United States v. Malinsky, 153 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), n. 20

Pennsylvania

Bumpus v. Uniroyal Tire Co. Division of Uniroyal, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 

1974), n. 538

Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 480 (W.D. 

Pa. 1998), n. 375

Puerto Rico

El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. The M/Y Johanny, 954 F. Supp. 23 (D.P.R. 1996), n. 487

Oriental Financial Group, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 176 

(D.P.R. 2006), nn. 392–94

Wisconsin

Marion v. Radtke, No. 07-cv-243-bbc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41031 (W.D. Wis. 

May 14, 2009), n. 303

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

Wireless Telephone Radio Frequency Emissions Products Liability Litigation, 

In re, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (J.P.M.L. 2001), n. 50
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152 Federal Judicial Center

Bankruptcy Courts

Marshall, In re, 291 B.R. 855 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003), nn. 168–69

Wilborn, In re, 401 B.R. 848 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009), n. 268

State Courts

Anderson v. United States, 754 A.2d 920 (D.C. Ct. App. 2000), n. 143
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About the Author

Charles Gardner Geyh is a distinguished professor and the John F. Kimberling 

Professor of Law at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law. His work on 

judicial independence, accountability, selection, administration, procedure, and 

ethics has appeared in over eighty books, articles, book chapters, reports, and 

other publications. Before entering the academy in 1991, he clerked for Thomas 

A. Clark on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, worked as an associate at the Washington D.C. firm of Covington & Burling, and served as counsel 

to the House Judiciary Committee. He joined the Indiana University faculty in 

1998, where he has served as the law school’s associate dean for research, and has 

received three faculty fellowships, three Trustees teaching awards, the Wallace 

teaching award, and a Carnegie Fellowship.
The Federal Judicial Center

Board

The Chief Justice of the United States, Chair

Judge Carol Bagley Amon, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York 

Judge Duane Benton, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Chief Bankruptcy Judge Mildred Cabán, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico

Judge Nancy D. Freudenthal, U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming 

Judge Thomas M. Hardiman, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Judge Raymond A. Jackson, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

Magistrate Judge Anthony E. Porcelli, U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida

Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf, Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

Director

John S. Cooke

Deputy Director

Clara J. Altman

About the Federal Judicial Center

The Federal Judicial Center is the research and education agency of the federal judicial 

system. It was established by Congress in 1967 (28 U.S.C. §§ 620–629), on the recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 

By statute, the Chief Justice of the United States chairs the Center’s Board, which 

also includes the director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and seven judges 

elected by the Judicial Conference. 

The organization of the Center reflects its primary statutory mandates. The Education 

Division plans and produces education and training for judges and court staff, including 

in-person and virtual programs, videos and podcasts, publications, curriculum packages 

for in-district training, and web-based resources. The Research Division examines and 

evaluates current and alternative federal court practices and policies. This research assists 

Judicial Conference committees, who request most Center research, in developing policy 

recommendations. The Center’s research also contributes substantially to its educational 

programs. The Federal Judicial History Office helps courts and others study and preserve 

federal judicial history. The International Judicial Relations Office provides information 

to judicial and legal officials from foreign countries and informs federal judicial personnel 

of developments in international law and other court systems that may affect their work. 

Two units of the Director’s Office—the Information Technology Office and the Editorial & 

Information Services Office—support Center missions through technology, editorial and 

design assistance, and organization and dissemination of Center resources.

Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law outlines the 

statutory framework of federal judicial disqualification law under 

statutes 28 U.S.C. §§ 455, 144, 47, and 2106. The monograph 

revises and expands on the previous edition, and analyzes 

the case law, with a focus both on substantive disqualification 

standards and procedural requirements.

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Washington, DC 20002-8003

fjc.dcn • fjc.gov